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Sample records for nuclear materials, convention on physical protection

  1. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is composed of the text of 23 articles, annex 1 showing the levels of physical protection and annex 2 which is the categorization list of nuclear material. The text consists of definitions (article 1), the scope of applications (2), liability of protecting nuclear material during international transport (3 and 4), duty of mutual cooperation (5 and 6), responsibility for criminal punishment (7 to 13), and final provisions (14 to 23). It is to be noted that the nuclear material for military purposes and domestic nuclear facilities are excluded in the connection. After the brief description of the course leading to the establishment of the convention, individual articles and annexes and the respective Japanese version, and the explanation based on the intergovernmental meeting discussion on the draft convention are described. (J.P.N.)

  2. Preliminary assessment on the differences of nuclear terrorism convention from the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material and amendment to the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Midiana Ariethia; Muhamad Ilman A A; Mas Pungky Hendrawijaya

    2011-01-01

    The threat of acts of nuclear terrorism in all its forms and manifestations create the urgent need to enhance international cooperation between countries in designing and following practical and effective measures for the prevention of acts of terrorism and to counter and punish its offenders. Several United Nations Security Council Resolutions, such as UNSCR Number 1373 (2001), and UNSCR Number 1540 (2005), and the result of Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 that encourage the member countries of IAEA to ratify nuclear conventions as soon as possible, are the reasons that the Indonesian Government planning on ratifying The International Convention for The Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention). Nuclear Terrorism Convention is one of the 16 (sixteen) international instruments that must be ratified by the member countries of IAEA. Of the 16 (sixteen) international instruments, 3 (three) conventions are related to nuclear; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, dan Nuclear Terrorism Convention. This paper presents the preliminary assessment on the differences of Nuclear Terrorism Convention to The Convention on The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Amendment to The Convention on The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This assessment is important due to the plan of the Indonesian Government to ratify the Nuclear Terrorism Convention. The result of this assessment could be used by BAPETEN in the ratification process of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention. The method used in this assessment is references assessment. (author)

  3. The convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-05-01

    This document contains the full text of a convention to facilitate the safe transfer of nuclear material, and to insure the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport. Two annexes are included, which establish categories of nuclear materials and levels of physical protection to be applied in international transport

  4. Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    The document presents the original draft for a Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, full reports of all the discussions held by representatives of Member States at meetings called by the IAEA, texts of written comments provided by Member States and the final agreed text of the Convention, list of original signatory States and status of the list of signatory States at the date of publication

  5. Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-09-01

    The document refers to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (IAEA-INFCIRC-274). Part I contains the status list as of September 6, 1991; Part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon expressing consent to be bound; Part III contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  6. Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-08-01

    The document refers to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274). Part I contains reservations/declarations made upon or following signature and Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument of consent to be bound. The status of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States or organizations as of 31 July 1990 is presented in an attachment

  7. Convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The document refers to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (IAEA-INFCIRC-274), including in Part I the status list of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession by States or organizations as of 31 December 1996, in Part II the texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following expressing consent to be bound, and in Part III the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  8. Text of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-11-01

    The Final Act of the Meeting of Governmental Representatives to Consider the Drafting of a Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was signed on 26 October 1979. According to paragraph 11 of the Final Act, ''The Meeting recommended that the text of the Convention be transmitted for information to the Twenty-Third General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.''

  9. The physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-12-01

    A Technical Committee on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material met in April-May 1989 to advise on the need to update the recommendations contained in document INFCIRC/225/Rev.1 and on any changes considered to be necessary. The Technical Committee indicated a number of such changes, reflecting mainly: the international consensus established in respect of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the experience gained since 1977; and a wish to give equal treatment to protection against the theft of nuclear material and protection against the sabotage of nuclear facilities. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. 1 tab

  10. Criminal offences considered in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neira, C.C.

    1996-01-01

    The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was signed in Vienna, on April 3, 1980, approved by Law 23.620 on September 28, 1998, and published in the Official Bulletin of the Argentine Republic on November 2, 1988. This Convention considers some aspects of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedural Law and integrates the normative hierarchical structure of the article 31 of the National Constitution. The adequacy of this Convention to the Argentine law is considered through two aspects: The first one examines figures existing in the Argentine Legislation about larceny and robbery of nuclear materials, misappropriation of nuclear materials, obtainment and fraud of nuclear materials, exaction through threat or intimidation, etc., which are considered in different articles of the Argentine Criminal Law. The second one analyses behaviours not foreseen in the Criminal Law and which are not qualified by the current Argentina's Criminal Code, such as exaction of nuclear material through the use of violence, the international perpetration of an act consisting to receive, possess, use, vacate, scatter nuclear material without legal authorization, or in the case that the act causes death, serious injuries to persons and others. The purpose of the future enactment of a new Nuclear Law is to put in order and fill-in gaps referred to different aspects such as civil liability in nuclear damages, characteristics of the nuclear damages, etc [es

  11. Announcement concerning the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material of March 3, 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    The State Council of the German Democratic Republic ratified the convention on physical protection of nuclear material which was signed on 21 May 1980 and deposited with the Director General on 5 February 1981. The convention entered into force in accordance with its article 19 on 8 February 1987. The German and English texts of this convention are presented

  12. Bill project authorizing the approval of the amendment to the convention on physical protection of nuclear material - Nr 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayrault, Jean-Marc; Fabius, Laurent

    2012-01-01

    This document contains the brief text of the bill project and the text of the amendment to the Convention on physical protection of nuclear material which has been adopted in Vienna in August 2005 to amend the Convention adopted in October 1979. This amendment introduces the following measures: extension of the scope of application of the Convention to nuclear materials used for peaceful purposes, definition of the objectives of the Convention, articulation of the Convention with other international instruments, definition of the main principles of physical protection, strengthened international cooperation, legal issues concerning extradition and legal cooperation

  13. Strengthening the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities Regime: A Path Forward

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pitts-Kiefer, S.; Nalabandian, M.

    2017-01-01

    With entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) on May 8, 2016, and the culmination of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities (CPP), as the amended convention is now known, can play an increasingly important role in efforts to strengthen the international nuclear security architecture. The CPP significantly enhances the international legal framework for nuclear security by expanding the scope of physical protection requirements and providing a direct linkage to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security guidance through incorporation of the Fundamental Principles.The CPP’s entry into force requires states parties to submit reports to the IAEA under Article 14 informing the IAEA of its laws and regulations giving effect to the convention—states parties were required to do so under the original CPPNM, but the scope of the reports will need to expand to reflect the expanded scope of the convention. Reporting builds confidence in the effectiveness of states’ security. In addition, entry into force of the CPP requires the IAEA, under Article 16, to convene a review conference in five years to assess the implementation and adequacy of the convention “in light of the then prevailing situation.” The review conference will provide an opportunity for states parties to assess the status of nuclear security progress and will provide a forum for dialogue on how to strengthen the global architecture and address remaining gaps in the system. Article 16 also provides for additional review conferences at periods of at least five years if requested by a majority of states parties. Regular review conferences would be an important mechanism for sustaining attention on nuclear security and ensuring continued nuclear security progress. For the CPP to fulfill its potential to play an important role in

  14. Diet discussion begins for signing convention on physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1988-01-01

    As a part of the amendment of the domestic laws required for signing the 'Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials', the government placed the bill for the partial amendment of the 'Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Materials, Nuclear Fuel Materials and Reactors' to the current session of the Diet, following the formal approval by the Cabinet on March 11. This bill provides for punishment in the case of endangering or threat related to the handling and use of nuclear materials. The Atomic Energy Commission proposed in December, last year the early signing of the Convention and the legislation on the antiterrorism and physical protection measures required for the signing. The amendment consists mainly of two parts: one stipulates the obligation for those who manage the handling of nuclear materials to take the proper measures for their physical protection, and the other stipulates the punishment of the crimes related to nuclear materials. Regarding the other amendment of the relevant domestic laws, the Criminal Law was partially amended in June, last year. The Aviation Act and the Ships Safety Act, both related to the transport of nuclear materials, will not be amended, but only the relevant Ministerial Ordinances will be revised. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials came into force in February, 1987, and consists of 23 articles. (Kako, I.)

  15. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-06-01

    The latest review (1993) of this document was of limited scope and resulted in changes to the text of INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 designed to make the categorization table in that document consistent with the categorization table contained in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Consequently, a comprehensive review of INFCIRC/225 has not been conducted since 1989. Consequently, a meeting of national experts was convened from 2-5 June 1998 and from 27-29 October 1998 for a thorough review of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. The revised document reflects the recommendations of the national experts to improve the structure and clarity of the document and to take account of improved technology and current international and national practices. In particular, a chapter has been added which provides specific recommendations related to sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. As a result of this addition, the title has been changed to 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities'. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States.

  16. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    The latest review (1993) of this document was of limited scope and resulted in changes to the text of INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 designed to make the categorization table in that document consistent with the categorization table contained in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Consequently, a comprehensive review of INFCIRC/225 has not been conducted since 1989. Consequently, a meeting of national experts was convened from 2-5 June 1998 and from 27-29 October 1998 for a thorough review of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. The revised document reflects the recommendations of the national experts to improve the structure and clarity of the document and to take account of improved technology and current international and national practices. In particular, a chapter has been added which provides specific recommendations related to sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. As a result of this addition, the title has been changed to 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities'. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States

  17. The physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Technical Committee met 21-25 June 1993 to consider changes to INFCIRC/225/Rev.2. The revised document, INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, reflects the Technical Committee recommendations for changes to the text as well as other modifications determined necessary to advance the consistency of the Categorization Table in INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 with the categorization table contained in The Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to reflect additional improvements presented by the experts. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States

  18. The physical protection of nuclear material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-09-01

    Technical Committee met 21-25 June 1993 to consider changes to INFCIRC/225/Rev.2. The revised document, INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, reflects the Technical Committee recommendations for changes to the text as well as other modifications determined necessary to advance the consistency of the Categorization Table in INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 with the categorization table contained in The Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to reflect additional improvements presented by the experts. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States.

  19. Bill project authorizing the approval of the amendment to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Juppe, Alain; Fillon, Francois

    2011-01-01

    This document deals with the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials which has been adopted in July 2005. This amendment notably extended the Convention's scope, objectives, relation with other international instruments and content (regarding cooperation, sanctions, and so on). After the text of this amendment, this document contains the bill project which reports an impact study (estimated economic, financial, environmental, and legal consequences of the amendment implementation), comments the penal and criminal cooperation defined in the Convention. A table indicates the impact of the amendment's articles on the French law

  20. National practices in physical protection of nuclear materials. Regulatory basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goltsov, V.Y.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The Federal law 'On The Use Of Atomic Energy' containing the section on physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities was issued in 1995 in Russian Federation. This document became the first federal level document regulating the general requirements to physical protection (PP). The federal PP rules developed on the base of this law by Minatom of Russia and other federal bodies of the Russian Federation were put in force by the government of Russia in 1997. The requirements of the convention on physical protection of nuclear materials (INFCIRC 274) and the modern IAEA recommendations (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4) are taken into account in the PP rules. Besides, while developing the PP rules the other countries' experience in this sphere has been studied and taken into account. The PP rules are action-obligatory for all juridical persons dealing with nuclear activity and also for those who are coordinating and monitoring this activity. Nuclear activity without physical protection ensured in accordance with PP rules requirements is prohibited. The requirements of PP Rules are stronger than the IAEA recommendations. The PP rules are establishing: physical protection objectives; federal executive bodies and organizations functions an implementation of physical protection; categorization of nuclear materials; requirements for nuclear materials physical protection as during use and storage as during transportation; main goals of state supervision and ministry level control for physical protection; notification order about the facts of unauthorized actions regarding nuclear materials and facilities. Besides the above mentioned documents, there were put in force president decrees, federal laws and regulations in the field of: counteraction to nuclear terrorism; interactions in physical protection systems; military and ministerial on-site guard activities; information protection. By the initiative of Minatom of Russia the corrections were put into the

  1. Physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    Full text: An Advisory Group met to consider the up-dating and extension of the Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, produced in 1972. Twenty-seven experts from 11 countries and EURATOM were present. Growing concern has been expressed in many countries that nuclear material may one day be used for acts of sabotage or terrorism. Serious attention is therefore being given to the need for States to develop national systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials during use, storage and transport throughout the nuclear fuel cycle which should minimize risks of sabotage or theft. The revised Recommendations formulated by the Advisory Group include new definitions of the objectives of national systems of physical protection and proposals for minimizing possibilities of unauthorized removal and sabotage to nuclear facilities. The Recommendations also describe administrative or organizational steps to be taken for this purpose and the essential technical requirements of physical protection for various types and locations of nuclear material, e.g., the setting up of protected areas, the use of physical barriers and alarms, the need for security survey, and the need of advance arrangements between the States concerned in case of international transportation, among others. (author)

  2. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [es

  3. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [fr

  4. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  5. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  6. Physical Protection of Nuclear Safeguards Technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoskins, Richard

    2004-01-01

    IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan is established to assist Member States in implementing effective measures against nuclear terrorism. Four potential threats were identified: theft of nuclear weapon, nuclear explosive device, radiological dispersal device and an attack on radiation facility. In order to achieve effective protection of nuclear materials and facilities, the IAEA sponsored the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials which focuses on the protection of nuclear materials 'in international transport. The IAEA also promoted INFCIRC/255 entitled the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities and published TECDOC/967 for the protection of nuclear materials and facilities against theft and sabotage and during transport. Assistance is available for the Member States through the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) and the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ). (author)

  7. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-08-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  8. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [es

  9. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  10. Protection and control of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jalouneix, J.; Winter, D.

    2007-01-01

    In the framework of the French regulation on nuclear materials possession, the first liability is the one of operators who have to know at any time the quantity, quality and localization of any nuclear material in their possession. This requires an organization of the follow up and of the inventory of these materials together with an efficient protection against theft or sabotage. The French organization foresees a control of the implementation of this regulation at nuclear facilities and during the transport of nuclear materials by the minister of industry with the sustain of the institute of radiation protection and nuclear safety (IRSN). This article presents this organization: 1 - protection against malevolence; 2 - national protection and control of nuclear materials: goals, administrative organization, legal and regulatory content (authorization, control, sanctions), nuclear materials protection inside facilities (physical protection, follow up and inventory, security studies), protection of nuclear material transports (physical protection, follow up), control of nuclear materials (inspection at facilities, control of nuclear material measurements, inspection of nuclear materials during transport); 3 - international commitments of France: non-proliferation treaty, EURATOM regulation, international convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials, enforcement in France. (J.S.)

  11. Legal Aspects of international cooperation in the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herron, L.W.

    1981-10-01

    This paper provides a detailed analysis of developments in the number field having led the IAEA to promote international cooperation in ensuring adequate physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. This work resulted in the establishment of recommendations and guidelines in this respect and culminated in the development of the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. (NEA) [fr

  12. Steps to implement the legal and regulatory infrastructure for physical protection of nuclear material in Peru

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramirez Quijada, R.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The signature of Peru to become part of the Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1995 has implied an obligation to formalize the legal and regulatory infrastructure for this purpose. As first step, physical protection measures were formalized on the two nuclear facilities: one critical assembly of zero power (RP0) and another research reactor of 10 Mw thermal power (RP10). Both of the installations use low enriched uranium nuclear fuel (Material and Testing Material - MTR type). On the other side, even thorium was put in perspective to control; currently it is being used for non-nuclear purposes and has not been included inside the physical protection measures. Its physical and chemical form and its small quantity do not warrant for applying the Convention. The physical protection measures implemented in the research reactor are well depicted and it is concluded that the physical protection system meets the recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. The critical facility (RP0), as having nuclear material categorized III, has implemented a less restrictive system but enough to meet the requirements. In 1999 an evaluation of all physical protection systems was performed for these two nuclear installations. This evaluation took into account the recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. The general conclusion was that the performance of physical protection system was suitable to the categories of nuclear material - II and III - and that the installations where nuclear material is used were suitably protected against non-authorized or illegal removal of nuclear material and sabotage. However, some of components of the system were not appropriately working and could make all of the system weak. Another of the identified problems was the lack of a rule on physical protection and also the lack of the Design Basis Threat, although this fact was well known due the social conditions in the country. The second undertaking has been to prepare the rule on

  13. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5): Recommendations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication, Revision 5 of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225), is intended to provide guidance to States and their competent authorities on how to develop or enhance, implement and maintain a physical protection regime for nuclear material and nuclear facilities, through the establishment or improvement of their capabilities to implement legislative and regulatory programmes. The recommendations presented in this publication reflect a broad consensus among IAEA Member States on the requirements which should be met for the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.

  14. A Road map for Establishing the Physical Protection Regime of Nuclear Materials and Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoo, Ho-Sik; Kwak, Sung-Woo; Jang, Sung-Soon; Kim, Jae-Kwang; Kim, Jung-Soo; Yoon, Wan-Ki

    2007-01-01

    The importance of physical protection for nuclear materials and facilities that can be an objective for terrorists has never been more stressed. The responsibility for physical protection within a State does not rest entirely with that state because cross-border transactions related to nuclear materials increase as nuclear related industries expand. The international community has prepared measures to strengthen the regime of physical protection such as the IAEA's proposal of the 'Nuclear Security Plan for 2006-2009' and UN's resolution on 'the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism'. In order to cope with this, Korea has also made efforts to establish the implementation system for physical protection in the field of nuclear industries since the law for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facility and Radiological Emergency Preparedness (LPPREP) was promulgated in 2004. The detailed plans should be prepared to accomplish this. This study has been performed to derive the items for establishing the regime of physical protection. The items derived were classified as short, mid and long-term depending on their characteristics and environmental circumstances. The regime of national physical protection will be established if the studies on these items are carried out successfully and tangible results are obtained

  15. Dealing with the regional challenge of physical protection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paschoa, A.S.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The problem of protecting sensitive fissile and fissionable nuclear materials of misuses by governments has been the subject of the convention on physical protection of nuclear material (CPPNM), which entered into force on February 8, 1987. However, in May 2001 the final report of the expert meeting had already recognized 'a clear need to strengthen the international physical protection regime'. The board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided then to convene a group, which would meet in Vienna from 3 to 7 December 2001, to draft on amendment to the CPPNM. The tragic occurrences of September 11, 2001, however, changed the then generally accepted view on the problem of physical protection, because nuclear materials had to be protected from falling into the hands of terrorists rather than of governments thirst of nuclear sensitive materials. Moreover, crude explosive devices could be made by terrorists, or hired scientists, using readily available radioactive materials, like 226 Ra or 137 Cs to inflict damage to civilians. Thus physical protection of those and other radioactive materials became an instant challenge for national and international authorities to prevent the use of such materials in terrorist actions. The prevention of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials is now in the priority list of these authorities. Fortunately; an international conference on 'Measures to Detect, Intercept and Respond to the Illicit Uses of Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Sources' was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in May 2001. An IAEA document - GOV/2001/37-GC(45)/20 - recommended in its plan of activities a series of projects to be implemented between 2002 and 2005, which included developing and providing assistance for the application of: (i) standards for physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities in member states; (ii) norms and guidelines for nuclear material accounting and control in member states; (iii

  16. Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

  17. Act of 17 April 1986 to implement Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done in Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The purpose of this Act is to implement in domestic legislation Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, signed by Belgium on 13th June 1980. Article 7 of the Convention lays down that states Parties must provide for penalties for a number of serious offences with respect to nuclear material. Article 8 specifies the cases in which measures must be taken by States Parties to establish their jurisdiction over such offences. (NEA) [fr

  18. Physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities in CEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garnier-Gratia, M.-H.; Jorda, A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique), as nuclear operator, is responsible for the control and protection of their nuclear materials. Inside CEA, DCS (Central Security Division) is in charge of the security matters, DCS defines the CEA strategy in this field, especially in physical protection. The paper will present the physical protection strategy of CEA. DCS defines the rules and methods; the operators have to apply in order to fulfill the security objectives of CEA. CEA has to provide the regulatory authority with documents proving that it is in accordance with the requirements of the 25th July 1980 law and 12th May 1981 decree. It has to implement all the necessary means in order to achieve the results requested by the regulatory authority. All these arrangements are described in the 'license and control file'. This file should specify the facility safeguards and physical protection system. Accounting measures are also described. In this file, the petitioner has to justify its capacity for holding nuclear materials and for exercising authorized activities on them. So the organization and the installed means have to be described in this authorization file. For physical protection, containment, surveillance and physical protection measures are presented: Containment measures must prevent the unauthorized or unjustified movements of nuclear material in the framework of the authorized activities; Surveillance measures must guarantee the integrity of the containment, check that no material is exiting by an abnormal channel; Physical protection measures for the materials, the premises and the facilities are intended to protect them against malevolent actions by means of security systems. The Central Security Division has established guidelines to provide guidance to the nuclear materials holders in writing such files. Each holding unit has to establish a 'license and control file' and each CEA site establishes a 'site license and control file

  19. Advanced physical protection systems for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1976-01-01

    Because of the increasing incidence of terrorism, there is growing concern that nuclear materials and facilities need improved physical protection against theft, diversion, or sabotage. Physical protection systems for facilities or transportation which have balanced effectiveness include information systems, access denial systems, adequate and timely response, recovery capability, and use denial methods for despoiling special nuclear materials (SNM). The role of these elements in reducing societal risk is described; however, it is noted that, similar to nuclear war, the absolute risks of nuclear theft and sabotage are basically unquantifiable. Sandia Laboratories has a major US Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) role in developing advanced physical protection systems for improving the security of both SNM and facilities. These activities are surveyed in this paper. A computer simulation model is being developed to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative physical protection systems under various levels of threat. Improved physical protection equipment such as perimeter and interior alarms, secure portals, and fixed and remotely activated barriers is being developed and tested. In addition, complete prototype protection systems are being developed for representative nuclear facilities. An example is shown for a plutonium storage vault. The ERDA safe-secure transportation system for highway shipments of all significant quantities of government-owned SNM is described. Adversary simulation as a tool for testing and evaluating physical protection systems is discussed. Finally, a list of measures is given for assessing overall physical protection system performance. (author)

  20. Advanced physical protection systems for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1975-10-01

    Because of the increasing incidence of terrorism, there is growing concern that nuclear materials and facilities need improved physical protection against theft, diversion, or sabotage. Physical protection systems for facilities or transportation which have balanced effectiveness include information systems, access denial systems, adequate and timely response, recovery capability, and use denial methods for despoiling special nuclear materials (SNM). The role of these elements in reducing societal risk is described; however, it is noted that, similar to nuclear war, the absolute risks of nuclear theft and sabotage are basically unquantifiable. Sandia Laboratories has a major Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) role in developing advanced physical protection systems for improving the security of both SNM and facilities. These activities are surveyed. A computer simulation model is being developed to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative physical protection systems under various levels of threat. Improved physical protection equipment such as perimeter and interior alarms, secure portals, and fixed and remotely-activated barriers is being developed and tested. In addition, complete prototype protection systems are being developed for representative nuclear facilities. An example is shown for a plutonium storage vault. The ERDA safe-secure transportation system for highway shipments of all significant quantities of government-owned SNM is described. Adversary simulation as a tool for testing and evaluating physical protection systems is discussed. A list of measures is given for assessing overall physical protection system performance. (auth)

  1. Facilitating the entry into force and implementation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material: Observations, challenges and benefits

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, Peri Lynne; )

    2014-01-01

    While the responsibility for nuclear security at the national level rests entirely with each state, international co-operation can be crucial in helping states to fulfil their nuclear security responsibilities and obligations. The central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in strengthening the nuclear security framework and leading the co-ordination of international activities in the field of nuclear security is now widely recognised. Although much has been done to help states in improving nuclear security, by and under the auspices of the IAEA and other intergovernmental organisations, nuclear terrorism has gained a global recognition as one of the most challenging threats to global security in the 21. century Reports by IAEA member states to the IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) indicate that nuclear material continues to go missing. Also, too many nuclear facilities are still inadequately protected and sabotage thereof is a threat. Border security remains lax in too many places and the possibility for nuclear smuggling may exist. Attempts by individuals and groups of persons are still made to acquire nuclear material for terrorist and other malicious purposes. The threat of nuclear terrorism remains real. Adopted under the auspices of the IAEA on 8 July 2005, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material ('Amendment') and the existing convention, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM or 'Convention') of 1980, are one of a number of treaties comprising the international legal framework on nuclear security. As will be explained later in the article, the Amendment expands and deepens the effect of the CPPNM. However, more than nine years after its adoption and despite the perceived threat and recognised need to strengthen the CPPNM dating back some 15 years ago, the Amendment is still not in force. Although to some CPPNM states parties, the pressing need for the

  2. Expert training on physical protection of nuclear materials at universities of Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pogozhin, N.S.; Bondarev, P.V.; Geraskin, N.I.; Kryuchkov, E.F.; Tolstoy, A.I.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The expert training on physical protection of nuclear materials in Russia is carry out by the universities on the following directions: 'Physical Protection, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials (MPCA)' master educational program. 'Physical and technical problems of atomic engineering' master educational standard. 'Technical Physics' direction. Qualification - master of physics. Duration of training - two years. 'Physical protection of nuclear objects' specialization. 'Nuclear physics and technology' educational standard of a direction for professionally qualified expert training. 'Safety and nonproliferation of nuclear materials' specialty. Qualification - engineer-physician. Duration of training - five years. The Master educational program is intended for the expert training with fundamental knowledge. The masters are assigned to work at the establishments of the Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia and at the state committee on nuclear supervision (Gosatomnaozor). Many graduates continue their education as post-graduate students. The program is designed for the experts having education of an engineer or a bachelor. The program concept consists in integration in a uniform educational process: profound scientific and technical knowledge; system approach to designing MPCA systems; knowledge of scientific and technical principles, means, devices; MPCA facilities and tools; legal, political and economic aspects of nuclear material management; modern computer and information technologies for MPCA systems; research work and practice of the students. The educational program for 'physical protection of nuclear objects' specialization is intended for the expert training of a practical orientation. Engineer-physicians are assigned as a rule to work at the nuclear objects and are intended for operation and servicing of the certain physical protection systems (PPS). The program concept consists in training not only fundamental aspects of an engineering

  3. Decree-Law No. 375/90 of 10 November 1990 designating the competent national authority for the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    This Decree-Law designates, in accordance with the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Protection and Nuclear Safety Bureau (GPSN) of the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources as the national competent authority in relation to physical protection matters. Accordingly, the import, manufacture, possession, purchase, sale or transfer of nuclear material, as well as its transport, are subject to prior authorisation by the GPSN [fr

  4. Peculiarities of physical protection assurance of the nuclear materials at nuclear installation decommissioning stage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinchuk, M.G.

    2001-01-01

    On December 15, 2000 Unit 3 of Chernobyl NPP, which is the last one in Ukraine having RBMK-type reactor, was permanently shutdown before the end of its lifetime. A number of projects related to establishing infrastructure for the plant decommissioning are being implemented in compliance with the Ukraine's commitments. Decommissioning stage includes activities on fuel unloading from the cores of Unit I and Unit 3, fuel cooling in the ponds followed by the fuel transportation to the spent fuel dry storage facility (currently under construction) for its safe long-term storage. Special facilities are being created for liquid and solid radioactive waste treatment. Besides, it is planned to implement a number of projects to convert Shelter Object in environmentally safe structure. Physical protection work being an essential part of the nuclear material management is organized in line with the recommendations of the IAEA, and the Laws of Ukraine 'On Nuclear Energy Utilization and Radiation Safety', 'On Physical Protection of Nuclear Installations and Materials', 'Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Installations', other codes and standards. While organizing physical protection on ChNPP decommissioning stage we have to deal with some specific features, namely: Significant amount of fuel assemblies, which are continuously transferred between various storage and operation facilities; Big amount of odd nuclear material at Shelter Object; 'Theft of new fuel fragments from the central hall of the Shelter Object in 1995 with the intention of their further sale. The thieves were detained and sentenced. The stolen material was withdrawn, that prevented its possible proliferation and illicit trafficking. At present physical protection of ChNPP does not fully satisfy the needs of the decommissioning stage and Ukraine's commitments on non-admission of illicit trafficking. Work is carried out, aimed to improve nuclear material physical protection, whose main

  5. Evolution of the physical protection and control of nuclear materials in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paschoa, A.S.; Renha, G.; Mafra, O.Y.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Brazil started protecting its nuclear materials soon after the end of the World War II, when the Combined Development Trust intended to control the world supply of uranium and thorium. This happened in 1944, but on December 27, 1946, an amendment to the report of Committee II of the United Nations established that the international ownership of the unexplored uranium and thorium would not be mandatory. Brazil nationalized its thorium and uranium reserves in 1951. The Brazil-Germany agreement signed in 1975 enhanced the need for Brazilian nuclear safeguards and security. The physical protection (PP) and control of nuclear materials (CNM) became activities under the supervision of the Brazilian military forces. The System for Protection of the Brazilian Nuclear Program (SIPRON), established on 7 October 1980, took over the responsibilities for PP and other aspects of the Brazilian nuclear program. The central organ of SIPRON was the Brazilian National Security Council (CSN). The Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) was in charge of coordinating, among others, the PP sector. Earlier that year - on 3 March 1980 - the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) was signed simultaneously in New York and Vienna. The Brazilian congress approved the CPPNM on 27 November 1984, and the Brazilian government deposited the ratification letter on 17 October 1985. On 16 April 1991 the Brazilian government issued a decree to enforce the CPPNM in the Brazilian territory. CNEN published the regulatory documents NE - 2.01 on 19 April 1996, and NN - 2.02 on 21 September 1999 for PP, and CNM, respectively. CNEN has the ultimate responsibility to enforce these regulations. The operational aspects of PP and CNM in Brazil are still improving. Potential nuclear terrorism for example needs to be examined. Activities concerning training personnel and implementing PP and CNM will be described in the paper. (author)

  6. Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Implementation of INFCIRC/225/Revision 5). Implementing Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2018-01-01

    This publication is the lead Implementing Guide in a suite of guidance on implementing the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13. It provides guidance and suggestions to assist States and their competent authorities in establishing, strengthening and sustaining their national physical protection regime and implementing the associated systems and measures, including operators’ physical protection systems. The structure of this publication is as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 describes the objectives of physical protection and the overall approach to managing the risks of the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear facilities. Section 3 provides guidance for the State and its competent authorities on the physical protection elements of the nuclear security regime; this guidance is based on the fundamental principles set out in the Recommendations publication. Section 4 provides guidance on the operator’s physical protection system and describes a systematic, integrated approach. Appendix I gives an annotated outline of the typical contents of an operator’s security plan. Appendix II provides similar guidance for the contingency plan. Appendix III provides a description of nuclear material aggregation that can be used to categorize nuclear material and determine the appropriate level of protection against unauthorized removal. Appendix IV presents a table of paragraph cross-references between the Recommendations publication and this Implementing Guide.

  7. Strengthened implementation of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities in the Republic of Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shim, H.-W.; Lee, J.-U.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Since the 9.11 terror, strengthening physical protection has been an accelerated trend internationally. IAEA has been requesting that member states implement a strengthened physical protection of nuclear facilities on the basis of threat assessments. In order to cope with this demand, the Korean government promulgated the 'Law for Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency Preparedness (LPPRE)' as a substantial countermeasure against possible threats. Pursuant to LPPRE, which entered into force on February 16, 2004, nuclear enterprisers are obliged to implement an effective physical protection of nuclear materials, get approval for its physical protection system, and be constantly inspected on. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) approved physical protection regulations of 24 domestic facilities operated by 14 enterprisers. National Nuclear management and Control Agency (NNCA) is entrusted with physical protection related duty and has been conducting physical protection inspection on nuclear materials in use, storage and transport. In addition, NNCA has established the methodology of threat assessment that entails organizing the threat assessment working group to develop a design basis threat (DBT). Korea is putting its best efforts to construct the threat assessment system and strengthen domestic physical protection regime in cooperation with competent authorities. (author)

  8. Physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myers, D.A.

    1989-01-01

    Physical protection is defined and its function in relation to other functions of a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials is described. The need for a uniform minimum international standard for physical protection as well as the need for international cooperation in physical protection is emphasized. The IAEA's INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1 (Annex 1) is reviewed. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Annex 2) is discussed. Photographs show examples of typical physical protection technology (Annex 3)

  9. Legal problems raised in Italy by the ratification of the Convention in Physical Protection - implications in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albano, R.; Crocenzi, G.

    1983-01-01

    This paper examines the legal problems which arose in Italy when the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, opened for signature in 1980, was ratified by that country in 1982. The purpose and background of the Convention and its relationship with other international regulations, in particular in the field of transport, are analysed in detail. Finally, the paper reviews the main European laws (French, German and British) on physical protection of nuclear material. (NEA) [fr

  10. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; Proteccion Fisica Delos Materiales Nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1993-09-15

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [French] La proteccion fisica contra el robo o la desviacion no autorizada de materiales nucleares y contra el sabotaje de las instalaciones nucleares por parte de individuos o de grupos ha sido durante largo tiempo motivo de preocupacion nacional e internacional. Aunque la obligacion de crear y hacer funcionar un sistema completo de proteccion fisica para las instalaciones y materiales nucleares en el territorio de un Estado determinado incumbe enteramente al Gobierno de dicho Estado, el que esa obligacion se cumpla o no, y si se cumple, en que medida o hasta que punto, es cosa que no deja indiferentes a los demas Estados. De aqui que la proteccion fisica se haya convertido en motivo de interes y cooperacion internacional. La necesidad de cooperacion internacional se hace evidente en los casos en que la eficacia de la proteccion fisica en el territorio de un Estado depende de que otros Estados tomen tambien medidas apropiadas para evitar o hacer fracasar los actos hostiles dirigidos contra instalaciones y

  11. Regulatory problems relating to physical protection of nuclear plants and materials in Italy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nocera, F.

    1981-10-01

    Although the questions raised by physical protection have an international charater, it is important to know of national regulations in that field since exchange of information and study of common problems help to achieve satisfactory results. This paper analyses the Italian situation, by illustrating legislative and administrative actions undertaken as well as the practices adopted in Italy to meet problems of prevention of malevolent acts against nuclear installations and substances, until such time an Act is passed in this respect. Finally, the author is in favour of the 1980 Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material being ratified soon by a large number of countries. (NEA) [fr

  12. Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. Safeguards and the role of the IAEA in physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smolej, M.

    1999-01-01

    The physical protection and security of nuclear facilities and materials concerns utilities, manufactures, the general public, and those who are responsible for licensing and regulating such facilities. The requirements and process to ensure an acceptable physical protection and security system have been evolutionary in nature. This paper reviews the first step of such process: the State's safeguards system and the international safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the relationship between these two safeguards systems. The elements of these systems that are reviewed include the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, physical protection measures, and containment and surveillance measures. In addition, the interactions between the State, the facility operator, and the IAEA are described. The paper addresses the IAEA safeguards system, including material accountancy and containment and surveillance; the State safeguards system, including material control and accountancy, and physical protection; the role of the IAEA in physical protection; a summary of safeguards system interactions.(author)

  13. Class notes from the first international training course on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Herrington, P.B. (ed.)

    1979-05-01

    The International Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials was intended for representatives from the developing countries who are responsible for preparing regulations and designing and assessing physical protection systems. The first part of the course consists of lectures on the objectives, organizational characteristics, and licensing and regulations requirements of a state system of physical protection. Since the participants may have little experience in nuclear energy, background information is provided on the topics of nuclear materials, radiation hazards, reactor systems, and reactor operations. Transportation of nuclear materials is addressed and emphasis is placed on regulations. Included in these discussions are presentations by guest speakers from countries outside the United States of America who present their countries' threat to nuclear facilities. Effectiveness evaluation methodology is introduced to the participants by means of instructions which teach them how to use logic trees and the EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) program. The following elements of a physical protection system are discussed: barriers, protective force, intrusion detection systems, communications, and entry-control systems. Total systems concepts of physical protection system design are emphasized throughout the course. Costs, manpower/technology trade-offs, and other practical considerations are discussed. Approximately one-third of the course is devoted to practical exercises during which the attendees participatein problem solving. A hypothetical nuclear facility is introduced, and the attendees participate in the conceptual design of a physical protection system for the facility.

  14. Class notes from the first international training course on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herrington, P.B.

    1979-05-01

    The International Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials was intended for representatives from the developing countries who are responsible for preparing regulations and designing and assessing physical protection systems. The first part of the course consists of lectures on the objectives, organizational characteristics, and licensing and regulations requirements of a state system of physical protection. Since the participants may have little experience in nuclear energy, background information is provided on the topics of nuclear materials, radiation hazards, reactor systems, and reactor operations. Transportation of nuclear materials is addressed and emphasis is placed on regulations. Included in these discussions are presentations by guest speakers from countries outside the United States of America who present their countries' threat to nuclear facilities. Effectiveness evaluation methodology is introduced to the participants by means of instructions which teach them how to use logic trees and the EASI (Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption) program. The following elements of a physical protection system are discussed: barriers, protective force, intrusion detection systems, communications, and entry-control systems. Total systems concepts of physical protection system design are emphasized throughout the course. Costs, manpower/technology trade-offs, and other practical considerations are discussed. Approximately one-third of the course is devoted to practical exercises during which the attendees participatein problem solving. A hypothetical nuclear facility is introduced, and the attendees participate in the conceptual design of a physical protection system for the facility

  15. Physical protection of export/import and transportation of nuclear material in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaclav, J

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The paper contains short overview about average amount of nuclear materials transported on the territory of the Slovak Republic in a year, and the physical protection of these nuclear materials. There are several types of transportation and export/import of nuclear materials in the SR: fresh fuel import; import of other unirradiated nuclear materials (e.g. depleted uranium, natural uranium); export of unirradiated nuclear materials (e.g. natural uranium); internal transportation of fresh fuel; internal transportation of other unirradiated nuclear materials; internal transportation of spent fuel. The main objective of the nuclear regulatory authority SR is to supervise observation of the national legislation as follows: the act no. 130 / 1998 on peaceful use of nuclear energy; UJD SR's regulation no. 186/1999 which details the physical protection of the nuclear facilities, nuclear materials, and radioactive waste (following requirements of INFCIRC 225 / Rev. 4); UJD SR's regulation no. 284 / 1999 which details conditions of nuclear material and radioactive wastes transportation. (author)

  16. Report made on the behalf of the Commission of foreign affairs, defence and armed forces on the bill project, adopted by the National Assembly, authorizing the approval of the amendment to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material - Nr 217

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pintat, Xavier

    2012-01-01

    After a presentation of the content of the international Convention (1979) on the physical protection of nuclear material, this report comments how the evolution of the international context during the 2000's induced a strengthening of the Convention measures through an amendment which expands the infractions to be introduced in the national law, and expands the protection to nuclear installations (however, the application is left to the initiative of member States). It discusses the consequences for France of the approval of the amendment. Two other texts are provided in appendix: the report on nuclear safety in 2012 made by the IAEA Director General, and the resolution nr 1540 of the U N Security Council

  17. Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material. Status list as of 12 September 2000. Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession. Declarations/reservations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto. Declarations/reservations made upon signature

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This document contains signatures, ratifications, acceptance, approval, accession or succession of the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material as well as declarations/reservations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto and declarations made upon signature

  18. Criteria and application methodology of physical protection of nuclear materials within the national and regional boundaries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.E.; Cesario, R.H.; Giustina, D.H.; Canibano, J.

    1998-01-01

    Full text: The physical protection against robbery, diversion of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installations by individuals or groups, has been for long time the reason of national and international concern. Even though, the obligation to create and implement an effective physical protection system for nuclear materials and installations in the territory of a given State, fall entirely on the State's Government, whether this obligation is fulfilled or not, and if it does, in what measure or up to what extent, it also concerns the rest of the States. Therefore, physical protection has become the reason for a regional co-operation. It is evident the need of co-operation in those cases where the physical protection efficiency within the territory of a given State depends also on the appropriate measures other States are taken, specially when dealing with materials been transported through national borders. The above mentioned constitute an important framework for the regional co-operation for the physical protection of nuclear materials. For that reason, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority established criteria and conditions aimed at mitigate diversions, robberies and sabotage to nuclear installations. As a working philosophy, it was established a simplify physical protection model of application in Argentina who, through the ARCAL No. 23 project, will be extrapolated to the whole Latin-American region, concluding that the application of the appropriated physical protection systems at regional level will lead to the strengthening of it at national level. (author) [es

  19. Specialists training on nuclear materials control, accounting and physical protection in the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khromov, V.V.; Pogozhin, N.S.; Kryuchkov, E.F.; Glebov, V.B.; Geraskin, N.I.

    1998-01-01

    Educational program to train specialists on non-proliferation problems and nuclear materials control, accounting and physical protection systems (NMCA and PP) at the Science Master's level was developed and is being realized in Moscow Sate Institute of Engineering and Physics at the support of the USA Ministry of Energy. The program is intended to train students who already got the Bachelor's degree on physical and technical subjects. The United methodological base of the program comprises lecture courses, practice in laboratories and computer programs. The educational program contains the following parts for training the students. 1) Deep scientific and technical knowledge. 2) System approach to designing and analysis of the NMCA and PP systems. 3) Knowledge of scientific and technical principles, means, devices and procedures used in the NMCA and PP systems. 4) Judicial, international and economical aspects of nuclear materials management. 5) Application of computer and information technologies for nuclear materials control and accounting. 6) Extensive practice in laboratories, using the most up-to-date equipment and devices used in the worldwide practice of NM control

  20. [Safeguards for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1975-01-01

    Testimony is given on the subject of safeguards for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, particularly during transportation. The ERDA nation-wide safe-secure transportation system and the Safe-Secure Trailer are described. The nationwide ERDA voice communication system is also described. Development of hardware and systems is discussed. The use of adversary simulation for evaluating protection systems is mentioned

  1. Guidance and considerations for the implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-05-01

    This publication is intended to provide guidance and considerations for a State's competent authority to better understand and prescribe appropriate requirements, consistent with INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 for the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities which are compatible with accepted international practice. This report, together with a more detailed report, Handbook on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities, which addresses to the licencee or designer of physical protection systems who has specific implementation and compliance responsibilities, should be used in conjunction to each other to provide better and comprehensive guidance on physical protection

  2. Guidance and considerations for the implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-05-01

    This publication is intended to provide guidance and considerations for a State's competent authority to better understand and prescribe appropriate requirements, consistent with INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 for the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities which are compatible with accepted international practice. This report, together with a more detailed report, Handbook on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities, which addresses to the licensee or designer of physical protection systems who has specific implementation and compliance responsibilities, should be used in conjunction to each other to provide better and comprehensive guidance on physical protection

  3. Implementation of physical protection of nuclear material in Yugoslavia and Slovenia - recent and planned activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.; Nikolic, A.; Nikoli, D.; Stegnar, P.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In more than ten last years region of South-Europe, especially countries originated from previous the Socialistic Federal Republics of Yugoslavia, are involved or surrounded, at least, by various conflicts including wars of different intensities. These unfavorable environment conditions have put additional focus at nuclear material kept in various institutions in the region. Following the IAEA recommendation on straighten the physical protection of nuclear material various actions are done or planned in the Yugoslavia and Slovenia to increase level of physical protection of nuclear material during its different usage and storage. Especial attention is drawn to update the administration rules, education of the involved personnel and redundancy of different physical protection modes of protection to prevent thieves and smuggling of nuclear material in the country or at country borders. The financial and experts help were offered by the IAEA at low level scale to Yugoslavia in 1996/97 to increase the physical protection of the fresh high-enriched uranium fuel stored and controlled regularly by the inspectors of the safeguard department of the IAEA. The further help and financial support is expected from the IAEA and relevant EU organization in aim to tighter the country borders to prevent the illegal traffic of nuclear material through the Europe. (author)

  4. International physical protection standards: support for development and implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soo Hoo, M.S.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Since 1972, the IAEA has been a recognized organization in promoting the development of international standards on the physical protection of nuclear materials. This responsibility has continued through the present in the 1999 publication of the fourth revision of INFCIRC/225, the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities and in being the repository for the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material which was originally published in 1980 as INFCIRC/274. The IAEA has also published other reference documents in support these two standards. With changing world events and greater concern for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, IAEA member states have increased IAEA physical protection responsibilities. Currently, the IAEA is serving as the secretariat for drafting revisions to the physical protection convention. The proposed revisions will strengthen international physical protection standards through the incorporation of physical protection fundamentals that should apply to all nuclear materials in international or domestic use, storage and transport. Furthermore, the physical protection fundamentals would also extend to include nuclear facilities. Presently, the physical protection convention applies only to nuclear materials that are in international transport. To complement efforts to develop and promote international physical protection standards, the IAEA is actively involved in assisting member states with the implementation of the standards. This is accomplished through the delivery of training courses, workshops and hosting other international forums for the exchange of information. Through review services such as the international physical protection advisory service (IPPAS), the IAEA provides advice to member states on the application of international standards at national and facility-specific levels. These services can be followed up with technical support to implement the

  5. Summary report on transportation of nuclear fuel materials in Japan : transportation infrastructure, threats identified in open literature, and physical protection regulations.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cochran, John Russell; Ouchi, Yuichiro (Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Japan); Furaus, James Phillip; Marincel, Michelle K.

    2008-03-01

    This report summarizes the results of three detailed studies of the physical protection systems for the protection of nuclear materials transport in Japan, with an emphasis on the transportation of mixed oxide fuel materials1. The Japanese infrastructure for transporting nuclear fuel materials is addressed in the first section. The second section of this report presents a summary of baseline data from the open literature on the threats of sabotage and theft during the transport of nuclear fuel materials in Japan. The third section summarizes a review of current International Atomic Energy Agency, Japanese and United States guidelines and regulations concerning the physical protection for the transportation of nuclear fuel materials.

  6. Physical protection of facilities and special nuclear materials in france

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeanpierre, G.

    1980-01-01

    Physical protection of nuclear facilities and special nuclear materials is subject in France to a national governmental regulation which provides for the basic principles to be taken into account and the minimal level of protection deemed necessary. But the responsibility of implementation is left to the facility management and the resulting decentralization allows for maximum efficiency. All safeguards measures comply with the commitments taken at the international level by the French government

  7. The system of physical protection of nuclear materials in the Republic of Belarus: problems and solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Piotukh, V.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: It is a matter of common knowledge, that the responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear material and facilities within a state shall rest entirely with the Government of that state. In Belarus all nuclear materials, including HEU, are located at the Center of Nuclear Technologies of the Belarus National Academy of Sciences 'Sosny'. Through regulatory resolution on measures for physical protection of nuclear materials issued by the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus in 1993, the committee for Supervision of Industrial and Nuclear Safety (Promatomnadzor) was appointed as the authority responsible for ensuring physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities and was tasked to develop and approve relevant normative documents. In 1994 Promatomnadzor issued the order on ensuring physical protection of nuclear materials during use, storage and transportation that was in line with then relevant IAEA recommendations. Since September 2001 Promatomnadzor has been a department of the Ministry for Emergencies of the Republic of Belarus. The system of physical protection at 'Sosny' includes elements of the 'old' system set up in 1984, and the 'new' one installed in 1996 as a result of a multilateral co-operative effort between Belarus, Sweden, Japan and USA. The main technical components of the system are: detection system including magnetic, microwave and infrared sensors; video-surveillance system; system of access delay including electronic blocking devices; system of authorized access including magnetic cards; system of computerized control over all components and communication system. Discussions between potential donor states are taking place regarding various security upgrades, particularly to the protected area where main security sensitive buildings are located. In 2000 Promatomnadzor requested an international physical protection advisory service (IPPAS) mission from the IAEA. The

  8. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities; Proteccion Fisica De Los Materiales Y Las Instalaciones Nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-06-15

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [Spanish] La proteccion fisica contra el robo o la desviacion no autorizada de materiales nucleares y contra el sabotaje de las instalaciones nucleares por parte de individuos o grupos es motivo de preocupacion nacional e internacional desde hace mucho tiempo. Aunque la obligacion de crear y hacer funcionar un sistema completo de proteccion fisica de las instalaciones y materiales nucleares en el territorio de un Estado determinado incumbe exclusivamente al Gobierno de dicho Estado, el que esa obligacion se cumpla o no, y si se cumple, en que medida o hasta que punto, son cosas que no dejan indiferentes a los demas Estados. Por ello, la proteccion fisica se ha convertido en motivo de interes y cooperacion internacional. La necesidad de la cooperacion internacional se hace evidente en los casos en que la eficacia de la proteccion fisica en el territorio de un Estado depende de que otros Estados tomen tambien medidas apropiadas para evitar o hacer fracasar los actos hostiles dirigidos contra instalaciones y

  9. Proposal for guidelines for the physical protection of nuclear materials, plants and transports in Denmark

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-03-01

    The guidelines are based on recommendations in the IAEA's ''Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,'' INFCIRC/225/rev.1. In accordance with practice in other countries, the guidelines give more detailed requirements for the protection of reactor plants than those given in the IAEA's present recommendations, which put more emphasis on the protection of nuclear materials. The measures to be taken for nuclear plants, or nuclear transports, are proposed made to fit the potential risk that the more closely defined actions imply. It is suggested that the more detailed rules for the scope of the protection of plants or materials should be laid down by the National Agency on the basis of recommendations made by the Inspectorate of Nuclear Installations, which in turn are based on the safety documentation of the plant/material owners. It is further proposed that the National Agency, again on a recommendation from the Inspectorate, should lay down more detailed guidelines for the reporting of changes in stocks or transports of nuclear materials. (author)

  10. Strengthening global physical protection practices; gaining better information on national practices for protection of weapons-usable material. Keynote address/session 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, G.; Rinne, R.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Unlike the Non-Proliferation Treaty requirement that non-nuclear-weapon parties provide 'safeguards' information to the IAEA on their nuclear materials and their state systems for accounting and control, there is no related requirement to provide information on state systems of physical protection. A review of 1997 IAEA and Stanford physical protection conference proceedings showed both the absence of information on important practices from many states and the great variation in practices from state to state. Besides the lack of internationally required standards for domestic protection, reasons for the variations described in Stanford-Sandia National Laboratories research include: differences in states' perceptions of the threats to their materials; differences in their abilities to pay the cost of stronger physical protection; differences in their laws and regulatory practices in general; and differences in their cultural attitudes - for example, attitudes toward whether to arm personnel guarding weapon-usable material or to require clearances for personnel with access to such material. The information presented to the 1997 IAEA and Stanford conferences was supplied voluntarily. The two global documents which provide norms for physical protection do not require submission of such information. These are the 1980 Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 1999 IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4. This means that, without bilateral cooperation, no state can find out how other states are protecting their nuclear material. Yet, as IAEA Director General El Baradei has said, '[I]t is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent [physical protection] responsibility is fulfilled. ...The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations - where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter and defeat hostile actions against nuclear

  11. Implementation of physical protection of nuclear material in Yugoslavia and Slovenia - recent and planned activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pesic, M.; Nikolic, A.; Nikolic, D.; Stegnar, P.

    2002-09-01

    In more than ten last years region of South-East Europe (especially countries originated from previous the Socialistic Federal Republics of Yugoslavia) was involved (or surrounded, at least) by various conflicts, including wars of different intensities. These unfavourable conditions have put additional focus at nuclear material stored in various institutions in the region. Following the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on straighten the physical protection of nuclear material, various actions were done or are planned in the Yugoslavia and Slovenia in aim to increase level of physical protection of nuclear material during its different usage and storage. Especial attention is drawn to update the administration rules, education of the involved personnel and redundancy of different physical protection modes to prevent stealing and smuggling of nuclear material in both the countries or at country borders. The financial and expert help at low-level scale were offered by the IAEA and US government to Yugoslavia in 1996/97. It was used to increase the physical protection of fresh high-enriched uranium fuel stored and controlled regularly by the inspectors of the Safeguard Department of the IAEA. The further help and financial support is expected from the IAEA, USA and relevant European Union (EU) organisations in aim to tighter the borders of both the countries to prevent the illegal traffic of nuclear materials through the Europe. (author)

  12. Guidance and considerations for implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-09-01

    The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, provides recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material against theft in use, storage and transport, whether national or international and whether peaceful or military, and contains provisions relating to the sabotage of nuclear material or facilities. The recommendations contained in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 detail the elements that should be included in a State's system of physical protection. It also recognizes the adverse health and safety consequences arising from the theft of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear material or facilities. Most industrial and developing countries use these recommendations to some extent in the establishment and operation of their physical protection systems. Although INFCIRC/225/Rev.3 provides recommendations for protecting materials and facilities from theft or sabotage, it does not provide in-depth details for these recommendations. In June 1996, the IAEA convened a consultants meeting to consider this matter. This report is the result of continuing discussions and drafts over a period of nine months. The intent of this guidance is to provide a broader basis for relevant State organizations to prescribe appropriate requirements for the use of nuclear materials which are compatible with accepted international practice

  13. Physical protection nuclear facilities against sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagemann, A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: INFCIRC 225 Rev. 4 has introduced the Design Basis Threat, DBT, as a key element of the states physical protection system. The DBT is a definition which determines the level of physical protection of nuclear material during use, storage, transport and of nuclear facilities. It the basis for physical protection concepts and for the design of measures the operator or licensee has to provide. By this means it is also a definition of the responsibility for the physical protection which the operator accepts with the license. The new chapter designated to the physical protection against sabotage which has resulted also in the amendment of the title in INFCIRC 225 demonstrates the grown international concern about the potential consequences of sabotage. More than the physical protection against unauthorized removal the physical protection against sabotage has interfaces with the nuclear safety field. The basis of protection against sabotage therefore is much more based on the facility design-the safety design of the facility. Using the DBT the competent authority is in the position to determine the level of protection against sabotage and the remaining risk which has to be accepted. This risk of course depends on the real threat which is not known in advance. The acceptance of the remaining risk depends on both the assessment of the threat, its credibility and the potential consequences. There has been no serious act of sabotage in the past nor an attempt of. Despite of this the Harnun attack of the Japanese underground and some other recent terrorist activities could have given reasons to reconsider what threat might be credible. The German physical protection system has been developed since the increasing terrorist activities in the 1970s. From the beginning the protection against sabotage played an important role in the German system of physical protection. The requirements for the physical protection against unauthorized removal and against sabotage were

  14. States agree on stronger physical protection regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Delegates from 89 countries agreed on 8 July to fundamental changes that will substantially strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed the agreement in saying 'This new and stronger treaty is an important step towards greater nuclear security by combating, preventing, and ultimately punishing those who would engage in nuclear theft, sabotage or even terrorism. It demonstrates that there is indeed a global commitment to remedy weaknesses in our nuclear security regime.' The amended CPPNM makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage as well as transport. It will also provide for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences. The original CPPNM applied only to nuclear material in international transport. Conference President Dr. Alec Baer said 'All 89 delegations demonstrated real unity of purpose. They put aside some very genuine national concerns in favour of the global interest and the result is a much improved convention that is better suited to addressing the nuclear security challenges we currently face.' The new rules will come into effect once they have been ratified by two-thirds of the 112 States Parties of the Convention, expected to take several years. 'But concrete actions are already taking place around the world. For more than 3 years, the IAEA has been implementing a systematic Nuclear Security plan, including physical protection activities designed to prevent, detect and respond to malicious acts,' said Anita Nillson, Director of the IAEA's Office of Nuclear Security. The Agency's Nuclear Security Fund, set up after the events of 9/11, has delivered $19.5 million in practical assistance to 121 countries

  15. Establishing design basis threats for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chetvergov, S.

    2001-01-01

    In the area of nuclear energy utilization, the Republic of Kazakhstan follows the standards of international legislation and is a participant of the Nuclear Weapons Non-proliferation Treaty as a country that does not have nuclear weapons. In the framework of this treaty, Kazakhstan provides for the measures to ensure the regime of nonproliferation. The Republic signed the Agreement with the IAEA on the guarantee that was ratified by the Presidential Decree in 1995. Now the Government of the RK is considering the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Kazakhstan legislation in the area of nuclear energy utilization is represented by a set of laws: the main of them is the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 'On the utilization of atomic energy', dated April 14, 1997. According to the Law, the issues of physical protection are regulated by interdepartmental guideline documents. Nuclear science and industry of RK include: Enterprises on uranium mining and processing; Ulba metallurgical plant, manufacturing fuel pellets of uranium dioxide for heat release assemblies of RBMK and WWR reactor types, with the enrichment on U235 1.6-4.4%; Power plant in Aktau for heat and power supply and water desalination, based on fast breeder reactor BN-350; Research reactors of National Nuclear Center: WWR-K - water-water reactor, with 10 MW power, uses highly enriched uranium (up to 36% of U-235); IVG.1M - water-water heterogeneous reactor of vessel type on thermal neutrons, maximum power is 35 MW; IGR - impulse homogeneous graphite reactor on thermal neutrons, with graphite reflector; RA - high temperature gas cooled reactor on thermal neutrons, 0.5 MW power. The establishment of design basis threats for nuclear objects in the Republic of Kazakhstan is an urgent problem because of the developing military-political situation in the region. It is necessary to specify important elements affecting the specific features of the design basis threat: military operations of

  16. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5). Recommendations (Spanish Edition); Recomendaciones de Seguridad Fisica Nuclear sobre la Proteccion Fisica de los Materiales y las Instalaciones Nucleares (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5). Recomendaciones

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2012-06-15

    This publication, Revision 5 of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225), is intended to provide guidance to States and their competent authorities on how to develop or enhance, implement and maintain a physical protection regime for nuclear material and nuclear facilities, through the establishment or improvement of their capabilities to implement legislative and regulatory programmes. The recommendations presented in this publication reflect a broad consensus among IAEA Member States on the requirements which should be met for the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.

  17. Security Culture in Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Susyanta-Widyatmaka; Koraag, Venuesiana-Dewi; Taswanda-Taryo

    2005-01-01

    In nuclear related field, there are three different cultures: safety, safeguards and security culture. Safety culture has established mostly in nuclear industries, meanwhile safeguards and security culture are relatively new and still developing. The latter is intended to improve the physical protection of material and nuclear facility. This paper describes concept, properties and factors affecting security culture and interactions among these cultures. The analysis indicates that anybody involving in nuclear material and facility should have strong commitment and awareness of such culture to establish it. It is concluded that the assessment of security culture outlined in this paper is still preliminary for developing and conduction rigorous security culture implemented in a much more complex facility such as nuclear power plant

  18. IAEA Director General welcomes landmark convention to combat nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed the adoption of an International convention against nuclear terrorism. 'This is a landmark achievement which will bolster global efforts to combat nuclear terrorism,' Dr. ElBaradei said. 'It will be a key part of international efforts to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons'. The United Nations General Assembly adopted the convention, The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, on 13 April 2005. The Convention strengthens the global legal framework to counter terrorist threats. Based on a proposal by the Russian Federation in 1998, the Convention focuses on criminal offences related to nuclear terrorism and covers a broad range of possible targets, including nuclear reactors as well as nuclear material and radioactive substances. Under its provisions, alleged offenders - for example any individual or group that unlawfully and intentionally possesses or uses radioactive material with the intent to cause harm - must be either extradited or prosecuted. States are also encouraged to cooperate with each other in connection with criminal investigations and extradition proceedings. The Convention further requires that any seized nuclear or radiological material be held in accordance with IAEA safeguards, and handled in keeping with the IAEA's health, safety and physical protection standards. Dr. ElBaradei also recalled that the Agency is in the process of amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, in order to broaden its scope, and in so doing, strengthen the current legal framework for securing nuclear material against illicit uses. A conference will be held from 4 to 8 July in Vienna to consider and adopt the amendments. The Convention opens for signature in September this year. Dr ElBaradei urged all States to 'sign and ratify the Convention without delay so nuclear terrorism will have no chance'. (IAEA)

  19. The implementation of nuclear security program and the improvement of physical protection in Indonesia: progress and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khairul

    2009-01-01

    facilities. The nuclear material and its installation is potential target in the facilities so that they needed physical protection measures in prevention and protection of nuclear material and radioactive source against theft and sabotage. The implementation of physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive sources in Indonesia complied with the international instruments such as the Convention of the Physical Protection on Nuclear Material and Facilities, amended on July 2005, and INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, (corrected), the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, June 1999. The application of nuclear energy for power program generation involve in the management of nuclear materials and other radioactive substance. According to international regulation and convention, an effective physical protection system is needed to protect nuclear materials and its facilities against theft and sabotage for both non-proliferation and radiation safety purpose. Further to implementation of the IAEA nuclear security program in the region, Indonesia received two nuclear security services, IPPAS and INSServ mission. Based on the expert mission recommendation, therefore Indonesia improved their physical protection system on nuclear material and facilities against theft and sabotage. One thing that should be considered by the Government of Indonesia is human resource development programmes. So far, some effort has developed to enhance the knowledge of the employee who deals with nuclear material and radioactive substances. It still needed to increase the awareness in particular to personal and other related agencies as well. The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration discussed security assistance with Indonesia's National Nuclear Energy Agency, BATAN. These upgrades not only reduced the threat of theft at the three research reactors, but also provided local physical protection expertise to use during the concept, design, and operation of

  20. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. These concepts identify ways in which material accounting systems can be used to enable effective monitoring of authorized movement of nuclear material through physical protection boundaries. Concepts are also discussed for monitoring user access to nuclear material and for tagging user identification to material accounting transactions through physical protection functions. These result in benefits in detecting diversion and in positively tracing material movement. Finally, coordination of safeguards information from both subsystems in such an integrated system through a safeguards coordination center is addressed with emphasis on appropriate response in case of discrepancies

  1. 10 CFR 73.25 - Performance capabilities for physical protection of strategic special nuclear material in transit.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... strategic special nuclear material in transit. 73.25 Section 73.25 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION... Transit § 73.25 Performance capabilities for physical protection of strategic special nuclear material in transit. (a) To meet the general performance objective and requirements of § 73.20 an in-transit physical...

  2. SNAP: a tool for nuclear physical protection system modeling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Engi, D.; Grant, F.H. III.

    1979-10-01

    Nuclear safeguards systems are concerned, in part, with the physical protection of nuclear materials. The function of a physical protection system is to define the facility against adversary activities which could lead to theft of nuclear material or sabotage resulting in a radiological release. The Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) provides a convenient and standard analysis methodology for the evaluation of physical protection system analysis. This paper describes a detailed application of SNAP to a hypothetical nuclear facility

  3. Physical protection of nuclear power plants-technical and legal aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Castro Martins, O.J. de.

    1978-04-01

    The nuclear power plants are defined according to the definitions included in the Brazilian legislation and international conventions and their physical protection is analysed. Besides, the differences and the relations among nuclear security, safeguards and physical protection are established. (A.L.) [pt

  4. Role of physical protection and safeguards technology used to Nuclear Material Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Djoko-Irianto, Ign.

    2005-01-01

    The presence of nuclear materials at any nuclear facility must be in secure and must be known as safeguards purpose such as its position, from or type and amount. The clarification of the amount be reported to the national regulatory body and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the International regulatory body. The national regulatory body and IAEA will then verify that report. The verification must be done to know there is no difference of the amount, and to give the assurance to the International community that any diversion of safeguarded nuclear material from civil use to a prescribed military purpose would be detected. To carry out verification, several verification techniques such as non-destructive analysis, surveillance, unattended and remote monitoring and environmental sampling are explained to convey the impression how those techniques are implemented. According to the security requirement, the physical protection system including all components of physical protection system have to be effectively designed

  5. Protecting nuclear material and facilities: Is a new approach needed?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steinhausler, F.; Bunn, G.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The main reason why national physical protection (PP) systems for nuclear and other radioactive material need to be strengthened further is that, after the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, the threat of dangerous, suicidal radiological and nuclear terrorism can no longer be excluded as a possibility. Existing PP systems were not designed to deal with the threat of suicidal terrorists having the numbers, skills, training, and resources available to the commandos attacking on 11 September. Moreover, there are no mandatory international standards for domestic PP systems for nuclear or radioactive material, and this has produced great variation in protection provided from country to country. IAEA recommended standards, while useful, were not designed with the new terrorist threat in mind. Moreover, they are often not followed in practice. The result is inadequate protection against the new form of terrorism in most countries. The Director General of the IAEA expressed a similar view after 11 September, but achieving a consensus to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to require specific standards of protection for different amounts and kinds of nuclear material used or stored domestically (not in international transport) has been impossible in the year since 11 September. In the case of radiological materials, a new effort to provide required international standards for protection against the new form of terrorism has not begun. In the summer of 2001, leaders of the G-8 countries agreed to a Global Partnership to prevent the new terrorists from acquiring nuclear and radiological as well as other materials related to weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps in part because of the failure to date to achieve agreement on an effective amendment to the CPPNM, the first principle of this partnership is to strengthen 'multilateral treaties and other instruments whose aim is to prevent the proliferation or illicit

  6. Systematic Approach to Training and Professional Development Specialists of Physical Protection, Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials in Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klos, Nataliia

    2014-01-01

    Conclusion: 1. Ukraine has created the State system for professional training, retraining and professional development of specialists in physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials. 2. Ukraine has founded profession physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials

  7. Physical protection concepts of nuclear materials. The French experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arnaud, G.; Artaud, R.

    1995-01-01

    As the nuclear energy was being developed, it appeared necessary to set up protections against its potential hazards, that should be more complete and elaborate than those implemented on the other industrial installations. This had to be done both in the safety field to prevent the environment and the populations from the consequences of severe casualties, and in the security field to avoid the risk of proliferation and limit to an acceptable level the results of voluntarily provoked accidents and sabotages. Taking advantage of the gathered experience, this document gives consideration to the concepts used in France in order to ensure the physical protection of the nuclear materials. The following topics are tackled: context inside which are envisaged the specific measures, coherence with the general dispositions taken to protect industrial installations, importance and limitations of the part played by the regulations, respective responsibilities of the plant operators and the public authorities, compromise between objectives in view and means to implement, adjustment between the physical protection system and the operating requirements. In addition, the ways in which these systems should be implemented are discussed, underlining the necessity to make progressive steps under a permanent will, in order, first, to update and bring under conformity the old installations, and second, to ensure the maintenance of the systems, taking account of the evolutions of needs and techniques. Those points are commented on examples taken among the different types of installations to be found in France, showing the differences in approach coming from the type and the age of the facilities, and giving the present trends for the new plants. (authors). 1 annexe

  8. Study on CPPNM Interpretation of the Physical Protection Regulatory Aspects for International Transport of Nuclear Material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Woo-jin; Yang, Seong-hyo; Hyung, Sang-chul [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    Nuclear energy has been regulated by various international agreements or treaties due to the potential dangers. In case of export or import of nuclear material, it is important to comply with international norms and domestic laws related to nonproliferation and physical protection of nuclear material. Because, if non-compliant, it can be taken nuclear sanctions from the international community, and thus the domestic nuclear activities can be under a negative impact. Recently, international interests in nuclear security have been increased, it has become very sensitive to whether or not to join, and to comply with international treaties during international transportation of nuclear materials. Currently it is not discussed yet how to present and interpret the relevant provisions in CPPNM. However, it is necessary to prepare for the dispute among the parties that we don't know when it happens.

  9. Physical protection system of nuclear material in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bueker, H.; Jungclaus, D.; von Eyss, H.J.; von Osten, W.

    1980-01-01

    The objective of physical protection, its statutory and other bases as well as the parties involved in the licensing process are described. The facilities are grouped in categories reflecting their hazard potentials: the possibility of a theft of nuclear fuels in an approach similar to INFCIRC 225 and, in addition, the possibility of a release of radioactive materials. Physical protection follows the concept of detection, alert of police force, delay, prevention of the act by police force. The schematic layout of a Category I facility is presented

  10. Consideration on the current status and issues of sensitive information management concerning the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Inamura, Tomoaki; Madarame, Haruki

    2009-01-01

    The confidentiality system concerning the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities was enacted by revision of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law in 2005. We made a comparative analysis with the information security in governmental agencies or financial sectors, in order to consider the way the sensitive information management concerning the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities should be. The considerations in this paper are as follows. (1) In order to secure a suitable level of security, close cooperation should be achieved among related governmental agencies. (2) A cycle that continuously evaluates whether suitable management is performed should be established. (3) Excessive secretiveness should be eliminated. (4) An information-sharing system among the related persons beyond the frame of governmental agencies and electricity companies should be established. (5) Improvement in the social acceptability of the sensitive information management is important. (6) Although it is important to perform evaluation by the consideration of suitable balance with information disclosure, it is also important that it is positively shown to society. (author)

  11. Fingerprinting of nuclear material to strengthen physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueck, K.; Lindauer, H.; Falta, G.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Physical protection of nuclear material against diversion and stealing presents a major step to prevent abuse of nuclear material for military or terrorist purposes. If such material had been diverted, however, and discovered by border traffic control, police control or other methods of investigation, identifying the site and time of diversion is of utmost importance to ensure that the point of possible diversion is closed and the possible delivery and end-use point becomes known. The quicker and more comprehensive these investigations are performed, the greater are the chances to find the criminal persons and the point of diversion. The paper, therefore, deals with fingerprinting methods used to obtain enough and comprehensive background information for investigators to find out the source of diversion and the channels through which it might have reached the point of discovery and the possible point of ultimate destination (end-use of the material). On the example of the round-robin test for the identification of illicit nuclear material performed by EURATOM in 1999, and the conclusions obtained by our laboratory it is demonstrated that a high amount of information can be drawn from a single sample and that this information can be used by investigators world-wide to find the point of origin of the material and its possible point of diversion. The set of information is segmented into 3 different levels: information gained in the first 24 hours after arrival of the unknown material, information gained up to one week after uptake and information gained up to one month after. The first information is to inform the investigators about the hazard and the relevance of the material, about preliminary investigation results and support the investigating judge on the justification to further detain the person(s). The second information should contain more detail on the material and the possible point of diversion and assist the investigators to decide on proper

  12. IPPAS guidelines. Reference document for the IAEA International Physical Protection Advisory Service

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The IAEA International Physical protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) provides advice to Member States to assist them in strengthening the effectiveness of their national physical protection system whilst recognizing the ultimate responsibility for physical protection is that of the Member State. The IPPAS is available to all countries with nuclear materials and facilities. The basic concepts, purposes and functions of physical protection are provided in INFCIR/225, 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities' as amended from time to time and 'the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIR/247/Rev.1). The guidance given in INFCIR/225 recognizes that implementation of these requirements vary from country to country depending on their existing constitutional, legal and administrative systems; the assessment of the threat for the potential theft of nuclear material or sabotage of nuclear facilities; the technical skills and professional and financial resources available to the competent authority; and social customs and cultural traditions. IPPAS missions are performance oriented in that they accept different approaches to the implementation of national physical protection system

  13. Nuclear material management: challenges and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rieu, J.; Besnainou, J.; Leboucher, I.; Chiguer, M.; Capus, G.; Greneche, D.; Durret, L.F.; Carbonnier, J.L.; Delpech, M.; Loaec, Ch.; Devezeaux de Lavergne, J.G.; Granger, S.; Devid, S.; Bidaud, A.; Jalouneix, J.; Toubon, H.; Pochon, E.; Bariteau, J.P.; Bernard, P.; Krellmann, J.; Sicard, B.

    2008-01-01

    The articles in this dossier were derived from the papers of the yearly S.F.E.N. convention, which took place in Paris, 12-13 March 2008. They deal with the new challenges and prospects in the field of nuclear material management, throughout the nuclear whole fuel cycle, namely: the institutional frame of nuclear materials management, the recycling, the uranium market, the enrichment market, the different scenarios for the management of civil nuclear materials, the technical possibilities of spent fuels utilization, the option of thorium, the convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials and installations, the characterisation of nuclear materials by nondestructive nuclear measurements, the proliferation from civil installations, the use of plutonium ( from military origin) and the international agreements. (N.C.)

  14. Strengthening global practices for protecting nuclear material (NUMAT). Book of Abstracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steinhaeusler, F.; Heissl, C.

    2002-08-01

    The International Conference on Physical Protection 'Strengthening Global Practices for Protecting Nuclear Material' was organized by the Institute of Physics and Biophysics, Salzburg University in cooperation with/supported by the European Commission, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, European Forum of the Stanford University's Institute for International Studies and Austria Institute for European Security. Its purpose was fostering exchange of information on the policy and technical aspects require to ensure the security of nuclear material around the world. There is a general concern that the international community needs to establish effective measures to counter theft, sabotage, and other illicit uses of nuclear fissile and other radioactive materials. The main subjects addressed by this conference were: a) global and local threat development and 'design basis'; b) standards for physical protection (PP), its adequacy and future needs; c) national practices in PP of nuclear materials (how to strengthen national security culture?); d) current R and D in security and detection technologies (identification of focus points for future R and D); e) programmes to aid in training, design, and implementation of physical protection systems (how to improve efficiency and assure sustainability of assistance programmes?). (nevyjel)

  15. Physical protection in the transport of nuclear materials (Legal aspects of the domestic system)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Novais, F.J.G.

    1978-04-01

    A study of the physical protection system is made. Emphasis is given to some considerations in the nuclear material transport area, mainly the details of the domestic system, from a juridic pont of view. (Author) [pt

  16. A Study on Establishment of Unacceptable Radiological Consequence (URC) for Physical Protection against Sabotage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Myungtak; Koh, Moonsung; Lee, Youngwook; Jo, Kwang Ho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    The international community has recommended that a graded approach should be applied to the establishment of the domestic regime for physical protection in accordance with fundamental principle H of the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and INFCIRC/225/rev.5. In Korea, Currently, the graded approach to unauthorized removal of nuclear material is divided into three categories (Category Ι, Category ΙΙ, Category ΙΙΙ) based on the IAEA INFCIRC/225/rev.5. Moreover, depending on the categorization of nuclear material, physical protection measures against unauthorized removal are also clearly categorized. But in the case of physical protection against sabotage, the graded approach to the physical protection measures is not applied since Unacceptable Radiological Consequence (URC) for identifying sabotage target and level is not determined. URC can be established based on either dose limit or design limit. The report by Sandia National Lab. in USA specifies that core damage is used for URC. Calculation of an exact dose is based on various assumptions and processes and subsequently increases uncertainty. Therefore, using design limit for decreasing uncertainty is more effective than using dose limit. In order to apply the graded approach to physical protection against sabotage, we have taken into Fundamental principle H : Physical protection requirements should be based on a graded approach, taking into account the current evaluation of the threat, the relative attractiveness, the nature of the material and potential consequences associated with the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and with the sabotage against nuclear material of nuclear facilities consideration legal and institutional standards on domestic and international radiological consequences and intended to provide a reference for the URC establishment by the State. The study on various standards led to the conclusion that each value has advantages and

  17. Physical protection of nuclear operational units

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-07-01

    The general principles of and basic requirements for the physical protection of operational units in the nuclear field are established. They concern the operational units whose activities are related with production, utilization, processing, reprocessing, handling, transport or storage of materials of interest for the Brazilian Nuclear Program. (I.C.R.) [pt

  18. Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    The main purpose of this Act is to enable the United Kingdom to ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which opened for signature at Vienne and New York on 3 March 1980. The Act extends throughout the United Kingdom. (NEA) [fr

  19. Support to the physical protection and accountancy for nuclear materials in Kazakstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hashimoto, Yu.; Yoshida, M.; Akutsu, M.; Takeda, H.

    1998-01-01

    The support programs for Republic of Kazakstan have been carried out for the purpose of establishing the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). These support are based on the cooperation agreement for the elimination of nuclear weapons, that reached mutual agreement between both government of Japan and the Republic of Kazakstan in March, 1994, 1994. Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America have conducted the support for Kazakstan. Since there are many facilities to be supported such as fast reactors, fuel fabrication facilities and research facilities, items to be supported are coordinated and shared among the supporting countries. Japan has been carrying out the supporting tasks mainly for the fast breeder reactor facility, BN-350 and Atomic Energy Agency of Kazakstan (KAEA). PESCO Co., Ltd. is entrusted this supporting work from Technical Secretariat on Cooperation for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Reduced in the Former Soviet Union, and has conducted the support in the area of flow monitoring system, nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection, obtaining technical cooperation from Power Reactor and Nuclear Development Corporation (PNC)

  20. Physical protection of small amounts of nuclear material or contaminated parts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zipper, R.

    2002-01-01

    In July 2001 an incident was recognized where a worker occupied with decontamination of structures in a shut down reprocessing plant for spent fuel illegally removed a small amount of radioactive material from the facility site. The investigations exhibited that he brought this material to the apartment of his partner in life and she incorporated significantly α-activity in the form of plutonium. Immediately after the incident was discovered the supervisory authorities and the operating company of the facility took action to minimize the harms to third parties arising from the radioactive material released and to prevent a similar event to occur. As the overall inventory of radioactive material in the shut down facility at the time the theft occurred was below the limit where measures of physical protection are required by the German regulatory work discussions were raised on consequences to be drawn from this incident to close this obvious gap. The German Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection and Reactor Safety (BMU) as the superior competent authority therefore ordered GRS to draft a set of fundamental requirements for future rules to make a repetition of the initiating incident unlikely. Further discussions of the authorities involved on supplementary rules and guidelines aiming to better protect small amounts of radioactive material from being illegally removed out of nuclear facilities and laboratories are based on these fundamentals defined by GRS but not yet finished. (orig.)

  1. Status of physical protection systems of nuclear facilities; survey report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, In Koo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Ahn, Jin Soo; Lee, Hyun Chul; Kim, Jung Soo

    2002-02-01

    This report presents a survey on the physical protection equipment for a nuclear power plant. This survey was conducted by Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute as a part of the project, 'Development of Technologies for National Control of and Accountancy for Nuclear Material,' funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Korea. A physical protection system of a nuclear plant includes outer and inner fences, intrusion detection sensors, alarm generation system, illumination equipment, central monitoring and control station, entry control and management system, etc. The outermost fence indicates the boundary of the plant area and prevents a simple or unintentional intrusion. The inner fence area of each plant unit associated with intrusion detection sensors, illuminators, monitoring cameras, serves the key role for physical protection function for the nuclear plant

  2. Transport of nuclear material under the 1971 Brussels Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lagorce, M.

    1975-01-01

    The legal regime in force before entry into force of the 1971 Brussels Convention relating to civil liability for the maritime carriage of nuclear material created serious difficulties for maritime carriers, regarding both the financial risks entailed and restrictions on enjoyment of the rights granted by civil liability conventions. The 1971 Convention exonerates from liability any person likely to be held liable for nuclear damage under maritime law, provided another person is liable under the nuclear conventions or an equivalent national law. A problem remaining is that of compensation of nuclear damage to the means of transport for countries not having opted for re-inclusion of such damage in the nuclear law regime; this does not apply however to countries having ratified the Convention to date. A feature of the latter is that it establishes as extensively as possible the priority of nuclear law over maritime law. Furthermore the new regime continues to preserve efficiently the interests of victims of nuclear incidents. It is therefore to be hoped that insurers will no longer hesitate to cover international maritime carriage of nuclear material [fr

  3. Design and evaluation of physical protection systems of nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    An, Jin Soo; Lee, Hyun Chul; Hwang, In Koo; Kwack, Eun Ho; Choi, Yung Myung

    2001-06-01

    Nuclear material and safety equipment of nuclear facilities are required to be protected against any kind of theft or sabotage. Physical protection is one of the measures to prevent such illegally potential threats for public security. It should cover all the cases of use, storage, and transportation of nuclear material. A physical protection system of a facility consists of exterior intrusion sensors, interior intrusion sensors, an alarm assessment and communication system, entry control systems, access delay equipment, etc. The design of an effective physical protection system requires a comprehensive approach in which the designers define the objective of the system, establish an initial design, and evaluate the proposed design. The evaluation results are used to determine whether or not the initial design should be modified and improved. Some modelling techniques are commonly used to analyse and evaluate the performance of a physical protection system. Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute(KAERI) has developed a prototype of software as a part of a full computer model for effectiveness evaluation for physical protection systems. The input data elements for the prototype, contain the type of adversary, tactics, protection equipment, and the attributes of each protection component. This report contains the functional and structural requirements defined in the development of the evaluation computer model.

  4. The trend on legislation of physical protection law and the effective measures for its implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, J. W.

    2002-01-01

    As a part of strengthening the international regime of physical protection, the 'Legal and Technical Experts Meeting' to prepare a draft amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material(INFCIRC/274/Rev.1) has been held under the auspices of IAEA Secretariat, based on the results of about two-year discussion related to its amendment among the Member States. In addition, terrorism of last September in the United States has made the amendment work of the Convention speed up to quickly cope with the real threat of nuclear facility, and the Diplomatic Conference for its amendment would be held at the end of this year. In order to meet these international strengthening trends and to prepare the measures against radiological emergency with the re-establishment of domestic protection system, Korean government has currently pursued to establish a comprehensive 'law for Physical Protection and Measures against Radiological Emergency' This paper suggests the consideration on domestic status of the legal system, the trend of its legislation and the effective measures for its implementation, to efficiently maintain domestic system of physical protection

  5. Increasing the effectiveness of the physical protection system on a nuclear facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vaz, Antonio C.A.; Conti, Thadeu N., E-mail: acavaz@ipen.br, E-mail: tnconti@ipen.br [Instituto de Pesquisas Energéticas e Nucleares (IPEN/CNEN-SP), São Paulo, SP (Brazil)

    2017-07-01

    The malicious use of radioactive material could be devastating, particularly in the case of a nuclear explosive device, it could be unpredictably disruptive resulting in the dispersal of radioactive material, like it was in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster. Physical Protection System (PPS) plays an important role in ensuring that individuals, organizations and institutions remain vigilant and that sustained measures are taken to prevent and combat the threat of sabotage or of using radioactive material for malicious acts. PPS is an integrated system of people, equipment and procedures used to protect nuclear facilities and radioactive sources against threat, theft or sabotage. In the operator's perspective, this paper study factors influencing the performance of a PPS in a nuclear facility suggesting ways to increase the system effectiveness. The human factor, the physical and the psychological work environment has a large impact on how personnel perform their work and comply with nuclear security requirements. Apathy and corporatism are two human behaviors that collaborate negatively and make decrease the effectiveness of any PPS. Job satisfaction reduces the probability that personnel will become less reliable and/or obstructive in extreme cases an insider threat. Managers must recognize individual and group needs and the relationship among personnel so that they may motivate personnel by creating a supportive working environment that reduces workplace stress. An effective PPS can result in a significant increase in the effectiveness of the security of radioactive material and associated facilities. (author)

  6. Increasing the effectiveness of the physical protection system on a nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaz, Antonio C.A.; Conti, Thadeu N.

    2017-01-01

    The malicious use of radioactive material could be devastating, particularly in the case of a nuclear explosive device, it could be unpredictably disruptive resulting in the dispersal of radioactive material, like it was in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster. Physical Protection System (PPS) plays an important role in ensuring that individuals, organizations and institutions remain vigilant and that sustained measures are taken to prevent and combat the threat of sabotage or of using radioactive material for malicious acts. PPS is an integrated system of people, equipment and procedures used to protect nuclear facilities and radioactive sources against threat, theft or sabotage. In the operator's perspective, this paper study factors influencing the performance of a PPS in a nuclear facility suggesting ways to increase the system effectiveness. The human factor, the physical and the psychological work environment has a large impact on how personnel perform their work and comply with nuclear security requirements. Apathy and corporatism are two human behaviors that collaborate negatively and make decrease the effectiveness of any PPS. Job satisfaction reduces the probability that personnel will become less reliable and/or obstructive in extreme cases an insider threat. Managers must recognize individual and group needs and the relationship among personnel so that they may motivate personnel by creating a supportive working environment that reduces workplace stress. An effective PPS can result in a significant increase in the effectiveness of the security of radioactive material and associated facilities. (author)

  7. A study on international nuclear organizations and conventions for the globalization of Korean nuclear community

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Kwang Seok; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Byung Wook; Cho, Il Hoon; Lee, Jae Sung; Choi, Young Rok; Ko, Han Seok; Ham, Chul Hoon; Lee, Byung Woon [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1995-12-01

    The objective of this study is to analyze the current status of international nuclear organizations and conventions in systems perspective and suggest national strategies for utilizing them for the globalization of Korean nuclear community. This study analyzes the current status of international nuclear organizations such as IAEA(International Atomic Energy Agency) and international nuclear conventions related to nuclear accidents, nuclear liability, physical protection or nuclear safety. Based on the analysis, this study suggests national strategies, in general and specific terms, to utilize international nuclear organizations and conventions for the globalization of Korean nuclear community. Separately from this report this study publishes `IAEA Handbook`, which contains all about IAEA such as statute, membership, organizational structure, main activities, finance and budget, etc.. 9 tabs., 2 figs., 35 refs. (Author).

  8. A study on international nuclear organizations and conventions for the globalization of Korean nuclear community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Kwang Seok; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Byung Wook; Cho, Il Hoon; Lee, Jae Sung; Choi, Young Rok; Ko, Han Seok; Ham, Chul Hoon; Lee, Byung Woon

    1995-12-01

    The objective of this study is to analyze the current status of international nuclear organizations and conventions in systems perspective and suggest national strategies for utilizing them for the globalization of Korean nuclear community. This study analyzes the current status of international nuclear organizations such as IAEA(International Atomic Energy Agency) and international nuclear conventions related to nuclear accidents, nuclear liability, physical protection or nuclear safety. Based on the analysis, this study suggests national strategies, in general and specific terms, to utilize international nuclear organizations and conventions for the globalization of Korean nuclear community. Separately from this report this study publishes 'IAEA Handbook', which contains all about IAEA such as statute, membership, organizational structure, main activities, finance and budget, etc.. 9 tabs., 2 figs., 35 refs. (Author)

  9. Guidance and considerations for the implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; Orientaciones y sugerencias para la aplicacion del documento INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, proteccion fisica de los materiales y las instalaciones nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-05-01

    This publication is intended to provide guidance and considerations for a State's competent authority to better understand and prescribe appropriate requirements, consistent with INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 for the protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities which are compatible with accepted international practice. This report, together with a more detailed report, Handbook on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities, which addresses to the licensee or designer of physical protection systems who has specific implementation and compliance responsibilities, should be used in conjunction to each other to provide better and comprehensive guidance on physical protection.

  10. Physical protection of nuclear materials: Experience in regulation, implementation and operations. Proceedings of a conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The conference was held at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna from 10 to 14 November 1997. It was attended by 162 registered participants from 42 countries and eight international organizations. The 58 papers presented dealt with the experience of regulators, designers and facility operators, including response forces, in meeting the demands and requirements in this changing area of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Individual abstracts were prepared for each of the papers. Topics covered include contemporary and emerging issues, experience in regulation, implementation at facilities, program assessment and cooperation, hardware and software, illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, and transportation

  11. Central eastern Europe approach to the security over nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smagala, G.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: This paper presents an overview of the national approaches to physical protection of nuclear materials in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), with an emphasis on Poland. Soviet influence in the past led to inadequate safety culture in nuclear activities and insufficient security of nuclear materials and facilities in the region. In the centralized economies all aspects of nuclear activities, including ownership of the nuclear facilities, were the responsibility of the state with no clear separation between regulating and promoting functions. During the last decade a significant progress has been made in the region to clean up the legacy of the past and to improve practices in physical protection of nuclear materials. The countries of Central Eastern Europe have had many similar deficiencies in nuclear field and problems to overcome, but cannot be viewed as a uniform block. There are local variations within the region in a size of nuclear activities, formulated respective regulations and adopted measures to secure nuclear materials and facilities. Nevertheless, all twelve nations, with nuclear reactors and without nuclear facilities, have joined the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material and most of them declare that they have followed the IAEA recommendations INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 to elaborate and implement their physical protection systems of nuclear materials and facilities. The largest request for an international advisory mission (IPPAS) to review states' physical protection systems and to address needs for improvement was received from the countries of Central Eastern Europe. Poland belongs to the beneficiaries where the IPPAS mission and later follow-up consultations resulted in physical protection upgrade of the research reactor under the IAEA/US/UK technical assistance project. A powerful incentive to the progress made in a number of CEE countries was the goal of accession to the European Union. The physical protection of nuclear

  12. Standard format and content of a licensee physical protection plan for strategic special nuclear material in transit - April 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    A predetermined plan to respond to safeguards contingency events is required to be prepared, based on personnel and other physical protection resources described in the Physical Protection Plan for strategic special nuclear material (SSNM) in transit. Specific requirements for the contingency plan are provided in Appendix C. Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans, to 10 CFR Part 73. Regulatory Guide 5.56, Standard Format and Content of Safeguards Contingency Plans for Transportation, provides guidance for the preparation of transportation contingency plans. Licensee is reminded that all three submissions - the Physical Protection Plan, the Physical Protection Arrangements for Specific Shipments, and the Safeguards Contingency Plan - together describe the system for physical protection of each particular shipment. They should be developed and maintained to be completely consistent with each other for each shipment

  13. Physics and technology of nuclear materials

    CERN Document Server

    Ursu, Ioan

    2015-01-01

    Physics and Technology of Nuclear Materials presents basic information regarding the structure, properties, processing methods, and response to irradiation of the key materials that fission and fusion nuclear reactors have to rely upon. Organized into 12 chapters, this book begins with selectively several fundamentals of nuclear physics. Subsequent chapters focus on the nuclear materials science; nuclear fuel; structural materials; moderator materials employed to """"slow down"""" fission neutrons; and neutron highly absorbent materials that serve in reactor's power control. Other chapters exp

  14. Physical protection system to detect and control the illicit trafficking and transfer of nuclear materials in Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cho, Young Ho [Catholic Univ. of Daegu, Gyeongbuk (Korea, Republic of); Moon, Joo Hyun [Dongguk Univ., Gyeongbuk (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-11-15

    Physical protection has played an essential role in ensuring the implementation of global nuclear nonproliferation framework for the past decades. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks upon the United States, physical protection has also played the same role in combating nuclear terrorism. Nowadays, physical protection is more highlighted than before with global nuclear security regimes more strengthened. Ever since the commencement of the first nuclear power plant in 1978, Korea has devotedly implemented international physical protection standards as an exemplary country in respect of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Korean government has recently reinforced national physical protection policy including the revision of laws and regulations. In this paper, the national policy is extensively reviewed and additional measures are proposed to enhance the national physical protection system. (orig.)

  15. The declaration regime: An efficient tool to improve control and protection of nuclear materials in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillette-Cousin, L.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The French Government set up a national safeguards system under the authority of the Ministry for Industry to control nuclear materials within national boundaries and to ensure physical protection for nuclear materials, even for the small quantities held by users in industrial, medical and research areas. The main nuclear materials detained by small owners are depleted uranium and thorium. These materials are present in manufactured equipment (radiation shielding in industrial gammagraphy and radiotherapy, collimation devices and other accessories) which are used or unused, which may be damaged or left as scraps. The French protection and control system of nuclear materials is an original system based on detailed and comprehensive regulations, taking into account in a specific way the small users of nuclear materials. The decree no. 81-512 of 12 May 1981 establishes three different regimes: licensing, declaration and exemption, according to the nature and quantity of nuclear materials involved. Typically, the declaration regime applies to quantities of depleted uranium or thorium, greater than 1 kg and lower than 500 kg. The Order of 14 March 1984 sets the requirements related to the control and physical protection of nuclear materials in the frame of the declaration regime. A declaration must be established every year by the operator and sent to the IPSN, acting as technical support body of the national authority. This declaration provides the stock of all nuclear materials held by the operator and stock variations occurred during the previous year, including the identification of senders and receivers. Before fulfilling its annual declaration, the operator must carry out a physical inventory of all nuclear material, both used and unused. The declaration also describes the main features concerning facility layout related to surveillance and physical protection of materials. With respect to physical protection requirements, nuclear materials should be

  16. Initiatives to strengthen physical protection in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, H.; Yagi, T.; Endo, M.; Murajiri, M.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) was established under the approval of the Japanese Government in 1972 to function as an important organization to implement national safeguards system together with the Government. It has been also working on R and D of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, and enhancing the awareness of the importance of the physical protection among physical protection related people. Japan has now 52 nuclear power reactors, accounting for about one-third of the nations electricity generation. Also nuclear fuel cycle facilities as enrichment plants, radioactive waste disposal facilities and reprocessing plant are either in operation or under construction at Rokkasho-Mura, Aomori prefecture. NMCC is doing several initiatives to strengthen and increase the understanding of the physical protection in Japan by disseminating necessary information to people which are described in the following: 1. Physical protection seminar for the physical protection specialists and management people - It is very important for the physical protection specialists as well as management people who are working at nuclear facilities to be able to get access to the related sophisticated information on the information on the global physical protection issues, physical protection regulations, physical protection systems and equipment etc. This kind of seminar was started in 19xx and is held once a year for two days in Tokyo. The curriculum includes global physical protection issues, physical protection related activities such as terrorism, current R and D, and application of equipment, experiences gained at nuclear facilities. About 70 people participate in the seminar every year. 2. Physical protection seminar for the physical protection related local people - It is more and more important for the nuclear industry to disseminate information to the local people about the nuclear facility operation. Such local people as local government

  17. Program for upgrading nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting at all facilities within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yuferev, V.; Zhikharev, S.; Yakimov, Y.

    1998-01-01

    As part of the Department of Energy-Russian program for strengthening nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A), plans have now been formulated to install an integrated MPC and A system at all facilities containing large quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF, Arzamas-16) complex. In addition to storage facilities, the complex houses a number of critical facilities used to conduct nuclear physics research and facilities for developing procedures for disassembly of nuclear weapons

  18. Implementing Physical Protection Education for an Enhanced Nuclear Security Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Jeong Ho; Kim, Hyun Chul; Shin, Ick Hyun; Lee, Hyung Kyung; Choe, Kwan Kyoo [KINAC, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    In this paper, we are going to outline our efforts and experiences at implementing physical protection education. KINAC (as the only designated educational institute) places great effort in delivering an effective and a high-quality education program for physical protection. We have also provided a way for nuclear operators to share the lessons they have gained through their own experiences. We made physical protection education an important communication channel, not only among nuclear operators but also between operators and a regulatory body. There is growing attention given to education and training on the subject of physical protection in order to enhance the nuclear security culture. The IAEA recommends that all personnel in organizations directly involved with the nuclear industry receive regularly education in physical protection according to the recently revised INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), which are mainly responsible for the national nuclear security regime, have already recognized the importance of education and training in physical protection. The NSSC enacted its decree on physical protection education and training in 2010. KINAC was designated as the first educational institute in 2011 and implemented physical protection education as mandatory from 2012.

  19. Implementing Physical Protection Education for an Enhanced Nuclear Security Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jeong Ho; Kim, Hyun Chul; Shin, Ick Hyun; Lee, Hyung Kyung; Choe, Kwan Kyoo

    2013-01-01

    In this paper, we are going to outline our efforts and experiences at implementing physical protection education. KINAC (as the only designated educational institute) places great effort in delivering an effective and a high-quality education program for physical protection. We have also provided a way for nuclear operators to share the lessons they have gained through their own experiences. We made physical protection education an important communication channel, not only among nuclear operators but also between operators and a regulatory body. There is growing attention given to education and training on the subject of physical protection in order to enhance the nuclear security culture. The IAEA recommends that all personnel in organizations directly involved with the nuclear industry receive regularly education in physical protection according to the recently revised INFCIRC/225/Rev.5. The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), which are mainly responsible for the national nuclear security regime, have already recognized the importance of education and training in physical protection. The NSSC enacted its decree on physical protection education and training in 2010. KINAC was designated as the first educational institute in 2011 and implemented physical protection education as mandatory from 2012

  20. Application of crime countermeasures for the protection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, C.H.

    1975-01-01

    Federal regulations prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and published in the Federal Register require licensees to take appropriate action to protect the health and safety of the public from unauthorized use of special nuclear material (SNM), which includes plutonium, uranium-233, and highly enriched uranium. Crime countermeasures for compliance with these regulations are an important part of the guidance that is provided by the NRC's Office of Standards Development. The use of crime countermeasures and protective devices is intended to prevent the unauthorized diversion of material and to aid in the detection of diversion should it be attempted. Plant and equipment designs should incorporate both electronic and physical security measures for protection of SNM. This applies to facilities and equipment for reprocessing, fabrication, and transportation of SNM. The protection systems include physical barriers, access controls, intrusion detection devices, surveillance devices, central alarm stations, communications, and response capability. Acceptable security measures and devices applicable to protected areas, material access areas, vital areas, vital equipment, and transportation vehicles have been presented in Regulatory Guides. (U.S.)

  1. Application of nuclear-physics methods in space materials science

    Science.gov (United States)

    Novikov, L. S.; Voronina, E. N.; Galanina, L. I.; Chirskaya, N. P.

    2017-07-01

    The brief history of the development of investigations at the Skobeltsyn Institute of Nuclear Physics, Moscow State University (SINP MSU) in the field of space materials science is outlined. A generalized scheme of a numerical simulation of the radiation impact on spacecraft materials and elements of spacecraft equipment is examined. The results obtained by solving some of the most important problems that modern space materials science should address in studying nuclear processes, the interaction of charged particles with matter, particle detection, the protection from ionizing radiation, and the impact of particles on nanostructures and nanomaterials are presented.

  2. Physical protection of special nuclear materials in the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rossnagel, A.

    1987-01-01

    Measures to protect special nuclear materials in West Germany are based on a relatively likely average threat and not on the less-likely but maximum credible threat. The reason is to avoid the costs of maintaining a very high level of security that is seldom needed. The concept of delayed action, which divides the responsibility for security between private protection forces and local police forces, would be insufficient in the event of the maximum credible threat. In principle, sufficient security is possible only when the facilities and transports are constantly protected by a police force large enough to deal with the maximum credible threat without assistance from outside. They must also be adequately armed to avert all possible attackers, and they must be paid by the licensees. The threat of an insider(s) diverting special nuclear material can be addressed only by strengthening the scope and depth of the checks on applicants and employees and the permanent work controls. It is recognized, however, that such security measures may not be compatible with constitutional civil liberties

  3. International Efforts for the Nuclear Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoo, Ho Sik; Kwak, Sung Woo; Lee, Ho Jin; Shim, Hye Won; Lee, Jong Uk

    2005-01-01

    Many concerns have been focused on the nuclear security since the 9.11. With increasing the threat related to nuclear material and nuclear facilities, the demand of strengthening the international physical protection system has been raised. Along with this, the international communities are making their efforts to increase nuclear security. The agreement of revising the 'Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials'(hereafter, CPPNM), which was held in Vienna on the July of 2005, was one of these efforts. U.N is also preparing the 'International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism' to show its firm resolution against nuclear terror. It is important to understand what measures should be taken to meet the international standard for establishing national physical protection system. To do this, international trend on the physical protection system such as CPPNM and U.N. convention should be followed. This paper explains about the content of the CPPNM and U.N convention. They will be helpful to consolidate the physical protection system in Korea

  4. Physical protection: his contribution to the safety culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.E.; Cesario, R.H.; Giustina, D.H.; Canibano, J.

    1998-01-01

    Full text: As a contribution to the safety culture improvement, the present paper aims at raising awareness about the importance of physical protection measures and, this way, increase the commitment of those responsible for the materials or nuclear installations safety that can cause severe radiological consequences to the public. To that purpose, a brief description is made of the basic criteria used for the design of a Physical Protection System and the introduction of our own computational tool designed and developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Authority to evaluate this type of systems. Likewise, comments are made on the illicit traffic events occurred during the last years involving nuclear materials and other radioactive sources out of some States control, showing that these type of materials are easily accessible and that there are always individuals willing to selling and buying it. Even though events like these won't grant enough uranium or plutonium to fabricate a nuclear weapon, but non-stables isotope and conventional explosives could be mixed to produce a huge contamination. These reported cases had built some public concern and threatened to set a lack of trust on the control systems in use. Even though, no nuclear material diversion and equipment of nuclear interest within the nuclear installations where it is in force the AR 10.13.1 Standard -Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities-, have been detected as of today, as a conclusion we must say that only a permanent strengthening of each link of the safety chain will allow a level of an adequate safety. This requires that the already established politics set by the safety authorities reach a high level of commitment by the individuals involved. (author) [es

  5. Safeguards Strategy in Physical Protection System for Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ade lndra B; Kasturi; Tatang Eryadi

    2004-01-01

    Safeguards strategy is directed at efforts of eliminating theft of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installation. For achieving the above objective, it is necessary to set up safeguards strategy in physical protection of nuclear materials and installation. The safeguards strategy starts from anticipated security condition, list of thefts, planning referred to as safeguards planning. Safeguards planning are implemented in safeguards implementation, followed up then by evaluation. Results of evaluation are equipped with results of safeguards survey already developed. Safeguards' planning is made from these results and serve as guidelines for next safeguards implementation and is repeated to form a safeguard cycle. One safeguard cycle is made on a periodical basis, at least annually. (author)

  6. Chapter No.5. Nuclear materials and physical protection of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) is based on requirements resulting from the Safeguards Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the IAEA. UJD performs this activity according to the 'Atomic Act' and relevant decree. The purpose of the SSAC is also to prevent unauthorised use of nuclear materials, to detect loses of nuclear materials and provide information that could lead to the recovery of missing material. The main part of nuclear materials under jurisdiction of the Slovak Republic is located at NPP Jaslovske Bohunice, NPP Mochovce and at interim storage in Jaslovske Bohunice. Even though that there are located more then 99% of nuclear materials in these nuclear facilities, there are not any significant problems with their accountancy and control due to very simply identification of accountancy units - fuel assemblies, and due to stability of legal subjects responsible for operation and for keeping of information continuity, which is necessary for fulfilling requirements of the Agreement. The nuclear material located outside nuclear facilities is a special category. There are 81 such subjects of different types and orientations on the territory of the Slovak Republic. These subjects use mainly depleted uranium as a shielding and small quantity of natural uranium, low enrichment uranium and thorium for experimental purposes and education. Frequent changes of these subjects, their transformations into the other subjects, extinction and very high fluctuation of employees causes loss of information about nuclear materials and creates problems with fulfilling requirements resulting from the Agreement. In 2001, the UJD carried out 51 inspections of nuclear materials, of which 31 inspections were performed at nuclear installations in co-operation with the IAEA inspectors. No discrepancies concerning the management of nuclear materials were found out during inspections and safeguards goals in year 2001 were

  7. Cooperative efforts to improve nuclear materials accounting, control and physical protection at the National Science Center, Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zelensky, V.F.; Mikhailov, V.A.

    1996-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Ukrainian Government are engaged in a program of cooperation to enhance the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons by developing a strong national system of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A). This paper describes the capabilities and work of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT) and cooperative efforts to improve MPC and A at this facility. It describes how these cooperative efforts grew out of Ukraine''s decision to become a non-nuclear weapon state and the shortcomings in MPC and A that developed at KIPT after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. It also envisions expanded future cooperation in other areas of nuclear materials management

  8. Collaborative Russian-US work in nuclear material protection, control and accounting at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. II. extension to additional facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuzin, V.V.; Pshakin, G.M.; Belov, A.P.

    1996-01-01

    During 1995, collaborative Russian-US nuclear material protection, control and accounting (MPC ampersand A) tasks at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Obninsk, Russia focused on improving the protection of nuclear materials at the BFS Fast Critical Facility. BFS has thousands of fuel disks containing highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium that are used to simulate the core configurations of experimental reactors in two critical assemblies. Completed tasks culminated in demonstrations of newly implemented equipment and methods that enhanced the MPC ampersand A at BFS through computerized accounting, nondestructive inventory verification measurements, personnel identification and assess control, physical inventory taking, physical protection, and video surveillance. The collaborative work is now being extended. The additional tasks encompass communications and tamper-indicating devices; new storage alternatives; and systemization of the MPC ampersand A elements that are being implemented

  9. Nuclear materials management handbook. Safeguards, physical protection of nuclear material. 1995 ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    Now, very safe and stable supply of electric power has become to be obtained by nuclear energy, and Japan has steadily promoted nuclear power as the basic energy that contributes to overcome the unstable structure of energy supply in Japan highly depending on foreign countries, as shown in the long term plan of the research, development and utilization of nuclear power. Great progress was observed in nuclear fuel recycling in Japan such as the attainment of initial criticality of the prototype FBR 'Monju' and the start of construction of the commercial fuel reprocessing plant in Rokkasho. Recently the recognition of the importance of nuclear substance management has heightened, and the measures for maintaining and strengthening the reliability of nuclear nonproliferation system are investigated. It is important that Japan strictly observes the nuclear nonproliferation system based on the NPT which was extended infinitely. In this handbook, the outline of the measures for nuclear nonproliferation and safeguard and the protection of nuclear substances, the treaties and agreements and the national laws related to these are described. (K.I.)

  10. Physics and technology of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ursu, I.

    1985-01-01

    The subject is covered in chapters, entitled; elements of nuclear reactor physics; structure and properties of materials (including radiation effects); fuel materials (uranium, plutonium, thorium); structural materials (including - aluminium, zirconium, stainless steels, ferritic steels, magnesium alloys, neutron irradiation induced changes in the mechanical properties of structural materials); moderator materials (including - nuclear graphite, natural (light) water, heavy water, beryllium, metal hydrides); materials for reactor reactivity control; coolant materials; shielding materials; nuclear fuel elements; nuclear material recovery from irradiated fuel and recycling; quality control of nuclear materials; materials for fusion reactors (thermonuclear fusion reaction, physical processes in fusion reactors, fuel materials, materials for blanket and cooling system, structural materials, materials for magnetic devices, specific problems of material irradiation). (U.K.)

  11. Educational and laboratory base for the expert training on physical protection of nuclear materials: the requirements and experience of practical implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bondarev, P.V.; Pogozhin, N.S.; Ryzhukhin, D.V.; Tolstoy, A.I.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In expert training on physical protection of nuclear materials (NMPP) an educational and laboratory base has special importance. In these laboratories the students receive practical skills concerning physical protection systems (PPS). The basic requirements for creating such base are formulated in a certain educational program implemented at an educational institution. Thus it is necessary to take into account the following features of a modern nuclear object PPS: restriction of an object visiting with the purpose of acquaintance with features of a certain object PPS; dynamical change of PPS component nomenclature; increase of use of computer facilities for managing all PPS subsystems; increase of integration degree of separate subsystems in a uniform PPS complex; high cost of PPS components. Taking that into consideration a university, which assumes to begin the expert training on NMPP, is compelled to solve the following tasks: creation of its own laboratory base. The implementation of practical occupations with visiting a nuclear object cannot be executed practically; definition of quantity and structure of educational laboratories. Thus the features of the implemented educational plan should be taken into account in addition; optimization of expenses on laboratory creation. The regular updating of laboratory equipment structure is impossible in a practical manner. Therefore unique correct decision is to supply laboratories with the equipment, which uses the typical technological decisions on performing the basic PPS functions (detection, delay, estimation of a situation, neutralization); development of laboratory work conducting procedures (laboratory practical works); technical support of the created laboratories. The certain experience of solving the listed tasks is accumulated at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (State University) (MEPhl) while implementing 'Physical Protection, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials' master

  12. Proceedings of the 6. Argentine congress on radiation protection and nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The 6th Argentine Congress on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety was organized by the Radioprotection Argentine Society, in Buenos Aires, between the 22 and 24 of september of 1998. In this event, were presented almost 66 papers in the following sessions, about these subjects: 1.- Safety in nuclear installations. 2.- Control of nuclear material and physical protection of nuclear installations. 3.- Programs of quality assurance. 4.- Training, technical information and public information. 5.- Physical dosimetry. 6.- Physical dosimetry and occupational radiation protection. 7.- Exposure of the natural radiation. 8.- Environmental radiological safety. 9.- Biological effects of the ionizing radiations and biological dosimetry. 10.- Radiological protection of the medical practice and the radiological emergencies. 11.- Radioactive wastes management. 12.- Transport of radioactive materials

  13. Achievements, current status and prospects for Russian-American cooperation in nuclear material physical protection, control and accounting - 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nikiforov, N.V.

    1999-01-01

    The process of upgrading the material physical protection, control and accounting systems is an ongoing and long-term process that consists of modernization measuring equipment and methodologies, improving, data exchange and processing technologies, and improving administrative procedures. The positive results that was already achieved form a foundation upon which this collaboration may extend into other new and important areas, such as - the second and third lines of defence, which are directed toward countering illegal trafficking not only in nuclear materials, but in other hazardous substances that constitute a threat to the nuclear sites and national security of the countries [ru

  14. Workshop materials from the 2nd international training course on physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials, Module 13

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, F.P.

    1980-04-01

    This course is intended for representatives of countries where nuclear power is being developed and whose responsibilities include the preparation of regulation and the design and evaluation of physical protection systems. This is the second of two volumes; the first volume is SAND-79-1090

  15. Strengthening global norms for protecting nuclear materials - feedback on little countries radiation safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chelidze, L.; Kakushadze, S.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Georgia is the part of New Great Silk Road, connecting Europe and Asia. Along this rout will be laid oil and gas pipelines, transport and telecommunication lines. Unfortunately, besides economical communication, the rout can be used for illegal transit of nuclear materials. There is special concern regarding uncontrolled territories of conflict zones. Taking into consideration recent terrible terrorist acts we feel great responsibility for ensuring safety of this rout, which is a precondition of economical development and political stability of the whole Caucasian region A potentially hazardous radiological situation developed in Georgia with orphan radiation sources in the late 1990s and 2001: discovery of high-activity strong Radiation sources of (Strontium-90 from thermo-generators) in Tsalenjikha district. Eight such generators were brought to Georgia in 1984, and four of them have been found in Svanety mountainous region in addition to the two found in the Tsalenjikha, but remaining two are not yet found. During the last years several incidents of illicit trafficking were reported. The radiation problems greatly relate to the withdrawal of the Russian military bases. The radiological accident took place in Lilo, Georgia, when sealed radiation sources had been abandoned by a previous owner at a site. Taking into account the geopolitical location of Georgia it is quite important to strengthen the physical protection infrastructure in country with has serious territorial problems. The first step was to provide an appropriate legal framework for the safety management in the country and clearly identify regulatory body. The ministry implements state control in the nuclear and radiation safety field for protection of environment and natural resources of Georgia (hereinafter referred to as the Ministry). The Ministry is obliged to supervise the physical protection systems. The Ministry shall co-ordinate the state system of physical protection of the use

  16. Experience of developing and introduction of the integrated systems for accounting, control and physical protection of nuclear materials under conditions of continuously operating production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Filatov, O.N.; Rogachev, V.E.

    2003-01-01

    The improvements of the integrated systems for accounting, control and physical protection (ACPP) of nuclear materials under conditions practically continuous production cycle are described. As a result of development and introduction of the improved means and technologies the developed systems realized successfully the requirements of reliable ACPP of nuclear materials [ru

  17. Application of a Physical Protection to HANARO

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryu, Jeong-Soo; Park, Cheol; Cho, Yeong-Garp; Lee, Jung-Hee; Jung, Hoan-Sung

    2006-01-01

    After the fearful terror attack on September 11, 2001, in USA, international nuclear society has strengthened its physical protection system against nuclear reactors to prevent the theft of nuclear materials and its ill-intended application, and the destruction of nuclear installations and the obstruction of an operation in such facilities. In the nuclear agreements between Korea and USA or other countries, the observance of the IAEA recommendations on a physical protection for a nuclear installation and nuclear materials is clearly requested. Since IAEA recommendation on physical protection was revised more strictly, KAERI made a plan to follow the strengthened IAEA recommendation and to improve the physical protection for the HANARO and fuel fabrication building. In response to the plan for the improvement of the physical protection system, the reactor hall, control room, and fuel fabrication building was established as the boundary of a physical protection concept. Accordingly, the existing doors were recommended to be replaced with new security doors against a terror attack. Therefore, security doors reflecting the design characteristics of the HANARO have been developed to replace the existing doors, and the design, fabrication, driving and leak tight tests were carried out before an installation. For securing a safety and easy operation of the security doors, HANARO access control system (HANACS) has been developed to perform a real time communication and identification of persons for an access control

  18. Physical protection as the most important part of the national system of combating illicit trafficking

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ivanov, P.; Kokhan, V.D.

    2001-01-01

    based on the Convention on Physical Protection, IAEA Guidelines and Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Installations as well as 'Basic Safety Standards for Ionising Radiation', practical application of which facilitates the development of a national system for combating illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and sources of radiation. These documents will assist in creating basic national legislation. An integrated approach should be provided for the improvement of the System of Physical Protection. These are main provisions of the Concept of Integration of the System of Physical Protection with the System of Accountancy and Control of Nuclear Materials. Goals: earlier detection of theft; improve accuracy of accounts, strengthen objectives and integrity of control; ensure personnel's safety; reduce dependence on human factor; speed-up detection and retrieval of stolen or lost material. The system is based on: national norms and regulations for accountancy, control and physical protection of nuclear materials and installations; existing control and management structure for nuclear materials and nuclear installations; senior officials and companies responsible for organization and quality assurance regarding work on accountancy, control and physical protection; new principles of accountancy and control; methods for supervision of working procedures, response to any abnormal event; model of life circle of nuclear materials; zone classification of nuclear materials etc. Establishment of single integrated system for accountancy, control and physical protection will undoubtedly lead to handling illicit trafficking of nuclear materials more efficiently and to eliminating unauthorized distribution of nuclear materials

  19. Physical protection enhancements in Japan and the role of JNES

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nishida, Seishi

    2010-01-01

    The possibility of terrorist attacks on nuclear material and nuclear facilities has posed a continuing threat since the events of September 11, 2001. The Japanese government has strengthened its physical protection regime, including legislative amendments, due to the necessity of upgrading the degree of protection of nuclear facilities to be equivalent to international levels, in order to cope effectively with the threat of theft of nuclear material and sabotage of nuclear facilities. In relation to these enhancements of the physical protection regime in Japan, the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) gives technical support to the regulatory agency, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), in the area of physical protection examination and inspection, through the development of technical guides for inspectors and operators, acquisition, analysis, and evaluation of related information, and international cooperation. This support is aimed at ensuring the consistent implementation of physical protection measures in Japan. In the future also, the JNES will provide further support to the NISA aimed at a well-developed physical protection framework in Japan, giving consideration to international physical protection enhancements such as publication of IAEA nuclear security series documents, inter alia Recommendations for physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities being also Revision 5 of INFCIRC 225. (author)

  20. Nuclear physics methods in materials research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bethge, K.; Baumann, H.; Jex, H.; Rauch, F.

    1980-01-01

    Proceedings of the seventh divisional conference of the Nuclear Physics Division held at Darmstadt, Germany, from 23rd through 26th of September, 1980. The scope of this conference was defined as follows: i) to inform solid state physicists and materials scientists about the application of nuclear physics methods; ii) to show to nuclear physicists open questions and problems in solid state physics and materials science to which their methods can be applied. According to the intentions of the conference, the various nuclear physics methods utilized in solid state physics and materials science and especially new developments were reviewed by invited speakers. Detailed aspects of the methods and typical examples extending over a wide range of applications were presented as contributions in poster sessions. The Proceedings contain all the invited papers and about 90% of the contributed papers. (orig./RW)

  1. Collaborative Russian-US work in nuclear material protection, control and accounting at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matveenko, I.P.; Pshakin, G.M.; Mozhaev, V.K.

    1995-01-01

    The Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) is a leading research center under the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation. IPPE encompasses many installations and many specialists who perform fundamental and applied investigations in nuclear power and technology for the national nuclear program. IPPE has a key role in the national nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC ampersand A) system both as a nuclear facility and also as a training center for MPC ampersand A. As a participant in the US-Russian Laboratory-to-Laboratory Cooperative Program in MPC ampersand A, IPPE is conducting several tasks in collaboration with US Department of Energy national laboratories. The main goal of these tasks is the rapid improvement of MPC ampersand A at one of the most sensitive operating IPPE installations, the BFS critical facility, which has large numbers of fuel items containing highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. After the completion of several test, evaluation, and demonstration tasks, it is hoped that the tested and adopted methods and procedures can be applied not only to the entire population of BFS fuel items, but also to other facilities at IPPE and other Russian nuclear institutes and operating facilities. The collaborative tasks cover seven areas: computerized nuclear material accounting, entry control and portals, item control and inventory, design evaluation and analysis, gamma and neutron assay, an integrated demonstration, and physical protection elements and test bed

  2. International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) Guidelines

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) was established by the IAEA in 1995 and is a fundamental part of the IAEA’s efforts to assist States, upon request, to establish and maintain an effective national nuclear security regime to protect against the unauthorized removal of nuclear and other radioactive material, and against the sabotage of nuclear and other associated facilities, as well as material during transport, while recognizing that the ultimate responsibility for physical protection lies with the State. IPPAS provides peer review on implementing relevant international instruments, in particular the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), together with the 2005 Amendment, and on implementing the IAEA Nuclear Security Series of guidance publications, in particular Fundamentals and Recommendations. IPPAS missions compare (insofar as this is possible) the procedures and practices employed by a State with the obligations specified under the CPPNM and the 2005 Amendment, as well as with the existing international consensus guidelines provided in relevant IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications. Since 1996, 63 IPPAS missions have been conducted in 40 countries, including 15 follow-up missions, as well as the recent mission to the IAEA Office of Safeguards Analytical Services laboratories, in Seibersdorf. More than 140 experts from 34 Member States have participated in the conduct of IPPAS missions as IPPAS team members or team leaders. The updated IPPAS guidelines reflect a modular approach to make them more flexible and responsive to the needs of States. The modular approach is an innovation of great value, ensuring the degree of flexibility required to fit individual national contexts, practices and objectives as expressed by the requesting States. In particular, it also offers States the opportunity to expand the scope of a requested IPPAS mission to embrace its nuclear security regime for the protection of

  3. Education in nuclear physics, medical physics and radiation protection in medicine and veterinary medicine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Popovic, D.; Djuric, G.; Andric, S.

    2001-01-01

    Education in Nuclear Physics, Medical Physics and Radiation Protection in medicine and veterinary medicine studies on Belgrade University is an integral part of the curriculum, incorporated in different courses of graduate and post-graduate studies. During graduate studies students get basic elements of Nuclear Physics through Physics and/or Biophysics courses in the 1 st year, while basic knowledge in Medical Physics and Radiation Protection is implemented in the courses of Radiology, Physical Therapy, Radiation Hygiene, Diagnostic Radiology and Radiation Therapy in the 4 th or 5 th year. Postgraduate studies offer MSc degree in Radiology, Physical Therapy, while courses in Nuclear Physics, Nuclear Instrumentation, Radiation Protection and Radiology are core or optional. On the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine graduated students may continue their professional education and obtain specialization degree in Radiology, Physical Therapy or Radiation Protection. On the Faculty of Medicine there are specialization degrees in Medical Nuclear Physics. Still, a closer analysis reveals a number of problems both from methodological and cognitive point of view. They are related mostly to graduate students ability to apply their knowledge in practise and with the qualifications of the educators, as those engaged in graduate studies lack basic knowledge in biological and medical sciences, while those engaged in post graduate studies mostly lack basic education in physics. Therefore, a reformed curricula resulting from much closer collaboration among educators, universities and professional societies at the national level should be considered. (author)

  4. Safeguards for special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.

    1979-12-01

    Safeguards, accountability, and nuclear materials are defined. The accuracy of measuring nuclear materials is discussed. The use of computers in nuclear materials accounting is described. Measures taken to physically protect nuclear materials are described

  5. The protection against nuclear risks under the international nuclear liability law: the geographical and technical scope of the international conventions on third party liability for nuclear damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kissich, S.J.

    2001-10-01

    This Ph.D.-research deals with the International Conventions on Third Party Liability for Nuclear Damage. In 1960, the Paris Convention was established with the aim of providing a special uniform nuclear third party liability regime for Western Europe. This Convention was supplemented in 1963 by the Brussels Supplementary Convention. Also in 1963, the Vienna Convention, which aimed to establish a world-wide system based on the same principles as the Paris Convention, was adopted. A further Convention was adopted in 1971 to ensure that nuclear third party liability law and not maritime law would apply to carriage of nuclear materials by sea. In 1988, the Paris and Vienna Conventions have been linked by the adoption of a Joint Protocol. In 1997, the process of amending the 1963 Vienna Convention was successfully concluded and a Convention on Supplementary Compensation was adopted. This Ph.D.-research consists of seven chapters: following an introduction, the second chapter gives a general view of the existing international legal sources. The third chapter describes the international civil nuclear liability law concept and its leading principles. The main element of this work is the question of the technical and geographical scope of the international nuclear liability conventions (chapter IV and V). The conventions are only applicable to nuclear incidents, which occur in a nuclear installation or incidental to the carriage or storage of nuclear material. The nuclear damage must arise out of the radioactive properties of nuclear substances which are also defined by legal terms. In addition, the scope of the conventions is limited by the nature of the installations. The geographical scope of application is established by the provisions on geographical coverage. Only the 1963 Vienna Convention does not contain any specific provision dealing with the territorial scope of its application. The geographical scope determines where the nuclear incident or the nuclear damage

  6. Collaborative Russian-US work in nuclear material protection, control and accounting at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering. 3: Emphasis on site-wide issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuzin, V.V.; Pshakin, G.M.; Belov, A.P.

    1997-07-01

    During 1997, collaborative Russian-US nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) tasks at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Obninsk, Russia are focusing increasingly on site-wide issues, though there is continued work at several major facilities: the Fast Critical Facility, the Technological Laboratory for Fuel Fabrication, and the (new and existing) Central Storage Facility. The collaborative work is being done with US Department of Energy National Laboratories. IPPE's emphasis on site-wide issues has resulted in the formation of a separate division for MPC and A. This new division reports directly to the IPPE Chief Engineer. It is a separate scientific and engineering operating division responsible for coordination and harmonization of MPC and A at IPPE, as well as for audit, assessment and inspection. By virtue of the organizational independence of this new division, IPPE has significantly strengthened the role of MPC and A. Two specific site-wide accomplishments are the consolidation of nuclear material from many buildings to a smaller number, and, as a major part of this strategy, the construction of a nuclear island surrounding the Fast Critical Facility and the new Central Storage Facility. Most of IPPE's weapons-grade nuclear materials will be concentrated within the nuclear island. The paper summarizes the following technical elements: computerized accounting, bar coding, weight measurements, gamma-ray measurements, tamper indicating devices, procedures for physical inventory taking and material balance closure, and video monitoring systems for storage and critical assembly areas

  7. International Law governing the Safe and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jankowitsch-Prevor, O.

    2002-01-01

    1. The International Governmental Institutions. History and mandates: IAEA, OECD/NEA, EURATOM. 2. International Treaties and Conventions: The Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: Commitment and Verification (the NPT, Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, The Additional protocol, Regional Non-proliferation Treaties); the Physical protection of Nuclear Material (Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material); Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna Convention on the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention, Paris Convention on Civil Liability, Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, Convention on Supplementary compensation for Nuclear Damage); In case of Nuclear Accident: Notification and Assistance (Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency); International Law Governing Nuclear Safety (Nuclear Safety Convention, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management). 3. Relationship between International and National Law

  8. Raising awareness about protection and control of nuclear materials held by 'small-scale holders'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ladsous, D.; Coulie, E.; Giorgio, M.

    2013-01-01

    In France, the activities carried out by the 'small-scale holders' of nuclear materials are organized by a specific regulatory system which defines in a detailed way their obligations and the means of control of the government. The first part of the article presents the legal framework relating to the use of nuclear materials by small-scale holders in civilian fields. The importance of the declaration of the nuclear material inventory is clearly emphasized and must be prepared and transmitted to the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) every year. The second part describes how this declaration is used to provide basic information for the competent Ministry and the inspectors to check the correct application of the regulatory requirements relating to physical protection and to the control of nuclear materials. Finally, the last part presents the on-site inspections carried out by sworn and accredited inspectors under the authority of the competent Authority, which provide an overall picture and allow an evaluation of the risks of theft, loss or diversion of these materials. (authors)

  9. Computerized materials protection, control, and accountability at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Efimenko, V.; Goryunov, V.; Ilyantsev, A.

    1998-01-01

    As part of a multifaceted approach to protecting its nuclear materials, The Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) at Obninsk, Russia, has been computerizing its materials protection, control, and accountability capabilities. This is being accomplished in collaboration with the CoreMAS team at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Such international cooperation in applying advanced science and technology to managing and controlling nuclear materials will help reduce the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation by preventing acquisition of weapons-grade nuclear materials by unauthorized individuals, organizations, or states. One important characteristic of IPPE is that it encompasses several facilities that manage nuclear materials, and three of these facilities already operate their own independent (or independently developed) computerized accounting systems. This paper focuses on the importance of compatibility between the computerized accountability systems at the facilities, the ability of the individual systems to communicate with a single site-wide system, and the necessity of coordination between facilities in designing and developing computerized systems. The authors believe that the lessons learned at IPPE in coordinating these efforts have wide-ranging significance for other sites with multiple facilities

  10. Physical protection upgrades in Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Djakov, A.

    1998-01-01

    The U.S. DOE is providing nuclear material safeguards assistance in both material control and accountability and in physical protection to several facilities in Ukraine. This paper summarizes the types of physical protection upgrades that have been or are presently being implemented at these facilities. These facilities include the Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research, Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology, Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry, and the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant. Typical upgrades include: hardening of storage areas; improvements in access control, intrusion detection, and CCTV assessment; central alarm station improvements; and implementation of new voice communication systems. Methods used to implement these upgrades and problems encountered are discussed. Training issues are also discussed

  11. Report made on the behalf of the Commission of foreign affairs, defence and armed forces on the bill project authorizing the ratification of the international convention for the repression of acts of nuclear terrorism - Nr 215

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pintat, Xavier

    2012-01-01

    In a first part, this report recalls that the terrorist threat has already been addressed by texts which have been negotiated within the United Nations. It describes how the content of the convention has been elaborated while taking into account existing conventions related to nuclear issues. It outlines that this text is the fruit of the efforts made by a special committee created by the U N, and by the Lyons-Rome group within the G8. The second part comments how this convention is based on other conventions already ratified by France, notably the conventions of 1980 and 1997 on the physical protection of nuclear material. It outlines the important progress contained by this convention regarding incriminations of acts of nuclear terrorism and their crackdown

  12. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  13. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  14. Evaluation of effectiveness of physical protection systems at nuclear facilities in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stefulova, A.

    2001-01-01

    This paper contains a short presentation of the state supervision in approach to the evaluation of physical protection systems at the nuclear facilities as one kind of measure used to prevent combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials in the Slovak Republic. (author)

  15. Quantitative evaluation of physical protection system in nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sun Yahua; Li Bin; Li Shiju

    2009-01-01

    Based on the prompt detection analysis, this paper introduced one analysis model of intrusion path in nuclear power plant by means of morphology analysis and developed the evaluation software for path model analysis of physical protection system. Quantitative analysis on three elements (detection, delay, and response) of physical protection system was presented with an imaginary intrusion event example in Mac Arthur nuclear center. The results indicated that the path prompt detection analysis worked effectively to find the weak point of the physical protection system in NPP, and meantime we can also get the high cost-effectiveness improved measures. It is an effective approach to evaluate the overall performance of the system. (authors)

  16. The role of nuclear law in nuclear safety after Fukushima; El rol del derecho nuclear en seguridad nuclear luego de Fukushima

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cardozo, Diva E. Puig, E-mail: d.puig@adinet.com.uy [International Nuclear Law Association (INLA), Montevideo (Uruguay)

    2013-07-01

    The paper contains the following topics: nuclear law, origin and evolution, role of the legal instruments on nuclear safety, nuclear safety the impact of major nuclear accidents: Chernobyl and Fukushima. The response of the nuclear law post Fukushima. Safety and security. International framework for nuclear safety: nuclear convention joint convention on safety on spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management. The Fukushima World Conference on Nuclear Safety. Convention on Prompt Notification and Assistance in case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety. IAEA recommendations for the safety transport of radioactive material. International framework for nuclear security. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts Against Nuclear Terrorism. Resolution No. 1540 of the Security Council of United Nations (2004). Measures to strengthen international safety. Code of conduct on the safety research reactor.

  17. Physical protection of radioactive material in transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    Safety in the transport of radioactive material is ensured by enclosing the material, when necessary, in packaging which prevents its dispersal and which absorbs to any adequate extent any radiation emitted by the material. Transport workers, the general public and the environment are thus protected against the harmful effects of the radioactive material. The packaging also serves the purpose of protecting its contents against the effects of rough handling and mishaps under normal transport conditions, and against the severe stresses and high temperatures that could be encountered in accidents accompanied by fires. If the radioactive material is also fissile, special design features are incorporated to prevent any possibility of criticality under normal transport conditions and in accidents. The safe transport requirements are designed to afford protection against unintentional opening of packages in normal handling and transport conditions and against damage in severe accident conditions; whereas the physical protection requirements are designed to prevent intentional opening of packages and deliberate damage. This clearly illustrates the difference in philosophical approach underlying the requirements for safe transport and for physical protection during transport. This difference in approach is, perhaps, most easily seen in the differing requirements for marking of consignments. While safety considerations dictate that packages be clearly labelled, physical protection considerations urge restraint in the use of special labels. Careful consideration must be given to such differences in approach in any attempt to harmonize the safety and physical protection aspects of transport. (author)

  18. Amendment of the regulations on the physical protection of nuclear materials (section 18c) made by Royal Decree no. 1809 of 2 november 1984 pursuant to Act no. 28 of 12 may 1972 on atomic energy activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-08-01

    These Regulations were made by Royal Decree of 25 August 1989 and entered into force on 20 October 1989. They insert a new Section in the 1984 Decree on physical protection of nuclear materials providing that in accordance with the 1979 Regulations on the transport of dangerous goods by air as amended, nuclear materials shall be transported in compliance with the relevant Technical Instructions of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) [fr

  19. Problems on shipping high-enriched nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ganzha, V.V.; Demko, N.A.; Deryavko, I.I.; Zelenski, D.I.; Kolbaenkov, A.N.; Pivovarov, O.S.; Storozhenko, A.N.; Chernyad'ev, V.V.; Yakovlev, V.V.; Gorin, N.V.; Prokhod'ko, A.I.; Sherbina, A.N.; Barsanov, V.I.; Dyakov, E.K.; Tishenko, M.F.; Khlystov, A.I.; Vasil'ev, A.P.; Smetannikov, V.P.

    1998-01-01

    In 1996-1998 all Russian nuclear materials were taken out of the Institute of Atomic Energy of Kazakhstan National Nuclear Centre (IAE NNC RK). In this report there are basic tasks related to the performance of this work. They are: 1) Preparation of Russian nuclear materials (NM) kept at IAE NNC RK for transportation; 2) accounting and control of Russian nuclear materials kept at IAE NNC RK; 3) arrangement of permit papers for NM transportation; 4) NM transportation from IAE NNC RK to the enterprises of Russian MINATOM; 5) provision of nuclear and radiation safety in the course of operations with NM; 6) provision of physical protection for Russian NM

  20. Vital area identification software VIP for the physical protection of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jung, Woo Sik; Park, Chang Kue; Yang, Joon Eon

    2004-01-01

    There are two major factors to be considered for the physical protection of nuclear power plants. They are a design basis threat (DBT) and the vital area identification (VAI). The DBT has been considered as 'the maximum credible threat.' The vital area is defined as 'an area inside a protected area containing equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear materials, the sabotage of which could directly or indirectly lead to unacceptable radiological consequences.' For the VAI of nuclear power plants, a software VIP (Vital area Identification Package based on PSA method) is being developed. The VIP is based on the current probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques. The PSA method, including internal as well as external events, is known as the most complete and consistent method for identifying various accident sequences that might result in a core melt and radioactive material release to the environment. Thus, the VIP employs a fault tree analysis method in the PSA and utilizes the PSA results

  1. Proceedings of the 6. Argentine congress on radiation protection and nuclear safety; Actas del 6. congreso argentino de proteccion radiologica y seguridad nuclear

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-12-31

    The 6th Argentine Congress on Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety was organized by the Radioprotection Argentine Society, in Buenos Aires, between the 22 and 24 of september of 1998. In this event, were presented almost 66 papers in the following sessions, about these subjects: 1.- Safety in nuclear installations. 2.- Control of nuclear material and physical protection of nuclear installations. 3.- Programs of quality assurance. 4.- Training, technical information and public information. 5.- Physical dosimetry. 6.- Physical dosimetry and occupational radiation protection. 7.- Exposure of the natural radiation. 8.- Environmental radiological safety. 9.- Biological effects of the ionizing radiations and biological dosimetry. 10.- Radiological protection of the medical practice and the radiological emergencies. 11.- Radioactive wastes management. 12.- Transport of radioactive materials

  2. Transweb and trafficking in illicit nuclear materials: beyond the borders of physical security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ballard, J.D.; Dilger, F.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Transweb is a developing threat assessment analytical protocol that uses real time GIS based assessments (a.k.a., GTA for GIS Threat Assessment) to better understand potential trafficking in illicit nuclear materials that may come from energy related sites and/or weapons production facilities. This is not a physical security protocol nor is this program a border check format like the DOE's Second Line of Defense which is designed to detect special nuclear fuels. Transweb is a tool that allows the user to look at surreptitious transportation pathways that may be used to move illicit nuclear materials after they have already breached traditional physical security barriers and allows for movement prediction and potential mitigation/intervention if they are not traveling on the highways or railways, traversing the waterways, or entering ports equipped with detecting equipment like that deployed in Second Line of Defense program. Transweb is for the real world, a world where physical security may be breached and the smugglers that capture these materials do not follow the most traveled highways, railways, or waterways in a given society. Transweb focuses on the less obvious transportation routes that may be the most likely ways that illicit nuclear materials will be transported. Thus this program offers an additional layer of security analysis not currently in use as physical protection or as border mitigation. (author)

  3. INMM Physical Protection Technical Working Group Workshops

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.D.

    1982-01-01

    The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) established the Physical Protection Technical Working Group to be a focal point for INMM activities related to the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. The Technical Working Group has sponsored workshops with major emphasis on intrusion detection systems, entry control systems, and security personnel training. The format for these workshops has consisted of a series of small informal group discussions on specific subject matter which allows direct participation by the attendees and the exchange of ideas, experiences, and insights. This paper will introduce the reader to the activities of the Physical Protection Technical Working Group, to identify the workshops which have been held, and to serve as an introduction to the following three papers of this session

  4. International Physical Protection Advisory Service

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soo Hoo, M.S.; Ek, D.; Hageman, A.; Jenkin, T.; Price, C.; Weiss, B.

    1998-01-01

    Since its inception in 1996, the purpose of the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) has been to provide advice and assistance to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member States on strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of their state system of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Since the protection of nuclear materials and facilities is a Member State's responsibility, participation within the IPPAS program is voluntary. At the request of a Member State, the IAEA forms a multinational IPPAS team consisting of physical protection specialists. These specialists have broad experience in physical protection system design, implementation, and regulatory oversight. The exact make-up of the team depends upon the needs of the requesting state. IPPAS missions to participating states strive to compare the domestic procedures and practices of the state against international physical protection guidelines (IAEA Information Circular 225) and internationally accepted practice. The missions utilize a top to bottom approach and begin by reviewing the legal and regulatory structure and conclude with reviews of the implementation of the state regulations and international guidelines at individual facilities. IPPAS findings are treated as IAEA Safeguards Confidential Information. To date, IPPAS missions have been concluded in Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Poland

  5. About role of human factors in the building of physical protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ivanov, P.

    2001-01-01

    factors: state ideology crisis, deformation of norms of behavior and spiritual values, and etc. In addition, a new problem suddenly appeared related to the safety and security of the energy complex, that is: uncontrolled processes such as: non-payments, debts on salary for a several month period; all these factors affect negatively the level of safety and security. It is clear that in such a difficult situation the role of an individual is increasing. There is a sufficient number of arguments to affirm that the ensuring of the physical protection from the point of view of a human factor lays the basis for the successful solution of security problems in general. The fundamental documents regulating the nuclear material non-proliferation aspects, i.e., Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, the revision of which is being conducted now under the IAEA's aegis, and the finalized IAEA's Recommendation INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, are used as the standard against which the physical protection level is assessed. With regard to the nuclear installation that can be subject to sabotage, the appropriate physical protection measures should be implemented regardless of the category of containing nuclear material. The act of nuclear sabotage can lead to a radiological hazard for the population. The convention and the IAEA's Recommendations pay particular attention to the human factor considering it as a basic executor of functions related to the unauthorized actions or activities on their prevention. Taking into account that nuclear terrorism does not have any statistics, while reviewing either options of threats we proceed from the tentative scenario of the terrorists' actions. Full or absolute security cannot be achieved. In order to make a comprehensive evaluation of the terrorism significance, we have to take into account political, moral and practical considerations. However, due to the lack of opportunities to assess the threat, the following approach is applied: we do not

  6. The role of nuclear law in nuclear safety after Fukushima

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cardozo, Diva E. Puig

    2013-01-01

    The paper contains the following topics: nuclear law, origin and evolution, role of the legal instruments on nuclear safety, nuclear safety the impact of major nuclear accidents: Chernobyl and Fukushima. The response of the nuclear law post Fukushima. Safety and security. International framework for nuclear safety: nuclear convention joint convention on safety on spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management. The Fukushima World Conference on Nuclear Safety. Convention on Prompt Notification and Assistance in case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety. IAEA recommendations for the safety transport of radioactive material. International framework for nuclear security. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts Against Nuclear Terrorism. Resolution No. 1540 of the Security Council of United Nations (2004). Measures to strengthen international safety. Code of conduct on the safety research reactor

  7. Order of 26 March 1982 on the protection and control of nuclear materials during transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    This Order was made in implementation of Act No. 80-572 of 25th July 1980 on protection and control of nuclear materials and in particular, of Decree No. 81-512 of 12th May 1981, which was itself made in pursuance of the Act. In accordance with the Decree, this Order determines the rules applicable to the protection and control of nuclear materials in course of carriage, especially in connection with the supervision of the conditions in which such transport is carried out and the authorities warned in case of an incident, accident or any occurrence whatsoever which is likely to delay or jeopardize execution of the planned transport operation or protection of the nuclear material concerned. (NEA) [fr

  8. Methodology For Evaluation Of Regulatory Effectiveness In Physical Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Izmaylov, Alexander; Valente, John; Griggs, James R.; Rexroth, Paul; Piskarev, Alexander; Babkin, Vladimir; Sokolov, Egor; Melton, Ronald B.; Cunningham, Mitchel E.; Baker, Kathryn A.; Brothers, Alan J.

    2005-01-01

    Material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) regulatory documents play an important role in securing and protecting nuclear material by regulating a variety of activities at different hierarchical levels. The development, implementation, and practical application of these regulatory documents requires a significant investment of financial and material resources. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of the regulatory development process and the extent to which regulations improve the effectiveness of MPC and A at nuclear sites. The joint Russian and U.S. Regulatory Development Project has a goal of evaluating the effectiveness of regulatory documents developed for MPC and A. As part of this joint Project, a methodology for evaluating effectiveness has been developed. This methodology was developed around physical protection objectives. The developed methodology specifies physical protection objectives to be accomplished through the implementation of a regulatory system based on the physical protection goals at the nuclear sites. It includes approaches to assessing regulatory effectiveness, the hierarchical structure of physical protection objectives to be accomplished through implementing regulations, a 'mapping' of the physical protection objectives to the regulatory framework, a list of criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of physical protection regulations and effectiveness indicators, as well as means and methods for gathering information and implementation of this evaluation.

  9. Proceedings of the Fifth Seminar on Technology of Nuclear Materials Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Indro Yuwono; Nababan, Binsar; Suharyanta

    2004-11-01

    Proceedings of the Fifth Seminar on Technology of Nuclear Material Safety all aspect of research activity concerning the role of physical protection, nuclear safeguards technology and international convection in supporting the establishment of Nuclear Power Plant in Indonesia. There are 16 articles which have separated index. (PPIN)

  10. Enhancement the physical protection system of the WWR-SM reactor at Institute of Nuclear Physics of Academy of Science of the Republic of Uzbekistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karabaev, Kh.Kh.; Rakhimbaev, A.T.; Rakhmanov, A.B.; Salikhbaev, U.S.; Yuldashev, B.S.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: Joining of the Republic of Uzbekistan to Non-Proliferation Treaty required the revision of nuclear fuel protection system and radioactive sources from illegal access in all stages of work with nuclear materials. One of the primary technical actions of ensuring non-proliferation of nuclear materials is physical protection. The project was worked out on upgrading and enhancement of the physical protection of the reactor building. In cooperation with Sandia National Laboratory and support of the Department of Energy (DOE) USA The first stage of the physical protection upgrading provided for fresh fuel protection: - the new fresh fuel storage room was built and equipped with the modern control and detection system, - the reactor building was equipped with detection devices and access control, - the central alarm station (CAS) has been built and equipped with computer control and observing system, - code access system has been implemented. The first stage of upgrading of physical protection system was accomplished for 4 months, and put into operation in 1996. The second stage of physical protection system modernization included the construction of the second barrier of the physical protection, equipping it with observation and control devices and also extension of the CAS. The perimeter around the reactor building was cleaned from trees, bushed and in a short time a two-fence barrier was erected. The access control point provided the secured intensified control of the access to the reactor territory. The physical protection system was supplied with equipment for safeguard and TV observation of perimeter, access control to the territory of the reactor: - the CAS was extended and computer observation control system was upgraded, - the badge station has been constructed, equipped and set up, - all doors, windows, reactor hall gate have been replaced by strengthened metal ones, - uninterruptible power supply (UPS) and diesel-generator have been installed, - the

  11. Nuclear material safeguards technology development in the new structure of BATAN organization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ilyas, Zurias

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The implementation of Nuclear Energy Act No. 10/97 has led to a restructuring in BATAN organization in July 1999. A new unit, Center for Nuclear Material Safeguards Technology (PTPBN), was established to be especially in charge of safeguards facilities. The main responsibility of this unit is to develop the technology of safeguards and physical protection. The function of this unit is also to analyze the operational technical aspect of the International Convention of Nuclear. The duties of Center for Nuclear Material Safeguards Technology can be seen from the various programs set up for every fiscal year. The programs for the year 2000 were: Analyses of SSAC implementation in BATAN; Development of Safeguards information system; Creation of database of physical protection technology; Physical protection simulator for Bandung reactor research; Development of detector technology for physical protection system; Identification of BATAN activities and facilities submitted to IAEA in order to be in line with the Additional Protocol to the agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons, which was ratified on September 29th, 1999 in Vienna, Austria; Seminar on Safeguards technology held in Jakarta in September 2000. The program of 2001 will be focusing on the continuation of the previous year's program as well as the creation of new ones, such as: Collaboration with other countries. At initial stage experts from JBC-Japan were invited to share their expertise on their safeguards information system; Development of education and training for safeguards operators by emphasizing more on the techniques of nuclear materials measurement; Seminar on Safeguards technology scheduled for December 2001 by inviting experts from IAEA and modem countries; Field survey to determine the location of radionuclide station in Indonesia in

  12. 2. Scientific meeting of Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission. Abstracts; Segundas jornadas cientificas de la Comision Chilena de Energia Nuclear. Resumenes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-10-01

    This publication includes 33 papers in the fields on analytical methods nuclear and conventional, atomic and molecular physics, ionizing radiations, nuclear and non nuclear materials, radiological protection and nuclear safety.

  13. 10 CFR 76.111 - Physical security, material control and accounting, and protection of certain information.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... significance (Category III), and for protection of Restricted Data, National Security Information, Safeguards... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Physical security, material control and accounting, and protection of certain information. 76.111 Section 76.111 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED...

  14. IAEA Director General addresses efforts to protect against nuclear terrorism before UN General Assembly

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, said October 22 in New York that the September 11 attacks on the United States had been a 'wake-up call' to everyone that more can and must be done to bolster security as an integral part of the management of national nuclear programmes. In support of that effort, he had already initiated a thorough review of all IAEA activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. 'The Agency is engaged in a variety of activities relevant to combating nuclear terrorism -- including programmes to ensure physical security, to help prevent and respond to illicit trafficking of nuclear material and other radioactive sources, to promote the safety of nuclear facilities, to safeguard nuclear material against non-peaceful uses, and to respond to emergencies', he said. Each of these programmes was being reviewed in-depth to identify additional measures that need to be taken in the light of recent events. In particular, expanding the scope and reach of many of the Agency's security and safety services was being considered. Also, existing conventions and guidelines, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, would be examined to ensure that they were comprehensive and effective, and efforts would be redoubled to ensure their universal application. The full text of the Director General's speech is available on the IAEA Web site www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements

  15. Physical Protection Study of the Radio metallurgy Installation Using SAVIComputer Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinitoyo, Andreas

    2000-01-01

    Based on IAEA Recommendation on INFCIR/225/Rev.3 (The Physical Protectionof Nuclear Material), a nuclear installation shall have physical protectionsystem for protection or being secure on sabotage activities in theinstallation and thieve of nuclear materials. The recommendation states therequirements for physical protection of nuclear materials usage, transit andstorage. Radio metallurgy Installation of the Fuel Element and ReprocessingDevelopment Center (BATAN) at Serpong is a nuclear installation for researchon post irradiation of high radioactive spent fuel element, its processingand storage. The installation has risk on threat of a sabotage, which isdominant than thieve. The RMI building was designed and constructed ofphysical protection components and have been integrated with the BATAN Safetyand Security System and the Security Guards functions to be PhysicalProtection System for the RMI. By using the SAVI Computer Program with inputdata from the existing standards, assumptions for detection possibility,delay and response, that will result the probability of interruptions of theworst adversary paths PI = 0.1. These mean that the physical protectionsystems of the RMI shall be upgraded and improved in order to be reliable orbetter if the most of paths to the target PI = 1.0. (author)

  16. Proceedings of the Third National Conference on Nuclear Physics and Techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nguyen Thanh Binh; Nguyen Nhi Dien; Tran Kim Hung; Vuong Huu Tan

    2000-01-01

    The proceedings contains 130 papers of scientists from institutes, universities, enterprises nation-wide in Vietnam. Its subjects include: nuclear physics, theoretical physics, science and technology of nuclear reactor, application of nuclear techniques in industry, agriculture, biology, medicine, geo-hydrology, environmental protection, nuclear equipment, radiation technology, material technology, waste management, ect

  17. System dynamics simulation framework for the evaluation of physical protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Chan Soo; Chung, Chang Hyun; Kwak, Sang Man; Kim, Sok Chul

    2004-01-01

    The events of September 11th, 2001 demonstrated the need for special considerations for the security of nuclear facilities against sabotage. Sabotage can be defined as any deliberate act directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear material in use, storage, or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the environment or the health and safety of personnel or the public by exposure to radiation or the release of radioactive substances. Sabotage protection aims to protect and mitigate unacceptable radiological consequences. Conventional physical protection concept has focused of how to protect against or prevent intrusion of adversaries based of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) and has given only rare consideration to extreme malevolent envets such as the September 11th attack. Human induced external events were mostly screened out due to their low probabilities of occurrence. However, in this time, several countries have begun to define new design requirements for proliferation resistance and physical protection of new facilities against malevolent event such as those of September 11th, 2001

  18. Implementation of the G8GP program on physical protection - experiences and results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagemann, A.

    2006-01-01

    At the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, G8 Leaders launched the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction committing to support projects to issues of non-proliferation, disarmament, counter terrorism and nuclear safety in Russia. Since then progress has been made in implementing projects. The German Federal Foreign Office contracted GRS to implement a program for improving the physical protection of nuclear or highly radioactive materials of relevance at facilities in the Russian Federation. This paper reports about this G8GP Program on physical protection, its implementation, gained experiences, current achievements and results. (author)

  19. Applications of the INFCIRC225/rev5 to the national physical protection regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jae Gwang

    2011-01-01

    The IAEA's first effort for playing a key role in physical protection of nuclear material and facilities resulted in the publication of 'Recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material' in 1972. These recommendations were revised by a group of experts in co-operation with the IAEA Secretariat and the revised version was published in 1975 in INFCIRC/225. The document was subsequently revised in 1977(rev.1), 1989(rev.2), in 1993(rev.3) and 1998(rev4). The Physical Protection regime in ROK has been established on the basis of INFCIRC225 rev4 since 2004 IAEA recently published The INFCIRC 225 rev5 through the 2 years expert consultations. The publication recommended 12 nuclear security fundamentals and requirements of physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facility to the member states. This paper suggests the several applications to the national physical protection system from the 12 fundamentals and the requirements

  20. Temporary physical protection systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.D.; Gangel, D.J.; Madsen, R.W.

    1991-01-01

    Terrorism and other aspects of world political instability have created a high demand for temporary physical protection systems within the nuclear materials management community. They can be used when vehicles carrying important assets are away from their permanent fixed site location, around areas where experiments are being temporarily conducted, around construction areas and one portions of a fixed site physical security system which is temporarily inoperable. Physical security systems can be grouped into four categories: tactical, portable, semi-permanent, and fixed. The resources and experience gained at Sandia National Laboratories in over forty years of developing and implementing security systems for protecting nuclear weapons and fixed nuclear facilities is now being applied to temporary physical security systems. This paper emphasizes temporary physical security systems and their component parts that are presently available and identify additional system-subsystem objectives, requirements, and concepts

  1. Progress in the activities on prevention and combating of illicit trafficking of nuclear material in Lithuania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurselis, S.; Stadalnikas, A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The paper gives a general overview of the progress which has been made in the activities on prevention and combating of illicit trafficking of nuclear material in Lithuania. It describes the measures which were taken to strengthen nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection. The current status of the national legislation and the functions of institutions involved in control of nuclear material and combating of illicit trafficking are discussed. Lithuania, similar to many countries, did not avoid a new type of a crime - smuggling of nuclear materials - which was observed in the 1990's. The most serious case in Lithuania happened in 1993 when fresh fuel assembly was stolen from Ignalina NPP. This assembly contains approximately 124 kg of UO 2 (enrichment 2%). 100 kg of the pellets from this assembly was found later in several pieces at different places. This case served as a strong stimulus to strengthen prevention measures of Illicit trafficking. The legal basis was created and governmental institutions were obliged with special duties related with nuclear material. The laws and regulations set the order for the shipment and handling of nuclear material. The penalties for violation of these laws and regulations specified in Penal Code and Administrative Code were made stricter. The State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) is a very important element in prevention of the illicit trafficking. The Regulations of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material at Nuclear Facilities and LOFs was issued by the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) on 10 December 1997 following the provisions of the Law on Nuclear Energy. Lithuania extended its international obligations by ratifying the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (entered into force on 5 July 2000). The fully computerized nuclear material accountancy system was created at Ignalina NPP. The system gives the possibility to find the

  2. 2. Scientific meeting of Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission. Abstracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-10-01

    This publication includes 33 papers in the fields on analytical methods nuclear and conventional, atomic and molecular physics, ionizing radiations, nuclear and non nuclear materials, radiological protection and nuclear safety

  3. International conventions on civil liability for nuclear damage. Revised 1976 ed.

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    This revised edition contains the texts of the following multilateral conventions and instruments concerning civil liability for nuclear damage: The Vienna Convention of 21 May 1963 on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; The Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (incorporating the provisions of the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964); The Brussels Convention of 31 January 1963; Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 (and incorporating the provisions of the Additional Protocol signed in Paris on 28 January 1964); and the Brussels Convention of 25 May 1962 on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships. Final Act and Resolutions of the International Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, held in Vienna from 29 April to 19 May 1963; Final Act of the International Legal Conference on Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Substances, held in Brussels from 29 November to 2 December 1971; and Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, adopted at Brussels on 17 December 1971

  4. Nuclear security from cradle to grave

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raja Adnan, Raja Abdul Aziz

    2016-01-01

    On 8 May 2016, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) finally entered into force, almost eleven years after its adoption. The world will be a more secure place as a result of the commitments that States party to the Amendment have made. The Amendment establishes legally binding commitments for countries to protect nuclear facilities as well as nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport. Under the Amendment, countries are required to establish appropriate physical protection regimes for nuclear material. They also take on new obligations to share information on sabotage, including on credible threats of sabotage. The entry into force of the Amendment demonstrates the international community’s resolve to act together to strengthen nuclear security globally. It also helps reduce the risk of an attack involving nuclear material, which could have catastrophic consequences.

  5. Physical protection in relation to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonnier, C.S.

    1985-01-01

    In this session, physical protection, nuclear material accounting and control, and containment and surveillance have been discussed, with emphasis on the interactions of these measures within the context of IAEA safeguards. In addition, the current physical protection equipment and techniques have been reviewed. The interactions can be summarized as follows. Although physical protection is a fundamental element of IAEA safeguards, it is solely a state/facility operator responsibility. While the IAEA has an interest in promoting the implementation of effective physical protection systems, it serves only in an advisory capacity. Nuclear material accounting directly involves the state, facility operator, and the IAEA. Facility records and reports provided by the state are independently verified by the IAEA. The SSAC is of fundamental importance in this process. Containment and surveillance measures are used by the UAEA. Installation and routine use of C/S equipment must be approved by the state and facility operator, and must not affect facility operations or safety

  6. Cooperative international arrangements: prevention of nuclear terrorism and the extradition and prosecution of terrorists

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murphy, J.F.

    1987-01-01

    In considering the problems associated with prosecuting and punishing nuclear terrorists, it is noted that nuclear terrorism per se is not currently a crime under international law. To be sure, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material would probably cover any act of nuclear terrorism that involved nuclear material used for peaceful purposes. However, nuclear material used for military purposes or military nuclear reactors is outside the scope of the convention. US legislation implementing the convention goes beyond its terms in this respect and covers crimes involving nuclear material for nonpeaceful purposes if the offense is committed within US territorial, special maritime, special territorial, or special aircraft jurisdiction or if the offense is committed by nationals of the US. The author feels an effort should be made, under the auspices of the United Nations, to conclude a convention that would define nuclear terrorism, declare it a crime under international law, and obligate state parties to extradite or prosecute those who commit the crime. Such a convention would fill the large gap in the coverage of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

  7. Treaty implementation applied to conventions on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Montjoie, Michel

    2015-01-01

    Given that safety is the number one priority for the nuclear industry, it would seem normal that procedures exist to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the conventions on nuclear safety, as already exist for numerous international treaties. Unfortunately, these procedures are either weak or even nonexistent. Therefore, consideration must be given to whether this weakness represents a genuine deficiency in ensuring the main objective of these conventions, which is to achieve a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. But, before one can even address that issue, a prior question must be answered: does the specific nature of the international legal framework on nuclear safety automatically result in a lack of non-compliance procedures in international conventions on the subject? If so, the lack of procedures is justified, despite the drawbacks. The specific nature of the international law on nuclear safety, which in 1994 shaped the content of the CNS by notably not 'allowing' (even today) the incorporation of precise international rules have been taken into account. The next step is to examine whether the absence of non-compliance procedures (which could have been integrated into the text) is a hindrance in ensuring the objectives of the conventions on nuclear safety, and to examine the procedures that could have been used, based on existing provisions in other areas of international law (environmental law, financial law, disarmament law, human rights, etc.). International environmental law will be the main source of this study, as it has certain similarities with the international law on nuclear safety due to the sometimes vague nature of its obligations and irrespective of the fact that one of the purposes of nuclear safety is in particular to protect the environment from radiological hazards. Indeed, the provisions of the law on nuclear safety are mainly technical and designed to guarantee the normal operation of nuclear facilities

  8. Ensuring preservation of nuclear materials at RT plant storage facilities by upgrading physical protection, containment (TID) and TV surveillance measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Savin, A.A.

    1999-01-01

    The upgrading of nuclear material (NM) physical protection system of storage facilities for plutonium dioxide has been carried out in the frame of contract between Sandia National Laboratories and PA Mayak. The implementation of this project is of great importance for ensuring the preservation of NM in storage. The project envisages a complex approach to the solution of the task: the use of engineered fences, detection means, observation devices, access and control thereof for the personnel; the organization of security force in such way that to give a possibility to take adequate and purposeful actions towards possible adversaries. The design includes upgrading the system for physical protection through the introduction of modern, efficient engineering devices for security, integrated system for access control and security, the system for TV surveillance [ru

  9. 10 CFR 73.73 - Requirement for advance notice and protection of export shipments of special nuclear material of...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... shipments of special nuclear material of low strategic significance. 73.73 Section 73.73 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS Records and Reports § 73.73... Incident Response, using any appropriate method listed in § 73.4; (2) Assure that the notification will be...

  10. Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities. Implementing Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) works in a complementary fashion with the international safeguards programme and physical protection systems to help prevent, deter or detect the unauthorized acquisition and use of nuclear materials. These three methodologies are employed by Member States to defend against external threats, internal threats and both state actors and non-state actors. This publication offers guidance for implementing NMAC measures for nuclear security at the nuclear facility level. It focuses on measures to mitigate the risk posed by insider threats and describes elements of a programme that can be implemented at a nuclear facility in coordination with the physical protection system for the purpose of deterring and detecting unauthorized removal of nuclear material

  11. A Regulators Systematic Approach to Physical Protection for Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bayer, Stephan; Doulgeris, Nicholas; Leask, Andrew

    2004-01-01

    This paper outlines the framework for a physical protection regime which needs to be incorporated into the design and construction phases of nuclear facility. The need for physical protection considerations at the outset of the design of nuclear facilities is explained. It also discusses about the consequences of malicious activity and the management of risk. Various risk and consequences evaluations are undertaken, notably using design basis threat methodology. (author)

  12. Upgrading nuclear material protection, control and accounting in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Caravelli, Jack; Behan, Chris; Fishbone, Les

    2001-01-01

    focus on implementation of the upgrades at the Russian nuclear sites, and on certain national or infrastructure areas: Regulatory Development; Training; Physical Inventory Taking and Material Balance; Computerized Material Accounting and Control; Bar Coding; Nondestructive Assay Measurements; Bulk (Weight and Volume) Measurements; Tamper-Indicating Devices; Nuclear Material Pedestrian Portal Monitors; Access Control; Building Hardening; Federal Information System. III. Results - To date, after more than six years of work, significant progress has been achieved in a variety of ways. For example: Security improvements are underway on some 750 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium at many sites under the supervision of Minatom, Gosatomnadzor, the Russian Navy, and other Russian entities. Among these are an ingenious concrete-block delay system for plutonium storage at the Mayak Production Association and an inventory strategy at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering that, by fostering the consolidation of items, reduces the time required to inventory them. About 850 kg of HEU have been converted to low-enriched uranium in a project that is now active at two processing sites; More than 1000 Russian MPC and A staff have undergone training at the Russian Methodological and Training Center; and Hardening of more than 90 transport vehicles has enhanced transport security. We will illustrate this progress in the paper by describing the MPC and A upgrade work at specific Russian sites. IV. Discussion - During its existence, the MPC and A Program has confronted several problems. They include issues surrounding taxation, exports, travel, assurances, and business practice. Most have been overcome, but sometimes only after long and sustained effort. Positive results have been achieved because of the mutual desire of the United States and Russia to address the need for enhanced nuclear material protection, control and accounting at Russian nuclear sites. Yet

  13. The adhesion characteristics of protective coating materials for the containment structure in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Sang-Kook; Shin, Jae-Chul

    2003-01-01

    Protective coating materials used in the containment structures should be durable for the designed 30 to 40 year lifetime of a nuclear power plant. At the present, these materials have not yet been developed. Therefore it is very important to keep the durability of the protective coating materials through persistent maintenance, and in order to achieve this, understanding the adhesion characteristics of the coating materials is of utmost importance. Therefore, this study attempts to find any methods for durability maintenance of these protective coating materials. To accomplish these aims, this study applied an experimental deterioration environment condition relevant to Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and Main Steam Line Break (MSLB), categorized as of Design Basis Accident (DBA), onto steel liner plate specimens covered with protective coating materials. Adhesion tests were performed on these deteriorated coating materials to characterize the physical properties and through these tests, the quantitative adhesion characteristics according to the history of deterioration environment were found

  14. The main findings of the third Russian international conference on nuclear material protection, control and accounting, Obninsk, RF, 16-20 May, 2005

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kondratov, S.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: The first and the second Russian international conferences on MPC+A held in 1997 and 2000 correspondingly, under the Russian-American program of the MPC+A cooperation proved to be a useful tool for Russian, American specialists and experts from a number for sharing their opinions and exchanging achievements in this sensitive area. The recommendation to hold the next third MPC+A conference in Russia was formulated in the final document of the second conference in 2000. The results of the Russian-American cooperation are especially valuable since they demonstrate how much can be done due to the joint efforts of even previously adversarial countries. This paper gives a summary of the main findings of the third Russian conference on the MPC+A with a specific emphasis on physical protection of the Russian nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. Besides the physical protection, materials accounting, education and training of personnel, security culture and some other associated topics of the conference are also addressed. (author)

  15. Convention on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted on 17 June 1994 by Diplomatic Conference convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency at its Headquarters from 14 to 17 June 1994. The Convention will enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit with the Depository (the Agency's Director General) of the twenty-second instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, including the instruments of seventeen States, having each at leas one nuclear installation which has achieved criticality in a reactor core. The text of the Convention as adopted is reproduced in the Annex hereto for the information of all Member States

  16. Regulation on control of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikeda, Kaname

    1976-01-01

    Some comment is made on the present laws and the future course of consolidating the regulation of nuclear fuel materials. The first part gives the definitions of the nuclear fuel materials in the laws. The second part deals with the classification and regulation in material handling. Refinement undertaking, fabrication undertaking, reprocessing undertaking, the permission of the government to use the materials, the permission of the government to use the materials under international control, the restriction of transfer and receipt, the reporting, and the safeguard measures are commented. The third part deals with the strengthening of regulation. The nuclear fuel safety deliberation special committee will be established at some opportunity of revising the ordinance. The nuclear material safeguard special committee has been established in the Atomic Energy Commission. The last part deals with the future course of legal consolidation. The safety control will be strengthened. The early investigation of waste handling is necessary, because low level solid wastes are accumulating at each establishment. The law for transporting nuclear materials must be consolidated as early as possible to correspond to foreign transportation laws. Physical protection is awaiting the conclusions of the nuclear fuel safeguard special committee. The control and information systems for the safeguard measures must be consolidated in the laws. (Iwakiri, K.)

  17. Modernization of physical protection educational laboratories in the National Research Nuclear University MEPhI

    Science.gov (United States)

    Geraskin, N. I.; Krasnoborodko, A. A.

    2017-01-01

    Non-proliferation of nuclear materials includes, in addition to accounting and control, the Physical Protection (PP) of one. The paper considers the experience by MEPhI in application the practical educational in the area of PP technical systems. The following aspects are discussed in the paper: specific features graduate program in nuclear security area; overview of the practical course curricula in the special laboratory.

  18. A Uniform Framework of Global Nuclear Materials Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupree, S.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Sanders, T.L; Sellers, T.A.

    1999-01-01

    Global Nuclear Materials Management (GNMM) anticipates and supports a growing international recognition of the importance of uniform, effective management of civilian, excess defense, and nuclear weapons materials. We expect thereto be a continuing increase in both the number of international agreements and conventions on safety, security, and transparency of nuclear materials, and the number of U.S.-Russian agreements for the safety, protection, and transparency of weapons and excess defense materials. This inventory of agreements and conventions may soon expand into broad, mandatory, international programs that will include provisions for inspection, verification, and transparency, To meet such demand the community must build on the resources we have, including State agencies, the IAEA and regional organizations. By these measures we will meet the future expectations for monitoring and inspection of materials, maintenance of safety and security, and implementation of transparency measures

  19. A Uniform Framework of Global Nuclear Materials Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dupree, S.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Sanders, T.L; Sellers, T.A.

    1999-04-20

    Global Nuclear Materials Management (GNMM) anticipates and supports a growing international recognition of the importance of uniform, effective management of civilian, excess defense, and nuclear weapons materials. We expect thereto be a continuing increase in both the number of international agreements and conventions on safety, security, and transparency of nuclear materials, and the number of U.S.-Russian agreements for the safety, protection, and transparency of weapons and excess defense materials. This inventory of agreements and conventions may soon expand into broad, mandatory, international programs that will include provisions for inspection, verification, and transparency, To meet such demand the community must build on the resources we have, including State agencies, the IAEA and regional organizations. By these measures we will meet the future expectations for monitoring and inspection of materials, maintenance of safety and security, and implementation of transparency measures.

  20. Legal framework and practice to prevent and detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sembiring, D.

    2001-01-01

    . BAPETEN also established the Decree on the Guidance for Physical Protection of nuclear material under Chairman Decree of BAPETEN No. 02-P/1999 (adopted from IAEA document INFCIRC/225 Rev. 1), as the implementation of the Convention on Physical Protection of nuclear material signed in 1986 and ratified by Presidential Decree No. 49/86. The second component of the regulatory function is licensing. An organization or individual intending to utilized nuclear energy must obtain license from BAPETEN. Guidance for applicants is provided in the form of standard format, which contain license conditions. Any utilization of nuclear energy shall maintain physical protection program or security plans. When the applicants meet BAPETEN's criteria for physical protection of nuclear material and facility, a license is granted. By this licensing, BAPETEN is able to know where, by whom, and how the use of nuclear and radioactive materials is conducted. The third component of the regulatory function is inspection. To ensure that legal user's activities comply with BAPETEN regulation and the conditions of their licenses, BAPETEN periodically inspects BAPETEN-licensed facilities. Inspections can be announced or unannounced, and varies in scope and frequency according to the authorized activities. The finding of all inspection are documented in inspection reports. These reports are sent to the licensees to inform them of the BAPETEN findings. When inspections disclose violations of BAPETEN requirement, BAPETEN has a range of enforcement sanctions available. Recommendation stated in the inspection report requires the licensee to correct the problem, take steps to prevent a recurrence of the violation, and advise BAPETEN at the action it has taken. The result of inspection by BAPETEN is published periodically and open for public. Some illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials can be detected during inspections. This detection must lead to prompt information of BAPETEN in order to

  1. The German system to prevent, detect and respond to illicit uses of nuclear materials and radioactive sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fechner, J.B.

    2001-01-01

    The German system to prevent, detect and respond to illicit uses of nuclear materials and radioactive sources consists of a variety of different elements: International and national laws and regulations covering safeguards, physical protection, and import/export control; Licensing and regulatory supervision of all activities related to nuclear materials and radioactive sources, including import and export; Responsibility of the licensee to ensure compliance with licensing conditions; sanctions; Law enforcement by police, security and customs authorities; prosecution and penalties; Detection of illicitly trafficked radioactive materials through intelligence and technical means; analysis capabilities; Response arrangements for normal and for severe cases of illicit use of nuclear materials; Participation in international programmes and POC-systems. Safeguards measures have been implemented in Germany in accordance with the Non- Proliferation Treaty and with safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153. As Germany is a member of the European Union, the Euratom Treaty and the Euratom-Ordinance Nr. 3227/76 together with the Verification Agreement between the IAEA, the European Commission and the European Member States have led to safeguards measures jointly implemented by the IAEA and by Euratom. The relevant international law for the physical protection of nuclear material in force in Germany is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The recommendations on physical protection objectives and fundamentals and on physical protection measures specified in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4 have been taken into account in various national regulations pertaining to the national design basis threat, the physical protection of LWR nuclear power plants, of interim spent fuel storage facilities, of facilities containing category III material, of nuclear material and radioactive waste transports by road or railway vehicles, aircraft or sea vessels; additional guidelines

  2. Development of conventional fatigue database for structure materials of nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Bing

    2002-01-01

    Management system of the conventional fatigue database for structure materials of nuclear power plant (NPP) is developed. The database included the parameters of design curves, i.e., the stress-life, survival probability-stress-life, strain-life, survival probability-strain-life, stress-strain and survival probability-stress-strain curves, and corresponding information of materials and testing conditions. Two ways, by materials name or by the inter-bounds of material mechanical properties, are constructed to search the database. From the searched information it can be conveniently performed of the conventional fatigue design analysis and reliability assessment of structures

  3. Supporting the material control and accountancy system with physical protection system features

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miyoshi, D.S.; Olson, C.E.; Caskey, D.L.

    1984-01-01

    Most physical security functions can be accomplished by a range of alternative features. Careful design can provide comparable levels of security regardless of which option is chosen, albeit with possible differences in cost and efficiency. However, the effectiveness and especially the cost and efficiency of the material control and accounting system may be strongly influenced by the selection of a particular design approach to physical security. In this paper, a series of examples are cited to illustrate the effects that particular physical protection design choices may have. The examples have been chosen from several systems engineering projects at facilities within the DOE nuclear community. These examples are generalized, and a series of design principles are proposed for integrating physical security with material control and accounting by appropriate selection of alternative features. 2 references, 6 figures

  4. 10 CFR 73.37 - Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... fuel in transit. 73.37 Section 73.37 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material in Transit § 73.37 Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit. (a) Performance objectives. (1...

  5. Perspectives on the International and Internal Nuclear Security Regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jang, Sung Soon

    2015-01-01

    The term, 'Nuclear Security' became more familiar to Korean public after the government hosted 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. Nuclear Security is prevention of, detection of and response to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities. Nuclear Security includes physical protection, security of radioactive sources, nuclear forensics, nuclear smuggling prevention, border monitoring, and cyber security with regard to nuclear and other radiological materials. This abstract will review recent international trends and discuss the nuclear security regime in the Republic of Korea (ROK). The international Nuclear Security Regime has been strengthened. The upcoming Chicago Summit in 2016 and the entry into force of the Amendment of Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) will bring major changes in nuclear security. The Republic of Korea hosted the 2012 Seoul Summit and strengthened domestic regime to meet international standards. The ROK has worked hard to contribute to the international security regime and to establish a robust domestic security regime against terrorist threats. Even if the nuclear security regime is robust, Risk-informed Nuclear Security management should be established to meet international standards and to implement effective as well as an efficient nuclear security regime

  6. Perspectives on the International and Internal Nuclear Security Regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jang, Sung Soon [Korea Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The term, 'Nuclear Security' became more familiar to Korean public after the government hosted 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. Nuclear Security is prevention of, detection of and response to criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities. Nuclear Security includes physical protection, security of radioactive sources, nuclear forensics, nuclear smuggling prevention, border monitoring, and cyber security with regard to nuclear and other radiological materials. This abstract will review recent international trends and discuss the nuclear security regime in the Republic of Korea (ROK). The international Nuclear Security Regime has been strengthened. The upcoming Chicago Summit in 2016 and the entry into force of the Amendment of Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) will bring major changes in nuclear security. The Republic of Korea hosted the 2012 Seoul Summit and strengthened domestic regime to meet international standards. The ROK has worked hard to contribute to the international security regime and to establish a robust domestic security regime against terrorist threats. Even if the nuclear security regime is robust, Risk-informed Nuclear Security management should be established to meet international standards and to implement effective as well as an efficient nuclear security regime.

  7. Protecting the source. Securing nuclear material and strong radiation sources. New threats of terrorism are prompting the need for swift action to better secure nuclear material and strong radiation sources. Are measures already in place enough? The Stanford-Salzburg initiative suggests not

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steinhausler, F.; Bunn, G.

    2003-01-01

    At a time of growing concern over threats of terrorism, the security of nuclear and radioactive material is an urgent and serious issue. Working with a range of partners, the IAEA has put into place a multi-faceted Action Plan to help countries upgrade their capabilities. But more needs to be done to counter new types of threats. One particular area that needs to be strengthened is the physical protection of nuclear and radioactive material. The attacks of 11 September 2001 opened our eyes to i he urgent need to strengthen national physical protection (PP) practices for nuclear and other radioactive material. The principle that highly radioactive material will protect itself does not apply to the newest generation of terrorists. Existing PP systems were not designed to deal with the threat of suicidal terrorists commanding the numbers, skills, training, and resources available to those who carried out the attacks in the US. Moreover, because there are no mandatory international standards for domestic PP systems for nuclear or radioactive material, protection measures vary greatly from country to country. The IAEA recommended standards (Inference/225/Rev. 4) were not designed with the new terrorist threats in mind and national practices often fall short of even these recommendations. The result is inadequate protection against the new form of terrorism. Few argue the point that national physical protection practices for nuclear and other radioactive material need to be strengthened. This article summarizes a Stanford-Salzburg plan developed by experts from Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, (USA) and revised at the EU-Physical Protection NUMAT Conference in September 2002 in Salzburg, Austria. It includes six recommended elements to consider in addition to what the IAEA is now doing to improve PP practices around the world: Establish a global list of physical protection priorities; Create a multilateral security cooperation

  8. Assessment of physical protection systems: EVA method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bernard, J.-L.; Lamotte, C.; Jorda, A.

    2001-01-01

    CEA's missions in various sectors of activity such as nuclear, defence, industrial contracts and the associated regulatory requirements, make it necessary to develop a strategy in the field of physical protection. In particular, firms having nuclear materials are subject to the July 25, 1980 law no.80-572 on the protection and control of nuclear materials. A holding permit delivered by the regulatory authority is conditioned to the protection by the operator of the nuclear materials used. In France it is the nuclear operator who must demonstrate, in the form of a security study, that potential aggressors would be neutralised before they could escape with the material. To meet these requirements, we have developed methods to assess the vulnerability of our facilities. The EVA method, the French acronym for 'Evaluation de la vulnerabilite des Acces' (access vulnerability system) allows dealing with internal and external threats involving brutal actions. In scenarios relating to external threat, the intruders get past the various barriers of our protection system, attempting to steal a large volume of material in one swoop and then escape. In the case of internal threat, the goal is the same. However, as the intruder usually has access to the material in the scope of his activities, the action begins at the level of the target. Our protection system is based on in-depth defense where the intruders are detected and then delayed in their advance towards their target to allow time for intervention forces to intercept them

  9. 20th International Training Course (ITC-20) on the physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials evaluation report.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ramirez, Amanda Ann

    2008-09-01

    The goal of this evaluation report is to provide the information necessary to improve the effectiveness of the ITC provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency Member States. This report examines ITC-20 training content, delivery methods, scheduling, and logistics. Ultimately, this report evaluates whether the course provides the knowledge and skills necessary to meet the participants needs in the protection of nuclear materials and facilities.

  10. Yugoslavia: Act of 21 November 1984 on radiation protection and the safe use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    This Act which entered into force on 1 December 1984 repeals the 1976 Act on Protection against Ionizing Radiation and regulates most of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and radiation protection in Yugoslavia. The Act lays down the licensing procedure for nuclear installations and covers safety-related questions in connection with standards, technical criteria etc. It also takes into account several areas regulated at international level, namely safeguards and physical protection of nuclear material. (NEA) [fr

  11. Main features of the convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage - an over view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boulanenkov, V.

    2000-01-01

    The Chernobyl accident prompted widespread awareness of the need for improved protection of the public from the consequences of nuclear accidents. It was generally recognised that urgent efforts should be undertaken to strengthen the international nuclear liability regime based on two civil law conventions, namely the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. The work initiated by the Agency - it was assigned to the Standing Committee established in 1990 - followed a two-track approach: to improve the existing civil liability regime, including revision of the Vienna Convention for which the IAEA is depositary; and, to develop a comprehensive international liability regime. The issue of compensation additional to that available under the two basic conventions received full attention in the negotiations. In the latter context, this work resulted in the adoption by a diplomatic conference convened by the IAEA in September 1997 of a new instrument, i.e. the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (the CSC). The CSC is a product of many years of multilateral negotiations and represents a balance of various legal, economic and political considerations. While not all concerns may have been fully met, it represents a significant improvement in the protection of the public from the consequences of nuclear accidents. (author)

  12. Physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Myre, W.C.; DeMontmollin, J.M.

    1989-01-01

    Serious concern about physical protection of nuclear facilities began around 1972. R and D was initiated at Sandia National Laboratories which had developed techniques to protect weapons for many years. Special vehicles, convoy procedures, and a communications system previously developed for weapons shipments were improved and extended for shipments of other sensitive materials. Barriers, perimeter alarms, portal and internal control systems were developed, tested, and published in handbooks and presented at symposia. Training programs were initiated for U.S. and foreign personnel. Containment and surveillance techniques were developed for the IAEA. Presently emphasis is on computer security, active barriers, and techniques to prevent theft or sabotage by ''insiders''

  13. Optimal Physical Protection against Nuclear Terrorism

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Doyoung; Kim, ChangLak [KEPCO International Nuclear Graduate School, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    There is no attempt with nuclear weapons to attack any places for terror or military victory since the atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. People have obviously experienced horrible destructive power of nuclear weapons and continuously remembered a terrible tragedy, lots of organizations and experts express their concerns about the nuclear terrorism and try to interchange opinions for prevention of deadly weapons. The purpose of this paper is to provide the information of nuclear terrorism and what the potential risk of Republic of Korea is and how to do the efficient physical protection. Terror is from the old French terreur, which is derived from Latin verb terror meaning 'great fear'. This is a policy to suppress political opponents through using violence and repression. Many scholars have been proposed, there is no consensus definition of the term 'terrorism.' In 1988, a proposed academic consensus definition: 'Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. These attacks showed that particular terrorists groups sought to cause heavy casualties and extreme terrorists were spontaneously prepared to make sacrifices for completion of that ultimate goal. Creation of nuclear weapons was like opening Pandora's box. Barack Obama has called nuclear terrorism 'the greatest danger we face'. Nuclear terror is one of the lethal risks. Using nuclear weapons or materials from terrorist groups is a fatal catastrophe to a targeting state though there is no accident similar like that. South

  14. Optimal Physical Protection against Nuclear Terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Doyoung; Kim, ChangLak

    2014-01-01

    There is no attempt with nuclear weapons to attack any places for terror or military victory since the atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. People have obviously experienced horrible destructive power of nuclear weapons and continuously remembered a terrible tragedy, lots of organizations and experts express their concerns about the nuclear terrorism and try to interchange opinions for prevention of deadly weapons. The purpose of this paper is to provide the information of nuclear terrorism and what the potential risk of Republic of Korea is and how to do the efficient physical protection. Terror is from the old French terreur, which is derived from Latin verb terror meaning 'great fear'. This is a policy to suppress political opponents through using violence and repression. Many scholars have been proposed, there is no consensus definition of the term 'terrorism.' In 1988, a proposed academic consensus definition: 'Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. These attacks showed that particular terrorists groups sought to cause heavy casualties and extreme terrorists were spontaneously prepared to make sacrifices for completion of that ultimate goal. Creation of nuclear weapons was like opening Pandora's box. Barack Obama has called nuclear terrorism 'the greatest danger we face'. Nuclear terror is one of the lethal risks. Using nuclear weapons or materials from terrorist groups is a fatal catastrophe to a targeting state though there is no accident similar like that. South

  15. Safety Analysis in Design and Assessment of the Physical Protection of the OKG NPP

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lindahl, P., E-mail: par.lindahl@okg.eon.se [OKG Aktiebolag, Oskarshamn (Sweden)

    2014-10-15

    OKG AB operates a three unit nuclear power plant in the southern parts of Sweden. As a result of recent development of the legislation regarding physical protection of nuclear facilities, OKG has upgraded the protection against antagonistic actions. The new legislation includes requirements both on specific protective measures and on the performance of the physical protection as a whole. In short, the performance related requirements state that sufficient measures shall be implemented to protect against antagonistic actions, as defined by the regulator in the “Design Basis Threat” (DBT). Historically, physical protection and nuclear safety has been managed much as separate issues with different, sometimes contradicting, objectives. Now, insights from the work with the security upgrade have emphasized that physical protection needs to be regarded as an important part of the Defence-In-Depth (DiD) against nuclear accidents. Specifically, OKG has developed new DBT-based analysis methods, which may be characterized as probabilistically informed deterministic analysis, conformed to a format similar to the one used for conventional internal events analysis. The result is a powerful tool for design and assessment of the performance of the protection against antagonistic actions, using a nuclear safety perspective. (author)

  16. National nuclear safety report 1998. Convention on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The Argentine Republic subscribed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, approved by a Diplomatic Conference in Vienna, Austria, in June 17th, 1994. According to the provisions in Section 5th of the Convention, each Contracting Party shall submit for its examination a National Nuclear Safety Report about the measures adopted to comply with the corresponding obligations. This Report describes the actions that the Argentine Republic is carrying on since the beginning of its nuclear activities, showing that it complies with the obligations derived from the Convention, in accordance with the provisions of its Article 4. The analysis of the compliance with such obligations is based on the legislation in force, the applicable regulatory standards and procedures, the issued licenses, and other regulatory decisions. The corresponding information is described in the analysis of each of the Convention Articles constituting this Report. The present National Report has been performed in order to comply with Article 5 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and has been prepared as much as possible following the Guidelines Regarding National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, approved in the Preparatory Meeting of the Contracting Parties, held in Vienna in April 1997. This means that the Report has been ordered according to the Articles of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the contents indicated in the guidelines. The information contained in the articles, which are part of the Report shows the compliance of the Argentine Republic, as a contracting party of such Convention, with the obligations assumed

  17. The prevention of the local nuclear accidents in the Republic of Moldova

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahnarel, I.

    1998-01-01

    Although there are no nuclear reactors in Moldova, there are numerous radiation sources situated in a few waste disposal sites as well as the sources applied in medicine, science, education, industry, agriculture, which demand serious concern from safety and radiation protection point of view. Under cooperation with IAEA national Regulatory Control in the Field of Nuclear Protection and Safety was established since 1993. A number of governmental regulatory bodies supervise the following activities: radiation standardization; radiological supervision of sources storage, exploitation and disposal; radiological monitoring of radioactive substances, food products, building materials; supervision of personnel exposure and environmental exposure; investigation of radiological accidents; etc. In 1998, Moldova has joined The International Convention for early Notification of Nuclear Accidents; The Convention on Nuclear Safety; The Convention on Assistance in Case of Nuclear Accident of Radiological Emergency and The Convention on the Physical protection of Nuclear Material

  18. US/Russian cooperative efforts in nuclear material protection, control, and accounting at the Siberian Chemical Combine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goloskokov, I.; Yarygin, A.; Petrushev, V.; Morgado, R.E.

    1998-01-01

    The Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) is the largest multifunction nuclear production facility in the Russian nuclear complex. Until recently, it produced and processed special nuclear material for the Russian Defense Ministry. SKhK and its US partners in the Department of Energy (DOE) US/Russian Materials Protection, Control, and Accountability (MPC and A) Program are nearing completion of the initial MPC and A upgrades at the six SKhK plant sites that were begun three years ago. Comprehensive enhancements to the physical protection and access control systems are progressing on a site-wide basis while a comprehensive MC and A system is being implemented at the Radiochemical Plant site. SKhK now produces thermal and electrical power, enriches uranium for commercial reactor fuel, reprocesses irradiated fuel, converts high-enriched uranium metal into high-enriched oxide for blending into reactor-grade, low-enriched uranium, and manufactures civilian products. The authors review the progress to date and outline plans for continuing the work in 1999

  19. The system of nuclear material control of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yeligbayeva, G.Zh.

    2001-01-01

    regulating exports and determines the mechanism for the realization of export control policy. KAEC is the main government organization for nuclear export control. KAEC's provision determines the functions, orders, and procedures to coordinate nuclear material export and import. KEAC's database on nuclear material exports and imports aids in the tracking of the transfer of nuclear materials into, out of, and through Kazakhstan. The consolidated analysis of the nuclear material accountancy and nuclear material transfer increases the level of the nuclear control system. The system of physical protection, which prevents the unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials from facilities, is another component of the state control system. The main goal of this system is the organizational activity to block the ability to steal nuclear material or to sabotage a facility through nuclear material dispersal. Now, physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities is implemented by different government organizations. They activate their physical protection programs according to their individual departmental regulations. From 1994-1998 with the financial and technical support of donor-countries, the Committee had been able to support the systems modernization of nuclear facilities. In 2000, Kazakhstan state boards had agreed upon an Additional Protocol to the Agreement between Kazakhstan and IAEA, for the application of safeguards. When the Additional Protocol procedures will be finished and signed, then mining facilities will also be under safeguards. The National Control List, similar to the European Control List, was also validated in 2000. Now, new rules considering the recommendation of the Nuclear Supplier Group for the export and import of nuclear materials, technologies, equipment, dual-use equipment, materials, and technologies is now being agreed upon by the Kazakhstan state board. Thus we have the basics for a nuclear control system in Kazakhstan and now we carrying out the

  20. Semi-annual report on strategic special nuclear material inventory differences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-07-01

    This fourteenth periodic semiannual report of Inventory Differences (ID) covers the last six months of fiscal year 1983 (April 1, 1983 through September 30, 1983), for the Department of Energy (DOE) and DOE contractor facilities possessing significant quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM). Inventory Differences are expected in nuclear material processing and are not, in and of themselves, evidence of lost or stolen material. On the other hand, ID analysis provides valuable information on the effectiveness of the safeguards system's physical protection and material control measures as well as a check on the process controls and material management procedures. ID's outside safeguards control limits or involving a missing SSNM discrete item are investigated. If necessary, an operation may be shut down until an ID is resolved

  1. Use of the project management methodology to establish physical protection system at nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gramotkin, F.; Kuzmyak, I.; Kravtsov, V.

    2015-01-01

    The paper considers the possibility of using the project management methodology developed by the Project Management Institute (USA) in nuclear security in terms of modernization or development of physical protection system at nuclear facility. It was demonstrated that this methodology allows competent and flexible management of the projects on physical protection, ensuring effective control of their timely implementation in compliance with the planned budget and quality

  2. International convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jankowitsch-Prevor, O.

    2005-01-01

    The Preamble, composed of 13 paragraphs and drafted in the usual style of a General Assembly resolution, is aimed at placing the convention in a number of relevant contexts. First, the convention is linked to the issue of the maintenance of international peace and security through a reference to the purposes of the United Nations under Article 1 of the Charter. Next, it is presented as being a further step in the decisions, measures and instruments developed by the United Nations over the past ten years with the common objective of eliminating international terrorism in all its forms. Lastly, the convention is placed in its specific nuclear context through a number of references. In its third paragraph, the Preamble contains a reference to the principle recognizing 'the right of all states to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interests in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear energy'. This paragraph is identical to the first paragraph of the Preamble of the CPPNM, and the same principle is stated again in the first paragraph of the Preamble of the Amendment to the CPPNM, and constitutes a kind of general statement in favour of the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technology, without explicit reservations concerning non-proliferation, the safety and security of nuclear facilities or the management of radioactive waste. A draft amendment presented by the United States delegation in the final phase of work that suggested adding the phrase 'while recognizing that the goals of peaceful utilisation should not be used as a cover for proliferation' to the sentence cited above, was apparently not retained. Next, the Preamble mentions the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and in the tenth paragraph the threat that 'acts of nuclear terrorism may result in the gravest consequences and may pose a threat to international peace and security'. Paragraph 11 of the

  3. Generic physical protection logic trees

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paulus, W.K.

    1981-10-01

    Generic physical protection logic trees, designed for application to nuclear facilities and materials, are presented together with a method of qualitative evaluation of the trees for design and analysis of physical protection systems. One or more defense zones are defined where adversaries interact with the physical protection system. Logic trees that are needed to describe the possible scenarios within a defense zone are selected. Elements of a postulated or existing physical protection system are tagged to the primary events of the logic tree. The likelihood of adversary success in overcoming these elements is evaluated on a binary, yes/no basis. The effect of these evaluations is propagated through the logic of each tree to determine whether the adversary is likely to accomplish the end event of the tree. The physical protection system must be highly likely to overcome the adversary before he accomplishes his objective. The evaluation must be conducted for all significant states of the site. Deficiencies uncovered become inputs to redesign and further analysis, closing the loop on the design/analysis cycle

  4. Generic physical protection logic trees

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Paulus, W.K.

    1981-10-01

    Generic physical protection logic trees, designed for application to nuclear facilities and materials, are presented together with a method of qualitative evaluation of the trees for design and analysis of physical protection systems. One or more defense zones are defined where adversaries interact with the physical protection system. Logic trees that are needed to describe the possible scenarios within a defense zone are selected. Elements of a postulated or existing physical protection system are tagged to the primary events of the logic tree. The likelihood of adversary success in overcoming these elements is evaluated on a binary, yes/no basis. The effect of these evaluations is propagated through the logic of each tree to determine whether the adversary is likely to accomplish the end event of the tree. The physical protection system must be highly likely to overcome the adversary before he accomplishes his objective. The evaluation must be conducted for all significant states of the site. Deficiencies uncovered become inputs to redesign and further analysis, closing the loop on the design/analysis cycle.

  5. Physical protection evaluation methodology program development and application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seo, Janghoon; Yoo, Hosik

    2015-01-01

    It is essential to develop a reliable physical protection evaluation methodology for applying physical protection concept to the design stage. The methodology can be used to assess weak points and improve performance not only for the design stage but also for nuclear facilities in operation. Analyzing physical protection property of nuclear facilities is not a trivial work since there are many interconnected factors affecting overall performance. Therefore several international projects have been organized to develop a systematic physical protection evaluation methodology. INPRO (The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles) and GIF PRPP (Generation IV International Forum Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection) methodology are among the most well-known evaluation methodologies. INPRO adopts a checklist type of questionnaire and has a strong point in analyzing overall characteristic of facilities in a qualitative way. COMPRE program has been developed to help general users apply COMPRE methodology to nuclear facilities. In this work, COMPRE program development and a case study of the hypothetical nuclear facility are presented. The development of COMPRE program and a case study for hypothetic facility is presented in this work. The case study shows that COMPRE PP methodology can be a useful tool to assess the overall physical protection performance of nuclear facilities. To obtain meaningful results from COMPRE PP methodology, detailed information and comprehensive analysis are required. Especially, it is not trivial to calculate reliable values for PPSE (Physical Protection System Effectiveness) and C (Consequence), while it is relatively straightforward to evaluate LI (Legislative and Institutional framework), MC (Material Control) and HR (Human Resources). To obtain a reliable PPSE value, comprehensive information about physical protection system, vital area analysis and realistic threat scenario assessment are required. Like

  6. Physical protection evaluation methodology program development and application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Janghoon; Yoo, Hosik [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    It is essential to develop a reliable physical protection evaluation methodology for applying physical protection concept to the design stage. The methodology can be used to assess weak points and improve performance not only for the design stage but also for nuclear facilities in operation. Analyzing physical protection property of nuclear facilities is not a trivial work since there are many interconnected factors affecting overall performance. Therefore several international projects have been organized to develop a systematic physical protection evaluation methodology. INPRO (The International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles) and GIF PRPP (Generation IV International Forum Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection) methodology are among the most well-known evaluation methodologies. INPRO adopts a checklist type of questionnaire and has a strong point in analyzing overall characteristic of facilities in a qualitative way. COMPRE program has been developed to help general users apply COMPRE methodology to nuclear facilities. In this work, COMPRE program development and a case study of the hypothetical nuclear facility are presented. The development of COMPRE program and a case study for hypothetic facility is presented in this work. The case study shows that COMPRE PP methodology can be a useful tool to assess the overall physical protection performance of nuclear facilities. To obtain meaningful results from COMPRE PP methodology, detailed information and comprehensive analysis are required. Especially, it is not trivial to calculate reliable values for PPSE (Physical Protection System Effectiveness) and C (Consequence), while it is relatively straightforward to evaluate LI (Legislative and Institutional framework), MC (Material Control) and HR (Human Resources). To obtain a reliable PPSE value, comprehensive information about physical protection system, vital area analysis and realistic threat scenario assessment are required. Like

  7. Expanding Nuclear Power Programmes - Romanian experience: Master - Nuclear Materials and Technologies Educational Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valeca, S.; Valeca, M.

    2012-01-01

    The main objectives of the Master Nuclear Materials and Technologies Educational Plan are: 1. To deliver higher education and training in the following specific domains, such as: Powders Technology and Ceramic Materials, Techniques of Structural Analysis, Composite Materials, Semiconductor Materials and Components, Metals and Metallic Alloys, Optoelectronic Materials and Devices, Nuclear Materials, The Engineering of Special Nuclear Materials, 2. To train managers of the Nuclear Waste Products and Nuclear Safety, 3. To qualify in ICT Systems for Nuclear Process Guidance, 4. To qualify in Environmental Protection System at the Level of Nuclear Power Stations, 5. To train managers for Quality Assurance of Nuclear Energetic Processes, 6. To deliver higher education and training regarding the International Treatises, Conventions and Settlements in force in the field of nuclear related activities. (author)

  8. International aspects of nuclear energy - guarantees for peaceful applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Longo, P.

    1980-03-01

    The author considers activities connected with treaties and international agreements in the context of safeguarding nuclear materials and technology and protection against radioactive contamination. A review is provided of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Convention on Physical Protection, the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation and the London Dumping Convention. (NEA) [fr

  9. Nuclear physics methods in materials research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The brochure contains the abstracts of the papers presented at the 7th EPS meeting 1980 in Darmstadt. The main subjects were: a) Neutron scattering and Moessbauer effect in materials research, b) ion implantation in micrometallurgy, c) applications of nuclear reactions and radioisotopes in research on solids, d) recent developments in activation analysis and e) pions, positrons, and heavy ions applied in solid state physics. (RW) [de

  10. Methodology for categorization of nuclear material in pyroprocessing facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Chanki; Choi, Sungyeol [UNIST, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Woo Jin; Kim, Min Su; Jeong, Yon Hong [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    For the pyroprocessing facility to be commercialized in future, current regulations should be evaluated and developed in advance, based on the new types of nuclear materials in the facility. Physical protection system, especially, requires reasonable and reliable categorization of nuclear materials, to prevent from the theft of nuclear materials. In this paper, therefore, current categorization methods of nuclear material are investigated and applied to the pyroprocessing facility. After inconsistencies and gaps are found among methods, they are compared and discussed based on eight considering points (i.e, degrees of attractiveness, levels of category, discount factor, physical barriers, chemical barriers, isotopic barriers, radiological barriers, and capabilities of adversaries), to roughly suggest a new method for categorization. Current categorization methods of nuclear material, including IAEA's INFCIRC/225, U.S. DOE's method, newly expected U.S. NRC's method, FOM, and Bunn's approach, are different and can bring inconsistencies of physical protection requirements. The gap among methods will be significant if advanced fuel cycles are applied to them for the future. For example, the categorization results of 5 target materials in pyroprocessing facility show clear inconsistencies, while TRU ingot is considered the most attractive material. To resolve inconsistencies, it is necessary to determine new method suitable to pyroproessing facility, by considering the effects of eight points (i.e, degrees of attractiveness, levels of category, discount factor, physical barriers, chemical barriers, isotopic barriers, radiological barriers, and capabilities of adversaries)

  11. Methodology for categorization of nuclear material in pyroprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chanki; Choi, Sungyeol; Kim, Woo Jin; Kim, Min Su; Jeong, Yon Hong

    2016-01-01

    For the pyroprocessing facility to be commercialized in future, current regulations should be evaluated and developed in advance, based on the new types of nuclear materials in the facility. Physical protection system, especially, requires reasonable and reliable categorization of nuclear materials, to prevent from the theft of nuclear materials. In this paper, therefore, current categorization methods of nuclear material are investigated and applied to the pyroprocessing facility. After inconsistencies and gaps are found among methods, they are compared and discussed based on eight considering points (i.e, degrees of attractiveness, levels of category, discount factor, physical barriers, chemical barriers, isotopic barriers, radiological barriers, and capabilities of adversaries), to roughly suggest a new method for categorization. Current categorization methods of nuclear material, including IAEA's INFCIRC/225, U.S. DOE's method, newly expected U.S. NRC's method, FOM, and Bunn's approach, are different and can bring inconsistencies of physical protection requirements. The gap among methods will be significant if advanced fuel cycles are applied to them for the future. For example, the categorization results of 5 target materials in pyroprocessing facility show clear inconsistencies, while TRU ingot is considered the most attractive material. To resolve inconsistencies, it is necessary to determine new method suitable to pyroproessing facility, by considering the effects of eight points (i.e, degrees of attractiveness, levels of category, discount factor, physical barriers, chemical barriers, isotopic barriers, radiological barriers, and capabilities of adversaries)

  12. Computer programs of information processing of nuclear physical methods as a demonstration material in studying nuclear physics and numerical methods

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bateev, A. B.; Filippov, V. P.

    2017-01-01

    The principle possibility of using computer program Univem MS for Mössbauer spectra fitting as a demonstration material at studying such disciplines as atomic and nuclear physics and numerical methods by students is shown in the article. This program is associated with nuclear-physical parameters such as isomer (or chemical) shift of nuclear energy level, interaction of nuclear quadrupole moment with electric field and of magnetic moment with surrounded magnetic field. The basic processing algorithm in such programs is the Least Square Method. The deviation of values of experimental points on spectra from the value of theoretical dependence is defined on concrete examples. This value is characterized in numerical methods as mean square deviation. The shape of theoretical lines in the program is defined by Gaussian and Lorentzian distributions. The visualization of the studied material on atomic and nuclear physics can be improved by similar programs of the Mössbauer spectroscopy, X-ray Fluorescence Analyzer or X-ray diffraction analysis.

  13. How the United Kingdom seeks to enhance nuclear security with the help of IPPAS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fawaz-Huber, May

    2016-01-01

    In October 2011, an IAEA team of international nuclear security experts conducted an International Physical Protection Service mission (IPPAS) to the United Kingdom. They visited the Sellafield civil nuclear site, as well as Barrow Port, which is used for the transport of nuclear material. The IAEA conducted a follow-up mission in February 2016. IPPAS missions provide advice on how to improve the effectiveness of a State’s physical protection regime, either nationally or at facility level. They do so by comparing it with relevant international legal instruments, guidelines and best practices, particularly the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the IAEA Nuclear Security Series guidance publications.

  14. Aspects of nuclear penal liability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Faria, N.M. de; Cruz, A.S.C. da

    1986-01-01

    Topics are treated with reference to articles of the Law 6.453 of october 17, 1977, relating to the nuclear penal liability. At the same time, the Penal Code disposes on illicits which may involve nuclear activity. With regard to the Jurisdiction, mention is made to the Federal Justice competence, due to the constitutional disposal. On the international field, the Convention on Physic Protection on Nuclear Material Transport disposes on illicit fact in which nuclear material may be involved. (Author) [pt

  15. Proceedings of the Tenth Radiation Physics and Protection Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The publication has been set up as proceedings of the Radiation Physics and Protection Conference.. The conference consists Natural Radiation Sources; Radiation Detection and Measurements; Applied Radiation Physics; Radiation Medical Physics and Biophysics; Radiation Dosimetry; Operational Radiation Protection; Radiation Shielding; Transport of Radioactive Materials; Nuclear and Radiation Physics; Medical Physics and Public Protection Against Radiological Attack. This conference consists of 402 p., figs., tabs., refs.

  16. Nuclear safety: an international approach: the convention on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosen, M.

    1994-01-01

    This paper is a general presentation of the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety which has already be signed by 50 countries and which is the first legal instrument that directly addresses the safety of nuclear power plants worldwide. The paper gives a review of its development and some key provisions for a better understanding of how this agreement will operate in practice. The Convention consists of an introductory preamble and four chapters consisting of 35 articles dealing with: the principal objectives, definitions and scope of application; the various obligations (general provisions, legislation, responsibility and regulation, general safety considerations taking into account: the financial and human resources, the human factors, the quality assurance, the assessment and verification of safety, the radiation protection and the emergency preparedness; the safety of installations: sitting, design and construction, operation); the periodic meetings of the contracting parties to review national reports on the measures taken to implement each of the obligations, and the final clauses and other judicial provisions common to international agreements. (J.S.). 1 append

  17. Guidelines regarding National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    These Guidelines, established by the Contracting Parties pursuant to Article 22 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (hereinafter called the Convention), are intended to be read in conjunction with the text of the Convention. Their purpose is to provide guidance to the Contracting Parties regarding material that may be useful to include in the National Reports required under Article 5 of the Convention and thereby to facilitate the most efficient review of implementation by the Contracting Parties of their obligations under the Convention.

  18. Research on effectiveness assessment programs for physical protection system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Janghoon; Yoo, Hosik; Ham, Taekyu [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    PPS (Physical Protection System) is an integrated set of procedures, installation and human resources to protect valuable assets from physical attack of potential adversaries. Since nuclear facilities or radioactive materials can be attractive targets for terrorists, PPS should be installed and maintained throughout the entire lifecycle of nuclear energy systems. One of key ingredients for effective protection is a reliable assessment procedure of the PPS capability. Due to complexity of possible threat categories and pathways, several pathway analysis programs have been developed to ease analysis or visualization. ASSESS using ASD approach runs fast and adopts a relatively simple modeling process for facility elements. But uncertainty due to assumptions used in modeling might complicate the interpretation of results. On the other hand, 2D pathway program such as TESS can utilize more self-consistent detection probability and delay time since actual pathway on 2D map is available. Also, this pathway visualization helps users understand analysis result more intuitively. But, in general, 2D pathway programs require strong computational power and careful optimization. Another possible difference between two approaches is response force deployment and RFT.

  19. Research on effectiveness assessment programs for physical protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seo, Janghoon; Yoo, Hosik; Ham, Taekyu

    2015-01-01

    PPS (Physical Protection System) is an integrated set of procedures, installation and human resources to protect valuable assets from physical attack of potential adversaries. Since nuclear facilities or radioactive materials can be attractive targets for terrorists, PPS should be installed and maintained throughout the entire lifecycle of nuclear energy systems. One of key ingredients for effective protection is a reliable assessment procedure of the PPS capability. Due to complexity of possible threat categories and pathways, several pathway analysis programs have been developed to ease analysis or visualization. ASSESS using ASD approach runs fast and adopts a relatively simple modeling process for facility elements. But uncertainty due to assumptions used in modeling might complicate the interpretation of results. On the other hand, 2D pathway program such as TESS can utilize more self-consistent detection probability and delay time since actual pathway on 2D map is available. Also, this pathway visualization helps users understand analysis result more intuitively. But, in general, 2D pathway programs require strong computational power and careful optimization. Another possible difference between two approaches is response force deployment and RFT

  20. Nuclear medicine physics

    CERN Document Server

    De Lima, Joao Jose

    2011-01-01

    Edited by a renowned international expert in the field, Nuclear Medicine Physics offers an up-to-date, state-of-the-art account of the physics behind the theoretical foundation and applications of nuclear medicine. It covers important physical aspects of the methods and instruments involved in modern nuclear medicine, along with related biological topics. The book first discusses the physics of and machines for producing radioisotopes suitable for use in conventional nuclear medicine and PET. After focusing on positron physics and the applications of positrons in medicine and biology, it descr

  1. 1987 Annual convention of the Austrian Physical Society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-09-01

    This is the pre-convention program of the annual convention to be held in September 1987. The divisions 1) general, 2) nuclear - and particle physics, 3) high-polymer physics have 124 contributions with abstracts, 75 of them of INIS interest. Another 22 contributions from the divisions, 4) atomic -, nuclear - and plasma physics, 5) solid state physics and 6) vocational training, are announced ty titles only. (G.Q.)

  2. Consideration on the evaluation of the two-man rule for the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Itakura, Shuichiro; Nakagome, Yoshihiro

    2008-01-01

    The establishment of effective anti-insider measures is a key issue with regard to the physical protection system. The two-man rule, which obligates workers to act always in pairs inside the protected area, is one of the important measures for the anti-insider physical protection system. However, the effectiveness of this method has not been examined in a quantitative manner taking into account the circumstances of Japanese society, which may influence the effectiveness of this method. In this paper, although with several hypotheses, the effectiveness of the two-man rule is confirmed based on the percentage of criminals in the Japanese population. (author)

  3. Buildings 104 and 142 Complex Physical Protection and Material Control and Accounting Upgrades at the Mayak Production Association

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aichele, Walter T.; Dwyer, Gregory M.; Larsen, R.; Malone, Tim

    2004-01-01

    The Federal State Unitary Enterprise Mayak Production Association (Mayak) and the U.S. Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) United States Project Team (USPT) have worked together for a number of years as part of the U.S. national Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) MPC and A program to implement both Physical Protection (PP) and Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) upgrades within the Buildings 104 and 142 Complex, a long-term storage area for uranium and plutonium oxide located within Mayak's RT-1 Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant. This paper focuses on the successes and areas for improvement in the analysis, planning, construction, implementation, and completion of a complex and labor-intensive project aimed at the refurbishment of two existing, in service, long-term special nuclear material (SNM) storage buildings within a Russian SNM production facility

  4. Nuclear physics at the KAON factory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kitching, R.

    1989-05-01

    The author surveys the range of nuclear physics issues which can be addressed with a high intensity hadron facility such as the KAON factory. He discusses hadron spectroscopy, kaon scattering, hypernuclear physics, spin physics, and nuclear physics with neutrinos. Nuclear Physics is defined rather broadly, encompassing the study of strongly interacting systems, and including the structure of individual hadrons, hadron-hadron interactions, hadronic weak and electromagnetic currents (in nuclei too), conventional nuclear structure, and exotic nuclei. The basic theme is how the KAON Factory can shed light on non-perturbative QCD and its relation to conventional nuclear physics

  5. Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chinese Nuclear Society, Beijing; U.S. Nuclear Energy Institute

    2000-01-01

    The Contracting parties recognize the importance of the measures provided in the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Paris Convention on Third party liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy as well as in national legislation on compensation for nuclear damage consistent with the principles of these conventions. The Contracting parties desire to establish a worldwide liability regime to supplement and enhance these measures with a view to increasing the amount of compensation for nuclear damage and encourage regional and global co-operation to promote a higher level of nuclear safety in accordance with the principle of international partnership and solidarity

  6. Legal aspects of transport of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jacobsson, Mans.

    The Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention are briefly discussed and other conventions in the field of civil liability for nuclear damage are mentioned: the Vienna Convention, the Nuclear Ships Convention and the 1971 Convention relating to civil liability in the field of maritime carriage of nuclear material. Legislation on civil liability in the Nordic countries, which is based on the Paris Convention and the Supplementary Convention is discussed, notably the principle of channelling of liability and exceptions from that principle due to rules of liability in older transport conventions and certain problems due to the limited geographical scope of the Paris Convention and the Supplementary Convention. Insurance problems arising in connection with transport of nuclear materials are surveyed and an outline is given of the administrative provisions concerning transport (based on the IAEA transport regulations) which govern transport of radioactive materials by different means: road, rail, sea and air. Finally, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is discussed. (NEA) [fr

  7. Order of 31 July 1987 on protection and control of nuclear materials carried by air

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Order is part of a series of texts on protection and control of nuclear materials which include: the Act of 25 July 1980 and the Decree of 12 May 1981 made in its implementation and, as regards the specific aspect of protection and control of materials during transport, the Order of 26 March 1982 amended in 1986. The 1987 Order lays down the conditions which must be complied with by approved carriers (the French or the foreign holders of a licence under the above-mentioned Act of 1980) in case of transport of such materials by air [fr

  8. Guidelines regarding National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    These guidelines, established by the Contracting Parties pursuant to Article 22 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (hereinafter called the Convention), are intended to be read in conjunction with the text of the Convention. Their purpose is to provide guidance to the Contracting Parties regarding material that it may be useful to include in the National Reports required under Article 5 and thereby to facilitate the most efficient review of implementation by the Contracting Parties of their obligations under the Convention [es

  9. Guidelines regarding National Reports under the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    These guidelines, established by the Contracting Parties pursuant to Article 22 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (hereinafter called the Convention), are intended to be read in conjunction with the text of the Convention. Their purpose is to provide guidance to the Contracting Parties regarding material that it may be useful to include in the National Reports required under Article 5 and thereby to facilitate the most efficient review of implementation by the Contracting Parties of their obligations under the Convention

  10. Supporting the material control and accountancy system with physical protection system features

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miyoshi, D.S.; Caskey, D.L.; Olson, C.E.

    1984-01-01

    Most physical security functions can be accomplished by a range of alternative features. Careful design can provide comparable levels of security regardless of which option is chosen, albeit with possible differences in cost and efficiency. However, the effectiveness and especially the cost and efficiency of the material control and accounting system may be strongly influenced by the selection of a particular design approach to physical security. In this paper, a series of examples are cited to illustrate the effects that particular physical protection design choices may have. The examples have been chosen from several systems engineering projects at facilities within the DOE nuclear community. These examples are generalized, and a series of design principles are proposed for integrating physical security with MC and A by appropriate selection of alternative features

  11. Nuclear reactors: physics and materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yadigaroglu, G

    2005-07-01

    In the form of a tutorial addressed to non-specialists, the article provides an introduction to nuclear reactor technology and more specifically to Light Water Reactors (LWR); it also shows where materials and chemistry problems are encountered in reactor technology. The basics of reactor physics are reviewed, as well as the various strategies in reactor design and the corresponding choices of materials (fuel, coolant, structural materials, etc.). A brief description of the various types of commercial power reactors follows. The design of LWRs is discussed in greater detail; the properties of light water as coolant and moderator are put in perspective. The physicochemical and metallurgical properties of the materials impose thermal limits that determine the performance and the maximum power a reactor can deliver. (author)

  12. Radiation and physical protection challenges at advanced nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pickett, Susan E.

    2008-01-01

    Full text: The purpose of this study is to examine challenges and opportunities for radiation protection in advanced nuclear reactors and fuel facilities proposed under the Generation IV (GEN IV) initiative which is examining and pursuing the exploration and development of advanced nuclear science and technology; and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which seeks to develop worldwide consensus on enabling expanded use of economical, carbon-free nuclear energy to meet growing energy demand. The International Energy Agency projects nuclear power to increase at a rate of 1.3 to 1.5 percent a year over the next 20 years, depending on economic growth. Much of this growth will be in Asia, which, as a whole, currently has plans for 40 new nuclear power plants. Given this increase in demand for new nuclear power facilities, ranging from light water reactors to advanced fuel processing and fabrication facilities, it is necessary for radiation protection and physical protection technologies to keep pace to ensure both worker and public health. This paper is based on a review of current initiatives and the proposed reactors and facilities, primarily the nuclear fuel cycle facilities proposed under the GEN IV and GNEP initiatives. Drawing on the Technology Road map developed under GEN IV, this work examines the potential radiation detection and protection challenges and issues at advanced reactors, including thermal neutron spectrum systems, fast neutron spectrum systems and nuclear fuel recycle facilities. The thermal neutron systems look to improve the efficiency of production of hydrogen or electricity, while the fast neutron systems aim to enable more effective management of actinides through recycling of most components in the discharged fuel. While there are components of these advanced systems that can draw on the current and well-developed radiation protection practices, there will inevitably be opportunities to improve the overall quality of radiation

  13. Physical protection equipment study. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haberman, W.

    1977-06-01

    This report summarizes the work performed by MITRE for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The major products of this effort are a Catalog of Physical Protection Equipment, a Guide for Evaluation of Physical Protection Equipment, a book of Reference Materials, and a set of guidelines for use in the development of a methodology for measuring levels of security system effectiveness. A summary of recommendations resulting from this study is also presented

  14. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. Integration is approached by coordinating all safeguards information through a safeguards coordination center. This center represents a higher level in a communication, data-processing, and decision-making structure which is needed for efficient real-time operation of the integrated system. The safeguards coordination center functions to assess alarm and warning data required to resolve threats in the safeguards system, coordinate information and interaction involving the material accounting, physical protection, and facility monitoring and control systems, and present a single unified interface for interaction with facility management, facility operations, safeguards system personnel, and response forces

  15. Physical protection of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toepfer, K.

    1989-01-01

    This contribution investigates the possible danger and the legal basis of physical protection and explains the current, integrated system provided for, as well as the underlying possible scenarios of an assault: (1) by a violent crowd of aggressors outside the installation, (2) by a small group of aggressors outside the installation, (3) by a person allowed to enter (internal assault). The physical protection system supplements the internal safety measures to enhance protection against hypothetical and possible acts of terrorism or other criminal assault. The system covers external and internal controlled areas, access monitoring, physical protection control room and service, security checks of the personnel, and activities to disclose sabotage. Some reflections on the problem field between security controls and the constitutional state conclude this contribution. (orig./HSCH) [de

  16. The Study on Progression for Consolidating the Nuclear Security Legislative System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Jae San; Jung, Myung Tak [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    One is the International Convention for Suppressing Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the other is amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). ICSANT and CPPNM were proposed by the UN and IAEA, respectively to strengthen the international framework of nuclear security. The ICSANT was entered into force in 2007, but CPPNM amendment is pending in force because the shortage of countries who ratify it. For going into effect this convention, it needs the two-thirds of the States Parties to the CPPNM. It is not completed, yet. So, various initiatives such as nuclear security summit, GICNT, UN ministerial conference, etc. treated that those two conventions were the primary basis to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. The Republic of Korea (ROK) continuously has made an effort to consolidate the nuclear security legislative framework since the 2010. The purpose of this paper is to provide what we did to strengthen the nuclear security legal framework and what should we do next.

  17. The Study on Progression for Consolidating the Nuclear Security Legislative System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jae San; Jung, Myung Tak

    2015-01-01

    One is the International Convention for Suppressing Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the other is amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). ICSANT and CPPNM were proposed by the UN and IAEA, respectively to strengthen the international framework of nuclear security. The ICSANT was entered into force in 2007, but CPPNM amendment is pending in force because the shortage of countries who ratify it. For going into effect this convention, it needs the two-thirds of the States Parties to the CPPNM. It is not completed, yet. So, various initiatives such as nuclear security summit, GICNT, UN ministerial conference, etc. treated that those two conventions were the primary basis to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. The Republic of Korea (ROK) continuously has made an effort to consolidate the nuclear security legislative framework since the 2010. The purpose of this paper is to provide what we did to strengthen the nuclear security legal framework and what should we do next

  18. Global nuclear material control model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.A.

    1996-01-01

    The nuclear danger can be reduced by a system for global management, protection, control, and accounting as part of a disposition program for special nuclear materials. The development of an international fissile material management and control regime requires conceptual research supported by an analytical and modeling tool that treats the nuclear fuel cycle as a complete system. Such a tool must represent the fundamental data, information, and capabilities of the fuel cycle including an assessment of the global distribution of military and civilian fissile material inventories, a representation of the proliferation pertinent physical processes, and a framework supportive of national or international perspective. They have developed a prototype global nuclear material management and control systems analysis capability, the Global Nuclear Material Control (GNMC) model. The GNMC model establishes the framework for evaluating the global production, disposition, and safeguards and security requirements for fissile nuclear material

  19. Definitive closure of nuclear power plants. Aspects concerning physical safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.; Puntarulo, L.; Canibano, J.

    1988-01-01

    This paper analyzes the various safety requirements that must be fulfilled by nuclear power plants for their operation without restrictions, such as safeguards, nuclear safety and physical protection. Physical protection, the subject most extensively dealt by the authors, is defined as safety measures aimed at providing protection against deliberate hostile deeds, such as robberies or non-authorized transport of radioactive materials or sabotage in nuclear facilities, performed either by individuals or by groups of individuals. (Author)

  20. Radiological Protection Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Irish Legislation

    2014-07-01

    This Act provides for the dissolution of the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland and the transfer of all its functions, assets, liabilities and staff to the Environmental Protection Agency, to give effect to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material done at Vienna on 8 July 2005, to amend the Radiological Protection Act 1991, the Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992 and certain other enactments, and to provide for matters connected therewith

  1. U.S. Department of Energy physical protection upgrades at the Latvian Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center, Latvia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haase, M.; Hine, C.; Robertson, C.

    1996-01-01

    Approximately five years ago, the Safe, Secure Dismantlement program was started between the US and countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The purpose of the program is to accelerate progress toward reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, including such threats as theft, diversion, and unauthorized possession of nuclear materials. This would be accomplished by strengthening the material protection, control, and accounting systems within the FSU countries. Under the US Department of Energy''s program of providing cooperative assistance to the FSU countries in the areas of Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC and A), the Latvian Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center (LNRC) near Riga, Latvia, was identified as a candidate site for a cooperative MPC and A project. The LNRC is the site of a 5-megawatt IRT-C pool-type research reactor. This paper describes: the process involved, from initial contracting to project completion, for the physical protection upgrades now in place at the LNRC; the intervening activities; and a brief overview of the technical aspects of the upgrades

  2. Basic principles and guidelines governing services of the police for the protection of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schulte, R.; Kern, R.

    1989-01-01

    Services of the police can be ordered for physical protection of nuclear installations of any kind and of nuclear materials transports in cases where there is danger that those first responsible cannot cope with the situation. The contribution discusses physical protection measures as a licensing requirement, the duties of the police forces within the given scope, the measures that can and may be taken by the police, the establishment of special commissions, as well as the particular provisions for nuclear materials transports. The provisions governing police services for physical protection have led to an efficient and well furnished system in terms of organisation, personnel, and materials, which guarantees protection to a great extent. (orig./HSCH) [de

  3. Information report on nuclear safety and radiation protection of the SOMANU site - Issue 2014

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Published in compliance with the French code of the environment, this report first presents different aspects of the SOMANU plant which is dedicated to the maintenance of materials and equipment from nuclear installations: location and environment, history, description of activities, regulatory framework. It describes the various measures regarding nuclear safety and radiation protection: general principles of nuclear safety, organization, presentation of the Areva's nuclear safety Charter, inspections and controls, measures regarding radiation protection. The next part addresses nuclear events which occurred on this site and had to be declared. The report gives an overview of activities and measures regarding the management of releases and the control of the environment. The next part addresses waste management: general considerations on radioactive waste management in France, description and classification of radioactive wastes present in the INB, management of conventional wastes. The management of other impacts is also reported. The last chapter reviews the actions undertaken in the field of transparency and information. Recommendations of the CHSCT are reported

  4. Information report on nuclear safety and radiation protection of the SOMANU site - Issue 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-06-01

    Published in compliance with the French code of the environment, this report first presents different aspects of the SOMANU plant which is dedicated to the maintenance of materials and equipment from nuclear installations: location and environment, history, description of activities, regulatory framework. It describes the various measures regarding nuclear safety and radiation protection: general principles of nuclear safety, organization, presentation of the Areva's nuclear safety Charter, inspections and controls, measures regarding radiation protection. The next part addresses nuclear events which occurred on this site and had to be declared. The report gives an overview of activities and measures regarding the management of releases and the control of the environment. The next part addresses waste management: generalities on radioactive waste management in France, description and classification of radioactive wastes present in the INB, management of conventional wastes. The management of other impacts is also reported. The last chapter reviews the actions undertaken in the field of transparency and information. Recommendations of the CHSCT are reported

  5. Risk Prevention for Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Badawy, I.

    2008-01-01

    The present paper investigates the parameters which may have effects on the safety of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources used in peaceful applications of atomic energy. The emergency response planning in such situations are also indicated. In synergy with nuclear safety measures, an approach is developed in this study for risk prevention. It takes into consideration the collective implementation of measures of nuclear material accounting and control, physical protection and monitoring of such strategic and dangerous materials in an integrated and coordinated real-time mode at a nuclear or radiation facility and in any time

  6. Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dougherty, D.; Fainberg, A.; Sanborn, J.; Allentuck, J.; Sun, C.

    1996-11-01

    On 27 September 1993, President Clinton proposed open-quotes... a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards.close quotes The UN General Assembly subsequently adopted a resolution recommending negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty (hereinafter referred to as open-quotes the Cutoff Conventionclose quotes) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The matter is now on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, although not yet under negotiation. This accord would, in effect, place all fissile material (defined as highly enriched uranium and plutonium) produced after entry into force (EIF) of the accord under international safeguards. open-quotes Productionclose quotes would mean separation of the material in question from radioactive fission products, as in spent fuel reprocessing, or enrichment of uranium above the 20% level, which defines highly enriched uranium (HEU). Facilities where such production could occur would be safeguarded to verify that either such production is not occurring or that all material produced at these facilities is maintained under safeguards

  7. Designing physical protection technology for insider protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Trujillo, A.A.; Waddoups, I.G.

    1986-01-01

    Since its inception, the nuclear industry has been engaged in providing protection against an insider threat. Although insider protection activities have been fairly successful in the past, present societal conditions require increased protection to further minimize the existence of an insider or the consequences of an insider-perpetrated incident. Integration of insider protection techniques into existing administrative and operational procedures has resulted in economic and operational impacts. Future increases in insider protection may result in even greater impacts, so we must proceed wisely as new approaches are developed. Increased emphasis on background investigations, security clearances, human reliability programs, security awareness activities, and the development of technology to address the insider threat are evidence of continuing concern in this area. Experience ranging from operational test and evaluation of developmental equipment to conceptual designs for new facilities has led to the development of general principles and conclusions for mitigating the insider threat while minimizing adverse impacts on site operations. Important principles include real-time monitoring of personnel and material and requiring that the physical protection and material control and accounting systems to be much more coordinated and integrated than in the past

  8. Proceedings of the workshop on a comparative analysis of approaches to the protection of fissile materials, Stanford University, July 28-30, 1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goodby, J.E.; Lehman, R. III; Potter, W.C.

    1998-01-01

    Events in recent years have caused heightened concern about the security of weapons-usable nuclear material. The possibility of illicit trafficking in, or seizure of, such material, leading to nuclear terrorism, is a worry for all states and their citizens. And given the relatively small quantities required, material obtained in one part of the world could be made into a weapon in another and threaten lives in a third. It is truly a global problem. Since the beginning of the nuclear era, the physical protection of fissile material has been a responsibility of the individual states possessing the material. These states have different organizational approaches for providing physical protection; and while cognizant of recommended general standards, they tend to follow their own practices, shaped by custom, costs, and threat perception. Moreover, the existence of military as well as civil programs in some states adds another dimension to the physical protection issue. Because physical protection is a sovereign matter and not part of an international regime (except for transit of civil material across borders), there has been less attention in much of the world community to the issues of physical protection than to the other elements of nuclear safeguards and controls. (An important exception to this situation is the effort being made to assist the states of the former Soviet Union in the disposition of their weapons-usable nuclear materials.) The lack of a general dialog about a problem of growing concern motivated us to hold a three-day workshop at Stanford University to develop a better understanding of some of the important underlying questions and issues, and to undertake a comparative examination of states' approaches to physical protection. We were pleased to have knowledgeable participants from a number of the countries and regions where physical protection of fissile materials is, or will become, a day-to-day matter. The results of the workshop are reported in

  9. Physical protection of radioactive materials in a University Research Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boeck, H.

    1998-01-01

    Although nuclear research centers attached to universities usually do not keep large inventories of radioactive or special nuclear material, the mentioned material has still to be under strict surveillance and safeguards if applicable. One problem in such research centers is the large and frequent fluctuation of persons - mainly students, scientists or visiting guest scientists - using such materials for basic or applied research. In the present paper an overview of protective actions in such a research institute will be given and experience of more than 36 years will be presented. (author)

  10. The regime for nuclear materials and the competence of the Communities to conclude international agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puissochet, J.-P.

    1978-01-01

    This is a commentary of a Decision handed down on 14 November 1978 by the Court of Justice of the European Communities. The Court was invited to decide whether it was necessary for the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) to take part in the negociations on the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Installations and Transport. In its Decision, the Court considered that the negotiations covered certain aspects within the sole competence of Euratom (in particular concerning supply). Euratom should therefore participate in the Convention on this basis. The author analyses the relevant provisions of the Euratom Treaty and expresses reservations on certain conclusions reached by the Court. (NEA) [fr

  11. Modernization of the physical protection system of IPEN-CNEN/SP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, F.F.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The plans of physical protection of nuclear facilities must be reviewed and updated every two years. A general study of the physical protection system was carried out in order to review and to update the plan of physical protection of IPEN-CNEN/SP. Important alterations accomplished at the institute were considered in the study, as the installation of a cyclotron 30 MeV and the new operation conditions for the nuclear research reactor IEA-RI, that include the increase of its operation power from two to five megawatts and the establishment of the continuous operation by 72 hours weekly. The area of IPEN-CNEN/SP is 478,000 m 2 (101,850 m 2 built area of 107 constructions). The group responsible for the study investigated the performance of the physical protection system and detected some points that could be reinforced at inner and protected areas. The initial step was the evaluation, in loco, of the constructions and physical barriers of inner and protected areas. The performance of the security force personnel on the conventional procedures, as access control to the facilities, control of material flow, area monitoring and patrol, as well as its response for special situation procedures in the case of a physical protection emergency, were evaluated too. The study also focused the communication means used by the security force, as the extension phone lines that are located in each entrance area and in the huts, and the portable VHP radios that are used by the guards. In order to elaborate a programme of modernization of the physical protection system, using the results of the study as basis, an internal committee composed of specialists in physical protection, nuclear safety, operation of reactors and engineering areas was created. The programme elaborated by the committee strengthens the physical protection system by applying the defense in depth concept. At the same time, it attempts to propitiate a balanced protection to minimize the consequences for

  12. Physical protection cooperation with Former Soviet Union countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.D.

    1995-01-01

    This paper presents an overview of physical protection cooperation activities between Sandia (SNL) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) regarding Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC ampersand A) responsibilities. Begun four years ago as part of the Safe, Secure Dismantlement Program, this project is intended to stem proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Purpose of the program is to accelerate progress toward a goal shared by both Russia and the United States: to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, including such threats as theft, diversion, and unauthorized possession of nuclear materials. This will be accomplished by strengthening the MPC ampersand A systems in both, countries. This new program (US Department of Energy Laboratory-to-Laboratory MPC ampersand A program) is designed to complement Government-to-Government programs sponsored by US Senators Nunn and Lugar. US and Russian representatives exchange visits and discuss physical protection philosophies. Russian representatives have received formal training in the US process of system design and analysis to include the design of an effective physical protection system, determination of physical protection system objectives, initial design of a physical protection system, evaluation of the design, and often redesign or refinement of the existing system. Some Russian organizations have philosophies similar to those of the United States, but when they differ, the US and Russian representatives must negotiate. Other Russian organizations, because of heavy reliance on guard forces, have not developed a systematic design process. Cooperative work between US national laboratories and Russian counterparts has resulted in major physical protection enhancements at a Russian demonstration site and other advancements for Laboratory-to-Laboratory projects

  13. New challenges in nuclear material detection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunlop, W.; Sale, K.; Dougan, A.; Luke, J.; Suski, N.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001 the International Safeguards community recognized the magnitude of the threat posed by illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and the need for enhanced physical protection. For the first time, separate sessions on illicit trafficking and physical protection of nuclear materials were included in the IAEA Safeguards Symposium. In the aftermath of September 11, it is clear that the magnitude of the problem and the urgency with which it must be addressed will be a significant driver for advanced nuclear materials detection technologies for years to come. Trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive sources is a global concern. According to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database Program, there have been confirmed cases in more than 40 countries and the number of cases per year have nearly doubled since 1996. The challenge of combating nuclear terrorism also brings with it many opportunities for the development of new tools and new approaches. In addition to the traditional gamma-ray imaging, spectrometry and neutron interrogation, there is a need for smaller, smarter, more energy-efficient sensors and sensor systems for detecting and tracking threats. These systems go by many names - correlated sensor networks, wide-area tracking systems, sensor or network fabrics - but the concept behind them is the same. Take a number of wireless sensors and tie them together with a communications network, develop a scheme for fusing the data and make the system easy to deploy. This paper will present a brief survey of nuclear materials detection capability, and discuss some advances in research and development that are particularly suited for illicit trafficking, detection of shielded highly enriched uranium, and border security. (author)

  14. Impact of Y2K problem on physical protection system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kumar, R.; Swadia, N.S.; Zanwar, P.S.; Mishra, G.P.; Salunke, A.S.; Nigam, R.K.

    1999-01-01

    Year 2000 related system failures/problems in Physical Protection System pose no threat to general safety and functioning of any nuclear facility. But there can be potential security threats having radiation safety and non-proliferation concern and hence should be given due importance. Reviewing and testing Physical Protection System for Y2K compliance are easier than other systems as it does not directly affect operation of the plant. The existing emergency response capability at the nuclear facilities should be utilizes effectively to mitigate any Y2K induced events on Physical Protection System with dedicated manpower and channeled efforts

  15. An integrated approach to adapt physical protection to the new terrorism threats

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steinhaeusler, F.; Braun, C.; Bunn, G.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: New terrorism (NT) differs significantly from the traditional form of terrorism insofar as it has the capability to: train and deploy suicide commandos; use sophisticated logistics; implement transnational terrorist operations; infiltrate security and diplomatic communities; and commit acts of mass disturbance and mass killings. NT does not engage in negotiations: it does not discriminate in its attacks between children, adult civilians or military personnel; and it is willing to deploy weapons of mass destruction. These characteristics require that the conventional approach to physical protection of installations dealing with nuclear and other radioactive materials (e.g., Design Basis Threat (DBT)) be adapted accordingly. This integrated approach should encompass: at the international level: revised legally binding conventions and recommendations which are more specific than current versions, providing practically applicable advice reflecting the new threat scenarios; at the national level: introducing an element of transparency for validating the national threat perception and supra-national review of the effectiveness of the counteractions taken such as regulatory approaches implementing these international agreements; at the operational level: enhancing security-related co-operation at the command and control level between the on-site security forces at nuclear installations, the response force, police and the military, as well as upgrading of the force-on-force training; and at the research level: R and D in physical protection technology and practices to keep abreast of the threats posed by the NT. (author)

  16. Physical protection: threat response and performance goals as applied at the nuclear material inspection and storage (NMIS) building

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanford, T.H.

    1982-01-01

    Only one aspect of nuclear security has been discussed here, a disciplined approach to physical protection systems (PPS) design. The best security against a multitude of threats to the nuclear industry is a dynamic and multifaceted safeguards program. It is one that combines PPS design with employee screening, reliability or behavioral observation programs, procedural control, assessment techniques, response capabilities, and security hardware. To be effective, such a program must be supported by management and applied uniformly to all personnel, including the safeguards and security staff

  17. Status report on US-Russian laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation in nuclear materials protection, control and accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullen, M.

    1996-01-01

    In April 1994, a new program of cooperation on nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) was initiated between (1) the US Department of Energy and its laboratories and (2) nuclear institutes and enterprises of the Russian Federation. The program is called the Laboratory-to-Laboratory Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (Lab-to-Lab MPC and A Program); it is one of several, complementary US-Russian MPC and A programs. The purpose of the Lab-to-Lab MPC and A Program is to accelerate progress toward a goal that is vital to the national security interests of both countries: reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation by strengthening MPC and A systems. In its first two years, the program has made significant progress and has expanded to include many additional Russian participants. It has also fostered a spirit of mutual understanding, partnership, and respect between US and Russian nuclear specialists, which has paved the way for advances in other MPC and A and nuclear security cooperative efforts. This paper reviews the current status of the program. In addition to summarizing the background and objectives of the program, the paper describes highlights of recent work and outlines future directions for Lab-to-Lab MPC and A cooperation

  18. Prerequisites for a nuclear weapons convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liebert, W.

    1999-01-01

    A Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) would prohibit the research, development, production, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and would serve their total elimination.' In this fashion it follows the model laid out by the biological and chemical weapons conventions. The NWC would encompass a few other treaties and while replacing them should learn from their experiences. The Nuclear Weapons Convention should at some given point in the future replace the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and so resolve its contradictions and shortcomings. The main objectives of an NWC Would be: reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the 'five' nuclear weapons powers down to zero within a set of fixed periods of time; elimination of stockpiles of weapons-usable materials and, where existent, nuclear warheads in de-facto nuclear weapon and threshold states; providing assurance that all states will retain their non-nuclear status forever

  19. International Legal Framework for Nuclear Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, G.M.

    2010-01-01

    The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each State. There is no single international instrument that addresses nuclear security in a comprehensive manner. The legal foundation for nuclear security comprises international instruments and recognized principles that are implemented by national authorities. Security systems at the national level will contribute to a strengthened and more universal system of nuclear security at the international level. The binding security treaties are; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the 2005 amendment thereto, Safeguards Agreements between the Agency and states required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Model Protocol additional to agreement(s) between State(s) and the Agency for the application of Safeguards Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Convention on Nuclear Safety, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

  20. A programmatic challenge - accelerating, expanding, and innovating physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Caravelli, J.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In the wake of the September 11th terrorists attacks, the Office of international material protection and cooperation is responding to the international community's call to strengthen a global response to the serious challenge of securing nuclear material with the aim of preventing nuclear terrorism. Recent events underline the urgency to proactively address the threat posed by insufficiently secured nuclear material. The sobering reality is that, at present, the threat is disproportional to international efforts to mitigate and stop the proliferation of nuclear materials. The potential consequences of failing to address deficiencies in security systems, or for that matter aiming at anything below 'comprehensive' nuclear material security' is a horrifying reminder of the incredible challenge that we are facing. Against this backdrop, our Office has undertaken a comprehensive program review and is making all possible efforts to expand, accelerate and innovate our physical protection approach. The presentation that I propose to deliver will provide an overview of our new thinking regarding the vulnerability of nuclear/radioactive material post 9-11, touch on some of the obstacles that we are experiencing, and outline the steps that we are aggressively pursuing with the aim of achieving real threat reduction. My presentation will begin with a look at the success and knowledge gained from the bilateral material protection, control and accounting (MPC and A) cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation and use this as a platform from which to launch a wider discussion on international efforts to strengthen practices for protecting nuclear material. I will examine lessons learned from our cooperation in relation to their applicability to today's security challenges and will outline how we are expanding on our traditional mission to address emerging threats. I will discuss programmatic efforts to bolster traditional, first line of defense

  1. A data communications systems for tamper-protected special nuclear materials (SNM) inventory management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurkamp, A.C.

    1995-01-01

    The Department of Energy (D.O.E.) is responsible for the long term storage and protection of large quantities of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). This material is stored within individual containers located in vaults. Security measures are required to ensure that the SNM remains within the canisters where it is stored and that it is not disturbed in any manner. Conventional security and inventory techniques are manpower intensive and often require exposure to radiation hazards. The Purpose of this D.O.E sponsored project is to develop a cost effective system to monitor Special Nuclear Materials that, when fielded, would result in an extension of manual inventory cycles at a wide variety of SNM storage locations. The system consists of a computer, radio frequency interrogator, and individual miniaturized radio frequency transponders (tags) that are co-located with individual SNM containers. Each tag can perform SNM inventory, tamper alarm, and multiple sensor data transmission to the interrogator under the control of software designed by the user. SNM custodians can customize the system by their choice of packaging, software, and sensors. When implemented in accordance with current department of energy (D.O.E.) Policy on SNM inventory extension, the system has the potential to qualify for maximum extension times thus saving considerable resources through reduction of radiation exposure

  2. Welcome from INMM (Institute of Nuclear Materials Management)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Satkowiak, L.

    2015-01-01

    The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) is the premier professional society focused on safe and secure use of Nuclear Materials and the related nuclear scientific technology and knowledge. Its international membership includes government, academia, non-governmental organizations and industry, spanning the full spectrum all the way from policy to technology. The Institute's primary role include the promotion of research, the establishment of standards and the development of best practices, all centered around nuclear materials. It then disseminates this information through meetings, professional contacts, reports, papers, discussions, and publications. The formal structure of the INMM includes six technical divisions: Facility Operation; Materials Control and Accountability; Nonproliferation and Arms Control; Nuclear Security and Physical Protection; Packaging, Transportation and Disposition

  3. International conference on security of material. Measures to prevent, intercept and respond to illicit uses of nuclear material and radioactive sources. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-10-01

    The papers cover the subjects relating to the trafficking of highly enriched nuclear materials, less radioactive, radioactive materials, radiations sources, prevention of crime, capabilities of preventing smuggling, radiation detection devices that are or should be applied on borders. Different aspects of physical protection, security and safety of nuclear materials in a number of countries are discussed. A number of papers are devoted to detectors, and measuring methods

  4. International conference on security of material. Measures to prevent, intercept and respond to illicit uses of nuclear material and radioactive sources. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-10-01

    The papers cover the subjects relating to the trafficking of highly enriched nuclear materials, less radioactive, radioactive materials, radiations sources, prevention of crime, capabilities of preventing smuggling, radiation detection devices that are or should be applied on borders. Different aspects of physical protection, security and safety of nuclear materials in a number of countries are discussed. A number of papers are devoted to detectors, and measuring methods.

  5. The status of United States R and D programs in safeguards and physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mangan, D.L.; Tape, J.W.

    1993-01-01

    The breakup of former Soviet Union and the strategic nuclear arms reduction agreements, START 1 and 2, when fully implemented, will result in the significant reduction and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. These events will produce the significant increase of stored nuclear materials requiring the utmost control and care for indefinite future. Some of these materials in addition to existing wastes and residues may need further processing. The control of nuclear materials through safeguards, both domestic and international, is one of only a few effective barriers to nuclear proliferation. The improved technology is the key to the cost effective safeguards of nuclear materials. The Department of Energy carries out the research and development programs at its national laboratories. As the most notable demonstration and training efforts of new technologies, there is International Training Courses on the State System of Accounting and Control and the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials. The Office of Research and Development of the Office of Intelligence and National Security Affairs, the Department of Energy, the Office of Safeguards and Security, International Safeguards Division and so on carry out the activities of the R and D on safeguards and physical protection. (K.I.)

  6. Upgrade of the Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting System at the VNIIEF Industrial Zone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lewis, J.C.; Maltsev, V.; Singh, S.P.

    1999-01-01

    The Industrial Zone at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center/All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (RFNC/VNEEF) consists of ten guarded areas with twenty two material balance areas (A and As). The type of facilities in the Industrial Zone include storage sites, machine shops, research facilities, and training facilities. Modernization of the Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) System at the Industrial Zone started in 1997. This paper provides a description of, the methodology/strategy used in the upgrade of the MFC and A system

  7. Main results of ten years co-operation with Nis in the field of physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salewski, P.; Gutschmidt, W.

    2001-01-01

    The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the Russian Federation (RF) and the New Independent States (NIS) have been working closely together since 1992 in the field of physical protection. The success of this co-operative work is based on mutually beneficial agreements between corresponding FRG and RF ministries. The main working points of these agreements were a) a mutual exchange of information and experience, and b) assistance in developing licensing and regulatory procedures and guidelines, and c) physical upgrades to Russian nuclear facilities. The first two points have been established by holding seminars, workshops and by on-site instruction. Upgrades of RF nuclear installations, financed by the FRG were performed at: the Bochvar Institute in Moscow, the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow and the Mayak reactor plant in Chelyabinsk. This paper will outline the progress made to date and the GRS procedure for achieving successful co-operation with its RF and NIS counterparts. The major results of ten years cooperation will be shown. The following document describes the experiences gained during the evaluation of security reports by GRS as an external expert organisation in contract with the Supervisory Authorities. (authors)

  8. Amendment of APPRE for Ratification of the International Conventions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoo, Ho Sik; Kwak, Sung Woo; Chang, Sung Soon; Seo, Hyung Min; Lee, Jeong Hoon; Lee, Jeong Ho

    2010-01-01

    Both the international community and the IAEA have been making efforts to strengthen the global regime on nuclear security. As a result of these efforts, two conventions regarding nuclear security were issued by the UN and IAEA. The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (NTC) and the Amendment to Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNMNF). The NTC entered into force in 2007, but the CPPNMNF still has not yet been enacted. In the work plan released after the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit (which was held in Washington D.C) these conventions were mentioned as important tools against nuclear terrorism. The purpose of these conventions was to prevent malicious acts against radioactive materials and nuclear facilities. The article also specifies strong penal provisions. Many countries which had ratified these conventions had to revise or change their domestic acts or laws in order conform to these new international regimes. The ROK signed these two conventions in 2005: however, it has not ratified them yet. The government has a plan to ratify them before the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, which will be held in the ROK. Each article in the conventions should be reviewed thoroughly in terms of their effects on the domestic legal and institutional systems. The penal provisions regulating the conventions should especially be carefully scrutinized since their effects are considerable. In this paper, we compared the penal provisions in the conventions with the ROK's laws and selected the provisions that are not specified in the ROK's legal system. The proposed articles for amendment to the APPRE are also suggested

  9. International conference on security of nuclear material and radioactive sources opens in Stockholm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The IAEA develops basic guidelines that have proven to be of significant importance in the development of national physical protection systems and international agreements. The IAEA has initiated a number of activities, including training, technology transfer and peer review, to support Member States in improving their nuclear material accountancy and physical protection systems at State and facility levels. The Agency also maintains a database of reported incidents. The Conference is organized by the IAEA, hosted by Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and held in co-operation with the World Customs Organization, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the European Police Office

  10. Nuclear technology in materials testing and radiation protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neider, R.

    1975-01-01

    A report of the 1974 activities of the laboratories for physical and measuring technical fundamentals, radiation effects and radiation protection, application of radionuclides and testing of radioactive materials of the Bundesanstalt fuer Materialpruefung (BAM) is given. (RW/LH) [de

  11. An analysis for formats to the cooperative nuclear nonproliferation agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Sung Tack

    1998-01-01

    A country's nuclear program can be designed to support nuclear research, the production of energy, and the production of nuclear materials for medical and industrial applications or for use in nuclear weapons, or any combination of these objectives. One significant concern is the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful nuclear activities to convert weapons programs. Other concerns include the accidental release and transport of radionuclides. The framework for cooperative monitoring consists of context, agreement, parameters and monitoring options. Nuclear material and energy production activities provide nuclear materials for medical and industrial applications, produce electrical power or heat for general use, and possibly support the production of nuclear materials for weapons. All types of nuclear agreements could increase transparency and/or reduce tensions in a regional setting. This article explains about nuclear agreements of South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, Korean Peace Zone, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. (Yi, J. H.)

  12. An alternative format for Category I fuel cycle facility physical protection plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dwyer, P.A.

    1992-06-01

    This document provides an alternative format for physical protection plans designed to meet the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Sections 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. These requirements apply to licensees who operate Category I fuel cycle facilities. Such licensees are authorized to use or possess a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material. The format described is an alternative to that found under Regulatory Guide 5.52, Rev. 2 ''Standard Format and Content of a Licensee Physical Protection Plan for Strategic Special Nuclear Material at Fixed Sites (Other than Nuclear Power Plants).''

  13. Effectiveness of the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwarz, G.

    2016-01-01

    The Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) has been established after the Chernobyl accident with the primary objective of achieving and maintaining a high level of nuclear safety worldwide, through the enhancement of national measures and international cooperation. The CNS is an incentive convention. It defines the basic safety standard which shall be met by the Contracting Parties. The verification of compliance is based on a self-assessment by the Countries and a Peer Review by the other Contracting Parties. As of July 2015, there are 78 Contracting Parties. Among the Contracting Parties of the Convention are all countries operating nuclear power plants except the Islamic Republic of Iran and Taiwan, all countries constructing nuclear power plants, all countries having nuclear power plants in long term shutdown and all countries having signed contracts for the construction of nuclear power plants. The National Reports under the CNS therefore cover almost all nuclear power plants of the world. The peer review of reports, questions and answers that are exchanged in connection with the Review Meetings provided a unique overview of nuclear safety provisions and issues in countries planning or operating nuclear power plants. This is especially important for neighbouring countries to those operating nuclear power plants.

  14. National system for prevention of nuclear and radiological terrorism in Lithuania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morkunas, G.; Klevinskas, G.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Minimization of the threat posed by nuclear and radiological terrorism and mitigation of its impact is one of the most important tasks for any state. Prevention of the diversion of nuclear and radioactive material is related with a number of measures, which include physical protection of nuclear industry, preparedness for investigation of the appropriate incidents and accidents, emergency preparedness. All these issues are closely related with radiation protection. Physical protection of nuclear facility is defined by Lithuanian legislation as a system of organizational, legal and technical measures aimed at protecting nuclear equipment, nuclear and radioactive material from their illegal possession or seizure and from an unauthorized entry into the area of a nuclear facility. Responsibilities and organizational measures in this respect are clearly stated by the legislation, which is the basis for protection related procedures. Requirements for physical protection of nuclear facilities were developed shortly after the Vienna Convention was ratified. They are permanently improved taking into account all the related recent developments. Though the most important object for physical protection in Lithuanian is Ignalina NPP, the physical protection measures were also introduced at the Maisiagala radioactive waste repository. Experience shows that physical protection should be used in connection with other measures. One of them is capability for detection and analysis of radioactive and nuclear material. All the detected sources in Lithuanian are analyzed in situ, some of them - in laboratory. Consequences on society of a terrorist attack might be mitigated by emergency preparedness. One of the most important elements of it is the raising of public awareness. The paper discusses both the system of physical protection and provides other issues related with prevention of nuclear and radiological terrorism in Lithuania with emphasis of radiation protection

  15. Advanced physical protection systems for facilities and transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1976-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is developing advanced physical protection safeguards in order to improve the security of special nuclear materials, facilities, and transportation. Computer models are being used to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative systems for protecting facilities against external attack which may include internal assistance, and against internal theft or sabotage. Physical protection elements such as admittance controls, portals and detectors, perimeter and interior intrusion alarms, fixed and remotely activated barriers, and secure communications are being evaluated, adapted, and where required, developed. New facilities safeguards concepts which involve ''control loops'' between physical protection and materials control elements are being evolved jointly between Sandia Laboratories and Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Special vehicles and digital communications equipment have been developed for the ERDA safe-secure transportation system. The current status and direction of these activities are surveyed

  16. Advanced physical protection systems for facilities and transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1976-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is developing advanced physical protection safeguards in order to improve the security of special nuclear materials, facilities, and transportation. Computer models are being used to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative systems for protecting facilities against external attack which may include internal assistance, and against internal theft or sabotage. Physical protection elements such as admittance controls, portals and detectors, perimeter and interior intrusion alarms, fixed and remotely-activated barriers, and secure communications are being evaluated, adapted, and where required, developed. New facilities safeguards concepts which involve (control loops) between physical protection and materials control elements are being evolved jointly between Sandia Laboratories and Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Special vehicles and digital communications equipment have been developed for the ERDA safe-secure transportation system. The current status and direction of these activities are surveyed

  17. The Effects of the Revised CPPNM on Legislative Framework

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwak, Sung-Woo; Yoo, Ho-Sik; Shim, Hye-Won; Chang, Sun-Young; Lee, Jong-Uk

    2006-01-01

    A Diplomatic Conference was held last July at Vienna of Austria and adopted an important Convention in physical protection field. The Convention is the revised Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. A State Party to the revised CPPNM has obligation to meet the Convention. Since the Amendment to CPPNM is expected to enter into force in near future, there is an urgent need to prepare for implementing the international obligation. Thus, it is important to assess the effect of the revised Convention on national legislative and regulatory framework to govern physical protection of domestic nuclear material and facilities. The objective of this paper is to perform comparative assessment between new provisions of the revised Convention and national law in order to prepare for the implementation of the international norm

  18. Analytic study for physical protection system (PPS) in nuclear power plants (NPPs)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Woo, Tae Ho, E-mail: thw@snu.ac.kr

    2013-12-15

    Highlights: • The physical protection system (PPS) is investigated. • General NPPs are modeled in the study. • Possible terror cases, likelihood, and consequence are studied. • PPS is constructed by analytical methods. - Abstract: The nuclear safeguard is analyzed in the aspect of the physical protection system (PPS) in nuclear power plants (NPPs). The PPS is reviewed and its related terror scenarios are investigated. The PPS is developed using analytical methods. In the terror scenarios, there are 8 possible cases for the terror attacks to the NPPs. Then, the likelihood of terror is classified by the general terror incidents. The consequence of terror is classified by Design Basis Threat (DBT) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) scale. The physical protection method is suggested by defense-in-depth constraints and severe accident countermeasures. Finally, the advanced PPS is constructed, which could be used for the preparation for the possible terror attacks in the NPPs.

  19. Analytic study for physical protection system (PPS) in nuclear power plants (NPPs)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woo, Tae Ho

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: • The physical protection system (PPS) is investigated. • General NPPs are modeled in the study. • Possible terror cases, likelihood, and consequence are studied. • PPS is constructed by analytical methods. - Abstract: The nuclear safeguard is analyzed in the aspect of the physical protection system (PPS) in nuclear power plants (NPPs). The PPS is reviewed and its related terror scenarios are investigated. The PPS is developed using analytical methods. In the terror scenarios, there are 8 possible cases for the terror attacks to the NPPs. Then, the likelihood of terror is classified by the general terror incidents. The consequence of terror is classified by Design Basis Threat (DBT) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) scale. The physical protection method is suggested by defense-in-depth constraints and severe accident countermeasures. Finally, the advanced PPS is constructed, which could be used for the preparation for the possible terror attacks in the NPPs

  20. Convention on nuclear safety. Final act

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The Diplomatic Conference, which was convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency at its Headquarters from 14 to 17 June 1994, adopted the Convention on Nuclear Safety reproduced in document INFCIRC/449 and the Final Act of the Conference. The text of the Final Act of the Conference, including an annexed document entitled ''Some clarification with respect to procedural and financial arrangements, national reports, and the conduct of review meetings, envisaged in the Convention on Nuclear Safety'', is reproduced in the Attachment hereto for the information of all Member States

  1. 37. annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1996-01-01

    The following subjects were covered in this meeting: waste management; nuclear materials management -- safety and health; international safeguards; measurement control and statistics for nuclear materials management; material control and accountability; packaging and transportation; nonproliferation and arms control; and physical protection. Separate papers were prepared for 74 items of this meeting

  2. Evaluating the attractiveness of nuclear material for proliferation-resistance and nuclear security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Jor-Shan; Ikegame, Kou; Kuno, Yusuke

    2011-01-01

    The attractiveness of nuclear material, defined as a function of the isotopic composition of the nuclear material in formulas expressing the material's intrinsic properties, is of considerably debate in recent developments of proliferation-resistance measures of a nuclear energy system. A reason for such debate arises from the fact that the concept of nuclear material attractiveness can be confusing because the desirability of a material for nuclear explosive use depends on many tangible and intangible factors including the intent and capability of the adversary. In addition, a material that is unattractive to an advanced nation (in the case of proliferation) may be very attractive to a terrorist (in the case of physical protection and nuclear security). Hence, the concept of 'Nuclear Material Attractiveness' for different nuclear materials must be considered in the context of safeguards and security. The development of a ranking scheme on the attractiveness of nuclear materials could be a useful concept to start-off the strategies for safeguards and security on a new footing (i.e., why and how nuclear material is attractive, and what are the quantifiable basis). Japan may benefit from such concept regarding the attractiveness of nuclear materials when recovering nuclear materials from the damaged cores in Fukushima because safety, security, and safeguards (3S) would be a prominent consideration for the recovery operation, and it would be the first time such operation is performed in a non-nuclear weapons state. (author)

  3. Fire protection and fire fighting in nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    Fires are a threat to all technical installations. While fire protection has long been a well established conventional discipline, its application to nuclear facilities requires special considerations. Nevertheless, for a long time fire engineering has been somewhat neglected in the design and operation of nuclear installations. In the nuclear industry, the Browns Ferry fire in 1975 brought about an essential change in the attention paid to fire problems. Designers and plant operators, as well as insurance companies and regulators, increased their efforts to develop concepts and methods for reducing fire risks, not only to protect the capital investment in nuclear plants but also to consider the potential secondary effects which could lead to nuclear accidents. Although the number of fires in nuclear installations is still relatively large, their overall importance to the safety of nuclear power plants was not considered to be very high. Only more recently have probabilistic analyses changed this picture. The results may well have to be taken into account more carefully. Various aspects of fire fighting and fire protection were discussed during the Symposium, the first of its kind to be organized by the IAEA. It was convened in co-operation with several organizations working in the nuclear or fire protection fields. The intention was to gather experts from nuclear engineering areas and the conventional fire protection field at one meeting with a view to enhancing the exchange of information and experience and to presenting current knowledge on the various disciplines involved. The presentations at the meeting were subdivided into eight sessions: standards and licensing (6 papers); national fire safety practices (7 papers); fire safety by design (11 papers); fire fighting (2 papers); computer fire modeling (7 papers); fire safety in fuel center facilities (7 papers); fire testing of materials (3 papers); fire risk assessment (5 papers). A separate abstract was

  4. Material control test and evaluation system at the ICPP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, C.E.

    1979-01-01

    The US DOE is evaluating process monitoring as part of a total nuclear material safeguards system. A monitoring system is being installed at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant to test and evaluate material control and surveillance concepts in an operating nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. Process monitoring for nuclear material control complements conventional safeguards accountability and physical protection to assure adherence to approved safeguards procedures and verify containment of nuclear materials within the processing plant

  5. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    Part I: Status lists as of 31 December 1996. A. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Notification Convention). B. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention). PART II: Texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto Part III: Texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  6. Role of nuclear material accounting and control on nuclear security. Countermeasure against insider threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    2014-01-01

    Possibility on unauthorized removal (theft) of nuclear material by a facility insider is a recognized as a serious threat. An insider could take advantage or knowledge of control system and access to nuclear material to intercept facility's system designed to protect theft of nuclear material by an insider. This paper will address how the facility level Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) System should be designed and implemented to enhance deterring and detect theft of nuclear material by a facility insider. (author)

  7. Protocol to amend the Vienna convention on civil liability for nuclear damage. Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage. Final act

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference held in Vienna between 8-12 September 1997 which adopted the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage

  8. Protocol to amend the Vienna convention on civil liability for nuclear damage. Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage. Final act

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-07-23

    The document reproduces the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference held in Vienna between 8-12 September 1997 which adopted the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage

  9. Protective clothing use at the Savannah River Plant Nuclear Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cabbil, C.C.

    1987-01-01

    The mission of the Savannah River Plant in producing nuclear materials does pose some unique protective clothing and equipment requirements not usually seen in the general industry. In addition to protection from the chemicals and physical agents encountered, radioactive hazards must also be managed. This paper describes the protective clothing and respiratory protection used at SRP, and focuses particularly on the development of a new plastic suit. 5 refs., 7 figs., 3 tabs

  10. Nuclear low and environmental protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vencato, A.C.B.

    1982-01-01

    The imperceptible character of nuclear radiation on the human senses and their harmful effects on living beings and the environment is emphasised. This is based on a review of published works about the concepts of energy and ecology. The potential hazards of a possible nuclear accident and the damage it would cause to a community as well as the problem of radioactive waste disposal are raised. The conclusions and recommendations of the Brazilian Physics Society's Report on Nuclear Pollution are endorsed. The general guidelines of Brazilian Legislation are presented. The legal aspects of nuclear reactor licensing in West Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Brazil are shown from the point of view of the applicable legal system, the licensing bodies, the general frame and scope, public participation, technical safety bodies, as well as the inspection procedures. The concepts of absolute and objective civil responsibility for nuclear damage are reviewed. The judicial principle of equity is considered in view of the exceptional character of the nuclear risk. The main aspects of the international Conventions of Paris, Brussels and Viena on civil ability of nuclear damage are presented. Some philosphical and judicial questions are discussed emphasising the instrumentality of the law control and effective protection. The final suggestion is the exchange of ideas with a view to obtain the maximum safety in the operation of nuclear installations. (author) [pt

  11. Evaluating physical protection systems of licensed nuclear facilities using systems engineered inspection guidance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bradley, R.T.; Olson, A.W.; Rogue, F.; Scala, S.; Richard, E.W.

    1980-01-01

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) have applied a systems engineering approach to provide the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) with improved methods and guidance for evaluating the physical protection systems of licensed nuclear facilities

  12. Design methodology for the physical protection upgrade rule requirements for fixed sites. Technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, L.J. Jr.; Allen, T.

    1980-06-01

    This Design Methodology document aids the licensee in understanding how the fixed site requirements of the Physical Protection Upgrade Rule affect the design of physical protection systems for fuel processing plants, fuel manufacturing plants, or other fixed site special nuclear material operations involving possession or use of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material. The document consists of three major elements: Logic Trees, Safeguards Jobs and Component Matrices, and Effectiveness Test Questionnaires. The work is based upon a previous study conducted by Sandia Laboratories for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  13. Decree of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission concerning the security protection of nuclear installations and nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    In compliance with the Czechoslovak State Surveillance over Nuclear Safety of Nuclear Installations Act No. 28/1984, the Decree specifies requirements for assuring security protection of nuclear installations (and their parts) and of nuclear materials with the aim to prevent their abuse for jeopardizing the environment and the health and lives of people. (P.A.)

  14. Nuclear Non-proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 - No 8 of 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Act aims at giving domestic legislative effect to Australia's international non-proliferation obligations and establishes controls over the possession and transport of nuclear materials and equipment by a system of permits. These obligations arise inter alia under the NPT Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Act provides that its provisions shall apply to nuclear material (as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute) and associated items which include associated material, equipment or technology. These are clearly defined in the Act. (NEA) [fr

  15. Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holzemer, Michael; Carvo, Alan

    2012-01-01

    Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S and S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

  16. Catalog of physical protection equipment. Book 3: Volume VI. Automated response components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haberman, W.

    1977-06-01

    The Catalog of Physical Protection Equipment presents information on currently available physical protection equipment that could be employed to safeguard special nuclear materials. The primary source of information was the responses of manufacturers and vendors to requests for literature and data. All equipment listed in the Catalog has been screened in accordance with the following general criteria, and only items meeting one or more of these criteria have been included: (1) equipment is commercially available off-the-shelf; (2) equipment is currently in use at commercial nuclear facilities licensed or to be licensed by NRC; (3) equipment is applicable for use at nuclear facilities licensed or to be licensed by NRC; (4) equipment can operate in the environmental conditions present at nuclear facilities; and (5) equipment is not designed solely or primarily for residential use. The final report describes the methodology and rationale used to create the Catalog of Physical Protection Equipment

  17. 10 CFR 73.28 - Security background checks for secure transfer of nuclear materials.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Security background checks for secure transfer of nuclear... PLANTS AND MATERIALS Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material in Transit § 73.28 Security background checks for secure transfer of nuclear materials. Licensees are excepted from the security...

  18. Conceptual Framework for Physical Protection Against Sabotage Considering Plant-specific Radiological Consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Joung Hoon; Yu, Dong Han

    2010-01-01

    According to the Generation IV (Gen IV) Technology Roadmap, Gen IV nuclear energy systems (NESs) should highlight proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) as one of the four goals along with sustainability, safety and reliability, and economics. Especially, physical protection (PP) is the typical important characteristic of an NES that impedes the theft of materials suitable for nuclear explosives or radiation dispersal devices (RDD) and the sabotage of facilities and transportation by subnation entities and other non-Host State adversaries. These two subjects have been studied separately. Proliferation is commonly considered as an international concern and the past work on the PR assessments can be found. On the other hands, PP is regarded as a State security concern, much of which is classified and facility-dependent. Recently, more concern has been focused on the PP design and regulation because of rapid environment changes including radiological consequences by internal sabotage and nuclear terrorism by RDDs. The current PP Regulation has been applied intensively to the existing nuclear facilities and could be a possible guidance for the future GEN-IV NESs. This paper first reviews the IAEA guide document, INFCIRC/225, which was accepted as the standard international guideline in the physical protection area. It has been updated several times up to now, and is undergoing another revision. The paper introduces current substantial changes in the document regarding PP including the national nuclear security and sabotage in the nuclear facilities. Then, it presents a conceptual framework for physical protection against sabotage considering plant-specific radiological consequence after malicious acts within certain vital areas. The framework combines the newly developed method of vital area identification, the current PSA level 2 works, and physical protection concepts. This would help to improve a design concept of new physical protection

  19. Conceptual Framework for Physical Protection Against Sabotage Considering Plant-specific Radiological Consequences

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Joung Hoon; Yu, Dong Han [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2010-10-15

    According to the Generation IV (Gen IV) Technology Roadmap, Gen IV nuclear energy systems (NESs) should highlight proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) as one of the four goals along with sustainability, safety and reliability, and economics. Especially, physical protection (PP) is the typical important characteristic of an NES that impedes the theft of materials suitable for nuclear explosives or radiation dispersal devices (RDD) and the sabotage of facilities and transportation by subnation entities and other non-Host State adversaries. These two subjects have been studied separately. Proliferation is commonly considered as an international concern and the past work on the PR assessments can be found. On the other hands, PP is regarded as a State security concern, much of which is classified and facility-dependent. Recently, more concern has been focused on the PP design and regulation because of rapid environment changes including radiological consequences by internal sabotage and nuclear terrorism by RDDs. The current PP Regulation has been applied intensively to the existing nuclear facilities and could be a possible guidance for the future GEN-IV NESs. This paper first reviews the IAEA guide document, INFCIRC/225, which was accepted as the standard international guideline in the physical protection area. It has been updated several times up to now, and is undergoing another revision. The paper introduces current substantial changes in the document regarding PP including the national nuclear security and sabotage in the nuclear facilities. Then, it presents a conceptual framework for physical protection against sabotage considering plant-specific radiological consequence after malicious acts within certain vital areas. The framework combines the newly developed method of vital area identification, the current PSA level 2 works, and physical protection concepts. This would help to improve a design concept of new physical protection

  20. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  1. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-07-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security.

  2. Nuclear material accounting software for Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doll, M.; Ewing, T.; Lindley, R.; McWilliams, C.; Roche, C.; Sakunov, I.; Walters, G.

    1999-01-01

    Among the needs identified during initial surveys of nuclear facilities in Ukraine was improved accounting software for reporting material inventories to the regulatory body. AIMAS (Automated Inventory/Material Accounting System) is a PC-based application written in Microsoft Access that was jointly designed by an US/Ukraine development team. The design is highly flexible and configurable, and supports a wide range of computing infrastructure needs and facility requirements including situations where networks are not available or reliable. AIMAS has both English and Russian-language options for displays and reports, and it operates under Windows 3.1, 95, or NT 4.0trademark. AIMAS functions include basic physical inventory tracking, transaction histories, reporting, and system administration functions (system configuration, security, data backup and recovery). Security measures include multilevel password access control, all transactions logged with the user identification, and system administration control. Interfaces to external modules provide nuclear fuel burn-up adjustment and barcode scanning capabilities for physical inventory taking. AIMAS has been installed at Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research (KINR), South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (SUNPP), Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT), Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry (SINEI), and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety/Nuclear Regulatory Administration (MEPNS/NRA). Facility specialists are being trained to use the application to track material movement and report to the national regulatory authority

  3. Vienna Convention and Its Revision and convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage on September 12, 1997

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soljan, V.

    1998-01-01

    After Chernobyl, the perception of common interest in modernization of the international regime that regulate various aspects of nuclear energy, has been evident among states with nuclear power plants as well as those likely to be involved in or affected by a nuclear incident. The adoption of the protocol Amending the Vienna Convention on Civil liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963 and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for nuclear damage in September 1997, represents important part of the entire result that has been achieved from the 1986. This article gives a brief survey on the background of the process of modernization of the international regime of liability for nuclear damage and examines solutions contained in the provisions of the conventions. (author)

  4. National Nuclear Safety Report 2001. Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The First National Nuclear Safety Report was presented at the first review meeting of the Nuclear Safety Convention. At that time it was concluded that Argentina met the obligations of the Convention. This second National Nuclear Safety Report is an updated report which includes all safety aspects of the Argentinian nuclear power plants and the measures taken to enhance the safety of the plants. The present report also takes into account the observations and discussions maintained during the first review meeting. The conclusion made in the first review meeting about the compliance by Argentina of the obligations of the Convention are included as Annex 1. In general, the information contained in this Report has been updated since March 31, 1998 to March 31, 2001. Those aspects that remain unchanged were not addressed in this second report with the objective of avoiding repetitions and in order to carry out a detailed analysis considering article by article. As a result of the above mentioned detailed analysis of all the Articles, it can be stated that the country fulfils all the obligations imposed by the Nuclear Safety Convention

  5. National nuclear safety report 2004. Convention on nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The second National Nuclear Safety Report was presented at the second review meeting of the Nuclear Safety Convention. At that time it was concluded that Argentina met the obligations of the Convention. This third National Nuclear Safety Report is an updated report which includes all safety aspects of the Argentinian nuclear power plants and the measures taken to enhance the safety of the plants. The present report also takes into account the observations and discussions maintained during the second review meeting. The conclusion made in the first review meeting about the compliance by Argentina of the obligations of the Convention are included as Annex I and those belonging to the second review meeting are included as Annex II. In general, the information contained in this Report has been updated since March 31, 2001 to April 30, 2004. Those aspects that remain unchanged were not addressed in this third report. As a result of the detailed analysis of all the Articles, it can be stated that the country fulfils all the obligations imposed by the Nuclear Safety Convention. The questions and answers originated at the Second Review Meeting are included as Annex III

  6. Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

    2013-01-01

    The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  7. 10 CFR 73.60 - Additional requirements for physical protection at nonpower reactors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... nonpower reactors. 73.60 Section 73.60 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) PHYSICAL PROTECTION... requirements for physical protection at nonpower reactors. Each nonpower reactor licensee who, pursuant to the... perform their duties. (6) Prior to entry into a material access area, packages shall be searched for...

  8. Systems Thinking Safety Analysis: Nuclear Security Assessment of Physical Protection System in Nuclear Power Plants

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tae Ho Woo

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available The dynamical assessment has been performed in the aspect of the nuclear power plants (NPPs security. The physical protection system (PPS is constructed by the cyber security evaluation tool (CSET for the nuclear security assessment. The systems thinking algorithm is used for the quantifications by the Vensim software package. There is a period of 60 years which is the life time of NPPs' operation. The maximum possibility happens as 3.59 in the 30th year. The minimum value is done as 1.26 in the 55th year. The difference is about 2.85 times. The results of the case with time delay have shown that the maximum possibility of terror or sabotage incident happens as 447.42 in the 58th year and the minimum value happens as 89.77 in the 51st year. The difference is about 4.98 times. Hence, if the sabotage happens, the worst case is that the intruder can attack the target of the nuclear material in about one and a half hours. The general NPPs are modeled in the study and controlled by the systematic procedures.

  9. US Department of Energy (DOE)/Gosatomnadzor (GAN) of Russia project at the Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PNPI)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baranov, I.A.; Konoplev, K.A.; Hauser, G.C.

    1997-01-01

    This paper presents a summary of work accomplished within the scope of the DOE-Gosatomnadzor (GAN) Agreement to reduce vulnerability to theft of direct-use nuclear materials in Russia. The DOE-GAN agreement concerns the Russian Academy of Science B.P. Konstantinov Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PNPI), located 45 kilometers from St. Petersburg. The PNPI operates facilities to research basic nuclear physics. Current world conditions require particular attention to the issue of Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC ampersand A) of nuclear materials. The long-term plan to increase security at the facility is outlined, including training, physical protection upgrades, and material control and accountability. 4 figs

  10. Audit program for physical security systems at nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Minichino, C.

    1982-01-01

    Licensees of nuclear power plants conduct audits of their physical security systems to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials. Section 73.55, Requirements for physical Protection of Licensed Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage, requires that the security programs be reviewed at least every 12 months, that the audit be conducted by individuals independent of both security management and security supervision, and that the audit program review all aspects of the physical security system: hardware, personnel, and operational and maintenance procedures. This report contains information for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and for the licensees of nuclear power reactors who carry out these comprehensive audits. Guidance on the overall management of the audit function includes organizational structure and issues concerning the auditors who perform the review: qualifications, independence, due professional care, and standards. Guidance in the audit program includes purpose and scope of the audit, planning, techniques, post-audit procedures, reporting, and follow-up

  11. Franco-German cooperation for the physical protection of the EPR reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jalouneix, J.; Hagemann, A.

    2001-01-01

    This article presents the proceeding that has been followed in the EPR (European pressurized water reactor) project concerning physical protection against malevolent actions and robbery of nuclear materials. Before the different options of the nuclear island were definitely set, a task group had been constituted to examine if these options could hamper the setting of physical protection measures that are required by the legislation of the 2 countries. Another group composed of experts from IPSN/GRS (Institut de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire / Gesellschaft fur Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit) had the task to define common requirements concerning the physical protection of reactors in Germany and in France. In this framework the EPR project team has prepared a technical document reviewing the different dispositions that have been retained to assure the physical protection of the reactor. (A.C.)

  12. Transportation of nuclear material in France: regulatory and technical aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flory, D.; Renard, C.

    1995-01-01

    Legislative and regulatory documentation define responsibilities in the field of security and physical protection for transportation of nuclear material. Any transportation activity has to conform to an advance authorization regime delivered by the Ministry of Industry. Responsibility for physical protection of nuclear material rests with the carrier under control of the public authority. Penalties reinforce this administrative regime. Operational responsibility for management and control of transport operations has been entrusted by the ministry to the operational transport unit (Echelon Operationnel des Transports - EOT) of IPSN (Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety). To guarantee en efficient protection of transport operations, the various following means are provided for: -specialized transport means; - devices for real time tracking of road vehicles; - administrative authorization and declaration procedures; -intervention capacities in case of sabotage... This set of technical means and administrative measures is completed by the existence of a body of inspectors who may control every step of the operations. (authors). 3 tabs

  13. Staatsblad 343 - Order of 4 June 1987 amending the Order concerning transport of fissile materials, ores and radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Decree amends the 1969 Decree to take account of developments in international transport regulations, already taken into account in the national regulations for all modes of transport of dangerous materials or goods. Further amendments concern physical protection requirements in compliance which the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which the Netherlands signed as a Member State of the European Communities. In essence, the modifications relate to licensing requirements in particular packaging and transport conditions for the different levels of activity of the materials carried, certificates of approval etc., and surveillance during transport. The Decree entered into force on 23 August 1987 [fr

  14. Safeguarding nuclear materials in the former Soviet Republics through computerized materials protection, control and accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roumiantsev, A.N.; Ostroumov, Y.A.; Whiteson, R.; Seitz, S.L.; Landry, R.P.; Martinez, B.J.; Boor, M.G.; Anderson, L.K.; Gary, S.P.

    1997-01-01

    The threat of nuclear weapons proliferation is a problem of global concern. International efforts at nonproliferation focus on preventing acquisition of weapons-grade nuclear materials by unauthorized states, organizations, or individuals. Nonproliferation can best be accomplished through international cooperation in the application of advanced science and technology to the management and control of nuclear materials. Computerized systems for nuclear material protection, control, and accountability (MPC and A) are a vital component of integrated nuclear safeguards programs. This paper describes the progress of scientists in the United States and former Soviet Republics in creating customized, computerized MPC and A systems. The authors discuss implementation of the Core Material Accountability System (CoreMAS), which was developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory by the US Department of Energy and incorporates, in condensed and integrated form, the most valuable experience gained by US nuclear enterprises in accounting for and controlling nuclear materials. The CoreMAS approach and corresponding software package have been made available to sites internationally. CoreMAS provides methods to evaluate their existing systems and to examine advantages and disadvantages of customizing CoreMAS or improving their own existing systems. The sites can also address crucial issues of software assurance, data security, and system performance; compare operational experiences at sites with functioning computerized systems; and reasonably evaluate future efforts. The goal of the CoreMAS project is to introduce facilities at sites all over the world to modern international MPC and A practices and to help them implement effective, modern, computerized MPC and A systems to account for their nuclear materials, and thus reduce the likelihood of theft or diversion. Sites are assisted with MPC and A concepts and the implementation of an effective computerized MPC and A system

  15. Second review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rafferty, Barbara

    2002-01-01

    identified that require special attention, particularly, with regard to safety management, safety culture, plant ageing, upgrading and effectiveness of regulatory practices, as well as maintaining competence and knowledge in the industry, regulatory bodies and research institutions. The review process highlighted factors and circumstances, external to nuclear safety as such, which nevertheless may impact on nuclear safety. Contracting Parties were invited to provide further information in their next national reports on maintaining competence and motivation of staff needed for safe regulation and operation of nuclear installation. Since the 1999 Review Meeting, several Contracting Parties have restructured their regulatory bodies and adopted new legislation or improved existing legislation to more closely meet the requirements of the Convention. Examples of areas of new legislation are: establishing independent regulatory bodies; emergency preparedness; decommissioning; and radiation protection provisions consistent with the International Commission on Radiological Protection's 1990 Recommendations (ICRP 60) and the International Basic Safety Standards published by the IAEA (BSS). Full implementation of the ICRP 60 recommendations and BSS is not complete in some countries. Contracting Parties reported on their individual national regulatory strategies. Some Contracting Parties use probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) as an additional tool in optimizing their regulatory or inspection activities, and some use performance indicators, whether they be quantitative or qualitative, to monitor the safety of their nuclear installations. In discussions, comparison was made of the advantages and disadvantages of regulations that are detailed and prescriptive in nature as compared to less prescriptive, goal-oriented approaches and the complementary use of risk assessments. Contracting Parties agreed to review their experience and report at the next Review Meeting. All Contracting

  16. Multimedia on nuclear reactors physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dies, Javier; Puig, Francesc

    2010-01-01

    The paper present an example of measures that have been found to be effective in the development of innovative educational and training technology. A multimedia course on nuclear reactor physics is presented. This material has been used for courses at master level at the universities; training for engineers at nuclear power plant as modular 2 weeks course; and training operators of nuclear power plant. The multimedia has about 785 slides and the text is in English, Spanish and French. (authors)

  17. Proceedings of the Eleventh Radiation Physics and Protection Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The proceeding contains of 404 pages, the available maertial of 35 contributions: and covering of conference topics: Plenary, Invited, Keynote Talks. Nuclear Power Plant Accident. Cosmogenic Radionuclides. Waste Storage and Disposal Solutions. Radiation Medical Physics. Radiation Detection and Measurements. Radioactive in Building Materials. Radiation Protection Regulations and public Protection. Environmental Radioactivity.

  18. France - Convention on Nuclear Safety. Fourth National Report Issued for the 2008 Peer Review Meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Convention on Nuclear Safety, hereinafter referred to as 'the Convention', is one of the results of international discussions initiated in 1992 with the aim of proposing binding international obligations regarding nuclear safety. France signed the Convention on 20 September 1994, the date on which it was opened for signature during the IAEA's General Conference, and approved it on 13 September 1995. The Convention entered into force on 24 October 1996. For many years France has been participating actively in international initiatives to enhance nuclear safety, and it considers the Convention on Nuclear Safety to be an important instrument for achieving this aim. The areas covered by the Convention have long been part of the French approach to nuclear safety. This report, the fourth of its kind, is issued in compliance with Article 5 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and presents the measures taken by France to fulfil each of the obligations of the Convention. As such, the Convention on Nuclear Safety applies to nuclear power reactors, and so most of this report deals with measures taken to ensure their safety. However, in this fourth report, as in the third, France has decided to include the measures taken concerning all research reactors, with a graded approach tailored to their size where appropriate. First of all, research reactors are subject to the same general regulations as nuclear power reactors with regard to nuclear safety and radiation protection. Furthermore, the most powerful research reactor also generates electricity. Secondly, in the reports under the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, to which France is a party, the measures taken for research reactors in these areas have been described. Finally, in March 2004 the IAEA Board of Governors, on which France has a seat, approved the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors, which incorporates most of the

  19. German Democratic Republic State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roehnsch, W.; Gegusch, M.

    1976-01-01

    The system of accountancy for and control of nuclear material in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) with its legal bases and components is embedded in the overall State system of protection in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As the competent State authority, the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Board of the GDR is also responsible for meeting the GDR's national and international tasks in the control of nuclear material. At enterprise level, the observance of all safety regulations for nuclear material, including the regulations for the control, is within the responsibility of managers of establishments, which are in any way concerned with the handling of nuclear material. To support managers and to function as internal control authorities, nuclear material officers have been appointed in these establishments. Design information, operating data, physical inventory of nuclear material and the respective enterprise records and reports are subject to State control by the Nuclear Material Inspectorate of the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Board. This Inspectorate keeps the central records on nuclear material, forwards reports and information to, and maintains the necessary contacts with, the IAEA. For the nuclear material in the GDR four material balance areas have been established for control purposes. To rationalize central recording and reporting, electronic data processing is increasingly made use of. In a year-long national and international control of nuclear material, the State control system has stood the test and successfully co-operates with the IAEA. (author)

  20. U.S. and Russian cooperative efforts to enhance nuclear material protection, control, and accountability at the Siberian Chemical Combine at Tomsk-7

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kreykes, J.; Petrushev, V.I.; Griggs, J.

    1996-01-01

    The US partners in the Laboratory-to-Laboratory Program in Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accountability (MPC and A) have reached signed agreements with the Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK) to rapidly enhance the protection, control, and accountability of nuclear material at all of its facilities. SKhK is the largest multi-function production center of the Russian nuclear complex and, until recently, its facilities produced and processed special nuclear materials for the Russian Defense Ministry. SKhK produces heat and electricity, enriches uranium for commercial reactor fuel, reprocesses irradiated fuel, and converts highly enriched uranium metal into oxide for blending into low-enriched reactor-grade uranium, and manufactures civilian products. SKhK is aggressively pursuing a program to enhance MPC and A which includes the installation of pedestrian and vehicle radiation monitors, rapid inventory methods, tamper-indicating devices, computerized accounting systems, and physical protection measures. This work is a collaboration between technical experts from Brookhaven, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, pacific Northwest, and Sandia National Laboratories and their Russian counterparts at SKhK. This paper reviews the status of this initial effort and outlines plans for continuing the work in 1996

  1. Attributes identification of nuclear material by non-destructive radiation measurement methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gan Lin

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The nuclear materials should be controlled under the regulation of National Safeguard System. The non-destructive analysis method, which is simple and quick, provide a effective process in determining the nuclear materials, nuclear scraps and wastes. The method play a very important role in the fields of nuclear material control and physical protection against the illegal removal and smuggling of nuclear material. The application of non-destructive analysis in attributes identification of nuclear material is briefly described in this paper. The attributes determined by radioactive detection technique are useful tolls to identify the characterization of special nuclear material (isotopic composition, enrichment etc.). (author)

  2. Methodology for proliferation resistance and physical protection of Generation IV nuclear energy systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bari, R.; Peterson, P.; Nishimura, R.; Roglans-Ribas, J.

    2005-01-01

    Enhanced proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR and PP) is one of the technology goals for advanced nuclear concepts. Under the auspices of the Generation IV International Forum an international experts group has been chartered to develop an evaluation methodology for PR and PP. This methodology will permit an objective PR and PP comparison between alternative nuclear systems and support design optimization to enhance robustness against proliferation, theft and sabotage. The assessment framework consists of identifying the threats to be considered, defining the PR and PP measures required to evaluate the resistance of a nuclear system to proliferation, theft or sabotage, and establishing quantitative methods to evaluate the proposed measures. The defined PR and PP measures are based on the design of the system (e.g., materials, processes, facilities), and institutional measures (e.g., safeguards, access control). The assessment methodology uses analysis of pathways' with respect to specific threats to determine the PR and PP measures. Analysis requires definition of the threats (i.e. objective, capability, strategy), decomposition of the system into its relevant elements (e.g., reactor core, fuel recycle facility, fuel storage), and identification of targets. (author)

  3. A Study on Current Status of Detection Technology and Establishment of National Detection Regime against Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwak, Sung Woo; Jang, Sung Soon; Lee, Joung Hoon; Yoo, Ho Sik

    2009-01-01

    Since 1990s, some events - detection of a dirty bomb in a Russian nation park in 1995, 9/11 terrorist attack to WTC in 2001, discovery of Al-Qaeda's experimentation to build a dirty bomb in 2003 etc - have showed that nuclear or radiological terrorism relating to radioactive materials (hereinafter 'radioactive materials' is referred to as 'nuclear material, nuclear spent fuel and radioactive source') is not incredible but serious and credible threat. Thus, to respond to the new threat, the international community has not only strengthened security and physical protection of radioactive materials but also established prevention of and response to illicit trafficking of radioactive materials. In this regard, our government has enacted or revised the national regulatory framework with a view to improving security of radioactive materials and joined the international convention or agreement to meet this international trend. For the purpose of prevention of nuclear/radiological terrorism, this paper reviews physical characteristics of nuclear material and existing detection instruments used for prevention of illicit trafficking. Finally, national detection regime against nuclear/radiological terrorism based on paths of the smuggled radioactive materials to terrorist's target building/area, national topography and road networks, and defence-in-depth concept is suggested in this paper. This study should contribute to protect people's health, safety and environment from nuclear/radiological terrorism

  4. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-08-01

    The document refers to the Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident (INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (INFCIRC-336). Part I contains reservations/declarations made upon or following signature and Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument expressing consent to be bound. The status of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States or organizations as of 31 July 1989 for the conventions is presented in two attachments

  5. The nuclear safety convention. Results for Argentine as contracting party

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Caruso, Gustavo

    2002-01-01

    A powerful mechanism for increasing safety worldwide is through the development and adoption of legally binding Safety Conventions. Since 1986 four Conventions were ratified in the areas of Nuclear, Radiation and Waste Safety. The Nuclear Safety Convention establishes an international co-operation mechanism to maintain safety nuclear installations, focused on: to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the enhancement of national measures and international co-operation including, where appropriate, safety-related technical co-operation; to establish and maintain effective defences in nuclear installations against potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation from such installations and to prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate such consequences should they occur. Each contracting party shall take, within the framework of its national law, the legislative, regulatory and administrative measures and other steps necessary for implementing its obligations under this Convention. Moreover, each contracting parties shall submit for review prior to each review meeting, a National Report on the measures it has taken to implement each of the obligations of the Convention. The contracting parties concluded that the review process had proven to be of great value to their national nuclear safety programmes. (author)

  6. US-Russian laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation in nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullen, M.; Augustson, R.; Horton, R.

    1995-01-01

    Under the guidance of the Department of Energy (DOE), six DOE laboratories have initiated a new program of cooperation with the Russian Federation's nuclear institutes. The purpose of the program is to accelerate progress toward a common goal shared by both the US and Russia--to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, including such threats as theft, diversion, and unauthorized possession of nuclear materials, by strengthening systems of nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting. This new program is called the Laboratory-to-Laboratory Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (Lab-to-Lab MPC and A) Program. It is designed to complement other US-Russian MPC and A programs such as the government-to-government (Nunn-Lugar) programs. The Lab-to-Lab MPC and A program began in 1994 with pilot projects at two sites: Arzamas-16 and the Kurchitov Institute. This paper presents an overview of the Laboratory-to-Laboratory MPC and A Program. It describes the background and need for the program; the objectives and strategy; the participating US and Russian laboratories, institutes and enterprises; highlights of the technical work; and plans for the next several years

  7. Introduction and user's information for the fixed site physical protection upgrade rule guidance compendium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, L.J. Jr.; Allen, T.

    1980-06-01

    Licensees at fixed sites who possess, use, process, or handle strategic special nuclear material are required to design a physical security system to protect this material. This report suggests an orderly process for using guidance, with special emphasis on two regulatory guides and two NUREG series documents that comprise a compendium, to aid in the design of a physical security system that meets the requirements of the final Physical Protection Upgrade Rule. The rule was published November 28, 1979 (44 FR 68184), and became effective March 25, 1980

  8. Global nuclear material flow/control model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.S.; Fasel, P.K.; Riese, J.M.

    1997-01-01

    This is the final report of a two-year, Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The nuclear danger can be reduced by a system for global management, protection, control, and accounting as part of an international regime for nuclear materials. The development of an international fissile material management and control regime requires conceptual research supported by an analytical and modeling tool which treats the nuclear fuel cycle as a complete system. The prototype model developed visually represents the fundamental data, information, and capabilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle in a framework supportive of national or an international perspective. This includes an assessment of the global distribution of military and civilian fissile material inventories, a representation of the proliferation pertinent physical processes, facility specific geographic identification, and the capability to estimate resource requirements for the management and control of nuclear material. The model establishes the foundation for evaluating the global production, disposition, and safeguards and security requirements for fissile nuclear material and supports the development of other pertinent algorithmic capabilities necessary to undertake further global nuclear material related studies

  9. IMPORTANCE OF MATERIAL BALANCES AND THEIR STATISTICAL EVALUATION IN RUSSIAN MATERIAL, PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1999-01-01

    While substantial work has been performed in the Russian MPC and A Program, much more needs to be done at Russian nuclear facilities to complete four necessary steps. These are (1) periodically measuring the physical inventory of nuclear material, (2) continuously measuring the flows of nuclear material, (3) using the results to close the material balance, particularly at bulk processing facilities, and (4) statistically evaluating any apparent loss of nuclear material. The periodic closing of material balances provides an objective test of the facility's system of nuclear material protection, control and accounting. The statistical evaluation using the uncertainties associated with individual measurement systems involved in the calculation of the material balance provides a fair standard for concluding whether the apparent loss of nuclear material means a diversion or whether the facility's accounting system needs improvement. In particular, if unattractive flow material at a facility is not measured well, the accounting system cannot readily detect the loss of attractive material if the latter substantially derives from the former

  10. 10 CFR 73.26 - Transportation physical protection systems, subsystems, components, and procedures.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material in Transit § 73.26... of deadly force when armed escorts or armed response personnel have a reasonable belief that it is... at least one level higher than that having responsibility for the day-to-day plant operation. These...

  11. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses. Addendum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards ( including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  12. Physics for radiation protection

    CERN Document Server

    Martin, James E

    2013-01-01

    A much-needed working resource for health physicists and other radiation protection professionals, this volume presents clear, thorough, up-to-date explanations of the basic physics necessary to address real-world problems in radiation protection. Designed for readers with limited as well as basic science backgrounds, Physics for Radiation Protection emphasizes applied concepts and carefully illustrates all topics through examples as well as practice problems. Physics for Radiation Protection draws substantially on current resource data available for health physics use, providing decay schemes and emission energies for approximately 100 of the most common radionuclides encountered by practitioners. Excerpts of the Chart of the Nuclides, activation cross sections, fission yields, fission-product chains, photon attenuation coefficients, and nuclear masses are also provided.

  13. Developments in international convention on nuclear third party liability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reyners, P.

    2000-01-01

    A few years after the adoption of a Protocol to amend the world-wide Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and of a new ''global'' Convention on the Supplementary Compensation of Nuclear Damage (September 1997), the countries which are party to the Western Europe based Paris and Brussels Conventions are working on the revision of these instruments within the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. The objective of this exercise is not only to preserve the compatibility of the Paris and Vienna provisions, which is now an imperative deriving from the application of the 1988 Joint Protocol linking these two Conventions, but also to substantially improve certain features of this regime such as its technical and geographical scope of application, the facilitation of the rights of victims to defend their claims and, of course, the level of funds effectively available to compensate the damage. This paper reviews briefly the recent evolution of the international nuclear liability regime and discusses some of the challenges which the nuclear countries are facing in this context. (author)

  14. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-11-01

    The full text of the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency adopted by the General Conference at its special session from 24-26 September 1986 is presented. It is stipulated that the States Parties shall cooperate between themselves and with the Agency to facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to minimize its consequences and to protect life, the property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases

  15. Trial operation of material protection, control, and accountability systems at two active nuclear material handling sites within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Skripka, G.; Vatulin, V.; Yuferev, V.

    1997-01-01

    This paper discusses Russian Federal Nuclear Center (RFNC)-VNIIEF activities in the area of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) procedures enhancement. The goal of such activities is the development of an automated systems for MPC and A at two of the active VNIIEF research sites: a research (reactor) site and a nuclear material production facility. The activities for MPC and A system enhancement at both sites are performed in the framework of a VNIIEF-Los Alamos National Laboratory contract with participation from Sandia National Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and PANTEX Plant in accordance with Russian programs supported by MinAtom. The American specialists took part in searching for possible improvement of technical solutions, ordering equipment, and delivering and testing the equipment that was provided by the Americans

  16. NPP physical protection and information security as necessary conditions for reducing nuclear and radiation accident risks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pogosov, O.Yu.; Derevyanko, O.V.

    2017-01-01

    The paper focuses on the fact that nuclear failures and incidents can lead to radioactive contamination of NPP premises. Nuclear and radiation hazard may be caused by malefactors in technological processes when applying computers or inadequate control in case of insufficient level of information security.The researchers performed analysis of factors for reducing risks of nuclear and radiation accidents at NPPs considering specific conditions related to information security of NPP physical protection systems. The paper considers connection of heterogeneous factors that may increase the risk of NPP accidents, possibilities and ways to improve adequate modelling of security of information with limited access directly related to the functioning of automated set of engineering and technical means for NPP physical protection. Within the overall Hutchinson formalization, it is proposed to include additional functional dependencies on indicators specific for NPPs into analysis algorithms.

  17. Act No. 80-572 on protection and control of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    This Act lays down that the import, export, possession, transfer, use and transport of nuclear materials defined by the Act are subject to licensing and control under conditions to be determined by Decree. The purpose of this control is to avoid loss, theft or diversion of such materials. Any person who obtains fraudulently nuclear material referred to in the Act or who carries out activities involving such material without the required licence shall be subject to severe penalties. Finally, it is provided that the Government shall report to Parliament each year on operation of the provisions of this Act. (NEA) [fr

  18. In front of a new challenge: nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Puig, D.E.

    2004-01-01

    Radiation sources utilising either radioactive materials or radiation generators have been widely used throughout the world in medicine, research, industry and education for decades. There are both, legal and governmental responsibilities in respect of the safe use of ionising radiation sources, radiation protection, the safe management of radioactive waste and the safe transport of radioactive material. The attacks of 11 September 2001 brought a new dimension to the actions against terrorism. There are not enough legal instruments to control this phenomenon. Potential threat: acquisition of a nuclear weapon, acquisition of nuclear material to construct a nuclear weapon or to cause a radiological hazard, violent acts against nuclear facilities to cause a radiological hazard, acquisition of other radioactive materials to construct a dirty bomb to cause a radiological hazard. 'The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material', IAEA, 1980 obliges Parties to apply established levels of physical protection to nuclear material used for peaceful purposes in international transport. It also requires Parties to criminalize under their respective laws various acts such as theft, illegal acquisition, possession and use, and to establish jurisdiction over those offences to enable the prosecution or extradition of alleged offenders. This is the only international legal instrument in the area of physical protection. Conclusion: At present the threat is not only of a nuclear accident but of a nuclear terrorism attack which could affect any country in the world and the lack of effective legal instruments to respond to that situation. It shows the need for the international community to work together in order to reinforce coordinated and integrated nuclear security and safeguards measures. States shall create appropriated regulatory infrastructures to ensure that the radioactive sources are appropriately regulated and adequately secured at all times. Stronger and

  19. Standard format and content for a licensee physical security plan for the protection of special nuclear material of moderate or low strategic significance - January 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    This guide describes the information required in the physical security plan submitted as part of an application for a license to possess, use, or transport special nuclear material (SNM) of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of SNM of low strategic significance and recommends a standard format for presenting the information in an orderly arrangement. This standards format will thus serve as an aid to uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the physical protection plan of the license application. This document can also be used as guidance by licensees possessing or transporting less than 10 kg of SNM of low strategic significance in understanding the intent and implementing the requirements of paragraphs 73.67(a), 73.67(f), and 73.67(g) of 10 CRF Part 73

  20. Automated personal identification: a new technique for controlling access to nuclear materials and facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eccles, D.R.

    1975-01-01

    Special nuclear materials must be protected against the threat of diversion or theft, and nuclear facilities against the threat of industrial sabotage. Implicit in this protection is the means of controlling access to protected areas, material access areas, and vital areas. With the advent of automated personal identification technology, the processes of access control can be automated to yield both higher security and reduced costs. This paper first surveys the conventional methods of access control; next, automated personal identification concepts are presented and various systems approaches are highlighted; finally, Calspan's FINGERSCAN /sub TM/ system for identity verification is described

  1. English/Russian and Russian/English glossary of physical protection terms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soo Hoo, M.S.

    1995-07-01

    This glossary was prepared in fulfillment of the Glossary Preparation Task identified in the Program Plan for providing Assistance to the Russian Federation in Nuclear Material Control and Accounting and Physical Protection. The Program Plan is part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as provided for under House Resolution (H.R.) 3807 (Title II, as referenced under Public Law (P.L.) 102-229. The terms in this glossary were derived from physical protection training material prepared at Sandia. The training material, and thus refinements to the glossary, has undergone years of development in presentation to both domestic and international audiences. Also, Russian Colleagues and interpreters have reviewed the translations for accuracy

  2. English/Russian and Russian/English glossary of physical protection terms

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Soo Hoo, M.S. [ed.

    1995-07-01

    This glossary was prepared in fulfillment of the Glossary Preparation Task identified in the Program Plan for providing Assistance to the Russian Federation in Nuclear Material Control and Accounting and Physical Protection. The Program Plan is part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as provided for under House Resolution (H.R.) 3807 (Title II, as referenced under Public Law (P.L.) 102-229. The terms in this glossary were derived from physical protection training material prepared at Sandia. The training material, and thus refinements to the glossary, has undergone years of development in presentation to both domestic and international audiences. Also, Russian Colleagues and interpreters have reviewed the translations for accuracy.

  3. Report on SUJB results achieved in the surveillance of nuclear facilities and radiation protection for 2005. Pt. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    This part of the report consists of the following chapters: (1) State Office for Nuclear Safety; (2) Nuclear safety; (3) Spent fuel, rad-waste management, decommissioning; (4) Transport of nuclear materials, physical protection; (5) Radiation protection; (6) Emergency preparedness; (7) Radiation Monitoring Network in the Czech Republic; (8) Non -proliferation, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; (9) International cooperation; (10) Science and research; (11) Free access to information; (12) Activities of institutes controlled by the State Office for Nuclear Safety. It is concluded that the operation of all Czech nuclear facilities, including the Dukovany and Temelin nuclear power plants, was safe and reliable in 2005. (P.A.)

  4. U.S. government-to-government cooperation on nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mladineo, S.; Bricker, K.; Alberque, W.

    1996-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) is cooperating with Russia, the Newly Independent States (NIS), and the Baltics to help prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the improvement of national systems of nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A). US cooperation with Russia is carried out under the DOE MPC and A Program and the Nunn-Lugar funded Cooperative Threat Reduction program for Russia. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-41 designated DOE as the government agency with primary responsibility for MPC and A efforts in Russia, the NIS, and Baltics. Cooperation is conducted in coordination with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for the development of a strong, independent national regulatory agency in Russia. DOE also coordinates these efforts with the European Community and other countries. DOE''s cooperation under the MPC and A program with Russia includes aggressive near-term activities to better secure nuclear materials through MPC and A system upgrades at facilities. Simultaneously, DOE is supporting Russia in its long-term goal of implementing upgraded MPC and A systems that can be maintained and supported from indigenous resources. Projects include the development of national regulations and laws, training of trainers, the development of a computerized federal information system, and other related tasks. NRC''s role in these efforts includes regulatory development activities, such as licensing and inspection program development, and related training. This paper provides an overview of the activities undertaken through DOE-Russian cooperation on MPC and A and how they complement each other

  5. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-05-01

    The document refers to the Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident (INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (INFCIRC-336). Part I of the document contains the texts of reservations/declarations made by some of the countries upon or following signature. Part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument, expressing consent to be bound

  6. Study on domestic material purchasing in MSR manufacture of conventional island

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xie Zhengmao

    2010-01-01

    Combining the real case of Dongfang Electric (Guangzhou) Heavy Machinery Co., Ltd. trying to purchase the domestic sealing gasket as needed in the MSR of the conventional island, this paper describes the trends and relevant experience about nuclear power equipment manufacturers purchasing materials in the domestic market, and provides a reference to broadening the procurement channels of the purchasing departments of nuclear equipment manufacturers. (author)

  7. Material control and accountability in nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rumyantsev, A.N.

    2006-01-01

    It is proposed to unify the complexes, used in the systems for control and accountability of nuclear materials, and to use the successful experience of developing these complexes. It is shown that the problem of control, accountability and physical protection may by achieved by using the developed complex Probabilistic expert-advising system, permitting to analyse the safety in nuclear fuel cycles [ru

  8. U.S. national nuclear material control and accounting system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, S; Terentiev, V G

    1998-01-01

    Issues related to nuclear material control and accounting and illegal dealing in these materials were discussed at the April 19--20, 1996 Moscow summit meeting (G7 + Russia). The declaration from this meeting reaffirmed that governments are responsible for the safety of all nuclear materials in their possession and for the effectiveness of the national control and accounting system for these materials. The Russian delegation at this meeting stated that ''the creation of a nuclear materials accounting, control, and physical protection system has become a government priority''. Therefore, in order to create a government nuclear material control and accounting system for the Russian Federation, it is critical to study the structure, operating principles, and regulations supporting the control and accounting of nuclear materials in the national systems of nuclear powers. In particular, Russian specialists have a definite interest in learning about the National Nuclear Material Control and Accounting System of the US, which has been operating successfully as an automated system since 1968

  9. The Attractiveness of Materials in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles for Various Proliferation and Theft Scenarios

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, C.G.; Wallace, R.K.; Ireland, J.R.; Johnson, M.W.; Hase, Kevin R.; Jarvinen, G.D.; Ebbinghaus, B.B.; Sleaford, Brad W.; Bradley, Keith S.; Collins, Brian A.; Smith, Brian W.; Prichard, Andrew W.

    2010-01-01

    This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant state and sub-national group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.

  10. The attractiveness of materials in advanced nuclear fuel cycles for various proliferation and theft scenarios

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, Charles G.; Wallace, Richard K.; Ireland, John R.; Johnson, M.W.; Hase, Kevin R.; Jarvinen, Gordon D.; Ebbinghaus, Bartley B.; Sleaford, Brad A.; Bradley, Keith S.; Collins, Brian W.; Smith, Brian W.; Prichard, Andrew W.

    2009-01-01

    This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant state and sub-national group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.

  11. Reactors physics. Bases of nuclear physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Diop, Ch.M.

    2006-01-01

    The aim of nuclear reactor physics is to quantify the relevant macroscopic data for the characterization of the neutronic state of a reactor core and to evaluate the effects of radiations (neutrons and gamma radiations) on organic matter and on inorganic materials. This first article presents the bases of nuclear physics in the context of nuclear reactors: 1 - reactor physics and nuclear physics; 2 - atomic nucleus - basic definitions: nucleus constituents, dimensions and mass of the atomic nucleus, mass defect, binding energy and stability of the nucleus, strong interaction, nuclear momentums of nucleons and nucleus; 3 - nucleus stability and radioactivity: equation of evolution with time - radioactive decay law; alpha decay, stability limit of spontaneous fission, beta decay, electronic capture, gamma emission, internal conversion, radioactivity, two-body problem and notion of radioactive equilibrium. (J.S.)

  12. Study on countermeasures for effective assessment of domestic system of physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Jong Uk; An, J. S.; Min, G. S.; Yoon, W. K.; Kim, K. J.; Kim, J. K.; Lim, J. H.; Choe, K. K.; Park, S. G.

    2004-04-01

    Since the threat for nuclear facilities has increased due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the allegations of Iraq and North Korean nuclear programmes, the concern for international regime of physical protection has been a hot issue worldwide. In addition, as the international strengthening trend of physical protection had been speeded up since the September 11th terror, Member States including the IAEA had agreed to revise the CPPNM(INFCIRC/274/rev.1) and prepared a draft amendment of CPPNM to establish their systems of physical protection based on threat assessment. However, Korean government has not yet established the domestic regime of threat assessment as well as national DBT for nuclear facilities, so it is very urgent to prepare the measures for them. As a domestic countermeasure for the international trend, Korean government promulgated a new 'Law for Physical Protection and Radiological Emergency'(LPPRE) on May 2003, which was based on establishing the regime of threat assessment, but it is necessary for us to construct the substantial countermeasures for its implementation as well as to legislate the following regulations of the LPPRE. Therefore, this study suggests the measures for constructing domestic regime of threat assessment in order to establish the legal and institutional framework and provides the efficient countermeasures for its implementation

  13. Technical criteria for terminating or reducing domestic safeguards on low-grade special nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1996-01-01

    A graded table for terminating or reducing domestic safeguards has been developed for use by programs and facilities within the Department of Energy in decisions regarding the need for or levels of protection of low-grade nuclear materials. Contained in this table are technical criteria which can allow for complete removal of safeguards over many special nuclear material forms and concentrations of typical low-grade materials either currently located at generating or processing sites and materials which may arise from processing operations related to stabilization and disposition activities. In addition, these criteria include higher concentration levels which may warrant maintaining some level of (albeit reduced) security on low-grade materials while allowing reductions in materials control and accountability requirements. These reductions can range from complete removal of these materials from materials control and accountability requirements such as measurements, physical inventories and recordkeeping, to deferring these measurements and physical inventories until a time that either the material is removed from the site or resubmitted for processing. It is important to note that other conditions contained in current Departmental safeguards and security policy be met prior to safeguards termination or reduction

  14. On-Going Nuclear Physics and Technology Research Programmes in Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaz, Pedro

    2007-01-01

    Innovative nuclear technology applications have emerged in recent years and triggered an unprecedented interest of different communities of scientists worldwide, concerned by the multidisciplinary scientific, technical and engineering aspects of such applications. ADS (Accelerator Driven Systems, for the transmutation of highly radiotoxic nuclear waste), EA (Energy Amplifiers, for the production of energy), Spallation Neutron Sources (for multiple applications such as in Bio-Sciences, Medicine, Material Science), Radioactive Ion Beams (of relevance for fundamental Nuclear Physics and Astrophysics, for applications in Medicine, amongst many others) are examples of applications that address a set of common multidisciplinary, leading edge and cross-cutting issues and research topics. Other applications being considered for High-Energy Physics purposes consist on facilities aiming at producing intense neutrino beams.The sustainability of nuclear energy as an economically competitive, environmentally friend and proliferation resistant technology to meet mankind's growing energy demand has imposed in recent years the consideration of new (Generation IV) or non-conventional types of nuclear reactors, operating with non-standard coolants, higher-energy neutron spectra, higher temperatures, amongst other issues. The safety and operational aspects of these nuclear energy systems share with the nuclear technology applications previously referred (ADS, EA, SNS, etc.) a set of common scientific and technical issues.In this paper, the scientific, technical and engineering topics and issues of relevance for the implementation and deployment of some of the systems previously described are briefly presented. A set of selected major on-going R and D programmes and experiments involving international collaborations of scientists and consortia of institutions are succinctly described

  15. Practices on nuclear security and international cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shen Ning

    2009-01-01

    Full text: Nuclear terrorism has been a great threat against the safety and security of the world. It has been reached the consensus by international community to strengthen the nuclear security regime to protect the nuclear and other radiological materials and related facilities. Protection of the security of nuclear and other radiological materials in use, storage and transport and related facilities is always a important issue faced by each country and it depends on the technologies, funds and human resources can be utilized. As nuclear technology has been widely used in different area, China competent authorities have issued a series of regulations, implementation rules and guidelines on security of nuclear and radioactive materials and related facilities. China supports and has taken an active part in the international efforts to strengthen the international nuclear security regime to combat nuclear terrorism. China has paid great importance on international cooperations on nuclear security with IAEA and other countries. More than 10 various national workshops and training courses on nuclear security and physical protection were delivered per year, which provided a communication platform for Chinese facility operators and managers to know the international technology-development and share the research achievements. In cooperation with the IAEA, China has held a great number of regional and national training courses on physical protection and nuclear security since 1998. Different types of training, such as training on awareness, Design Basis Threat (DBT), physical security system design, equipments operation and vulnerability analysis, benefited the administrators, facility operators, engineers and technical staff in charge of physical security system design, operation and maintenance from China and regional countries. Under the framework of the bilateral agreement on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology (PUNT), China and U.S. jointly conducted a Technical Demo

  16. France - convention on nuclear safety. Fifth national report for the 2011 peer review meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Convention on Nuclear Safety, hereinafter referred to as 'the Convention', is one of the results of international discussions initiated in 1992 in order to contribute maintaining a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. The convention aims to propose binding international obligations regarding nuclear safety. France signed the Convention on 20 September 1994, the date on which it was opened for signature during the IAEA's General Conference, and approved it on 13 September 1995. The Convention entered into force on 24 October 1996. For many years France has been participating actively in international initiatives to enhance nuclear safety, and it considers the Convention on Nuclear Safety to be an important instrument for achieving this aim. The areas covered by the Convention have long been part of the French approach to nuclear safety. The purpose of this fifth report, which was drafted pursuant to Article 5 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, is to present the measures taken by France in order to fulfil each of her obligations as specified in the said Convention. Since the Convention applies to all nuclear-power generating reactors, most of this report is dedicated to the measures taken in order to ensure their safety. However, as in previous reports, France has decided to present also in this fifth report, the measures that were taken for all research reactors, together with a graduated approach, if need be, for taking their size into account. First of all, research reactors are actually submitted to the same overall regulations as nuclear-power reactors with regard to safety and radiation protection. It should be noted that the most powerful French research reactor, called Phenix, which also used to produce electricity, was disconnected from the grid in March 2009, but continued to run an 'ultimate-test programme' until 1 February 2010. Later, in the framework of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive

  17. Nuclear Materials Management. Proceedings of the Symposium on Nuclear Materials Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1966-02-15

    An increasing number of countries are using nuclear materials which, because of their high value and the potential hazards involved, require special methods of handling. To discuss these and to provide a forum at which different systems for achieving the necessary economy and safety could be compared, the International Atomic Energy Agency held a Symposium at Vienna on Nuclear Materials Management from 30 August to 3 September, 1965. It was attended by 115 participants from 19 Member States and two international organizations. Nuclear materials are already being used on an industrial scale and their high cost demands close and continuous control to ensure that they are delivered precisely on time and that they are used to the fullest possible extent before they are withdrawn from service. Routine industrial methods of material control and verification are widely used to ensure safe and economical operation and handling in nuclear power stations, in fuel-element fabrication and reprocessing plants, and in storage facilities. In addition special refinements are needed to take account of the value and the degree of purity required of nuclear materials. Quality as well as quantity has to be checked thoroughly and the utmost economy in processing is necessary. The radioactivity of the material poses special problems of handling and storage and creates a potential hazard to health. A further problem is that of criticality. These dangers and the means of averting them are well understood, as is evidenced by the outstandingly good safety record of the atomic energy industry. But besides accommodating all these special problems, day-to-day procedures must be simple enough to fit in with industrial conditions. Many of the 58 papers presented at the Symposium emphasized that records, checks, measurements and handling precautions, if suitably devised, provide the control vital to efficient operation, serve as checks against loss or waste of valuable materials and help meet the

  18. Nuclear. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Treaty series 1990 no.21

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1992-12-31

    The States present at this convention are aware that comprehensive measures have been are being taken to ensure a high level of safety in nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and minimizing the consequences of any such accident should it occur. The States are convinced of the need to provide relevant information about nuclear accidents as early as possible in order that transboundary radiological consequences can be minimized. In the event of an accident the State involved will notify, through the International Energy Agency the other States which may be physically affected, as to the nature of the accident, the time of occurrence and its exact location.

  19. Nuclear. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Treaty series 1990 no.21

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    The States present at this convention are aware that comprehensive measures have been are being taken to ensure a high level of safety in nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and minimizing the consequences of any such accident should it occur. The States are convinced of the need to provide relevant information about nuclear accidents as early as possible in order that transboundary radiological consequences can be minimized. In the event of an accident the State involved will notify, through the International Energy Agency the other States which may be physically affected, as to the nature of the accident, the time of occurrence and its exact location

  20. The international safeguards system and physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canty, M.J.; Lauppe, W.D.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

    1990-02-01

    The report summarizes and explains facts and aspects of the IAEA safeguards performed within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and shows perspectives to be discussed by the NPT Review Conferences in 1990 and 1995. The technical background of potential misuse of nuclear materials for military purposes is explained in connection with the physical protection regime of the international safeguards, referring to recent developments for improvement of technical measures for material containment and surveillance. Most attention is given to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and their surveillance by the IAEA safeguards, including such new technologies and applications as controlled nuclear fusion, laser techniques for uranium enrichment, and particle accelerators. The report's concluding analyses of the current situation show potentials for improvement and desirable or necessary consequences to be drawn for the international safeguards system, also taking into account recent discussions on the parliamentary level. (orig./HP) [de

  1. Inventory of nuclear materials in case of emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Portugal, J.L.; Zanetti, S.

    2001-01-01

    The crisis situations for nuclear materials in nuclear facilities are provided for in the French regulation, as the decree of 12 May 1981 specifies that 'In any circumstance, the Ministry of Industry can order a physical inventory of the materials and its comparison with the accountancy records'. Such an inventory can be ordered in facilities holding category I nuclear materials, in case of a theft for example. The operators must be able to establish quickly if the stolen materials come from their facility. To test the organization set at the operators and competent authority levels respectively, five exercises of increasing complexity have already been carried out. These exercises have permitted the validation of procedures, composition of the various crisis centers, methodology for such an inventory and use of protected communication means. The authority crisis center includes members of the competent Authority and it's technical support body: staff members of the IPSN. It is in charge of the national managing of the operations, in relation with one or several site crisis centers. The site crisis center is the interface between the authorities and the facility crisis center. The operations of inventory are carried out from the roughest checking to the finest ones. To be efficient during the first hours of the crisis, the authority crisis center must have data bases at the disposal of its experts, containing information about physical protection and accountancy of the nuclear materials detained by the site and the relevant facilities. (authors)

  2. Physics contributions to radiation protection in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krueger, F.W.

    1980-01-01

    Physical research and physical methods can essentially contribute to radiation protection in nuclear power plants. With their aid, properties of radiation sources can be determined, and calculations of radiation shields can be performed. In the present paper, such tasks are analyzed, the state of the art of their solution is evaluated, and trends of further work are shown. Focal points of the present study are the calculation of properties of radiation sources outside the reactor (fission products, activated corrosion products, decontamination facilities for contaminated media), exact and engineering methods for calculating radiation fields also in inhomogeneous shields, and classification of concretes for gamma-ray shielding. Objectives, possibilities, and problems of standardization of such activities are discussed. (author)

  3. United States assistance to Kazakstan in the area of nuclear material security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tittemore, G.; Mitchell, W.

    1996-01-01

    The US has agreed to pursue cooperative nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) programs with the Republic of Kazakstan. As part of this cooperation, a state system of control accounting and physical protection for nuclear materials is being developed. The US Department of Energy is providing assistance at the four nuclear sites in the Republic to enhance MPC and A systems, techniques, hardware, software, procedures, and training. US survey teams, which include both material control and accounting (MC and A) and physical protection experts, have visited four nuclear sites in Kazakstan. MPC and A assistance is being provided to the Ulba State Holding Company, the Institute of Atomic Energy at Kurchatov City and Ala Tau, and the Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Complex (MAEC) BN-350 nuclear power plant in Aktau. At these sites, the facility staffs and DOE technical teams are working together to identify conditions not completely conforming with accepted international standards, as well as potential enhancements to correct such conditions. Design packages for enhancements at each of these facilities are prepared in collaboration with Kazakstani specialists. After agreement is reached on the specifications by the US and Kazakstan, MPC and A equipment is procured and installed. This paper summarizes the approach to the cooperative programs at these facilities, program status, and future plans

  4. Outline of a future security system to provide physical protection of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rossnagel, A.

    1984-01-01

    Nuclear energy, within three or four decades, may become a main pillar of the world's energy supply. The author discusses the problems entailed by the necessity to protect nuclear facilities against assaults, and whether this can be ensured without interference with civic rights. The method applied by the author to show the significance of the problems is to explain the current situation, and to compare it with a plausible outline of the developments to be expected over the next 50 years. He shows the hazards to be taken into account due to criminal actions by persons from outside, or by persons working in nuclear facilities. A main problem is the fact that the security system to be set up has to encompass not only the nuclear installation itself, but also the surrounding area, and the measures to be taken will have an impact on the society, which necessarily will curtail personal freedom. The author presumes that the necessity to guarantee physical protection of nuclear facilities will lead to a modification of the meaning of basic rights, and states his anxiety that security for nuclear installations might affect our concept of freedom. (HSCH) [de

  5. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-09-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status lists as of August 31, 1991. Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections there to. Part III contains reservations/declarations made upon signature

  6. IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2018-01-01

    An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts today completed a nuclear security advisory mission in France. The mission was carried out at the request of the French Government. The scope of the two-week International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) follow-up mission included France’s responses to the recommendations of the initial mission in 2011, the regulatory framework for the security of nuclear material and facilities as well as computer security. The IPPAS team also reviewed the country’s implementation of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). As part of the review, the team visited the Georges Besse II uranium enrichment plant at the Tricastin nuclear site in Pierrelatte, south-eastern France. The team observed that the nuclear security regime in France is robust and well-established, and incorporates the fundamental principles of the amended CPPNM. The team provided recommendations and suggestions to support France in enhancing and sustaining nuclear security. Good practices were identified that can serve as examples to other IAEA Member States to help strengthen their nuclear security activities.

  7. Regulations on nuclear materials control of the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The present 'Regulations on Nuclear Materials Control of the People's Republic of China' were promulgated by the State Council on June 15, 1987, which are enacted to ensure safe and lawful use of nuclear materials, to prevent theft, sabotage, lose, unlawful diversion and unlawful use, to protect the security of the State and the Public and to facilitate the development of nuclear undertakings. The nuclear materials controlled are: 1. Uranium-235 (materials and products); 2. Uranium-233 (material and products); 3. Plutonium-239 (materials and products); 4. tritium (materials and products); 5. lithium-6 (materials and products); 6. Other nuclear materials requiring control. The present regulations are not applicable to the control of uranium ore and its primary products. The control measures for nuclear products transferred to the armed forces shall be laid down by the national defence department

  8. Evolution of nuclear security regulatory activities in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mello, Luiz A. de; Monteiro Filho, Joselio S.; Belem, Lilia M.J.; Torres, Luiz F.B.

    2009-01-01

    The changing of the world scenario in the last 15 years has increased worldwide the concerns about overall security and, as a consequence, about the nuclear and radioactive material as well as their associated facilities. Considering the new situation, in February 2004, the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), decided to create the Nuclear Security Office. This Office is under the Coordination of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, in the Directorate for Safety, Security and Safeguards (Regulatory Directorate). Before that, security regulation issues were dealt in a decentralized manner, within that Directorate, by different licensing groups in specific areas (power reactors, fuel cycle facilities, radioactive facilities, transport of nuclear material, etc.). This decision was made in order to allow a coordinated approach on the subject, to strengthen the regulation in nuclear/radioactive security, and to provide support to management in the definition of institutional security policies. The CNEN Security Office develops its work based in the CNEN Physical Protection Regulation for Nuclear Operational Units - NE-2.01, 1996, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the IAEA Nuclear Security Series . This paper aims at presenting the activities developed and the achievements obtained by this new CNEN office, as well as identifying the issues and directions for future efforts. (author)

  9. Nuclear materials thermo-physical property database and property analysis using the database

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Yeong Seok

    2002-02-01

    It is necessary that thermo-physical properties and understand of nuclear materials for evaluation and analysis to steady and accident states of commercial and research reactor. In this study, development of nuclear materials thermo-properties database and home page. In application of this database, it is analyzed of thermal conductivity, heat capacity, enthalpy, and linear thermal expansion of fuel and cladding material and compared thermo-properties model in nuclear fuel performance evaluation codes with experimental data in database. Results of compare thermo-property model of UO 2 fuel and cladding major performance evaluation code, both are similar

  10. A U.S. Perspective on Nuclear Liability: A Continuing Impediment to International Trade and Public Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, O. F.

    2008-01-01

    More than two decades after the 1986 events at Chernobyl demonstrated nuclear power plant accidents can have cross-border consequences, there still is not a unified international legal regime for liability associated with nuclear accidents. This continues to present an impediment to international nuclear trade and protection of the public. Liability potentially associated with international nuclear commerce remains a labyrinth of statutes and treaties not yet interpreted by the courts. Countries with a majority of the world's 439 operating nuclear power plants are not yet parties to any nuclear liability convention in force. The global Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage now covers only about 73 operating nuclear power plants; the regional Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy now covers about 126; and, the Joint Protocol that links those two Conventions covers only about 68. The best solution would be for more countries to join the United States (with 104 operating nuclear power plants) in ratifying the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1997. As soon as the CSC enters into force, it will cover more nuclear power plants than either the Vienna or Paris Convention. This presentation also provides an update on insurance coverage in the United States for acts of terrorism.(author)

  11. The physical protection systems at the Czech nuclear installations and the Y2K issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malach, J.; Seifert, Z.; Sedlacek, J.; Bartak, L.; Polanka, J.

    1999-01-01

    The paper describes the joint effort of the State Office for Nuclear Safety, EZ, a.s., Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany and EBIS Ltd., as a subcontractor, to solve the problem of the Y2K particularly in connection with real time operation of the integrated physical protection system at Nuclear Power Plant Dukovany. (author)

  12. Nuclear security - New challenge to the safety of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Ganjie

    2008-01-01

    The safety of nuclear power plants involves two aspects: one is to prevent nuclear accidents resulted from systems and equipments failure or human errors; the other is to refrain nuclear accidents from external intended attack. From this point of view, nuclear security is an organic part of the nuclear safety of power plants since they have basically the same goals and concrete measures with each other. In order to prevent malicious attacks; the concept of physical protection of nuclear facilities has been put forward. In many years, a series of codes and regulations as well as technical standard systems on physical protection had been developed at international level. The United Nations passed No. 1540 resolution as well as 'Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear terrorism', and revised 'Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials', which has enhanced a higher level capacity of preparedness by international community to deal with security issues of nuclear facilities. In China, in order to improve the capability of nuclear power plants on preventing and suppressing the external attacks, the Chinese government consecutively developed the related codes and standards as well as technical documents based on the existing laws and regulations, including 'Guide for the Nuclear Security of Nuclear Power Plants' and 'Guide for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials', so as to upgrade the legislative requirements for nuclear security in power plants. The government also made greater efforts to support the scientific research and staff training on physical protection, and satisfying the physical protection standards for newly-built nuclear facilities such as large scale nuclear power plants to meet requirement at international level. At the same time old facilities were renovated and the Chinese government established a nuclear emergency preparedness coordination mechanism, developed corresponding emergency preparedness plans, intensified the

  13. Nuclear Legislation in OECD and NEA Countries. Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities - France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This country profile provide comprehensive information on the regulatory and Institutional Framework governing nuclear activities as well as a detailed review of a full range of nuclear law topics, including: mining regime; radioactive substances; nuclear installations; trade in nuclear materials and equipment; radiation protection; radioactive waste management; non-proliferation and physical protection; transport; and nuclear third party liability. The profile is complemented by reproductions of the primary legislation regulating nuclear activities in the country. Content: I. General Regulatory Framework: 1. General (The French nuclear power programme and its main players; French nuclear law); 2. Mining Regime; 3. Radioactive Substances and Nuclear Equipment (Regulatory diversity; Radioactive sources; Medical activities); 4. Trade in Nuclear Materials and Equipment (Basic nuclear installations - INB; Tax on basic nuclear installations, Additional taxes, Funding nuclear costs; Installations classified for environmental protection purposes (ICPE) using radioactive substances; Nuclear pressure equipment - ESPN; Defence-related nuclear installations and activities - IANID; Emergency plans); 5. Trade in Nuclear Materials and Equipment (General provisions; Patents); 6. Radiation protection (Protection of the public; Protection of workers; Radiation protection inspectors; Labour inspectors; Protection of individuals in a radiological emergency); 7. Radioactive Waste Management (General regulations; Radioactive waste regulations; Discharge of effluents); 8. Non-proliferation and physical protection (Materials not used for the nuclear deterrent; Materials used for the nuclear deterrent); 9. Transport (Licensing and notification regime: Transport of radioactive materials, Transport of nuclear materials, Transport of radioactive substances between member states of the European Union; Methods of transport: Land transport, Sea transport, Air transport, Transport by post); 10

  14. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-08-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains reservations/declarations made upon or following signature and Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument expressing consent to be bound. The status of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States or organizations as of 31 July 1990 is presented in two attachments

  15. France - Convention on nuclear safety. Fourth national report established in view of the 2008 examination meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-07-01

    This report is the fourth one established in compliance with the article 5 of the international Convention on nuclear safety, and presents measures implemented by France to meet each of the Convention requirements. It addresses electro-nuclear reactors as well as research reactors. After an overview of the main evolutions since the third French report, and a general presentation of the French national nuclear policy, the report addresses the different articles of the Convention. These articles deal with general arrangements (application arrangements, presentation of reports, existing nuclear installations with their safety assessments and main safety improvements brought to the different nuclear reactors), law and regulation (legal and regulatory framework, regulation bodies, responsibility of an authorization holder), general safety considerations (priority for safety, human and financial resources, human factors, quality insurance, safety assessment and verification, radiation protection, organisation in case of emergency), and installation safety (site selection, design and construction, exploitation, activities planned to improve safety). Appendices propose a list and locations of French nuclear reactors, a list of the main legal and regulatory texts, presentations of nuclear reactor operators (EDF, CEA, ILL), and an overview of practices of control of the environment

  16. 40. annual convention 1990 of the Austrian physical society

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    Titles and abstracts of the 1990 Convention of the Austrian Physical Society, 17-21 September 1990 at Salzburg, Austria, are given. The topical sections are: 1. Atomic, Molecular- and Plasma Physics; 2. Solid State Physics; 3. Polymer Physics; 4. Nuclear- and Particle Physics; 5. Medical Physics and Biophysics. There are alltogether 193 contributions, 61 thereof of INIS interest

  17. Design basis threat analysis and implementation of the physical protection system at Nuclear Facility of BATAN Yogyakarta

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syarip

    2005-01-01

    An analysis to determine the design basis threat (DBT) and its follow-up through the implementation of physical protection system at the nuclear facility of BATAN Yogyakarta has been done. Methodology used for the analysis is based on the IAEA guidance for the development and maintenance of a DBT. Based on the analysis results, it can be concluded that the threat motivation is influenced by political situation (related to the government policy), criminal, sabotage and theft. The characteristics of threats are: not so well organized, terror, theft of materials information, involving insider (collusion), and intimidation to workers. Potential threat could from guests/students who take a practical job or laboratory exercise. Therefore, it is necessary to be anticipated the possibility and its impact of turmoil/demonstrators such as destruction of: lighting, road, fence, sabotage on the electric and communication lines, surrounding the Yogyakarta nuclear facility

  18. Development of the system for academic training of personnel engaged in nuclear material protection, control and accounting in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kryuchkov, E.F.

    2004-01-01

    educational problems in area of nuclear materials physical protection, control and accountability (MPC and A) in Russia. General scheme of Russian educational system is considered with main emphasis on the directions under implementation now, namely academic training system, re-training system and specialists qualification upgrade system in MPC and A area. Russian academic training system consists of the educational programs at various levels: Bachelor of Sciences, Master of Sciences, Specialist (also referred to as an Engineer Degree), and professional re-training of the personnel already working in the nuclear field. Currently, only the Master of Sciences Graduate Program is completely developed for the students training. This is taking place at Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (State University, MEPhI), where the fourth generation of Masters has graduated from in May 2003. The graduates are now working at nuclear-related governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations, universities, and nuclear facilities. Development of the system to produce academically trained Russian MPC and A personnel is therefore well underway. MEPhI's MPC and A Engineering Degree Program which currently under development is considered in the paper. Analysis of MPC and A needs at Russian nuclear facilities has demonstrated the Engineering Degree Program is the best way to satisfy these needs and the resulting demands for MPC and A specialists at Russian nuclear enterprises. This paper discusses specific features of the Engineering Degree training required by Russian education legislation and the Russian system of quality control as applied to the training process. The paper summarizes the main joint actions undertaken during the past three years by MEPhI in collaboration with the US Department of Energy and US national laboratories to develop the MPC and A Engineering Degree Program in Russia. These actions include opening a new Engineering Degree specialty, Safeguards and Nonproliferation

  19. France - Convention on Nuclear Safety. Sixth National report for the 2014 review meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-07-01

    The Convention on Nuclear Safety, hereinafter referred to as 'the Convention', is one of the results of international discussions initiated in 1992 in order to contribute to maintaining a high level of nuclear safety worldwide. The convention sets a number of nuclear safety objectives and defines measures to meet them. France signed the Convention on 20 September 1994, the date on which it was opened for signature during the IAEA General Conference, and approved it on 13 September 1995. The Convention entered into force on 24 October 1996. For many years France has been participating actively in international initiatives to enhance nuclear safety. It considers the Convention on Nuclear Safety to be an important instrument for achieving this aim. The areas covered by the Convention have long been part of the French approach to nuclear safety. The purpose of this sixth report, which was drafted pursuant to Article 5 of the Convention and which covers the period 2010 to mid-2013, is to present the measures taken by France in order to fulfil each of its obligations as specified in the said Convention. Since the Convention applies to all nuclear-power generating reactors most of this report is dedicated to the measures taken in order to ensure their safety. However, as in previous reports, France has decided in this sixth report also to present the measures that were taken for all research reactors. First of all, research reactors are actually subject to the same overall regulations as nuclear-power reactors with regard to safety and radiation protection. Then, within the framework of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, to which France is a Contracting Party, an account was made of the measures taken in those respective fields with regard to research reactors. Lastly, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), of which France is a member, in March 2004 approved the Code

  20. Use of NMAC for the Evaluation of Physical Protection

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoo, Ho Sik; Koh, Moon Sung; Seo, Hyoung Min; Kim, Jae San [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    At the facility level, an NMAC system can help to deter and detect the unauthorized removal of nuclear material by maintaining an accurate inventory, including information related to its location. An effective NMAC system can detect insider activities and assess any irregularity involving nuclear material. Therefore, an NMAC can be a useful tool for evaluating a physical protection system at nuclear facility. In this study, elements of an NMAC system at the facility level were identified based on a draft document prepared by the IAEA. An evaluation sheet on the NMAC system was also developed by analyzing these elements. The NMAC system has been used as an important measure in safeguards. The system is useful in detecting and preventing insiders from acquiring nuclear material. Many countries are considering adopting the NMAC system for their own nuclear security. The IAEA has also recognized the importance of the NMAC system for strengthening the nuclear security regime. The Agency is preparing to publish a document on the use of the NMAC for nuclear security as implementation guide. The NMAC system consists of several elements such as management, nuclear material control, nuclear material movement and PIT. Those elements can be used as attributes for evaluating the NMAC system at a nuclear facility. In this study, all the elements comprising the NMAC system were extracted and major elements that were seen as significant for evaluating the system were selected. In addition, questionnaires on each selected element were developed. These questionnaires reflected the underlying purpose of the NMAC system for nuclear security.

  1. Transportation of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brobst, W.A.

    1977-01-01

    Twenty years of almost accident-free transport of nuclear materials is pointed to as evidence of a fundamentally correct approach to the problems involved. The increased volume and new technical problems in the future will require extension of these good practices in both regulations and packaging. The general principles of safety in the transport of radioactive materials are discussed first, followed by the transport of spent fuel and of radioactive waste. The security and physical protection of nuclear shipments is then treated. In discussing future problems, the question of public understanding and acceptance is taken first, thereafter transport safeguards and the technical bases for the safety regulations. There is also said to be a need for a new technology for spent fuel casks, while a re-examination of the IAEA transport standards for radiation doses is recommended. The IAEA regulations regarding quality assurance are said to be incomplete, and more information is required on correlations between engineering analysis, scale model testing and full scale crash testing. Transport stresses on contents need to be considered while administrative controls have been neglected. (JIW)

  2. Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-07-22

    The document reproduces the text of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage which was adopted on 12 September 1997 by a Diplomatic Conference held between 8-12 September 1997 in Vienna

  3. Convention on supplementary compensation for nuclear damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage which was adopted on 12 September 1997 by a Diplomatic Conference held between 8-12 September 1997 in Vienna

  4. Measures against illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: This presentation contains description of measures used in the Slovak Republic to combat illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The main goal of these measures is to allow safe and effective utilization of nuclear and other radioactive materials under surveillance of responsible state authorities as well as recover materials that were removed form legal utilization despite the preventive measures. Prevention is the most effective and the cheapest way how to overcome problems. An important precondition for prevention is existence of a national (or state) system for controlled utilization of nuclear and other radioactive materials completed by an effective physical protection of these materials and facilities involved and supported by sufficient low enforcement. A state system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials in Slovakia is based on the IAEA INFCIRC/153 requirements. A fact that the IAEA inspectors never have recognized any unaccounted nuclear material could be the best proof of its quality. Physical protection system in both Slovak NPPs is based on principles applied in development of advanced physical protection systems used in western NPPs. Technological systems and nuclear materials are categorized into three categories - first one is most sensitive. Barriers of each category zone are equipped with sufficient detection systems and are monitored by TV system. The system is operated by NPPs operators. Entrances are guarded by private security guards. Response forces are created by the police. A legal support provides the Act No. 130/1998 on peaceful use of nuclear energy and regulations on accounting and control of nuclear materials, on physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials and on transports of nuclear materials and radioactive wastes. The Criminal Code of the Slovak Republic has been amended and an illegal possession of nuclear and radioactive materials is treated as a crime. Response

  5. Experience gained with certification of instruments for the system for nuclear material physical protection, accounting, and control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gus'kov, O.M.; Egorov, V.V.; Morozov, O.S.; Novikov, V.M.

    1999-01-01

    Results of the tests have confirmed the expedience of certification of the equipment, especially imported items. For the use of imported equipment at Russian facilities, it is justified to accommodate the accompanying documents thereto for the Russian standards. Equipment items shipped to Russia should be prepared for the certification tests and/or operation. When taking decision on the certification of imported equipment, it is expedient to preliminarily estimate the instrument's parameters and its operation in Russia. To solve the question whether the imported equipment is usable for Russia and what engineering support and maintenance is needed for its operation, it would be justified to create the Center for engineering support of instruments to be used for nuclear material protection, control and accounting on the basis of one of institutes dealing with the development of instruments for these application [ru

  6. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-09-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (CENNA) (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (CANARE) (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status lists as of 10 September 1992, part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections there to, and part III contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  7. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (CENNA) (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (CANARE) (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status list as of 31 December 1996, Part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto, and Part III contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  8. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-02-28

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (CENNA) (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (CANARE) (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status list as of 31 December 1996, Part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto, and Part III contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature.

  9. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-01

    Global Partnership and the UNSC Resolution 1540. However, this is only partially true as there is a growing realisation that radiation protection as well as emergency preparedness is part and parcel of the objectives that the international community is striving towards. Some of the projects have a genuinely humanitarian or civilian nature in the sense that they aim at alleviating for instance natural radiation such as from radon. But on the other hand, certain activities that concern radiation protection in terms of reducing the emissions of radiation from radioactive materials also become a security component with regard to the physical protection measures that in most cases will have to be in place. The projects in this field are implemented in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. There are a total of 22 projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation and security, the geographical scope of SSM's activities is broad and stretching beyond the nearest parts of Russia and other neighbouring states. This has to do with the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies relies on human will and therefore an amount of irradiated nuclear fuel in Siberia may be just as dangerous as a similar or smaller amount much closer to Sweden. It all depends on the people involved and their intentions. Sweden cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in this particular field. The projects include the installation of physical protection at facilities with nuclear and radioactive materials; the application of safeguards or nuclear materials accountancy on nuclear materials; assistance to the improvement of national export control systems as well as education in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. SSM participates in a number of projects that are financed by the EU. The projects were initiated in the framework of TACIS and soon to be formulated in the framework of INSC. TACIS focussed on the

  10. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-15

    foreseen by for instance the Global Partnership and the UNSC Resolution 1540. However, this is only partially true as there is a growing realisation that radiation protection as well as emergency preparedness is part and parcel of the objectives that the international community is striving towards. Some of the projects have a genuinely humanitarian or civilian nature in the sense that they aim at alleviating for instance natural radiation such as from radon. But on the other hand, certain activities that concern radiation protection in terms of reducing the emissions of radiation from radioactive materials also become a security component with regard to the physical protection measures that in most cases will have to be in place. The projects in this field are implemented in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. There are a total of 22 projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation and security, the geographical scope of SSM's activities is broad and stretching beyond the nearest parts of Russia and other neighbouring states. This has to do with the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies relies on human will and therefore an amount of irradiated nuclear fuel in Siberia may be just as dangerous as a similar or smaller amount much closer to Sweden. It all depends on the people involved and their intentions. Sweden cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in this particular field. The projects include the installation of physical protection at facilities with nuclear and radioactive materials; the application of safeguards or nuclear materials accountancy on nuclear materials; assistance to the improvement of national export control systems as well as education in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. SSM participates in a number of projects that are financed by the EU. The projects were initiated in the framework of TACIS and soon to be formulated in the framework of

  11. Dismantlement and destruction of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schulte, N.T.

    1997-01-01

    The safe destruction and dismantling of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons is of fundamental importance to the security of all countries represented in this volume. Expertise in the field is not confined to one country or organisation: all can benefit from each other. There is an ever present danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: approximately two dozen countries have ongoing programmes to develop or acquire such weapons, and many are also gaining the capability to build air-surface delivery systems. But much can be done to prevent proliferation by reducing leakage of materials and know-how and by solving the problems of the destruction of surplus weapons systems, which has now come to be a key issue. In 13 sessions of the workshop attention was paid to (1) Dismantlement and Destruction of Chemical, Nuclear and Conventional Weapons; (2) Status of Implementation of Arms Control Treaties and Voluntary Commitments; (3) National Perspectives on Cooperation in Disarmament; (4) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Chemical Weapons; (5) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Nuclear Weapons; (6) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Conventional Weapons. Session; (7) Experience with Currently Employed Chemical Destruction Technologies; (8) Alternative Chemical Destruction Technologies; (9) Deactivation, Dismantlement and Destruction of Delivery Systems and Infrastructure for Nuclear Weapons; (10) Storage, Safeguarding and Disposition of Fissile Materials; (11) Technologies for Conversion and Civil Use of Demilitarized Materials; (12) International Organizations; and (13) Environmental Challenges Posed by Chemical and Nuclear Disarmament

  12. Physical protection design and analysis training for the former Soviet Union

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soo Hoo, M.S.; Chapek, J.F.; Ebel, P.E.

    1996-01-01

    Since 1978, Sandia National Laboratories has provided training courses in the systematic design of Physical Protection Systems (PPS). One such course, the International Training Course (TC) on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials, is sponsored by the Department of Energy's International Safeguards Division , the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Department of State. Since 1978, twelve 3- and 4-week classes have been conducted by Sandia for these sponsors. One- and two-week adaptations of this course have been developed for other customers, and, since 1994, nine of these abbreviated courses have been presented in the Russian language to participants from the Former Soviet Union (SU). These courses have been performed in support of the Department of Energy's program on Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC ampersand A) for the Russian Federation and the Newly Independent States. MPC ampersand A physical protection training assumes participants have more narrowly defined backgrounds. In using affective approaches, the overall goal of training in the context of the MPC ampersand A Program is to develop modern and effective, indigenous capabilities for physical protection system design and analysis within the SU. This paper contrasts the cognitive and affective approaches to training and indicates why different approaches are required for the ITC and the MPC ampersand A Programs

  13. Protection against nuclear terrorism: the IAEA response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dodd, B.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: As a result of the events of 11 September 2001, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identified possible threats from acts of nuclear terrorism. A report to the Board of Governors in November 2001 summarized the IAEA's ongoing work in areas relevant to the prevention and mitigation of the consequences of such acts and outlined proposals for a number of new and/or enhanced activities. Four main threats were addressed: theft of a nuclear weapon; acquisition of nuclear material; acquisition of other radioactive material; and violent acts against nuclear facilities. These proposals have been further refined and the new plan was approved in principle at the March 2002 board meeting. In the beginning, implementation will be dependent on member state contributions to a voluntary fund. Proposed new or enhanced activities are grouped into eight areas: I. Physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities; II. Detection of malicious activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials; III. State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control; IV. Security of radioactive material other than nuclear material; V. Assessment of safety/security related vulnerability of nuclear facilities; VI. Response to malicious acts, or threats thereof; VII. Adherence to and implementation of international agreements, guidelines and recommendations; VIII. Nuclear security co-ordination and information management. After an overview, this paper focuses on activity area IV, which deals with the radiological terrorism issues involving radioactive sources. A strategy for evaluation of the IAEA's role is presented, covering an analysis of the likely threats and possible scenarios. This leads to an assessment of the most desirable sources from a terrorist's viewpoint. The strategy then examines how terrorists might acquire such sources and attempts to determine the best ways to prevent their acquisition. Further activities are proposed to prevent the use

  14. Nuclear security: A global response to a global threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Yukiya

    2016-01-01

    The threat of nuclear terrorism is real. The possibility of criminals getting hold of nuclear and other radioactive material cannot be ruled out. Much progress has been made in tackling this threat nationally, regionally and globally, but more needs to be done. International cooperation is vital. As the global platform for cooperation in nuclear security, the IAEA helps countries to establish and maintain robust and sustainable national nuclear security regimes. We help ensure that measures are taken to protect nuclear and other radioactive material, as well as the facilities in which such material is housed, from malicious acts. This has been an important year for nuclear security with the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This establishes legally binding commitments for countries to protect nuclear facilities as well as nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport. I encourage all countries that have not yet done so to adhere to this Amendment and thereby contribute to a stronger global nuclear security regime. In this edition of the IAEA Bulletin, you will learn about the different areas of security where our work is making a real difference. We highlight the progress made in a number of countries.

  15. Study on interface between nuclear material accounting system and national nuclear forensic library

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Yonhong; Han, Jae-Jun; Chang, Sunyoung; Shim, Hye-Won; Ahn, Seungho

    2016-01-01

    The implementation of nuclear forensics requires physical, chemical and radiological characteristics with transport history to unravel properties of seized nuclear materials. For timely assessment provided in the ITWG guideline, development of national response system (e.g., national nuclear forensic library) is strongly recommended. Nuclear material accounting is essential to obtain basic data in the nuclear forensic implementation phase from the perspective of nuclear non-proliferation related to the IAEA Safeguards and nuclear security. In this study, the nuclear material accounting reports were chosen due to its well-established procedure, and reviewed how to efficiently utilize the existing material accounting system to the nuclear forensic implementation phase In conclusion, limits and improvements in implementing the nuclear forensics were discussed. This study reviewed how to utilize the existing material accounting system for implementing nuclear forensics. Concerning item counting facility, nuclear material properties can be obtained based on nuclear material accounting information. Nuclear fuel assembly data being reported for the IAEA Safeguards can be utilized as unique identifier within the back-end fuel cycle. Depending upon the compulsory accountability report period, there exist time gaps. If national capabilities ensure that history information within the front-end nuclear fuel cycle is traceable particularly for the bulk handling facility, the entire cycle of national nuclear fuel would be managed in the framework of developing a national nuclear forensic library

  16. Study on interface between nuclear material accounting system and national nuclear forensic library

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Yonhong; Han, Jae-Jun; Chang, Sunyoung; Shim, Hye-Won; Ahn, Seungho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The implementation of nuclear forensics requires physical, chemical and radiological characteristics with transport history to unravel properties of seized nuclear materials. For timely assessment provided in the ITWG guideline, development of national response system (e.g., national nuclear forensic library) is strongly recommended. Nuclear material accounting is essential to obtain basic data in the nuclear forensic implementation phase from the perspective of nuclear non-proliferation related to the IAEA Safeguards and nuclear security. In this study, the nuclear material accounting reports were chosen due to its well-established procedure, and reviewed how to efficiently utilize the existing material accounting system to the nuclear forensic implementation phase In conclusion, limits and improvements in implementing the nuclear forensics were discussed. This study reviewed how to utilize the existing material accounting system for implementing nuclear forensics. Concerning item counting facility, nuclear material properties can be obtained based on nuclear material accounting information. Nuclear fuel assembly data being reported for the IAEA Safeguards can be utilized as unique identifier within the back-end fuel cycle. Depending upon the compulsory accountability report period, there exist time gaps. If national capabilities ensure that history information within the front-end nuclear fuel cycle is traceable particularly for the bulk handling facility, the entire cycle of national nuclear fuel would be managed in the framework of developing a national nuclear forensic library.

  17. Circular from January 26, 2004, taken for the enforcement of the by-law from January 26, 2004, relative to the national defense secrecy protection in the domain of nuclear materials protection and control; Circulaire du 26 janvier 2004 prise pour l'application de l'arrete du 26 janvier 2004 relatif a la protection du secret de la defense nationale dans le domaine de la protection et du controle des matieres nucleaires

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2004-01-15

    The by-law of January 26, 2004 gives a regulatory foundation to the classification of sensible informations relative to the security and physical protection of nuclear materials. This circular recalls, in this framework, the conditions of implementation of the regulation relative to the protection of national defense secrecies in the domain of the protection of nuclear facilities and materials. (J.S.)

  18. The Brussels Nuclear Ship Convention and its impact on the German Atomic Energy Act

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bernaerts, A.

    1976-01-01

    Although the Brussels Nuclear Ship Liability Convention of 1962, whose incorporation into German law was agreed upon by the German Federal Parliament (the Bundestag) in 1975, will have only minor international significance once it has entered into force, it will yet provide a new legal basis for the nuclear liability of the German vessel N.S. 'Otto Hahn' for the periods of her stay within the Federal Republic of Germany. However, there is no smooth concurrence of the Brussels Convention and the German Atomic Energy Act adapted to the Paris Liability Convention in 1975. This means that a number of questions still need to be resolved with respect to the protection of victims and the liability of shipowners. (orig.) [de

  19. September 11 and Nuclear Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knapp, V.

    2002-01-01

    The terrible September 11 attacks have demonstrated the ability of international terrorists to carry out well-planned and complex operations that can kill thousands of citizens. The potential for biological, chemical and nuclear terrorism has increased and will remain as long as their underlying causes. Nuclear installations could be the targets, or the sources of materials usable for terrorism. Whilst thick containment buildings around nuclear reactors are unlikely to be breached, some installations, such as spent fuel pond are more vulnerable. The safety of nuclear installations must be reconsidered taking into account some new initiating events hitherto considered of very low probability. A resistance against nuclear power plant sabotage by terrorist group penetrating into reactor building, is a controversial topic. Measures against diversion of nuclear materials, which could be used in nuclear terrorism, must be reviewed. The danger of diversion from giant military stocks of highly enriched uranium and plutonium by far exceeds that from peaceful use of nuclear energy. Measures to neutralize these stocks, such as dilution of highly enriched uranium, should be speeded up and have a priority in public concern. As for the nuclear power stations, public should be informed about the recommendations of IAEA for better physical protection of nuclear materials prepared in 1999 (INFCIRC 225/Rev.4) and about Additional protocol to inadequate Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials from 1980, which is in a process of ratification. For acceptable nuclear future public must be aware that all required measures to eliminate unacceptable risks resulting from terrorist activity against nuclear installations will be undertaken. (author)

  20. Physical protection of power reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Darby, J.L.

    1979-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories has applied a systematic approach to designing physical protection systems for nuclear facilities to commercial light-water reactor power plants. A number of candidate physical protection systems were developed and evaluated. Focus is placed on the design of access control subsystems at each of three plant layers: the protected area perimeter, building surfaces, and vital areas. Access control refers to barriers, detectors, and entry control devices and procedures used to keep unauthorized personnel and contraband out of the plant, and to control authorized entry into vital areas within the plant

  1. Applications of nuclear physics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hayes, A. C.

    2017-02-01

    Today the applications of nuclear physics span a very broad range of topics and fields. This review discusses a number of aspects of these applications, including selected topics and concepts in nuclear reactor physics, nuclear fusion, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear-geophysics, and nuclear medicine. The review begins with a historic summary of the early years in applied nuclear physics, with an emphasis on the huge developments that took place around the time of World War II, and that underlie the physics involved in designs of nuclear explosions, controlled nuclear energy, and nuclear fusion. The review then moves to focus on modern applications of these concepts, including the basic concepts and diagnostics developed for the forensics of nuclear explosions, the nuclear diagnostics at the National Ignition Facility, nuclear reactor safeguards, and the detection of nuclear material production and trafficking. The review also summarizes recent developments in nuclear geophysics and nuclear medicine. The nuclear geophysics areas discussed include geo-chronology, nuclear logging for industry, the Oklo reactor, and geo-neutrinos. The section on nuclear medicine summarizes the critical advances in nuclear imaging, including PET and SPECT imaging, targeted radionuclide therapy, and the nuclear physics of medical isotope production. Each subfield discussed requires a review article unto itself, which is not the intention of the current review; rather, the current review is intended for readers who wish to get a broad understanding of applied nuclear physics.

  2. Applications of nuclear physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hayes-Sterbenz, Anna Catherine

    2017-01-01

    Today the applications of nuclear physics span a very broad range of topics and fields. This review discusses a number of aspects of these applications, including selected topics and concepts in nuclear reactor physics, nuclear fusion, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear-geophysics, and nuclear medicine. The review begins with a historic summary of the early years in applied nuclear physics, with an emphasis on the huge developments that took place around the time of World War II, and that underlie the physics involved in designs of nuclear explosions, controlled nuclear energy, and nuclear fusion. The review then moves to focus on modern applications of these concepts, including the basic concepts and diagnostics developed for the forensics of nuclear explosions, the nuclear diagnostics at the National Ignition Facility, nuclear reactor safeguards, and the detection of nuclear material production and trafficking. The review also summarizes recent developments in nuclear geophysics and nuclear medicine. The nuclear geophysics areas discussed include geo-chronology, nuclear logging for industry, the Oklo reactor, and geo-neutrinos. The section on nuclear medicine summarizes the critical advances in nuclear imaging, including PET and SPECT imaging, targeted radionuclide therapy, and the nuclear physics of medical isotope production. Lastly, each subfield discussed requires a review article unto itself, which is not the intention of the current review; rather, the current review is intended for readers who wish to get a broad understanding of applied nuclear physics.

  3. National report of Brazil on nuclear safety convention - introduction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This document was prepared for fulfilling the Brazilian obligations under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Chapter 1 presents some historical aspects of the Brazilian nuclear policy, targets to be attained for increasing the nuclear energy contribution for the national production of electric energy

  4. Capabilities of the Institute of Nuclear Physics (Kazakhstan) for technical expertise of seized nuclear and other radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lukashenko, S.; Chakrov, P.; Gorlachyov, I.; Knyazev, B.; Yakushev, E.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Institute of Nuclear Physics of the National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan (INP NNC RK) widely uses the nuclear-physical and others analytical methods which were used during the last years to carry out technical expertise of the nuclear and radioactive materials as well. The spectrometric methods for determination radionuclide composition. INP NNC RK has modern spectrometric equipment for solving all types of analytical and radio analytical problems including: gamma spectrometers - planar, coaxial and well type, alpha spectrometers ('Canberra'), liquid scintillation counter 'TriCarb 3100', beta spectrometers. An original procedures with own software are developed for each spectrometric device. Mass-spectrometric methods. The thermion mass - spectrometry (TI-MS) with prism ionic optics are used for environment objects and nuclear materials analysis. Now the operations on determination of plutonium and uranium isotope composition of the environmental objects of former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site by usage of this method are under way. Scanning electron microscopy (SEM). At the INP, SEM techniques have been used traditionally in studies of irradiated metal materials (original surface, fracture surfaces, cross sections), but rather recently they were successfully applied for characterization of 'hot particles' from nuclear testing site, polymer materials, and also uranium fuel pellets. (The microscope used in AMRAY-1200B equipped with ANS X-ray analyzer). Determination methods of macro - and microelements composition. For determination of macro - and microelement composition the set of various methods are used, including: neutron - activation analysis, atomic - emission spectrometry with high - frequency inductively- coupled plasma, roentgen fluorescent analysis, traditional chemical methods: titrimetry, voltamperometry etc. For determination the most difficult elements - carbon and oxygen the nuclear reactions method is developed at the

  5. International instruments and information exchange on incidents falling within the ITDB scope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each individual state. However,states need to work together to enhance collective nuclear security. There are international legal instruments that provide a strategic framework and a common platform for such cooperation. Among such legally binding security related instruments are: Convention on the physical protection of Nuclear materials, Convention on the early notification of nuclear accident and the International convention for the Suppression of acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

  6. The fundamental principles of the physical protection, the group of six point of view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Claeys, M.; Carnas, L.; Robeyns, G.; Rommevaux, G.; Venot, R.; Hagemann, A.; Fontaneda Gonzalez, A.; Gimenez Gonzalez, S.; Isaksson, S.G.; Wager, K.; Price, C.

    2001-01-01

    This paper presents the joint experience of the Group of Six in the field of physical protection against the theft or unauthorized removal of nuclear material and against the sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, which emerged from the joint discussion. Several fundamental principles stem from this experience. Of course the particular terms and conditions of the implementation of these principles are specific to each country. (authors)

  7. Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control. Implementing Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Nuclear terrorism and the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material threaten the security of all States. There are large quantities of diverse radioactive material in existence, which are used in areas such as health, the environment, agriculture and industry. The possibility that nuclear and other radioactive material may be used for terrorist acts cannot be ruled out in the current global situation. States have responded to this risk by engaging in a collective commitment to strengthen the protection and control of such material, and to establish capabilities for detection and response to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. Through its nuclear security programme, the IAEA supports States to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security regime. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security. This approach recognizes that an effective national nuclear security regime builds on: the implementation of relevant international legal instruments; information protection; physical protection; material accounting and control; detection of and response to trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material; national response plans; and contingency measures. Within its nuclear security programme, the IAEA aims to assist States in implementing and sustaining such a regime in a coherent and integrated manner. Each State carries the full responsibility for nuclear security, specifically: to provide for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities; to ensure the security of such material in use, storage or in transport; to combat illicit trafficking; and to detect and respond to nuclear security events. This is an Implementing Guide on nuclear security systems and measures for the detection of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. The objective of the publication is to provide guidance to Member States for the

  8. Manual of use and accounting of radioactive material and procedures of radiological protection for nuclear medicine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chavez, Miguel

    1997-03-01

    This manual of use and accounting of material radioactive and procedures of radiological safety tries to facilitate workings of protection of material radioactive in services of medicine nuclear, during diagnosis (examinations with x-rays, or those that are made in nuclear medicine), or during the processing of diseases, mainly of the carcinomas (x-ray)

  9. Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center, Institute of Materials Research. Progress report on research and development work in 1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-03-01

    The Institute consists of three parts IMF I, IMF II and IMF III. The tasks are divided into applied material physics (IMF I), material and structural mechanics (IMF II) and material process technology (IMF III). IMF I works preferably on the development of metallic, non-metallic and compound materials and on questions of the structure and properties of boundary surfaces and surface protection coatings. The main work of IMF II is the reliability of components, failure mechanics and the science of damage. IMF III examines process technology questions in the context of the manufacture of ceramic materials and fusion materials and the design of nuclear components. The Institute works on various main points of the Kernforschungszentrum in its research work, particularly in nuclear fusion, micro-system technique, nuclear safety research, superconductivity and in processes with little harmful substances and waste. Material and strength problems for future fusion reactors and fission reactors, in powerful micro systems and safety-related questions of nuclear technology are examined. Also, research not bound to projects in the field of metallic, ceramic and polymer materials for high stresses is carried out. (orig.) [de

  10. Inspection Methods for Physical Protection Project: annual report, March-December 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowden, D.D.; Green, J.N.; Minichino, C.; Thatcher, R.M.; Tyler, G.C.

    1982-01-01

    The report details the current production status of the expanded replacement inspection procedures for physical protection of power reactors, for strategic special nuclear material fixed sites, and for transportation of special nuclear material. In addition to the expanded replacement procedures, the final production status is reported for the new series of inspection procedures for special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance at fixed sites, for personnel training and qualifications plan (Appendix B to 10 CFR 73), for safeguards contingency plan (Appendix C to 10 CFR 73), and for licensee implementing procedures evaluation. Other deliverables, trips, management meetings, training, and changes in personnel are discussed

  11. IAEA to hold special session on nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    Experts from around the world are meeting at the IAEA this week for an international symposium on nuclear safeguards, verification, and security. A special session on 2 November focuses on the issue of combating nuclear terrorism. The Special Session, which will bring together experts on nuclear terrorism from around the world, will deal with the following issues: The Psychology of terrorism; Intelligence, police and border protection; Guarding nuclear reactors and material from terrorists and thieves; The threat of nuclear terrorism: Nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; The threat of nuclear terrorism: Intentional dispersal of radioactive material - Sabotage of fixed installations or transport systems; The Legal Framework: Treaties and Conventions, Laws; Regulations and Codes of Practice; IAEA Nuclear Security and Safety Programmes

  12. Theoretical nuclear physics

    CERN Document Server

    Blatt, John M

    1979-01-01

    A classic work by two leading physicists and scientific educators endures as an uncommonly clear and cogent investigation and correlation of key aspects of theoretical nuclear physics. It is probably the most widely adopted book on the subject. The authors approach the subject as ""the theoretical concepts, methods, and considerations which have been devised in order to interpret the experimental material and to advance our ability to predict and control nuclear phenomena.""The present volume does not pretend to cover all aspects of theoretical nuclear physics. Its coverage is restricted to

  13. Observations on physical protection methods for protecting against unauthorized acts by an insider

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ericson, D.M.; Goldman, L.A.; Lobner, R.R.

    1983-01-01

    Two basic approaches have evolved over the past several years for physical protection against sabotage by insiders. One, area-type physical protection, involves the use of access controls at area boundaries. Current practices at nuclear power plants generally fall into this category. The second, component-level physical protection, involves hardware at individual components as well as access controls at the boundary. The area-type physical protection concepts include team, area, and operational zoning. Team zoning requires the formation of multiperson teams that must be used to gain access to vital areas. Area zoning divides the plant into two or more zones, each of which is operated and maintained by separate, dedicated teams. Operational zoning is a closed-loop access control system that permits an initial vital area access, but blocks access to certain other vital areas until the operability of equipment in the first area is verified by test or inspection. Component-level physical protection is also a closed-loop system in which both area and component access are monitored. Each of the above measures can provide effective protection against an insider in certain instances, but each has weaknesses that must be recognized. An approach for protection against the insider is to take the most promising features of each of the above physical protection measures and supplement these capabilities with damage control and design changes as appropriate for a particular plant

  14. Development of Integrated Code for Risk Assessment (INCORIA) for Physical Protection System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jang, Sung Soon; Seo, Hyung Min; Yoo, Ho Sik

    2010-01-01

    A physical protection system (PPS) integrates people, procedures and equipment for the protection of assets or facilities against theft, sabotage or other malevolent human attacks. Among critical facilities, nuclear facilities and nuclear weapon sites require the highest level of PPS. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, international communities, including the IAEA, have made substantial efforts to protect nuclear material and nuclear facilities. The international flow on nuclear security is using the concept or risk assessment. The concept of risk assessment is firstly devised by nuclear safety people. They considered nuclear safety including its possible risk, which is the frequency of failure and possible consequence. Nuclear security people also considers security risk, which is the frequency of threat action, vulnerability, and consequences. The concept means that we should protect more when the credible threat exists and the possible radiological consequence is high. Even if there are several risk assessment methods of nuclear security, the application needs the help of tools because of a lot of calculation. It's also hard to find tools for whole phase of risk assessment. Several codes exist for the part of risk assessment. SAVI are used for vulnerability of PPS. Vital area identification code is used for consequence analysis. We are developing Integrated Code for Risk Assessment (INCORIA) to apply risk assessment methods for nuclear facilities. INCORIA evaluates PP-KINAC measures and generation tools for threat scenario. PP-KINAC is risk assessment measures for physical protection system developed by Hosik Yoo and is easy to apply. A threat scenario tool is used to generate threat scenario, which is used as one of input value to PP-KINAC measures

  15. Towards an International Approach to Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tomihiro Taniguchi

    2006-01-01

    This document presents in a series of transparencies the different activities of the IAEA: Introduction of International Atomic Energy Agency, Changing world, Changing Technology, Changing Global Security, Developing Innovative Nuclear Energy Systems, Global Nuclear Safety Regime, IAEA Safety Standards: Hierarchy - Global Reference for Striving for Excellence, IAEA Safety Reviews and Services: Integrated Safety Approach, Global Knowledge Network - Asian Nuclear Safety Network, Safety Issues and Challenges, Synergy between Safety and Security, Recent Developments: Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), Incident and Emergency Preparedness and Response, Holistic Approach for Safety and Security, Sustainable Development. (J.S.)

  16. Security of material: Preventing criminal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    2001-01-01

    The report emphasizes the need for national regulatory authorities to include in the regulatory systems, measures to control and protect nuclear materials from being used in illegal activities, as well as aspects of relevance for detecting and responding to illegal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. The report will give an overview of the international treaties and agreements that underpin the establishment of a regulatory structure necessary for States to meet their non-proliferation policy and undertakings. Ongoing work to strengthen the protection of nuclear material and to detect and respond to illegal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive material will be included. The focus of the paper is on the need for standards and national regulation in the nuclear security area. (author)

  17. Questions raised on transport of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lubinska, A.

    1984-01-01

    Public opinion is demanding safer rules for the shipment of radioactive materials since the recent collision and sinking of a French freighter carrying uranium hexafluoride. At issue is the secrecy of the cargo, the delay in releasing information to the public and salvage crews, and the use of unmarked trucks. The nuclear industry points out that no recent incidents have led to the loss of human life, but there is concern among European Community members that a number of countries have yet to ratify international conventions and agreements on hazardous materials transport, that none of these agreements are mandatory, and that none address the transfrontier movement of waste materials

  18. Development of technologies for national control of and accountancy for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Young Myung; Kwack, E. H.; Kim, B. K.

    2002-03-01

    The aim of this project is to establish a rigid foundation of national safeguards and to develop the new technologies for the nuclear control. This project is composed of four different technologies; 1. Monitoring technology for nuclear materials, 2. Detection technology for a single particle, 3. Safeguards information management technology, 4. Physical protection technology. Various studies such as a remote verification system for CANDU spent fuel in dry storage canister, a spent fuel verification system using an optical fiber scintillator, and development of softwares for safeguards and physical protection were performed in the frist phase('99-'01). As a result of this research, it has been identified that the developed technologies could be a crucial means of the control for the nuclear material and facilities related. We are planing to accomplish a steady national safeguard system in the second phase('02-'06). This research will help to elevate the transparency and credibility in national nuclear activities by improving the relative technologies

  19. US/Russian program in materials protection, control and accounting at the RRC Kurchatov Institute: 1997--1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sukhoruchkin, V.; Rumyantsev, A.; Shmelev, V.

    1998-01-01

    Six US Department of Energy Laboratories are carrying out a program of cooperation with the Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute to improve nuclear material protection, control and accounting (MPC and A) at Kurchatov. In 1997--1998 the primary thrust of this program has been directed to Building 106, which houses a number of test reactors and critical facilities. Substantial improvements in physical protection, upgrades in the physical inventory taking procedures, installation of equipment for the computerized materials accounting system, and installation of nuclear material portal monitors and neutron-based measurement equipment are being carried out at this facility. Software for the computerized accounting system, named KI-MACS, has been developed at Kurchatov and the system has been fully integrated with the bar code printing and reading equipment, electronic scales, and nondestructive assay equipment provided under this program. Additional 1997--1998 activities at Kurchatov include continuation of a tamper indicating device program, vulnerability assessments of several facilities, hosting of a Russian-American Workshop on Fissile Material Control and Accountability at Critical Facilities, and the development of accounting procedures for transfers of nuclear materials between material balance areas

  20. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. United Nations 2005: International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2005-01-01

    The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism is a 2005 United Nations treaty designed to criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism and to promote police and judicial cooperation to prevent, investigate and punish those acts. As of September 2016, the convention has 115 signatories and 106 state parties, including the nuclear powers China, France, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Convention covers a broad range of acts and possible targets, including nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors; covers threats and attempts to commit such crimes or to participate in them, as an accomplice; stipulates that offenders shall be either extradited or prosecuted; encourages States to cooperate in preventing terrorist attacks by sharing information and assisting each other in connection with criminal investigations and extradition proceedings; and, deals with both crisis situations, assisting States to solve the situations and post-crisis situations by rendering nuclear material safe through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

  1. Considerations in Emergency Preparedness and Response for a State Embarking on a Nuclear Power Programme, Training Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The aim of these training materials is to provide a practical tool for emergency planning for a State embarking on a nuclear power programme, and to fulfil, in part, functions assigned to the IAEA under the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (the Assistance Convention). Under Article 5.a(ii) of the Assistance Convention, one function of the IAEA is to collect and disseminate to States Parties and Member States information concerning methodologies, techniques and available results of research relating to such emergencies. One of the concerns associated with nuclear power is the possibility that a State embarking on a nuclear power programme might not have sufficient capabilities and therefore would not be adequately prepared to respond to a radiation emergency caused by severe accident conditions. Protecting the public, the environment and property in the event of a failure of any level of defence in depth is the most important safety objective. A robust framework for emergency preparedness and response to a radiation emergency forms the last level of defence in depth and, as such, must be developed and implemented by any State embarking on a nuclear power programme, using best international practices. The establishment of capabilities and arrangements for emergency preparedness and response to severe accident conditions is one of the principal tasks in the development of a national infrastructure for nuclear power. State of the art emergency preparedness and response is a key element in achieving overall plant safety. This training course complements the IAEA publication 'Considerations in Emergency Preparedness and Response for a State Embarking on a Nuclear Power Programme' (EPR-Embarking 2012). These materials are designed to help States apply the guidance in EPR-Embarking 2012, in order to develop the capability to adequately prepare for and respond to a radiation emergency after the commissioning and start of

  2. Nuclear Legislation in OECD and NEA Countries. Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities - Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This country profile provide comprehensive information on the regulatory and Institutional Framework governing nuclear activities as well as a detailed review of a full range of nuclear law topics, including: mining regime; radioactive substances; nuclear installations; trade in nuclear materials and equipment; radiation protection; radioactive waste management; non-proliferation and physical protection; transport; and nuclear third party liability. The profile is complemented by reproductions of the primary legislation regulating nuclear activities in the country. Content: I. General Regulatory Regime: 1. Introduction; 2. Mining regime; 3. Radioactive substances, nuclear fuel and equipment (Licensing; Registration and monitoring of nuclear materials and radioactive sources; High activity sources); 4. Nuclear facilities (Licensing and inspection, including nuclear safety; Emergency response); 5. Trade in nuclear materials and equipment; 6. Radiological protection; 7. Radioactive waste management; 8. Non-proliferation and physical protection; 9. Transport; 10. Nuclear third party liability; II. Institutional Framework: 1. Regulatory and supervisory authorities (The President of the National Atomic Energy Agency - Prezes Panstwowej Agencji Atomistyki (President of the PAA); Minister of Health; Minister of the Environment); 2. Advisory bodies (Council for Nuclear Safety and Radiological Protection); 3. Public and semi-public bodies (Radioactive Waste Management Plant); 4. Research institutes (Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection; National Centre for Nuclear Research; Institute of Nuclear Physics; Institute of Nuclear Chemistry and Technology; Institute of Plasma Physics and Laser Microfusion)

  3. Routine inspection effort required for verification of a nuclear material production cutoff convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Sanborn, J.

    1994-12-01

    Preliminary estimates of the inspection effort to verify a Nuclear Material Cutoff Convention are presented. The estimates are based on (1) a database of about 650 facilities a total of eight states, i.e., the five nuclear-weapons states and three ''threshold'' states; (2) typical figures for inspection requirements for specific facility types derived from IAEA experience, where applicable; and (3) alternative estimates of inspection effort in cutoff options where full IAEA safeguards are not stipulated. Considerable uncertainty must be attached to the effort estimates. About 50--60% of the effort for each option is attributable to 16 large-scale reprocessing plants assumed to be in operation in the eight states; it is likely that some of these will be shut down by the time the convention enters into force. Another important question involving about one third of the overall effort is whether Euratom inspections in France and the U.K. could obviate the need for full-scale IAEA inspections at these facilities. Finally, the database does not yet contain many small-scale and military-related facilities. The results are therefore not presented as predictions but as the consequences of alternative assumptions. Despite the preliminary nature of the estimates, it is clear that a broad application of NPT-like safeguards to the eight states would require dramatic increases in the IAEA's safeguards budget. It is also clear that the major component of the increased inspection effort would occur at large reprocessing plants (and associated plutonium facilities). Therefore, significantly bounding the increased effort requires a limitation on the inspection effort in these facility types

  4. The project of the Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum to develop an interactive educational material on Radiological Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Real, A.; Cruz, T. de la; Girona, L.; Montesinos, L.; Sanchez, P.

    2012-01-01

    The Training Department of the Spanish Nuclear Industry Forum has undertaken a new project to develop an interactive educational material on Radiological Protection. The objective was to develop an attractive, comprehensive and interactive material, to facilitate students and teachers of Elementary, Middle and High schools, to become familiar with ionising radiations. The novelly of the project, is that based on the European framework of key competencies for file long learning, which are defined as a set of knowledge, skills and altitudes that all individuals need for personal fulfilment and employment. The material presented in this paper, is based in an integrated structure of tasks, activities and exercises, which will facilitate the acquisition of as may key competencies as possible. Besides, the material also includes reference texts, links to pertinent web sites and videos. Students, through the development of a specific task (and related activities and exercises), will learn the differences between ionizing and non ionising radiation, the origin, characteristics and types of types of ionising radiation, how to detect and measure them, the potential detrimental health effects, the principles of radiation protection and the beneficial applications can have for man. The material is freely available in www.rinconeducativo.org. (Author) 4 refs.

  5. Licensing authority's control of radiation sources and nuclear materials in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Binns, D.A.C.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission is the national licensing authority and among its responsibilities is the control of nuclear materials and radiation sources. This control is carried out in three different ways: 1) Control of the import and export of nuclear materials and radiation sources. To be able to import or export any nuclear material or radiation source, the user has to have an explicit permission of the licensing authority. This is controlled by electronic means in which the user has to fill a special form found on the licensing authority's home page, where he has to fill in his name, license number, license number of his radiation protection officer and data of the material to be imported or exported. These data are checked with a data base that contains all the information of the licensed users and qualified personnel before authorization is emitted. The airport authorities have already installed x-ray machines to check all baggages entering or leaving the country. 2) Transport and transfer permit for radiation sources. In order to transport and/or transfer radiations sources and nuclear materials within the country, the user(s) have to submit an application to the licensing authority. The user(s) fill out an application form where he fills in his company's name, licensing I.D., radiation protection officer's name and I.D and identification of the sources involved. These information are checked with the licensing operations data before the operations is permitted. 3) Inspections and radiation monitoring systems. Routine and regulatory inspections are continuously carried out where the user's radiation sources and nuclear materials inventory are checked. Also the physical security and protection of these materials are verified. The installation of monitoring systems is an item that is being discussed with the airport authorities so as to increase the possibilities of detecting any illegal transport of these materials. (author)

  6. Physical protection educational program - information security aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tolstoy, A.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Conceptual approaches for designing an expert training program on object physical protection taking into account information security aspects are examined. A special educational course does not only address the immediate needs for an educational support but also ensures that new professionals include new concepts and knowledge in their practice and encourages current practitioners towards such practice. Features of the modern physical protection systems (PPS) and classification of information circulating at them are pointed out. The requirements to the PPS information protection subsystem are discussed. During the PPS expert training on information security (IS) aspects they should receive certain knowledge, on the basis of which they could competently define and carry out the PPS IS policy for a certain object. Thus, it is important to consider minimally necessary volume of knowledge taught to the PPS experts for independent and competent implementation of the above listed tasks. For the graduate PPS IS expert training it is also necessary to examine the normative and legal acts devoted to IS as a whole and the PPS IS in particular. It is caused by necessity of conformity of methods and information protection tools implemented on a certain object to the federal and departmental IS requirements. The departmental normative IS requirements define an orientation of the PPS expert training. By curriculum development it is necessary to precisely determine for whom the PPS experts are taught. The curriculum should reflect common features of the PPS functioning of the certain object type, i.e. it should be adapted to a certain customer of the experts. The specified features were taken into account by development of an educational course 'Information security of the nuclear facility physical protection systems', taught at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (State University) according to the Russian-American educational program 'Master in Physical

  7. Insights of the periodic reviews regarding the physical protection of nuclear power plants designed to earlier standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hagemann, A.

    2001-01-01

    Among other prerequisites for licensing a nuclear activity, the German Atomic Energy Act stipulates that the necessary physical protection against malevolent acts has to be approved before granting a license. This is required for nuclear power plants in paragraph 7 of the Atomic Energy Act. The licenses for nuclear power plants designed to earlier standards were granted about 20 years ago and more. All NPPs are under the supervision of the Supervisory Authority in order to ensure that all conditions of the license are met during the whole plant operation period. The 'Periodic Safety Review', PSR, is designated to provide the Supervisory Authority with additional information on the safety status. One part of the PSR is the 'Deterministic Security Analysis', DSA. The subject of the DSA is the actual physical protection of a NPP. The following document outlines the experiences gained during the evaluation of DSA reports by GRS as an external expert organisation under contract of the Supervisory Authorities. (author)

  8. Insights of the periodic reviews regarding the physical protection of nuclear power plants designed to earlier standards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hagemann, A. [Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH, Cologne (Germany)

    2001-07-01

    Among other prerequisites for licensing a nuclear activity, the German Atomic Energy Act stipulates that the necessary physical protection against malevolent acts has to be approved before granting a license. This is required for nuclear power plants in paragraph 7 of the Atomic Energy Act. The licenses for nuclear power plants designed to earlier standards were granted about 20 years ago and more. All NPPs are under the supervision of the Supervisory Authority in order to ensure that all conditions of the license are met during the whole plant operation period. The 'Periodic Safety Review', PSR, is designated to provide the Supervisory Authority with additional information on the safety status. One part of the PSR is the 'Deterministic Security Analysis', DSA. The subject of the DSA is the actual physical protection of a NPP. The following document outlines the experiences gained during the evaluation of DSA reports by GRS as an external expert organisation under contract of the Supervisory Authorities. (author)

  9. Nuclear science in the 20th century. Nuclear technology applications in material science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pei Junchen; Xu Furong; Zheng Chunkai

    2003-01-01

    The application of nuclear technology to material science has led to a new cross subject, nuclear material science (also named nuclear solid physics) which covers material analysis, material modification and new material synthesis. This paper reviews the development of nuclear technical applications in material science and the basic physics involved

  10. Physical protection philosophy and techniques in Sweden

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dufva, B.

    1988-01-01

    The circumstances for the protection of nuclear power plants are special in Sweden. A very important factor is that armed guards at the facilities are alien to the Swedish society. They do not use them. The Swedish concept of physical protection accepts that the aggressor will get into the facility. With this in mind, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) has established the policy that administrative, technical, and organizational measures will be directed toward preventing an aggressor from damaging the reactor, even if he has occupied the facility. In addition, the best conditions possible shall be established for the operator and the police to reoccupy the plant. The author believes this policy is different from that of many other countries. Therefore, he focusses on the Swedish philosophy and techniques for the physical protection of nuclear power plants

  11. Nuclear material control in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.; Waddoups, I.

    1995-01-01

    The Department of Energy has defined a safeguards system to be an integrated system of physical protection, material accounting and material control subsystems designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession, use, or sabotage of SNM. In practice, safeguards involve the development and application of techniques and procedures dealing with the establishment and continued maintenance of a system of activities. The system must also include administrative controls and surveillance to assure that the procedures and techniques of the system are effective and are being carried out. The control of nuclear material is critical to the safeguarding of nuclear materials within the United States. The U.S. Department of Energy includes as part of material control four functional performance areas. They include access controls, material surveillance, material containment and detection/assessment. This paper will address not only these areas but also the relationship between material control and other safeguards and security functions

  12. Statement at UN Secretary General's High-Level Meeting on Countering Nuclear Terrorism, 28 September 2012, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Y.

    2012-01-01

    international obligations in this area. One area where more action is urgently needed is the ratification of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. The Amendment was agreed in 2005 but has still not entered into force. The original Convention covers only the physical protection of nuclear material in international transport. The Amendment would expand its coverage to include the protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, and the protection of nuclear facilities against acts of sabotage. Entry into force of the Amendment would make an important difference to global nuclear security by enhancing national security frameworks and international cooperation. The IAEA also helps countries to strengthen physical security at nuclear, industrial or medical facilities where nuclear or other radioactive material is stored, or while it is being transported. This may involve things like establishing better access control and alarm systems. We make it more difficult for criminals and terrorists to traffic nuclear and radioactive material across borders by providing detection equipment at border crossings and training border guards. In the past ten years, we have trained over 12 000 people in more than 120 countries in nuclear security. We have helped to ensure that radioactive sources which were not properly secured were transported either to a safe and secure national storage facility, or repatriated to their country of origin. We have also helped countries to put a considerable amount of high enriched uranium into more secure storage. Information is key to identifying trends and patterns of threats in nuclear security, analysing weaknesses in States' security systems, and determining the appropriate response. One hundred and seventeen countries now contribute information to the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database, which monitors thefts and other unauthorised activities involving nuclear and radioactive materials. The

  13. Technological studies on uranium refining at nuclear materials authority, Egypt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mohammed, H.S.

    1997-01-01

    In 1992 nuclear materials authority (NMA) took a decision to establish yellow cake refining. Unit so as to study refining of El-Atshan yellow cake which recently produced by ion-exchange pilot plant, production sector. The research studies followed the conventional refining rout to produce nuclear grade UO 3 . This implies investigations on some common solvents to refine the cake viz. tri alkyl phosphates, tri alkyl phosphine oxides, dialkyl phosphoric acid as well as high-molecular weight long-chain tertiary amines. Moreover, non-conventional refining process has also been presented depending on the selectivity of uranyl ion to be dissolved by carbonate and to be precipitated by hydrogen peroxide. Most of the proposed processes were found feasible to refine El-Atshan yellow cake. however, the non- conventional refining process appears to be the most promising, owing to its superior performance and economy

  14. Ministers at IAEA Conference Call for Stronger Nuclear Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Declaration says. The Declaration recognizes the threat to international security posed by theft and smuggling of nuclear material and affirms the responsibility of States to keep all nuclear material secure. It also encourages all States to join and participate in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database, the international repository of information about nuclear and other radioactive material that has fallen out of regulatory control. It invites States that have not yet done so to become party to, and fully implement, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment, which broadens the scope of that Convention. Many ministers at the Conference stated that entry into force of the Amendment would make a big difference. Among a number of other issues that are addressed, the Declaration also encourages States to use, on a voluntary basis, the IAEA's nuclear security advisory services and peer reviews such as International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions, which are based on internationally accepted guidance and tailored to national needs. The Ministers welcomed the IAEA's work in nuclear forensics, and recognized its efforts to raise awareness of the growing threat of cyber-attacks and their potential impact on nuclear security. The work of the Conference will contribute to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan for 2014 to 2017. Consultations on the Declaration among IAEA Member States were coordinated by Ambassador Balazs Csuday, Resident Representative of Hungary, and Ambassador Laercio Antonio Vinhas, Resident Representative of Brazil. (IAEA)

  15. Proceedings of the 9. Workshop on Nuclear Physics - Communications of basic nuclear physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The abstracts of researches on basic nuclear physics of 9. Workshop on Nuclear Physics in Brazil are presented. Mathematical models and experimental methods for nuclear phenomenon description, such as nuclear excitation and disintegration of several nuclei were discussed. (M.C.K.) [pt

  16. Physical Chemistry '98: Fourth International Conference on Fundamental and Applied Aspects of Physical Chemistry - Papers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ribnikar, S.; Anic, S.

    1998-01-01

    The proceedings has following chapters: Plenary lectures; Chemical Thermodynamics; Spectroscopy, Molecular Structures, Physical Chemistry of Plasma; Kinetics, Catalysis, Nonlinear Dynamics; Electrochemistry; Biophysical Chemistry, Photochemistry, Radiation Chemistry; Radiochemistry, Nuclear Chemistry; Solid State Physical Chemistry, Material Science; Macromolecular Physical Chemistry; Environmental Protection; Phase Boundaries; Complex Compounds; General Physical Chemistry. A separated abstract was prepared for each of the 20 papers selected from the three chapters: Biophysical Chemistry, Photochemistry, Radiation Chemistry; Radiochemistry, Nuclear Chemistry. and Environmental Protection. Refs and figs

  17. Sweden's fourth national report under the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Swedish implementation of the obligations of the Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The national reports to the review meetings according to Article 5 of the Convention call for a self-assessment of each Contracting Party with regard to compliance with the obligations of the Convention. For Sweden this self-assessment has demonstrated compliance with all the obligations of the Convention, as shown in part B of this national report. The Swedish existing nuclear power programme is currently under strong development since a few years. Large amounts are being invested in the 10 remaining operating reactors to prepare for long term operation. The licensees as well as the regulatory bodies have also been challenged over the last years by events, especially the Forsmark event in July 2006, demonstrating the importance of having strong safety management in place and maintaining of a vital safety culture. Of particular importance is not only to develop good formal management systems, but also to monitor and follow up how the systems function in the daily work at the plants. The need for this attention is reinforced by the major programmes going on during a limited time period to upgrade and uprate the plants. These programmes will require a full effort of the operating organisations as well as of the regulatory bodies. An additional challenge is, during the same time period, to manage the transfer of knowledge to a new generation of engineers and specialists. A large number of key staff is due to retire within the next 10 years. The generally positive impression reported to earlier review meetings under the Convention still stands. Therefore, Sweden would like to point out the following as strong features in its national nuclear practice: The Swedish legal framework is well developed and the responsibility for safety is very well defined. The nuclear law also provides for public insight into the activities of the licensees. The regulatory bodies have maintained and increased their resources and are further developing their regulatory practices. There is an

  18. Risk classification for nuclear facilities in connection with the illegal use of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahm, W.; Naegele, G.; Sellinschegg, D.

    1976-01-01

    It is shown, and illustrated by an example, that specific conditions at a nuclear facility to a large extent determine the probability of a successful illegal attack against that facility. Therefore, a categorization of nuclear materials according to the associated hazards alone, as practised currently, does not appear to be sufficient for the establishment of a balanced national physical protection system. In this paper a possible way of categorizing nuclear facilities according to the associated risks, determined as objectively as possible, is discussed. It is felt that initially the analysis should be restricted to the determination of the conditional risks, associated with illegal acquisition and use of radioactive materials by a postulated hostile or similar group. (author)

  19. The Russian Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting Program: Analysis and prospect

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kempf, C.R.

    1998-01-01

    This paper summarizes an analysis of the US-Russian Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) Program, developed on the basis of extensive discussions with US laboratory participants as well as personal experience. Results of the discussions have been organized into three main areas: Technical/MPC and A Progress; Programmatic and Administrative Issues; and Professional Aspects. Implications for MPC and A effectiveness, for MPC and A sustainability, and for future relations and collaboration are derived. Suggested next steps are given

  20. Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) System Upgrades and Performance Testing at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center-All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (RFNC-VNIIEF)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bushmelev, Vadim; Viktorov, Vladimir; Zhikharev, Stanislav; Yuferev, Vladimir; Singh, Surinder Paul; Kuzminski, Jozef; Hogan, Kevin; McKisson, Jacquelin

    2008-01-01

    The All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), founded in 1946 at the historic village of Sarov, in Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, is the largest nuclear research center in the Rosatom complex. In the framework of international collaboration, the United States (US) Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Agency, in cooperation with US national laboratories, on the one hand, Rosatom and VNIIEF on the other hand, have focused their cooperative efforts to upgrade the existing material protection control and accountability system to prevent unauthorized access to the nuclear material. In this paper we will discuss the present status of material control and accounting (MC and A) system upgrades and the preliminary results from a pilot program on the MC and A system performance testing that was recently conducted at one technical area.

  1. Treaties against nuclear terrorism. The global legal framework can make a difference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, L.D.

    2002-01-01

    Two international treaties, one being drafted and the other already on the books, specifically address nuclear terrorism. The first Treaty known as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was adopted in 1980 under auspices of the IAEA. The second Treaty for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism is being drafted as part of the UN global campaign against terrorism. Both could require that specific measures be taken worldwide to protect and secure nuclear facilities from terrorist attack and sabotage. But neither one does. Efforts to include such requirements, before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, have not borne fruit. Now, in the wake of lessons learned, is the time to revive and support them

  2. Radiation protection in nuclear medicine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seeburrun, V.

    2013-04-01

    Radiation protection in nuclear medicine in this project is concerned with the reduction of doses to workers, patients and members of the public. Protection of workers is achieved by adopting good personal habits, good housekeeping, proper use of personal protective devices and equipment, attend training and have continuous education. Exposure to radiation of workers and the members of the public are minimised by proper management of radioactive waste and safe transport of radioactive material. The design and shielding of a nuclear medicine department shall further provide for the protection of the worker, the patient and the general public. Protection of patient is achieved by justifying the procedure, delivering the minimum radiation dose possible to the patient while obtaining the best image quality and applying guidance levels. Special considerations shall be given to pregnant and breast-feeding patients. Quality assurance programme through image quality, radiopharmaceutical quality and patient records on nuclear medicine procedures shall provide assurance to the patient. (au)

  3. Reflections on nuclear challenges today. 6 December 2005, London, UK, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Allistair Buchan Lecture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    challenges is to strengthen the mechanisms that deal with non-compliance. The potential for being reported to the UN Security Council has clearly acted as an incentive for compliance in some situations. However, this may not always be the case. We should recall that the actual reporting of North Korea to the Council, first in 1992 and again in 2003, led to little to no action. For a case in which a country has withdrawn from the NPT, the minimum required action by the Council should be a prompt review of the consequences of that withdrawal, and a serious effort to establish a framework for the settlement of the underlying disputes. Efforts to protect existing nuclear material should be accelerated. Multiple international and regional initiatives are underway to help countries to improve the physical protection of such material. The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2005. Many governments have also responded to UN Security Council resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004. Both the Convention and resolution 1540 call on countries to criminalize the illicit possession and use of radioactive material, and aim to enhance efforts to detect and combat illicit trafficking. And in July, parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material agreed on major changes. Many countries convert their research reactors from HEU fuel to LEU fuel, and return the HEU to the country of origin. Accelerate disarmament efforts is the responsibility of the nuclear weapons states. The Comprehensive Nuclear test Ban Treaty (CTBT), ten years after its conclusion, is not yet in force. Progress on the Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty has been at a standstill for over a decade. But complete nuclear disarmament will not be achieved before we develop a reliable alternative that eliminates the need for a nuclear deterrence. Civil society must confront the challenge in developing the concepts, approaches

  4. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Fourth National Report on Compliance with the Joint Convention Obligations. France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-09-01

    The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, hereinafter referred to as the 'Joint Convention', is the result of international discussions that followed the adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, in 1994. France signed the Joint Convention at the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held on 29 September 1997, the very first day the Joint Convention was opened for signature. She approved it on 22 February 2000 and filed the corresponding instruments with the IAEA on 27 April 2000. The Joint Convention entered into force on 18 June 2001. For many years, France has been taking an active part in the pursuit of international actions to reinforce nuclear safety and considers the Joint Convention to be a key step in that direction. The fields covered by the Joint Convention have long been part of the French approach to nuclear safety. This report is the fourth of its kind. It is published in accordance with Article 32 of the Joint Convention and presents the measures taken by France to meet each of her obligations set out in the Convention. The facilities and radioactive materials covered by the Joint Convention are much diversified in nature and are controlled in France by different regulatory authorities (see Section E). Over and above a specific threshold of radioactive content, a facility is referred to as a 'basic nuclear facility' (installation nucleaire de base - INB) and placed under the control of the French Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorite de surete nucleaire - ASN). Below that threshold and provided that the facility involved falls under a category of the nomenclature of classified facilities for other purposes than their radioactive materials, any facility may be considered as a 'classified facility on environmental-protection grounds' (installation classee pour la protection de l'environnement - ICPE) and placed under the control of the Ministry for the

  5. The nuclear liability conventions revised

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reyners, P.

    2004-01-01

    The signature on 12 February 2004 of the Protocols amending respectively the 1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention was the second step of the process of modernisation of the international nuclear liability regime after the adoption in September 1997 of a Protocol revising the 1963 Vienna Convention and of a new Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. The common objective of the new instruments is to provide more funds to compensate a larger number of potential victims in respect of a broader range of damage. Another goal of the revision exercise was to maintain the compatibility between the Paris and Vienna based systems, a commitment enshrined in the 1988 Joint Protocol, as well as to ascertain that Paris/Brussels countries could also become a Party to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation. However, while generally consistent vis a vis the Joint Protocol, the provisions of the Paris and Vienna Conventions, as revised, differ on some significant aspects. Another remaining issue is whether the improved international nuclear liability regime will succeed in attracting in the future a larger number of countries, particularly outside Europe, and will so become truly universal. Therefore, the need for international co-operation to address these issues, to facilitate the adoption of new implementing legislation and to ensure that this special regime keeps abreast of economic and technological developments, is in no way diminished after the revision of the Conventions.(author)

  6. Third National Report on compliance with the Joint Convention Obligations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-09-01

    The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, hereinafter referred to as the 'Joint Convention', is the result of international discussions that followed the adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, in 1994. France signed the Joint Convention at the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) held on 29 September 1997, the very first day the Joint Convention was opened for signature. She approved it on 22 February 2000 and filed the corresponding instruments with the IAEA on 27 April 2000. The Joint Convention entered into force on 18 June 2001. For many years, France has been taking an active part in the pursuit of international actions to reinforce nuclear safety and considers the Joint Convention to be a key step in that direction. The fields covered by the Joint Convention have long been part of the French approach to nuclear safety. This report is the third one of its kind. It is published in accordance with Article 32 of the Joint Convention and presents the measures taken by France to meet each of her obligations set out in the Convention. The facilities and the radioactive materials covered by this Convention are quite diversified in nature and are controlled in France by different regulatory authorities. Above a specific threshold of radioactive content, a facility is referred to as a 'basic nuclear facility' (installation nucleaire de base - INB) and placed under the control of the Nuclear Safety Authority (Autorite de surete nucleaire - ASN). Below that threshold and provided that the facility involved is subject to the nomenclature of classified facilities for other purposes than their radioactive materials, any facility may be considered as a 'classified facility on environmental-protection grounds' (installation classee pour la protection de l'environnement - ICPE) and placed under the control of the Ministry for the Environment. Facilities that contain only

  7. Nuclear Liability and Insurance Protection for Nuclear Transport Accidents Involving Non-Contracting EU States: An assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Horbach, N. L. J. T.

    2006-01-01

    This paper provides an analysis of the possible complications and consequences with respect to nuclear liability and insurance protection applicable in respect of transport activities resulting in damage suffered and/or accidents occurring in EU States that are not party to the Paris Convention. It looks at the different legal aspects (jurisdiction, applicable law, liability amounts, reciprocity) should the revised Vienna and Paris Convention become applicable in comparison with the unrevised Conventions. Within Europe, a large number of States are party to the 1960 Paris Convention and the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention, providing liability and insurance protection, in general, up to a limit of 300 million SDRs (or even higher). In principle, such protection is confined to nuclear incidents occurring and nuclear damage suffered in the territory of Contracting Parties, including, as recommended, the high seas, unless the legislation of the Installation State determines otherwise (Article 2). The geographical scope of application of the Paris Convention would thus vary according to the law of the Installation State. However, some EU States never became party to the Paris Convention, and are not bound by its the liability principles (notably, channelling of liability), such as Austria, Luxembourg and Ireland. Transport accidents involving these countries might therefore result in liability claims outside the treaty liability regime against operators, suppliers, carriers or persons involved and for types of damages different from those currently covered by the Paris Convention (e.g., environmental damage). It is uncertain to what extent liability insurance of the installation operators would provide adequate protection and whether related damage claims can be enforceable. In addition, a number of newly entered EU States are party to the Vienna Convention, which, although bound by liability principles basically similar to those of the Paris Convention, will

  8. Liability and insurance aspects of international transport of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    van Gijn, S.H.

    1985-01-01

    The Paris and Vienna Conventions do not affect the application of any international transport agreement already in force. However, in certain circumstances both the nuclear operator and the carrier may be held liable for nuclear damage which arises during international transports of nuclear materials. The ensuing cumulation of liabilities under the Nuclear and Transport Conventions may cause serious problems in obtaining adequate insurance cover for such transports. The 1971 Brussels Convention seeks to solve this problem by exonerating any person who might be held liable for nuclear damage under an international maritime convention or national law. Similar difficulties are encountered in the case of transports of nuclear materials between states which have and states which have not ratified the Paris and Vienna Conventions. (NEA) [fr

  9. Regulatory control of physical protection systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajdeep; Mayya, Y.S.

    2017-01-01

    The safety of facilities in BARC is under the regulatory oversight of BSC. The security architecture for these facilities incorporates multiple layers of Physical Protection Systems. The demands of safety may sometimes conflict with the needs of security. Realizing the need to identify these interfaces and extend the regulatory coverage to Physical Protection Systems, a Standing Committee named Physical Protection System Review Committee (PPSRC) has been constituted as a 2"n"d tier entity of BSC. PPSRC includes experts from various domains concerned with nuclear security, viz. physical protection systems, cyber security, radiation safety, security operations, technical services and security administration

  10. A Study on Developing a Framework for Sabotage Protection of Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Kilyoo; Jung, WooSik

    2007-01-01

    A methodology related to physical protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage is preparing by IAEA. However, the framework of IAEA is somewhat superficial and it seems not to reflect the risk concept since IAEA prefers a proven technology. In this paper, a framework for sabotage protection of nuclear facilities using risk assessment is described

  11. The Halland model - An innovative model for the physical protection of a nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boode, A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Halland - Halland is situated on the west coast of Sweden. The entire west coast borders on the sea - the Kattegatt and Skagerack. The local population is about 280,000, and is considerably larger during the summer. The county comprises six municipalities - Falkenberg, Halmstad, Hylte, Kungsbacka, Laholm and Varberg). Halmstad is the seat of the county administration. Ringhals - Ringhals is Sweden's largest nuclear facility with four reactors. The facility is located near to the sea, several kilometres north of Varberg. Physical Protection - The Police Authority of Halland County is responsible for physical protection at Ringhals. Officers have been appointed to ensure that there is adequate preparedness and competence within the Police Authority. The Police Authority works in close co-operation with the County Administrative Board and the municipalities involved as well as with the management of Ringhals. An extensive set of plans exists for work at Ringhals Nuclear Power Plant. The plans relate to physical protection, emergency standby and incident response in connection with technical problems. The plans for physical protection are formulated so that they coincide with Ringhals' status with respect to threats. Emergency alerts and measures exist in order to cope with the following events: Demonstrations - Peaceful demonstrations concern offsite activities that do not have a significant impact on Ringhals' activities and which mainly aim at influencing external opinion. Threatening demonstrations that concern offsite activities that have a significant impact on Ringhals' activities or which involve masked or armed participants as well as any form of demonstration where the participants enter the Ringhals site. Assault - Threats that arise if an armed individual or a group of people enter the Ringhals site and/or congregate on the site. Bomb Threats - The bomb threat must be directed to Ringhals or to Ringhals' activities. Dangerous Objects - Unknown

  12. Atlas of atomic and nuclear physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brocker, B.

    2002-01-01

    This book presents the main notions of nuclear physics in a very pedagogical way, many drawings and the use of colors make easier the understanding. The aim of this work is to give a general background in nuclear physics to all people interested in sciences. The text is divided into 14 themes: 1) first discoveries, 2) quantum physics, 3) the electronic cloud around atoms and molecules, 4) measurement methods, 5) nuclear physics, 6) nuclear models, 7) elementary particles, 8) interactions, 9) radiation detection, 10) radiation sources, 11) nuclear reactors, 12) atomic bombs, 13) radiation protection, 14) isotope table and physics constants. (A.C.)

  13. Radiation protection principles applied to conventional industries producing deleterious environmental effects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tadmor, J.

    1980-01-01

    Comparison of the radiation protection standards, for the population at large, with the conventional pollutants ambient standards, reveals differences in basic principles which result in more relaxed ambient standards for conventional pollutants and consequently, the penalization of the nuclear industry, due to the increased cost of its safety measures. It is proposed that radiation protection principles should be used as a prototype for pollutants having harmful environmental effects and that radiation health physicists should be active in the application of these principles of population protection. A case study of atmospheric release of SO 2 , under different conditions, is analyzed, to emphasize the importance of consideration of the size of the exposed population. (H.K.)

  14. Proceedings of the Eigth Radiation Physics and Protection Conference (RPC-2006)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2007-06-15

    The publication's has been set up in 487 papers and also as electronic of the conference of Radiation Physics and Protection, it consists of the following session (1) nuclear physics; (2) neutron physics, shielding and applications; (3) radiation detection and dosimetry; (4) environmental and protection; (5) nuclear physics; (6) radiation effects; (7) medical physics and biophysics; (8) atmospheric dispersion, atomic physics; (9) radiation physics and protection awarded contribution.

  15. Proceedings of the Eigth Radiation Physics and Protection Conference (RPC-2006)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-06-01

    The publication's has been set up in 487 papers and also as electronic of the conference of Radiation Physics and Protection, it consists of the following session (1) nuclear physics; (2) neutron physics, shielding and applications; (3) radiation detection and dosimetry; (4) environmental and protection; (5) nuclear physics; (6) radiation effects; (7) medical physics and biophysics; (8) atmospheric dispersion, atomic physics; (9) radiation physics and protection awarded contribution

  16. Multilateral agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2012-01-01

    I. Status of conventions in the field of nuclear energy as of December 2012: Non-proliferation and nuclear security (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty); Nuclear safety and emergency response (Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Convention on Nuclear Safety, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management); Liability and compensation for nuclear damage (Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability, Brussels Supplementary Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability, Protocol to Amend the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention, Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage). II. Status of conventions in the field of environmental protection/assessment which affect nuclear energy use as of December 2012: Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention), Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment (Kiev Protocol), Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR). III. OECD member country participation in the nuclear energy treaties/conventions and in the

  17. Guarding nuclear reactors and material from terrorists and thieves

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, George; Steinhausler, Fritz

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The May 2001 Final Report of Experts convened to consider revising CPPNM did not make recommendations on what standards an amendment extending the CPPNM to domestic use, storage and transport should cover except that it should apply to sabotage as well as theft. Many resist specific standards arguing that threats vary from place to place and that the design of protections for a particular facility should be based entirely upon the threats that facility faces - its own 'design-basis threat,' But the information now available on how countries perceive the threats against them shows great variation from country to country. If a country does not perceive any 'insider' threat of stealing even weapons-usable material, is it not a threat to other countries if the material is stolen? If some countries do not perceive any threat that a truck bomber will attack a nuclear power reactor that is located in their country, does that not constitute a possible threat to neighboring countries? As the Director General's preface to INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 says, although responsibility for physical protection rests with the state having the nuclear material or facility to be protected, 'it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled.' The May 2001 Final Report of Experts opposed any form of international oversight for physical protection. But if adequate protection by one state is not a matter of indifference to other states, should not some way be found for experts from other countries to discuss with the state providing protection what the threats are and what the best methods are for protecting against them are? What will be the point of adopting amendments if parties to the CPPNM can say: 'We have already done all that is necessary to comply with the new requirements. Our facilities meet all the threats that they will face. What we have done is confidential and of no business to anyone else.' (author)

  18. Nuclear security: strategies and techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, I.K.

    2010-05-01

    The modern society, whether in developed or in developing countries, depend on the availability of nuclear energy and on the day-to-day use of radioactive materials in medicine, agriculture, industry and for research. Before 9/11, these activities were mainly covered by safety rules regarding health and environment. Since 9/ 11, it is clear, that these activities also require adequate security. For the continued and expanded use of nuclear energy or radioactive materials, nuclear security is indispensable and an important prerequisite for successful and sustainable development. Many of our nuclear security services, expert assistance and training events, we have assisted Member States in their efforts to improve their preparedness and response capabilities and acquired a much better understanding of Member States prob and the need for further support. The end of the Cold War was marked by a shift from a bi-polar structure of global security into a more complex and unpredictable configuration of world affairs. It also brought about new security challenges, i.e. an increased probability for low-density regional, national or sub-national conflicts with new and more dispersed threats emanating from a larger number of actors, including non-state actors; terrorists or criminals. The audio-visual impact of modern media has enhanced the socio-psychological impact on a global scale of such conflicts. The number of cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials that were recorded since the 90's raised concern about the international physical protection regime and triggered an effort to enhance our capabilities for prevention, detection and responses regarding terrorist acts, as well as to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

  19. IAEA Completes Nuclear Security Advisory Mission in Ecuador

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2018-01-01

    An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts today completed a nuclear security advisory mission in Ecuador. The mission was carried out at the request of the Government of Ecuador. The scope of the two-week International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission included the legislative and regulatory framework for the security of radioactive material, regulatory licensing, inspection and enforcement as well as coordination among authorities and other stakeholders involved in nuclear security. In September 2017, Ecuador ratified the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its incorporation into the nuclear security regime was also included in the scope of the mission. The IPPAS team carried out a number of visits, including to a steel company that uses gamma radiography, two hospitals, the National Polytechnic University and a company that transports radioactive material. In addition, the team visited a temporary storage facility for disused radioactive sources in Alóag, a town about 50 km south of the capital, Quito. The team observed that Ecuador is making efforts towards enhancing its national nuclear security regime. The team provided recommendations and suggestions to support Ecuador in enhancing and sustaining nuclear security. Good practices were identified that can serve as examples to other IAEA Member States to help strengthen their nuclear security activities.

  20. Ordinance on the Implementation of Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    In execution of the new Atomic Energy Act the Ordinance on the Implementation of Atomic Safety and Radiation Protection was put into force on 1 February 1985. It takes into account all forms of peaceful nuclear energy and ionizing radiation uses in nuclear installations, irradiation facilities and devices in research, industries, and health services, and in radioactive isotope production and laboratories. It covers all aspects of safety and protection and defines atomic safety as nuclear safety and nuclear safeguards and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, whereas radiation protection includes the total of requirements, measures, means and methods necessary to protect man and the environment from the detrimental effects of ionizing radiation. It has been based on ICRP Recommendation No. 26 and the IAEA's Basic Safety Standards and supersedes the Radiation Protection Ordinance of 1969

  1. Order of 20 September 1993 amending the Order of 26 March 1982 on protection and control of nuclear materials during transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    This Order amends and supplements the system for the transport of nuclear materials laid down by the 1982 Order. Two new provisions have been inserted. The first specifies that in the event of an accident or an incident occurring during the transport of nuclear materials which implies a radiological risk, the Central Service for Proteciton against Ionizing Radiation (SCPRI) must be notified immediately. The other provision specifies that the transport vehicle must be equipped with a means of communication so as to inform the Institute for Protection and Nuclear Safety (IPSN) about the main stages of the operation. (NEA)

  2. IAEA inspectors complete verification of nuclear material in Iraq

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    recent months. IAEA marine scientists have completed a regional pollution survey to guide the UN Development Programme in the clearing of sunken wreckage from Iraq's coastal zone. IAEA personnel have also provided data on radioactive sources around the country. A delegation led by the Iraqi Science and Technology Minister visited IAEA headquarters last month to discuss technical cooperation in fields as various as radiation protection, radioactive waste management, combating illicit trafficking, the physical protection of radioactive materials, and human-resource development for nuclear applications. (IAEA)

  3. Physical protection system design and evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.D.

    1997-01-01

    The design of an effective physical protection system includes the determination of physical protection system objectives, initial design of a physical protection system, design evaluation, and probably a redesign or refinement. To develop the objectives, the designer must begin by gathering information about facility operation and conditions, such as a comprehensive description of the facility, operating conditions, and the physical protection requirements. The designer then needs to define the threat. This involves considering factors about potential adversaries: class of adversary, adversary's capabilities, and range of adversary's tactics. Next, the designer should identify targets. Determination of whether or not the materials being protected are attractive targets is based mainly on the ease or difficulty of acquisition and desirability of the material. The designer now knows the objectives of the physical protection system, that is, open-quotes what to protect against whom.close quotes The next step is to design the system by determining how best to combine such elements as fences, vaults, sensors and assessment devices, entry control elements, procedures, communication devices, and protective forces personnel to meet the objectives of the system. Once a physical protection system is designed, it must be analyzed and evaluated to ensure it meets the physical protection objectives. Evaluation must allow for features working together to ensure protection rather than regarding each feature separately. Due to the complexity of the protection systems, an evaluation usually requires modeling techniques. If any vulnerabilities are found, the initial system must be redesigned to correct the vulnerabilities and a reevaluation conducted. This paper reviews the physical protection system design and methodology mentioned above. Examples of the steps required and a brief introduction to some of the technologies used in modem physical protections system are given

  4. Using virtual reality in the training of security staff and evaluation of physical protection barriers in nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Augusto, Silas C.; Mol, Antonio C.A.; Mol, Pedro C.; Sales, Douglas S. [Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear (IEN/CNEN-RJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), RJ (Brazil)], e-mail: silas@ien.gov.br, e-mail: mol@ien.gov.br, e-mail: pedro98@gmail.com, e-mail: dsales@ien.gov.br

    2009-07-01

    The physical security of facilities containing radioactive objects, an already important matter, now has a new aggravating factor: the existence of groups intending to obtain radioactive materials for the purpose of intentionally induce radioactive contamination incidents, as for example the explosion of dirty bombs in populated regions, damaging both people and environment. In this context, the physical security of such facilities must be reinforced so to reduce the possibilities of such incidents. This paper presents a adapted game engine used as a virtual reality system, enabling the modeling and simulation of scenarios of nuclear facilities containing radioactive objects. In these scenarios, the physical protection barriers, as fences and walls, are simulated along with vigilance screens. Using a computer network, several users can participate simultaneously in the simulation, being represented by avatars. Users can play the roles of both invaders and security staff. The invaders have as objective to surpass the facility's physical protection barriers to steal radioactive objects and flee. The security staff have as objective to prevent and stop the theft of radioactive objects from the facility. The system can be used to analysis simulated scenarios and train vigilance/security staff. A test scenario was already developed and used, and the preliminary tests had satisfactory results, as they enabled the evaluation of the physical protection barriers of the virtual facility, and the training of those who participated in the simulations in the functions of a security staff. (author)

  5. Using virtual reality in the training of security staff and evaluation of physical protection barriers in nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Augusto, Silas C.; Mol, Antonio C.A.; Mol, Pedro C.; Sales, Douglas S.

    2009-01-01

    The physical security of facilities containing radioactive objects, an already important matter, now has a new aggravating factor: the existence of groups intending to obtain radioactive materials for the purpose of intentionally induce radioactive contamination incidents, as for example the explosion of dirty bombs in populated regions, damaging both people and environment. In this context, the physical security of such facilities must be reinforced so to reduce the possibilities of such incidents. This paper presents a adapted game engine used as a virtual reality system, enabling the modeling and simulation of scenarios of nuclear facilities containing radioactive objects. In these scenarios, the physical protection barriers, as fences and walls, are simulated along with vigilance screens. Using a computer network, several users can participate simultaneously in the simulation, being represented by avatars. Users can play the roles of both invaders and security staff. The invaders have as objective to surpass the facility's physical protection barriers to steal radioactive objects and flee. The security staff have as objective to prevent and stop the theft of radioactive objects from the facility. The system can be used to analysis simulated scenarios and train vigilance/security staff. A test scenario was already developed and used, and the preliminary tests had satisfactory results, as they enabled the evaluation of the physical protection barriers of the virtual facility, and the training of those who participated in the simulations in the functions of a security staff. (author)

  6. Acceptance criteria for the physical protection upgrade rule requirements for fixed sites. Information guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dwyer, P.

    1980-09-01

    This document has been developed as a tool to assist in providing consistent evaluation of upgraded physical security plans submitted in response to the Physical Protection Upgrade Rule, effective March 25, 1980. It presents a means for assuring licensee compliance with every regulatory requirement of particular significance to the protection of the public health and safety. Acceptance criteria are included to determine the extent to which each licensee meets the regulatory requirements. The format parallels Regulatory Guide 5.52, Standard Format and Content of a Licensee Physical Protection Plan for Strategic Special Nuclear Material at Fixed Sites

  7. Stakeholder involvement in international conventions governing civil nuclear activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Emmerechts, Sam

    2017-01-01

    Mr Emmerechts explained that international conventions have varying positions on stakeholders and their involvement depending upon the intent of the legislator and the field they cover, ranging from a narrow to a broad interpretation. He addressed stakeholder involvement in two other international conventions governing civil nuclear activities, namely the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (the Joint Convention), both concluded under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He noted that the Convention on Nuclear Safety remains a 'traditional' international legal instrument, focusing on governments and governmental bodies as the main stakeholders and limiting obligations regarding the involvement of the public and intergovernmental organisations to their receiving information and observing. Likewise, the Joint Convention limits obligations regarding public involvement to access to information, notably as to the siting of proposed facilities. However, he noted that in the European Union, the Directive on Nuclear Safety (2014/87/Euratom) and the Directive for the Safe Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste (2011/70/Euratom) have more advanced public participation requirements in nuclear decision making. Mr Emmerechts explained that the substantial differences between nuclear legislation and the Aarhus and Espoo Conventions with regards to public involvement requirements could partly be explained by the technicality of nuclear information and by issues related to nuclear security

  8. Asymmetrical sabotage tactics, nuclear facilities/materials, and vulnerability analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ballard, J.D.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The emerging paradigm of a global community wherein post-modern political violence is a fact of life that must be dealt with by safety and security planners is discussed. This paradigm shift in the philosophy of terrorism is documented by analysis of the emerging pattern of asymmetrical tactics being employed by terrorists. Such philosophical developments in violent political movements suggest a shift in the risks that security and safety personnel must account for in their planning for physical protection of fixed site nuclear source facilities like power generation stations and the eventual storage and transportation of the by-products of these facilities like spent nuclear fuel and other high level wastes. This paper presents a framework for identifying these new political realities and related threat profiles, suggests ways in which security planners and administrators can design physical protection practices to meet these emerging threats, and argues for global adoption of standards for the protection of nuclear facilities that could be used as a source site from which terrorists could inflict a mass contamination event and for standards related to the protection of the waste materials that can be used in the production of radiological weapons of mass victimization. (author)

  9. Workshop on materials science and the physics of non-conventional energy sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furlan, G.; Nobili, D.; Sayigh, A.M.; Seraphin, B.O.

    1989-01-01

    The non-conventional energy activities started in 1974, on the island of Procida, Italy. About 50 leading physicists and engineers got together for two weeks in September to discuss the states of the art and consult with each other about various devices and ways of energy conversion. The esteemed Nobel Prize Laureate, Professor Abdus Salam, accepted to have the first meeting on non-conventional energy at the ICTP, Trieste, in September 1977. In 1987, the meeting was once again back in Trieste, Italy. Also, during the even years since 1978 until 1986, meetings were held in Trieste in the French language. The results of the last 10 years at ICTP are very clear to all fellow scientist and engineers. Some 150 applicants are chosen every year. The workshop is being graded gradually to emphasize the high technology and up-to-date achievements in the field. A good proportion of the physicists who were with us from the beginning are now top experts in the field and in charge of existing programmes in their own countries. The present programme emphasized the following topics: Material Science; Solar Energy Conversion with concentration on Photovoltaic Conversion; and Energy Storage. Refs, figs and tabs

  10. Development of an integrated system for nuclear material accountancy and control at JAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nishimura, Hideo; Nishizawa, Satoshi

    1993-01-01

    This paper describes the design concept and the current status of an integrated system for nuclear material accountancy and control, which is under development at JAERI. We, at JAERI, have decided to update the current system for material accountancy and control and to develop the integrated new system with a consolidated data base in order to augment transparency, credibility and promptness of the system, to materialize a prudent control of obligations required by bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, and to give information for the physical protection, safely handling, property control and cost-effective use of nuclear material and for public relations. The system is composed of two work-stations operated by UNIX, one for implementation and the other for development, and many terminals located at the headquarters, administrative offices, and research facilities and laboratories. It is connected with a mainframe computer. There are many files on the data base to record inventory changes, book and physical inventories, and statistics on material balances. These files are controlled by a commercial data base management system which enables us to make access to data on the files with a simple query language, spread sheet type software or an application program. (author)

  11. Strategic special nuclear material Inventory Differences. Semiannual report, April 1-September 30, 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-07-01

    This sixteenth periodic semiannual report of Inventory Differences (ID) covers the last six months of fiscal year 1984 (April 1, 1984, through September 30, 1984), for the Department of Energy (DOE) and DOE contractor facilities possessing significant quantities of strategic special nuclear material (SSNM). Inventory Differences are simply the differences between the amount of material shown in the accounting records and the amount of material reported in the physical inventory. These differences are generally due to errors in estimating material in unmeasurable form at the time of an inventory, unmeasurable holdup in equipment, measurement imprecisions, inaccuracies in initial determinations of SSNM produced or used in nuclear reactors, and inventory or bookkeeping errors. Both DOE and contractors operating DOE facilities carefully maintain, analyze, and investigate ID data. Inventory Differences are expected in nuclear material processing and are not, in and of themselves, evidence of lost or stolen material. On the other hand, ID analysis provides valuable information on the effectiveness of the safeguards system's physical protection and material control measures as well as a check on the process controls and material management procedures. ID's outside safeguards control limits or involving a missing SSNM discrete item are investigated. If necessary, an operation may be shut down until an ID is resolved

  12. Physical protection as the most important part of the national system of combating illicit trafficking

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mishchenko, V.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: It is now obvious today that illicit trafficking, including its most dangerous manifestations proliferation of nuclear weapons, smuggling of nuclear materials and equipment - present a serious threat to the international community. To defeat this evil is possible only by joint efforts, by undertaken protective measures on national and international level. Joint efforts should be directed at fulfilling three main tasks as follows: safe and reliable handling of nuclear material, effective measures of its physical protection, accountancy and control in order to prevent proliferation; joint activities of intelligence customs and law-enforcement authorities directed at prevention of international trafficking and marketing of stolen goods; joint activities directed at identification and prevention of illegal supply and demand of fissionable materials counteracting thereby various criminal structures. In order to solve these problems an international regime should be established. Such regime will define a number of criteria and demands to be met by-the states to ensure effective combat illicit trafficking. The international regime should be based on national systems of combating illicit trafficking, which include measures for prevention, detection and response regarding illicit trafficking in each specific state of across its borders. When undertaking these measures one should take into account specific characteristics of the state, its unique features and its geography, political and economic situation, as well as different types of potential threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons; availability of materials subjected to illicit trafficking in this state, general situation of criminal trafficking in this state, general situation of criminal trafficking with radioactive materials, potential consumers and suppliers, market features, possible incentives for crime etc. In the paper I would like to reflect the vital components of national systems for combating

  13. The 1968 Brussels convention and liability for nuclear damage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sands, Ph.; Galizzi, P.

    2000-01-01

    The legal regime governing civil liability for transboundary nuclear damage is expressly addressed by two instruments adopted in the 1960's: the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage These establish particular rules governing the jurisdiction of national courts and other matters, including channelling of liability to nuclear operators, definitions of nuclear damage, the applicable standard of care, and limitations on liability. Another instrument - the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter referred to as 'the Brussels Convention') - which is not often mentioned in the nuclear context will nevertheless also be applicable in certain cases. It is premised upon different rules as to forum and applicable law, and presents an alternate vision of the appropriate arrangements governing civil liability for nuclear damage. In this paper we consider the relative merits and demerits of the Brussels Convention from the perspective of non-nuclear states which might suffer damage as a result of a nuclear accident in another state. We conclude that in the context of the applicability of the Brussels Convention the dedicated nuclear liability conventions present few attractions to non-nuclear states in Europe. We focus in particular on issues relating to jurisdiction and applicable law, and do so by reference to a hypothetical accident in the United Kingdom which has transboundary effects in Ireland. (author)

  14. Nuclear energy, environmental protection and international conflicts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menke-Glueckert, P.

    1975-01-01

    Some general and some critical remarks on: nuclear energy as an image for politics; nuclear energy as a model for research planning; nuclear controversy; the principle of precaution in nuclear and radiation protection law; reactor safety on probation; advantages and economy of nuclear energy; communication difficulties; the special role of nuclear energy; the need for European site planning; supervision of fissionable materials; the world's energy household in danger; global structure politics and nuclear energy; nuclear energy with a capacity for social innovations. (HP/LN) [de

  15. 3. French national report on implementation of the obligations of the Convention on nuclear safety - Issued for the 2005 Peer review meeting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The Convention on Nuclear Safety, hereinafter referred to as 'the Convention', is one of the results of international discussions initiated in 1992 with the aim of proposing binding international obligations regarding nuclear safety. France signed the Convention on 20 September 1994, on the first day it was opened for signature on the occasion of the General Conference of the IAEA. France approved the Convention on 13 September 1995 and it entered into force on 24 October 1996. For many years, France has been participating in international initiatives to enhance nuclear safety and considers the Convention on Nuclear Safety to be an important step in this direction. The areas covered by the Convention have long been part of the French approach to nuclear safety. This report, the third one of its kind, is issued in compliance with Article 5 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and presents the measures taken by France to meet each of the obligations of the Convention. As such, the Convention on Nuclear Safety applies to nuclear power reactors and so most of this report deals with measures taken to ensure their safety. However, for this third report, a number of considerations led France also to present the measures taken concerning all research reactors, with a 'graded approach' tailored to their size where appropriate. First of all, research reactors are subject to the same general regulations as power reactors with regard to nuclear safety and radiation protection. Furthermore, the most powerful research reactor, which is also intended for producing power, was already included in the previous French report. Secondly, within the first report under the Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management, to which France is a party, the measures taken for research reactors in these areas were already presented. Finally the IAEA Board of Governors, on which France has a seat, in March 2004 approved the Code of

  16. Status of U.S. programs for material protection, control ampersand accounting assistance to Ukraine and Kazakstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roche, C.T.; Zinneman, T.E.; Rudolph, R.R.

    1995-01-01

    The United States is one of several donor states providing technical assistance to the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) for improving their systems for control of nuclear materials. Ukraine and Kazakstan have significant nuclear energy programs. Both countries have committed to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. They have signed the NPT and have safeguards agreements with the U.S. concerning development of state systems of control, accounting and physical protection of nuclear materials. As directed by the DOE - International Safeguards Division (now the DOE - Russia/NIS Nuclear Materials Security Task Force), technical specialists from several national laboratories, including Argonne, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest and Sandia, as well as representatives of other U.S. Government organizations, such as the NRC, DOD/DNA and the New Brunswick Laboratory, are interacting with government regulatory and facility personnel of Ukraine and Kazakstan. Argonne has program coordination responsibilities for both countries. In support of agreements between the U.S. and Ukraine and the U.S. and Kazakstan, the DOE is responsible for providing technical assistance and training to aid in the evaluation, design, development, and implementation of nuclear material safeguards. This assistance includes: (1) information systems for tracking and reporting the location of nuclear materials, (2) application of nuclear measurement techniques for verifying inventories, (3) material control and accounting (MC ampersand A) systems, and (4) physical protection (PP) systems. Site survey teams, including both MC ampersand A and PP experts from several national labs, have visited Ukraine and Kazakstan. This paper summarizes activities to date and future plans

  17. The strengthening of international regime of protection of the nuclear materials and other radioactive sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shiganbayev, E.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The widening of export streams satisfies the interest of any state, but at the same time the interests of individual countries and the whole international community requires the limitation of export of goods and technologies which are potentially dangerous. The decision of this problem, finding of the optimal balance between the devotion of the principles of free trade and the necessity of limiting the danger export is one of the main tasks of the national system of security of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a country with a policy of nonproliferation. This important element of the policy of the country, directed to maintenance and strengthening of the international security, becomes the priority trend in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan. The international community decides this problem under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on the Destruction, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction. At present there are four international regimes in control with the aim of nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD): The group of the nuclear supplies which deals with the questions of delivery of special nuclear materials and technologies, and also nuclear materials and double function technologies; Australian group works in the sphere of control for materials and technologies of chemical and biological weapons; The regime of the control of rocket technologies functioning with the aim to prevent the proliferation of rockets as means of delivery of weapon of mass destruction; Wassenaar agreement, regime of export control for usual armament, goods and double function technologies. Kazakhstan does not have nuclear weapons and participants in the Agreement

  18. Development, use and maintenance of the design basis threat. Implementing guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    threat to those assets. As described in this publication, an understanding of the threat can lead to a detailed description of potential adversaries (the design basis threat), which, in turn, is the basis of an appropriately designed physical protection system. This direct link gives confidence that protection would be effective against an adversary attack. International experience in using a design basis threat to protect assets of high consequence is largely based on the protection of nuclear material and facilities. Furthermore, the nuclear security documents defining and recommending that physical protection be based upon the threat - The Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles (GOV/2001/41/ Attachment), the Recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4 (corrected)), and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Material as Amended (INFCIRC/274) (adopted on 8 July 2005; (GOV/2005/57)) - do so exclusively for the protection of nuclear material and facilities. Given the historical background, and its continuing contemporary relevance, it has been necessary to draw on that nuclear protection experience in developing this publication. However, the general approach can also be applied to protecting other assets that require a high degree of confidence in the effectiveness of their protection, such as high-activity radioactive material. Specialists from France, Germany, Japan, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America assisted the IAEA in preparing this publication. A draft was presented to an open-ended technical meeting in December 2006, and subsequently circulated for comment to all Member States. This publication is consistent with The Physical Protection Objectives and Fundamental Principles; the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Material as Amended; and the Recommendations on the

  19. The 1988 activity report of the Health service of the Nuclear Physics Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The 1988 activity report of the Heath Service of the Nuclear Physics Institute (Orsay, France), is presented. The report covers: The modifications and application of the conventions on medical surveillance; the activities of the services of hematology, lung radiography, the Tchernobyl site surveillance, ophthalmology, radiation protection, the surveillance of the working platforms, occupational injuries and diseases, and blood transfusion. Statistics on the following fields are also given: clinical activities (stoppage and resumption of work), check-up, and the medical opinion on the personnel's health [fr

  20. Report of the State Office for Nuclear Safety on state supervision of nuclear safety of nuclear facilities and radiation protection in 1998

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-05-01

    The legislative basis of the authority of the State Office for Nuclear Safety as the Czech national regulatory body is outlined, its organizational scheme is presented, and the responsibilities of the various departments are highlighted. The operation of major Czech nuclear facilities, including the Dukovany NPP which is in operation and the Temelin NPP which is under construction, is described with respect to nuclear safety. Since the Office's responsibilities also cover radiation protection in the Czech Republic, a survey of ionizing radiation sources and their supervision is given. Other topics include, among other things, nuclear material transport, the state system for nuclear materials accountancy and control, central registries for radiation protection, nuclear waste management, the National Radiation Monitoring Network, personnel qualification and training, emergency planning, legislative activities, international cooperation, and public information. (P.A.)