WorldWideScience

Sample records for nuclear materials diversion

  1. Illicit diversion of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bett, F.L.

    1975-08-01

    This paper discusses the means of preventing illegal use of nuclear material by terrorists or other sub-national groups and by governments. With respect to sub-national groups, it concludes that the preventive measures of national safeguards systems, when taken together with the practical difficulties of using nuclear material, would make the diversion and illegal use of nuclear material unattractive in comparison with other avenues open to these groups to attain their ends. It notes that there are only certain areas in the nuclear fuel cycle, e.g. production of some types of nuclear fuel embodying highly enriched uranium and shipment of strategically significant nuclear material, which contain material potentially useful to these groups. It also discusses the difficult practical problems, e.g. coping with radiation, which would face the groups in making use of the materials for terrorist purposes. Concerning illegal use by Governments, the paper describes the role of international safeguards, as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the real deterrent effect of these safeguards which is achieved through the requirements to maintain comprehensive operating records of the use of nuclear material and by regular inspections to verify these records. The paper makes the point that Australia would not consider supplying nuclear material unless it were subject to international safeguards. (author)

  2. Nuclear Materials Diversion Safety and the Long-term Future of Nuclear Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knapp, V.

    2002-01-01

    Primarily due to irresponsible cold war politics of nuclear weapon countries nuclear proliferation situation is little short of getting out of control. In addition to five nominal nuclear weapon countries there are at present at least three more nuclear weapon countries and several countries with nuclear weapon potential. Non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed in 1970, has been recognized by most non-nuclear weapon countries as unjust and ineffective. After the initial, deliberate, nuclear weapon developments of five nominal nuclear weapon countries, subsequent paths to nuclear weapons have been preceded by nominal peaceful use of nuclear energy. Uranium enrichment installations as well as reprocessing installations in non-nuclear weapon countries are the weakest spots of fuel cycle for diversion of nuclear materials either by governments or by illicit groups. An energy scenario, which would, by the end of century, replace the large part of fossil fuels use through extension of present nuclear practices, would mean very large increase in a number of such installations, with corresponding increase of the probability of diversion of nuclear materials. Such future is not acceptable from the point of view of proliferation safety. Recent events make it clear, that it cannot be accepted from the requirements of nuclear terrorism safety either. Nuclear community should put it clearly to their respective governments that the time has come to put general interest before the supposed national interest, by placing all enrichment and reprocessing installations under full international control. Such internationalization has a chance to be accepted by non-nuclear weapon countries, only in case should it apply to nuclear weapon countries as well, without exception. Recent terrorist acts, however horrible they were, are child,s play compared with possible acts of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear energy can be made proliferation safe and diversion of nuclear materials safe, and provide

  3. Active neutron technique for detecting attempted special nuclear material diversion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, G.W.; Rice, L.G. III.

    1979-01-01

    The identification of special nuclear material (SNM) diversion is necessary if SNM inventory control is to be maintained at nuclear facilities. (Special nuclear materials are defined for this purpose as either 235 U of 239 Pu.) Direct SNM identification by the detection of natural decay or fission radiation is inadequate if the SNM is concealed by appropriate shielding. The active neutron interrogation technique described combines direct SNM identification by delayed fission neutron (DFN) detection with implied SNM detection by the identification of materials capable of shielding SNM from direct detection. This technique is being developed for application in an unattended material/equipment portal through which items such as electronic instruments, packages, tool boxes, etc., will pass. The volume of this portal will be 41-cm wide, 53-cm high and 76-cm deep. The objective of this technique is to identify an attempted diversion of at least 20 grams of SNM with a measurement time of 30 seconds

  4. The IAEA concept of detection of diversion through nuclear material accountancy (2)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Akiba, Mitsunori

    2005-01-01

    Diversion into D (falsification of accounting report) and diversion into MUF could be detected by the Inspectorate through nuclear material accountancy. The Inspectorate designs inspection activities to detect diversion into D in cost effective ways. As a result, detection of diversion into D is divided into two statistics, one is item difference statistics which could detect major defects and the other is material balance statistics which could detect remaining small defects. MUF statistics could detect Diversion into MUF. Item statistics has many useful characteristics from safeguards view points, so it is examined in details. Material balance statistics and MUF statistics stem from measurement error associated with equipment inevitably. The above-mentioned concept is called 'IAEA decision structure'. Hereafter, designing safeguards (inspection activities) approach will be based on the IAEA decision structure. (author)

  5. Comprehensive nuclear materials

    CERN Document Server

    Allen, Todd; Stoller, Roger; Yamanaka, Shinsuke

    2012-01-01

    Comprehensive Nuclear Materials encapsulates a panorama of fundamental information on the vast variety of materials employed in the broad field of nuclear technology. The work addresses, in five volumes, 3,400 pages and over 120 chapter-length articles, the full panorama of historical and contemporary international research in nuclear materials, from Actinides to Zirconium alloys, from the worlds' leading scientists and engineers. It synthesizes the most pertinent research to support the selection, assessment, validation and engineering of materials in extreme nuclear environments. The work discusses the major classes of materials suitable for usage in nuclear fission, fusion reactors and high power accelerators, and for diverse functions in fuels, cladding, moderator and control materials, structural, functional, and waste materials.

  6. Study of nuclear material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruderman, H.

    1977-01-01

    The implications of deliberate diversion of nuclear materials on materials accounting, the validity of the MUF concept to establish assurance concerning the possible diversion of special nuclear materials, and an economic analysis to permit cost comparison of varying the inventory frequency are being studied. An inventory cost model, the statistical hypothesis testing approach, the game theoretic approach, and analysis of generic plants are considered

  7. Details of criminological investigations of large-valued thefts related to nuclear materials (diversion safeguards program)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leachman, R.B.; Cornella, A.P.

    1972-06-01

    Studies were made of five areas of criminology which have great similarity to the case of nuclear materials. Actual cases of crimes were analyzed by experts in law enforcement and criminal justice. To identify fields of analogous criminology, possible characteristics of nuclear material thefts were considered: total value, high unit cost, limited marketability, special technology for handling, and licensing. The items considered to be analogous to nuclear materials in these aspects were: narcotics, data (as exists in computer memories, tapes, or discs), precious metal and gems, objects of art, and weapons. A criminology survey was conducted in which 509 individuals received one or more questionnaires soliciting opinion responses. Sixty-five questionnaires were returned. Eighty-four individuals replied by letter indicating inadequate knowledge of the crimes being surveyed. The questionnaire was supplemented by 18 interviews with criminal justice and industry personnel for more definitive information on diversion problems. Results of this survey are reported

  8. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-08-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  9. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [es

  10. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  11. Integrated Global Nuclear Materials Management Preliminary Concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, E; Dreicer, M.

    2006-01-01

    The world is at a turning point, moving away from the Cold War nuclear legacy towards a future global nuclear enterprise; and this presents a transformational challenge for nuclear materials management. Achieving safety and security during this transition is complicated by the diversified spectrum of threat 'players' that has greatly impacted nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and homeland security requirements. Rogue states and non-state actors no longer need self-contained national nuclear expertise, materials, and equipment due to availability from various sources in the nuclear market, thereby reducing the time, effort and cost for acquiring a nuclear weapon (i.e., manifestations of latency). The terrorist threat has changed the nature of military and national security requirements to protect these materials. An Integrated Global Nuclear Materials Management (IGNMM) approach would address the existing legacy nuclear materials and the evolution towards a nuclear energy future, while strengthening a regime to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation. In this paper, some preliminary concepts and studies of IGNMM will be presented. A systematic analysis of nuclear materials, activities, and controls can lead to a tractable, integrated global nuclear materials management architecture that can help remediate the past and manage the future. A systems approach is best suited to achieve multi-dimensional and interdependent solutions, including comprehensive, end-to-end capabilities; coordinated diverse elements for enhanced functionality with economy; and translation of goals/objectives or standards into locally optimized solutions. A risk-informed basis is excellent for evaluating system alternatives and performances, and it is especially appropriate for the security arena. Risk management strategies--such as defense-in-depth, diversity, and control quality--help to weave together various technologies and practices into a strong and robust security fabric. Effective

  12. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [es

  13. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [fr

  14. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  15. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  16. Fingerprinting of nuclear material to strengthen physical protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueck, K.; Lindauer, H.; Falta, G.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Physical protection of nuclear material against diversion and stealing presents a major step to prevent abuse of nuclear material for military or terrorist purposes. If such material had been diverted, however, and discovered by border traffic control, police control or other methods of investigation, identifying the site and time of diversion is of utmost importance to ensure that the point of possible diversion is closed and the possible delivery and end-use point becomes known. The quicker and more comprehensive these investigations are performed, the greater are the chances to find the criminal persons and the point of diversion. The paper, therefore, deals with fingerprinting methods used to obtain enough and comprehensive background information for investigators to find out the source of diversion and the channels through which it might have reached the point of discovery and the possible point of ultimate destination (end-use of the material). On the example of the round-robin test for the identification of illicit nuclear material performed by EURATOM in 1999, and the conclusions obtained by our laboratory it is demonstrated that a high amount of information can be drawn from a single sample and that this information can be used by investigators world-wide to find the point of origin of the material and its possible point of diversion. The set of information is segmented into 3 different levels: information gained in the first 24 hours after arrival of the unknown material, information gained up to one week after uptake and information gained up to one month after. The first information is to inform the investigators about the hazard and the relevance of the material, about preliminary investigation results and support the investigating judge on the justification to further detain the person(s). The second information should contain more detail on the material and the possible point of diversion and assist the investigators to decide on proper

  17. Precedents for diversion-resistant nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Culler, F.L. Jr.

    1978-01-01

    The urgent need to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and to control the means of production of fissionable material has been the dominant force in the worldwide development of civilian nuclear power. The author follows the historical perspective for institutional control. To improve diversion resistance of the back end of the fuel recycle, the Civex process is proposed. The Civex process does not use new separation process principles or new methods for fuel fabrication. Rather, it is a combination of processes used and partially developed techniques for breeder fuel reprocessing and refabrication. Its characteristics are listed. The process steps and the design knowledge to meet these criteria, and to operate under conditions that provide maximum diversion resistance, can be adaptations of methods studied earlier and, in most cases, used for both military and civilian fuel recycle. The adaptations change the original techniques enough to make the technology different from that used for existing power reactors. The author discusses tried or partially demonstrated techniques from which Civex has been or could be fashioned. Separation processes discussed are bismuth phosphate; Purex; Thorex; fluoride volatility; pyrometallurgy. The Sol--Gel Uranium--Plutonium Spherepak and Pellet Fuels processes are discussed as candidates for Civex fuel-production methods. The author concludes that, in his opinion, the Civex process is as far as technology can go in the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle from illicit diversion of fissile materials

  18. Advanced research workshop: nuclear materials safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L J; Moshkov, M M.

    1999-01-01

    The Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) on Nuclear Materials Safety held June 8-10, 1998, in St. Petersburg, Russia, was attended by 27 Russian experts from 14 different Russian organizations, seven European experts from six different organizations, and 14 U.S. experts from seven different organizations. The ARW was conducted at the State Education Center (SEC), a former Minatom nuclear training center in St. Petersburg. Thirty-three technical presentations were made using simultaneous translations. These presentations are reprinted in this volume as a formal ARW Proceedings in the NATO Science Series. The representative technical papers contained here cover nuclear material safety topics on the storage and disposition of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium (HEU) fissile materials, including vitrification, mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication, plutonium ceramics, reprocessing, geologic disposal, transportation, and Russian regulatory processes. This ARW completed discussions by experts of the nuclear materials safety topics that were not covered in the previous, companion ARW on Nuclear Materials Safety held in Amarillo, Texas, in March 1997. These two workshops, when viewed together as a set, have addressed most nuclear material aspects of the storage and disposition operations required for excess HEU and plutonium. As a result, specific experts in nuclear materials safety have been identified, know each other from their participation in t he two ARW interactions, and have developed a partial consensus and dialogue on the most urgent nuclear materials safety topics to be addressed in a formal bilateral program on t he subject. A strong basis now exists for maintaining and developing a continuing dialogue between Russian, European, and U.S. experts in nuclear materials safety that will improve the safety of future nuclear materials operations in all the countries involved because of t he positive synergistic effects of focusing these diverse backgrounds of

  19. Topical understandings of nuclear material measurement · accountancy and quality assurance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro; Muraoka, Susumu; Osabe, Takeshi; Terada, Hiromi; Shimizu, Kenichi; Ohtani, Tetsuo; Fujimaki, Kazunori; Ishikawa, Tadatsugu; Shinohara, Yoshinori

    2002-01-01

    Nuclear material measurement is an important measure to determine the amount of nuclear material of each stage such as receipt, shipment, inventory and hold-up. The material accountancy based on the material balance among the measurements is a measure to control of nuclear material. The material accountancy, from the technical aspect, can be used as promising measures for purposes from operator's level to state's level such as the nuclear safety, property control and environmental preservation other than safeguards measures only to conclude no diversion of nuclear material. This paper discusses various purposes of nuclear material measurements and clarifies the certain function such as quality assurance to be expected at each purpose. Based on the discussion, critical points for the quality assurance of each stage are studied. (author)

  20. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  1. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  2. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the ''non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

  3. Nuclear materials stewardship: Our enduring mission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Isaacs, T.H.

    1998-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors have handled a remarkably wide variety of nuclear materials over the past 50 yr. Two fundamental changes have occurred that shape the current landscape regarding nuclear materials. If one recognizes the implications and opportunities, one sees that the stewardship of nuclear materials will be a fundamental and important job of the DOE for the foreseeable future. The first change--the breakup of the Soviet Union and the resulting end to the nuclear arms race--altered US objectives. Previously, the focus was on materials production, weapon design, nuclear testing, and stockpile enhancements. Now the attention is on dismantlement of weapons, excess special nuclear material inventories, accompanying increased concern over the protection afforded to such materials; new arms control measures; and importantly, maintenance of the safety and reliability of the remaining arsenal without testing. The second change was the raised consciousness and sense of responsibility for dealing with the environmental legacies of past nuclear arms programs. Recognition of the need to clean up radioactive contamination, manage the wastes, conduct current operations responsibly, and restore the environment have led to the establishment of what is now the largest program in the DOE. Two additional features add to the challenge and drive the need for recognition of nuclear materials stewardship as a fundamental, enduring, and compelling mission of the DOE. The first is the extraordinary time frames. No matter what the future of nuclear weapons and no matter what the future of nuclear power, the DOE will be responsible for most of the country's nuclear materials and wastes for generations. Even if the Yucca Mountain program is successful and on schedule, it will last more than 100 yr. Second, the use, management, and disposition of nuclear materials and wastes affect a variety of nationally important and diverse objectives, from national

  4. IAEA safeguards to prevent nuclear matrials diversion for fabrication of nuclear explosives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Preuschen von und zu Liebenstein, R.

    1982-01-01

    The IAEA precautionary measures in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty can be characterized as measures creating confidence. They constitute at present the essential basis for peaceful use of atomic energy. Even though there is a lot of criticism concerning the efficiency of the precautionary measures, and all justified calls for the elaboration of further legal instruments against nuclear materials diversion must not be neglected, the IAEA precautionary measures have already in a credible way contributed to contain the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (orig./HSCH) [de

  5. Regulations on nuclear materials control of the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The present 'Regulations on Nuclear Materials Control of the People's Republic of China' were promulgated by the State Council on June 15, 1987, which are enacted to ensure safe and lawful use of nuclear materials, to prevent theft, sabotage, lose, unlawful diversion and unlawful use, to protect the security of the State and the Public and to facilitate the development of nuclear undertakings. The nuclear materials controlled are: 1. Uranium-235 (materials and products); 2. Uranium-233 (material and products); 3. Plutonium-239 (materials and products); 4. tritium (materials and products); 5. lithium-6 (materials and products); 6. Other nuclear materials requiring control. The present regulations are not applicable to the control of uranium ore and its primary products. The control measures for nuclear products transferred to the armed forces shall be laid down by the national defence department

  6. Sample size optimization in nuclear material control. 1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gladitz, J.

    1982-01-01

    Equations have been derived and exemplified which allow the determination of the minimum variables sample size for given false alarm and detection probabilities of nuclear material losses and diversions, respectively. (author)

  7. Linear filtering applied to safeguards of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pike, D.H.; Morrison, G.W.; Holland, C.W.

    1975-01-01

    In regard to the problem of nuclear materials theft or diversion in the fuel cycle, a method is needed to detect continual thefts of relatively small amounts of material. It is suggested that Kalman filtering techniques be used. A hypothetical material flow situation is used to illustrate the technique; losses could be detected in as few as 5 months. (DLC)

  8. Management of Global Nuclear Materials for International Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Isaacs, T; Choi, J-S

    2003-01-01

    Nuclear materials were first used to end the World War II. They were produced and maintained during the cold war for global security reasons. In the succeeding 50 years since the Atoms for Peace Initiative, nuclear materials were produced and used in global civilian reactors and fuel cycles intended for peaceful purposes. The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 established a framework for appropriate applications of both defense and civilian nuclear activities by nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. As global inventories of nuclear materials continue to grow, in a diverse and dynamically changing manner, it is time to evaluate current and future trends and needed actions: what are the current circumstances, what has been done to date, what has worked and what hasn't? The aim is to identify mutually reinforcing programmatic directions, leading to global partnerships that measurably enhance international security. Essential elements are material protection, control and accountability (MPC and A) of separated nuclear materials, interim storage, and geologic repositories for all nuclear materials destined for final disposal. Cooperation among key partners, such as the MPC and A program between the U.S. and Russia for nuclear materials from dismantled weapons, is necessary for interim storage and final disposal of nuclear materials. Such cooperative partnerships can lead to a new nuclear regime where a complete fuel cycle service with fuel leasing and spent fuel take-back can be offered to reactor users. The service can effectively minimize or even eliminate the incentive or rationale for the user-countries to develop their indigenous enrichment and reprocessing technologies. International cooperation, supported by governments of key countries can be best to facilitate the forum for formation of such cooperative partnerships

  9. Nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    In 1998, Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (NRA SR) performed 38 inspections, 25 of them were performed in co-operation with IAEA inspectors. There is no fresh nuclear fuel at Bohunice A-1 NPP at present. Fresh fuel of Bohunice V-1 and V-2 NPPs is inspected in the fresh fuel storage.There are 327 fresh fuel assemblies in Mochovce NPP fresh fuel storage. In addition to that, are also 71 small users of nuclear materials in Slovakia. In most cases they use: covers made of depleted uranium for non-destructive works, detection of level in production plants, covers for therapeutical sources at medical facilities. In. 1995, NRA SR issued 4 new licences for nuclear material withdrawal. In the next part manipulation with nuclear materials, spent fuel stores and illegal trafficking in nuclear materials are reported

  10. Responsible stewardship of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hannum, W.H.

    1994-01-01

    The ability to tap the massive energy potential of nuclear fission was first developed as a weapon to end a terrible world war. Nuclear fission is also a virtually inexhaustible energy resource, and is the only energy supply in certain areas in Russia, Kazakhstan and elsewhere. The potential link between civilian and military applications has been and continues to be a source of concern. With the end of the Cold War, this issue has taken a dramatic turn. The U.S. and Russia have agreed to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles by as much as two-thirds. This will make some 100 tonnes of separated plutonium and 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium available, in a form that is obviously directly usable for weapons. The total world inventory of plutonium is now around 1000 tonnes and is increasing at 60-70 tonnes per year. There is even more highly enriched uranium. Fortunately the correct answer to what to do with excess weapons material is also the most attractive. It should be used and reused as fuel for fast reactors. Material in use (particularly nuclear material) is very easy to monitor and control, and is quite unattractive for diversion. Active management of fissile materials not only makes a major contribution to economic stability and well-being, but also simplifies accountability, inspection and other safeguards processes; provides a revenue stream to pay for the necessary safeguards; and, most importantly, limits the prospective world inventory of plutonium to only that which is used and useful

  11. The system of nuclear material control of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yeligbayeva, G.Zh.

    2001-01-01

    regulating exports and determines the mechanism for the realization of export control policy. KAEC is the main government organization for nuclear export control. KAEC's provision determines the functions, orders, and procedures to coordinate nuclear material export and import. KEAC's database on nuclear material exports and imports aids in the tracking of the transfer of nuclear materials into, out of, and through Kazakhstan. The consolidated analysis of the nuclear material accountancy and nuclear material transfer increases the level of the nuclear control system. The system of physical protection, which prevents the unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials from facilities, is another component of the state control system. The main goal of this system is the organizational activity to block the ability to steal nuclear material or to sabotage a facility through nuclear material dispersal. Now, physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities is implemented by different government organizations. They activate their physical protection programs according to their individual departmental regulations. From 1994-1998 with the financial and technical support of donor-countries, the Committee had been able to support the systems modernization of nuclear facilities. In 2000, Kazakhstan state boards had agreed upon an Additional Protocol to the Agreement between Kazakhstan and IAEA, for the application of safeguards. When the Additional Protocol procedures will be finished and signed, then mining facilities will also be under safeguards. The National Control List, similar to the European Control List, was also validated in 2000. Now, new rules considering the recommendation of the Nuclear Supplier Group for the export and import of nuclear materials, technologies, equipment, dual-use equipment, materials, and technologies is now being agreed upon by the Kazakhstan state board. Thus we have the basics for a nuclear control system in Kazakhstan and now we carrying out the

  12. Measures for prevention illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strezov, A.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In the early 1990ies the number of illicit trafficking cases with nuclear material and radioactive sources began to appear in the press more often than before. This fact became of great concern among international organizations and different states that the nuclear material subjected to trafficking might become in possession of rogue states and be implicated in weapons production or that stolen radioactive sources may cause health and safety effects to the population or to the environment. The creation and proposition of a model scheme procedure for the developing countries is important for starting the initial process of preventing and combating the illicit traffic of nuclear materials. Particular efforts have been directed for the protection of fissile materials. The reported incidents for diversion of nuclear materials have raised the problem of potential nuclear terrorism and also for countries of proliferation to take a short cut to the bomb. There is a need of rapid implementation of comprehensive, mutually reinforcing strategy to control the existing stockpiles of fissile material and to lower the future production and use of such materials. The illicit traffic of nuclear materials is a new threat, which requires new efforts, new approaches and coordination of services and institutions and even new legislation. The propositions of a model-procedure will allow better and quicker upgrade of developing countries capabilities for combating illicit nuclear trafficking. (author)

  13. Act No. 80-572 on protection and control of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    This Act lays down that the import, export, possession, transfer, use and transport of nuclear materials defined by the Act are subject to licensing and control under conditions to be determined by Decree. The purpose of this control is to avoid loss, theft or diversion of such materials. Any person who obtains fraudulently nuclear material referred to in the Act or who carries out activities involving such material without the required licence shall be subject to severe penalties. Finally, it is provided that the Government shall report to Parliament each year on operation of the provisions of this Act. (NEA) [fr

  14. Semi-annual report on strategic special nuclear material inventory differences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-08-01

    This eighth periodic semiannual report of inventory differences covers the second six months of fiscal year 1980 (April 1, 1980, through September 30, 1980), for the Department of Energy (DOE) and DOE contractor facilities possessing significant quantities of strategic special nuclear material. Strategic special nuclear material is plutonium or uranium-233 or uranium-235 in material whose uranium-235 content is 20 percent or greater (known as highly enriched uranium). A significant quantity is either 2 kilograms of plutonium or uranium-233 or 5 kilograms of uranium-235 in highly enriched uranium or the appropriate weighted combination. All Inventory Differences reported here have been analyzed, investigated when necessary, and resolved. These data and explanations, together with the absences of physical indications of any theft attempt, support a finding that during this period no theft or diversion of strategic special nuclear material has occurred

  15. Application of Nuclear Forensics in Combating Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    As a scientific discipline, nuclear forensics poses formidable scientific challenges with regard to extracting information on the history, origin, movement and processing of nuclear and other radioactive material found to be out of regulatory control. Research into optimized techniques is being pursued by leading nuclear forensic research groups around the world. This research encompasses areas including evidence collection, analytical measurements for rapid and reliable categorization and characterization of nuclear and radioactive material, and interpretation using diverse data characteristics or the 'science of signatures' from throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. In this regard, the IAEA recently concluded the Coordinated Research Project (CRP) entitled Application of Nuclear Forensics in Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material. The CRP seeks to improve the ability of Member States to provide robust categorization and characterization of seized material, reliable techniques for the collection and preservation of nuclear forensic evidence, and the ability to interpret the results for law enforcement and other purposes. In accordance with broader IAEA objectives, the CRP provides a technical forum for participating institutes from Member States to exchange technical information to benefit national confidence building as well as to advance the international discipline of nuclear forensics. This CRP was initially planned in 2006, commenced in 2008 and was completed in 2012. Three research coordination meetings (RCM) were convened at the IAEA in Vienna to review progress. The leadership of the chairpersons was essential to establishing the technical viability of nuclear forensics at the IAEA and with the Member States

  16. Semi-annual report on strategic special nuclear material inventory differences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    This report provides and explains the generally small differences between the amounts of nuclear materials charged to DOE facilities and the amounts that could be physically inventoried. This report covers data for the period from October 1, 1977, through March 31, 1978, and includes accounting corrections for data from earlier periods. The data and explanations, together with the absence of physical indications of any theft attempt, support a finding that during this period no theft or diversion of a significant amount of strategic special nuclear material has occurred

  17. Semi-annual report on strategic special nuclear material inventory differences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This report provides and explains the differences between the amounts of nuclear materials charged to DOE facilities and the amounts that could be physically inventoried. This report covers data for the period from October 1, 1979, through March 31, 1980, and includes accounting corrections for data from earlier periods. It is the seventh such semiannual report. These data and explanations, together with the absences of physical indications of any theft attempt, support a finding that during this period no theft or diversion of strategic spcial nuclear material has occurred

  18. Study of nuclear material accounting. Final report, July 1, 1976--April 1, 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siri, W.E.; Ruderman, H.; Winsen, J.; Dresher, M.

    1977-04-01

    The basic result of this study was to affirm the utility of material accounting as a tool for safeguards purposes. Periodic inventories and proper interpretation of material unaccounted for (MUF) can be an effective procedure for estimating diversion and taking necessary follow-on action. We have developed a new approach in this study based upon the theory of games that eliminates many of the deficiencies of the classical statistical hypothesis testing approach. This new approach explicitly considers a malevolent Diverter as a basic ingredient of the analysis. This permits a different and more effective interpretation of MUF for safeguards purposes. At the present time MUF interpretation for major nuclear facilities cannot adequately support statements about diversion. Consequently NRC does not rely solely on MUF analysis for such statements. Diversion statements now are primarily based upon other safeguards systems and information. However, the game theoretic approach can make the periodic inventory-MUF concept work better for safeguards. With its use, MUF data by itself can be useful in directly interpreting possible unauthorized diversion of special nuclear material

  19. Device for separating, purifying and recovering nuclear fuel material, impurities and materials from impurity-containing nuclear fuel materials or nuclear fuel containing material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Ryuichi; Kamei, Yoshinobu; Watanabe, Tsuneo; Tanaka, Shigeru.

    1988-01-01

    Purpose: To separate, purify and recover nuclear fuel materials, impurities and materials with no formation of liquid wastes. Constitution: Oxidizing atmosphere gases are introduced from both ends of a heating furnace. Vessels containing impurity-containing nuclear fuel substances or nuclear fuel substance-containing material are continuously disposed movably from one end to the other of the heating furnace. Then, impurity oxides or material oxides selectively evaporated from the impurity-containing nuclear fuel substances or nuclear fuel substance-containing materials are entrained in the oxidizing atmosphere gas and the gases are led out externally from a discharge port opened at the intermediate portion of the heating furnace, filters are disposed to the exit to solidify and capture the nuclear fuel substances and traps are disposed behind the filters to solidify and capture the oxides by spontaneous air cooling or water cooling. (Sekiya, K.)

  20. Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holzemer, Michael; Carvo, Alan

    2012-01-01

    Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S and S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

  1. Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Vulnerabilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-18

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

  2. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; Proteccion Fisica Delos Materiales Nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1993-09-15

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [French] La proteccion fisica contra el robo o la desviacion no autorizada de materiales nucleares y contra el sabotaje de las instalaciones nucleares por parte de individuos o de grupos ha sido durante largo tiempo motivo de preocupacion nacional e internacional. Aunque la obligacion de crear y hacer funcionar un sistema completo de proteccion fisica para las instalaciones y materiales nucleares en el territorio de un Estado determinado incumbe enteramente al Gobierno de dicho Estado, el que esa obligacion se cumpla o no, y si se cumple, en que medida o hasta que punto, es cosa que no deja indiferentes a los demas Estados. De aqui que la proteccion fisica se haya convertido en motivo de interes y cooperacion internacional. La necesidad de cooperacion internacional se hace evidente en los casos en que la eficacia de la proteccion fisica en el territorio de un Estado depende de que otros Estados tomen tambien medidas apropiadas para evitar o hacer fracasar los actos hostiles dirigidos contra instalaciones y

  3. 10 CFR 74.51 - Nuclear material control and accounting for strategic special nuclear material.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nuclear material control and accounting for strategic special nuclear material. 74.51 Section 74.51 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear...

  4. Evaluating the Aspect of Nuclear Material in Fuel Cycles

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Takagi, Shunsuke; Pickett, Susan; Oda, Takuji; Choi, Jor-Shan; Kuno, Yusuke; Takana, Satoru [Department of Nuclear Engineering and Management, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8685 (Japan); Nagasaki, Shinya [Nuclear Professional School, The University of Tokyo (Japan)

    2009-06-15

    The increasing number of countries that wish to introduce nuclear power plants raises attention to proliferation resistance in nuclear power plants, and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In order to achieve adequate proliferation resistance, it is important to evaluate it and to construct effective international institutional frameworks as well as technologies involving high level of proliferation resistance. Although some methods have been proposed for evaluation of the proliferation resistance, their validities have not been investigated in detail. In the present paper, therefore, we compare some of the proposed methodologies. It is essential to detect the abuse or diversion of nuclear material before the nuclear explosive device can be manufactured in order to prevent proliferation. The time needed for the detection of material primary depends on the safeguards that the country applies, and the time needed for fabrication mainly depends on the attributes of the nuclear material. Hence, we divided the proliferation resistance into two parts: the level of safeguards and the material. For examination of evaluation methods such as the one proposed by Charlton [1] or the figure of merit (FOM) [2], sensitivity analysis was performed on weighting factors and scenarios. The validity and characteristics of each method were discussed, focusing on the applicability of each method to the assessment of multi-national approaches such as GNEP. [1] W. S. Charlton, R. L. LeBouf, C. Gariazzo, D. G. Ford, C. Beard, S. Landeberger, M. Whitaker, 'Proliferation resistance assessment methodology for nuclear fuel cycles', Nuclear Technology, 157, 1 (2007). [2] C.G. Bathke et al, 'An assessment of the proliferation resistance of materials in advanced nuclear fuel cycles', 8. International Conference on Facility Operations (2008). (authors)

  5. Application of crime countermeasures for the protection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, C.H.

    1975-01-01

    Federal regulations prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and published in the Federal Register require licensees to take appropriate action to protect the health and safety of the public from unauthorized use of special nuclear material (SNM), which includes plutonium, uranium-233, and highly enriched uranium. Crime countermeasures for compliance with these regulations are an important part of the guidance that is provided by the NRC's Office of Standards Development. The use of crime countermeasures and protective devices is intended to prevent the unauthorized diversion of material and to aid in the detection of diversion should it be attempted. Plant and equipment designs should incorporate both electronic and physical security measures for protection of SNM. This applies to facilities and equipment for reprocessing, fabrication, and transportation of SNM. The protection systems include physical barriers, access controls, intrusion detection devices, surveillance devices, central alarm stations, communications, and response capability. Acceptable security measures and devices applicable to protected areas, material access areas, vital areas, vital equipment, and transportation vehicles have been presented in Regulatory Guides. (U.S.)

  6. Nuclear Forensics' role in analyzing nuclear trafficking activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hrnecek, E.; Mayer, K.; Schubert, A.; Wallenius, M.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear forensics aims at identifying origin and intended use of nuclear material using information inherent to the nuclear material.The information gathered in nuclear forensics include isotopic composition, elemental composition, impurities and age of the material, macroscopic appearance and microstructure. The information so collected helps to solve criminal cases and put the individuals involved in nuclear trafficking in jails. The information also helps to improve safeguards and physical protection measures at place of theft or diversion to prevent future thefts or diversions.

  7. Mobile Techniques for Rapid Detection of Concealed Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosenstock, W.; Koeble, T.; Risse, M.; Berky, W.

    2015-01-01

    To prevent the diversion of nuclear material as well as illicit production, transport and use of nuclear material we investigated in mobile techniques to detect and identify such material in the field as early as possible. For that purpose we use a highly sensitive gamma measurement system installed in a car. It consists of two large volume plastic scintillators, one on each side of the car, each scintillator with 12 l active volume, and two extreme sensitive high purity Germanium detectors with 57 cm 2 crystal diameter, cooled electrically. The measured data are processed immediately with integrated, appropriate analysis software for direct assessment including material identification and classification within seconds. The software for the plastic scintillators can differentiate between natural and artificial radioactivity, thus giving a clear hint for the existence of unexpected material. In addition, the system is equipped with highly sensitive neutron detectors. We have performed numerous measurements by passing different radioactive and nuclear sources in relatively large distances with this measurement car. Even shielded as well as masked material was detected and identified in most of the cases. We will report on the measurements performed in the field (on an exercise area) and in the lab and discuss the capabilities of the system, especially with respect to timeliness and identification. This system will improve the nuclear verification capabilities also. (author)

  8. An accountancy system for nuclear materials control in research centres

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buttler, R.; Bueker, H.; Vallee, J.

    1979-01-01

    The Nuclear Accountancy and Control System (NACS) was developed at KFA Juelich in accordance with the requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The main features are (1) recording of nuclear material in inventory items. These are combined to form batches wherever suitable; (2) extrapolation of accounting data as a replacement for detailed measurement of inventory items data. Recording and control of nuclear material are carried out on two levels with access to a common data bank. The lower level deals with nuclear materials handling plus internal management while on the upper level there is a central control point which is responsible for nuclear safeguarding within the entire research centre. By keeping the organizational and technical infrastructure it was possible to develop a system which is both economical and operator-oriented. In this system the emphasis of nuclear safeguarding is placed on the acquisition of the nuclear material inventory. As much consideration has been given to the interests of the various operational levels and organizational units as to internal and national regulations. Since it is part of the safeguarding and control system, access to the NACS must be restricted to a limited number of users only. Furthermore, it must include facilities for manual control in the form of records. Authorization for access must correspond with the various tasks of different user groups. All necessary data are acquired decentrally in the organizational units and entered via a terminal. It is available to the user groups on both levels through a central data bank. To meet all requirements, the NACS has been designed as an integrated, computer-assisted information system for the automated processing of extensive and multi-level nuclear materials data. As part of the preventive measures entailed with nuclear safeguarding, the accountancy system enables the operator of a nuclear plant to furnish proof of non-diversion of nuclear material. (author)

  9. Safeguards for special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.

    1979-12-01

    Safeguards, accountability, and nuclear materials are defined. The accuracy of measuring nuclear materials is discussed. The use of computers in nuclear materials accounting is described. Measures taken to physically protect nuclear materials are described

  10. Nuclear material attractiveness: an assessment of material associated with a closed fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, C.G.; Wallace, R.K.; Hase, K.R.; Jarvinen, G.D.; Ireland, J.R.; Johnson, M.W.; Ebbinghaus, B.B.; Sleaford, B.W.; Robel, M.; Bradley, K.S.; Collins, B.A.; Prichard, A.W.; Smith, B.W.

    2010-01-01

    This paper examines the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with the various processing steps required for a closed fuel cycle. This paper combines the results from earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of SNM associated with the processing of spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel by various reprocessing schemes and the recycle of plutonium as a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in LWR with new results for the final, repeated burning of SNM in fast-spectrum reactors: fast reactors and accelerator driven systems (ADS). The results of this paper suggest that all reprocessing products evaluated so far need to be rigorously safeguarded and provided moderate to high levels of physical protection. These studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE), and are based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that has been couched in terms chosen for consistency with those normally used for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The methodology and key findings will be presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance (e.g. by increasing impediments to the diversion, theft, or undeclared production of SNM for the purpose of acquiring a nuclear weapon), and how they could be used to help inform policy makers, will be discussed. (authors)

  11. Nuclear Material Attractiveness: An Assessment Of Material Associated With A Closed Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, C.G.; Ebbinghaus, B.; Sleaford, Brad W.; Wallace, R.K.; Collins, Brian A.; Hase, Kevin R.; Robel, Martin; Jarvinen, G.D.; Bradley, Keith S.; Ireland, J.R.; Johnson, M.W.; Prichard, Andrew W.; Smith, Brian W.

    2010-01-01

    This paper examines the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with the various processing steps required for a closed fuel cycle. This paper combines the results from earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of SNM associated with the processing of spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel by various reprocessing schemes and the recycle of plutonium as a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in LWR with new results for the final, repeated burning of SNM in fast-spectrum reactors: fast reactors and accelerator driven systems (ADS). The results of this paper suggest that all reprocessing products evaluated so far need to be rigorously safeguarded and provided moderate to high levels of physical protection. These studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE), and are based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that has been couched in terms chosen for consistency with those normally used for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The methodology and key findings will be presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance (e.g. by increasing impediments to the diversion, theft, or undeclared production of SNM for the purpose of acquiring a nuclear weapon), and how they could be used to help inform policy makers, will be discussed.

  12. Thermodynamics of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Full text: The science of chemical thermodynamics has substantially contributed to the understanding of the many problems encountered in nuclear and reactor technology. These problems include reaction of materials with their surroundings and chemical and physical changes of fuels. Modern reactor technology, by its very nature, has offered new fields of investigations for the scientists and engineers concerned with the design of nuclear fuel elements. Moreover, thermodynamics has been vital in predicting the behaviour of new materials for fission as well as fusion reactors. In this regard, the Symposium was organized to provide a mechanism for review and discussion of recent thermodynamic investigations of nuclear materials. The Symposium was held in the Juelich Nuclear Research Centre, at the invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The International Atomic Energy Agency has given much attention to the thermodynamics of nuclear materials, as is evidenced by its sponsorship of four international symposia in 1962, 1965, 1967, and 1974. The first three meetings were primarily concerned with the fundamental thermodynamics of nuclear materials; as with the 1974 meeting, this last Symposium was primarily aimed at the thermodynamic behaviour of nuclear materials in actual practice, i.e., applied thermodynamics. Many advances have been made since the 1974 meeting, both in fundamental and applied thermodynamics of nuclear materials, and this meeting provided opportunities for an exchange of new information on this topic. The Symposium dealt in part with the thermodynamic analysis of nuclear materials under conditions of high temperatures and a severe radiation environment. Several sessions were devoted to the thermodynamic studies of nuclear fuels and fission and fusion reactor materials under adverse conditions. These papers and ensuing discussions provided a better understanding of the chemical behaviour of fuels and materials under these

  13. Evaluation and development of advanced nuclear materials: IAEA activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Inozemtsev, V.; Basak, U.; Killeen, J.; Dyck, G.; Zeman, A.; )

    2011-01-01

    Economical, environmental and non-proliferation issues associated with sustainable development of nuclear power bring about a need for optimization of fuel cycles and implementation of advanced nuclear systems. While a number of physical and design concepts are available for innovative reactors, the absence of reliable materials able to sustain new challenging irradiation conditions represents the real bottle-neck for practical implementation of these promising ideas. Materials performance and integrity are key issues for the safety and competitiveness of future nuclear installations being developed for sustainable nuclear energy production incorporating fuel recycling and waste transmutation systems. These systems will feature high thermal operational efficiency, improved utilization of resources (both fissile and fertile materials) and reduced production of nuclear waste. They will require development, qualification and deployment of new and advanced fuel and structural materials with improved mechanical and chemical properties combined with high radiation and corrosion resistance. The extensive, diverse, and expensive efforts toward the development of these materials can be more effectively organized within international collaborative programmes with wide participation of research, design and engineering communities. IAEA carries out a number of international projects supporting interested Member States with the use of available IAEA program implementation tools (Coordinated Research Projects, Technical Meetings, Expert Reviews, etc). The presentation summarizes the activities targeting material developments for advanced nuclear systems, with particular emphasis on fast reactors, which are the focal topics of IAEA Coordinated Research Projects 'Accelerator Simulation and Theoretical Modelling of Radiation Effects' (on-going), 'Benchmarking of Structural Materials Pre-Selected for Advanced Nuclear Reactors', 'Examination of advanced fast reactor fuel and core

  14. Safeguarding nuclear materials in the former Soviet Republics through computerized materials protection, control and accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roumiantsev, A.N.; Ostroumov, Y.A.; Whiteson, R.; Seitz, S.L.; Landry, R.P.; Martinez, B.J.; Boor, M.G.; Anderson, L.K.; Gary, S.P.

    1997-01-01

    The threat of nuclear weapons proliferation is a problem of global concern. International efforts at nonproliferation focus on preventing acquisition of weapons-grade nuclear materials by unauthorized states, organizations, or individuals. Nonproliferation can best be accomplished through international cooperation in the application of advanced science and technology to the management and control of nuclear materials. Computerized systems for nuclear material protection, control, and accountability (MPC and A) are a vital component of integrated nuclear safeguards programs. This paper describes the progress of scientists in the United States and former Soviet Republics in creating customized, computerized MPC and A systems. The authors discuss implementation of the Core Material Accountability System (CoreMAS), which was developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory by the US Department of Energy and incorporates, in condensed and integrated form, the most valuable experience gained by US nuclear enterprises in accounting for and controlling nuclear materials. The CoreMAS approach and corresponding software package have been made available to sites internationally. CoreMAS provides methods to evaluate their existing systems and to examine advantages and disadvantages of customizing CoreMAS or improving their own existing systems. The sites can also address crucial issues of software assurance, data security, and system performance; compare operational experiences at sites with functioning computerized systems; and reasonably evaluate future efforts. The goal of the CoreMAS project is to introduce facilities at sites all over the world to modern international MPC and A practices and to help them implement effective, modern, computerized MPC and A systems to account for their nuclear materials, and thus reduce the likelihood of theft or diversion. Sites are assisted with MPC and A concepts and the implementation of an effective computerized MPC and A system

  15. The regulations concerning refining business of nuclear source material and nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The regulations are provided for under the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors and provisions concerning refining business in the enforcement order for the law. The basic concepts and terms are defined, such as: exposure dose, accumulative dose; controlled area; inspected surrounding area and employee. Refining facilities listed in the application for designation shall be classified into clushing and leaching, thickning, refining facilities, storage facilities of nuclear source materials and nuclear fuel materials, disposal facilities of contaminated substances and building for refining, etc. Business program attached to the application shall include expected time of beginning of refining, estimated production amount of nuclear source materials or nuclear fuel materials for the first three years and funds necessary for construction, etc. Records shall be made and kept for particular periods on delivery and storage of nuclear source materials and nuclear fuel materials, control of radiation, maintenance and accidents of refining facilities. Safety securing, application of internationally regulated substances and measures in dangerous situations are stipulated respectively. Exposure dose of employees and other specified matters shall be reported by the refiner yearly to the Director General of Science and Technology Agency and the Minister of International Trade and Industry. (Okada, K.)

  16. Passive nuclear material detection in a personnel portal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Eaton, M.J.

    1979-01-01

    The concepts employed in the development of gamma-ray and neutron detection systems for a special nuclear materials booth portal monitor are described. The portal is designed for unattended use in detecting diversion by a technically sophisticated adversary and has possible application to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards of a fast critical assembly facility. Preliminary evaluation results are given and plans for further parameter studies are noted

  17. Transcending sovereignty. In the management and control of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, Lawrence

    2001-01-01

    Effective control of nuclear material is fundamentally important to the credibility and reliability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), international safeguards are applied to non-nuclear- weapon State Parties for the purpose of verifying compliance with their undertakings not to seek to acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices by assuring that safeguarded nuclear activities and material are not diverted from their intended peaceful use. Reflecting the sovereign State basis upon which the international system rests, the control and protection of nuclear materials within the State are the responsibility of the national authority. This division of responsibility between international verification of non-diversion on the one hand and national responsibility for material protection on the other has worked quite well over time. But it has not created a seamless web of fully effective control over nuclear material. 34 In so far as safeguards are concerned, six points are to be made: 1. INFCIRC/153 Agreements: Completion by all NPT Parties of the required safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Fifty States Party to the NPT still have not entered into treaty-obligated safeguards agreements with the IAEA. 2. Adherence by all States having full-scope safeguards INFCIRC/540. As noted, very few States have thus far negotiated and implemented the strengthened safeguards arrangements. 3. United Nations Security Council action to take its 1992 assertions (related to compliance and enforcement) on proliferation and safeguards a step further. 4. Non-NPT Party support for international Safeguards. 5. Safeguards financing. 6. IAEA Access to export license information

  18. Microcomputer based shelf system to monitor special nuclear materials in storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nicholson, N.; Kuckertz, T.H.; Ethridge, C.D.

    1980-01-01

    Diversion of special nuclear material has become a matter of grave concern in recent years. Large quantities of this material are kept in long-term storage and must be inventoried periodically, resulting in a time-consuming activity that exposes personnel to additional radiation. A system that provides continuous surveillance of stored special nuclear materials has been developed. A shelf monitor has been designed using a single component microcomputer to collect data from a Geiger Muller tube that monitors gamma emissions and a scale that monitors the total weight of the special nuclear material and its container. A network of these shelf monitors reports their acquired data to a minicomputer for analysis and storage. Because a large number of these monitors is likely to be needed in most storage facilities, one objective of this program has been to develop a low cost but reliable monitor

  19. Nuclear material control systems for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-06-01

    Paragraph 70.51(c) of 10 CFR Part 70 requires each licensee who is authorized to possess at any one time special nuclear material in a quantity exceeding one effective kilogram to establish, maintain, and follow written material control and accounting procedures that are sufficient to enable the licensee to account for the special nuclear material in his possession under license. While other paragraphs and sections of Part 70 provide specific requirements for nuclear material control systems for fuel cycle plants, such detailed requirements are not included for nuclear power reactors. This guide identifies elements acceptable to the NRC staff for a nuclear material control system for nuclear power reactors. (U.S.)

  20. The regulations concerning refining business of nuclear source material and nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This rule is established under the provisions concerning refining business in the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and nuclear reactors and the ordinance for the execution of this law, and to enforce them. Basic terms are defined, such as: exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding monitoring area and worker. The application for the designation for refining business under the law shall be classified into the facilities for crushing and leaching-filtration, thikening, and refining, the storage facilities for nuclear raw materials and nuclear fuel materials, and the disposal facilities for radioactive wastes, etc. To the application, shall be attached business plans, the explanations concerning the technical abilities of applicants and the prevention of hazards by nuclear raw materials and nuclear fuel materials regarding refining facilities, etc. Records shall be made on the accept, delivery and stock of each kind of nuclear raw materials and nuclear fuel materials, radiation control, the maintenance of and accidents in refining facilities, and kept for specified periods, respectively. Security regulations shall be enacted for each works or enterprise on the functions and organizations of persons engaged in the control of refining facilities, the operation of the apparatuses which must be controlled for the prevention of accidents, and the establishment of control area and surrounding monitoring area, etc. The report on the usage of internationally regulated goods and the measures taken at the time of danger are defined particularly. (Okada, K.)

  1. Nuclear materials inventory plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doerr, R.W.; Nichols, D.H.

    1982-03-01

    In any processing, manufacturing, or active storage facility it is impractical to assume that any physical security system can prevent the diversion of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). It is, therefore, the responsibility of any DOE Contractor, Licensee, or other holder of SNM to provide assurance that loss or diversion of a significant quantity of SNM is detectable. This ability to detect must be accomplishable within a reasonable time interval and can be accomplished only by taking physical inventories. The information gained and decisions resulting from these inventories can be no better than the SNM accounting system and the quality of measurements performed for each receipt, removal and inventory. Inventories interrupt processing or production operations, increase personnel exposures, and can add significantly to the cost of any operation. Therefore, realistic goals for the inventory must be defined and the relationship of the inherent parameters used in its validation be determined. Purpose of this document is to provide a statement of goals and a plan of action to achieve them

  2. 10 CFR 74.41 - Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of moderate strategic...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. 74.41 Section 74.41 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Special Nuclear Material...

  3. Pickering nuclear fish diversion net

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xiao, J.; Lew, A. [Ontario Power Generation, Toronto, Ontario (Canada)

    2013-07-01

    Pickering Fish Diversion Net - An Engineered Environmental Solution that has significantly reduced fish impingement at the Pickering Nuclear Facility. Note: As a recent urgent request/discussed by Mark Elliot, CNE-OPG and Jacques Plourde, CNS.

  4. Auditing nuclear materials statements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1973-01-01

    A standard that may be used as a guide for persons making independent examinations of nuclear materials statements or reports regarding inventory quantities on hand, receipts, production, shipment, losses, etc. is presented. The objective of the examination of nuclear materials statements by the independent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which the statements present the nuclear materials position of a nuclear materials facility and the movement of such inventory materials for the period under review. The opinion is based upon an examination made in accordance with auditing criteria, including an evaluation of internal control, a test of recorded transactions, and a review of measured discards and materials unaccounted for (MUF). The standard draws heavily upon financial auditing standards and procedures published by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

  5. Protection and control of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jalouneix, J.; Winter, D.

    2007-01-01

    In the framework of the French regulation on nuclear materials possession, the first liability is the one of operators who have to know at any time the quantity, quality and localization of any nuclear material in their possession. This requires an organization of the follow up and of the inventory of these materials together with an efficient protection against theft or sabotage. The French organization foresees a control of the implementation of this regulation at nuclear facilities and during the transport of nuclear materials by the minister of industry with the sustain of the institute of radiation protection and nuclear safety (IRSN). This article presents this organization: 1 - protection against malevolence; 2 - national protection and control of nuclear materials: goals, administrative organization, legal and regulatory content (authorization, control, sanctions), nuclear materials protection inside facilities (physical protection, follow up and inventory, security studies), protection of nuclear material transports (physical protection, follow up), control of nuclear materials (inspection at facilities, control of nuclear material measurements, inspection of nuclear materials during transport); 3 - international commitments of France: non-proliferation treaty, EURATOM regulation, international convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials, enforcement in France. (J.S.)

  6. The nuclear materials contraband

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, P.; Woessner, P.

    1996-01-01

    Several seizures of nuclear materials carried by contraband have been achieved. Some countries or criminal organizations could manufacture atomic bombs and use them. This alarming situation is described into details. Only 40% of drugs are seized by the American police and probably less in western Europe. The nuclear materials market is smaller than the drugs'one but the customs has also less experience to intercept the uranium dispatch for instance more especially as the peddlers are well organized. A severe control of the international transports would certainly allow to seize a large part of nuclear contraband materials but some dangerous isotopes as uranium 235 or plutonium 239 are little radioactive and which prevents their detection by the Geiger-Mueller counters. In France, some regulations allow to control the materials used to manufacture the nuclear weapons, and diminish thus the risk of a nuclear materials contraband. (O.L.). 4 refs., 2 figs

  7. Annual report on strategic special nuclear material inventory differences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    This report of unclassified Inventory Difference (ID's) covers the twelve months from April 1, 1989 through March 31, 1990 for all key Department of Energy (DOE) and DOE contractor operated facilities possessing strategic special nuclear material. Classified information is not included in this report. This classified information includes data for the Rocky Flats and Y-12 nuclear weapons production facilities or facilities under ID investigation. However, classified ID data from such facilities receive the same scrutiny and analyses was the included data. The data in this report have been prepared and reviewed by DOE contractors, field offices, and Headquarters. When necessary, special investigations have been performed in addition to these reviews: This ID data, explanations, reviews, and any additional special investigations, together with the absence of physical indications of any theft attempt, support a finding that no theft or diversion of significant quantities of strategic special nuclear material has occurred in DOE facilities during the twelve-month period covered by this report

  8. Materials and wastes from power generation of nuclear origin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dessus, Benjamin; Guillemette, Andre; Laponche, Bernard; Zerbib, Jean-Claude

    2014-01-01

    In most countries, spent nuclear fuel is directly stored in pools and constitute the bulk of highly radioactive waste. In France, reprocessing separates spent fuel into three categories: uranium, plutonium, minor actinides and fission products. Hence, a vast amount of very diverse radioactive materials are stored in various sites and conditions, under two denominations: 'nuclear materials' (which can be or are partly recycled) and 'radioactive waste' which should be permanently disposed of. The production of highly radioactive and long-lived waste raise legitimate questions on the use of nuclear energy for power production and many people think that it's a sufficient reason for giving up this technique. Concerning existing radioactive waste, the alternative to deep disposal should be: a) dry storage of spent fuel and other existing waste in protected sites (bunkers or hills), and b) more active research on the possibilities to reduce both radioactivity and the lifetime of radioactive waste. (authors)

  9. Nuclear Material Control and Accountability System Effectiveness Tool (MSET)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Powell, Danny H.; Elwood, Robert H. Jr.; Roche, Charles T.; Campbell, Billy J.; Hammond, Glenn A.; Meppen, Bruce W.; Brown, Richard F.

    2011-01-01

    A nuclear material control and accountability (MC and A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) has been developed in the United States for use in evaluating material protection, control, and accountability (MPC and A) systems in nuclear facilities. The project was commissioned by the National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation. MSET was developed by personnel with experience spanning more than six decades in both the U.S. and international nuclear programs and with experience in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in the nuclear power industry. MSET offers significant potential benefits for improving nuclear safeguards and security in any nation with a nuclear program. MSET provides a design basis for developing an MC and A system at a nuclear facility that functions to protect against insider theft or diversion of nuclear materials. MSET analyzes the system and identifies several risk importance factors that show where sustainability is essential for optimal performance and where performance degradation has the greatest impact on total system risk. MSET contains five major components: (1) A functional model that shows how to design, build, implement, and operate a robust nuclear MC and A system (2) A fault tree of the operating MC and A system that adapts PRA methodology to analyze system effectiveness and give a relative risk of failure assessment of the system (3) A questionnaire used to document the facility's current MPC and A system (provides data to evaluate the quality of the system and the level of performance of each basic task performed throughout the material balance area (MBA)) (4) A formal process of applying expert judgment to convert the facility questionnaire data into numeric values representing the performance level of each basic event for use in the fault tree risk assessment calculations (5) PRA software that performs the fault tree risk assessment calculations and produces risk importance

  10. Advanced physical protection systems for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1976-01-01

    Because of the increasing incidence of terrorism, there is growing concern that nuclear materials and facilities need improved physical protection against theft, diversion, or sabotage. Physical protection systems for facilities or transportation which have balanced effectiveness include information systems, access denial systems, adequate and timely response, recovery capability, and use denial methods for despoiling special nuclear materials (SNM). The role of these elements in reducing societal risk is described; however, it is noted that, similar to nuclear war, the absolute risks of nuclear theft and sabotage are basically unquantifiable. Sandia Laboratories has a major US Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) role in developing advanced physical protection systems for improving the security of both SNM and facilities. These activities are surveyed in this paper. A computer simulation model is being developed to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative physical protection systems under various levels of threat. Improved physical protection equipment such as perimeter and interior alarms, secure portals, and fixed and remotely activated barriers is being developed and tested. In addition, complete prototype protection systems are being developed for representative nuclear facilities. An example is shown for a plutonium storage vault. The ERDA safe-secure transportation system for highway shipments of all significant quantities of government-owned SNM is described. Adversary simulation as a tool for testing and evaluating physical protection systems is discussed. Finally, a list of measures is given for assessing overall physical protection system performance. (author)

  11. Advanced physical protection systems for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1975-10-01

    Because of the increasing incidence of terrorism, there is growing concern that nuclear materials and facilities need improved physical protection against theft, diversion, or sabotage. Physical protection systems for facilities or transportation which have balanced effectiveness include information systems, access denial systems, adequate and timely response, recovery capability, and use denial methods for despoiling special nuclear materials (SNM). The role of these elements in reducing societal risk is described; however, it is noted that, similar to nuclear war, the absolute risks of nuclear theft and sabotage are basically unquantifiable. Sandia Laboratories has a major Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) role in developing advanced physical protection systems for improving the security of both SNM and facilities. These activities are surveyed. A computer simulation model is being developed to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative physical protection systems under various levels of threat. Improved physical protection equipment such as perimeter and interior alarms, secure portals, and fixed and remotely-activated barriers is being developed and tested. In addition, complete prototype protection systems are being developed for representative nuclear facilities. An example is shown for a plutonium storage vault. The ERDA safe-secure transportation system for highway shipments of all significant quantities of government-owned SNM is described. Adversary simulation as a tool for testing and evaluating physical protection systems is discussed. A list of measures is given for assessing overall physical protection system performance. (auth)

  12. Control of Nuclear Materials and Special Equipment (Nuclear Safety Regulations)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cizmek, A.; Prah, M.; Medakovic, S.; Ilijas, B.

    2008-01-01

    Based on Nuclear Safety Act (OG 173/03) the State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS) in 2008 adopted beside Ordinance on performing nuclear activities (OG 74/06) and Ordinance on special conditions for individual activities to be performed by expert organizations which perform activities in the area of nuclear safety (OG 74/06) the new Ordinance on the control of nuclear material and special equipment (OG 15/08). Ordinance on the control of nuclear material and special equipment lays down the list of nuclear materials and special equipment as well as of nuclear activities covered by the system of control of production of special equipment and non-nuclear material, the procedure for notifying the intention to and filing the application for a license to carry out nuclear activities, and the format and contents of the forms for doing so. This Ordinance also lays down the manner in which nuclear material records have to be kept, the procedure for notifying the State administration organization (regulatory body) responsible for nuclear safety by the nuclear material user, and the keeping of registers of nuclear activities, nuclear material and special equipment by the State administration organization (regulatory body) responsible for nuclear safety, as well as the form and content of official nuclear safety inspector identification card and badge.(author)

  13. Nuclear Security Systems and Measures for the Detection of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control. Implementing Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Nuclear terrorism and the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material threaten the security of all States. There are large quantities of diverse radioactive material in existence, which are used in areas such as health, the environment, agriculture and industry. The possibility that nuclear and other radioactive material may be used for terrorist acts cannot be ruled out in the current global situation. States have responded to this risk by engaging in a collective commitment to strengthen the protection and control of such material, and to establish capabilities for detection and response to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. Through its nuclear security programme, the IAEA supports States to establish, maintain and sustain an effective nuclear security regime. The IAEA has adopted a comprehensive approach to nuclear security. This approach recognizes that an effective national nuclear security regime builds on: the implementation of relevant international legal instruments; information protection; physical protection; material accounting and control; detection of and response to trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material; national response plans; and contingency measures. Within its nuclear security programme, the IAEA aims to assist States in implementing and sustaining such a regime in a coherent and integrated manner. Each State carries the full responsibility for nuclear security, specifically: to provide for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities; to ensure the security of such material in use, storage or in transport; to combat illicit trafficking; and to detect and respond to nuclear security events. This is an Implementing Guide on nuclear security systems and measures for the detection of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. The objective of the publication is to provide guidance to Member States for the

  14. Semi-annual report on strategic special nuclear material inventory differences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-07-01

    This report covers data for the period from April 1, 1982, through September 30, 1982, and includes accounting corrections for data from earlier periods. These data and explanations, together with the absences of physical indications of any theft attempt, support a finding that during this period no theft or diversion of strategic special nuclear material has occurred

  15. Physics and technology of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ursu, I.

    1985-01-01

    The subject is covered in chapters, entitled; elements of nuclear reactor physics; structure and properties of materials (including radiation effects); fuel materials (uranium, plutonium, thorium); structural materials (including - aluminium, zirconium, stainless steels, ferritic steels, magnesium alloys, neutron irradiation induced changes in the mechanical properties of structural materials); moderator materials (including - nuclear graphite, natural (light) water, heavy water, beryllium, metal hydrides); materials for reactor reactivity control; coolant materials; shielding materials; nuclear fuel elements; nuclear material recovery from irradiated fuel and recycling; quality control of nuclear materials; materials for fusion reactors (thermonuclear fusion reaction, physical processes in fusion reactors, fuel materials, materials for blanket and cooling system, structural materials, materials for magnetic devices, specific problems of material irradiation). (U.K.)

  16. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities; Proteccion Fisica De Los Materiales Y Las Instalaciones Nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-06-15

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [Spanish] La proteccion fisica contra el robo o la desviacion no autorizada de materiales nucleares y contra el sabotaje de las instalaciones nucleares por parte de individuos o grupos es motivo de preocupacion nacional e internacional desde hace mucho tiempo. Aunque la obligacion de crear y hacer funcionar un sistema completo de proteccion fisica de las instalaciones y materiales nucleares en el territorio de un Estado determinado incumbe exclusivamente al Gobierno de dicho Estado, el que esa obligacion se cumpla o no, y si se cumple, en que medida o hasta que punto, son cosas que no dejan indiferentes a los demas Estados. Por ello, la proteccion fisica se ha convertido en motivo de interes y cooperacion internacional. La necesidad de la cooperacion internacional se hace evidente en los casos en que la eficacia de la proteccion fisica en el territorio de un Estado depende de que otros Estados tomen tambien medidas apropiadas para evitar o hacer fracasar los actos hostiles dirigidos contra instalaciones y

  17. The regulations concerning refining business of nuclear source material and nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    Regulations specified here cover application for designation of undertakings of refining (spallation and eaching filtration facilities, thickening facilities, refining facilities, nuclear material substances or nuclear fuel substances storage facilities, waste disposal facilities, etc.), application for permission for alteration (business management plan, procurement plan, fund raising plan, etc.), application for approval of merger (procedure, conditions, reason and date of merger, etc.), submission of report on alteration (location, structure, arrangements processes and construction plan for refining facilities, etc.), revocation of designation, rules for records, rules for safety (personnel, organization, safety training for employees, handling of important apparatus and tools, monitoring and removal of comtaminants, management of radioactivity measuring devices, inspection and testing, acceptance, transport and storage of nuclear material and fuel, etc.), measures for emergency, submission of report on abolition of an undertaking, submission of report on disorganization, measures required in the wake of revocation of designation, submission of information report (exposure to radioactive rays, stolen or missing nuclear material or nuclear fuel, unusual leak of nuclear fuel or material contaminated with nuclear fuel), etc. (Nogami, K.)

  18. Global nuclear material control model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.A.

    1996-01-01

    The nuclear danger can be reduced by a system for global management, protection, control, and accounting as part of a disposition program for special nuclear materials. The development of an international fissile material management and control regime requires conceptual research supported by an analytical and modeling tool that treats the nuclear fuel cycle as a complete system. Such a tool must represent the fundamental data, information, and capabilities of the fuel cycle including an assessment of the global distribution of military and civilian fissile material inventories, a representation of the proliferation pertinent physical processes, and a framework supportive of national or international perspective. They have developed a prototype global nuclear material management and control systems analysis capability, the Global Nuclear Material Control (GNMC) model. The GNMC model establishes the framework for evaluating the global production, disposition, and safeguards and security requirements for fissile nuclear material

  19. Absolute nuclear material assay

    Science.gov (United States)

    Prasad, Manoj K [Pleasanton, CA; Snyderman, Neal J [Berkeley, CA; Rowland, Mark S [Alamo, CA

    2010-07-13

    A method of absolute nuclear material assay of an unknown source comprising counting neutrons from the unknown source and providing an absolute nuclear material assay utilizing a model to optimally compare to the measured count distributions. In one embodiment, the step of providing an absolute nuclear material assay comprises utilizing a random sampling of analytically computed fission chain distributions to generate a continuous time-evolving sequence of event-counts by spreading the fission chain distribution in time.

  20. US-Russian Cooperation in Upgrading MC and A System at Rosatom Facilities: Measurement of Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Powell, Danny H.; Jensen, Bruce A.

    2011-01-01

    Improve protection of weapons-usable nuclear material from theft or diversion through the development and support of a nationwide sustainable and effective Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) program based on material measurement. The material protection, control, and accountability (MPC and A) cooperation has yielded significant results in implementing MC and A measurements at Russian nuclear facilities: (1) Establishment of MEM WG and MEMS SP; (2) Infrastructure for development, certification, and distribution of RMs; and (3) Coordination on development and implementation of MMs.

  1. Raising awareness about protection and control of nuclear materials held by 'small-scale holders'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ladsous, D.; Coulie, E.; Giorgio, M.

    2013-01-01

    In France, the activities carried out by the 'small-scale holders' of nuclear materials are organized by a specific regulatory system which defines in a detailed way their obligations and the means of control of the government. The first part of the article presents the legal framework relating to the use of nuclear materials by small-scale holders in civilian fields. The importance of the declaration of the nuclear material inventory is clearly emphasized and must be prepared and transmitted to the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) every year. The second part describes how this declaration is used to provide basic information for the competent Ministry and the inspectors to check the correct application of the regulatory requirements relating to physical protection and to the control of nuclear materials. Finally, the last part presents the on-site inspections carried out by sworn and accredited inspectors under the authority of the competent Authority, which provide an overall picture and allow an evaluation of the risks of theft, loss or diversion of these materials. (authors)

  2. Physics and technology of nuclear materials

    CERN Document Server

    Ursu, Ioan

    2015-01-01

    Physics and Technology of Nuclear Materials presents basic information regarding the structure, properties, processing methods, and response to irradiation of the key materials that fission and fusion nuclear reactors have to rely upon. Organized into 12 chapters, this book begins with selectively several fundamentals of nuclear physics. Subsequent chapters focus on the nuclear materials science; nuclear fuel; structural materials; moderator materials employed to """"slow down"""" fission neutrons; and neutron highly absorbent materials that serve in reactor's power control. Other chapters exp

  3. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  4. Determination of internationally controlled materials according to provisions of the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The internationally controlled materials determined according to the law for nuclear source materials, etc. are the following: nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials, moderating materials, facilities including reactors, etc. sold, transferred, etc. to Japan according to the agreements for peaceful uses of atomic energy between Japan, and the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and France by the respective governments and those organs under them; nuclear fuel materials resulting from usage of the above sold and transferred materials, facilities; nuclear fuel materials sold to Japan according to agreements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency; nuclear fuel materials involved with the safeguards in nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty with IAEA. (Mori, K.)

  5. Professional Nuclear Materials Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forcella, A.A.; O'Leary, W.J.

    1966-01-01

    This paper describes the scope of nuclear materials management for a typical power reactor in the United States of America. Since this power reactor is financed by private capital, one of the principal obligations of the reactor operator is to ensure that the investment is protected and will furnish an adequate financial return. Because of the high intrinsic value of nuclear materials, appropriate security and accountability must be continually exercised to minimize losses beyond security and accountability for the nuclear materials. Intelligent forethought and planning must be employed to ensure that additional capital is not lost as avoidable additional costs or loss of revenue in a number of areas. The nuclear materials manager must therefore provide in advance against the following contingencies and maintain constant control or liaison against deviations from planning during (a) pre-reactor acquisition of fuel and fuel elements, (b) in-reactor utilization of the fuel elements, and (c) post-reactor recovery of fuel values. During pre-reactor planning and operations, it is important that the fuel element be designed for economy in manufacture, handling, shipping, and replaceability. The time schedule for manufacturing operations must minimize losses of revenue from unproductive dead storage of high cost materials. For in-reactor operations, the maximum achievable burn-up of the fissionable material must be obtained by means of appropriate fuel rearrangement schemes. Concurrently the unproductive down-time of the reactor for fuel rearrangement, inspections, and the like must be minimized. In the post-reactor period, when the fuel has reached a predetermined depletion of fissionable material, the nuclear materials manager must provide for the most economical reprocessing and recovery of fissionable values and by-products. Nuclear materials management is consequently an essential factor in achieving competitive fuel cycle and unit energy costs with power reactors

  6. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  7. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  8. Nuclear materials management storage study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Becker, G.W. Jr.

    1994-02-01

    The Office of Weapons and Materials Planning (DP-27) requested the Planning Support Group (PSG) at the Savannah River Site to help coordinate a Departmental complex-wide nuclear materials storage study. This study will support the development of management strategies and plans until Defense Programs' Complex 21 is operational by DOE organizations that have direct interest/concerns about or responsibilities for nuclear material storage. They include the Materials Planning Division (DP-273) of DP-27, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Facilities (DP-60), the Office of Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (DP-40), and other program areas, including Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM). To facilitate data collection, a questionnaire was developed and issued to nuclear materials custodian sites soliciting information on nuclear materials characteristics, storage plans, issues, etc. Sites were asked to functionally group materials identified in DOE Order 5660.1A (Management of Nuclear Materials) based on common physical and chemical characteristics and common material management strategies and to relate these groupings to Nuclear Materials Management Safeguards and Security (NMMSS) records. A database was constructed using 843 storage records from 70 responding sites. The database and an initial report summarizing storage issues were issued to participating Field Offices and DP-27 for comment. This report presents the background for the Storage Study and an initial, unclassified summary of storage issues and concerns identified by the sites

  9. Nuclear material operations manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler, R.P.

    1981-02-01

    This manual provides a concise and comprehensive documentation of the operating procedures currently practiced at Sandia National Laboratories with regard to the management, control, and accountability of nuclear materials. The manual is divided into chapters which are devoted to the separate functions performed in nuclear material operations-management, control, accountability, and safeguards, and the final two chapters comprise a document which is also issued separately to provide a summary of the information and operating procedures relevant to custodians and users of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual also contains samples of the forms utilized in carrying out nuclear material activities. To enhance the clarity of presentation, operating procedures are presented in the form of playscripts in which the responsible organizations and necessary actions are clearly delineated in a chronological fashion from the initiation of a transaction to its completion

  10. Nuclear material operations manuals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler, R.P.

    1979-06-01

    This manual is intended to provide a concise and comprehensive documentation of the operating procedures currently practiced at Sandia Laboratories with regard to the management, control, and accountability of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual is divided into chapters which are devoted to the separate functions performed in nuclear material operations-management, control, accountability, and safeguards, and the final two chapters comprise a document which is also issued separately to provide a summary of the information and operating procedures relevant to custodians and users of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual also contains samples of the forms utilized in carrying out nuclear material activities. To enhance the clarity of presentation, operating procedures are presented in the form of playscripts in which the responsible organizations and necessary actions are clearly delineated in a chronological fashion from the initiation of a transaction to its completion

  11. Selection of nuclear reactor coolant materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shi Lisheng; Wang Bairong

    2012-01-01

    Nuclear material is nuclear material or materials used in nuclear industry, the general term, it is the material basis for the construction of nuclear power, but also a leader in nuclear energy development, the two interdependent and mutually reinforcing. At the same time, nuclear materials research, development and application of the depth and breadth of science and technology reflects a nation and the level of the nuclear power industry. Coolant also known as heat-carrier agent, is an important part of the heart nuclear reactor, its role is to secure as much as possible to the economic output in the form fission energy to heat the reactor to be used: the same time cooling the core, is controlled by the various structural components allowable temperature. This paper described the definition of nuclear reactor coolant and characteristics, and then addressed the requirements of the coolant material, and finally were introduced several useful properties of the coolant and chemical control. (authors)

  12. Criteria and application methodology of physical protection of nuclear materials within the national and regional boundaries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.E.; Cesario, R.H.; Giustina, D.H.; Canibano, J.

    1998-01-01

    Full text: The physical protection against robbery, diversion of nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear installations by individuals or groups, has been for long time the reason of national and international concern. Even though, the obligation to create and implement an effective physical protection system for nuclear materials and installations in the territory of a given State, fall entirely on the State's Government, whether this obligation is fulfilled or not, and if it does, in what measure or up to what extent, it also concerns the rest of the States. Therefore, physical protection has become the reason for a regional co-operation. It is evident the need of co-operation in those cases where the physical protection efficiency within the territory of a given State depends also on the appropriate measures other States are taken, specially when dealing with materials been transported through national borders. The above mentioned constitute an important framework for the regional co-operation for the physical protection of nuclear materials. For that reason, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority established criteria and conditions aimed at mitigate diversions, robberies and sabotage to nuclear installations. As a working philosophy, it was established a simplify physical protection model of application in Argentina who, through the ARCAL No. 23 project, will be extrapolated to the whole Latin-American region, concluding that the application of the appropriated physical protection systems at regional level will lead to the strengthening of it at national level. (author) [es

  13. Nuclear material accounting handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The handbook documents existing best practices and methods used to account for nuclear material and to prepare the required nuclear material accounting reports for submission to the IAEA. It provides a description of the processes and steps necessary for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of nuclear material accounting and control at the material balance area, facility and State levels, and defines the relevant terms. This handbook serves the needs of State personnel at various levels, including State authorities, facility operators and participants in training programmes. It can assist in developing and maintaining accounting systems which will support a State's ability to account for its nuclear material such that the IAEA can verify State declarations, and at the same time support the State's ability to ensure its nuclear security. In addition, the handbook is useful for IAEA staff, who is closely involved with nuclear material accounting. The handbook includes the steps and procedures a State needs to set up and maintain to provide assurance that it can account for its nuclear material and submit the prescribed nuclear material accounting reports defined in Section 1 and described in Sections 3 and 4 in terms of the relevant agreement(s), thereby enabling the IAEA to discharge its verification function as defined in Section 1 and described in Sections 3 and 4. The contents of the handbook are based on the model safeguards agreement and, where applicable, there will also be reference to the model additional protocol. As a State using The handbook consists of five sections. In Section 1, definitions or descriptions of terms used are provided in relation to where the IAEA applies safeguards or, for that matter, accounting for and control of nuclear material in a State. The IAEA's approach in applying safeguards in a State is also defined and briefly described, with special emphasis on verification. In Section 2, the obligations of the State

  14. The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Concerning refining, fabrication and reprocessing operations of such materials as well as the installation and operation of reactors, necessary regulations are carried out. Namely, in case of establishing the business of refining, fabricating and reprocessing nuclear materials as well as installing nuclear reactors, applications for the permission of the Prime Minister and the Minister of International Trade and Industry should be filed. Change of such operations should be permitted after filing applications. These permissions are retractable. As regards the reactors installed aboard foreign ships, it must be reported to enter Japanese waters and the permission by the Prime Minister must be obtained. In case of nuclear fuel fabricators, a chief technician of nuclear fuel materials (qualified) must be appointed per each fabricator. In case of installing nuclear reactors, the design and methods of construction should be permitted by the Prime Minister. The standard for such permission is specified, and a chief engineer for operating reactors (qualified) must be appointed. Successors inherit the positions of ones who have operated nuclear material refining, fabrication and reprocessing businesses or operated nuclear reactors. (Rikitake, Y.)

  15. Human as a component of a nuclear material safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgan, D.E.; Schechter, R.S.

    1978-01-01

    Many human vigilance experiments are summarized and principles are extracted which should be useful in designing and evaluating a nuclear material safeguard system. A human is a poor observer and is not a dependable part of any man-machine system when required to function as an observer. There are a few techniques which improve his performance by providing feedback. A conceptual model is presented which is helpful in design and evaluation of systems. There is some slight experimental support for the model. Finally, some techniques of time study and statistical control charting will be useful as a means of detecting nuclear diversion attempts

  16. Nuclear material management: challenges and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rieu, J.; Besnainou, J.; Leboucher, I.; Chiguer, M.; Capus, G.; Greneche, D.; Durret, L.F.; Carbonnier, J.L.; Delpech, M.; Loaec, Ch.; Devezeaux de Lavergne, J.G.; Granger, S.; Devid, S.; Bidaud, A.; Jalouneix, J.; Toubon, H.; Pochon, E.; Bariteau, J.P.; Bernard, P.; Krellmann, J.; Sicard, B.

    2008-01-01

    The articles in this dossier were derived from the papers of the yearly S.F.E.N. convention, which took place in Paris, 12-13 March 2008. They deal with the new challenges and prospects in the field of nuclear material management, throughout the nuclear whole fuel cycle, namely: the institutional frame of nuclear materials management, the recycling, the uranium market, the enrichment market, the different scenarios for the management of civil nuclear materials, the technical possibilities of spent fuels utilization, the option of thorium, the convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials and installations, the characterisation of nuclear materials by nondestructive nuclear measurements, the proliferation from civil installations, the use of plutonium ( from military origin) and the international agreements. (N.C.)

  17. Nuclear material operations manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler, R.P.; Gassman, L.D.

    1978-04-01

    This manual is intended to provide a concise and comprehensive documentation of the operating procedures currently practiced at Sandia Laboratories with regard to the management, control, and accountability of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual is divided into chapters which are devoted to the separate functions performed in nuclear material operations--management, control, accountability, and safeguards, and the final two chapters comprise a document which is also issued separately to provide a summary of the information and operating procedures relevant to custodians and users of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual also contains samples of the forms utilized in carrying out nuclear material activities. To enhance the clarity of presentation, operating procedures are presented in the form of ''play-scripts'' in which the responsible organizations and necessary actions are clearly delineated in a chronological fashion from the initiation of a transaction to its completion

  18. Nuclear measurements and reference materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    This report summarizes the progress of the JRC programs on nuclear data, nuclear metrology, nuclear reference materials and non-nuclear reference materials. Budget restrictions and personnel difficulties were encountered during 1987. Fission properties of 235 U as a function of neutron energy and of the resonances can be successfully described on the basis of a three exit channel fission model. Double differential neutron emission cross-sections were accomplished on 7 Li and were started for the tritium production cross-section of 9 Be. Reference materials of uranium minerals and ores were prepared. Special nuclear targets were prepared. A batch of 250 g of Pu0 2 was characterized in view of certification as reference material for the elemental assay of plutonium

  19. Nuclear materials management procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Veevers, K.; Silver, J.M.; Quealy, K.J.; Steege, E. van der.

    1987-10-01

    This manual describes the procedures for the management of nuclear materials and associated materials at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories. The procedures are designed to comply with Australia's nuclear non-proliferation obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), bilateral agreements with other countries and ANSTO's responsibilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act, 1987. The manual replaces those issued by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission in 1959, 1960 and 1969

  20. Material input of nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rissanen, S.; Tarjanne, R.

    2001-01-01

    The Material Input (MI) of nuclear fuel, expressed in terms of the total amount of natural material needed for manufacturing a product, is examined. The suitability of the MI method for assessing the environmental impacts of fuels is also discussed. Material input is expressed as a Material Input Coefficient (MIC), equalling to the total mass of natural material divided by the mass of the completed product. The material input coefficient is, however, only an intermediate result, which should not be used as such for the comparison of different fuels, because the energy contents of nuclear fuel is about 100 000-fold compared to the energy contents of fossil fuels. As a final result, the material input is expressed in proportion to the amount of generated electricity, which is called MIPS (Material Input Per Service unit). Material input is a simplified and commensurable indicator for the use of natural material, but because it does not take into account the harmfulness of materials or the way how the residual material is processed, it does not alone express the amount of environmental impacts. The examination of the mere amount does not differentiate between for example coal, natural gas or waste rock containing usually just sand. Natural gas is, however, substantially more harmful for the ecosystem than sand. Therefore, other methods should also be used to consider the environmental load of a product. The material input coefficient of nuclear fuel is calculated using data from different types of mines. The calculations are made among other things by using the data of an open pit mine (Key Lake, Canada), an underground mine (McArthur River, Canada) and a by-product mine (Olympic Dam, Australia). Furthermore, the coefficient is calculated for nuclear fuel corresponding to the nuclear fuel supply of Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) company in 2001. Because there is some uncertainty in the initial data, the inaccuracy of the final results can be even 20-50 per cent. The value

  1. Statistical methods for nuclear material management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowen, W.M.; Bennett, C.A.

    1988-12-01

    This book is intended as a reference manual of statistical methodology for nuclear material management practitioners. It describes statistical methods currently or potentially important in nuclear material management, explains the choice of methods for specific applications, and provides examples of practical applications to nuclear material management problems. Together with the accompanying training manual, which contains fully worked out problems keyed to each chapter, this book can also be used as a textbook for courses in statistical methods for nuclear material management. It should provide increased understanding and guidance to help improve the application of statistical methods to nuclear material management problems

  2. Statistical methods for nuclear material management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bowen W.M.; Bennett, C.A. (eds.)

    1988-12-01

    This book is intended as a reference manual of statistical methodology for nuclear material management practitioners. It describes statistical methods currently or potentially important in nuclear material management, explains the choice of methods for specific applications, and provides examples of practical applications to nuclear material management problems. Together with the accompanying training manual, which contains fully worked out problems keyed to each chapter, this book can also be used as a textbook for courses in statistical methods for nuclear material management. It should provide increased understanding and guidance to help improve the application of statistical methods to nuclear material management problems.

  3. Considerations for sampling nuclear materials for SNM accounting measurements. Special nuclear material accountability report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brouns, R.J.; Roberts, F.P.; Upson, U.L.

    1978-05-01

    This report presents principles and guidelines for sampling nuclear materials to measure chemical and isotopic content of the material. Development of sampling plans and procedures that maintain the random and systematic errors of sampling within acceptable limits for SNM(Special Nuclear Materials) accounting purposes are emphasized

  4. Nuclear Materials Management. Proceedings of the Symposium on Nuclear Materials Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1966-02-15

    An increasing number of countries are using nuclear materials which, because of their high value and the potential hazards involved, require special methods of handling. To discuss these and to provide a forum at which different systems for achieving the necessary economy and safety could be compared, the International Atomic Energy Agency held a Symposium at Vienna on Nuclear Materials Management from 30 August to 3 September, 1965. It was attended by 115 participants from 19 Member States and two international organizations. Nuclear materials are already being used on an industrial scale and their high cost demands close and continuous control to ensure that they are delivered precisely on time and that they are used to the fullest possible extent before they are withdrawn from service. Routine industrial methods of material control and verification are widely used to ensure safe and economical operation and handling in nuclear power stations, in fuel-element fabrication and reprocessing plants, and in storage facilities. In addition special refinements are needed to take account of the value and the degree of purity required of nuclear materials. Quality as well as quantity has to be checked thoroughly and the utmost economy in processing is necessary. The radioactivity of the material poses special problems of handling and storage and creates a potential hazard to health. A further problem is that of criticality. These dangers and the means of averting them are well understood, as is evidenced by the outstandingly good safety record of the atomic energy industry. But besides accommodating all these special problems, day-to-day procedures must be simple enough to fit in with industrial conditions. Many of the 58 papers presented at the Symposium emphasized that records, checks, measurements and handling precautions, if suitably devised, provide the control vital to efficient operation, serve as checks against loss or waste of valuable materials and help meet the

  5. Determination of internationally controlled materials according to provisions of the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This rule is established under the provisions of the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors, and the former notification No. 26, 1961, is hereby abolished. Internationally regulated goods under the law are as follows: nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and moderator materials transferred by sale or other means from the governments of the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia and France or the persons under their jurisdictions according to the agreements concluded between the governments of Japan and these countries, respectively, the nuclear fuel materials recovered from these materials or produced by their usage, nuclear reactors, the facilities and heavy water transferred by sale or other means from these governments or the persons under their jurisdictions, the nuclear fuel materials produced by the usage of such reactors, facilities and heavy water, the nuclear fuel materials sold by the International Atomic Energy Agency under the contract between the Japanese government and the IAEA, the nuclear fuel materials recovered from these materials or produced by their usage, the heavy water produced by the facilities themselves transferred from the Canadian government, Canadian governmental enterprises or the persons under the jurisdiction of the Canadian government or produced by the usage of these facilities, etc. (Okada, K.)

  6. Nuclear safeguards: power tool for ensuring nuclear safety and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramakumar, K.L.

    2016-01-01

    The quantitative measurement of fissile nuclear materials through independent measurements is one of the cornerstones of the Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NUMAC) edifice. The verification of the accountancy also represents one of the key elements of international nuclear materials Safeguards. The very basis of NUMAC is to ensure safeguarding nuclear material and to state with confidence, “no significant amount of nuclear material has been withdrawn from its intended civilian use.” Thus, materials accounting systems are designed to account for or keep track of the amounts and locations of sensitive nuclear materials by periodic measurements. The purpose of this activity is to detect missing items (gross defects). A variety of C/S techniques are used, primarily optical surveillance and sealing. These measures serve to back up nuclear material accountancy by providing means by which access to nuclear material can be monitored. Unattended monitoring is a special mode of application of NDA or C/S techniques, or a combination of these, that operates for extended periods of time. The complexity and diversity of facilities containing safeguarded nuclear material require a correspondingly diverse set of verification techniques and equipment. The equipment and techniques used in safeguards are briefly described in this talk

  7. 1993 Annual report of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials - ABACC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    The 1993 annual report of the Brazilian Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, (ABACC), describes the activities regarding the administration and application of the Control and Accounting Common System (SCCC) established by the bilateral agreement between the Republic of Argentine and Federative Republic of Brazil for exclusive peaceful use of the nuclear energy. The main goal to verify practically all the installations which were not subjected to the international safeguards, before the agreement, was reached. Considering the safeguards application under implementation in both countries, the ABACC is preparing itself technically for the quadripartite agreement to be into force and signed among Argentine, Brazil, IAEA and ABACC. On checking the procedures established by the SCCC and controlled material, nothing was detected that could indicate nuclear material diversion either for nuclear weapon or for other explosive nuclear device. (B.C.A.)

  8. Nuclear material discovery or loss: the French experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zanetti, S.H.

    2006-01-01

    In a nuclear facility, when a difference between the physical inventory listing and accountancy records is discovered, the French law (Article 11 of the 'Decret 81-512') requires a declaration to the High Civil Servant for Defence of the Ministry in charge of Industry. Moreover, according to article L.1333-13 of the Defence Code, in case of a suspicion of loss, theft or diversion of nuclear material, the licensee has to declare this event to the police. In the meantime, an investigation is carried out in the facility, and in cooperation with other facilities if necessary. These measures are aimed at: - Finding the lost nuclear material (if any), - Understand the causes of the problem, - Solve the differences by acting on the PIL or/and accountancy records, - Act to prevent any other occurrence of this kind of event. These actions can take place in the general field of a police investigation. After all these facts and information have been gathered, the licensee writes down a complete file which is transferred to the High Civil Servant for Defence of the Ministry in charge of Industry, in order to be analysed by his technical support body (IRSN). Thus, the IRSN is able to give its conclusion to the authority about this event, especially regarding: - The causes of the event, - Relevance and completeness of investigations, - Pertinence of the corrections, - Relevance of corrective actions, - Probability of another occurrence. This system is useful to ensure a complete follow-up of the events occurring in the various nuclear facilities in France, to have an extensive overview of the problems on a national scale. If an item is found in a facility A, numerous questions must be answered: - Where does it come from? - Since when is it in facility A? - How did it happened that this item has been transferred from facility B to facility A without the transfer of information? - We will consider these issues through examples. This kind of event can be potentially very rich in

  9. Development and implementation of methods for determination of the origin of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wallenius, M.; Pajo, L.; Mayer, K.

    2001-01-01

    The determination of the origin of seized nuclear material is important for authorities in the context of the criminal investigation, in order to return the material to its last legal owner and to help preventing any further diversion of material from this source. Origin determination is based on a complex pattern of parameters obtained through analytical measurements. The information required to determine the origin of nuclear materials may be divided into two categories: endogenous information (e.g. age or mode of production of the material) which is self-explanatory; whereas exogenous information (e.g. dimensions, surface roughness, impurities) requires a database to which the parameters can be compared. The Institute for Transuranium Elements has developed methods to determine characteristic parameters like impurities, surface roughness, or microstructural information. Furthermore, a database was set up containing relevant information on reactor fuels. (author)

  10. Evaluating the attractiveness of nuclear material for proliferation-resistance and nuclear security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Jor-Shan; Ikegame, Kou; Kuno, Yusuke

    2011-01-01

    The attractiveness of nuclear material, defined as a function of the isotopic composition of the nuclear material in formulas expressing the material's intrinsic properties, is of considerably debate in recent developments of proliferation-resistance measures of a nuclear energy system. A reason for such debate arises from the fact that the concept of nuclear material attractiveness can be confusing because the desirability of a material for nuclear explosive use depends on many tangible and intangible factors including the intent and capability of the adversary. In addition, a material that is unattractive to an advanced nation (in the case of proliferation) may be very attractive to a terrorist (in the case of physical protection and nuclear security). Hence, the concept of 'Nuclear Material Attractiveness' for different nuclear materials must be considered in the context of safeguards and security. The development of a ranking scheme on the attractiveness of nuclear materials could be a useful concept to start-off the strategies for safeguards and security on a new footing (i.e., why and how nuclear material is attractive, and what are the quantifiable basis). Japan may benefit from such concept regarding the attractiveness of nuclear materials when recovering nuclear materials from the damaged cores in Fukushima because safety, security, and safeguards (3S) would be a prominent consideration for the recovery operation, and it would be the first time such operation is performed in a non-nuclear weapons state. (author)

  11. Uncertainty estimation in nuclear material weighing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thaure, Bernard [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, Fontenay aux Roses, (France)

    2011-12-15

    The assessment of nuclear material quantities located in nuclear plants requires knowledge of additions and subtractions of amounts of different types of materials. Most generally, the quantity of nuclear material held is deduced from 3 parameters: a mass (or a volume of product); a concentration of nuclear material in the product considered; and an isotopic composition. Global uncertainties associated with nuclear material quantities depend upon the confidence level of results obtained in the measurement of every different parameter. Uncertainties are generally estimated by considering five influencing parameters (ISHIKAWA's rule): the material itself; the measurement system; the applied method; the environmental conditions; and the operator. A good practice guide, to be used to deal with weighing errors and problems encountered, is presented in the paper.

  12. International dimension of illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zaitseva, L.; Bunn, G.; Steinhaeusler, F.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material is primarily associated with Russia and other former Soviet republics. Indeed, with the collapse of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in 1991, hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear material and thousands of radiation sources were left without adequate control and protection, thus posing a risk for sabotage, theft and diversion. Out of 700 illicit trafficking incidents recorded in the Stanford's database on nuclear smuggling, theft and orphan radiation sources (DSTO), over 450 either took place in the former Soviet Union or involved material that had reportedly originated from the FSU. In the period 1992-1994, Western and Eastern Europe were heavily affected by the inflow of nuclear material smuggled from the FSU. Since then, various measures were taken by the European countries and former Soviet republics to prevent the trafficking of radioactive substances ranging from the improvement of physical security at nuclear facilities to the installation of detection equipment at international borders. However, although the number of illicit trafficking incidents in Western Europe has decreased dramatically since 1994 and the overall annual number of such cases has been lower than in 1994, evidence suggests that diverted nuclear material is still being smuggled out of the FSU. An increased number of interceptions of nuclear and other radioactive material in the Caucasus, Turkey and Central Asia, well-known for their drugs and arms smuggling routes, over the past three years demonstrates that the material may now be moving south rather than west. This is particularly alarming considering the proximity of three countries to the potential end-users of nuclear and other radioactive material, such as AI Qaida terrorist network and aspiring nuclear weapon states in the Middle East. Although the FSU remains the major potential source of nuclear and other radioactive material, it is not the only one. Thefts

  13. Smuggling special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lazaroiu, Gheorghe

    1999-01-01

    Ever since the collapse of the former Soviet Union reports have circulated with increasing frequency concerning attempts to smuggle materials from that country's civil and military nuclear programs. Such an increase obviously raises a number of concerns (outlined in the author's introduction), chief among which is the possibility that these materials might eventually fall into the hands of proliferant states or terrorist groups. The following issues are presented: significance of materials being smuggled; sources and smuggling routes; potential customers; international efforts to reduce nuclear smuggling; long-term disposition of fissile materials. (author)

  14. Nuclear battery materials and application of nuclear batteries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hao Shaochang; Lu Zhenming; Fu Xiaoming; Liang Tongxiang

    2006-01-01

    Nuclear battery has lots of advantages such as small volume, longevity, environal stability and so on, therefore, it was widely used in aerospace, deep-sea, polar region, heart pacemaker, micro-electromotor and other fields etc. The application of nuclear battery and the development of its materials promote each other. In this paper the development and the latest research progress of nuclear battery materials has been introduced from the view of radioisotope, electric energy conversion and encapsulation. And the current and potential applications of the nuclear battery are also summarized. (authors)

  15. Management of nuclear materials in an R ampersand D environment at the Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Behrens, R.G.; Roth, S.B.; Jones, S.R.

    1991-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory is a multidisciplinary R ampersand D organization and, as such, its nuclear materials inventory is diverse. Accordingly, major inventories of isotopes such as Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-242, U-235, Th, tritium, and deuterium, and lesser amounts of isotopes of Am, Cm, Np and exotic isotopes such as berkelium must be managed in accordance with Department of Energy Orders and Laboratory policies. Los Alamos also acts as a national resource for many one-of-a-kind materials which are supplied to universities, industry, and other government agencies within the US and throughout the world. Management of these materials requires effective interaction and communication with many nuclear materials custodians residing in over forty technical groups as well as effective interaction with numerous outside organizations. This paper discusses the role, philosophy, and organizational structure of Nuclear Materials Management at Los Alamos and also briefly presents results of two special nuclear materials management projects: 1- Revision of Item Description Codes for use in the Los Alamos nuclear material data base and 2- The recommendation of new economic discard limits for Pu-239. 2 refs., 1 fig

  16. Automated personal identification: a new technique for controlling access to nuclear materials and facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eccles, D.R.

    1975-01-01

    Special nuclear materials must be protected against the threat of diversion or theft, and nuclear facilities against the threat of industrial sabotage. Implicit in this protection is the means of controlling access to protected areas, material access areas, and vital areas. With the advent of automated personal identification technology, the processes of access control can be automated to yield both higher security and reduced costs. This paper first surveys the conventional methods of access control; next, automated personal identification concepts are presented and various systems approaches are highlighted; finally, Calspan's FINGERSCAN /sub TM/ system for identity verification is described

  17. US-Russian laboratory-to-laboratory cooperation in nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mullen, M.; Augustson, R.; Horton, R.

    1995-01-01

    Under the guidance of the Department of Energy (DOE), six DOE laboratories have initiated a new program of cooperation with the Russian Federation's nuclear institutes. The purpose of the program is to accelerate progress toward a common goal shared by both the US and Russia--to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation, including such threats as theft, diversion, and unauthorized possession of nuclear materials, by strengthening systems of nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting. This new program is called the Laboratory-to-Laboratory Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (Lab-to-Lab MPC and A) Program. It is designed to complement other US-Russian MPC and A programs such as the government-to-government (Nunn-Lugar) programs. The Lab-to-Lab MPC and A program began in 1994 with pilot projects at two sites: Arzamas-16 and the Kurchitov Institute. This paper presents an overview of the Laboratory-to-Laboratory MPC and A Program. It describes the background and need for the program; the objectives and strategy; the participating US and Russian laboratories, institutes and enterprises; highlights of the technical work; and plans for the next several years

  18. Determination of internationally controlled materials according to provisions of the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    According to the provisions of The Law, those stipulated as internationally controlled materials are nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials, moderating materials, reactors and facilities, transferred from such as the U.S.A., the U.K. and Canada on the agreements of peaceful uses of atomic energy, and nuclear fuel materials accruing therefrom. (Mori, K.)

  19. Chapter No.5. Nuclear materials and physical protection of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) is based on requirements resulting from the Safeguards Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the IAEA. UJD performs this activity according to the 'Atomic Act' and relevant decree. The purpose of the SSAC is also to prevent unauthorised use of nuclear materials, to detect loses of nuclear materials and provide information that could lead to the recovery of missing material. The main part of nuclear materials under jurisdiction of the Slovak Republic is located at NPP Jaslovske Bohunice, NPP Mochovce and at interim storage in Jaslovske Bohunice. Even though that there are located more then 99% of nuclear materials in these nuclear facilities, there are not any significant problems with their accountancy and control due to very simply identification of accountancy units - fuel assemblies, and due to stability of legal subjects responsible for operation and for keeping of information continuity, which is necessary for fulfilling requirements of the Agreement. The nuclear material located outside nuclear facilities is a special category. There are 81 such subjects of different types and orientations on the territory of the Slovak Republic. These subjects use mainly depleted uranium as a shielding and small quantity of natural uranium, low enrichment uranium and thorium for experimental purposes and education. Frequent changes of these subjects, their transformations into the other subjects, extinction and very high fluctuation of employees causes loss of information about nuclear materials and creates problems with fulfilling requirements resulting from the Agreement. In 2001, the UJD carried out 51 inspections of nuclear materials, of which 31 inspections were performed at nuclear installations in co-operation with the IAEA inspectors. No discrepancies concerning the management of nuclear materials were found out during inspections and safeguards goals in year 2001 were

  20. Thermodynamics of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rand, M.H.

    1975-01-01

    A report is presented of the Fourth International Symposium on Thermodynamics of Nuclear Materials held in Vienna, 21-25 October 1974. The technological theme of the Symposium was the application of thermodynamics to the understanding of the chemistry of irradiated nuclear fuels and to safety assessments for hypothetical accident conditions in reactors. The first four sessions were devoted to these topics and they were followed by four more sessions on the more basic thermodynamics, phase diagrams and the thermodynamic properties of a wide range of nuclear materials. Sixty-seven papers were presented

  1. Global nuclear material flow/control model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.S.; Fasel, P.K.; Riese, J.M.

    1997-01-01

    This is the final report of a two-year, Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The nuclear danger can be reduced by a system for global management, protection, control, and accounting as part of an international regime for nuclear materials. The development of an international fissile material management and control regime requires conceptual research supported by an analytical and modeling tool which treats the nuclear fuel cycle as a complete system. The prototype model developed visually represents the fundamental data, information, and capabilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle in a framework supportive of national or an international perspective. This includes an assessment of the global distribution of military and civilian fissile material inventories, a representation of the proliferation pertinent physical processes, facility specific geographic identification, and the capability to estimate resource requirements for the management and control of nuclear material. The model establishes the foundation for evaluating the global production, disposition, and safeguards and security requirements for fissile nuclear material and supports the development of other pertinent algorithmic capabilities necessary to undertake further global nuclear material related studies

  2. Techniques and methods in nuclear materials traceability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1996-01-01

    The nonproliferation community is currently addressing concerns that the access to special nuclear materials may increase the illicit trafficking in weapons-usable materials from civil and/or weapons material stores and/or fuel cycles systems. Illicit nuclear traffic usually involves reduced quantities of nuclear materials perhaps as samplings of a potential protracted diversionary flow from sources to users. To counter illicit nuclear transactions requires the development of techniques and methods in nuclear material traceability as an important phase of a broad forensic analysis capability. This report discusses how isotopic signatures and correlation methods were applied to determine the origins of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium samples reported as illicit trafficking in nuclear materials

  3. Control of nuclear material specified equipment and specified material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-04-01

    The goal and application field of NE 2.02 regulatory guide of CNEN (Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear), are described. This regulatory guide is about nuclear material management, specified equipment and specified material. (E.G.) [pt

  4. Physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    Full text: An Advisory Group met to consider the up-dating and extension of the Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, produced in 1972. Twenty-seven experts from 11 countries and EURATOM were present. Growing concern has been expressed in many countries that nuclear material may one day be used for acts of sabotage or terrorism. Serious attention is therefore being given to the need for States to develop national systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials during use, storage and transport throughout the nuclear fuel cycle which should minimize risks of sabotage or theft. The revised Recommendations formulated by the Advisory Group include new definitions of the objectives of national systems of physical protection and proposals for minimizing possibilities of unauthorized removal and sabotage to nuclear facilities. The Recommendations also describe administrative or organizational steps to be taken for this purpose and the essential technical requirements of physical protection for various types and locations of nuclear material, e.g., the setting up of protected areas, the use of physical barriers and alarms, the need for security survey, and the need of advance arrangements between the States concerned in case of international transportation, among others. (author)

  5. Nuclear science in the 20th century. Nuclear technology applications in material science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pei Junchen; Xu Furong; Zheng Chunkai

    2003-01-01

    The application of nuclear technology to material science has led to a new cross subject, nuclear material science (also named nuclear solid physics) which covers material analysis, material modification and new material synthesis. This paper reviews the development of nuclear technical applications in material science and the basic physics involved

  6. Expanding Nuclear Power Programmes - Romanian experience: Master - Nuclear Materials and Technologies Educational Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valeca, S.; Valeca, M.

    2012-01-01

    The main objectives of the Master Nuclear Materials and Technologies Educational Plan are: 1. To deliver higher education and training in the following specific domains, such as: Powders Technology and Ceramic Materials, Techniques of Structural Analysis, Composite Materials, Semiconductor Materials and Components, Metals and Metallic Alloys, Optoelectronic Materials and Devices, Nuclear Materials, The Engineering of Special Nuclear Materials, 2. To train managers of the Nuclear Waste Products and Nuclear Safety, 3. To qualify in ICT Systems for Nuclear Process Guidance, 4. To qualify in Environmental Protection System at the Level of Nuclear Power Stations, 5. To train managers for Quality Assurance of Nuclear Energetic Processes, 6. To deliver higher education and training regarding the International Treatises, Conventions and Settlements in force in the field of nuclear related activities. (author)

  7. United States Department of Energy Nuclear Materials Stewardship

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newton, J. W.

    2002-01-01

    The Department of Energy launched the Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative in January 2000 to accelerate the work of achieving integration and cutting long-term costs associated with the management of the Department's nuclear materials, with the principal focus on excess materials. Management of nuclear materials is a fundamental and enduring responsibility that is essential to meeting the Department's national security, nonproliferation, energy, science, and environmental missions into the distant future. The effective management of nuclear materials is important for a set of reasons: (1) some materials are vital to our national defense; (2) the materials pose physical and security risks; (3) managing them is costly; and (4) costs are likely to extend well into the future. The Department currently manages nuclear materials under eight programs, with offices in 36 different locations. Through the Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative, progress was during calendar year 20 00 in achieving better coordination and integration of nuclear materials management responsibilities and in evaluating opportunities to further coordinate and integrate cross-program responsibilities for the treatment, storage, and disposition of excess nuclear materials. During CY 2001 the Departmental approach to nuclear materials stewardship changed consistent with the business processes followed by the new administration. This paper reports on the progress of the Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative in evaluating and implementing these opportunities, and the remaining challenges in integrating the long-term management of nuclear materials

  8. The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The law intends under the principles of the atomic energy act to regulate the refining, processing and reprocessing businesses of nuclear raw and fuel metarials and the installation and operation of reactors for the peaceful and systematic utilization of such materials and reactors and for securing public safety by preventing disasters, as well as to control internationally regulated things for effecting the international agreements on the research, development and utilization of atomic energy. Basic terms are defined, such as atomic energy; nuclear fuel material; nuclear raw material; nuclear reactor; refining; processing; reprocessing; internationally regulated thing. Any person who is going to engage in refining businesses other than the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation shall get the special designation by the Prime Minister and the Minister of International Trade Industry. Any person who is going to engage in processing businesses shall get the particular admission of the Prime Minister. Any person who is going to establish reactors shall get the particular admission of the Prime Minister, The Minister of International Trade and Industry or the Minister of Transportation according to the kinds of specified reactors, respectively. Any person who is going to engage in reprocessing businesses other than the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute shall get the special designation by the Prime Minister. The employment of nuclear fuel materials and internationally regulated things is defined in detail. (Okada, K.)

  9. The physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-12-01

    A Technical Committee on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material met in April-May 1989 to advise on the need to update the recommendations contained in document INFCIRC/225/Rev.1 and on any changes considered to be necessary. The Technical Committee indicated a number of such changes, reflecting mainly: the international consensus established in respect of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the experience gained since 1977; and a wish to give equal treatment to protection against the theft of nuclear material and protection against the sabotage of nuclear facilities. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. 1 tab

  10. Approaches to characterization of nuclear material for establishment of nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okazaki, Hiro; Sumi, Mika; Sato, Mitsuhiro; Kayano, Masashi; Kageyama, Tomio; Shinohara, Nobuo; Martinez, Patrick; Xu, Ning; Thomas, Mariam; Porterfield, Donivan; Colletti, Lisa; Schwartz, Dan; Tandon, Lav

    2014-01-01

    The Plutonium Fuel Development Center (PFDC) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency has been analyzing isotopic compositions and contents of plutonium and uranium as well as trace impurities and physics in the nuclear fuel from MOX fuel fabrication process for accountancy and process control purpose. These analytical techniques are also effective for nuclear forensics to identify such as source, history, and route of the material by determining a composition and characterization of nuclear material. Therefore, PFDC cooperates with Los Alamos National Laboratory which has broad experience and established measurement skill for nuclear forensics, and evaluates the each method, procedure and analytical data toward R and D of characterizing a nuclear material for forensic purposes. This paper describes the approaches to develop characterization techniques of nuclear material for nuclear forensics purposes at PFDC. (author)

  11. Supplier responsibility for nuclear material quality

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stuart, P.S.; Dohna, A.E.

    1976-01-01

    Nuclear materials must be delivered by either the manufacturer or the distributor with objective, documented evidence that the material was manufactured, inspected, and tested by proven techniques performed by qualified personnel working to documented procedures. Measurement devices used for acceptance must be of proven accuracy. The material and all records must be identified for positive traceability as part of the quality history of the nuclear components, system, or structure in which the material was used. In conclusion, the nuclear material supplier must join the fabricator, the installer, and the user in effective implementation of the total systems approach to the application of quality assurance principles to all phases of procurement, fabrication, installation, and use of the safety-related components, systems, and structures in a nuclear power plant

  12. Role of physical protection and safeguards technology used to Nuclear Material Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Djoko-Irianto, Ign.

    2005-01-01

    The presence of nuclear materials at any nuclear facility must be in secure and must be known as safeguards purpose such as its position, from or type and amount. The clarification of the amount be reported to the national regulatory body and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the International regulatory body. The national regulatory body and IAEA will then verify that report. The verification must be done to know there is no difference of the amount, and to give the assurance to the International community that any diversion of safeguarded nuclear material from civil use to a prescribed military purpose would be detected. To carry out verification, several verification techniques such as non-destructive analysis, surveillance, unattended and remote monitoring and environmental sampling are explained to convey the impression how those techniques are implemented. According to the security requirement, the physical protection system including all components of physical protection system have to be effectively designed

  13. Study on interface between nuclear material accounting system and national nuclear forensic library

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Yonhong; Han, Jae-Jun; Chang, Sunyoung; Shim, Hye-Won; Ahn, Seungho

    2016-01-01

    The implementation of nuclear forensics requires physical, chemical and radiological characteristics with transport history to unravel properties of seized nuclear materials. For timely assessment provided in the ITWG guideline, development of national response system (e.g., national nuclear forensic library) is strongly recommended. Nuclear material accounting is essential to obtain basic data in the nuclear forensic implementation phase from the perspective of nuclear non-proliferation related to the IAEA Safeguards and nuclear security. In this study, the nuclear material accounting reports were chosen due to its well-established procedure, and reviewed how to efficiently utilize the existing material accounting system to the nuclear forensic implementation phase In conclusion, limits and improvements in implementing the nuclear forensics were discussed. This study reviewed how to utilize the existing material accounting system for implementing nuclear forensics. Concerning item counting facility, nuclear material properties can be obtained based on nuclear material accounting information. Nuclear fuel assembly data being reported for the IAEA Safeguards can be utilized as unique identifier within the back-end fuel cycle. Depending upon the compulsory accountability report period, there exist time gaps. If national capabilities ensure that history information within the front-end nuclear fuel cycle is traceable particularly for the bulk handling facility, the entire cycle of national nuclear fuel would be managed in the framework of developing a national nuclear forensic library

  14. Study on interface between nuclear material accounting system and national nuclear forensic library

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Yonhong; Han, Jae-Jun; Chang, Sunyoung; Shim, Hye-Won; Ahn, Seungho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The implementation of nuclear forensics requires physical, chemical and radiological characteristics with transport history to unravel properties of seized nuclear materials. For timely assessment provided in the ITWG guideline, development of national response system (e.g., national nuclear forensic library) is strongly recommended. Nuclear material accounting is essential to obtain basic data in the nuclear forensic implementation phase from the perspective of nuclear non-proliferation related to the IAEA Safeguards and nuclear security. In this study, the nuclear material accounting reports were chosen due to its well-established procedure, and reviewed how to efficiently utilize the existing material accounting system to the nuclear forensic implementation phase In conclusion, limits and improvements in implementing the nuclear forensics were discussed. This study reviewed how to utilize the existing material accounting system for implementing nuclear forensics. Concerning item counting facility, nuclear material properties can be obtained based on nuclear material accounting information. Nuclear fuel assembly data being reported for the IAEA Safeguards can be utilized as unique identifier within the back-end fuel cycle. Depending upon the compulsory accountability report period, there exist time gaps. If national capabilities ensure that history information within the front-end nuclear fuel cycle is traceable particularly for the bulk handling facility, the entire cycle of national nuclear fuel would be managed in the framework of developing a national nuclear forensic library.

  15. Inseparable twins: nuclear bomb fuel and nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruff, T.; University of Melbourne, Melbourne

    2006-01-01

    The spread of nuclear power increases the number of nations and organisations with opportunities to make nuclear weapons or buy or steal the materials to make them. Global warming demands real solutions, not nuclear diversions and dangers.

  16. Nuclear material control in Spain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Velilla, A.

    1988-01-01

    A general view about the safeguards activities in Spain is presented. The national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials is described. The safeguards agreements signed by Spain are presented and the facilities and nuclear materials under these agreements are listed. (E.G.) [pt

  17. The Attractiveness of Materials in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles for Various Proliferation and Theft Scenarios

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, C.G.; Wallace, R.K.; Ireland, J.R.; Johnson, M.W.; Hase, Kevin R.; Jarvinen, G.D.; Ebbinghaus, B.B.; Sleaford, Brad W.; Bradley, Keith S.; Collins, Brian A.; Smith, Brian W.; Prichard, Andrew W.

    2010-01-01

    This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant state and sub-national group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.

  18. The attractiveness of materials in advanced nuclear fuel cycles for various proliferation and theft scenarios

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, Charles G.; Wallace, Richard K.; Ireland, John R.; Johnson, M.W.; Hase, Kevin R.; Jarvinen, Gordon D.; Ebbinghaus, Bartley B.; Sleaford, Brad A.; Bradley, Keith S.; Collins, Brian W.; Smith, Brian W.; Prichard, Andrew W.

    2009-01-01

    This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant state and sub-national group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.

  19. Automated nuclear materials accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pacak, P.; Moravec, J.

    1982-01-01

    An automated state system of accounting for nuclear materials data was established in Czechoslovakia in 1979. A file was compiled of 12 programs in the PL/1 language. The file is divided into four groups according to logical associations, namely programs for data input and checking, programs for handling the basic data file, programs for report outputs in the form of worksheets and magnetic tape records, and programs for book inventory listing, document inventory handling and materials balance listing. A similar automated system of nuclear fuel inventory for a light water reactor was introduced for internal purposes in the Institute of Nuclear Research (UJV). (H.S.)

  20. Development of nuclear material accountancy control system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirosawa, Naonori; Kashima, Sadamitsu; Akiba, Mitsunori

    1992-01-01

    PNC is developing a wide area of nuclear fuel cycle. Therefore, much nuclear material with a various form exists at each facility in the Works, and the controls of the inventory changes and the physical inventories of nuclear material are important. Nuclear material accountancy is a basic measure in safeguards system based on Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the light of such importance of material accountancy, the data base of nuclear material control and the material accountancy report system for all facilities has been developed by using the computer. By this system, accountancy report to STA is being presented certainly and timely. Property management and rapid corresponding to various inquiries can be carried out by the data base system which has free item searching procedure. (author)

  1. New materials in nuclear fusion reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iwata, Shuichi

    1988-01-01

    In the autumn of 1987, the critical condition was attained in the JET in Europe and Japanese JT-60, thus the first subject in the physical verification of nuclear fusion reactors was resolved, and the challenge to the next attainment of self ignition condition started. As the development process of nuclear fusion reactors, there are the steps of engineering, economical and social verifications after this physical verification, and in respective steps, there are the critical problems related to materials, therefore the development of new materials must be advanced. The condition of using nuclear fusion reactors is characterized by high fluence, high thermal flux and strong magnetic field, and under such extreme condition, the microscopic structures of materials change, and they behave much differently from usual case. The subjects of material development for nuclear fusion reactors, the material data base being built up, the materials for facing plasma and high thermal flux, first walls, blanket structures, electric insulators and others are described. The serious effect of irradiation and the rate of defect inducement must be taken in consideration in the structural materials for nuclear fusion reactors. (Kako, I.)

  2. Multinuclear solid-state nuclear magnetic resonance of inorganic materials

    CERN Document Server

    MacKenzie, Kenneth J D

    2002-01-01

    Techniques of solid state nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy are constantly being extended to a more diverse range of materials, pressing into service an ever-expanding range of nuclides including some previously considered too intractable to provide usable results. At the same time, new developments in both hardware and software are being introduced and refined. This book covers the most important of these new developments. With sections addressed to non-specialist researchers (providing accessible answers to the most common questions about the theory and practice of NMR asked by novices) as well as a more specialised and up-to-date treatment of the most important areas of inorganic materials research to which NMR has application, this book should be useful to NMR users whatever their level of expertise and whatever inorganic materials they wish to study.

  3. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-06-01

    The latest review (1993) of this document was of limited scope and resulted in changes to the text of INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 designed to make the categorization table in that document consistent with the categorization table contained in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Consequently, a comprehensive review of INFCIRC/225 has not been conducted since 1989. Consequently, a meeting of national experts was convened from 2-5 June 1998 and from 27-29 October 1998 for a thorough review of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. The revised document reflects the recommendations of the national experts to improve the structure and clarity of the document and to take account of improved technology and current international and national practices. In particular, a chapter has been added which provides specific recommendations related to sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. As a result of this addition, the title has been changed to 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities'. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States.

  4. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    The latest review (1993) of this document was of limited scope and resulted in changes to the text of INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 designed to make the categorization table in that document consistent with the categorization table contained in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Consequently, a comprehensive review of INFCIRC/225 has not been conducted since 1989. Consequently, a meeting of national experts was convened from 2-5 June 1998 and from 27-29 October 1998 for a thorough review of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. The revised document reflects the recommendations of the national experts to improve the structure and clarity of the document and to take account of improved technology and current international and national practices. In particular, a chapter has been added which provides specific recommendations related to sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. As a result of this addition, the title has been changed to 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities'. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States

  5. Graphite materials for nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oku, Tatsuo

    1991-01-01

    Graphite materials have been used in the nuclear fission reactors from the beginning of the reactor development for the speed reduction and reflection of neutron. Graphite materials are used both as a moderator and as a reflector in the core of high temperature gas-cooled reactors, and both as a radiation shielding material and as a reflector in the surrounding of the core for the fast breeder reactor. On the other hand, graphite materials are being positively used as a first wall of plasma as it is known that low Z materials are useful for holding high temperature plasma in the nuclear fusion devices. In this paper the present status of the application of graphite materials to the nuclear fission reactors and fusion devices (reactors) is presented. In addition, a part of results on the related properties to the structural design and safety evaluation and results examined on the subjects that should be done in the future are also described. (author)

  6. LECI Department of Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The LECI is a 'hot' laboratory dedicated mostly to the characterization of irradiated materials. It has, however, limited activities on fuel, as a back up to the LECA STAR in Cadarache. The LECI belongs to the Section of Research on Irradiated Materials (Department of Nuclear Materials). The Department for Nuclear Materials (DMN) has for its missions: - to contribute, through theoretical and experimental investigations, to the development of knowledge in materials science in order to be able to predict the evolution of the material physical and mechanical properties under service conditions (irradiation, thermomechanical solicitations, influence of the environment,..); - to characterize the properties of the materials used in the nuclear industry in order to determine their performance and to be able to predict their life expectancy, in particular via modelling. These materials can be irradiated or not, and originate from surveillance programs, experimental neutron irradiations or simulated irradiations with charged particles; - to establish, maintain and make use of the databases generated by these data; - to propose new or optimized materials, satisfying future service conditions and extend the life or the competitiveness of the associated systems; - to establish constitutive laws and models for the materials in service, incidental, accidental and storage conditions, and contribute to the development of the associated design codes in order to support the safety argumentation of utilities and vendors; - to provide expertise on industrial components, in particular to investigate strain or rupture mechanisms and to offer leads for improvement. This document presents, first, the purpose of the LECI (Historical data, Strategy, I and K shielded cell lines (building 605), M shielded cell line (building 625), Authorized materials). Then, it presents the microscopy and irradiation damage studies laboratory of the Saclay centre (Building 605) Which belongs to the Nuclear

  7. Combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. Reference material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    This publication is intended for individuals and organizations that may be called upon to deal with the detection of and response to criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material. It will also be useful for legislators, law enforcement agencies, government officials, technical experts, lawyers, diplomats and users of nuclear technology. This manual emphasizes the international initiatives for improving the security of nuclear and other radioactive material. However, it is recognized that effective measures for controlling the transfer of equipment, non-nuclear material, technology or information that may assist in the development of nuclear explosive devices, improvised nuclear devices (INDs) or other radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are important elements of an effective nuclear security system. In addition, issues of personal integrity, inspection and investigative procedures are not discussed in this manual, all of which are essential elements for an effective overall security system. The manual considers a variety of elements that are recognized as being essential for dealing with incidents of criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material. Depending on conditions in a specific State, including its legal and governmental infrastructure, some of the measures discussed will need to be adapted to suit that State's circumstances. However, much of the material can be applied directly in the context of other national programmes. This manual is divided into four main parts. Section 2 discusses the threat posed by criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material, as well as the policy and legal bases underlying the international effort to restrain such activities. Sections 3 and 4 summarize the major international undertakings in the field. Sections 5-8 provide some basic technical information on radiation, radioactive material, the health consequences of radiation

  8. Material degradation - a nuclear utility's view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spekkens, P.

    2007-01-01

    Degradation of nuclear plant materials has been responsible for major costs and unit outage time. As such, nuclear utilities are important end users of the information produced by R and D on material degradation. This plenary describes the significance of material degradation for the nuclear utilities, and how utilities use information about material degradation in their short, medium and long term planning activities. Utilities invest in R and D programs to assist them in their business objective of operating safely, reliably and cost competitively. Material degradation impacts all three of these business drivers. Utilities make decisions on life cycle planning, unit refurbishment and 'new build' projects on the basis of their understanding of the behaviour of a variety of materials in a broad range of environments. The R and D being carried out today will determine the future business success of the nuclear utilities. The R and D program needs to be broadly based to include a range of materials, environments and time-frames, particularly any new materials proposed for use in new units. The R and D community needs to help the utility managers make choices that will result in an optimized materials R and D program

  9. Control of Nuclear Material in Republic of Croatia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cizmek, A.; Medakovic, S.; Prah, M.; Novosel, N.

    2008-01-01

    State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS) is established based on 'Nuclear Safety Act' (Official Gazette No. 173/2003) as an independent state organization responsible for all questions in connection with safe use of nuclear energy and technology, for expert matters of preparedness in the case of nuclear emergency, as well as for international co-operation in these fields (regulatory body). In the second half of year 2006, stationary detection systems for nuclear and other radioactive materials were installed on Border Crossing Bregana, Croatia. Yantar 2U, which is the commercial name of the system, is integrated automatic system capable of detection of nuclear and other radioactive materials prepared for fixed-site customs applications (Russian origin). Installed system contains portal monitors, camera, communication lines and communication boxes and server. Two fully functional separate systems has been installed on BC Bregana, one on truck entrance and another one on car entrance. In this article the operational experience of installed system is presented. This includes statistical analysis of recorded alarms, evaluation of procedures for operational stuff and maintenance and typical malfunction experience, as well as some of the recommendation for future use of detection systems. Ordinance on the control of nuclear material and special equipment (Official Gazette No. 15/08) lays down the list of nuclear materials and special equipment as well as the list of other activities related to the production of special equipment and non-nuclear materials; the contents of the declaration of intent form for export/import of goods, the form for notifying export/import of goods, the form for notifying transport of nuclear material, the form for notifying the activity related to producing of special equipment and non-nuclear material, as well as of the form of the report on nuclear material balance in the user's material balance area. This Ordinance lays down the method of

  10. Nuclear material control in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marzo, M.A.S.; Iskin, M.C.L.; Palhares, L.C.; Almeida, S.G. de.

    1988-01-01

    A general view about the safeguards activities in Brazil is presented. The national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials is described. The safeguards agreements signed by Brazil are presented, the facilities and nuclear material under these agreements are listed, and the dificulties on the pratical implementation are discussed. (E.G.) [pt

  11. Radiation Effects in Nuclear Waste Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weber, William J.; Wang, Lumin; Hess, Nancy J.; Icenhower, Jonathan P.; Thevuthasan, Suntharampillai

    2003-01-01

    The objective of this project is to develop a fundamental understanding of radiation effects in glasses and ceramics, as well as the influence of solid-state radiation effects on aqueous dissolution kinetics, which may impact the performance of nuclear waste forms and stabilized nuclear materials. This work provides the underpinning science to develop improved glass and ceramic waste forms for the immobilization and disposition of high-level tank waste, excess plutonium, plutonium residues and scrap, other actinides, and other nuclear waste streams. Furthermore, this work is developing develop predictive models for the performance of nuclear waste forms and stabilized nuclear materials. Thus, the research performed under this project has significant implications for the immobilization of High-Level Waste (HLW) and Nuclear Materials, two mission areas within the Office of Environmental Management (EM). With regard to the HLW mission, this research will lead to improved understanding of radiation-induced degradation mechanisms and their effects on dissolution kinetics, as well as development of predictive models for waste form performance. In the Nuclear Materials mission, this research will lead to improvements in the understanding of radiation effects on the chemical and structural properties of materials for the stabilization and long-term storage of plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, and other actinides. The research uses plutonium incorporation, ion-beam irradiation, and electron-beam irradiation to simulate the effects of alpha decay and beta decay on relevant glasses and ceramics. The research under this project has the potential to result in improved glass and ceramic materials for the stabilization and immobilization of high-level tank waste, plutonium residues and scraps, surplus weapons plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, other actinides, and other radioactive materials

  12. Radiation Effects in Nuclear Waste Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weber, William J.

    2005-01-01

    The objective of this project is to develop a fundamental understanding of radiation effects in glasses and ceramics, as well as the influence of solid-state radiation effects on aqueous dissolution kinetics, which may impact the performance of nuclear waste forms and stabilized nuclear materials. This work provides the underpinning science to develop improved glass and ceramic waste forms for the immobilization and disposition of high-level tank waste, excess plutonium, plutonium residues and scrap, other actinides, and other nuclear waste streams. Furthermore, this work is developing develop predictive models for the performance of nuclear waste forms and stabilized nuclear materials. Thus, the research performed under this project has significant implications for the immobilization of High-Level Waste (HLW) and Nuclear Materials, two mission areas within the Office of Environmental Management (EM). With regard to the HLW mission, this research will lead to improved understanding of radiation-induced degradation mechanisms and their effects on dissolution kinetics, as well as development of predictive models for waste form performance. In the Nuclear Materials mission, this research will lead to improvements in the understanding of radiation effects on the chemical and structural properties of materials for the stabilization and long-term storage of plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, and other actinides. The research uses plutonium incorporation, ion-beam irradiation, and electron-beam irradiation to simulate the effects of alpha decay and beta decay on relevant glasses and ceramics. The research under this project has the potential to result in improved glass and ceramic materials for the stabilization and immobilization of high-level tank waste, plutonium residues and scraps, surplus weapons plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, other actinides, and other radioactive materials

  13. Nuclear materials transport worldwide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stellpflug, J.

    1987-01-01

    This Greenpeace report shows: nuclear materials transport is an extremely hazardous business. There is no safe protection against accidents, kidnapping, or sabotage. Any moment of a day, at any place, a nuclear transport accident may bring the world to disaster, releasing plutonium or radioactive fission products to the environment. Such an event is not less probable than the MCA at Chernobyl. The author of the book in hand follows the secret track of radioactive materials around the world, from uranium mines to the nuclear power plants, from reprocessing facilities to the waste repositories. He explores the routes of transport and the risks involved, he gives the names of transport firms and discloses incidents and carelessness, tells about damaged waste drums and plutonium that 'disappeared'. He also tells about worldwide, organised resistance to such nuclear transports, explaining the Greenpeace missions on the open sea, or the 'day X' operation at the Gorleben site, informing the reader about protests and actions for a world freed from the threat of nuclear energy. (orig./HP) [de

  14. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  15. Nuclear Forensic Science: Analysis of Nuclear Material Out of Regulatory Control

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kristo, Michael J.; Gaffney, Amy M.; Marks, Naomi; Knight, Kim; Cassata, William S.; Hutcheon, Ian D.

    2016-06-01

    Nuclear forensic science seeks to identify the origin of nuclear materials found outside regulatory control. It is increasingly recognized as an integral part of a robust nuclear security program. This review highlights areas of active, evolving research in nuclear forensics, with a focus on analytical techniques commonly employed in Earth and planetary sciences. Applications of nuclear forensics to uranium ore concentrates (UOCs) are discussed first. UOCs have become an attractive target for nuclear forensic researchers because of the richness in impurities compared to materials produced later in the fuel cycle. The development of chronometric methods for age dating nuclear materials is then discussed, with an emphasis on improvements in accuracy that have been gained from measurements of multiple radioisotopic systems. Finally, papers that report on casework are reviewed, to provide a window into current scientific practice.

  16. The century of nuclear materials

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mansur, Lou; Was, Gary S.; Zinkle, Steve; Petti, David; Ukai, Shigeharu

    2018-03-01

    In the spring of 1959 the well-read metallurgist would have noticed the first issue of an infant Journal, one dedicated to a unique and fast growing field of materials issues associated with nuclear energy systems. The periodical, Journal of Nuclear Materials (JNM), is now the leading publication in the field from which it takes its name, thriving beyond the rosiest expectations of its founders. The discipline is well into the second half-century. During that time much has been achieved in nuclear materials; the Journal provides the authoritative record of virtually all those accomplishments. These pages introduce the 500th volume, a significant measure in the world of publishing. The Editors reflect on the progress in the field and the role of this journal.

  17. Safeguards on nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

  18. Metabonomics for detection of nuclear materials processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alam, Todd Michael; Luxon, Bruce A.; Neerathilingam, Muniasamy; Ansari, S.; Volk, David; Sarkar, S.; Alam, Mary Kathleen

    2010-01-01

    Tracking nuclear materials production and processing, particularly covert operations, is a key national security concern, given that nuclear materials processing can be a signature of nuclear weapons activities by US adversaries. Covert trafficking can also result in homeland security threats, most notably allowing terrorists to assemble devices such as dirty bombs. Existing methods depend on isotope analysis and do not necessarily detect chronic low-level exposure. In this project, indigenous organisms such as plants, small mammals, and bacteria are utilized as living sensors for the presence of chemicals used in nuclear materials processing. Such 'metabolic fingerprinting' (or 'metabonomics') employs nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy to assess alterations in organismal metabolism provoked by the environmental presence of nuclear materials processing, for example the tributyl phosphate employed in the processing of spent reactor fuel rods to extract and purify uranium and plutonium for weaponization.

  19. Nuclear materials facility safety initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peddicord, K.L.; Nelson, P.; Roundhill, M.; Jardine, L.J.; Lazarev, L.; Moshkov, M.; Khromov, V.V.; Kruchkov, E.; Bolyatko, V.; Kazanskij, Yu.; Vorobeva, I.; Lash, T.R.; Newton, D.; Harris, B.

    2000-01-01

    Safety in any facility in the nuclear fuel cycle is a fundamental goal. However, it is recognized that, for example, should an accident occur in either the U.S. or Russia, the results could seriously delay joint activities to store and disposition weapons fissile materials in both countries. To address this, plans are underway jointly to develop a nuclear materials facility safety initiative. The focus of the initiative would be to share expertise which would lead in improvements in safety and safe practices in the nuclear fuel cycle.The program has two components. The first is a lab-to-lab initiative. The second involves university-to-university collaboration.The lab-to-lab and university-to-university programs will contribute to increased safety in facilities dealing with nuclear materials and related processes. These programs will support important bilateral initiatives, develop the next generation of scientists and engineers which will deal with these challenges, and foster the development of a safety culture

  20. Modernizing computerized nuclear material accounting systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erkkila, B.H.; Claborn, J.

    1995-01-01

    DOE Orders and draft orders for nuclear material control and accountability address a complete material control and accountability (MC and A) program for all DOE contractors processing, using, or storing nuclear materials. A critical element of an MC and A program is the accounting system used to track and record all inventories of nuclear material and movements of materials in those inventories. Most DOE facilities use computerized accounting systems to facilitate the task of accounting for all their inventory of nuclear materials. Many facilities still use a mixture of a manual paper system with a computerized system. Also, facilities may use multiple systems to support information needed for MC and A. For real-time accounting it is desirable to implement a single integrated data base management system for a variety of users. In addition to accountability needs, waste management, material management, and production operations must be supported. Information in these systems can also support criticality safety and other safety issues. Modern networked microcomputers provide extensive processing and reporting capabilities that single mainframe computer systems struggle with. This paper describes an approach being developed at Los Alamos to address these problems

  1. Reducing nuclear danger through intergovernmental technical exchanges on nuclear materials safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.J.; Peddicord, K.L.; Witmer, F.E.; Krumpe, P.F.; Lazarev, L.; Moshkov, M.

    1997-01-01

    The United States and Russia are dismantling nuclear weapons and generating hundreds of tons of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium fissile nuclear materials that require disposition. The U.S. Department of Energy and Russian Minatom organizations.are planning and implementing safe, secure storage and disposition operations for these materials in numerous facilities. This provides a new opportunity for technical exchanges between Russian and Western scientists that can establish an improved and sustained common safety culture for handling these materials. An initiative that develops and uses personal relationships and joint projects among Russian and Western participants involved in fissile nuclear materials safety management contributes to improving nuclear materials nonproliferation and to making a safer world. Technical exchanges and workshops are being used to systematically identify opportunities in the nuclear fissile materials facilities to improve and ensure the safety of workers, the public, and the environment

  2. Regulation on control of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikeda, Kaname

    1976-01-01

    Some comment is made on the present laws and the future course of consolidating the regulation of nuclear fuel materials. The first part gives the definitions of the nuclear fuel materials in the laws. The second part deals with the classification and regulation in material handling. Refinement undertaking, fabrication undertaking, reprocessing undertaking, the permission of the government to use the materials, the permission of the government to use the materials under international control, the restriction of transfer and receipt, the reporting, and the safeguard measures are commented. The third part deals with the strengthening of regulation. The nuclear fuel safety deliberation special committee will be established at some opportunity of revising the ordinance. The nuclear material safeguard special committee has been established in the Atomic Energy Commission. The last part deals with the future course of legal consolidation. The safety control will be strengthened. The early investigation of waste handling is necessary, because low level solid wastes are accumulating at each establishment. The law for transporting nuclear materials must be consolidated as early as possible to correspond to foreign transportation laws. Physical protection is awaiting the conclusions of the nuclear fuel safeguard special committee. The control and information systems for the safeguard measures must be consolidated in the laws. (Iwakiri, K.)

  3. Technologies for detection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeVolpi, A.

    1996-01-01

    Detection of smuggled nuclear materials at transit points requires monitoring unknown samples in large closed packages. This review contends that high-confidence nuclear-material detection requires induced fission as the primary mechanism, with passive radiation screening in a complementary role. With the right equipment, even small quantities of nuclear materials are detectable with a high probability at transit points. The equipment could also be linked synergistically with detectors of other contrabond. For screening postal mail and packages, passive monitors are probably more cost-effective. When a suspicious item is detected, a single active probe could then be used. Until active systems become mass produced, this two-stage screening/interrogation role for active/passive equipment is more economic for cargo at border crossings. For widespread monitoring of nuclear smuggling, it will probably be necessary to develop a system for simultaneously detecting most categories of contraband, including explosives and illicit drugs. With control of nuclear materials at known storage sites being the first line of defense, detection capabilities at international borders could establish a viable second line of defense against smuggling

  4. Tracer techniques in estimating nuclear materials holdup

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1987-01-01

    Residual inventory of nuclear materials remaining in processing facilities (holdup) is recognized as an insidious problem for safety of plant operations and safeguarding of special nuclear materials (SNM). This paper reports on an experimental study where a well-known method of radioanalytical chemistry, namely tracer technique, was successfully used to improve nondestructive measurements of holdup of nuclear materials in a variety of plant equipment. Such controlled measurements can improve the sensitivity of measurements of residual inventories of nuclear materials in process equipment by several orders of magnitude and the good quality data obtained lend themselves to developing mathematical models of holdup of SNM during stable plant operations

  5. Metabonomics for detection of nuclear materials processing.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alam, Todd Michael; Luxon, Bruce A. (University Texas Medical Branch); Neerathilingam, Muniasamy (University Texas Medical Branch); Ansari, S. (University Texas Medical Branch); Volk, David (University Texas Medical Branch); Sarkar, S. (University Texas Medical Branch); Alam, Mary Kathleen

    2010-08-01

    Tracking nuclear materials production and processing, particularly covert operations, is a key national security concern, given that nuclear materials processing can be a signature of nuclear weapons activities by US adversaries. Covert trafficking can also result in homeland security threats, most notably allowing terrorists to assemble devices such as dirty bombs. Existing methods depend on isotope analysis and do not necessarily detect chronic low-level exposure. In this project, indigenous organisms such as plants, small mammals, and bacteria are utilized as living sensors for the presence of chemicals used in nuclear materials processing. Such 'metabolic fingerprinting' (or 'metabonomics') employs nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy to assess alterations in organismal metabolism provoked by the environmental presence of nuclear materials processing, for example the tributyl phosphate employed in the processing of spent reactor fuel rods to extract and purify uranium and plutonium for weaponization.

  6. Security of material: Preventing criminal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    2001-01-01

    The report emphasizes the need for national regulatory authorities to include in the regulatory systems, measures to control and protect nuclear materials from being used in illegal activities, as well as aspects of relevance for detecting and responding to illegal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. The report will give an overview of the international treaties and agreements that underpin the establishment of a regulatory structure necessary for States to meet their non-proliferation policy and undertakings. Ongoing work to strengthen the protection of nuclear material and to detect and respond to illegal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive material will be included. The focus of the paper is on the need for standards and national regulation in the nuclear security area. (author)

  7. Role of nuclear material accounting and control on nuclear security. Countermeasure against insider threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    2014-01-01

    Possibility on unauthorized removal (theft) of nuclear material by a facility insider is a recognized as a serious threat. An insider could take advantage or knowledge of control system and access to nuclear material to intercept facility's system designed to protect theft of nuclear material by an insider. This paper will address how the facility level Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) System should be designed and implemented to enhance deterring and detect theft of nuclear material by a facility insider. (author)

  8. Proliferation Resistance: Acquisition/Diversion Pathway Analysis for the DUPIC Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ko, Won Il; Chang, Hong Lae; Song, Dae Yong; Lee, Ho Hee; Kwon, Eun Ha; Jeong, Chang Joon; Kim, Ho Dong

    2009-07-01

    Within the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), a methodology for evaluating proliferation resistance (INPRO PR methodology) has been developed. However, it remains to develop the methodology to evaluate User Requirements (UR) 4 regarding multiplicity and robustness of barriers against proliferation - innovative nuclear energy systems should incorporate multiple proliferation resistance features and measures. Since this requires an acquisition/diversion pathway analysis, this report describes a systematic approach developed for the identification and analysis of pathways for the acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear material using the DUPIC fuel cycle system. At the first step, the objectives of the proliferation were identified, including the quality and quantity of the material, the time required to acquire the material for the proliferation, thr capability of the potential proliferant country, etc. At the second step, the possible strategies, which the potential proliferant country could adopt, were identified: undeclared removal of nuclear material from the fuel cycle facilities; and further treatment of the diverted nuclear materials needed to acquire weapons-usable materials. At the final step, a systematic approach to select the plausible pathways for the acquisition/diversion of nuclear material during the whole fuel cycle has been developed. The coarse material diversion pathways for the DUPIC fuel cycle and the approach developed was reviewed and discussed at the experts meeting at the IAEA for its appropriateness and comprehensiveness

  9. Problems on shipping high-enriched nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ganzha, V.V.; Demko, N.A.; Deryavko, I.I.; Zelenski, D.I.; Kolbaenkov, A.N.; Pivovarov, O.S.; Storozhenko, A.N.; Chernyad'ev, V.V.; Yakovlev, V.V.; Gorin, N.V.; Prokhod'ko, A.I.; Sherbina, A.N.; Barsanov, V.I.; Dyakov, E.K.; Tishenko, M.F.; Khlystov, A.I.; Vasil'ev, A.P.; Smetannikov, V.P.

    1998-01-01

    In 1996-1998 all Russian nuclear materials were taken out of the Institute of Atomic Energy of Kazakhstan National Nuclear Centre (IAE NNC RK). In this report there are basic tasks related to the performance of this work. They are: 1) Preparation of Russian nuclear materials (NM) kept at IAE NNC RK for transportation; 2) accounting and control of Russian nuclear materials kept at IAE NNC RK; 3) arrangement of permit papers for NM transportation; 4) NM transportation from IAE NNC RK to the enterprises of Russian MINATOM; 5) provision of nuclear and radiation safety in the course of operations with NM; 6) provision of physical protection for Russian NM

  10. Study of nuclear environment and material strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kamei, Takashi

    2011-01-01

    There is a concern about the environmental hazard caused by radioactive materials coming with the expansion of nuclear power and even by renewable energies, which are used as countermeasures against global warming to construct a sustainable society. A concept to internalize the pollution caused by radioactive materials, which are directly or indirectly related to nuclear power, to economical activities by adopting externality is proposed. Energy and industrial productions are strongly related to the supply of material. Therefore material flow is also part of this internalization concept. The concept is named 'NEMS (Nuclear Environment and Material Strategy)'. Fission products and transuranic isotopes from nuclear power such as plutonium are considered in this concept. Thorium, which comes from the material flow of rare-earth production to support the elaboration of renewable energies including electric vehicles on the consumer side, is considered as an externality of the non-nuclear power field. Fission products contain some rare-earth materials. Thus, these rare-earth materials, which are extracted by the advanced ORIENT (Optimization by Recycling Instructive Elements) cycle, are internalized as rare-earth supplier in economy. However, the supply quantity is limited. Therefore rare-earth production itself is still needed. The externality of rare-earth production is thorium and is internalized by using it as nuclear fuel. In this case, the demand of thorium is still small within these few decades compared to the production of thorium as byproduct of the rare-earth production. A thorium energy bank (The Bank) is advanced to regulate the storage of the excess amount of thorium inside of an international framework in order to prevent environmental hazard resulting from the illegal disposal of thorium. In this paper, the material flows of thorium and rare-earth are outlined. Their material balance are demonstrated based on the prediction of rare-earth mining and an

  11. Passive nondestructive assay of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reilly, D.; Ensslin, N.; Smith, H. Jr.; Kreiner, S.

    1991-03-01

    The term nondestructive assay (NDA) is applied to a series of measurement techniques for nuclear fuel materials. The techniques measure radiation induced or emitted spontaneously from the nuclear material; the measurements are nondestructive in that they do not alter the physical or chemical state of the nuclear material. NDA techniques are characterized as passive or active depending on whether they measure radiation from the spontaneous decay of the nuclear material or radiation induced by an external source. This book emphasizes passive NDA techniques, although certain active techniques like gamma-ray absorption densitometry and x-ray fluorescence are discussed here because of their intimate relation to passive assay techniques. The principal NDA techniques are classified as gamma-ray assay, neutron assay, and calorimetry. Gamma-ray assay techniques are treated in Chapters 1--10. Neutron assay techniques are the subject of Chapters 11--17. Chapters 11--13 cover the origin of neutrons, neutron interactions, and neutron detectors. Chapters 14--17 cover the theory and applications of total and coincidence neutron counting. Chapter 18 deals with the assay of irradiated nuclear fuel, which uses both gamma-ray and neutron assay techniques. Chapter 19 covers perimeter monitoring, which uses gamma-ray and neutron detectors of high sensitivity to check that no unauthorized nuclear material crosses a facility boundary. The subject of Chapter 20 is attribute and semiquantitative measurements. The goal of these measurements is a rapid verification of the contents of nuclear material containers to assist physical inventory verifications. Waste and holdup measurements are also treated in this chapter. Chapters 21 and 22 cover calorimetry theory and application, and Chapter 23 is a brief application guide to illustrate which techniques can be used to solve certain measurement problems

  12. Further assessments of the attractiveness of materials in advanced nuclear fuel cycles from a safeguards perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, Charles G.; Jarvinen, Gordon D.; Wallace, Richard K.; Ireland, John R.; Johnson, M.W.; Sleaford, Brad W.; Ebbinghaus, Bartley B.; Bradley, Keith S.; Collins, Brian A.; Smith, Brian W.; Prichard, Andrew W.

    2010-01-01

    This paper summarises the results of an extension to an earlier study [1] that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with the Purex, Urex+ and COEX reprocessing schemes. This study focuses on the materials associated with the Urex, COEX, Thorex and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study also examines what is required to render plutonium as 'unattractive.' Furthermore, combining the results of this study with those from the earlier study permits a comparison of the uranium- and thorium-based fuel cycles on the basis of the attractiveness of the SNM associated with each fuel cycle. Both studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE), and are based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that has been couched in terms chosen for consistency with those normally used for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities [2]. The methodology and key findings will be presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance (e.g. by increasing impediments to the diversion, theft, undeclared production of SNM for the purpose of acquiring a nuclear weapon), and how they could be used to help inform policy makers, will be discussed. (authors)

  13. Concepts of IAEA nuclear materials accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oakberg, John A.

    2001-01-01

    The paper describes nuclear material accounting from the standpoint of IAEA Safeguards and how this accounting is applied by the Agency. The basic concepts of nuclear material accounting are defined and the way these apply to States with INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements is presented. (author)

  14. Nuclear disarmament and peaceful nuclear technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, T.B.

    1989-01-01

    According to the author, it remains to be seen whether nuclear disarmament can reduce the risks of nuclear war sufficiently for the residual risks to be acceptable to a majority of the world's population, while at the same time vigorous growth in the world's dependence on nuclear energy for peaceful purposes continues. This paper discusses how use of nuclear materials from dismantled weapons as fuel for peaceful purposes may help progress to be made towards that goal, by stimulating considerable improvements in the effectiveness of arrangements for preventing diversion of the materials from peaceful to military purposes, while at the same time eliminating large numbers of nuclear weapons

  15. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5): Recommendations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication, Revision 5 of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225), is intended to provide guidance to States and their competent authorities on how to develop or enhance, implement and maintain a physical protection regime for nuclear material and nuclear facilities, through the establishment or improvement of their capabilities to implement legislative and regulatory programmes. The recommendations presented in this publication reflect a broad consensus among IAEA Member States on the requirements which should be met for the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.

  16. Illicit trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials: modeling and analysis of trafficking trends and risks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    York, David L.; Love, Tracia L.; Rochau, Gary Eugene

    2005-01-01

    Concerns over the illicit trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials were focused originally on the lack of security and accountability of such material throughout the former Soviet states. This is primarily attributed to the frequency of events that have occurred involving the theft and trafficking of critical material components that could be used to construct a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) or even a rudimentary nuclear device. However, with the continued expansion of nuclear technology and the deployment of a global nuclear fuel cycle these materials have become increasingly prevalent, affording a more diverse inventory of dangerous materials and dual-use items. To further complicate the matter, the list of nuclear consumers has grown to include: (1) Nation-states that have gone beyond the IAEA agreed framework and additional protocols concerning multiple nuclear fuel cycles and processes that reuse the fuel through reprocessing to exploit technologies previously confined to the more industrialized world; (2) Terrorist organizations seeking to acquire nuclear and radiological material due to the potential devastation and psychological effect of their use; (3) Organized crime, which has discovered a lucrative market in trafficking of illicit material to international actors and/or countries; and (4) Amateur smugglers trying to feed their families in a post-Soviet era. An initial look at trafficking trends of this type seems scattered and erratic, localized primarily to a select group of countries. This is not necessarily the case. The success with which other contraband has been smuggled throughout the world suggests that nuclear trafficking may be carried out with relative ease along the same routes by the same criminals or criminal organizations. Because of the inordinately high threat posed by terrorist or extremist groups acquiring the ingredients for unconventional weapons, it is necessary that illicit trafficking of these materials be better

  17. Nuclear Materials Management for the Nevada Test Site (NTS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jesse C. Schreiber

    2007-01-01

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) has transitioned from its historical role of weapons testing to a broader role that is focused on being a solution to multiple National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) challenges and opportunities with nuclear materials for the nation. NTS is supporting other NNSA sites challenged with safe nuclear materials storage and disposition. NNSA, with site involvement, is currently transforming the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure to meet the 2030 vision. Efforts are under way to make the production complex smaller, more consolidated, and more modern. With respect to the nuclear material stockpile, the NNSA sites are currently reducing the complex nuclear material inventory through dispositioning and consolidating nuclear material. This includes moving material from other sites to NTS. State-of-the-art nuclear material management and control practices at NTS are essential for NTS to ensure that these new activities are accomplished in a safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally responsible manner. NTS is aggressively addressing this challenge

  18. Diversity Strategies for Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wood, Richard Thomas; Belles, Randy; Cetiner, Mustafa Sacit; Holcomb, David Eugene; Korsah, Kofi; Loebl, Andy; Mays, Gary T.; Muhlheim, Michael David; Mullens, James Allen; Poore, Willis P. III; Qualls, A.L.; Wilson, Thomas L.; Waterman, Michael E.

    2010-01-01

    This report presents the technical basis for establishing acceptable mitigating strategies that resolve diversity and defense-in-depth (D3) assessment findings and conform to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. The research approach employed to establish appropriate diversity strategies involves investigation of available documentation on D3 methods and experience from nuclear power and nonnuclear industries, capture of expert knowledge and lessons learned, determination of best practices, and assessment of the nature of common-cause failures (CCFs) and compensating diversity attributes. The research described in this report does not provide guidance on how to determine the need for diversity in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs. Rather, the scope of this report provides guidance to the staff and nuclear industry after a licensee or applicant has performed a D3 assessment per NUREG/CR-6303 and determined that diversity in a safety system is needed for mitigating the consequences of potential CCFs identified in the evaluation of the safety system design features. Succinctly, the purpose of the research described in this report was to answer the question, 'If diversity is required in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs, how much diversity is enough?' The principal results of this research effort have identified and developed diversity strategies, which consist of combinations of diversity attributes and their associated criteria. Technology, which corresponds to design diversity, is chosen as the principal system characteristic by which diversity criteria are grouped to form strategies. The rationale for this classification framework involves consideration of the profound impact that technology-focused design diversity provides. Consequently, the diversity usage classification scheme involves three families of strategies: (1) different technologies, (2) different approaches within the same

  19. Diversity Strategies for Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wood, Richard Thomas [ORNL; Belles, Randy [ORNL; Cetiner, Mustafa Sacit [ORNL; Holcomb, David Eugene [ORNL; Korsah, Kofi [ORNL; Loebl, Andy [ORNL; Mays, Gary T [ORNL; Muhlheim, Michael David [ORNL; Mullens, James Allen [ORNL; Poore III, Willis P [ORNL; Qualls, A L [ORNL; Wilson, Thomas L [ORNL; Waterman, Michael E. [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

    2010-02-01

    This report presents the technical basis for establishing acceptable mitigating strategies that resolve diversity and defense-in-depth (D3) assessment findings and conform to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. The research approach employed to establish appropriate diversity strategies involves investigation of available documentation on D3 methods and experience from nuclear power and nonnuclear industries, capture of expert knowledge and lessons learned, determination of best practices, and assessment of the nature of common-cause failures (CCFs) and compensating diversity attributes. The research described in this report does not provide guidance on how to determine the need for diversity in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs. Rather, the scope of this report provides guidance to the staff and nuclear industry after a licensee or applicant has performed a D3 assessment per NUREG/CR-6303 and determined that diversity in a safety system is needed for mitigating the consequences of potential CCFs identified in the evaluation of the safety system design features. Succinctly, the purpose of the research described in this report was to answer the question, 'If diversity is required in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs, how much diversity is enough?' The principal results of this research effort have identified and developed diversity strategies, which consist of combinations of diversity attributes and their associated criteria. Technology, which corresponds to design diversity, is chosen as the principal system characteristic by which diversity criteria are grouped to form strategies. The rationale for this classification framework involves consideration of the profound impact that technology-focused design diversity provides. Consequently, the diversity usage classification scheme involves three families of strategies: (1) different technologies, (2) different approaches within

  20. U.S. national nuclear material control and accounting system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, S; Terentiev, V G

    1998-01-01

    Issues related to nuclear material control and accounting and illegal dealing in these materials were discussed at the April 19--20, 1996 Moscow summit meeting (G7 + Russia). The declaration from this meeting reaffirmed that governments are responsible for the safety of all nuclear materials in their possession and for the effectiveness of the national control and accounting system for these materials. The Russian delegation at this meeting stated that ''the creation of a nuclear materials accounting, control, and physical protection system has become a government priority''. Therefore, in order to create a government nuclear material control and accounting system for the Russian Federation, it is critical to study the structure, operating principles, and regulations supporting the control and accounting of nuclear materials in the national systems of nuclear powers. In particular, Russian specialists have a definite interest in learning about the National Nuclear Material Control and Accounting System of the US, which has been operating successfully as an automated system since 1968

  1. Management review of nuclear material control and accounting systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-06-01

    Section 70.58, ''Fundamental Nuclear Material Controls,'' of 10 CFR Part 70, ''Special Nuclear Materials,'' requires, in paragraph 70.58(c), that certain licensees authorized to possess more than one effective kilogram of special nuclear material establish a management system to provide for the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of nuclear material control and accounting procedures. Such a system must provide for a review of the nuclear material control system at least every 12 months. This guide describes the purpose and scope, personnel qualifications, depth of detail, and procedures that are acceptable to the NRC staff for the management review of nuclear material control systems required under paragraph 70.58(c) of 10 CFR Part 70. (U.S.)

  2. Base isolation for nuclear power and nuclear material facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eidinger, J.M.; Kircher, C.A.; Vaidya, N.; Constantinou, M.; Kelly, J.M.; Seidensticker, R.; Tajirian, F.F.; Ovadia, D.

    1989-01-01

    This report serves to document the status of the practice for the use of base isolation systems in the design and construction of nuclear power and nuclear material facilities. The report first describes past and current (1989) applications of base isolation in nuclear facilities. The report then provides a brief discussion of non-nuclear applications. Finally, the report summarizes the status of known base-isolation codes and standards

  3. The choice of nuclear material measurement strategy in bulk-form in material balance area

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smirnov, V.M.; Sergeev, S.A.; Kirsanov, V.S.

    1999-01-01

    Concepts have been defined such as Shipment batch, Technological batch, and Accounting batch, it has been found that Shipment and Technological batches should be formed through the arrangement of group of measured Accounting batches. The strategy for nuclear material (NM) measurement based on the Accounting batch is shown to give a possibility to use the advantages for the accounting purposes: ensure safeguards of non-diversion of NM at quantitative (numerical) level, which is a higher grade of safeguards compared to the systems of accounting and control now in force of the US and EURATOM; ensure a guaranteed accuracy and reliability (confidence level) when making up NM balance in Material Balance Area (MBA) and at Federal level, which has been realized only in part in the NM control and accounting systems. Strategy of NM measurement for MBAs counting NM in bulk form has been proposed [ru

  4. Active Interrogation using Photofission Technique for Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, Haori [Oregon State Univ., Corvallis, OR (United States)

    2016-03-31

    Innovative systems with increased sensitivity and resolution are in great demand to detect diversion and to prevent misuse in support of nuclear materials management for the U.S. fuel cycle. Nuclear fission is the most important multiplicative process involved in non-destructive active interrogation. This process produces the most easily recognizable signature for nuclear materials. In addition to thermal or high-energy neutrons, high-energy gamma rays can also excite a nucleus and cause fission through a process known as photofission. Electron linear accelerators (linacs) are widely used as the interrogating photon sources for inspection methods involving photofission technique. After photofission reactions, prompt signals are much stronger than the delayed signals, but it is difficult to quantify them in practical measurements. Delayed signals are easily distinguishable from the interrogating radiation. Linac-based, advanced inspection techniques utilizing the delayed signals after photofission have been extensively studied for homeland security applications. Previous research also showed that a unique delayed gamma ray energy spectrum exists for each fissionable isotope. In this work, high-energy delayed γ-rays were demonstrated to be signatures for detection, identification, and quantification of special nuclear materials. Such γ-rays were measured in between linac pulses using independent data acquisition systems. A list-mode system was developed to measure low-energy delayed γ-rays after irradiation. Photofission product yields of 238U and 239Pu were determined based on the measured delayed γ-ray spectra. The differential yields of delayed γ-rays were also proven to be able to discriminate nuclear from non-nuclear materials. The measurement outcomes were compared with Monte Carlo simulation results. It was demonstrated that the current available codes have capabilities and limitations in the simulation of photofission process. A two

  5. Active Interrogation using Photofission Technique for Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Haori

    2016-01-01

    Innovative systems with increased sensitivity and resolution are in great demand to detect diversion and to prevent misuse in support of nuclear materials management for the U.S. fuel cycle. Nuclear fission is the most important multiplicative process involved in non-destructive active interrogation. This process produces the most easily recognizable signature for nuclear materials. In addition to thermal or high-energy neutrons, high-energy gamma rays can also excite a nucleus and cause fission through a process known as photofission. Electron linear accelerators (linacs) are widely used as the interrogating photon sources for inspection methods involving photofission technique. After photofission reactions, prompt signals are much stronger than the delayed signals, but it is difficult to quantify them in practical measurements. Delayed signals are easily distinguishable from the interrogating radiation. Linac-based, advanced inspection techniques utilizing the delayed signals after photofission have been extensively studied for homeland security applications. Previous research also showed that a unique delayed gamma ray energy spectrum exists for each fissionable isotope. In this work, high-energy delayed γ-rays were demonstrated to be signatures for detection, identification, and quantification of special nuclear materials. Such γ-rays were measured in between linac pulses using independent data acquisition systems. A list-mode system was developed to measure low-energy delayed γ-rays after irradiation. Photofission product yields of 238 U and 239 Pu were determined based on the measured delayed γ-ray spectra. The differential yields of delayed γ-rays were also proven to be able to discriminate nuclear from non-nuclear materials. The measurement outcomes were compared with Monte Carlo simulation results. It was demonstrated that the current available codes have capabilities and limitations in the simulation of photofission process. A two-fold approach was

  6. The plutonium mountain: preventing diversion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pohling-Brown, Pamela.

    1997-01-01

    With continued arms-reduction between the USA and the former Soviet Union, surplus nuclear materials, from dismantled weapons, requires handling. A number of risks are identified including occupational safety for workers involved with handling nuclear materials, and environmental protection. Perhaps the most sinister is the extra security needed to ensure that these materials are not diverted to rogue states or terrorist groups, as materials are handled in a larger number of countries. In particular, the author addresses the problem of plutonium reserves, and discusses the role of reprocessing in preventing diversion. (UK)

  7. Order for execution of the law concerning regulation of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The designations according to Item 1, Article 3 and Item 1, Article 13 of the Law must be obtained for each factory or business place where refining and fabrication of nuclear material are to be performed. One who wants to obtain such designation should file an application attached with a business plan and other documents via the director of a regional bureau of international trade and industry having jurisdiction over such factory or business place. When nuclear material refiners and nuclear material fabricators wish to obtain the approval for change stipulated in Item 1, Article 6 and Item 1, Article 16 of the Law, they must file applications to the Prime Minister and the Minister of International Trade and Industry via said directors. Chief handlers of nuclear fuel materials shall be approved among those meeting the strict requirements. One who wishes to install reactors must obtain the approval for each factory or business place where the reactors are to be installed. The permission must be obtained for each nuclear ship entering Japanese waters. The reactors proper and several facilities are subject to periodic inspection. (Rikitake, Y.)

  8. The separation of nuclear power from nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Starr, C.

    1979-01-01

    There exists world wide a strong common desire to limit nuclear weapons proliferation so as to inhibit or remove the threat of nuclear warfare. While this is a primary international political objective, there has also developed a secondary objective to limit any potential contribution to such nuclear weapons proliferation which might arise by the diversion of weapons material from the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle. This secondary objective is the basis of the present US government policy to defer the reprocessing of nuclear fuels anywhere. This policy has been generally recognized as a temporary expedient to provide time for international reexamination of the problems of weapons proliferation associated with nuclear power. A successful development of the proposed combination of the Fast Breeder Reactor and the Civex fuel reprocessing facility would provide an economical nuclear power source for many centuries which inherently separates nuclear power from the issue of weapons material diversion and proliferation. Further, by so doing, it permits great flexibility in international and national planning for nuclear power, as the issues of fuel dependence and terrorist and subnational diversions disappear. In addition, the expansion of the FBR/Civex system would eat into the LWR spent fuel stockpile, diminishing steadily this relatively accessible plutonium source. And finally, a rapid development of the FBR/Civex for the above reasons would substantially reduce the worldwide concern as to the adequacy of uranium ore supply. (Auth.)

  9. Nuclear physics methods in materials research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bethge, K.; Baumann, H.; Jex, H.; Rauch, F.

    1980-01-01

    Proceedings of the seventh divisional conference of the Nuclear Physics Division held at Darmstadt, Germany, from 23rd through 26th of September, 1980. The scope of this conference was defined as follows: i) to inform solid state physicists and materials scientists about the application of nuclear physics methods; ii) to show to nuclear physicists open questions and problems in solid state physics and materials science to which their methods can be applied. According to the intentions of the conference, the various nuclear physics methods utilized in solid state physics and materials science and especially new developments were reviewed by invited speakers. Detailed aspects of the methods and typical examples extending over a wide range of applications were presented as contributions in poster sessions. The Proceedings contain all the invited papers and about 90% of the contributed papers. (orig./RW)

  10. Gamma spectrometric discrimination of special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dowdall, M.; Mattila, A.; Ramebaeck, H.; Aage, H.K.; Palsson, S.E.

    2012-12-01

    This report presents details pertaining to an exercise conducted as part of the NKS-B programme using synthetic gamma ray spectra to simulate the type of data that may be encountered in the interception of material potentially containing special nuclear materials. A range of scenarios were developed involving sources that may or may not contain special nuclear materials. Gamma spectral data was provided to participants as well as ancillary data and participants were asked, under time constraint, to determine whether or not the data was indicative of circumstances involving special nuclear materials. The situations varied such that different approaches were required in order to obtain the correct result in each context. In the majority of cases participants were able to correctly ascertain whether or not the situations involved special nuclear material. Although fulfilling the primary goal of the exercise, some participants were not in a position to correctly identify with certainty the material involved, Situations in which the smuggled material was being masked by another source proved to be the most challenging for participants. (Author)

  11. Gamma spectrometric discrimination of special nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dowdall, M. [Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (Norway); Mattila, A. [Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Helsinki (Finland); Ramebaeck, H. [Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm (Sweden); Aage, H.K. [Danish Emergency Management Agency, Birkeroed (Denmark); Palsson, S.E. [Icelandic Radiation Safety Authority, Reykjavik (Iceland)

    2012-12-15

    This report presents details pertaining to an exercise conducted as part of the NKS-B programme using synthetic gamma ray spectra to simulate the type of data that may be encountered in the interception of material potentially containing special nuclear materials. A range of scenarios were developed involving sources that may or may not contain special nuclear materials. Gamma spectral data was provided to participants as well as ancillary data and participants were asked, under time constraint, to determine whether or not the data was indicative of circumstances involving special nuclear materials. The situations varied such that different approaches were required in order to obtain the correct result in each context. In the majority of cases participants were able to correctly ascertain whether or not the situations involved special nuclear material. Although fulfilling the primary goal of the exercise, some participants were not in a position to correctly identify with certainty the material involved, Situations in which the smuggled material was being masked by another source proved to be the most challenging for participants. (Author)

  12. Materials for nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Banerjee, S.; Kamath, H.S.

    2005-01-01

    The improved performance of present generation nuclear reactors and the realization of advanced reactor concepts, both, require development of better materials. Physical metallurgy/materials science principles which have been exploited in meeting the exacting requirements of nuclear reactor materials (fuels and structural materials), are outlined citing a few specific examples. While the incentive for improvement of traditional fuels (e.g., UO 2 fuel) is primarily for increasing the average core burn up, the development of advanced fuels (e.g., MOX, mixed carbide, nitride, silicide and dispersion fuels) are directed towards better utilization of fissile and fertile inventories through adaptation of innovative fuel cycles. As the burn up of UO 2 fuel reaches higher levels, a more detailed and quantitative understanding of the phenomena such as fission gas release, fuel restructuring induced by radiation and thermal gradients and pellet-clad interaction is being achieved. Development of zirconium based alloys for both cladding and pressure tube applications is discussed with reference to their physical metallurgy, fabrication techniques and in-reactor degradation mechanisms. The issue of radiation embrittlement of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) is covered drawing a comparison between the western and eastern specifications of RPV steels. The search for new materials which can stand higher rates of atomic displacement due to radiation has led to the development of swelling resistant austenitic and ferritic stainless steels for fast reactor applications as exemplified by the development of the D-9 steel for Indian fast breeder reactor. The presentation will conclude by listing various materials related phenomena, which have a strong bearing on the successful development of future nuclear energy systems. (author)

  13. The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The law aims to perform regulations on enterprises of refining, processing and reprocessing of nuclear source and fuel materials and on establishment and operation of reactors to realize the peaceful and deliberate utilization of atomic energy according to the principle of the atomic energy basic law. Regulations of use of internationally regulated substances are also envisaged to observe international agreements. Basic concepts and terms are defined, such as: atomic energy; nuclear fuel material; nuclear source material; reactor; refining; processing; reprocessing and internationally regulated substance. Any person besides the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Material Developing Corporation who undertakes refining shall be designated by the Prime Minister and the Minister of International Trade and Industry. An application shall be filed to the ministers concerned, listing name and address of the person, name and location of the refining works, equipment and method of refining, etc. The permission of the Prime Minister is necessary for any person who engages in processing. An application shall be filed to the Prime Minister, listing name and address of the person, name and location of the processing works and equipment and method of processing, etc. Permission of the Prime Minister, the Minister of International Trade and Industry or the Minister of Transport is necessary for any person who sets up reactors. An application shall be filed to the minister concerned, listing name and address of the person, purpose of operation, style, thermal output of reactor and number of units, etc. (Okada, K.)

  14. Automated processing of nuclear materials accounting data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Straka, J.; Pacak, P.; Moravec, J.

    1980-01-01

    An automated system was developed of nuclear materials accounting in Czechoslovakia. The system allows automating data processing including data storage. It comprises keeping records of inventories and material balance. In designing the system, the aim of the IAEA was taken into consideration, ie., building a unified information system interconnected with state-run systems of accounting and checking nuclear materials in the signatory countries of the non-proliferation treaty. The nuclear materials accounting programs were written in PL-1 and were tested at an EC 1040 computer at UJV Rez where also the routine data processing takes place. (B.S.)

  15. 78 FR 38739 - Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-27

    ... Systems for Nuclear Power Plants AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Regulatory guide; issuance... Guide (RG) 5.29, ``Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants... material control and accounting. This guide applies to all nuclear power plants. ADDRESSES: Please refer to...

  16. Structural materials for innovative nuclear systems (SMINS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    Structural materials research is a field of growing relevance in the nuclear sector, especially for the different innovative reactor systems being developed within the Generation IV International Forum (GIF), for critical and subcritical transmutation systems, and of interest to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Under the auspices of the NEA Nuclear Science Committee (NSC) the Workshop on Structural Materials for Innovative Nuclear Systems (SMINS) was organised in collaboration with the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe in Germany. The objectives of the workshop were to exchange information on structural materials research issues and to discuss ongoing programmes, both experimental and in the field of advanced modelling. These proceedings include the papers and the poster session materials presented at the workshop, representing the international state of the art in this domain. (author)

  17. Nuclear technology and materials science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olander, D.R.

    1992-01-01

    Current and expected problems in the materials of nuclear technology are reviewed. In the fuel elements of LWRs, cladding waterside corrosion, secondary hydriding and pellet-cladding interaction may be significant impediments to extended burnup. In the fuel, fission gas release remains a key issue. Materials issues in the structural alloys of the primary system include stress-corrosion cracking of steel, corrosion of steam generator tubing and pressurized thermal shock of the reactor vessel. Prediction of core behavior in severe accidents requires basic data and models for fuel liquefaction, aerosol formation, fission product transport and core-concrete interaction. Materials questions in nuclear waste management and fusion technology are briefly reviewed. (author)

  18. The reprocessing of irradiated MTR fuel and the nuclear material accountancy - Dounreay, UKAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barrett, T.R.; Harrison, R. [UKAEA, Nuclear Materials Control Dep., Dounreay (United Kingdom)

    1997-07-01

    The reprocessing of irradiated HEU MTR fuel is a sensible part of a safeguards regime. It brings together fuel otherwise scattered around the world into a concerted accountancy and protection arrangement. From a nuclear material accountants view the overall accountancy performance has been excellent. While investigations have been required for a few individual MUFs or trends, very little effort has required to be expended by the Nuclear Materials Control Department. That is a definition of a 'good plant'; it operates, measures and records input and output streams, and then the accountancy falls into place. As identified in this paper, the accountancy of the nuclear material processed in the plant is well founded and sound. The accountancy results over several decades confirm the adequacy of the safeguards arrangements at Dounreay. The processing makes good commercial sense and meets the current philosophy of recycling valuable resource materials. The risk of operating the full fuel cycle are less than those of extended storage of irradiated fuel at disparate diverse locations. The reprocessing at Dounreay accords with all of these philosophies. The assessed risk is at a very low level, well within published UK HSE 'tolerability of risk' regulatory guidelines. The impact of the operations are similarly low within the guidelines, for the operators and for the general public. (author)

  19. The reprocessing of irradiated MTR fuel and the nuclear material accountancy - Dounreay, UKAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barrett, T.R.; Harrison, R.

    1997-01-01

    The reprocessing of irradiated HEU MTR fuel is a sensible part of a safeguards regime. It brings together fuel otherwise scattered around the world into a concerted accountancy and protection arrangement. From a nuclear material accountants view the overall accountancy performance has been excellent. While investigations have been required for a few individual MUFs or trends, very little effort has required to be expended by the Nuclear Materials Control Department. That is a definition of a 'good plant'; it operates, measures and records input and output streams, and then the accountancy falls into place. As identified in this paper, the accountancy of the nuclear material processed in the plant is well founded and sound. The accountancy results over several decades confirm the adequacy of the safeguards arrangements at Dounreay. The processing makes good commercial sense and meets the current philosophy of recycling valuable resource materials. The risk of operating the full fuel cycle are less than those of extended storage of irradiated fuel at disparate diverse locations. The reprocessing at Dounreay accords with all of these philosophies. The assessed risk is at a very low level, well within published UK HSE 'tolerability of risk' regulatory guidelines. The impact of the operations are similarly low within the guidelines, for the operators and for the general public. (author)

  20. New challenges in nuclear material detection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunlop, W.; Sale, K.; Dougan, A.; Luke, J.; Suski, N.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001 the International Safeguards community recognized the magnitude of the threat posed by illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and the need for enhanced physical protection. For the first time, separate sessions on illicit trafficking and physical protection of nuclear materials were included in the IAEA Safeguards Symposium. In the aftermath of September 11, it is clear that the magnitude of the problem and the urgency with which it must be addressed will be a significant driver for advanced nuclear materials detection technologies for years to come. Trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive sources is a global concern. According to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database Program, there have been confirmed cases in more than 40 countries and the number of cases per year have nearly doubled since 1996. The challenge of combating nuclear terrorism also brings with it many opportunities for the development of new tools and new approaches. In addition to the traditional gamma-ray imaging, spectrometry and neutron interrogation, there is a need for smaller, smarter, more energy-efficient sensors and sensor systems for detecting and tracking threats. These systems go by many names - correlated sensor networks, wide-area tracking systems, sensor or network fabrics - but the concept behind them is the same. Take a number of wireless sensors and tie them together with a communications network, develop a scheme for fusing the data and make the system easy to deploy. This paper will present a brief survey of nuclear materials detection capability, and discuss some advances in research and development that are particularly suited for illicit trafficking, detection of shielded highly enriched uranium, and border security. (author)

  1. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-15

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  2. Welcome from INMM (Institute of Nuclear Materials Management)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Satkowiak, L.

    2015-01-01

    The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) is the premier professional society focused on safe and secure use of Nuclear Materials and the related nuclear scientific technology and knowledge. Its international membership includes government, academia, non-governmental organizations and industry, spanning the full spectrum all the way from policy to technology. The Institute's primary role include the promotion of research, the establishment of standards and the development of best practices, all centered around nuclear materials. It then disseminates this information through meetings, professional contacts, reports, papers, discussions, and publications. The formal structure of the INMM includes six technical divisions: Facility Operation; Materials Control and Accountability; Nonproliferation and Arms Control; Nuclear Security and Physical Protection; Packaging, Transportation and Disposition

  3. Detecting Illicit Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kouzes, Richard T.

    2005-01-01

    The threat that weapons of mass destruction might enter the United States has led to a number of efforts for the detection and interdiction of nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons at our borders. There have been multiple deployments of instrumentation to detect radiation signatures to interdict radiological material, including weapons and weapons material worldwide

  4. Resources of nuclear fuels and materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kawamura, K [Tokyo Inst. of Tech. (Japan); Kamiyama, Teiji; Hayashi, S; Hida, Noboru; Okano, T

    1974-11-01

    In this explanatory article, data on the world resources of nuclear fuels and materials, their production, and the present state of utilization are presented by specialists in varied fields. Main materials taken up are uranium, thorium, beryllium, zirconium, niobium, rare earth elements, graphite, and materials for nuclear fusion (heavy hydrogen and tritium). World reserves and annual production of these materials listed in a number of tables are cited from statistics of the period 1970-1973 or given by estimation. These data may be used as valuable numerical data for various projects and problems of atomic power industries.

  5. Nuclear material accounting software for Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doll, M.; Ewing, T.; Lindley, R.; McWilliams, C.; Roche, C.; Sakunov, I.; Walters, G.

    1999-01-01

    Among the needs identified during initial surveys of nuclear facilities in Ukraine was improved accounting software for reporting material inventories to the regulatory body. AIMAS (Automated Inventory/Material Accounting System) is a PC-based application written in Microsoft Access that was jointly designed by an US/Ukraine development team. The design is highly flexible and configurable, and supports a wide range of computing infrastructure needs and facility requirements including situations where networks are not available or reliable. AIMAS has both English and Russian-language options for displays and reports, and it operates under Windows 3.1, 95, or NT 4.0trademark. AIMAS functions include basic physical inventory tracking, transaction histories, reporting, and system administration functions (system configuration, security, data backup and recovery). Security measures include multilevel password access control, all transactions logged with the user identification, and system administration control. Interfaces to external modules provide nuclear fuel burn-up adjustment and barcode scanning capabilities for physical inventory taking. AIMAS has been installed at Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research (KINR), South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (SUNPP), Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT), Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry (SINEI), and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety/Nuclear Regulatory Administration (MEPNS/NRA). Facility specialists are being trained to use the application to track material movement and report to the national regulatory authority

  6. The national nuclear material tracking system. A Korea's countermeasure against nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moon, Joo Hyun

    2011-01-01

    Since nuclear terrorism has been identified as a real threat, the Korean government has earnestly developed elementary technologies and sub-systems for establishing an integrated defensive system against nuclear terrorism, which is based on the concept of defense-in-depth. This paper introduces the gist and implications of the studies that have been conducted in building the national nuclear material tracking system for preventing and intercepting the illicit trafficking and transporting of nuclear material in Korea. (orig.)

  7. Order for execution of the law concerning regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    Under the above mentioned law this order prescribes the procedures of controls given to the persons who wish to conduct refining and fabricating businesses, to construct and operate reactors, and to use nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and internationally controlled materials. The common controlling principle prescribed is that the permission or authorization necessary for above listed businesses should be applied for at each factory or each place of business. Based on the principle, the order prescribes: the procedures to apply for the authorization of the refining business, the permission of the change thereof, and the permission of the fabricating business and the change, thereof (the 1st chapter); the procedures to apply for the permission of the construction of reactors and of the change of the construction, as well as the procedure to do periodic inspections of reactor facilities (the 2nd chapter); the procedures to apply for the permission to use nuclear fuel materials and to change the use thereof, the submission of the report to use nuclear source materials, as well as the procedure to apply for the permission to use internationally controlled materials. In the 4th chapter the order lists up the items on which the competent Ministers may require reports from the person who carries on the relevant business. (Matsushima, A.)

  8. The regulations concerning the uses of nuclear source materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This rule is established under the provisions of the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and nuclear reactors and the ordinance for the execution of this law, and to enforce them. Basic terms are defined, such as exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding monitoring area, worker and radioactive waste. Nuclear raw materials shall be used at the facilities for using them, and control areas and surrounding monitoring areas shall be set up. Cumulative dose and exposure radiation dose of workers shall not exceed the permissible quantities defined by the General Director of the Science and Technology Agency. Records shall be made in each works or enterprise on the accept, delivery and stock of each kind of nuclear raw materials, radiation control and the accidents in the facilities of using nuclear raw materials, and kept for specified periods, respectively. The users of nuclear raw materials shall present reports in each works or enterprise on the stock of these materials on July 30 and December 31, every year. They shall submit reports immediately to the Director General on the particular accidents concerning nuclear raw materials and their facilities and on the circumstances and the measures taken against such accidents within ten days. These reports shall be presented on internationally regulated raw materials too. (Okada, K.)

  9. Nuclear material statistical accountancy system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentest, F.; Casilli, T.; Franklin, M.

    1979-01-01

    The statistical accountancy system developed at JRC Ispra is refered as 'NUMSAS', ie Nuclear Material Statistical Accountancy System. The principal feature of NUMSAS is that in addition to an ordinary material balance calcultation, NUMSAS can calculate an estimate of the standard deviation of the measurement error accumulated in the material balance calculation. The purpose of the report is to describe in detail, the statistical model on wich the standard deviation calculation is based; the computational formula which is used by NUMSAS in calculating the standard deviation and the information about nuclear material measurements and the plant measurement system which are required as data for NUMSAS. The material balance records require processing and interpretation before the material balance calculation is begun. The material balance calculation is the last of four phases of data processing undertaken by NUMSAS. Each of these phases is implemented by a different computer program. The activities which are carried out in each phase can be summarised as follows; the pre-processing phase; the selection and up-date phase; the transformation phase, and the computation phase

  10. The U.S. national nuclear forensics library, nuclear materials information program, and data dictionary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lamont, Stephen Philip; Brisson, Marcia; Curry, Michael

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear forensics assessments to determine material process history requires careful comparison of sample data to both measured and modeled nuclear material characteristics. Developing centralized databases, or nuclear forensics libraries, to house this information is an important step to ensure all relevant data will be available for comparison during a nuclear forensics analysis and help expedite the assessment of material history. The approach most widely accepted by the international community at this time is the implementation of National Nuclear Forensics libraries, which would be developed and maintained by individual nations. This is an attractive alternative toan international database since it provides an understanding that each country has data on materials produced and stored within their borders, but eliminates the need to reveal any proprietary or sensitive information to other nations. To support the concept of National Nuclear Forensics libraries, the United States Department of Energy has developed a model library, based on a data dictionary, or set of parameters designed to capture all nuclear forensic relevant information about a nuclear material. Specifically, information includes material identification, collection background and current location, analytical laboratories where measurements were made, material packaging and container descriptions, physical characteristics including mass and dimensions, chemical and isotopic characteristics, particle morphology or metallurgical properties, process history including facilities, and measurement quality assurance information. While not necessarily required, it may also be valuable to store modeled data sets including reactor burn-up or enrichment cascade data for comparison. It is fully expected that only a subset of this information is available or relevant to many materials, and much of the data populating a National Nuclear Forensics library would be process analytical or material accountability

  11. Nuclear materials transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ushakov, B.A.

    1986-01-01

    Various methods of nuclear materials transportation at different stages of the fuel cycle (U 3 O 8 , UF 6 production enrichment, fuel element manufacturing, storage) are considered. The advantages and drawbacks of railway, automobile, maritime and air transport are analyzed. Some types of containers are characterized

  12. Evaluation of Terminated Nuclear Material Licenses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spencer, K.M.; Zeighami, E.A.

    1999-01-01

    This report presents the results of a six-year project that reviewed material licenses that had been terminated during the period from inception of licensing until approximately late-1994. The material licenses covered in the review project were Part 30, byproduct material licenses; Part 40, source material licenses; and Part 70, special nuclear material licenses. This report describes the methodology developed for the project, summarizes the findings of the license file inventory process, and describes the findings of the reviews or evaluations of the license files. The evaluation identified nuclear material use sites that need review of the licensing material or more direct follow-up of some type. The review process also identified licenses authorized to possess sealed sources for which there was incomplete or missing documentation of the fate of the sources

  13. Materials. The Argentine nuclear policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strasser, H.

    1982-01-01

    Part A of the volume contains a literature search on proliferation and the Third World and on the nuclear technology of Argentina. The materials in part B are divided in: 1. Nonproliferation discussion and the Third World. 2. Development and state of nuclear technology in Argentina. 3. Argentina's international contacts in the field of nuclear energy 1. Federal Republic of Germany, 2. Soviet Union, 3. Brazil. (orig./HP) [de

  14. The establishment of computer system for nuclear material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, Jong Sook; Lee, Byung Doo; Park, Ho Joon

    1988-01-01

    Computer based nuclear material accountancy system will not only increase the credibility of KOREA-IAEA safeguards agreement and bilateral agreements but also decrease the man-power needed to carry out the inspection activity at state level and at facility level. Computer software for nuclear material accounting for and control has been materialized the application to both item and bulk facilities and software for database at state level has been also established to maintain up -to-date status of nation-wide nuclear material inventory. Computer recordings and reporting have been realized to fulfill the national and international commitments to nuclear material accounting for and control. The exchange of information related to nuclear material accounting for has become possible by PC diskettes. (Author)

  15. A future vision of nuclear material information systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suski, N.; Wimple, C.

    1999-01-01

    To address the current and future needs for nuclear materials management and safeguards information, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory envisions an integrated nuclear information system that will support several functions. The vision is to link distributed information systems via a common communications infrastructure designed to address the information interdependencies between two major elements: Domestic, with information about specific nuclear materials and their properties, and International, with information pertaining to foreign nuclear materials, facility design and operations. The communication infrastructure will enable data consistency, validation and reconciliation, as well as provide a common access point and user interface for a broad range of nuclear materials information. Information may be transmitted to, from, and within the system by a variety of linkage mechanisms, including the Internet. Strict access control will be employed as well as data encryption and user authentication to provide the necessary information assurance. The system can provide a mechanism not only for data storage and retrieval, but will eventually provide the analytical tools necessary to support the U.S. government's nuclear materials management needs and non-proliferation policy goals

  16. A review on nuclear forensic methodology for analysis of nuclear material of unknown origin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deshmukh, A.V.; Raghav, N.K.; Fatangare, N.M.; Jagtap, S.S.

    2014-01-01

    With the growing use of nuclear power and threat from illegal nuclear smuggling nuclear forensic provides an aid to the law enforcement to trace back modus operandi of such threats. Extensive nuclear proliferation, race among countries to acquire nuclear capability and global terrorism scenario has mandated Nuclear Forensic Science technology to tackle nuclear threats. Gamma spectrometry, alpha spectrometry, thermal ionization mass spectrometry, inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry are employed for characterization and relative isotopic composition determinant of Nuclear material and techniques like SEM transmission electron TEM, FT-IR, GC-MS, Electrophoretic technique are used to characterize the contaminated materials in order to deceive investigative agencies. The present paper provide systematic forensic methodology for nuclear and radioactive materials encountered at any crime scene due to any accidental discharges or military activities. (author)

  17. Tungsten - Yttrium Based Nuclear Structural Materials

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ramana, Chintalapalle; Chessa, Jack; Martinenz, Gustavo

    2013-04-01

    The challenging problem currently facing the nuclear science community in this 21st century is design and development of novel structural materials, which will have an impact on the next-generation nuclear reactors. The materials available at present include reduced activation ferritic/martensitic steels, dispersion strengthened reduced activation ferritic steels, and vanadium- or tungsten-based alloys. These materials exhibit one or more specific problems, which are either intrinsic or caused by reactors. This work is focussed towards tungsten-yttrium (W-Y) based alloys and oxide ceramics, which can be utilized in nuclear applications. The goal is to derive a fundamental scientific understanding of W-Y-based materials. In collaboration with University of Califonia -- Davis, the project is designated to demonstrate the W-Y based alloys, ceramics and composites with enhanced physical, mechanical, thermo-chemical properties and higher radiation resistance. Efforts are focussed on understanding the microstructure, manipulating materials behavior under charged-particle and neutron irradiation, and create a knowledge database of defects, elemental diffusion/segregation, and defect trapping along grain boundaries and interfaces. Preliminary results will be discussed.

  18. Practicality of diversion path analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murphey, W.M.; Schleter, J.C.

    1974-07-01

    One can define the safeguards system for nuclear material as the set of all protective actions taken to prevent or to deter attempts to divert nuclear material to unauthorized use. Maintenance of effective safeguards requires a program for routine assessment of plant safeguards systems in terms of their capabilities to satisfy safeguards aims. Plant internal control systems provide capabilities for detection of unprevented diversion and can provide assurance that diversion has not occurred. A procedure called Diversion Path Analysis (DPA) enables routine assessment of the capabilities of internal control systems in this regard and identification of safeguards problem areas in a plant. A framework for safeguards system design is also provided which will allow flexibility to accommodate individual plant circumstances while maintaining acceptable diversion detection capability. The steps of the procedure are described and the practicality of the analytical method is shown by referring to a demonstration test for a high throughput process where plant personnel were major participants. The boundary conditions for the demonstration case are given, along with some conclusions about the general procedure. (U.S.)

  19. Order for execution of the law concerning regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    This ordinance is stipulated under the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors. The designation for refining and processing businesses under the law shall be obtained for each works or enterprise where these operations are to be practiced. Persons who intend to accept the designation shall file applications attaching business plans and the other documents specified by the ordinances of the Prime Minister's Office and other ministry orders. The permission for the installation of nuclear reactors under the law shall be received for each works or enterprise where reactors are to be set up. Persons who intend to get the permission shall file applications attaching the financing plans required for the installation of reactors and the other documents designated by the orders of the competent ministry. The permission concerning the reactors installed on foreign ships shall be obtained for each ship which is going to enter into the Japanese waters. Persons who ask for the permission shall file applications attaching the documents which explain the safety of reactor facilities and the other documents defined by the orders of the Ministry of Transportation. The designation for reprocessing business and the application for it are provided for, respectively. The usage of nuclear fuel materials, nuclear raw materials and internationally regulated goods is ruled in detail. (Kubozone, M.)

  20. Order for execution of the law concerning regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This ordinance is stipulated under the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors. The designation for refining and processing businesses under the law shall be obtained for each works or enterprise where these operations are to be practiced. Persons who intend to accept the designation shall file applications attaching business plans and the other documents specified by the ordinances of the Prime Minister's Office and other ministry orders. The permission for the installation of nuclear reactors under the law shall be received for each works or enterprise where reactors are to be set up. Persons who intend to get the permission shall file applications attaching the financing plans required for the installation of reactors and the other documents designated by the orders of the competent ministry. The permission concerning the reactors installed on foreign ships shall be obtained for each ship which is going to enter into the Japanese waters. Persons who ask for the permission shall file applications attaching the documents which explain the safety of reactor facilities and the other documents defined by the orders of the Ministry of Transportation. The designation for reprocessing business and the application for it are provided for, respectively. The usage of nuclear fuel materials, nuclear raw materials and internationally regulated goods is ruled in detail.(Okada, K.)

  1. RADIATION EFFECTS IN NUCLEAR WASTE MATERIALS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weber, William J.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of this research was to develop fundamental understanding and predictive models of radiation effects in glasses and ceramics at the atomic, microscopic, and macroscopic levels, as well as an understanding of the effects of these radiation-induced solid-state changes on dissolution kinetics (i.e., radionuclide release). The research performed during the duration of this project has addressed many of the scientific issues identified in the reports of two DOE panels [1,2], particularly those related to radiation effects on the structure of glasses and ceramics. The research approach taken by this project integrated experimental studies and computer simulations to develop comprehensive fundamental understanding and capabilities for predictive modeling of radiation effects and dissolution kinetics in both glasses and ceramics designed for the stabilization and immobilization of high-level tank waste (HLW), plutonium residues and scraps, surplus weapons plutonium, other actinides, and other highly radioactive waste streams. Such fundamental understanding is necessary in the development of predictive models because all experimental irradiation studies on nuclear waste materials are ''accelerated tests'' that add a great deal of uncertainty to predicted behavior because the damage rates are orders of magnitude higher than the actual damage rates expected in nuclear waste materials. Degradation and dissolution processes will change with damage rate and temperature. Only a fundamental understanding of the kinetics of all the physical and chemical processes induced or affected by radiation will lead to truly predictive models of long-term behavior and performance for nuclear waste materials. Predictive models of performance of nuclear waste materials must be scientifically based and address both radiation effects on structure (i.e., solid-state effects) and the effects of these solid-state structural changes on dissolution kinetics. The ultimate goal of this

  2. Croatian National System of Nuclear Materials Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biscan, R.

    1998-01-01

    In the process of economic and technological development of Croatia by using or introducing nuclear power or in the case of international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material, Croatia should establish and implement National System of Nuclear Materials Control. Croatian National System of accounting for and control of all nuclear material will be subjected to safeguards under requirements of Agreement and Additional Protocol between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The decision by NPT parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference to endorse the Fullscope IAEA Safeguards Standard (FSS) as a necessary precondition of nuclear supply means that states are obliged to ensure that the recipient country has a FSS agreement in place before any nuclear transfer can take place (Ref. 1). The FSS standard of nuclear supply is a central element of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines which the NSG adopted in 1992 and should be applied to members and non-members of the NSG. The FSS standard of nuclear supply in general allows for NPT parties or countries which have undertaken the same obligations through other treaty arrangements, to receive favourable treatment in nuclear supply arrangements. However, the Iraqi experience demonstrate that trade in nuclear and dual-use items, if not properly monitored, can contribute to a nuclear weapons program in countries acting contrary to their non-proliferation obligation. Multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms, including the FSS supply standard, provide the basis for co-ordination and standardisation of export control measures. (author)

  3. Software development for managing nuclear material database

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tondin, Julio Benedito Marin

    2011-01-01

    In nuclear facilities, the nuclear material control is one of the most important activities. The Brazilian National Commission of Nuclear Energy (CNEN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), when inspecting routinely, regards the data provided as a major safety factor. Having a control system of nuclear material that allows the amount and location of the various items to be inspected, at any time, is a key factor today. The objective of this work was to enhance the existing system using a more friendly platform of development, through the VisualBasic programming language (Microsoft Corporation), to facilitate the operation team of the reactor IEA-R1 Reactor tasks, providing data that enable a better and prompter control of the IEA-R1 nuclear material. These data have allowed the development of papers presented at national and international conferences and the development of master's dissertations and doctorate theses. The software object of this study was designed to meet the requirements of the CNEN and the IAEA safeguard rules, but its functions may be expanded in accordance with future needs. The program developed can be used in other reactors to be built in the country, since it is very practical and allows an effective control of the nuclear material in the facilities. (author)

  4. Nuclear Materials Stewardship Within the DOE Environmental Management Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bilyeu, J. D.; Kiess, T. E.; Gates, M. L.

    2002-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Program has made significant progress in planning disposition of its excess nuclear materials and has recently completed several noteworthy studies. Since establishment in 1997, the EM Nuclear Material Stewardship Program has developed disposition plans for excess nuclear materials to support facility deactivation. All nuclear materials have been removed from the Miamisburg Environmental Management Project (Mound), and disposition planning is nearing completion for the Fernald Environmental Management Project and the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site. Only a few issues remain for materials at the Hanford and Idaho sites. Recent trade studies include the Savannah River Site Canyons Nuclear Materials Identification Study, a Cesium/Strontium Management Alternatives Trade Study, a Liquid Technical Standards Trade Study, an Irradiated Beryllium Reflectors with Tritium study, a Special Performance Assessment Required Trade Study, a Neutron Source Trade Study, and development of discard criteria for uranium. A Small Sites Workshop was also held. Potential and planned future activities include updating the Plutonium-239 storage study, developing additional packaging standards, developing a Nuclear Material Disposition Handbook, determining how to recover or dispose of Pu-244 and U-233, and working with additional sites to define disposition plans for their nuclear materials

  5. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is composed of the text of 23 articles, annex 1 showing the levels of physical protection and annex 2 which is the categorization list of nuclear material. The text consists of definitions (article 1), the scope of applications (2), liability of protecting nuclear material during international transport (3 and 4), duty of mutual cooperation (5 and 6), responsibility for criminal punishment (7 to 13), and final provisions (14 to 23). It is to be noted that the nuclear material for military purposes and domestic nuclear facilities are excluded in the connection. After the brief description of the course leading to the establishment of the convention, individual articles and annexes and the respective Japanese version, and the explanation based on the intergovernmental meeting discussion on the draft convention are described. (J.P.N.)

  6. Regulations concerning the fabricating business of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The Regulation is revised on the basis of ''The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors'' and the ''Provisions concerning the enterprises processing nuclear fuel materials'' in the Enforcement Ordinance for the Law, to enforce such provisions. This is the complete revision of the regulation of the same name in 1957. Terms are explained, such as exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding inspection area, persons engaged in works, radioactive wastes, area for incoming and outgoing of materials, fluctuation of stocks, batch, real stocks, effective value and main measuring points. For the applications for the permission of the enterprises processing nuclear fuel materials, the location of an enterprise, the construction of buildings and the construction of and the equipments for facilities of chemical processing, forming, coating, assembling, storage of nuclear fuel materials, disposal of radioactive wastes and radiation control must be written. Records shall be made and maintained for the periods specified on the inspection of processing facilities, nuclear fuel materials, radiation control, operation, maintainance, accidents of processing facilities and weather. Limit to entrance into the control area, measures for exposure radiation dose, patrol and inspection, operation of processing facilities, transport of materials, disposal of radioactive wastes, safety regulations are provided for. Reports to be filed by the persons engaging in the enterprises processing nuclear fuel materials are prescribed. (Okada, K.)

  7. ANCRE alliance: Road-map for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Touboul, F.; Carre, F.

    2013-01-01

    Created in 2009 by the Higher Education and Research ministry and by the Ecology ministry, ANCRE, the National Alliance for Energy Research Coordination aims at enhancing the efficiency of French research in the field of energy by promoting partnerships and synergies between public and private sectors (research organizations, universities and companies). ANCRE aims to propose a coordinated strategy for research and innovation projects. Beyond its four founding members, CEA, CNRS, IFPEN and CPU, ANCRE brings together all the French public research organizations concerned with energy issues, and has strong links with the industrial sector. Among the 10 programmatic groups of ANCRE, one is specifically dedicated to Nuclear Energies (fission and fusion). This group has proposed road-maps in five scientific fields, considered as strategic for R and D, in relation to industrial objectives and scientific bottlenecks: nuclear materials, nuclear chemistry, reactor physics, instrumentation and fusion. For twenty to thirty years, R and D on nuclear materials has evolved from the heavy metallurgy of the first generation of power reactors to the nano-materials science under extreme conditions for present and future needs. Nuclear systems are characterized by extreme operating conditions: high temperatures, mechanical stresses, radiations, corrosive environment, and long durations. In order to deal with these extreme conditions, it is necessary to have a sound knowledge of the materials, to the finest scale. R and D development was made possible by advances in materials science, in relation to more efficient observation means (now reaching the atom scale) and deeper control of the microstructure. Development of simulation methods at the atomic level (ab initio, classical molecular dynamics, kinetic Monte Carlo, etc.) have also allowed a better understanding of phenomena at their most fundamental level. Material performance issues, however, remain significant, as the performance

  8. Diversion Path Analysis Handbook. Volume 1. Methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goodwin, K.E.; Schleter, J.C.; Maltese, M.D.K.

    1978-11-01

    Diversion Path Analysis (DPA) is a safeguards evaluation tool which is used to determine the vulnerability of the Material Control and Material Accounting (MC and MA) Subsystems to the threat of theft of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) by a knowledgeable Insider. The DPA team should consist of two individuals who have technical backgrounds. The implementation of DPA is divided into five basic steps: Information and Data Gathering, Process Characterization, Analysis of Diversion Paths, Results and Findings, and Documentation

  9. Nuclear data of the major actinide fuel materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Poenitz, W.P.; Saussure, G. De

    1984-01-01

    The effect of nuclear data of the major actinide fuel materials on the design accuracy, economics and safety of nuclear power systems is discussed. Since most of the data are measured relative to measurement standards, in particular the fission cross-section of /sup 235/U, data must be examined to ensure that absolute measurements and relative measurements are correctly handled. Nuclear data of fissile materials, fertile materials and minor plutonium isotopes are discussed.

  10. National and international nuclear material monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waddoups, I.G.

    1996-01-01

    The status of nuclear materials in both the U.S. and Former Soviet Union is changing based upon the execution of agreements relative to weapons materials production and weapon dismantlement. The result of these activities is that a considerably different emphasis is being placed on how nuclear materials are viewed and utilized. Even though much effort is being expended on the final disposition of these materials, the interim need for storage and security of the material is increasing. Both safety and security requirements exist to govern activities when these materials are placed in storage. These requirements are intended to provide confidence that the material is not being misused and that the storage operations are conducted safely. Both of these goals can be significantly enhanced if technological monitoring of the material is performed. This paper will briefly discuss the traditional manual methods of U.S. and international material monitoring and then present approaches and technology that are available to achieve the same goals under the evolving environment

  11. Risk Prevention for Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Badawy, I.

    2008-01-01

    The present paper investigates the parameters which may have effects on the safety of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources used in peaceful applications of atomic energy. The emergency response planning in such situations are also indicated. In synergy with nuclear safety measures, an approach is developed in this study for risk prevention. It takes into consideration the collective implementation of measures of nuclear material accounting and control, physical protection and monitoring of such strategic and dangerous materials in an integrated and coordinated real-time mode at a nuclear or radiation facility and in any time

  12. Legal aspects of transport of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jacobsson, Mans.

    The Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention are briefly discussed and other conventions in the field of civil liability for nuclear damage are mentioned: the Vienna Convention, the Nuclear Ships Convention and the 1971 Convention relating to civil liability in the field of maritime carriage of nuclear material. Legislation on civil liability in the Nordic countries, which is based on the Paris Convention and the Supplementary Convention is discussed, notably the principle of channelling of liability and exceptions from that principle due to rules of liability in older transport conventions and certain problems due to the limited geographical scope of the Paris Convention and the Supplementary Convention. Insurance problems arising in connection with transport of nuclear materials are surveyed and an outline is given of the administrative provisions concerning transport (based on the IAEA transport regulations) which govern transport of radioactive materials by different means: road, rail, sea and air. Finally, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is discussed. (NEA) [fr

  13. Materials Science of High-Level Nuclear Waste Immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weber, William J.; Navrotsky, Alexandra; Stefanovsky, S. V.; Vance, E. R.; Vernaz, Etienne Y.

    2009-01-01

    With the increasing demand for the development of more nuclear power comes the responsibility to address the technical challenges of immobilizing high-level nuclear wastes in stable solid forms for interim storage or disposition in geologic repositories. The immobilization of high-level nuclear wastes has been an active area of research and development for over 50 years. Borosilicate glasses and complex ceramic composites have been developed to meet many technical challenges and current needs, although regulatory issues, which vary widely from country to country, have yet to be resolved. Cooperative international programs to develop advanced proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies to close the nuclear fuel cycle and increase the efficiency of nuclear energy production might create new separation waste streams that could demand new concepts and materials for nuclear waste immobilization. This article reviews the current state-of-the-art understanding regarding the materials science of glasses and ceramics for the immobilization of high-level nuclear waste and excess nuclear materials and discusses approaches to address new waste streams

  14. Development status of irradiation devices and instrumentation for material and nuclear fuel irradiation tests in HANARO

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Bong Goo; Sohn, Jae Min; Choo, Kee Nam [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2010-04-15

    The High flux Advanced Neutron Application ReactOr (HANARO), an open-tank-in-pool type reactor, is one of the multi-purpose research reactors in the world. Since the commencement of HANARO's operations in 1995, a significant number of experimental facilities have been developed and installed at HANARO, and continued efforts to develop more facilities are in progress. Owing to the stable operation of the reactor and its frequent utilization, more experimental facilities are being continuously added to satisfy various fields of study and diverse applications. The irradiation testing equipment for nuclear fuels and materials at HANARO can be classified into capsules and the Fuel Test Loop (FTL). Capsules for irradiation tests of nuclear fuels in HANARO have been developed for use under the dry conditions of the coolant and materials at HANARO and are now successfully utilized to perform irradiation tests. The FTL can be used to conduct irradiation testing of a nuclear fuel under the operating conditions of commercial nuclear power plants. During irradiation tests conducted using these capsules in HANARO, instruments such as the thermocouple, Linear Variable Differential Transformer (LVDT), small heater, Fluence Monitor (F/M) and Self-Powered Neutron Detector (SPND) are used to measure various characteristics of the nuclear fuel and irradiated material. This paper describes not only the status of HANARO and the status and perspective of irradiation devices and instrumentation for carrying out nuclear fuel and material tests in HANARO but also some results from instrumentation during irradiation tests

  15. U.S.-origin nuclear material removal program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Messick, C.E.; Galan, J.J.

    2014-01-01

    The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) U.S.-Origin Nuclear Material Removal program, also known as the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program (FRR SNF AP), was established by the U.S. Department of Energy in May 1996. The program's mission provides a disposition pathway for certain U.S. origin spent nuclear fuel and other weapons-grade nuclear material. The program will continue until May 2016 with an additional three year window for fuel cooldown and transportation. This paper provides an update on recent program accomplishments, current program initiatives and future activities.

  16. The convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-05-01

    This document contains the full text of a convention to facilitate the safe transfer of nuclear material, and to insure the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport. Two annexes are included, which establish categories of nuclear materials and levels of physical protection to be applied in international transport

  17. The use of modern databases in managing nuclear material inventories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Behrens, R.G.

    1994-01-01

    The need for a useful nuclear materials database to assist in the management of nuclear materials within the Department of Energy (DOE) Weapons Complex is becoming significantly more important as the mission of the DOE Complex changes and both international safeguards and storage issues become drivers in determining how these materials are managed. A well designed nuclear material inventory database can provide the Nuclear Materials Manager with an essential cost effective tool for timely analysis and reporting of inventories. This paper discusses the use of databases as a management tool to meet increasing requirements for accurate and timely information on nuclear material inventories and related information. From the end user perspective, this paper discusses the rationale, philosophy, and technical requirements for an integrated database to meet the needs for a variety of users such as those working in the areas of Safeguards, Materials Control and Accountability (MC ampersand A), Nuclear Materials Management, Waste Management, materials processing, packaging and inspection, and interim/long term storage

  18. Nuclear material measurement system in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Almeida, S.G. de.

    1988-01-01

    The description of the activities developed at the Safeguards Laboratory of Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission is done. The methods and techniques used for measuring and evaluating nuclear materials and facilities are presented. (E.G.) [pt

  19. Materials aspects of nuclear waste isolation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, J.W.

    1984-01-01

    This paper is intended to provide an overview of the nuclear waste repository performance requirements and the roles which we expect materials to play in meeting these requirements. The objective of the U.S. Dept. of Energy's (DOE) program is to provide for the safe, permanent isolation of high-level radioactive wastes from the public. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (the Act) provides the mandate to accomplish this objective by establishing a program timetable, a schedule of procedures to be followed, and program funding (1 mil/kwhr for all nuclear generated electricity). The centerpiece of this plan is the design and operation of a mined geologic repository system for the permanent isolation of radioactive wastes. A nuclear waste repository contains several thousand acres of tunnels and drifts into which the nuclear waste will be emplaced, and several hundred acres for the facilities on the surface in which the waste is received, handled, and prepared for movement underground. With the exception of the nuclear material-related facilities, a repository is similar to a standard mining operation. The difference comes in what a repository is supposed to do - to contain an isolate nuclear waste from man and the environment

  20. International nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syed Azmi Syed Ali

    1985-01-01

    History can be a very dull subject if it relates to events which have long since lost their relevance. The factors which led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), however, are as important and relevant today as they were when the Agency was first created. Without understanding these factors it is impossible to realise how important the Agency is in the present world or to understand some of the controversies surrounding its future. Central to these controversies is the question of how best to promote the international transfer of nuclear technology without contributing further to the problem of proliferating nuclear explosives or explosive capabilities. One effective means is to subject nuclear materials (see accompanying article in box), which forms the basic link between the manufacture of nuclear explosives and nuclear power generation, to international safeguards. This was realized very early in the development of nuclear power and was given greater emphasis following the deployment of the first two atomic bombs towards the end of World War II. (author)

  1. Materials research in the Nuclear Research Centre Karlsruhe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kleykamp, H.

    1990-03-01

    This report gives a survey of the research work done at the Institute for Material and Solids Research at Karlsruhe. The following subjects are dealt with: Instrumental analysis; producing thin films; corrosion; failure mechanism and damage analysis; fuel elements, ceramic nuclear fuels and can and structure materials for fast breeder reactors; material problems and ceramic breeding materials for nuclear fusion plants; glass materials for the treatment of radioactive waste; super-conducting materials; amorphous metals, new high alloyed steels; ceramic high performance materials; hard materials; compound materials and polymers. (MM) [de

  2. Psychology of nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, L [Manchester Univ. (UK)

    1978-08-17

    it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion.

  3. The regulations concerning the uses of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The Regulations are established on the basis of ''The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors'' and the ''Provisions concerning the usage of nuclear fuel materials'' in the Enforcement Ordinance of the Law, to enforce such provisions. Terms are explained, such as exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding inspection area, persons engaging in works, area for incoming and outgoing of materials, batch, real stocks, effective value and main measuring points. In the applications for the permission to use nuclear fuel materials, the expected period and quantity of usage of each kind of such materials and the other party and the method of selling, lending and returning spent fuel or the process of disposal of such fuel must be written. Explanations concerning the technical ability required for the usage of nuclear fuel materials shall be attached to the applications. Applications shall be filed for the inspection of facilities for use, in which the name and the address of the applicant, the name and the address of the factory or the establishment, the range of the facilities for use, the maximum quantity of nuclear fuel materials to be used or stocked, and the date, the place and the kind of the expected inspection are written. Prescriptions cover the records to be held, safety regulations, the technical standards for usage, the disposal, transport and storage of nuclear fuel materials and the reports to be filed. (Okada, K.)

  4. Complementarities Between Nuclear Security, Safeguards and State System of Accounting for and Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jalouneix, J.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear security deals with prevention against theft and diversion of nuclear materials and sabotage against nuclear materials or installations. It is based on provisions of physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities complemented by: - Provisions for accounting for and control to prevent and, where appropriate, detect loss, theft or diversion of nuclear materials; - The nuclear safety provisions to protect nuclear materials and facilities against sabotage. Safeguards are based on the statements and accounting controls in the facilities. The respective aim of EURATOM and IAEA controls is to verify afterwards the respect for the declared use of materials or political commitments undertaken by States under the non-proliferation purpose. However, EURATOM and IAEA controls are not exercised at all facilities (including those working for defence purposes) or in respect of all nuclear materials subject to the French national control. In addition, these international safeguards do not deal with physical protection of nuclear materials which is the sole responsibility of the State. The state control, implemented in France, is positioned upstream to the international controls. It aims to prevent, deter and detect the loss, theft or diversion of nuclear materials in installations or during transport. It places the responsibility of a possible diversion at the operator level. It is made of different components that complement each other and form a coherent whole. This includes: - physical protection; - accounting for and control; - inspections. The physical protection system has to protect nuclear materials against a malicious act. Malicious act means a theft or diversion of nuclear material or an act of sabotage affecting nuclear materials or facilities which could lead to radiological releases into the environment. The accounting for and control system of nuclear materials has to allow the continuous and accurate knowledge of the quantity, quality and location

  5. Radiation damage in nuclear waste materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jencic, I.

    2000-01-01

    Final disposal of high-level radioactive nuclear waste is usually envisioned in some sort of ceramic material. The physical and chemical properties of host materials for nuclear waste can be altered by internal radiation and consequently their structural integrity can be jeopardized. Assessment of long-term performance of these ceramic materials is therefore vital for a safe and successful disposal. This paper presents an overview of studies on several possible candidate materials for immobilization of fission products and actinides, such as spinel (MgAl 2 O 4 ), perovskite (CaTiO 3 ), zircon (ZrSiO 4 ), and pyrochlore (Gd 2 Ti 2 O 7 and Gd 2 Zr 2 O 7 ). The basic microscopic picture of radiation damage in ceramics consists of atomic displacements and ionization. In many cases these processes result in amorphization (metaminctization) of irradiated material. The evolution of microscopic structure during irradiation leads to various macroscopic radiation effects. The connection between microscopic and macroscopic picture is in most cases at least qualitatively known and studies of radiation induced microscopic changes are therefore an essential step in the design of a reliable nuclear waste host material. The relevance of these technologically important results on our general understanding of radiation damage processes and on current research efforts in Slovenia is also addressed. (author)

  6. Nuclear Space Power Systems Materials Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckman, R.W. Jr.

    2004-01-01

    High specific energy is required for space nuclear power systems. This generally means high operating temperatures and the only alloy class of materials available for construction of such systems are the refractory metals niobium, tantalum, molybdenum and tungsten. The refractory metals in the past have been the construction materials selected for nuclear space power systems. The objective of this paper will be to review the past history and requirements for space nuclear power systems from the early 1960's through the SP-100 program. Also presented will be the past and present status of refractory metal alloy technology and what will be needed to support the next advanced nuclear space power system. The next generation of advanced nuclear space power systems can benefit from the review of this past experience. Because of a decline in the refractory metal industry in the United States, ready availability of specific refractory metal alloys is limited

  7. Nuclear reactor structural material forming less radioactive corrosion product

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakazawa, Hiroshi.

    1988-01-01

    Purpose: To provide nuclear reactor structural materials forming less radioactive corrosion products. Constitution: Ni-based alloys such as inconel alloy 718, 600 or inconel alloy 750 and 690 having excellent corrosion resistance and mechanical property even in coolants at high temperature and high pressure have generally been used as nuclear reactor structural materials. However, even such materials yield corrosion products being attacked by coolants circulating in the nuclear reactor, which produce by neutron irradiation radioactive corrosion products, that are deposited in primary circuit pipeways to constitute exposure sources. The present invention dissolves dissolves this problems by providing less activating nuclear reactor structural materials. That is, taking notice on the fact that Ni-58 contained generally by 68 % in Ni changes into Co-58 under irradiation of neutron thereby causing activation, the surface of nuclear reactor structural materials is applied with Ni plating by using Ni with a reduced content of Ni-58 isotopes. Accordingly, increase in the radiation level of the nuclear reactor structural materials can be inhibited. (K.M.)

  8. Better materials for nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Banerjee, S.

    2005-01-01

    The improved performance of present generation nuclear reactors and the realization of advanced reactor concepts, both, require development of better materials. Physical metallurgy /materials science principles which have been exploited in meeting the exacting requirements of nuclear systems comprising fuels, structural materials, moderators and coolants are outlined citing a few specific examples. While the incentive for improvement of traditional fuels (e.g., UO 2 fuel) is primarily for increasing the average core burn up, the development of advanced fuels (e.g., MOX, mixed carbide, nitride, silicide and dispersion fuels) are directed towards better utilization of fissile and fertile inventories through adaptation of innovative fuel cycles. As the burn up of UO 2 fuel reaches higher levels, a more detailed and quantitative understanding of the phenomena such as fission gas release, fuel restructuring - induced by radiation and thermal gradients and pellet-clad interaction is being achieved. Development of zirconium based alloys for both cladding and pressure tube applications is discussed with reference to their physical metallurgy, fabrication techniques, in-reactor degradation mechanisms, and in-service inspection. The issue of radiation embrittlement of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) is covered drawing a comparison between the western and eastern specifications of RPV steels. The search for new materials which can stand higher rates of atomic displacement due to radiation has led to the development of swelling resistant austenitic and ferritic stainless steels for fast reactor applications as exemplified by the development of the D-9 steel for Indian fast breeder reactor. New challenges are thrown to material scientists for the development of materials suitable for high temperature reactors, which have a potential for providing primary heat for thermo chemical dissociation of water. Development of several ceramic materials, carbon based materials, dissimilar

  9. Large area nuclear particle detectors using ET materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-08-01

    The purpose of this SBIR Phase 1 feasibility effort was to demonstrate the usefulness of Quantex electron-trapping (ET) materials for spatial detection of nuclear particles over large areas. This demonstration entailed evaluating the prompt visible scintillation as nuclear particles impinged on films of ET materials, and subsequently detecting the nuclear particle impingement information pattern stored in the ET material, by means of the visible-wavelength luminescence produced by near-infrared interrogation. Readily useful levels of scintillation and luminescence outputs are demonstrated

  10. Attributes identification of nuclear material by non-destructive radiation measurement methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gan Lin

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The nuclear materials should be controlled under the regulation of National Safeguard System. The non-destructive analysis method, which is simple and quick, provide a effective process in determining the nuclear materials, nuclear scraps and wastes. The method play a very important role in the fields of nuclear material control and physical protection against the illegal removal and smuggling of nuclear material. The application of non-destructive analysis in attributes identification of nuclear material is briefly described in this paper. The attributes determined by radioactive detection technique are useful tolls to identify the characterization of special nuclear material (isotopic composition, enrichment etc.). (author)

  11. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control: Recommendations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication presents recommendations for the nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control. It is based on national experiences and practices and guidance publications in the field of security as well as the nuclear security related international instruments. The recommendations include guidance for States with regard to the nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material that has been reported as being out of regulatory control as well as for material that is lost, missing or stolen but has not been reported as such, or has been otherwise discovered. In addition, these recommendations adhere to the detection and assessment of alarms and alerts and to a graded response to criminal or unauthorized acts with nuclear security implications

  12. Introduction of the Recycling program for Nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Jae Beom; Shin, Byung Woo; Park, Jae Whan; Park, Soo Jin

    2009-01-01

    The LOF is the abbreviation of Location outside Facilities using in safeguards. IAEA want to control the location using the small nuclear material over the world. The depleted uranium used in Industrial field should be controlled by the Government according to the agreement between the IAEA and the ROK. From 2006, The ROK is managing the locations in the LOF. The detail article governing the locations is on the Location attachment agreed between two bodies. As of end of 2007, The LOF was consisting of 64 locations. Now, A number of Locations are increasing up to 75. The KINAC(Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control) is controlling the data about the amount of nuclear material in LOF. The KINAC is trying to upgrade the efficiency and accuracy about the data. The KINAC will make a storage house at the underground of head office from 2009. The purpose of the storage system in KINAC is gathering the nuclear material, which is difficult to control by the industries, especially the nuclear material involved in LOF. The final goal for gathering the nuclear materials are recycling to new another machine. I would like to introduce the handling case of the Depleted uranium in their countries. On this paper, I will show 4 countries case briefly

  13. Characteristics of X-ray fluorescence of nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Seunghoon; Kwak, Sung-Woo; Shin, Jung-Ki; Park, Uk-Rayng; Jung, Heejun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    LED is a technique of determination of uranium concentration as a continuous X-ray energy beams transmit a uranium liquid sample for safeguards. Compared to K-edge densitometer, due to relatively lower energy (L-edge energy is 17.17 keV) of Uranium L series energy than K-series energy, L-edge densitometer does not require high purity germanium detector with liquid nitride cooling. Therefore, the Ledge densitometer is appropriate for portable equipment for on-site nuclear material inspection and safeguards at facility sites. XRF combined with LED is a technique of finding of nuclear materials from reflected characteristic X-ray photons. In this study, characteristics of XRF of nuclear materials are simulated Monte Carlo method (Geant4) for feasibility of the system for determination of concentration of nuclear species. The analysis method of uranium concentration or minor actinides is applied using combination of linear extrapolation from jump of L-edge of sample and ratio between uranium and minor actinide from XRF measurement. In this study, The XRF ch aracteristics was simulated from Monte Carlo method. The peaks were obtained from nuclear material mixture. The estimated nuclear material concentration is low due to the volume effect of the sample. The correction factor or minimization of the effect is required.

  14. Radiation damage studies of nuclear structural materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barat, P.

    2012-01-01

    Maximum utilization of fuel in nuclear reactors is one of the important aspects for operating them economically. The main hindrance to achieve this higher burnups of nuclear fuel for the nuclear reactors is the possibility of the failure of the metallic core components during their operation. Thus, the study of the cause of the possibility of failure of these metallic structural materials of nuclear reactors during full power operation due to radiation damage, suffered inside the reactor core, is an important field of studies bearing the basic to industrial scientific views.The variation of the microstructure of the metallic core components of the nuclear reactors due to radiation damage causes enormous variation in the structure and mechanical properties. A firm understanding of this variation of the mechanical properties with the variation of microstructure will serve as a guide for creating new, more radiation-tolerant materials. In our centre we have irradiated structural materials of Indian nuclear reactors by charged particles from accelerator to generate radiation damage and studied the some aspects of the variation of microstructure by X-ray diffraction studies. Results achieved in this regards, will be presented. (author)

  15. Modeling of fissile material diversion in solvent extraction cascades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, A.; Carlson, R.W.

    1980-01-01

    Changes were calculated for measurable parameters of a solvent extraction section of a reprocessing plant resulting from postulated fissile material diversion actions. The computer program SEPHIS was modified to calculate the time-dependent concentrations of uranium and plutonium in each stage of a cascade. The calculation of the inventories of uranium and plutonium in each contactor was also included. The concentration and inventory histories were computed for a group of four sequential columns during start-up and for postulated diversion conditions within this group of columns. Monitoring of column exit streams or of integrated column inventories for fissile materials could provide qualitative indications of attempted diversions. However, the time delays and resulting changes are complex and do not correlate quantitatively with the magnitude of the initiating event

  16. The application of a figure of merit for nuclear explosive utility as a metric for material attractiveness in a nuclear material theft scenario

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    King, Wayne E.; Bradley, Keith; Jones, Edwin D.; Kramer, Kevin J.; Latkowski, Jeffery F.; Robel, Martin; Sleaford, Brad W.

    2010-01-01

    Effective integration of nonproliferation management into the design process is key to the broad deployment of advanced nuclear energy systems, and is an explicit goal of the Laser Inertial Fusion Energy (LIFE) project at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The nuclear explosives utility of a nuclear material to a state (proliferator) or sub-state (terrorist) is a critical factor to be assessed and is one aspect of material attractiveness. In this work, we approached nuclear explosives utility through the calculation of a 'figure of merit' (FOM) that has recently been developed to capture the relative viability and difficulty of constructing nuclear explosives starting from various nuclear material forms and compositions. We discuss the integration of the figure of merit into an assessment of a nuclear material theft scenario and its use in the assessment. This paper demonstrates that material attractiveness is a multidimensional concept that embodies more than the FOM. It also seeks to propose that other attributes may be able to be quantified through analogous FOMs (e.g., transformation) and that, with quantification, aggregation may be possible using concepts from the risk community.

  17. U.S.-origin nuclear material removal program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Messick, C.E.; Galan, J.J. [U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC (United States). U.S.-Origin Nuclear Material Removal Program

    2014-12-15

    The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) U.S.-Origin Nuclear Material Removal program, also known as the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program (FRR SNF AP), was established by the U.S. Department of Energy in May 1996. The program's mission provides a disposition pathway for certain U.S. origin spent nuclear fuel and other weapons-grade nuclear material. The program will continue until May 2016 with an additional three year window for fuel cooldown and transportation. This paper provides an update on recent program accomplishments, current program initiatives and future activities.

  18. Criteria of diversity evaluation for intelligent diagnosis of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Washio, Takashi; Sakuma, Masatake; Furukawa, Hiroshi; Kitamura, Masaharu.

    1995-01-01

    One of important problems of a current operation support system for a nuclear power plant is that the credibility of its resultant suggestions is not always high sufficiently. The authors have proposed an efficient remedy called 'Diversity Criteria' for this issue in the previous works. It employs a variety of information resources and reasoning mechanisms for the system to enhance its entire credibility. Within this framework, a complementary combination of the resources and mechanisms is desired. The work presented here proposes systematic and quantitative measures determining the appropriate combinations. First, concrete and systematic guidelines are proposed for the detailed criteria of 'Information Diversity' and 'Methodology Diversity'. Next, two concepts of 'Orthogonality of Identified Result' and 'Orthogonality of Utilized Symptom' are presented together with their quantitative measures. These guidelines and measures have been applied to an example of failure diagnosis of a nuclear power plant, and their efficiency has been clearly confirmed. (author)

  19. In-field analysis and assessment of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgado, R.E.; Myers, W.S.; Olivares, J.A.; Phillips, J.R.; York, R.L.

    1996-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory has actively developed and implemented a number of instruments to monitor, detect, and analyze nuclear materials in the field. Many of these technologies, developed under existing US Department of Energy programs, can also be used to effectively interdict nuclear materials smuggled across or within national borders. In particular, two instruments are suitable for immediate implementation: the NAVI-2, a hand-held gamma-ray and neutron system for the detection and rapid identification of radioactive materials, and the portable mass spectrometer for the rapid analysis of minute quantities of radioactive materials. Both instruments provide not only critical information about the characteristics of the nuclear material for law-enforcement agencies and national authorities but also supply health and safety information for personnel handling the suspect materials

  20. Reliability of structural materials in nuclear industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinard Legry, G.

    1996-01-01

    The reliability of nuclear installations is a fundamental point for the exploitation of nuclear energy. It requires an extensive knowledge of the behaviour of materials in the operating conditions and during the expected service life of the installations. In nuclear power plants multiple risks of failure can exist and are expressed by corrosion and deformation phenomena or by modification in the mechanical characteristics of materials. The knowledge of the evolution with time of a given material requires to take into account the data relative to the material itself, to its environment and to the physical conditions of this environment. The study of materials aging needs a more precise knowledge of the kinetics of phenomena at any scale and of their interactions, and a micro- or macro-modeling of their behaviour during long periods of time. This paper gives an overview of the aging phenomena that occur in the structural materials involved in PWR and fast neutron reactors: thermal aging, generalized corrosion, corrosion under constraint, intergranular corrosion, crack growth under loading, wear, irradiation etc.. (J.S.)

  1. Statistical methods in nuclear material accountancy: Past, present and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pike, D.J.; Woods, A.J.

    1983-01-01

    The analysis of nuclear material inventory data is motivated by the desire to detect any loss or diversion of nuclear material, insofar as such detection may be feasible by statistical analysis of repeated inventory and throughput measurements. The early regulations, which laid down the specifications for the analysis of inventory data, were framed without acknowledging the essentially sequential nature of the data. It is the broad aim of this paper to discuss the historical nature of statistical analysis of inventory data including an evaluation of why statistical methods should be required at all. If it is accepted that statistical techniques are required, then two main areas require extensive discussion. First, it is important to assess the extent to which stated safeguards aims can be met in practice. Second, there is a vital need for reassessment of the statistical techniques which have been proposed for use in nuclear material accountancy. Part of this reassessment must involve a reconciliation of the apparent differences in philosophy shown by statisticians; but, in addition, the techniques themselves need comparative study to see to what extent they are capable of meeting realistic safeguards aims. This paper contains a brief review of techniques with an attempt to compare and contrast the approaches. It will be suggested that much current research is following closely similar lines, and that national and international bodies should encourage collaborative research and practical in-plant implementations. The techniques proposed require credibility and power; but at this point in time statisticians require credibility and a greater level of unanimity in their approach. A way ahead is proposed based on a clear specification of realistic safeguards aims, and a development of a unified statistical approach with encouragement for the performance of joint research. (author)

  2. Nuclear data information system for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujita, Mitsutane; Noda, Tetsuji; Utsumi, Misako

    1996-01-01

    The conceptual system for nuclear material design is considered and some trials on WWW server with functions of the easily accessible simulation of nuclear reactions are introduced. Moreover, as an example of the simulation on the system using nuclear data, transmutation calculation was made for candidate first wall materials such as 9Cr-2W steel, V-5Cr-5Ti and SiC in SUS316/Li 2 O/H 2 O(SUS), 9Cr-2W/Li 2 O/H 2 O(RAF), V alloy/Li/Be(V), and SiC/Li 2 ZrO 3 /He(SiC) blanket/shield systems based on ITER design model. Neutron spectrum varies with different blanket/shield compositions. The flux of low energy neutrons decreases in order of V< SiC< RAF< SUS blanket/shield systems. Fair amounts of W depletion in 9Cr-2W steel and the increase of Cr content in V-5Cr-5Ti were predicted in SUS or RAF systems. Concentration change in W and Cr is estimated to be suppressed if Li coolant is used in place of water. Helium and hydrogen production are not strongly affected by the different blanket/shield compositions. (author)

  3. Uncovering Special Nuclear Materials by Low-energy Nuclear Reaction Imaging.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rose, P B; Erickson, A S; Mayer, M; Nattress, J; Jovanovic, I

    2016-04-18

    Weapons-grade uranium and plutonium could be used as nuclear explosives with extreme destructive potential. The problem of their detection, especially in standard cargo containers during transit, has been described as "searching for a needle in a haystack" because of the inherently low rate of spontaneous emission of characteristic penetrating radiation and the ease of its shielding. Currently, the only practical approach for uncovering well-shielded special nuclear materials is by use of active interrogation using an external radiation source. However, the similarity of these materials to shielding and the required radiation doses that may exceed regulatory limits prevent this method from being widely used in practice. We introduce a low-dose active detection technique, referred to as low-energy nuclear reaction imaging, which exploits the physics of interactions of multi-MeV monoenergetic photons and neutrons to simultaneously measure the material's areal density and effective atomic number, while confirming the presence of fissionable materials by observing the beta-delayed neutron emission. For the first time, we demonstrate identification and imaging of uranium with this novel technique using a simple yet robust source, setting the stage for its wide adoption in security applications.

  4. Security of nuclear materials using fusion multi sensor wavelett

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Djoko Hari Nugroho

    2010-01-01

    Security of a nuclear material in an installation is determined by how far the installation is to assure that nuclear material remains at a predetermined location. This paper observed a preliminary design on nuclear material tracking system in the installation for decision making support based on multi sensor fusion that is reliable and accurate to ensure that the nuclear material remains inside the control area. Capability on decision making in the Management Information System is represented by an understanding of perception in the third level of abstraction. The second level will be achieved with the support of image analysis and organizing data. The first level of abstraction is constructed by merger between several CCD camera sensors distributed in a building in a data fusion representation. Data fusion is processed based on Wavelett approach. Simulation utilizing Matlab programming shows that Wavelett fuses multi information from sensors as well. Hope that when the nuclear material out of control regions which have been predetermined before, there will arise a warning alarm and a message in the Management Information System display. Thus the nuclear material movement time event can be obtained and tracked as well. (author)

  5. Regulation on control of nuclear materials of the 31 Oct 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The new regulation on accounting for and control of nuclear materials was issued on 31 October 1986 and put into force on 1 February 1987. The following provisions are included: aim and scope, responsibility for nuclear material accounting and control, rights and obligations of the nuclear material control officer, licensing, facility's instructions for nuclear material control, accounting, records, reporting, unusual events, inspections, nuclear material transfers, exemptions and termination of IAEA safeguards, final provisions, and definitions of terms

  6. Bar code usage in nuclear materials accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mee, W.T.

    1983-01-01

    The age old method of physically taking an inventory of materials by listing each item's identification number has lived beyond its usefulness. In this age of computerization, which offers the local grocery store a quick, sure, and easy means to inventory, it is time for nuclear materials facilities to automate accountability activities. The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant began investigating the use of automated data collection devices in 1979. At that time, bar code and optical-character-recognition (OCR) systems were reviewed with the purpose of directly entering data into DYMCAS (Dynamic Special Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability System). Both of these systems appeared applicable; however, other automated devices already employed for production control made implementing the bar code and OCR seem improbable. However, the DYMCAS was placed on line for nuclear material accountability, a decision was made to consider the bar code for physical inventory listings. For the past several months a development program has been underway to use a bar code device to collect and input data to the DYMCAS on the uranium recovery operations. Programs have been completed and tested, and are being employed to ensure that data will be compatible and useful. Bar code implementation and expansion of its use for all nuclear material inventory activity in Y-12 is presented

  7. Aims and methods of nuclear materials management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leven, D.; Schier, H.

    1979-05-01

    Whilst international safeguarding of fissile materials against abuse has been the subject of extensive debate, little public attention has so far been devoted to the internal security of these materials. All countries using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes have laid down appropriate regulations. In the Federal Republic of Germany safeguards are required, for instance, by the Atomic Energy Act, and are therefore a prerequisite for licensing. The aims and methods of national nuclear materials management are contrasted with viewpoints on international safeguards

  8. Overview moderator material for nuclear reactor components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mairing Manutu Pongtuluran; Hendra Prihatnadi

    2009-01-01

    In order for a reactor design is considered acceptable absolute technical requirement is fulfilled because the most important part of a reactor design. Safety considerations emphasis on the handling of radioactive substances emitted during the operation of a reactor and radioactive waste handling. Moderator material is a layer that interacts directly with neutrons split the nuclear fuel that will lead to changes in physical properties, nuclear properties, mechanical properties and chemical properties. Reviews moderator of this time is of the types of moderator is often used to meet the requirements as nuclear material. (author)

  9. RETIMAC: a real-time material control concept for strategic special nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shea, T.E.

    1975-01-01

    As one possible means to upgrade licensee safeguards systems, the NRC is exploring a real-time material control concept. The concept incorporates process controls, material containment provisions, and extensive instrumentation. Plants incorporating this concept would be better able to prevent, deter, and detect diversion, and to assure that diversion has not gone undetected. A substantial methods development, evaluation, and preliminary standards development program is under way to develop the basis for future policy decisions

  10. New technologies for monitoring nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    1993-01-01

    This paper describes new technologies for monitoring the continued presence of nuclear materials that are being evaluated in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to reduce the effort, cost, and employee exposures associated with conducting nuclear material inventories. These technologies also show promise for the international safeguarding of process systems and nuclear materials in storage, including spent fuels. The identified systems are based on innovative technologies that were not developed for safeguards applications. These advanced technologies include passive and active sensor systems based on optical materials, inexpensive solid-state radiation detectors, dimensional surface characterization, and digital color imagery. The passive sensor systems use specialized scintillator materials coupled to optical-fiber technologies that not only are capable of measuring radioactive emissions but also are capable of measuring or monitoring pressure, weight, temperature, and source location. Small, durable solid-state gamma-ray detection devices, whose components are estimated to cost less than $25 per unit, can be implemented in a variety of configurations and can be adapted to enhance existing monitoring systems. Variations in detector design have produced significantly different system capabilities. Dimensional surface characterization and digital color imaging are applications of developed technologies that are capable of motion detection, item surveillance, and unique identification of items

  11. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material and other radioactive sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yilmazer, A.; Yuecel, A.; Yavuz, U.

    2001-01-01

    As it is known, for the fact that the illicit trafficking and trading of nuclear materials are being increased over the past few years because of the huge demand of third world states. Nuclear materials like uranium, plutonium, and thorium are used in nuclear explosives that have very attractive features for crime groups, terrorist groups and, the states that are willing to have this power. Crime groups that make illegal trade of nuclear material are also trying to market strategic radioactive sources like red mercury and Osmium. This kind of illegal trade threats public safety, human health, environment also it brings significant threat on world peace and world public health. For these reasons, both states and international organizations should take a role in dealing with illicit trafficking. An important precondition for preventing this kind of incidents is the existence of a strengthened national system for control of all nuclear materials and other radioactive sources. Further, Governments are responsible for law enforcement within their borders for prevention of illegal trading and trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources

  12. 10 CFR 74.31 - Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of low strategic significance.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... and maintain a measurement system which assures that all quantities in the material accounting records...) In each inventory period, control total material control and accounting measurement uncertainty so... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nuclear material control and accounting for special...

  13. The application of a figure of merit for nuclear explosive utility as a metric for material attractiveness in a nuclear material theft scenario

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    King, Wayne E., E-mail: weking@llnl.go [Physical and Life Sciences Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States); Bradley, Keith [Global Security Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States); Jones, Edwin D. [Physical and Life Sciences Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States); Kramer, Kevin J.; Latkowski, Jeffery F. [Engineering Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States); Robel, Martin [Physical and Life Sciences Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States); Sleaford, Brad W. [Engineering Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States)

    2010-11-15

    Effective integration of nonproliferation management into the design process is key to the broad deployment of advanced nuclear energy systems, and is an explicit goal of the Laser Inertial Fusion Energy (LIFE) project at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The nuclear explosives utility of a nuclear material to a state (proliferator) or sub-state (terrorist) is a critical factor to be assessed and is one aspect of material attractiveness. In this work, we approached nuclear explosives utility through the calculation of a 'figure of merit' (FOM) that has recently been developed to capture the relative viability and difficulty of constructing nuclear explosives starting from various nuclear material forms and compositions. We discuss the integration of the figure of merit into an assessment of a nuclear material theft scenario and its use in the assessment. This paper demonstrates that material attractiveness is a multidimensional concept that embodies more than the FOM. It also seeks to propose that other attributes may be able to be quantified through analogous FOMs (e.g., transformation) and that, with quantification, aggregation may be possible using concepts from the risk community.

  14. Nuclear Fuels & Materials Spotlight Volume 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petti, David Andrew

    2016-01-01

    As the nation's nuclear energy laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory brings together talented people and specialized nuclear research capability to accomplish our mission. This edition of the Nuclear Fuels and Materials Division Spotlight provides an overview of some of our recent accomplishments in research and capability development. These accomplishments include: • Evaluation and modeling of light water reactor accident tolerant fuel concepts • Status and results of recent TRISO-coated particle fuel irradiations, post-irradiation examinations, high-temperature safety testing to demonstrate the accident performance of this fuel system, and advanced microscopy to improve the understanding of fission product transport in this fuel system. • Improvements in and applications of meso and engineering scale modeling of light water reactor fuel behavior under a range of operating conditions and postulated accidents (e.g., power ramping, loss of coolant accident, and reactivity initiated accidents) using the MARMOT and BISON codes. • Novel measurements of the properties of nuclear (actinide) materials under extreme conditions, (e.g. high pressure, low/high temperatures, high magnetic field) to improve the scientific understanding of these materials. • Modeling reactor pressure vessel behavior using the GRIZZLY code. • New methods using sound to sense temperature inside a reactor core. • Improved experimental capabilities to study the response of fusion reactor materials to a tritium plasma. Throughout Spotlight, you'll find examples of productive partnerships with academia, industry, and government agencies that deliver high-impact outcomes. The work conducted at Idaho National Laboratory helps spur innovation in nuclear energy applications that drive economic growth and energy security. We appreciate your interest in our work here at Idaho National Laboratory, and hope that you find this issue informative.

  15. Control of nuclear materials and materials in Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arbor G, A.; Fernandes M, S.

    1988-01-01

    A general view about the safeguards activities in Argentina is presented. The national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials is described. The safeguards agreement signed by Argentina are presented. (E.G.) [pt

  16. Hungarian national nuclear material control and accounting system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lendvai, O.

    1985-01-01

    The Hungarian system for nuclear materials control and accounting is briefly described. Sections include a historical overview, a description of nuclear activities and an outline of the organizational structure of the materials management system. Subsequent sections discuss accounting, verification and international relations

  17. Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities. Implementing Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) works in a complementary fashion with the international safeguards programme and physical protection systems to help prevent, deter or detect the unauthorized acquisition and use of nuclear materials. These three methodologies are employed by Member States to defend against external threats, internal threats and both state actors and non-state actors. This publication offers guidance for implementing NMAC measures for nuclear security at the nuclear facility level. It focuses on measures to mitigate the risk posed by insider threats and describes elements of a programme that can be implemented at a nuclear facility in coordination with the physical protection system for the purpose of deterring and detecting unauthorized removal of nuclear material

  18. IMPORTANCE OF MATERIAL BALANCES AND THEIR STATISTICAL EVALUATION IN RUSSIAN MATERIAL, PROTECTION, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1999-01-01

    While substantial work has been performed in the Russian MPC and A Program, much more needs to be done at Russian nuclear facilities to complete four necessary steps. These are (1) periodically measuring the physical inventory of nuclear material, (2) continuously measuring the flows of nuclear material, (3) using the results to close the material balance, particularly at bulk processing facilities, and (4) statistically evaluating any apparent loss of nuclear material. The periodic closing of material balances provides an objective test of the facility's system of nuclear material protection, control and accounting. The statistical evaluation using the uncertainties associated with individual measurement systems involved in the calculation of the material balance provides a fair standard for concluding whether the apparent loss of nuclear material means a diversion or whether the facility's accounting system needs improvement. In particular, if unattractive flow material at a facility is not measured well, the accounting system cannot readily detect the loss of attractive material if the latter substantially derives from the former

  19. Material control and accounting at Exxon Nuclear, I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, R.A.

    1985-01-01

    The nuclear material control and accounting system at Exxon Nuclear will be described in detail. Subjects discussed will include: the basis of the MC and A system, the nuclear materials accounting systems (NMRS and NICS), physical inventory taking, IAEA inspection experience, safeguards organization, measurements and measurement control, MUF evaluation, accounting forms and reports and use of tamper-indicating seals. The general requirements for material accounting and control in this type of a bulk-handling facility are described. The way those requirements are met for the subject areas shown above is illustrated using a reference (Model Plant) version of the Exxon Nuclear plant The difference between the item-accounting procedures used at reactor facilities and the bulk-accounting procedures used at fuel fabrication facilities is discussed in detail

  20. Nuclear Materials Characterization in the Materials and Fuels Complex Analytical Hot Cells

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriquez, Michael

    2009-01-01

    As energy prices skyrocket and interest in alternative, clean energy sources builds, interest in nuclear energy has increased. This increased interest in nuclear energy has been termed the 'Nuclear Renaissance'. The performance of nuclear fuels, fuels and reactor materials and waste products are becoming a more important issue as the potential for designing new nuclear reactors is more immediate. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Analytical Laboratory Hot Cells (ALHC) are rising to the challenge of characterizing new reactor materials, byproducts and performance. The ALHC is a facility located near Idaho Falls, Idaho at the INL Site. It was built in 1958 as part of the former Argonne National Laboratory West Complex to support the operation of the second Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR-II). It is part of a larger analytical laboratory structure that includes wet chemistry, instrumentation and radiochemistry laboratories. The purpose of the ALHC is to perform analytical chemistry work on highly radioactive materials. The primary work in the ALHC has traditionally been dissolution of nuclear materials so that less radioactive subsamples (aliquots) could be transferred to other sections of the laboratory for analysis. Over the last 50 years though, the capabilities within the ALHC have also become independent of other laboratory sections in a number of ways. While dissolution, digestion and subdividing samples are still a vitally important role, the ALHC has stand alone capabilities in the area of immersion density, gamma scanning and combustion gas analysis. Recent use of the ALHC for immersion density shows that extremely fine and delicate operations can be performed with the master-slave manipulators by qualified operators. Twenty milligram samples were tested for immersion density to determine the expansion of uranium dioxide after irradiation in a nuclear reactor. The data collected confirmed modeling analysis with very tight

  1. Education and training in nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Falcon, S.; Marco, M.

    2014-01-01

    CIEMAT participates in the European project Matisse (Materials Innovations for a Safe and Sustainable nuclear in Europe) belonging to FP7, whose main objective is to promote the link between the respective national research programs through networking and integration of activities for innovation in materials for advanced nuclear systems, sharing among partners best practices and implementation of training tools and efficient communication. The draft four years, from 2013 to 2017, includes aspects such as the interaction between infrastructure, R and D programs and postgraduate education and training. (Author)

  2. Outline of a computerized nuclear material accounting system applicable to nuclear power reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Handshuh, J.W.

    1975-01-01

    A computerized nuclear material accounting system is described which enables a utility to account for its material throughout the entire fuel cycle. From input of transactions, the system records and reports inventories and transactions by accounts which the user may establish for discrete locations, item control areas, further subdivisions, and material types. Account numbers are designed so that accounts and records are automatically sorted in the order desired. The system also generates the Material Status Reports for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  3. The national nuclear material tracking system. A Korea's countermeasure against nuclear terrorism

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moon, Joo Hyun [Dongguk Univ., Gyeongbuk (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-07-15

    Since nuclear terrorism has been identified as a real threat, the Korean government has earnestly developed elementary technologies and sub-systems for establishing an integrated defensive system against nuclear terrorism, which is based on the concept of defense-in-depth. This paper introduces the gist and implications of the studies that have been conducted in building the national nuclear material tracking system for preventing and intercepting the illicit trafficking and transporting of nuclear material in Korea. (orig.)

  4. Nuclear materials control and accountability criteria for upgrades measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erkkila, B.H.; Hatcher, C.R.

    1998-01-01

    As a result of major political and societal changes in the past several years, methods of nuclear material control may no longer be as effective as in the past in Russia, the Newly Independent States (NIS), and the Baltic States (BS). The objective of the Department of Energy (DOE) Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC and A) is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation by collaborating with Russia, NIS, and BS governments to promote western-style MPC and A. This cooperation will improve the MPC and A on all weapons useable nuclear materials and will establish a sustainable infrastructure to provide future support and maintenance for these technology-based improvements. Nuclear materials of proliferation concern include materials of the types and quantities that can be most easily and directly used in a nuclear weapon. Sabotage of nuclear material is an event of great concern and potentially disastrous consequences to both the US and the host country. However, sabotage is currently beyond the scope of program direction and cannot be used to justify US-funded MPC and A upgrades. Judicious MPC and A upgrades designed to protect against insider and outsider theft scenarios would also provide addition, although not comprehensive, protection against saboteurs. This paper provides some suggestions to establish consistency in prioritizing system-enhancement efforts at nuclear material facilities. The suggestions in this paper are consistent with DOE policy and directions and should be used as a supplement to any policy directives issued by NN-40, DOE Russia/NIS Task Force

  5. Nuclear materials control and accountability criteria for upgrades measures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Erkkila, B.H.; Hatcher, C.R.

    1998-11-01

    As a result of major political and societal changes in the past several years, methods of nuclear material control may no longer be as effective as in the past in Russia, the Newly Independent States (NIS), and the Baltic States (BS). The objective of the Department of Energy (DOE) Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC and A) is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation by collaborating with Russia, NIS, and BS governments to promote western-style MPC and A. This cooperation will improve the MPC and A on all weapons useable nuclear materials and will establish a sustainable infrastructure to provide future support and maintenance for these technology-based improvements. Nuclear materials of proliferation concern include materials of the types and quantities that can be most easily and directly used in a nuclear weapon. Sabotage of nuclear material is an event of great concern and potentially disastrous consequences to both the US and the host country. However, sabotage is currently beyond the scope of program direction and cannot be used to justify US-funded MPC and A upgrades. Judicious MPC and A upgrades designed to protect against insider and outsider theft scenarios would also provide addition, although not comprehensive, protection against saboteurs. This paper provides some suggestions to establish consistency in prioritizing system-enhancement efforts at nuclear material facilities. The suggestions in this paper are consistent with DOE policy and directions and should be used as a supplement to any policy directives issued by NN-40, DOE Russia/NIS Task Force.

  6. September 11 and Nuclear Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knapp, V.

    2002-01-01

    The terrible September 11 attacks have demonstrated the ability of international terrorists to carry out well-planned and complex operations that can kill thousands of citizens. The potential for biological, chemical and nuclear terrorism has increased and will remain as long as their underlying causes. Nuclear installations could be the targets, or the sources of materials usable for terrorism. Whilst thick containment buildings around nuclear reactors are unlikely to be breached, some installations, such as spent fuel pond are more vulnerable. The safety of nuclear installations must be reconsidered taking into account some new initiating events hitherto considered of very low probability. A resistance against nuclear power plant sabotage by terrorist group penetrating into reactor building, is a controversial topic. Measures against diversion of nuclear materials, which could be used in nuclear terrorism, must be reviewed. The danger of diversion from giant military stocks of highly enriched uranium and plutonium by far exceeds that from peaceful use of nuclear energy. Measures to neutralize these stocks, such as dilution of highly enriched uranium, should be speeded up and have a priority in public concern. As for the nuclear power stations, public should be informed about the recommendations of IAEA for better physical protection of nuclear materials prepared in 1999 (INFCIRC 225/Rev.4) and about Additional protocol to inadequate Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials from 1980, which is in a process of ratification. For acceptable nuclear future public must be aware that all required measures to eliminate unacceptable risks resulting from terrorist activity against nuclear installations will be undertaken. (author)

  7. US develops neutron to sniff out nuclear material

    CERN Document Server

    2002-01-01

    The USA has developed a tiny portable neutron device that can detect hidden nuclear materials. The device is undergoing trials in the Argonne National Laboratory to see if it could be used to stop smuggling and unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and materials (1/2 page).

  8. The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    General provisions specify the purpose of the Law and definitions of terms used in it. Provisions relating to control of business management for refining cover designation of business operation, requirements for designation, permission and report of alteration, report of commencement of business operation, revocation of designation, recording, and measures for wastes. Provisions relating to control of business management for processing cover permission of operation, requirements for permission, approval of design and construction plan, inspection of facilities, report of commencement of business management, measures for maintenance, suspension of use of facilities, responsible personnel for handling nuclear fuel, and permit, obligations, etc. of responsible personnel for handing nuclear fuel. Provisions relating to control of construction and operation of nuclear reactor cover permission of construction, permission concerning nuclear reactor mounted on foreign nuclear powered ships, requirements for permission, etc. Other articles stipulate provisions relating to control of business management for reprocessing, use of nuclear fuel substances, use of materials and substances covered by international regulations, designation of inspection organizations, and other rules. (Nogami, K.)

  9. Induced-Fission Imaging of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hausladen, Paul; Blackston, Matthew A.; Mullens, James Allen; McConchie, Seth M.; Mihalczo, John T.; Bingham, Philip R.; Ericson, Milton Nance; Fabris, Lorenzo

    2010-01-01

    This paper presents initial results from development of the induced-fission imaging technique, which can be used for the purpose of measuring or verifying the distribution of fissionable material in an unopened container. The technique is based on stimulating fissions in nuclear material with 14 MeV neutrons from an associated-particle deuterium-tritium (D-T) generator and counting the subsequent induced fast fission neutrons with an array of fast organic scintillation detectors. For each source neutron incident on the container, the neutron creation time and initial trajectory are known from detection of the associated alpha particle of the d + t → α + n reaction. Many induced fissions will lie along (or near) the interrogating neutron path, allowing an image of the spatial distribution of prompt induced fissions, and thereby fissionable material, to be constructed. A variety of induced-fission imaging measurements have been performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory with a portable, low-dose D-T generator, including single-view radiographic measurements and three-dimensional tomographic measurements. Results from these measurements will be presented along with the neutron transmission images that have been performed simultaneously. This new capability may have applications to a number of areas in which there may be a need to confirm the presence or configuration of nuclear materials, such as nuclear material control and accountability, quality assurance, treaty confirmation, or homeland security applications.

  10. Computerized nuclear material database management system for power reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cheng Binghao; Zhu Rongbao; Liu Daming; Cao Bin; Liu Ling; Tan Yajun; Jiang Jincai

    1994-01-01

    The software packages for nuclear material database management for power reactors are described. The database structure, data flow and model for management of the database are analysed. Also mentioned are the main functions and characterizations of the software packages, which are successfully installed and used at both the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant and the Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant for the purposed of handling nuclear material database automatically

  11. A Uniform Framework of Global Nuclear Materials Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupree, S.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Sanders, T.L; Sellers, T.A.

    1999-01-01

    Global Nuclear Materials Management (GNMM) anticipates and supports a growing international recognition of the importance of uniform, effective management of civilian, excess defense, and nuclear weapons materials. We expect thereto be a continuing increase in both the number of international agreements and conventions on safety, security, and transparency of nuclear materials, and the number of U.S.-Russian agreements for the safety, protection, and transparency of weapons and excess defense materials. This inventory of agreements and conventions may soon expand into broad, mandatory, international programs that will include provisions for inspection, verification, and transparency, To meet such demand the community must build on the resources we have, including State agencies, the IAEA and regional organizations. By these measures we will meet the future expectations for monitoring and inspection of materials, maintenance of safety and security, and implementation of transparency measures

  12. A Uniform Framework of Global Nuclear Materials Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dupree, S.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Sanders, T.L; Sellers, T.A.

    1999-04-20

    Global Nuclear Materials Management (GNMM) anticipates and supports a growing international recognition of the importance of uniform, effective management of civilian, excess defense, and nuclear weapons materials. We expect thereto be a continuing increase in both the number of international agreements and conventions on safety, security, and transparency of nuclear materials, and the number of U.S.-Russian agreements for the safety, protection, and transparency of weapons and excess defense materials. This inventory of agreements and conventions may soon expand into broad, mandatory, international programs that will include provisions for inspection, verification, and transparency, To meet such demand the community must build on the resources we have, including State agencies, the IAEA and regional organizations. By these measures we will meet the future expectations for monitoring and inspection of materials, maintenance of safety and security, and implementation of transparency measures.

  13. Software development for managing nuclear material database; Desenvolvimento de um programa computacional para gerenciamento de banco de dados de material nuclear

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tondin, Julio Benedito Marin

    2011-07-01

    In nuclear facilities, the nuclear material control is one of the most important activities. The Brazilian National Commission of Nuclear Energy (CNEN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), when inspecting routinely, regards the data provided as a major safety factor. Having a control system of nuclear material that allows the amount and location of the various items to be inspected, at any time, is a key factor today. The objective of this work was to enhance the existing system using a more friendly platform of development, through the VisualBasic programming language (Microsoft Corporation), to facilitate the operation team of the reactor IEA-R1 Reactor tasks, providing data that enable a better and prompter control of the IEA-R1 nuclear material. These data have allowed the development of papers presented at national and international conferences and the development of master's dissertations and doctorate theses. The software object of this study was designed to meet the requirements of the CNEN and the IAEA safeguard rules, but its functions may be expanded in accordance with future needs. The program developed can be used in other reactors to be built in the country, since it is very practical and allows an effective control of the nuclear material in the facilities. (author)

  14. Nuclear Fuels & Materials Spotlight Volume 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Petti, David Andrew [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2016-10-01

    As the nation's nuclear energy laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory brings together talented people and specialized nuclear research capability to accomplish our mission. This edition of the Nuclear Fuels and Materials Division Spotlight provides an overview of some of our recent accomplishments in research and capability development. These accomplishments include: • Evaluation and modeling of light water reactor accident tolerant fuel concepts • Status and results of recent TRISO-coated particle fuel irradiations, post-irradiation examinations, high-temperature safety testing to demonstrate the accident performance of this fuel system, and advanced microscopy to improve the understanding of fission product transport in this fuel system. • Improvements in and applications of meso and engineering scale modeling of light water reactor fuel behavior under a range of operating conditions and postulated accidents (e.g., power ramping, loss of coolant accident, and reactivity initiated accidents) using the MARMOT and BISON codes. • Novel measurements of the properties of nuclear (actinide) materials under extreme conditions, (e.g. high pressure, low/high temperatures, high magnetic field) to improve the scientific understanding of these materials. • Modeling reactor pressure vessel behavior using the GRIZZLY code. • New methods using sound to sense temperature inside a reactor core. • Improved experimental capabilities to study the response of fusion reactor materials to a tritium plasma. Throughout Spotlight, you'll find examples of productive partnerships with academia, industry, and government agencies that deliver high-impact outcomes. The work conducted at Idaho National Laboratory helps spur innovation in nuclear energy applications that drive economic growth and energy security. We appreciate your interest in our work here at Idaho National Laboratory, and hope that you find this issue informative.

  15. Selection of materials in nuclear fuel: present and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Munoz-Reja, C.; Fuentes, L.; Garcia de la Infanta, J. M.; Munoz Sicilia, A.

    2013-01-01

    One of the main aspects of the nuclear fuel is the selection of materials for the components. The operating conditions of the fuel elements impose a major challenge to materials: high temperature, corrosive aqueous environment, high mechanical properties, long periods of time under these extreme conditions and what is the differentiating factor; the effect of irradiation. The materials are selected to fulfill these severe requirements and also to be able to control and to predict its behavior in the working conditions. Their development, in terms of composition and processing, is based on the continuous follow-up of the operation behavior. Many of these materials are specific of the nuclear industry, such as the uranium dioxide and the zirconium alloys. This article presents the selection and development of the nuclear fuel materials as a function of the services requirements. It also includes a view of the new nuclear fuels materials that are being raised after Fukushima accident. (Author)

  16. Estimation methods for special nuclear materials holdup

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.

    1984-01-01

    The potential value of statistical models for the estimation of residual inventories of special nuclear materials was examined using holdup data from processing facilities and through controlled experiments. Although the measurement of hidden inventories of special nuclear materials in large facilities is a challenging task, reliable estimates of these inventories can be developed through a combination of good measurements and the use of statistical models. 7 references, 5 figures

  17. Nuclear and hazardous material perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sandquist, Gary M.; Kunze, Jay F.; Rogers, Vern C.

    2007-01-01

    The reemerging nuclear enterprise in the 21. century empowering the power industry and nuclear technology is still viewed with fear and concern by many of the public and many political leaders. Nuclear phobia is also exhibited by many nuclear professionals. The fears and concerns of these groups are complex and varied, but focus primarily on (1) management and disposal of radioactive waste [especially spent nuclear fuel and low level radioactive waste], (2) radiation exposures at any level, and (3) the threat nuclear terrorism. The root cause of all these concerns is the exaggerated risk perceived to human health from radiation exposure. These risks from radiation exposure are compounded by the universal threat of nuclear weapons and the disastrous consequences if these weapons or materials become available to terrorists or rogue nations. This paper addresses the bases and rationality for these fears and considers methods and options for mitigating these fears. Scientific evidence and actual data are provided. Radiation risks are compared to similar risks from common chemicals and familiar human activities that are routinely accepted. (authors)

  18. 10 CFR 70.11 - Persons using special nuclear material under certain Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Persons using special nuclear material under certain Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission contracts. 70.11 Section 70.11 Energy NUCLEAR... using special nuclear material under certain Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission...

  19. Absolute nuclear material assay using count distribution (LAMBDA) space

    Science.gov (United States)

    Prasad, Manoj K [Pleasanton, CA; Snyderman, Neal J [Berkeley, CA; Rowland, Mark S [Alamo, CA

    2012-06-05

    A method of absolute nuclear material assay of an unknown source comprising counting neutrons from the unknown source and providing an absolute nuclear material assay utilizing a model to optimally compare to the measured count distributions. In one embodiment, the step of providing an absolute nuclear material assay comprises utilizing a random sampling of analytically computed fission chain distributions to generate a continuous time-evolving sequence of event-counts by spreading the fission chain distribution in time.

  20. The Application of materials attractiveness in a graded approach to nuclear materials security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ebbinghaus, B.; Bathke, C.; Dalton, D.; Murphy, J.

    2013-01-01

    The threat from terrorist groups has recently received greater attention. In this paper, material quantity and material attractiveness are addressed through the lens of a minimum security strategy needed to prevent the construction of a nuclear explosive device (NED) by an adversary. Nuclear materials are placed into specific security categories (3 or 4 categories) , which define a number of security requirements to protect the material. Materials attractiveness can be divided into four attractiveness levels, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low that correspond to the utility of the material to the adversary and to a minimum security strategy that is necessary to adequately protect the nuclear material. We propose a graded approach to materials attractiveness that recognizes for instance substantial differences in attractiveness between pure reactor-grade Pu oxide (High attractiveness) and fresh MOX fuel (Low attractiveness). In either case, an adversary's acquisition of a Category I quantity of plutonium would be a major incident, but the acquisition of Pu oxide by the adversary would be substantially worse than the acquisition of fresh MOX fuel because of the substantial differences in the time and complexity required of the adversary to process the material and fashion it into a NED

  1. Peculiarities of physical protection assurance of the nuclear materials at nuclear installation decommissioning stage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinchuk, M.G.

    2001-01-01

    On December 15, 2000 Unit 3 of Chernobyl NPP, which is the last one in Ukraine having RBMK-type reactor, was permanently shutdown before the end of its lifetime. A number of projects related to establishing infrastructure for the plant decommissioning are being implemented in compliance with the Ukraine's commitments. Decommissioning stage includes activities on fuel unloading from the cores of Unit I and Unit 3, fuel cooling in the ponds followed by the fuel transportation to the spent fuel dry storage facility (currently under construction) for its safe long-term storage. Special facilities are being created for liquid and solid radioactive waste treatment. Besides, it is planned to implement a number of projects to convert Shelter Object in environmentally safe structure. Physical protection work being an essential part of the nuclear material management is organized in line with the recommendations of the IAEA, and the Laws of Ukraine 'On Nuclear Energy Utilization and Radiation Safety', 'On Physical Protection of Nuclear Installations and Materials', 'Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Installations', other codes and standards. While organizing physical protection on ChNPP decommissioning stage we have to deal with some specific features, namely: Significant amount of fuel assemblies, which are continuously transferred between various storage and operation facilities; Big amount of odd nuclear material at Shelter Object; 'Theft of new fuel fragments from the central hall of the Shelter Object in 1995 with the intention of their further sale. The thieves were detained and sentenced. The stolen material was withdrawn, that prevented its possible proliferation and illicit trafficking. At present physical protection of ChNPP does not fully satisfy the needs of the decommissioning stage and Ukraine's commitments on non-admission of illicit trafficking. Work is carried out, aimed to improve nuclear material physical protection, whose main

  2. Special nuclear material simulation device

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leckey, John H.; DeMint, Amy; Gooch, Jack; Hawk, Todd; Pickett, Chris A.; Blessinger, Chris; York, Robbie L.

    2014-08-12

    An apparatus for simulating special nuclear material is provided. The apparatus typically contains a small quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) in a configuration that simulates a much larger quantity of SNM. Generally the apparatus includes a spherical shell that is formed from an alloy containing a small quantity of highly enriched uranium. Also typically provided is a core of depleted uranium. A spacer, typically aluminum, may be used to separate the depleted uranium from the shell of uranium alloy. A cladding, typically made of titanium, is provided to seal the source. Methods are provided to simulate SNM for testing radiation monitoring portals. Typically the methods use at least one primary SNM spectral line and exclude at least one secondary SNM spectral line.

  3. Diversity in the Minerals, Metals, and Materials Professions (DMMM2)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Clarke, Amy Jean [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-04-07

    Slide presentation includes background data on diversity in employed persons in metallurgical and materials and other engineering disciplines by ethnicity and gender, and it includes TMS strategic goals for 2018, diversity and inclusion goals, outputs, programming details, as well as supporting initiatives.

  4. Order for execution of the law concerning regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    Chapeter 1 specifies regulations concerning business management for refining and processing, which cover application for designation of refining operation, application for permission for processing operation, and approval of personnel responsible for handling nuclear fuel. Chapter 2 specifies regulations concerning construction and operation of nuclear reactors, which cover application for construction of nuclear reactors, reactors in a research and development stage, application for permission concerning nuclear reactors mounted on foreign nuclear powered ships, application for permission for alteration concerning construction of nuclear reactors, application for permission for alteration concerning nuclear reactors mounted on foreign nuclear powered ships, nuclear reactor facilities to be subjected to regular inspection, nuclear reactor for which submission of operation plan is not required, and application for permission for transfer of nuclear reactor. Chapter 2 also specifies regulations concerning business management for reprocessing and waste disposal. Chapter 3 stipulates regulations concerning use of nuclear fuel substances, nuclear material substances and other substances covered by international regulations, which include rules for application for permission for use of nuclear fuel substances, etc. Supplementary provisions are provided in Chapter 4. (Nogami, K.)

  5. Thermodynamics of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1962-01-01

    The first session of the symposium discussed in general the thermodynamic properties of actinides, including thorium, uranium and Plutonium which provide reactor fuel. The second session was devoted to applications of thermodynamic theory to the study of nuclear materials, while the experimental techniques for the determination of thermodynamic data were examined at the next session. The thermodynamic properties of alloys were considered at a separate session, and another session was concerned with solids other than alloys. Vaporization processes, which are of special interest in the development of high-temperature reactors, were discussed at a separate session. The discussions on the methods of developing the data and ascertaining their accuracy were especially useful in highlighting the importance of determining whether any given data are reliable before they can be put to practical application. Many alloys and refractory materials (i. e. materials which evaporate only at very high temperatures) are of great importance in nuclear technology, and some of these substances are extremely complex in their chemical composition. For example, until recently the phase composition of the oxides of thorium, uranium and plutonium had been only very imperfectly understood, and the same was true of the carbides of these elements. Recent developments in experimental techniques have made it possible to investigate the phase composition of these complex materials as well as the chemical species of these materials in the gaseous phase. Recent developments in measuring techniques, such as fluorine bomb calorimetry and Knudsen effusion technique, have greatly increased the accuracy of thermodynamic data

  6. Atomistic Simulations of Small-scale Materials Tests of Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Chan Sun; Jin, Hyung Ha; Kwon, Jun Hyun

    2012-01-01

    Degradation of materials properties under neutron irradiation is one of the key issues affecting the lifetime of nuclear reactors. Evaluating the property changes of materials due to irradiations and understanding the role of microstructural changes on mechanical properties are required for ensuring reliable and safe operation of a nuclear reactor. However, high dose of neuron irradiation capabilities are rather limited and it is difficult to discriminate various factors affecting the property changes of materials. Ion beam irradiation can be used to investigate radiation damage to materials in a controlled way, but has the main limitation of small penetration depth in the length scale of micro meters. Over the past decade, the interest in the investigations of size-dependent mechanical properties has promoted the development of various small-scale materials tests, e.g. nanoindentation and micro/nano-pillar compression tests. Small-scale materials tests can address the issue of the limitation of small penetration depth of ion irradiation. In this paper, we present small-scale materials tests (experiments and simulation) which are applied to study the size and irradiation effects on mechanical properties. We have performed molecular dynamics simulations of nanoindentation and nanopillar compression tests. These atomistic simulations are expected to significantly contribute to the investigation of the fundamental deformation mechanism of small scale irradiated materials

  7. Materials for Nuclear Plants From Safe Design to Residual Life Assessments

    CERN Document Server

    Hoffelner, Wolfgang

    2013-01-01

    The clamor for non-carbon dioxide emitting energy production has directly  impacted on the development of nuclear energy. As new nuclear plants are built, plans and designs are continually being developed to manage the range of challenging requirement and problems that nuclear plants face especially when managing the greatly increased operating temperatures, irradiation doses and extended design life spans. Materials for Nuclear Plants: From Safe Design to Residual Life Assessments  provides a comprehensive treatment of the structural materials for nuclear power plants with emphasis on advanced design concepts.   Materials for Nuclear Plants: From Safe Design to Residual Life Assessments approaches structural materials with a systemic approach. Important components and materials currently in use as well as those which can be considered in future designs are detailed, whilst the damage mechanisms responsible for plant ageing are discussed and explained. Methodologies for materials characterization, material...

  8. Analytical chemistry of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1963-01-01

    The last two decades have witnessed an enormous development in chemical analysis. The rapid progress of nuclear energy, of solid-state physics and of other fields of modern industry has extended the concept of purity to limits previously unthought of, and to reach the new dimensions of these extreme demands, entirely new techniques have been invented and applied and old ones have been refined. Recognizing these facts, the International Atomic Energy Agency convened a Panel on Analytical Chemistry of Nuclear Materials to discuss the general problems facing the analytical chemist engaged in nuclear energy development, particularly in newly developing centre and countries, to analyse the represent situation and to advise as to the directions in which research and development appear to be most necessary. The Panel also discussed the analytical programme of the Agency's laboratory at Seibersdorf, where the Agency has already started a programme of international comparison of analytical methods which may lead to the establishment of international standards for many materials of interest. Refs and tabs

  9. Nuclear Materials Management U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jesse Schreiber

    2008-01-01

    In light of the changing Defense Complex mission, the high cost to storing and protecting nuclear materials, and in consideration of scarcity of resources, it is imperative that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned nuclear materials are managed effectively. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Strategic Action Plan outlines the strategy for continuing to meet America's nuclear security goals, meeting the overall mission challenges of DOE and NNSA as well as giving focus to local missions. The mission of the NNSA/NSO Nuclear Materials Management (NMM) Program is to ensure that nuclear material inventories are accurately assessed and reported, future material needs are adequately planned, and that existing Nevada Test Site (NTS) inventories are efficiently utilized, staged, or dispositioned. The NNSA/NSO understands that the NTS has unique characteristics to serve and benefit the nation with innovative solutions to the complex problems involving Special Nuclear Materials, hazardous materials, and multi-agency, integrated operations. The NNSA/NSO is defining infrastructure requirements for known future missions, developing footprint consolidation strategic action plans, and continuing in the path of facility modernization and improvements. The NNSA/NSO is striving for the NTS to be acknowledged as an ideal location towards mission expansion and growth. The NTS has the capability of providing isolated, large scale construction and development locations for nuclear power or alternate energy source facilities, expanded nuclear material storage sites, and for new development in 'green' technology

  10. Nuclear material control in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.; Waddoups, I.

    1995-01-01

    The Department of Energy has defined a safeguards system to be an integrated system of physical protection, material accounting and material control subsystems designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession, use, or sabotage of SNM. In practice, safeguards involve the development and application of techniques and procedures dealing with the establishment and continued maintenance of a system of activities. The system must also include administrative controls and surveillance to assure that the procedures and techniques of the system are effective and are being carried out. The control of nuclear material is critical to the safeguarding of nuclear materials within the United States. The U.S. Department of Energy includes as part of material control four functional performance areas. They include access controls, material surveillance, material containment and detection/assessment. This paper will address not only these areas but also the relationship between material control and other safeguards and security functions

  11. System to detect nuclear materials by active neutron method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koroev, M.; Korolev, Yu.; Lopatin, Yu.; Filonov, V.

    1999-01-01

    The report presents the results of the development of the system to detect nuclear materials by active neutron method measuring delayed neutrons. As the neutron source the neutron generator was used. The neutron generator was controlled by the system. The detectors were developed on the base of the helium-3 counters. Each detector consist of 6 counters. Using a number of such detectors it is possible to verify materials stored in different geometry. There is an spectrometric scintillator detector in the system which gives an additional functional ability to the system. The system could be used to estimate the nuclear materials in waste, to detect the unauthorized transfer of the nuclear materials, to estimate the material in tubes [ru

  12. Measurement control program for nuclear material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brouns, R.J.; Roberts, F.P.; Merrill, J.A.; Brown, W.B.

    1980-06-01

    A measurement control program for nuclear material accounting monitors and controls the quality of the measurments of special nuclear material that are involved in material balances. The quality is monitored by collecting data from which the current precision and accuracy of measurements can be evaluated. The quality is controlled by evaluations, reviews, and other administrative measures for control of selection or design of facilities, equipment and measurement methods and the training and qualification of personnel who perform SNM measurements. This report describes the most important elements of a program by which management can monitor and control measurement quality

  13. Consequences of Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear or Other Radioactive Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, G.M.

    2010-01-01

    Explosion of a nuclear yield device is probably the worst consequence of Illicit Trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials.The nuclear yield device might be a stolen nuclear weapon, or an improvised nuclear device. An improvised nuclear device requires nuclear material design, and construction ability. Use of a radioactive dispersal device probably would not result in large numbers of casualties.However economic losses can be enormous. Non-Technical effects of nuclear trafficking (e.g. public panic, work disruption, etc.) and political and psychological consequences can far exceed technical consequences

  14. Ordinance concerning the filing of transport of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The ordinance is defined under the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors and the order for execution of the law. Any person who reports the transport of nuclear fuel materials shall file four copies of a notification according to the form attached to the public safety commission of the prefecture in charge of the dispatching place. When the transportation extends over the area in charge of another public safety commission, the commission which has received the notice shall report without delay date and route of the transport, kind and quantity of nuclear fuel materials and other necessary matters to the commission concerned and hear from the latter opinions on the items informed. The designation by the ordinance includes speed of the vehicle loaded with nuclear fuel materials, disposition of an accompanying car, arrangement of the line of the loaded vehicle and accompanying and other escorting cars, location of the parking, place of unloading and temporary storage, etc. Reports concerning troubles and measures taken shall be filed in ten days to the public safety commission which has received the notification, when accidents occur on the way, such as: theft or loss of nuclear fuel materials; traffic accident; irregular leaking of nuclear fuel materials and personal trouble by the transport. (Okada, K.)

  15. The changing role of nuclear materials accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibbs, P.W.

    1995-01-01

    Nuclear materials accounting and accounting systems at what have been DOE Production sites are evolving into management decision support tools. As the sites are moving into the mode of making decisions on how to disposition complex and varied nuclear material holdings, the need for complete and many times different information has never been greater. The artificial boundaries that have historically been established between what belongs in the classic material control and accountability (MC and A) records versus what goes into the financial, radiological control, waste, or decommissioning and decontamination records are being challenged. In addition, the tools historically used to put material into different categories such as scrap codes, composition codes, etc. have been found to be inadequate for the information needs of today. In order to be cost effective and even, more importantly to effectively manage -our inventories, the new information systems the authors design have to have the flexibility to serve many needs. In addition, those tasked with the responsibility of managing the inventories must also expand beyond the same artificial boundaries. This paper addresses some of the things occurring at the Savannah River Site to support the changing role of nuclear materials accounting

  16. Analysis of difficulties accounting and evaluating nuclear material of PWR fuel plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Min; Jue Ji; Liu Tianshu

    2013-01-01

    Background: Nuclear materials accountancy must be developed for nuclear facilities, which is required by regulatory in China. Currently, there are some unresolved problems for nuclear materials accountancy of bulk nuclear facilities. Purpose: The retention values and measurement errors are analyzed in nuclear materials accountancy of Power Water Reactor (PWR) fuel plant to meet the regulatory requirements. Methods: On the basis of nuclear material accounting and evaluation data of PWR fuel plant, a deep analysis research including ratio among random error variance, long-term systematic error variance, short-term systematic error variance and total error involving Material Unaccounted For (MUF) evaluation is developed by the retention value measure in equipment and pipeline. Results: In the equipment pipeline, the holdup estimation error and its total proportion are not more than 5% and 1.5%, respectively. And the holdup estimation can be regraded as a constant in the PWR nuclear material accountancy. Random error variance, long-term systematic error variance, short-term systematic error variance of overall measurement, and analytical and sampling methods are also obtained. A valuable reference is provided for nuclear material accountancy. Conclusion: In nuclear material accountancy, the retention value can be considered as a constant. The long-term systematic error is a main factor in all errors, especially in overall measurement error and sampling error: The long-term systematic errors of overall measurement and sampling are considered important in the PWR nuclear material accountancy. The proposals and measures are applied to the nuclear materials accountancy of PWR fuel plant, and the capacity of nuclear materials accountancy is improved. (authors)

  17. Test and evaluation of computerized nuclear material accounting methods. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    In accordance with the definition of a Material Balance Area (MBA) as a well-defined geographical area involving an Integral operation, the building housing the BFS-1 and BFS-1 critical facilities is considered to consist of one MBA. The BFS materials are in the form of small disks clad in stainless steel and each disk with nuclear material has its own serial number. Fissile material disks in the BFS MBA can be located at three key monitoring points: BFS-1 facility, BFS-2 facility and main storage of BFS fissile materials (storage 1). When used in the BFS-1 or BFS-2 critical facilities, the fissile material disks are loaded in tubes (fuel rods) forming critical assembly cores. The following specific features of the BFS MBA should be taken into account for the purpose of computerized accounting of nuclear material: (1) very large number of nuclear material items (about 70,000 fissile material items); and (2) periodically very intensive shuffling of nuclear material items. Requirements for the computerized system are determined by basic objectives of nuclear material accounting: (1) providing accurate information on the identity and location of all items in the BFS material balance area; (2) providing accurate information on location and identity of tamper-indicating devices; (3) tracking nuclear material inventories; (4) issuing periodic reports; (5) assisting with the detection of material gains or losses; (6) providing a history of nuclear material transactions; (7) preventing unauthorized access to the system and data falsification. In August 1995, the prototype computerized accounting system was installed on the BFS facility for trial operation. Information on two nuclear material types was entered into the data base: weapon-grade plutonium metal and 36% enriched uranium dioxide. The total number of the weapon-grade plutonium disks is 12,690 and the total number of the uranium dioxide disks is 1,700

  18. Control and Management of Small Quantity Nuclear Material (SQNM) on Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Jae Hwan; Shin, Byung Woo; Park, Jae Beom

    2009-01-01

    Small Quantity Nuclear Material (SQNM) is defined as the nuclear material that is below the amount approved in atomic energy act. SQNM generally lists depleted uranium (DU) used as a catalyst or shielding material in exposure devices in industries. The SQNM users have a duty to report information on possessing and using SQNM regularly to the government. All nuclear materials must be included in IAEA reporting lists according to safeguards agreement and additional protocol regardless of amount. However, it is difficult to investigate the status of nuclear material possessed in industries because SQNM is excepted regulation item list in atomic energy act. Most SQNM user industries are small companies so they have some problems like the loss of nuclear material after bankruptcy. Even though the damage of radiation leakage is very low, loss or careless management of nuclear material causes confusion. Thus, developing a control and management system for SQNM is essential. This paper discusses the present condition and prospect of control and management SQNM in Korea

  19. Security of fissile materials in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bukharin, O.

    1996-01-01

    The problem of security of huge stocks of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium and plutonium in Russia against theft or diversion remains a serious nonproliferation concern. During the Cold War, the security of Soviet nuclear materials was based on centralization and discipline, protection by the military, and intrusive political oversight of the people. The recent fundamental societal changes have rendered these arrangements inadequate, and the security of nuclear materials has decreased. Safeguarding nuclear materials in Russia is particularly difficult because of their very large inventories and the size and complexity of the nation's nuclear infrastructure. Russia needs a reliable and more objective technology-based system of nuclear safeguards designed to control nuclear materials. The Russian government and the international community are working towards this goal

  20. Some issues on the Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors Amendment after JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanabe, Tomoyuki

    2001-01-01

    As the Amendment of the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors on an opportunity of the JCO criticality accident can be almost evaluated at a viewpoint of upgrading on effectiveness of safety regulation, it is thought to remain a large problem to rely on only enforcement of regulation due to amendment of the Law at future accident. In future, it can be also said to be important subjects to further expand a philosophy on the regulation (material regulation) focussed to hazards of nuclear material itself, not only to secure effectiveness on the multi-complementary safety regulation due to the administrative agency and the Nuclear Safety Commission but also to prepare a mechanism reflexible of a new information to the safety regulation, and to prepare a mechanism to assist adequate business execution and so forth of enterprises. (G.K.)

  1. Nuclear reactions and self-shielding effects of gamma-ray database for nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fujita, Mitsutane; Noda, Tetsuji [National Research Institute for Metals, Tsukuba, Ibaraki (Japan)

    2001-03-01

    A database for transmutation and radioactivity of nuclear materials is required for selection and design of materials used in various nuclear reactors. The database based on the FENDL/A-2.0 on the Internet and the additional data collected from several references has been developed in NRIM site of 'Data-Free-Way' on the Internet. Recently, the function predicted self-shielding effect of materials for {gamma}-ray was added to this database. The user interface for this database has been constructed for retrieval of necessary data and for graphical presentation of the relation between the energy spectrum of neutron and neutron capture cross section. It is demonstrated that the possibility of chemical compositional change and radioactivity in a material caused by nuclear reactions can be easily retrieved using a browser such as Netscape or Explorer. (author)

  2. Nuclear reactions and self-shielding effects of gamma-ray database for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujita, Mitsutane; Noda, Tetsuji

    2001-01-01

    A database for transmutation and radioactivity of nuclear materials is required for selection and design of materials used in various nuclear reactors. The database based on the FENDL/A-2.0 on the Internet and the additional data collected from several references has been developed in NRIM site of 'Data-Free-Way' on the Internet. Recently, the function predicted self-shielding effect of materials for γ-ray was added to this database. The user interface for this database has been constructed for retrieval of necessary data and for graphical presentation of the relation between the energy spectrum of neutron and neutron capture cross section. It is demonstrated that the possibility of chemical compositional change and radioactivity in a material caused by nuclear reactions can be easily retrieved using a browser such as Netscape or Explorer. (author)

  3. The nuclear materials control system: Safeguards - circa 1957

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, C.C. Jr.

    1992-01-01

    In the late 1950s, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation undertook a nuclear materials control study for the Division of International Affairs of the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). The objective of the study was to develop a Nuclear Materials Control System (NMCS) that could be used under the US bilateral agreements or by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Phase I was a system study to determine the requirements for an NMCS for an assumed nuclear fuel complex. This paper summarizes aspects of Phase I studies addressing facility types, measurement points, and instrumentation needs and Phase II studies covering chemistry/chemical engineering, nuclear, special devices, and security devices and techniques. 1 fig

  4. Central eastern Europe approach to the security over nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smagala, G.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: This paper presents an overview of the national approaches to physical protection of nuclear materials in Central Eastern Europe (CEE), with an emphasis on Poland. Soviet influence in the past led to inadequate safety culture in nuclear activities and insufficient security of nuclear materials and facilities in the region. In the centralized economies all aspects of nuclear activities, including ownership of the nuclear facilities, were the responsibility of the state with no clear separation between regulating and promoting functions. During the last decade a significant progress has been made in the region to clean up the legacy of the past and to improve practices in physical protection of nuclear materials. The countries of Central Eastern Europe have had many similar deficiencies in nuclear field and problems to overcome, but cannot be viewed as a uniform block. There are local variations within the region in a size of nuclear activities, formulated respective regulations and adopted measures to secure nuclear materials and facilities. Nevertheless, all twelve nations, with nuclear reactors and without nuclear facilities, have joined the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material and most of them declare that they have followed the IAEA recommendations INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 to elaborate and implement their physical protection systems of nuclear materials and facilities. The largest request for an international advisory mission (IPPAS) to review states' physical protection systems and to address needs for improvement was received from the countries of Central Eastern Europe. Poland belongs to the beneficiaries where the IPPAS mission and later follow-up consultations resulted in physical protection upgrade of the research reactor under the IAEA/US/UK technical assistance project. A powerful incentive to the progress made in a number of CEE countries was the goal of accession to the European Union. The physical protection of nuclear

  5. The Application of materials attractiveness in a graded approach to nuclear materials security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ebbinghaus, B. [Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, P.O. Box 808, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States); Bathke, C. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1663, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Dalton, D.; Murphy, J. [National Nuclear Security Administration, US Department of Energy, 1000 Independent Ave., S. W. Washington, DC 20585 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The threat from terrorist groups has recently received greater attention. In this paper, material quantity and material attractiveness are addressed through the lens of a minimum security strategy needed to prevent the construction of a nuclear explosive device (NED) by an adversary. Nuclear materials are placed into specific security categories (3 or 4 categories) , which define a number of security requirements to protect the material. Materials attractiveness can be divided into four attractiveness levels, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low that correspond to the utility of the material to the adversary and to a minimum security strategy that is necessary to adequately protect the nuclear material. We propose a graded approach to materials attractiveness that recognizes for instance substantial differences in attractiveness between pure reactor-grade Pu oxide (High attractiveness) and fresh MOX fuel (Low attractiveness). In either case, an adversary's acquisition of a Category I quantity of plutonium would be a major incident, but the acquisition of Pu oxide by the adversary would be substantially worse than the acquisition of fresh MOX fuel because of the substantial differences in the time and complexity required of the adversary to process the material and fashion it into a NED.

  6. Risk ranking of LANL nuclear material storage containers for repackaging prioritization.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Smith, Paul H; Jordan, Hans; Hoffman, Jenifer A; Eller, P Gary; Balkey, Simon

    2007-05-01

    Safe handling and storage of nuclear material at U.S. Department of Energy facilities relies on the use of robust containers to prevent container breaches and subsequent worker contamination and uptake. The U.S. Department of Energy has no uniform requirements for packaging and storage of nuclear materials other than those declared excess and packaged to DOE-STD-3013-2000. This report describes a methodology for prioritizing a large inventory of nuclear material containers so that the highest risk containers are repackaged first. The methodology utilizes expert judgment to assign respirable fractions and reactivity factors to accountable levels of nuclear material at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A relative risk factor is assigned to each nuclear material container based on a calculated dose to a worker due to a failed container barrier and a calculated probability of container failure based on material reactivity and container age. This risk-based methodology is being applied at LANL to repackage the highest risk materials first and, thus, accelerate the reduction of risk to nuclear material handlers.

  7. Development of stainless steels for nuclear power plant - Advanced nuclear materials development -

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, Jun Hwa; Ryu, Woo Seog; Chi, Se Hwan; Lee, Bong Sang; Oh, Yong Jun; Byun, Thak Sang; Oh, Jong Myung

    1994-07-01

    This report reviews the status of R and D and the material specifications of nuclear components in order to develop the stainless steels for nuclear applications, and the technology of computer-assisted alloy design is developed to establish the thermodynamic data of Fe-Cr-Ni-Mo-Si-C-N system which is the basic stainless steel systems. High strength and corrosion resistant stainless steels, 316LN and super clean 347, are developed, and the manufacturing processes and heat treatment conditions are determined. In addition, a martensitic steel is produced as a model alloy for turbine blade, and characterized. The material properties showed a good performance for nuclear applications. (Author)

  8. Solid state nuclear magnetic resonance: investigating the spins of nuclear related materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Charpentier, Th.

    2007-10-01

    The author reviews his successive research works: his research thesis work on the Multiple Quantum Magic Angle Spinning (MQMAS) which is a quadric-polar nucleus multi-quanta correlation spectroscopy method, the modelling of NMR spectra of disordered materials, the application to materials of interest for the nuclear industry (notably the glasses used for nuclear waste containment). He presents the various research projects in which he is involved: storing glasses, nuclear magnetic resonance in paramagnetism, solid hydrogen storing matrices, methodological and instrument developments in high magnetic field and high resolution solid NMR, long range distance measurement by solid state Tritium NMR (observing the structure and dynamics of biological complex systems at work)

  9. Preliminary assessment on the differences of nuclear terrorism convention from the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material and amendment to the convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Midiana Ariethia; Muhamad Ilman A A; Mas Pungky Hendrawijaya

    2011-01-01

    The threat of acts of nuclear terrorism in all its forms and manifestations create the urgent need to enhance international cooperation between countries in designing and following practical and effective measures for the prevention of acts of terrorism and to counter and punish its offenders. Several United Nations Security Council Resolutions, such as UNSCR Number 1373 (2001), and UNSCR Number 1540 (2005), and the result of Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 that encourage the member countries of IAEA to ratify nuclear conventions as soon as possible, are the reasons that the Indonesian Government planning on ratifying The International Convention for The Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention). Nuclear Terrorism Convention is one of the 16 (sixteen) international instruments that must be ratified by the member countries of IAEA. Of the 16 (sixteen) international instruments, 3 (three) conventions are related to nuclear; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, dan Nuclear Terrorism Convention. This paper presents the preliminary assessment on the differences of Nuclear Terrorism Convention to The Convention on The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Amendment to The Convention on The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. This assessment is important due to the plan of the Indonesian Government to ratify the Nuclear Terrorism Convention. The result of this assessment could be used by BAPETEN in the ratification process of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention. The method used in this assessment is references assessment. (author)

  10. Illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material: the 'net' security threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zaitseva, L.; Steinhaeusler, F.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: Illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material, which could lead to the creation of a nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device (RDD), has been a subject of concern for more than a decade now. This concern became even more pronounced after the September 11 th attacks in the United States, which demonstrated that modern day terrorists are willing and capable of inflicting mass casualties among civilian population in target countries in order to further their goals. The problem of illicit trafficking - intentional diversion and smuggling of nuclear fissile material and radioactive sources - has been closely watched and studied by several national institutions and international organizations. This resulted in the establishment of several nuclear smuggling databases, tracking illicit trafficking incidents. The number of such incidents for a given period varies widely between the different databases, reflecting the different sources of information used, the different geographical regions covered, as well as the different methodologies applied to data mining and data analysis. One major obstacle to assessing the actual security threat due to illicit trafficking is the inclusion of incidents in the analysis, which do not represent a security threat in the sense of being the pre-stage of a terrorist operation or a malevolent act. Such incidents mainly involve inadvertent movement of illegally disposed of radioactive sources in scrap metal or contaminated goods across international borders and discoveries of so called 'orphan' radiation sources. This paper analyzes the global data contained in the database on nuclear smuggling, theft and orphan radiation sources (DSTO) operated by the University of Salzburg, using special filters to discriminate between illicit trafficking incidents involving a criminal intent and those that do not. Thereby, the net security threat of illicit trafficking will be determined to help provide a realistic

  11. Accounting for and control of nuclear material at the Central Institute of Nuclear Research, Rossendorf

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heidel, S.; Rossbander, W.; Helming, M.

    1983-01-01

    A survey is given of the system of accounting for and control of nuclear material at the Central Institute for Nuclear Research, Rossendorf. It includes 3 material balance areas. Control is implemented at both the institute and the MBA levels on the basis of concepts which are coordinated with the national control authority of the IAEA. The system applied enables national and international nuclear material control to be carried out effectively and economically at a minimum of interference with operational procedures. (author)

  12. New materials options for nuclear systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, R.H.; Garner, F.A.; Bruemmer, S.M.; Gelles, D.S.

    1989-01-01

    Development of new materials for nuclear reactor systems is continuing to produce options for improved reactor designs. Materials with reduced environment-induced crack growth is a key materials issue for the light water reactor (LWR) industry while the development of low activation ferritic, austenitic and vanadium alloys has been an active area for materials development for fusion reactor structural applications. Development of advanced materials such as metal matrix and ceramic matrix composites for reactor systems have received a limited amount of attention. (author)

  13. Some technical aspects of the nuclear material accounting and control at nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, O.A.; Babaev, N.S.; Gryazev, V.M.; Gadzhiev, G.I.; Gabeskiriya, V.Ya.

    1977-01-01

    The possibilities of nuclear material accounting and control are discussed at nuclear facilities of fuel cycle (WWER-type reactor, fuel fabrication plant, reprocessing plant and uranium enrichment facility) and zero energy fast reactor facility. It is shown that for nuclear material control the main method is the accounting with the application isotopic correlations at the reprocessing plant and enrichment facility. Possibilities and limitations of the application of destructive and non-destructive methods are discussed for nuclear material determinations at fuel facilities and their role in the accounting and safeguards systems as well as possibilities of the application of neutron method at a zero energy fast reactor facility [ru

  14. Basic research for nuclear energy. y Study on the nuclear materials technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kuk, I H; Lee, H S; Jeong, Y H; Sung, K W; Han, J H; Lee, J T; Lee, H K; Kim, S J; Kang, H S; An, D H; Kim, K R; Park, S D; Han, C H; Jung, M K; Oh, Y J; Kim, K H; Kim, S H; Back, J H; Kim, C H; Lim, K S; Kim, Y Y; Na, J W; Ku, J H; Lee, D H

    1996-12-01

    A study on the nuclear materials technologies which are necessary to establish the base for alloy development was performed. - The feasibility study on the application of Zircaloy scrap waste for hydrogen storage - The development of metal hydride battery for energy storage system - The establishment of transmission electron microscopy database for nuclear materials - The basic technology for the development of cladding materials for high burnup - The water chemistry technology for secondary system pH control and the photocatalysis technology for decomposition and removal of organics. - Improvement of primary component integrity of PWR by Zinc injection. (author). 175 refs., 58 tabs., 262 figs.

  15. Basic research for nuclear energy. y Study on the nuclear materials technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuk, I. H.; Lee, H. S.; Jeong, Y. H.; Sung, K. W.; Han, J. H.; Lee, J. T.; Lee, H. K.; Kim, S. J.; Kang, H. S.; An, D. H.; Kim, K. R.; Park, S. D.; Han, C. H.; Jung, M. K.; Oh, Y. J.; Kim, K. H.; Kim, S. H.; Back, J. H.; Kim, C. H.; Lim, K. S.; Kim, Y. Y.; Na, J. W.; Ku, J. H.; Lee, D. H.

    1996-12-01

    A study on the nuclear materials technologies which are necessary to establish the base for alloy development was performed. - The feasibility study on the application of Zircaloy scrap waste for hydrogen storage - The development of metal hydride battery for energy storage system - The establishment of transmission electron microscopy database for nuclear materials - The basic technology for the development of cladding materials for high burnup - The water chemistry technology for secondary system pH control and the photocatalysis technology for decomposition and removal of organics. - Improvement of primary component integrity of PWR by Zinc injection. (author). 175 refs., 58 tabs., 262 figs

  16. Safeguarding nuclear weapon: Usable materials in Russia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cochran, T.

    1998-01-01

    Both the United States and Russia are retaining as strategic reserves more plutonium and HEU for potential reuse as weapons, than is legitimately needed. Both have engaged in discussions and have programs in various stages of development to dispose of excess plutonium and HEU. These fissile material disposition programs will take decades to complete. In the interim there will be, as there is now, hundreds of tons of separated weapon-usable fissile material stored in tens of thousands of transportable canisters, each containing from a few to several tons of kgs of weapon-usable fissile material. This material must be secured against theft and unauthorized use. To have high confidence that the material is secure, one must establish criteria against which the adequacy of the protective systems can be judged. For example, one finds such criteria in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) regulations for the protection of special nuclear materials

  17. Control and accountancy of nuclear materials in a uranium enrichment plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurt, N.H.

    1985-01-01

    A nuclear material control and accountancy system has been developed by Goodyear Atomic Corporation to meet safeguards and security requirements. It comprises three major elements: physical security, nuclear material control, and nuclear material accounting. This safeguards system is called Dynamic Material Control and Accountancy System (DYMCAS). The system approaches real-time computer control on a transaction-by-transaction basis

  18. Accounting systems for special nuclear material control. Technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korstad, P.A.

    1980-05-01

    Nuclear material accounting systems were examined and compared to financial double-entry accounting systems. Effective nuclear material accounting systems have been designed using the principles of double-entry financial accounting. The modified double-entry systems presently employed are acceptable if they provide adequate control over the recording and summarizing of transactions. Strong internal controls, based on principles of financial accounting, can help protect nuclear materials and produce accurate, reliable accounting data. An electronic data processing system can more accurately maintain large volumes of data and provide management with more current, reliable information

  19. Defense Nuclear Material Stewardship Integrated Inventory Information Management System (IIIMS).

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Aas, Christopher A.; Lenhart, James E.; Bray, Olin H.; Witcher, Christina Jenkin

    2004-11-01

    Sandia National Laboratories was tasked with developing the Defense Nuclear Material Stewardship Integrated Inventory Information Management System (IIIMS) with the sponsorship of NA-125.3 and the concurrence of DOE/NNSA field and area offices. The purpose of IIIMS was to modernize nuclear materials management information systems at the enterprise level. Projects over the course of several years attempted to spearhead this modernization. The scope of IIIMS was broken into broad enterprise-oriented materials management and materials forecasting. The IIIMS prototype was developed to allow multiple participating user groups to explore nuclear material requirements and needs in detail. The purpose of material forecasting was to determine nuclear material availability over a 10 to 15 year period in light of the dynamic nature of nuclear materials management. Formal DOE Directives (requirements) were needed to direct IIIMS efforts but were never issued and the project has been halted. When restarted, duplicating or re-engineering the activities from 1999 to 2003 is unnecessary, and in fact future initiatives can build on previous work. IIIMS requirements should be structured to provide high confidence that discrepancies are detected, and classified information is not divulged. Enterprise-wide materials management systems maintained by the military can be used as overall models to base IIIMS implementation concepts upon.

  20. Concerning enactment of regulations on burying of waste of nuclear fuel material or waste contaminated with nuclear fuel material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    The Atomic Safety Commission of Japan, after examining a report submitted by the Science and Technology Agency concerning the enactment of regulations on burying of waste of nuclear fuel material or waste contaminated with nuclear fuel material, has approved the plan given in the report. Thus, laws and regulations concerning procedures for application for waste burying business, technical standards for implementation of waste burying operation, and measures to be taken for security should be established to ensure the following. Matters to be described in the application for the approval of such business and materials to be attached to the application should be stipulated. Technical standards concerning inspection of waste burying operation should be stipulated. Measures to be taken for the security of waste burying facilities and security concerning the transportation and disposal of nuclear fuel material should be stipulated. Matters to be specified in the security rules should be stipulated. Matters to be recorded by waste burying business operators, measures to be taken to overcome dangers and matters to be reported to the Science and Technology Agency should be stipulated. (Nogami, K.)

  1. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control: Recommendations (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication presents recommendations for the nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control. It is based on national experiences and practices and guidance publications in the field of security as well as the nuclear security related international instruments. The recommendations include guidance for States with regard to the nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material that has been reported as being out of regulatory control as well as for material that is lost, missing or stolen but has not been reported as such, or has been otherwise discovered. In addition, these recommendations adhere to the detection and assessment of alarms and alerts and to a graded response to criminal or unauthorized acts with nuclear security implications.

  2. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control: Recommendations (Arabic Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    This publication presents recommendations for the nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control. It is based on national experiences and practices and guidance publications in the ? field of security as well as the nuclear security related international instruments. The recommendations include guidance for States with regard to the nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material that has been reported as being out of regulatory control as well as for material that is lost, missing or stolen but has not been reported as such, or has been otherwise discovered. In addition, these recommendations adhere to the detection and assessment of alarms and alerts and to a graded response to criminal or unauthorized acts with nuclear security implications.

  3. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control: Recommendations (Russian Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication presents recommendations for the nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control. It is based on national experiences and practices and guidance publications in the field of security as well as the nuclear security related international instruments. The recommendations include guidance for States with regard to the nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material that has been reported as being out of regulatory control as well as for material that is lost, missing or stolen but has not been reported as such, or has been otherwise discovered. In addition, these recommendations adhere to the detection and assessment of alarms and alerts and to a graded response to criminal or unauthorized acts with nuclear security implications.

  4. Securing nuclear warheads and materials: seven steps for immediate action

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, M.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In the last decade, substantial progress has been made in improving security and accounting for nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material worldwide, both by states' own domestic actions and through international cooperation. Thousands of nuclear warheads and hundreds of tons of nuclear material are demonstrably more secure than they were before, and through programs such as the U.S.-Russian Highly Enriched Uranium (He) Purchase Agreement, enough potentially vulnerable bomb material for thousands of nuclear weapons has been verifiably destroyed. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the international community has attempted to expand and accelerate these efforts. But much more remains to be done. This paper summarizes a recent report from Harvard University, which recommended seven further steps for immediate action in U.S.-Russian and international cooperation. It covers two recommendations that may be of particular interest to this audience in detail. The first is a proposed program to remove nuclear material entirely from many of the most vulnerable sites around the world (by offering incentives targeted to the needs of each facility to give up the material at that site). The second is a suggestion that participants in the global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction announced at the June 2002 Group of Eight summit make a political commitment to meet stringent security standards for nuclear materials on their territories, and urge (and assist) other states to do likewise. (author)

  5. Fugitive binder for nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gallivan, T.J.

    1977-01-01

    A process for fabricating a body of a nuclear fuel material has the steps of admixing the nuclear fuel material in powder form wih a binder of a compound or its hydration products containing ammonium cations and anions selected from the group consisting of carbonate anions, bicarbonate anions, carbamate anions and mixtures of such anions, forming the resulting mixture into a green body such as by die pressing, heating the green body to decompose substantially all of the binder into gases, further heating the body to produce a sintered body, and cooling the sintered body in a controlled atmosphere. Preferred binders used in the practice of this invention include ammonium bicarbonate, ammonium carbonate, ammonium bicarbonate carbamate, ammonium sesquicarbonate, ammonium carbamate and mixtures thereof. This invention includes a composition of matter in the form of a compacted structure suitable for sintering comprising a mixture of a nuclear fuel material and a binder of a compound or its hydration products containing ammonium cations and anions selected from the group consisting of carbonate anions, bicarbonate anions, carbamate anions and mixtures of such anions. 9 claims, 4 figures

  6. Some political issues related to future special nuclear materials production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peaslee, A.T. Jr.

    1981-08-01

    The Federal Government must take action to assure the future adequate supply of special nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. Existing statutes permit the construction of advanced defense production reactors and the reprocessing of commercial spent fuel for the production of special materials. Such actions would not only benefit the US nuclear reactor manufacturers, but also the US electric utilities that use nuclear reactors

  7. Experience of air transport of nuclear fuel material in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamashita, T.; Toguri, D.; Kawasaki, M.

    2004-01-01

    Certified Reference Materials (hereafter called as to CRMs), which are indispensable for Quality Assurance and Material Accountability in nuclear fuel plants, are being provided by overseas suppliers to Japanese nuclear entities as Type A package (non-fissile) through air transport. However, after the criticality accident at JCO in Japan, special law defining nuclear disaster countermeasures (hereafter called as to the LAW) has been newly enforced in June 2000. Thereafter, nuclear fuel materials must meet not only to the existing transport regulations but also to the LAW for its transport

  8. Fieldable Nuclear Material Identification System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Radle, James E.; Archer, Daniel E.; Carter, Robert J.; Mullens, James Allen; Mihalczo, John T.; Britton, Charles L. Jr.; Lind, Randall F.; Wright, Michael C.

    2010-01-01

    The Fieldable Nuclear Material Identification System (FNMIS), funded by the NA-241 Office of Dismantlement and Transparency, provides information to determine the material attributes and identity of heavily shielded nuclear objects. This information will provide future treaty participants with verifiable information required by the treaty regime. The neutron interrogation technology uses a combination of information from induced fission neutron radiation and transmitted neutron imaging information to provide high confidence that the shielded item is consistent with the host's declaration. The combination of material identification information and the shape and configuration of the item are very difficult to spoof. When used at various points in the warhead dismantlement sequence, the information complimented by tags and seals can be used to track subassembly and piece part information as the disassembly occurs. The neutron transmission imaging has been developed during the last seven years and the signature analysis over the last several decades. The FNMIS is the culmination of the effort to put the technology in a usable configuration for potential treaty verification purposes.

  9. Research-based approaches to nuclear education

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Donev, J.M.K.C., E-mail: jason.donev@ucalgary.ca [Univ. of Calgary, Calgary, AB (Canada); Carpenter, Y., E-mail: ycarpenter@gmail.com [Univ.ty of Colorado at Boulder, Boulder, CO (United States)

    2014-07-01

    Teaching nuclear power requires an expert to communicate a significant number of abstract concepts from diverse disciplines, and assemble these into a larger intellectual framework for the students. Scholarly education research, particularly in individual science disciplines, has provided significant advances in teaching core subject material by breaking away from traditional lecturing. Thus far, however,little work has applied these results to introductory nuclear power classes. This paper explores a method of engaging introductory nuclear students deeply by using a combination of Socratic and mastery methods of teaching. Students develop conceptual understanding of the material through the group work and the use of diverse resources, including textbooks, online references, and computer models that encourage free exploration of these concepts. Marks have improved considerably, and students engage with the material at a significantly deeper level than in previous lecture-based iterations of this course. (author)

  10. Research-based approaches to nuclear education

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donev, J.M.K.C.; Carpenter, Y.

    2014-01-01

    Teaching nuclear power requires an expert to communicate a significant number of abstract concepts from diverse disciplines, and assemble these into a larger intellectual framework for the students. Scholarly education research, particularly in individual science disciplines, has provided significant advances in teaching core subject material by breaking away from traditional lecturing. Thus far, however,little work has applied these results to introductory nuclear power classes. This paper explores a method of engaging introductory nuclear students deeply by using a combination of Socratic and mastery methods of teaching. Students develop conceptual understanding of the material through the group work and the use of diverse resources, including textbooks, online references, and computer models that encourage free exploration of these concepts. Marks have improved considerably, and students engage with the material at a significantly deeper level than in previous lecture-based iterations of this course. (author)

  11. Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 3

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Libby, R.A.; Segal, J.E.; Stanbro, W.D.; Davis, C.

    1995-08-01

    This document is appendices D-J for the Special Nuclear Materials Cutoff Exercise: Issues and Lessons Learned. Included are discussions of the US IAEA Treaty, safeguard regulations for nuclear materials, issue sheets for the PUREX process, and the LANL follow up activity for reprocessing nuclear materials.

  12. Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Libby, R.A.; Segal, J.E.; Stanbro, W.D.; Davis, C.

    1995-08-01

    This document is appendices D-J for the Special Nuclear Materials Cutoff Exercise: Issues and Lessons Learned. Included are discussions of the US IAEA Treaty, safeguard regulations for nuclear materials, issue sheets for the PUREX process, and the LANL follow up activity for reprocessing nuclear materials

  13. Transportation of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brobst, W.A.

    1977-01-01

    Twenty years of almost accident-free transport of nuclear materials is pointed to as evidence of a fundamentally correct approach to the problems involved. The increased volume and new technical problems in the future will require extension of these good practices in both regulations and packaging. The general principles of safety in the transport of radioactive materials are discussed first, followed by the transport of spent fuel and of radioactive waste. The security and physical protection of nuclear shipments is then treated. In discussing future problems, the question of public understanding and acceptance is taken first, thereafter transport safeguards and the technical bases for the safety regulations. There is also said to be a need for a new technology for spent fuel casks, while a re-examination of the IAEA transport standards for radiation doses is recommended. The IAEA regulations regarding quality assurance are said to be incomplete, and more information is required on correlations between engineering analysis, scale model testing and full scale crash testing. Transport stresses on contents need to be considered while administrative controls have been neglected. (JIW)

  14. Integrated software package for nuclear material safeguards in a MOX fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schreiber, H.J.; Piana, M.; Moussalli, G.; Saukkonen, H.

    2000-01-01

    Since computerized data processing was introduced to Safeguards at large bulk handling facilities, a large number of individual software applications have been developed for nuclear material Safeguards implementation. Facility inventory and flow data are provided in computerized format for performing stratification, sample size calculation and selection of samples for destructive and non-destructive assay. Data is collected from nuclear measurement systems running in attended, unattended mode and more recently from remote monitoring systems controlled. Data sets from various sources have to be evaluated for Safeguards purposes, such as raw data, processed data and conclusions drawn from data evaluation results. They are reported in computerized format at the International Atomic Energy Agency headquarters and feedback from the Agency's mainframe computer system is used to prepare and support Safeguards inspection activities. The integration of all such data originating from various sources cannot be ensured without the existence of a common data format and a database system. This paper describes the fundamental relations between data streams, individual data processing tools, data evaluation results and requirements for an integrated software solution to facilitate nuclear material Safeguards at a bulk handling facility. The paper also explains the basis for designing a software package to manage data streams from various data sources and for incorporating diverse data processing tools that until now have been used independently from each other and under different computer operating systems. (author)

  15. Nuclear materials teaching and research at the University of California, Berkeley

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olander, D.R.; Roberts, J.T.A.

    1985-01-01

    In academic nuclear engineering departments, research and teaching in the specialized subdiscipline of nuclear materials is usually a one-person or at best a two-person operation. These subcritical sizes invariably result in inadequate overall representation of the many topics in nuclear materials in the research program of the department, although broader coverage of the field is possible in course offerings. Even in course-work, the full range of materials problems important in nuclear technology cannot be dealt with in detail because the small number of faculty involved restricts staffing to as little as a single summary course and generally no more than three courses in this specialty. The contents of the two nuclear materials courses taught at the University of California at Berkeley are listed. Materials research in most US nuclear engineering departments focuses on irradiation effects on metals, but at UC Berkeley, the principal interest is in the high-temperature materials chemistry of UO 2 fuel and Zircaloy cladding

  16. Fourth Collaborative Materials Exercise of the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwantes, J.M.; Reilly, D.; Marsden, O.

    2018-01-01

    The Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group is a community of nuclear forensic practitioners who respond to incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. The Group is dedicated to advancing nuclear forensic science in part through periodic participation in materials exercises. The Group completed its fourth Collaborative Materials Exercise in 2015 in which laboratories from 15 countries and one multinational organization analyzed three samples of special nuclear material in support of a mock nuclear forensic investigation. This special section of the Journal for Radioanalytical and Nuclear Chemistry is devoted to summarizing highlights from this exercise. (author)

  17. NECSA'S Need to Establish a Nuclear Forensics Specific NDA Facility for On-Site Categorization of Seized Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boshielo, P.; Mogafe, R.

    2015-01-01

    The increase of nuclear material that are out of regulatory control is becoming a serious concern and threat and thereby continuously seeking urgent interventions and counteractions from the international community aspiring effective control over all nuclear material and peaceful uses of nuclear technologies globally. In South Africa the nuclear forensics initiative approach and its execution have been adopted, established and managed by the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA) to support the country's nuclear safeguards system and nuclear security investigations plan to fight against the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. On this nuclear forensics initiative approach adopted by Necsa, the development and later execution of a Non-Destructive Analyses (NDA) facility capability for quick categorization of any seized nuclear material by law-enforcement agencies is currently envisaged as a critical initiative to comprehend nuclear forensics Laboratory analytical or characterization techniques. The main objective for this NDA facility is planned to be used for performing nuclear material screening process for material categorization purposes to generate information and results which will be open to law enforcement agencies for prosecution processes and also for the safeguards reporting to the IAEA (ITDB). The NDA technique is therefore found to be a critical tool needed at NECSA as an Early-Checking-Point or first-line material check point for all seized nuclear materials in determining some characteristics of the materials and collection of data without having to destroy or changing the morphology of the material. (author)

  18. Materials characterization center workshop on compositional and microstructural analysis of nuclear waste materials. Summary report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Daniel, J.L.; Strachan, D.M.; Shade, J.W.; Thomas, M.T.

    1981-06-01

    The purpose of the Workshop on Compositional and Microstructural Analysis of Nuclear Waste Materials, conducted November 11 and 12, 1980, was to critically examine and evaluate the various methods currently used to study non-radioactive, simulated, nuclear waste-form performance. Workshop participants recognized that most of the Materials Characterization Center (MCC) test data for inclusion in the Nuclear Waste Materials Handbook will result from application of appropriate analytical procedures to waste-package materials or to the products of performance tests. Therefore, the analytical methods must be reliable and of known accuracy and precision, and results must be directly comparable with those from other laboratories and from other nuclear waste materials. The 41 participants representing 18 laboratories in the United States and Canada were organized into three working groups: Analysis of Liquids and Solutions, Quantitative Analysis of Solids, and Phase and Microstructure Analysis. Each group identified the analytical methods favored by their respective laboratories, discussed areas needing attention, listed standards and reference materials currently used, and recommended means of verifying interlaboratory comparability of data. The major conclusions from this workshop are presented

  19. Non destructive assay techniques applied to nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gavron, A.

    2001-01-01

    Nondestructive assay is a suite of techniques that has matured and become precise, easily implementable, and remotely usable. These techniques provide elaborate safeguards of nuclear material by providing the necessary information for materials accounting. NDA techniques are ubiquitous, reliable, essentially tamper proof, and simple to use. They make the world a safer place to live in, and they make nuclear energy viable. (author)

  20. Holdup-related issues in safeguarding of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1988-03-01

    Residual inventories of special nuclear materials (SNM) remaining in processing facilities (holdup) are recognized as an insidious problem for both safety and safeguards. This paper identifies some of the issues that are of concern to the safeguards community at-large that are related to holdup of SNM in large-scale process equipment. These issues range from basic technologies of SNM production to changing regulatory requirements to meet the needs of safeguarding nuclear materials. Although there are no magic formulas to resolve these issues, there are several initiatives that could be taken in areas of facility design, plant operation, personnel training, SNM monitoring, and regulatory guidelines to minimize the problems of holdup and thereby improve both safety and safeguards at nuclear material processing plants. 8 refs

  1. Bar code usage in nuclear materials accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mee, W.T.

    1983-01-01

    The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant began investigating the use of automated data collection devices in 1979. At this time, bar code and optical-character-recognition (OCR) systems were reviewed with the purpose of directly entering data into DYMCAS (Dynamic Special Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability System). Both of these systems appeared applicable, however, other automated devices already employed for production control made implementing the bar code and OCR seem improbable. However, the DYMCAS was placed on line for nuclear material accountability, a decision was made to consider the bar code for physical inventory listings. For the past several months a development program has been underway to use a bar code device to collect and input data to the DYMCAS on the uranium recovery operations. Programs have been completed and tested, and are being employed to ensure that data will be compatible and useful. Bar code implementation and expansion of its use for all nuclear material inventory activity in Y-12 is presented

  2. Methodology for categorization of nuclear material in pyroprocessing facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Chanki; Choi, Sungyeol [UNIST, Ulsan (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Woo Jin; Kim, Min Su; Jeong, Yon Hong [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    For the pyroprocessing facility to be commercialized in future, current regulations should be evaluated and developed in advance, based on the new types of nuclear materials in the facility. Physical protection system, especially, requires reasonable and reliable categorization of nuclear materials, to prevent from the theft of nuclear materials. In this paper, therefore, current categorization methods of nuclear material are investigated and applied to the pyroprocessing facility. After inconsistencies and gaps are found among methods, they are compared and discussed based on eight considering points (i.e, degrees of attractiveness, levels of category, discount factor, physical barriers, chemical barriers, isotopic barriers, radiological barriers, and capabilities of adversaries), to roughly suggest a new method for categorization. Current categorization methods of nuclear material, including IAEA's INFCIRC/225, U.S. DOE's method, newly expected U.S. NRC's method, FOM, and Bunn's approach, are different and can bring inconsistencies of physical protection requirements. The gap among methods will be significant if advanced fuel cycles are applied to them for the future. For example, the categorization results of 5 target materials in pyroprocessing facility show clear inconsistencies, while TRU ingot is considered the most attractive material. To resolve inconsistencies, it is necessary to determine new method suitable to pyroproessing facility, by considering the effects of eight points (i.e, degrees of attractiveness, levels of category, discount factor, physical barriers, chemical barriers, isotopic barriers, radiological barriers, and capabilities of adversaries)

  3. Methodology for categorization of nuclear material in pyroprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chanki; Choi, Sungyeol; Kim, Woo Jin; Kim, Min Su; Jeong, Yon Hong

    2016-01-01

    For the pyroprocessing facility to be commercialized in future, current regulations should be evaluated and developed in advance, based on the new types of nuclear materials in the facility. Physical protection system, especially, requires reasonable and reliable categorization of nuclear materials, to prevent from the theft of nuclear materials. In this paper, therefore, current categorization methods of nuclear material are investigated and applied to the pyroprocessing facility. After inconsistencies and gaps are found among methods, they are compared and discussed based on eight considering points (i.e, degrees of attractiveness, levels of category, discount factor, physical barriers, chemical barriers, isotopic barriers, radiological barriers, and capabilities of adversaries), to roughly suggest a new method for categorization. Current categorization methods of nuclear material, including IAEA's INFCIRC/225, U.S. DOE's method, newly expected U.S. NRC's method, FOM, and Bunn's approach, are different and can bring inconsistencies of physical protection requirements. The gap among methods will be significant if advanced fuel cycles are applied to them for the future. For example, the categorization results of 5 target materials in pyroprocessing facility show clear inconsistencies, while TRU ingot is considered the most attractive material. To resolve inconsistencies, it is necessary to determine new method suitable to pyroproessing facility, by considering the effects of eight points (i.e, degrees of attractiveness, levels of category, discount factor, physical barriers, chemical barriers, isotopic barriers, radiological barriers, and capabilities of adversaries)

  4. German Democratic Republic State system of accounting for and control of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roehnsch, W.; Gegusch, M.

    1976-01-01

    The system of accountancy for and control of nuclear material in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) with its legal bases and components is embedded in the overall State system of protection in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As the competent State authority, the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Board of the GDR is also responsible for meeting the GDR's national and international tasks in the control of nuclear material. At enterprise level, the observance of all safety regulations for nuclear material, including the regulations for the control, is within the responsibility of managers of establishments, which are in any way concerned with the handling of nuclear material. To support managers and to function as internal control authorities, nuclear material officers have been appointed in these establishments. Design information, operating data, physical inventory of nuclear material and the respective enterprise records and reports are subject to State control by the Nuclear Material Inspectorate of the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Board. This Inspectorate keeps the central records on nuclear material, forwards reports and information to, and maintains the necessary contacts with, the IAEA. For the nuclear material in the GDR four material balance areas have been established for control purposes. To rationalize central recording and reporting, electronic data processing is increasingly made use of. In a year-long national and international control of nuclear material, the State control system has stood the test and successfully co-operates with the IAEA. (author)

  5. Analysis on Domestic Law and Management Trend Related to Small-Quantity Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Jae Beom; Lee, Kyong Woo; Shim, Hye Won; Min, Gyung Sik

    2005-01-01

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has requested Korea to establish and manage the law ruling all nuclear materials through the INFCIRC/153. Now, it has been 30 years since Korea made the agreement, INFCIRC/153, with IAEA. Korea has tried their best to accomplish the international standard in nuclear control field and it is a fact that Korea finally produced some results in the nuclear control field. Related to nuclear material control, Korea is above the common level appropriately ranked 6th in the world in terms of nuclear power. Before 2000, Korea was making the foundation secure in the nuclear control. IAEA did not urge to establish the law supervising the small-quantity nuclear material and depleted uranium (DU). In a turnaround from early IAEA moderate line to Korea, the situation was changed. Since IAEA brought up the agenda to 2000 Joint Review Meeting between Korea-IAEA, IAEA has asked Korea to establish the control system for smallquantity nuclear material and DU. In 2003, the Korean government set up a project establishing the control system about all nuclear material including small-quantity nuclear material and DU. National Nuclear Management and Control Agency (NNCA), delegating the business relating to international controlling materials from government, developed some modules in nuclear material control system and operated it. The system includes a controlling system for small-quantity nuclear material. NNCA on behalf of government has collected the information and Korea Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) has reported the information to the IAEA. This paper introduces you the background of controlling the small-quantity nuclear material and the system of controlling nuclear material in Korea. And it will suggest the improvement of the management method in the system for small-quantity nuclear material

  6. Analysis on Domestic Law and Management Trend Related to Small-Quantity Nuclear Material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Jae Beom; Lee, Kyong Woo; Shim, Hye Won; Min, Gyung Sik [National Nuclear Management and Control Agency, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2005-07-01

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has requested Korea to establish and manage the law ruling all nuclear materials through the INFCIRC/153. Now, it has been 30 years since Korea made the agreement, INFCIRC/153, with IAEA. Korea has tried their best to accomplish the international standard in nuclear control field and it is a fact that Korea finally produced some results in the nuclear control field. Related to nuclear material control, Korea is above the common level appropriately ranked 6th in the world in terms of nuclear power. Before 2000, Korea was making the foundation secure in the nuclear control. IAEA did not urge to establish the law supervising the small-quantity nuclear material and depleted uranium (DU). In a turnaround from early IAEA moderate line to Korea, the situation was changed. Since IAEA brought up the agenda to 2000 Joint Review Meeting between Korea-IAEA, IAEA has asked Korea to establish the control system for smallquantity nuclear material and DU. In 2003, the Korean government set up a project establishing the control system about all nuclear material including small-quantity nuclear material and DU. National Nuclear Management and Control Agency (NNCA), delegating the business relating to international controlling materials from government, developed some modules in nuclear material control system and operated it. The system includes a controlling system for small-quantity nuclear material. NNCA on behalf of government has collected the information and Korea Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) has reported the information to the IAEA. This paper introduces you the background of controlling the small-quantity nuclear material and the system of controlling nuclear material in Korea. And it will suggest the improvement of the management method in the system for small-quantity nuclear material.

  7. Nuclear security recommendations on nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control: Recommendations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The purpose of this publication is to provide guidance to States in strengthening their nuclear security regimes, and thereby contributing to an effective global nuclear security framework, by providing: - Recommendations to States and their competent authorities on the establishment or improvement of the capabilities of their nuclear security regimes, for carrying out effective strategies to deter, detect and respond to a criminal act, or an unauthorized act, with nuclear security implications, involving nuclear or other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control; - Recommendations to States in support of international cooperation aimed at ensuring that any nuclear or other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control, whether originating from within the State or from outside that State, is placed under regulatory control and the alleged offenders are, as appropriate, prosecuted or extradited

  8. Regulations concerning the fabricating business of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    In the Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, the regulations have all been revised on the fabrication business of nuclear fuel materials. The revised regulations are given : application for permission of the fabrication business, application for permission of the alteration, application for approval of the design and the construction methods, application for approval of the alteration, application for the facilities inspection, facilities inspection, recordings, entry limitations etc. for controlled areas, measures concerning exposure radiation doses etc., operation of the fabrication facilities, transport within the site of the business, storage, disposal within the site of the business, security regulations, designation etc. of the licensed engineer of nuclear fuels, collection of reports, etc. (Mori, K.)

  9. Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (NEET) Reactor Materials: News for the Reactor Materials Crosscut, May 2016

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Maloy, Stuart Andrew [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States). Materials Science in Radiation and Dynamics Extremes

    2016-09-26

    In this newsletter for Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (NEET) Reactor Materials, pages 1-3 cover highlights from the DOE-NE (Nuclear Energy) programs, pages 4-6 cover determining the stress-strain response of ion-irradiated metallic materials via spherical nanoindentation, and pages 7-8 cover theoretical approaches to understanding long-term materials behavior in light water reactors.

  10. Transportation of nuclear materials: the nuclear focus of the 80's

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meyers, S.; Hardin, E.C. Jr.; Jefferson, R.M.

    1980-01-01

    The transport of radioactive material has been carried out since the inception of the nuclear age (over 30 years) with an unparralled safety record. Despite these achievements, there is a need to strive for improvements, to develop safer and more efficient transportation systems, moreover to perform these tasks in a highly visible manner so that public concern can be allayed. But, in the same vein that the past record is not of itself sufficient, neither is public participation the solution to all the issues surrounding the transportation of radioactive materials. The solutions to the problems facing the nuclear transport industry involve many disciplines, much of which rest on a foundation of sound technology. This conference is built around a core of papers on the developing technology of nuclear transportation: on systems, their design and development, their manufacturing processes, their operation and the methodologies of quality assurance in each of these activities. The role of IAEA in the collecting of data to compile information on the flow of radioactive materials, the mode of transport and the corresponding accident/incident experience, as well as its role in initiating a program to develop a worldwide uniform methodology to address the risks of transporting radioactive materials are covered in this symposium

  11. Separation of nuclear power from nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Starr, C.

    1978-01-01

    A successful development of the proposed combination of the Fast Breeder Reactor and the CIVEX fuel reprocessing facility would provide an economical nuclear power source for many centuries which inherently separates nuclear power from the issue of weapons material diversion and proliferation. Further, by so doing, it permits great flexibility in international and national planning for nuclear power, as the issues of fuel dependence and terrorist and subnational diversions disappear. In addition, the expansion of the FBR/CIVEX system would eat into the LWR spent fuel stockpile, diminishing steadily this relatively accessible plutonium source. And finally, a rapid development of the FBR/CIVEX for the above reasons would substantially reduce the worldwide concern as to the adequacy of uranium ore supply. From a historical view, it would restore fast reactor development to the path originally foreseen in the programs of worldwide nuclear energy authorities, including the Atomic Energy Commission during its first two decades of existence

  12. Development of data base system for nuclear material accountancy data at PNC

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirosawa, N.; Akiba, Mitsunori; Nakagima, Kiyoshi; Usui, Shinichi; Tosa, Kiyofumi; Hashimoto, Kazuyuki.

    1993-01-01

    PNC is developing a wide area of nuclear fuel cycle. Therefore, much nuclear material with a various form exists at each facility in the Works, and the controls of the inventory changes and the physical inventories of nuclear material are important. Nuclear material accountancy is a basic measure in safeguards system based on Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). In the light of such importance of material accountancy, the data base of nuclear material control and the material accountancy report system for all facilities has been developed by using the computer. By this system, accountancy report to STA is being presented certainly and timely. Property management and rapid corresponding to inquiries from STA can be carried out by the data base system which has free item searching procedure. The present paper introduces 'Development of Data Base System for Nuclear Material Accountancy Data at PNC'. (author)

  13. Materials science for nuclear detection

    OpenAIRE

    Peurrung, Anthony

    2008-01-01

    The increasing importance of nuclear detection technology has led to a variety of research efforts that seek to accelerate the discovery and development of useful new radiation detection materials. These efforts aim to improve our understanding of how these materials perform, develop formalized discovery tools, and enable rapid and effective performance characterization. We provide an overview of these efforts along with an introduction to the history, physics, and taxonomy of radiation detec...

  14. Integrating the stabilization of nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dalton, H.F. [Department of Energy, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-05-01

    In response to Recommendation 94-1 of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Department of Energy committed to stabilizing specific nuclear materials within 3 and 8 years. These efforts are underway. The Department has already repackaged the plutonium at Rocky Flats and metal turnings at Savannah River that had been in contact with plastic. As this effort proceeds, we begin to look at activities beyond stabilization and prepare for the final disposition of these materials. To describe the plutonium materials being stabilize, Figure 1 illustrates the quantities of plutonium in various forms that will be stabilized. Plutonium as metal comprises 8.5 metric tons. Plutonium oxide contains 5.5 metric tons of plutonium. Plutonium residues and solutions, together, contain 7 metric tons of plutonium. Figure 2 shows the quantity of plutonium-bearing material in these four categories. In this depiction, 200 metric tons of plutonium residues and 400 metric tons of solutions containing plutonium constitute most of the material in the stabilization program. So, it is not surprising that much of the work in stabilization is directed toward the residues and solutions, even though they contain less of the plutonium.

  15. 10 CFR Appendix M to Part 110 - Categorization of Nuclear Material d

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Categorization of Nuclear Material d M Appendix M to Part 110 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) EXPORT AND IMPORT OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL Pt. 110, App. M Appendix M to Part 110—Categorization of Nuclear Material d [From IAEA INFCIRC/225...

  16. Safeguards against use of nuclear material for weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rometsch, R.

    1975-01-01

    The history of safeguards is traced from the first session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, through the various stages of the IAEA safeguard system for nuclear materials and to the initiation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. The role of the IAEA under the treaty is discussed. The structure and content of safeguards agreements in connection with the treaty were laid down and the objective of safeguards clearly defined. The methods of verification by the IAEA of the facility operator's material accountancy through inspection and statistical analysis and evaluation of 'material unaccounted for' are explained. The extent to which the IAEA may make use of the State's system of accounting and control of nuclear materials is considered. Reference is also made to the question of protection against theft and sabotage. Finally the scope of safeguards work for the next 15 years is forecast. (U.K.)

  17. Evaluation of excess nuclear materials suitability for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newton, J.W.; White, W.C.; Davis, R.M.; Cherry, R.C.

    1996-01-01

    President Clinton announced in March 1995 the permanent withdrawal of 200 tons of fissile material from the US nuclear stockpile. This action was made possible by the dramatic reduction in nuclear weapons stockpile size and a desire to demonstrate the US'' commitment to nonproliferation goals. To provide further assurance of that commitment, the US is addressing placement of these materials under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. An initial step of this overall assessment was evaluation of the nuclear materials'' suitability for international safeguards. US Department of Energy (DOE) field organizations reviewed a detailed listing of all candidate materials with respect to characterization status, security classification, and acceptability for international safeguards compared to specified criteria. These criteria included form, location, environment and safety considerations, measurability, and stability. The evaluation resulted in broad categorizations of all materials with respect to preparing and placing materials under IAEA safeguards and provided essential information for decisions on the timing for offering materials as a function of materials attributes. A plan is being prepared to determine the availability of these materials for IAEA safeguards considering important factors such as costs, processes and facilities required to prepare materials, and impacts on other programs

  18. Application of ceramic and glass materials in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamnabard, Z.

    2008-01-01

    Ceramic and glass are high temperature materials that can be used in many fields of application in nuclear industries. First, it is known that nuclear fuel UO 2 is a ceramic material. Also, ability to absorb neutrons without forming long lived radio-nuclides make the non-oxide ceramics attractive as an absorbent for neutron radiation arising in nuclear power plants. Glass-ceramic materials are a new type of ceramic that produced by the controlled nucleation and crystallization of glass, and have several advantages such as very low or null porosity, uniformity of microstructure, high chemical resistance etc. over conventional powder processed ceramics. These ceramic materials are synthesized in different systems based on their properties and applications. In nuclear industries, those are resistant to leaching and radiation damage for thousands of years, Such as glass-ceramics designed for radioactive waste immobilization and machinable glass-ceramics are used. This article introduces requirements of different glass and ceramic materials used in nuclear power plants and have been focused on developments in properties and application of them

  19. Nuclear Technology Series. Course 25: Radioactive Material Handling Techniques.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Center for Occupational Research and Development, Inc., Waco, TX.

    This technical specialty course is one of thirty-five courses designed for use by two-year postsecondary institutions in five nuclear technician curriculum areas: (1) radiation protection technician, (2) nuclear instrumentation and control technician, (3) nuclear materials processing technician, (4) nuclear quality-assurance/quality-control…

  20. Prevention of nuclear fuel cladding materials corrosion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, K.R.; Yang, J.C.; Lee, I.C.; Kang, H.D.; Cho, S.W.; Whang, C.K.

    1983-01-01

    The only way which could be performed by the operator of nuclear power plant to minimizing the degradation of nuclear fuel cladding material is to control the water quality of primary coolant as specified standard conditions which dose not attack the cladding material. If the water quality of reactor coolant does not meet far from the specification, the failure will occure not only cladding material itself but construction material of primary system which contact with the coolant. The corrosion product of system material are circulate through the whole primary system with the coolant and activated by the neutron near the reactor core. The activated corrosion products and fission products which released from fuel rod to the coolant, so called crud, will repeate deposition and redeposition continuously on the fuel rod and construction material surface. As a result we should consider heat transfer problem. In this study following activities were performed; 1. The crud sample was taken from the spent fuel rod surface of Kori unit one and analized for radioactive element and non radioactive chemical species. 2. The failure mode of nuclear fuel cladding material was estimated by the investigation of releasing type of fission products from the fuel rod to the reactor coolant using the iodine isotopes concentration of reactor coolants. 3. A study was carried out on the sipping test results of spent fuel and a discussion was made on the water quality control records through the past three cycle operation period of Kori unit one plant. (Author)

  1. Measures Against-Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials and Other Radioactive Sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barakat, M.B.; Nassef, M.H.; El Mongy, S.A.

    2008-01-01

    Since the early nineties, illicit trafficking (IT) of nuclear materials and radioactive sources appeared as a new trend which raised the concern of the international community due to the grave consequences that would merge if these materials or radioactive sources fell into the hands of terrorist groups. However, by the end of the last century illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive sources lost its considerable salience, in spite of seizure of considerable amounts of 2 '3'5U (76% enrichment) in Bulgaria (May 1999) and also 235 U (30% enrichment) in Georgia (April 2000). Nevertheless, IT should be always considered as a continued and viable threat to the international community. Awareness of the problem should be developed and maintained among concerned circles as the first step towards combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive sources. Illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials needs serious consideration and proper attention by the governmental law enforcement authorities. Measures to combat with IT of nuclear material or radioactive sources should be effective in recovery, of stolen, removed or lost nuclear materials or radioactive sources due to the failure of the physical protection system or the State System Accounting and Control (SSAC) system which are normally applied for protecting these materials against illegal actions. Measures such as use of modern and efficient radiation monitoring equipment at the borders inspection points, is an important step in preventing the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials across the borders. Also providing radiological training to specific personnel and workers in this field will minimize the consequences of a radiological attack in case of its occurrence. There is a real need to start to enter into cooperative agreements to strengthen borders security under the umbrella of IAEA to faster as an international cooperation in the illicit trafficking

  2. Physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities in CEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garnier-Gratia, M.-H.; Jorda, A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: CEA (Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique), as nuclear operator, is responsible for the control and protection of their nuclear materials. Inside CEA, DCS (Central Security Division) is in charge of the security matters, DCS defines the CEA strategy in this field, especially in physical protection. The paper will present the physical protection strategy of CEA. DCS defines the rules and methods; the operators have to apply in order to fulfill the security objectives of CEA. CEA has to provide the regulatory authority with documents proving that it is in accordance with the requirements of the 25th July 1980 law and 12th May 1981 decree. It has to implement all the necessary means in order to achieve the results requested by the regulatory authority. All these arrangements are described in the 'license and control file'. This file should specify the facility safeguards and physical protection system. Accounting measures are also described. In this file, the petitioner has to justify its capacity for holding nuclear materials and for exercising authorized activities on them. So the organization and the installed means have to be described in this authorization file. For physical protection, containment, surveillance and physical protection measures are presented: Containment measures must prevent the unauthorized or unjustified movements of nuclear material in the framework of the authorized activities; Surveillance measures must guarantee the integrity of the containment, check that no material is exiting by an abnormal channel; Physical protection measures for the materials, the premises and the facilities are intended to protect them against malevolent actions by means of security systems. The Central Security Division has established guidelines to provide guidance to the nuclear materials holders in writing such files. Each holding unit has to establish a 'license and control file' and each CEA site establishes a 'site license and control file

  3. Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards: Common technologies and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1989-01-01

    Nuclear fission and nuclear safeguards have much in common, including the basic physical phenomena and technologies involved as well as the commitments and challenges posed by expanding nuclear programs in many countries around the world. The unique characteristics of the fission process -- such as prompt and delayed neutron and gamma ray emission -- not only provide the means of sustaining and controlling the fission chain reaction, but also provide unique ''signatures'' that are essential to quantitative measurement and effective safeguarding of key nuclear materials (notably 239 Pu and 235 U) against theft, loss, or diversion. In this paper, we trace briefly the historical emergence of safeguards as an essential component of the expansion of the nuclear enterprise worldwide. We then survey the major categories of passive and active nondestructive assay techniques that are currently in use or under development for rapid, accurate measurement and verification of safe-guarded nuclear materials in the many forms in which they occur throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. 23 refs., 14 figs

  4. Introduction to Special Edition (of the Journal of Nuclear Materials Management) on Reducing the Threat from Radioactive Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2007-01-01

    Introductory article for special edition of the JOURNAL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT outlining the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technical Division. In particular the International Nuclear and Radiological Security Standing Committee and its initial focus covering four topical areas--Radiological Threat Reduction, Nuclear Smuggling and Illicit Trafficking, Countering Nuclear Terrorism, and Radiological Terrorism Consequence Management

  5. International nuclear safety center database on material properties

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fink, J.K.

    1996-01-01

    International nuclear safety center database on the following material properties is described: fuel, cladding,absorbers, moderators, structural materials, coolants, concretes, liquid mixtures, uranium dioxide

  6. Dealing with the regional challenge of physical protection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paschoa, A.S.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The problem of protecting sensitive fissile and fissionable nuclear materials of misuses by governments has been the subject of the convention on physical protection of nuclear material (CPPNM), which entered into force on February 8, 1987. However, in May 2001 the final report of the expert meeting had already recognized 'a clear need to strengthen the international physical protection regime'. The board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided then to convene a group, which would meet in Vienna from 3 to 7 December 2001, to draft on amendment to the CPPNM. The tragic occurrences of September 11, 2001, however, changed the then generally accepted view on the problem of physical protection, because nuclear materials had to be protected from falling into the hands of terrorists rather than of governments thirst of nuclear sensitive materials. Moreover, crude explosive devices could be made by terrorists, or hired scientists, using readily available radioactive materials, like 226 Ra or 137 Cs to inflict damage to civilians. Thus physical protection of those and other radioactive materials became an instant challenge for national and international authorities to prevent the use of such materials in terrorist actions. The prevention of illicit trafficking of radioactive materials is now in the priority list of these authorities. Fortunately; an international conference on 'Measures to Detect, Intercept and Respond to the Illicit Uses of Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Sources' was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in May 2001. An IAEA document - GOV/2001/37-GC(45)/20 - recommended in its plan of activities a series of projects to be implemented between 2002 and 2005, which included developing and providing assistance for the application of: (i) standards for physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities in member states; (ii) norms and guidelines for nuclear material accounting and control in member states; (iii

  7. Safeguards for nuclear material transparency monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    MacArthur, D.A.; Wolford, J.K.

    1999-01-01

    The US and the Russian Federation are currently engaged in negotiating or implementing several nuclear arms and nuclear material control agreements. These involve placing nuclear material in specially designed containers within controlled facilities. Some of the agreements require the removal of nuclear components from stockpile weapons. These components are placed in steel containers that are then sealed and tagged. Current strategies for monitoring the agreements involve taking neutron and gamma radiation measurements of components in their containers to monitor the presence, mass, and composition of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, as well as other attributes that indicate the use of the material in a weapon. If accurate enough to be useful, these measurements will yield data containing information about the design of the weapon being monitored. In each case, the design data are considered sensitive by one or both parties to the agreement. To prevent the disclosure of this information in a bilateral or trilateral inspection scenario, so-called information barriers have evolved. These barriers combine hardware, software, and procedural safeguards to contain the sensitive data within a protected volume, presenting to the inspector only the processed results needed for verification. Interlocks and volatile memory guard against disclosure in case of failure. Implementing these safeguards requires innovation in radiation measurement instruments and data security. Demonstrating their reliability requires independent testing to uncover any flaws in design. This study discusses the general problem and gives a proposed solution for a high resolution gamma ray detection system. It uses historical examples to illustrate the evolution of other successful systems

  8. 37. annual meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1996-01-01

    The following subjects were covered in this meeting: waste management; nuclear materials management -- safety and health; international safeguards; measurement control and statistics for nuclear materials management; material control and accountability; packaging and transportation; nonproliferation and arms control; and physical protection. Separate papers were prepared for 74 items of this meeting

  9. Physical protection of export/import and transportation of nuclear material in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaclav, J

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The paper contains short overview about average amount of nuclear materials transported on the territory of the Slovak Republic in a year, and the physical protection of these nuclear materials. There are several types of transportation and export/import of nuclear materials in the SR: fresh fuel import; import of other unirradiated nuclear materials (e.g. depleted uranium, natural uranium); export of unirradiated nuclear materials (e.g. natural uranium); internal transportation of fresh fuel; internal transportation of other unirradiated nuclear materials; internal transportation of spent fuel. The main objective of the nuclear regulatory authority SR is to supervise observation of the national legislation as follows: the act no. 130 / 1998 on peaceful use of nuclear energy; UJD SR's regulation no. 186/1999 which details the physical protection of the nuclear facilities, nuclear materials, and radioactive waste (following requirements of INFCIRC 225 / Rev. 4); UJD SR's regulation no. 284 / 1999 which details conditions of nuclear material and radioactive wastes transportation. (author)

  10. Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-01-01

    The main purpose of this Act is to enable the United Kingdom to ratify the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which opened for signature at Vienne and New York on 3 March 1980. The Act extends throughout the United Kingdom. (NEA) [fr

  11. The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    This law has following two purposes. At first, it exercises necessary controls concerning nuclear source material, nuclear fuel material and reactors in order to: (a) limit their uses to those for the peaceful purpose; (b) ensure planned uses of them; and (c) ensure the public safety by preventing accidents from their uses. Necessary controls are to be made concerning the refining, fabricating and reprocessing businesses, as well as the construction and operation of reactors. The second purpose of the law is to exercise necessary controls concerning internationally controlled material in order to execute the treaties and other international agreements on the research, development and use of atomic energy (the first chapter). In the second and following chapters the law prescribes controls for the persons who wish to carry on the refining and fabricating businesses, to construct and operate reactors, and to conduct the reprocessing business, as well as for those who use the internationally controlled material, respectively in separate chapters by the category of those businesses. For example, the controls to the person who wishes to construct and operate reactors are: (a) the permission of the business after the examination; (b) the examination and approval of the design and methods of construction prior to the construction; (c) the inspection of the facilities prior to their use; (d) periodic inspections of the facilities; (e) the establishment of requirements for safety measures and punishments to their violations. (Matsushima, A.)

  12. Establishment of ultra trace nuclear material analysis system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Kyuseok; Jee, Kwangyong; Lee, Changheon

    2012-05-01

    Highly accurate and precise analysis of ultra trace nuclear materials contained in swipe samples and environmental samples is required to improve the national nuclear transparency and the international nuclear security. The objectives of the first stage of this project are to develop the techniques for bulk analysis of environmental samples and the elemental techniques for particle analysis using FT-TIMS. To accomplish the objectives, state-of-the-art analytical instruments were set up followed by the development of the techniques for screening of nuclear materials, chemical treatement, particle handling, isotopic measurements using TIMS and ICP-MS, and fabrication of uranium microparticles. The verifications of the developed techniques were carried out by measurement of reference materials, and by participation to interlaboratory comparison programs. In additon, the establishement of a quality management system and the performance of the analysis of QC samples for IAEA-NWAL qualification were carried out to obtain the international accreditation for the related analytical system. In this report, the results of research and developments, and the achievements to obtain the international accreditation were summarized

  13. On evaluated nuclear data for beta-delayed gamma rays following of special nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mencarini, Leonardo de H.; Caldeira, Alexandre D., E-mail: mencarini@ieav.cta.b, E-mail: alexdc@ieav.cta.b [Instituto de Estudos Avancados (IEAv/CTA), Sao Jose dos Campos, SP (Brazil)

    2011-07-01

    In this paper, a new type of information available in ENDF is discussed. During a consistency check of the evaluated nuclear data library ENDF/B-VII.0 performed at the Nuclear Data Subdivision of the Institute for Advanced Studies, the size of the files for some materials drew the attention of one of the authors. Almost 94 % of all available information for these special nuclear materials is used to represent the beta-delayed gamma rays following fission. This is the first time this information is included in an ENDF version. (author)

  14. On evaluated nuclear data for beta-delayed gamma rays following of special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mencarini, Leonardo de H.; Caldeira, Alexandre D.

    2011-01-01

    In this paper, a new type of information available in ENDF is discussed. During a consistency check of the evaluated nuclear data library ENDF/B-VII.0 performed at the Nuclear Data Subdivision of the Institute for Advanced Studies, the size of the files for some materials drew the attention of one of the authors. Almost 94 % of all available information for these special nuclear materials is used to represent the beta-delayed gamma rays following fission. This is the first time this information is included in an ENDF version. (author)

  15. Development of proactive technology against nuclear materials degradation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Yong Hwan; Kim, Hong Pyo; Lee, Bong Sang

    2012-04-01

    As the nuclear power plants are getting older, the extent of materials degradation increases and unexpected degradation mechanisms may occur under complex environments, including high-temperature and pressure, radiation and coolant. The components in the primary system are maintained at the temperature of 320 .deg. C, pressure of 2500 psi, and reactor internals are exposed to fast neutrons. The pipes and nozzles are affected by the mechanical, thermal and corrosive cyclic fatigue stresses. Since the steam generator tubes are affected by both primary and secondary coolants, the materials degradation mechanisms are dependent upon the multiple or complex factors. In this report, we make contribution to the enhancement of reactor safety by developing techniques for predicting and evaluating materials behaviors in nuclear environments. The research product in the following five areas, described in this report, plays a vital role in improving the safe operation of nuclear reactors, upgrading the level of skills and extending the use of nuclear power. Development of corrosion control and protection technology Development of fracture mechanical evaluation model of reactor pressure Development of prediction and analysis technology for radiation damage Development of advanced diagnostic techniques for micro-materials degradation Development of core technology for control of steam generator degradation

  16. Supply of nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1959-07-15

    Any large-scale atomic energy programme is inherently dependent on the availability of materials that can be used as fuel in reactors, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, at its inception, was intended to act as a bank for the flow of materials between Member States. According to its Statute, one of its primary functions is to provide materials 'to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, including the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the under-developed areas of the world'. If the Agency is to fulfil its Statutory function, it would be essential for it to have not only some ready sources of supply, but also an established framework of general terms and conditions on which it could secure the supplies. The latter would eliminate the need for going through elaborate procedural formalities whenever the Agency receives a new request for materials. Such a framework has now been established with the signing of broad agreements with three countries which had offered to supply various quantities of special fissionable materials to the Agency. These agreements, signed in Vienna on 11 May 1959, with the USSR, the UK and the USA, lay down the basic terms and conditions on which these three countries will make nuclear materials available when needed by the Agency. The USSR has agreed to make available to the Agency 50 kg of uranium-235, the UK 20 kg and the USA 5 000 kg. The material will be supplied in the form of enriched uranium in any concentration up to 20 per cent; the amounts mentioned relate to the 235-isotope content of the materials. The UK and the USA have agreed that the parties to a particular supply agreement may decide on higher enrichment of uranium to be used for research reactors, material testing reactors or for other research purposes. The USA has also agreed to make available to the Agency such additional supplies as would match in amount

  17. Enhancing materials management programs in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hassaballa, M.M.; Malak, S.M.

    1992-01-01

    Materials management programs for the nuclear utilities in the United States are continually being affected, concurrent with the gradual disappearance of qualified component and replacement parts vendors by regulatory concerns about procurement and materials management. In addition, current economic and competitive pressures are forcing utilities to seek avenues for reducing procurement costs for safety-related items. In response to these concerns, initiatives have been undertaken and engineering guidelines have been developed by the nuclear power industry-sponsored organizations, such as the Electric Power Research Institute and the Nuclear Management Resources Council. It is our experience that successful materials management programs require a multitude of engineering disciplines and experience and are composed of three major elements: strategic procurement plan, parts classification and procurement data base, and enhancement tools. This paper provides a brief description of each of the three elements

  18. Experience of air transport of nuclear fuel material as type A package

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawasaki, Masashi; Kageyama, Tomio; Suzuki, Toru

    2004-01-01

    Special law on nuclear disaster countermeasures (hereafter called as to nuclear disaster countermeasures low) that is domestic law for dealing with measures for nuclear disaster, was enforced in June, 2000. Therefore, nuclear enterprise was obliged to report accidents as required by nuclear disaster countermeasures law, besides meeting the technical requirement of existent transport regulation. For overseas procurement of plutonium reference materials that are needed for material accountability, A Type package must be transported by air. Therefore, concept of air transport of nuclear fuel materials according to the nuclear disaster countermeasures law was discussed, and the manual including measures against accident in air transport was prepared for the oversea procurement. In this presentation, the concept of air transport of A Type package containing nuclear fuel materials according to the nuclear disaster countermeasures law, and the experience of a transportation of plutonium solution from France are shown. (author)

  19. Standardization, diversity, and learning: A model for the nuclear power industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    David, P.A.; Rothwell, G.S.

    1992-11-01

    The lack of standardization, frequently mentioned as a burden borne by the U.S. nuclear industry, is discussed. A simple model of learning and standardization is presented. It is shown that when the effects of learning through diversity are strong, the present value of long-run costs can be minimized with either complete standardization or with complete experimentation where no two reactors are similar in the early stages of the industry. The conclusion discusses the relevance of these and other analytical results to the present U.S. nuclear industry regarding standardization policies. 8 refs

  20. The use of measurement uncertainty in nuclear materials accuracy and verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alique, O.; Vaccaro, S.; Svedkauskaite, J.

    2015-01-01

    EURATOM nuclear safeguards are based on the nuclear operators’ accounting for and declaring of the amounts of nuclear materials in their possession, as well as on the European Commission verifying the correctness and completeness of such declarations by means of conformity assessment practices. Both the accountancy and the verification processes comprise the measurements of amounts and characteristics of nuclear materials. The uncertainties associated to these measurements play an important role in the reliability of the results of nuclear material accountancy and verification. The document “JCGM 100:2008 Evaluation of measurement data – Guide to the expression of uncertainty in measurement” - issued jointly by the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM) and international organisations for metrology, standardisation and accreditation in chemistry, physics and electro technology - describes a universal, internally consistent, transparent and applicable method for the evaluation and expression of uncertainty in measurements. This paper discusses different processes of nuclear materials accountancy and verification where measurement uncertainty plays a significant role. It also suggests the way measurement uncertainty could be used to enhance the reliability of the results of the nuclear materials accountancy and verification processes.

  1. The physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Technical Committee met 21-25 June 1993 to consider changes to INFCIRC/225/Rev.2. The revised document, INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, reflects the Technical Committee recommendations for changes to the text as well as other modifications determined necessary to advance the consistency of the Categorization Table in INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 with the categorization table contained in The Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to reflect additional improvements presented by the experts. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States

  2. The physical protection of nuclear material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1993-09-01

    Technical Committee met 21-25 June 1993 to consider changes to INFCIRC/225/Rev.2. The revised document, INFCIRC/225/Rev.3, reflects the Technical Committee recommendations for changes to the text as well as other modifications determined necessary to advance the consistency of the Categorization Table in INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 with the categorization table contained in The Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to reflect additional improvements presented by the experts. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States.

  3. Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (Implementation of INFCIRC/225/Revision 5). Implementing Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2018-01-01

    This publication is the lead Implementing Guide in a suite of guidance on implementing the Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13. It provides guidance and suggestions to assist States and their competent authorities in establishing, strengthening and sustaining their national physical protection regime and implementing the associated systems and measures, including operators’ physical protection systems. The structure of this publication is as follows. After this introduction, Section 2 describes the objectives of physical protection and the overall approach to managing the risks of the unauthorized removal of nuclear material and the sabotage of nuclear facilities. Section 3 provides guidance for the State and its competent authorities on the physical protection elements of the nuclear security regime; this guidance is based on the fundamental principles set out in the Recommendations publication. Section 4 provides guidance on the operator’s physical protection system and describes a systematic, integrated approach. Appendix I gives an annotated outline of the typical contents of an operator’s security plan. Appendix II provides similar guidance for the contingency plan. Appendix III provides a description of nuclear material aggregation that can be used to categorize nuclear material and determine the appropriate level of protection against unauthorized removal. Appendix IV presents a table of paragraph cross-references between the Recommendations publication and this Implementing Guide.

  4. Reuse of contaminated material from nuclear-power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Melichar, Z.

    1988-01-01

    Some building structures of decommissioned nuclear power plants are contaminated to a very low extent. Little experience is so far available concerning the recycling and furher exploitation of such materials, the majority of which is constituted by concrete and steel. The mass and activities of the metal parts of the Bohunice A-1 nuclear power plant are estimated and the major contaminant radionuclides are listed. Czechoslovak as well as foreign regulations concerning radioactive material handling are cited and criteria for releasing such materials for further use are discussed. (M.D.). 7 tabs., 3 figs, 28 refs

  5. International control of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koponen, Hannu

    1989-01-01

    Nuclear materials are subject to both national and international safeguards control. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) takes care of the international safeguards control. The control activities, which are discussed in this article, are carried out according to the agreements between various countries and the IAEA

  6. Regulation on the transport of nuclear fuel materials by vehicles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The regulations applying to the transport of nuclear fuel materials by vehicles, mentioned in the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors. The transport is for outside of the factories and the site of enterprises by such modes of transport as rail, trucks, etc. Covered are the following: definitions of terms, places of fuel materials handling, loading methods, limitations on mix loading with other cargo, radiation dose rates concerning the containers and the vehicles, transport indexes, signs and indications, limitations on train linkage during transport by rail, security guards, transport of empty containers, etc. together with ordinary rail cargo and so on. (Mori, K.)

  7. Approach to a generalized real-time nuclear materials control system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jarsch, V.; Onnen, S.; Polster, F.J.; Woit, J.

    1978-01-01

    Untrained users and a large amount of--at first glance incompatible--processes and materials are the environment of computer-aided nuclear materials control systems. To find an efficient model of the real processes and materials descriptions and to allow the operating personnel to communicate with the system in his everyday symbolism are goals in the development of the concept presented in this paper. According to this concept a real-time minicomputer-based materials control system is being implemented in the Nuclear Research Center of Karlsruhe. The chosen approach satisfies the heterogeneous requirements of the various institutes of the Center and is also applicable to other nuclear plants

  8. Inventory of nuclear materials in case of emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Portugal, J.L.; Zanetti, S.

    2001-01-01

    The crisis situations for nuclear materials in nuclear facilities are provided for in the French regulation, as the decree of 12 May 1981 specifies that 'In any circumstance, the Ministry of Industry can order a physical inventory of the materials and its comparison with the accountancy records'. Such an inventory can be ordered in facilities holding category I nuclear materials, in case of a theft for example. The operators must be able to establish quickly if the stolen materials come from their facility. To test the organization set at the operators and competent authority levels respectively, five exercises of increasing complexity have already been carried out. These exercises have permitted the validation of procedures, composition of the various crisis centers, methodology for such an inventory and use of protected communication means. The authority crisis center includes members of the competent Authority and it's technical support body: staff members of the IPSN. It is in charge of the national managing of the operations, in relation with one or several site crisis centers. The site crisis center is the interface between the authorities and the facility crisis center. The operations of inventory are carried out from the roughest checking to the finest ones. To be efficient during the first hours of the crisis, the authority crisis center must have data bases at the disposal of its experts, containing information about physical protection and accountancy of the nuclear materials detained by the site and the relevant facilities. (authors)

  9. Management of Materials from the Decommissioning of Nuclear Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Braehler, Georg

    2014-01-01

    Georg Braehler of the World Nuclear Association (WNA) gave an insightful presentation on what can be done with materials from the decommissioning of nuclear reactors. The presentation showed that, although the volumes of waste generated seem large, they are in fact small compared to the conventional recycling market and should not have much impact on operations. The main issue surrounding the recycling of these materials is acceptance, both from a public and a legal perspective which are needed to promote a sustainable route for the recovered materials. Georg concluded that recycling is the most practical and affordable process to minimise the environmental impact. Several questions were raised following the presentation about the issue of public acceptance in Germany of recycling metal that has been cleared for release. The main reason for the current public acceptance is that nothing has happened to generate distrust. A comment was also raised about the limited scale of materials from the nuclear industry. The small volumes of metal generated could deter the conventional waste market from accepting the perceived risk of recycling cleared metals from the nuclear industry

  10. Performance analysis of nuclear materials accounting systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cobb, D.D.; Shipley, J.P.

    1979-01-01

    Techniques for analyzing the level of performance of nuclear materials accounting systems in terms of the four performance measures, total amount of loss, loss-detection time, loss-detection probability, and false-alarm probability, are presented. These techniques are especially useful for analyzing the expected performance of near-real-time (dynamic) accounting systems. A conservative estimate of system performance is provided by the CUSUM (cumulative summation of materials balances) test. Graphical displays, called performance surfaces, are developed as convenient tools for representing systems performance, and examples from a recent safeguards study of a nuclear fuels reprocessing plant are given. 6 refs

  11. Approach on origin management of nuclear materials at KAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hyun-Jo; Lee, Sung-Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, In-Chul; Kim, Hyun-Sook; Jung, Juang

    2017-01-01

    This paper describes the current origin management approach and reviews the requirement to be reflected to meet the bilateral agreements. KAERI developed the origin management system to efficiently and effectively manage the origin information. The system is connected with KASIS to share the information on the inventory changes of nuclear material. After development of the system, however, the new concept of obligated nuclear material is introduced according to the amended ROK-US agreement. Also, the origin management system based on IAEA accounting reports needs to revise to include the nuclear material exempted from safeguards. Therefore KAERI will improve the origin management system to meet the requirement of bilateral agreements and NSSC notice to be revised.

  12. Calcium phosphate nuclear materials: apatitic ceramics for separated wastes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carpena, J.; Lacout, J.L.

    2005-01-01

    Is it feasible to elaborate conditioning materials for separated high activity nuclear wastes, as actinides or fission products? Specific materials have been elaborated so that the waste is incorporated within the crystalline structure of the most stable calcium phosphate, i.e. apatite. This mineral is able to sustain high irradiation doses assuming a well chosen chemical composition. Mainly two different ways of synthesis have been developed to produce hard apatite ceramics that can be used to condition nuclear wastes. Here we present a data synthesis regarding the elaboration of these apatite nuclear materials that includes experiments on crystallo-chemistry, chemical analysis, leaching and irradiation tests performed for the past fifteen years. (authors)

  13. Nuclear reactors: physics and materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yadigaroglu, G

    2005-07-01

    In the form of a tutorial addressed to non-specialists, the article provides an introduction to nuclear reactor technology and more specifically to Light Water Reactors (LWR); it also shows where materials and chemistry problems are encountered in reactor technology. The basics of reactor physics are reviewed, as well as the various strategies in reactor design and the corresponding choices of materials (fuel, coolant, structural materials, etc.). A brief description of the various types of commercial power reactors follows. The design of LWRs is discussed in greater detail; the properties of light water as coolant and moderator are put in perspective. The physicochemical and metallurgical properties of the materials impose thermal limits that determine the performance and the maximum power a reactor can deliver. (author)

  14. Nuclear Materials: Reconsidering Wastes and Assets - 13193

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Michalske, T.A.

    2013-01-01

    The nuclear industry, both in the commercial and the government sectors, has generated large quantities of material that span the spectrum of usefulness, from highly valuable ('assets') to worthless ('wastes'). In many cases, the decision parameters are clear. Transuranic waste and high level waste, for example, have no value, and is either in a final disposition path today, or - in the case of high level waste - awaiting a policy decision about final disposition. Other materials, though discardable, have intrinsic scientific or market value that may be hidden by the complexity, hazard, or cost of recovery. An informed decision process should acknowledge the asset value, or lack of value, of the complete inventory of materials, and the structure necessary to implement the range of possible options. It is important that informed decisions are made about the asset value for the variety of nuclear materials available. For example, there is a significant quantity of spent fuel available for recycle (an estimated $4 billion value in the Savannah River Site's (SRS) L area alone); in fact, SRS has already blended down more than 300 metric tons of uranium for commercial reactor use. Over 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium is also on a path to be used as commercial fuel. There are other radiological materials that are routinely handled at the site in large quantities that should be viewed as strategically important and / or commercially viable. In some cases, these materials are irreplaceable domestically, and failure to consider their recovery could jeopardize our technological leadership or national defense. The inventories of nuclear materials at SRS that have been characterized as 'waste' include isotopes of plutonium, uranium, americium, and helium. Although planning has been performed to establish the technical and regulatory bases for their discard and disposal, recovery of these materials is both economically attractive and in the national interest. (authors)

  15. Methodologies for nuclear material accounting and control: challenges and expectations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramakumar, K.L.

    2007-01-01

    Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NUMAC) represents one of the most important and indispensable responsibilities of any nuclear installation. The emphasis is to ensure that the nuclear material being handled in the nuclear installation is properly accounted for with the expected accuracy and confidence levels. A number of analytical methods based on both destructive and non-destructive assay techniques are available at the disposal of the nuclear analytical scientists for this purpose and they have been enumerated extensively in literature. Instead of recounting the analytical methodologies available, an attempt has been made in this paper to highlight some of the challenges. (author)

  16. Special nuclear material information, security classification guidance. Instruction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flickinger, A.

    1982-01-01

    The Instruction reissues DoD Instruction 5210.67, July 5, 1979, and provides security classification guidance for information concerning significant quantities of special nuclear material, other than that contained in nuclear weapons and that used in the production of energy in the reactor plant of nuclear-powered ships. Security classification guidance for these data in the latter two applications is contained in Joint DoE/DoD Nuclear Weapons Classification Guide and Joint DoE/DoD Classification Guide for the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

  17. Software for MUF evaluating in item nuclear material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang Dong; Zhang Quanhu; He Bin; Wang Hua; Yang Daojun

    2009-01-01

    Nuclear material accounting is a key measure for nuclear safeguard. Software for MUF evaluation in item nuclear material accounting was worked out in this paper. It is composed of several models, including input model, data processing model, data inquiring model, data print model, system setting model etc. It could be used to check the variance of the measurement and estimate the confidence interval according to the MUF value. To insure security of the data multi-user management function was applied in the software. (authors)

  18. Erosion and corrosion of nuclear power plant materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This conference is composed of 23 papers, grouped in 3 sessions which main themes are: analysis of corrosion and erosion damages of nuclear power plant equipment and influence of water chemistry, temperature, irradiations, metallurgical and electrochemical factors, flow assisted cracking, stress cracking; monitoring and control of erosion and corrosion in nuclear power plants; susceptibility of structural materials to erosion and corrosion and ways to improve the resistance of materials, steels, coatings, etc. to erosion, corrosion and cracking

  19. An analysis for formats to the cooperative nuclear nonproliferation agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Sung Tack

    1998-01-01

    A country's nuclear program can be designed to support nuclear research, the production of energy, and the production of nuclear materials for medical and industrial applications or for use in nuclear weapons, or any combination of these objectives. One significant concern is the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful nuclear activities to convert weapons programs. Other concerns include the accidental release and transport of radionuclides. The framework for cooperative monitoring consists of context, agreement, parameters and monitoring options. Nuclear material and energy production activities provide nuclear materials for medical and industrial applications, produce electrical power or heat for general use, and possibly support the production of nuclear materials for weapons. All types of nuclear agreements could increase transparency and/or reduce tensions in a regional setting. This article explains about nuclear agreements of South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, Korean Peace Zone, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. (Yi, J. H.)

  20. The regulations concerning the uses of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The regulations are defined under the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors and provisions concerning the uses of nuclear fuel materials in the order for execution of the law. Basic concepts and terms are explained, such as: exposure dose; accumulative dose; controlled area; inspected surrounding area and employee. The application for permission shall state the expected period and amount of the uses for each kind of nuclear fuel materials. Persons to whom spent fuels shall be sold, lent or returned and the method of disposal of such fuels shall be also indicated. Records shall be made and kept for particular periods for each works and enterprise on inspection of facilities, control of dose, maintenance and accident of facilities in use. The application for permission of the safeguard regulations shall report rules for each works and enterprise on the faculty and organization of controllers of facilities in use, safeguard education of employees, operation of apparatus which needs special control for prevention of disaster, establishment of controlled and inspected surrounding areas, entrance limitation, inspection of exposure dose, etc. Technical standards of the uses of nuclear fuel materials, disposal and transportation in the works and the enterprise and storage are stipulated in detail. Reports on exposure dose of employees and other specified matters shall be submitted every year to the Director General of Science and Technology Agency according to the forms attached. (Okada, K.)

  1. A saddle-point for data verification and materials accountancy to control nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beedgen, R.

    1983-01-01

    Materials accountancy is one of the main elements in international safeguards to determine whether or not nuclear material has been diverted in nuclear plants. The inspector makes independent measurements to verify the plant-operator's data before closing the materials balance with the operator's data. All inspection statements are in principle probability statements because of random errors in measuring the material and verification on a random sampling basis. Statistical test procedures help the inspector to decide under this uncertainty. In this paper a statistical test procedure representing a saddle-point is presented that leads to the highest guaranteed detection probability taking all concealing strategies into account. There are arguments favoring a separate statistical evaluation of data verification and materials accountancy. Following these considerations, a bivariate test procedure is explained that evaluates verification and accountancy separately. (orig.) [de

  2. Transport of nuclear material under the 1971 Brussels Convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lagorce, M.

    1975-01-01

    The legal regime in force before entry into force of the 1971 Brussels Convention relating to civil liability for the maritime carriage of nuclear material created serious difficulties for maritime carriers, regarding both the financial risks entailed and restrictions on enjoyment of the rights granted by civil liability conventions. The 1971 Convention exonerates from liability any person likely to be held liable for nuclear damage under maritime law, provided another person is liable under the nuclear conventions or an equivalent national law. A problem remaining is that of compensation of nuclear damage to the means of transport for countries not having opted for re-inclusion of such damage in the nuclear law regime; this does not apply however to countries having ratified the Convention to date. A feature of the latter is that it establishes as extensively as possible the priority of nuclear law over maritime law. Furthermore the new regime continues to preserve efficiently the interests of victims of nuclear incidents. It is therefore to be hoped that insurers will no longer hesitate to cover international maritime carriage of nuclear material [fr

  3. Evaluation method for change of concentration of nuclear fuel material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kiyono, Takeshi; Ando, Ryohei.

    1997-01-01

    The present invention provides a method of evaluating the change of concentration of compositions of nuclear fuel element materials loaded to a reactor along with neutron irradiation based on analytic calculation not relying on integration with time. Namely, the method of evaluating the change of concentration of nuclear fuel materials comprises evaluating the changing concentration of nuclear fuel materials based on nuclear fission, capturing of neutrons and radioactive decaying along with neutron irradiation. In this case, an optional nuclide on a nuclear conversion chain is determined as a standard nuclide. When the main fuel material is Pu-239, it is determined as the standard nuclide. The ratio of the concentration of the standard nuclide to that of the nuclide as an object of the evaluation can be expressed by the ratio of the cross sectional area of neutron nuclear reaction of the standard nuclide to the cross sectional area of the neutron nuclear reaction of the nuclide as the object of the evaluation. Accordingly, the concentration of the nuclide as the object of the evaluation can be expressed by an analysis formula shown by an analysis function for the ratio of the concentration of the standard nuclide to the cross section of the neutron nuclear reaction. As a result, by giving an optional concentration of the standard nuclide to the analysis formula, the concentration of each of other nuclides can be determined analytically. (I.S.)

  4. MD-portal: Highly Effective Website for Nuclear Materials Information Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kil, Soyeon; Lee, Gyeonggeun; Kwon, Junhyun

    2014-01-01

    A web-based system is widespread in not only everyday activities but also business fields. In past years, the systematic information of various properties of materials usually has been provided as tabulated documents; however it recently has been provided as web-based DB. There are many websites providing material properties information, representative examples include MatWeb from the United States, Granta MI from England and MatNavi from Japan. In 2003, the nuclear materials division in KAERI established a website about nuclear materials property DB, called MatDB. To inherit it, a website called MD-portal has been recently set up to release degradation information and various properties of nuclear materials. In this presentation, the structure and characteristics of MD-portal will be mentioned, and comments on its application will be given

  5. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  6. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of Safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  7. Management of Small Quantity of Nuclear Material at Locations Outside Facilities in Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Seung Sik; Kim, Ki Hyun [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    Small quantity of nuclear material (SQNM) is prescribed to be less than specified minimum quantities of nuclear material in a facility. SQNM is used at the locations called locations outside facilities (LOFs). LOFs are used to control the locations and installations that store nuclear materials under one effective Kg, respectively. Holders of SQNM don't need to require a license for use or possession of Uranium or Thorium exclusively for non-nuclear activities, or neither report them to the System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) under specified quantities according to the Atomic Safety Law. Well defined safeguards law is fundamental to the effective control of nuclear material, facilities and nuclear related activities. In the current nuclear safety legislation, there are some exceptive clauses. Users of SQNM don't need to require a license for use or possession of Uranium or Thorium exclusively for non-nuclear activities, or not report them to the national authority below specified amount.

  8. Management of Small Quantity of Nuclear Material at Locations Outside Facilities in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Seung Sik; Kim, Ki Hyun

    2016-01-01

    Small quantity of nuclear material (SQNM) is prescribed to be less than specified minimum quantities of nuclear material in a facility. SQNM is used at the locations called locations outside facilities (LOFs). LOFs are used to control the locations and installations that store nuclear materials under one effective Kg, respectively. Holders of SQNM don't need to require a license for use or possession of Uranium or Thorium exclusively for non-nuclear activities, or neither report them to the System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC) under specified quantities according to the Atomic Safety Law. Well defined safeguards law is fundamental to the effective control of nuclear material, facilities and nuclear related activities. In the current nuclear safety legislation, there are some exceptive clauses. Users of SQNM don't need to require a license for use or possession of Uranium or Thorium exclusively for non-nuclear activities, or not report them to the national authority below specified amount

  9. Materials analysis with a nuclear microprobe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maggiore, C.J.

    1980-01-01

    The ability to produce focused beams of a few MeV light ions from Van de Graaff accelerators has resulted in the development of nuclear microprobes. Rutherford backscattering, nuclear reactions, and particle-induced x-ray emission are used to provide spatially resolved information from the near surface region of materials. Rutherford backscattering provides nondestructive depth and mass resolution. Nuclear reactions are sensitive to light elements (Z < 15). Particle-induced x-ray analysis is similar to electron microprobe analysis, but 2 orders of magnitude more sensitive. The focused beams are usually produced with specially designed multiplets of magnetic quadrupoles. The LASL microprobe uses a superconducting solenoid as a final lens. The data are acquired by a computer interfaced to the experiment with CAMAC. The characteristics of the information acquired with a nuclear microprobe are discussed; the means of producing the beams of nuclear particles are described; and the limitations and applications of such systems are given

  10. Formal training program for nuclear material custodians at Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scott, D.D.

    1979-01-01

    Hanford Engineering Development Laboratory (HEDL) has established a formal training program for nuclear material (NM) custodians. The program, designed to familiarize the custodian with the fundamental concepts of proper nuclear materials control and accountability, is conducted on a semiannual basis. The program is prepared and presented by the Safeguards and Materials Management Section of HEDL and covers 14 subjects on accountability, documentation, transportation, custodian responsibilities, and the safeguarding of nuclear material

  11. A system of nuclear material accountancy in the JAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kase, Toshio; Nishizawa, Satoshi; Takahashi, Yoshindo

    1983-05-01

    Pursuant to the domestic law and regulations revised in 1978 as to be conformed to the requirements specified in the Safeguards Agreement under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the JAERI's system of nuclear material accountancy has been effectively developed. The system of accountancy in the JAERI is based on the information treatment by the computer. The data of nuclear material are retained batchwisely together with their complicate history reflected the inventory changes and other transactions. The reports represented these data are prepared and submitted to the IAEA through the Government every month. The inspections are frequently conducted to the JAERI to verify the material appeared in the reports. Item counting, item identification and non-destructive assay technique are brought to the verification. In some cases, seals of the Government and the IAEA are applied to the nuclear material at the inspections, as their containment measures. The surveillance camera is also installed in the facility to look whole view of reactor room and spent fuel pond. In this paper, the general safeguards application and its corresponding accountancy system on JAERI's nuclear facility are described. (author)

  12. Liability and insurance aspects of international transport of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    van Gijn, S.H.

    1985-01-01

    The Paris and Vienna Conventions do not affect the application of any international transport agreement already in force. However, in certain circumstances both the nuclear operator and the carrier may be held liable for nuclear damage which arises during international transports of nuclear materials. The ensuing cumulation of liabilities under the Nuclear and Transport Conventions may cause serious problems in obtaining adequate insurance cover for such transports. The 1971 Brussels Convention seeks to solve this problem by exonerating any person who might be held liable for nuclear damage under an international maritime convention or national law. Similar difficulties are encountered in the case of transports of nuclear materials between states which have and states which have not ratified the Paris and Vienna Conventions. (NEA) [fr

  13. National practices in physical protection of nuclear materials. Regulatory basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goltsov, V.Y.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The Federal law 'On The Use Of Atomic Energy' containing the section on physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities was issued in 1995 in Russian Federation. This document became the first federal level document regulating the general requirements to physical protection (PP). The federal PP rules developed on the base of this law by Minatom of Russia and other federal bodies of the Russian Federation were put in force by the government of Russia in 1997. The requirements of the convention on physical protection of nuclear materials (INFCIRC 274) and the modern IAEA recommendations (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4) are taken into account in the PP rules. Besides, while developing the PP rules the other countries' experience in this sphere has been studied and taken into account. The PP rules are action-obligatory for all juridical persons dealing with nuclear activity and also for those who are coordinating and monitoring this activity. Nuclear activity without physical protection ensured in accordance with PP rules requirements is prohibited. The requirements of PP Rules are stronger than the IAEA recommendations. The PP rules are establishing: physical protection objectives; federal executive bodies and organizations functions an implementation of physical protection; categorization of nuclear materials; requirements for nuclear materials physical protection as during use and storage as during transportation; main goals of state supervision and ministry level control for physical protection; notification order about the facts of unauthorized actions regarding nuclear materials and facilities. Besides the above mentioned documents, there were put in force president decrees, federal laws and regulations in the field of: counteraction to nuclear terrorism; interactions in physical protection systems; military and ministerial on-site guard activities; information protection. By the initiative of Minatom of Russia the corrections were put into the

  14. CETAMA contribution to safeguards and nuclear forensic analysis based on nuclear reference materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roudil, D.; Rigaux, C.; Rivier, C.; Hubinois, J.C.; Aufore, L.

    2012-01-01

    Measurement quality is crucial for the safety of nuclear facilities: nuclear reference materials (CRM) and interlaboratory programs (ILC), beyond the assessment of analytical measurement quality, play an important role. In the nuclear field, the CETAMA proposes suitable scientific and technical developments, in particular the preparation and certification of CRM used either as analytical standards or as reference samples for ILCs. The growing emphasis on nuclear forensic measurements will require some re-certification of old CRMs. But the future analytical challenges of meeting nuclear fuel cycle needs and of ensuring safeguard performance improvements will also concern the future CRMs. (authors)

  15. Savannah River Site nuclear materials management plan FY 2017-2031

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Magoulas, V. [Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, SC (United States). Savannah River National Lab. (SRNL)

    2017-06-22

    The purpose of the Nuclear Materials Management Plan (herein referred to as “this Plan”) is to integrate and document the activities required to disposition the legacy and/or surplus Enriched Uranium (EU) and Plutonium (Pu) and other nuclear materials already stored or anticipated to be received by facilities at the Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) as well as the activities to support the DOE Tritium mission. It establishes a planning basis for EU and Pu processing operations in Environmental Management Operations (EMO) facilities through the end of their program missions and for the tritium through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Defense Programs (DP) facilities. Its development is a joint effort among the Department of Energy - Savannah River (DOE-SR), DOE – Environmental Management (EM), NNSA Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3), NNSA Savannah River Field Office (SRFO), and the Management and Operations (M&O) contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC (SRNS). Life-cycle program planning for Nuclear Materials Stabilization and Disposition and the Tritium Enterprise may use this Plan as a basis for the development of the nuclear materials disposition scope and schedule. This Plan assumes full funding to accomplish the required project and operations activities. It is recognized that some aspects of this Plan are pre decisional with regard to National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); in such cases new NEPA actions will be required.

  16. Automated accounting systems for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erkkila, B.

    1994-01-01

    History of the development of nuclear materials accounting systems in USA and their purposes are considered. Many present accounting systems are based on mainframe computers with multiple terminal access. Problems of future improvement accounting systems are discussed

  17. The reality of nuclear power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murphy, D.

    1979-01-01

    The following matters are discussed in relation to the nuclear power programmes in USA and elsewhere: siting of nuclear power plants in relation to a major geological fault; public attitudes to nuclear power; plutonium, radioactive wastes and transfrontier contamination; radiation and other hazards; economics of nuclear power; uranium supply; fast breeder reactors; insurance of nuclear facilities; diversion of nuclear materials and weapons proliferation; possibility of manufacture of nuclear weapons by developing countries; possibility of accidents on nuclear power plants in developing countries; radiation hazards from use of uranium ore tailings; sociological alternative to use of nuclear power. (U.K.)

  18. Structural integrity of materials in nuclear service: a bibliography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heddleson, F.A.

    1977-01-01

    This report contains 679 abstracts from the Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) computer file dated 1973 through 1976 covering material properties with respect to structural integrity. All materials important to the nuclear industry (except concrete) are covered for mechanical properties, chemical properties, corrosion, fracture or failure, radiation damage, creep, cracking, and swelling. Keyword, author, and permuted-title indexes are included for the convenience of the user

  19. Structural integrity of materials in nuclear service: a bibliography

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heddleson, F.A.

    1977-06-07

    This report contains 679 abstracts from the Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) computer file dated 1973 through 1976 covering material properties with respect to structural integrity. All materials important to the nuclear industry (except concrete) are covered for mechanical properties, chemical properties, corrosion, fracture or failure, radiation damage, creep, cracking, and swelling. Keyword, author, and permuted-title indexes are included for the convenience of the user.

  20. Ageing studies on materials, components and process instruments used in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bora, J.S.

    1997-04-01

    This report is a compilation of test results of thermal and radiation ageing tests carried out in the laboratory over a period of 25 years on diverse engineering materials, components and instruments used in nuclear power plants. Test items covered are different types of electrical cables, elastomers, surface coatings, electrical and electronics components and process instruments. Effects of thermal and radiation ageing on performance parameters are shown in tabular forms. Apart from finding the characteristics, capabilities and limitations of test items, ageing research has helped in pin-pointing sub-standard and critical parts and necessary corrective action has been taken. This report is expected to be quite useful to the manufacturers users and researchers for reference and guidance. (author)

  1. Nuclear verification: What it is, how it works, the assurances it can provide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fortakov, V.

    1998-01-01

    International nuclear safeguards consist of a complex control system based on material accountancy with the technical objective of providing for 'the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection' (INFCIR 153). This paper addresses the many technical principles of nuclear safeguards as implemented today. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements undertake to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material within the State territory or under its jurisdiction or control. The basic procedural elements of the safeguards system are facility design examination and verification, maintenance of records by facility operators, provision of reports to the IAEA and on-site inspections by IAEA staff. The system requires the concerted action of nuclear facility operators, State Authorities and the IAEA inspectorate and is constantly improved to strengthen it and make it more cost-efficient

  2. A open-quotes Newclose quotes regime for nuclear weapons and materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sutcliffe, W.G.

    1994-01-01

    In this paper, I discuss the principal ideas that I covered in my presentation on December 8, 1993, at the Future of Foreign Nuclear Materials Symposium held by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I was asked to discuss issues related to military inventories of plutonium, and I took this opportunity to describe a possible declaratory regime that could encompass military as well as civilian inventories of plutonium. The open-quote newclose quotes in the title does not imply that the regime discussed here is an original idea. Rather, the regime will be open-quotes new,close quotes when it is adopted. The regime proposed here and in other works is one in which all stocks of nuclear weapons and materials are declared. Originally, declarations were proposed as a traditional arms control measure. Here, declarations are proposed to support the prevention of misuse of nuclear weapons and materials, including support for the nonproliferation regime. In the following, I discuss: (1) Worldwide inventories of nuclear weapons and materials, including the fact that military plutonium must be viewed as part of that worldwide inventory. (2) Life cycles of nuclear weapons and materials, including the various stages from the creation of nuclear materials for weapons through deployment and retirement of weapons to the final disposition of the materials. (3) Mechanisms for making declarations. (4) Risks and benefits to be derived from declarations. (5) Possibilities for supporting evidence or verification

  3. Role of proper response schemes, legislation and regional cooperation in combating illicit trafficking of nuclear materials in developing countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sterzov, A.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The suitable geographical situation on the crossroad between Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Middle East puts Bulgaria into the stream of many illegal traffics - people, arms, drugs etc. The illicit traffic of nuclear and radioactive materials is a serious violation of nonproliferation laws as well as a risk for the health of the population. Criminal diversion of fissile materials could lead to the potential construction of nuclear weapon or applied with conventional explosives the radioactive material could pose a threat to dwelling places, water supplies etc. The traffic of nuclear and radioactive materials in Bulgaria can be divided in two main parts -- internal and transit. I. Internal traffic The internal traffic consisted of stolen radioactive sources mainly imported with the Soviet equipment from companies or plants that were privatized or stopped functioning due to the economic changes in the country. There there were attempts to divert and transport materials from the Uranium mining industry including different amounts of 'yellow cake', depleted Uranium containers or shielding. These devices consisted of level and dense meters, irradiation devices, removing static electricity, smoke detectors etc. mainly containing the isotopes Cs-137, Co-60, Ir-192, Ra-226, Am-241 etc. II. External traffic The external traffic of illicit nuclear materials is connected with the transfer of raw materials and expensive metals from the former Soviet Union towards Western Europe and the Middle East. This traffic included Al, Os, Cs, Sc, Rare earth elements, Red Mercury, Pu, Enriched U. The traffic of the last three items is of greatest concern and should be addressed with highest priority. III. Response to the illicit traffic of nuclear materials The detection of both the internal and external traffic raises serious problems to the Bulgarian controlling organs both for equipment and qualified personnel at the borders and inside the country. The creation of

  4. Symposium on application of new materials to nuclear plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    The papers on the application of new materials for upgrading LWRs, the application of new materials to FBRs, the application of new materials to high temperature gas-cooled reactors, the application of new materials to nuclear fusion reactors, engineering ceremics shape memorizing alloys and metal base composite materials are collected in this book. As for LWRs, the change of materials for LWR components and the present status of the research and development of the application of new materials in ANERI are described. As for the application of new materials to a demonstration FBR, high Cr-Mo steel, high ductility stainless steel, neutron resistant stainless steel and low cobalt case hardening material are explained, and the development of new materials for practical FBRs is discussed. As for high temperature gas-cooled reactors, the materials for control rod cladding tubes, heat exchangers and high temperature piping, fuel cladding, moderator and reflector, and heat insulator are described. As for nuclear fusion reactors, the structural materials, the materials facing plasma, and superconductive materials, electrode materials and others are discussed. (K.I.)

  5. Regulations concerning the transport of nuclear fuel materials outside the works or the enterprise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The regulations are defined under the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors and the order for execution of the law. Basic concepts and terms are explained, such as: vehicle transport; easy transport; nuclear fuel material load, exclusive loading, employee, accumulative dose and exposure dose. Technical standards of vehicle transport are specified in detail on nucler fuel materials as nuclear fuel load, L,A, EM and BU type of load, nuclear fuel load of fission substances, the second and third type of fission load and materials contaminated by nuclear fuel substances to be carried not as nuclear fuel loads. Special exceptional measures to such transport and technical standards of easy transport are also designated. The application for confirmation of the transport shall be filed to the Director General of Science and Technology Agency according to the form attached with documents explaining nuclear fuel materials to be transferred, the vessel of such materials and construction, material and method of production of such a vessel, safety of nuclear materials contained, etc. Measures in dangerous situations shall be taken to fight a fire or prohibit the entrance of persons other than the staff concerned. Reports shall be presented in 10 days to the Director, when theft, loss or irregular leaking of nuclear fuel materials or personal troubles occur on the way. (Okada, K.)

  6. Improved moulding material for addition to nuclear fuel particles to produce nuclear fuel elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miertschin, G.N.; Leary, D.F.

    1976-01-01

    A suggestion is made to improve the moulding materials used to produce carbon-contained nuclear fuel particles by a coke-reducing added substance. The nuclear fuel particles are meant for the formation of fuel elements for gas-cooled high-temperature nuclear reactors. The moulding materials are above all for the formation of coated particles which are burnt in situ in nuclear fuel element chambers out of 'green' nuclear fuel bodies. The added substance improves the shape stability of the particles forming and prevents a stiding or bridge formation between the particles or with the surrounding walls. The following are named as added substances: 1) Polystyrene and styrene-butadiene-Co polymers (mol. wt. between 5oo and 1,000,000), 2) aromatic compounds (mol. wt. 75 to 300), 3) saturated hydrocarbon polymers (mol. wt. 5,000 to 1,000,000). Additional release agents further improve the properties in the same direction (e.g. alcohols, fatty acids, amines). (orig.) [de

  7. Subcritical calculation of the nuclear material warehouse

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garcia M, T.; Mazon R, R.

    2009-01-01

    In this work the subcritical calculation of the nuclear material warehouse of the Reactor TRIGA Mark III labyrinth in the Mexico Nuclear Center is presented. During the adaptation of the nuclear warehouse (vault I), the fuel was temporarily changed to the warehouse (vault II) and it was also carried out the subcritical calculation for this temporary arrangement. The code used for the calculation of the effective multiplication factor, it was the Monte Carlo N-Particle Extended code known as MCNPX, developed by the National Laboratory of Los Alamos, for the particles transport. (Author)

  8. Gamma-ray identification of nuclear weapon materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gosnell, T. B.; Hall, J. M.; Jam, C. L.; Knapp, D. A.; Koenig, Z. M.; Luke, S. J.; Pohl, B. A.; Schach Wittenau, A. von; Wolford, J. K.

    1997-01-01

    There has been an accelerating national interest in countering nuclear smuggling. This has caused a corresponding expansion of interest in the use of gamma-ray spectrometers for checkpoint monitoring, nuclear search, and within networks of nuclear and collateral sensors. All of these are fieldable instruments--ranging from large, fixed portal monitors to hand-held and remote monitoring equipment. For operational reasons, detectors with widely varying energy resolution and detection efficiency will be employed. In many instances, such instruments must be sensitive to weak signals, always capable of recognizing the gamma-ray signatures from nuclear weapons materials (NWM), often largely insensitive to spectral alteration by radiation transport through intervening materials, capable of real-time implementation, and able to discriminate against signals from commonly encountered legitimate gamma-ray sources, such as radiopharmaceuticals. Several decades of experience in classified programs have shown that all of these properties are not easily achieved and successful approaches were of limited scope--such as the detection of plutonium only. This project was originally planned as a two-year LDRD-ER. Since funding for 1997 was not sustained, this is a report of the first year's progress

  9. Challenges in ensuring radiological safety and nuclear forensic for malicious acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sharma, Ranjit; Chatterjee, M.K.; Singh, Rajvir; Pradeepkumar, K.S.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear and other radioactive materials may get smuggled into the country aimed at malicious acts. Radioactive material detected accidentally or during inspection at the entry points/national borders may indicate illicit trafficking for the purpose of nuclear/radiological terrorism. As country requires prevention and preparedness for response to these malicious acts, nuclear forensic techniques are to be developed incorporating radiological safety aspects. Nuclear forensics helps in determining the origin, intended use, legal owner and the smuggled route etc. by using fingerprinting as well as comparison with reference data. The suggested sequence of methods for analysis of radioactive material/samples will be radiological assessment, physical characterization, traditional forensic analysis, isotope analysis along with elemental/chemical analysis

  10. Nuclear Material Processing at the Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Severynse, T.F.

    1998-07-01

    Plutonium production for national defense began at Savannah River in the mid-1950s, following construction of production reactors and separations facilities. Following the successful completion of its production mission, the site's nuclear material processing facilities continue to operate to perform stabilization of excess materials and potentially support the disposition of these materials. A number of restoration and productivity improvement projects implemented in the 1980s, totaling nearly a billion dollars, have resulted in these facilities representing the most modern and only remaining operating large-scale processing facilities in the DOE Complex. Together with the Site's extensive nuclear infrastructure, and integrated waste management system, SRS is the only DOE site with the capability and mission of ongoing processing operations

  11. Meeting of socialist conntries' representatives on problems of nuclear materials analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pacak, P.; Moravec, J.; Krtil, J.; Sus, F.

    1982-01-01

    A meeting of representatives of the socialist countries was held in Prague from May 18 to 22, 1981, to discuss cooperation in the field of analytical control of nuclear materials. The Czechoslovak delegation informed the participants of the extent and results of the work of the Central Control Laboratory of the Nuclear Research Institute in Rez. A brief survey is given of the nondestructive methods of measuring the physical parameters of nuclear fuel, the methods of destructive determination of uranium and plutonium and the methods of preparation of standard materials for mass spectrometry which the Central Control Laboratory has introduced and verified for securing analytical control of nuclear materials. (B.S.)

  12. Decree 2805 by means of which the National Accounting and Control of Basic Nuclear Materials and Special Fusionable Materials System, is established

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    This Decree has for object to establish a National Accounting and Control of Basic Nuclear Materials and Special Fusionable Materials System, under the supervision of the National Council for the Nuclear Industry Development. Its aims are to account nuclear materials, to control nuclear activities, to preserve and control nuclear information, to keep technical relationship with specialized organizations, and to garant nuclear safeguards [es

  13. Nuclear Materials: Reconsidering Wastes and Assets - 13193

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Michalske, T.A. [Savannah River National Laboratory (United States)

    2013-07-01

    The nuclear industry, both in the commercial and the government sectors, has generated large quantities of material that span the spectrum of usefulness, from highly valuable ('assets') to worthless ('wastes'). In many cases, the decision parameters are clear. Transuranic waste and high level waste, for example, have no value, and is either in a final disposition path today, or - in the case of high level waste - awaiting a policy decision about final disposition. Other materials, though discardable, have intrinsic scientific or market value that may be hidden by the complexity, hazard, or cost of recovery. An informed decision process should acknowledge the asset value, or lack of value, of the complete inventory of materials, and the structure necessary to implement the range of possible options. It is important that informed decisions are made about the asset value for the variety of nuclear materials available. For example, there is a significant quantity of spent fuel available for recycle (an estimated $4 billion value in the Savannah River Site's (SRS) L area alone); in fact, SRS has already blended down more than 300 metric tons of uranium for commercial reactor use. Over 34 metric tons of surplus plutonium is also on a path to be used as commercial fuel. There are other radiological materials that are routinely handled at the site in large quantities that should be viewed as strategically important and / or commercially viable. In some cases, these materials are irreplaceable domestically, and failure to consider their recovery could jeopardize our technological leadership or national defense. The inventories of nuclear materials at SRS that have been characterized as 'waste' include isotopes of plutonium, uranium, americium, and helium. Although planning has been performed to establish the technical and regulatory bases for their discard and disposal, recovery of these materials is both economically attractive and in the

  14. A strategy study on the technology development for key nuclear structural materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, Jun Hwa; Jeong, Youg Hwan; Kim, Tae Kyu

    2012-01-01

    In order to realize the advanced long-life PWRs and new Generation-IV nuclear systems, it is pre-requisite to establish or ensure the several key materials technology. In this study, we proposed the several key needs and directions for the key materials issues. Each issue is envisioned and described below. 1) Development of innovative nuclear structural materials with extreme environment-resistance for advanced G-IV systems 2) Improvement/development of key reactor materials for advanced and long -life PWRs. 3) Development of technologies against nuclear materials aging degradation

  15. Chemical characterization of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramakumar, K.L.

    2011-01-01

    India is fabricating nuclear fuels for various types of reactors, for example, (U-Pu) MOX fuel of varying Pu content for boiling water reactors (BWRs), pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs), prototype fast breeder reactors (PFBRs), (U-Pu) carbide fuel fast breeder test reactor (FBTR), and U-based fuels for research reactors. Nuclear fuel being the heart of the reactor, its chemical and physical characterisation is an important component of this design. Both the fuel materials and finished fuel products are to be characterised for this purpose. Quality control (both chemical and physical) provides a means to ensure that the quality of the fabricated fuel conforms to the specifications for the fuel laid down by the fuel designer. Chemical specifications are worked out for the major and minor constituents which affect the fuel properties and hence its performance under conditions prevailing in an operating reactor. Each fuel batch has to be subjected to comprehensive chemical quality control for trace constituents, stoichiometry and isotopic composition. A number of advanced process and quality control steps are required to ensure the quality of the fuels. Further more, in the case of Pu-based fuels, it is necessary to extract maximum quality data by employing different evaluation techniques which would result in minimum scrap/waste generation of valuable plutonium. The task of quality control during fabrication of nuclear fuels of various types is both challenging and difficult. The underlying philosophy is total quality control of the fuel by proper mix of process and quality control steps at various stages of fuel manufacture starting from the feed materials. It is also desirable to adapt more than one analytical technique to increase the confidence and reliability of the quality data generated. This is all the most required when certified reference materials are not available. In addition, the adaptation of non-destructive techniques in the chemical quality

  16. Report on the Workshop on Accelerated Nuclear Energy Materials Development

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    King, Wayne E. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Allen, Todd [Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI (United States); Arsenlis, Tom [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Bench, Graham [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Bulatov, Vasily [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Fluss, Michael [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Klein, Richard [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); McMahon, Donn [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Middleton, Carolin [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Morley, Maureen [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Pasamehmetoglu, Kemal [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Turchi, Patrice [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Was, Gary [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)

    2010-05-11

    This document reports on the Office of Nuclear Energy’s (NE’s) Workshop on Accelerated Nuclear Energy Materials Development held May 11, 2010, in Washington, DC. The purpose of the workshop was twofold: (1) to provide feedback on an initiative to use uncertainty quantification (UQ) to integrate theory, simulation, and modeling with accelerated experimentation to predict the behavior of materials and fuels in an irradiation environment and thereby accelerate the lengthy materials design and qualification process; and (2) to provide feedback on and refinement to five topical areas to develop predictive models for fuels and cladding and new radiation-tolerant materials. The goal of the workshop was to gather technical feedback with respect to the Office of Nuclear Energy’s research and development while also identifying and highlighting crosscutting capability and applicability of the initiative to other federal offices, including the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOE Office of Basic Energy Sciences (BES), DOE Office of Fusion Energy Sciences (FES), and Naval Reactors. The goals of the initiative are twofold: (1) develop time- and length-scale transcending models that predict material properties using UQ to effectively integrate theory, simulation, and modeling with accelerated experiments; and (2) design and develop new radiation-tolerant materials using the knowledge gained and methodologies created to shorten the development and qualification time and reduce cost. The initiative is crosscutting and has synergy with industry and other federal offices including Naval Reactors, NRC, FES, BES, and the Office of Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR). It is distinguished by its use of uncertainty quantification to effectively integrate theory, simulation, and modeling with high-dose experimental capabilities. The initiative aims to bring the methodology that is being

  17. A framework and methodology for nuclear fuel cycle transparency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClellan, Yvonne; York, David L.; Inoue, Naoko; Love, Tracia L.; Rochau, Gary Eugene

    2006-01-01

    A key objective to the global deployment of nuclear technology is maintaining transparency among nation-states and international communities. By providing an environment in which to exchange scientific and technological information regarding nuclear technology, the safe and legitimate use of nuclear material and technology can be assured. Many nations are considering closed or multiple-application nuclear fuel cycles and are subsequently developing advanced reactors in an effort to obtain some degree of energy self-sufficiency. Proliferation resistance features that prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material and reduce the likelihood of diversion from the civilian nuclear power fuel cycle are critical for a global nuclear future. IAEA Safeguards have been effective in minimizing opportunities for diversion; however, recent changes in the global political climate suggest implementation of additional technology and methods to ensure the prompt detection of proliferation. For a variety of reasons, nuclear facilities are becoming increasingly automated and will require minimum manual operation. This trend provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring proliferation risk, especially in future facilities. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to resist proliferation associated with these activities. Additionally, a framework designed to monitor processes will ensure the legitimate use of nuclear material. This report describes recent efforts to develop a methodology capable of assessing proliferation risk in support of overall plant transparency. The framework may be tested at the candidate site located in Japan: the Fuel Handling Training Model designed for the Monju Fast Reactor at the International Cooperation and Development Training Center of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency

  18. Nuclear Material Detection by One-Short-Pulse-Laser-Driven Neutron Source

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Favalli, Andrea; Aymond, F.; Bridgewater, Jon S.; Croft, Stephen; Deppert, O.; Devlin, Matthew James; Falk, Katerina; Fernandez, Juan Carlos; Gautier, Donald Cort; Gonzales, Manuel A.; Goodsell, Alison Victoria; Guler, Nevzat; Hamilton, Christopher Eric; Hegelich, Bjorn Manuel; Henzlova, Daniela; Ianakiev, Kiril Dimitrov; Iliev, Metodi; Johnson, Randall Philip; Jung, Daniel; Kleinschmidt, Annika; Koehler, Katrina Elizabeth; Pomerantz, Ishay; Roth, Markus; Santi, Peter Angelo; Shimada, Tsutomu; Swinhoe, Martyn Thomas; Taddeucci, Terry Nicholas; Wurden, Glen Anthony; Palaniyappan, Sasikumar; McCary, E.

    2015-01-01

    Covered in the PowerPoint presentation are the following areas: Motivation and requirements for active interrogation of nuclear material; laser-driven neutron source; neutron diagnostics; active interrogation of nuclear material; and, conclusions, remarks, and future works.

  19. Japan's regulatory and safety issues regarding nuclear materials transport

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saito, T.; Yamanaka, T.

    2004-01-01

    This paper focuses on the regulatory and safety issues on nuclear materials transport which the Government of Japan (GOJ) faces and needs to well handle. Background information about the status of nuclear power plants (NPP) and nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) facilities in Japan will promote a better understanding of what this paper addresses

  20. Nuclear energy and materials in the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krakowski, R.A.; Davidson, J.W.; Bathke, C.G.; Arthur, E.D.; Wagner, R.L. Jr.

    1997-01-01

    The Global Nuclear Vision Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory is examining a range of long- term nuclear energy futures as well as exploring and assessing optimal nuclear fuel-cycle and material strategies. An established global energy, economics, environmental (E 3 ) model has been adopted and modified with a simplified, but comprehensive and multi-regional, nuclear energy module. Consistent nuclear energy scenarios are constructed, where future demands for nuclear power are projected in price competition with other energy sources under a wide range of long-term (∼2100) demographic, economic, policy, and technological drivers. A spectrum of futures is examined at two levels in a hierarchy of scenario attributes in which drivers are either external or internal to nuclear energy. The results reported examine departures from a ''basis scenario'' and are presented in the following order of increasing specificity: a) definition and parametric variations the basis scenario; b) comparison of the basis scenario with other recent studies; c) parametric studies that vary upper-level hierarchical scenario attributes (external drivers); and d) variations of the lower-level scenario attributes (internal drivers). Impacts of a range of nuclear fuel cycle scenarios are reflected back to the higher-level scenario attributes that characterize particular nuclear energy scenarios. Special attention is given to the role of nuclear materials inventories (in magnitude, location, and form) and their contribution to the long-term sustainability of nuclear energy, the future competitiveness of both conventional and advanced nuclear reactors, and proliferation risk. (author)

  1. Nuclear energy and materials in the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krakowski, R.A.; Davidson, J.W.; Bathke, C.G.

    1997-05-01

    The Global Nuclear Vision Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory is examining a range of long-term nuclear energy futures as well as exploring and assessing optimal nuclear fuel-cycle and material strategies. An established global energy, economics, environmental (E 3 ) model has been adopted and modified with a simplified, but comprehensive and multi-regional, nuclear energy module. Consistent nuclear energy scenarios are constructed, where future demands for nuclear power are projected in price competition with other energy sources under a wide range of long-term (∼2100) demographic, economic, policy, and technological drivers. A spectrum of futures is examined at two levels in a hierarchy of scenario attributes in which drivers are either external or internal to nuclear energy. The result reported examine departures from a basis scenario and are presented in the following order of increasing specificity: (a) definition and parametric variations of the basis scenario; (b) comparison of the basis scenario with other recent studies; (c) parametric studies that vary upper-level hierarchical scenario attributes (external drivers); and (d) variations of the lower-level scenario attributes (internal drivers). Impacts of a range of nuclear fuel-cycle scenarios are reflected back to the higher-level scenario attributes that characterize particular nuclear energy scenarios. Special attention is given to the role of nuclear materials inventories (in magnitude, location, and form) and their contribution to the long-term sustainability of nuclear energy, the future competitiveness of both conventional and advanced nuclear reactors, and proliferation risk

  2. Data base concepts for managing the DOE nuclear material inventory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beams, J.D.

    1996-01-01

    Information required by nuclear materials managers in the Department of Energy (DOE) is accessible with varying levels of difficulty. Currently, the most readily available information is provided by the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). Information not provided by NMMSS must be obtained either from field site data bases or collected through physical inventory inspections, both very costly and time-consuming alternatives. This paper discusses the possibility of providing more detailed information at DOE headquarters on nuclear material inventories than is provided by NMMSS. In particular, this paper considers some of the issues associated with managing materials at the lowest-level--the item-level--and uses a hypothetical item-level data base to describe some of the advantages and disadvantages of managing information at the item-level

  3. Legal aspects and liabilities of storage in transit of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mees, M.C.

    1983-01-01

    This paper considers the question of storage in transit of nuclear materials under the Paris Convention. It specifies the concepts of storage in transit of nuclear materials and then sets out the basic principles of nuclear third party liability. The paper concludes with an analysis of the practical situation in this field and the extent of State liability. (NEA) [fr

  4. Nuclear materials for fission reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matzke, H.; Schumacher, G.

    1992-01-01

    This volume brings together 47 papers from scientists involved in the fabrication of new nuclear fuels, in basic research of nuclear materials, their application and technology as well as in computer codes and modelling of fuel behaviour. The main emphasis is on progress in the development of non -oxide fuels besides reporting advances in the more conventional oxide fuels. The two currently performed large reactor safety programmes CORA and PHEBUS-FP are described in invited lectures. The contributions review basic property measurements, as well as the present state of fuel performance modelling. The performance of today's nuclear fuel, hence UO 2 , at high burnup is also reviewed with particular emphasis on the recently observed phenomenon of grain subdivision in the cold part of the oxide fuel at high burnup, the so-called 'rim' effect. Similar phenomena can be simulated by ion implantation in order to better elucidate the underlying mechanism and reviews on high resolution electron microscopy provide further information. The papers will provide a useful treatise of views, ideas and new results for all those scientists and engineers involved in the specific questions of current nuclear waste management

  5. 10 CFR 73.28 - Security background checks for secure transfer of nuclear materials.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Security background checks for secure transfer of nuclear... PLANTS AND MATERIALS Physical Protection of Special Nuclear Material in Transit § 73.28 Security background checks for secure transfer of nuclear materials. Licensees are excepted from the security...

  6. U.S. and Russian Collaboration in the Area of Nuclear Forensics

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kristo, M J

    2007-10-22

    diversion through interdiction are important goals for nuclear forensics and attribution. It is equally important to determine whether additional devices or materials that pose a threat to public safety are also available. Finding the answer to these questions depends on determining the source of the material and its method of production. Nuclear forensics analysis and interpretation provide essential insights into methods of production and sources of illicit radioactive materials. However, they are most powerful when combined with other sources of information, including intelligence and traditional detective work. The certainty of detection and punishment for those who remove nuclear materials from legitimate control provides the ultimate deterrent for such diversion and, ultimately, for the intended goal of such diversion, including nuclear terrorism or proliferation. Consequently, nuclear forensics is an integral part of 'nuclear deterrence' in the 21st century. Nuclear forensics will always be limited by the diagnostic information inherent in the interdicted material. Important markers for traditional forensics (fingerprints, stray material, etc.) can be eliminated or obscured, but many nuclear materials have inherent isotopic or chemical characteristics that serve as unequivocal markers of specific sources, production processes, or transit routes. The information needed for nuclear forensics goes beyond that collected for most commercial and international verification activities. Fortunately, the international nuclear engineering enterprise has a restricted number of conspicuous process steps that makes the interpretation process easier. Ultimately, though, it will always be difficult to distinguish between materials that reflect similar source or production histories, but are derived from disparate sites. Due to the significant capital costs of the equipment and the specialized expertise of the personnel, work in the field of nuclear forensics has been

  7. U.S. and Russian Collaboration in the Area of Nuclear Forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kristo, M J

    2007-01-01

    diversion through interdiction are important goals for nuclear forensics and attribution. It is equally important to determine whether additional devices or materials that pose a threat to public safety are also available. Finding the answer to these questions depends on determining the source of the material and its method of production. Nuclear forensics analysis and interpretation provide essential insights into methods of production and sources of illicit radioactive materials. However, they are most powerful when combined with other sources of information, including intelligence and traditional detective work. The certainty of detection and punishment for those who remove nuclear materials from legitimate control provides the ultimate deterrent for such diversion and, ultimately, for the intended goal of such diversion, including nuclear terrorism or proliferation. Consequently, nuclear forensics is an integral part of 'nuclear deterrence' in the 21st century. Nuclear forensics will always be limited by the diagnostic information inherent in the interdicted material. Important markers for traditional forensics (fingerprints, stray material, etc.) can be eliminated or obscured, but many nuclear materials have inherent isotopic or chemical characteristics that serve as unequivocal markers of specific sources, production processes, or transit routes. The information needed for nuclear forensics goes beyond that collected for most commercial and international verification activities. Fortunately, the international nuclear engineering enterprise has a restricted number of conspicuous process steps that makes the interpretation process easier. Ultimately, though, it will always be difficult to distinguish between materials that reflect similar source or production histories, but are derived from disparate sites. Due to the significant capital costs of the equipment and the specialized expertise of the personnel, work in the field of nuclear forensics has been restricted so

  8. Risk classification for nuclear facilities in connection with the illegal use of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahm, W.; Naegele, G.; Sellinschegg, D.

    1976-01-01

    It is shown, and illustrated by an example, that specific conditions at a nuclear facility to a large extent determine the probability of a successful illegal attack against that facility. Therefore, a categorization of nuclear materials according to the associated hazards alone, as practised currently, does not appear to be sufficient for the establishment of a balanced national physical protection system. In this paper a possible way of categorizing nuclear facilities according to the associated risks, determined as objectively as possible, is discussed. It is felt that initially the analysis should be restricted to the determination of the conditional risks, associated with illegal acquisition and use of radioactive materials by a postulated hostile or similar group. (author)

  9. Some basic criteria for using of accountancy common system and nuclear material control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marzo, M.A.; Biaggio, A.L.

    1994-01-01

    Some basic criteria used by the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, using in the Accountancy and Control Common System of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) are presented and the control elements are described. The SCCC is a safeguard system used for all nuclear materials present in all nuclear activities executed by Brazil and Argentina. (C.G.C.). 4 refs, 1 tab

  10. Bulk material management mode of general contractors in nuclear power project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Jinyong; Zhao Xiaobo

    2011-01-01

    The paper introduces the characteristics of bulk material management mode in construction project, and the advantages and disadvantages of bulk material management mode of general contractors in nuclear power project. In combination with the bulk material management mode of China Nuclear Power Engineering Co., Ltd, some improvement measures have been put forward as well. (authors)

  11. Technology development for nuclear material accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, Jong Sook; Lee, Byung Doo; Cha, Hong Ryul; Choi, Hyoung Nai; Park, Ho Joon

    1991-03-01

    Using Segmented Gamma Scanning(SGS) System and coaxical Ge detector, the amounts of uranium in 55 gallon waste drums mixed with low density matrix material were determined by segmented gamma-scanning method. Various factors that influence sample measurement were identified as attenuation effects against sample container and matrix material counting loss effect by dead time and signal pile-up and radial and axial non-uniformity effects of sample. External transmission source, Yb-169, was used to correct gamma-ray attenuation by matrix material. The measure deviation caused by non-uniform distribution in the drum was minimized by rotating and dividing the drum. To calibrate the measurement system, calibration sources were prepared in the range of 50g, 100g, 300g, and 500g of U0 2 powder which let it stick to thin gummed papers and mix with other matrix materials such as papers, vinyl sheets, pieces of rubber gloves in 4 each drum. Under the calibrated assay system the uncertainty of measured amounts of UO 2 powder approached about 10% of absolute value at 1σ and a normal flow of waste stream can be maintained at least one drum per hour. On the other hand, in an effort to ease the nuclear material accounting for and control the flow of nuclear material in CANDU Fuel Fabrication Facility was analyzed to develope a model computer network interfaced with hardwares, structual design of network, computer operating system, and hardware set-up were studied to draw out the most practical network system. (Author)

  12. Certified reference materials and reference methods for nuclear safeguards and security.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jakopič, R; Sturm, M; Kraiem, M; Richter, S; Aregbe, Y

    2013-11-01

    Confidence in comparability and reliability of measurement results in nuclear material and environmental sample analysis are established via certified reference materials (CRMs), reference measurements, and inter-laboratory comparisons (ILCs). Increased needs for quality control tools in proliferation resistance, environmental sample analysis, development of measurement capabilities over the years and progress in modern analytical techniques are the main reasons for the development of new reference materials and reference methods for nuclear safeguards and security. The Institute for Reference Materials and Measurements (IRMM) prepares and certifices large quantities of the so-called "large-sized dried" (LSD) spikes for accurate measurement of the uranium and plutonium content in dissolved nuclear fuel solutions by isotope dilution mass spectrometry (IDMS) and also develops particle reference materials applied for the detection of nuclear signatures in environmental samples. IRMM is currently replacing some of its exhausted stocks of CRMs with new ones whose specifications are up-to-date and tailored for the demands of modern analytical techniques. Some of the existing materials will be re-measured to improve the uncertainties associated with their certified values, and to enable laboratories to reduce their combined measurement uncertainty. Safeguards involve the quantitative verification by independent measurements so that no nuclear material is diverted from its intended peaceful use. Safeguards authorities pay particular attention to plutonium and the uranium isotope (235)U, indicating the so-called 'enrichment', in nuclear material and in environmental samples. In addition to the verification of the major ratios, n((235)U)/n((238)U) and n((240)Pu)/n((239)Pu), the minor ratios of the less abundant uranium and plutonium isotopes contain valuable information about the origin and the 'history' of material used for commercial or possibly clandestine purposes, and

  13. Notice to exporters on products prohibited from export (nuclear material, equipment and large nuclear units)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    In order to ensure that the policy to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons is complied with, the French Administration applies stricter controls over the export of certain sensitive products, materials and equipment. To this effect, lists of such products, materials and equipment are published in the form of Notices to exporters and periodically revised. This Notice repeals and replaces the previous Notice published in the Official Gazette of 21 January 1986. Annex I contains the list of materials whose export is subject to nuclear non-proliferation controls. Annex II lists the equipment whose export is subject to the same controls. Annex III includes the list of large nuclear units for which an application for prior approval of export must be submitted to the Administrations concerned. (NEA) [fr

  14. Security Culture in Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Susyanta-Widyatmaka; Koraag, Venuesiana-Dewi; Taswanda-Taryo

    2005-01-01

    In nuclear related field, there are three different cultures: safety, safeguards and security culture. Safety culture has established mostly in nuclear industries, meanwhile safeguards and security culture are relatively new and still developing. The latter is intended to improve the physical protection of material and nuclear facility. This paper describes concept, properties and factors affecting security culture and interactions among these cultures. The analysis indicates that anybody involving in nuclear material and facility should have strong commitment and awareness of such culture to establish it. It is concluded that the assessment of security culture outlined in this paper is still preliminary for developing and conduction rigorous security culture implemented in a much more complex facility such as nuclear power plant

  15. The Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Sweden. Considerations for safeguards and data handling

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fritzell, Anni (ES-konsult, Solna (Sweden))

    2011-01-15

    All nuclear facilities and activities in Sweden are under safeguards - an international monitoring system for all nuclear material. When the planned facilities for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel are constructed, they will also be covered by the safeguards system. The Swedish plans for final disposal is to emplace all spent fuel in a geological repository. The new facility type, the geological repository, will mean that the safeguards system is faced with new challenges, mainly since the nuclear material will be inaccessible after encapsulation and emplacement. This implies that, unlike for existing facilities, it is not possible to verify that the nuclear material is where it is declared to be or that it has the declared characteristics. This report consists of three parts, where each part investigates one aspect of safeguards for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The first part, Paper 1, presents a plausible safeguards approach for the two new facilities. The paper starts with an introduction to international safeguards and to the facilities. The facility layouts and processes are comprehensively described. The main part of Paper 1 is spent describing a safeguards system that covers all diversion paths for fissile material. The diversion paths are identified in the diversion path analysis which is the basis for Paper 3. A strategy to detect diversion is presented for each diversion path. The safeguards system comprises three main measures: 1. Verification of Nuclear Material Accountancy using, for example, verifying measurements and comparisons between shipment documents and receipt documents for transports. 2. Containment and Surveillance which are methods used to maintain continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material during periods between inspections. 3. Design Information Verification which is methods to verify that nuclear facilities are designed and operated according to declarations. The second part of the

  16. The Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Sweden. Considerations for safeguards and data handling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fritzell, Anni

    2011-01-01

    All nuclear facilities and activities in Sweden are under safeguards - an international monitoring system for all nuclear material. When the planned facilities for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel are constructed, they will also be covered by the safeguards system. The Swedish plans for final disposal is to emplace all spent fuel in a geological repository. The new facility type, the geological repository, will mean that the safeguards system is faced with new challenges, mainly since the nuclear material will be inaccessible after encapsulation and emplacement. This implies that, unlike for existing facilities, it is not possible to verify that the nuclear material is where it is declared to be or that it has the declared characteristics. This report consists of three parts, where each part investigates one aspect of safeguards for encapsulation and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The first part, Paper 1, presents a plausible safeguards approach for the two new facilities. The paper starts with an introduction to international safeguards and to the facilities. The facility layouts and processes are comprehensively described. The main part of Paper 1 is spent describing a safeguards system that covers all diversion paths for fissile material. The diversion paths are identified in the diversion path analysis which is the basis for Paper 3. A strategy to detect diversion is presented for each diversion path. The safeguards system comprises three main measures: 1. Verification of Nuclear Material Accountancy using, for example, verifying measurements and comparisons between shipment documents and receipt documents for transports. 2. Containment and Surveillance which are methods used to maintain continuity of knowledge of the nuclear material during periods between inspections. 3. Design Information Verification which is methods to verify that nuclear facilities are designed and operated according to declarations. The second part of the

  17. Non cooperative games applied to nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goutal, P.

    1997-01-01

    This study presents the utilization of the non cooperative games in the nuclear safeguards. In order to dissuade from possible diversions of nuclear materials, an inspector has to realize a certain number of inspections in a nuclear installation. The inspector has to minimize the detection time of a diversion and the diverter has to maximize this time. A software, JADIS, is realized to obtain optimum inspection strategy for a great number of periods. Another game is studied: the infiltration game. An infiltration agent has to brake into the installation without being headed off. (A.L.B.)

  18. Nuclear safeguards control in nuclear power stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boedege, R.; Braatz, U.; Heger, H.

    1976-01-01

    The execution of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has initiated a third phase in the efforts taken to ensure peace by limiting the number of atomic powers. In this phase it is important, above all, to turn into workable systems the conditions imposed upon technology by the different provisions of the Verification Agreement of the NPT. This is achieved mainly by elaborating annexes to the Agreement specifically geared to certain model plants, typical representatives selected for LWR power stations being the plants at Garigliano, Italy (BWR), and Stade, Federal Republic of Germany (PWR). The surveillance measures taken to prevent any diversion of special nuclear material for purposes of nuclear weapons manufacture must be effective in achieving their specific objective and must not impede the circumspect management of operations of the plants concerned. A VDEW working party has studied the technical details of the planned surveillance measures in nuclear power stations in the Federal Republic of Germany and now presents a concept of material balancing by units which meets the conditions imposed by the inspection authority and could also be accepted by the operators of nuclear power stations. The concept provides for uninterrupted control of the material balance areas of the nuclear power stations concerned, allows continuous control of the whole nuclear fuel cycle, is based exclusively on existing methods and facilities, and can be implemented at low cost. (orig.) [de

  19. Investigative radiochemistry. A key element in nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mayer, K.; Wallenius, M.; Varga, Z.; Wiss, T.; Fanghaenel, T.

    2011-01-01

    Since the fall of the Iron Curtain illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material has become an issue of concern both on the political and the scientific level. Seized material may be analysed in order to obtain clues on its origin and intended use and to prevent diversion of material from the same source in the future. Nuclear materials (uranium or plutonium) are of particular worry due to the nuclear proliferation risk associated with the material. Nuclear forensic investigations are aimed at the fact that nuclear material carries (inherent) information on its history, including on its origin and the processes applied for its production. Important conclusions can be drawn from decay products, activation products and fission products. Chemical impurities and the isotopic composition of certain major and minor constituents may provide additional information. Comparison of the measured results with nuclear material databases may yield evidence on the production site. The paper will describe the methodologies developed for addressing the above issues, focussing on radiochemical methods. Examples of nuclear forensic casework will illustrate the experience gathered in these areas. (orig.)

  20. Application of nuclear-physics methods in space materials science

    Science.gov (United States)

    Novikov, L. S.; Voronina, E. N.; Galanina, L. I.; Chirskaya, N. P.

    2017-07-01

    The brief history of the development of investigations at the Skobeltsyn Institute of Nuclear Physics, Moscow State University (SINP MSU) in the field of space materials science is outlined. A generalized scheme of a numerical simulation of the radiation impact on spacecraft materials and elements of spacecraft equipment is examined. The results obtained by solving some of the most important problems that modern space materials science should address in studying nuclear processes, the interaction of charged particles with matter, particle detection, the protection from ionizing radiation, and the impact of particles on nanostructures and nanomaterials are presented.

  1. General problems specific to hot nuclear materials research facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bart, G.

    1996-01-01

    During the sixties, governments have installed hot nuclear materials research facilities to characterize highly radioactive materials, to describe their in-pile behaviour, to develop and test new reactor core components, and to provide the industry with radioisotopes. Since then, the attitude towards the nuclear option has drastically changed and resources have become very tight. Within the changed political environment, the national research centres have defined new objectives. Given budgetary constraints, nuclear facilities have to co-operate internationally and to look for third party research assignments. The paper discusses the problems and needs within experimental nuclear research facilities as well as industrial requirements. Special emphasis is on cultural topics (definition of the scope of nuclear research facilities, the search for competitive advantages, and operational requirements), social aspects (overageing of personnel, recruitment, and training of new staff), safety related administrative and technical issues, and research needs for expertise and state of the art analytical infrastructure

  2. Retrieval system of nuclear data for transmutation of nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fujita, Mitsutane; Utsumi, Misako; Noda, Tetsuji [National Research Inst. for Metals, Tsukuba, Ibaraki (Japan)

    1997-03-01

    A database storing the data on nuclear reaction was built to calculate for simulating transmutation behaviours of materials /1/-/3/. In order to retrieve and maintain the database, the user interface for the data retrieval was developed where special knowledge on handling of the database or the machine structure is not required for end-user. It is indicated that using the database, the possibility of He formation and radioactivity in a material can be easily retrieved though the evaluation is qualitatively. (author)

  3. Nuclear and mitochondrial DNA quantification of various forensic materials.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Andréasson, H; Nilsson, M; Budowle, B; Lundberg, H; Allen, M

    2006-12-01

    Due to the different types and quality of forensic evidence materials, their DNA content can vary substantially, and particularly low quantities can impact the results in an identification analysis. In this study, the quantity of mitochondrial and nuclear DNA was determined in a variety of materials using a previously described real-time PCR method. DNA quantification in the roots and distal sections of plucked and shed head hairs revealed large variations in DNA content particularly between the root and the shaft of plucked hairs. Also large intra- and inter-individual variations were found among hairs. In addition, DNA content was estimated in samples collected from fingerprints and accessories. The quantification of DNA on various items also displayed large variations, with some materials containing large amounts of nuclear DNA while no detectable nuclear DNA and only limited amounts of mitochondrial DNA were seen in others. Using this sensitive real-time PCR quantification assay, a better understanding was obtained regarding DNA content and variation in commonly analysed forensic evidence materials and this may guide the forensic scientist as to the best molecular biology approach for analysing various forensic evidence materials.

  4. Nordic Nuclear Materials Forum for Generation IV Reactors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Anghel, C. (Studsvik Nuclear AB, Nykoeping (Sweden)); Penttilae, S. (Technical Research Centre of Finland, VTT (Finland))

    2010-03-15

    A network for material issues for Generation IV nuclear power has been initiated within the Nordic countries. The objectives of the Generation IV Nordic Nuclear Materials Forum (NOMAGE4) are to put the basis of a sustainable forum for Gen IV issues, especially focussing on fuels, cladding, structural materials and coolant interaction. Other issues include reactor physics, dynamics and diagnostics, core and fuel design. The present report summarizes the work performed during the year 2009. The efforts made include identification of organisations involved in Gen IV issues in the Nordic countries, update of the forum website, http://www.studsvik.se/GenerationIV, and investigation of capabilities for research within the area of Gen IV. Within the NOMAGE4 project a seminar on Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems has been organized during 15-16th of October 2009. The aim of the seminar was to provide a forum for exchange of information, discussion on future research needs and networking of experts on Generation IV reactor concepts. As an outcome of the NOMAGE4, a few collaboration project proposals have been prepared/planned in 2009. The network was welcomed by the European Commission and was mentioned as an exemplary network with representatives from industries, universities, power companies and research institutes. NOMAGE4 has been invited to participate to the 'European Energy Research Alliance, EERA, workshop for nuclear structural materials' http://www.eera-set.eu/index.php?index=41 as external observers. Future plans include a new Nordic application for continuation of NOMAGE4 network. (author)

  5. Nordic Nuclear Materials Forum for Generation IV Reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anghel, C.; Penttilae, S.

    2010-03-01

    A network for material issues for Generation IV nuclear power has been initiated within the Nordic countries. The objectives of the Generation IV Nordic Nuclear Materials Forum (NOMAGE4) are to put the basis of a sustainable forum for Gen IV issues, especially focussing on fuels, cladding, structural materials and coolant interaction. Other issues include reactor physics, dynamics and diagnostics, core and fuel design. The present report summarizes the work performed during the year 2009. The efforts made include identification of organisations involved in Gen IV issues in the Nordic countries, update of the forum website, http://www.studsvik.se/GenerationIV, and investigation of capabilities for research within the area of Gen IV. Within the NOMAGE4 project a seminar on Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems has been organized during 15-16th of October 2009. The aim of the seminar was to provide a forum for exchange of information, discussion on future research needs and networking of experts on Generation IV reactor concepts. As an outcome of the NOMAGE4, a few collaboration project proposals have been prepared/planned in 2009. The network was welcomed by the European Commission and was mentioned as an exemplary network with representatives from industries, universities, power companies and research institutes. NOMAGE4 has been invited to participate to the 'European Energy Research Alliance, EERA, workshop for nuclear structural materials' http://www.eera-set.eu/index.php?index=41 as external observers. Future plans include a new Nordic application for continuation of NOMAGE4 network. (author)

  6. Accountability of Radioactive Materials in Malaysian Nuclear Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Noor Fadilla Ismail; Wan Saffiey Wan Abdullah; Khairuddin Mohamad Kontol; Azimawati Ahmad; Suzilawati Muhd Sarowi; Mohd Fazlie Abdul Rashid

    2016-01-01

    Radioactive materials possessed in Malaysian Nuclear Agency have many beneficial applications for research and development, calibration, tracer and irradiation. There are two types of radioactive materials which consist of sealed sourced and unsealed sourced shall be accounted for and secured at all the times by following the security aspect. The Health Physics Group in the Department of Radiation Safety and Health Division is responsible to manage the issues related to any accountability for all radioactive material purchased or received under the radioactive material protocol. The accountability of radioactive materials in Malaysian Nuclear Agency is very important to ensure the security and control the radioactive materials to not to be lost or fall into the hands of people who do not have permission to possess or use it. The accountability of radioactive materials considered as a mandatory to maintaining accountability by complying the requirements of the Atomic Energy Licensing Act 1984 (Act 304) and regulations made thereunder and the conditions of license LPTA / A / 724. In this report describes the important element of accountability of radioactive materials in order to enhances security standard by allowing tracking of the locations of sources and to reduce the risk of radioactive materials falling into the wrong hands. (author)

  7. List of Nuclear Materials Licensing Actions Received

    Data.gov (United States)

    Nuclear Regulatory Commission — A catalog of all Materials Licensing Actions received for review. The catalog lists the name of the entity submitting the license application, their city and state,...

  8. Security of a nuclear material in an installation is determined by how far the installation is to assure that nuclear material remains at a predetermined location

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Djoko Hari Nugroho

    2010-01-01

    This paper observed a preliminary design on nuclear material tracking system in the installation for decision making support based on multi sensor fusion that is reliable and accurate to ensure that the nuclear material remains inside the control area. Capability on decision making in the Management Information System is represented by an understanding of perception in the third level of abstraction. The second level will be achieved with the support of image analysis and organizing data. The first level of abstraction is constructed by merger between several CCD camera sensors distributed in a building in a data fusion representation. Data fusion is processed based on Wavelett approach. Simulation utilizing Matlab programming shows that Wavelett fuses multi information from sensors as well. Hope that when the nuclear material out of control regions which have been predetermined before, there will arise a warning alarm and a message in the Management Information System display. Thus the nuclear material movement time event can be obtained and tracked as well. (author)

  9. Criminal offences considered in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neira, C.C.

    1996-01-01

    The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was signed in Vienna, on April 3, 1980, approved by Law 23.620 on September 28, 1998, and published in the Official Bulletin of the Argentine Republic on November 2, 1988. This Convention considers some aspects of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedural Law and integrates the normative hierarchical structure of the article 31 of the National Constitution. The adequacy of this Convention to the Argentine law is considered through two aspects: The first one examines figures existing in the Argentine Legislation about larceny and robbery of nuclear materials, misappropriation of nuclear materials, obtainment and fraud of nuclear materials, exaction through threat or intimidation, etc., which are considered in different articles of the Argentine Criminal Law. The second one analyses behaviours not foreseen in the Criminal Law and which are not qualified by the current Argentina's Criminal Code, such as exaction of nuclear material through the use of violence, the international perpetration of an act consisting to receive, possess, use, vacate, scatter nuclear material without legal authorization, or in the case that the act causes death, serious injuries to persons and others. The purpose of the future enactment of a new Nuclear Law is to put in order and fill-in gaps referred to different aspects such as civil liability in nuclear damages, characteristics of the nuclear damages, etc [es

  10. Cement-Based Materials for Nuclear Waste Storage

    CERN Document Server

    Cau-di-Coumes, Céline; Frizon, Fabien; Lorente, Sylvie

    2013-01-01

    As the re-emergence of nuclear power as an acceptable energy source on an international basis continues, the need for safe and reliable ways to dispose of radioactive waste becomes ever more critical. The ultimate goal for designing a predisposal waste-management system depends on producing waste containers suitable for storage, transportation and permanent disposal. Cement-Based Materials for Nuclear-Waste Storage provides a roadmap for the use of cementation as an applied technique for the treatment of low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes.Coverage includes, but is not limited to, a comparison of cementation with other solidification techniques, advantages of calcium-silicate cements over other materials and a discussion of the long-term suitability and safety of waste packages as well as cement barriers. This book also: Discusses the formulation and production of cement waste forms for storing radioactive material Assesses the potential of emerging binders to improve the conditioning of problemati...

  11. Nuclear material inventory estimation in a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, J.E.; Beyerlein, A.L.

    1981-01-01

    A new approach in the application of modern system identification and estimation techniques is proposed to help nuclear reprocessing facilities meet the nuclear accountability requirement proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The proposed identification and estimation method considers the material inventory in a portion of the chemical separations area of a reprocessing facility. The method addresses the nonlinear aspects of the problem, the time delay through the separation facility, and the lack of measurement access. The method utilizes only input-output measured data and knowledge of the uncertainties associated with the process and measured data. 14 refs

  12. Microstructural characterization of radiation effects in nuclear materials

    CERN Document Server

    2017-01-01

    Microstructural Characterization of Radiation Effects in Nuclear Materials provides an overview into experimental techniques that can be used to examine those effects (both neutron and charged particle) and can be used by researchers, technicians or students as a tool to introduce them to the various techniques. The need to examine the effect of radiation on materials is becoming increasingly important as nuclear energy is emerging as a growing source of renewable energy. The book opens with a discussion of why it is important to study the effects of radiation on materials and looks at current and future reactor designs and the various constraints faced by materials as a result of those designs. The book also includes an overview of the radiation damage mechanisms. The next section explores the various methods for characterizing damage including transmission electron microscopy, scanning transmission electron microscopy, analytical electron microscopy, electron backscatter diffraction, atom probe tomography,...

  13. Licensing authority's control of radiation sources and nuclear materials in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Binns, D.A.C.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission is the national licensing authority and among its responsibilities is the control of nuclear materials and radiation sources. This control is carried out in three different ways: 1) Control of the import and export of nuclear materials and radiation sources. To be able to import or export any nuclear material or radiation source, the user has to have an explicit permission of the licensing authority. This is controlled by electronic means in which the user has to fill a special form found on the licensing authority's home page, where he has to fill in his name, license number, license number of his radiation protection officer and data of the material to be imported or exported. These data are checked with a data base that contains all the information of the licensed users and qualified personnel before authorization is emitted. The airport authorities have already installed x-ray machines to check all baggages entering or leaving the country. 2) Transport and transfer permit for radiation sources. In order to transport and/or transfer radiations sources and nuclear materials within the country, the user(s) have to submit an application to the licensing authority. The user(s) fill out an application form where he fills in his company's name, licensing I.D., radiation protection officer's name and I.D and identification of the sources involved. These information are checked with the licensing operations data before the operations is permitted. 3) Inspections and radiation monitoring systems. Routine and regulatory inspections are continuously carried out where the user's radiation sources and nuclear materials inventory are checked. Also the physical security and protection of these materials are verified. The installation of monitoring systems is an item that is being discussed with the airport authorities so as to increase the possibilities of detecting any illegal transport of these materials. (author)

  14. Time-series-analysis techniques applied to nuclear-material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pike, D.H.; Morrison, G.W.; Downing, D.J.

    1982-05-01

    This document is designed to introduce the reader to the applications of Time Series Analysis techniques to Nuclear Material Accountability data. Time series analysis techniques are designed to extract information from a collection of random variables ordered by time by seeking to identify any trends, patterns, or other structure in the series. Since nuclear material accountability data is a time series, one can extract more information using time series analysis techniques than by using other statistical techniques. Specifically, the objective of this document is to examine the applicability of time series analysis techniques to enhance loss detection of special nuclear materials. An introductory section examines the current industry approach which utilizes inventory differences. The error structure of inventory differences is presented. Time series analysis techniques discussed include the Shewhart Control Chart, the Cumulative Summation of Inventory Differences Statistics (CUSUM) and the Kalman Filter and Linear Smoother

  15. Nuclear material inventory estimation in solvent extraction contactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beyerlein, A.; Geldard, J.

    1986-06-01

    This report describes the development of simple nuclear material (uranium and plutonium) inventory relations for mixer-settler solvent extraction contactors used in reprocessing spent nuclear fuels. The relations are developed for light water reactor fuels where the organic phase is 30% tri-n-butylphosphate (TBP) by volume. For reprocessing plants using mixer-settler contactors as much as 50% of the nuclear material within the contactors is contained in A type (aqueous to organic extraction) contactors. Another very significant portion of the contactor inventory is in the partitioning contactors. The stripping contactors contain a substantial uranium inventory but contain a very small plutonium inventory (about 5 to 10% of the total contactor inventory). The simplified inventory relations developed in this work for mixer-settler contactors reproduce the PUBG databases within about a 5% standard deviation. They can be formulated to explicitly show the dependence of the inventory on nuclear material concentrations in the aqueous feed streams. The dependence of the inventory on contactor volumes, phase volume ratios, and acid and TBP concentrations are implicitly contained in parameters that can be calculated for a particular reprocessing plant from nominal flow sheet data. The terms in the inventory relations that represent the larger portion of the inventory in A type and partitioning contactors can be extended to pulsed columns virtually without change

  16. Safeguards: Modelling of the Detection and Characterization of Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Enqvist, Andreas

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards is a collective term for the tools and methods needed to ensure nonproliferation and safety in connection to utilization of nuclear materials. It encompasses a variety of concepts from legislation to measurement equipment. The objective of this thesis is to present a number of research results related to nuclear materials control and accountability, especially the area of nondestructive assay. Physical aspects of nuclear materials are often the same as for materials encountered in everyday life. One special aspect though is that nuclear materials also emit radiation allowing them to be qualitatively and quantitatively measured without direct interaction with the material. For the successful assay of the material, the particle generation and detection needs to be well understood, and verified with measurements, simulations and models. Four topics of research are included in the thesis. First the generation and multiplication of neutrons and gamma rays in a fissile multiplying sample is treated. The formalism used enables investigation of the number of generated, absorbed and detected particles, offering understanding of the different processes involved. Secondly, the issue of relating the coincident detector signals, generated by both neutrons and gamma rays, to sample parameters is dealt with. Fission rate depends directly on the sample mass, while parameters such as neutron generation by alpha decay and neutron leakage multiplication are parameters that depend on the size, composition and geometry of the sample. Artificial neural networks are utilized to solve the inverse problem of finding sample characteristics from the measured rates of particle multiples. In the third part the interactions between neutrons and organic scintillation detectors are treated. The detector material consists of hydrogen and carbon, on which the neutrons scatter and transfer energy. The problem shares many characteristics with the area of neutron moderation found in

  17. Materials research and development for nuclear weapons applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1977-01-01

    Highlights of a comprehensive summary of materials research and development being conducted at Sandia in support of the nuclear weapons development programs are presented. The developments include foams, encapsulants, metals with memories, material equations-of-state, composites, glass-to-metal bonds, and design processes

  18. Nuclear energy - Fissile materials - Principles of criticality safety in storing, handling and processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    This International Standard specifies the basic principles and limitations which govern operations with fissile materials. It discusses general criticality safety criteria for equipment design and for the development of operating controls, while providing guidance for the assessment of procedures, equipment, and operations. It does not cover quality assurance requirements or details of equipment or operational procedures, nor does it cover the effects of radiation on man or materials, or sources of such radiation, either natural or as the result of nuclear chain reactions. Transport of fissile materials outside the boundaries of nuclear establishments is not within the scope of this International Standard and should be governed by appropriate national and international standards and regulations. These criteria apply to operations with fissile materials outside nuclear reactors but within the boundaries of nuclear establishments. They are concerned with the limitations which must be imposed on operations because of the unique properties of these materials which permit them to support nuclear chain reactions. These principles apply to quantities of fissile materials in which nuclear criticality can be established

  19. REVIEW OF EQUIPMENT USED IN RUSSIAN PRACTICE FOR ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NEYMOTIN, L.

    1999-01-01

    The objective of this work was to analyze instrumentation and methodologies used at Russian nuclear facilities for measurement of item nuclear materials, materials in bulk form, and waste streams; specify possibilities for the application of accounting measurements; and develop recommendations for improvement. The major steps and results: Representative conversion, enrichment (gas centrifuge), fuel fabrication, spent fuel reprocessing, and chemical-metallurgical production facilities in Russia were selected; Full lists of nuclear materials were prepared; Information about measurement methods and instrumentation for each type of nuclear material were gathered; and Recommendations on methodological and instrumentation support of accounting measurements for all types of materials were formulated. The analysis showed that the existing measurement methods and instrumentation serve mostly to support the technological process control and nuclear and radiation safety control. Requirements for these applications are lower than requirements for MC and A applications. To improve the state of MC and A at Russian nuclear facilities, significant changes in instrumentation support will be required, specifically in weighing equipment, volume measurements, and destructive and non-destructive analysis equipment, along with certified reference materials

  20. Corrosion degradation of materials in nuclear reactors and its control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kain, Vivekanand

    2016-01-01

    As in every industry, nuclear industry also faces the challenge of corrosion degradation due to the exposure of the materials to the working environment. The aggressiveness of the environment is enhanced by the presence of radiation and high temperature and high-pressure environment. Radiation has influence on both the materials (changes in microstructure and microchemistry) and the aqueous environment (radiolysis producing oxidizing conditions). A survey of all the light water reactors in the world showed that stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and flow accelerated corrosion (FAC) account for more than two third of all the corrosion degradation cases. This paper visits these two forms of corrosion in nuclear power plants and illustrates cases from Indian nuclear power plants. Remedial measures against these two forms of corrosion that are possible to be employed and the actual measures employed in Indian nuclear power plants are discussed. Key features of SCC in different types of nuclear power plants are discussed. Main reasons for irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) are presented and discussed. The signature patterns of single and dual phase FAC captured from components replaced from Indian nuclear power plants are presented. The development of a correlation between the scallop size and rate of single phase FAC - based on the database developed in Indian nuclear power plants is presented. Based on these two forms of degradation in nuclear reactors, design of materials that would resist these forms of degradation is presented. (author)