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Sample records for nuclear material snm

  1. Considerations for sampling nuclear materials for SNM accounting measurements. Special nuclear material accountability report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brouns, R.J.; Roberts, F.P.; Upson, U.L.

    1978-05-01

    This report presents principles and guidelines for sampling nuclear materials to measure chemical and isotopic content of the material. Development of sampling plans and procedures that maintain the random and systematic errors of sampling within acceptable limits for SNM(Special Nuclear Materials) accounting purposes are emphasized

  2. Considerations for sampling nuclear materials for SNM accounting measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brouns, R.J.; Roberts, F.P.; Upson, U.L.

    1978-01-01

    This report presents principles and guidelines for sampling nuclear materials to measure chemical and isotopic content of the material. Development of sampling plans and procedures that maintain the random and systematic errors of sampling within acceptable limits for SNM accounting purposes are emphasized

  3. 75 FR 2163 - Constellation Energy; Notice of Docketing of Special Nuclear Material License SNM-2505 Amendment...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-14

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 72-8; NRC-2010-0011] Constellation Energy; Notice of Docketing of Special Nuclear Material License SNM-2505 Amendment Application for the Calvert Cliffs... Constellation Energy (Constellation) to amend its Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-2505, under the...

  4. A data communications systems for tamper-protected special nuclear materials (SNM) inventory management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurkamp, A.C.

    1995-01-01

    The Department of Energy (D.O.E.) is responsible for the long term storage and protection of large quantities of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). This material is stored within individual containers located in vaults. Security measures are required to ensure that the SNM remains within the canisters where it is stored and that it is not disturbed in any manner. Conventional security and inventory techniques are manpower intensive and often require exposure to radiation hazards. The Purpose of this D.O.E sponsored project is to develop a cost effective system to monitor Special Nuclear Materials that, when fielded, would result in an extension of manual inventory cycles at a wide variety of SNM storage locations. The system consists of a computer, radio frequency interrogator, and individual miniaturized radio frequency transponders (tags) that are co-located with individual SNM containers. Each tag can perform SNM inventory, tamper alarm, and multiple sensor data transmission to the interrogator under the control of software designed by the user. SNM custodians can customize the system by their choice of packaging, software, and sensors. When implemented in accordance with current department of energy (D.O.E.) Policy on SNM inventory extension, the system has the potential to qualify for maximum extension times thus saving considerable resources through reduction of radiation exposure

  5. 77 FR 22362 - Exemption Requests for Special Nuclear Material License SNM-362, Department of Commerce...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-04-13

    ... Nuclear Material License SNM-362, Department of Commerce, Gaithersburg, MD AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory... Commerce, National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) in Gaithersburg, Maryland. NIST requested... within the Department of Commerce. The SNM license was renewed in 1979, 1985, 1991, and 1997. The current...

  6. Environmental-impact appraisal related to special nuclear materials. License No. SNM-696; Docket No. 70-734

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-06-01

    This Environmental Impact Appraisal is issued by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission in response to an application by GA Technologies, Inc., (GA) for renewal of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) License No. SNM-696 covering plant operations at San Diego, California. The proposed action provides for continuing research, development, and production activities involving SNM, uranium enriched in the U-235 and U-233 isotopes, and plutonium

  7. Project Plan For Remove Special Nuclear Material (SNM) from Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BARTLETT, W.D.

    1999-01-01

    This plan presents the overall objectives, description, justification and planning for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Remove SNM Materials. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with other facility stabilization and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Integrated Project Management Plan (IPMP), HNF-3617. This project plan is the top-level definitive project management document for the PFP Remove SNM Materials project. It specifies the technical, schedule, requirements and the cost baseline to manage the execution of the Remove SNM Materials project. Any deviation to the document must be authorized through the appropriate change control process. The Remove SNM Materials project provides the necessary support and controls required for DOE-HQ, DOE-RL, BWHC, and other DOE Complex Contractors the path forward to negotiate shipped/receiver agreements, schedule shipments, and transfer material out of PFP to enable final deactivation

  8. Department of Energy (DOE) system for the transportation of strategic quantities of special nuclear material (SQ SNM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickason, D.P.

    1978-01-01

    Since 1947 DOE and its predecessor agencies, AEC and ERDA, have moved nuclear materials by a variety of commercial and government transportation modes. In the late 1960's world-wide terrorism and other dissident activities prompted the then-AEC to review its procedures for safeguarding SNM. These reviews resulted in immediate and long-range programs for improvement of overall safeguards. Domestic transportation of completed nuclear weapons and SNM used in the weapons program was selected for special consideration. In the early 1970's AEC started the development of a Safe Secure Trailer (SST) to transport nuclear weapons and nuclear components and the development and installation of a high frequency (HF) communications system to assure continuous radio contact between selected highway and rail shipments and Headquarters, Albuquerque Operations (ALO). Late 1974 AEC directed ALO to develop a transportation system to extend weapons-level protection to all AEC SQ SNM shipments and to consolidate, manage, and operate this system. As of September 1976 all SQ SNM was being transported in the Safe Secure DOE (then ERDA) transportation safeguards system, composed of the following principal elements: (1) Transport equipment consisting of Safe Secure Trailers and specially modified towing tractors; Safe Secure Railcars and specially modified escort coaches; and specially designed highway escort vehicles. (2) An automated high-frequency digital radio system that enables continuous communications between the transporting equipment and central control. (3) A courier force that operates all transport equipment (except aircraft and rail power units) and mobile communications equipment; provides armed protection for shipments; and assures proper safety en route. (4) A central Headquarters staff that plans, executes, and controls shipments and directs, manages, and operates the system

  9. The TMI-2 SNM accountability program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schork, J.S.; Rogan, R.E.; Deininger, F.W.; Weaver, W.W.

    1988-01-01

    This paper describes the Special Nuclear Material (SNM) Accountability Program for Three Mile Isaland Unit 2. The TMI-2 SNM Accountability Program is uniquely designed to inventory and control the SNM borne by the fuel materials that were distributed throughout the Reactor Vessel and connected Reactor Coolant System piping as a result of the March, 1979 accident. The current knowledge of fuel (SNM) quantities and locations as a result of the TMI-2 accident is reviewed. The inventory and control of fuel debris canisters, core debris samples, water process filters, ion exchnagers and radioactive waste that contain SNM is discussed. In addition, the methods and techniques for performing the Post-Defueling Survey of residual SNM quantities at the end of defueling activities are described. The integration of the Waste Management (shipping), Defueling (packaging), Radiological Controls and Data Management and Analysis Departments support is addressed. Finally, the contractual transfer of TMI-2 fuel debris ownership from GPU Nuclear to the Department of Energy is reviewed

  10. Applications guide to pedestrian SNM monitors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1986-02-01

    The applications guide introduces readers to the pedestrian special nuclear material (SNM) monitors that provide nuclear material control at DOE contractor facilities. It explains the principles of operation, the strong and weak points, and steps for calibration and maintenance of the monitors. Administrators and security specialists will find an overview of pedestrain monitor application and upkeep in Part 1 of the guide and a descriptive catalog of present-day monitors in Part 3. Technically oriented readers will be interested in the more detailed discussion of SNM monitoring physics and SNM monitor design principles found in Part 2. 18 refs., 33 figs., 9 tabs.

  11. Applications guide to pedestrian SNM monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1986-02-01

    The applications guide introduces readers to the pedestrian special nuclear material (SNM) monitors that provide nuclear material control at DOE contractor facilities. It explains the principles of operation, the strong and weak points, and steps for calibration and maintenance of the monitors. Administrators and security specialists will find an overview of pedestrain monitor application and upkeep in Part 1 of the guide and a descriptive catalog of present-day monitors in Part 3. Technically oriented readers will be interested in the more detailed discussion of SNM monitoring physics and SNM monitor design principles found in Part 2. 18 refs., 33 figs., 9 tabs

  12. Special nuclear material simulation device

    Science.gov (United States)

    Leckey, John H.; DeMint, Amy; Gooch, Jack; Hawk, Todd; Pickett, Chris A.; Blessinger, Chris; York, Robbie L.

    2014-08-12

    An apparatus for simulating special nuclear material is provided. The apparatus typically contains a small quantity of special nuclear material (SNM) in a configuration that simulates a much larger quantity of SNM. Generally the apparatus includes a spherical shell that is formed from an alloy containing a small quantity of highly enriched uranium. Also typically provided is a core of depleted uranium. A spacer, typically aluminum, may be used to separate the depleted uranium from the shell of uranium alloy. A cladding, typically made of titanium, is provided to seal the source. Methods are provided to simulate SNM for testing radiation monitoring portals. Typically the methods use at least one primary SNM spectral line and exclude at least one secondary SNM spectral line.

  13. An applications guide to vehicle SNM monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1987-03-01

    The applications guide introduces its readers to the vehicle special nuclear material (SNM) monitors that are becoming part of safeguards and security measures for nuclear material control at DOE facilities. Building on the foundation provided by an applications guide to pedestrian SNM monitors published in 1986 and a technical report on vehicle monitoring published in 1982, the guide provides an overview of vehicle monitoring in Part 1, a discussion of technical aspects of vehicle monitoring in Part 2, and a catalog of vehicle SNM monitors available to DOE facilities in Part 3. Vehicle monitor upkeep, calibration, testing, and performance are important topics in Part 1. The short technical discussion in Part 2 is devoted to new developments and unique features of vehicle monitors

  14. Active neutron technique for detecting attempted special nuclear material diversion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, G.W.; Rice, L.G. III.

    1979-01-01

    The identification of special nuclear material (SNM) diversion is necessary if SNM inventory control is to be maintained at nuclear facilities. (Special nuclear materials are defined for this purpose as either 235 U of 239 Pu.) Direct SNM identification by the detection of natural decay or fission radiation is inadequate if the SNM is concealed by appropriate shielding. The active neutron interrogation technique described combines direct SNM identification by delayed fission neutron (DFN) detection with implied SNM detection by the identification of materials capable of shielding SNM from direct detection. This technique is being developed for application in an unattended material/equipment portal through which items such as electronic instruments, packages, tool boxes, etc., will pass. The volume of this portal will be 41-cm wide, 53-cm high and 76-cm deep. The objective of this technique is to identify an attempted diversion of at least 20 grams of SNM with a measurement time of 30 seconds

  15. Holdup-related issues in safeguarding of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1988-03-01

    Residual inventories of special nuclear materials (SNM) remaining in processing facilities (holdup) are recognized as an insidious problem for both safety and safeguards. This paper identifies some of the issues that are of concern to the safeguards community at-large that are related to holdup of SNM in large-scale process equipment. These issues range from basic technologies of SNM production to changing regulatory requirements to meet the needs of safeguarding nuclear materials. Although there are no magic formulas to resolve these issues, there are several initiatives that could be taken in areas of facility design, plant operation, personnel training, SNM monitoring, and regulatory guidelines to minimize the problems of holdup and thereby improve both safety and safeguards at nuclear material processing plants. 8 refs

  16. 1997 update for the applications guide to vehicle SNM monitors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    York, R.L.; Fehlau, P.E.

    1997-04-01

    Ten years have elapsed since the publication of the original applications guide to vehicle special nuclear material (SNM) monitors. During that interval, use of automatic vehicle monitors has become more commonplace, and formal procedures for monitor upkeep and evaluation have become available. New concepts for vehicle monitoring are being explored, as well. This update report reviews the basics of vehicle SNM monitoring, discusses what is new in vehicle SNM monitoring, and catalogs the vehicle SNM monitors that are commercial available

  17. Security improvements for rail movements of SNM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garcia, M.R.; Gronager, J.E.; Shemigon, N.N.

    1998-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Russian Special Scientific and Production State Enterprise Eleron have teamed to lead a project to enhance the overall security of Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) transportation of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) shipments. The effort is called the Railcar Transportation Security Project and is part of the overall DOE Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC and A) program addressing the enhancement of nuclear material control, accounting, and physical protection for Russian SNM. The goal of this MPC and A project is to significantly increase the security of Russian MINATOM highly enriched SNM rail shipments. To accomplish this, the MPC and A Railcar Transportation Security program will provide an enhanced, yet cost effective, railcar transportation security system. The system incorporates a balance between the traditional detection, communications, delay, and response security elements to significantly improve the security of MINATOM SNM shipments. The strategy of this program is to use rapid upgrades to implement mature security technologies as quickly as possible. The rapid upgrades emphasize rapidly deployable delay elements, enhanced radio communications, and intrusion detection and surveillance. Upgraded railcars have begun operation during FY98. Subsequent upgrades will build upon the rapid upgrades and eventually be integrated into a final deployed system configuration. This paper provides an overview of the program, with a summary of performance of the deployed railcars

  18. Detection of SNM by Pulsed Neutron Interrogation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pedersen, Bent; Mayorov, Valeriy; Roesgen, Eric; Mosconi, Marita; Crochemore, Jean-Michel; Ocherashvili, Aharon; Beck, Arie; Ettedgui, Hanania

    2014-01-01

    A method for the detection of special nuclear materials (SNM) in shielded containers which is both sensitive and easily applicable under field conditions is presented. The method applies neutron induced fission in SNM by means of an external pulsed neutron source with subsequent detection of the fast prompt fission neutrons. Liquid scintillation detectors surrounding the container under investigation are able to discriminate gamma rays from fast neutrons by the so-called pulse shape discrimination technique (PSD)

  19. Tracer techniques in estimating nuclear materials holdup

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1987-01-01

    Residual inventory of nuclear materials remaining in processing facilities (holdup) is recognized as an insidious problem for safety of plant operations and safeguarding of special nuclear materials (SNM). This paper reports on an experimental study where a well-known method of radioanalytical chemistry, namely tracer technique, was successfully used to improve nondestructive measurements of holdup of nuclear materials in a variety of plant equipment. Such controlled measurements can improve the sensitivity of measurements of residual inventories of nuclear materials in process equipment by several orders of magnitude and the good quality data obtained lend themselves to developing mathematical models of holdup of SNM during stable plant operations

  20. Process instrument monitoring for SNM solution surveillance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armatys, C.M.; Johnson, C.E.; Wagner, E.P.

    1983-02-01

    A process monitoring computer system at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) is being used to evaluate nuclear fuel reprocessing plant data for Safeguards surveillance capabilities. The computer system was installed to collect data from the existing plant instruments and to evaluate what safeguards assurances can be provided to complement conventional accountability and physical protection measures. Movements of solutions containing special nuclear material (SNM) can be observed, activities associated with accountancy measurements (mixing, sampling, and bulk measurement) can be confirmed, and long-term storage of SNM solutions can be monitored to ensure containment. Special precautions must be taken, both in system design and operation to ensure adequate coverage of essential measured parameters and interpretation of process data, which can be comprised by instrument malfunctions or failures, unreliable data collection, or process activities that deviate from readily identified procedures. Experience at ICPP and prior evaluations at the Tokai reprocessing plant show that the use of process data can provide assurances that accountability measurement procedures are followed and SNM solutions are properly contained and can help confirm that SNM controls are in effect within a facility

  1. Use of Sources and SNM in COE Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Archuleta, Jeffrey Christopher [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-06-07

    This procedure describes how to use Special Nuclear Material (SNM) and sources in order to perform measurements in a safe manner. The hazards and controls associated with these activities are addressed in this document.

  2. Nuclear material attractiveness: an assessment of material associated with a closed fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, C.G.; Wallace, R.K.; Hase, K.R.; Jarvinen, G.D.; Ireland, J.R.; Johnson, M.W.; Ebbinghaus, B.B.; Sleaford, B.W.; Robel, M.; Bradley, K.S.; Collins, B.A.; Prichard, A.W.; Smith, B.W.

    2010-01-01

    This paper examines the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with the various processing steps required for a closed fuel cycle. This paper combines the results from earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of SNM associated with the processing of spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel by various reprocessing schemes and the recycle of plutonium as a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in LWR with new results for the final, repeated burning of SNM in fast-spectrum reactors: fast reactors and accelerator driven systems (ADS). The results of this paper suggest that all reprocessing products evaluated so far need to be rigorously safeguarded and provided moderate to high levels of physical protection. These studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE), and are based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that has been couched in terms chosen for consistency with those normally used for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The methodology and key findings will be presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance (e.g. by increasing impediments to the diversion, theft, or undeclared production of SNM for the purpose of acquiring a nuclear weapon), and how they could be used to help inform policy makers, will be discussed. (authors)

  3. Nuclear Material Attractiveness: An Assessment Of Material Associated With A Closed Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, C.G.; Ebbinghaus, B.; Sleaford, Brad W.; Wallace, R.K.; Collins, Brian A.; Hase, Kevin R.; Robel, Martin; Jarvinen, G.D.; Bradley, Keith S.; Ireland, J.R.; Johnson, M.W.; Prichard, Andrew W.; Smith, Brian W.

    2010-01-01

    This paper examines the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with the various processing steps required for a closed fuel cycle. This paper combines the results from earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of SNM associated with the processing of spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel by various reprocessing schemes and the recycle of plutonium as a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in LWR with new results for the final, repeated burning of SNM in fast-spectrum reactors: fast reactors and accelerator driven systems (ADS). The results of this paper suggest that all reprocessing products evaluated so far need to be rigorously safeguarded and provided moderate to high levels of physical protection. These studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE), and are based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that has been couched in terms chosen for consistency with those normally used for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The methodology and key findings will be presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance (e.g. by increasing impediments to the diversion, theft, or undeclared production of SNM for the purpose of acquiring a nuclear weapon), and how they could be used to help inform policy makers, will be discussed.

  4. Neutron spectrometer for improved SNM search.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vance, Andrew L.; Aigeldinger, Georg

    2007-03-01

    With the exception of large laboratory devices with very low sensitivities, a neutron spectrometer have not been built for fission neutrons such as those emitted by special nuclear materials (SNM). The goal of this work was to use a technique known as Capture Gated Neutron Spectrometry to develop a solid-state device with this functionality. This required modifications to trans-stilbene, a known solid-state scintillator. To provide a neutron capture signal we added lithium to this material. This unique triggering signal allowed identification of neutrons that lose all of their energy in the detector, eliminating uncertainties that arise due to partial energy depositions. We successfully implemented a capture gated neutron spectrometer and were able to distinguish an SNM like fission spectrum from a spectrum stemming from a benign neutron source.

  5. Internal transfers of special nuclear material - March 1975

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1976-01-01

    Paragraph 70.51(e) of 10 CFR Part 70 requires, with certain exceptions stated in the rule, that each licensee authorized to possess more than one effective kilogram of special nuclear material (SNM) maintain certain procedures. These procedures are to include: (1) records of the quantities of SNM added to or removed from the process; (2) documentation of all transfers of SNM between material-balance areas to show the identity and quantity of SNM transferred; (3) requirements for authorized signatures on each document used to record the transfer of SNM between material-balance areas; and (4) means for control of and accounting for internal transfer documents. Paragraph 70.58(e) requires licensees to establish, maintain, and follow a system for measuring the SNM transferred between material-balance areas and item-control areas. Paragraph 70.58(f) requires that licensees have a program that evaluates and controls the quality of their measurement system. Additionally, all licensees authorized to possess SNM must comply with paragraph 70.51(b) of 10 CFR Part 70. That rule requires licensees to keep records showing, among other things, the inventory of all SNM in their possession and its location. This guide sets forth acceptable methods for controlling and documenting transfers of SNM within a plant site in order to meet the requirements listed above

  6. Nuclear material attractiveness: an assessment of used-fuel assemblies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, Charles Gary; Edelman, Paul G.; Hase, Kevin R.; Ebbinghaus, Bartley B.; Sleaford, Brad W.; Robel, Martin; Collins, B.A.; Prichard, Andrew W.; Smith, B Brian W.

    2011-01-01

    This paper examines the material attractiveness of used-fuel assemblies in a hypothetical scenario in which terrorists steal one or more assemblies in order to use the special nuclear materials (SNM) within an assembly in a nuclear explosive device. For assessing material attractiveness, this paper uses the Figure of Merit (FOM) that was used in earlier studies to examine the attractiveness of the SNM associated with the reprocessing of used light water reactor (LWR) fuel by various reprocessing schemes. However, for a theft scenario the mass used in the Acquisition Factor of the FOM is the mass of the stolen object conta ining SNM ; whereas the mass used for analyzing the material attractiveness of the products of various reprocessing schemes in the earlier studies was a fraction of the bare critical mass in recognition that a successful proliferator must avoid a criticality accident. This paper will indicate how long after discharge the radiation emanating from a cooling assembly is no longer self-protecting. Additionally, this paper will give the time scale for the SNM within the assembly to become more attractive. These studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE), and are based on the calculation of ''attractiveness levels'' that has been couched in terms chosen for consistency with those normally used for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The methodology and key findings will be presented. Additionally, this paper discusses how the results presented herein impact the application of safeguards and the securitization of SNM, and how they could be used to help inform policy makers.

  7. Nuclear material control and accounting safeguards in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woltermann, H.A.; Rudy, C.R.; Rakel, D.A.; DeVer, E.A.

    1982-01-01

    Material control and accounting (MC and A) of special nuclear material (SNM) must supplement physical security to protect SNM from unlawful use such as terrorist activities. This article reviews MC and A safeguards of SNM in the United States. The following topics are covered: a brief perspective and history of MC and A safeguards, current MC and A practices, measurement methods for SNM, historical MC and A performance, a description of near-real-time MC and A systems, and conclusions on the status of MC and A in the United States

  8. Detecting special nuclear material using muon-induced neutron emission

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Guardincerri, Elena; Bacon, Jeffrey; Borozdin, Konstantin; Matthew Durham, J.; Fabritius II, Joseph [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Hecht, Adam [University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131 (United States); Milner, Edward C. [Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75205 (United States); Miyadera, Haruo; Morris, Christopher L. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Perry, John [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131 (United States); Poulson, Daniel [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States)

    2015-07-21

    The penetrating ability of cosmic ray muons makes them an attractive probe for imaging dense materials. Here, we describe experimental results from a new technique that uses neutrons generated by cosmic-ray muons to identify the presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Neutrons emitted from SNM are used to tag muon-induced fission events in actinides and laminography is used to form images of the stopping material. This technique allows the imaging of SNM-bearing objects tagged using muon tracking detectors located above or to the side of the objects, and may have potential applications in warhead verification scenarios. During the experiment described here we did not attempt to distinguish the type or grade of the SNM.

  9. The Nuclear Car Wash: Neutron interrogation of cargo containers to detect hidden SNM

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hall, J. M.; Asztalos, S.; Biltoft, P.; Church, J.; Descalle, M.-A.; Luu, T.; Manatt, D.; Mauger, G.; Norman, E.; Petersen, D.; Pruet, J.; Prussin, S.; Slaughter, D.

    2007-08-01

    LLNL is actively involved in the development of advanced technologies for use in detecting threats in sea-going cargo containers, particularly the presence of hidden special nuclear materials (SNM). The "Nuclear Car Wash" (NCW) project presented here uses a high-energy (En ≈ 3.5-7.0 MeV) neutron probe to scan a container and then takes high-energy (Eγ ⩾ 2.5 MeV), β-delayed γ-rays emitted during the subsequent decay of any short-lived, neutron-induced fission products as a signature of fissionable material. The components of the proposed system (e.g. neutron source, gamma detectors, etc.) will be discussed along with data processing schemes, possible threat detection metrics and potential interference signals. Results from recent laboratory experiments using a prototype system at LLNL will also be presented.

  10. The Nuclear Car Wash: Neutron interrogation of cargo containers to detect hidden SNM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hall, J.M.; Asztalos, S.; Biltoft, P.; Church, J.; Descalle, M.-A.; Luu, T.; Manatt, D.; Mauger, G.; Norman, E.; Petersen, D.; Pruet, J.; Prussin, S.; Slaughter, D.

    2007-01-01

    LLNL is actively involved in the development of advanced technologies for use in detecting threats in sea-going cargo containers, particularly the presence of hidden special nuclear materials (SNM). The 'Nuclear Car Wash' (NCW) project presented here uses a high-energy (E n ∼ 3.5-7.0 MeV) neutron probe to scan a container and then takes high-energy (E γ ≥ 2.5 MeV), β-delayed γ-rays emitted during the subsequent decay of any short-lived, neutron-induced fission products as a signature of fissionable material. The components of the proposed system (e.g. neutron source, gamma detectors, etc.) will be discussed along with data processing schemes, possible threat detection metrics and potential interference signals. Results from recent laboratory experiments using a prototype system at LLNL will also be presented

  11. Standard guide for in-plant performance evaluation of automatic pedestrian SNM monitors

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    1997-01-01

    1.1 This guide is affiliated with Guide C1112 on special nuclear material (SNM) monitors, Guide C1169 on laboratory performance evaluation, and Guide C1189 on calibrating pedestrian SNM monitors. This guide to in-plant performance evaluation is a comparatively rapid way to verify whether a pedestrian SNM monitor performs as expected for detecting SNM or SNM-like test sources. 1.1.1 In-plant performance evaluation should not be confused with the simple daily functional test recommended in Guide C1112. In-plant performance evaluation takes place less often than daily tests, usually at intervals ranging from weekly to once every three months. In-plant evaluations are also more extensive than daily tests and may examine both a monitor's nuisance alarm record and its detection sensitivity for a particular SNM or alternative test source. 1.1.2 In-plant performance evaluation also should not be confused with laboratory performance evaluation. In-plant evaluation is comparatively rapid, takes place in the monitor...

  12. Real time loss detection for SNM in process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Candy, J.V.; Dunn, D.R.; Gavel, D.T.

    1980-01-01

    This paper discusses the basis of a design for real time special nuclear material (SNM) loss detectors. The design utilizes process measurements and signal processing techniques to produce a timely estimate of material loss. A state estimator is employed as the primary signal processing algorithm. Material loss is indicated by changes in the states or process innovations (residuals). The design philosophy is discussed in the context of these changes

  13. Standard guide for application of radiation monitors to the control and physical security of special nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1989-01-01

    This guide briefly describes the state-of-the-art of radiation monitors for detecting special nuclear material (SNM) in order to establish the context in which to write performance standards for the monitors. This guide extracts information from technical documentation to provide information for selecting, calibrating, testing, and operating such radiation monitors when they are used for the control and protection of SNM. This guide offers an unobtrusive means of searching pedestrians, packages, and motor vehicles for concealed SNM as one part of a nuclear material control or security plan for nuclear materials. The radiation monitors can provide an efficient, sensitive, and reliable means of detecting the theft of small quantities of SNM while maintaining a low likelihood of nuisance alarms

  14. Robot development for nuclear material processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pedrotti, L.R.; Armantrout, G.A.; Allen, D.C.; Sievers, R.H. Sr.

    1991-07-01

    The Department of Energy is seeking to modernize its special nuclear material (SNM) production facilities and concurrently reduce radiation exposures and process and incidental radioactive waste generated. As part of this program, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) lead team is developing and adapting generic and specific applications of commercial robotic technologies to SNM pyrochemical processing and other operations. A working gantry robot within a sealed processing glove box and a telerobot control test bed are manifestations of this effort. This paper describes the development challenges and progress in adapting processing, robotic, and nuclear safety technologies to the application. 3 figs

  15. Special nuclear material radiation monitors for the 1980's

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1985-01-01

    During the two decades that automatic gamma-radiation monitors have been applied to detecting special nuclear material (SNM), little attention has been devoted to how well the monitors perform in plant environments. Visits to 11 DOE facilities revealed poor information flow between developers, manufacturers, and maintainers of SNM radiation monitors. To help users achieve best performance from their monitors or select new ones, Los Alamos National Laboratory developed a hand-held monitor user's guide, calibration manuals for some commercial SNM pedestrian monitors, and an application guide for SNM pedestrian monitors. In addition, Los Alamos evaluated new commercial SNM monitors, considered whether to apply neutron detection to SNM monitoring, and investigated the problem of operating gamma-ray SNM monitors in variable plutonium gamma-radiation fields. As a result, the performance of existing SNM monitors will improve and alternative monitoring methods will become commerciallly available during the 1980s. 9 refs., 6 figs., 1 tab

  16. Standard guide for application of radiation monitors to the control and physical security of special nuclear material

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    1999-01-01

    1.1 This guide briefly describes the state-of-the-art of radiation monitors for detecting special nuclear material (SNM) (see 3.1.11) in order to establish the context in which to write performance standards for the monitors. This guide extracts information from technical documentation to provide information for selecting, calibrating, testing, and operating such radiation monitors when they are used for the control and protection of SNM. This guide offers an unobtrusive means of searching pedestrians, packages, and motor vehicles for concealed SNM as one part of a nuclear material control or security plan for nuclear materials. The radiation monitors can provide an efficient, sensitive, and reliable means of detecting the theft of small quantities of SNM while maintaining a low likelihood of nuisance alarms. 1.2 Dependable operation of SNM radiation monitors rests on selecting appropriate monitors for the task, operating them in a hospitable environment, and conducting an effective program to test, calibrat...

  17. Nuclear materials inventory plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doerr, R.W.; Nichols, D.H.

    1982-03-01

    In any processing, manufacturing, or active storage facility it is impractical to assume that any physical security system can prevent the diversion of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). It is, therefore, the responsibility of any DOE Contractor, Licensee, or other holder of SNM to provide assurance that loss or diversion of a significant quantity of SNM is detectable. This ability to detect must be accomplishable within a reasonable time interval and can be accomplished only by taking physical inventories. The information gained and decisions resulting from these inventories can be no better than the SNM accounting system and the quality of measurements performed for each receipt, removal and inventory. Inventories interrupt processing or production operations, increase personnel exposures, and can add significantly to the cost of any operation. Therefore, realistic goals for the inventory must be defined and the relationship of the inherent parameters used in its validation be determined. Purpose of this document is to provide a statement of goals and a plan of action to achieve them

  18. Westinghouse Hanford Company special nuclear material vault storage study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borisch, R.R.

    1996-01-01

    Category 1 and 2 Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) require storage in vault or vault type rooms as specified in DOE orders 5633.3A and 6430.1A. All category 1 and 2 SNM in dry storage on the Hanford site that is managed by Westinghouse Hanford Co (WHC) is located in the 200 West Area at Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) facilities. This document provides current and projected SNM vault inventories in terms of storage space filled and forecasts available space for possible future storage needs

  19. Calculations to support design of a nuclear material tracking system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carter, L.L.; Eggers, R.F.; Williams, T.L.

    1991-01-01

    The Westinghouse Hanford Company is developing a nuclear material tracking system called NTRAK for the US Department of Energy at the Savannah River site. The NTRAK system is designed to determine the position and approximate magnitude of packages of special nuclear material (SNM) moving through a nuclear plant. The NTRAK accomplishes this by using special assemblies of detectors called modules to measure the gamma radiation emitted by the SNM. After measurement, raw data are processed to determine the direction to and position of the gamma-ray source. In order for the NTRAK method of SNM tracking to work, the gamma-ray signal at the detector modules must be at least four standard deviations above background. This paper addresses the use of the Monte Carlo computer code for neutron and photon transport (MCNP) to (a) predict the radiation emitted by plutonium oxide sources and (b) predict the counting rate of NaI detectors measuring those sources

  20. Special Nuclear Material Gamma-Ray Signatures for Reachback Analysts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Karpius, Peter Joseph [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Myers, Steven Charles [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-08-29

    These are slides on special nuclear material gamma-ray signatures for reachback analysts for an LSS Spectroscopy course. The closing thoughts for this presentation are the following: SNM materials have definite spectral signatures that should be readily recognizable to analysts in both bare and shielded configurations. One can estimate burnup of plutonium using certain pairs of peaks that are a few keV apart. In most cases, one cannot reliably estimate uranium enrichment in an analogous way to the estimation of plutonium burnup. The origin of the most intense peaks from some SNM items may be indirect and from ‘associated nuclides.' Indirect SNM signatures sometimes have commonalities with the natural gamma-ray background.

  1. Design of microprocessor data acquisition system for pedestrian portal SNM monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Wenliang

    2003-01-01

    The paper introduces the hardware structure and composition of data acquisition system for pedestrian portal special nuclear material (SNM) monitor. The hardware and software of single chip microprocessor AT89C52, LCM, keyboard and serial communication interface software are also discussed. (authors)

  2. Advanced physical protection systems for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1976-01-01

    Because of the increasing incidence of terrorism, there is growing concern that nuclear materials and facilities need improved physical protection against theft, diversion, or sabotage. Physical protection systems for facilities or transportation which have balanced effectiveness include information systems, access denial systems, adequate and timely response, recovery capability, and use denial methods for despoiling special nuclear materials (SNM). The role of these elements in reducing societal risk is described; however, it is noted that, similar to nuclear war, the absolute risks of nuclear theft and sabotage are basically unquantifiable. Sandia Laboratories has a major US Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) role in developing advanced physical protection systems for improving the security of both SNM and facilities. These activities are surveyed in this paper. A computer simulation model is being developed to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative physical protection systems under various levels of threat. Improved physical protection equipment such as perimeter and interior alarms, secure portals, and fixed and remotely activated barriers is being developed and tested. In addition, complete prototype protection systems are being developed for representative nuclear facilities. An example is shown for a plutonium storage vault. The ERDA safe-secure transportation system for highway shipments of all significant quantities of government-owned SNM is described. Adversary simulation as a tool for testing and evaluating physical protection systems is discussed. Finally, a list of measures is given for assessing overall physical protection system performance. (author)

  3. Advanced physical protection systems for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, O.E.

    1975-10-01

    Because of the increasing incidence of terrorism, there is growing concern that nuclear materials and facilities need improved physical protection against theft, diversion, or sabotage. Physical protection systems for facilities or transportation which have balanced effectiveness include information systems, access denial systems, adequate and timely response, recovery capability, and use denial methods for despoiling special nuclear materials (SNM). The role of these elements in reducing societal risk is described; however, it is noted that, similar to nuclear war, the absolute risks of nuclear theft and sabotage are basically unquantifiable. Sandia Laboratories has a major Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) role in developing advanced physical protection systems for improving the security of both SNM and facilities. These activities are surveyed. A computer simulation model is being developed to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative physical protection systems under various levels of threat. Improved physical protection equipment such as perimeter and interior alarms, secure portals, and fixed and remotely-activated barriers is being developed and tested. In addition, complete prototype protection systems are being developed for representative nuclear facilities. An example is shown for a plutonium storage vault. The ERDA safe-secure transportation system for highway shipments of all significant quantities of government-owned SNM is described. Adversary simulation as a tool for testing and evaluating physical protection systems is discussed. A list of measures is given for assessing overall physical protection system performance. (auth)

  4. Locating sensors for detecting source-to-target patterns of special nuclear material smuggling: a spatial information theoretic approach.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Przybyla, Jay; Taylor, Jeffrey; Zhou, Xuesong

    2010-01-01

    In this paper, a spatial information-theoretic model is proposed to locate sensors for detecting source-to-target patterns of special nuclear material (SNM) smuggling. In order to ship the nuclear materials from a source location with SNM production to a target city, the smugglers must employ global and domestic logistics systems. This paper focuses on locating a limited set of fixed and mobile radiation sensors in a transportation network, with the intent to maximize the expected information gain and minimize the estimation error for the subsequent nuclear material detection stage. A Kalman filtering-based framework is adapted to assist the decision-maker in quantifying the network-wide information gain and SNM flow estimation accuracy.

  5. Locating Sensors for Detecting Source-to-Target Patterns of Special Nuclear Material Smuggling: A Spatial Information Theoretic Approach

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xuesong Zhou

    2010-08-01

    Full Text Available In this paper, a spatial information-theoretic model is proposed to locate sensors for detecting source-to-target patterns of special nuclear material (SNM smuggling. In order to ship the nuclear materials from a source location with SNM production to a target city, the smugglers must employ global and domestic logistics systems. This paper focuses on locating a limited set of fixed and mobile radiation sensors in a transportation network, with the intent to maximize the expected information gain and minimize the estimation error for the subsequent nuclear material detection stage. A Kalman filtering-based framework is adapted to assist the decision-maker in quantifying the network-wide information gain and SNM flow estimation accuracy.

  6. Project plan remove special nuclear material from PFP project plutonium finishing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BARTLETT, W.D.

    1999-01-01

    This plan presents the overall objectives, description, justification and planning for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Remove Special Nuclear Material (SNM) Materials. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with other facility stabilization and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Integrated Project Management Plan (IPMP), HNF-3617, Rev. 0. This project plan is the top-level definitive project management document for PFP Remove SNM Materials project. It specifies the technical, schedule, requirements and the cost baselines to manage the execution of the Remove SNM Materials project. Any deviations to the document must be authorized through the appropriate change control process

  7. Selected topics in special nuclear materials safeguard system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    King, L.L.; Thatcher, C.D.; Clarke, J.D.; Rodriguez, M.P.

    1991-01-01

    During the past two decades the improvements in circuit integration have given rise to many new applications in digital processing technology by continuously reducing the unit cost of processing power. Along with this increase in processing power a corresponding decrease in circuit volume has been achieved. Progress has been so swift that new classes of applications become feasible every 2 or 3 years. This is especially true in the application of proven new technology to special nuclear materials (SNM) safeguard systems. Several areas of application were investigated in establishing the performance requirements for the SNM safeguard system. These included the improvements in material control and accountability and surveillance by using multiple sensors to continuously monitor SNM inventory within the selected value(s); establishing a system architecture to provide capabilities needed for present and future performance requirements; and limiting operating manpower exposure to radiation. This paper describes two selected topics in the application of state-of-the-art, well-proven technology to SNM safeguard system design

  8. Continuous inventory in SNM storage facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chambers, W.H.

    1975-01-01

    Instrumentation and data processing techniques that provide inexpensive verification of material in storage were investigated. Transfers of special nuclear materials (SNM) into the storage area are accompanied by an automated verification of the container identity, weight, and the radiation signature of the contents. This information is computer-processed and stored for comparison at subsequent transfers and also provides the data base for record purposes. Physical movement of containers across the boundary of the storage area is presently accomplished by operating personnel in order to minimize expensive modifications to existing storage facilities. Personnel entering and leaving the storage area are uniquely identified and also through portal monitors capable of detecting small quantities of SNM. Once material is placed on the storage shelves, simple, low-cost container tagging and radiation sensors are activated. A portion of the prescribed gamma signature, obtained by duplicate shelf monitors during the transfer verification, is thus continuously checked against the stored identification data. Radiation detector design is severely constrained by the need to discriminate individual signatures in a high background area and the need for low unit costs. In operation any unauthorized change in signal is analyzed along with auxiliary data from surveillance sensors to activate the appropriate alarms. (auth))

  9. Application of crime countermeasures for the protection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, C.H.

    1975-01-01

    Federal regulations prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and published in the Federal Register require licensees to take appropriate action to protect the health and safety of the public from unauthorized use of special nuclear material (SNM), which includes plutonium, uranium-233, and highly enriched uranium. Crime countermeasures for compliance with these regulations are an important part of the guidance that is provided by the NRC's Office of Standards Development. The use of crime countermeasures and protective devices is intended to prevent the unauthorized diversion of material and to aid in the detection of diversion should it be attempted. Plant and equipment designs should incorporate both electronic and physical security measures for protection of SNM. This applies to facilities and equipment for reprocessing, fabrication, and transportation of SNM. The protection systems include physical barriers, access controls, intrusion detection devices, surveillance devices, central alarm stations, communications, and response capability. Acceptable security measures and devices applicable to protected areas, material access areas, vital areas, vital equipment, and transportation vehicles have been presented in Regulatory Guides. (U.S.)

  10. Project plan remove special nuclear material from PFP project plutonium finishing plant; TOPICAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    BARTLETT, W.D.

    1999-01-01

    This plan presents the overall objectives, description, justification and planning for the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) Remove Special Nuclear Material (SNM) Materials. The intent of this plan is to describe how this project will be managed and integrated with other facility stabilization and deactivation activities. This plan supplements the overall integrated plan presented in the Plutonium Finishing Plant Integrated Project Management Plan (IPMP), HNF-3617,Rev. 0. This project plan is the top-level definitive project management document for PFP Remove SNM Materials project. It specifies the technical, schedule, requirements and the cost baselines to manage the execution of the Remove SNM Materials project. Any deviations to the document must be authorized through the appropriate change control process

  11. Environmental impact appraisal for renewal of Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-1097 (Docket No. 70-1113)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-06-01

    The proposed action, the full 5-year renewal of License SNM-1097, is necessary for GE to continue producing fuel used in light-water nuclear reactors. The fuel manufacturing operation principally involves converting UF 6 to UO 2 powder, pressing the UO 2 powder into pellets, sintering and grinding the pellets, loading the pellets into Zircaloy tubes, and then assembling the loaded tubes into fuel bundles. A variety of radiological and nonradiological gaseous, liquid, and solid wastes are generated. After treatment, some of the wastes are released to the environment. In addition to the nuclear fuel fabrication operation, there are other operations performed at GE which do not require NRC licensing (e.g., zirconium metal processing, production of fuel bundle and mechanical reactor components, and the manufacture of aircraft engine parts) and are not associated with the proposed action. 28 references, 15 figures, 21 tables

  12. Standard guide to In-Plant performance evaluation of Hand-Held SNM monitors

    CERN Document Server

    American Society for Testing and Materials. Philadelphia

    1999-01-01

    1.1 This guide is one of a series on the application and evaluation of special nuclear material (SNM) monitors. Other guides in the series are listed in Section 2, and the relationship of in-plant performance evaluation to other procedures described in the series is illustrated in Fig. 1. Hand-held SNM monitors are described in of Guide C1112, and performance criteria illustrating their capabilities can be found in Appendix X1. 1.2 The purpose of this guide to in-plant performance evaluation is to provide a comparatively rapid procedure to verify that a hand-held SNM monitor performs as expected for detecting SNM or alternative test sources or to disclose the need for repair. The procedure can be used as a routine operational evaluation or it can be used to verify performance after a monitor is calibrated. 1.3 In-plant performance evaluations are more comprehensive than daily functional tests. They take place less often, at intervals ranging from weekly to once every three months, and derive their result fr...

  13. Methods of Verification, Accountability and Control of Special Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, J.E.

    1999-01-01

    This session demonstrates nondestructive assay (NDA) measurement, surveillance and analysis technology required to protect, control and account (MPC and A) for special nuclear materials (SNM) in sealed containers. These measurements, observations and analyses comprise state-of-the art, strengthened, SNM safeguards systems. Staff member specialists, actively involved in research, development, training and implementation worldwide, will present six NDA verification systems and two software tools for integration and analysis of facility MPC and A data

  14. Tempering of accounts and records to disguise SNM theft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lim, J.J.; Huebel, J.G.

    1979-07-01

    A typical nuclear material accounting system employing double-entry bookkeeping is described. A logic diagram is used to model the interactions of the accounting system and the adversary when he attempts to thwart it. Boolean equations are derived from the logic diagram; solution of these equations yields the accounts and records through which the adversary may disguise SNM theft and the collusion requirements needed to accomplish this feat

  15. Automated nuclear material recovery and decontamination of large steel dynamic experiment containers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dennison, D.K.; Gallant, D.A.; Nelson, D.C.; Stovall, L.A.; Wedman, D.E.

    1999-01-01

    A key mission of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is to reduce the global nuclear danger through stockpile stewardship efforts that ensure the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons. In support of this mission LANL performs dynamic experiments on special nuclear materials (SNM) within large steel containers. Once these experiments are complete, these containers must be processed to recover residual SNM and to decontaminate the containers to below low level waste (LLW) disposal limits which are much less restrictive for disposal purposes than transuranic (TRU) waste limits. The purpose of this paper is to describe automation efforts being developed by LANL for improving the efficiency, increasing worker safety, and reducing worker exposure during the material cleanout and recovery activities performed on these containers

  16. Further assessments of the attractiveness of materials in advanced nuclear fuel cycles from a safeguards perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, Charles G.; Jarvinen, Gordon D.; Wallace, Richard K.; Ireland, John R.; Johnson, M.W.; Sleaford, Brad W.; Ebbinghaus, Bartley B.; Bradley, Keith S.; Collins, Brian A.; Smith, Brian W.; Prichard, Andrew W.

    2010-01-01

    This paper summarises the results of an extension to an earlier study [1] that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with the Purex, Urex+ and COEX reprocessing schemes. This study focuses on the materials associated with the Urex, COEX, Thorex and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study also examines what is required to render plutonium as 'unattractive.' Furthermore, combining the results of this study with those from the earlier study permits a comparison of the uranium- and thorium-based fuel cycles on the basis of the attractiveness of the SNM associated with each fuel cycle. Both studies were performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE), and are based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that has been couched in terms chosen for consistency with those normally used for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities [2]. The methodology and key findings will be presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance (e.g. by increasing impediments to the diversion, theft, undeclared production of SNM for the purpose of acquiring a nuclear weapon), and how they could be used to help inform policy makers, will be discussed. (authors)

  17. Commissioning of calorimeter in radiochemical laboratory for non-destructive assay of special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patra, S.; Mhatre, A.M.; Agarwal, C.; Chaudhury, S.; Pujari, P.K.

    2017-01-01

    Accounting of special nuclear materials (SNM) in every stages of nuclear fuel cycle is a necessity where one needs the quantitative estimation of SNM in variety of samples like sealed containers or finished products without altering its physical and chemical form. Non-destructive assay (NDA) techniques are capable of assaying such samples by the way of measuring passive/active neutrons/gamma rays or by the measurement of decay heat. Radiochemistry Division has been actively involved in the development and deployment of various NDA methodologies for meeting the demand of nuclear material accounting as and when required. Recently a radiometric calorimeter, developed by Reactor Control Division, E and I Group, BARC, has been installed in Lab C-33, Radiochemistry Division

  18. Termination of Safeguards for Accountable Nuclear Materials at the Idaho National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holzemer, Michael; Carvo, Alan

    2012-01-01

    Termination of safeguards ends requirements of Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) and thereby removes the safeguards basis for applying physical protection requirements for theft and diversion of nuclear material, providing termination requirements are met as described. Department of Energy (DOE) M 470.4 6 (Nuclear Material Control and Accountability [8/26/05]) stipulates: 1. Section A, Chapter I (1)( q) (1): Safeguards can be terminated on nuclear materials provided the following conditions are met: (a) 'If the material is special nuclear material (SNM) or protected as SNM, it must be attractiveness level E and have a measured value.' (b) 'The material has been determined by DOE line management to be of no programmatic value to DOE.' (c) 'The material is transferred to the control of a waste management organization where the material is accounted for and protected in accordance with waste management regulations. The material must not be collocated with other accountable nuclear materials.' Requirements for safeguards termination depend on the safeguards attractiveness levels of the material. For attractiveness level E, approval has been granted from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE ID) to Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (BEA) Safeguards and Security (S and S). In some cases, it may be necessary to dispose of nuclear materials of attractiveness level D or higher. Termination of safeguards for such materials must be approved by the Departmental Element (this is the DOE Headquarters Office of Nuclear Energy) after consultation with the Office of Security.

  19. Measurement control program for nuclear material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brouns, R.J.; Roberts, F.P.; Merrill, J.A.; Brown, W.B.

    1980-06-01

    A measurement control program for nuclear material accounting monitors and controls the quality of the measurments of special nuclear material that are involved in material balances. The quality is monitored by collecting data from which the current precision and accuracy of measurements can be evaluated. The quality is controlled by evaluations, reviews, and other administrative measures for control of selection or design of facilities, equipment and measurement methods and the training and qualification of personnel who perform SNM measurements. This report describes the most important elements of a program by which management can monitor and control measurement quality

  20. An expert system to estimate SNM production at LWR systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sandquist, G.M.; Allison, J.L.; Rogers, V.C.

    1988-01-01

    An artificial intelligence expert system, analysis of proliferation by expert system (APES), has been developed and tested to permit a nonexpert to quickly evaluate the capabilities and capacities of a reactor and reprocessing system for producing and separating plutonium [special nuclear material (SNM)] even when system information may be limited and uncertain. The present analysis domain of APES is directed at light water reactors and Purex reprocessing, but extension of the domain is planned

  1. Conceptual design report: Nuclear materials storage facility renovation. Part 3, Supplemental information

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (NMSF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was a Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 line-item project completed in 1987 that has never been operated because of major design and construction deficiencies. This renovation project, which will correct those deficiencies and allow operation of the facility, is proposed as an FY 97 line item. The mission of the project is to provide centralized intermediate and long-term storage of special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with defined LANL programmatic missions and to establish a centralized SNM shipping and receiving location for Technical Area (TA)-55 at LANL. Based on current projections, existing storage space for SNM at other locations at LANL will be loaded to capacity by approximately 2002. This will adversely affect LANUs ability to meet its mission requirements in the future. The affected missions include LANL's weapons research, development, and testing (WRD ampersand T) program; special materials recovery; stockpile survelliance/evaluation; advanced fuels and heat sources development and production; and safe, secure storage of existing nuclear materials inventories. The problem is further exacerbated by LANL's inability to ship any materials offsite because of the lack of receiver sites for mate rial and regulatory issues. Correction of the current deficiencies and enhancement of the facility will provide centralized storage close to a nuclear materials processing facility. The project will enable long-term, cost-effective storage in a secure environment with reduced radiation exposure to workers, and eliminate potential exposures to the public. It is organized into seven parts. Part I - Design Concept describes the selected solution. Part III - Supplemental Information contains calculations for the various disciplines as well as other supporting information and analyses

  2. Special Nuclear Material Portal Monitoring at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeAnn Long; Michael Murphy

    2008-01-01

    Prior to April 2007, acceptance and performance testing of the various Special Nuclear Material (SNM) monitoring devices at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) was performed by the Radiological Health Instrumentation department. Calibration and performance testing on the PM-700 personnel portal monitor was performed, but there was no test program for the VM-250 vehicle portal monitor. The handheld SNM monitors, the TSA model 470B, were being calibrated annually, but there was no performance test program. In April of 2007, the Material Control and Accountability Manager volunteered to take over performance testing of all SNM portal monitors at NTS in order to strengthen the program and meet U.S. Department of Energy Order requirements. This paper will discuss the following activities associated with developing a performance testing program: changing the culture, learning the systems, developing and implementing procedures, troubleshooting and repair, validating the process, physical control of equipment, acquisition of new systems, and implementing the performance test program

  3. Special Nuclear Material Portal Monitoring at the Nevada Test Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mike Murphy

    2008-01-01

    In the past, acceptance and performance testing of the various Special Nuclear Material (SNM) monitoring devices at the Nevada Test Site has been performed by the Radiological Health Instrumentation Department. Calibration and performance tests on the PM-700 personnel portal monitor were performed but there was no test program for the VM-250 vehicle portal monitor because it had never been put into service. The handheld SNM monitors, the TSA model 470B, were being calibrated annually, but there was no program in place to test them quarterly. In April of 2007, the Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) Manager at the time decided that the program needed to be strengthened and MC and A took over performance testing of all SNM portal monitoring equipment. This paper will discuss the following activities associated with creating a performance testing program: changing the culture, learning the systems, writing procedures, troubleshooting/repairing, validating the process, control of equipment, acquisition of new systems, and running the program

  4. Conceptual design report: Nuclear materials storage facility renovation. Part 6, Alternatives study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (NMSF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was a Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 line-item project completed in 1987 that has never been operated because of major design and construction deficiencies. This renovation project, which will correct those deficiencies and allow operation of the facility, is proposed as an FY 97 line item. The mission of the project is to provide centralized intermediate and long-term storage of special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with defined LANL programmatic missions and to establish a centralized SNM shipping and receiving location for Technical Area (TA)-55 at LANL. Based on current projections, existing storage space for SNM at other locations at LANL will be loaded to capacity by approximately 2002. This will adversely affect LANUs ability to meet its mission requirements in the future. The affected missions include LANL's weapons research, development, and testing (WRD ampersand T) program; special materials recovery; stockpile survelliance/evaluation; advanced fuels and heat sources development and production; and safe, secure storage of existing nuclear materials inventories. The problem is further exacerbated by LANL's inability to ship any materials offsite because of the lack of receiver sites for material and regulatory issues. Correction of the current deficiencies and enhancement of the facility will provide centralized storage close to a nuclear materials processing facility. The project will enable long-term, cost-effective storage in a secure environment with reduced radiation exposure to workers, and eliminate potential exposures to the public. This report is organized according to the sections and subsections outlined by Attachment 111-2 of DOE Document AL 4700.1, Project Management System. It is organized into seven parts. This document, Part VI - Alternatives Study, presents a study of the different storage/containment options considered for NMSF

  5. Dual Neutral Particle Beam Interrogation of Intermodal Shipping Containers for Special Nuclear Material

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keith, Rodney Lyman

    Intermodal shipping containers entering the United States provide an avenue to smuggle unsecured or stolen special nuclear material (SNM). The only direct method fielded to indicate the presence of SNM is by passive photon/neutron radiation detection. Active interrogation using neutral particle beams to induce fission in SNM is a method under consideration. One by-product of fission is the creation of fragments that undergo radioactive decay over a time period on the order of tens of seconds after the initial event. The "delayed" gamma-rays emitted from these fragments over this period are considered a hallmark for the presence of SNM. A fundamental model is developed using homogenized cargos with a SNM target embedded at the center and computationally interrogated using simultaneous neutron and photon beams. Findings from analysis of the delayed gamma emissions from these experiments are intended to mitigate the effects of poor quality information about the composition and disposition of suspect cargo before examination in an active interrogation portal.

  6. Conceptual design report: Nuclear materials storage facility renovation. Part 7, Estimate data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (NMSF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was a Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 line-item project completed in 1987 that has never been operated because of major design and construction deficiencies. This renovation project, which will correct those deficiencies and allow operation of the facility, is proposed as an FY 97 line item. The mission of the project is to provide centralized intermediate and long-term storage of special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with defined LANL programmatic missions and to establish a centralized SNM shipping and receiving location for Technical Area (TA)-55 at LANL. Based on current projections, existing storage space for SNM at other locations at LANL will be loaded to capacity by approximately 2002. This will adversely affect LANUs ability to meet its mission requirements in the future. The affected missions include LANL's weapons research, development, and testing (WRD ampersand T) program; special materials recovery; stockpile survelliance/evaluation; advanced fuels and heat sources development and production; and safe, secure storage of existing nuclear materials inventories. The problem is further exacerbated by LANL's inability to ship any materials offsite because of the lack of receiver sites for mate rial and regulatory issues. Correction of the current deficiencies and enhancement of the facility will provide centralized storage close to a nuclear materials processing facility. The project will enable long-term, cost-effective storage in a secure environment with reduced radiation exposure to workers, and eliminate potential exposures to the public. This report is organized according to the sections and subsections outlined by Attachment III-2 of DOE Document AL 4700.1, Project Management System. It is organized into seven parts. This document, Part VII - Estimate Data, contains the project cost estimate information

  7. Conceptual design report: Nuclear materials storage facility renovation. Part 7, Estimate data

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-14

    The Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (NMSF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was a Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 line-item project completed in 1987 that has never been operated because of major design and construction deficiencies. This renovation project, which will correct those deficiencies and allow operation of the facility, is proposed as an FY 97 line item. The mission of the project is to provide centralized intermediate and long-term storage of special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with defined LANL programmatic missions and to establish a centralized SNM shipping and receiving location for Technical Area (TA)-55 at LANL. Based on current projections, existing storage space for SNM at other locations at LANL will be loaded to capacity by approximately 2002. This will adversely affect LANUs ability to meet its mission requirements in the future. The affected missions include LANL`s weapons research, development, and testing (WRD&T) program; special materials recovery; stockpile survelliance/evaluation; advanced fuels and heat sources development and production; and safe, secure storage of existing nuclear materials inventories. The problem is further exacerbated by LANL`s inability to ship any materials offsite because of the lack of receiver sites for mate rial and regulatory issues. Correction of the current deficiencies and enhancement of the facility will provide centralized storage close to a nuclear materials processing facility. The project will enable long-term, cost-effective storage in a secure environment with reduced radiation exposure to workers, and eliminate potential exposures to the public. This report is organized according to the sections and subsections outlined by Attachment III-2 of DOE Document AL 4700.1, Project Management System. It is organized into seven parts. This document, Part VII - Estimate Data, contains the project cost estimate information.

  8. Conceptual design report: Nuclear materials storage facility renovation. Part 3, Supplemental information

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-14

    The Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (NMSF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was a Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 line-item project completed in 1987 that has never been operated because of major design and construction deficiencies. This renovation project, which will correct those deficiencies and allow operation of the facility, is proposed as an FY 97 line item. The mission of the project is to provide centralized intermediate and long-term storage of special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with defined LANL programmatic missions and to establish a centralized SNM shipping and receiving location for Technical Area (TA)-55 at LANL. Based on current projections, existing storage space for SNM at other locations at LANL will be loaded to capacity by approximately 2002. This will adversely affect LANUs ability to meet its mission requirements in the future. The affected missions include LANL`s weapons research, development, and testing (WRD&T) program; special materials recovery; stockpile survelliance/evaluation; advanced fuels and heat sources development and production; and safe, secure storage of existing nuclear materials inventories. The problem is further exacerbated by LANL`s inability to ship any materials offsite because of the lack of receiver sites for mate rial and regulatory issues. Correction of the current deficiencies and enhancement of the facility will provide centralized storage close to a nuclear materials processing facility. The project will enable long-term, cost-effective storage in a secure environment with reduced radiation exposure to workers, and eliminate potential exposures to the public. It is organized into seven parts. Part I - Design Concept describes the selected solution. Part III - Supplemental Information contains calculations for the various disciplines as well as other supporting information and analyses.

  9. Radioisotope Identification Of Shielded And Masked SNM RDD Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salaymeh, S.; Jeffcoat, R.

    2010-01-01

    Sonar and speech techniques have been investigated to improve functionality and enable handheld and other man-portable, mobile, and portal systems to positively detect and identify illicit nuclear materials, with minimal data and with minimal false positives and false negatives. RadSonar isotope detection and identification is an algorithm development project funded by NA-22 and employing the resources of Savannah River National Laboratory and three University Laboratories (JHU-APL, UT-ARL, and UW-APL). Algorithms have been developed that improve the probability of detection and decrease the number of false positives and negatives. Two algorithms have been developed and tested. The first algorithm uses support vector machine (SVM) classifiers to determine the most prevalent nuclide(s) in a spectrum. It then uses a constrained weighted least squares fit to estimate and remove the contribution of these nuclide(s) to the spectrum, iterating classification and fitting until there is nothing of significance left. If any Special Nuclear Materials (SNMs) were detected in this process, a second tier of more stringent classifiers are used to make the final SNM alert decision. The second algorithm is looking at identifying existing feature sets that would be relevant in the radioisotope identification context. The underlying philosophy here is to identify parallels between the physics and/or the structures present in the data for the two applications (speech analysis and gamma spectroscopy). The expectation is that similar approaches may work in both cases. The mel-frequency cepstral representation of spectra is widely used in speech, particularly for two reasons: approximation of the response of the human ear, and simplicity of channel effect separation (in this context, a 'channel' is a method of signal transport that affects the signal, examples being vocal tract shape, room echoes, and microphone response). Measured and simulated gamma-ray spectra from a hand

  10. On-site transportation and handling of uranium-233 special nuclear material: Preliminary hazards and accident analysis. Final

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Solack, T.; West, D.; Ullman, D.; Coppock, G.; Cox, C.

    1995-01-01

    U-233 Special Nuclear Material (SNM) currently stored at the T-Building Storage Areas A and B must be transported to the SW/R Tritium Complex for repackaging. This SNM is in the form of oxide powder contained in glass jars which in turn are contained in heat sealed double polyethylene bags. These doubled-bagged glass jars have been primarily stored in structural steel casks and birdcages for approximately 20 years. The three casks, eight birdcages, and one pail/pressure vessel will be loaded onto a transport truck and moved over an eight day period. The Preliminary Hazards and Accident Analysis for the on-site transportation and handling of Uranium-233 Special Nuclear Material, documented herein, was performed in accordance with the format and content guidance of DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports, dated July 1994, specifically Chapter Three, Hazard and Accident Analysis. The Preliminary Hazards Analysis involved detailed walkdowns of all areas of the U-233 SNM movement route, including the T-Building Storage Area A and B, T-Building truck tunnel, and the roadway route. Extensive discussions were held with operations personnel from the Nuclear Material Control Group, Nuclear Materials Accountability Group, EG and G Mound Security and the Material Handling Systems Transportation Group. Existing documentation related to the on-site transportation of hazardous materials, T-Building and SW/R Tritium Complex SARs, and emergency preparedness/response documentation were also reviewed and analyzed to identify and develop the complete spectrum of energy source hazards

  11. 76 FR 34273 - Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for Special Nuclear Material...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-13

    ... Nuclear Material, TVA applied for an SNM license by application dated November 12, 2009 (ML100120487). The..., including site geography, demographics, meteorology, hydrology, and geology. The proposed activity is...

  12. Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hayes, Timothy [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Carlsbad Operations Group (United States); Nelson, Roger [Department Of Energy, Carlsbad Operations Office (United States)

    2012-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an

  13. 78 FR 67225 - Amendments to Material Control and Accounting Regulations

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-08

    ... Amendments to Material Control and Accounting Regulations AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION... for material control and accounting (MC&A) of special nuclear material (SNM). The goal of this... for control and accounting of SNM that is held by a licensee. The MC&A regulations ensure that the...

  14. Evaluating safeguards effectiveness against protracted theft of special nuclear material by insiders

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Sicherman, A.

    1991-01-01

    The new draft DOE Material Control and Accountability Order 5633.3 requires that facilities handling special nuclear material (SNM) evaluate their effectiveness against protracted theft of SNM. Protracted theft means repeated thefts of small quantities of material to accumulate a goal quantity. In this paper the authors discuss issues regarding the evaluation of safeguards and describe how we are augmenting the Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) to provide the user with a tool for evaluating effectiveness against protracted theft. Currently, the Insider module of ASSESS focuses on evaluating the timely detection of abrupt theft attempts by various types of single nonviolent insiders. In this paper we describe the approach we're implementing to augment ASSESS to handle various cases of protracted theft attempts

  15. Elcodrum I, a tamper-resistant and integrity controlled container for SNM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bueker, H.; Arning, F.; Reuters, H.; Nicolai, S.

    1984-01-01

    The safekeeping of special nuclear material (SNM) requires the use of a container with opening and surface area protection, which means that any access to the nuclear material whether by opening or damaging the container shell must be recorded. Based on the optoelectronic sensor principle, a 55-gallon drum with opening and surface area protection has been developed for which the opening status as well as the integrity of its entire surface can be verified at any time in a tamperproof manner. This may be done either ''in situ'' or from a remote monitoring station by means of a computer-aided remote verification system. The prototype of such a container has been successfully tested for more than five months at the Juelich Nuclear Research Center. It can be used both for national and international nuclear materials safeguards. It also offers itself for application in the planned ''International Plutonium Storage (IPS)'' system. The design and functioning of the container as well as the use of several containers in conjunction with a computer-aided remote verification system will be described

  16. SNM gamma-ray fingerprint monitor functional requirements and design specifications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bieber, A.M. Jr.; Kane, W.R.

    1994-07-01

    A number of DOE facilities need to perform confirmatory inventory measurements on items of special nuclear material (SNM). The DOE Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) has tasked the Safeguards, Safety and Nonproliferation Division (SSN) of the Department of Advanced Technology at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) to develop a high-resolution gamma-ray-spectroscopy-based instrument for performing confirmatory inventory measurements on such materials, a ''gamma-ray fingerprint monitor'' (GRFM). This document is a conceptual design for the SSN GRFM system. This conceptual design is based on previous experience with measurements of plutonium-bearing materials and comparison of gamma-ray spectrum features, not on actual tests of the procedures or hardware described. As a result, modifications may be necessary when actual prototype hardware and software are tested in realistic circumstances on actual materials of interest

  17. A Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS) for accountability monitoring of stored nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pickett, C.A.; Barham, M.A.; Gafford, T.A.; Hutchinson, D.P.; Jordan, J.K.; Maxey, L.C.; Moran, B.W.; Muhs, J.; Nodine, R.; Simpson, M.L.

    1994-01-01

    Nearly all facilities that store hazardous (radioactive or non-radioactive) materials must comply with prevailing federal, state, and local laws. These laws usually have components that require periodic physical inspections to insure that all materials remain safely and securely stored. The inspections are generally labor intensive, slow, put personnel at risk, and only find anomalies after they have occurred. The system described in this paper was developed for monitoring stored nuclear materials resulting from weapons dismantlement, but its applications extend to any storage facility that meets the above criteria. The traditional special nuclear material (SNM) accountability programs, that are currently used within most of the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, require the physical entry of highly trained personnel into SNM storage vaults. This imposes the need for additional security measures, which typically mandate that extra security personnel be present while SNM inventories are performed. These requirements increase labor costs and put additional personnel at risk to radiation exposure. In some cases, individuals have received radiation exposure equivalent to the annual maximum during just one inventory verification. With increasing overhead costs, the current system is rapidly becoming too expensive to operate, the need for an automated method of inventory verification is evident. The Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS) described in this paper was designed and prototyped as a low cost, highly reliable, and user friendly system that is capable of providing, real-time weight, gamma. and neutron energy confirmation from each item stored in a SNM vault. This paper describes the sensor technologies, the CAVIS prototype system (built at Y- 12 for highly enriched uranium storage), the technical requirements that must be achieved to assure successful implementation, and descriptions of sensor technologies needed for a plutonium facility

  18. A Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS) for accountability monitoring of stored nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pickett, C.A.; Barham, M.A.; Gafford, T.A.; Hutchinson, D.P.; Jordan, J.K.; Maxey, L.C.; Moran, B.W.; Muhs, J.; Nodine, R.; Simpson, M.L. [and others

    1994-12-08

    Nearly all facilities that store hazardous (radioactive or non-radioactive) materials must comply with prevailing federal, state, and local laws. These laws usually have components that require periodic physical inspections to insure that all materials remain safely and securely stored. The inspections are generally labor intensive, slow, put personnel at risk, and only find anomalies after they have occurred. The system described in this paper was developed for monitoring stored nuclear materials resulting from weapons dismantlement, but its applications extend to any storage facility that meets the above criteria. The traditional special nuclear material (SNM) accountability programs, that are currently used within most of the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, require the physical entry of highly trained personnel into SNM storage vaults. This imposes the need for additional security measures, which typically mandate that extra security personnel be present while SNM inventories are performed. These requirements increase labor costs and put additional personnel at risk to radiation exposure. In some cases, individuals have received radiation exposure equivalent to the annual maximum during just one inventory verification. With increasing overhead costs, the current system is rapidly becoming too expensive to operate, the need for an automated method of inventory verification is evident. The Continuous Automated Vault Inventory System (CAVIS) described in this paper was designed and prototyped as a low cost, highly reliable, and user friendly system that is capable of providing, real-time weight, gamma. and neutron energy confirmation from each item stored in a SNM vault. This paper describes the sensor technologies, the CAVIS prototype system (built at Y- 12 for highly enriched uranium storage), the technical requirements that must be achieved to assure successful implementation, and descriptions of sensor technologies needed for a plutonium facility.

  19. Nuclear material control in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.; Waddoups, I.

    1995-01-01

    The Department of Energy has defined a safeguards system to be an integrated system of physical protection, material accounting and material control subsystems designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession, use, or sabotage of SNM. In practice, safeguards involve the development and application of techniques and procedures dealing with the establishment and continued maintenance of a system of activities. The system must also include administrative controls and surveillance to assure that the procedures and techniques of the system are effective and are being carried out. The control of nuclear material is critical to the safeguarding of nuclear materials within the United States. The U.S. Department of Energy includes as part of material control four functional performance areas. They include access controls, material surveillance, material containment and detection/assessment. This paper will address not only these areas but also the relationship between material control and other safeguards and security functions

  20. Conceptual design report: Nuclear materials storage facility renovation. Part 1, Design concept. Part 2, Project management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (NMSF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was a Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 line-item project completed in 1987 that has never been operated because of major design and construction deficiencies. This renovation project, which will correct those deficiencies and allow operation of the facility, is proposed as an FY 97 line item. The mission of the project is to provide centralized intermediate and long-term storage of special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with defined LANL programmatic missions and to establish a centralized SNM shipping and receiving location for Technical Area (TA)-55 at LANL. Based on current projections, existing storage space for SNM at other locations at LANL will be loaded to capacity by approximately 2002. This will adversely affect LANUs ability to meet its mission requirements in the future. The affected missions include LANL's weapons research, development, and testing (WRD ampersand T) program; special materials recovery; stockpile survelliance/evaluation; advanced fuels and heat sources development and production; and safe, secure storage of existing nuclear materials inventories. The problem is further exacerbated by LANL's inability to ship any materials offsite because of the lack of receiver sites for mate rial and regulatory issues. Correction of the current deficiencies and enhancement of the facility will provide centralized storage close to a nuclear materials processing facility. The project will enable long-term, cost-effective storage in a secure environment with reduced radiation exposure to workers, and eliminate potential exposures to the public. This document provides Part I - Design Concept which describes the selected solution, and Part II - Project Management which describes the management system organization, the elements that make up the system, and the control and reporting system

  1. Conceptual design report: Nuclear materials storage facility renovation. Part 1, Design concept. Part 2, Project management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-07-14

    The Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (NMSF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was a Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 line-item project completed in 1987 that has never been operated because of major design and construction deficiencies. This renovation project, which will correct those deficiencies and allow operation of the facility, is proposed as an FY 97 line item. The mission of the project is to provide centralized intermediate and long-term storage of special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with defined LANL programmatic missions and to establish a centralized SNM shipping and receiving location for Technical Area (TA)-55 at LANL. Based on current projections, existing storage space for SNM at other locations at LANL will be loaded to capacity by approximately 2002. This will adversely affect LANUs ability to meet its mission requirements in the future. The affected missions include LANL`s weapons research, development, and testing (WRD&T) program; special materials recovery; stockpile survelliance/evaluation; advanced fuels and heat sources development and production; and safe, secure storage of existing nuclear materials inventories. The problem is further exacerbated by LANL`s inability to ship any materials offsite because of the lack of receiver sites for mate rial and regulatory issues. Correction of the current deficiencies and enhancement of the facility will provide centralized storage close to a nuclear materials processing facility. The project will enable long-term, cost-effective storage in a secure environment with reduced radiation exposure to workers, and eliminate potential exposures to the public. This document provides Part I - Design Concept which describes the selected solution, and Part II - Project Management which describes the management system organization, the elements that make up the system, and the control and reporting system.

  2. Passive and active correlation techniques for the detection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deyglun, Clement; Carasco, Cedric; Perot, Bertrand; Eleon, Cyrille; Sannie, Guillaume; Boudergui, Karim; Corre, Gwenole; Konzdrasovs, Vladimir; Pras, Philippe

    2013-06-01

    In the frame of the French trans-governmental R and D program against CBRN-E threats, CEA (French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission) is studying the detection of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) by neutron interrogation with the Associated Particle Technique (APT). Coincidences including at least 3 fission neutrons or gamma rays induced by tagged neutrons are used to detect and distinguish SNM from benign materials in which lower multiplicity events of 1 or 2 particles are produced by (n, 2n) or (n, n'γ) reactions. Coincidence are detected by fast plastic scintillators and correlated with tagged neutrons to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. Dedicated data acquisition electronics (DAQ) has been developed with independent FPGA cards associated to each detector, so that the acquisition window can be opened by any of the plastic scintillators. DAQ tests in passive mode are presented, in which acquisition is triggered by the sum signal of all detectors. The system time and energy calibration and resolution are reported, as well as the qualification of numerical simulations thanks to experimental data acquired with simple setups using a 252 Cf source. Numerical studies for the design and performance of cargo container inspection are also performed with the MCNP-PoliMi computer code and the ROOT data analysis package. SNM detection in iron cargo is quite straightforward but in organic matrix, data processing will need to combine more information to evidence SNM. (authors)

  3. 76 FR 55711 - Confirmatory Order Modifying License No. SNM-2001 for the Shallow Land Disposal Area, Parks...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-09-08

    ... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 40-8907; NRC-2011-0193] Confirmatory Order Modifying License No. SNM-2001 for the Shallow Land Disposal Area, Parks Township, Armstrong County, PA; Notice of... (SNM), pursuant to the terms and conditions of the aforementioned License, at the Shallow Land Disposal...

  4. A method for assay of special nuclear material in high level liquid waste streams

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Venkata Subramani, C.R.; Swaminathan, K.; Asuvathraman, R.; Kutty, K.V.G.

    2003-01-01

    The assay of special nuclear material in the high level liquid waste streams assumes importance as this is the first stage in the extraction cycle and considerable losses of plutonium could occur here. This stream contains all the fission products as also the minor actinides and hence normal nuclear techniques cannot be used without prior separation of the special nuclear material. This paper presents the preliminary results carried out using wavelength dispersive x-ray fluorescence as part of the developmental efforts to assay SNM in these streams by instrumental techniques. (author)

  5. Computer-based accountability system (Phase I) for special nuclear materials at Argonne-West

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingermanson, R.S.; Proctor, A.E.

    1982-05-01

    An automated accountability system for special nuclear materials (SNM) is under development at Argonne National Laboratory-West. Phase I of the development effort has established the following basic features of the system: a unique file organization allows rapid updating or retrieval of the status of various SNM, based on batch numbers, storage location, serial number, or other attributes. Access to the program is controlled by an interactive user interface that can be easily understood by operators who have had no prior background in electronic data processing. Extensive use of structured programming techniques make the software package easy to understand and to modify for specific applications. All routines are written in FORTRAN

  6. Recommendations to the NRC on acceptable standard format and content for the Fundamental Nuclear Material Control (FNMC) Plan required for low-enriched uranium enrichment facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.; Belew, W.L.; Hammond, G.A.; Brenner, L.M.

    1991-11-01

    A new section, 10 CFR 74.33, has been added to the material control and accounting (MC ampersand A) requirements of 10 CFR Part 74. This new section pertains to US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-licensed uranium enrichment facilities that are authorized to produce and to possess more than one effective kilogram of special nuclear material (SNM) of low strategic significance. The new section is patterned after 10 CFR 74.31, which pertains to NRC licensees (other than production or utilization facilities licensed pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50 and 70 and waste disposal facilities) that are authorized to possess and use more than one effective kilogram of unencapsulated SNM of low strategic significance. Because enrichment facilities have the potential capability of producing SNM of moderate strategic significance and also strategic SNM, certain performance objectives and MC ampersand A system capabilities are required in 10 CFR 74.33 that are not contained in 10 CFR 74.31. This document recommends to the NRC information that the licensee or applicant should provide in the fundamental nuclear material control (FNMC) plan. This document also describes methods that should be acceptable for compliance with the general performance objectives. While this document is intended to cover various uranium enrichment technologies, the primary focus at this time is gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion

  7. Detection of special nuclear materials with the associate particle technique

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carasco, Cédric; Deyglun, Clément; Pérot, Bertrand; Eléon, Cyrille; Normand, Stéphane; Sannié, Guillaume; Boudergui, Karim; Corre, Gwenolé; Konzdrasovs, Vladimir; Pras, Philippe

    2013-01-01

    In the frame of the French trans-governmental R and D program against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives (CBRN-E) threats, CEA is studying the detection of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) by neutron interrogation with fast neutrons produced by an associated particle sealed tube neutron generator. The deuterium-tritium fusion reaction produces an alpha particle and a 14 MeV neutron almost back to back, allowing tagging neutron emission both in time and direction with an alpha particle position-sensitive sensor embedded in the generator. Fission prompt neutrons and gamma rays induced by tagged neutrons which are tagged by an alpha particle are detected in coincidence with plastic scintillators. This paper presents numerical simulations performed with the MCNP-PoliMi Monte Carlo computer code and with post processing software developed with the ROOT data analysis package. False coincidences due to neutron and photon scattering between adjacent detectors (cross talk) are filtered out to increase the selectivity between nuclear and benign materials. Accidental coincidences, which are not correlated to an alpha particle, are also taken into account in the numerical model, as well as counting statistics, and the time-energy resolution of the data acquisition system. Such realistic calculations show that relevant quantities of SNM (few kg) can be distinguished from cargo and shielding materials in 10 min acquisitions. First laboratory tests of the system under development in CEA laboratories are also presented.

  8. NMC and A and nuclear criticality safety systems integration: A prospective way for enhancement of the nuclear industry facilities safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryazanov, Boris G.; Sviridov, Victor I.; Frolov, Vladimir V.; Shvedov, Maxim O.; Mclaughlin, Thomas P.; Pruvost, Norman L.

    2003-01-01

    A considerable body of data has now been acquired about the principles, parameters and consequences of nuclear (criticality) accidents at facilities of the atomic industry in Russia, the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The total number of such accidents stands at 22. Russian and US specialists have prepared a rather extensive survey and analysis of these accidents. The final and important section of this survey is the lessons implied by the results of analysis of these 22 accidents. Among these lessons is the necessity of unconditional enforcement of control over the movement and transformations of special nuclear materials (SNM), and in particular fissile materials, (those SNMs with criticality accident concerns) during production and processing. Inadequacies in such control have been among the causes of most of the accidents that have occurred. Nuclear materials control and accounting (MC and A) for the purpose of ensuring storage reliability and nonproliferation safeguards is a major task of nuclear facilities in any nation. MC and A systems use the latest techniques and hardware for periodic control of SNM in specifically organized material balance areas. Immediate checking, periodic inventory of SNM, and measurements of the parameters of SNM at key points are the main sources of data for these systems. Data about the presence and sites of location of SNM in material balance areas that are acquired in inventories can be used for objective assessment of the status of nuclear safety. On the other hand, the inventory itself involves performance of operations that are unlike routine process engineering, and require special consideration of nuclear safety. Use of the techniques and hardware of MC and A systems not only for purposes of storage reliability, but also to ensure nuclear safety, will reduce the risk of nuclear accidents. This paper gives a concise overview of nuclear accidents that have occurred due to inadequacies in MC and A, and demonstrates

  9. The role of certified reference materials in material control and accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turel, S.P.

    1979-01-01

    One way of providing an adequate material control and accounting system for the nuclear fuel cycle is to calculate material unaccounted for (MUF) after a physical inventory and to compare the limit of error of the MUF value (LEMUF) against prescribed criteria. To achieve a meaningful LEMUF, a programme for the continuing determination of systematic and random errors is necessary. Within this programme it is necessary to achieve traceability of all Special Nuclear Material (SNM) control and accounting measurements to an International/National Measurement System by means of Certified Reference Materials. SNM measurements for control and accounting are made internationally on a great variety of materials using many diverse measurement procedures by a large number of facilities. To achieve valid overall accountability over this great variety of measurements there must be some means of relating all these measurements and their uncertainties to each other. This is best achieved by an International/National Measurement System (IMS/NMS). To this end, all individual measurement systems must be compatible to the IMS/NMS and all measurement results must be traceable to appropriate international/national Primary Certified Reference Materials. To obtain this necessary compatibility for any given SNM measurement system, secondary certified reference materials or working reference materials are needed for every class of SNM and each type of measurement system. Ways to achieve ''traceability'' and the various types of certified reference material are defined and discussed in this paper. (author)

  10. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence and Isotopic Mapping of Containers

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johnson, Micah S.; McNabb, Dennis P.

    2009-03-01

    National security programs have expressed interest in developing systems to isotopically map shipping containers, fuel assemblies, and waste barrels for various materials including special nuclear material (SNM). Current radiographic systems offer little more than an ambiguous density silhouette of a container's contents. In this paper we will present a system being developed at LLNL to isotopically map containers using the nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) method. Recent experimental measurements on NRF strengths in SNM are discussed.

  11. Conceptual design report: Nuclear materials storage facility renovation. Part 5, Structural/seismic investigation. Section B, Renovation calculations/supporting data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (NMSF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was a Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 line-item project completed in 1987 that has never been operated because of major design and construction deficiencies. This renovation project, which will correct those deficiencies and allow operation of the facility, is proposed as an FY 97 line item. The mission of the project is to provide centralized intermediate and long-term storage of special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with defined LANL programmatic missions and to establish a centralized SNM shipping and receiving location for Technical Area (TA)-55 at LANL. Based on current projections, existing storage space for SNM at other locations at LANL will be loaded to capacity by approximately 2002. This will adversely affect LANUs ability to meet its mission requirements in the future. The affected missions include LANL's weapons research, development, and testing (WRD ampersand T) program; special materials recovery; stockpile survelliance/evaluation; advanced fuels and heat sources development and production; and safe, secure storage of existing nuclear materials inventories. The problem is further exacerbated by LANL's inability to ship any materials offsite because of the lack of receiver sites for mate rial and regulatory issues. Correction of the current deficiencies and enhancement of the facility will provide centralized storage close to a nuclear materials processing facility. The project will enable long-term, cost-effective storage in a secure environment with reduced radiation exposure to workers, and eliminate potential exposures to the public. This report is organized according to the sections and subsections. It is organized into seven parts. This document, Part V, Section B - Structural/Seismic Information provides a description of the seismic and structural analyses performed on the NMSF and their results

  12. A portable, automatic SNM monitor for nuclear safeguards: Development, evaluation, and applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1993-09-01

    The portable SNM monitor is a lightweight, full-size, automatic monitor, suitable for temporary service (such as demonstrations or for use during maintenance) or as a permanent replacement for hand- held monitors. The authors based the monitor on the TSA Systems, Ltd., modular SNM monitor design and, through evaluation and improvement of the commercial modules, obtained adequate sensitivity in a single- cabinet monitor that is easily portable. Complete monitoring of pedestrians with a single detector cabinet is achieved by requiring the pedestrian to stand in front of the detectors and turn around through 360 deg while being observed by a security inspector. The monitor is available commercially as the TSA Systems Model PMD-701, and it is beginning to be used in both temporary and permanent applications

  13. Simulations and imaging algorithm development for a cosmic ray muon tomography system for the detection of special nuclear material in transport containers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jewett, C.; Anghel, V.N.P.; Armitage, J.; Boudjemline, K.; Botte, J.; Bryman, D.; Bueno, J.; Charles, E.; Cousins, T.; Didsbury, R.; Erhardt, L.; Erlandson, A.; Gallant, G.; Jason, A.; Jonkmans, G.; Liu, Z.; McCall, M.; Noel, S.; Oakham, F.G.; Ong, D.; Stocki, T.; Thompson, M.; Waller, D.

    2011-01-01

    The Cosmic Ray Inspection and Passive Tomography (CRIPT) collaboration is developing a cosmic ray muon tomography system to identify Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) in cargo containers. In order to gauge the viability of the technique, and to determine the best detector type, GEANT4 was used to simulate the passage of cosmic ray muons through a cargo container. The scattering density estimation (SDE) algorithm was developed and tested with data from these simulations to determine how well it could reconstruct the interior of a container. The simulation results revealed the ability of cosmic ray muon tomography techniques to image spheres of lead-shielded Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), such as uranium or plutonium, in a cargo container, containing a cargo of granite slabs. (author)

  14. Simulations and imaging algorithm development for a cosmic ray muon tomography system for the detection of special nuclear material in transport containers

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jewett, C.; Anghel, V.N.P. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, Ontario (Canada); Armitage, J.; Boudjemline, K.; Botte, J. [Carleton Univ., Dept. of Physics, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada); Bryman, D. [Advanced Applied Physics Solutions, Vancouver, British Columbia (Canada); Univ. of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia (Canada); Bueno, J. [Advanced Applied Physics Solutions, Vancouver, British Columbia (Canada); Charles, E. [Canada Border Services Agency, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada); Cousins, T. [International Safety Research, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada); Didsbury, R. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, Ontario (Canada); Erhardt, L. [Defence Research and Development Canada, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada); Erlandson, A. [Carleton Univ., Dept. of Physics, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada); Gallant, G. [Canada Border Services Agency, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada); Jason, A. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos (United States); Jonkmans, G. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, Ontario (Canada); Liu, Z. [Advanced Applied Physics Solutions, Vancouver, British Columbia (Canada); Univ. of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia (Canada); McCall, M.; Noel, S. [International Safety Research, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada); Oakham, F.G. [Carleton Univ., Dept. of Physics, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada); TRIUMF, Vancouver, British Columbia, (Canada); Ong, D.; Stocki, T. [Health Canada, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada); Thompson, M. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, Ontario (Canada); Waller, D. [Defence Research and Development Canada, Ottawa, Ontario (Canada)

    2011-07-01

    The Cosmic Ray Inspection and Passive Tomography (CRIPT) collaboration is developing a cosmic ray muon tomography system to identify Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) in cargo containers. In order to gauge the viability of the technique, and to determine the best detector type, GEANT4 was used to simulate the passage of cosmic ray muons through a cargo container. The scattering density estimation (SDE) algorithm was developed and tested with data from these simulations to determine how well it could reconstruct the interior of a container. The simulation results revealed the ability of cosmic ray muon tomography techniques to image spheres of lead-shielded Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), such as uranium or plutonium, in a cargo container, containing a cargo of granite slabs. (author)

  15. Variance and covariance calculations for nuclear materials accounting using ''MAVARIC''

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nasseri, K.K.

    1987-07-01

    Determination of the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system to the loss of special nuclear material (SNM) requires (1) obtaining a relation for the variance of the materials balance by propagation of the instrument errors for the measured quantities that appear in the materials balance equation and (2) substituting measured values and their error standard deviations into this relation and calculating the variance of the materials balance. MAVARIC (Materials Accounting VARIance Calculations) is a custom spreadsheet, designed using the second release of Lotus 1-2-3, that significantly reduces the effort required to make the necessary variance (and covariance) calculations needed to determine the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system. Predefined macros within the spreadsheet allow the user to carry out long, tedious procedures with only a few keystrokes. MAVARIC requires that the user enter the following data into one of four data tables, depending on the type of the term in the materials balance equation; the SNM concentration, the bulk mass (or solution volume), the measurement error standard deviations, and the number of measurements made during an accounting period. The user can also specify if there are correlations between transfer terms. Based on these data entries, MAVARIC can calculate the variance of the materials balance and the square root of this variance, from which the detection sensitivity of the accounting system can be determined

  16. Variance and covariance calculations for nuclear materials accounting using 'MAVARIC'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nasseri, K.K.

    1987-01-01

    Determination of the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system to the loss of special nuclear material (SNM) requires (1) obtaining a relation for the variance of the materials balance by propagation of the instrument errors for the measured quantities that appear in the materials balance equation and (2) substituting measured values and their error standard deviations into this relation and calculating the variance of the materials balance. MAVARIC (Materials Accounting VARIance Calculations) is a custom spreadsheet, designed using the second release of Lotus 1-2-3, that significantly reduces the effort required to make the necessary variance (and covariance) calculations needed to determine the detection sensitivity of a materials accounting system. Predefined macros within the spreadsheet allow the user to carry out long, tedious procedures with only a few keystrokes. MAVARIC requires that the user enter the following data into one of four data tables, depending on the type of the term in the materials balance equation; the SNM concentration, the bulk mass (or solution volume), the measurement error standard deviations, and the number of measurements made during an accounting period. The user can also specify if there are correlations between transfer terms. Based on these data entries, MAVARIC can calculate the variance of the materials balance and the square root of this variance, from which the detection sensitivity of the accounting system can be determined

  17. Investigation of Active Interrogation Techniques to Detect Special Nuclear Material in Maritime Environments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, Thomas Martin; Patton, Bruce W.

    2010-01-01

    The detection and interdiction of special nuclear material (SNM) is still a high-priority focus area for many organizations around the world. One method that is commonly considered a leading candidate in the detection of SNM is active interrogation (AI). AI is different from its close relative, passive interrogation, in that an active source is used to enhance or create a detectable signal (usually fission) from SNM, particularly in shielded scenarios or scenarios where the SNM has a low activity. The use of AI thus makes the detection of SNM easier or, in some scenarios, even enables previously impossible detection. In this work the signal from prompt neutrons and photons as well as delayed neutrons and photons will be combined, as is typically done in AI. In previous work AI has been evaluated experimentally and computationally. However, for the purposes of this work, past scenarios are considered lightly shielded and tightly coupled spatially. At most, the previous work interrogated the contents of one standard cargo container (2.44 x 2.60 x 6.10 m) and the source and detector were both within a few meters of the object being interrogated. A few examples of this type of previous work can be found in references 1 and 2. Obviously, more heavily shielded AI scenarios will require larger source intensities, larger detector surface areas (larger detectors or more detectors), greater detector efficiencies, longer count times, or some combination of these.

  18. Investigations of active interrogation techniques to detect special nuclear material in maritime environments: Standoff interrogation of small- and medium-sized cargo ships

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miller, Thomas M., E-mail: millertm@ornl.gov; Patton, Bruce W.; Grogan, Brandon R.; Henkel, James J.; Murphy, Brian D.; Johnson, Jeffrey O.; Mihalczo, John T.

    2013-12-01

    In this work, several active interrogation (AI) sources are evaluated to determine their usefulness in detecting the presence of special nuclear material (SNM) in fishing trawlers, small cargo transport ships, and luxury yachts at large standoff distances from the AI source and detector. This evaluation is performed via computational analysis applying Monte Carlo methods with advanced variance reduction techniques. The goal is to determine the AI source strength required to detect the presence of SNM. The general conclusion of this study is that AI is not reliable when SNM is heavily shielded and not tightly coupled geometrically with the source and detector, to the point that AI should not be considered a via interrogation option in these scenarios. More specifically, when SNM is shielded by hydrogenous material large AI source strengths are required if detection is based on neutrons, which is not surprising. However, if the SNM is shielded by high-Z material the required AI source strengths are not significantly different if detection is based on neutrons or photons, which is somewhat surprising. Furthermore, some of the required AI source strengths that were calculated are very large. These results coupled with the realities of two ships moving independently at sea and other assumptions made during this analysis make the use of standoff AI in the maritime environment impractical.

  19. Investigations of active interrogation techniques to detect special nuclear material in maritime environments: Standoff interrogation of small- and medium-sized cargo ships

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, Thomas M.; Patton, Bruce W.; Grogan, Brandon R.; Henkel, James J.; Murphy, Brian D.; Johnson, Jeffrey O.; Mihalczo, John T.

    2013-01-01

    In this work, several active interrogation (AI) sources are evaluated to determine their usefulness in detecting the presence of special nuclear material (SNM) in fishing trawlers, small cargo transport ships, and luxury yachts at large standoff distances from the AI source and detector. This evaluation is performed via computational analysis applying Monte Carlo methods with advanced variance reduction techniques. The goal is to determine the AI source strength required to detect the presence of SNM. The general conclusion of this study is that AI is not reliable when SNM is heavily shielded and not tightly coupled geometrically with the source and detector, to the point that AI should not be considered a via interrogation option in these scenarios. More specifically, when SNM is shielded by hydrogenous material large AI source strengths are required if detection is based on neutrons, which is not surprising. However, if the SNM is shielded by high-Z material the required AI source strengths are not significantly different if detection is based on neutrons or photons, which is somewhat surprising. Furthermore, some of the required AI source strengths that were calculated are very large. These results coupled with the realities of two ships moving independently at sea and other assumptions made during this analysis make the use of standoff AI in the maritime environment impractical

  20. Conceptual design report: Nuclear materials storage facility renovation. Part 5, Structural/seismic investigation. Section A report, existing conditions calculations/supporting information

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (NMSF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was a Fiscal Year (FY) 1984 line-item project completed in 1987 that has never been operated because of major design and construction deficiencies. This renovation project, which will correct those deficiencies and allow operation of the facility, is proposed as an FY 97 line item. The mission of the project is to provide centralized intermediate and long-term storage of special nuclear materials (SNM) associated with defined LANL programmatic missions and to establish a centralized SNM shipping and receiving location for Technical Area (TA)-55 at LANL. Based on current projections, existing storage space for SNM at other locations at LANL will be loaded to capacity by approximately 2002. This will adversely affect LANUs ability to meet its mission requirements in the future. The affected missions include LANL's weapons research, development, and testing (WRD ampersand T) program; special materials recovery; stockpile survelliance/evaluation; advanced fuels and heat sources development and production; and safe, secure storage of existing nuclear materials inventories. The problem is further exacerbated by LANL's inability to ship any materials offsite because of the lack of receiver sites for mate rial and regulatory issues. Correction of the current deficiencies and enhancement of the facility will provide centralized storage close to a nuclear materials processing facility. The project will enable long-term, cost-effective storage in a secure environment with reduced radiation exposure to workers, and eliminate potential exposures to the public. Based upon US Department of Energy (DOE) Albuquerque Operations (DOE/Al) Office and LANL projections, storage space limitations/restrictions will begin to affect LANL's ability to meet its missions between 1998 and 2002

  1. The SNM Scanner: A Non-invasive Protocol for Effective Monitoring of Special Nuclear Material Inventories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lanier, R G; Dauffy, L S; Hodge, A M

    2004-01-01

    We suggest a system of monitoring special nuclear material inventories which uses simple mathematical techniques to compare the gross features of emitted gamma-ray spectra. In this report we develop the techniques necessary to make such spectral comparisons and describe their application. We also apply these ideas and develop inventory confirmation results using a room-temperature CdTe detector in a real nuclear-material inventory environment

  2. High-fidelity MCNP modeling of a D-T neutron generator for active interrogation of special nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Katalenich, Jeff; Flaska, Marek; Pozzi, Sara A.; Hartman, Michael R.

    2011-01-01

    Fast and robust methods for interrogation of special nuclear material (SNM) are of interest to many agencies and institutions in the United States. It is well known that passive interrogation methods are typically sufficient for plutonium identification because of a relatively high neutron production rate from 240 Pu . On the other hand, identification of shielded uranium requires active methods using neutron or photon sources . Deuterium-deuterium (2.45 MeV) and deuterium-tritium (14.1 MeV) neutron-generator sources have been previously tested and proven to be relatively reliable instruments for active interrogation of nuclear materials . In addition, the newest generators of this type are small enough for applications requiring portable interrogation systems. Active interrogation techniques using high-energy neutrons are being investigated as a method to detect hidden SNM in shielded containers . Due to the thickness of some containers, penetrating radiation such as high-energy neutrons can provide a potential means of probing shielded SNM. In an effort to develop the capability to assess the signal seen from various forms of shielded nuclear materials, University of Michigan Neutron Science Laboratory's D-T neutron generator and its shielding were accurately modeled in MCNP. The generator, while operating at nominal power, produces approximately 1x10 10 neutrons/s, a source intensity which requires a large amount of shielding to minimize the dose rates around the generator. For this reason, the existing shielding completely encompasses the generator and does not include beam ports. Therefore, several MCNP simulations were performed to estimate the yield of uncollided 14.1-MeV neutrons from the generator for active interrogation experiments. Beam port diameters of 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 cm were modeled to assess the resulting neutron fluxes. The neutron flux outside the beam ports was estimated to be approximately 2x10 4 n/cm 2 s.

  3. On screening for Special Nuclear Materials (SNMs) with X-ray diffraction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harding, G.

    2010-01-01

    A novel detection technique employing X-ray diffraction (XRD) to screen for Special Nuclear Materials (SNMs), in particular for uranium, has been recently proposed. It is based on the interesting fact that uranium (and incidentally, plutonium) has a non-cubic lattice structure, in contrast to all other non-SNM, high-density elements of the Periodic Table. The principle of this screening technique is briefly elucidated by comparing the XRD lines of uranium with those of lead, a material of high atomic number (Z) commonly found in container traffic. Several physical conditions that must be satisfied to enable XRD for SNM screening are considered. To achieve adequate penetration, both of suspicious high-Z materials and their containers, photon energies of 1 MeV and above must be employed. Implications from partial coherence theory for the XRD measurement geometry at such photon energies are presented. The question of multiple scatter degradation of the coherent scatter signal is addressed. Technological considerations relevant to performing XRD at 1 MeV, particularly regarding the radiation source and detector, are discussed. A novel secondary aperture scheme permitting high energy XRD is presented. It is concluded that the importance of the application and the prospect of its feasibility are sufficient to warrant experimental verification.

  4. Material control system design: Test Bed Nitrate Storage Area (TBNSA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clark, G.A.; Da Roza, R.A.; Dunn, D.R.; Sacks, I.J.; Harrison, W.; Huebel, J.G.; Ross, W.N.; Salisbury, J.D.; Sanborn, R.H.; Weissenberger, S.

    1978-05-01

    This report provides an example of a hypothetical Special Nuclear Material (SNM) Safeguard Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) System which will be used as a subject for the demonstration of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory MC and A System Evaluation Methodology in January 1978. This methodology is to become a tool in the NRC evaluation of license applicant submittals for Nuclear Fuel Cycle facilities. The starting point for this test bed design was the Allied-General Nuclear Services--Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Reprocessing plant as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), of August 1975. The test bed design effort was limited to providing an SNM safeguard system for the plutonium nitrate storage area of this facility

  5. Special Nuclear Material Detection with a Water Cherenkov based Detector

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sweany, M.; Bernstein, A.; Bowden, N.; Dazeley, S.; Svoboda, R.

    2008-01-01

    Fission events from Special Nuclear Material (SNM), such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium, produce a number of neutrons and high energy gamma-rays. Assuming the neutron multiplicity is approximately Poissonian with an average of 2 to 3, the observation of time correlations between these particles from a cargo container would constitute a robust signature of the presence of SNM inside. However, in order to be sensitive to the multiplicity, one would require a high total efficiency. There are two approaches to maximize the total efficiency; maximizing the detector efficiency or maximizing the detector solid angle coverage. The advanced detector group at LLNL is investigating one way to maximize the detector size. We are designing and building a water Cerenkov based gamma and neutron detector for the purpose of developing an efficient and cost effective way to deploy a large solid angle car wash style detector. We report on our progress in constructing a larger detector and also present preliminary results from our prototype detector that indicates detection of neutrons

  6. Special nuclear materials cutoff exercise: Issues and lessons learned. Volume 1: Summary of exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Libby, R.A.; Davis, C.; Segal, J.E.; Stanbro, W.D.

    1995-08-01

    In a September 1993 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Clinton announced a new nonproliferation and export control policy that established a framework for US efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The new policy proposed that the US undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material. One of the key elements was for the US to support a special nuclear materials (SNM) multilateral convention prohibiting the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards. This policy is often referred to as the President's Cutoff Initiative or the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Because both the US Department of Energy (DOE) and foreign reprocessing facilities similar to PUREX will likely to be inspected under a FMCT, the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Negotiations and Analysis Division (DOE/NN-41) tasked Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) to perform an information gathering exercise, the PUREX Exercise, using the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Plant located on the Hanford Site in Washington State. PUREX is a former production reactor fuel reprocessing plant currently undergoing a transition to a ''decontamination and decommissioning (D ampersand D) ready'' mode. The PUREX Exercise was conducted March 29--30, 1994, to examine aspects of the imposition of several possible cutoff regimes and to study verification of non-production of SNM for nuclear weapons purposes or outside of safeguards. A follow-up activity to further examine various additional verification regimes was held at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) on May 10, 1994

  7. MATERIAL CONTROL ACCOUNTING INMM

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hasty, T.

    2009-06-14

    Since 1996, the Mining and Chemical Combine (MCC - formerly known as K-26), and the United States Department of Energy (DOE) have been cooperating under the cooperative Nuclear Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) Program between the Russian Federation and the U.S. Governments. Since MCC continues to operate a reactor for steam and electricity production for the site and city of Zheleznogorsk which results in production of the weapons grade plutonium, one of the goals of the MPC&A program is to support implementation of an expanded comprehensive nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) program. To date MCC has completed upgrades identified in the initial gap analysis and documented in the site MC&A Plan and is implementing additional upgrades identified during an update to the gap analysis. The scope of these upgrades includes implementation of MCC organization structure relating to MC&A, establishing material balance area structure for special nuclear materials (SNM) storage and bulk processing areas, and material control functions including SNM portal monitors at target locations. Material accounting function upgrades include enhancements in the conduct of physical inventories, limit of error inventory difference procedure enhancements, implementation of basic computerized accounting system for four SNM storage areas, implementation of measurement equipment for improved accountability reporting, and both new and revised site-level MC&A procedures. This paper will discuss the implementation of MC&A upgrades at MCC based on the requirements established in the comprehensive MC&A plan developed by the Mining and Chemical Combine as part of the MPC&A Program.

  8. DoD Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Assurance

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-04-27

    systems, positive control material (PCM) and equipment, and special nuclear material (SNM) and subject to a nuclear weapons personnel reliability...assurance implementation guidance for consistency and compliance with this issuance. c. Conducts programmatic reviews, manages audits , and directs...personnel reliability assurance education and training materials . 2.4. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS (ASD(HA)). Under the authority

  9. Estimation methods for process holdup of special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.; Marshall, R.S.

    1984-06-01

    The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission sponsored a research study at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to explore the possibilities of developing statistical estimation methods for materials holdup at highly enriched uranium (HEU)-processing facilities. Attempts at using historical holdup data from processing facilities and selected holdup measurements at two operating facilities confirmed the need for high-quality data and reasonable control over process parameters in developing statistical models for holdup estimations. A major effort was therefore directed at conducting large-scale experiments to demonstrate the value of statistical estimation models from experimentally measured data of good quality. Using data from these experiments, we developed statistical models to estimate residual inventories of uranium in large process equipment and facilities. Some of the important findings of this investigation are the following: prediction models for the residual holdup of special nuclear material (SNM) can be developed from good-quality historical data on holdup; holdup data from several of the equipment used at HEU-processing facilities, such as air filters, ductwork, calciners, dissolvers, pumps, pipes, and pipe fittings, readily lend themselves to statistical modeling of holdup; holdup profiles of process equipment such as glove boxes, precipitators, and rotary drum filters can change with time; therefore, good estimation of residual inventories in these types of equipment requires several measurements at the time of inventory; although measurement of residual holdup of SNM in large facilities is a challenging task, reasonable estimates of the hidden inventories of holdup to meet the regulatory requirements can be accomplished through a combination of good measurements and the use of statistical models. 44 references, 62 figures, 43 tables

  10. Standard format and content for a licensee physical security plan for the protection of special nuclear material of moderate or low strategic significance - January 1980

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    This guide describes the information required in the physical security plan submitted as part of an application for a license to possess, use, or transport special nuclear material (SNM) of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of SNM of low strategic significance and recommends a standard format for presenting the information in an orderly arrangement. This standards format will thus serve as an aid to uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the physical protection plan of the license application. This document can also be used as guidance by licensees possessing or transporting less than 10 kg of SNM of low strategic significance in understanding the intent and implementing the requirements of paragraphs 73.67(a), 73.67(f), and 73.67(g) of 10 CRF Part 73

  11. The contribution of material control to meeting performance requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rivers, J.D.

    1989-01-01

    The U.S. Dept. of Energy (DOE) is in the process of implementing a set of performance requirements for material control and accountability (MC ampersand A). These graded requirements set a uniform level of performance for similar materials at various facilities with respect to the threat of an insider adversary stealing special nuclear material (SNM). These requirements are phrased in terms of detecting the theft of a goal quantity of SNM within a specified time period and with a probability greater than or equal to a specified value and include defense in-depth requirements

  12. Material control and accountability alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations governing material control and accountability in nuclear facilities have become more restrictive in the past decade, especially in areas that address the insider threat. As the insider threat receives greater credibility, regulations have been strengthened to increase the probability of detecting insider activity and to prevent removal of a significant quantity of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) from areas under control of the protective force

  13. Disposition scenarios and safeguardability of fissile materials under START Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.

    1993-01-01

    Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) signed in 1991 and the Lisbon Protocol of 1992, a large inventory of fissile materials will be removed from the weapons fuel cycles of the United States and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The Lisbon Protocol calls for Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Byelarus to become nonnuclear members of the treaty and for Russia to assume the responsibility of the treaty as a nuclear weapons state. In addition, the START-II Treaty, which was signed in 1993 by the United States and Russia, further reduces deployed nuclear warheads and adds to the inventory of excess special nuclear materials (SNM). Because storage of in-tact warheads has the potential for a open-quotes breakout,close quotes it would be desirable to dismantle the warheads and properly dispose of the SNMs under appropriate safeguards to prevent their reentry into the weapons fuel cycle. The SNM recovered from dismantled warheads can be disposed of in several ways, and the final choices may be up to the country having the title to the SNM. Current plans are to store them indefinitely, leaving serious safeguards concerns. Recognizing that the underlying objective of these treaties is to prevent the fissile materials from reentering the weapons fuel cycle, it is necessary to establish a verifiable disposal scheme that includes safeguards requirements. This paper identifies some realistic scenarios for the disposal of SNM from the weapons fuel cycle and examines the safeguardability of those scenarios

  14. Potential information requirements for spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Disbrow, J.A.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that the Energy Information Administration (EIA) has performed analyses of the requirements for data and information for the management of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) designated for disposal under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA). Subsequently, the EIA collected data on the amounts and characteristics of SNF stored at commercial nuclear facilities. Most recently, the EIA performed an analysis of the international and domestic laws and regulations which have been established to ensure the safeguarding, accountability, and safe management of special nuclear materials (SNM). The SNM of interest are those designated for permanent disposal by the NWPA. This analysis was performed to determine what data and information may be needed to fulfill the specific accountability responsibilities of the Department of Energy (DOE) related to SNF handling, transportation, storage and disposal; to work toward achieving a consistency between nuclear fuel assembly identifiers and material weights as reported by the various responsible parties; and to assist in the revision of the Nuclear Fuel Data Form RW-859 used to obtain spent nuclear fuel characteristics data from the nuclear utilities

  15. Standard format and content for a licensee physical security plan for the protection of special nuclear material of moderate or low strategic significance (Revision 1, Feb. 1983)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1983-01-01

    This regulatory guide describes the information required in the physical security plan submitted as part of an application for a license to possess, use, or transport Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of SNM of low strategic significance and recommends a standard format for presenting the information in an orderly arrangement. This standard format will thus serve as an aid to uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the physical security plan of the license application. This document can also be used as guidance by licensees possessing or transporting less than 10 kg of SNM of low strategic significance in understanding the intent and implementing the requirements of paragraphs 73.67(a), 73.67(f), and 73.67(g) of 10 CFR Part 73

  16. OR14-V-Uncertainty-PD2La Uncertainty Quantification for Nuclear Safeguards and Nondestructive Assay Final Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nicholson, Andrew D. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Croft, Stephen [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); McElroy, Robert Dennis [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2017-08-01

    The various methods of nondestructive assay (NDA) of special nuclear material (SNM) have applications in nuclear nonproliferation, including detection and identification of illicit SNM at border crossings and quantifying SNM at nuclear facilities for safeguards. No assay method is complete without “error bars,” which provide one way of expressing confidence in the assay result. Consequently, NDA specialists typically provide error bars and also partition total uncertainty into “random” and “systematic” components so that, for example, an error bar can be developed for the total mass estimate in multiple items. Uncertainty Quantification (UQ) for NDA has always been important, but it is recognized that greater rigor is needed and achievable using modern statistical methods.

  17. Real-time inventory system for special nuclear material

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kuckertz, T.H.; Ethridge, C.D.; Nicholson, N.

    1979-01-01

    This paper describes a special purpose peripheral device for a minicomputer that can monitor SNM in vault storage in real time and give timely indication of any tampering with the material. This device, called a shelf monitor, is designed around a single-chip microcomputer, and can be manufactured in quantity for about $100. A typical system of shelf monitors controlled by a minicomputer is described. The minicomputer is used to acquire data associated with the weight and gamma activity of the sample of SNM under observation. Significant deviations in the weight and gamma activity are cause for a tampering alarm.

  18. Real-time inventory system for special nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuckertz, T.H.; Ethridge, C.D.; Nicholson, N.

    1979-01-01

    This paper describes a special purpose peripheral device for a minicomputer that can monitor SNM in vault storage in real time and give timely indication of any tampering with the material. This device, called a shelf monitor, is designed around a single-chip microcomputer, and can be manufactured in quantity for about $100. A typical system of shelf monitors controlled by a minicomputer is described. The minicomputer is used to acquire data associated with the weight and gamma activity of the sample of SNM under observation. Significant deviations in the weight and gamma activity are cause for a tampering alarm

  19. Material control for a reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rundquist, D.; Bray, G.; Donelson, S.; Glancy, J.; Gozani, T.; Harris, L.; McNamera, R.; Pence, D.; Ringham, M.

    1976-01-01

    Adequate control of special nuclear material (SNM) implies a basic knowledge of the quantities of SNM processed through or contained within a fuels processing facility with sufficient accuracy that diversion of the SNM for deleterious purposes can be detected in a timely manner. This report to the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) describes the primary process streams containing plutonium that are handled routinely within a spent fuel reprocessing plant and conversion facility. As an aid in implementing the objectives of the accountability system in a realistic situation, the Allied General Nuclear Services (AGNS) reprocessing plant now under construction near Barnwell, South Carolina, was chosen as the study model. The AGNS plant processes are discussed in detail emphasizing those portions of the process that contain significant quantities of plutonium. The unit processes within the separations plant, nitrate storage, plutonium product facility and the analytical laboratory are described with regard to the SNM control system currently planned for use in the facilities. A general discussion of laboratory techniques, nondestructive assay and process instrumentation for plutonium process and product material from a reprocessing plant is included. A comprehensive discussion is given of holdup measurements in plutonium recycle facilities. A brief preliminary overview is presented of alternative processing strategies for LWR fuel. An extensive review and summary of modeling efforts for liquid-liquid extraction cycles is included. A comprehensive bibliography of previous modeling efforts is covered

  20. Westinghouse Hanford Company FY 1996 Materials Management Plan (MMP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higginson, M.C.

    1995-12-01

    The safe and sound operation of facilities and the storage of nuclear material are top priorities within Hanford's environmental management, site restoration mission. The assumptions, plans and Special Nuclear Material (SNM) inventory summaries contained in this document were prepared for Department of Energy (DOE) use for interim and long- range planning. In accordance with Richland DOE field office (DOE-RL) direction, year-end inventory values were not projected over an 11 year period, as historically done in previous MMP documents. This decision was made since significant SNM movements to or from Hanford are not projected in the foreseeable future. Instead, the inventory summaries within this document reflect an ''as of date'' of June 30, 1995

  1. Mobile Pit verification system design based on passive special nuclear material verification in weapons storage facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Paul, J. N.; Chin, M. R.; Sjoden, G. E. [Nuclear and Radiological Engineering Program, George W. Woodruff School of Mechanical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 770 State St, Atlanta, GA 30332-0745 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    A mobile 'drive by' passive radiation detection system to be applied in special nuclear materials (SNM) storage facilities for validation and compliance purposes has been designed through the use of computational modeling and new radiation detection methods. This project was the result of work over a 1 year period to create optimal design specifications to include creation of 3D models using both Monte Carlo and deterministic codes to characterize the gamma and neutron leakage out each surface of SNM-bearing canisters. Results were compared and agreement was demonstrated between both models. Container leakages were then used to determine the expected reaction rates using transport theory in the detectors when placed at varying distances from the can. A 'typical' background signature was incorporated to determine the minimum signatures versus the probability of detection to evaluate moving source protocols with collimation. This established the criteria for verification of source presence and time gating at a given vehicle speed. New methods for the passive detection of SNM were employed and shown to give reliable identification of age and material for highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons grade plutonium (WGPu). The finalized 'Mobile Pit Verification System' (MPVS) design demonstrated that a 'drive-by' detection system, collimated and operating at nominally 2 mph, is capable of rapidly verifying each and every weapon pit stored in regularly spaced, shelved storage containers, using completely passive gamma and neutron signatures for HEU and WGPu. This system is ready for real evaluation to demonstrate passive total material accountability in storage facilities. (authors)

  2. Detection of SNM by delayed gamma rays from induced fission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rennhofer, H.; Crochemore, J.-M.; Roesgen, E.; Pedersen, B.

    2011-01-01

    The Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly (PUNITA) is an experimental device for research in NDA methods and field applicable instrumentation for nuclear safeguards and security applications. PUNITA incorporates a standard 14-MeV (D-T) pulsed neutron generator inside a large graphite mantle. The generator target is surrounded by a thick tungsten filter with the purpose to increase the neutron output and to tailor the neutron energy spectrum. In this configuration a sample may be exposed to a relatively high average thermal neutron flux of about (2.2±0.1)x10 3 s -1 cm -2 at only 10% of the maximum target neutron emission. The sample cavity is large enough to allow variation of the experimental setup including the fissile sample, neutron and gamma detectors, and shielding materials. The response from SNM samples of different fissile material content was investigated with various field-applicable scintillation gamma detectors such as the 3x2 in. LaBr 3 detector. Shielding in the form of tungsten and cadmium was applied to the detector to improve the signal to background ratio. Gamma and neutron shields surrounding the samples were also tested for the purpose of simulating clandestine conduct. The energy spectra of delayed gamma rays were recorded in the range 100 keV-9 MeV. In addition time spectra of delayed gamma rays in the range 3.3-8 MeV were recorded in the time period of 10 ms-120 s after the 14-MeV neutron burst. The goal of the experiment was to optimize the sample/detector configuration including the energy range and time period for SNM detection. The results show, for example, that a 170 g sample of depleted uranium can be detected with the given setup in less than 3 min of investigation. Samples of higher enrichment or higher mass are detected in much shorter time.

  3. Value-impact analysis of regulations for the nuclear industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.; Judd, B.; Huntsman, J.

    1980-01-01

    This paper summarizes a quantitative tool developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid the NRC in establishing Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) regulations for safeguarding Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Illustrative Value-Impact results of demonstrating the methodology at a facility handling SNM to evaluate alternative safeguards rules is given. The methodology developed also offers a useful framework for facility designers to choose safeguards measures that meet the NRC's criteria in a cost-effective manner. Furthermore, the methodology requires very modest computing capability and is straightforward to apply

  4. Application of controllable unit approach (CUA) to performance-criterion-based nuclear material control and accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Foster, K.W.; Rogers, D.R.

    1979-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering the use of maximum-loss performance criteria as a means of controlling SNM in nuclear plants. The Controllable Unit Approach to material control and accounting (CUA) was developed by Mound to determine the feasibility of controlling a plant to a performance criterion. The concept was tested with the proposed Anderson, SC, mixed-oxide plant, and it was shown that CUA is indeed a feasible method for controlling a complex process to a performance criterion. The application of CUA to an actual low-enrichment plant to assist the NRC in establishing performance criteria for uranium processes is discussed. 5 refs

  5. Computerized real-time materials accountability system for safeguards material control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spencer, W.F.; Affel, R.G.; Austin, H.C.; Nichols, J.P.; Stoutt, B.H.; Wachter, J.W.

    1975-01-01

    A real-time, computer-based system is described which provides safeguards material control at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Originally installed in 1972 to provide computerized real-time fissile materials accountability for criticality control purposes, the system has been expanded to provide accountability of all source and nuclear materials (SNM) and to utilize the on-line inventory files in support of the Laboratory physical protection and surveillance procedures. (auth)

  6. The Attractiveness of Materials in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles for Various Proliferation and Theft Scenarios

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, C.G.; Wallace, R.K.; Ireland, J.R.; Johnson, M.W.; Hase, Kevin R.; Jarvinen, G.D.; Ebbinghaus, B.B.; Sleaford, Brad W.; Bradley, Keith S.; Collins, Brian A.; Smith, Brian W.; Prichard, Andrew W.

    2010-01-01

    This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant state and sub-national group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.

  7. The attractiveness of materials in advanced nuclear fuel cycles for various proliferation and theft scenarios

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bathke, Charles G.; Wallace, Richard K.; Ireland, John R.; Johnson, M.W.; Hase, Kevin R.; Jarvinen, Gordon D.; Ebbinghaus, Bartley B.; Sleaford, Brad A.; Bradley, Keith S.; Collins, Brian W.; Smith, Brian W.; Prichard, Andrew W.

    2009-01-01

    This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant state and sub-national group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.

  8. Safeguards systems concepts for nuclear material transportation. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baldonado, O.C.; Kevany, M.; Rodney, D.; Pitts, D.; Mazur, M.

    1977-09-01

    The report describes the development of system concepts for the safeguarding of special strategic nuclear materials (SNM) against malevolent adversary action during the interfacility transport of the SNM. The methodology used includes techniques for defining, classifying, and analyzing adversary action sequences; defining safeguards system components; assessing the vulnerability of various safeguards systems and their component parts to the potential adversary action sequences, and conceptualizing system design requirements. The method of analysis is based primarily on a comparison of adversary actions with safeguards measures, to estimate vulnerability. Because of the paucity of the data available for assessing vulnerability, the Delphi approach was used to generate data: values were estimated in a structured exercise by a panel of experts in the safeguards and terrorist fields. It is concluded that the probability of successful attack against a truck/escort convoy manned by well-trained, well-armed personnel is low enough to discourage all but the strongest adversaries. Secrecy of operations and careful screening of personnel are very important. No reliance should be placed on current capabilities of local law enforcement agencies. The recommendation of the study is the use of road transport in the near future and air transport at a later time when the number of shipments reaches a level to justify it, and when present safety problems are resolved

  9. Microchannel plate special nuclear materials sensor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feller, W.B.; White, P.L.; White, P.B.; Siegmund, O.H.W.; Martin, A.P.; Vallerga, J.V.

    2011-01-01

    Nova Scientific Inc., is developing for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO SBIR no. HSHQDC-08-C-00190), a solid-state, high-efficiency neutron detection alternative to 3 He gas tubes, using neutron-sensitive microchannel plates (MCPs) containing 10 B and/or Gd. This work directly supports DNDO development of technologies designed to detect and interdict nuclear weapons or illicit nuclear materials. Neutron-sensitized MCPs have been shown theoretically and more recently experimentally, to be capable of thermal neutron detection efficiencies equivalent to 3 He gas tubes. Although typical solid-state neutron detectors typically have an intrinsic gamma sensitivity orders of magnitude higher than that of 3 He gas detectors, we dramatically reduce gamma sensitivity by combining a novel electronic coincidence rejection scheme, employing a separate but enveloping gamma scintillator. This has already resulted in a measured gamma rejection ratio equal to a small 3 He tube, without in principle sacrificing neutron detection efficiency. Ongoing improvements to the MCP performance as well as the coincidence counting geometry will be described. Repeated testing and validation with a 252 Cf source has been underway throughout the Phase II SBIR program, with ongoing comparisons to a small commercial 3 He gas tube. Finally, further component improvements and efforts toward integration maturity are underway, with the goal of establishing functional prototypes for SNM field testing.

  10. The role of SNM portal monitoring in the Russian MPC ampersand A program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    York, R.L.

    1997-01-01

    Controlling the movement of nuclear materials is still the most effective nonproliferation measure. Pedestrian and vehicle portal monitors have been an established tool for preventing the unauthorized movement of SNM across US nuclear facility boundaries for 15 years. Because the portals are reliable and easy to install, they are an efficient first step to improve the security at Russian nuclear facilities. The portals were first furnished to Russian facilities for testing and evaluation. After Russian technical experts gained experience with the operating parameters, the instruments were implemented at appropriate locations at each facility. This process has been executed at IPPE, VNIEF, VNIITF, RCC KI, and SKhK. The transfer of the portal monitoring technology to Russian institutes to promote the manufacture of Russian instruments is also an important goal of the program. The process was started with two portal monitor workshops attended by representatives of Russian facilities at ORNL and followed by technical collaborations at the individual Russian facilities. The success of this effort is illustrated by the recent workshop hosted by VNIIA at the SCI in Obninsk where specialists from thirty-two Russian nuclear facilities met to discuss their experience in portal monitoring. Twelve institutes and firms reported on the status of Russian designed and manufactured instruments. Details of this program will be presented in this paper

  11. Glass fiber sensors for detecting special nuclear materials at portal and monitor stations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hull, C.D.; Seymour, R.; Crawford, T.; Bliss, M.; Craig, R.A.

    2001-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards and Security Systems LLC (NucSafe) participated in the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program (ITRAP) recently conducted by the Austrian Research Center, Seibersdorf (ARCS) for IAEA, INTERPOL, and the World Customs Organization (IAEA, in press). This presentation reviews ITRAP test results of NucSafe instrumentation. NucSafe produces stationary, mobile, and hand-held systems that use neutron and gamma ray sensors to detect Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). Neutron sensors are comprised of scintillating glass fibers (trade name 'PUMA' for Pu Materials Analysis), which provide several advantages over 3 He and 10 BF 3 tubes. PUMA 6 Li glass fiber sensors offer greater neutron sensitivity and dynamic counting range with significantly less microphonic susceptibility than tubes, while eliminating transport and operational hazards. PUMA sensors also cost less per active area than gas tubes, which is important since rapid neutron detection at passenger, freight, and vehicle portals require large sensor areas to provide the required sensitivity

  12. Report on the 31st annual meeting of the Society of Nuclear Medicine (SNM), June 4-8, 1984, Los Angeles, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pfannenstiel, P.

    1984-01-01

    As the meeting of the Society of Nuclear Medicine ''SNM '84'' in Los Angeles made clear, the future of nuclear medicine lies in regional functional diagnostics in vivo, and biochemistry will in future play a dominating past in nuclear medicine, the more since all life is based on biochemical process which it is not so far possible to investigate in vivo except by means of nuclear medicine. The hopes for wider PET uses seem unrealistic. But at the PET principle is increasingly being transterred to SPECT - 'not looking for cold spots, but for function' - nuclear medicine will perhaps gain a new independent significance and nuclear medicine is badly in need of a new upswing. To achieve this goal it must emerge from its (self-inflicted) isolation and seek interdisciplinary cooperation again. For other fields can learn from nuclear medicine, and nuclear medicine can learn a lot from other fields. Following quite an impetuous development at the beginning of the 70s, nuclear medicine has now entered its 'period of maturity'. It is characterized by perfect apparatuses and a wide range of differentiated substances for radiodiagnosis offering many new possibilities of examination. The new methods are by no means 'mature' yet. If the position of nuclear medicine as a young diagnostical discipline is to be strengthened it must be repared to jettison methods that have become obsolete or for which alternative processes have been found and break interesting new ground. (orig./MG) [de

  13. Risk analysis of nuclear safeguards regulations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Altman, W.D.; Judd, B.R.

    1982-06-01

    The Aggregated Systems Model (ASM), a probabilisitic risk analysis tool for nuclear safeguards, was applied to determine benefits and costs of proposed amendments to NRC regulations governing nuclear material control and accounting systems. The objective of the amendments was to improve the ability to detect insiders attempting to steal large quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). Insider threats range from likely events with minor consequences to unlikely events with catastrophic consequences. Moreover, establishing safeguards regulations is complicated by uncertainties in threats, safeguards performance, and consequences, and by the subjective judgments and difficult trade-offs between risks and safeguards costs. The ASM systematically incorporates these factors in a comprehensive, analytical framework. The ASM was used to evaluate the effectiveness of current safeguards and to quantify the risk of SNM theft. Various modifications designed to meet the objectives of the proposed amendments to reduce that risk were analyzed. Safeguards effectiveness was judged in terms of the probability of detecting and preventing theft, the expected time to detection, and the expected quantity of SNM diverted in a year. Data were gathered in tours and interviews at NRC-licensed facilities. The assessment at each facility was begun by carefully selecting scenarios representing the range of potential insider threats. A team of analysts and facility managers assigned probabilities for detection and prevention events in each scenario. Using the ASM we computed the measures of system effectiveness and identified cost-effective safeguards modifications that met the objectives of the proposed amendments

  14. The expression of the rice (Oryza sativa L.) homologue of Snm1 is induced by DNA damages

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimura, Seisuke; Saotome, Ai; Uchiyama, Yukinobu; Mori, Yoko; Tahira, Yasue; Sakaguchi, Kengo

    2005-01-01

    We isolated and characterized the rice homologue of the DNA repair gene Snm1 (OsSnm1). The length of the cDNA was 1862 bp; the open reading frame encoded a predicted product of 485 amino acid residues with a molecular mass of 53.2 kDa. The OsSnm1 protein contained the conserved β-lactamase domain in its internal region. OsSnm1 was expressed in all rice organs. The expression was induced by MMS, H 2 O 2 , and mitomycin C, but not by UV. Transient expression of an OsSnm1/GFP fusion protein in onion epidermal cells revealed the localization of OsSnm1 to the nucleus. These results suggest that OsSnm1 is involved not only in the repair of DNA interstrand crosslinks, but also in various other DNA repair pathways

  15. Silicon nanopore membrane (SNM) for islet encapsulation and immunoisolation under convective transport

    Science.gov (United States)

    Song, Shang; Faleo, Gaetano; Yeung, Raymond; Kant, Rishi; Posselt, Andrew M.; Desai, Tejal A.; Tang, Qizhi; Roy, Shuvo

    2016-03-01

    Problems associated with islet transplantation for Type 1 Diabetes (T1D) such as shortage of donor cells, use of immunosuppressive drugs remain as major challenges. Immune isolation using encapsulation may circumvent the use of immunosuppressants and prolong the longevity of transplanted islets. The encapsulating membrane must block the passage of host’s immune components while providing sufficient exchange of glucose, insulin and other small molecules. We report the development and characterization of a new generation of semipermeable ultrafiltration membrane, the silicon nanopore membrane (SNM), designed with approximately 7 nm-wide slit-pores to provide middle molecule selectivity by limiting passage of pro-inflammatory cytokines. Moreover, the use of convective transport with a pressure differential across the SNM overcomes the mass transfer limitations associated with diffusion through nanometer-scale pores. The SNM exhibited a hydraulic permeability of 130 ml/hr/m2/mmHg, which is more than 3 fold greater than existing polymer membranes. Analysis of sieving coefficients revealed 80% reduction in cytokines passage through SNM under convective transport. SNM protected encapsulated islets from infiltrating cytokines and retained islet viability over 6 hours and remained responsive to changes in glucose levels unlike non-encapsulated controls. Together, these data demonstrate the novel membrane exhibiting unprecedented hydraulic permeability and immune-protection for islet transplantation therapy.

  16. Finding of no significant impact. Consolidation and interim storage of special nuclear material at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-06-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared an environmental assessment (EA), DOE/EA -- 1060, for the consolidation, processing, and interim storage of Category I and II special nuclear material (SNM) in Building 371 at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (hereinafter referred to as Rocky Flats or Site), Golden, Colorado. The scope of the EA included alternatives for interim storage including the no action alternative, the construction of a new facility for interim storage at Rocky Flats, and shipment to other DOE facilities for interim storage.

  17. Finding of no significant impact. Consolidation and interim storage of special nuclear material at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) has prepared an environmental assessment (EA), DOE/EA -- 1060, for the consolidation, processing, and interim storage of Category I and II special nuclear material (SNM) in Building 371 at the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (hereinafter referred to as Rocky Flats or Site), Golden, Colorado. The scope of the EA included alternatives for interim storage including the no action alternative, the construction of a new facility for interim storage at Rocky Flats, and shipment to other DOE facilities for interim storage

  18. 78 FR 71532 - Amendments to Material Control and Accounting Regulations and Proposed Guidance for Fuel Cycle...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-29

    ... Accounting Regulations and Proposed Guidance for Fuel Cycle Facility Material Control and Accounting Plans... material control and accounting (MC&A) of special nuclear material (SNM) and the proposed guidance... and how the NRC will review and inspect these plans. DATES: The public meeting will be held on...

  19. Westinghouse Hanford Company FY 1995 Materials Management Plan (MMP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higginson, M.C.

    1994-10-01

    The safe and sound operation of facilities and storage of nuclear material are top priorities within Hanford's environmental management, site restoration mission. The projected materials estimates, based on the Materials Management Plan (MMP) assumptions outlined below, were prepared for Department of Energy (DOE) use in long-range planning. The Hanford MMP covers the period FY 1995 through FY 2005, as directed by DOE. All DOE Richland Operations (RL) Office facilities are essentially funded by the Office of Transition and Facilities Management, Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM). These facilities include PUREX, the UO 3 plant, N-Reactor, T-Plant, K-Basins, FFTF, PFP and the 300 Area Fuel Fabrication facilities. Currently DP provides partial funding for the latter two facilities. Beginning in FY 1996 (in accordance with DOE-HQ MMP assumptions), EM will fund expenses related to the storage, monitoring, and safeguarding of all Special Nuclear Material (SNM) in the PFP. Ownership and costs related to movement and/or stabilization of that material will belong to EM programs (excluding NE material). It is also assumed that IAEA will take over inventory validation and surveillance of EM owned SNM at this time (FY 1996)

  20. Confirmatory measurements of special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Belew, W.L.; Williams, T.L.

    1985-01-01

    Confirmatory measurements have been considered to be interim measures until accountability measurements could be performed. When the objectives of the measurements are defined and, measurement techniques selected to attain these objectives, confirmatory type measurements can significantly increase the effectiveness of the safeguards system and in some cases may be preferred to accountability measurements for safeguards purposes. The use of fingerprint type confirmatory measurements can provide highly reliable data to ensure no diversion of SNM has occurred. These measurements can be made quickly to provide rapid assessments of SNM in shipping or storage containers. The use of fingerprint type measurements at SRP on enriched uranium shipments was shown to provide assurance at a high confidence level that no diversion of SNM could have occurred. The objective of the 10 day DOE requirement for accountability measurements is to provide a rapid assessment of SNM quantity for safeguards purposes. In cases where confirmatory or fingerprint measurements have provided assurance that no diversion has occurred, the safeguards system is not compromised by delay of the accountability measurements. The accountability measurements can then be performed for inventory purposes without undue time constraints in a more cost effective and efficient manner. 1 fig

  1. A dual neutron/gamma source for the Fissmat Inspection for Nuclear Detection (FIND) system.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Doyle, Barney Lee (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM); King, Michael; Rossi, Paolo (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM); McDaniel, Floyd Del (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM); Morse, Daniel Henry; Antolak, Arlyn J.; Provencio, Paula Polyak (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM); Raber, Thomas N.

    2008-12-01

    Shielded special nuclear material (SNM) is very difficult to detect and new technologies are needed to clear alarms and verify the presence of SNM. High-energy photons and neutrons can be used to actively interrogate for heavily shielded SNM, such as highly enriched uranium (HEU), since neutrons can penetrate gamma-ray shielding and gamma-rays can penetrate neutron shielding. Both source particles then induce unique detectable signals from fission. In this LDRD, we explored a new type of interrogation source that uses low-energy proton- or deuteron-induced nuclear reactions to generate high fluxes of mono-energetic gammas or neutrons. Accelerator-based experiments, computational studies, and prototype source tests were performed to obtain a better understanding of (1) the flux requirements, (2) fission-induced signals, background, and interferences, and (3) operational performance of the source. The results of this research led to the development and testing of an axial-type gamma tube source and the design/construction of a high power coaxial-type gamma generator based on the {sup 11}B(p,{gamma}){sup 12}C nuclear reaction.

  2. Lessons learned in streamlining the preparation of SNM standard solutions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clark, J.P.; Johnson, S.R.

    1986-01-01

    Improved safeguard measurements have produced a demand for greater quantities of reliable SNM solution standards. At the Savannah River Plant (SRP), the demand for these standards has been met by several innovations to improve the productivity and reliability of standards preparations. With the use of computer controlled balance, large batches of SNM stock solutions are prepared on a gravimetric basis. Accurately dispensed quantities of the stock solution are weighed and stored in bottles. When needed, they are quantitatively transferred to tared containers, matrix adjusted to target concentrations, weighed, and measured for density at 25 0 C. Concentrations of SNM are calculated both gravimetrically and volumetrically. Calculated values are confirmed analytically before the standards are used in measurement control program (MCP) activities. The lessons learned include: MCP goals include error identification and management. Strategy modifications are required to improve error management. Administrative controls can minimize certain types of errors. Automation can eliminate redundancy and streamline preparations. Prudence and simplicity enhance automation success. The effort expended to increase productivity has increased the reliability of standards and provided better documentation for quality assurance

  3. Buildings 104 and 142 Complex Physical Protection and Material Control and Accounting Upgrades at the Mayak Production Association

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aichele, Walter T.; Dwyer, Gregory M.; Larsen, R.; Malone, Tim

    2004-01-01

    The Federal State Unitary Enterprise Mayak Production Association (Mayak) and the U.S. Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC and A) United States Project Team (USPT) have worked together for a number of years as part of the U.S. national Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) MPC and A program to implement both Physical Protection (PP) and Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) upgrades within the Buildings 104 and 142 Complex, a long-term storage area for uranium and plutonium oxide located within Mayak's RT-1 Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant. This paper focuses on the successes and areas for improvement in the analysis, planning, construction, implementation, and completion of a complex and labor-intensive project aimed at the refurbishment of two existing, in service, long-term special nuclear material (SNM) storage buildings within a Russian SNM production facility

  4. Strategic Niche Management (SNM) beyond sustainability : an exploration of key findings of SNM through the lens of ICT and privacy

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Schilpzand, W.F.; Raven, R.P.J.M.; Est, van Q.C.

    2011-01-01

    The governance of transitions to sustainability is gaining attention. This paper discusses the approach of strategic niche management (SNM) and contributes by asking whether this approach is also useful for other types of socially desirable change. This question is addressed through a review of six

  5. Use of a SLOWPOKE-2 reactor for nuclear forensics applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Andrews, M.T.; Beames-Canivet, T.L.; Elliott, R.S.; Kelly, D.G.; Corcoran, E.C., E-mail: Emily.Corcoran@rmc.ca [Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    A low enriched uranium SLOWPOKE-2 reactor is used as a neutron interrogation source in support of the identification and characterization of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC). Small amounts of fissile uranium and plutonium are sent into a SLOWPOKE-2 irradiation site before their transport to RMCC’s delayed neutron and gamma counting (DNGC) system. The counting arrangement of the DNGC consists of an array of six {sup 3}He and a high purity germanium detector. These detectors record the delayed neutron and photon emissions as a function of count time, to verify MCNP6 simulations of delayed particle emissions, and to detect and quantify trace amounts of fissile content. This paper discusses MCNP analyses done in preparation for an upcoming nuclear forensics exercise in the fall of 2014. MCNP6 simulations of the DNGC system focussed on the identification of characteristic gamma lines from prominent fission products. The relative intensities of these gamma lines are dependent on the SNM content in the sample. Gamma line pairs useful for SNM identification in RMCC's DNGC system are presented. (author)

  6. Holdup measurement for nuclear fuel manufacturing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zucker, M.S.; Degen, M.; Cohen, I.; Gody, A.; Summers, R.; Bisset, P.; Shaub, E.; Holody, D.

    The assay of nuclear material holdup in fuel manufacturing plants is a laborious but often necessary part of completing the material balance. A range of instruments, standards, and a methodology for assaying holdup has been developed. The objectives of holdup measurement are ascertaining the amount, distribution, and how firmly fixed the SNM is. The purposes are reconciliation of material unbalance during or after a manufacturing campaign or plant decommissioning, to decide security requirements, or whether further recovery efforts are justified

  7. Nuclear fuels accounting interface: River Bend experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barry, J.E.

    1986-01-01

    This presentation describes nuclear fuel accounting activities from the perspective of nuclear fuels management and its interfaces. Generally, Nuclear Fuels-River Bend Nuclear Group (RBNG) is involved on a day-by-day basis with nuclear fuel materials accounting in carrying out is procurement, contract administration, processing, and inventory management duties, including those associated with its special nuclear materials (SNM)-isotopics accountability oversight responsibilities as the Central Accountability Office for the River Bend Station. As much as possible, these duties are carried out in an integrated, interdependent manner. From these primary functions devolve Nuclear Fuels interfacing activities with fuel cost and tax accounting. Noting that nuclear fuel tax accounting support is of both an esoteric and intermittent nature, Nuclear Fuels-RBNG support of developments and applications associated with nuclear fuel cost accounting is stressed in this presentation

  8. Material control and accounting in the Department of Energy's nuclear fuel complex

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    None

    1989-01-01

    Material control and accounting takes place within an envelope of activities related to safeguards and security, as well as to safety, health, and environment, all of which need to be managed to assure that the entire nuclear fuel complex can operate in a societally accepted manner. Within this envelope the committee was directed to carry out the following scope of work: (1) Review the MCandA systems in use at selected DOE facilities that are processing special nuclear material (SNM) in various physical and chemical forms. (2) Design and convene a workshop for senior representatives from each of DOE's facilities on the flows and inventories of nuclear materials. (3) Plan and conduct a series of site visits to each of the facilities to observe first hand the processing operations and the related MCandA systems. (4) Review the potential improvement in overall safeguard systems effectiveness, as measured by expected reduction in inventory difference control limits and inventory differences for materials balance accounts and facilities, or other criteria as appropriate. Indicate how this affects the relative degree of uncertainty in the system. (5) Review the efficiency of operating the MCandA system with and without the upgrading options and assess whether upgrading will contribute further efficiencies in operation, which may reduce many of the current operations costs. Determine if the current system is cost-effective. (6) Recommend the most promising technical approaches for further development by DOE and further study as warranted.

  9. Human SNM1B is required for normal cellular response to both DNA interstrand crosslink-inducing agents and ionizing radiation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Demuth, Ilja; Digweed, Martin; Concannon, Patrick

    2004-11-11

    DNA interstrand crosslinks (ICLs) are critical lesions for the mammalian cell since they affect both DNA strands and block transcription and replication. The repair of ICLs in the mammalian cell involves components of different repair pathways such as nucleotide-excision repair and the double-strand break/homologous recombination repair pathways. However, the mechanistic details of mammalian ICL repair have not been fully delineated. We describe here the complete coding sequence and the genomic organization of hSNM1B, one of at least three human homologs of the Saccharomyces cerevisiae PSO2 gene. Depletion of hSNM1B by RNA interference rendered cells hypersensitive to ICL-inducing agents. This requirement for hSNM1B in the cellular response to ICL has been hypothesized before but never experimentally verified. In addition, siRNA knockdown of hSNM1B rendered cells sensitive to ionizing radiation, suggesting the possibility of hSNM1B involvement in homologous recombination repair of double-strand breaks arising as intermediates of ICL repair. Monoubiquitination of FANCD2, a key step in the FANC/BRCA pathway, is not affected in hSNM1B-depleted HeLa cells, indicating that hSNM1B is probably not a part of the Fanconi anemia core complex. Nonetheless, similarities in the phenotype of hSNM1B-depleted cells and cultured cells from patients suffering from Fanconi anemia make hSNM1B a candidate for one of the as yet unidentified Fanconi anemia genes not involved in monoubiquitination of FANCD2.

  10. Upgrades for truck transportation of SNM in the Russian Federation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gardner, B.H.; Kornilovich, E.

    1998-01-01

    The goal of this project is the rapid reduction of risk to truck transportation of SNM in Russia. Enhanced protection is being accomplished by cooperation between the US Department of Energy, MINATOM of Russia, the Russian Ministry of Defense, and various Russian Institutes. This program provides an integrated program of specialized trucks that are equipped with hardened overpack (SNM vault) containers, alarm and communications systems, and armored cabs. Armored escort vehicles are also provided to increase the survivability of the guards escorting convoys. Only indigenous Russian equipment, modified and/or manufactured by Designing Bureau for Motor Vehicle Transport Equipment (KBATO), is provided under this program. The US will not provide assistance in the truck transportation arena without a commitment from the Russian facility to provide heavily armed escorts for SNM movement. Each site conducts a detailed transportation needs assessment study that is used as the basis for prioritizing assistance. The Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7) was the initial site of cooperation. The designs used at Tomsk-7 are serving as the baseline for all future vehicles modified under this program. In FY98, many vehicles systems have been ordered for various institutes. Many additional systems will be ordered in FY99

  11. Description of a Multipurpose Processing and Storage Complex for the Hanford Site's radioactive material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nyman, D.H.; Wolfe, B.A.; Hoertkorn, T.R.

    1993-05-01

    The mission of the US Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site has changed from defense nuclear materials production to that of waste management/disposal and environmental restoration. ne Multipurpose Processing and Storage Complex (MPSC) is being designed to process discarded waste tank internal hardware contaminated with mixed wastes, failed melters from the vitrification plant, and other Hanford Site high-level solid waste. The MPSC also will provide interim storage of other radioactive materials (irradiated fuel, canisters of vitrified high-level waste [HLW], special nuclear material [SNM], and other designated radioactive materials)

  12. Enviromental Development Plan: special nuclear materials production

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-07-01

    This Environmental Development Plan includes the process steps and facilities necessary for the production of plutonium and tritium for Government needs and the production of some other radioactive materials that will be used for heat and radiation sources by domestic and international customers. The production reactors and the spent fuel processing plants and their effluents are discussed, but the defense wastes from them are treated in a separate EDP. The scope does not include transportation, decontamination and decommissioning, safeguards and security, or use of the SNM products

  13. Y-12 Integrated Materials Management System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alspaugh, D. H.; Hickerson, T. W.

    2002-06-03

    The Integrated Materials Management System, when fully implemented, will provide the Y-12 National Security Complex with advanced inventory information and analysis capabilities and enable effective assessment, forecasting and management of nuclear materials, critical non-nuclear materials, and certified supplies. These capabilities will facilitate future Y-12 stockpile management work, enhance interfaces to existing National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) corporate-level information systems, and enable interfaces to planned NNSA systems. In the current national nuclear defense environment where, for example, weapons testing is not permitted, material managers need better, faster, more complete information about material properties and characteristics. They now must manage non-special nuclear material at the same high-level they have managed SNM, and information capabilities about both must be improved. The full automation and integration of business activities related to nuclear and non-nuclear materials that will be put into effect by the Integrated Materials Management System (IMMS) will significantly improve and streamline the process of providing vital information to Y-12 and NNSA managers. This overview looks at the kinds of information improvements targeted by the IMMS project, related issues, the proposed information architecture, and the progress to date in implementing the system.

  14. Y-12 Integrated Materials Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alspaugh, D. H.; Hickerson, T. W.

    2002-01-01

    The Integrated Materials Management System, when fully implemented, will provide the Y-12 National Security Complex with advanced inventory information and analysis capabilities and enable effective assessment, forecasting and management of nuclear materials, critical non-nuclear materials, and certified supplies. These capabilities will facilitate future Y-12 stockpile management work, enhance interfaces to existing National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) corporate-level information systems, and enable interfaces to planned NNSA systems. In the current national nuclear defense environment where, for example, weapons testing is not permitted, material managers need better, faster, more complete information about material properties and characteristics. They now must manage non-special nuclear material at the same high-level they have managed SNM, and information capabilities about both must be improved. The full automation and integration of business activities related to nuclear and non-nuclear materials that will be put into effect by the Integrated Materials Management System (IMMS) will significantly improve and streamline the process of providing vital information to Y-12 and NNSA managers. This overview looks at the kinds of information improvements targeted by the IMMS project, related issues, the proposed information architecture, and the progress to date in implementing the system

  15. Integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitors for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1994-01-01

    Radiation monitoring is one nuclear-safeguards measure used to protect against the theft of special nuclear materials (SNM) by pedestrians departing from SNM access areas. The integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitor is an ideal radiation monitor for the task when the SNM is plutonium. It achieves high sensitivity for detecting both bare and shielded plutonium by combining two types of radiation detector. One type is a neutron-chamber detector, comprising a large, hollow, neutron moderator that contains a single thermal-neutron proportional counter. The entrance wall of each chamber is thin to admit slow neutrons from plutonium contained in a moderating shield, while the other walls are thick to moderate fast neutrons from bare or lead-shielded plutonium so that they can be detected. The other type of detector is a plastic scintillator that is primarily for detecting gamma rays from small amounts of unshielded plutonium. The two types of detector are easily integrated by making scintillators part of the thick back wall of each neutron chamber or by inserting them into each chamber void. The authors compared the influence of the two methods of integration on detecting neutrons and gamma rays, and they examined the effectiveness of other design factors and the methods for signal detection as well

  16. Analytical chemistry needs for nuclear safeguards in nuclear fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.

    1977-01-01

    A fuel reprocessing plant designed to process 1500 tons of light water reactor fuel per year will recover 15 tons of Pu during that time, or approximately 40 to 50 kg of Pu per day. Conventional nuclear safeguards accountability has relied on batch accounting at the head and tail ends of the reprocessing plant with semi-annual plant cleanout to determine in-process holdup. An alternative proposed safeguards system relies on dynamic material accounting whereby in-line NDA and conventional analytical techniques provide indications on a daily basis of SNM transfers into the system and information of Pu holdup within the system. Some of the analytical requirements and problems for dynamic materials accounting in a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant are described. Some suggestions for further development will be proposed

  17. Advanced accounting techniques in automated fuel fabrication facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.; DeMerschman, A.W.; Engel, D.W.

    1977-01-01

    The accountability system being designed for automated fuel fabrication facilities will provide real-time information on all Special Nuclear Material (SNM) located in the facility. It will utilize a distributed network of microprocessors and minicomputers to monitor material movement and obtain nuclear materials measurements directly from remote, in-line Nondestructive Assay instrumentation. As SNM crosses an accounting boundary, the accountability computer will update the master files and generate audit trail records. Mass balance accounting techniques will be used around each unit process step, while item control will be used to account for encapsulated material, and SNM in transit

  18. Evaluating safeguards effectiveness against protracted theft of special nuclear material by insiders

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.; Sicherman, A.

    1991-01-01

    The new draft DOE Material Control and Accountability Order 5633.3 requires that facilities handling special nuclear material (SNM) evaluate their effectiveness against provided theft of SNMProtracted theft means repeated thefts of small quantities of material to accumulate a goal quanfity. To evaluate the safeguards effectiveness against pro thefts, one must addresses several issues: (1) defining relevant time frames for various threat scenarios and delayed detection safeguards: (2) identifying which safeguards come into play more than once because of repeated adversary actions or because of periodic occurrence during the theft time frame (e.g., daily administrative check on presence of material): (3) considering whether the second and subsequent applications of safeguards are different in effectiveness from the first; (4)synthesizing how physical security, material control, and material accountability safeguards combine to provide protection against protracted theft scenarios. In this paper we discuss these issues and describe how we are augmenting the Analytic System and Software for Evaluating Safeguards and Security (ASSESS) to provide the user with a tool for evaluating effectiveness against protracted theft. Currently, the Insider module of ASSESS focuses on evaluating the ''timely'' detection of abrupt theft attempts by various types of single nonviolent insiders. In this paper we describe the approach we're implementing to augment ASSESS to handle various cases of protracted theft attempts

  19. Environmental Impact Appraisal for renewal of special nuclear material license No. SNM-42 (Docket No. 70-27)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-03-01

    The Babcock and Wilcox Company (B and W) Naval Nuclear Fuel Division (NNFD) facility near Lynchburg, Virginia, produces fuel assemblies and complete fuel modules for reactors used in the US Navy nuclear propulsion program and fuel components for university and other research reactors; and processes scrap material to recover the enriched uranium content. No significant modifications of the production procedures for the US Navy nuclear fuel fabrication have been made since the previous environmental assessment, and none are anticipated during the five-year license renewal period being considered. In 1982 the fabrication of fuel assemblies for university and other research reactors was begun. This environmental assessment provides a review of the past five years of operation and an analysis of future impacts, including the effect of plant changes. The proposed action is the renewal of the license necessary for B and W to continue the existing fuel fabrication operations. Principal operations in the fabrication facility include the processing of highly enriched uranium (> 90% 235 U) into fuel elements and assembling the elements into complete reactor cores for shipment and eventual installation in US Navy facilities. The principal environmental impacts of current operation of the NNFD result from release of radioactive gases to the atmosphere and of radioactively contaminated liquids to the adjacent James River. The actual gaseous and liquid pollutants released during normal operation of the plant have been monitored and documented. The principal subjects addressed in this environmental assessment include water use, pollutant controls, environmental monitoring, and environmental impact of operation and accidents. Other site factors and plant operations necessary for this assessment are described, and aspects of insignificant impacts are identified. 10 figures, 36 tables

  20. Physical protection of special nuclear material in the commercial fuel cycle. Volume I. Executive summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-04-01

    This is the summary of the work and recommendations resulting from Sandia's participation in the Special Safeguards Study, which covered three areas: protection of SNM at fixed facilities, protection of SNM while in transit, and relocation and recovery of lost SNM. The results are published in full in five other volumes. 6 tables, 4 fig

  1. Measuring the safeguards value of material accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sicherman, A.

    1988-01-01

    Material accountability (MA) activities focus on providing after-the-fact indication of diversion or theft of special nuclear material (SNM). MA activities include maintaining records for tracking nuclear material and conducting periodic inventories and audits to ensure that loss has not occurred. This paper presents a value model concept for assessing the safeguards benefits of MA activities and for comparing these benefits to those provided by physical protection (PP) and material control (MC) components. The model considers various benefits of MA, which include: 1) providing information to assist in recovery of missing material, 2) providing assurance that physical protection and material control systems have been working, 3) defeating protracted theft attempts, and 4) properly resolving causes of and responding appropriately to anomalies of missing material and external alarms (e.g., hoax). Such a value model can aid decision-makers in allocating safeguards resources among PP, MC, and MA systems

  2. Exporting automatic vehicle SNM monitoring technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    York, R.L.; Fehlau, P.E.; Close, D.A.

    1995-01-01

    Controlling the transportation of nuclear materials is still one of the most effective nuclear proliferation barriers. The recent increase of global nuclear material proliferation has expanded the application of vehicle monitor technology to prevent the diversion of special nuclear material across international borders. To satisfy this new application, a high-sensitivity vehicle monitor, which is easy to install and capable of operating in high-traffic areas, is required. A study of a new detector configuration for a drive-through vehicle monitor is discussed in this paper

  3. New Non-Intrusive Inspection Technologies for Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ledoux, Robert J.

    2015-10-01

    Comprehensive monitoring of the supply chain for nuclear materials has historically been hampered by non-intrusive inspection systems that have such large false alarm rates that they are impractical in the flow of commerce. Passport Systems, Inc. (Passport) has developed an active interrogation system which detects fissionable material, high Z material, and other contraband in land, sea and air cargo. Passport's design utilizes several detection modalities including high resolution imaging, passive radiation detection, effective-Z (EZ-3D™) anomaly detection, Prompt Neutrons from Photofission (PNPF), and Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) isotopic identification. These technologies combine to: detect fissionable, high-Z, radioactive and contraband materials, differentiate fissionable materials from high-Z shielding materials, and isotopically identify actinides, Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), and other contraband (e.g. explosives, drugs, nerve agents). Passport's system generates a 3-D image of the scanned object which contains information such as effective-Z and density, as well as a 2-D image and isotopic and fissionable information for regions of interest.

  4. Signal estimation and change detection in tank data for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, Tom; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Howell, John; Longo, Claire E.; Hamada, Michael S.

    2011-01-01

    Process monitoring (PM) is increasingly important in nuclear safeguards as a complement to mass-balance based nuclear materials accounting (NMA). Typically, PM involves more frequent but lower quality measurements than NMA. While NMA estimates special nuclear material (SNM) mass balances and uncertainties, PM often tracks SNM attributes qualitatively or in the case of solution monitoring (SM) tracks bulk mass and volume. Automatic event marking is used in several nuclear safeguards PM systems. The aims are to locate the start and stop times and signal changes associated with key events. This paper describes results using both real and simulated SM data to quantify the errors associated with imperfect marking of start and stop times of tank events such as receipts and shipments. In the context of safeguards, one can look both forward and backward in modest time intervals to recognize events. Event marking methods evaluated include differencing, multi-scale principal component analysis using wavelets, and piecewise linear regression (PLR). All methods are evaluated on both raw and smoothed data, and several smoothing options are compared, including standard filters, hybrid filters, and local kernel smoothing. The main finding for real and simulated examples considered is that a two-step strategy is most effective. First, any reasonably effective initial smoother is used to provide a good initial guess at change point locations. Second, PLR is applied, looking for one change point at a time. In contrast, PLR that allows for multiple change points simultaneously has worse performance.

  5. VALIDATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY (MC and A) SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS TOOL (MSET) AT IDAHO NATIONAL LABORATORY (INL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meppen, Bruce; Haga, Roger; Moedl, Kelley; Bean, Tom; Sanders, Jeff; Thom, Mary Alice

    2008-01-01

    A Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) Functional Model has been developed to describe MC and A systems at facilities possessing Category I or II Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Emphasis is on achieving the objectives of 144 'Fundamental Elements' in key areas ranging from categorization of nuclear material to establishment of Material Balance Areas (MBAs), controlling access, performing quality measurements of inventories and transfers, timely reporting all activities, and detecting and investigating anomalies. An MC and A System Effectiveness Tool (MSET), including probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) technology for evaluating MC and A effectiveness and relative risk, has been developed to accompany the Functional Model. The functional model and MSET were introduced at the 48th annual International Nuclear Material Management (INMM) annual meeting in July, 20071,2. A survey/questionnaire is used to accumulate comprehensive data regarding the MC and A elements at a facility. Data is converted from the questionnaire to numerical values using the DELPHI method and exercises are conducted to evaluate the overall effectiveness of an MC and A system. In 2007 a peer review was conducted and a questionnaire was completed for a hypothetical facility and exercises were conducted. In the first quarter of 2008, a questionnaire was completed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and MSET exercises were conducted. The experience gained from conducting the MSET exercises at INL helped evaluate the completeness and consistency of the MC and A Functional Model, descriptions of fundamental elements of the MC and A Functional Model, relationship between the MC and A Functional Model and the MC and A PRA tool and usefulness of the MSET questionnaire data collection process

  6. Optimal interface between principal deterrent systems and material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deiermann, P.J.; Opelka, J.H.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to find an optimal blend between three safeguards systems for special nuclear material (SNM), the material accounting system and the physical security and material control systems. The latter two are denoted as principal deterrent systems. The optimization methodology employed is a two-stage decision algorithm, first an explicit maximization of expected diverter benefits and subsequently a minimization of expected defender costs for changes in material accounting procedures and incremental improvements in the principal deterrent systems. The probability of diverter success function dependent upon the principal deterrents and material accounting system variables is developed. Within the range of certainty of the model, existing material accounting, material control and physical security practices are justified

  7. Nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    In 1998, Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (NRA SR) performed 38 inspections, 25 of them were performed in co-operation with IAEA inspectors. There is no fresh nuclear fuel at Bohunice A-1 NPP at present. Fresh fuel of Bohunice V-1 and V-2 NPPs is inspected in the fresh fuel storage.There are 327 fresh fuel assemblies in Mochovce NPP fresh fuel storage. In addition to that, are also 71 small users of nuclear materials in Slovakia. In most cases they use: covers made of depleted uranium for non-destructive works, detection of level in production plants, covers for therapeutical sources at medical facilities. In. 1995, NRA SR issued 4 new licences for nuclear material withdrawal. In the next part manipulation with nuclear materials, spent fuel stores and illegal trafficking in nuclear materials are reported

  8. Kalman-filter model for determining block and trickle SNM losses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barlow, R.E.; Durst, M.J.; Smiriga, N.G.

    1982-07-01

    This paper describes an integrated decision procedure for deciding whether a diversion of SNM has occurred. Two possible types of diversion are considered: a block loss during a single time period and a cumulative trickle loss over several time periods. The methodology used is based on a compound Kalman filter model. Numerical examples illustrate our approach

  9. Actinide Isotope Ratios Measured by Resonance Ionization Mass Spectrometry: Optimization of Ionization Schemes and Demonstration Using Nuclear Fallout

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-12-01

    9 2. The Time -Dependent Schrödinger Equation ............................12 3. Stimulated Excitation to Bound States...response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and...SNM Special Nuclear Material TDC Time to Digital Converter Ti:Saph Titanium Sapphire TOF-MS Time -of-Flight Mass Spectrometry xvi THIS

  10. Radiation portal evaluation parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    York, R.L.

    1998-01-01

    The detection of the unauthorized movement of radioactive materials is one of the most effective nonproliferation measures. Automatic special nuclear material (SNM) portal monitors are designed to detect this unauthorized movement and are an important part of the safeguard systems at US nuclear facilities. SNM portals differ from contamination monitors because they are designed to have high sensitivity for the low energy gamma-rays associated with highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. These instruments are now being installed at international borders to prevent the spread of radioactive contamination an SNM. In this paper the parameters important to evaluating radiation portal monitors are discussed. (author)

  11. Comprehensive nuclear materials

    CERN Document Server

    Allen, Todd; Stoller, Roger; Yamanaka, Shinsuke

    2012-01-01

    Comprehensive Nuclear Materials encapsulates a panorama of fundamental information on the vast variety of materials employed in the broad field of nuclear technology. The work addresses, in five volumes, 3,400 pages and over 120 chapter-length articles, the full panorama of historical and contemporary international research in nuclear materials, from Actinides to Zirconium alloys, from the worlds' leading scientists and engineers. It synthesizes the most pertinent research to support the selection, assessment, validation and engineering of materials in extreme nuclear environments. The work discusses the major classes of materials suitable for usage in nuclear fission, fusion reactors and high power accelerators, and for diverse functions in fuels, cladding, moderator and control materials, structural, functional, and waste materials.

  12. Material Identification Technology (MIT) concept technical feasibility study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, J.L.; Harker, Y.D.; Yoon, W.Y.; Johnson, L.O.

    1993-09-01

    The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) has initiated the design and development of a novel pulsed accelerator-based, active interrogation concept. The proposed concept, referred to as the Material Identification Technology (MIT), enables rapid (between accelerator pulses), non-destructive, elemental composition analysis of both nuclear and non-nuclear materials. Applications of this technique include material monitoring in support of counter-proliferation activities, such as export controls (at domestic and international inspection locations), SNM controls, nuclear weapon dismantlement, and chemical weapon verification. Material Identification Technology combines a pulsed, X-ray source (an electron accelerator) and a gamma detection system. The accelerator must maximize neutron production (pulse width, beam current, beam energy, and repetition rate) and minimize photon dose to the object. Current available accelerator technology can meet these requirements. The detection system must include detectors which provide adequate gamma energy resolution capability, rapid recovery after the initial X-ray interrogation pulse, and multiple single gamma event detection between accelerator pulses. Further research is required to develop the detection system. This report provides the initial feasibility assessment of the MIT concept

  13. 77 FR 34093 - License Renewal for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC's

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-08

    ... Nuclear Power Plant, LLC's AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Environmental assessment and... Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant site near Lusby... Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, LLC (CCNPP) submitted an application to the NRC to renew NRC License SNM-2505...

  14. Neutron kinetics in moderators and SNM detection through epithermal-neutron-induced fissions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gozani, Tsahi, E-mail: tgmaven@gmail.com [1050 Harriet St., Palo Alto, CA 94301 (United States); King, Michael J. [Rapiscan Laboratories Inc., 520 Almanor Ave., Sunnyvale, CA 94085 (United States)

    2016-01-01

    Extension of the well-established Differential Die Away Analysis (DDAA) into a faster time domain, where more penetrating epithermal neutrons induce fissions, is proposed and demonstrated via simulations and experiments. In the proposed method the fissions stimulated by thermal, epithermal and even higher-energy neutrons are measured after injection of a narrow pulse of high-energy 14 MeV (d,T) or 2.5 MeV (d,D) source neutrons, appropriately moderated. The ability to measure these fissions stems from the inherent correlation of neutron energy and time (“E–T” correlation) during the process of slowing down of high-energy source neutrons in common moderating materials such as hydrogenous compounds (e.g., polyethylene), heavy water, beryllium and graphite. The kinetic behavior following injection of a delta-function-shaped pulse (in time) of 14 MeV neutrons into such moderators is studied employing MCNPX simulations and, when applicable, some simple “one-group” models. These calculations served as a guide for the design of a source moderator which was used in experiments. Qualitative relationships between slowing-down time after the pulse and the prevailing neutron energy are discussed. A laboratory system consisting of a 14 MeV neutron generator, a polyethylene-reflected Be moderator, a liquid scintillator with pulse-shape discrimination (PSD) and a two-parameter E–T data acquisition system was set up to measure prompt neutron and delayed gamma-ray fission signatures in a 19.5% enriched LEU sample. The measured time behavior of thermal and epithermal neutron fission signals agreed well with the detailed simulations. The laboratory system can readily be redesigned and deployed as a mobile inspection system for SNM in, e.g., cars and vans. A strong pulsed neutron generator with narrow pulse (<75 ns) at a reasonably high pulse frequency could make the high-energy neutron induced fission modality a realizable SNM detection technique.

  15. Device for separating, purifying and recovering nuclear fuel material, impurities and materials from impurity-containing nuclear fuel materials or nuclear fuel containing material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Ryuichi; Kamei, Yoshinobu; Watanabe, Tsuneo; Tanaka, Shigeru.

    1988-01-01

    Purpose: To separate, purify and recover nuclear fuel materials, impurities and materials with no formation of liquid wastes. Constitution: Oxidizing atmosphere gases are introduced from both ends of a heating furnace. Vessels containing impurity-containing nuclear fuel substances or nuclear fuel substance-containing material are continuously disposed movably from one end to the other of the heating furnace. Then, impurity oxides or material oxides selectively evaporated from the impurity-containing nuclear fuel substances or nuclear fuel substance-containing materials are entrained in the oxidizing atmosphere gas and the gases are led out externally from a discharge port opened at the intermediate portion of the heating furnace, filters are disposed to the exit to solidify and capture the nuclear fuel substances and traps are disposed behind the filters to solidify and capture the oxides by spontaneous air cooling or water cooling. (Sekiya, K.)

  16. 10 CFR 74.51 - Nuclear material control and accounting for strategic special nuclear material.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nuclear material control and accounting for strategic special nuclear material. 74.51 Section 74.51 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Formula Quantities of Strategic Special Nuclear...

  17. Neutron Multiplicity Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frame, Katherine Chiyoko [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-06-28

    Neutron multiplicity measurements are widely used for nondestructive assay (NDA) of special nuclear material (SNM). When combined with isotopic composition information, neutron multiplicity analysis can be used to estimate the spontaneous fission rate and leakage multiplication of SNM. When combined with isotopic information, the total mass of fissile material can also be determined. This presentation provides an overview of this technique.

  18. Safeguards for special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.

    1979-12-01

    Safeguards, accountability, and nuclear materials are defined. The accuracy of measuring nuclear materials is discussed. The use of computers in nuclear materials accounting is described. Measures taken to physically protect nuclear materials are described

  19. Thermodynamics of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Full text: The science of chemical thermodynamics has substantially contributed to the understanding of the many problems encountered in nuclear and reactor technology. These problems include reaction of materials with their surroundings and chemical and physical changes of fuels. Modern reactor technology, by its very nature, has offered new fields of investigations for the scientists and engineers concerned with the design of nuclear fuel elements. Moreover, thermodynamics has been vital in predicting the behaviour of new materials for fission as well as fusion reactors. In this regard, the Symposium was organized to provide a mechanism for review and discussion of recent thermodynamic investigations of nuclear materials. The Symposium was held in the Juelich Nuclear Research Centre, at the invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The International Atomic Energy Agency has given much attention to the thermodynamics of nuclear materials, as is evidenced by its sponsorship of four international symposia in 1962, 1965, 1967, and 1974. The first three meetings were primarily concerned with the fundamental thermodynamics of nuclear materials; as with the 1974 meeting, this last Symposium was primarily aimed at the thermodynamic behaviour of nuclear materials in actual practice, i.e., applied thermodynamics. Many advances have been made since the 1974 meeting, both in fundamental and applied thermodynamics of nuclear materials, and this meeting provided opportunities for an exchange of new information on this topic. The Symposium dealt in part with the thermodynamic analysis of nuclear materials under conditions of high temperatures and a severe radiation environment. Several sessions were devoted to the thermodynamic studies of nuclear fuels and fission and fusion reactor materials under adverse conditions. These papers and ensuing discussions provided a better understanding of the chemical behaviour of fuels and materials under these

  20. The regulations concerning refining business of nuclear source material and nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The regulations are provided for under the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors and provisions concerning refining business in the enforcement order for the law. The basic concepts and terms are defined, such as: exposure dose, accumulative dose; controlled area; inspected surrounding area and employee. Refining facilities listed in the application for designation shall be classified into clushing and leaching, thickning, refining facilities, storage facilities of nuclear source materials and nuclear fuel materials, disposal facilities of contaminated substances and building for refining, etc. Business program attached to the application shall include expected time of beginning of refining, estimated production amount of nuclear source materials or nuclear fuel materials for the first three years and funds necessary for construction, etc. Records shall be made and kept for particular periods on delivery and storage of nuclear source materials and nuclear fuel materials, control of radiation, maintenance and accidents of refining facilities. Safety securing, application of internationally regulated substances and measures in dangerous situations are stipulated respectively. Exposure dose of employees and other specified matters shall be reported by the refiner yearly to the Director General of Science and Technology Agency and the Minister of International Trade and Industry. (Okada, K.)

  1. 77 FR 28407 - Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-05-14

    ... and Management System (ADAMS): You may access publicly-available documents online in the NRC Library... revised ANSI N15.8 in February 2009. ANSI N15.8-2009 provides guidance on the fundamentals of an SNM...

  2. Termination of Safeguards on ULWBR Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ivan R. Thomas; Ernest L. Laible

    2008-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Management, has approved the disposition of 31 metric tons of Unirradiated Light Water Breeder Reactor (ULWBR) material in canisters stored within dry wells of the Underground Fuel Storage Facility at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC). This unirradiated material consists primarily of ceramic pellets of thorium oxide in stainless steel cladding, but it also contains 300 kilograms of uranium that is 98 wt% U-233. The ULWBR material was not processed at the INTEC because it was incompatible with prior chemical separation schemes. Other economical recovery options have not been identified, and expressions of interest for consolidating the material with existing projects at other DOE sites have not been received. The U-233 could be used for producing the medical isotope Actinium-225, but the proof-of-principle demonstration and follow-on pilot program have not been developed to the point of requiring production quantities of U-233. Consequently, the selected disposition of the ULWBR material was burial as Low Level Waste at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which required terminating safeguards controls for the contained Category II quantity of Attractiveness Level D special nuclear material (SNM). The requested termination followed the twelve point evaluation criteria of the Historical Defense Program Discard Guidance and included a security analysis for evaluating the risks of theft, diversion, and radiological sabotage associated with the material. Continuity of knowledge in the book inventory was assured by documenting that the original shipper's measurements accurately reflected the quantities of materials received and that the ULWBR materials had remained under adequate physical protection and had been subject to periodic physical inventories. The method selected for substantiating the book values as the basis for terminating safeguards was the nondestructive assay used during physical

  3. Nuclear material control systems for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-06-01

    Paragraph 70.51(c) of 10 CFR Part 70 requires each licensee who is authorized to possess at any one time special nuclear material in a quantity exceeding one effective kilogram to establish, maintain, and follow written material control and accounting procedures that are sufficient to enable the licensee to account for the special nuclear material in his possession under license. While other paragraphs and sections of Part 70 provide specific requirements for nuclear material control systems for fuel cycle plants, such detailed requirements are not included for nuclear power reactors. This guide identifies elements acceptable to the NRC staff for a nuclear material control system for nuclear power reactors. (U.S.)

  4. The regulations concerning refining business of nuclear source material and nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This rule is established under the provisions concerning refining business in the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and nuclear reactors and the ordinance for the execution of this law, and to enforce them. Basic terms are defined, such as: exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding monitoring area and worker. The application for the designation for refining business under the law shall be classified into the facilities for crushing and leaching-filtration, thikening, and refining, the storage facilities for nuclear raw materials and nuclear fuel materials, and the disposal facilities for radioactive wastes, etc. To the application, shall be attached business plans, the explanations concerning the technical abilities of applicants and the prevention of hazards by nuclear raw materials and nuclear fuel materials regarding refining facilities, etc. Records shall be made on the accept, delivery and stock of each kind of nuclear raw materials and nuclear fuel materials, radiation control, the maintenance of and accidents in refining facilities, and kept for specified periods, respectively. Security regulations shall be enacted for each works or enterprise on the functions and organizations of persons engaged in the control of refining facilities, the operation of the apparatuses which must be controlled for the prevention of accidents, and the establishment of control area and surrounding monitoring area, etc. The report on the usage of internationally regulated goods and the measures taken at the time of danger are defined particularly. (Okada, K.)

  5. Decree of the 27. July 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2001-01-01

    The decree of the 27. July 2001 defines the organization of nuclear safety concerning nuclear military systems (SNM) and secret basic nuclear installations (INBS). The responsibility of nuclear safety is shared between 3 authorities: 1) the synthetic authority, this authority defines the organization required to reach and maintain the adequate level of safety set by the ministry of defence, the synthetic authority can change according to the state in which SNM or INBS is (designing, fabrication, operation and dismantling); 2) the authority that is responsible for the material and staff resources that are required to operate the SNM or INBS according to the rules and regulations of nuclear safety; and 3) the military territorial authority, this authority manages the actions made by the state services concerning the prevention of accidents, or the measures to take in case of accidents. (A.C.)

  6. 10 CFR 74.41 - Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of moderate strategic...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance. 74.41 Section 74.41 Energy NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (CONTINUED) MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL Special Nuclear Material...

  7. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances, August 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    Contents include: Issuances of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission--Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), Metropolitan Edison Company, et al. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Export of LEU to the Philippines); Issuances of Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards--Duke Power Company (Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773--Transportation of Spent Fuel from Oconee Nuclear Station for Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station); Issuances of the Atomic Safety Licensing Boards--Commonwealth Edison Company (Byron Station, Units 1 and 2), Dairyland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor, Operating License and Show Cause), Florida Power and Light Company (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2), Florida Power and Light Company (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4), Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1) Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), The Regents of the University of California (UCLA Research Reactor), The Toledo Edison Company, et al. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3: Terminiation of Proceedings); Issuances of the Directors Denial--Florida Power and Light Company

  8. Material discrimination using scattering and stopping of cosmic ray muons and electrons: Differentiating heavier from lighter metals as well as low-atomic weight materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blanpied, Gary; Kumar, Sankaran; Dorroh, Dustin; Morgan, Craig; Blanpied, Isabelle; Sossong, Michael; McKenney, Shawn; Nelson, Beth

    2015-06-01

    Reported is a new method to apply cosmic-ray tomography in a manner that can detect and characterize not only dense assemblages of heavy nuclei (like Special Nuclear Materials, SNM) but also assemblages of medium- and light-atomic-mass materials (such as metal parts, conventional explosives, and organic materials). Characterization may enable discrimination between permitted contents in commerce and contraband (explosives, illegal drugs, and the like). Our Multi-Mode Passive Detection System (MMPDS) relies primarily on the muon component of cosmic rays to interrogate Volumes of Interest (VOI). Muons, highly energetic and massive, pass essentially un-scattered through materials of light atomic mass and are only weakly scattered by conventional metals used in industry. Substantial scattering and absorption only occur when muons encounter sufficient thicknesses of heavy elements characteristic of lead and SNM. Electrons are appreciably scattered by light elements and stopped by sufficient thicknesses of materials containing medium-atomic-mass elements (mostly metals). Data include simulations based upon GEANT and measurements in the HMT (Half Muon Tracker) detector in Poway, CA and a package scanner in both Poway and Socorro NM. A key aspect of the present work is development of a useful parameter, designated the “stopping power” of a sample. The low-density regime, comprising organic materials up to aluminum, is characterized using very little scattering but a strong variation in stopping power. The medium-to-high density regime shows a larger variation in scattering than in stopping power. The detection of emitted gamma rays is another useful signature of some materials.

  9. Material discrimination using scattering and stopping of cosmic ray muons and electrons: Differentiating heavier from lighter metals as well as low-atomic weight materials

    Science.gov (United States)

    Blanpied, Gary; Kumar, Sankaran; Dorroh, Dustin; Morgan, Craig; Blanpied, Isabelle; Sossong, Michael; McKenney, Shawn; Nelson, Beth

    2015-06-01

    Reported is a new method to apply cosmic-ray tomography in a manner that can detect and characterize not only dense assemblages of heavy nuclei (like Special Nuclear Materials, SNM) but also assemblages of medium- and light-atomic-mass materials (such as metal parts, conventional explosives, and organic materials). Characterization may enable discrimination between permitted contents in commerce and contraband (explosives, illegal drugs, and the like). Our Multi-Mode Passive Detection System (MMPDS) relies primarily on the muon component of cosmic rays to interrogate Volumes of Interest (VOI). Muons, highly energetic and massive, pass essentially un-scattered through materials of light atomic mass and are only weakly scattered by conventional metals used in industry. Substantial scattering and absorption only occur when muons encounter sufficient thicknesses of heavy elements characteristic of lead and SNM. Electrons are appreciably scattered by light elements and stopped by sufficient thicknesses of materials containing medium-atomic-mass elements (mostly metals). Data include simulations based upon GEANT and measurements in the HMT (Half Muon Tracker) detector in Poway, CA and a package scanner in both Poway and Socorro NM. A key aspect of the present work is development of a useful parameter, designated the "stopping power" of a sample. The low-density regime, comprising organic materials up to aluminum, is characterized using very little scattering but a strong variation in stopping power. The medium-to-high density regime shows a larger variation in scattering than in stopping power. The detection of emitted gamma rays is another useful signature of some materials.

  10. 77 FR 59994 - Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., Erwin, TN; Issuance of License Renewal

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-10-01

    ... Environmental Assessment). If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the... NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 70-143; NRC-2009-0435] Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc... No. SNM-124, to Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (the licensee), which authorizes the licensee to continue...

  11. Auditing nuclear materials statements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1973-01-01

    A standard that may be used as a guide for persons making independent examinations of nuclear materials statements or reports regarding inventory quantities on hand, receipts, production, shipment, losses, etc. is presented. The objective of the examination of nuclear materials statements by the independent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which the statements present the nuclear materials position of a nuclear materials facility and the movement of such inventory materials for the period under review. The opinion is based upon an examination made in accordance with auditing criteria, including an evaluation of internal control, a test of recorded transactions, and a review of measured discards and materials unaccounted for (MUF). The standard draws heavily upon financial auditing standards and procedures published by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

  12. Study of the prompt gamma ray signal from fissions in special nuclear materials induced using an associated particle neutron generator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koltick, D. S.; Kane, S. Z.

    2009-01-01

    More than 42 million cargo containers entered the United States in 2005. To search for a few kilograms of special nuclear material (SNM) within this vast stream of cargo, an inspection system based on neutron-induced fission followed by the coincident detection of multiple prompt fission gamma rays is investigated using MCNP-Polimi code. The system utilizes two deuterium-tritium (DT) associated particle neutron generators, each capable of 10 9 neutrons/s at 14.1 MeV, with sub-nanosecond timing resolution ZnO:Ga alpha detectors internal to the generator. Because prompt fission signals are approximately 100 times stronger than the delayed signals, the neutron flux is greatly reduced compared to 10 11-12 neutrons/s required for systems based on delayed signals such as the 'nuclear car wash' [4]. In addition the system utilizes 30 cm deep liquid krypton (LKr) noble gas detectors having 94% detection efficiency for 1 MeV gamma rays, high solid angle coverage (∼ 50% of the total solid angle), and sub-nanosecond timing resolution (∼ 600 ps). An algorithm for distinguishing U-235 from U-238 is presented. (authors)

  13. Protection and control of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jalouneix, J.; Winter, D.

    2007-01-01

    In the framework of the French regulation on nuclear materials possession, the first liability is the one of operators who have to know at any time the quantity, quality and localization of any nuclear material in their possession. This requires an organization of the follow up and of the inventory of these materials together with an efficient protection against theft or sabotage. The French organization foresees a control of the implementation of this regulation at nuclear facilities and during the transport of nuclear materials by the minister of industry with the sustain of the institute of radiation protection and nuclear safety (IRSN). This article presents this organization: 1 - protection against malevolence; 2 - national protection and control of nuclear materials: goals, administrative organization, legal and regulatory content (authorization, control, sanctions), nuclear materials protection inside facilities (physical protection, follow up and inventory, security studies), protection of nuclear material transports (physical protection, follow up), control of nuclear materials (inspection at facilities, control of nuclear material measurements, inspection of nuclear materials during transport); 3 - international commitments of France: non-proliferation treaty, EURATOM regulation, international convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials, enforcement in France. (J.S.)

  14. Progress report on installing DYMCAS in the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mee, W.T.

    1979-01-01

    A material control and accountability system to assist in detecting diversion of special nuclear materials (SNM) was being considered by the management of the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant in early 1975. The Dynamic Special Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability System (DYMCAS) is the product of these considerations. The evolution of computerized accountability systems for near real-time accounting of SNM will revolutionize the activities for operations and accountability departments in Y-12. The advancement of nondestructive analysis equipment with a capability for real-time input of accounting data is becoming a reality. The progress of installing the DYMCAS in a large plant processing unirradiated enriched uranium is described

  15. The nuclear materials contraband

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, P.; Woessner, P.

    1996-01-01

    Several seizures of nuclear materials carried by contraband have been achieved. Some countries or criminal organizations could manufacture atomic bombs and use them. This alarming situation is described into details. Only 40% of drugs are seized by the American police and probably less in western Europe. The nuclear materials market is smaller than the drugs'one but the customs has also less experience to intercept the uranium dispatch for instance more especially as the peddlers are well organized. A severe control of the international transports would certainly allow to seize a large part of nuclear contraband materials but some dangerous isotopes as uranium 235 or plutonium 239 are little radioactive and which prevents their detection by the Geiger-Mueller counters. In France, some regulations allow to control the materials used to manufacture the nuclear weapons, and diminish thus the risk of a nuclear materials contraband. (O.L.). 4 refs., 2 figs

  16. Control of Nuclear Materials and Special Equipment (Nuclear Safety Regulations)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cizmek, A.; Prah, M.; Medakovic, S.; Ilijas, B.

    2008-01-01

    Based on Nuclear Safety Act (OG 173/03) the State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS) in 2008 adopted beside Ordinance on performing nuclear activities (OG 74/06) and Ordinance on special conditions for individual activities to be performed by expert organizations which perform activities in the area of nuclear safety (OG 74/06) the new Ordinance on the control of nuclear material and special equipment (OG 15/08). Ordinance on the control of nuclear material and special equipment lays down the list of nuclear materials and special equipment as well as of nuclear activities covered by the system of control of production of special equipment and non-nuclear material, the procedure for notifying the intention to and filing the application for a license to carry out nuclear activities, and the format and contents of the forms for doing so. This Ordinance also lays down the manner in which nuclear material records have to be kept, the procedure for notifying the State administration organization (regulatory body) responsible for nuclear safety by the nuclear material user, and the keeping of registers of nuclear activities, nuclear material and special equipment by the State administration organization (regulatory body) responsible for nuclear safety, as well as the form and content of official nuclear safety inspector identification card and badge.(author)

  17. Development and implementation of attractiveness Level E criteria and the plutonium disposition methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, D.C.; Robinson, M.A.

    1998-03-01

    Historically, the Department of Energy used the Economic Discard Limits (EDLs), those Special Nuclear Material (SNM) concentrations in residue matrices below which production of new SNM was more economic than SNM recovery, as a basis for discard decisions. In 1994, a joint team from DOE Defense Programs (DP) and Environmental Management (EM) determined that the EDLs were no longer a valid discriminator and directed that SNM disposition consider instead 12 specific criteria, foremost of which are waste minimization, environmental impacts, safety, proliferation concerns, and cost. In response, the Los Alamos National Laboratory developed a technical basis for determining SNM bearing materials unattractive for proliferation purposes and a quantitative method for predicting materials disposition consequences as a basis for decision making called the plutonium disposition methodology. The objective of attractiveness Level E criteria is to insure that waste is unattractive for proliferation or terrorist purposes. Level E criteria is about 0.17 kg Pu per 208 liter drum (requiring diversion of a minimum of 54 drums, assuming 100% recovery efficiency)

  18. Illicit diversion of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bett, F.L.

    1975-08-01

    This paper discusses the means of preventing illegal use of nuclear material by terrorists or other sub-national groups and by governments. With respect to sub-national groups, it concludes that the preventive measures of national safeguards systems, when taken together with the practical difficulties of using nuclear material, would make the diversion and illegal use of nuclear material unattractive in comparison with other avenues open to these groups to attain their ends. It notes that there are only certain areas in the nuclear fuel cycle, e.g. production of some types of nuclear fuel embodying highly enriched uranium and shipment of strategically significant nuclear material, which contain material potentially useful to these groups. It also discusses the difficult practical problems, e.g. coping with radiation, which would face the groups in making use of the materials for terrorist purposes. Concerning illegal use by Governments, the paper describes the role of international safeguards, as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the real deterrent effect of these safeguards which is achieved through the requirements to maintain comprehensive operating records of the use of nuclear material and by regular inspections to verify these records. The paper makes the point that Australia would not consider supplying nuclear material unless it were subject to international safeguards. (author)

  19. Physics and technology of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ursu, I.

    1985-01-01

    The subject is covered in chapters, entitled; elements of nuclear reactor physics; structure and properties of materials (including radiation effects); fuel materials (uranium, plutonium, thorium); structural materials (including - aluminium, zirconium, stainless steels, ferritic steels, magnesium alloys, neutron irradiation induced changes in the mechanical properties of structural materials); moderator materials (including - nuclear graphite, natural (light) water, heavy water, beryllium, metal hydrides); materials for reactor reactivity control; coolant materials; shielding materials; nuclear fuel elements; nuclear material recovery from irradiated fuel and recycling; quality control of nuclear materials; materials for fusion reactors (thermonuclear fusion reaction, physical processes in fusion reactors, fuel materials, materials for blanket and cooling system, structural materials, materials for magnetic devices, specific problems of material irradiation). (U.K.)

  20. Nuclear car wash status report, August 2005

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prussin, S; Slaughter, D; Pruet, J; Descalle, M; Bernstein, A; Hall, J; Accatino, M; Alford, O; Asztalos, S; Church, J; Loshak, A; Madden, N; Manatt, D; Moore, T; Norman, E; Petersen, D

    2005-01-01

    A large majority of US imports arrive at seaports in maritime cargo containers. The number of containers arriving is nearly 10 million per year, each with a cargo of up to 30 tons of various materials. This provides a vulnerable entry point for the importation of a nuclear weapon or its components by a terrorist group. Passive radiation sensors are being deployed at portals to detect radioactive material and portable instruments are carried by port personnel to augment detection. Those instruments can detect the neutrons and g-rays produced by 240 Pu that is normally present in weapons grade plutonium in cases where cargo overburden is not too great. However, 235 U produces almost no neutron output in its normal radioactive decay and its principal γ-radiation is at 186 keV and is readily attenuated by small amounts of wood or packing materials. Impurities such as 232 U, often present in reactor irradiated material at the 100-200 ppt level, can provide a detectable signal through significant cargo overburden but the wide variations among samples of HEU make this an unreliable means of detecting SNM. High quality radiography may be useful in determining that the majority of containers are clearly free of SNM. However, some containers will lead to ambiguous results from radiography and passive radiation sensing. For these reasons active neutron interrogation is proposed as a means to produce fission and thus greatly amplify the radiation output of fissionable material to facilitate its reliable detection even when well shielded by large cargo overburden. Historically, the fission signature utilized as the unique identifying feature of fissionable materials is the detection of delayed neutrons. However, these neutrons have very low yield ∼ 0.017 per fission in 235 U, and their low energy results in very poor penetration of hydrogenous materials such as fuels, water, wood, or agricultural products. That signature alone does not provide reliable detection in thick

  1. The regulations concerning refining business of nuclear source material and nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    Regulations specified here cover application for designation of undertakings of refining (spallation and eaching filtration facilities, thickening facilities, refining facilities, nuclear material substances or nuclear fuel substances storage facilities, waste disposal facilities, etc.), application for permission for alteration (business management plan, procurement plan, fund raising plan, etc.), application for approval of merger (procedure, conditions, reason and date of merger, etc.), submission of report on alteration (location, structure, arrangements processes and construction plan for refining facilities, etc.), revocation of designation, rules for records, rules for safety (personnel, organization, safety training for employees, handling of important apparatus and tools, monitoring and removal of comtaminants, management of radioactivity measuring devices, inspection and testing, acceptance, transport and storage of nuclear material and fuel, etc.), measures for emergency, submission of report on abolition of an undertaking, submission of report on disorganization, measures required in the wake of revocation of designation, submission of information report (exposure to radioactive rays, stolen or missing nuclear material or nuclear fuel, unusual leak of nuclear fuel or material contaminated with nuclear fuel), etc. (Nogami, K.)

  2. Global nuclear material control model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.A.

    1996-01-01

    The nuclear danger can be reduced by a system for global management, protection, control, and accounting as part of a disposition program for special nuclear materials. The development of an international fissile material management and control regime requires conceptual research supported by an analytical and modeling tool that treats the nuclear fuel cycle as a complete system. Such a tool must represent the fundamental data, information, and capabilities of the fuel cycle including an assessment of the global distribution of military and civilian fissile material inventories, a representation of the proliferation pertinent physical processes, and a framework supportive of national or international perspective. They have developed a prototype global nuclear material management and control systems analysis capability, the Global Nuclear Material Control (GNMC) model. The GNMC model establishes the framework for evaluating the global production, disposition, and safeguards and security requirements for fissile nuclear material

  3. Absolute nuclear material assay

    Science.gov (United States)

    Prasad, Manoj K [Pleasanton, CA; Snyderman, Neal J [Berkeley, CA; Rowland, Mark S [Alamo, CA

    2010-07-13

    A method of absolute nuclear material assay of an unknown source comprising counting neutrons from the unknown source and providing an absolute nuclear material assay utilizing a model to optimally compare to the measured count distributions. In one embodiment, the step of providing an absolute nuclear material assay comprises utilizing a random sampling of analytically computed fission chain distributions to generate a continuous time-evolving sequence of event-counts by spreading the fission chain distribution in time.

  4. Incorporation of an item/material attribute system into PAMTRAK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anspach, D.A.; Waddoups, I.G.; Fox, E.T.

    1994-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) mission is changing due to the number of nuclear weapon reductions by the United States and the former Soviet Union with long-term storage requirements for DOE sites increasing. New technology to ensure the integrity of special nuclear material (SNM) in storage is available to sites to supplement manual physical inventories. This allows them to decrease operating costs while keeping radiation exposure at minimal levels. We have developed a generic, real time, personnel tracking and material monitoring system named PAMTRAK. Such a system can significantly reduce the number of required, manual physical inventories at DOE sites while increasing assurance that an insider has not diverted or stolen material. Until recently Pamtrak used only material monitoring devices that provided location/containment attributes. However, Westinghouse Electric Corp. and Metrox, Inc. have recently developed hard-wired item/material attribute systems that monitor both temperature and weight. We have incorporated both of these systems into PAMTRAK. If a site employed one of these item/material attribute systems, it could decrease its manual inventory frequency to three years. This paper describes how a site might implement such a system to meet the DOE's requirements

  5. Physics and technology of nuclear materials

    CERN Document Server

    Ursu, Ioan

    2015-01-01

    Physics and Technology of Nuclear Materials presents basic information regarding the structure, properties, processing methods, and response to irradiation of the key materials that fission and fusion nuclear reactors have to rely upon. Organized into 12 chapters, this book begins with selectively several fundamentals of nuclear physics. Subsequent chapters focus on the nuclear materials science; nuclear fuel; structural materials; moderator materials employed to """"slow down"""" fission neutrons; and neutron highly absorbent materials that serve in reactor's power control. Other chapters exp

  6. Automation in a material processing/storage facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peterson, K.; Gordon, J.

    1997-01-01

    The Savannah River Site (SRS) is currently developing a new facility, the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF), to process and store legacy materials from the United States nuclear stockpile. A variety of materials, with a variety of properties, packaging and handling/storage requirements, will be processed and stored at the facility. Since these materials are hazardous and radioactive, automation will be used to minimize worker exposure. Other benefits derived from automation of the facility include increased throughput capacity and enhanced security. The diversity of materials and packaging geometries to be handled poses challenges to the automation of facility processes. In addition, the nature of the materials to be processed underscores the need for safety, reliability and serviceability. The application of automation in this facility must, therefore, be accomplished in a rational and disciplined manner to satisfy the strict operational requirements of the facility. Among the functions to be automated are the transport of containers between process and storage areas via an Automatic Guided Vehicle (AGV), and various processes in the Shipping Package Unpackaging (SPU) area, the Accountability Measurements (AM) area, the Special Isotope Storage (SIS) vault and the Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) vault. Other areas of the facility are also being automated, but are outside the scope of this paper

  7. Determination of internationally controlled materials according to provisions of the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The internationally controlled materials determined according to the law for nuclear source materials, etc. are the following: nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials, moderating materials, facilities including reactors, etc. sold, transferred, etc. to Japan according to the agreements for peaceful uses of atomic energy between Japan, and the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and France by the respective governments and those organs under them; nuclear fuel materials resulting from usage of the above sold and transferred materials, facilities; nuclear fuel materials sold to Japan according to agreements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency; nuclear fuel materials involved with the safeguards in nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty with IAEA. (Mori, K.)

  8. Segmented gamma scanning method for measuring holdup in the spherical container

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deng Jingshan; Li Ze; Gan Lin; Lu Wenguang; Dong Mingli

    2007-01-01

    Some special nuclear material (SNM) is inevitably deposited in the facilities (mixer, reactor) of nuclear material process line. Exactly knowing the quantity of nuclear material holdup is very important for nuclear material accountability and critical safety. This paper presents segmented gamma scanning method for SNM holdup measurement of spherical container, at the left, right and back of which other equipments exist so that the detectors can be put at the only front of container for measurement. The nuclear material deposited in the spherical container can be looked as spherical shell source, which is divided into many layers. The detectors scanning spherical shell source are moved layer by layer from the top to the bottom to obtain projection data, with which deposited material distribution can be reconstructed by using Least Square (LS) method or Maximum Likelihood (ML) method. With these methods accurate total holdup can be obtained by summing up all the segmental values reconstructed. In this paper this measurement method for holdup in the spherical container was verified with Monte-Carlo simulation calculation and experiment. (authors)

  9. INEL integrated spent nuclear fuel consolidation task team report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henry, R.N.; Clark, J.H.; Chipman, N.A.

    1994-01-01

    This document describes a draft plan and schedule to consolidate spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and special nuclear material (SNW) from aging storage facilities throughout the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) in a safe, cost-effective, and expedient manner. A fully integrated and resource-loaded schedule was developed to achieve consolidation as soon as possible. All of the INEL SNF and SNM management task, projects, and related activities from fiscal year 1994 to the end of the consolidation period are logic-tied and integrated with each other. The schedule and plan are presented to initiate discussion of their implementation, which is expected to generate alternate concepts that can be evaluated using the methodology described in this report. Three perturbations to consolidating SNF as soon as possible are also explored. If the schedule is executed as proposed, the new and on-going consolidation activities will require about 6 years to complete and about $25.3M of additional funding. Reduced annual operating costs are expected to recover the additional investment in about 6.4 years. The total consolidation program as proposed will cost about $66.8M and require about 6 years to recover via reduced operating costs from retired SNF/SNM storage facilities. Detailed schedules and cost estimates for the Test Reactor Area Materials Test Reactor canal transfers are included as an example of the level of detail that is typical of the entire schedule (see Appendix D). The remaining work packages for each of the INEL SNF consolidation transfers are summarized in this document. Detailed cost and resource information is available upon request for any of the SNF consolidation transfers

  10. Characterization of depleted uranium oxides fabricated using different processing methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hastings, E.P.; Lewis, C.; FitzPatrick, J.; Rademacher, D.; Tandon, L.

    2008-01-01

    Identifying both physical and chemical characteristics of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) production processes is the corner stone of nuclear forensics. Typically, processing markers are based on measuring an interdicted sample's bulk chemical properties, such as the elemental or isotopic composition, or focusing on the chemical and physical morphology of only a few particles. Therefore, it is imperative that known SNM processes be fully characterized from bulk to trace level for each particle size range. This report outlines a series of particle size measurements and fractionation techniques that can be applied to a bulk SNM powders, categorizing both chemical and physical properties in discrete particle size fractions. This will be demonstrated by characterizing the process signatures of a series of different depleted uranium oxides prepared at increasing firing temperatures (350-1100 deg C). Results will demonstrate how each oxides' material density, particle size distribution, and morphology varies. (author)

  11. Professional Nuclear Materials Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forcella, A.A.; O'Leary, W.J.

    1966-01-01

    This paper describes the scope of nuclear materials management for a typical power reactor in the United States of America. Since this power reactor is financed by private capital, one of the principal obligations of the reactor operator is to ensure that the investment is protected and will furnish an adequate financial return. Because of the high intrinsic value of nuclear materials, appropriate security and accountability must be continually exercised to minimize losses beyond security and accountability for the nuclear materials. Intelligent forethought and planning must be employed to ensure that additional capital is not lost as avoidable additional costs or loss of revenue in a number of areas. The nuclear materials manager must therefore provide in advance against the following contingencies and maintain constant control or liaison against deviations from planning during (a) pre-reactor acquisition of fuel and fuel elements, (b) in-reactor utilization of the fuel elements, and (c) post-reactor recovery of fuel values. During pre-reactor planning and operations, it is important that the fuel element be designed for economy in manufacture, handling, shipping, and replaceability. The time schedule for manufacturing operations must minimize losses of revenue from unproductive dead storage of high cost materials. For in-reactor operations, the maximum achievable burn-up of the fissionable material must be obtained by means of appropriate fuel rearrangement schemes. Concurrently the unproductive down-time of the reactor for fuel rearrangement, inspections, and the like must be minimized. In the post-reactor period, when the fuel has reached a predetermined depletion of fissionable material, the nuclear materials manager must provide for the most economical reprocessing and recovery of fissionable values and by-products. Nuclear materials management is consequently an essential factor in achieving competitive fuel cycle and unit energy costs with power reactors

  12. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  13. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  14. Functional Design Criteria - plutonium stabilization and handling (PUSH) project W-460

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NELSON, D.W.

    1999-01-01

    This Functional Design Criteria (FDC) contains information to guide the design of the Stabilization and Packaging Equipment necessary to oxidize and package the remaining plutonium-bearing Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) currently in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) inventory. The FDC also guides the design of vault modifications to allow storage of 3013 packages of stabilized SNM for up to 50 years

  15. Functional Design Criteria plutonium stabilization and handling (PUSH) project W-460

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NELSON, D.W.

    1999-09-02

    This Functional Design Criteria (FDC) contains information to guide the design of the Stabilization and Packaging Equipment necessary to oxidize and package the remaining plutonium-bearing Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) currently in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) inventory. The FDC also guides the design of vault modifications to allow storage of 3013 packages of stabilized SNM for up to 50 years.

  16. Nuclear materials management storage study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Becker, G.W. Jr.

    1994-02-01

    The Office of Weapons and Materials Planning (DP-27) requested the Planning Support Group (PSG) at the Savannah River Site to help coordinate a Departmental complex-wide nuclear materials storage study. This study will support the development of management strategies and plans until Defense Programs' Complex 21 is operational by DOE organizations that have direct interest/concerns about or responsibilities for nuclear material storage. They include the Materials Planning Division (DP-273) of DP-27, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Facilities (DP-60), the Office of Weapons Complex Reconfiguration (DP-40), and other program areas, including Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM). To facilitate data collection, a questionnaire was developed and issued to nuclear materials custodian sites soliciting information on nuclear materials characteristics, storage plans, issues, etc. Sites were asked to functionally group materials identified in DOE Order 5660.1A (Management of Nuclear Materials) based on common physical and chemical characteristics and common material management strategies and to relate these groupings to Nuclear Materials Management Safeguards and Security (NMMSS) records. A database was constructed using 843 storage records from 70 responding sites. The database and an initial report summarizing storage issues were issued to participating Field Offices and DP-27 for comment. This report presents the background for the Storage Study and an initial, unclassified summary of storage issues and concerns identified by the sites

  17. Nuclear material operations manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler, R.P.

    1981-02-01

    This manual provides a concise and comprehensive documentation of the operating procedures currently practiced at Sandia National Laboratories with regard to the management, control, and accountability of nuclear materials. The manual is divided into chapters which are devoted to the separate functions performed in nuclear material operations-management, control, accountability, and safeguards, and the final two chapters comprise a document which is also issued separately to provide a summary of the information and operating procedures relevant to custodians and users of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual also contains samples of the forms utilized in carrying out nuclear material activities. To enhance the clarity of presentation, operating procedures are presented in the form of playscripts in which the responsible organizations and necessary actions are clearly delineated in a chronological fashion from the initiation of a transaction to its completion

  18. Nuclear material operations manuals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler, R.P.

    1979-06-01

    This manual is intended to provide a concise and comprehensive documentation of the operating procedures currently practiced at Sandia Laboratories with regard to the management, control, and accountability of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual is divided into chapters which are devoted to the separate functions performed in nuclear material operations-management, control, accountability, and safeguards, and the final two chapters comprise a document which is also issued separately to provide a summary of the information and operating procedures relevant to custodians and users of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual also contains samples of the forms utilized in carrying out nuclear material activities. To enhance the clarity of presentation, operating procedures are presented in the form of playscripts in which the responsible organizations and necessary actions are clearly delineated in a chronological fashion from the initiation of a transaction to its completion

  19. Selection of nuclear reactor coolant materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shi Lisheng; Wang Bairong

    2012-01-01

    Nuclear material is nuclear material or materials used in nuclear industry, the general term, it is the material basis for the construction of nuclear power, but also a leader in nuclear energy development, the two interdependent and mutually reinforcing. At the same time, nuclear materials research, development and application of the depth and breadth of science and technology reflects a nation and the level of the nuclear power industry. Coolant also known as heat-carrier agent, is an important part of the heart nuclear reactor, its role is to secure as much as possible to the economic output in the form fission energy to heat the reactor to be used: the same time cooling the core, is controlled by the various structural components allowable temperature. This paper described the definition of nuclear reactor coolant and characteristics, and then addressed the requirements of the coolant material, and finally were introduced several useful properties of the coolant and chemical control. (authors)

  20. Nuclear material accounting handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The handbook documents existing best practices and methods used to account for nuclear material and to prepare the required nuclear material accounting reports for submission to the IAEA. It provides a description of the processes and steps necessary for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of nuclear material accounting and control at the material balance area, facility and State levels, and defines the relevant terms. This handbook serves the needs of State personnel at various levels, including State authorities, facility operators and participants in training programmes. It can assist in developing and maintaining accounting systems which will support a State's ability to account for its nuclear material such that the IAEA can verify State declarations, and at the same time support the State's ability to ensure its nuclear security. In addition, the handbook is useful for IAEA staff, who is closely involved with nuclear material accounting. The handbook includes the steps and procedures a State needs to set up and maintain to provide assurance that it can account for its nuclear material and submit the prescribed nuclear material accounting reports defined in Section 1 and described in Sections 3 and 4 in terms of the relevant agreement(s), thereby enabling the IAEA to discharge its verification function as defined in Section 1 and described in Sections 3 and 4. The contents of the handbook are based on the model safeguards agreement and, where applicable, there will also be reference to the model additional protocol. As a State using The handbook consists of five sections. In Section 1, definitions or descriptions of terms used are provided in relation to where the IAEA applies safeguards or, for that matter, accounting for and control of nuclear material in a State. The IAEA's approach in applying safeguards in a State is also defined and briefly described, with special emphasis on verification. In Section 2, the obligations of the State

  1. The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Concerning refining, fabrication and reprocessing operations of such materials as well as the installation and operation of reactors, necessary regulations are carried out. Namely, in case of establishing the business of refining, fabricating and reprocessing nuclear materials as well as installing nuclear reactors, applications for the permission of the Prime Minister and the Minister of International Trade and Industry should be filed. Change of such operations should be permitted after filing applications. These permissions are retractable. As regards the reactors installed aboard foreign ships, it must be reported to enter Japanese waters and the permission by the Prime Minister must be obtained. In case of nuclear fuel fabricators, a chief technician of nuclear fuel materials (qualified) must be appointed per each fabricator. In case of installing nuclear reactors, the design and methods of construction should be permitted by the Prime Minister. The standard for such permission is specified, and a chief engineer for operating reactors (qualified) must be appointed. Successors inherit the positions of ones who have operated nuclear material refining, fabrication and reprocessing businesses or operated nuclear reactors. (Rikitake, Y.)

  2. Nuclear material management: challenges and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rieu, J.; Besnainou, J.; Leboucher, I.; Chiguer, M.; Capus, G.; Greneche, D.; Durret, L.F.; Carbonnier, J.L.; Delpech, M.; Loaec, Ch.; Devezeaux de Lavergne, J.G.; Granger, S.; Devid, S.; Bidaud, A.; Jalouneix, J.; Toubon, H.; Pochon, E.; Bariteau, J.P.; Bernard, P.; Krellmann, J.; Sicard, B.

    2008-01-01

    The articles in this dossier were derived from the papers of the yearly S.F.E.N. convention, which took place in Paris, 12-13 March 2008. They deal with the new challenges and prospects in the field of nuclear material management, throughout the nuclear whole fuel cycle, namely: the institutional frame of nuclear materials management, the recycling, the uranium market, the enrichment market, the different scenarios for the management of civil nuclear materials, the technical possibilities of spent fuels utilization, the option of thorium, the convention on the physical protection of nuclear materials and installations, the characterisation of nuclear materials by nondestructive nuclear measurements, the proliferation from civil installations, the use of plutonium ( from military origin) and the international agreements. (N.C.)

  3. Nuclear material operations manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyler, R.P.; Gassman, L.D.

    1978-04-01

    This manual is intended to provide a concise and comprehensive documentation of the operating procedures currently practiced at Sandia Laboratories with regard to the management, control, and accountability of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual is divided into chapters which are devoted to the separate functions performed in nuclear material operations--management, control, accountability, and safeguards, and the final two chapters comprise a document which is also issued separately to provide a summary of the information and operating procedures relevant to custodians and users of radioactive and nuclear materials. The manual also contains samples of the forms utilized in carrying out nuclear material activities. To enhance the clarity of presentation, operating procedures are presented in the form of ''play-scripts'' in which the responsible organizations and necessary actions are clearly delineated in a chronological fashion from the initiation of a transaction to its completion

  4. Nuclear measurements and reference materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    This report summarizes the progress of the JRC programs on nuclear data, nuclear metrology, nuclear reference materials and non-nuclear reference materials. Budget restrictions and personnel difficulties were encountered during 1987. Fission properties of 235 U as a function of neutron energy and of the resonances can be successfully described on the basis of a three exit channel fission model. Double differential neutron emission cross-sections were accomplished on 7 Li and were started for the tritium production cross-section of 9 Be. Reference materials of uranium minerals and ores were prepared. Special nuclear targets were prepared. A batch of 250 g of Pu0 2 was characterized in view of certification as reference material for the elemental assay of plutonium

  5. Comparative study of three-nucleon potentials in nuclear matter

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lovato, Alessandro; Benhar, Omar; Fantoni, Stefano; Schmidt, Kevin E.

    2012-02-01

    A new generation of local three-body potentials providing an excellent description of the properties of light nuclei, as well as of the neutron-deuteron doublet scattering length, has been recently derived. We have performed a comparative analysis of the equations of state of both pure neutron matter (PNM) and symmetric nuclear matter (SNM) at zero temperature obtained using these models of three-nucleon forces. In particular, we have carried out both variational and auxiliary field diffusion Monte Carlo calculations of the equation of state of PNM, while in the case of SNM we have only the variational approach has been considered. None of the considered potentials simultaneously explains the empirical equilibrium density and binding energy of symmetric nuclear matter. However, two of them provide reasonable values of the saturation density. The ambiguity concerning the treatment of the contact term of the chiral inspired potentials is discussed.

  6. Nuclear materials management procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Veevers, K.; Silver, J.M.; Quealy, K.J.; Steege, E. van der.

    1987-10-01

    This manual describes the procedures for the management of nuclear materials and associated materials at the Lucas Heights Research Laboratories. The procedures are designed to comply with Australia's nuclear non-proliferation obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), bilateral agreements with other countries and ANSTO's responsibilities under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act, 1987. The manual replaces those issued by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission in 1959, 1960 and 1969

  7. Material input of nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rissanen, S.; Tarjanne, R.

    2001-01-01

    The Material Input (MI) of nuclear fuel, expressed in terms of the total amount of natural material needed for manufacturing a product, is examined. The suitability of the MI method for assessing the environmental impacts of fuels is also discussed. Material input is expressed as a Material Input Coefficient (MIC), equalling to the total mass of natural material divided by the mass of the completed product. The material input coefficient is, however, only an intermediate result, which should not be used as such for the comparison of different fuels, because the energy contents of nuclear fuel is about 100 000-fold compared to the energy contents of fossil fuels. As a final result, the material input is expressed in proportion to the amount of generated electricity, which is called MIPS (Material Input Per Service unit). Material input is a simplified and commensurable indicator for the use of natural material, but because it does not take into account the harmfulness of materials or the way how the residual material is processed, it does not alone express the amount of environmental impacts. The examination of the mere amount does not differentiate between for example coal, natural gas or waste rock containing usually just sand. Natural gas is, however, substantially more harmful for the ecosystem than sand. Therefore, other methods should also be used to consider the environmental load of a product. The material input coefficient of nuclear fuel is calculated using data from different types of mines. The calculations are made among other things by using the data of an open pit mine (Key Lake, Canada), an underground mine (McArthur River, Canada) and a by-product mine (Olympic Dam, Australia). Furthermore, the coefficient is calculated for nuclear fuel corresponding to the nuclear fuel supply of Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) company in 2001. Because there is some uncertainty in the initial data, the inaccuracy of the final results can be even 20-50 per cent. The value

  8. New portable hand-held radiation instruments for measurements and monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1987-01-01

    Hand-held radiation monitors are often used to search pedestrians and motor vehicles for special nuclear material (SNM) as part of a physical protection plan for nuclear materials. Recently, the Los Alamos Advanced Nuclear Technology group has commercialized an improved hand-held monitor that can be used for both physical-protection monitoring and verification measurements in nuclear material control and waste management. The new monitoring instruments are smaller and lighter; operate much longer on a battery charge; are available with NaI(Tl) or neutron and gamma-ray sensitive plastic scintillation detectors; and are less expensive than other comparable instruments. They also have a second operating mode for making precise measurements over counting times as long as 99 s. This mode permits making basic verification measurements that may be needed before transporting nuclear material or waste outside protected areas. Improved verification measurements can be made with a second new hand-held instrument that has a stabilized detector and three separate gamma-ray energy windows to obtain spectral information for SNM quantity, enrichment, or material-type verification

  9. CSER 94-015: New portable NDA equipment for use in SNM audits

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hess, A.L.

    1994-12-12

    A criticality safety review is presented for the use of two portable NDA detectors from Los Alamos during an IAEA inspection of the SNM at PFP. The units are an Active Well Coincidence Counter (AWCC) and a High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter (HLNCC). Approval for their employment is based on the inherent safety of the containers to be assayed, one at a time, and because their designs conform with the acceptability criteria which allow the other NDA detectors currently employed at the facility.

  10. Statistical methods for nuclear material management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bowen, W.M.; Bennett, C.A.

    1988-12-01

    This book is intended as a reference manual of statistical methodology for nuclear material management practitioners. It describes statistical methods currently or potentially important in nuclear material management, explains the choice of methods for specific applications, and provides examples of practical applications to nuclear material management problems. Together with the accompanying training manual, which contains fully worked out problems keyed to each chapter, this book can also be used as a textbook for courses in statistical methods for nuclear material management. It should provide increased understanding and guidance to help improve the application of statistical methods to nuclear material management problems

  11. Statistical methods for nuclear material management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bowen W.M.; Bennett, C.A. (eds.)

    1988-12-01

    This book is intended as a reference manual of statistical methodology for nuclear material management practitioners. It describes statistical methods currently or potentially important in nuclear material management, explains the choice of methods for specific applications, and provides examples of practical applications to nuclear material management problems. Together with the accompanying training manual, which contains fully worked out problems keyed to each chapter, this book can also be used as a textbook for courses in statistical methods for nuclear material management. It should provide increased understanding and guidance to help improve the application of statistical methods to nuclear material management problems.

  12. Nuclear Materials Management. Proceedings of the Symposium on Nuclear Materials Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1966-02-15

    An increasing number of countries are using nuclear materials which, because of their high value and the potential hazards involved, require special methods of handling. To discuss these and to provide a forum at which different systems for achieving the necessary economy and safety could be compared, the International Atomic Energy Agency held a Symposium at Vienna on Nuclear Materials Management from 30 August to 3 September, 1965. It was attended by 115 participants from 19 Member States and two international organizations. Nuclear materials are already being used on an industrial scale and their high cost demands close and continuous control to ensure that they are delivered precisely on time and that they are used to the fullest possible extent before they are withdrawn from service. Routine industrial methods of material control and verification are widely used to ensure safe and economical operation and handling in nuclear power stations, in fuel-element fabrication and reprocessing plants, and in storage facilities. In addition special refinements are needed to take account of the value and the degree of purity required of nuclear materials. Quality as well as quantity has to be checked thoroughly and the utmost economy in processing is necessary. The radioactivity of the material poses special problems of handling and storage and creates a potential hazard to health. A further problem is that of criticality. These dangers and the means of averting them are well understood, as is evidenced by the outstandingly good safety record of the atomic energy industry. But besides accommodating all these special problems, day-to-day procedures must be simple enough to fit in with industrial conditions. Many of the 58 papers presented at the Symposium emphasized that records, checks, measurements and handling precautions, if suitably devised, provide the control vital to efficient operation, serve as checks against loss or waste of valuable materials and help meet the

  13. Detector placement optimization for cargo containers using deterministic adjoint transport examination for SNM detection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, Trevor D.; Sjoden, Glenn E.; Manalo, Kevin L.

    2011-01-01

    With growing concerns over port security and the potential for illicit trafficking of SNM through portable cargo shipping containers, efforts are ongoing to reduce the threat via container monitoring. This paper focuses on answering an important question of how many detectors are necessary for adequate coverage of a cargo container considering the detection of neutrons and gamma rays. Deterministic adjoint transport calculations are performed with compressed helium- 3 polyethylene moderated neutron detectors and sodium activated cesium-iodide gamma-ray scintillation detectors on partial and full container models. Results indicate that the detector capability is dependent on source strength and potential shielding. Using a surrogate weapons grade plutonium leakage source, it was determined that for a 20 foot ISO container, five neutron detectors and three gamma detectors are necessary for adequate coverage. While a large CsI(Na) gamma detector has the potential to monitor the entire height of the container for SNM, the He-3 neutron detector is limited to roughly 1.25 m in depth. Detector blind spots are unavoidable inside the container volume unless additional measures are taken for adequate coverage. (author)

  14. Determination of internationally controlled materials according to provisions of the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This rule is established under the provisions of the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors, and the former notification No. 26, 1961, is hereby abolished. Internationally regulated goods under the law are as follows: nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and moderator materials transferred by sale or other means from the governments of the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia and France or the persons under their jurisdictions according to the agreements concluded between the governments of Japan and these countries, respectively, the nuclear fuel materials recovered from these materials or produced by their usage, nuclear reactors, the facilities and heavy water transferred by sale or other means from these governments or the persons under their jurisdictions, the nuclear fuel materials produced by the usage of such reactors, facilities and heavy water, the nuclear fuel materials sold by the International Atomic Energy Agency under the contract between the Japanese government and the IAEA, the nuclear fuel materials recovered from these materials or produced by their usage, the heavy water produced by the facilities themselves transferred from the Canadian government, Canadian governmental enterprises or the persons under the jurisdiction of the Canadian government or produced by the usage of these facilities, etc. (Okada, K.)

  15. Advanced research workshop: nuclear materials safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L J; Moshkov, M M.

    1999-01-01

    The Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) on Nuclear Materials Safety held June 8-10, 1998, in St. Petersburg, Russia, was attended by 27 Russian experts from 14 different Russian organizations, seven European experts from six different organizations, and 14 U.S. experts from seven different organizations. The ARW was conducted at the State Education Center (SEC), a former Minatom nuclear training center in St. Petersburg. Thirty-three technical presentations were made using simultaneous translations. These presentations are reprinted in this volume as a formal ARW Proceedings in the NATO Science Series. The representative technical papers contained here cover nuclear material safety topics on the storage and disposition of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium (HEU) fissile materials, including vitrification, mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication, plutonium ceramics, reprocessing, geologic disposal, transportation, and Russian regulatory processes. This ARW completed discussions by experts of the nuclear materials safety topics that were not covered in the previous, companion ARW on Nuclear Materials Safety held in Amarillo, Texas, in March 1997. These two workshops, when viewed together as a set, have addressed most nuclear material aspects of the storage and disposition operations required for excess HEU and plutonium. As a result, specific experts in nuclear materials safety have been identified, know each other from their participation in t he two ARW interactions, and have developed a partial consensus and dialogue on the most urgent nuclear materials safety topics to be addressed in a formal bilateral program on t he subject. A strong basis now exists for maintaining and developing a continuing dialogue between Russian, European, and U.S. experts in nuclear materials safety that will improve the safety of future nuclear materials operations in all the countries involved because of t he positive synergistic effects of focusing these diverse backgrounds of

  16. Municipalities in action. Comment to the article 'Slow with air quality plans' of the SNM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) does not agree with the environmental organization SNM, which states in another article in this issue of the magazine that municipalities in the Netherlands are slow in setting up and implementing air quality plans. From a VNG study it appears that investments are made to improve the air quality [nl

  17. Portal monitoring technology control process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    York, R.L.

    1998-01-01

    Portal monitors are an important part of the material protection, control, and accounting (MPC and A) programs in Russia and the US. Although portal monitors are only a part of an integrated MPC and A system, they are an effective means of controlling the unauthorized movement of special nuclear material (SNM). Russian technical experts have gained experience in the use of SNM portal monitors from US experts ad this has allowed them to use the monitors more effectively. Several Russian institutes and companies are designing and manufacturing SNM portal monitors in Russia. Interactions between Russian and US experts have resulted in improvements to the instruments. SNM portal monitor technology has been effectively transferred from the US to Russia and should be a permanent part of the Russian MPC and A Program. Progress in the implementation of the monitors and improvements to how they are used are discussed

  18. A Stochastic Imaging Technique for Spatio-Spectral Characterization of Special Nuclear Material

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hamel, Michael C.

    Radiation imaging is advantageous for detecting, locating and characterizing special nuclear material (SNM) in complex environments. A dual-particle imager (DPI) has been designed that is capable of detecting gamma-ray and neutron signatures from shielded SNM. The system combines liquid organic and NaI(Tl) scintillators to form a combined Compton and neutron scatter camera. Effective image reconstruction of detected particles is a crucial component for maximizing the performance of the system; however, a key deficiency exists in the widely used list-mode maximum-likelihood estimation-maximization (MLEM) image reconstruction technique. The steady-state solution produced by this iterative method will have poor quality compared to solutions produced with fewer iterations. A stopping condition is required to achieve a better solution but these conditions fail to achieve maximum image quality. Stochastic origin ensembles (SOE) imaging is a good candidate to address this problem as it uses Markov chain Monte Carlo to reach a stochastic steady-state solution that has image quality comparable to the best MLEM solution. The application of SOE to the DPI is presented in this work. SOE was originally applied in medical imaging applications with no mechanism to isolate spectral information based on location. This capability is critical for non-proliferation applications as complex radiation environments with multiple sources are often encountered. This dissertation extends the SOE algorithm to produce spatially dependent spectra and presents experimental result showing that the technique was effective for isolating a 4.1-kg mass of weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) when other neutron and gamma-ray sources were present. This work also demonstrates the DPI as an effective tool for localizing and characterizing highly enriched uranium (HEU). A series of experiments were performed with the DPI using a deuterium-deuterium (DD) and deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron generator, as well as

  19. Evaluating the attractiveness of nuclear material for proliferation-resistance and nuclear security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Jor-Shan; Ikegame, Kou; Kuno, Yusuke

    2011-01-01

    The attractiveness of nuclear material, defined as a function of the isotopic composition of the nuclear material in formulas expressing the material's intrinsic properties, is of considerably debate in recent developments of proliferation-resistance measures of a nuclear energy system. A reason for such debate arises from the fact that the concept of nuclear material attractiveness can be confusing because the desirability of a material for nuclear explosive use depends on many tangible and intangible factors including the intent and capability of the adversary. In addition, a material that is unattractive to an advanced nation (in the case of proliferation) may be very attractive to a terrorist (in the case of physical protection and nuclear security). Hence, the concept of 'Nuclear Material Attractiveness' for different nuclear materials must be considered in the context of safeguards and security. The development of a ranking scheme on the attractiveness of nuclear materials could be a useful concept to start-off the strategies for safeguards and security on a new footing (i.e., why and how nuclear material is attractive, and what are the quantifiable basis). Japan may benefit from such concept regarding the attractiveness of nuclear materials when recovering nuclear materials from the damaged cores in Fukushima because safety, security, and safeguards (3S) would be a prominent consideration for the recovery operation, and it would be the first time such operation is performed in a non-nuclear weapons state. (author)

  20. Uncertainty estimation in nuclear material weighing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thaure, Bernard [Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, Fontenay aux Roses, (France)

    2011-12-15

    The assessment of nuclear material quantities located in nuclear plants requires knowledge of additions and subtractions of amounts of different types of materials. Most generally, the quantity of nuclear material held is deduced from 3 parameters: a mass (or a volume of product); a concentration of nuclear material in the product considered; and an isotopic composition. Global uncertainties associated with nuclear material quantities depend upon the confidence level of results obtained in the measurement of every different parameter. Uncertainties are generally estimated by considering five influencing parameters (ISHIKAWA's rule): the material itself; the measurement system; the applied method; the environmental conditions; and the operator. A good practice guide, to be used to deal with weighing errors and problems encountered, is presented in the paper.

  1. Covariance Spectroscopy for Fissile Material Detection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Trainham, Rusty; Tinsley, Jim; Hurley, Paul; Keegan, Ray

    2009-01-01

    Nuclear fission produces multiple prompt neutrons and gammas at each fission event. The resulting daughter nuclei continue to emit delayed radiation as neutrons boil off, beta decay occurs, etc. All of the radiations are causally connected, and therefore correlated. The correlations are generally positive, but when different decay channels compete, so that some radiations tend to exclude others, negative correlations could also be observed. A similar problem of reduced complexity is that of cascades radiation, whereby a simple radioactive decay produces two or more correlated gamma rays at each decay. Covariance is the usual means for measuring correlation, and techniques of covariance mapping may be useful to produce distinct signatures of special nuclear materials (SNM). A covariance measurement can also be used to filter data streams because uncorrelated signals are largely rejected. The technique is generally more effective than a coincidence measurement. In this poster, we concentrate on cascades and the covariance filtering problem

  2. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-08-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  3. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [es

  4. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international co-operation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  5. Smuggling special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lazaroiu, Gheorghe

    1999-01-01

    Ever since the collapse of the former Soviet Union reports have circulated with increasing frequency concerning attempts to smuggle materials from that country's civil and military nuclear programs. Such an increase obviously raises a number of concerns (outlined in the author's introduction), chief among which is the possibility that these materials might eventually fall into the hands of proliferant states or terrorist groups. The following issues are presented: significance of materials being smuggled; sources and smuggling routes; potential customers; international efforts to reduce nuclear smuggling; long-term disposition of fissile materials. (author)

  6. Nuclear battery materials and application of nuclear batteries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hao Shaochang; Lu Zhenming; Fu Xiaoming; Liang Tongxiang

    2006-01-01

    Nuclear battery has lots of advantages such as small volume, longevity, environal stability and so on, therefore, it was widely used in aerospace, deep-sea, polar region, heart pacemaker, micro-electromotor and other fields etc. The application of nuclear battery and the development of its materials promote each other. In this paper the development and the latest research progress of nuclear battery materials has been introduced from the view of radioisotope, electric energy conversion and encapsulation. And the current and potential applications of the nuclear battery are also summarized. (authors)

  7. Nuclear materials stewardship: Our enduring mission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Isaacs, T.H.

    1998-01-01

    The US Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors have handled a remarkably wide variety of nuclear materials over the past 50 yr. Two fundamental changes have occurred that shape the current landscape regarding nuclear materials. If one recognizes the implications and opportunities, one sees that the stewardship of nuclear materials will be a fundamental and important job of the DOE for the foreseeable future. The first change--the breakup of the Soviet Union and the resulting end to the nuclear arms race--altered US objectives. Previously, the focus was on materials production, weapon design, nuclear testing, and stockpile enhancements. Now the attention is on dismantlement of weapons, excess special nuclear material inventories, accompanying increased concern over the protection afforded to such materials; new arms control measures; and importantly, maintenance of the safety and reliability of the remaining arsenal without testing. The second change was the raised consciousness and sense of responsibility for dealing with the environmental legacies of past nuclear arms programs. Recognition of the need to clean up radioactive contamination, manage the wastes, conduct current operations responsibly, and restore the environment have led to the establishment of what is now the largest program in the DOE. Two additional features add to the challenge and drive the need for recognition of nuclear materials stewardship as a fundamental, enduring, and compelling mission of the DOE. The first is the extraordinary time frames. No matter what the future of nuclear weapons and no matter what the future of nuclear power, the DOE will be responsible for most of the country's nuclear materials and wastes for generations. Even if the Yucca Mountain program is successful and on schedule, it will last more than 100 yr. Second, the use, management, and disposition of nuclear materials and wastes affect a variety of nationally important and diverse objectives, from national

  8. Secure automated fabrication (SAF). Phase I interim report: a systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    An advanced Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) System is being developed for mixed uranium and plutonium fuel fabrication. SAF System development will ultimately result in systems which maximize personnel radiation protection, restrict and control access to SNM material, improve containment and detection systems for nuclear materials, provide adequate SNM accountability and improve product uniformity and quality. A systems requirement analysis study was initiated to establish the consistent and objective set of requirements within which the choice among alternatives represents the balanced viewpoints of performance, achievability and risk

  9. Material stabilization characterization management plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    GIBSON, M.W.

    1999-01-01

    This document presents overall direction for characterization needs during stabilization of SNM at the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). Technical issues for needed data and equipment are identified. Information on material categories and links to vulnerabilities are given. Comparison data on the material categories is discussed to assist in assessing the relative risks and desired processing priority

  10. Determination of internationally controlled materials according to provisions of the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    According to the provisions of The Law, those stipulated as internationally controlled materials are nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials, moderating materials, reactors and facilities, transferred from such as the U.S.A., the U.K. and Canada on the agreements of peaceful uses of atomic energy, and nuclear fuel materials accruing therefrom. (Mori, K.)

  11. Chapter No.5. Nuclear materials and physical protection of nuclear installations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) is based on requirements resulting from the Safeguards Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the IAEA. UJD performs this activity according to the 'Atomic Act' and relevant decree. The purpose of the SSAC is also to prevent unauthorised use of nuclear materials, to detect loses of nuclear materials and provide information that could lead to the recovery of missing material. The main part of nuclear materials under jurisdiction of the Slovak Republic is located at NPP Jaslovske Bohunice, NPP Mochovce and at interim storage in Jaslovske Bohunice. Even though that there are located more then 99% of nuclear materials in these nuclear facilities, there are not any significant problems with their accountancy and control due to very simply identification of accountancy units - fuel assemblies, and due to stability of legal subjects responsible for operation and for keeping of information continuity, which is necessary for fulfilling requirements of the Agreement. The nuclear material located outside nuclear facilities is a special category. There are 81 such subjects of different types and orientations on the territory of the Slovak Republic. These subjects use mainly depleted uranium as a shielding and small quantity of natural uranium, low enrichment uranium and thorium for experimental purposes and education. Frequent changes of these subjects, their transformations into the other subjects, extinction and very high fluctuation of employees causes loss of information about nuclear materials and creates problems with fulfilling requirements resulting from the Agreement. In 2001, the UJD carried out 51 inspections of nuclear materials, of which 31 inspections were performed at nuclear installations in co-operation with the IAEA inspectors. No discrepancies concerning the management of nuclear materials were found out during inspections and safeguards goals in year 2001 were

  12. Thermodynamics of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rand, M.H.

    1975-01-01

    A report is presented of the Fourth International Symposium on Thermodynamics of Nuclear Materials held in Vienna, 21-25 October 1974. The technological theme of the Symposium was the application of thermodynamics to the understanding of the chemistry of irradiated nuclear fuels and to safety assessments for hypothetical accident conditions in reactors. The first four sessions were devoted to these topics and they were followed by four more sessions on the more basic thermodynamics, phase diagrams and the thermodynamic properties of a wide range of nuclear materials. Sixty-seven papers were presented

  13. Global nuclear material flow/control model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, J.S.; Rutherford, D.S.; Fasel, P.K.; Riese, J.M.

    1997-01-01

    This is the final report of a two-year, Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The nuclear danger can be reduced by a system for global management, protection, control, and accounting as part of an international regime for nuclear materials. The development of an international fissile material management and control regime requires conceptual research supported by an analytical and modeling tool which treats the nuclear fuel cycle as a complete system. The prototype model developed visually represents the fundamental data, information, and capabilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle in a framework supportive of national or an international perspective. This includes an assessment of the global distribution of military and civilian fissile material inventories, a representation of the proliferation pertinent physical processes, facility specific geographic identification, and the capability to estimate resource requirements for the management and control of nuclear material. The model establishes the foundation for evaluating the global production, disposition, and safeguards and security requirements for fissile nuclear material and supports the development of other pertinent algorithmic capabilities necessary to undertake further global nuclear material related studies

  14. Techniques and methods in nuclear materials traceability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1996-01-01

    The nonproliferation community is currently addressing concerns that the access to special nuclear materials may increase the illicit trafficking in weapons-usable materials from civil and/or weapons material stores and/or fuel cycles systems. Illicit nuclear traffic usually involves reduced quantities of nuclear materials perhaps as samplings of a potential protracted diversionary flow from sources to users. To counter illicit nuclear transactions requires the development of techniques and methods in nuclear material traceability as an important phase of a broad forensic analysis capability. This report discusses how isotopic signatures and correlation methods were applied to determine the origins of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium samples reported as illicit trafficking in nuclear materials

  15. The system of nuclear material control of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yeligbayeva, G.Zh.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The State system for nuclear material control consists of three integral components. The efficiency of each is to guarantee the non-proliferation regime in Kazakhstan. The components are the following: accounting, export and import control and physical protection of nuclear materials. First, the implementation of the goals of accounting and control bring into force, by the organization of the system for accounting and measurement of nuclear materials to determine present quantity. Organizing the accounting for nuclear material at facilities will ensure the efficiency of accountancy and reporting information. This defines the effectiveness of the state system for the accounting for the Kazakhstan's nuclear materials. Currently, Kazakhstan's nuclear material is fully safeguarded in designated secure locations. Kazakhstan has a nuclear power plant, 4 research reactors and a fuel fabrication plant. The governmental information system for nuclear materials control consist of two level: Governmental level - KAEA collects reports from facilities and prepares the reports for International Atomic Energy Agency, keeping of supporting documents and other necessary information, a data base of export and import, a data base of nuclear material inventory. Facility level - registration and processing information from key measurement points, formation the facility's nuclear materials accounting database. All facilities have computerized systems. Currently, all facilities are safeguarded under IAEA safeguarding standards, through IAEA inspections. Annually, IAEA verifies all nuclear materials at all Kazakhstan nuclear facilities. The government reporting system discloses the existence of all nuclear material and its transfer intended for interaction through the export control system and the nuclear control accounting system. Nuclear material export is regulated by the regulations of the Nuclear Export Control Law. The standard operating procedure is the primary means for

  16. Control of nuclear material specified equipment and specified material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-04-01

    The goal and application field of NE 2.02 regulatory guide of CNEN (Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear), are described. This regulatory guide is about nuclear material management, specified equipment and specified material. (E.G.) [pt

  17. Physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    Full text: An Advisory Group met to consider the up-dating and extension of the Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, produced in 1972. Twenty-seven experts from 11 countries and EURATOM were present. Growing concern has been expressed in many countries that nuclear material may one day be used for acts of sabotage or terrorism. Serious attention is therefore being given to the need for States to develop national systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials during use, storage and transport throughout the nuclear fuel cycle which should minimize risks of sabotage or theft. The revised Recommendations formulated by the Advisory Group include new definitions of the objectives of national systems of physical protection and proposals for minimizing possibilities of unauthorized removal and sabotage to nuclear facilities. The Recommendations also describe administrative or organizational steps to be taken for this purpose and the essential technical requirements of physical protection for various types and locations of nuclear material, e.g., the setting up of protected areas, the use of physical barriers and alarms, the need for security survey, and the need of advance arrangements between the States concerned in case of international transportation, among others. (author)

  18. Nuclear science in the 20th century. Nuclear technology applications in material science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pei Junchen; Xu Furong; Zheng Chunkai

    2003-01-01

    The application of nuclear technology to material science has led to a new cross subject, nuclear material science (also named nuclear solid physics) which covers material analysis, material modification and new material synthesis. This paper reviews the development of nuclear technical applications in material science and the basic physics involved

  19. Expanding Nuclear Power Programmes - Romanian experience: Master - Nuclear Materials and Technologies Educational Plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valeca, S.; Valeca, M.

    2012-01-01

    The main objectives of the Master Nuclear Materials and Technologies Educational Plan are: 1. To deliver higher education and training in the following specific domains, such as: Powders Technology and Ceramic Materials, Techniques of Structural Analysis, Composite Materials, Semiconductor Materials and Components, Metals and Metallic Alloys, Optoelectronic Materials and Devices, Nuclear Materials, The Engineering of Special Nuclear Materials, 2. To train managers of the Nuclear Waste Products and Nuclear Safety, 3. To qualify in ICT Systems for Nuclear Process Guidance, 4. To qualify in Environmental Protection System at the Level of Nuclear Power Stations, 5. To train managers for Quality Assurance of Nuclear Energetic Processes, 6. To deliver higher education and training regarding the International Treatises, Conventions and Settlements in force in the field of nuclear related activities. (author)

  20. United States Department of Energy Nuclear Materials Stewardship

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Newton, J. W.

    2002-01-01

    The Department of Energy launched the Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative in January 2000 to accelerate the work of achieving integration and cutting long-term costs associated with the management of the Department's nuclear materials, with the principal focus on excess materials. Management of nuclear materials is a fundamental and enduring responsibility that is essential to meeting the Department's national security, nonproliferation, energy, science, and environmental missions into the distant future. The effective management of nuclear materials is important for a set of reasons: (1) some materials are vital to our national defense; (2) the materials pose physical and security risks; (3) managing them is costly; and (4) costs are likely to extend well into the future. The Department currently manages nuclear materials under eight programs, with offices in 36 different locations. Through the Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative, progress was during calendar year 20 00 in achieving better coordination and integration of nuclear materials management responsibilities and in evaluating opportunities to further coordinate and integrate cross-program responsibilities for the treatment, storage, and disposition of excess nuclear materials. During CY 2001 the Departmental approach to nuclear materials stewardship changed consistent with the business processes followed by the new administration. This paper reports on the progress of the Nuclear Materials Stewardship Initiative in evaluating and implementing these opportunities, and the remaining challenges in integrating the long-term management of nuclear materials

  1. The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The law intends under the principles of the atomic energy act to regulate the refining, processing and reprocessing businesses of nuclear raw and fuel metarials and the installation and operation of reactors for the peaceful and systematic utilization of such materials and reactors and for securing public safety by preventing disasters, as well as to control internationally regulated things for effecting the international agreements on the research, development and utilization of atomic energy. Basic terms are defined, such as atomic energy; nuclear fuel material; nuclear raw material; nuclear reactor; refining; processing; reprocessing; internationally regulated thing. Any person who is going to engage in refining businesses other than the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation shall get the special designation by the Prime Minister and the Minister of International Trade Industry. Any person who is going to engage in processing businesses shall get the particular admission of the Prime Minister. Any person who is going to establish reactors shall get the particular admission of the Prime Minister, The Minister of International Trade and Industry or the Minister of Transportation according to the kinds of specified reactors, respectively. Any person who is going to engage in reprocessing businesses other than the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute shall get the special designation by the Prime Minister. The employment of nuclear fuel materials and internationally regulated things is defined in detail. (Okada, K.)

  2. Computer-determined assay time based on preset precision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Foster, L.A.; Hagan, R.; Martin, E.R.; Wachter, J.R.; Bonner, C.A.; Malcom, J.E.

    1994-01-01

    Most current assay systems for special nuclear materials (SNM) operate on the principle of a fixed assay time which provides acceptable measurement precision without sacrificing the required throughput of the instrument. Waste items to be assayed for SNM content can contain a wide range of nuclear material. Counting all items for the same preset assay time results in a wide range of measurement precision and wastes time at the upper end of the calibration range. A short time sample taken at the beginning of the assay could optimize the analysis time on the basis of the required measurement precision. To illustrate the technique of automatically determining the assay time, measurements were made with a segmented gamma scanner at the Plutonium Facility of Los Alamos National Laboratory with the assay time for each segment determined by counting statistics in that segment. Segments with very little SNM were quickly determined to be below the lower limit of the measurement range and the measurement was stopped. Segments with significant SNM were optimally assays to the preset precision. With this method the total assay time for each item is determined by the desired preset precision. This report describes the precision-based algorithm and presents the results of measurements made to test its validity

  3. The physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-12-01

    A Technical Committee on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material met in April-May 1989 to advise on the need to update the recommendations contained in document INFCIRC/225/Rev.1 and on any changes considered to be necessary. The Technical Committee indicated a number of such changes, reflecting mainly: the international consensus established in respect of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the experience gained since 1977; and a wish to give equal treatment to protection against the theft of nuclear material and protection against the sabotage of nuclear facilities. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. 1 tab

  4. Approaches to characterization of nuclear material for establishment of nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okazaki, Hiro; Sumi, Mika; Sato, Mitsuhiro; Kayano, Masashi; Kageyama, Tomio; Shinohara, Nobuo; Martinez, Patrick; Xu, Ning; Thomas, Mariam; Porterfield, Donivan; Colletti, Lisa; Schwartz, Dan; Tandon, Lav

    2014-01-01

    The Plutonium Fuel Development Center (PFDC) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency has been analyzing isotopic compositions and contents of plutonium and uranium as well as trace impurities and physics in the nuclear fuel from MOX fuel fabrication process for accountancy and process control purpose. These analytical techniques are also effective for nuclear forensics to identify such as source, history, and route of the material by determining a composition and characterization of nuclear material. Therefore, PFDC cooperates with Los Alamos National Laboratory which has broad experience and established measurement skill for nuclear forensics, and evaluates the each method, procedure and analytical data toward R and D of characterizing a nuclear material for forensic purposes. This paper describes the approaches to develop characterization techniques of nuclear material for nuclear forensics purposes at PFDC. (author)

  5. Supplier responsibility for nuclear material quality

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stuart, P.S.; Dohna, A.E.

    1976-01-01

    Nuclear materials must be delivered by either the manufacturer or the distributor with objective, documented evidence that the material was manufactured, inspected, and tested by proven techniques performed by qualified personnel working to documented procedures. Measurement devices used for acceptance must be of proven accuracy. The material and all records must be identified for positive traceability as part of the quality history of the nuclear components, system, or structure in which the material was used. In conclusion, the nuclear material supplier must join the fabricator, the installer, and the user in effective implementation of the total systems approach to the application of quality assurance principles to all phases of procurement, fabrication, installation, and use of the safety-related components, systems, and structures in a nuclear power plant

  6. ACNP Public Education Program on nuclear medicine and related low-level waste issues. Final technical report, 7 July 1980-30 June 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    The goal of the ACNP Public Education Program was to educate and inform the greatest number of people in the areas of radiation and health and, in turn, to gain the public's understanding of Nuclear Medicine. The related low-level waste issues also were incorporated into the program. To carry out the program's objectives and design to educate the public, the ACNP established a Speaker Bureau which consists of those members of the ACNP and the Society of Nuclear Medicine (SNM) who go through the training seminars, conducted by ACNP, and are available to speak publicly about Nuclear Medicine and related low-level waste issues. In addition, the ACNP developed the necessary audiovisual and printed materials to be used in their own right or as supplemental tools. Promotion of the Speakers Bureau and the audiovisual materials to the media and other various public forums was undertaken

  7. 76 FR 68792 - Agency Information Collection Activities: Submission for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-07

    ... requirements for material control and accounting of SNM, and specific performance-based regulations for... Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material. 3. Current OMB approval number: 3150-0123. 4. The form... NRC to make licensing and regulatory determinations concerning material control and accounting of...

  8. Incineration of alpha-active solid waste by microwaves

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mallik, G K; Bhargava, V K; Kamath, H S; Purushotham, D S.C. [Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Tarapur (India). Advanced Fuel Fabrication Facility

    1996-12-31

    The conventional techniques for treatment of alpha-active compressible solid waste involve incineration using electrically heated incinerators and subsequent recovery of special nuclear materials (SNM) from the ash by acid leaching. A microwave incineration followed by microwave digestion and SNM recovery from ash has specific advantages from maintenance and productivity consideration. The paper describes a preliminary work carried out with simulated uranium containing compressible solid waste using microwave heating technique. (author). 3 refs., 1 tab.

  9. Study on interface between nuclear material accounting system and national nuclear forensic library

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Yonhong; Han, Jae-Jun; Chang, Sunyoung; Shim, Hye-Won; Ahn, Seungho

    2016-01-01

    The implementation of nuclear forensics requires physical, chemical and radiological characteristics with transport history to unravel properties of seized nuclear materials. For timely assessment provided in the ITWG guideline, development of national response system (e.g., national nuclear forensic library) is strongly recommended. Nuclear material accounting is essential to obtain basic data in the nuclear forensic implementation phase from the perspective of nuclear non-proliferation related to the IAEA Safeguards and nuclear security. In this study, the nuclear material accounting reports were chosen due to its well-established procedure, and reviewed how to efficiently utilize the existing material accounting system to the nuclear forensic implementation phase In conclusion, limits and improvements in implementing the nuclear forensics were discussed. This study reviewed how to utilize the existing material accounting system for implementing nuclear forensics. Concerning item counting facility, nuclear material properties can be obtained based on nuclear material accounting information. Nuclear fuel assembly data being reported for the IAEA Safeguards can be utilized as unique identifier within the back-end fuel cycle. Depending upon the compulsory accountability report period, there exist time gaps. If national capabilities ensure that history information within the front-end nuclear fuel cycle is traceable particularly for the bulk handling facility, the entire cycle of national nuclear fuel would be managed in the framework of developing a national nuclear forensic library

  10. Study on interface between nuclear material accounting system and national nuclear forensic library

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeong, Yonhong; Han, Jae-Jun; Chang, Sunyoung; Shim, Hye-Won; Ahn, Seungho [Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    The implementation of nuclear forensics requires physical, chemical and radiological characteristics with transport history to unravel properties of seized nuclear materials. For timely assessment provided in the ITWG guideline, development of national response system (e.g., national nuclear forensic library) is strongly recommended. Nuclear material accounting is essential to obtain basic data in the nuclear forensic implementation phase from the perspective of nuclear non-proliferation related to the IAEA Safeguards and nuclear security. In this study, the nuclear material accounting reports were chosen due to its well-established procedure, and reviewed how to efficiently utilize the existing material accounting system to the nuclear forensic implementation phase In conclusion, limits and improvements in implementing the nuclear forensics were discussed. This study reviewed how to utilize the existing material accounting system for implementing nuclear forensics. Concerning item counting facility, nuclear material properties can be obtained based on nuclear material accounting information. Nuclear fuel assembly data being reported for the IAEA Safeguards can be utilized as unique identifier within the back-end fuel cycle. Depending upon the compulsory accountability report period, there exist time gaps. If national capabilities ensure that history information within the front-end nuclear fuel cycle is traceable particularly for the bulk handling facility, the entire cycle of national nuclear fuel would be managed in the framework of developing a national nuclear forensic library.

  11. Study of nuclear material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ruderman, H.

    1977-01-01

    The implications of deliberate diversion of nuclear materials on materials accounting, the validity of the MUF concept to establish assurance concerning the possible diversion of special nuclear materials, and an economic analysis to permit cost comparison of varying the inventory frequency are being studied. An inventory cost model, the statistical hypothesis testing approach, the game theoretic approach, and analysis of generic plants are considered

  12. Nuclear material control in Spain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Velilla, A.

    1988-01-01

    A general view about the safeguards activities in Spain is presented. The national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials is described. The safeguards agreements signed by Spain are presented and the facilities and nuclear materials under these agreements are listed. (E.G.) [pt

  13. Automated nuclear materials accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pacak, P.; Moravec, J.

    1982-01-01

    An automated state system of accounting for nuclear materials data was established in Czechoslovakia in 1979. A file was compiled of 12 programs in the PL/1 language. The file is divided into four groups according to logical associations, namely programs for data input and checking, programs for handling the basic data file, programs for report outputs in the form of worksheets and magnetic tape records, and programs for book inventory listing, document inventory handling and materials balance listing. A similar automated system of nuclear fuel inventory for a light water reactor was introduced for internal purposes in the Institute of Nuclear Research (UJV). (H.S.)

  14. Development of nuclear material accountancy control system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirosawa, Naonori; Kashima, Sadamitsu; Akiba, Mitsunori

    1992-01-01

    PNC is developing a wide area of nuclear fuel cycle. Therefore, much nuclear material with a various form exists at each facility in the Works, and the controls of the inventory changes and the physical inventories of nuclear material are important. Nuclear material accountancy is a basic measure in safeguards system based on Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In the light of such importance of material accountancy, the data base of nuclear material control and the material accountancy report system for all facilities has been developed by using the computer. By this system, accountancy report to STA is being presented certainly and timely. Property management and rapid corresponding to various inquiries can be carried out by the data base system which has free item searching procedure. (author)

  15. New materials in nuclear fusion reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iwata, Shuichi

    1988-01-01

    In the autumn of 1987, the critical condition was attained in the JET in Europe and Japanese JT-60, thus the first subject in the physical verification of nuclear fusion reactors was resolved, and the challenge to the next attainment of self ignition condition started. As the development process of nuclear fusion reactors, there are the steps of engineering, economical and social verifications after this physical verification, and in respective steps, there are the critical problems related to materials, therefore the development of new materials must be advanced. The condition of using nuclear fusion reactors is characterized by high fluence, high thermal flux and strong magnetic field, and under such extreme condition, the microscopic structures of materials change, and they behave much differently from usual case. The subjects of material development for nuclear fusion reactors, the material data base being built up, the materials for facing plasma and high thermal flux, first walls, blanket structures, electric insulators and others are described. The serious effect of irradiation and the rate of defect inducement must be taken in consideration in the structural materials for nuclear fusion reactors. (Kako, I.)

  16. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-06-01

    The latest review (1993) of this document was of limited scope and resulted in changes to the text of INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 designed to make the categorization table in that document consistent with the categorization table contained in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Consequently, a comprehensive review of INFCIRC/225 has not been conducted since 1989. Consequently, a meeting of national experts was convened from 2-5 June 1998 and from 27-29 October 1998 for a thorough review of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. The revised document reflects the recommendations of the national experts to improve the structure and clarity of the document and to take account of improved technology and current international and national practices. In particular, a chapter has been added which provides specific recommendations related to sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. As a result of this addition, the title has been changed to 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities'. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States.

  17. The physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-06-01

    The latest review (1993) of this document was of limited scope and resulted in changes to the text of INFCIRC/225/Rev.2 designed to make the categorization table in that document consistent with the categorization table contained in the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. Consequently, a comprehensive review of INFCIRC/225 has not been conducted since 1989. Consequently, a meeting of national experts was convened from 2-5 June 1998 and from 27-29 October 1998 for a thorough review of INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. The revised document reflects the recommendations of the national experts to improve the structure and clarity of the document and to take account of improved technology and current international and national practices. In particular, a chapter has been added which provides specific recommendations related to sabotage of nuclear facilities and nuclear material. As a result of this addition, the title has been changed to 'The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities'. The recommendations presented in this IAEA document reflect a broad consensus among Member States on the requirements which should be met by systems for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It is hoped that they will provide helpful guidance for Member States

  18. Graphite materials for nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oku, Tatsuo

    1991-01-01

    Graphite materials have been used in the nuclear fission reactors from the beginning of the reactor development for the speed reduction and reflection of neutron. Graphite materials are used both as a moderator and as a reflector in the core of high temperature gas-cooled reactors, and both as a radiation shielding material and as a reflector in the surrounding of the core for the fast breeder reactor. On the other hand, graphite materials are being positively used as a first wall of plasma as it is known that low Z materials are useful for holding high temperature plasma in the nuclear fusion devices. In this paper the present status of the application of graphite materials to the nuclear fission reactors and fusion devices (reactors) is presented. In addition, a part of results on the related properties to the structural design and safety evaluation and results examined on the subjects that should be done in the future are also described. (author)

  19. Integrated Global Nuclear Materials Management Preliminary Concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, E; Dreicer, M.

    2006-01-01

    The world is at a turning point, moving away from the Cold War nuclear legacy towards a future global nuclear enterprise; and this presents a transformational challenge for nuclear materials management. Achieving safety and security during this transition is complicated by the diversified spectrum of threat 'players' that has greatly impacted nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and homeland security requirements. Rogue states and non-state actors no longer need self-contained national nuclear expertise, materials, and equipment due to availability from various sources in the nuclear market, thereby reducing the time, effort and cost for acquiring a nuclear weapon (i.e., manifestations of latency). The terrorist threat has changed the nature of military and national security requirements to protect these materials. An Integrated Global Nuclear Materials Management (IGNMM) approach would address the existing legacy nuclear materials and the evolution towards a nuclear energy future, while strengthening a regime to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation. In this paper, some preliminary concepts and studies of IGNMM will be presented. A systematic analysis of nuclear materials, activities, and controls can lead to a tractable, integrated global nuclear materials management architecture that can help remediate the past and manage the future. A systems approach is best suited to achieve multi-dimensional and interdependent solutions, including comprehensive, end-to-end capabilities; coordinated diverse elements for enhanced functionality with economy; and translation of goals/objectives or standards into locally optimized solutions. A risk-informed basis is excellent for evaluating system alternatives and performances, and it is especially appropriate for the security arena. Risk management strategies--such as defense-in-depth, diversity, and control quality--help to weave together various technologies and practices into a strong and robust security fabric. Effective

  20. LECI Department of Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The LECI is a 'hot' laboratory dedicated mostly to the characterization of irradiated materials. It has, however, limited activities on fuel, as a back up to the LECA STAR in Cadarache. The LECI belongs to the Section of Research on Irradiated Materials (Department of Nuclear Materials). The Department for Nuclear Materials (DMN) has for its missions: - to contribute, through theoretical and experimental investigations, to the development of knowledge in materials science in order to be able to predict the evolution of the material physical and mechanical properties under service conditions (irradiation, thermomechanical solicitations, influence of the environment,..); - to characterize the properties of the materials used in the nuclear industry in order to determine their performance and to be able to predict their life expectancy, in particular via modelling. These materials can be irradiated or not, and originate from surveillance programs, experimental neutron irradiations or simulated irradiations with charged particles; - to establish, maintain and make use of the databases generated by these data; - to propose new or optimized materials, satisfying future service conditions and extend the life or the competitiveness of the associated systems; - to establish constitutive laws and models for the materials in service, incidental, accidental and storage conditions, and contribute to the development of the associated design codes in order to support the safety argumentation of utilities and vendors; - to provide expertise on industrial components, in particular to investigate strain or rupture mechanisms and to offer leads for improvement. This document presents, first, the purpose of the LECI (Historical data, Strategy, I and K shielded cell lines (building 605), M shielded cell line (building 625), Authorized materials). Then, it presents the microscopy and irradiation damage studies laboratory of the Saclay centre (Building 605) Which belongs to the Nuclear

  1. Challenges of Non-Destructive Assay Waste Measurement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shull, A.H.

    2003-01-01

    Historically, the Savannah River Site (SRS) routinely produced special nuclear material (SNM), which provided stable measurement conditions for the non-destructive assay (NDA) methods. However, the main mission of SRS has changed from the production of SNM to the processing of waste and material stabilization. Currently, the purpose of processing is to recover the SNM from the waste and stabilization materials, much of which is from other DOE facilities. These missions are usually of a short duration, but require non-destructive assay (NDA) accountability measurements on materials of varying composition and geometric configuration. These missions usually have cost and time constraints, which sometimes require re-application of existing NDA methods to waste measurements. Usually, each new material or re-application of the NDA method to a different SNM campaign requires new standards and timely re-calibration of the method. These constraints provide numerous challenges for the NDA methods, particularly in the area of measurement uncertainty. This paper will discuss the challenges of these situations, mainly from a measurement and statistical point of view and provide some possible solutions to the problems encountered. Specific examples will be discussed for the segmented gamma scanner (SGS), neutron multiplicity counter (NMC) and passive neutron coincidence counter (PNCC), which are some of the most common NDA instruments at SRS

  2. Combating illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. Reference material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    This publication is intended for individuals and organizations that may be called upon to deal with the detection of and response to criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material. It will also be useful for legislators, law enforcement agencies, government officials, technical experts, lawyers, diplomats and users of nuclear technology. This manual emphasizes the international initiatives for improving the security of nuclear and other radioactive material. However, it is recognized that effective measures for controlling the transfer of equipment, non-nuclear material, technology or information that may assist in the development of nuclear explosive devices, improvised nuclear devices (INDs) or other radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are important elements of an effective nuclear security system. In addition, issues of personal integrity, inspection and investigative procedures are not discussed in this manual, all of which are essential elements for an effective overall security system. The manual considers a variety of elements that are recognized as being essential for dealing with incidents of criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material. Depending on conditions in a specific State, including its legal and governmental infrastructure, some of the measures discussed will need to be adapted to suit that State's circumstances. However, much of the material can be applied directly in the context of other national programmes. This manual is divided into four main parts. Section 2 discusses the threat posed by criminal or unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material, as well as the policy and legal bases underlying the international effort to restrain such activities. Sections 3 and 4 summarize the major international undertakings in the field. Sections 5-8 provide some basic technical information on radiation, radioactive material, the health consequences of radiation

  3. Material degradation - a nuclear utility's view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spekkens, P.

    2007-01-01

    Degradation of nuclear plant materials has been responsible for major costs and unit outage time. As such, nuclear utilities are important end users of the information produced by R and D on material degradation. This plenary describes the significance of material degradation for the nuclear utilities, and how utilities use information about material degradation in their short, medium and long term planning activities. Utilities invest in R and D programs to assist them in their business objective of operating safely, reliably and cost competitively. Material degradation impacts all three of these business drivers. Utilities make decisions on life cycle planning, unit refurbishment and 'new build' projects on the basis of their understanding of the behaviour of a variety of materials in a broad range of environments. The R and D being carried out today will determine the future business success of the nuclear utilities. The R and D program needs to be broadly based to include a range of materials, environments and time-frames, particularly any new materials proposed for use in new units. The R and D community needs to help the utility managers make choices that will result in an optimized materials R and D program

  4. Control of Nuclear Material in Republic of Croatia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cizmek, A.; Medakovic, S.; Prah, M.; Novosel, N.

    2008-01-01

    State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS) is established based on 'Nuclear Safety Act' (Official Gazette No. 173/2003) as an independent state organization responsible for all questions in connection with safe use of nuclear energy and technology, for expert matters of preparedness in the case of nuclear emergency, as well as for international co-operation in these fields (regulatory body). In the second half of year 2006, stationary detection systems for nuclear and other radioactive materials were installed on Border Crossing Bregana, Croatia. Yantar 2U, which is the commercial name of the system, is integrated automatic system capable of detection of nuclear and other radioactive materials prepared for fixed-site customs applications (Russian origin). Installed system contains portal monitors, camera, communication lines and communication boxes and server. Two fully functional separate systems has been installed on BC Bregana, one on truck entrance and another one on car entrance. In this article the operational experience of installed system is presented. This includes statistical analysis of recorded alarms, evaluation of procedures for operational stuff and maintenance and typical malfunction experience, as well as some of the recommendation for future use of detection systems. Ordinance on the control of nuclear material and special equipment (Official Gazette No. 15/08) lays down the list of nuclear materials and special equipment as well as the list of other activities related to the production of special equipment and non-nuclear materials; the contents of the declaration of intent form for export/import of goods, the form for notifying export/import of goods, the form for notifying transport of nuclear material, the form for notifying the activity related to producing of special equipment and non-nuclear material, as well as of the form of the report on nuclear material balance in the user's material balance area. This Ordinance lays down the method of

  5. The potential for criticality following disposal of uranium at low-level waste facilities: Uranium blended with soil

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Toran, L.E.; Hopper, C.M.; Naney, M.T. [and others

    1997-06-01

    The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether or not fissile uranium in low-level-waste (LLW) facilities can be concentrated by hydrogeochemical processes to permit nuclear criticality. A team of experts in hydrology, geology, geochemistry, soil chemistry, and criticality safety was formed to develop achievable scenarios for hydrogeochemical increases in concentration of special nuclear material (SNM), and to use these scenarios to aid in evaluating the potential for nuclear criticality. The team`s approach was to perform simultaneous hydrogeochemical and nuclear criticality studies to (1) identify some achievable scenarios for uranium migration and concentration increase at LLW disposal facilities, (2) model groundwater transport and subsequent concentration increase via sorption or precipitation of uranium, and (3) evaluate the potential for nuclear criticality resulting from potential increases in uranium concentration over disposal limits. The analysis of SNM was restricted to {sup 235}U in the present scope of work. The outcome of the work indicates that criticality is possible given established regulatory limits on SNM disposal. However, a review based on actual disposal records of an existing site operation indicates that the potential for criticality is not a concern under current burial practices.

  6. The potential for criticality following disposal of uranium at low-level waste facilities: Uranium blended with soil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toran, L.E.; Hopper, C.M.; Naney, M.T.

    1997-06-01

    The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether or not fissile uranium in low-level-waste (LLW) facilities can be concentrated by hydrogeochemical processes to permit nuclear criticality. A team of experts in hydrology, geology, geochemistry, soil chemistry, and criticality safety was formed to develop achievable scenarios for hydrogeochemical increases in concentration of special nuclear material (SNM), and to use these scenarios to aid in evaluating the potential for nuclear criticality. The team's approach was to perform simultaneous hydrogeochemical and nuclear criticality studies to (1) identify some achievable scenarios for uranium migration and concentration increase at LLW disposal facilities, (2) model groundwater transport and subsequent concentration increase via sorption or precipitation of uranium, and (3) evaluate the potential for nuclear criticality resulting from potential increases in uranium concentration over disposal limits. The analysis of SNM was restricted to 235 U in the present scope of work. The outcome of the work indicates that criticality is possible given established regulatory limits on SNM disposal. However, a review based on actual disposal records of an existing site operation indicates that the potential for criticality is not a concern under current burial practices

  7. Nuclear material control in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marzo, M.A.S.; Iskin, M.C.L.; Palhares, L.C.; Almeida, S.G. de.

    1988-01-01

    A general view about the safeguards activities in Brazil is presented. The national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials is described. The safeguards agreements signed by Brazil are presented, the facilities and nuclear material under these agreements are listed, and the dificulties on the pratical implementation are discussed. (E.G.) [pt

  8. A confirmatory measurement technique for HEU [highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sprinkle, J.K. Jr.; Goldman, A.; Russo, P.A.; Stovall, L.; Brumfield, T.L.; Gunn, C.S.; Watson, D.R.; Beedgen, R.

    1987-01-01

    Precise measurements of the special nuclear material (SNM) in an item can be used to confirm that the item has not been tampered with. These measurements do not require a highly accurate calibration, but they should be based on an attribute that is unique to the SNM. We describe an instrument that performs gamma-ray measurements at three energies: 185.7 keV, 1001 keV, and 2614 keV. This instrument collects data for 200 s from shipping containers (208-l barrels). These measurements help to distinguish the issue of material control - Has any material been diverted? - from the issue of measurement control - Is there a measurement bias?

  9. Radiation Effects in Nuclear Waste Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weber, William J.; Wang, Lumin; Hess, Nancy J.; Icenhower, Jonathan P.; Thevuthasan, Suntharampillai

    2003-01-01

    The objective of this project is to develop a fundamental understanding of radiation effects in glasses and ceramics, as well as the influence of solid-state radiation effects on aqueous dissolution kinetics, which may impact the performance of nuclear waste forms and stabilized nuclear materials. This work provides the underpinning science to develop improved glass and ceramic waste forms for the immobilization and disposition of high-level tank waste, excess plutonium, plutonium residues and scrap, other actinides, and other nuclear waste streams. Furthermore, this work is developing develop predictive models for the performance of nuclear waste forms and stabilized nuclear materials. Thus, the research performed under this project has significant implications for the immobilization of High-Level Waste (HLW) and Nuclear Materials, two mission areas within the Office of Environmental Management (EM). With regard to the HLW mission, this research will lead to improved understanding of radiation-induced degradation mechanisms and their effects on dissolution kinetics, as well as development of predictive models for waste form performance. In the Nuclear Materials mission, this research will lead to improvements in the understanding of radiation effects on the chemical and structural properties of materials for the stabilization and long-term storage of plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, and other actinides. The research uses plutonium incorporation, ion-beam irradiation, and electron-beam irradiation to simulate the effects of alpha decay and beta decay on relevant glasses and ceramics. The research under this project has the potential to result in improved glass and ceramic materials for the stabilization and immobilization of high-level tank waste, plutonium residues and scraps, surplus weapons plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, other actinides, and other radioactive materials

  10. Radiation Effects in Nuclear Waste Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weber, William J.

    2005-01-01

    The objective of this project is to develop a fundamental understanding of radiation effects in glasses and ceramics, as well as the influence of solid-state radiation effects on aqueous dissolution kinetics, which may impact the performance of nuclear waste forms and stabilized nuclear materials. This work provides the underpinning science to develop improved glass and ceramic waste forms for the immobilization and disposition of high-level tank waste, excess plutonium, plutonium residues and scrap, other actinides, and other nuclear waste streams. Furthermore, this work is developing develop predictive models for the performance of nuclear waste forms and stabilized nuclear materials. Thus, the research performed under this project has significant implications for the immobilization of High-Level Waste (HLW) and Nuclear Materials, two mission areas within the Office of Environmental Management (EM). With regard to the HLW mission, this research will lead to improved understanding of radiation-induced degradation mechanisms and their effects on dissolution kinetics, as well as development of predictive models for waste form performance. In the Nuclear Materials mission, this research will lead to improvements in the understanding of radiation effects on the chemical and structural properties of materials for the stabilization and long-term storage of plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, and other actinides. The research uses plutonium incorporation, ion-beam irradiation, and electron-beam irradiation to simulate the effects of alpha decay and beta decay on relevant glasses and ceramics. The research under this project has the potential to result in improved glass and ceramic materials for the stabilization and immobilization of high-level tank waste, plutonium residues and scraps, surplus weapons plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, other actinides, and other radioactive materials

  11. Criticality Safety Support to a Project Addressing SNM Legacy Items at LLNL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pearson, J S; Burch, J G; Dodson, K E; Huang, S T

    2005-01-01

    and new ES and H container labels applied. In many cases, legacy material that was inspected was determined to be excess to programmatic needs and it was then either processed to meet the DOE-3013-STD or designated as TRU waste and disposed of accordingly. During FY2003 through FY2004 approximately 1600 items were opened and the items processed if necessary, repackaged and newly labeled with ES and H labels. As of April, 2005, there are only 32 non-ES and H labeled items in existence within the Plutonium Facility. Due to a consolidated effort in dealing with the legacy items, the problems associated with storage of these items at LLNL has been substantially abated. The paper will discuss the background, implementation, and results of the SNM Legacy Items Implementation Project. Benefits and Lessons Learned will be identified

  12. Nuclear materials transport worldwide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stellpflug, J.

    1987-01-01

    This Greenpeace report shows: nuclear materials transport is an extremely hazardous business. There is no safe protection against accidents, kidnapping, or sabotage. Any moment of a day, at any place, a nuclear transport accident may bring the world to disaster, releasing plutonium or radioactive fission products to the environment. Such an event is not less probable than the MCA at Chernobyl. The author of the book in hand follows the secret track of radioactive materials around the world, from uranium mines to the nuclear power plants, from reprocessing facilities to the waste repositories. He explores the routes of transport and the risks involved, he gives the names of transport firms and discloses incidents and carelessness, tells about damaged waste drums and plutonium that 'disappeared'. He also tells about worldwide, organised resistance to such nuclear transports, explaining the Greenpeace missions on the open sea, or the 'day X' operation at the Gorleben site, informing the reader about protests and actions for a world freed from the threat of nuclear energy. (orig./HP) [de

  13. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  14. Nuclear Forensic Science: Analysis of Nuclear Material Out of Regulatory Control

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kristo, Michael J.; Gaffney, Amy M.; Marks, Naomi; Knight, Kim; Cassata, William S.; Hutcheon, Ian D.

    2016-06-01

    Nuclear forensic science seeks to identify the origin of nuclear materials found outside regulatory control. It is increasingly recognized as an integral part of a robust nuclear security program. This review highlights areas of active, evolving research in nuclear forensics, with a focus on analytical techniques commonly employed in Earth and planetary sciences. Applications of nuclear forensics to uranium ore concentrates (UOCs) are discussed first. UOCs have become an attractive target for nuclear forensic researchers because of the richness in impurities compared to materials produced later in the fuel cycle. The development of chronometric methods for age dating nuclear materials is then discussed, with an emphasis on improvements in accuracy that have been gained from measurements of multiple radioisotopic systems. Finally, papers that report on casework are reviewed, to provide a window into current scientific practice.

  15. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  16. Enhancing the performance of a tensioned metastable fluid detector based active interrogation system for the detection of SNM in interrogation source in moderated/reflected geometries

    Science.gov (United States)

    Grimes, T. F.; Hagen, A. R.; Archambault, B. C.; Taleyarkhan, R. P.

    2018-03-01

    This paper describes the development of a SNM detection system for interrogating 1m3 cargos via the combination of a D-D neutron interrogation source (with and without reflectors) and tensioned metastable fluid detectors (TMFDs). TMFDs have been previously shown (Taleyarkhan et al., 2008; Grimes et al., 2015; Grimes and Taleyarkhan, 2016; Archambault et al., 2017; Hagen et al., 2016) to be capable of using Threshold Energy Neutron Analysis (TENA) techniques to reject the ∼2.45 MeV D-D interrogating neutrons while still remaining sensitive to >2.45 MeV neutrons resulting from fission in the target (HEU) material. In order to enhance the performance, a paraffin reflector was included around the accelerator head. This reflector was used to direct neutrons into the package to increase the fission signal, lower the energy of the interrogating neutrons to increase the fission cross-section with HEU, and, also to direct interrogating neutrons away from the detectors in order to enhance the required discrimination between interrogating and fission neutrons. Experiments performed with a 239 Pu-Be neutron source and MnO2 indicated that impressive performance gains could be made by placing a parabolic paraffin moderator between the interrogation source and an air-filled cargo container with HEU placed at the center. However, experiments with other cargo fillers (as specified in the well-known ANSI N42.41-2007 report), and with HEU placed in locations other than the center of the package indicated that other reflector geometries might be superior due to over-"focusing" and the increased solid angle effects due to the accommodation of the moderator geometry. The best performance for the worst case of source location and box fill was obtained by placing the reflector only behind the D-D neutron source rather than in front of it. Finally, it was shown that there could be significant gains in the ability to detect concealed SNM by operating the system in multiple geometric

  17. The century of nuclear materials

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mansur, Lou; Was, Gary S.; Zinkle, Steve; Petti, David; Ukai, Shigeharu

    2018-03-01

    In the spring of 1959 the well-read metallurgist would have noticed the first issue of an infant Journal, one dedicated to a unique and fast growing field of materials issues associated with nuclear energy systems. The periodical, Journal of Nuclear Materials (JNM), is now the leading publication in the field from which it takes its name, thriving beyond the rosiest expectations of its founders. The discipline is well into the second half-century. During that time much has been achieved in nuclear materials; the Journal provides the authoritative record of virtually all those accomplishments. These pages introduce the 500th volume, a significant measure in the world of publishing. The Editors reflect on the progress in the field and the role of this journal.

  18. Safeguards on nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

  19. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [es

  20. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [fr

  1. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  2. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-09-01

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers

  3. Metabonomics for detection of nuclear materials processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alam, Todd Michael; Luxon, Bruce A.; Neerathilingam, Muniasamy; Ansari, S.; Volk, David; Sarkar, S.; Alam, Mary Kathleen

    2010-01-01

    Tracking nuclear materials production and processing, particularly covert operations, is a key national security concern, given that nuclear materials processing can be a signature of nuclear weapons activities by US adversaries. Covert trafficking can also result in homeland security threats, most notably allowing terrorists to assemble devices such as dirty bombs. Existing methods depend on isotope analysis and do not necessarily detect chronic low-level exposure. In this project, indigenous organisms such as plants, small mammals, and bacteria are utilized as living sensors for the presence of chemicals used in nuclear materials processing. Such 'metabolic fingerprinting' (or 'metabonomics') employs nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy to assess alterations in organismal metabolism provoked by the environmental presence of nuclear materials processing, for example the tributyl phosphate employed in the processing of spent reactor fuel rods to extract and purify uranium and plutonium for weaponization.

  4. Nuclear materials facility safety initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Peddicord, K.L.; Nelson, P.; Roundhill, M.; Jardine, L.J.; Lazarev, L.; Moshkov, M.; Khromov, V.V.; Kruchkov, E.; Bolyatko, V.; Kazanskij, Yu.; Vorobeva, I.; Lash, T.R.; Newton, D.; Harris, B.

    2000-01-01

    Safety in any facility in the nuclear fuel cycle is a fundamental goal. However, it is recognized that, for example, should an accident occur in either the U.S. or Russia, the results could seriously delay joint activities to store and disposition weapons fissile materials in both countries. To address this, plans are underway jointly to develop a nuclear materials facility safety initiative. The focus of the initiative would be to share expertise which would lead in improvements in safety and safe practices in the nuclear fuel cycle.The program has two components. The first is a lab-to-lab initiative. The second involves university-to-university collaboration.The lab-to-lab and university-to-university programs will contribute to increased safety in facilities dealing with nuclear materials and related processes. These programs will support important bilateral initiatives, develop the next generation of scientists and engineers which will deal with these challenges, and foster the development of a safety culture

  5. Modernizing computerized nuclear material accounting systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erkkila, B.H.; Claborn, J.

    1995-01-01

    DOE Orders and draft orders for nuclear material control and accountability address a complete material control and accountability (MC and A) program for all DOE contractors processing, using, or storing nuclear materials. A critical element of an MC and A program is the accounting system used to track and record all inventories of nuclear material and movements of materials in those inventories. Most DOE facilities use computerized accounting systems to facilitate the task of accounting for all their inventory of nuclear materials. Many facilities still use a mixture of a manual paper system with a computerized system. Also, facilities may use multiple systems to support information needed for MC and A. For real-time accounting it is desirable to implement a single integrated data base management system for a variety of users. In addition to accountability needs, waste management, material management, and production operations must be supported. Information in these systems can also support criticality safety and other safety issues. Modern networked microcomputers provide extensive processing and reporting capabilities that single mainframe computer systems struggle with. This paper describes an approach being developed at Los Alamos to address these problems

  6. Reducing nuclear danger through intergovernmental technical exchanges on nuclear materials safety management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jardine, L.J.; Peddicord, K.L.; Witmer, F.E.; Krumpe, P.F.; Lazarev, L.; Moshkov, M.

    1997-01-01

    The United States and Russia are dismantling nuclear weapons and generating hundreds of tons of excess plutonium and high enriched uranium fissile nuclear materials that require disposition. The U.S. Department of Energy and Russian Minatom organizations.are planning and implementing safe, secure storage and disposition operations for these materials in numerous facilities. This provides a new opportunity for technical exchanges between Russian and Western scientists that can establish an improved and sustained common safety culture for handling these materials. An initiative that develops and uses personal relationships and joint projects among Russian and Western participants involved in fissile nuclear materials safety management contributes to improving nuclear materials nonproliferation and to making a safer world. Technical exchanges and workshops are being used to systematically identify opportunities in the nuclear fissile materials facilities to improve and ensure the safety of workers, the public, and the environment

  7. Insider protection: A report card

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.

    1986-01-01

    Enhanced security measures against external threats (e.g., terrorists, criminals) have been implemented at most facilities that handle special nuclear material, classified information, or other assets critical to national security. Attention is now focusing on insider protection, and safeguards managers are attempting to provide balanced protection against insider and outsider threats. Potential insider threats include attempts by facility employees to steal special nuclear material (SNM), to cause a radiological hazard to the public, to sabotage critical facilities, or to steal property or classified information. This paper presents a report card on the status of insider protection at Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed facilities, with emphasis on SNM theft. The authors discuss the general trends in insider protection and the limitations of protection measures currently in use. They also discuss the most critical needs for improved procedures, technology, analytical tools, and education for safeguards personnel

  8. Process monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    Many of the measurements and observations made in a nuclear processing facility to monitor processes and product quality can also be used to monitor the location and movements of nuclear materials. In this session information is presented on how to use process monitoring data to enhance nuclear material control and accounting (MC and A). It will be seen that SNM losses can generally be detected with greater sensitivity and timeliness and point of loss localized more closely than by conventional MC and A systems if process monitoring data are applied. The purpose of this session is to enable the participants to: (1) identify process unit operations that could improve control units for monitoring SNM losses; (2) choose key measurement points and formulate a loss indicator for each control unit; and (3) describe how the sensitivities and timeliness of loss detection could be determined for each loss indicator

  9. Insider protection: a report card

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.

    1986-01-01

    Enhanced security measures against external threats (e.g., terrorists, criminals) have been implemented at most facilities that handle special nuclear material, classified information, or other assets critical to national security. Attention is not focussing on insider protection, and safeguards managers are attempting to provide balanced protection against insider and outsider threats. Potential insider threats include attempts by facility employees to steal special nuclear material (SNM), to cause a radiological hazard to the public, to sabotage critical facilities, or to steal property or classified information. This paper presents a report card on the status of insider protection at Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed facilities, with emphasis on SNM theft. We discuss the general trends in insider protection and the limitations of protection measures currently in use. We also discuss the most critical needs for improved procedures, technology, analytical tools, and education for safeguards personnel

  10. ACR-SNM Task Force on Nuclear Medicine Training: report of the task force.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Guiberteau, Milton J; Graham, Michael M

    2011-06-01

    The expansion of knowledge and technological advances in nuclear medicine and radiology require physicians to have more expertise in functional and anatomic imaging. The convergence of these two specialties into the new discipline of molecular imaging has also begun to place demands on residency training programs for additional instruction in physiology and molecular biology. These changes have unmasked weaknesses in current nuclear medicine and radiology training programs. Adding to the impetus for change are the attendant realities of the job market and uncertain employment prospects for physicians trained in nuclear medicine but not also trained in diagnostic radiology. With this background, the ACR and the Society of Nuclear Medicine convened the Task Force on Nuclear Medicine Training to define the issues and develop recommendations for resident training.

  11. Regulation on control of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ikeda, Kaname

    1976-01-01

    Some comment is made on the present laws and the future course of consolidating the regulation of nuclear fuel materials. The first part gives the definitions of the nuclear fuel materials in the laws. The second part deals with the classification and regulation in material handling. Refinement undertaking, fabrication undertaking, reprocessing undertaking, the permission of the government to use the materials, the permission of the government to use the materials under international control, the restriction of transfer and receipt, the reporting, and the safeguard measures are commented. The third part deals with the strengthening of regulation. The nuclear fuel safety deliberation special committee will be established at some opportunity of revising the ordinance. The nuclear material safeguard special committee has been established in the Atomic Energy Commission. The last part deals with the future course of legal consolidation. The safety control will be strengthened. The early investigation of waste handling is necessary, because low level solid wastes are accumulating at each establishment. The law for transporting nuclear materials must be consolidated as early as possible to correspond to foreign transportation laws. Physical protection is awaiting the conclusions of the nuclear fuel safeguard special committee. The control and information systems for the safeguard measures must be consolidated in the laws. (Iwakiri, K.)

  12. Technologies for detection of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeVolpi, A.

    1996-01-01

    Detection of smuggled nuclear materials at transit points requires monitoring unknown samples in large closed packages. This review contends that high-confidence nuclear-material detection requires induced fission as the primary mechanism, with passive radiation screening in a complementary role. With the right equipment, even small quantities of nuclear materials are detectable with a high probability at transit points. The equipment could also be linked synergistically with detectors of other contrabond. For screening postal mail and packages, passive monitors are probably more cost-effective. When a suspicious item is detected, a single active probe could then be used. Until active systems become mass produced, this two-stage screening/interrogation role for active/passive equipment is more economic for cargo at border crossings. For widespread monitoring of nuclear smuggling, it will probably be necessary to develop a system for simultaneously detecting most categories of contraband, including explosives and illicit drugs. With control of nuclear materials at known storage sites being the first line of defense, detection capabilities at international borders could establish a viable second line of defense against smuggling

  13. Metabonomics for detection of nuclear materials processing.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alam, Todd Michael; Luxon, Bruce A. (University Texas Medical Branch); Neerathilingam, Muniasamy (University Texas Medical Branch); Ansari, S. (University Texas Medical Branch); Volk, David (University Texas Medical Branch); Sarkar, S. (University Texas Medical Branch); Alam, Mary Kathleen

    2010-08-01

    Tracking nuclear materials production and processing, particularly covert operations, is a key national security concern, given that nuclear materials processing can be a signature of nuclear weapons activities by US adversaries. Covert trafficking can also result in homeland security threats, most notably allowing terrorists to assemble devices such as dirty bombs. Existing methods depend on isotope analysis and do not necessarily detect chronic low-level exposure. In this project, indigenous organisms such as plants, small mammals, and bacteria are utilized as living sensors for the presence of chemicals used in nuclear materials processing. Such 'metabolic fingerprinting' (or 'metabonomics') employs nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy to assess alterations in organismal metabolism provoked by the environmental presence of nuclear materials processing, for example the tributyl phosphate employed in the processing of spent reactor fuel rods to extract and purify uranium and plutonium for weaponization.

  14. Establishing sitewide risk perspectives due to cumulative impacts from AB, EP, and NEPA hazard analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olinger, S.J.

    1998-06-01

    With the end of the Cold War in 1992, the mission for the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (Site) was changed from production of nuclear weapon components to special nuclear materials (SNM) and waste management, accelerated cleanup, reuse and closure of the Site. This change in mission presents new hazards and risk management challenges. With today's shrinking DOE budget, a balance needs to be achieved between controlling those hazards related to SNM and waste management and interim storage, and those hazards related to accelerated closure of the Site involving deactivation, decontamination, and decommissioning (DD and D) of surplus nuclear facilities. This paper discusses how risk assessments of normal operations and potential accidents have provided insights on the risks of current operations and planned closure activities

  15. Security of material: Preventing criminal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    2001-01-01

    The report emphasizes the need for national regulatory authorities to include in the regulatory systems, measures to control and protect nuclear materials from being used in illegal activities, as well as aspects of relevance for detecting and responding to illegal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. The report will give an overview of the international treaties and agreements that underpin the establishment of a regulatory structure necessary for States to meet their non-proliferation policy and undertakings. Ongoing work to strengthen the protection of nuclear material and to detect and respond to illegal activities involving nuclear and other radioactive material will be included. The focus of the paper is on the need for standards and national regulation in the nuclear security area. (author)

  16. Role of nuclear material accounting and control on nuclear security. Countermeasure against insider threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    2014-01-01

    Possibility on unauthorized removal (theft) of nuclear material by a facility insider is a recognized as a serious threat. An insider could take advantage or knowledge of control system and access to nuclear material to intercept facility's system designed to protect theft of nuclear material by an insider. This paper will address how the facility level Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) System should be designed and implemented to enhance deterring and detect theft of nuclear material by a facility insider. (author)

  17. Problems on shipping high-enriched nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ganzha, V.V.; Demko, N.A.; Deryavko, I.I.; Zelenski, D.I.; Kolbaenkov, A.N.; Pivovarov, O.S.; Storozhenko, A.N.; Chernyad'ev, V.V.; Yakovlev, V.V.; Gorin, N.V.; Prokhod'ko, A.I.; Sherbina, A.N.; Barsanov, V.I.; Dyakov, E.K.; Tishenko, M.F.; Khlystov, A.I.; Vasil'ev, A.P.; Smetannikov, V.P.

    1998-01-01

    In 1996-1998 all Russian nuclear materials were taken out of the Institute of Atomic Energy of Kazakhstan National Nuclear Centre (IAE NNC RK). In this report there are basic tasks related to the performance of this work. They are: 1) Preparation of Russian nuclear materials (NM) kept at IAE NNC RK for transportation; 2) accounting and control of Russian nuclear materials kept at IAE NNC RK; 3) arrangement of permit papers for NM transportation; 4) NM transportation from IAE NNC RK to the enterprises of Russian MINATOM; 5) provision of nuclear and radiation safety in the course of operations with NM; 6) provision of physical protection for Russian NM

  18. Signal Analysis for Radiation Event Identification

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Steven A. Wallace

    2004-12-30

    The method of digitizing the scintillation output signals from a lithiated sol-gel based glass is described. The design considerations for using the lithiated scintillator for the detection of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) is presented.

  19. Study of nuclear environment and material strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kamei, Takashi

    2011-01-01

    There is a concern about the environmental hazard caused by radioactive materials coming with the expansion of nuclear power and even by renewable energies, which are used as countermeasures against global warming to construct a sustainable society. A concept to internalize the pollution caused by radioactive materials, which are directly or indirectly related to nuclear power, to economical activities by adopting externality is proposed. Energy and industrial productions are strongly related to the supply of material. Therefore material flow is also part of this internalization concept. The concept is named 'NEMS (Nuclear Environment and Material Strategy)'. Fission products and transuranic isotopes from nuclear power such as plutonium are considered in this concept. Thorium, which comes from the material flow of rare-earth production to support the elaboration of renewable energies including electric vehicles on the consumer side, is considered as an externality of the non-nuclear power field. Fission products contain some rare-earth materials. Thus, these rare-earth materials, which are extracted by the advanced ORIENT (Optimization by Recycling Instructive Elements) cycle, are internalized as rare-earth supplier in economy. However, the supply quantity is limited. Therefore rare-earth production itself is still needed. The externality of rare-earth production is thorium and is internalized by using it as nuclear fuel. In this case, the demand of thorium is still small within these few decades compared to the production of thorium as byproduct of the rare-earth production. A thorium energy bank (The Bank) is advanced to regulate the storage of the excess amount of thorium inside of an international framework in order to prevent environmental hazard resulting from the illegal disposal of thorium. In this paper, the material flows of thorium and rare-earth are outlined. Their material balance are demonstrated based on the prediction of rare-earth mining and an

  20. Passive nondestructive assay of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reilly, D.; Ensslin, N.; Smith, H. Jr.; Kreiner, S.

    1991-03-01

    The term nondestructive assay (NDA) is applied to a series of measurement techniques for nuclear fuel materials. The techniques measure radiation induced or emitted spontaneously from the nuclear material; the measurements are nondestructive in that they do not alter the physical or chemical state of the nuclear material. NDA techniques are characterized as passive or active depending on whether they measure radiation from the spontaneous decay of the nuclear material or radiation induced by an external source. This book emphasizes passive NDA techniques, although certain active techniques like gamma-ray absorption densitometry and x-ray fluorescence are discussed here because of their intimate relation to passive assay techniques. The principal NDA techniques are classified as gamma-ray assay, neutron assay, and calorimetry. Gamma-ray assay techniques are treated in Chapters 1--10. Neutron assay techniques are the subject of Chapters 11--17. Chapters 11--13 cover the origin of neutrons, neutron interactions, and neutron detectors. Chapters 14--17 cover the theory and applications of total and coincidence neutron counting. Chapter 18 deals with the assay of irradiated nuclear fuel, which uses both gamma-ray and neutron assay techniques. Chapter 19 covers perimeter monitoring, which uses gamma-ray and neutron detectors of high sensitivity to check that no unauthorized nuclear material crosses a facility boundary. The subject of Chapter 20 is attribute and semiquantitative measurements. The goal of these measurements is a rapid verification of the contents of nuclear material containers to assist physical inventory verifications. Waste and holdup measurements are also treated in this chapter. Chapters 21 and 22 cover calorimetry theory and application, and Chapter 23 is a brief application guide to illustrate which techniques can be used to solve certain measurement problems

  1. Di-nucleon structures in homogeneous nuclear matter based on two- and three-nucleon interactions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Arellano, Hugo F. [University of Chile, Department of Physics - FCFM, Santiago (Chile); CEA, DAM, DIF, Arpajon (France); Isaule, Felipe [University of Chile, Department of Physics - FCFM, Santiago (Chile); Rios, Arnau [University of Surrey, Department of Physics, Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences, Guildford (United Kingdom)

    2016-09-15

    We investigate homogeneous nuclear matter within the Brueckner-Hartree-Fock (BHF) approach in the limits of isospin-symmetric nuclear matter (SNM) as well as pure neutron matter at zero temperature. The study is based on realistic representations of the internucleon interaction as given by Argonne v{sub 18}, Paris, Nijmegen I and II potentials, in addition to chiral N{sup 3}LO interactions, including three-nucleon forces up to N{sup 2}LO. Particular attention is paid to the presence of di-nucleon bound states structures in {sup 1}S{sub 0} and {sup 3}SD{sub 1} channels, whose explicit account becomes crucial for the stability of self-consistent solutions at low densities. A characterization of these solutions and associated bound states is discussed. We confirm that coexisting BHF single-particle solutions in SNM, at Fermi momenta in the range 0.13-0.3 fm{sup -1}, is a robust feature under the choice of realistic internucleon potentials. (orig.)

  2. Concepts of IAEA nuclear materials accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oakberg, John A.

    2001-01-01

    The paper describes nuclear material accounting from the standpoint of IAEA Safeguards and how this accounting is applied by the Agency. The basic concepts of nuclear material accounting are defined and the way these apply to States with INFCIRC/153-type safeguards agreements is presented. (author)

  3. Detection of Special Nuclear Material in Cargo Containers Using Neutron Interrogation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Slaughter, D.; Accatino, M.; Bernstein, A.; Candy, J.; Dougan, A.; Hall, J.; Loshak, A.; Manatt, D.; Meyer, A.; Pohl, B.; Prussin, S.; Walling, R.; Weirup, D.

    2003-01-01

    The goal of the work reported here is to develop a concept for an active neutron interrogation system that can detect small targets of SNM contraband in cargo containers, roughly 5 kg HEU or 1 kg Pu, even when well shielded by a thick cargo. It is essential that the concept be reliable and have low false-positive and false-negative error rates. It also must be rapid to avoid interruption of commerce, completing the analysis in minutes. A new radiation signature unique to SNM has been identified that utilizes high-energy (E γ = 3-7 MeV) fission product γ-ray emission. Fortunately, this high-energy γ-ray signature is robust in that it is very distinct compared to normal background radiation where there is no comparable high-energy γ-ray radiation. Equally important, it has a factor of 10 higher yield than delayed neutrons that are the basis of classical interrogation technique normally used on small unshielded specimens of SNM. And it readily penetrates two meters of low-Z and high-Z cargo at the expected density of ∼ 0.5 gm/cm 3 . Consequently, we expect that in most cases the signature flux at the container wall is at least 2-3 decades more intense than delayed neutron signals used historically and facilitates the detection of SNM even when shielded by thick cargo. Experiments have verified this signature and its predicted characteristics. However, they revealed an important interference due to the activation of 16 O by the 16 O(n,p) 16 N reaction that produces a 6 MeV γ-ray following a 7-sec β-decay of the 16 N. This interference is important when irradiating with 14 MeV neutrons but is eliminated when lower energy neutron sources are utilized since the reaction threshold for 16 O(n,p) 16 N is 10 MeV. The signature γ-ray fluxes exiting a thick cargo can be detected in large arrays of scintillation detectors to produce useful signal count rates of 2-4 x 10 4 cps. That is high enough to quickly identify SNM fission by its characteristic high energy

  4. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-09-28

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs.

  5. International safeguards: Accounting for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.

    1988-01-01

    Nuclear safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are one element of the ''non-proliferation regime'', the collection of measures whose aim is to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already possess them. Safeguards verifications provide evidence that nuclear materials in peaceful use for nuclear-power production are properly accounted for. Though carried out in cooperation with nuclear facility operators, the verifications can provide assurance because they are designed with the capability to detect diversion, should it occur. Traditional safeguards verification measures conducted by inspectors of the IAEA include book auditing; counting and identifying containers of nuclear material; measuring nuclear material; photographic and video surveillance; and sealing. Novel approaches to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards verifications are under investigation as the number and complexity of nuclear facilities grow. These include the zone approach, which entails carrying out verifications for groups of facilities collectively, and randomization approach, which entails carrying out entire inspection visits some fraction of the time on a random basis. Both approaches show promise in particular situations, but, like traditional measures, must be tested to ensure their practical utility. These approaches are covered on this report. 15 refs., 16 figs., 3 tabs

  6. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5): Recommendations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication, Revision 5 of Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225), is intended to provide guidance to States and their competent authorities on how to develop or enhance, implement and maintain a physical protection regime for nuclear material and nuclear facilities, through the establishment or improvement of their capabilities to implement legislative and regulatory programmes. The recommendations presented in this publication reflect a broad consensus among IAEA Member States on the requirements which should be met for the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.

  7. New PAMTRAK video and interface capabilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anspach, J.

    1994-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) mission is changing due to the number of nuclear weapon reductions by the United States and the former Soviet Union, and increasing long-term storage requirements for DOE sites. New techniques to ensure the integrity of special nuclear material (SNM) in storage are available to sites to supplement manual physical inventories, thus allowing them to decrease operating costs while keeping radiation exposure at minimal levels. To help ensure the integrity of SNM Sandia National Laboratories has developed a generic, real time, personnel tracking and material monitoring system named PAMTRAK. PAMTRAK can significantly reduce the number of required manual physical inventories at DOE sites while increasing assurance that an insider has not diverted or stolen material. This paper describes two new capabilities that we have recently added to PAMTRAK; a video motion detection subsystem, and a communication interface to other systems

  8. Nuclear Materials Management for the Nevada Test Site (NTS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jesse C. Schreiber

    2007-01-01

    The Nevada Test Site (NTS) has transitioned from its historical role of weapons testing to a broader role that is focused on being a solution to multiple National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) challenges and opportunities with nuclear materials for the nation. NTS is supporting other NNSA sites challenged with safe nuclear materials storage and disposition. NNSA, with site involvement, is currently transforming the nuclear stockpile and supporting infrastructure to meet the 2030 vision. Efforts are under way to make the production complex smaller, more consolidated, and more modern. With respect to the nuclear material stockpile, the NNSA sites are currently reducing the complex nuclear material inventory through dispositioning and consolidating nuclear material. This includes moving material from other sites to NTS. State-of-the-art nuclear material management and control practices at NTS are essential for NTS to ensure that these new activities are accomplished in a safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally responsible manner. NTS is aggressively addressing this challenge

  9. Management of Global Nuclear Materials for International Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Isaacs, T; Choi, J-S

    2003-01-01

    Nuclear materials were first used to end the World War II. They were produced and maintained during the cold war for global security reasons. In the succeeding 50 years since the Atoms for Peace Initiative, nuclear materials were produced and used in global civilian reactors and fuel cycles intended for peaceful purposes. The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 established a framework for appropriate applications of both defense and civilian nuclear activities by nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. As global inventories of nuclear materials continue to grow, in a diverse and dynamically changing manner, it is time to evaluate current and future trends and needed actions: what are the current circumstances, what has been done to date, what has worked and what hasn't? The aim is to identify mutually reinforcing programmatic directions, leading to global partnerships that measurably enhance international security. Essential elements are material protection, control and accountability (MPC and A) of separated nuclear materials, interim storage, and geologic repositories for all nuclear materials destined for final disposal. Cooperation among key partners, such as the MPC and A program between the U.S. and Russia for nuclear materials from dismantled weapons, is necessary for interim storage and final disposal of nuclear materials. Such cooperative partnerships can lead to a new nuclear regime where a complete fuel cycle service with fuel leasing and spent fuel take-back can be offered to reactor users. The service can effectively minimize or even eliminate the incentive or rationale for the user-countries to develop their indigenous enrichment and reprocessing technologies. International cooperation, supported by governments of key countries can be best to facilitate the forum for formation of such cooperative partnerships

  10. U.S. national nuclear material control and accounting system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taylor, S; Terentiev, V G

    1998-01-01

    Issues related to nuclear material control and accounting and illegal dealing in these materials were discussed at the April 19--20, 1996 Moscow summit meeting (G7 + Russia). The declaration from this meeting reaffirmed that governments are responsible for the safety of all nuclear materials in their possession and for the effectiveness of the national control and accounting system for these materials. The Russian delegation at this meeting stated that ''the creation of a nuclear materials accounting, control, and physical protection system has become a government priority''. Therefore, in order to create a government nuclear material control and accounting system for the Russian Federation, it is critical to study the structure, operating principles, and regulations supporting the control and accounting of nuclear materials in the national systems of nuclear powers. In particular, Russian specialists have a definite interest in learning about the National Nuclear Material Control and Accounting System of the US, which has been operating successfully as an automated system since 1968

  11. Management review of nuclear material control and accounting systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-06-01

    Section 70.58, ''Fundamental Nuclear Material Controls,'' of 10 CFR Part 70, ''Special Nuclear Materials,'' requires, in paragraph 70.58(c), that certain licensees authorized to possess more than one effective kilogram of special nuclear material establish a management system to provide for the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of nuclear material control and accounting procedures. Such a system must provide for a review of the nuclear material control system at least every 12 months. This guide describes the purpose and scope, personnel qualifications, depth of detail, and procedures that are acceptable to the NRC staff for the management review of nuclear material control systems required under paragraph 70.58(c) of 10 CFR Part 70. (U.S.)

  12. Base isolation for nuclear power and nuclear material facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eidinger, J.M.; Kircher, C.A.; Vaidya, N.; Constantinou, M.; Kelly, J.M.; Seidensticker, R.; Tajirian, F.F.; Ovadia, D.

    1989-01-01

    This report serves to document the status of the practice for the use of base isolation systems in the design and construction of nuclear power and nuclear material facilities. The report first describes past and current (1989) applications of base isolation in nuclear facilities. The report then provides a brief discussion of non-nuclear applications. Finally, the report summarizes the status of known base-isolation codes and standards

  13. Order for execution of the law concerning regulation of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The designations according to Item 1, Article 3 and Item 1, Article 13 of the Law must be obtained for each factory or business place where refining and fabrication of nuclear material are to be performed. One who wants to obtain such designation should file an application attached with a business plan and other documents via the director of a regional bureau of international trade and industry having jurisdiction over such factory or business place. When nuclear material refiners and nuclear material fabricators wish to obtain the approval for change stipulated in Item 1, Article 6 and Item 1, Article 16 of the Law, they must file applications to the Prime Minister and the Minister of International Trade and Industry via said directors. Chief handlers of nuclear fuel materials shall be approved among those meeting the strict requirements. One who wishes to install reactors must obtain the approval for each factory or business place where the reactors are to be installed. The permission must be obtained for each nuclear ship entering Japanese waters. The reactors proper and several facilities are subject to periodic inspection. (Rikitake, Y.)

  14. Status report on the TSA Systems, Ltd., MCA465 gamma-ray confirmation instrument

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.; Rutherford, D.A.

    1994-01-01

    The TSA Systems, Ltd., MCA465 is hand-portable, low resolution, gamma-ray instrument for confirming special nuclear materials (SNM) and related applications. The instrument evolved from earlier TSA Systems hand-held instruments, and, since its inception in 1991, it has been undergoing cycles of evaluation and then repair or redesign to correct problems. Through the efforts of Los Alamos, Rocky Flats, and TSA Systems, the MCA465 now has achieved commendable progress toward achieving quality performance as a rapid confirmation tool for SNM

  15. Nuclear physics methods in materials research

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bethge, K.; Baumann, H.; Jex, H.; Rauch, F.

    1980-01-01

    Proceedings of the seventh divisional conference of the Nuclear Physics Division held at Darmstadt, Germany, from 23rd through 26th of September, 1980. The scope of this conference was defined as follows: i) to inform solid state physicists and materials scientists about the application of nuclear physics methods; ii) to show to nuclear physicists open questions and problems in solid state physics and materials science to which their methods can be applied. According to the intentions of the conference, the various nuclear physics methods utilized in solid state physics and materials science and especially new developments were reviewed by invited speakers. Detailed aspects of the methods and typical examples extending over a wide range of applications were presented as contributions in poster sessions. The Proceedings contain all the invited papers and about 90% of the contributed papers. (orig./RW)

  16. Temporal response methods for dynamic measurement of in-process inventory of dissolved nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zivi, S.M.; Seefeldt, W.B.

    1976-01-01

    This analysis demonstrated that a plant's temporal response to perturbations of feed isotope composition can be used to measure the in-process inventory, without suspending plant operations. The main advantage of the temporal response technique over the step-displacement method are (1) it obviates the need for large special feed batches and (2) it obviates the requirement that all the in-process material have a uniform isotopic composition at the beginning of the measurement. The temporal response method holds promise for essentially continuous real-time determination of in-process SNM. The main disadvantage or problem with the temporal response method is that it requires the measurement of the isotopic composition of a great many samples to moderately high accuracy. This requirement appears amenable to solution by a modest effort in instrument development

  17. Gamma spectrometric discrimination of special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dowdall, M.; Mattila, A.; Ramebaeck, H.; Aage, H.K.; Palsson, S.E.

    2012-12-01

    This report presents details pertaining to an exercise conducted as part of the NKS-B programme using synthetic gamma ray spectra to simulate the type of data that may be encountered in the interception of material potentially containing special nuclear materials. A range of scenarios were developed involving sources that may or may not contain special nuclear materials. Gamma spectral data was provided to participants as well as ancillary data and participants were asked, under time constraint, to determine whether or not the data was indicative of circumstances involving special nuclear materials. The situations varied such that different approaches were required in order to obtain the correct result in each context. In the majority of cases participants were able to correctly ascertain whether or not the situations involved special nuclear material. Although fulfilling the primary goal of the exercise, some participants were not in a position to correctly identify with certainty the material involved, Situations in which the smuggled material was being masked by another source proved to be the most challenging for participants. (Author)

  18. Gamma spectrometric discrimination of special nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dowdall, M. [Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (Norway); Mattila, A. [Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, Helsinki (Finland); Ramebaeck, H. [Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm (Sweden); Aage, H.K. [Danish Emergency Management Agency, Birkeroed (Denmark); Palsson, S.E. [Icelandic Radiation Safety Authority, Reykjavik (Iceland)

    2012-12-15

    This report presents details pertaining to an exercise conducted as part of the NKS-B programme using synthetic gamma ray spectra to simulate the type of data that may be encountered in the interception of material potentially containing special nuclear materials. A range of scenarios were developed involving sources that may or may not contain special nuclear materials. Gamma spectral data was provided to participants as well as ancillary data and participants were asked, under time constraint, to determine whether or not the data was indicative of circumstances involving special nuclear materials. The situations varied such that different approaches were required in order to obtain the correct result in each context. In the majority of cases participants were able to correctly ascertain whether or not the situations involved special nuclear material. Although fulfilling the primary goal of the exercise, some participants were not in a position to correctly identify with certainty the material involved, Situations in which the smuggled material was being masked by another source proved to be the most challenging for participants. (Author)

  19. Materials for nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Banerjee, S.; Kamath, H.S.

    2005-01-01

    The improved performance of present generation nuclear reactors and the realization of advanced reactor concepts, both, require development of better materials. Physical metallurgy/materials science principles which have been exploited in meeting the exacting requirements of nuclear reactor materials (fuels and structural materials), are outlined citing a few specific examples. While the incentive for improvement of traditional fuels (e.g., UO 2 fuel) is primarily for increasing the average core burn up, the development of advanced fuels (e.g., MOX, mixed carbide, nitride, silicide and dispersion fuels) are directed towards better utilization of fissile and fertile inventories through adaptation of innovative fuel cycles. As the burn up of UO 2 fuel reaches higher levels, a more detailed and quantitative understanding of the phenomena such as fission gas release, fuel restructuring induced by radiation and thermal gradients and pellet-clad interaction is being achieved. Development of zirconium based alloys for both cladding and pressure tube applications is discussed with reference to their physical metallurgy, fabrication techniques and in-reactor degradation mechanisms. The issue of radiation embrittlement of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) is covered drawing a comparison between the western and eastern specifications of RPV steels. The search for new materials which can stand higher rates of atomic displacement due to radiation has led to the development of swelling resistant austenitic and ferritic stainless steels for fast reactor applications as exemplified by the development of the D-9 steel for Indian fast breeder reactor. The presentation will conclude by listing various materials related phenomena, which have a strong bearing on the successful development of future nuclear energy systems. (author)

  20. The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The law aims to perform regulations on enterprises of refining, processing and reprocessing of nuclear source and fuel materials and on establishment and operation of reactors to realize the peaceful and deliberate utilization of atomic energy according to the principle of the atomic energy basic law. Regulations of use of internationally regulated substances are also envisaged to observe international agreements. Basic concepts and terms are defined, such as: atomic energy; nuclear fuel material; nuclear source material; reactor; refining; processing; reprocessing and internationally regulated substance. Any person besides the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Material Developing Corporation who undertakes refining shall be designated by the Prime Minister and the Minister of International Trade and Industry. An application shall be filed to the ministers concerned, listing name and address of the person, name and location of the refining works, equipment and method of refining, etc. The permission of the Prime Minister is necessary for any person who engages in processing. An application shall be filed to the Prime Minister, listing name and address of the person, name and location of the processing works and equipment and method of processing, etc. Permission of the Prime Minister, the Minister of International Trade and Industry or the Minister of Transport is necessary for any person who sets up reactors. An application shall be filed to the minister concerned, listing name and address of the person, purpose of operation, style, thermal output of reactor and number of units, etc. (Okada, K.)

  1. Automated processing of nuclear materials accounting data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Straka, J.; Pacak, P.; Moravec, J.

    1980-01-01

    An automated system was developed of nuclear materials accounting in Czechoslovakia. The system allows automating data processing including data storage. It comprises keeping records of inventories and material balance. In designing the system, the aim of the IAEA was taken into consideration, ie., building a unified information system interconnected with state-run systems of accounting and checking nuclear materials in the signatory countries of the non-proliferation treaty. The nuclear materials accounting programs were written in PL-1 and were tested at an EC 1040 computer at UJV Rez where also the routine data processing takes place. (B.S.)

  2. 78 FR 38739 - Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-27

    ... Systems for Nuclear Power Plants AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Regulatory guide; issuance... Guide (RG) 5.29, ``Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Systems for Nuclear Power Plants... material control and accounting. This guide applies to all nuclear power plants. ADDRESSES: Please refer to...

  3. Structural materials for innovative nuclear systems (SMINS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    Structural materials research is a field of growing relevance in the nuclear sector, especially for the different innovative reactor systems being developed within the Generation IV International Forum (GIF), for critical and subcritical transmutation systems, and of interest to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). Under the auspices of the NEA Nuclear Science Committee (NSC) the Workshop on Structural Materials for Innovative Nuclear Systems (SMINS) was organised in collaboration with the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe in Germany. The objectives of the workshop were to exchange information on structural materials research issues and to discuss ongoing programmes, both experimental and in the field of advanced modelling. These proceedings include the papers and the poster session materials presented at the workshop, representing the international state of the art in this domain. (author)

  4. Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 36. annual meeting: Proceedings. Volume 24

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1995-01-01

    The sessions at this meeting covered the following topics: international safeguards; physical protection; material control and accountability (MC and A) training; waste overview; nonproliferation and arms control -- US/former Soviet Union; MC and A/physical protection -- SNM storage; spent fuel storage; physical protection -- intrusion sensors and access delay; MC and A -- gamma ray and holdup measurements; MC and A -- neutron based measurements; MC and A/nonproliferation and arms control -- fissile materials disposition; low level waste; packaging and transportation; international safeguards and nonproliferation and arms control -- IAEA verification in the US; international safeguards and physical protection -- video systems; poster and demonstrations; international safeguards and physical protection -- T.I.D.'s, tags and seals; high level wastes and mixed waste; MC and A -- bulk measurements; MC and A and physical protection -- policy; nonproliferation and arms control -- detection and monitoring techniques; nonproliferation and arms control -- US-Russian lab-to-lab safeguards cooperation; MC and A -- information systems; physical protection and MC and A -- vulnerability assessments; waste management -- measurement; international safeguards -- integrated and remote monitoring systems; MC and A -- material control and accountability and indicators; nonproliferation and arms control -- treaties and analysis; nonproliferation and arms control -- plutonium/HEU nonproliferation; MC and A -- measurement control and verification; and international safeguards and nonproliferation and arms control -- environmental monitoring and export control. Separate abstracts were prepared for some of the papers in this volume

  5. Nuclear technology and materials science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olander, D.R.

    1992-01-01

    Current and expected problems in the materials of nuclear technology are reviewed. In the fuel elements of LWRs, cladding waterside corrosion, secondary hydriding and pellet-cladding interaction may be significant impediments to extended burnup. In the fuel, fission gas release remains a key issue. Materials issues in the structural alloys of the primary system include stress-corrosion cracking of steel, corrosion of steam generator tubing and pressurized thermal shock of the reactor vessel. Prediction of core behavior in severe accidents requires basic data and models for fuel liquefaction, aerosol formation, fission product transport and core-concrete interaction. Materials questions in nuclear waste management and fusion technology are briefly reviewed. (author)

  6. New challenges in nuclear material detection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunlop, W.; Sale, K.; Dougan, A.; Luke, J.; Suski, N.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: Even before the attacks of September 11, 2001 the International Safeguards community recognized the magnitude of the threat posed by illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and the need for enhanced physical protection. For the first time, separate sessions on illicit trafficking and physical protection of nuclear materials were included in the IAEA Safeguards Symposium. In the aftermath of September 11, it is clear that the magnitude of the problem and the urgency with which it must be addressed will be a significant driver for advanced nuclear materials detection technologies for years to come. Trafficking in nuclear material and other radioactive sources is a global concern. According to the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database Program, there have been confirmed cases in more than 40 countries and the number of cases per year have nearly doubled since 1996. The challenge of combating nuclear terrorism also brings with it many opportunities for the development of new tools and new approaches. In addition to the traditional gamma-ray imaging, spectrometry and neutron interrogation, there is a need for smaller, smarter, more energy-efficient sensors and sensor systems for detecting and tracking threats. These systems go by many names - correlated sensor networks, wide-area tracking systems, sensor or network fabrics - but the concept behind them is the same. Take a number of wireless sensors and tie them together with a communications network, develop a scheme for fusing the data and make the system easy to deploy. This paper will present a brief survey of nuclear materials detection capability, and discuss some advances in research and development that are particularly suited for illicit trafficking, detection of shielded highly enriched uranium, and border security. (author)

  7. Welcome from INMM (Institute of Nuclear Materials Management)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Satkowiak, L.

    2015-01-01

    The Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) is the premier professional society focused on safe and secure use of Nuclear Materials and the related nuclear scientific technology and knowledge. Its international membership includes government, academia, non-governmental organizations and industry, spanning the full spectrum all the way from policy to technology. The Institute's primary role include the promotion of research, the establishment of standards and the development of best practices, all centered around nuclear materials. It then disseminates this information through meetings, professional contacts, reports, papers, discussions, and publications. The formal structure of the INMM includes six technical divisions: Facility Operation; Materials Control and Accountability; Nonproliferation and Arms Control; Nuclear Security and Physical Protection; Packaging, Transportation and Disposition

  8. Detecting Illicit Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kouzes, Richard T.

    2005-01-01

    The threat that weapons of mass destruction might enter the United States has led to a number of efforts for the detection and interdiction of nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons at our borders. There have been multiple deployments of instrumentation to detect radiation signatures to interdict radiological material, including weapons and weapons material worldwide

  9. Resources of nuclear fuels and materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kawamura, K [Tokyo Inst. of Tech. (Japan); Kamiyama, Teiji; Hayashi, S; Hida, Noboru; Okano, T

    1974-11-01

    In this explanatory article, data on the world resources of nuclear fuels and materials, their production, and the present state of utilization are presented by specialists in varied fields. Main materials taken up are uranium, thorium, beryllium, zirconium, niobium, rare earth elements, graphite, and materials for nuclear fusion (heavy hydrogen and tritium). World reserves and annual production of these materials listed in a number of tables are cited from statistics of the period 1970-1973 or given by estimation. These data may be used as valuable numerical data for various projects and problems of atomic power industries.

  10. Nuclear material accounting software for Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doll, M.; Ewing, T.; Lindley, R.; McWilliams, C.; Roche, C.; Sakunov, I.; Walters, G.

    1999-01-01

    Among the needs identified during initial surveys of nuclear facilities in Ukraine was improved accounting software for reporting material inventories to the regulatory body. AIMAS (Automated Inventory/Material Accounting System) is a PC-based application written in Microsoft Access that was jointly designed by an US/Ukraine development team. The design is highly flexible and configurable, and supports a wide range of computing infrastructure needs and facility requirements including situations where networks are not available or reliable. AIMAS has both English and Russian-language options for displays and reports, and it operates under Windows 3.1, 95, or NT 4.0trademark. AIMAS functions include basic physical inventory tracking, transaction histories, reporting, and system administration functions (system configuration, security, data backup and recovery). Security measures include multilevel password access control, all transactions logged with the user identification, and system administration control. Interfaces to external modules provide nuclear fuel burn-up adjustment and barcode scanning capabilities for physical inventory taking. AIMAS has been installed at Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research (KINR), South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant (SUNPP), Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology (KIPT), Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry (SINEI), and the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety/Nuclear Regulatory Administration (MEPNS/NRA). Facility specialists are being trained to use the application to track material movement and report to the national regulatory authority

  11. The national nuclear material tracking system. A Korea's countermeasure against nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moon, Joo Hyun

    2011-01-01

    Since nuclear terrorism has been identified as a real threat, the Korean government has earnestly developed elementary technologies and sub-systems for establishing an integrated defensive system against nuclear terrorism, which is based on the concept of defense-in-depth. This paper introduces the gist and implications of the studies that have been conducted in building the national nuclear material tracking system for preventing and intercepting the illicit trafficking and transporting of nuclear material in Korea. (orig.)

  12. Order for execution of the law concerning regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    Under the above mentioned law this order prescribes the procedures of controls given to the persons who wish to conduct refining and fabricating businesses, to construct and operate reactors, and to use nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and internationally controlled materials. The common controlling principle prescribed is that the permission or authorization necessary for above listed businesses should be applied for at each factory or each place of business. Based on the principle, the order prescribes: the procedures to apply for the authorization of the refining business, the permission of the change thereof, and the permission of the fabricating business and the change, thereof (the 1st chapter); the procedures to apply for the permission of the construction of reactors and of the change of the construction, as well as the procedure to do periodic inspections of reactor facilities (the 2nd chapter); the procedures to apply for the permission to use nuclear fuel materials and to change the use thereof, the submission of the report to use nuclear source materials, as well as the procedure to apply for the permission to use internationally controlled materials. In the 4th chapter the order lists up the items on which the competent Ministers may require reports from the person who carries on the relevant business. (Matsushima, A.)

  13. The regulations concerning the uses of nuclear source materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This rule is established under the provisions of the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and nuclear reactors and the ordinance for the execution of this law, and to enforce them. Basic terms are defined, such as exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding monitoring area, worker and radioactive waste. Nuclear raw materials shall be used at the facilities for using them, and control areas and surrounding monitoring areas shall be set up. Cumulative dose and exposure radiation dose of workers shall not exceed the permissible quantities defined by the General Director of the Science and Technology Agency. Records shall be made in each works or enterprise on the accept, delivery and stock of each kind of nuclear raw materials, radiation control and the accidents in the facilities of using nuclear raw materials, and kept for specified periods, respectively. The users of nuclear raw materials shall present reports in each works or enterprise on the stock of these materials on July 30 and December 31, every year. They shall submit reports immediately to the Director General on the particular accidents concerning nuclear raw materials and their facilities and on the circumstances and the measures taken against such accidents within ten days. These reports shall be presented on internationally regulated raw materials too. (Okada, K.)

  14. SRS K-area material storage. Expanding capabilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koenig, R.

    2013-01-01

    In support of the Department of Energy’s continued plans to de-inventory and reduce the footprint of Cold War era weapons’ material production sites, the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility, located in the K-Area Complex (KAC) at the Savannah River Site reservation, has expanded since its startup authorization in 2000 to accommodate DOE’s material consolidation mission. During the facility’s growth and expansion, KAMS will have expanded its authorization capability of material types and storage containers to allow up to 8200 total shipping containers once the current expansion effort completes in 2014. Recognizing the need to safely and cost effectively manage other surplus material across the DOE Complex, KAC is constantly evaluating the storage of different material types within K area. When modifying storage areas in KAC, the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) must undergo extensive calculations and reviews; however, without an extensive and proven security posture the possibility for expansion would not be possible. The KAC maintains the strictest adherence to safety and security requirements for all the SNM it handles. Disciplined Conduct of Operations and Conduct of Projects are demonstrated throughout this historical overview highlighting various improvements in capability, capacity, demonstrated cost effectiveness and utilization of the KAC as the DOE Center of Excellence for safe and secure storage of surplus SNM.

  15. Nuclear material statistical accountancy system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentest, F.; Casilli, T.; Franklin, M.

    1979-01-01

    The statistical accountancy system developed at JRC Ispra is refered as 'NUMSAS', ie Nuclear Material Statistical Accountancy System. The principal feature of NUMSAS is that in addition to an ordinary material balance calcultation, NUMSAS can calculate an estimate of the standard deviation of the measurement error accumulated in the material balance calculation. The purpose of the report is to describe in detail, the statistical model on wich the standard deviation calculation is based; the computational formula which is used by NUMSAS in calculating the standard deviation and the information about nuclear material measurements and the plant measurement system which are required as data for NUMSAS. The material balance records require processing and interpretation before the material balance calculation is begun. The material balance calculation is the last of four phases of data processing undertaken by NUMSAS. Each of these phases is implemented by a different computer program. The activities which are carried out in each phase can be summarised as follows; the pre-processing phase; the selection and up-date phase; the transformation phase, and the computation phase

  16. The U.S. national nuclear forensics library, nuclear materials information program, and data dictionary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lamont, Stephen Philip; Brisson, Marcia; Curry, Michael

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear forensics assessments to determine material process history requires careful comparison of sample data to both measured and modeled nuclear material characteristics. Developing centralized databases, or nuclear forensics libraries, to house this information is an important step to ensure all relevant data will be available for comparison during a nuclear forensics analysis and help expedite the assessment of material history. The approach most widely accepted by the international community at this time is the implementation of National Nuclear Forensics libraries, which would be developed and maintained by individual nations. This is an attractive alternative toan international database since it provides an understanding that each country has data on materials produced and stored within their borders, but eliminates the need to reveal any proprietary or sensitive information to other nations. To support the concept of National Nuclear Forensics libraries, the United States Department of Energy has developed a model library, based on a data dictionary, or set of parameters designed to capture all nuclear forensic relevant information about a nuclear material. Specifically, information includes material identification, collection background and current location, analytical laboratories where measurements were made, material packaging and container descriptions, physical characteristics including mass and dimensions, chemical and isotopic characteristics, particle morphology or metallurgical properties, process history including facilities, and measurement quality assurance information. While not necessarily required, it may also be valuable to store modeled data sets including reactor burn-up or enrichment cascade data for comparison. It is fully expected that only a subset of this information is available or relevant to many materials, and much of the data populating a National Nuclear Forensics library would be process analytical or material accountability

  17. Nuclear materials transportation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ushakov, B.A.

    1986-01-01

    Various methods of nuclear materials transportation at different stages of the fuel cycle (U 3 O 8 , UF 6 production enrichment, fuel element manufacturing, storage) are considered. The advantages and drawbacks of railway, automobile, maritime and air transport are analyzed. Some types of containers are characterized

  18. Evaluation of Terminated Nuclear Material Licenses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spencer, K.M.; Zeighami, E.A.

    1999-01-01

    This report presents the results of a six-year project that reviewed material licenses that had been terminated during the period from inception of licensing until approximately late-1994. The material licenses covered in the review project were Part 30, byproduct material licenses; Part 40, source material licenses; and Part 70, special nuclear material licenses. This report describes the methodology developed for the project, summarizes the findings of the license file inventory process, and describes the findings of the reviews or evaluations of the license files. The evaluation identified nuclear material use sites that need review of the licensing material or more direct follow-up of some type. The review process also identified licenses authorized to possess sealed sources for which there was incomplete or missing documentation of the fate of the sources

  19. Materials. The Argentine nuclear policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strasser, H.

    1982-01-01

    Part A of the volume contains a literature search on proliferation and the Third World and on the nuclear technology of Argentina. The materials in part B are divided in: 1. Nonproliferation discussion and the Third World. 2. Development and state of nuclear technology in Argentina. 3. Argentina's international contacts in the field of nuclear energy 1. Federal Republic of Germany, 2. Soviet Union, 3. Brazil. (orig./HP) [de

  20. Proceedings of seventh symposium on sharing of computer programs and technology in nuclear medicine, computer assisted data processing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Howard, B.Y.; McClain, W.J.; Landay, M.

    1977-01-01

    The Council on Computers (CC) of the Society of Nuclear Medicine (SNM) annually publishes the Proceedings of its Symposium on the Sharing of Computer Programs and Technology in Nuclear Medicine. This is the seventh such volume and has been organized by topic, with the exception of the invited papers and the discussion following them. An index arranged by author and by subject is included

  1. Proceedings of seventh symposium on sharing of computer programs and technology in nuclear medicine, computer assisted data processing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Howard, B.Y.; McClain, W.J.; Landay, M. (comps.)

    1977-01-01

    The Council on Computers (CC) of the Society of Nuclear Medicine (SNM) annually publishes the Proceedings of its Symposium on the Sharing of Computer Programs and Technology in Nuclear Medicine. This is the seventh such volume and has been organized by topic, with the exception of the invited papers and the discussion following them. An index arranged by author and by subject is included.

  2. The establishment of computer system for nuclear material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, Jong Sook; Lee, Byung Doo; Park, Ho Joon

    1988-01-01

    Computer based nuclear material accountancy system will not only increase the credibility of KOREA-IAEA safeguards agreement and bilateral agreements but also decrease the man-power needed to carry out the inspection activity at state level and at facility level. Computer software for nuclear material accounting for and control has been materialized the application to both item and bulk facilities and software for database at state level has been also established to maintain up -to-date status of nation-wide nuclear material inventory. Computer recordings and reporting have been realized to fulfill the national and international commitments to nuclear material accounting for and control. The exchange of information related to nuclear material accounting for has become possible by PC diskettes. (Author)

  3. A future vision of nuclear material information systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suski, N.; Wimple, C.

    1999-01-01

    To address the current and future needs for nuclear materials management and safeguards information, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory envisions an integrated nuclear information system that will support several functions. The vision is to link distributed information systems via a common communications infrastructure designed to address the information interdependencies between two major elements: Domestic, with information about specific nuclear materials and their properties, and International, with information pertaining to foreign nuclear materials, facility design and operations. The communication infrastructure will enable data consistency, validation and reconciliation, as well as provide a common access point and user interface for a broad range of nuclear materials information. Information may be transmitted to, from, and within the system by a variety of linkage mechanisms, including the Internet. Strict access control will be employed as well as data encryption and user authentication to provide the necessary information assurance. The system can provide a mechanism not only for data storage and retrieval, but will eventually provide the analytical tools necessary to support the U.S. government's nuclear materials management needs and non-proliferation policy goals

  4. A review on nuclear forensic methodology for analysis of nuclear material of unknown origin

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deshmukh, A.V.; Raghav, N.K.; Fatangare, N.M.; Jagtap, S.S.

    2014-01-01

    With the growing use of nuclear power and threat from illegal nuclear smuggling nuclear forensic provides an aid to the law enforcement to trace back modus operandi of such threats. Extensive nuclear proliferation, race among countries to acquire nuclear capability and global terrorism scenario has mandated Nuclear Forensic Science technology to tackle nuclear threats. Gamma spectrometry, alpha spectrometry, thermal ionization mass spectrometry, inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry are employed for characterization and relative isotopic composition determinant of Nuclear material and techniques like SEM transmission electron TEM, FT-IR, GC-MS, Electrophoretic technique are used to characterize the contaminated materials in order to deceive investigative agencies. The present paper provide systematic forensic methodology for nuclear and radioactive materials encountered at any crime scene due to any accidental discharges or military activities. (author)

  5. Tungsten - Yttrium Based Nuclear Structural Materials

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ramana, Chintalapalle; Chessa, Jack; Martinenz, Gustavo

    2013-04-01

    The challenging problem currently facing the nuclear science community in this 21st century is design and development of novel structural materials, which will have an impact on the next-generation nuclear reactors. The materials available at present include reduced activation ferritic/martensitic steels, dispersion strengthened reduced activation ferritic steels, and vanadium- or tungsten-based alloys. These materials exhibit one or more specific problems, which are either intrinsic or caused by reactors. This work is focussed towards tungsten-yttrium (W-Y) based alloys and oxide ceramics, which can be utilized in nuclear applications. The goal is to derive a fundamental scientific understanding of W-Y-based materials. In collaboration with University of Califonia -- Davis, the project is designated to demonstrate the W-Y based alloys, ceramics and composites with enhanced physical, mechanical, thermo-chemical properties and higher radiation resistance. Efforts are focussed on understanding the microstructure, manipulating materials behavior under charged-particle and neutron irradiation, and create a knowledge database of defects, elemental diffusion/segregation, and defect trapping along grain boundaries and interfaces. Preliminary results will be discussed.

  6. Order for execution of the law concerning regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    This ordinance is stipulated under the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors. The designation for refining and processing businesses under the law shall be obtained for each works or enterprise where these operations are to be practiced. Persons who intend to accept the designation shall file applications attaching business plans and the other documents specified by the ordinances of the Prime Minister's Office and other ministry orders. The permission for the installation of nuclear reactors under the law shall be received for each works or enterprise where reactors are to be set up. Persons who intend to get the permission shall file applications attaching the financing plans required for the installation of reactors and the other documents designated by the orders of the competent ministry. The permission concerning the reactors installed on foreign ships shall be obtained for each ship which is going to enter into the Japanese waters. Persons who ask for the permission shall file applications attaching the documents which explain the safety of reactor facilities and the other documents defined by the orders of the Ministry of Transportation. The designation for reprocessing business and the application for it are provided for, respectively. The usage of nuclear fuel materials, nuclear raw materials and internationally regulated goods is ruled in detail. (Kubozone, M.)

  7. Order for execution of the law concerning regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1981-01-01

    This ordinance is stipulated under the law concerning the regulation of nuclear raw materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors. The designation for refining and processing businesses under the law shall be obtained for each works or enterprise where these operations are to be practiced. Persons who intend to accept the designation shall file applications attaching business plans and the other documents specified by the ordinances of the Prime Minister's Office and other ministry orders. The permission for the installation of nuclear reactors under the law shall be received for each works or enterprise where reactors are to be set up. Persons who intend to get the permission shall file applications attaching the financing plans required for the installation of reactors and the other documents designated by the orders of the competent ministry. The permission concerning the reactors installed on foreign ships shall be obtained for each ship which is going to enter into the Japanese waters. Persons who ask for the permission shall file applications attaching the documents which explain the safety of reactor facilities and the other documents defined by the orders of the Ministry of Transportation. The designation for reprocessing business and the application for it are provided for, respectively. The usage of nuclear fuel materials, nuclear raw materials and internationally regulated goods is ruled in detail.(Okada, K.)

  8. RADIATION EFFECTS IN NUCLEAR WASTE MATERIALS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weber, William J.

    2000-01-01

    The objective of this research was to develop fundamental understanding and predictive models of radiation effects in glasses and ceramics at the atomic, microscopic, and macroscopic levels, as well as an understanding of the effects of these radiation-induced solid-state changes on dissolution kinetics (i.e., radionuclide release). The research performed during the duration of this project has addressed many of the scientific issues identified in the reports of two DOE panels [1,2], particularly those related to radiation effects on the structure of glasses and ceramics. The research approach taken by this project integrated experimental studies and computer simulations to develop comprehensive fundamental understanding and capabilities for predictive modeling of radiation effects and dissolution kinetics in both glasses and ceramics designed for the stabilization and immobilization of high-level tank waste (HLW), plutonium residues and scraps, surplus weapons plutonium, other actinides, and other highly radioactive waste streams. Such fundamental understanding is necessary in the development of predictive models because all experimental irradiation studies on nuclear waste materials are ''accelerated tests'' that add a great deal of uncertainty to predicted behavior because the damage rates are orders of magnitude higher than the actual damage rates expected in nuclear waste materials. Degradation and dissolution processes will change with damage rate and temperature. Only a fundamental understanding of the kinetics of all the physical and chemical processes induced or affected by radiation will lead to truly predictive models of long-term behavior and performance for nuclear waste materials. Predictive models of performance of nuclear waste materials must be scientifically based and address both radiation effects on structure (i.e., solid-state effects) and the effects of these solid-state structural changes on dissolution kinetics. The ultimate goal of this

  9. Croatian National System of Nuclear Materials Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biscan, R.

    1998-01-01

    In the process of economic and technological development of Croatia by using or introducing nuclear power or in the case of international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material, Croatia should establish and implement National System of Nuclear Materials Control. Croatian National System of accounting for and control of all nuclear material will be subjected to safeguards under requirements of Agreement and Additional Protocol between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The decision by NPT parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference to endorse the Fullscope IAEA Safeguards Standard (FSS) as a necessary precondition of nuclear supply means that states are obliged to ensure that the recipient country has a FSS agreement in place before any nuclear transfer can take place (Ref. 1). The FSS standard of nuclear supply is a central element of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines which the NSG adopted in 1992 and should be applied to members and non-members of the NSG. The FSS standard of nuclear supply in general allows for NPT parties or countries which have undertaken the same obligations through other treaty arrangements, to receive favourable treatment in nuclear supply arrangements. However, the Iraqi experience demonstrate that trade in nuclear and dual-use items, if not properly monitored, can contribute to a nuclear weapons program in countries acting contrary to their non-proliferation obligation. Multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms, including the FSS supply standard, provide the basis for co-ordination and standardisation of export control measures. (author)

  10. A review of the Y-12 Plant discharge of enriched uranium to the sanitary sewer (DEUSS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-09-01

    The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant is situated adjacent to the Oak Ridge city limits and is operated by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The Y-12 Plant is located on 4,860 acres, which is collectively referred to as the Y-12 Plant site. Among the missions for which the facility is in existence are producing nuclear weapons components, supporting weapon design laboratories, and processing special nuclear materials (SNM). The Y-12 Plant is under the regulatory guidance of DOE Order 5400.5 and has complied with the technical requirements governing SNM since its issue. However, an in-depth review with appropriate documentation had not been performed, prior to the effect presented herein, to substantiate this claim. As a result of the solid waste issue, it was determined that other types of waste should be formally reviewed for content with respect to SNM. Therefore, a project was formed to investigate the conveyance of SNM through the sanitary sewer system. It is emphasized that this project addresses only effluent from the sanitary sewer system and not the storm sewer system. The project reviewed sanitary sewer data both for the Y-12 Plant and the Y-12 Plant site

  11. A review of the Y-12 Plant discharge of enriched uranium to the sanitary sewer (DEUSS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1991-09-01

    The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant is situated adjacent to the Oak Ridge city limits and is operated by the United States Department of Energy (DOE). The Y-12 Plant is located on 4,860 acres, which is collectively referred to as the Y-12 Plant site. Among the missions for which the facility is in existence are producing nuclear weapons components, supporting weapon design laboratories, and processing special nuclear materials (SNM). The Y-12 Plant is under the regulatory guidance of DOE Order 5400.5 and has complied with the technical requirements governing SNM since its issue. However, an in-depth review with appropriate documentation had not been performed, prior to the effect presented herein, to substantiate this claim. As a result of the solid waste issue, it was determined that other types of waste should be formally reviewed for content with respect to SNM. Therefore, a project was formed to investigate the conveyance of SNM through the sanitary sewer system. It is emphasized that this project addresses only effluent from the sanitary sewer system and not the storm sewer system. The project reviewed sanitary sewer data both for the Y-12 Plant and the Y-12 Plant site.

  12. Software development for managing nuclear material database

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tondin, Julio Benedito Marin

    2011-01-01

    In nuclear facilities, the nuclear material control is one of the most important activities. The Brazilian National Commission of Nuclear Energy (CNEN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), when inspecting routinely, regards the data provided as a major safety factor. Having a control system of nuclear material that allows the amount and location of the various items to be inspected, at any time, is a key factor today. The objective of this work was to enhance the existing system using a more friendly platform of development, through the VisualBasic programming language (Microsoft Corporation), to facilitate the operation team of the reactor IEA-R1 Reactor tasks, providing data that enable a better and prompter control of the IEA-R1 nuclear material. These data have allowed the development of papers presented at national and international conferences and the development of master's dissertations and doctorate theses. The software object of this study was designed to meet the requirements of the CNEN and the IAEA safeguard rules, but its functions may be expanded in accordance with future needs. The program developed can be used in other reactors to be built in the country, since it is very practical and allows an effective control of the nuclear material in the facilities. (author)

  13. Nuclear Materials Stewardship Within the DOE Environmental Management Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bilyeu, J. D.; Kiess, T. E.; Gates, M. L.

    2002-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Program has made significant progress in planning disposition of its excess nuclear materials and has recently completed several noteworthy studies. Since establishment in 1997, the EM Nuclear Material Stewardship Program has developed disposition plans for excess nuclear materials to support facility deactivation. All nuclear materials have been removed from the Miamisburg Environmental Management Project (Mound), and disposition planning is nearing completion for the Fernald Environmental Management Project and the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site. Only a few issues remain for materials at the Hanford and Idaho sites. Recent trade studies include the Savannah River Site Canyons Nuclear Materials Identification Study, a Cesium/Strontium Management Alternatives Trade Study, a Liquid Technical Standards Trade Study, an Irradiated Beryllium Reflectors with Tritium study, a Special Performance Assessment Required Trade Study, a Neutron Source Trade Study, and development of discard criteria for uranium. A Small Sites Workshop was also held. Potential and planned future activities include updating the Plutonium-239 storage study, developing additional packaging standards, developing a Nuclear Material Disposition Handbook, determining how to recover or dispose of Pu-244 and U-233, and working with additional sites to define disposition plans for their nuclear materials

  14. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is composed of the text of 23 articles, annex 1 showing the levels of physical protection and annex 2 which is the categorization list of nuclear material. The text consists of definitions (article 1), the scope of applications (2), liability of protecting nuclear material during international transport (3 and 4), duty of mutual cooperation (5 and 6), responsibility for criminal punishment (7 to 13), and final provisions (14 to 23). It is to be noted that the nuclear material for military purposes and domestic nuclear facilities are excluded in the connection. After the brief description of the course leading to the establishment of the convention, individual articles and annexes and the respective Japanese version, and the explanation based on the intergovernmental meeting discussion on the draft convention are described. (J.P.N.)

  15. Regulations concerning the fabricating business of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The Regulation is revised on the basis of ''The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors'' and the ''Provisions concerning the enterprises processing nuclear fuel materials'' in the Enforcement Ordinance for the Law, to enforce such provisions. This is the complete revision of the regulation of the same name in 1957. Terms are explained, such as exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding inspection area, persons engaged in works, radioactive wastes, area for incoming and outgoing of materials, fluctuation of stocks, batch, real stocks, effective value and main measuring points. For the applications for the permission of the enterprises processing nuclear fuel materials, the location of an enterprise, the construction of buildings and the construction of and the equipments for facilities of chemical processing, forming, coating, assembling, storage of nuclear fuel materials, disposal of radioactive wastes and radiation control must be written. Records shall be made and maintained for the periods specified on the inspection of processing facilities, nuclear fuel materials, radiation control, operation, maintainance, accidents of processing facilities and weather. Limit to entrance into the control area, measures for exposure radiation dose, patrol and inspection, operation of processing facilities, transport of materials, disposal of radioactive wastes, safety regulations are provided for. Reports to be filed by the persons engaging in the enterprises processing nuclear fuel materials are prescribed. (Okada, K.)

  16. ANCRE alliance: Road-map for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Touboul, F.; Carre, F.

    2013-01-01

    Created in 2009 by the Higher Education and Research ministry and by the Ecology ministry, ANCRE, the National Alliance for Energy Research Coordination aims at enhancing the efficiency of French research in the field of energy by promoting partnerships and synergies between public and private sectors (research organizations, universities and companies). ANCRE aims to propose a coordinated strategy for research and innovation projects. Beyond its four founding members, CEA, CNRS, IFPEN and CPU, ANCRE brings together all the French public research organizations concerned with energy issues, and has strong links with the industrial sector. Among the 10 programmatic groups of ANCRE, one is specifically dedicated to Nuclear Energies (fission and fusion). This group has proposed road-maps in five scientific fields, considered as strategic for R and D, in relation to industrial objectives and scientific bottlenecks: nuclear materials, nuclear chemistry, reactor physics, instrumentation and fusion. For twenty to thirty years, R and D on nuclear materials has evolved from the heavy metallurgy of the first generation of power reactors to the nano-materials science under extreme conditions for present and future needs. Nuclear systems are characterized by extreme operating conditions: high temperatures, mechanical stresses, radiations, corrosive environment, and long durations. In order to deal with these extreme conditions, it is necessary to have a sound knowledge of the materials, to the finest scale. R and D development was made possible by advances in materials science, in relation to more efficient observation means (now reaching the atom scale) and deeper control of the microstructure. Development of simulation methods at the atomic level (ab initio, classical molecular dynamics, kinetic Monte Carlo, etc.) have also allowed a better understanding of phenomena at their most fundamental level. Material performance issues, however, remain significant, as the performance

  17. Nuclear data of the major actinide fuel materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Poenitz, W.P.; Saussure, G. De

    1984-01-01

    The effect of nuclear data of the major actinide fuel materials on the design accuracy, economics and safety of nuclear power systems is discussed. Since most of the data are measured relative to measurement standards, in particular the fission cross-section of /sup 235/U, data must be examined to ensure that absolute measurements and relative measurements are correctly handled. Nuclear data of fissile materials, fertile materials and minor plutonium isotopes are discussed.

  18. National and international nuclear material monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waddoups, I.G.

    1996-01-01

    The status of nuclear materials in both the U.S. and Former Soviet Union is changing based upon the execution of agreements relative to weapons materials production and weapon dismantlement. The result of these activities is that a considerably different emphasis is being placed on how nuclear materials are viewed and utilized. Even though much effort is being expended on the final disposition of these materials, the interim need for storage and security of the material is increasing. Both safety and security requirements exist to govern activities when these materials are placed in storage. These requirements are intended to provide confidence that the material is not being misused and that the storage operations are conducted safely. Both of these goals can be significantly enhanced if technological monitoring of the material is performed. This paper will briefly discuss the traditional manual methods of U.S. and international material monitoring and then present approaches and technology that are available to achieve the same goals under the evolving environment

  19. Responsible stewardship of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hannum, W.H.

    1994-01-01

    The ability to tap the massive energy potential of nuclear fission was first developed as a weapon to end a terrible world war. Nuclear fission is also a virtually inexhaustible energy resource, and is the only energy supply in certain areas in Russia, Kazakhstan and elsewhere. The potential link between civilian and military applications has been and continues to be a source of concern. With the end of the Cold War, this issue has taken a dramatic turn. The U.S. and Russia have agreed to reduce their nuclear weapons stockpiles by as much as two-thirds. This will make some 100 tonnes of separated plutonium and 500 tonnes of highly enriched uranium available, in a form that is obviously directly usable for weapons. The total world inventory of plutonium is now around 1000 tonnes and is increasing at 60-70 tonnes per year. There is even more highly enriched uranium. Fortunately the correct answer to what to do with excess weapons material is also the most attractive. It should be used and reused as fuel for fast reactors. Material in use (particularly nuclear material) is very easy to monitor and control, and is quite unattractive for diversion. Active management of fissile materials not only makes a major contribution to economic stability and well-being, but also simplifies accountability, inspection and other safeguards processes; provides a revenue stream to pay for the necessary safeguards; and, most importantly, limits the prospective world inventory of plutonium to only that which is used and useful

  20. Risk Prevention for Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Badawy, I.

    2008-01-01

    The present paper investigates the parameters which may have effects on the safety of nuclear materials and other radioactive sources used in peaceful applications of atomic energy. The emergency response planning in such situations are also indicated. In synergy with nuclear safety measures, an approach is developed in this study for risk prevention. It takes into consideration the collective implementation of measures of nuclear material accounting and control, physical protection and monitoring of such strategic and dangerous materials in an integrated and coordinated real-time mode at a nuclear or radiation facility and in any time

  1. Legal aspects of transport of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jacobsson, Mans.

    The Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention are briefly discussed and other conventions in the field of civil liability for nuclear damage are mentioned: the Vienna Convention, the Nuclear Ships Convention and the 1971 Convention relating to civil liability in the field of maritime carriage of nuclear material. Legislation on civil liability in the Nordic countries, which is based on the Paris Convention and the Supplementary Convention is discussed, notably the principle of channelling of liability and exceptions from that principle due to rules of liability in older transport conventions and certain problems due to the limited geographical scope of the Paris Convention and the Supplementary Convention. Insurance problems arising in connection with transport of nuclear materials are surveyed and an outline is given of the administrative provisions concerning transport (based on the IAEA transport regulations) which govern transport of radioactive materials by different means: road, rail, sea and air. Finally, the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is discussed. (NEA) [fr

  2. Materials Science of High-Level Nuclear Waste Immobilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weber, William J.; Navrotsky, Alexandra; Stefanovsky, S. V.; Vance, E. R.; Vernaz, Etienne Y.

    2009-01-01

    With the increasing demand for the development of more nuclear power comes the responsibility to address the technical challenges of immobilizing high-level nuclear wastes in stable solid forms for interim storage or disposition in geologic repositories. The immobilization of high-level nuclear wastes has been an active area of research and development for over 50 years. Borosilicate glasses and complex ceramic composites have been developed to meet many technical challenges and current needs, although regulatory issues, which vary widely from country to country, have yet to be resolved. Cooperative international programs to develop advanced proliferation-resistant nuclear technologies to close the nuclear fuel cycle and increase the efficiency of nuclear energy production might create new separation waste streams that could demand new concepts and materials for nuclear waste immobilization. This article reviews the current state-of-the-art understanding regarding the materials science of glasses and ceramics for the immobilization of high-level nuclear waste and excess nuclear materials and discusses approaches to address new waste streams

  3. U.S.-origin nuclear material removal program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Messick, C.E.; Galan, J.J.

    2014-01-01

    The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) U.S.-Origin Nuclear Material Removal program, also known as the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program (FRR SNF AP), was established by the U.S. Department of Energy in May 1996. The program's mission provides a disposition pathway for certain U.S. origin spent nuclear fuel and other weapons-grade nuclear material. The program will continue until May 2016 with an additional three year window for fuel cooldown and transportation. This paper provides an update on recent program accomplishments, current program initiatives and future activities.

  4. The convention on the physical protection of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-05-01

    This document contains the full text of a convention to facilitate the safe transfer of nuclear material, and to insure the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport. Two annexes are included, which establish categories of nuclear materials and levels of physical protection to be applied in international transport

  5. The use of modern databases in managing nuclear material inventories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Behrens, R.G.

    1994-01-01

    The need for a useful nuclear materials database to assist in the management of nuclear materials within the Department of Energy (DOE) Weapons Complex is becoming significantly more important as the mission of the DOE Complex changes and both international safeguards and storage issues become drivers in determining how these materials are managed. A well designed nuclear material inventory database can provide the Nuclear Materials Manager with an essential cost effective tool for timely analysis and reporting of inventories. This paper discusses the use of databases as a management tool to meet increasing requirements for accurate and timely information on nuclear material inventories and related information. From the end user perspective, this paper discusses the rationale, philosophy, and technical requirements for an integrated database to meet the needs for a variety of users such as those working in the areas of Safeguards, Materials Control and Accountability (MC ampersand A), Nuclear Materials Management, Waste Management, materials processing, packaging and inspection, and interim/long term storage

  6. Nuclear material measurement system in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Almeida, S.G. de.

    1988-01-01

    The description of the activities developed at the Safeguards Laboratory of Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission is done. The methods and techniques used for measuring and evaluating nuclear materials and facilities are presented. (E.G.) [pt

  7. Materials aspects of nuclear waste isolation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, J.W.

    1984-01-01

    This paper is intended to provide an overview of the nuclear waste repository performance requirements and the roles which we expect materials to play in meeting these requirements. The objective of the U.S. Dept. of Energy's (DOE) program is to provide for the safe, permanent isolation of high-level radioactive wastes from the public. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (the Act) provides the mandate to accomplish this objective by establishing a program timetable, a schedule of procedures to be followed, and program funding (1 mil/kwhr for all nuclear generated electricity). The centerpiece of this plan is the design and operation of a mined geologic repository system for the permanent isolation of radioactive wastes. A nuclear waste repository contains several thousand acres of tunnels and drifts into which the nuclear waste will be emplaced, and several hundred acres for the facilities on the surface in which the waste is received, handled, and prepared for movement underground. With the exception of the nuclear material-related facilities, a repository is similar to a standard mining operation. The difference comes in what a repository is supposed to do - to contain an isolate nuclear waste from man and the environment

  8. International nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syed Azmi Syed Ali

    1985-01-01

    History can be a very dull subject if it relates to events which have long since lost their relevance. The factors which led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), however, are as important and relevant today as they were when the Agency was first created. Without understanding these factors it is impossible to realise how important the Agency is in the present world or to understand some of the controversies surrounding its future. Central to these controversies is the question of how best to promote the international transfer of nuclear technology without contributing further to the problem of proliferating nuclear explosives or explosive capabilities. One effective means is to subject nuclear materials (see accompanying article in box), which forms the basic link between the manufacture of nuclear explosives and nuclear power generation, to international safeguards. This was realized very early in the development of nuclear power and was given greater emphasis following the deployment of the first two atomic bombs towards the end of World War II. (author)

  9. Materials research in the Nuclear Research Centre Karlsruhe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kleykamp, H.

    1990-03-01

    This report gives a survey of the research work done at the Institute for Material and Solids Research at Karlsruhe. The following subjects are dealt with: Instrumental analysis; producing thin films; corrosion; failure mechanism and damage analysis; fuel elements, ceramic nuclear fuels and can and structure materials for fast breeder reactors; material problems and ceramic breeding materials for nuclear fusion plants; glass materials for the treatment of radioactive waste; super-conducting materials; amorphous metals, new high alloyed steels; ceramic high performance materials; hard materials; compound materials and polymers. (MM) [de

  10. The regulations concerning the uses of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The Regulations are established on the basis of ''The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors'' and the ''Provisions concerning the usage of nuclear fuel materials'' in the Enforcement Ordinance of the Law, to enforce such provisions. Terms are explained, such as exposure radiation dose, cumulative dose, control area, surrounding inspection area, persons engaging in works, area for incoming and outgoing of materials, batch, real stocks, effective value and main measuring points. In the applications for the permission to use nuclear fuel materials, the expected period and quantity of usage of each kind of such materials and the other party and the method of selling, lending and returning spent fuel or the process of disposal of such fuel must be written. Explanations concerning the technical ability required for the usage of nuclear fuel materials shall be attached to the applications. Applications shall be filed for the inspection of facilities for use, in which the name and the address of the applicant, the name and the address of the factory or the establishment, the range of the facilities for use, the maximum quantity of nuclear fuel materials to be used or stocked, and the date, the place and the kind of the expected inspection are written. Prescriptions cover the records to be held, safety regulations, the technical standards for usage, the disposal, transport and storage of nuclear fuel materials and the reports to be filed. (Okada, K.)

  11. The Potential for Criticality Following Disposal of Uranium at Low-Level-Waste Facilities. Containerized Disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Colten-Bradley, V.A.; Hopper, C.M.; Parks, C.V.; Toran, L.E.

    1999-01-01

    The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether or not fissile uranium in low-level-waste (LLW) facilities can be concentrated by hydrogeochemical processes to permit nuclear criticality. A team of experts in hydrology, geology, geochemistry, soil chemistry, and criticality safety was formed to develop and test some reasonable scenarios for hydrogeochemical increases in concentration of special nuclear material (SNM) and to use these scenarios to aid in evaluating the potential for nuclear criticality. The team's approach was to perform simultaneous hydrogeochemical and nuclear criticality studies to (1) identify some possible scenarios for uranium migration and concentration increase at LLW disposal facilities, (2) model groundwater transport and subsequent concentration increase via precipitation of uranium, and (3) evaluate the potential for nuclear criticality resulting from potential increase in uranium concentration over disposal limits. The analysis of SNM was restricted to 235 U in the present scope of work. The work documented in this report indicates that the potential for a criticality safety concern to arise in an LLW facility is extremely remote, but not impossible. Theoretically, conditions that lead to a potential criticality safety concern might arise. However, study of the hydrogeochemical mechanisms, the associated time frames, and the factors required for an actual criticality event indicate that proper emplacement of the SNM at the site can eliminate practical concerns relative to the occurrence and possible consequences of a criticality event

  12. DOE/PNC joint program on transportation technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kubo, M.; Kajitani, M.; Seya, M.; Yoshimura, H.R.; Moya, J.L.; May, R.A.; Huerta, M.; Stenberg, D.R.

    1986-01-01

    This paper summarizes the work performed in a cooperative program on transportation technology between the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) of Japan. This work was performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The joint program emphasized the safety analysis for truck transportation of special nuclear materials (SNM) in Japan. Tasks included structural analyses and testing, thermal testing, leak rate studies and tests, and transportation risk assessments. The purpose of this paper is to present the results of full-scale structural and thermal tests conducted on a PNC development SNM transport system. Correlation of full-scale impact test results with structural analysis and scale model testing will also be reviewed

  13. Radiation damage in nuclear waste materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jencic, I.

    2000-01-01

    Final disposal of high-level radioactive nuclear waste is usually envisioned in some sort of ceramic material. The physical and chemical properties of host materials for nuclear waste can be altered by internal radiation and consequently their structural integrity can be jeopardized. Assessment of long-term performance of these ceramic materials is therefore vital for a safe and successful disposal. This paper presents an overview of studies on several possible candidate materials for immobilization of fission products and actinides, such as spinel (MgAl 2 O 4 ), perovskite (CaTiO 3 ), zircon (ZrSiO 4 ), and pyrochlore (Gd 2 Ti 2 O 7 and Gd 2 Zr 2 O 7 ). The basic microscopic picture of radiation damage in ceramics consists of atomic displacements and ionization. In many cases these processes result in amorphization (metaminctization) of irradiated material. The evolution of microscopic structure during irradiation leads to various macroscopic radiation effects. The connection between microscopic and macroscopic picture is in most cases at least qualitatively known and studies of radiation induced microscopic changes are therefore an essential step in the design of a reliable nuclear waste host material. The relevance of these technologically important results on our general understanding of radiation damage processes and on current research efforts in Slovenia is also addressed. (author)

  14. Nuclear Space Power Systems Materials Requirements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckman, R.W. Jr.

    2004-01-01

    High specific energy is required for space nuclear power systems. This generally means high operating temperatures and the only alloy class of materials available for construction of such systems are the refractory metals niobium, tantalum, molybdenum and tungsten. The refractory metals in the past have been the construction materials selected for nuclear space power systems. The objective of this paper will be to review the past history and requirements for space nuclear power systems from the early 1960's through the SP-100 program. Also presented will be the past and present status of refractory metal alloy technology and what will be needed to support the next advanced nuclear space power system. The next generation of advanced nuclear space power systems can benefit from the review of this past experience. Because of a decline in the refractory metal industry in the United States, ready availability of specific refractory metal alloys is limited

  15. Nuclear reactor structural material forming less radioactive corrosion product

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakazawa, Hiroshi.

    1988-01-01

    Purpose: To provide nuclear reactor structural materials forming less radioactive corrosion products. Constitution: Ni-based alloys such as inconel alloy 718, 600 or inconel alloy 750 and 690 having excellent corrosion resistance and mechanical property even in coolants at high temperature and high pressure have generally been used as nuclear reactor structural materials. However, even such materials yield corrosion products being attacked by coolants circulating in the nuclear reactor, which produce by neutron irradiation radioactive corrosion products, that are deposited in primary circuit pipeways to constitute exposure sources. The present invention dissolves dissolves this problems by providing less activating nuclear reactor structural materials. That is, taking notice on the fact that Ni-58 contained generally by 68 % in Ni changes into Co-58 under irradiation of neutron thereby causing activation, the surface of nuclear reactor structural materials is applied with Ni plating by using Ni with a reduced content of Ni-58 isotopes. Accordingly, increase in the radiation level of the nuclear reactor structural materials can be inhibited. (K.M.)

  16. Better materials for nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Banerjee, S.

    2005-01-01

    The improved performance of present generation nuclear reactors and the realization of advanced reactor concepts, both, require development of better materials. Physical metallurgy /materials science principles which have been exploited in meeting the exacting requirements of nuclear systems comprising fuels, structural materials, moderators and coolants are outlined citing a few specific examples. While the incentive for improvement of traditional fuels (e.g., UO 2 fuel) is primarily for increasing the average core burn up, the development of advanced fuels (e.g., MOX, mixed carbide, nitride, silicide and dispersion fuels) are directed towards better utilization of fissile and fertile inventories through adaptation of innovative fuel cycles. As the burn up of UO 2 fuel reaches higher levels, a more detailed and quantitative understanding of the phenomena such as fission gas release, fuel restructuring - induced by radiation and thermal gradients and pellet-clad interaction is being achieved. Development of zirconium based alloys for both cladding and pressure tube applications is discussed with reference to their physical metallurgy, fabrication techniques, in-reactor degradation mechanisms, and in-service inspection. The issue of radiation embrittlement of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs) is covered drawing a comparison between the western and eastern specifications of RPV steels. The search for new materials which can stand higher rates of atomic displacement due to radiation has led to the development of swelling resistant austenitic and ferritic stainless steels for fast reactor applications as exemplified by the development of the D-9 steel for Indian fast breeder reactor. New challenges are thrown to material scientists for the development of materials suitable for high temperature reactors, which have a potential for providing primary heat for thermo chemical dissociation of water. Development of several ceramic materials, carbon based materials, dissimilar

  17. The impact of gate width setting and gate utilization factors on plutonium assay in passive correlated neutron counting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henzlova, D.; Menlove, H.O.; Croft, S.; Favalli, A.; Santi, P.

    2015-01-01

    In the field of nuclear safeguards, passive neutron multiplicity counting (PNMC) is a method typically employed in non-destructive assay (NDA) of special nuclear material (SNM) for nonproliferation, verification and accountability purposes. PNMC is generally performed using a well-type thermal neutron counter and relies on the detection of correlated pairs or higher order multiplets of neutrons emitted by an assayed item. To assay SNM, a set of parameters for a given well-counter is required to link the measured multiplicity rates to the assayed item properties. Detection efficiency, die-away time, gate utilization factors (tightly connected to die-away time) as well as optimum gate width setting are among the key parameters. These parameters along with the underlying model assumptions directly affect the accuracy of the SNM assay. In this paper we examine the role of gate utilization factors and the single exponential die-away time assumption and their impact on the measurements for a range of plutonium materials. In addition, we examine the importance of item-optimized coincidence gate width setting as opposed to using a universal gate width value. Finally, the traditional PNMC based on multiplicity shift register electronics is extended to Feynman-type analysis and application of this approach to Pu mass assay is demonstrated

  18. The impact of gate width setting and gate utilization factors on plutonium assay in passive correlated neutron counting

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Henzlova, D., E-mail: henzlova@lanl.gov [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Menlove, H.O. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States); Croft, S. [Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN 37831 (United States); Favalli, A.; Santi, P. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States)

    2015-10-11

    In the field of nuclear safeguards, passive neutron multiplicity counting (PNMC) is a method typically employed in non-destructive assay (NDA) of special nuclear material (SNM) for nonproliferation, verification and accountability purposes. PNMC is generally performed using a well-type thermal neutron counter and relies on the detection of correlated pairs or higher order multiplets of neutrons emitted by an assayed item. To assay SNM, a set of parameters for a given well-counter is required to link the measured multiplicity rates to the assayed item properties. Detection efficiency, die-away time, gate utilization factors (tightly connected to die-away time) as well as optimum gate width setting are among the key parameters. These parameters along with the underlying model assumptions directly affect the accuracy of the SNM assay. In this paper we examine the role of gate utilization factors and the single exponential die-away time assumption and their impact on the measurements for a range of plutonium materials. In addition, we examine the importance of item-optimized coincidence gate width setting as opposed to using a universal gate width value. Finally, the traditional PNMC based on multiplicity shift register electronics is extended to Feynman-type analysis and application of this approach to Pu mass assay is demonstrated.

  19. Large area nuclear particle detectors using ET materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-08-01

    The purpose of this SBIR Phase 1 feasibility effort was to demonstrate the usefulness of Quantex electron-trapping (ET) materials for spatial detection of nuclear particles over large areas. This demonstration entailed evaluating the prompt visible scintillation as nuclear particles impinged on films of ET materials, and subsequently detecting the nuclear particle impingement information pattern stored in the ET material, by means of the visible-wavelength luminescence produced by near-infrared interrogation. Readily useful levels of scintillation and luminescence outputs are demonstrated

  20. Attributes identification of nuclear material by non-destructive radiation measurement methods

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gan Lin

    2002-01-01

    Full text: The nuclear materials should be controlled under the regulation of National Safeguard System. The non-destructive analysis method, which is simple and quick, provide a effective process in determining the nuclear materials, nuclear scraps and wastes. The method play a very important role in the fields of nuclear material control and physical protection against the illegal removal and smuggling of nuclear material. The application of non-destructive analysis in attributes identification of nuclear material is briefly described in this paper. The attributes determined by radioactive detection technique are useful tolls to identify the characterization of special nuclear material (isotopic composition, enrichment etc.). (author)

  1. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control: Recommendations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This publication presents recommendations for the nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control. It is based on national experiences and practices and guidance publications in the field of security as well as the nuclear security related international instruments. The recommendations include guidance for States with regard to the nuclear security of nuclear and other radioactive material that has been reported as being out of regulatory control as well as for material that is lost, missing or stolen but has not been reported as such, or has been otherwise discovered. In addition, these recommendations adhere to the detection and assessment of alarms and alerts and to a graded response to criminal or unauthorized acts with nuclear security implications

  2. Standard format and content for the physical protection section of a license application (for facilities other than nuclear power plants)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-06-01

    The document presented has been prepared as an aid to uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the physical protection section of license applications. It is applicable to fuel reprocessing plants, fuel manufacturing plants, SNM tranportation, or other special nuclear material operations involving the possession and use of uranium 235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope), uranium 233, or plutonium alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5000 grams or more computed by the formula: grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium). The document is not intended to be used for nuclear power plants. The information specified is the minimum needed for a license application. Additional information may be required for completion of the staff review of a particular application

  3. Introduction of the Recycling program for Nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Jae Beom; Shin, Byung Woo; Park, Jae Whan; Park, Soo Jin

    2009-01-01

    The LOF is the abbreviation of Location outside Facilities using in safeguards. IAEA want to control the location using the small nuclear material over the world. The depleted uranium used in Industrial field should be controlled by the Government according to the agreement between the IAEA and the ROK. From 2006, The ROK is managing the locations in the LOF. The detail article governing the locations is on the Location attachment agreed between two bodies. As of end of 2007, The LOF was consisting of 64 locations. Now, A number of Locations are increasing up to 75. The KINAC(Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control) is controlling the data about the amount of nuclear material in LOF. The KINAC is trying to upgrade the efficiency and accuracy about the data. The KINAC will make a storage house at the underground of head office from 2009. The purpose of the storage system in KINAC is gathering the nuclear material, which is difficult to control by the industries, especially the nuclear material involved in LOF. The final goal for gathering the nuclear materials are recycling to new another machine. I would like to introduce the handling case of the Depleted uranium in their countries. On this paper, I will show 4 countries case briefly

  4. Characteristics of X-ray fluorescence of nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Seunghoon; Kwak, Sung-Woo; Shin, Jung-Ki; Park, Uk-Rayng; Jung, Heejun [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    LED is a technique of determination of uranium concentration as a continuous X-ray energy beams transmit a uranium liquid sample for safeguards. Compared to K-edge densitometer, due to relatively lower energy (L-edge energy is 17.17 keV) of Uranium L series energy than K-series energy, L-edge densitometer does not require high purity germanium detector with liquid nitride cooling. Therefore, the Ledge densitometer is appropriate for portable equipment for on-site nuclear material inspection and safeguards at facility sites. XRF combined with LED is a technique of finding of nuclear materials from reflected characteristic X-ray photons. In this study, characteristics of XRF of nuclear materials are simulated Monte Carlo method (Geant4) for feasibility of the system for determination of concentration of nuclear species. The analysis method of uranium concentration or minor actinides is applied using combination of linear extrapolation from jump of L-edge of sample and ratio between uranium and minor actinide from XRF measurement. In this study, The XRF ch aracteristics was simulated from Monte Carlo method. The peaks were obtained from nuclear material mixture. The estimated nuclear material concentration is low due to the volume effect of the sample. The correction factor or minimization of the effect is required.

  5. Radiation damage studies of nuclear structural materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barat, P.

    2012-01-01

    Maximum utilization of fuel in nuclear reactors is one of the important aspects for operating them economically. The main hindrance to achieve this higher burnups of nuclear fuel for the nuclear reactors is the possibility of the failure of the metallic core components during their operation. Thus, the study of the cause of the possibility of failure of these metallic structural materials of nuclear reactors during full power operation due to radiation damage, suffered inside the reactor core, is an important field of studies bearing the basic to industrial scientific views.The variation of the microstructure of the metallic core components of the nuclear reactors due to radiation damage causes enormous variation in the structure and mechanical properties. A firm understanding of this variation of the mechanical properties with the variation of microstructure will serve as a guide for creating new, more radiation-tolerant materials. In our centre we have irradiated structural materials of Indian nuclear reactors by charged particles from accelerator to generate radiation damage and studied the some aspects of the variation of microstructure by X-ray diffraction studies. Results achieved in this regards, will be presented. (author)

  6. The application of a figure of merit for nuclear explosive utility as a metric for material attractiveness in a nuclear material theft scenario

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    King, Wayne E.; Bradley, Keith; Jones, Edwin D.; Kramer, Kevin J.; Latkowski, Jeffery F.; Robel, Martin; Sleaford, Brad W.

    2010-01-01

    Effective integration of nonproliferation management into the design process is key to the broad deployment of advanced nuclear energy systems, and is an explicit goal of the Laser Inertial Fusion Energy (LIFE) project at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The nuclear explosives utility of a nuclear material to a state (proliferator) or sub-state (terrorist) is a critical factor to be assessed and is one aspect of material attractiveness. In this work, we approached nuclear explosives utility through the calculation of a 'figure of merit' (FOM) that has recently been developed to capture the relative viability and difficulty of constructing nuclear explosives starting from various nuclear material forms and compositions. We discuss the integration of the figure of merit into an assessment of a nuclear material theft scenario and its use in the assessment. This paper demonstrates that material attractiveness is a multidimensional concept that embodies more than the FOM. It also seeks to propose that other attributes may be able to be quantified through analogous FOMs (e.g., transformation) and that, with quantification, aggregation may be possible using concepts from the risk community.

  7. U.S.-origin nuclear material removal program

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Messick, C.E.; Galan, J.J. [U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, DC (United States). U.S.-Origin Nuclear Material Removal Program

    2014-12-15

    The United States (U.S.) Department of Energy (DOE) Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) U.S.-Origin Nuclear Material Removal program, also known as the Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program (FRR SNF AP), was established by the U.S. Department of Energy in May 1996. The program's mission provides a disposition pathway for certain U.S. origin spent nuclear fuel and other weapons-grade nuclear material. The program will continue until May 2016 with an additional three year window for fuel cooldown and transportation. This paper provides an update on recent program accomplishments, current program initiatives and future activities.

  8. In-field analysis and assessment of nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgado, R.E.; Myers, W.S.; Olivares, J.A.; Phillips, J.R.; York, R.L.

    1996-01-01

    Los Alamos National Laboratory has actively developed and implemented a number of instruments to monitor, detect, and analyze nuclear materials in the field. Many of these technologies, developed under existing US Department of Energy programs, can also be used to effectively interdict nuclear materials smuggled across or within national borders. In particular, two instruments are suitable for immediate implementation: the NAVI-2, a hand-held gamma-ray and neutron system for the detection and rapid identification of radioactive materials, and the portable mass spectrometer for the rapid analysis of minute quantities of radioactive materials. Both instruments provide not only critical information about the characteristics of the nuclear material for law-enforcement agencies and national authorities but also supply health and safety information for personnel handling the suspect materials

  9. Reliability of structural materials in nuclear industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinard Legry, G.

    1996-01-01

    The reliability of nuclear installations is a fundamental point for the exploitation of nuclear energy. It requires an extensive knowledge of the behaviour of materials in the operating conditions and during the expected service life of the installations. In nuclear power plants multiple risks of failure can exist and are expressed by corrosion and deformation phenomena or by modification in the mechanical characteristics of materials. The knowledge of the evolution with time of a given material requires to take into account the data relative to the material itself, to its environment and to the physical conditions of this environment. The study of materials aging needs a more precise knowledge of the kinetics of phenomena at any scale and of their interactions, and a micro- or macro-modeling of their behaviour during long periods of time. This paper gives an overview of the aging phenomena that occur in the structural materials involved in PWR and fast neutron reactors: thermal aging, generalized corrosion, corrosion under constraint, intergranular corrosion, crack growth under loading, wear, irradiation etc.. (J.S.)

  10. Temporal response methods for dynamic measurement of in-process inventory of dissolved nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ziri, S.M.; Seefeldt, W.B.

    1977-08-01

    This analysis has demonstrated that a plant's temporal response to perturbation of feed isotope composition can be used to measure the in-process inventory, without suspending plant operations. The main advantages of the temporal response technique over the step-displacement method are (1) it (the temporal response method) obviates the need for large special feed batches, and (2) it obviates the requirement that all the in-process material have a uniform isotopic composition at the beginning of the measurement. The temporal response method holds promise for essentially continuous real-time determination of in-process SNM. However, the temporal response method requires the measurement of the isotopic composition of many samples, and it works best for a stationary random input time series of tracer perturbations. Both of these requirements appear amenable to satisfaction by practical equipment and procedures if the benefits are deemed sufficiently worthwhile

  11. Nuclear data information system for nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fujita, Mitsutane; Noda, Tetsuji; Utsumi, Misako

    1996-01-01

    The conceptual system for nuclear material design is considered and some trials on WWW server with functions of the easily accessible simulation of nuclear reactions are introduced. Moreover, as an example of the simulation on the system using nuclear data, transmutation calculation was made for candidate first wall materials such as 9Cr-2W steel, V-5Cr-5Ti and SiC in SUS316/Li 2 O/H 2 O(SUS), 9Cr-2W/Li 2 O/H 2 O(RAF), V alloy/Li/Be(V), and SiC/Li 2 ZrO 3 /He(SiC) blanket/shield systems based on ITER design model. Neutron spectrum varies with different blanket/shield compositions. The flux of low energy neutrons decreases in order of V< SiC< RAF< SUS blanket/shield systems. Fair amounts of W depletion in 9Cr-2W steel and the increase of Cr content in V-5Cr-5Ti were predicted in SUS or RAF systems. Concentration change in W and Cr is estimated to be suppressed if Li coolant is used in place of water. Helium and hydrogen production are not strongly affected by the different blanket/shield compositions. (author)

  12. Topical understandings of nuclear material measurement · accountancy and quality assurance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro; Muraoka, Susumu; Osabe, Takeshi; Terada, Hiromi; Shimizu, Kenichi; Ohtani, Tetsuo; Fujimaki, Kazunori; Ishikawa, Tadatsugu; Shinohara, Yoshinori

    2002-01-01

    Nuclear material measurement is an important measure to determine the amount of nuclear material of each stage such as receipt, shipment, inventory and hold-up. The material accountancy based on the material balance among the measurements is a measure to control of nuclear material. The material accountancy, from the technical aspect, can be used as promising measures for purposes from operator's level to state's level such as the nuclear safety, property control and environmental preservation other than safeguards measures only to conclude no diversion of nuclear material. This paper discusses various purposes of nuclear material measurements and clarifies the certain function such as quality assurance to be expected at each purpose. Based on the discussion, critical points for the quality assurance of each stage are studied. (author)

  13. Uncovering Special Nuclear Materials by Low-energy Nuclear Reaction Imaging.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rose, P B; Erickson, A S; Mayer, M; Nattress, J; Jovanovic, I

    2016-04-18

    Weapons-grade uranium and plutonium could be used as nuclear explosives with extreme destructive potential. The problem of their detection, especially in standard cargo containers during transit, has been described as "searching for a needle in a haystack" because of the inherently low rate of spontaneous emission of characteristic penetrating radiation and the ease of its shielding. Currently, the only practical approach for uncovering well-shielded special nuclear materials is by use of active interrogation using an external radiation source. However, the similarity of these materials to shielding and the required radiation doses that may exceed regulatory limits prevent this method from being widely used in practice. We introduce a low-dose active detection technique, referred to as low-energy nuclear reaction imaging, which exploits the physics of interactions of multi-MeV monoenergetic photons and neutrons to simultaneously measure the material's areal density and effective atomic number, while confirming the presence of fissionable materials by observing the beta-delayed neutron emission. For the first time, we demonstrate identification and imaging of uranium with this novel technique using a simple yet robust source, setting the stage for its wide adoption in security applications.

  14. Security of nuclear materials using fusion multi sensor wavelett

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Djoko Hari Nugroho

    2010-01-01

    Security of a nuclear material in an installation is determined by how far the installation is to assure that nuclear material remains at a predetermined location. This paper observed a preliminary design on nuclear material tracking system in the installation for decision making support based on multi sensor fusion that is reliable and accurate to ensure that the nuclear material remains inside the control area. Capability on decision making in the Management Information System is represented by an understanding of perception in the third level of abstraction. The second level will be achieved with the support of image analysis and organizing data. The first level of abstraction is constructed by merger between several CCD camera sensors distributed in a building in a data fusion representation. Data fusion is processed based on Wavelett approach. Simulation utilizing Matlab programming shows that Wavelett fuses multi information from sensors as well. Hope that when the nuclear material out of control regions which have been predetermined before, there will arise a warning alarm and a message in the Management Information System display. Thus the nuclear material movement time event can be obtained and tracked as well. (author)

  15. Regulation on control of nuclear materials of the 31 Oct 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    The new regulation on accounting for and control of nuclear materials was issued on 31 October 1986 and put into force on 1 February 1987. The following provisions are included: aim and scope, responsibility for nuclear material accounting and control, rights and obligations of the nuclear material control officer, licensing, facility's instructions for nuclear material control, accounting, records, reporting, unusual events, inspections, nuclear material transfers, exemptions and termination of IAEA safeguards, final provisions, and definitions of terms

  16. Bar code usage in nuclear materials accountability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mee, W.T.

    1983-01-01

    The age old method of physically taking an inventory of materials by listing each item's identification number has lived beyond its usefulness. In this age of computerization, which offers the local grocery store a quick, sure, and easy means to inventory, it is time for nuclear materials facilities to automate accountability activities. The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant began investigating the use of automated data collection devices in 1979. At that time, bar code and optical-character-recognition (OCR) systems were reviewed with the purpose of directly entering data into DYMCAS (Dynamic Special Nuclear Materials Control and Accountability System). Both of these systems appeared applicable; however, other automated devices already employed for production control made implementing the bar code and OCR seem improbable. However, the DYMCAS was placed on line for nuclear material accountability, a decision was made to consider the bar code for physical inventory listings. For the past several months a development program has been underway to use a bar code device to collect and input data to the DYMCAS on the uranium recovery operations. Programs have been completed and tested, and are being employed to ensure that data will be compatible and useful. Bar code implementation and expansion of its use for all nuclear material inventory activity in Y-12 is presented

  17. Formation of Sn-M (M=Fe, Al, Ni) alloy nanoparticles by DC arc-discharge and their electrochemical properties as anodes for Li-ion batteries

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gao, Song; Huang, Hao; Wu, Aimin; Yu, Jieyi; Gao, Jian; Dong, Xinglong; Liu, Chunjing; Cao, Guozhong

    2016-10-01

    A direct current arc-discharge method was applied to prepare the Sn-M (M=Fe, Al, Ni) bi-alloy nanoparticles. Thermodynamic is introduced to analyze the energy circumstances for the formation of the nanoparticles during the physical condensation process. The electrochemical properties of as-prepared Sn-M alloy nanoparticles are systematically investigated as anodes of Li-ion batteries. Among them, Sn-Fe nanoparticles electrode exhibits high Coulomb efficiency (about 71.2%) in the initial charge/discharge (257.9 mA h g-1/366.6 mA h g-1) and optimal cycle stability (a specific reversible capacity of 240 mA h g-1 maintained after 20 cycles) compared with others. Large differences in the electrochemical behaviors indicate that the chemical composition and microstructure of the nanoparticles determine the lithium-ion storage properties and the long-term cyclic stability during the charge/discharge process.

  18. Aims and methods of nuclear materials management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leven, D.; Schier, H.

    1979-05-01

    Whilst international safeguarding of fissile materials against abuse has been the subject of extensive debate, little public attention has so far been devoted to the internal security of these materials. All countries using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes have laid down appropriate regulations. In the Federal Republic of Germany safeguards are required, for instance, by the Atomic Energy Act, and are therefore a prerequisite for licensing. The aims and methods of national nuclear materials management are contrasted with viewpoints on international safeguards

  19. Overview moderator material for nuclear reactor components

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mairing Manutu Pongtuluran; Hendra Prihatnadi

    2009-01-01

    In order for a reactor design is considered acceptable absolute technical requirement is fulfilled because the most important part of a reactor design. Safety considerations emphasis on the handling of radioactive substances emitted during the operation of a reactor and radioactive waste handling. Moderator material is a layer that interacts directly with neutrons split the nuclear fuel that will lead to changes in physical properties, nuclear properties, mechanical properties and chemical properties. Reviews moderator of this time is of the types of moderator is often used to meet the requirements as nuclear material. (author)

  20. New technologies for monitoring nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    1993-01-01

    This paper describes new technologies for monitoring the continued presence of nuclear materials that are being evaluated in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to reduce the effort, cost, and employee exposures associated with conducting nuclear material inventories. These technologies also show promise for the international safeguarding of process systems and nuclear materials in storage, including spent fuels. The identified systems are based on innovative technologies that were not developed for safeguards applications. These advanced technologies include passive and active sensor systems based on optical materials, inexpensive solid-state radiation detectors, dimensional surface characterization, and digital color imagery. The passive sensor systems use specialized scintillator materials coupled to optical-fiber technologies that not only are capable of measuring radioactive emissions but also are capable of measuring or monitoring pressure, weight, temperature, and source location. Small, durable solid-state gamma-ray detection devices, whose components are estimated to cost less than $25 per unit, can be implemented in a variety of configurations and can be adapted to enhance existing monitoring systems. Variations in detector design have produced significantly different system capabilities. Dimensional surface characterization and digital color imaging are applications of developed technologies that are capable of motion detection, item surveillance, and unique identification of items

  1. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material and other radioactive sources

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yilmazer, A.; Yuecel, A.; Yavuz, U.

    2001-01-01

    As it is known, for the fact that the illicit trafficking and trading of nuclear materials are being increased over the past few years because of the huge demand of third world states. Nuclear materials like uranium, plutonium, and thorium are used in nuclear explosives that have very attractive features for crime groups, terrorist groups and, the states that are willing to have this power. Crime groups that make illegal trade of nuclear material are also trying to market strategic radioactive sources like red mercury and Osmium. This kind of illegal trade threats public safety, human health, environment also it brings significant threat on world peace and world public health. For these reasons, both states and international organizations should take a role in dealing with illicit trafficking. An important precondition for preventing this kind of incidents is the existence of a strengthened national system for control of all nuclear materials and other radioactive sources. Further, Governments are responsible for law enforcement within their borders for prevention of illegal trading and trafficking of nuclear materials and radiation sources

  2. The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; Proteccion Fisica Delos Materiales Nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1993-09-15

    Physical protection against the theft or unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials and against the sabotage of nuclear facilities by individuals or groups has long been a matter of national and international concern. Although responsibility for establishing and operating a comprehensive physical protection system for nuclear materials and facilities within a State rests entirely with the Government of that State, it is not a matter of indifference to other States whether and to what extent that responsibility is fulfilled. Physical protection has therefore become a matter of international concern and co-operation. The need for international cooperation becomes evident in situations where the effectiveness of physical protection in one State depends on the taking by other States also of adequate measures to deter or defeat hostile actions against nuclear facilities and materials, particularly when such materials are transported across national frontiers [French] La proteccion fisica contra el robo o la desviacion no autorizada de materiales nucleares y contra el sabotaje de las instalaciones nucleares por parte de individuos o de grupos ha sido durante largo tiempo motivo de preocupacion nacional e internacional. Aunque la obligacion de crear y hacer funcionar un sistema completo de proteccion fisica para las instalaciones y materiales nucleares en el territorio de un Estado determinado incumbe enteramente al Gobierno de dicho Estado, el que esa obligacion se cumpla o no, y si se cumple, en que medida o hasta que punto, es cosa que no deja indiferentes a los demas Estados. De aqui que la proteccion fisica se haya convertido en motivo de interes y cooperacion internacional. La necesidad de cooperacion internacional se hace evidente en los casos en que la eficacia de la proteccion fisica en el territorio de un Estado depende de que otros Estados tomen tambien medidas apropiadas para evitar o hacer fracasar los actos hostiles dirigidos contra instalaciones y

  3. Assessment of accountability and safeguards efficiencies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCormick, N.J.; Erdmann, R.C.

    1975-01-01

    Accountability and safeguards problems fall into the class of problems of searches for an anomaly, which in this case happens to be either an undesired amount of special nuclear material (SNM) in a specimen or the person or parcel which possesses SNM which is being removed surreptitiously. In such searches, principles from information theory can be used to relate the relative efficiency of the search itself to the relative efficiency of the detector. Such correlations are examined and provide some insight into the improvement of the search potentially available from an altered detector efficiency. Example calculations are presented

  4. Sequential Detection of Fission Processes for Harbor Defense

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Candy, J V; Walston, S E; Chambers, D H

    2015-02-12

    With the large increase in terrorist activities throughout the world, the timely and accurate detection of special nuclear material (SNM) has become an extremely high priority for many countries concerned with national security. The detection of radionuclide contraband based on their γ-ray emissions has been attacked vigorously with some interesting and feasible results; however, the fission process of SNM has not received as much attention due to its inherent complexity and required predictive nature. In this paper, on-line, sequential Bayesian detection and estimation (parameter) techniques to rapidly and reliably detect unknown fissioning sources with high statistical confidence are developed.

  5. Nonproliferation and safeguarding via ionization detection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koster, J.E.; Johnson, J.P.; Steadman, P.

    1995-01-01

    A significant signature of the presence of special nuclear material (SNM) is ionizing radiation. SNM naturally decays with the emission of alpha particles, gamma rays, and neutrons. Detecting and monitoring these emissions is an important capability for international safeguards. A new detection method collects the ions produced by such radiation in ambient air. Alpha particles in particular are specific to heavy nuclei but have very short range. The ions produced by an alpha, however, can be transported tens of meters to an ion detector. These new monitors are rugged, very sensitive, respond in real time, and in most cases are quite portable

  6. 10 CFR 74.31 - Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear material of low strategic significance.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... and maintain a measurement system which assures that all quantities in the material accounting records...) In each inventory period, control total material control and accounting measurement uncertainty so... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nuclear material control and accounting for special...

  7. Nuclear Materials Diversion Safety and the Long-term Future of Nuclear Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Knapp, V.

    2002-01-01

    Primarily due to irresponsible cold war politics of nuclear weapon countries nuclear proliferation situation is little short of getting out of control. In addition to five nominal nuclear weapon countries there are at present at least three more nuclear weapon countries and several countries with nuclear weapon potential. Non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed in 1970, has been recognized by most non-nuclear weapon countries as unjust and ineffective. After the initial, deliberate, nuclear weapon developments of five nominal nuclear weapon countries, subsequent paths to nuclear weapons have been preceded by nominal peaceful use of nuclear energy. Uranium enrichment installations as well as reprocessing installations in non-nuclear weapon countries are the weakest spots of fuel cycle for diversion of nuclear materials either by governments or by illicit groups. An energy scenario, which would, by the end of century, replace the large part of fossil fuels use through extension of present nuclear practices, would mean very large increase in a number of such installations, with corresponding increase of the probability of diversion of nuclear materials. Such future is not acceptable from the point of view of proliferation safety. Recent events make it clear, that it cannot be accepted from the requirements of nuclear terrorism safety either. Nuclear community should put it clearly to their respective governments that the time has come to put general interest before the supposed national interest, by placing all enrichment and reprocessing installations under full international control. Such internationalization has a chance to be accepted by non-nuclear weapon countries, only in case should it apply to nuclear weapon countries as well, without exception. Recent terrorist acts, however horrible they were, are child,s play compared with possible acts of nuclear terrorism. Nuclear energy can be made proliferation safe and diversion of nuclear materials safe, and provide

  8. The application of a figure of merit for nuclear explosive utility as a metric for material attractiveness in a nuclear material theft scenario

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    King, Wayne E., E-mail: weking@llnl.go [Physical and Life Sciences Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States); Bradley, Keith [Global Security Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States); Jones, Edwin D. [Physical and Life Sciences Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States); Kramer, Kevin J.; Latkowski, Jeffery F. [Engineering Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States); Robel, Martin [Physical and Life Sciences Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States); Sleaford, Brad W. [Engineering Directorate, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551 (United States)

    2010-11-15

    Effective integration of nonproliferation management into the design process is key to the broad deployment of advanced nuclear energy systems, and is an explicit goal of the Laser Inertial Fusion Energy (LIFE) project at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The nuclear explosives utility of a nuclear material to a state (proliferator) or sub-state (terrorist) is a critical factor to be assessed and is one aspect of material attractiveness. In this work, we approached nuclear explosives utility through the calculation of a 'figure of merit' (FOM) that has recently been developed to capture the relative viability and difficulty of constructing nuclear explosives starting from various nuclear material forms and compositions. We discuss the integration of the figure of merit into an assessment of a nuclear material theft scenario and its use in the assessment. This paper demonstrates that material attractiveness is a multidimensional concept that embodies more than the FOM. It also seeks to propose that other attributes may be able to be quantified through analogous FOMs (e.g., transformation) and that, with quantification, aggregation may be possible using concepts from the risk community.

  9. Regulations on nuclear materials control of the People's Republic of China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The present 'Regulations on Nuclear Materials Control of the People's Republic of China' were promulgated by the State Council on June 15, 1987, which are enacted to ensure safe and lawful use of nuclear materials, to prevent theft, sabotage, lose, unlawful diversion and unlawful use, to protect the security of the State and the Public and to facilitate the development of nuclear undertakings. The nuclear materials controlled are: 1. Uranium-235 (materials and products); 2. Uranium-233 (material and products); 3. Plutonium-239 (materials and products); 4. tritium (materials and products); 5. lithium-6 (materials and products); 6. Other nuclear materials requiring control. The present regulations are not applicable to the control of uranium ore and its primary products. The control measures for nuclear products transferred to the armed forces shall be laid down by the national defence department

  10. Robotic and nuclear safety for an automated/teleoperated glove box system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Domning, E.E.; McMahon, T.T.; Sievers, R.H.

    1991-09-01

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing a fully automated system to handle the processing of special nuclear materials (SNM). This work is performed in response to the new goals at the Department of Energy (DOE) for hazardous waste minimization and radiation dose reduction. This fully automated system, called the automated test bed (ATB), consists of an IBM gantry robot and automated processing equipment sealed within a glove box. While the ATB is a cold system, we are designing it as a prototype of the future hot system. We recognized that identification and application of safety requirements early in the design phase will lead to timely installation and approval of the hot system. This paper identifies these safety issues as well as the general safety requirements necessary for the safe operation of the ATB. 4 refs., 2 figs

  11. Nuclear Fuels & Materials Spotlight Volume 5

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petti, David Andrew

    2016-01-01

    As the nation's nuclear energy laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory brings together talented people and specialized nuclear research capability to accomplish our mission. This edition of the Nuclear Fuels and Materials Division Spotlight provides an overview of some of our recent accomplishments in research and capability development. These accomplishments include: • Evaluation and modeling of light water reactor accident tolerant fuel concepts • Status and results of recent TRISO-coated particle fuel irradiations, post-irradiation examinations, high-temperature safety testing to demonstrate the accident performance of this fuel system, and advanced microscopy to improve the understanding of fission product transport in this fuel system. • Improvements in and applications of meso and engineering scale modeling of light water reactor fuel behavior under a range of operating conditions and postulated accidents (e.g., power ramping, loss of coolant accident, and reactivity initiated accidents) using the MARMOT and BISON codes. • Novel measurements of the properties of nuclear (actinide) materials under extreme conditions, (e.g. high pressure, low/high temperatures, high magnetic field) to improve the scientific understanding of these materials. • Modeling reactor pressure vessel behavior using the GRIZZLY code. • New methods using sound to sense temperature inside a reactor core. • Improved experimental capabilities to study the response of fusion reactor materials to a tritium plasma. Throughout Spotlight, you'll find examples of productive partnerships with academia, industry, and government agencies that deliver high-impact outcomes. The work conducted at Idaho National Laboratory helps spur innovation in nuclear energy applications that drive economic growth and energy security. We appreciate your interest in our work here at Idaho National Laboratory, and hope that you find this issue informative.

  12. Nuclear microprobe analysis and source apportionment of individual atmospheric aerosol particles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Artaxo, P.; Rabello, M.L.C.; Watt, F.; Grime, G.; Swietlicki, E.

    1993-01-01

    In atmospheric aerosol reserach, one key issue is to determine the sources of the airborne particles. Bulk PIXE analysis coupled with receptor modeling provides a useful, but limited view of the aerosol sources influencing one particular site or sample. The scanning nuclear microprobe (SNM) technique is a microanalytical technique that gives unique information on individual aerosol particles. In the SNM analyses a 1.0 μm size 2.4 MeV proton beam from the Oxford SNM was used. The trace elements with Z>11 were measured by the particle induced X-ray emission (PIXE) method with detection limits in the 1-10 ppm range. Carbon, nitrogen and oxygen are measured simultaneously using Rutherford backscattering spectrometry (RBS). Atmospheric aerosol particles were collected at the Brazilian Antarctic Station and at biomass burning sites in the Amazon basin tropical rain forest in Brazil. In the Antarctic samples, the sea-salt aerosol particles were clearly predominating, with NaCl and CaSO 4 as major compounds with several trace elements as Al, Si, P, K, Mn, Fe, Ni, Cu, Zn, Br, Sr, and Pb. Factor analysis of the elemental data showed the presence of four components: 1) Soil dust particles; 2) NaCl particles; 3) CaSO 4 with Sr; and 4) Br and Mg. Strontium, observed at 20-100 ppm levels, was always present in the CaSO 4 particles. The hierarchical cluster procedure gave results similar to the ones obtained through factor analysis. For the tropical rain forest biomass burning aerosol emissions, biogenic particles with a high organic content dominate the particle population, while K, P, Ca, Mg, Zn, and Si are the dominant elements. Zinc at 10-200 ppm is present in biogenic particles rich in P and K. The quantitative aspects and excellent detection limits make SNM analysis of individual aerosol particles a very powerful analytical tool. (orig.)

  13. Control of nuclear materials and materials in Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arbor G, A.; Fernandes M, S.

    1988-01-01

    A general view about the safeguards activities in Argentina is presented. The national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials is described. The safeguards agreement signed by Argentina are presented. (E.G.) [pt

  14. Hungarian national nuclear material control and accounting system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lendvai, O.

    1985-01-01

    The Hungarian system for nuclear materials control and accounting is briefly described. Sections include a historical overview, a description of nuclear activities and an outline of the organizational structure of the materials management system. Subsequent sections discuss accounting, verification and international relations

  15. Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Security Purposes at Facilities. Implementing Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) works in a complementary fashion with the international safeguards programme and physical protection systems to help prevent, deter or detect the unauthorized acquisition and use of nuclear materials. These three methodologies are employed by Member States to defend against external threats, internal threats and both state actors and non-state actors. This publication offers guidance for implementing NMAC measures for nuclear security at the nuclear facility level. It focuses on measures to mitigate the risk posed by insider threats and describes elements of a programme that can be implemented at a nuclear facility in coordination with the physical protection system for the purpose of deterring and detecting unauthorized removal of nuclear material

  16. Material control and accounting at Exxon Nuclear, I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, R.A.

    1985-01-01

    The nuclear material control and accounting system at Exxon Nuclear will be described in detail. Subjects discussed will include: the basis of the MC and A system, the nuclear materials accounting systems (NMRS and NICS), physical inventory taking, IAEA inspection experience, safeguards organization, measurements and measurement control, MUF evaluation, accounting forms and reports and use of tamper-indicating seals. The general requirements for material accounting and control in this type of a bulk-handling facility are described. The way those requirements are met for the subject areas shown above is illustrated using a reference (Model Plant) version of the Exxon Nuclear plant The difference between the item-accounting procedures used at reactor facilities and the bulk-accounting procedures used at fuel fabrication facilities is discussed in detail

  17. Radiation portal monitor with {sup 10}B+ZnS(Ag) neutron detector performance for the detection of special nuclear materials

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Guzman G, K. A.; Gallego, E.; Lorente, A.; Ibanez F, S. [Universidad Politecnica de Madrid, Departamento de Ingenieria Energetica, ETSI Industriales, C. Jose Gutierrez Abascal 2, 28006 Madrid (Spain); Vega C, H. R. [Universidad Autonoma de Zacatecas, Unidad Academica de Estudios Nucleares, Cipres No. 10, Fracc. La Penuela, 98068 Zacatecas, Zac. (Mexico); Gonzalez, J. A. [Universidad Politecnica de Madrid, Laboratorio de Ingenieria Nuclear, ETSI Caminos, Canales y Puertos, C. Prof. Aranguren 3, 28040 Madrid (Spain); Mendez, R., E-mail: ingkarenguzman@gmail.com [Centro de Investigaciones Energeticas, Medioambientales y Tecnologicas, Laboratorio de Patrones Neutronicos, Av. Complutense 40, 28040 Madrid (Spain)

    2016-10-15

    In homeland security, neutron detection is used to prevent the smuggling of special nuclear materials. Thermal neutrons are normally detected with {sup 3}He proportional counters, in the radiation portal monitors, Rpms, however due to the {sup 3}He shortage new procedures are being studied. In this work Monte Carlo methods, using the MCNP6 code, have been used to study the neutron detection features of a {sup 10}B+ZnS(Ag) under real conditions inside of a Rpm. The performance for neutron detection was carried out for {sup 252}Cf, {sup 238}U and {sup 239}Pu under different conditions. In order to mimic an actual situation occurring at border areas, a sample of SNM sited inside a vehicle was simulated and the Rpm with {sup 10}B+ZnS(Ag) response was calculated. At 200 cm the {sup 10}B+ZnS(Ag) on Rpm response is close to 2.5 cps-ng {sup 252}Cf, when the {sup 252}Cf neutron source is shielded with 0.5 cm-thick lead and 2.5 cm-thick polyethylene fulfilling the ANSI recommendations. Three different geometries of neutron detectors of {sup 10}B+ZnS(Ag) in a neutron detection system in Rpm were modeled. Therefore, the {sup 10}B+ZnS(Ag) detectors are an innovative and viable replacement for the {sup 3}He detectors in the Rpm. (Author)

  18. Nuclear Materials Characterization in the Materials and Fuels Complex Analytical Hot Cells

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriquez, Michael

    2009-01-01

    As energy prices skyrocket and interest in alternative, clean energy sources builds, interest in nuclear energy has increased. This increased interest in nuclear energy has been termed the 'Nuclear Renaissance'. The performance of nuclear fuels, fuels and reactor materials and waste products are becoming a more important issue as the potential for designing new nuclear reactors is more immediate. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Analytical Laboratory Hot Cells (ALHC) are rising to the challenge of characterizing new reactor materials, byproducts and performance. The ALHC is a facility located near Idaho Falls, Idaho at the INL Site. It was built in 1958 as part of the former Argonne National Laboratory West Complex to support the operation of the second Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR-II). It is part of a larger analytical laboratory structure that includes wet chemistry, instrumentation and radiochemistry laboratories. The purpose of the ALHC is to perform analytical chemistry work on highly radioactive materials. The primary work in the ALHC has traditionally been dissolution of nuclear materials so that less radioactive subsamples (aliquots) could be transferred to other sections of the laboratory for analysis. Over the last 50 years though, the capabilities within the ALHC have also become independent of other laboratory sections in a number of ways. While dissolution, digestion and subdividing samples are still a vitally important role, the ALHC has stand alone capabilities in the area of immersion density, gamma scanning and combustion gas analysis. Recent use of the ALHC for immersion density shows that extremely fine and delicate operations can be performed with the master-slave manipulators by qualified operators. Twenty milligram samples were tested for immersion density to determine the expansion of uranium dioxide after irradiation in a nuclear reactor. The data collected confirmed modeling analysis with very tight

  19. Modern NDA needs at Savannah River Site

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holt, S.H.

    1995-01-01

    As the missions within the nuclear weapons complex change, so do the accountability measurement needs. Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) measurements have played a key role in accounting for special nuclear materials (SNM), and as time goes on, more and more reliance is made on this type of measurement. Key questions NDA instrument designers ask are: Which isotopes are of interest? What matrix are they in? What other isotopes are present? What container configuration will it be measured through? What precision and accuracy is required? What level of resolution is required? At the Savannah River Site (SRS) the desire to make direct measurements of SNM isotopes has prompted the evaluation to these and other questions. This paper will outline the current NDA needs at SRS. The discussion includes the types of materials that require measurement ,including the very difficult waste measurements. The special challenges associated with these measurement efforts will also be discussed

  20. Using exotic atoms to keep borders safe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stocki, T J; Olsthoorn, J; Jason, A; Miyadera, H; Esch, E-I; Hoteling, N J; Heffner, R H; Green, A; Adelmann, A

    2011-01-01

    Muons, created by a particle accelerator, can be used to scan cargo for special nuclear materials (SNM). These muons have a sufficiently long lifetime and are penetrating enough that they can be used to actively scan cargo to ensure the non-proliferation of SNM. A set of 'proof-of-concept' experiments have been performed to show that active muon analysis can be used. Experiments were performed at high intensity, medium energy particle accelerators (TRIUMF and PSI). Negative muons form exotic atoms with one electron replaced by the muon. Since the muon is captured in an excited state, it will give off x-rays which can be detected by high purity germanium detectors. The characteristic x-ray spectrum can be potentially used to identify nuclides. The muonic x-rays corresponding to the SNM of interest have been measured, even with the use of various shielding configurations composed of lead, iron, polyethylene, or fibreglass. These preliminary results show that muon scanning systems can be successfully used to find shielded SNM, helping to ensure the safety of all citizens.

  1. Using exotic atoms to keep borders safe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jason, A.; Miyadera, H.; Esch, E.I.; Hoteling, N.J.; Adelmann, A.; Heffner, R.H.; Green, A.; Olsthoorn, J.; Stocki, T.J.

    2010-01-01

    Muons, created by a particle accelerator, can be used to scan cargo for special nuclear materials (SNM). These muons exist long enough and are penetrating enough that they can be used to actively scan cargo to ensure the non-proliferation of SNM. A set of 'proof-of-concept' experiments have been performed to show that active muon analysis can be used. Experiments were performed at high intensity, medium energy particle accelerators (TRIUMF and PSI). Negative muons form exotic atoms with one electron replaced by the muon. Since the muon is captured in an excited state, it will give off x-rays which can be detected by high purity germanium detectors. These characteristic x-rays can be used to identify the nuclide. The muonic x-rays corresponding to the SNM of interest have been measured, even with the use of various shielding configurations composed of lead, iron, polyethylene, or fiberglass. These preliminary results show that muons can be successfully used to find shielded SNM. The safety of North Americans can be protected by the use of this technology.

  2. Education and training in nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Falcon, S.; Marco, M.

    2014-01-01

    CIEMAT participates in the European project Matisse (Materials Innovations for a Safe and Sustainable nuclear in Europe) belonging to FP7, whose main objective is to promote the link between the respective national research programs through networking and integration of activities for innovation in materials for advanced nuclear systems, sharing among partners best practices and implementation of training tools and efficient communication. The draft four years, from 2013 to 2017, includes aspects such as the interaction between infrastructure, R and D programs and postgraduate education and training. (Author)

  3. Outline of a computerized nuclear material accounting system applicable to nuclear power reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Handshuh, J.W.

    1975-01-01

    A computerized nuclear material accounting system is described which enables a utility to account for its material throughout the entire fuel cycle. From input of transactions, the system records and reports inventories and transactions by accounts which the user may establish for discrete locations, item control areas, further subdivisions, and material types. Account numbers are designed so that accounts and records are automatically sorted in the order desired. The system also generates the Material Status Reports for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  4. The national nuclear material tracking system. A Korea's countermeasure against nuclear terrorism

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Moon, Joo Hyun [Dongguk Univ., Gyeongbuk (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-07-15

    Since nuclear terrorism has been identified as a real threat, the Korean government has earnestly developed elementary technologies and sub-systems for establishing an integrated defensive system against nuclear terrorism, which is based on the concept of defense-in-depth. This paper introduces the gist and implications of the studies that have been conducted in building the national nuclear material tracking system for preventing and intercepting the illicit trafficking and transporting of nuclear material in Korea. (orig.)

  5. Nuclear materials control and accountability criteria for upgrades measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erkkila, B.H.; Hatcher, C.R.

    1998-01-01

    As a result of major political and societal changes in the past several years, methods of nuclear material control may no longer be as effective as in the past in Russia, the Newly Independent States (NIS), and the Baltic States (BS). The objective of the Department of Energy (DOE) Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC and A) is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation by collaborating with Russia, NIS, and BS governments to promote western-style MPC and A. This cooperation will improve the MPC and A on all weapons useable nuclear materials and will establish a sustainable infrastructure to provide future support and maintenance for these technology-based improvements. Nuclear materials of proliferation concern include materials of the types and quantities that can be most easily and directly used in a nuclear weapon. Sabotage of nuclear material is an event of great concern and potentially disastrous consequences to both the US and the host country. However, sabotage is currently beyond the scope of program direction and cannot be used to justify US-funded MPC and A upgrades. Judicious MPC and A upgrades designed to protect against insider and outsider theft scenarios would also provide addition, although not comprehensive, protection against saboteurs. This paper provides some suggestions to establish consistency in prioritizing system-enhancement efforts at nuclear material facilities. The suggestions in this paper are consistent with DOE policy and directions and should be used as a supplement to any policy directives issued by NN-40, DOE Russia/NIS Task Force

  6. Nuclear materials control and accountability criteria for upgrades measures

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Erkkila, B.H.; Hatcher, C.R.

    1998-11-01

    As a result of major political and societal changes in the past several years, methods of nuclear material control may no longer be as effective as in the past in Russia, the Newly Independent States (NIS), and the Baltic States (BS). The objective of the Department of Energy (DOE) Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC and A) is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation by collaborating with Russia, NIS, and BS governments to promote western-style MPC and A. This cooperation will improve the MPC and A on all weapons useable nuclear materials and will establish a sustainable infrastructure to provide future support and maintenance for these technology-based improvements. Nuclear materials of proliferation concern include materials of the types and quantities that can be most easily and directly used in a nuclear weapon. Sabotage of nuclear material is an event of great concern and potentially disastrous consequences to both the US and the host country. However, sabotage is currently beyond the scope of program direction and cannot be used to justify US-funded MPC and A upgrades. Judicious MPC and A upgrades designed to protect against insider and outsider theft scenarios would also provide addition, although not comprehensive, protection against saboteurs. This paper provides some suggestions to establish consistency in prioritizing system-enhancement efforts at nuclear material facilities. The suggestions in this paper are consistent with DOE policy and directions and should be used as a supplement to any policy directives issued by NN-40, DOE Russia/NIS Task Force.

  7. US develops neutron to sniff out nuclear material

    CERN Document Server

    2002-01-01

    The USA has developed a tiny portable neutron device that can detect hidden nuclear materials. The device is undergoing trials in the Argonne National Laboratory to see if it could be used to stop smuggling and unauthorised use of nuclear weapons and materials (1/2 page).

  8. The law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    General provisions specify the purpose of the Law and definitions of terms used in it. Provisions relating to control of business management for refining cover designation of business operation, requirements for designation, permission and report of alteration, report of commencement of business operation, revocation of designation, recording, and measures for wastes. Provisions relating to control of business management for processing cover permission of operation, requirements for permission, approval of design and construction plan, inspection of facilities, report of commencement of business management, measures for maintenance, suspension of use of facilities, responsible personnel for handling nuclear fuel, and permit, obligations, etc. of responsible personnel for handing nuclear fuel. Provisions relating to control of construction and operation of nuclear reactor cover permission of construction, permission concerning nuclear reactor mounted on foreign nuclear powered ships, requirements for permission, etc. Other articles stipulate provisions relating to control of business management for reprocessing, use of nuclear fuel substances, use of materials and substances covered by international regulations, designation of inspection organizations, and other rules. (Nogami, K.)

  9. Induced-Fission Imaging of Nuclear Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hausladen, Paul; Blackston, Matthew A.; Mullens, James Allen; McConchie, Seth M.; Mihalczo, John T.; Bingham, Philip R.; Ericson, Milton Nance; Fabris, Lorenzo

    2010-01-01

    This paper presents initial results from development of the induced-fission imaging technique, which can be used for the purpose of measuring or verifying the distribution of fissionable material in an unopened container. The technique is based on stimulating fissions in nuclear material with 14 MeV neutrons from an associated-particle deuterium-tritium (D-T) generator and counting the subsequent induced fast fission neutrons with an array of fast organic scintillation detectors. For each source neutron incident on the container, the neutron creation time and initial trajectory are known from detection of the associated alpha particle of the d + t → α + n reaction. Many induced fissions will lie along (or near) the interrogating neutron path, allowing an image of the spatial distribution of prompt induced fissions, and thereby fissionable material, to be constructed. A variety of induced-fission imaging measurements have been performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory with a portable, low-dose D-T generator, including single-view radiographic measurements and three-dimensional tomographic measurements. Results from these measurements will be presented along with the neutron transmission images that have been performed simultaneously. This new capability may have applications to a number of areas in which there may be a need to confirm the presence or configuration of nuclear materials, such as nuclear material control and accountability, quality assurance, treaty confirmation, or homeland security applications.

  10. Computerized nuclear material database management system for power reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cheng Binghao; Zhu Rongbao; Liu Daming; Cao Bin; Liu Ling; Tan Yajun; Jiang Jincai

    1994-01-01

    The software packages for nuclear material database management for power reactors are described. The database structure, data flow and model for management of the database are analysed. Also mentioned are the main functions and characterizations of the software packages, which are successfully installed and used at both the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant and the Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant for the purposed of handling nuclear material database automatically

  11. New ICPP portal monitor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Georgeson, M.A.; Nichols, C.E.

    1981-04-01

    A large area gas filled proportional-detector portal monitor mounted in a swinging door frame has been designed and developed at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP). This monitor extends the sensitivity and speed of personnel contamination detection to levels equal to or exceeding that obtained using hand-held portable survey techniques. The new monitor has state-of-the-art electronics which result in rapid response, and use statistical principles in the alarm logic to reduce or eliminate spurious alarms. In addition, the evaluation of this instrument indicates that it will detect small enough quantities of U-235 in shielded containers to meet current special nuclear materials (SNM) detection standards. Simultaneous detection of very low level contamination and small quantities of SNM results in a monitor particularly useful for nuclear installations

  12. A Uniform Framework of Global Nuclear Materials Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupree, S.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Sanders, T.L; Sellers, T.A.

    1999-01-01

    Global Nuclear Materials Management (GNMM) anticipates and supports a growing international recognition of the importance of uniform, effective management of civilian, excess defense, and nuclear weapons materials. We expect thereto be a continuing increase in both the number of international agreements and conventions on safety, security, and transparency of nuclear materials, and the number of U.S.-Russian agreements for the safety, protection, and transparency of weapons and excess defense materials. This inventory of agreements and conventions may soon expand into broad, mandatory, international programs that will include provisions for inspection, verification, and transparency, To meet such demand the community must build on the resources we have, including State agencies, the IAEA and regional organizations. By these measures we will meet the future expectations for monitoring and inspection of materials, maintenance of safety and security, and implementation of transparency measures

  13. A Uniform Framework of Global Nuclear Materials Management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dupree, S.A.; Mangan, D.L.; Sanders, T.L; Sellers, T.A.

    1999-04-20

    Global Nuclear Materials Management (GNMM) anticipates and supports a growing international recognition of the importance of uniform, effective management of civilian, excess defense, and nuclear weapons materials. We expect thereto be a continuing increase in both the number of international agreements and conventions on safety, security, and transparency of nuclear materials, and the number of U.S.-Russian agreements for the safety, protection, and transparency of weapons and excess defense materials. This inventory of agreements and conventions may soon expand into broad, mandatory, international programs that will include provisions for inspection, verification, and transparency, To meet such demand the community must build on the resources we have, including State agencies, the IAEA and regional organizations. By these measures we will meet the future expectations for monitoring and inspection of materials, maintenance of safety and security, and implementation of transparency measures.

  14. Software development for managing nuclear material database; Desenvolvimento de um programa computacional para gerenciamento de banco de dados de material nuclear

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tondin, Julio Benedito Marin

    2011-07-01

    In nuclear facilities, the nuclear material control is one of the most important activities. The Brazilian National Commission of Nuclear Energy (CNEN) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), when inspecting routinely, regards the data provided as a major safety factor. Having a control system of nuclear material that allows the amount and location of the various items to be inspected, at any time, is a key factor today. The objective of this work was to enhance the existing system using a more friendly platform of development, through the VisualBasic programming language (Microsoft Corporation), to facilitate the operation team of the reactor IEA-R1 Reactor tasks, providing data that enable a better and prompter control of the IEA-R1 nuclear material. These data have allowed the development of papers presented at national and international conferences and the development of master's dissertations and doctorate theses. The software object of this study was designed to meet the requirements of the CNEN and the IAEA safeguard rules, but its functions may be expanded in accordance with future needs. The program developed can be used in other reactors to be built in the country, since it is very practical and allows an effective control of the nuclear material in the facilities. (author)

  15. Nuclear Fuels & Materials Spotlight Volume 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Petti, David Andrew [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)

    2016-10-01

    As the nation's nuclear energy laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory brings together talented people and specialized nuclear research capability to accomplish our mission. This edition of the Nuclear Fuels and Materials Division Spotlight provides an overview of some of our recent accomplishments in research and capability development. These accomplishments include: • Evaluation and modeling of light water reactor accident tolerant fuel concepts • Status and results of recent TRISO-coated particle fuel irradiations, post-irradiation examinations, high-temperature safety testing to demonstrate the accident performance of this fuel system, and advanced microscopy to improve the understanding of fission product transport in this fuel system. • Improvements in and applications of meso and engineering scale modeling of light water reactor fuel behavior under a range of operating conditions and postulated accidents (e.g., power ramping, loss of coolant accident, and reactivity initiated accidents) using the MARMOT and BISON codes. • Novel measurements of the properties of nuclear (actinide) materials under extreme conditions, (e.g. high pressure, low/high temperatures, high magnetic field) to improve the scientific understanding of these materials. • Modeling reactor pressure vessel behavior using the GRIZZLY code. • New methods using sound to sense temperature inside a reactor core. • Improved experimental capabilities to study the response of fusion reactor materials to a tritium plasma. Throughout Spotlight, you'll find examples of productive partnerships with academia, industry, and government agencies that deliver high-impact outcomes. The work conducted at Idaho National Laboratory helps spur innovation in nuclear energy applications that drive economic growth and energy security. We appreciate your interest in our work here at Idaho National Laboratory, and hope that you find this issue informative.

  16. Measures for prevention illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strezov, A.

    2002-01-01

    Full text: In the early 1990ies the number of illicit trafficking cases with nuclear material and radioactive sources began to appear in the press more often than before. This fact became of great concern among international organizations and different states that the nuclear material subjected to trafficking might become in possession of rogue states and be implicated in weapons production or that stolen radioactive sources may cause health and safety effects to the population or to the environment. The creation and proposition of a model scheme procedure for the developing countries is important for starting the initial process of preventing and combating the illicit traffic of nuclear materials. Particular efforts have been directed for the protection of fissile materials. The reported incidents for diversion of nuclear materials have raised the problem of potential nuclear terrorism and also for countries of proliferation to take a short cut to the bomb. There is a need of rapid implementation of comprehensive, mutually reinforcing strategy to control the existing stockpiles of fissile material and to lower the future production and use of such materials. The illicit traffic of nuclear materials is a new threat, which requires new efforts, new approaches and coordination of services and institutions and even new legislation. The propositions of a model-procedure will allow better and quicker upgrade of developing countries capabilities for combating illicit nuclear trafficking. (author)

  17. Evaluating late detection capability against diverse insider adversaries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sicherman, A.

    1987-01-01

    The threat of theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by insiders is a key concern for safeguards planners. Different types of employees having varying degrees of access to both SNM and safeguards systems pose a difficult challenge for theft detection. Safeguards planners rely on physical security, material control, and accountability to provide detection of a theft attempt. When detection occurs too late to prevent a theft, it is called a late detection or late alarm. Activities or events that many provide late detection usually belong to material control and accountability (MC ampersand A) activities. A model has been developed for evaluating the probability of late detection as a function of time elapsed since the theft. Late detection capability is beneficial if it is timely enough to improve the ability to determine the cause of an alarm, speed recovery of SNM, prevent an incorrect response to a threat demand, or promote assurance that no theft has occurred in the absence of an alarm. The model provides insight into the effectiveness of late detection safeguards components in place and helps to identify areas where the MC ampersand A can be most effectively improved

  18. Selection of materials in nuclear fuel: present and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Munoz-Reja, C.; Fuentes, L.; Garcia de la Infanta, J. M.; Munoz Sicilia, A.

    2013-01-01

    One of the main aspects of the nuclear fuel is the selection of materials for the components. The operating conditions of the fuel elements impose a major challenge to materials: high temperature, corrosive aqueous environment, high mechanical properties, long periods of time under these extreme conditions and what is the differentiating factor; the effect of irradiation. The materials are selected to fulfill these severe requirements and also to be able to control and to predict its behavior in the working conditions. Their development, in terms of composition and processing, is based on the continuous follow-up of the operation behavior. Many of these materials are specific of the nuclear industry, such as the uranium dioxide and the zirconium alloys. This article presents the selection and development of the nuclear fuel materials as a function of the services requirements. It also includes a view of the new nuclear fuels materials that are being raised after Fukushima accident. (Author)

  19. Estimation methods for special nuclear materials holdup

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pillay, K.K.S.; Picard, R.R.

    1984-01-01

    The potential value of statistical models for the estimation of residual inventories of special nuclear materials was examined using holdup data from processing facilities and through controlled experiments. Although the measurement of hidden inventories of special nuclear materials in large facilities is a challenging task, reliable estimates of these inventories can be developed through a combination of good measurements and the use of statistical models. 7 references, 5 figures

  20. Nuclear and hazardous material perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sandquist, Gary M.; Kunze, Jay F.; Rogers, Vern C.

    2007-01-01

    The reemerging nuclear enterprise in the 21. century empowering the power industry and nuclear technology is still viewed with fear and concern by many of the public and many political leaders. Nuclear phobia is also exhibited by many nuclear professionals. The fears and concerns of these groups are complex and varied, but focus primarily on (1) management and disposal of radioactive waste [especially spent nuclear fuel and low level radioactive waste], (2) radiation exposures at any level, and (3) the threat nuclear terrorism. The root cause of all these concerns is the exaggerated risk perceived to human health from radiation exposure. These risks from radiation exposure are compounded by the universal threat of nuclear weapons and the disastrous consequences if these weapons or materials become available to terrorists or rogue nations. This paper addresses the bases and rationality for these fears and considers methods and options for mitigating these fears. Scientific evidence and actual data are provided. Radiation risks are compared to similar risks from common chemicals and familiar human activities that are routinely accepted. (authors)

  1. 10 CFR 70.11 - Persons using special nuclear material under certain Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Persons using special nuclear material under certain Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission contracts. 70.11 Section 70.11 Energy NUCLEAR... using special nuclear material under certain Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission...

  2. Absolute nuclear material assay using count distribution (LAMBDA) space

    Science.gov (United States)

    Prasad, Manoj K [Pleasanton, CA; Snyderman, Neal J [Berkeley, CA; Rowland, Mark S [Alamo, CA

    2012-06-05

    A method of absolute nuclear material assay of an unknown source comprising counting neutrons from the unknown source and providing an absolute nuclear material assay utilizing a model to optimally compare to the measured count distributions. In one embodiment, the step of providing an absolute nuclear material assay comprises utilizing a random sampling of analytically computed fission chain distributions to generate a continuous time-evolving sequence of event-counts by spreading the fission chain distribution in time.

  3. The Application of materials attractiveness in a graded approach to nuclear materials security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ebbinghaus, B.; Bathke, C.; Dalton, D.; Murphy, J.

    2013-01-01

    The threat from terrorist groups has recently received greater attention. In this paper, material quantity and material attractiveness are addressed through the lens of a minimum security strategy needed to prevent the construction of a nuclear explosive device (NED) by an adversary. Nuclear materials are placed into specific security categories (3 or 4 categories) , which define a number of security requirements to protect the material. Materials attractiveness can be divided into four attractiveness levels, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low that correspond to the utility of the material to the adversary and to a minimum security strategy that is necessary to adequately protect the nuclear material. We propose a graded approach to materials attractiveness that recognizes for instance substantial differences in attractiveness between pure reactor-grade Pu oxide (High attractiveness) and fresh MOX fuel (Low attractiveness). In either case, an adversary's acquisition of a Category I quantity of plutonium would be a major incident, but the acquisition of Pu oxide by the adversary would be substantially worse than the acquisition of fresh MOX fuel because of the substantial differences in the time and complexity required of the adversary to process the material and fashion it into a NED

  4. Application of Nuclear Forensics in Combating Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    As a scientific discipline, nuclear forensics poses formidable scientific challenges with regard to extracting information on the history, origin, movement and processing of nuclear and other radioactive material found to be out of regulatory control. Research into optimized techniques is being pursued by leading nuclear forensic research groups around the world. This research encompasses areas including evidence collection, analytical measurements for rapid and reliable categorization and characterization of nuclear and radioactive material, and interpretation using diverse data characteristics or the 'science of signatures' from throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. In this regard, the IAEA recently concluded the Coordinated Research Project (CRP) entitled Application of Nuclear Forensics in Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material. The CRP seeks to improve the ability of Member States to provide robust categorization and characterization of seized material, reliable techniques for the collection and preservation of nuclear forensic evidence, and the ability to interpret the results for law enforcement and other purposes. In accordance with broader IAEA objectives, the CRP provides a technical forum for participating institutes from Member States to exchange technical information to benefit national confidence building as well as to advance the international discipline of nuclear forensics. This CRP was initially planned in 2006, commenced in 2008 and was completed in 2012. Three research coordination meetings (RCM) were convened at the IAEA in Vienna to review progress. The leadership of the chairpersons was essential to establishing the technical viability of nuclear forensics at the IAEA and with the Member States

  5. Peculiarities of physical protection assurance of the nuclear materials at nuclear installation decommissioning stage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinchuk, M.G.

    2001-01-01

    On December 15, 2000 Unit 3 of Chernobyl NPP, which is the last one in Ukraine having RBMK-type reactor, was permanently shutdown before the end of its lifetime. A number of projects related to establishing infrastructure for the plant decommissioning are being implemented in compliance with the Ukraine's commitments. Decommissioning stage includes activities on fuel unloading from the cores of Unit I and Unit 3, fuel cooling in the ponds followed by the fuel transportation to the spent fuel dry storage facility (currently under construction) for its safe long-term storage. Special facilities are being created for liquid and solid radioactive waste treatment. Besides, it is planned to implement a number of projects to convert Shelter Object in environmentally safe structure. Physical protection work being an essential part of the nuclear material management is organized in line with the recommendations of the IAEA, and the Laws of Ukraine 'On Nuclear Energy Utilization and Radiation Safety', 'On Physical Protection of Nuclear Installations and Materials', 'Regulations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Installations', other codes and standards. While organizing physical protection on ChNPP decommissioning stage we have to deal with some specific features, namely: Significant amount of fuel assemblies, which are continuously transferred between various storage and operation facilities; Big amount of odd nuclear material at Shelter Object; 'Theft of new fuel fragments from the central hall of the Shelter Object in 1995 with the intention of their further sale. The thieves were detained and sentenced. The stolen material was withdrawn, that prevented its possible proliferation and illicit trafficking. At present physical protection of ChNPP does not fully satisfy the needs of the decommissioning stage and Ukraine's commitments on non-admission of illicit trafficking. Work is carried out, aimed to improve nuclear material physical protection, whose main

  6. Order for execution of the law concerning regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    Chapeter 1 specifies regulations concerning business management for refining and processing, which cover application for designation of refining operation, application for permission for processing operation, and approval of personnel responsible for handling nuclear fuel. Chapter 2 specifies regulations concerning construction and operation of nuclear reactors, which cover application for construction of nuclear reactors, reactors in a research and development stage, application for permission concerning nuclear reactors mounted on foreign nuclear powered ships, application for permission for alteration concerning construction of nuclear reactors, application for permission for alteration concerning nuclear reactors mounted on foreign nuclear powered ships, nuclear reactor facilities to be subjected to regular inspection, nuclear reactor for which submission of operation plan is not required, and application for permission for transfer of nuclear reactor. Chapter 2 also specifies regulations concerning business management for reprocessing and waste disposal. Chapter 3 stipulates regulations concerning use of nuclear fuel substances, nuclear material substances and other substances covered by international regulations, which include rules for application for permission for use of nuclear fuel substances, etc. Supplementary provisions are provided in Chapter 4. (Nogami, K.)

  7. Thermodynamics of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1962-01-01

    The first session of the symposium discussed in general the thermodynamic properties of actinides, including thorium, uranium and Plutonium which provide reactor fuel. The second session was devoted to applications of thermodynamic theory to the study of nuclear materials, while the experimental techniques for the determination of thermodynamic data were examined at the next session. The thermodynamic properties of alloys were considered at a separate session, and another session was concerned with solids other than alloys. Vaporization processes, which are of special interest in the development of high-temperature reactors, were discussed at a separate session. The discussions on the methods of developing the data and ascertaining their accuracy were especially useful in highlighting the importance of determining whether any given data are reliable before they can be put to practical application. Many alloys and refractory materials (i. e. materials which evaporate only at very high temperatures) are of great importance in nuclear technology, and some of these substances are extremely complex in their chemical composition. For example, until recently the phase composition of the oxides of thorium, uranium and plutonium had been only very imperfectly understood, and the same was true of the carbides of these elements. Recent developments in experimental techniques have made it possible to investigate the phase composition of these complex materials as well as the chemical species of these materials in the gaseous phase. Recent developments in measuring techniques, such as fluorine bomb calorimetry and Knudsen effusion technique, have greatly increased the accuracy of thermodynamic data

  8. Evalution of NDA techniques and instruments for assay of nuclear waste at a waste terminal storage facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blakeman, E.D.; Allen, E.J.; Jenkins, J.D.

    1978-05-01

    The use of Nondestructive Assay (NDA) instrumentation at a nuclear waste terminal storage facility for purposes of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) accountability is evaluated. Background information is given concerning general NDA techniques and the relative advantages and disadvantages of active and passive NDA methods are discussed. The projected characteristics and amounts of nuclear wastes that will be delivered to a waste terminal storage facility are presented. Wastes are divided into four categories: High Level Waste, Cladding Waste, Intermediate Level Waste, and Low Level Waste. Applications of NDA methods to the assay of these waste types is discussed. Several existing active and passive NDA instruments are described and, where applicable, results of assays performed on wastes in large containers (e.g., 55-gal drums) are given. It is concluded that it will be difficult to routinely achieve accuracies better than approximately 10--30% with ''simple'' NDA devices or 5--20% with more sohpisticated NDA instruments for compacted wastes. It is recommended that NDA instruments not be used for safeguards accountability at a waste storage facility. It is concluded that item accountability methods be implemented. These conclusions and recommendations are detailed in a concurrent report entitled ''Recommendations on the Safeguards Requirements Related to the Accountability of Special Nuclear Material at Waste Terminal Storage Facilities'' by J.D. Jenkins, E.J. Allen and E.D. Blakeman

  9. EMCAS, an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eggers, R.F.; Giese, E.W.; Bichl, F.J.

    1987-01-01

    EMCAS is an evaluation methodology for safeguards and security systems. It provides a score card of projected or actual system performance for several areas of system operation. In one area, the performance of material control and accounting and security systems, which jointly defend against the insider threat to divert or steal special nuclear material (SNM) using stealth and deceit, is evaluated. Time-dependent and time-independent risk equations are used for both diversion and theft risk calculations. In the case of loss detection by material accounting, a detailed timeliness model is provided to determine the combined effects of loss detection sensitivity and timeliness on the overall effectiveness of the material accounting detection procedure. Calculated risks take into account the capabilities of process area containment/surveillance, material accounting mass balance tests, and physical protection barriers and procedures. In addition, EMCAS evaluates the Material Control and Accounting (MCandA) System in the following areas: (1) system capability to detect errors in the official book inventory of SNM, using mass balance accounting methods, (2) system capability to prevent errors from entering the nuclear material data base during periods of operation between mass balance tests, (3) time to conduct inventories and resolve alarms, and (4) time lost from production to carry out material control and accounting loss detection activities

  10. Atomistic Simulations of Small-scale Materials Tests of Nuclear Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Chan Sun; Jin, Hyung Ha; Kwon, Jun Hyun

    2012-01-01

    Degradation of materials properties under neutron irradiation is one of the key issues affecting the lifetime of nuclear reactors. Evaluating the property changes of materials due to irradiations and understanding the role of microstructural changes on mechanical properties are required for ensuring reliable and safe operation of a nuclear reactor. However, high dose of neuron irradiation capabilities are rather limited and it is difficult to discriminate various factors affecting the property changes of materials. Ion beam irradiation can be used to investigate radiation damage to materials in a controlled way, but has the main limitation of small penetration depth in the length scale of micro meters. Over the past decade, the interest in the investigations of size-dependent mechanical properties has promoted the development of various small-scale materials tests, e.g. nanoindentation and micro/nano-pillar compression tests. Small-scale materials tests can address the issue of the limitation of small penetration depth of ion irradiation. In this paper, we present small-scale materials tests (experiments and simulation) which are applied to study the size and irradiation effects on mechanical properties. We have performed molecular dynamics simulations of nanoindentation and nanopillar compression tests. These atomistic simulations are expected to significantly contribute to the investigation of the fundamental deformation mechanism of small scale irradiated materials

  11. Materials for Nuclear Plants From Safe Design to Residual Life Assessments

    CERN Document Server

    Hoffelner, Wolfgang

    2013-01-01

    The clamor for non-carbon dioxide emitting energy production has directly  impacted on the development of nuclear energy. As new nuclear plants are built, plans and designs are continually being developed to manage the range of challenging requirement and problems that nuclear plants face especially when managing the greatly increased operating temperatures, irradiation doses and extended design life spans. Materials for Nuclear Plants: From Safe Design to Residual Life Assessments  provides a comprehensive treatment of the structural materials for nuclear power plants with emphasis on advanced design concepts.   Materials for Nuclear Plants: From Safe Design to Residual Life Assessments approaches structural materials with a systemic approach. Important components and materials currently in use as well as those which can be considered in future designs are detailed, whilst the damage mechanisms responsible for plant ageing are discussed and explained. Methodologies for materials characterization, material...

  12. Analytical chemistry of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1963-01-01

    The last two decades have witnessed an enormous development in chemical analysis. The rapid progress of nuclear energy, of solid-state physics and of other fields of modern industry has extended the concept of purity to limits previously unthought of, and to reach the new dimensions of these extreme demands, entirely new techniques have been invented and applied and old ones have been refined. Recognizing these facts, the International Atomic Energy Agency convened a Panel on Analytical Chemistry of Nuclear Materials to discuss the general problems facing the analytical chemist engaged in nuclear energy development, particularly in newly developing centre and countries, to analyse the represent situation and to advise as to the directions in which research and development appear to be most necessary. The Panel also discussed the analytical programme of the Agency's laboratory at Seibersdorf, where the Agency has already started a programme of international comparison of analytical methods which may lead to the establishment of international standards for many materials of interest. Refs and tabs

  13. Nuclear Materials Management U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jesse Schreiber

    2008-01-01

    In light of the changing Defense Complex mission, the high cost to storing and protecting nuclear materials, and in consideration of scarcity of resources, it is imperative that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned nuclear materials are managed effectively. The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Strategic Action Plan outlines the strategy for continuing to meet America's nuclear security goals, meeting the overall mission challenges of DOE and NNSA as well as giving focus to local missions. The mission of the NNSA/NSO Nuclear Materials Management (NMM) Program is to ensure that nuclear material inventories are accurately assessed and reported, future material needs are adequately planned, and that existing Nevada Test Site (NTS) inventories are efficiently utilized, staged, or dispositioned. The NNSA/NSO understands that the NTS has unique characteristics to serve and benefit the nation with innovative solutions to the complex problems involving Special Nuclear Materials, hazardous materials, and multi-agency, integrated operations. The NNSA/NSO is defining infrastructure requirements for known future missions, developing footprint consolidation strategic action plans, and continuing in the path of facility modernization and improvements. The NNSA/NSO is striving for the NTS to be acknowledged as an ideal location towards mission expansion and growth. The NTS has the capability of providing isolated, large scale construction and development locations for nuclear power or alternate energy source facilities, expanded nuclear material storage sites, and for new development in 'green' technology

  14. Evaluation and development of advanced nuclear materials: IAEA activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Inozemtsev, V.; Basak, U.; Killeen, J.; Dyck, G.; Zeman, A.; )

    2011-01-01

    Economical, environmental and non-proliferation issues associated with sustainable development of nuclear power bring about a need for optimization of fuel cycles and implementation of advanced nuclear systems. While a number of physical and design concepts are available for innovative reactors, the absence of reliable materials able to sustain new challenging irradiation conditions represents the real bottle-neck for practical implementation of these promising ideas. Materials performance and integrity are key issues for the safety and competitiveness of future nuclear installations being developed for sustainable nuclear energy production incorporating fuel recycling and waste transmutation systems. These systems will feature high thermal operational efficiency, improved utilization of resources (both fissile and fertile materials) and reduced production of nuclear waste. They will require development, qualification and deployment of new and advanced fuel and structural materials with improved mechanical and chemical properties combined with high radiation and corrosion resistance. The extensive, diverse, and expensive efforts toward the development of these materials can be more effectively organized within international collaborative programmes with wide participation of research, design and engineering communities. IAEA carries out a number of international projects supporting interested Member States with the use of available IAEA program implementation tools (Coordinated Research Projects, Technical Meetings, Expert Reviews, etc). The presentation summarizes the activities targeting material developments for advanced nuclear systems, with particular emphasis on fast reactors, which are the focal topics of IAEA Coordinated Research Projects 'Accelerator Simulation and Theoretical Modelling of Radiation Effects' (on-going), 'Benchmarking of Structural Materials Pre-Selected for Advanced Nuclear Reactors', 'Examination of advanced fast reactor fuel and core

  15. Initial results from a multiple monoenergetic gamma radiography system for nuclear security

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Day, Buckley E.; Hartwig, Zachary S.; Lanza, Richard C.; Danagoulian, Areg

    2016-10-01

    The detection of assembled nuclear devices and concealed special nuclear materials (SNM) such as plutonium or uranium in commercial cargo traffic is a major challenge in mitigating the threat of nuclear terrorism. Currently available radiographic and active interrogation systems use ∼1-10 MeV bremsstrahlung photon beams. Although simple to build and operate, bremsstrahlung-based systems deliver high radiation doses to the cargo and to potential stowaways. To eliminate problematic issues of high dose, we are developing a novel technique known as multiple monoenergetic gamma radiography (MMGR). MMGR uses ion-induced nuclear reactions to produce two monoenergetic gammas for dual-energy radiography. This allows us to image the areal density and effective atomic number (Zeff) of scanned cargo. We present initial results from the proof-of-concept experiment, which was conducted at the MIT Bates Research and Engineering Center. The purpose of the experiment was to assess the capabilities of MMGR to measure areal density and Zeff of container cargo mockups. The experiment used a 3.0 MeV radiofrequency quadrupole accelerator to create sources of 4.44 MeV and 15.11 MeV gammas from the 11B(d,nγ)12C reaction in a thick natural boron target; the gammas are detected by an array of NaI(Tl) detectors after transmission through cargo mockups . The measured fluxes of transmitted 4.44 MeV and 15.11 MeV gammas were used to assess the areal density and Zeff. Initial results show that MMGR is capable of discriminating the presence of high-Z materials concealed in up to 30 cm of iron shielding from low- and mid-Z materials present in the cargo mockup.

  16. System to detect nuclear materials by active neutron method

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koroev, M.; Korolev, Yu.; Lopatin, Yu.; Filonov, V.

    1999-01-01

    The report presents the results of the development of the system to detect nuclear materials by active neutron method measuring delayed neutrons. As the neutron source the neutron generator was used. The neutron generator was controlled by the system. The detectors were developed on the base of the helium-3 counters. Each detector consist of 6 counters. Using a number of such detectors it is possible to verify materials stored in different geometry. There is an spectrometric scintillator detector in the system which gives an additional functional ability to the system. The system could be used to estimate the nuclear materials in waste, to detect the unauthorized transfer of the nuclear materials, to estimate the material in tubes [ru

  17. Consequences of Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear or Other Radioactive Materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moore, G.M.

    2010-01-01

    Explosion of a nuclear yield device is probably the worst consequence of Illicit Trafficking of nuclear or other radioactive materials.The nuclear yield device might be a stolen nuclear weapon, or an improvised nuclear device. An improvised nuclear device requires nuclear material design, and construction ability. Use of a radioactive dispersal device probably would not result in large numbers of casualties.However economic losses can be enormous. Non-Technical effects of nuclear trafficking (e.g. public panic, work disruption, etc.) and political and psychological consequences can far exceed technical consequences

  18. Ordinance concerning the filing of transport of nuclear fuel materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    The ordinance is defined under the law for the regulations of nuclear source materials, nuclear fuel materials and reactors and the order for execution of the law. Any person who reports the transport of nuclear fuel materials shall file four copies of a notification according to the form attached to the public safety commission of the prefecture in charge of the dispatching place. When the transportation extends over the area in charge of another public safety commission, the commission which has received the notice shall report without delay date and route of the transport, kind and quantity of nuclear fuel materials and other necessary matters to the commission concerned and hear from the latter opinions on the items informed. The designation by the ordinance includes speed of the vehicle loaded with nuclear fuel materials, disposition of an accompanying car, arrangement of the line of the loaded vehicle and accompanying and other escorting cars, location of the parking, place of unloading and temporary storage, etc. Reports concerning troubles and measures taken shall be filed in ten days to the public safety commission which has received the notification, when accidents occur on the way, such as: theft or loss of nuclear fuel materials; traffic accident; irregular leaking of nuclear fuel materials and personal trouble by the transport. (Okada, K.)

  19. The changing role of nuclear materials accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibbs, P.W.

    1995-01-01

    Nuclear materials accounting and accounting systems at what have been DOE Production sites are evolving into management decision support tools. As the sites are moving into the mode of making decisions on how to disposition complex and varied nuclear material holdings, the need for complete and many times different information has never been greater. The artificial boundaries that have historically been established between what belongs in the classic material control and accountability (MC and A) records versus what goes into the financial, radiological control, waste, or decommissioning and decontamination records are being challenged. In addition, the tools historically used to put material into different categories such as scrap codes, composition codes, etc. have been found to be inadequate for the information needs of today. In order to be cost effective and even, more importantly to effectively manage -our inventories, the new information systems the authors design have to have the flexibility to serve many needs. In addition, those tasked with the responsibility of managing the inventories must also expand beyond the same artificial boundaries. This paper addresses some of the things occurring at the Savannah River Site to support the changing role of nuclear materials accounting

  20. Analysis of difficulties accounting and evaluating nuclear material of PWR fuel plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhang Min; Jue Ji; Liu Tianshu

    2013-01-01

    Background: Nuclear materials accountancy must be developed for nuclear facilities, which is required by regulatory in China. Currently, there are some unresolved problems for nuclear materials accountancy of bulk nuclear facilities. Purpose: The retention values and measurement errors are analyzed in nuclear materials accountancy of Power Water Reactor (PWR) fuel plant to meet the regulatory requirements. Methods: On the basis of nuclear material accounting and evaluation data of PWR fuel plant, a deep analysis research including ratio among random error variance, long-term systematic error variance, short-term systematic error variance and total error involving Material Unaccounted For (MUF) evaluation is developed by the retention value measure in equipment and pipeline. Results: In the equipment pipeline, the holdup estimation error and its total proportion are not more than 5% and 1.5%, respectively. And the holdup estimation can be regraded as a constant in the PWR nuclear material accountancy. Random error variance, long-term systematic error variance, short-term systematic error variance of overall measurement, and analytical and sampling methods are also obtained. A valuable reference is provided for nuclear material accountancy. Conclusion: In nuclear material accountancy, the retention value can be considered as a constant. The long-term systematic error is a main factor in all errors, especially in overall measurement error and sampling error: The long-term systematic errors of overall measurement and sampling are considered important in the PWR nuclear material accountancy. The proposals and measures are applied to the nuclear materials accountancy of PWR fuel plant, and the capacity of nuclear materials accountancy is improved. (authors)

  1. Test and evaluation of computerized nuclear material accounting methods. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    In accordance with the definition of a Material Balance Area (MBA) as a well-defined geographical area involving an Integral operation, the building housing the BFS-1 and BFS-1 critical facilities is considered to consist of one MBA. The BFS materials are in the form of small disks clad in stainless steel and each disk with nuclear material has its own serial number. Fissile material disks in the BFS MBA can be located at three key monitoring points: BFS-1 facility, BFS-2 facility and main storage of BFS fissile materials (storage 1). When used in the BFS-1 or BFS-2 critical facilities, the fissile material disks are loaded in tubes (fuel rods) forming critical assembly cores. The following specific features of the BFS MBA should be taken into account for the purpose of computerized accounting of nuclear material: (1) very large number of nuclear material items (about 70,000 fissile material items); and (2) periodically very intensive shuffling of nuclear material items. Requirements for the computerized system are determined by basic objectives of nuclear material accounting: (1) providing accurate information on the identity and location of all items in the BFS material balance area; (2) providing accurate information on location and identity of tamper-indicating devices; (3) tracking nuclear material inventories; (4) issuing periodic reports; (5) assisting with the detection of material gains or losses; (6) providing a history of nuclear material transactions; (7) preventing unauthorized access to the system and data falsification. In August 1995, the prototype computerized accounting system was installed on the BFS facility for trial operation. Information on two nuclear material types was entered into the data base: weapon-grade plutonium metal and 36% enriched uranium dioxide. The total number of the weapon-grade plutonium disks is 12,690 and the total number of the uranium dioxide disks is 1,700

  2. Evaluating the Aspect of Nuclear Material in Fuel Cycles

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Takagi, Shunsuke; Pickett, Susan; Oda, Takuji; Choi, Jor-Shan; Kuno, Yusuke; Takana, Satoru [Department of Nuclear Engineering and Management, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8685 (Japan); Nagasaki, Shinya [Nuclear Professional School, The University of Tokyo (Japan)

    2009-06-15

    The increasing number of countries that wish to introduce nuclear power plants raises attention to proliferation resistance in nuclear power plants, and nuclear fuel cycle facilities. In order to achieve adequate proliferation resistance, it is important to evaluate it and to construct effective international institutional frameworks as well as technologies involving high level of proliferation resistance. Although some methods have been proposed for evaluation of the proliferation resistance, their validities have not been investigated in detail. In the present paper, therefore, we compare some of the proposed methodologies. It is essential to detect the abuse or diversion of nuclear material before the nuclear explosive device can be manufactured in order to prevent proliferation. The time needed for the detection of material primary depends on the safeguards that the country applies, and the time needed for fabrication mainly depends on the attributes of the nuclear material. Hence, we divided the proliferation resistance into two parts: the level of safeguards and the material. For examination of evaluation methods such as the one proposed by Charlton [1] or the figure of merit (FOM) [2], sensitivity analysis was performed on weighting factors and scenarios. The validity and characteristics of each method were discussed, focusing on the applicability of each method to the assessment of multi-national approaches such as GNEP. [1] W. S. Charlton, R. L. LeBouf, C. Gariazzo, D. G. Ford, C. Beard, S. Landeberger, M. Whitaker, 'Proliferation resistance assessment methodology for nuclear fuel cycles', Nuclear Technology, 157, 1 (2007). [2] C.G. Bathke et al, 'An assessment of the proliferation resistance of materials in advanced nuclear fuel cycles', 8. International Conference on Facility Operations (2008). (authors)

  3. Control and Management of Small Quantity Nuclear Material (SQNM) on Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Jae Hwan; Shin, Byung Woo; Park, Jae Beom

    2009-01-01

    Small Quantity Nuclear Material (SQNM) is defined as the nuclear material that is below the amount approved in atomic energy act. SQNM generally lists depleted uranium (DU) used as a catalyst or shielding material in exposure devices in industries. The SQNM users have a duty to report information on possessing and using SQNM regularly to the government. All nuclear materials must be included in IAEA reporting lists according to safeguards agreement and additional protocol regardless of amount. However, it is difficult to investigate the status of nuclear material possessed in industries because SQNM is excepted regulation item list in atomic energy act. Most SQNM user industries are small companies so they have some problems like the loss of nuclear material after bankruptcy. Even though the damage of radiation leakage is very low, loss or careless management of nuclear material causes confusion. Thus, developing a control and management system for SQNM is essential. This paper discusses the present condition and prospect of control and management SQNM in Korea

  4. Independent verification of a material balance at a LEU fuel fabrication plant. Program for technical assistance to IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sorenson, R.J.; McSweeney, T.I.; Hartman, M.G.; Brouns, R.J.; Stewart, K.B.; Granquist, D.P.

    1977-11-01

    This report describes the application of methodology for planning an inspection according to the procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and an example evaluation of data representative of low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication facilities. Included are the inspection plan test criteria, the inspection sampling plans, the sample data collected during the inspection, acceptance testing of physical inventories with test equipment, material unaccounted for (MUF) evaluation, and quantitative statements of the results and conclusions that could be derived from the inspection. The analysis in this report demonstrates the application of inspection strategies which produce quantitative results. A facility model was used that is representative of large low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication plants with material flows, inventory sizes, and compositions of material representative of operating commercial facilities. The principal objective was to determine and illustrate the degree of assurance against a diversion of special nuclear materials (SNM) that can be achieved by an inspection and the verification of material flows and inventories. This work was performed as part of the USA program for technical assistance to the IAEA. 10 figs, 14 tables

  5. Some issues on the Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors Amendment after JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanabe, Tomoyuki

    2001-01-01

    As the Amendment of the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors on an opportunity of the JCO criticality accident can be almost evaluated at a viewpoint of upgrading on effective