WorldWideScience

Sample records for nuclear deterrence

  1. Nuclear deterrence revisited

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sur, S.

    1993-01-01

    One of the most important consequences of the profound changes that have affected the international system over recent years undoubtedly relates to nuclear deterrence. As a cornerstone of East-West relations, and the foundation of the arms control effort which dominated all other approaches to disarmament, it embodied the permanent opposition between two camps as well as the limits to their confrontation. This presentation deals with permanence of the basic elements concerning deterrence of nuclear weapons and arms control. Evolution of deterrence is presented, including prospects of spread of nuclear capabilities, political foundations of deterrence, fragility of the non-proliferation efforts as well as problems concerned with management of deterrence

  2. France and nuclear deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berquier, Marie-Noelle

    2012-01-01

    The nuclear deterrence topic in in the French programs of national education for students of middle and high schools. This dossier is made of 3 parts: Part 1 presents an historical review of the French nuclear deterrence policy and of the present day worldwide situation (nuclear weapon stocks, international agreements, non-proliferation policy, proliferation). Part 2 is a compilation of various documents, mainly excerpts from politicians' speeches and papers, presenting cross looks on French nuclear deterrence. The last part is devoted to various avenues of work and reflection about nuclear deterrence for various educational levels up to higher education and university

  3. Hearings on nuclear deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adam, Patricia; Tertrais, Bruno; Niquet, Valerie; Vilboux, Nicole; Kalika, Arnaud; Ravel, Luc; Korsia, Haim; Remy, Stephane; Arbi, Abdelkader; Bentegeat, Henri; Villiers, Pierre de; Norlain, Bernard; Mercier, Denis; Charaix, Patrick; Rogel, Bernard; Coriolis, Charles-edouard de; Boissier, Patrick; Bouvier, Antoine; Charmeau, Alain; Collet-Billon, Laurent; Ricketts, Peter; Collin, Jean-Marie; Bouveret, Patrice; Bigot, Bernard; Verwaerde, Daniel

    2014-01-01

    This report contains hearings of various French actors and experts (researchers, military chaplains, high-ranking officers, industrial executives, members of public military agencies, members of associations promoting non proliferation) on the issue of nuclear deterrence. Each of them states its point of view on nuclear deterrence, on strategic issues, on military issues, on philosophical issues, depending on their positions

  4. Nuclear deterrence and diplomacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Singh, Jasjit; Sethi, Manpreet

    2004-01-01

    Nuclear diplomacy worldwide is in a state of flux. Nuclear deterrence is being overhauled to accommodate missile defence, and arms control is facing an unprecedented challenge. Treaties such as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), strategic arms reductions treaty (START), anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, etc. that had attempted, however imperfectly, to place certain restrictions on the horizontal or vertical development of nuclear weapons, are facing a crisis of legitimacy as the present status of each is very distant from what was intended. This book explores the changes taking place in nuclear deterrence and diplomacy at the beginning of the 21st century, especially as they relate to India and its security

  5. The nuclear deterrence history

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dumoulin, Andre

    2013-01-01

    This book relates the history of French nuclear deterrence, from its political, scientific and military genesis, to its context, sometimes complex, of the relations between France and its strategic environment. It details the air and submarine means and the evolution of the political context, from the cold war to the present day. This book is intended to be a synthesis in which all topics, doctrine, means, capacity and nuclear diplomacy are approached. At a time when France is reconsidering the future of its deterrence, this book addresses all the questions: the open debate of the abolitionists' policy, the new fields of proliferation, and the question of the French nuclear situation in the case of a withdrawal of the last US missiles from Europe

  6. Nuclear deterrence, morality, and realism

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Finnis, J.; Boyle, J.M. Jr.; Grisez, G.

    1987-01-01

    Nuclear deterrence deserves rigorous, objective ethical analysis. In providing it, the authors of this book face realities - the Soviet threat, possible nuclear holocaust, strategic imperatives - but they also unmask moral evasions - deterrence cannot be bluff, pure counterforce, the lesser (or greater) evil, or a step towards disarmament. They conclude that the deterrent is unjustifiable and examine the new questions of conscience that this raises for everyone.

  7. Give up the nuclear deterrence?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Savoyant, L.

    2009-01-01

    The nuclear deterrence question is always today the subject of a large consensus in spite of the evolution of its creation conditions. Taking into account the proliferation risk, the France could play a role in the disarmament process including the whole renouncement to the nuclear deterrence. (A.L.B.)

  8. The nuclear deterrence in questions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pascallon, P.; Paris, H.

    2006-03-01

    Facing the actuality (60. birthday of Hiroshima, the Iran and south Korea atomic ambitions, the United Nations convention against the nuclear terrorism...) the authors wonder about the french nuclear deterrence. (A.L.B.)

  9. The future of nuclear deterrence

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Quester, G.H.

    1986-01-01

    Nuclear deterrence has been in existence for almost four decades. Yet, analysts from the left and the right keep reemphasizing the dangers and problems with deterrence without always remembering its purpose-the prevention of nuclear war or the prevention of all war. In this book. George Quester analyzes the future of nuclear deterrence in light of its past, and discovers that the fundamental tenets of nuclear deterrence remain unchanged. George Quester considers the overwhelming tensions present in a society threatened by the prospect of a nuclear holocaust and a lingering nuclear winter. But he also acknowledges that nuclear deterrence has prevented a great deal of global and local warfare that otherwise would have occurred. He spotlights the basic military problems facing the world today, including the shadow cast on all levels of strategic planning by the threat of nuclear war. Quester warns against charging forth with radical new alternatives, such as the Strategic Defense Initiative and deep-cut disarmament. He argues that initiatives such as these reflect a return to traditional military thinking about waging and winning wars that pose serious possibilities for a breakdown in deterrence policy.

  10. Defence and illustration of nuclear deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2011-01-01

    After having shown that nuclear deterrence has been efficient since 1945 (nuclear weapons prevented from war, nuclear deterrence contributed to the reduction of risks related to proliferation), the author discusses the amorality and illegality of nuclear deterrence (its ethics can indeed be a matter of discussion, as well as issues like self-defence and international humanitarian law). On another hand, he shows that deterrence costs remain acceptable and that substitutes to nuclear deterrence are not credible. He concludes that deterrence is therefore still useful and legitimate

  11. Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Research

    Science.gov (United States)

    2003-05-15

    ressources nationales et qui, manié avec autant de sang- froid que de détermination, devrait, par la dissuasion, lui permettre d’échapper à certaines grandes...in providing credibility to the deterrent. 47 See Bruno Tertrais, "La Dissuasion Nucléaire Française Après La Guerre Froide : Continuité, Ruptures...ces situations de stabilité plus ou moins absolue ." The translations are the SAIC author’s. Beaufre, Dissuasion et Stratégie, op.cit.; this text

  12. Nuclear deterrence: which environmental transparency?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cherief, Hamza

    2012-01-01

    This article addresses the field of nuclear geopolitics. The author discusses the tensions between the principle of transparency regarding environmental issues on the one hand, and the protection of nuclear deterrence as instrument of power on the other hand. According to the French law, the preservation of nuclear power instruments means the acknowledgement of a legal regime which is specific to national defence requirements in terms of secret and right to information. Thus, the author discusses the constitutional limitations of the environmental transparency obligation for the protection of Nation's fundamental interests. Then, by commenting the Rainbow Warrior affair, the author highlights the exceptional limitations of the transparency requirement regarding nuclear issues

  13. Nuclear deterrence: Inherent escalation?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bergbauer, J.R. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    Despite 40 years of peace between the super powers, there is increasing clamor to the effect that nuclear war between the super powers is imminent; or could occur through escalation from a minor conflict; or could result from harsh rhetoric (but only on the part of the U.S.) in the super power dialogue. The factor that is ignored is that a massive nuclear attack would be rational ONLY if that attack could inflict such damage that the other super power could not launch a significant retaliatory nuclear attack. ONLY in this circumstance would there be any profit in launching an initial Strategic Nuclear Attack. This First Strike capability is not now possessed nor projected to be developed by either super power. As long as ANY possible Strategic Nuclear Attack against the national territory of one super power would be insufficient to prevent an equally destructive retaliatory attack, then a Strategic Nuclear Attack would inevitably result in the destruction of both and would be profitless, hence, pointless. This situation describes Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the governing conflict paradigm applicable to both super powers. The only convential attack that would even remotely rival the national-destruction potential of a Strategic Nuclear Attack and could cause the attacked power to consider launching a retaliatory Strategic Nuclear Attack would be a massive land-air invasion/occupation of one super power by the other. Since neither super power can successfully execute such a conventional invasion/occupation, this situation is moot. The geo-political environments of the two super powers are so asymmetrical and their military positions so symmetrical that the probability of ANY forseeable situation resulting in their resorting to a Strategic Nuclear Exchange is vanishingly small. It is possible escape the Chicken-Little syndrome and, instead, devote energy to ensuring the maintenance of this favorable, but fragile, world system

  14. Strategic Missile Defense & Nuclear Deterrence

    Science.gov (United States)

    Grego, Laura

    The United States has pursued defenses against nuclear-armed long-range ballistic missiles since at least the 1950s. At the same time, concerns that missile defenses could undermine nuclear deterrence and potentially spark an arms race led the United States and Soviet Union to negotiate limits on these systems. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty constrained strategic missile defenses for thirty years. After abandoning the treaty in 2002, President George W. Bush began fielding the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) homeland missile defense system on an extremely aggressive schedule, nominally to respond to threats from North Korea and Iran. Today, nearly fifteen years after its initial deployment, the potential and the limits of this homeland missile defense are apparent. Its test record is poor and it has no demonstrated ability to stop an incoming missile under real-world conditions. No credible strategy is in place to solve the issue of discriminating countermeasures. Insufficient oversight has not only exacerbated the GMD system's problems, but has obscured their full extent, which could encourage politicians and military leaders to make decisions that actually increase the risk of a missile attack against the United States. These are not the only costs. Both Russia and China have repeatedly expressed concerns that U.S. missile defenses adversely affect their own strategic capabilities and interests, particularly taken in light of the substantial US nuclear forces. This in turn affects these countries' nuclear modernization priorities. This talk will provide a technical overview of the US strategic missile defense system, and how it relates to deterrence against non-peer adversaries as well as how it affects deterrence with Russia and China and the long-term prospects for nuclear reductions

  15. The nuclear deterrence: permanence and changes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Debouzy, O.

    2009-01-01

    The author aims to present that the nuclear deterrence, even with some change, remains today always pertinent and useful. He shows how the application modalities changed. He discusses the need of an analysis of the future weapons and their use, of the articulation between the nuclear deterrence and the anti missiles defense and the necessity of a discussion on the enlarged deterrence. (A.L.B.)

  16. Nuclear Deterrence in a New Nuclear Era

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miraillet, Michel

    2010-01-01

    Within an unstable international environment and an unpredictable future, nuclear weapons will continue to play a major role in defense policies. Indeed, since disarmament currently seems an unlikely objective, nuclear weapons remain as a security guarantee. Within this context, talk of the global abolition of nuclear weapons remains essentially rhetorical and the supposed link between disarmament and non-proliferation is a tenuous one. The foremost purpose of both disarmament and nuclear deterrence must be security

  17. The ethic of nuclear deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bobbitt, P.C.

    1987-01-01

    Roughly speaking, two approaches are taken to the question of whether or not the strategy of nuclear deterrence can be morally justified. These are on the one hand, utilitarian and consequentialist for example, does the strategy succeed in reducing the likelihood of war and the lethality of war if it comes? and, on the other hand, Kantian or deontological for example, is it just to hold innocent millions hostage as a necessary element in a politico-military strategy if we hold, as a first principle, that some human beings may not be used as a means by others? Considering the focus of these approaches on the individual, calculating conscience, the author does not see how either is capable of determining whether the U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence is ethically legitimate, nor does the author think that either approach can resolve the more general question of which approach to choose between the two. In this paper the author does not try to persuade the reader of this conviction but merely attempt to reflect the views that are its consequences

  18. The nuclear deterrence a topical interest

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chetaille, C.

    2009-01-01

    The author aims to explain with the today world situation favors the nuclear deterrence. The nuclear disarmament of the main european countries will deprive them of a great asset, which will guarantee the international stability. (A.L.B.)

  19. Prospective analysis. Nuclear deterrence in 2030

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, B.

    2006-12-01

    This study is a prospective analysis of the long-term future of nuclear weapons, and particularly the future of French nuclear deterrence after 2015. The selected time period is 2025-2030. The principal objective is to reflect on what the nuclear world might look like during the first part of the 21 st century, beyond the modernization decisions already planned or envisaged, and to draw conclusions for the future of the French deterrent. (author)

  20. ASSESSING THE UNCERTAINTY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-04-22

    unlimited. Abstract Nuclear deterrence theory in its many forms arose as a theoretical architecture with the goal of preventing rather than winning a nuclear... Egyptians and Syrians advanced toward Israel.31 Finally, the Kargil war represents a particularly volatile situation where the world looked on in fear as

  1. Flaws in the Concept of Nuclear Deterrance

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    John Scales Avery

    2012-04-01

    Full Text Available The concept of nuclear deterrence is seriously flawed, and it violates the fundamental ethical principles of all major religions. Besides being morally unacceptable, nuclear weapons are also illegal according to a historic 1996 decision of the International Court of Justice, a ruling that reflects the opinion of the vast majority of the worldʼs peoples. Even a small nuclear war would be an ecological catastrophe, not only killing civilian populations indiscriminately in both belligerent and neutral countries, but also severely damaging global agriculture and making large areas of the earth permanently uninhabitable through radioactive contamination. The danger of accidental nuclear war continues to be very great today, and the danger of nuclear terrorism is increasing. In this perilous situation, it is necessary for the nuclear nations to acknowledge that the concept of deterrence has been a mistake, which is threatening the lives of all human beings as well as threatening devastation of the biosphere. Acknowledging that the policy of nuclear deterrence has been a grave error can reduce risk of nuclear weapons proliferation.

  2. From Hiroshima to nuclear deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Villain, Jacques; Moret, Andre

    2015-01-01

    The authors first propose an overview of nuclear weapons from their origins to 2014: evolution of weapon systems between 1945 and 2014, main treaties related to nuclear weapons, main consequences of the nuclear revolution, brief presentation and assessment of defences against ballistic missiles, cost of nuclear warfare. The second part proposes a perspective for nuclear weapons in tomorrow's world as it seems that the World will remain nuclear: possible evolution of nuclear proliferation, evolution of risks related to nuclear weapons, desirable and possible evolution of nuclear weapons. Appendices propose presentations of the main techniques used for ballistic missiles: propulsion, control, navigation and guiding, atmosphere re-entry, multiple nuclear heads, data processing, relationship between nuclear plants and weapons

  3. Nuclear deterrence - The French nuclear adventure - The cockerel's spurs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valensi, Edouard

    2013-01-01

    This book reveals the secrets of the French strike force: the formidable adventure which provided France with first ranking strategic forces, the incredible fight given by Europe and the European Commission states to prohibit France from acquiring nuclear weapons, the US ambiguous game of accompanying France in her nuclear adventure in order to better monitor her, the core of deterrence with its doctrine of use, and for the future, the measures which will make French deterrence a decisive tool for worldwide peace

  4. Nuclear strategy: India's march towards credible deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sethi, Manpreet

    2009-01-01

    May 1998 was a momentous event in India's life. At one level, the five nuclear tests marked the culmination of the long debate on India's nuclear status. At another level, they initiated the country's journey towards credible nuclear deterrence. In the eleventh year of its existence as a state with nuclear weapons, India is engaged in a range of activities to meaningfully integrate the nuclear weapon into its national security strategy. The US and the USSR, at the same stage of their lives were engaged in pretty much a similar exercise. However, unlike the superpowers, for whom the immense destructive potential of the atomic weapon and its implications for inter-state relations suddenly burst on the scene and sent them scrambling to craft strategies that could fit the new reality, India's acquisition of nuclear weapons capability, though dictated by circumstances, came with a basic understanding of the ground rules of the game of nuclear deterrence. In fact, it may be recalled that soon after the tests, there was a spate of books and studies on India's nuclear strategy. A draft nuclear doctrine was made public just fifteen months after the tests and operational issues were beginning to be grappled with

  5. Clausewitz Nuclear War and Deterrence

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Barr, Alan W

    1991-01-01

    .... The advent of nuclear weapons and their role in the evolving east-west struggle following the second world war created a situation, however, unforeseen by Clausewitz, where the most basic political...

  6. Nuclear deterrence - Instructions for use

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valensi, Edouard

    2012-01-01

    At the end of the cold war, 7000 nuclear weapons (missiles, bombs, mines) were ready for use in Europe. This book, based on a database of more than 350 US, Russian and Chinese genuine documents, presents each type of weapon with its expected effects, the elaboration and implementation of fire plans and how these plans were activated during the eight acute nuclear crises which threatened the World. A lesson is drawn from each of them

  7. Is Nuclear Deterrence Morally Defensible? Religious Perspectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maitre, Emmanuelle

    2016-07-01

    For a few years, the Holy See critics against nuclear weapons and the Vatican's calls in favor of disarmament have been very visible and have led to a new round of analysis and reflection in circles working on strategic issues. This renewed interest, which was in all probability increased by the media coverage generally conferred to Pope Francis, is also linked to the Church's declarations in themselves, which show a slight evolution of its position and a clearer moral condemnation of nuclear deterrence. This focus is also the proof that far from being a purely anecdotal issue reserved to theology experts, the compatibility between nuclear deterrence and religious ethics can have a very concrete impact on strategic realities. In a more direct way, the Pope's message to the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons tends to reinforce the credibility and exposure of groups calling for immediate disarmament measures and believing that nuclear-weapon states do not fulfill the commitments taken under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). More deeply, it seems that the religious factor still plays (or something plays again) an important role in the 21. century in terms of geopolitics. In many places in the world, religious speeches are linked to nationalism and used to explain part of the geostrategic interests of nations, but also in a way define their behavior on the world stage. This influence does not spare the seemingly very cold and rational positioning towards nuclear weapons, as seen by the decision in 1998 of the nationalist and Hinduist party BJP to make official the nuclear-weapon status of India or the fatwa of Ayatollah Khamenei forbidding Iran to build a nuclear weapon. Even if in many states, religion plays a less and less important role and is considered a private and personal matter, in others, it remains an essential key to define individual as well as national identity. In that regard, it still participates, with more

  8. Give up the nuclear deterrence?; Renoncer a la dissuasion nucleaire?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Savoyant, L

    2009-07-15

    The nuclear deterrence question is always today the subject of a large consensus in spite of the evolution of its creation conditions. Taking into account the proliferation risk, the France could play a role in the disarmament process including the whole renouncement to the nuclear deterrence. (A.L.B.)

  9. Can the deterrence survive to nuclear tests ban

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gaffney, F.J. Jr.

    1996-01-01

    The problem of the soundness of the nuclear tests stopping is discussed here. The safety, the durability of nuclear weapons need nuclear tests. So, unless other means able to guarantee the deterrence, it is prejudicial to stop nuclear tests and to sign a non proliferation treaty with the option of zero nuclear explosion. (N.C.)

  10. Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Ziemke, Caroline

    2000-01-01

    Changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War has necessitated the reevaluation of the theoretical assumptions that have underlay nuclear deterrence strategies for the past half-century...

  11. The nuclear deterrence in 2030; La dissuasion nucleaire en 2030

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tertrais, B. [Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique (FRS), 75 - Paris (France)

    2007-05-15

    This article presents the conclusions of the prospective analysis, of December 2006, on the future of the french nuclear deterrence after 2015, under the responsibility of the Foundation for the strategic research. The principal objective is to reflect on what the nuclear world might look like during the first part of the 21. century, beyond the modernization decisions already planned or envisaged and to draw conclusions for the future of the french deterrent. (A.L.B.)

  12. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-09-01

    75 Appendix A. Nuclear Deterrent Workplace Survey Results...77 Appendix B. Nuclear Deterrent Workplace Survey Questionnaire .............. 107 Terms of Reference...active detection of nuclear explosives and materials, including accelerator technologies for radiography and stimulation of nuclear radiation

  13. The deterrent effect of nuclear forensics: The case of Hungary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gil, Laura

    2016-01-01

    A State capable of identifying the origin and history of intercepted nuclear or radioactive material can have a deterrent effect. This is why nuclear forensics — the examination of nuclear and other radioactive material as part of criminal or nuclear security investigations — is an important tool.

  14. French Senate debate on nuclear deterrence; Dissuasion nucleaire francaise

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vincon, S. [UMP Cher (France); Bentegeat, H. [Cema, 75 - Paris (France); Verwaerde, D. [CEA Bruyeres le Chatel, 91 (France); Quinlan, M. [IISS, Londre (United Kingdom); Tertrais, B. [Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique (FRS), 75 - Paris (France)

    2006-07-15

    The Senate committee on foreign affairs, defence and the Armed Forces met at a round table session on 14 June 2006 to discuss French nuclear deterrence. Serge Vincon presided the discussion, which covered three aspects of the subject: first, an analysis of the current and medium-term future strategic contexts and their consequences for the role of deterrence, and thus whether or not current doctrine is matched to current and future threats; second, the assets dedicated to deterrence, how well they reflect doctrine and how they fit in with other defence priorities; and finally an examination of Britain position within NATO along with future possibilities arising from closer European defence cooperation. (author)

  15. Challenging Minimum Deterrence: Articulating the Contemporary Relevance of Nuclear Weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-07-13

    elements of the US nuclear force gives this debate added meaning and urgency . One alternative currently under discus- sion is minimum deterrence. This...in 2013 illustrates this concept well.55 In this sense , an escalation-deterrence force would supply the tools neces- sary for context-specific...Shaub, “Remembrance of Things Past,” 78–79, 82. 16. Ibid., 80. For further elaboration of this argument, see James Forsyth’s “The Common Sense of

  16. Defence and illustration of nuclear deterrence; Defense et illustration de la dissuasion nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2011-07-01

    After having shown that nuclear deterrence has been efficient since 1945 (nuclear weapons prevented from war, nuclear deterrence contributed to the reduction of risks related to proliferation), the author discusses the amorality and illegality of nuclear deterrence (its ethics can indeed be a matter of discussion, as well as issues like self-defence and international humanitarian law). On another hand, he shows that deterrence costs remain acceptable and that substitutes to nuclear deterrence are not credible. He concludes that deterrence is therefore still useful and legitimate

  17. What Happens to Deterrence as Nuclear Weapons Decrease Toward Zero?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Drell, Sidney

    2011-04-01

    Steps reducing reliance on deployed nuclear weapons en route to zero will be discussed. They include broadly enhancing cooperation and transparency agreements beyond the provisions for verifying limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the New START treaty. Two questions that will be addressed are: What conditions would have to be established in order to maintain strategic stability among nations as nuclear weapons recede in importance? What would nuclear deterrence be like in a world without nuclear weapons?

  18. Fallout: the defence, industrial and technological benefits of nuclear deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2015-01-01

    In the current climate of budgetary restrictions, it is fair to question the weight of military nuclear defence spending. Upon examination, however, nuclear deterrence has numerous military, industrial, and technological benefits. It is, in fact, totally intertwined with the other elements of our defence system. (author)

  19. Nuclear deterrence, which relevance in the 21. century? To debate on deterrence: a democratic requirement, a strategic necessity. Nuclear deterrence: relevance or obsolescence? The Catholic Church and the nuclear deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupuy, Emmanuel; Fath, Jacques; Le Dauphin, Jacques

    2015-09-01

    In a first article, a member of a centrist party in charge of defence issues calls for a broader debate on nuclear weapons, and notably questions the existence of the airborne component of the French deterrence (as the ground-based component has already been suppressed), and more particularly when budgets and their evolutions are taken into account. He states that the principles of nuclear deterrence can be met with only the sea-borne component. He also outlines the role a European Defence should have. He discusses a possible approach to disarmament. In the second article, the author discusses the past acceptable relevance and present obsolescence of the nuclear weapon. The last article proposes an overview of opinions expressed by the Catholic Church since the 1950's about nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, and always more in favour of a nuclear disarmament

  20. Outer space and nuclear deterrence: problems and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gasparini Alves, P.

    1993-01-01

    The presentation deals with the role of outer-space applications and prospects for near future developments in nuclear deterrence. Outer space capabilities of United Sates, Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, China, and United Kingdom as well as other states are analyzed. Conceptual problems of offensive and defensive doctrines are reviewed together with legal implications

  1. Nuclear Deterrence in Cyber-ia: Challenges and Controversies

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-09-01

    54 | Air & Space Power Journal Nuclear Deterrence in Cyber-ia Challenges and Controversies © Dr. Stephen J. Cimbala* Disclaimer: The views and...into here. 11. Mazanec, “International Order in Cyberspace,” 83. 12. Joel Brenner, Glass Houses: Privacy , Secrecy, and Cyber Insecurity in a Transparent

  2. FAILURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-04-06

    Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. ii DISCLAIMER The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and...letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev prior to October 1962 support the notion that nuclear deterrence failed. The purpose of this essay is to

  3. Nuclear deterrence in second tier nuclear weapon states: a case study of India

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sethi, Manpreet

    2009-12-01

    Nuclear deterrence today anchors the national security of all states that possess nuclear weapons. Certain principles or requirements of nuclear deterrence are the same for all such countries. For instance, the ability to threaten with unacceptable damage, or the ability to raise the costs of an action that an adversary might want to take by threatening punishment that would make the act seem meaningless and even regrettable. But must every nuclear nation indulge in an exercise of large-scale warhead accumulation or yield refinements through nuclear testing, or creation of elaborate nuclear war fighting plans in order to claim credible deterrence? Can the practice of deterrence in the second tier states follow a different course? The study examines the manner in which India is engaged in constructing a credible and stable deterrence relationship with two of its nuclear armed adversaries, Pakistan and China with an arsenal much smaller, and command and control structures far simpler than in any of the P-5 nations. Does this difference impact the nature of its nuclear deterrence? In its efforts at creating and sustaining credible nuclear deterrence should India necessarily be expected to follow the same path and rules as those of the P-5? Would it be compelled to build hundreds of warheads and a huge weapons infrastructure? Would a deterrence based on anything less not be credible or stable? The study concludes that even countries with small nuclear arsenals behave no differently from states that possess several thousands of such weapons. The assumption that small nuclear arsenals and rudimentary command and control lend themselves to temptations of easy nuclear use is misplaced. Credible nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan or India and China would hold on the same bases it has held elsewhere - fear of nuclear destruction, imposition of unacceptable damage, and the ability to rationally calculate and weigh the benefits against the costs of use of nuclear

  4. Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia - an Assessment of Deterrence and Stability in the India-Pakistan Conflict

    OpenAIRE

    Westh, Mark; Juel Giorgio, Maia; Wiegersma, Jakob; Madsen, Tina

    2011-01-01

    This paper offers a coherent assessment of the stability created by nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. Our examination posits the neorealist understanding of the stability created by nuclear deterrence in relation to alternative frameworks. To unfold the varying theoretical presuppositions upon which the concept of stability is based, three logically constructed analyses will be undertaken where the theories are explored in relation to empirical data. The Kargil Crisis in 1999 and...

  5. What to think about deterrence? New absolute weapons? The beautiful future of the concept of deterrence. Can the world free itself from nuclear deterrence? Deterrence, did you say deterrence?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henrotin, Joseph; Le Dauphin, Jacques; Vahe, Raphael

    2010-09-01

    In a first article, a researcher comments and discusses the evolution of the concept of deterrence from a conventional and tactical approach to a strategic approach. He notices that the end of Cold War resulted in an important evolution of this concept and of its theory. As the nuclear weapon has been appearing as the absolute weapon since 1945, the question is now to see whether war would be different without nuclear weapons, and then whether chemical weapons could prevail and become again the absolute weapons as they were in the 1930's. In the next article, the author recalls the Church's position about nuclear weapons: condemnation as a matter of principle, and call for a progressive disarmament leading to a world without nuclear weapons. He notices that nuclear deterrence was the foundation of equilibriums during the Cold War, and that the end of Cold War resulted in strategic upheavals and difficulties to implement the non-proliferation regime. He also comments the initiative of President Obama for nuclear disarmament, and wanders whether there will be a realistic alternative to deterrence. The last article comments the historical evolutions of deterrence during the Cold War, and after the Cold War

  6. Nuclear deterrence: problems and perspectives in the 1990's

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sur, S.

    1993-01-01

    Few strategic doctrines raise as many controversies as nuclear deterrence. Some are philosophical, ideological or political in nature and question its legitimacy in regards to the considerable risks that it implies, or to the inequality between nations that it upholds. Others are of technical character and develop possible scenarios, corresponding arms systems, and foreseeable interactions between partners. Still others have a retrospective or historic dimension, notably when it comes to evaluating the past efficiency of nuclear deterrence and appraising its contribution to the maintenance of peace - for deterrence strives to be a doctrine of peace maintenance, its organizing principle being that of non-use. The present volume attempts to adopt a different approach. In conjunction with the remarkable transformations affecting international society and the resulting new security - or insecurity - context, it is more a reflection on the future of nuclear deterrence. Today, nuclear deterrence warrants fundamental reexamination. Apart from the traditional challenges from diverse sources and countries, the pertinence of a strategy which presently has neither a major threat to confront nor a designated enemy cannot but be questioned. Concurrently, the spread of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, and the vibrant political interest in acquisition of nuclear arms in a number of countries, threaten further proliferation. In the future, therefore, there may be a decoupling between deterrence and nuclear arms, presenting new dangers to international security. To implement existing commitments to nuclear disarmament is an enormous task. Tens of thousands of nuclear weapons are slated for withdrawal, and most of them for elimination as well. Still, the retention of US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons at the level of 3000-3500 is compatible with existing nuclear doctrines and not to be confused with the concept of minimal deterrence. Depending on the properties

  7. Nuclear deterrence in Southern Asia: China,India and Pakistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajain, Arpit

    2005-01-01

    Deterrence includes a mix of reassurance and accommodation, and should not focus exclusively on nuclear capabilities. It is premised on the notion that decision makers are rational individuals. The question of armed conflict, the risk of war and the issue of deterrence in Southern Asia are complicated by the fact that India has a nuclear adversarial relationship with Pakistan and China. Historically, this is an unprecedented situation where a triangular nuclear competition has been constructed, since it is geo-strategically different and more complicated than the bilateral nuclear rivalry that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Should India and Pakistan continue creeping along towards weaponisation and deployment, and China proceed with its nuclear modernisation plans, also partially resulting from the US's national missile defence programme, the three could easily enter into a triad that would be more competitive and conflictual in nature than cooperating with each other in the medium and long term. This book seeks to investigate the nuances of the oft-repeated mantra of credible minimum deterrent, study decision making in crisis and the drivers of various processes and structures in the domestic environment that influence the existence of the bomb in these countries. It seeks to explicate the prevailing attitudes towards issues of arms control, doctrines, strategy, weaponisation and deployment. The fundamental objective here is to highlight issues and prepare decision makers and policy elites in these countries

  8. Atomic power engineering as military and nuclear deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koryakin, Yu.I.

    2000-01-01

    The legislative aspects of the nuclear power facilities protection during military actions are discussed. The IAEA position on this question is considered. Absence in the IAEA subject scope of the works on preparation of the treaty on prohibiting the destruction of nuclear power facilities means that the IAEA countries differently understand the necessity for introducing the legislative positions of the international atomic law. However, observation of the unwritten codex of mutual nuclear deterrence gives rise to the hope for the wise solution of the problem on the nuclear power objects protection during the military actions [ru

  9. Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richardson, J

    2009-01-21

    The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

  10. In Defense of Deterrence. The Relevance, Morality and Cost-Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2011-10-01

    Since 1945, nuclear deterrence has been the target of continuous criticism on strategic, legal and moral grounds. But in the past five years, the renewed debate on nuclear disarmament has been accompanied by an increase in such criticism. Efforts led by four US statesmen, or the more radical 'Global Zero' movement, as well as various diplomatic initiatives, have been accompanied by a flurry of new, serious academic studies questioning the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. More than ever, nuclear deterrence is attacked by many, both on the 'Left' and on the 'Right'. To the traditional arguments related to the credibility, the legality or the morality of nuclear deterrence are now added two other factors. First, nuclear weapons, it is argued, have limited value vis-a-vis proliferation and terrorism, and such risks bolster the case for nuclear disarmament. Second, alternatives such as high-precision conventional means and missile defense are said to now be much more effective than they were in the past. What follows is an attempt to respond to those arguments and offer a proper defense of nuclear deterrence. It is essentially devoted to the most traditional and widely used form of nuclear deterrence, that is, deterrence through the threat of nuclear retaliation ('deterrence by punishment'). It begins with revisiting and addressing the two classic criticisms of nuclear deterrence: its validity as a war-prevention mechanism (Part One, 'Nuclear Deterrence Works'), and its legality as well as morality (Part Two, 'Nuclear Deterrence Is Neither Immoral Nor Illegal'). It then goes on to address criticisms which, without being entirely new, have gained in importance in recent years: first, the cost-effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, in particular vis-a-vis so-called possible alternatives such conventional deterrence and missile defense (Part Three, 'Nuclear Deterrence is Cost-Effective'); second, the validity of nuclear deterrence in the context of twenty-first century

  11. Increasing Uncertainty: The Dangers of Relying on Conventional Forces for Nuclear Deterrence

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-03-14

    72 | Air & Space Power Journal Increasing Uncertainty The Dangers of Relying on Conventional Forces for Nuclear Deterrence Jennifer Bradley To put...relationships and should serve as the cornerstone of US nuclear deterrence policy. Although Russia and China are not identified as adversaries of...exactly what has happened over the past year. The US decision to meet the needs of deterrence by relying less on nuclear weapons and instead devel- oping

  12. Deterrence at Three: US, UK and French Nuclear Cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lewis, Jeffrey; Tertrais, Bruno

    2016-01-01

    Following Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine, members of NATO are again pondering the strength of Western deterrence. Over the course of the Ukraine crisis, President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly emphasised the potency of Russian nuclear weapons, announced new nuclear-weapons programmes and brushed off accusations that Russia is cheating on a number of arms-control agreements. Most ominously, Putin has declared that he would have been prepared to place Russian nuclear forces on alert - which implies threatening their use - had the annexation of Crimea met with serious resistance. The three NATO nuclear-weapons states - the United States, United Kingdom and France - must again contemplate how best to ensure that their very different nuclear forces strengthen NATO's nuclear deterrence against Russian aggression. There is a tendency among Western defence analysts to assume that, in the event of a major crisis, the three NATO nuclear-weapons states would be able to effectively coordinate their deterrence policies and communications. The stakes are so high, so the thinking goes, that the three parties would find a way to successfully manage the crisis together. Yet, recent experience in terms of trilateral crisis management and strategic communications is not encouraging. In 2013, the United States, the United Kingdom and France attempted to deter Syria from using chemical weapons. This ended up being one of the biggest deterrence fiascos in recent memory - a textbook example of how not to prevent adversaries from embarking on large-scale aggression. The president of the United States announced a 'red line' regarding Syrian use of chemical weapons. Although the red line was apparently drawn extemporaneously, at a press conference on 20 August 2012, London and Paris presumed that Washington was committed to the red line and followed suit with their own statements. Over the course of several months, Syria appears to have

  13. Nuclear deterrence and the Alliance in the 21. century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grand, Camille

    2016-01-01

    For more than two decades, nuclear debates had vanished from the heart of Western strategic debates. The general perception within the Alliance was that NATO was not facing direct threats on its territory and borders. NATO was surrounded by multiple 'partners', many of which were aspiring to membership. The threat of nuclear weapons seemed remote, and debates focused on the risks of proliferation or the prospects of a world free of nuclear weapons. This situation has changed dramatically in the last few years. Major and regional powers are modernising their nuclear forces and giving them a central role in their broader strategic posture. In such a context, deterrence is back and NATO needs to re-establish a robust and credible defence and deterrent vis-a-vis multiple and diverse threats, a topic which will be high on the agenda at NATO's summit in Warsaw in early July. There is a strong nuclear component to this debate. Reprint of a paper published in 'Nato Review', 2016

  14. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-03-25

    Freedman, Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 735. 4 Carl von Clausewitz, On...26 Scott D. Sagan , "How to Keep the Bomb from Iran," Foreign Affairs 85, (September/October 2006): 45 27 Matthew Bunn, "Bombs We Can Stop

  15. Nuclear deterrence and disarmament: France in a corner

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gautier, L.

    2010-01-01

    The author comments the implications and consequences of the recent Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference which drew a line between emerging actors and non-aligned countries on one side, and nuclear states on the other. As the United States got some benefits from this review conference, France, because of its involvement on the Iranian issue and of its clumsy reaction to the Brazil's and Turkey's initiative, found itself in an uncomfortable position. The author stresses that nuclear weapon proliferation is presently the biggest threat against peace, and that negotiations on nuclear disarmament must be resumed. He describes France's position and orientations on this issue: to restore the NPT authority, to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to implement the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). He also discusses the importance of talks about nuclear deterrence in Europe, and more particularly about the role and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons and missiles present on the European soil

  16. The nuclear deterrence: permanence and changes; La dissuasion nucleaire: permanence et changements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Debouzy, O. [August and Debouzy, 75 - Paris (France)

    2009-10-15

    The author aims to present that the nuclear deterrence, even with some change, remains today always pertinent and useful. He shows how the application modalities changed. He discusses the need of an analysis of the future weapons and their use, of the articulation between the nuclear deterrence and the anti missiles defense and the necessity of a discussion on the enlarged deterrence. (A.L.B.)

  17. Practical consideration of nuclear fuel spiking for proliferation deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Selle, J.E.; Angelini, P.; Rainey, R.H.; Federer, J.I.; Olsen, A.R.

    1978-10-01

    The use of a gamma active radionuclide with nuclear fuel has been proposed as a way to inhibit unauthorized diversion of the fuel and thus provide proliferation deterrence. The purpose of this report is to examine some of the practical aspects of incorporating spikants into nuclear fuel in an attempt to identify any adverse consequences of their use. Selection of potential spikants was made by the application of some somewhat arbitrary radiation criteria to 64 candidate spikants followed by an analysis of the chemical and physical state of each potential spikant. As a result of this analysis the list of candidates was narrowed to 60 Co, 106 Ru, and 144 Ce. Following this, we investigated the practical aspects of the use of these three spikants in nuclear fuel. Among the subjects considered are: dose rates available from fuel elements, fission product buildup, chemical behavior of spikants during reproecssing, and possible effects of spikants on refabrication and on the fuel properties. No single radionuclide was found to be preferred in all stages of reprocessing and refabriaction. In order to provide deterrence in all stages of reprocessing and refabrication, a duplex spiking process appears necessary, in which two different spikants, 106 Ru and 60 Co, are used in different portions of reprocessing. The use of nominal amounts of ruthenium or cobalt as spikants is not expected to adversely affect fuel performance

  18. In defiance of nuclear deterrence: anti-nuclear New Zealand after two decades.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Reitzig, Andreas

    2006-01-01

    In 1984, nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered vessels were banned from New Zealand to express the country's rejection of the nuclear deterrence concept. This led to a disagreement with the United States. Today, the ban on nuclear-powered ships is the only element of the nuclear-free legislation that still strains US-New Zealand relations. This article presents the reasons for the ban on nuclear-powered ships, which include scientific safety concerns, a symbolic rejection of the nuclear deterrence posture, and patriotic factors such as a nuclear-free national identity. The military and economic consequences of the ban are also examined. Since the ban on nuclear-powered vessels appears to be neither widely known abroad nor commonly recognised as a supportive disarmament measure outside New Zealand, it is concluded that whatever the future of this ban will be, New Zealand's anti-nuclear image will remain known internationally through the ban on nuclear arms.

  19. The nuclear deterrence a topical interest; La dissuasion nucleaire reste d'actualite

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chetaille, C. [Commandant d' un sous-marin d' attaque, 83 (France)

    2009-12-15

    The author aims to explain with the today world situation favors the nuclear deterrence. The nuclear disarmament of the main european countries will deprive them of a great asset, which will guarantee the international stability. (A.L.B.)

  20. Exercise book n.10: the nuclear deterrence has to be thought again

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-06-01

    Numerous questions about nuclear deterrence are tackled in this part. Some definitions are given (what is deterrence, nuclear winter). In practice what it means, lack of credibility, prevention between nuclear powers, hostility, suspicion, escalation. Ethical aspect and legality are tackled too. Toward a strategy giving a real security: the example of the New Zealand, a non nuclear strategy for O.T.A.N., the importance of checking. (N.C.)

  1. Nuclear Strategy, Deterrence, Compellence, and Risk(y?) Management: Thomas Schelling Meets Joint Vision 2010

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Tomes, Robert

    1997-01-01

    .... The following critique of nuclear strategy and deterrence theory should not be mistaken for an argument paralleling that of John Mueller or other revisionists who suggest that nuclear weapons were or are irrelevant in international politics. Opposing Mueller, it links a review of the strategy of nuclear deterrence with an analysis of the role nuclear weapons played in past, present and future global political military affairs.

  2. The national drill for deterrence and fighting nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cioflan, Constantin

    2006-01-01

    Full text: National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN) in cooperation with the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) organized the 'National Drill for Deterrence and Fighting the Nuclear Terrorism' which took place on May 10, 2006 in Cheile Rasnoavei, Brasov county, Romania. This event continues the activities undertaken by CNCAN, in its capacity of a national center ensuring the nuclear safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials as well as for preventing and fighting against illicit traffic with radioactive nuclear materials and deterring the terrorist actions menacing the security and nuclear safety of the nation. The drill consisted in simulating a terrorist attack against a shipment of nuclear fuel (made available by the Nuclear Fuel Plant at Pitesti). It was a good opportunity for testing the reacting and organizing technical capacity of the national institutions committed with physical protection in emergency situations generated by terrorist actions. The objectives of the drill was the deployment of a counter-terrorist intervention in case of a terrorist attack intending to hijack a special expedition of dangerous materials. Hostages were seized and the demand was issued for clearing the traffic up to the national boundary. The anti-terrorist brigade (SRI) organized an ambush on the route of displacement in order to capture and annihilate the terrorist unit and re-establishing the legal order. CNCAN participated in this drill with its mobile intervention unit which is a team of experts correspondingly equipped with specific instruments for detecting the nuclear materials, special equipment for communication and locating as well as with two marked vehicles. The SRI employed a number higher than 80 officers and military technicians from anti-terrorist brigade, constituted in negotiators, storming squads, paratroopers, pyrotechnic experts, communication technicians. PUMA and Alouette helicopters for launching air attacks were employed

  3. Prospective analysis. Nuclear deterrence in 2030; Essai de prospective. La dissuasion nucleaire en 2030

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tertrais, B

    2006-12-15

    This study is a prospective analysis of the long-term future of nuclear weapons, and particularly the future of French nuclear deterrence after 2015. The selected time period is 2025-2030. The principal objective is to reflect on what the nuclear world might look like during the first part of the 21 st century, beyond the modernization decisions already planned or envisaged, and to draw conclusions for the future of the French deterrent. (author)

  4. "Nuclear Deterrence" as an Adaptive Game Frame for Crisis Decision-Making.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sorenson, David S.

    1981-01-01

    Describes the simulation game "Nuclear Deterrence," which was developed to model an international relations crisis situation involving a bargaining framework potentially applicable to crisis modeling in other disciplines. Eight references are listed. (Author/LLS)

  5. Global Zero and Deterrence Credibility : A Critical Analysis of Obama`s Nuclear Policy and Extended Nuclear Deterrence Credibility on the Korean Peninsula

    OpenAIRE

    Ganss, Mathias

    2012-01-01

    This thesis is a qualitative case study analysis of the whether the nuclear policies of President Obama has weakened the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence credibility on the Korean Peninsula. To answer this, the thesis employs two strategies: First, two variables are discussed; a nuclear capabilities-variable; and a nuclear policy-variable. The purpose is to assess the impact the New START treaty has on U.S. nuclear capabilities, and to assess the implications of Obama`s nuclear policy, expres...

  6. China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-01-01

    155 Implications for Extended Deterrence of Nuclear and Regional Political Stability . . . . . . . . . 159...Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, No. 3, August 1990. 4 Robert J. Powell, “Crisis Stability in the Nuclear Age,” American Political Science Review, Vol... instability and, potentially, rapid escalation. Regional crisis stability may be further undermined by nonstructural factors: Potential belligerents

  7. Virtual nuclear capabilities and deterrence in a world without nuclear weapons. VERTIC research report no. 3

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paloczi-Horvath, G.

    1998-01-01

    'Virtual nuclear capabilities' (VNC) can be defined as the ability of a state not equipped wth nuclear weapons to produce them within a matter of months or years, using fissile material and/or technological skills and materials available to it. 'Virtual nuclear deterrence' (VND) would use these capabilities to a specific end. It could be a temporary posture adopted by former nuclear weapon states as a guarantee against nuclear weapon 'break out'. VND could hence reinforce a temporary security architecture, even if in this instance 'temporary' might mean up to around ten years. In the context of getting to 'zero', VND could not be an end in itself, but rather serve as an element of the security architecture of a world free of nuclear weapons. VND would only be adopted by the acknowledged nuclear weapon states (NWS) - China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America - after the commit to complete nuclear disarmament, sign the appropriate treaties and perceive the temporary adoption of this form of deterrence to be in their political and security interests. As with the NWS, VND will only be accepted as an interim form of security by the de facto nuclear weapon states (DFNWS) - India, Israel and Pakistan - when they can be assured that their virtual security interests would be guaranteed by other means after they sign a nuclear disarmament treaty. There are several alternative approaches to VND. These range from various types of precise or explicit virtual deterrence to more implicit or tacit forms. An explicit VND posture might allow materials and capabilities relevant to the construction of a nuclear weapon to be retained under verified arrangements for a limited time. This report explains why explicit VND would not be a reliable tool for reinforcing a nuclear disarmament treaty, as it could undermine the treaty's whole purpose. An implicit VND posture would not permit the retention of any weapons-related fissile material or

  8. The myth of nuclear deterrence: The lessons of the Cold War

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamada, Yasuhiro

    1997-01-01

    The end of the Cold War has provided a great opportunity and an urgent need for recasting a long-range policy for nuclear weapons. At the moment, however, there is not much prospect of nuclear disarmament by the United States and Russia beyond START II, and no prospect of nuclear disarmament by the other states, while the chances of nuclear proliferation remain high. This paper explores the implications of the Cold War for further nuclear disarmament and preventing future nuclear proliferation, focusing on the notion of nuclear deterrence and the 'crystal ball effect' of nuclear weapons

  9. Analysis of the morality of intention in nuclear deterrence, with special reference to final retaliation. Doctoral thesis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zink, J.A.

    1990-01-01

    Quite apart from its apparent political obsolescence, the policy of nuclear deterrence is vulnerable to attack for its seemingly obvious immorality. Nuclear war is blatantly immoral, and nuclear deterrence requires a genuine intention to resort to the nuclear retaliation which would precipitate such a war. Therefore, since it is wrong to intend that which is wrong to do, deterrence is immoral. This thesis seeks to examine the nature of the deterrent intention as a means of verifying the soundness of the above deontological argument. This examination is carried out by first suggesting an acceptable notion of intention in general and then, after analysing the views of deterrent intention by other writers, proceeding to demonstrate the uniqueness of that intention. Having done this, and having explored the possibility that deterrence need not contain a genuine intention to retaliate, the thesis moves on to suggest and defend a moral principle which states that endeavours requiring the formation of an immoral intention may nevertheless be moral. Called the Principle of Double Intention (and based on the Principle of Double Effect), it offers a method for the moral assessment of agents who form immoral intentions within larger contexts. By applying this principle to nuclear deterrence, it is demonstrated that agents who undertake such a policy may be morally justified in doing so, provided certain conditions are met. The thesis closes with a refutation of the objection that an agent cannot rationally form an intention (such as that required in deterrence) which he has no reason to carry out.

  10. A Nuclear Submarine in the South Atlantic: The Framing of Threats and Deterrence

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mônica Herz

    Full Text Available Abstract In this article, we analyse one aspect of Brazilian nuclear policy during the tenure of the Workers Party (2003–2016: the development of a nuclear-propelled submarine. We propose that the project of building a nuclear-propelled submarine has become possible partly because of the mobilisation of a set of arguments for the construction of the South Atlantic as a strategic area, framed in terms of security and development. On the other hand, we contend that the need for a nuclear-propelled submarine is framed through the mobilisation of a specific notion of deterrence. In other words, we claim that the notions of ‘strategic area’, ‘general deterrence’, ‘conventional deterrence’, and ‘deterrence by denial’ can help us analyse the fundamental aspects involved in the framing of the South Atlantic as a security concern, justifying the nuclear-propelled submarine project.

  11. Perseverance of Power: The Relevancy of Nuclear Deterrence in the Future

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-01

    3 Patrick Morgan, "The Practice of Deterrence," in International Practices, ed. Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (Cambridge New York: Cambridge...Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight : Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 216...Monica, CA: RAND, 2012. Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight : Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War. 1st ed. New York: Alfred A

  12. Examination of the role of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: a systems analysis approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Martz, Joseph C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stevens, Patrice A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Branstetter, Linda [SNL; Hoover, Edward [SNL; O' Brien, Kevin [SNL; Slavin, Adam [SNL; Caswell, David [STANFORD UNIV

    2010-01-01

    Until very recently, an evaluation of US policy regarding deterrence and the role of its nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent has been largely absent in the public debate. With President's Obama embrace of a goal of a future world without nuclear weapons, issues of nuclear policy and deterrence have just recently risen to the forefront of policy discussions. The traditional role of US nuclear weapons-to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states-endures, but is no longer unique nor even predominant. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the US now faces growing risks of nuclear weapons proliferation; the spread of weapons of mass destruction generally to non-state, substate and transnational actors; cyber, space, economic, environmental and resource threats along with the application of numerous other forms of 'soft power' in ways that are inimical to national security and to global stability. What concept of deterrence should the US seek to maintain in the 21st Century? That question remains fluid and central to the current debate. Recently there has been a renewed focusing of attention on the role of US nuclear weapons and a national discussion about what the underlying policy should be. In this environment, both the United States and Russia have committed to drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while still maintaining forces sufficient to ensure unacceptable consequence in response to acts of aggression. Further, the declared nuclear powers have maintained that a limited nuclear arsenal continues to provide insurance against uncertain developments in a changing world. In this environment of US and Russian stockpile reductions, all declared nuclear states have reiterated the central role which nuclear weapons continue to provide for their supreme national security interests. Given this new environment and the challenges of the next several decades, how might the United States structure its policy and forces with regard to nuclear

  13. Nuclear deterrence and disarmament after the Cold War

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1995-03-01

    During the Cold War, nuclear arms control measures were shaped significantly by nuclear doctrine. Consequently, the negotiation of arms control agreements often became a battleground for different nuclear strategies. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union has been declared over. Today, both nuclear weapons policies and arms control objectives are again being reviewed. This document discusses points of this review.

  14. Perspectives on extended Deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, Bruno; Yost, David S.; Bunn, Elaine; Lee, Seok-soo; Levite, Ariel e.; Russell, James A.; Hokayem, Emile; Kibaroglu, Mustafa; Schulte, Paul; Thraenert, Oliver; Kulesa, Lukasz

    2010-05-01

    In November 2009, the Foundation for Strategic Research (Fondation pour la recherche strategique, FRS) convened a workshop on 'The Future of extended Deterrence', which included the participation of some of the best experts of this topic, from the United States, Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, as well as French and NATO officials. This document brings together the papers prepared for this seminar. Several of them were updated after the publication in April 2010 of the US Nuclear Posture Review. The seminar was organized with the support of the French Atomic energy Commission (Commissariat a l'energie atomique - CEA). Content: 1 - The future of extended deterrence: a brainstorming paper (Bruno Tertrais); 2 - US extended deterrence in NATO and North-East Asia (David S. Yost); 3 - The future of US extended deterrence (Elaine Bunn); 4 - The future of extended deterrence: a South Korean perspective (Seok-soo Lee); 5 - Reflections on extended deterrence in the Middle East (Ariel e. Levite); 6 - extended deterrence, security guarantees and nuclear weapons: US strategic and policy conundrums in the Gulf (James A. Russell); 7 - extended deterrence in the Gulf: a bridge too far? (Emile Hokayem); 8 - The future of extended deterrence: the case of Turkey (Mustafa Kibaroglu); 9 - The future of extended deterrence: a UK view (Paul Schulte); 10 - NATO and extended deterrence (Oliver Thraenert); 11 - extended deterrence and assurance in Central Europe (Lukasz Kulesa)

  15. Assessing Possible Improvements in NATO’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Deterrence Forces

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-12-01

    great country .”86 Consequently, this perspective brings Moscow into conflict with any former Soviet state wishing to align with a rival great power... Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY ( 2. REPORT DATE December 2017 3. REPORT TYPE AND...Reinforcing Deterrence, 1. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., 7. 8 Matthew Kroenig, Toward a More Flexible NATO Nuclear Posture: Developing a Response to a Russian

  16. Dangerous deterrent: nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paul Kapur, S.

    2008-01-01

    This book discusses the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan and its effect on security of the South Asian region. The author uses quantitative analysis to establish the relationship between nuclearization and conventional stability in the region between 1971 and 2002. He shows a positive correlation between nuclear proliferation and conventional instability during these three decades. Thus, this study affirms that nuclear weapons have failed to prevent conflict in South Asia. In fact, they have escalated tensions

  17. The World After Proliferation, Deterrence and Disarmament if the Nuclear Taboo is Broken

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fitzpatrick, M.

    2009-01-01

    he nuclear taboo is customarily seen as a black and white norm, separating the world of the familiar from that of an unknowable afterlife.1 Nina Tannenwald argues that 'once the threshold between use and non-use is crossed, one is immediately in a new world with all the unimaginable consequences that could follow'. It is not correct, however, to say that the consequences are 'unimaginable'. They are certainly unpredictable, but one can imagine at least some of the consequences. This article attempts to do so with regard to consequences for proliferation, deterrence and disarmament. If the nuclear taboo were broken, whether by design, accident, miscalculation, or a breakdown of command and control, one of the more easily imagined consequences would be the collapse of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is safe to assume that the use of nuclear weapons in war for the first time since 1945 would be a transformational event. But would nuclear use spell the failure of deterrence and doom the prospects of a nuclear-weapons free world, making obsolete much of the current thinking about nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence? Not every nuclear use scenario would necessarily break the lock on the nuclear Pandora's Box. A 'demonstration shot', for example, would not have the same impact as nuclear obliteration of a city. Both would be breaches of the taboo, but the use of a single nuclear bomb probably would not disrupt the status quo as thoroughly as would a massive attack or a two-way exchange. Breaching the taboo would not necessarily reverse the powerful norm and tradition that has developed in the last 60+ years against use of nuclear weapons. There is no compelling logic to assume that nuclear weapons would thereby become re-legitimized as instruments of war. The breaking of the nuclear taboo could actually spur either or both of two opposite reactions: an increased salience of nuclear weapons and a stimulus to disarmament. Which impulse prevails will

  18. The World After Proliferation, Deterrence and Disarmament if the Nuclear Taboo is Broken

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fitzpatrick, M.

    2009-07-01

    he nuclear taboo is customarily seen as a black and white norm, separating the world of the familiar from that of an unknowable afterlife.1 Nina Tannenwald argues that 'once the threshold between use and non-use is crossed, one is immediately in a new world with all the unimaginable consequences that could follow'. It is not correct, however, to say that the consequences are 'unimaginable'. They are certainly unpredictable, but one can imagine at least some of the consequences. This article attempts to do so with regard to consequences for proliferation, deterrence and disarmament. If the nuclear taboo were broken, whether by design, accident, miscalculation, or a breakdown of command and control, one of the more easily imagined consequences would be the collapse of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is safe to assume that the use of nuclear weapons in war for the first time since 1945 would be a transformational event. But would nuclear use spell the failure of deterrence and doom the prospects of a nuclear-weapons free world, making obsolete much of the current thinking about nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence? Not every nuclear use scenario would necessarily break the lock on the nuclear Pandora's Box. A 'demonstration shot', for example, would not have the same impact as nuclear obliteration of a city. Both would be breaches of the taboo, but the use of a single nuclear bomb probably would not disrupt the status quo as thoroughly as would a massive attack or a two-way exchange. Breaching the taboo would not necessarily reverse the powerful norm and tradition that has developed in the last 60+ years against use of nuclear weapons. There is no compelling logic to assume that nuclear weapons would thereby become re-legitimized as instruments of war. The breaking of the nuclear taboo could actually spur either or both of two opposite reactions: an increased salience of nuclear weapons and a stimulus to

  19. The Complexity of Threats to Nuclear Strategic Deterrence Posture

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-02-07

    India and Pakistan, and concludes “…South Asian nuclear adversaries are believed to make each of the four dangers of inadvertent use of nuclear...directed energy, unmanned systems, and artificial intelligence ( AI ).”50 Ultimately, the promulgation of either of these technologies in a mature or

  20. Norm of nuclear weapons non-use and deterrence: interaction of the conceptions in case of usa

    OpenAIRE

    Bladaitė, Neringa

    2016-01-01

    Norm of Nuclear Weapons Non-use and Deterrence: Interaction of the Conceptions in Case of USA The problem that is analyzed in this master thesis is formed according the paradox. Although, US is thought to be the county that maintains norm of non-use, in the practice US forms the strategy according nuclear deterrence. The object of this master thesis is nuclear weapons posture of US during the period of 2009-2015. The main aim of this thesis is to explore posture of US nuclear weapons use base...

  1. Through the Time Tunnel - Clausewitz on Nuclear Deterrence

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Studenka, John M

    1990-01-01

    This essay presents the presumed thoughts and ruminations of Carl von Clausewitz, the great Prussian military strategist, on an article by Bernard Brodie entitled "On Nuclear Weapons: Utility in Nonuse...

  2. A U.S. Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: By Design or Default It’s about the Policy Options

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-01

    then who are we to suggest actions that may upset the apple cart. Continued Retention of a Nuclear Deterrence Force. The ideas of M. K. Ghandi ...shaped India’s thinking about nuclear weapons. Ghandi espoused non-violence as a political strategy and his moral rejection of nuclear weapons laid the

  3. Extended Nuclear Deterrence for Europe Without Forward-based Weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-02-15

    financial costs of nuclear burden sharing, bolsters safety and security and further reduces proliferation risks. 22 Bibliography Bildt, Carl and... Sagan , Scott D. and Waltz, Kenneth N. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed. W. W. Norton and Company New York, NY and London...Point. Center for International Relations, Reports and Analyses. Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, Warsaw, 2011, 2. 30 Bildt, Carl and Sikorski, Radek

  4. Nuclear Deterrence: Strong Policy is Needed for Effective Defense

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-03-24

    providing anti-access to U.S. forces should conflict erupt, for example over the Taiwan sovereignty issue.29 Emerging Chinese long- range delivery systems...securing fissile material is already extremely difficult. It is quite possible that some nuclear material is unaccounted for in the world; even if banned ...Nuclear weapons are like very complicated chemical experiments, sometimes changing in unforeseen ways as metals corrode, plastics break down and

  5. Russian Nuclear Power: an Instrument of Deterrence and Intimidation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marange, Celine

    2017-01-01

    Given current tensions with Western countries, nuclear power is assuming a new importance for Moscow. It serves as ever to compensate for the relative weakness of Russian forces in comparison to those of NATO and China. Furthermore, it increasingly serves as an intimidation to an adversary by demonstrating renewed power

  6. Department of Energy: An Organizational Look at Americas Nuclear Deterrent

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-09-01

    benefits of job location also play a significant role in the hiring and retention process. As one case study respondent commented: “Geography presents...the marriage of the nuclear weapons program with DOE was anything but smooth. When DOE was created, it merged together “two very different 13...concern at the laboratories, which could impact future recruiting and retention efforts. The Council (2013) cites numerous complaints from workers

  7. Los Alamos National Laboratory Human and Intellectual Capital for Sustaining Nuclear Deterrence

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McAlpine, Bradley [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-04-01

    This paper provides an overview of the current human and intellectual capital at Los Alamos National Laboratory, through specific research into the statistics and demographics as well as numerous personal interviews at all levels of personnel. Based on this information, a series of recommendations are provided to assist Los Alamos National Laboratory in ensuring the future of the human and intellectual capital for the nuclear deterrence mission. While the current human and intellectual capital is strong it stands on the precipice and action must be taken to ensure Los Alamos National Laboratory maintains leadership in developing and sustaining national nuclear capabilities. These recommendations may be applicable to other areas of the nuclear enterprise, including the Air Force, after further research and study.

  8. Los Alamos National Laboratory Human and Intellectual Capital for Sustaining Nuclear Deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McAlpine, Bradley

    2015-01-01

    This paper provides an overview of the current human and intellectual capital at Los Alamos National Laboratory, through specific research into the statistics and demographics as well as numerous personal interviews at all levels of personnel. Based on this information, a series of recommendations are provided to assist Los Alamos National Laboratory in ensuring the future of the human and intellectual capital for the nuclear deterrence mission. While the current human and intellectual capital is strong it stands on the precipice and action must be taken to ensure Los Alamos National Laboratory maintains leadership in developing and sustaining national nuclear capabilities. These recommendations may be applicable to other areas of the nuclear enterprise, including the Air Force, after further research and study.

  9. Deterrence and disarmament

    OpenAIRE

    Gärtner, Heinz

    2012-01-01

    In his April 2009 speech in Prague US President Barack Obama spoke of a world free of nuclear weapons. Obama stated that the United States would maintain nuclear deterrence during the disarmament process. This paper discusses the limitations and deficiencies of the traditional mutual nuclear deterrence and assesses why progress in nuclear disarmament since the end of the Cold War has fallen short of expectations.

  10. How to achieve deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, S.

    1987-01-01

    This paper reports on the present direction of U.S. nuclear weapons policy toward a greater emphasis on counterforce targeting which has caused great concern among members of the public and among many strategic theorists. Although U.S. policy has been moving in this direction for many years, the speed of the movement has increased greatly, with talk of flexible response giving way to that of escalation dominance and nuclear war fighting. The public concern this has raised has led the philosophical community belatedly to begin considering issues such as the morality of nuclear deterrence. But most of the philosophical examinations of this issue have focused on the moral status of nuclear deterrence in general and thus on the choice between nuclear deterrence and unilateral nuclear disarmament. This misses much of the contemporary debate on nuclear weapons policy, which is concerned mainly with the choice between present policy and some form of minimum deterrence

  11. The deterrence - Champ de Mars nr 25

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Romer, Jean-Christophe; Widemann, Thierry; Dufourcq, Jean; Wodka-Gallien, Philippe; Joubert, Vincent; Queau, Yannick; Gere, Francois; Cumin, David; Puhl, Detlef; Chansoria, Monika; Goya, Michel; Montignac, Jean-Luc; David, Dominique

    2013-01-01

    This document proposes a brief presentation of a publication which contains contributions on the various aspects of the present nuclear deterrence and the future strategic challenges. The authors discuss the role of deterrence before and after the nuclear era, the signals of strategic deterrence, the presence of deterrence beneath the surface of arms race, deterrence challenged by cyber-space, and the ways to assess deterrence. Some specific cases are also addressed (Iran, Japan, Germany, India, the 2006 war) as well as perspectives for 2020. A contribution propose an analysis of the French situation with respect to deterrence and nuclear

  12. Nuclear deterrence in the 21. century. Lessons from the cold war for a new era of strategic piracy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delpech, Therese

    2013-01-01

    Deterrence remains a primary doctrine for dealing with the threat of nuclear weapons in the 21. century. In this book, the author calls for a renewed intellectual effort to address the relevance of the traditional concepts of first strike, escalation, extended deterrence, and other Cold War-era strategies in today's complex world of additional superpowers (e.g., China), smaller nuclear powers (e.g., Pakistan and North Korea), and non-state actors (e.g., terrorists), as well as the extension of defense and security analysis to new domains, such as outer space and cyber-space. The author draws upon the lessons of the bipolar Cold War era to illustrate new concepts of deterrence that properly account for the variety of nuclear actors, the proliferation of missiles and thermonuclear weapons, and the radical ideologies that all are part of the nuclear scene today. Contents: 1- Introduction, 2 - Why Is This Subject Important?, 3 - Concepts, 4 - Lessons from Crises, 5 - The Age of Small Powers, 6 - Ahead of Us: The Big Piracy Game?, 7 - Space and Cyber-deterrence

  13. Preliminary evaluation of a fluorescence and radioisotope nuclear smuggling deterrence tag - final report (IL500E)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hartenstein, S.D.; Aryaeinejad, R.; Delmastro, J.R.

    1997-04-01

    This report summarizes the efforts completed in identifying candidate fluorescence compounds and radioisotopes for a developing tagging system. The tagging system is being developed as a deterrent to nuclear smuggling, by providing a means of: (1) tracing materials and pilferers to the facility of origin for any recovered special nuclear materials, (2) inventory control of long-term stored items containing special nuclear materials, and (3) tracking materials transferred between facilities. The system uses three types of materials to cover a range of applications intended to prevent the pilfering of special nuclear materials. One material, fluorescent compounds which are invisible without ultraviolet or near-infrared detection systems, is marked on controlled items with a tracking pattern that corresponds to a specified item in a specified location in the data control system. The tagging system uses an invisible, fluorescent dusting powder to mark equipment and personnel who inappropriately handle the tagged material. The tagging system also uses unique combinations of radionuclides to identify the facility of origin for any special nuclear material. This report also summarizes the efforts completed in identifying hardware that will be used for the tagging system. This hardware includes the devices for applying the tagging materials, the commercially available fluorescence detection systems, and gamma ray detection systems assembled from existing, commercially available technologies

  14. Preliminary evaluation of a fluorescence and radioisotope nuclear smuggling deterrence tag - final report (IL500E)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hartenstein, S.D.; Aryaeinejad, R.; Delmastro, J.R. [and others

    1997-04-01

    This report summarizes the efforts completed in identifying candidate fluorescence compounds and radioisotopes for a developing tagging system. The tagging system is being developed as a deterrent to nuclear smuggling, by providing a means of: (1) tracing materials and pilferers to the facility of origin for any recovered special nuclear materials, (2) inventory control of long-term stored items containing special nuclear materials, and (3) tracking materials transferred between facilities. The system uses three types of materials to cover a range of applications intended to prevent the pilfering of special nuclear materials. One material, fluorescent compounds which are invisible without ultraviolet or near-infrared detection systems, is marked on controlled items with a tracking pattern that corresponds to a specified item in a specified location in the data control system. The tagging system uses an invisible, fluorescent dusting powder to mark equipment and personnel who inappropriately handle the tagged material. The tagging system also uses unique combinations of radionuclides to identify the facility of origin for any special nuclear material. This report also summarizes the efforts completed in identifying hardware that will be used for the tagging system. This hardware includes the devices for applying the tagging materials, the commercially available fluorescence detection systems, and gamma ray detection systems assembled from existing, commercially available technologies.

  15. Network Science for Deterrence: Sheathing the Sword of the Terrorism/Nuclear Horseman

    Science.gov (United States)

    Carley, Kathleen

    2010-03-01

    After 9/11, network analysis became popular as a way to connect and disconnect the dots. It was heralded as the new science with intrinsic value for understanding and breaking up terrorist groups, insurgencies and hostile foreign governments. The limit of the initially forwarded approach was that it focused on only the social network -- who talked to whom. However ,the networks of war, terror or nuclear or cyber, are complex networks composed of people, organizations, resources, and capabilities connected in a geo-temporal web that constrains and enables activities that are ``hidden'' in the web of everyday life. Identifying these networks requires extraction and fusion of information from cyber-mediated realms resulting in a network map of the hostile groups and their relations to the populations in which they are embedded. These data are at best a sample, albeit a very large sample, replete with missing and incomplete data. Geo-temporal considerations in addition to information loss and error called into question the value of traditional network approaches. In this talk, a new approaches and associated technologies that integrate scientific advances in machine learning, network statistics, and the social and organizational science with traditional graph theoretic approaches to social networks are presented. Then, examples, of how these technologies can be used as part of a deterrence strategy are described. Examples related to terrorism and groups such as al-Qaida and Hamas, cyber and nuclear deterrence are described. By taking this meta-network approach, embracing the complexity and simultaneously examining not just one network, but the connections among networks, it is possible to identify emergent leaders, locate changes in activities, and forecast the potential impact of various interventions. Key challenges, such as data-streaming and deception, that need to be addressed scientifically are referenced.

  16. Which future for the French nuclear deterrence in front of today's and tomorrow's geostrategic challenges and changes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pascallon, Pierre; Tertrais, Bruno; Gere, Francois; Le Guelte, Georges; Rocard, Michel; Wodka-Gallien, Philippe; Queau, Yannick; Forget, Michel; Dufourcq, Jean; Desportes, Vincent; Copel, Etienne; Gaviard, Jean-Patrick; Morin, Herve

    2015-01-01

    The contributions of this colloquium aimed at examining and discussing various issues regarding the French nuclear deterrence policy and forces: must we maintain our deterrence force in front of new geostrategic challenges and changes (development of asymmetric conflicts and of terrorism, high threats of conventional conflicts)? If yes, which choices and which modifications must be made for this nuclear deterrence to take these threats into account? Thus, the authors address and discuss various issues like budgetary constraints, doctrine and strategy, role of the Non Proliferation Treaty, choice among the various components of the nuclear force (airborne, seaborne), disarmament, proliferation, and so on

  17. The reasons for deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roche, Nicolas

    2017-01-01

    Based on a series of seminars gathering students of the French Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris, the author first proposes as introduction a discussion of lessons learned from recent Ukrainian crisis and Syrian crisis by focusing on issues related to deterrence, more precisely to the Syrian chemical program and attacks, and to the nuclear dimension of the Ukrainian crisis. The first part of this book addresses the French case with the definition of threats and of the defence policy (French white papers, overview of Russian and American defence policies, the current role of nuclear deterrence), and an historical overview of the French nuclear program. The second part proposes a brief grammar of deterrence through a presentation of the main technical data of nuclear defence, and of the main concepts related to nuclear defence and deterrence, through an historical overview of the strategic relationship between the USA and Russia, and through a discussion of the Non Proliferation Treaty (its history, its content, its current debates). The third part addresses the relationship between deterrence and regional balances by discussing issues related to various regions: South Asia (India and Pakistan), North Korea, China, role of the USA in Asia in terms of extended deterrence. It also comments the Iranian crisis: discussion of the problem, international, security and political stakes, brief history of negotiations. The fourth part addresses the relationships between non nuclear capabilities and deterrence: chemical and biological weapons as arms of massive destruction, programs and concepts of anti-missile defence, space and cyber-defence. The last and concluding part discusses the moral (or immoral) value of nuclear deterrence as it can be perceived from a humanitarian or legal point of view

  18. Questioning minimal deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boyer, Y.

    1993-01-01

    Nuclear deterrence has yet to be adapted to the geo-strategic context of the aftermath of the Cold War. While nuclear weapons continue to play a vital role in the military policy of the five officially recognized nuclear Powers, an unprecedent reduction of their stocks o weapons is taking shape. Hidden behind the idea and the notion of minimum deterrence are a number of ambiguities or misunderstandings. It is easy to conceive of minimum deterrence in relation to previous state of affairs, namely that of the Cold War, which was noteworthy for the arms race. Alternatively, minimum deterrence could be approached solely from the point of view of the number of devices on which it was intended to be based

  19. Multi-Use seismic stations offer strong deterrent to clandestine nuclear weapons testing

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hennet, C. B.; Van der Vink, G. E.; Richards, P. G.; Adushkin, V. V.; Kopnichev, Y. F.; Geary, R.

    As the United States and other nations push for the signing of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, representatives are meeting in Geneva this year to develop an International Seismic Monitoring System to verify compliance with the treaty's restrictions. In addition to the official monitoring system, regional networks developed for earthquake studies and basic research can provide a strong deterrent against clandestine testing. The recent release of information by the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) on previously unannounced nuclear tests provides an opportunity to assess the ability of multi-use seismic networks to help monitor nuclear testing across the globe.Here we look at the extent to which the formerly unannounced tests were recorded and identified on the basis of publicly available seismographic data recorded by five seismic networks. The data were recorded by networks in southern Nevada and northern California at stations less than 1500 km from the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and two networks in the former Soviet Union at stations farther than 1500 km from the NTS.

  20. Strategic Deterrence in the 21st Century

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Habiger, Eugene

    1998-01-01

    .... Nuclear deterrence is at the core of American national security strategy. Joint Vision 2010 defines the primary task of our Armed Forces to deter conflict, but should deterrence fail, to fight and to win...

  1. A widened deterrence, devised deterrence or deterrence towards the Prussian King

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soutou, G.H.

    1996-01-01

    The question of a nuclear deterrence devised between France and Germany is discussed here. The advantages and disadvantages, the NATO position are studied and integrated to a larger point of view in an European nuclear deterrence. (N.C.). 9 refs

  2. Strategic Personality and the Effectiveness of Nuclear Deterrence: Deterring Iraq and Iran

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Ziemke, Caroline

    2001-01-01

    Changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War have necessitated reevaluation of the theoretical assumptions that provided the foundations of deterrence theory for the past six decades...

  3. Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence FY 2016 Data Analysis Annual Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Enders, Alexander L. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Harris, Tyrone C. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Pope, Thomas C. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Patterson, Jeremy B. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2017-01-01

    The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) has facilitated the installation of more than 3,500 radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at 606 sites in 56 countries worldwide. This collection of RPMs represents the world’s largest network of radiation detectors and provides one element in the defense-in-depth approach that supports the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. These systems support NSDD’s mission to build partner country capability to deter, detect, and interdict the illicit transport of radiological and fissile material through strategic points of entry and exit at seaports, airports, and border crossings. NSDD works collaboratively with partner countries and international organizations to optimize the operation of these RPMs. The large amount of data provided by NSDD partner countries highlights the close cooperation and partnerships NSDD has built with 56 countries around the world. Thirty-seven of these countries shared at least some RPM-related data with NSDD in fiscal year 2016. This significant level of data sharing is a key element that distinguishes the NSDD office as unique among nuclear nonproliferation programs and initiatives: NSDD can provide specific, objective, data-driven decisions and support for sustaining the radiation detection systems it helped deploy. This data analysis report summarizes and aggregates the RPM data provided to the NSDD office for analysis and review in fiscal year 2016. The data can be used to describe RPM performance and characterize the wide diversity of NSDD deployment sites. For example, NSDD deploys detector systems across sites with natural background radiation levels that can vary by a factor of approximately six from site to site. Some lanes have few occupancies, whereas others have approximately 8,000 occupancies per day and the different types of cargo that travel through a site can result in site-wide alarm rates that range from near 0% at

  4. The limits of deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2009-01-01

    The objective of this contribution is to propose a better insight of the validity of the theory of deterrence, and of related doctrines in more complex and more various situations than in the past: emergence of powers like China and India, of new nuclear States like North Korea and Pakistan, of countries planning to acquire nuclear weapons like Iran, and possibility of a new wave of nuclear proliferation in Middle-East and north-eastern Asia. It also aims at providing arguments in the debates on the struggle against nuclear proliferation and on the future of deterrence. The author first presents and comments the principles of deterrence, and illustrates them by more or less recent historical situations (Iran during the war with Iraq, USA after Pearl Harbour, Arab-Israeli wars, Iraq, and so on). He notably outlines that the notion of deterrence is present in Islamic culture, and that Iran has well integrated it in its defence strategy. Examples of statements and behaviours of other Arab leaders are discussed. The author also briefly indicates how the deterrence strategy is present in the official doctrines of Russia, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In a second part, based on various examples, the author analyses the practical limitations of deterrence by distinguishing the psychological dimension (bounded rationality, political leaders suffering from various psychological problems, importance of the ideological and spiritual dimension, values prevailing on interests, the case of Iran), and the strategic dimension (good understanding of the enemy, sensitivity of the threat of massive damages, existence of a single decision centre and of an efficient communication). The author finally proposes seven recommendations for better deterrence efficiency

  5. Real-world nuclear decision making: using behavioral economics insights to adjust nonproliferation and deterrence policies to predictable deviations from rationality

    OpenAIRE

    Knopf, Jeffrey W.; Harrington, Anne I.; Pomper, Miles

    2016-01-01

    42 p. The invention of nuclear weapons created unprecedented challenges for the world. Even today, seventy years after the first atomic weapons test, the effort to find effective policies and strategies for dealing with nuclear weapons remains a daunting challenge. From early in the nuclear age, attention focused on deterrence as a strategy to prevent nuclear war. By the 1960s, key states were also seeking to limit the growth of nuclear arsenals and spread of nuclear arms through tools suc...

  6. Deterrence before Hiroshima

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Quester, G.H.

    1985-01-01

    The gap between studies of military history and military strategy is ever widening. The enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons has tended to persuade us that the military experience of the first half of this century is not relevant to more ''modern'' military questions. In Deterrence before Hiroshima, first published in 1966, George H. Quester analyzes pre-nuclear age theories of deterrence to equip us with a perspective and data by which current theories can be evaluated. Quester shows that from almost the time of the first military aircraft, air-power was believed to have the capacity for apocalyptic destruction. He points out that the modern terms deterrence, limited war, tacit agreement, and balance of terror, show up often in the literature from 1900-1945, coupled with war scenarios every bit as awesome as a nuclear holocaust.

  7. The deterrence: history and becoming

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gallois, P.M.

    1996-01-01

    The nuclear deterrence is discussed here: From the beginning, with the Usa deterrence about the fight against communism and the Ussr, the case of Japan and Germany, to reach the problem of cost which comes higher and higher and will oblige to limit the number of atomic weapons to only one extremely sophisticated. (N.C.)

  8. A Poor Man's Nuclear Deterrent: Assessing the Value of Radiological Weapons for State Actors

    Science.gov (United States)

    Donohue, Nathan

    The threat of weapons of mass destruction is an issue which remains at the forefront on national security. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are all considered very dangerous by both state and non-state actors. Radiological weapons exist in that same category yet are not held in the same regard; the reason that is given is that these types of weapons are not the weapons of mass destruction that the other three are. Instead, radiological weapons are better considered weapons of mass disruption. Accordingly, in the academic and policy literature there has been very little perceived value associated with such weapons for use by state actors. However the historical focus on the military efficacy of radiological weapons has obscured the obvious truth that they may pose significant value for state actors. What this research shows is that the explosion of a radiological weapon could disrupt a target area in ways which could cripple the economy of an adversary state and promote widespread fear concerning exposure to radiation. Any such attack would not only necessitate large scale evacuation, but cleanup, decontamination, demolition, territory exclusion, and relocation. Moreover, the effects of such an attack would be unlikely to remain an isolated event as evacuated and displaced citizens spread across the nation carrying both fear and residual radiation. All of these factors would only be compounded by a state actor's ability to not only develop such weapons, but to manufacture them in such a composition that contemporary examples of such weapons grossly underestimate their impact. Accordingly, radiological weapons could hold great value for any state actor wishing to pursue their development and to threaten their use. Moreover, "while RDDs may not be well suited as "military weapons" in the classic sense, the use of RDDs could be powerfully coercive."1 In that sense, state actors could even acquire radiological weapons for their deterrent value. 1James L. Ford

  9. Beyond the cold war nuclear legacy: offense-defense and the role of nuclear deterrence

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dunn, L.A

    2001-07-01

    Since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the defense community of the United States focused overwhelmingly on countering the threat of global terrorism. This focus rightly reflects the danger of additional terrorist attacks against the American homeland, including conceivably even with nuclear weapons or radiological devices. At the same time, the December, 2001 announcement of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty after the six month waiting period serves as a reminder that there still is considerable other outstanding 'defense business' confronting the United States and its European allies. In particular, it is increasingly essential to re-craft the Cold War nuclear weapons legacy, not only in its own right but because doing so can also have important payoffs for the success of the U.S.-led global anti-terrorist campaign. The following paper first describes some of the main features of the Cold War nuclear legacy. It then sketches a number of different schools of thought or camps that exist within the U.S. defense community in answer to the question, 'what next with nuclear weaponry?' In light of those contending positions, it then sets out a possible way ahead - moving to re-craft U.S. strategic dealings with Russia toward a non-adversary relationship, to avoid a new Cold War with China, and to put in place the right mix of offensive and defensive, nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to contain 21. century proliferation dangers. (author)

  10. Beyond the cold war nuclear legacy: offense-defense and the role of nuclear deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunn, L.A.

    2001-01-01

    Since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the defense community of the United States focused overwhelmingly on countering the threat of global terrorism. This focus rightly reflects the danger of additional terrorist attacks against the American homeland, including conceivably even with nuclear weapons or radiological devices. At the same time, the December, 2001 announcement of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty after the six month waiting period serves as a reminder that there still is considerable other outstanding 'defense business' confronting the United States and its European allies. In particular, it is increasingly essential to re-craft the Cold War nuclear weapons legacy, not only in its own right but because doing so can also have important payoffs for the success of the U.S.-led global anti-terrorist campaign. The following paper first describes some of the main features of the Cold War nuclear legacy. It then sketches a number of different schools of thought or camps that exist within the U.S. defense community in answer to the question, 'what next with nuclear weaponry?' In light of those contending positions, it then sets out a possible way ahead - moving to re-craft U.S. strategic dealings with Russia toward a non-adversary relationship, to avoid a new Cold War with China, and to put in place the right mix of offensive and defensive, nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to contain 21. century proliferation dangers. (author)

  11. Beyond the cold war nuclear legacy: offense-defense and the role of nuclear deterrence

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dunn, L A

    2001-07-01

    Since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the defense community of the United States focused overwhelmingly on countering the threat of global terrorism. This focus rightly reflects the danger of additional terrorist attacks against the American homeland, including conceivably even with nuclear weapons or radiological devices. At the same time, the December, 2001 announcement of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty after the six month waiting period serves as a reminder that there still is considerable other outstanding 'defense business' confronting the United States and its European allies. In particular, it is increasingly essential to re-craft the Cold War nuclear weapons legacy, not only in its own right but because doing so can also have important payoffs for the success of the U.S.-led global anti-terrorist campaign. The following paper first describes some of the main features of the Cold War nuclear legacy. It then sketches a number of different schools of thought or camps that exist within the U.S. defense community in answer to the question, 'what next with nuclear weaponry?' In light of those contending positions, it then sets out a possible way ahead - moving to re-craft U.S. strategic dealings with Russia toward a non-adversary relationship, to avoid a new Cold War with China, and to put in place the right mix of offensive and defensive, nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to contain 21. century proliferation dangers. (author)

  12. Nuclear Deterrence. Applications of Elementary Probability to International Relations. Modules and Monographs in Undergraduate Mathematics and Its Applications Project. UMAP Unit 327.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Smith, Harvey A.

    This module is designed to apply mathematical models to nuclear deterrent problems, and to aid users in developing enlightened skepticism about the use of linear models in stability analyses and long-term predictions. An attempt is made at avoiding overwhelming complexities through concentration on land-based missile forces. It is noted that after…

  13. Ethics and nuclear deterrence. Proceedings of the colloquium of October 21, 2006 at the Paris Catholic Institute

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marc Stenger; Arbonneau, Amiral d'; Le Gal, Patrick; Muller, Jean-Marie; Jonghe, Etienne de; Richard, Alain; Klein, Jean; Quinchon, Jean; Lafouasse, Michel; Berten, Ignace; Bavarez, Nicolas

    2007-09-01

    The contributions of this colloquium have been proposed by people coming from the political, religious, associative, military, media or academic worlds. The objective was to create a dialogue between those who definitely condemn the use and even possession of nuclear weapons, and those who are in favour of the nuclear deterrence principle, and thus to question the fact that Christians could be found on both sides. The authors comment and discuss the opinion of the Church regarding nuclear weapons, its evolution and the questions it raises, and the ethical issue as an element of an efficient defence. They also propose a non-violent approach of these issues, outline the importance of a mobilisation of the civil society, define a way to ban nuclear weapons through disarmament, regulation and good will, discuss the rationality of a defence policy, the necessity to re-consider the French nuclear defence, or the use of humanitarian right to impulse nuclear disarmament. They also highlight the misfortunes of the non proliferation regime, and recall the different statements made by the catholic church since Vatican II

  14. Advice presented on behalf of the commission of national defence and army, about the 2005 finances law project (no. 1800). Tome 2, defense, nuclear deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-10-01

    Nuclear deterrence still represents an important part of French military budgets. However, its relative share is progressively reducing with the progress of the big programs implemented for its modernization. The 2005 finances law project rules out any risk of threat on these programs. This report presents, first, the schedule of the renewal of the strategic oceanic fleet (the M51 missile and the new generation of submarines) and the strategic air forces. Then, it comments the programs in progress at the direction of military applications of the atomic energy commission (CEA): a significant part of funds devoted to nuclear deterrence, the evolution of the simulation program, the delicate question of the financing of the dismantling of fissile material production facilities. Finally, it stresses of the research effort to sustain in order to stand the evolution of threats and to warrant the perenniality of deterrence: nuclear proliferation remains worrying and technologies linked with deterrence are changing rapidly, the need of a constant research effort in order to keep the competences up. (J.S.)

  15. Technical description of candidate fluorescence compounds and radioisotopes for a nuclear smuggling deterrence tag (IL500E)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hartenstein, S.D.; Aryaeinejad, R.

    1996-03-01

    This report summarizes the efforts completed in identifying candidate fluorescence compounds and radioisotopes for a developing tagging system. The tagging system is being developed as a deterrent to nuclear smuggling, by providing a means of: (1) tracing materials and pilferers to the facility of origin for any recovered special nuclear materials; (2) inventory control of long-term stored items containing special nuclear materials; and (3) tracking materials transferred between facilities. The tagging system uses four types of tagging materials to cover a range of applications intended to prevent the pilfering of special nuclear materials. One material, fluorescent compounds which are invisible without ultraviolet or near-infrared detection systems, is marked on controlled items with a tracking pattern that corresponds to a specified item in a specified location in the data control system. The tagging system uses an invisible, fluorescent dusting powder to mark equipment and personnel who inappropriately handle the tagged material. The tagging system also uses unique combinations of radionuclides to identify the facility of origin for any special nuclear material. Currently, 18 long-lived radioisotopes, 38 short-live radioisotopes and 10 fluorescent compounds have been selected as candidate materials for the tagging system

  16. Technical description of candidate fluorescence compounds and radioisotopes for a nuclear smuggling deterrence tag (IL500E)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hartenstein, S.D.; Aryaeinejad, R.

    1996-03-01

    This report summarizes the efforts completed in identifying candidate fluorescence compounds and radioisotopes for a developing tagging system. The tagging system is being developed as a deterrent to nuclear smuggling, by providing a means of: (1) tracing materials and pilferers to the facility of origin for any recovered special nuclear materials; (2) inventory control of long-term stored items containing special nuclear materials; and (3) tracking materials transferred between facilities. The tagging system uses four types of tagging materials to cover a range of applications intended to prevent the pilfering of special nuclear materials. One material, fluorescent compounds which are invisible without ultraviolet or near-infrared detection systems, is marked on controlled items with a tracking pattern that corresponds to a specified item in a specified location in the data control system. The tagging system uses an invisible, fluorescent dusting powder to mark equipment and personnel who inappropriately handle the tagged material. The tagging system also uses unique combinations of radionuclides to identify the facility of origin for any special nuclear material. Currently, 18 long-lived radioisotopes, 38 short-live radioisotopes and 10 fluorescent compounds have been selected as candidate materials for the tagging system.

  17. Nuclear deterrence and disarmament: France in a corner; Dissuasion et desarmement nucleaire: la France dans un corner

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gautier, L. [Lyon-3 Univ., 69 (France)

    2010-07-15

    The author comments the implications and consequences of the recent Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference which drew a line between emerging actors and non-aligned countries on one side, and nuclear states on the other. As the United States got some benefits from this review conference, France, because of its involvement on the Iranian issue and of its clumsy reaction to the Brazil's and Turkey's initiative, found itself in an uncomfortable position. The author stresses that nuclear weapon proliferation is presently the biggest threat against peace, and that negotiations on nuclear disarmament must be resumed. He describes France's position and orientations on this issue: to restore the NPT authority, to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to implement the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). He also discusses the importance of talks about nuclear deterrence in Europe, and more particularly about the role and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons and missiles present on the European soil

  18. The French deterrence from 1945

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bouchard, J.

    1997-01-01

    Here is presented a particular lighting of deterrence history, by sciences and technologies which have allowed their creation and development. Accompanying the historical evolution of the French deterrence forces during the first phase of these sciences constitution, these sciences and technologies are at the base of the nuclear weapons conception, but they also contributed to the realization of the industrial building and to a doctrine constitution. (N.C.)

  19. The debate on minimal deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arbatov, A.; Karp, R.C.; Toth, T.

    1993-01-01

    Revitalization of debates on minimal nuclear deterrence at the present time is induced by the end of the Cold War and a number of unilateral and bilateral actions by the great powers to curtail nuclear arms race and reduce nuclear weapons arsenals

  20. Taking a Quantum Leap in Cyber Deterrence

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-17

    frame an adversary‘s rationale and decision calculus. 82 Understanding a group‘s rationale helps frame a strategy for deterrence. Emanuel Adler ...to leverage against America. 8586 Adler adds that when deterrence culture in this context is driven by religious and ethnic- nationalist beliefs...Path to the Quantum Computer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003. Kapur, S. Paul. "Deterring Nuclear Terrorists." In Complex Deterrence: Strategy in

  1. Deterrence according to Francois Hollande

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2015-01-01

    On the February 19, 2015, the President of the Republic gave a speech on nuclear deterrence. Although it did not contain any major announcements, it reaffirms our nuclear policy while further elaborating upon it - something that the 2013 White Paper did not do - and in this respect provides significant clarifications on French doctrine and posture, and mentions several instances of reorientation. (author)

  2. Lessons of the Indo-Pakistani example for nuclear deterrence. Study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, B.

    2003-10-01

    Southern Asia has similar characteristics as those of central Europe during the cold war. The arguments suggesting that the nuclear dissuasion cannot work between India and Pakistan are not convincing. A deep analysis of the Indo-Pakistan 'nuclear crises' is necessary to learn lessons from the south-Asian example. This analysis suggests that both parties have learnt the dissuasion rules in an empirical way since 1990 and now have more certitudes about their options and the related risks in a bilateral nuclear environment. In particular, it appears that the line of control (LoC) is now well identified, both by Islamabad and New Delhi, as one of those 'red lines' the crossing of which would lead the conflict towards a new dimension. (J.S.)

  3. Lessons of the Indo-Pakistani example for nuclear deterrence. Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, B.

    2003-10-01

    Southern Asia has similar characteristics as those of central Europe during the cold war. The arguments suggesting that the nuclear dissuasion cannot work between India and Pakistan are not convincing. A deep analysis of the Indo-Pakistan 'nuclear crises' is necessary to learn lessons from the south-Asian example. This analysis suggests that both parties have learnt the dissuasion rules in an empirical way since 1990 and now have more certitudes about their options and the related risks in a bilateral nuclear environment. In particular, it appears that the line of control (LoC) is now well identified, both by Islamabad and New Delhi, as one of those 'red lines' the crossing of which would lead the conflict towards a new dimension. (J.S.)

  4. Britain’s Nuclear Deterrent Force and the U.S.-U.K. Special Relationship

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-06-01

    Role,” Science 214, no. 4518 (1981): 324, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1686877. 80 Ferenc Morton Szasz , The Day the Sun Rose Twice: The Story of the...Richard N. Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Szasz , Ferenc Morton. The Day

  5. Ways and means of attaining minimal deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boden, D.

    1993-01-01

    Means for attaining minimum nuclear deterrence include negotiations, unilateral measures, changes of doctrines, priorities with respect to armaments concerned, co-management of deterrence. Deterrence is a positive relationship related to non-proliferation. It is helpful because it has to be seen in the context of overall international security. Nuclear weapons have a significance which is real. The treat they pose should be dealt with in order to develop a better and safer world, and in that context the security needs of the nations should be provided, meaning truly improved security situation

  6. Nuclear deterrents: Intrinsic regulators of IL-1β-induced effects on hippocampal neurogenesis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Léime, Ciarán S; Cryan, John F; Nolan, Yvonne M

    2017-11-01

    Hippocampal neurogenesis, the process by which new neurons are born and develop into the host circuitry, begins during embryonic development and persists throughout adulthood. Over the last decade considerable insights have been made into the role of hippocampal neurogenesis in cognitive function and the cellular mechanisms behind this process. Additionally, an increasing amount of evidence exists on the impact of environmental factors, such as stress and neuroinflammation on hippocampal neurogenesis and subsequent impairments in cognition. Elevated expression of the pro-inflammatory cytokine interleukin-1β (IL-1β) in the hippocampus is established as a significant contributor to the neuronal demise evident in many neurological and psychiatric disorders and is now known to negatively regulate hippocampal neurogenesis. In order to prevent the deleterious effects of IL-1β on neurogenesis it is necessary to identify signalling pathways and regulators of neurogenesis within neural progenitor cells that can interact with IL-1β. Nuclear receptors are ligand regulated transcription factors that are involved in modulating a large number of cellular processes including neurogenesis. In this review we focus on the signalling mechanisms of specific nuclear receptors involved in regulating neurogenesis (glucocorticoid receptors, peroxisome proliferator activated receptors, estrogen receptors, and nuclear receptor subfamily 2 group E member 1 (NR2E1 or TLX)). We propose that these nuclear receptors could be targeted to inhibit neuroinflammatory signalling pathways associated with IL-1β. We discuss their potential to be therapeutic targets for neuroinflammatory disorders affecting hippocampal neurogenesis and associated cognitive function. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  7. Miscalculated Ambiguity: The Effects of US Nuclear Declaratory Policy on Deterrence and Nonproliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-01

    Use. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995) 7. 5 Sagan , Scott. "The Case for No First Use." Survival 51, no. 3 (2009): 163-182. 6 The Stanley Foundation...America’s Nuclear Posture. (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program, 2010) 1. 60 Sagan , Scott. "The Case for No First...Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace. S.l.: s.n., 1971. Nonproliferation--60 Years Later. DVD. Directed by Carla Robbins. Washington D.C

  8. Department of Defense Authorization for appropriations for fiscal years 1988 and 1989. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, First Session on S. 1174, Part 4, Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1987-01-01

    Government, academic and military officials provided statements and documents in regard to S. 1174 authorizing appropriations for military activities of the Department of Defense and Department of Energy for defense activities. Strategic Forces and Nuclear deterrence categories include the following major topics: (1) Nuclear Testing Limitations, (2) Strategic Warning Capabilities and ICMB modernization, (3) Strategic Policy and Arms Control, and (4) Strategic Defense Initiatives

  9. Deterrence Today Roles, Challenges and Responses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dunn, L.A.

    2007-07-01

    Nuclear deterrence was the centerpiece of U.S. and NATO strategy - and as adapted to their own circumstances, of the strategies of France and the United Kingdom - in the long Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. At its most basic, U.S. strategy was designed to deter an attack upon the American homeland by the threat of society devastating nuclear retaliation. This strategy came to be implemented in doctrine (assured destruction), forces (more than twelve thousand deployed strategic nuclear warheads organized in a nuclear triad of land-based bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles), and command and control procedures (including extremely high readiness and alert levels.) At the same time, the United States extended deterrence to America's NATO allies by a threat of escalation to all-out nuclear war. This extended deterrent provided reassurance against possible Soviet nuclear blackmail. Concepts and analysis, doctrine, force posture and deployments (conventional as well as nuclear), R and D, technical investments, diplomacy, institution-building and cooperation, and leadership all supported what was a successful Cold War nuclear deterrence strategy. Compared to the challenge of Cold War nuclear deterrence, however, the strategic situation confronting the United States and in varying degrees other countries in the early 21. century is considerably more complex. Unlike one superpower nuclear adversary, the United States confronts a mix of new or emerging hostile proliferators from North Korea in Asia to Iran in the Middle East; a network of al-Qaeda-Jihadist extremists as well as possibly other non-state actors seeking nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and a rising China with whom conflict triggered by Taiwan may be unlikely but cannot be excluded. In some of these situations, deterrence role is little questioned in principle, typified best by the importance of U.S. extended nuclear

  10. Deterrence Today Roles, Challenges and Responses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunn, L.A.

    2007-01-01

    Nuclear deterrence was the centerpiece of U.S. and NATO strategy - and as adapted to their own circumstances, of the strategies of France and the United Kingdom - in the long Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. At its most basic, U.S. strategy was designed to deter an attack upon the American homeland by the threat of society devastating nuclear retaliation. This strategy came to be implemented in doctrine (assured destruction), forces (more than twelve thousand deployed strategic nuclear warheads organized in a nuclear triad of land-based bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles), and command and control procedures (including extremely high readiness and alert levels.) At the same time, the United States extended deterrence to America's NATO allies by a threat of escalation to all-out nuclear war. This extended deterrent provided reassurance against possible Soviet nuclear blackmail. Concepts and analysis, doctrine, force posture and deployments (conventional as well as nuclear), R and D, technical investments, diplomacy, institution-building and cooperation, and leadership all supported what was a successful Cold War nuclear deterrence strategy. Compared to the challenge of Cold War nuclear deterrence, however, the strategic situation confronting the United States and in varying degrees other countries in the early 21. century is considerably more complex. Unlike one superpower nuclear adversary, the United States confronts a mix of new or emerging hostile proliferators from North Korea in Asia to Iran in the Middle East; a network of al-Qaeda-Jihadist extremists as well as possibly other non-state actors seeking nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and a rising China with whom conflict triggered by Taiwan may be unlikely but cannot be excluded. In some of these situations, deterrence role is little questioned in principle, typified best by the importance of U.S. extended nuclear

  11. For a NATO defensive deterrent

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smoke, R.

    1988-01-01

    This paper proposes that NATO should adopt, in a gradual and orderly fashion, a grand strategy and accompanying posture distinctly different from its present one. The strategy the author recommends has variously been termed non-provocative defence, defence-only defence, or defensive deterrence, employs the latter term here. By it the author means a militarily sound strategy relying solely on conventional weapons so long as the enemy uses only conventional weapons, and a posture that is unambiguously capable only of defence. Secure, second-strike nuclear forces would be retained for deterrence of any nuclear use by the opponent. This goal is consistent with the goal stated in Frank Barnaby's companion paper in this volume; here however the author lays the emphasis on political and politico-military rationales for a defensive deterrent. The paper begins with two brief arguments why a shift in NATO strategy is needed, advances some distinctions among the possible alternatives, and then presents some seven rationales for its recommended policy

  12. Deterrents to Accountability.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hencley, Stephen P.

    This speech assesses potential deterrents to the implementation of accountability in education. The author divides these deterrents into (1) philosophical-ideological; humanist-behaviorist conflicts, individuality versus "techno-urban fascism," and accountability systems tied to the achievement of cognitive objectives at the lower end of Bloom's…

  13. Nuclear rights - nuclear wrongs

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Paul, E.F.; Miller, F.D.; Paul, J.; Ahrens, J.

    1986-01-01

    This book contains 11 selections. The titles are: Three Ways to Kill Innocent Bystanders: Some Conundrums Concerning the Morality of War; The International Defense of Liberty; Two Concepts of Deterrence; Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control; Ethical Issues for the 1980s; The Moral Status of Nuclear Deterrent Threats; Optimal Deterrence; Morality and Paradoxical Deterrence; Immoral Risks: A Deontological Critique of Nuclear Deterrence; No War Without Dictatorship, No Peace Without Democracy: Foreign Policy as Domestic Politics; Marxism-Leninism and its Strategic Implications for the United States; Tocqueveille War.

  14. Crime, deterrence, and democracy

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Dušek, Libor

    2012-01-01

    Roč. 13, č. 4 (2012), s. 447-469 ISSN 1465-6485 Institutional support: RVO:67985998 Keywords : crime under transition * deterrence * economics of crime Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 0.736, year: 2012

  15. Crime, deterrence, and democracy

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Dušek, Libor

    2012-01-01

    Roč. 13, č. 4 (2012), s. 447-469 ISSN 1465-6485 Institutional support: PRVOUK-P23 Keywords : crime under transition * deterrence * economics of crime Subject RIV: AH - Economics Impact factor: 0.736, year: 2012

  16. Ultrasonic Bat Deterrent Technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kinzie, Kevin; Rominger, Kathryn M.

    2017-12-14

    The project objective was to advance the development and testing of an Near commercial bat-deterrent system with a goal to increase the current GE deterrent system effectiveness to over 50% with broad species applicability. Additionally, the research supported by this program has provided insights into bat behavior and ultrasonic deterrent design that had not previously been explored. Prior research and development had demonstrated the effectiveness of a commercial-grade, air-powered, ultrasonic bat deterrent to be between 30-50% depending upon the species of bat. However, the previous research provided limited insight into the behavioral responses of bats in the presence of ultrasonic deterrent sound fields that could be utilized to improve effectiveness. A unique bat flight room was utilized to observe the behavioral characteristics of bats in the presence of ultrasonic sound fields. Behavioral testing in the bat flight facility demonstrated that ultrasonic sounds similar to those produced by the GE deterrent influenced the activities and behaviors, primarily those associated with foraging, of the species exposed. The study also indicated that continuous and pulsing ultrasonic signals had a similar effect on the bats, and confirmed that as ultrasonic sounds attenuate, their influence on the bats’ activities and behavior decreases. Ground testing at Wolf Ridge Wind, LLC and Shawnee National Forest assessed both continuous and pulsing deterrent signals emitted from the GE deterrent system and further enhanced the behavioral understanding of bats in the presence of the deterrent. With these data and observations, the existing 4-nozzle continuous, or steady, emission ultrasonic system was redesigned to a 6-nozzle system that could emit a pulsing signal covering a larger air space around a turbine. Twelve GE 1.6-100 turbines were outfitted with the deterrent system and a formal three-month field study was performed using daily carcass searches beneath the 12

  17. Cyber Deterrence and Stability

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Goychayev, Rustam [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Carr, Geoffrey A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Weise, Rachel A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Donnelly, David A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Clements, Samuel L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Benz, Jacob M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Rodda, Kabrena E. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Bartholomew, Rachel A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); McKinnon, Archibald D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Andres, Richard B. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2017-09-30

    Throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, deterrence and arms control have been cornerstones of strategic stability between the superpowers. However, the weaponization of the cyber realm by State actors and the multipolar nature of cyber conflict now undermines that stability. Strategic stability is the state in which nations believe that if they act aggressively to undermine U.S. national interests and the post-World War II liberal democratic order, the consequences will outweigh the benefits. The sense of lawlessness and lack of consequences in the cyber realm embolden States to be more aggressive in taking actions that undermine stability. Accordingly, this paper examines 1) the role of deterrence and arms control in securing cyber stability, and 2) the limitations and challenges associated with these traditional national security paradigms as applied to this emerging threat domain. This paper demonstrates that many 20th-century deterrence and arms control concepts are not particularly applicable in the cyber realm. However, they are not entirely irrelevant. The United States can distill lessons learned from this rich deterrence and arms control experience to develop and deploy a strategy to advance cyber stability.

  18. On behalf of the commission of the National Defense and the armed forces, on the law project of finances for 2004 (no. 1093). Part 2. Defense - nuclear deterrence; Au nom de la commission de la defense nationale et des forces armees, sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2004 (no. 1093). Tome 2. Defense - dissuasion nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-10-01

    This analysis deals with the nuclear weapons situation in the world. It presents a new and coherent deterrence tool with an evolutive doctrine. It presents also the financial aspects of the problem and the dismantling of fissile materials production installations. It takes stock on the simulation program of nuclear weapons already engaged. (A.L.B.)

  19. Deterrence in Cyberspace

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-13

    sea craft, and affect food or water supplies are strategic and the target of a policy statement on cyber deterrence. Cyber-isolation The third...mechanical damage, but the uranium that was enriched was done so incorrectly and was contaminated to a point it would have to be re-processed.8...Insurgency, and Peacekeeping, (New York: Stackpole, 1971). 38 in Malaysia , or at least it provides a readily available conduit to communication

  20. Cyber Gray Space Deterrence

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-12-21

    its adversaries calculate that the benefits of their attacks exceed the risks of U.S. retaliation. This perverse incentive exists because the...significant incentives for nations to hack them, and both commercial enterprises and military organizations regularly complain that they have...From the perspective of traditional deterrence theory , America’s reluctance to seriously attempt to deter cyberattacks is puzzling. If the cost of

  1. On the Interaction of Deterrence and Emotions

    OpenAIRE

    Menusch Khadjavi

    2015-01-01

    This study analyzes deterrence schemes and their impact on stealing. The results confirm Becker’s deterrence hypothesis. Moreover, crowding out of pro-social behavior occurs due to deterrence incentives: when deterrence incentives first exist and are removed later on, subsequent behavior is more selfish than without this deterrence history. This study offers evidence that (part of this) crowding out takes place via change of emotions. Without deterrence incentives in place, in a variant of th...

  2. Advice presented on behalf of the commission of national defence and army, about the 2005 finances law project (no. 1800). Tome 2, defense, nuclear deterrence; Avis presente au nom de la commission de la defense nationale et de forces armees, sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2005 (no. 1800). Tome 2, defense, dissuasion nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2004-10-01

    Nuclear deterrence still represents an important part of French military budgets. However, its relative share is progressively reducing with the progress of the big programs implemented for its modernization. The 2005 finances law project rules out any risk of threat on these programs. This report presents, first, the schedule of the renewal of the strategic oceanic fleet (the M51 missile and the new generation of submarines) and the strategic air forces. Then, it comments the programs in progress at the direction of military applications of the atomic energy commission (CEA): a significant part of funds devoted to nuclear deterrence, the evolution of the simulation program, the delicate question of the financing of the dismantling of fissile material production facilities. Finally, it stresses of the research effort to sustain in order to stand the evolution of threats and to warrant the perenniality of deterrence: nuclear proliferation remains worrying and technologies linked with deterrence are changing rapidly, the need of a constant research effort in order to keep the competences up. (J.S.)

  3. Minimum deterrence and regional security. Section 1. Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gnesotto, N.

    1993-01-01

    The impact of regional security in Europe on the minimum nuclear deterrence is analyzed. There are four factors that enable definition of specific features of European security. Europe is the only theatre in which four of the five nuclear Powers coexist, where three states, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, represent a new type of proliferation. It is therefore the strategic region with the heaviest concentration of nuclear weapons in the world. Finally it is a theatre in which regional wars are again a possibility. In other words, the end of cold war meant return of real wars in Europe on one hand, and on the other, a combination of absolutely massive and essential nuclear capability and over-increasing economic, political and diplomatic instability. In spite of these circumstances nuclear deterrence in Europe is inevitable and desirable

  4. Using detection and deterrence to reduce insider risk

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eggers, R.F.; Carlson, R.L.; Udell, C.J.

    1988-01-01

    This paper addresses a new concept of interaction between adversary detection and deterrence. It provides an initial evaluation of the effects of these variables on the risk of theft of special nuclear material by an insider adversary and can be extended to the sabotage threat. A steady-state risk equation is used. Exercises with this equation show that deterrence, resulting from the prospect of detection, has a greater ability to reduce the risk than the detection exercise itself. This is true for all cases except those in which the probabilty of detection is 1. Cases were developed for three different types of adversaries that can be distinguished from one another by the level of detection they are willing to tolerate before they are deterred from attempting a theft. By considering the effects of detection, deterrence, and adversary type, the ground work is laid for designing cost-effective insider threat-protection systems

  5. Using detection and deterrence to reduce insider risk

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eggers, R F; Carlson, R L; Udell, C J

    1988-06-01

    This paper addresses a new concept of interaction between adversary detection and deterrence. It provides an initial evaluation of the effects of these variables on the risk of theft of special nuclear material by an insider adversary and can be extended to the sabotage threat. A steady-state risk equation is used. Exercises with this equation show that deterrence, resulting from the prospect of detection, has a greater ability to reduce the risk than the detection exercise itself. This is true for all cases except those in which the probability of detection is 1. Cases were developed for three different types of adversaries that can be distinguished from one another by the level of detection they are willing to tolerate before they are deterred from attempting a theft. By considering the effects of detection, deterrence, and adversary type, the ground work is laid for designing cost-effective insider threat-protection systems. 2 refs., 6 figs.

  6. Optimal interface between principal deterrent systems and material accounting

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deiermann, P.J.; Opelka, J.H.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to find an optimal blend between three safeguards systems for special nuclear material (SNM), the material accounting system and the physical security and material control systems. The latter two are denoted as principal deterrent systems. The optimization methodology employed is a two-stage decision algorithm, first an explicit maximization of expected diverter benefits and subsequently a minimization of expected defender costs for changes in material accounting procedures and incremental improvements in the principal deterrent systems. The probability of diverter success function dependent upon the principal deterrents and material accounting system variables is developed. Within the range of certainty of the model, existing material accounting, material control and physical security practices are justified

  7. Thinking Globally about U.S. Extended Deterrence

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Roberts, Brad [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Santoro, David [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Volpe, Tristan [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Warden, John [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2016-01-20

    In contrast to the Cold War bilateral global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, the modern nuclear age features a more complex, multiplayer arena on the regional scale. With the exception of the U.S. and Russia, most major powers retain relatively small nuclear arsenals or technical hedge capabilities. The U.S., with strong interests and security partnerships in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East, must navigate through long-standing rivalries and active conflicts while attempting to divine the intentions of less experienced nuclear decision makers in charge of weak domestic institutions. As a result, analysts and policymakers must think globally about U.S. extended deterrence. How have the requirements of extended deterrence and assurance changed? Are there important threads that connect each region? What should the U.S. do differently? To explore these questions, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Center for Global Security Research, in partnership with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Pacific Forum CSIS, held a workshop on “Thinking Globally about U.S. Extended Deterrence” in Washington, DC on November 2, 2015. The workshop brought together approximately 40 U.S. and foreign deterrence specialists and government officials, all attending in their private capacities. The participants joined a day of not-for-attribution discussions on the changing deterrence and assurance requirements, the threads that connect the regions, and U.S. strategy to deal with emerging challenges. The following is a summary of key takeaways.

  8. Endogenous and costly institutional deterrence

    Science.gov (United States)

    David C. Kingsley; Thomas C. Brown

    2014-01-01

    Modern economies rely on central-authority institutions to regulate individual behaviour. Despite the importance of such institutions little is known about their formation within groups. In a public good experiment, groups selected the level of deterrence implemented by the institution, knowing that the administrative costs of the institution rose with the level of...

  9. Is Cyber Deterrence an Illusory Course of Action?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Emilio Iasiello

    2014-04-01

    Full Text Available With the U.S. government acknowledgement of the seriousness of cyber threats, particularly against its critical infrastructures, as well as the Department of Defense officially labeling cyberspace as a war fighting domain, the Cold War strategy of deterrence is being applied to the cyber domain. However, unlike the nuclear realm, cyber deterrence must incorporate a wide spectrum of potential adversaries of various skill, determination, and capability, ranging from individual actors to state run enterprises. What’s more, the very principles that achieved success in deterring the launch of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, namely the threat of severe retaliation, cannot be achieved in cyberspace, thus neutralizing the potential effectiveness of leveraging a similar strategy. Attribution challenges, the ability to respond quickly and effectively, and the ability to sustain a model of repeatability prove to be insurmountable in a domain where actors operate in obfuscation.

  10. MAD with Aliens? Interstellar deterrence and its implications

    OpenAIRE

    Korhonen, Janne M.

    2013-01-01

    The possibility that extraterrestrial intelligences (ETIs) could be hostile to humanity has been raised as a reason to avoid even trying to contact ETIs. However, there is a distinct shortage of analytical discussion about the risks of an attack, perhaps because of an implicit premise that we cannot analyze the decision making of an alien civilization. This paper argues that we can draw some inferences from the history of the Cold War and nuclear deterrence in order to show that at least some...

  11. In search of security: Finding an alternative to nuclear deterrence. 4 November 2004, Stanford, California, USA. Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2004-01-01

    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the global anchor for humanity's efforts to curb nuclear proliferation and move towards nuclear disarmament. There is no doubt that the implementation of the NPT continues to provide important security benefits, by providing assurance that, in the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear energy is not being misused for weapon purposes. The NPT is also the only binding agreement in which all five of the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to move forward towards nuclear disarmament. Still, for all of us who have been intimately associated with the implementation of the Treaty for over three decades, it is clear that recent events have placed the NPT and the regime supporting it under unprecedented stress, exposing some of its inherent limitations and pointing to areas that need to be adjusted. This presentation discusses some of the lessons that can be taken from recent experience, and a number of possible ways for moving forward. Of course, the Iraq experience is the most glaring recent case relevant to nuclear proliferation and security, but unfortunately not the only one. The IAEA's efforts to verify undeclared nuclear programmes in Iran, Libya and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have also provided considerable insights and a number of lessons. For centuries, perhaps for millennia, security strategies have been based on boundaries: city walls, border patrols, and the use of racial and religious groupings or other categories to separate friend from foe. Those strategies no longer work. This is a mindset we must change. In this century, in this generation, we must develop a new approach to security capable of transcending borders - an inclusive approach that is centred on the value of every human life. The sooner we can make that transition, the sooner we will achieve our goal of a planet with peace and justice as its hallmark

  12. In search of security: Finding an alternative to nuclear deterrence. 4 November 2004, Stanford, California, USA. Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ElBaradei, M

    2004-11-04

    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the global anchor for humanity's efforts to curb nuclear proliferation and move towards nuclear disarmament. There is no doubt that the implementation of the NPT continues to provide important security benefits, by providing assurance that, in the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear energy is not being misused for weapon purposes. The NPT is also the only binding agreement in which all five of the nuclear-weapon States have committed themselves to move forward towards nuclear disarmament. Still, for all of us who have been intimately associated with the implementation of the Treaty for over three decades, it is clear that recent events have placed the NPT and the regime supporting it under unprecedented stress, exposing some of its inherent limitations and pointing to areas that need to be adjusted. This presentation discusses some of the lessons that can be taken from recent experience, and a number of possible ways for moving forward. Of course, the Iraq experience is the most glaring recent case relevant to nuclear proliferation and security, but unfortunately not the only one. The IAEA's efforts to verify undeclared nuclear programmes in Iran, Libya and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have also provided considerable insights and a number of lessons. For centuries, perhaps for millennia, security strategies have been based on boundaries: city walls, border patrols, and the use of racial and religious groupings or other categories to separate friend from foe. Those strategies no longer work. This is a mindset we must change. In this century, in this generation, we must develop a new approach to security capable of transcending borders - an inclusive approach that is centred on the value of every human life. The sooner we can make that transition, the sooner we will achieve our goal of a planet with peace and justice as its hallmark.

  13. Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?

    OpenAIRE

    Sunstein, Cass Robert; Schkade, David; Kahneman, Daniel

    2014-01-01

    Two studies test whether people believe in optimal deterrence. The first provides people with personal injury cases that are identical except for variations in the probability of detection and explores whether lower probability cases produce higher punitive damage awards and whether higher probability cases produce lower awards. No such effect is observed. The second asks people whether they agree or disagree with administrative and judicial policies that increase penalties when the probabili...

  14. Lessons of the Indo-Pakistani example for nuclear deterrence. Summary; Lecons de l'exemple Indo-Pakistanais pour la dissuasion nucleaire. synthese

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tertrais, B

    2003-10-15

    Southern Asia has similar characteristics as those of central Europe during the cold war. The arguments suggesting that the nuclear dissuasion cannot work between India and Pakistan are not convincing. A deep analysis of the Indo-Pakistan 'nuclear crises' is necessary to learn lessons from the south-Asian example. This analysis suggests that both parties have learnt the dissuasion rules in an empirical way since 1990 and now have more certitudes about their options and the related risks in a bilateral nuclear environment. In particular, it appears that the line of control (LoC) is now well identified, both by Islamabad and New Delhi, as one of those 'red lines' the crossing of which would lead the conflict towards a new dimension. (J.S.)

  15. Denatured plutonium: a study of deterrent action. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hutchins, B.A.

    1975-07-01

    The safeguarding of nuclear reactor fuel includes physical security methods as well as technological process options. The purpose of this study was to provide a preliminary evaluation of a technological option; the introduction of denaturing as a deterrent to illicit plutonium diversion. Denaturing is accomplished by coextracting some highly-radioactive fission products with the plutonium during reprocessing of spent fuel. The radioactive denaturant is always in companion with the plutonium through all subsequent fuel cycle steps - and serves as a deterrent to diversion or illicit usage of this fissile source. In concept the denaturing approach is simple and straightforward. This report provides a preliminary analysis of denaturing which can be achieved within the framework of present reprocessing technology. The impact of denaturing is indicated by comparison to a conventional (i.e., non-denatured) light water reacter cycle approach

  16. The International Politics of Peace Education: The Conflict between Deterrence and Disarmament.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Willers, Jack Conrad

    The main impetus for peace education is the arms race, which places peace education in the conflict between conservatives advocating increased nuclear deterrence and liberals supporting nuclear disarmament. In the United States, education for peace is still in its infancy. Other developed nations, such as the Scandinavian countries and to a lesser…

  17. Mechanisms of Feeding Deterrence by Ziziphins.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1985-05-30

    number) e mechanism of feeding deterrence by ziziphins for sout rn armyworms ( Spodoptera eridania ; Lepidoptera:Noctuidae) was investigated using bo long... Spodoptera eridania , to investigate the mechanisms of feeding deterrence by ziziphins extracted from the leaves of • .Ziziphus jujuba. Evaluation...Videotape Analysis of Feeding Suppression in the Southern Armyworm ( Spodoptera eridania ; Lepidoptera: Noctuidae) Produced by Extracts of the

  18. Affect intensity and processing fluency of deterrents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Holman, Andrei

    2013-01-01

    The theory of emotional intensity (Brehm, 1999) suggests that the intensity of affective states depends on the magnitude of their current deterrents. Our study investigated the role that fluency--the subjective experience of ease of information processing--plays in the emotional intensity modulations as reactions to deterrents. Following an induction phase of good mood, we manipulated both the magnitude of deterrents (using sets of photographs with pre-tested potential to instigate an emotion incompatible with the pre-existent affective state--pity) and their processing fluency (normal vs. enhanced through subliminal priming). Current affective state and perception of deterrents were then measured. In the normal processing conditions, the results revealed the cubic effect predicted by the emotional intensity theory, with the initial affective state being replaced by the one appropriate to the deterrent only in participants exposed to the high magnitude deterrence. In the enhanced fluency conditions the emotional intensity pattern was drastically altered; also, the replacement of the initial affective state occurred at a lower level of deterrence magnitude (moderate instead of high), suggesting the strengthening of deterrence emotional impact by enhanced fluency.

  19. The Primacy of Alliance: Deterrence and European Security - Proliferation Papers No. 46

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Freedman, Lawrence

    2013-03-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has been transformed and nuclear weapons have been marginalized in the West. However, the NATO security policies remain almost unchanged: deterrence is still considered as a principle guiding the Atlantic Alliance, even though the actual policy statements lack target, direction and urgency. Questioning the credibility of deterrence in Europe and its future, this text recalls that it lies first and foremost with solidarity and political cohesion among members of the Alliance, and only secondly with the threat of nuclear retaliation. As a consequence, the decreasing salience of nuclear weapons in the West seems less worrying for the robustness of deterrence in Europe than a long-term and lasting shift of US foreign policy away from the European continent. (author)

  20. Approaches to Building Global Strategic Deterrence System after 2021

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vitaliy V. Kabernik

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The article studies prospective for transformation of the current global deterrence system in 21st century, paying special attention to the structures of treaties past 2021. After the mainstay arms control treaty (New START expiration development of the new system of treaties and agreements seems inevitable, quite possibly, on multilateral basis. The hypothesis stressing possibility of multilateral deterrence system for global stability is quite popular nowadays. Studying the dynamics of nuclear arms cuts and monitoring progress on New START treaty, we can see numerous positive effects. However, the nuclear modernization programs currently in progress or planned for the near future should be taken into account for future agreements. This is when geospatialanalysis is important, demonstrating effectively which states are deterring each other and for which ones this is simply impossible because of the available weapons delivery range. This analysis is performed for three possible candidates for future multilateral treaties: USA, Russia and China, mentioning Great Britain and France as well. Going further into geospatial analysis, strategic ABM factor is accounted and the role of global ABM is estimated for future treaties. Numerical estimates of nuclear potentials of third countries - incomparable to the current numbers in possession of two main nuclear powers - performed specifically. Based on the analysis provided we can effectively deny the possibility of multilateral agreements for future deterrence scenarios. However, some steps for involving third countries into the global process of nuclear regulations can be outlined. This includes a number of bilateral agreements for arms control in certain regions, specifically developed to form a system of treaties aimed for global tensions reduction moving towards a safer world in the 21st century.

  1. Approaches to Building Global Strategic Deterrence System after 2021

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vitaliy V. Kabernik

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The article studies prospective for transformation of the current global deterrence system in 21 century, paying special attention to the structures of treaties past 2021. After the mainstay arms control treaty (New START expiration development of the new system of treaties and agreements seems inevitable, quite possibly, on multilateral basis. The hypothesis stressing possibility of multilateral deterrence system for global stability is quite popular nowadays. Studying the dynamics of nuclear arms cuts and monitoring progress on New START treaty, we can see numerous positive effects. However, the nuclear modernization programs currently in progress or planned for the near future should be taken into account for future agreements. This is when geospatialanalysis is important, demonstrating effectively which states are deterring each other and for which ones this is simply impossible because of the available weapons delivery range. This analysis is performed for three possible candidates for future multilateral treaties: USA, Russia and China, mentioning Great Britain and France as well. Going further into geospatial analysis, strategic ABM factor is accounted and the role of global ABM is estimated for future treaties. Numerical estimates of nuclear potentials of third countries - incomparable to the current numbers in possession of two main nuclear powers - performed specifically. Based on the analysis provided we can effectively deny the possibility of multilateral agreements for future deterrence scenarios. However, some steps for involving third countries into the global process of nuclear regulations can be outlined. This includes a number of bilateral agreements for arms control in certain regions, specifically developed to form a system of treaties aimed for global tensions reduction moving towards a safer world in the 21st century.

  2. Limits to the use of highly compacted bentonite as a deterrent for microbiologically influenced corrosion in a nuclear fuel waste repository

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stroes-Gascoyne, Simcha; Hamon, Connie J.; Maak, Peter

    Recent studies have suggested that microbial activity in highly compacted bentonite (⩾1600 kg/m 3) is severely suppressed. Therefore, it appears that the dry density of emplaced bentonite barriers in a geological repository for nuclear waste may be tailored such that a microbiologically unfavorable environment can be created adjacent to used fuel containers. This would ensure that microbiologically influenced corrosion is a negligible contributor to the overall corrosion process. However, this premise is valid only as long as the emplaced bentonite maintains a uniform high dry density (⩾1600 kg/m 3) because it has been shown that high dry density only suppresses microbial activity but not necessarily eliminates the viable microbial population in bentonite. In a repository, a reduction in the dry density of highly compacted bentonite may occur at a number of interface locations, such as placement gaps, contact regions with materials of different densities and contact points with water-carrying fractures in the rock. Experiments were carried out in our laboratory to examine the effects of a reduction in dry density (from 1600 kg/m 3 to about 1000 kg/m 3) on the recovery of microbial culturability in compacted bentonite. Results showed that upon expansion of compacted bentonite into a void, the resulting reduction in dry density stimulated or restored culturability of indigenous microbes. In a repository this would increase the possibility of in situ activity, which might be detrimental for the longevity of waste containers. Reductions in dry density, therefore, should be minimized or eliminated by adequate design and placement methods of compacted bentonite. Materials compliance models can be used to determine the required as-placed dry densities of bentonite buffer and gap fillings to achieve specific targets for long-term equilibrium dry densities for various container placement room designs. Locations where flowing fractures could be in contact with highly

  3. Limits to the use of highly compacted bentonite as a deterrent for microbially influenced corrosion in a nuclear fuel waste repository

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stroes-Gascoyne, Simcha; Hamon, Connie J.; Maak, Peter

    2010-01-01

    Highly compacted bentonite-based sealing materials are being developed for use in future geological repositories for nuclear fuel waste. Such materials would ensure a diffusion-controlled hydrology and additionally form a sorption barrier against radionuclide migration after container breach. Due to some inherent physical characteristics, such as low water activity (a w ), small pores and high swelling pressure, an additional role of highly compacted bentonite may be the elimination of significant microbial activity near used fuel containers, which would reduce the occurrence of microbially influenced corrosion (MIC) to insignificant levels. Several recent studies have examined the indigenous microbial populations in compacted bentonite and the factors that control microbial activity in such environments. Laboratory experiments with Wyoming MX-80 bentonite plugs, compacted to dry densities (DD's) of 0.8 to 2.0 g/cm 3 , and infiltrated with sterile distilled deionised water were carried out. At DD's of 0.8 and 1.3 g/cm 3 , culturability of heterotrophic aerobic bacteria increased by up to four orders of magnitude above back-ground levels. Anaerobic heterotrophic bacteria and SRB did not increase significantly above background levels in any of the tests. At higher DD's all culturability remained at, or fell below, the background levels. However, even at the highest DD tested, some culturability remained and viability was only mildly affected by high DD's. Therefore, the potential for increased microbial activity exist if a substantial reduction in DD of bentonite were to occur in a repository. The microbes that survive in dry as-purchased or highly compacted bentonite appear to be largely spore-forming organisms. Chi Fru and Athar (2008) studied the bacterial colonization of compacted MX-80 bentonite from the surrounding granitic groundwater population, at various temperature ranges. Results suggested that high temperature rather than high DD

  4. Effects of acoustic deterrents on foraging bats

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johnson, Joshua B.; Ford, W. Mark; Rodrigue, Jane L.; Edwards, John W.

    2012-01-01

    Significant bat mortality events associated with wind energy expansion, particularly in the Appalachians, have highlighted the need for development of possible mitigation practices to reduce or prevent strike mortality. Other than increasing turbine cut-in speed, acoustic deterrents probably hold the greatest promise for reducing bat mortality. However, acoustic deterrent effectiveness and practicality has not been experimentally examined and is limited to site-specific case studies. Accordingly, we used a crossover experimental design with prior control period to show that bat activity was reduced 17.1 percent by the deployment of ultrasonic deterrents placed around gauged watershed weir ponds on the Fernow Experimental Forest in West Virginia. We caution that while our results should not be extrapolated to the scope of a typical wind energy production facility, the results warrant further research on the use of acoustic deterrents to reduce bat fatalities.

  5. Nuclear energy: a master card

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garaud, M.F.

    1996-01-01

    Here are exposed the elements of the French doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The historical points, from the American deterrence to the actual situation are detailed. The political aspects, with the non proliferation, the ecologists pressure and the anti nuclear pacifism are evoked to precise the uncertainty of the actual French deterrence. 9 analysis are on the deterrence subject, then the civil aspect of nuclear energy is discussed, with the advantages and the disadvantages of the nuclear power plants and the reprocessing in two analysis; a special mention is noted for the reactor safety in Eastern Europe, in the last article. (N.C.)

  6. Signaling the End of Deterrence Afforded by Dual Capable Aircraft

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-04-06

    what might happen in response to a Soviet attack would make extended nuclear deterrence work .”3 Schelling advocated for the deployment of...strategic forces to possess an array of offensive and defensive 3 capabilities to limit damage to the US using an imbalance of terror argument...initiated a $8.9B B61 Life Extension Program (LEP).18 Dubbed the B61-12, the new variant of the B61 is intended to replace all previous variants (-3, -4

  7. Nuclear Deterrence 2035: Millennials Inheriting the Flight

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-06-01

    SLBM 1992 W88 SLBM 1990 W80 ALCM/B-52 1961 B61 Bomb /B-2/B-52 1994 B83 Bomb /B-2/B-52 1994 35 must be savvy in how to leverage all aspects of...across the electromagnetic spectrum ( EMS ). However, each vector is currently only theoretical. There are treaty limitations that restrict war in space...February 2017). 41 cyberspace and hinder the development of a weapon in those domains. A weapon with effects in the EMS is most likely and its

  8. Differential Deterrence: Studying Heterogeneity and Changes in Perceptual Deterrence among Serious Youthful Offenders

    Science.gov (United States)

    Loughran, Thomas A.; Piquero, Alex R.; Fagan, Jeffrey; Mulvey, Edward P.

    2012-01-01

    Perceptual deterrence has been an enduring focus of interest in criminology. Although recent research has generated important new insights about how risks, costs, and rewards of offending are perceived and internalized, there remain two specific limitations to advancing theories of deterrence: (a) the lack of panel data to show whether issues of…

  9. How to Quantify Deterrence and Reduce Critical Infrastructure Risk

    OpenAIRE

    Taquechel, Eric F.; Lewis, Ted G.

    2012-01-01

    This article appeared in Homeland Security Affairs (August 2012), v.8, article 12 "We propose a definition of critical infrastructure deterrence and develop a methodology to explicitly quantify the deterrent effects of critical infrastructure security strategies. We leverage historical work on analyzing deterrence, game theory and utility theory. Our methodology quantifies deterrence as the extent to which an attacker's expected utility from an infrastructure attack changes after a defende...

  10. Military nuclear activities. Strategic prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coldefy, Alain; Wodka-Gallien, Philippe; Tertrais, Bruno; Rouillard, Gwendal; Widemann, Thierry; Guillaume, Louis-Michel; Steininger, Philippe; Guillemette, Alain; Amabile, Jean-Christophe; Granger-Veyron, Nicolas; Carbonnieres, Hubert de; Roche, Nicolas; Guillou, Herve; Bouvier, Antoine; Pastre, Bertrand; Baconnet, Alexis; Monsonis, Guillem; Brisset, Jean-Vincent; Hemez, Remy; Tchernega, Vladimir; Wedin, Lars; Dumoulin, Andre; Razoux, Pierre; Migault, Philippe; Wilson, Ward; Maillard, Benjamin de; Aichi, Leila; Charvoz, Ivan; Rousset, Valery; Lespinois, Jerome de; Kempf, Olivier; Dufourcq, Jean; Gere, Francois; Mauro, Frederic; Delort Laval, Gabriel; Charaix, Patrick; Norlain, Bernard; Collin, Jean-Marie; Jourdier, Francois

    2015-01-01

    This special dossier aims at providing some key articles about France's deterrence doctrine. It provides a comprehensive overview of the challenges and questions about military nuclear activities and opens up some future prospects about this question. The dossier comprises 37 papers dealing with: 1 - Military nuclear activities: yesterday, today, tomorrow (Coldefy, A.); 2 - Deterrence according to French President Francois Hollande: continuation, precision and inflexions (Tertrais, B.); 3 - French deterrence warrantor of our independence in the 21. century (Rouillard, G.); 4 - The deterrence concept prior to the nuclear weapon era (Widemann, T.); 5 - France: the strategic marine force in operation (Guillaume, L.M.); 6 - Relevance of the airborne component in the nuclear deterrence strategy (Steininger, P.); 7 - Deterrence stakes for the Directorate General of Armaments (Guillemette, A.); 8 - The Charles-de-Gaulle aircraft carrier: the deterrence voice from the sea (Wodka-Gallien, P.); 9 - Deterrence: missions of the army's radiation protection department (Amabile, J.C.; Granger-Veyron, N.; Carbonnieres, H. de); 10 - The French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) and the French defense strategy (Roche, N.); 11 - DCNS, general contractor in the service of deterrence (Guillou, H.); 12 - The airborne nuclear component for MBDA (Bouvier, A.); 13 - Ballistic missile of the marine nuclear component: industrial stakes (Pastre, B.); 14 - Beyond defense against missiles: a US anti-deterrence strategy (Baconnet, A.); 15 - Deterrence dynamics in South Asia (Monsonis, G.); 16 - Military nuclear activities in East Asia (Brisset, J.V.); 17 - North Korea would own nuclear weapons, so what? (Hemez, R.); 18 - About the risk of nuclear warfare in Europe (Tchernega, V.); 19 - Present day nuclear activities: deterrence and gesticulation (Wedin, L.); 20 - Belgian F-16 replacement: nuclear dimension (Dumoulin, A.); 21 - Israel and nuclear deterrence (Razoux, P.); 22 - Nuclear

  11. Fundamental deterrence and START III

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, K.D.

    1998-12-31

    The public`s brief respite from the specter of nuclear holocaust abruptly ended in May 1998 when India, 24 years after its only successful nuclear weapon test, detonated five more just sixty miles from its border with Pakistan. Pakistan quickly declared itself a nuclear power and threatened tests of its own. Various capitals issued condemnations and an assortment of largely symbolic political and economic sanctions. India then proclaimed a moratorium on further testing and announced its willingness to accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as a declared nuclear power. Inevitably, India`s tests will prompt Pakistan and China to accelerate their own nuclear programs, to the detriment of regional stability in South Asia.

  12. Countering Putins Nuclear-Backed Aggression with a Continuous Nuclear-Capable Bomber Presence

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-05-13

    comprehensive strategy to counter Putin in Europe. 15. SUBJECT TERMS Nuclear Deterrence , Continuous Bomber Presence, NATO, Russia, Europe, B-52, B-2 16...conventional deterrence , such as Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems, to be moved into eastern areas in order to destroy Russian nuclear missiles after... deterrent is achieved when the enemy believes one has both the will and the capability (or credibility) to use the nuclear weapons. 28 While the U.S

  13. On Entry Deterrence and Imperfectly Observable Commitment

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Poulsen, Anders

    2001-01-01

    We analyse a simple entry-deterrence game, where a `Potential Intruder' only imperfectly observes the decision of an `Incumbent' to commit or to not commit to fight any entry by the Potential Intruder. Our game generalises the one studied in Bonanno (1992) by allowing for a richer information tec...

  14. Deterrence at the Operational Level of War

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-01-01

    edited, with Barry Blechman, Making Defense Reform Work (Brassey’s, 1990) and has also authored numerous books and articles . Deterrence at the...computational power. In contrast, many models of rational inference view the mind as if it were a supernatural being possessing demonic powers of reason

  15. Effects of acoustic deterrents on foraging bats

    Science.gov (United States)

    Joshua B. Johnson; W. Mark Ford; Jane L. Rodrigue; John W. Edwards

    2012-01-01

    Significant bat mortality events associated with wind energy expansion, particularly in the Appalachians, have highlighted the need for development of possible mitigation practices to reduce or prevent strike mortality. Other than increasing turbine cut-in speed, acoustic deterrents probably hold the greatest promise for reducing bat mortality. However, acoustic...

  16. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and their Role in Future Nuclear Forces

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-05-01

    while minimizing collateral damage, speed of response, and in-flight survivability. Without ICBMs, the US nuclear deterrent force would probably...September 2013. Delpech, Thérèse. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy. Santa Monica, CA...to Minimal Deterrence : A New Nuclear Policy on the Path toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons. Occasion Paper no. 7. Washington, DC: Natural Resources

  17. 2015 Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar Bibliography

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Juarez, Anthony [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2016-02-04

    In November 2015, the Center for Global Security Research, NSO, and Global Security program jointly sponsored a seminar investigating questions related to cross-domain deterrence at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. At the seminar, experts were asked to moderate discussion based on the four topics below. For each of these topics, we have compiled a short list of literature that will help analysts develop a baseline understanding of the issue.

  18. Deterrence and Geographical Externalities in Auto Theft

    OpenAIRE

    Marco Gonzalez-Navarro

    2013-01-01

    Understanding the degree of geographical crime displacement is crucial for the design of crime prevention policies. This paper documents changes in automobile theft risk that were generated by the plausibly exogenous introduction of Lojack, a highly effective stolen vehicle recovery device, into a number of new Ford car models in some Mexican states, but not others. Lojack-equipped vehicles in Lojack-coverage states experienced a 48 percent reduction in theft risk due to deterrence effects. H...

  19. Bomber Deterrence Missions: Criteria To Evaluate Mission Effectiveness

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-02-16

    international security, the practice of general deterrence usually occurs when nations feel insecure , suspicious or even hostility towards them but...both a deterrence and assurance mission even though it was not planned or advertised as such. Since the intent of this mission was partly perceived

  20. Strategic Entry Deterrence Modeling: Literature Review

    OpenAIRE

    D. A. Seliverstov

    2017-01-01

    The prime focus in this article is on key findings concerning theoretical aspects of strategic behavior by incumbents to deter market entry of new firms. The author summarizes main lines of scientific research in the topic which give an insight into the patterns of the incumbent’s impact on the behavior of the entrants, the entry deterrence instruments and the consequences of these actions. Today the free entry markets are considered to be a rare phenomenon. The market entry of new firms is a...

  1. The future of the British deterrent force; L'avenir de la force de dissuasion britannique

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Y. [Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique (FRS), 75 - Paris (France)

    2006-07-15

    Of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, the United Kingdom has the smallest deterrent force, with fewer than 200 warheads and a single delivery system. Successive British governments policies for nuclear interdependence with the United States over the past 50 years have led to a growing technological dissymmetry with the Americans. This politico-strategic choice now considerably restricts Britain options for remaining a member of the club of nuclear powers into the future. (author)

  2. A review on the Warsaw Summit: nuclear aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grand, Camille

    2016-01-01

    Written at the time of the Ukrainian crisis, this article discusses the evolution of the international and nuclear deterrence context, notably for NATO due to Russia's attitudes and actions. The author questions the opportunity or possible need for reviewing Nato's posture in terms of nuclear defence and deterrence. More precisely, the role of nuclear weapons in Nato's defence and deterrence must be more precisely defined. The evolving context and a stronger deterrence also require conventional capacities, and the author outlines that Nato's determination must be better and more firmly stated

  3. Deterrence and the Celerity of the Death Penalty: A Neglected Question in Deterrence Research. Discussion Paper No. 532-78.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bailey, William C.

    This paper focuses on the deterrent effect of the celerity of the death penalty on homicide rates. The deterrent effect of both the certainty and the celerity of the death penalty on homicide rates is examined cross-sectionally for States. Multiple measures of execution and homicide are considered, along with various sociodemographic variables, in…

  4. Remixing the ‘Appropriate Mix’: Reassessing NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture in the Face of New Threats

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Juarez, Anthony [Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States). Richard and Rhoda Goldman School of Public Policy

    2016-05-31

    The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the countries of Europe face a renewed challenge from the east vis-à-vis the Putin regime in Moscow. In the face of these new challenges, NATO must reconsider its deterrence and defense posture in order to deter conflict in Europe. Unfortunately, Russian attempts to rewrite the rules of the post-Cold War international order by force have been coupled with nuclear saber rattling and overt nuclear threats. Russia’s nuclear threats, in addition to provocative changes to Russia’s nuclear posture in its Military Doctrine, are methods to make up for Russia’s conventional military inferiority relative to NATO and the United States. Some have described Moscow’s actions as laying the groundwork for a nuclear coercion strategy. While the decrease in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States has reduced the likelihood of nuclear annihilation to an all-time low since the height of the Cold War, Russia’s nuclear coercion strategy is increasing the probability of nuclear employment in Europe. The probability of nuclear use is compounded by Russia’s tremendous local military advantage around its periphery in spite of U.S. global military primacy. This military advantage increases the incentive to use military force if Russian decision-makers conclude that a quick military victory is possible, or if Russian leaders miscalculate based on an incorrect assessment of military force balance or resolve of their adversary. The integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (referred to as the Baltics in this paper) into the NATO alliance in 2004 makes Russia’s military advantage in its periphery increasingly relevant. Each NATO state is required to assist any NATO state that comes under attack per Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Baltic states’ proximity to Russia, their weak indigenous militaries, their former status as Soviet Republics, large population of ethnic Russians, and Russian President

  5. Defense Nuclear Enterprise: DOD Has Established Processes for Implementing and Tracking Recommendations to Improve Leadership, Morale, and Operations

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-07-14

    Department of Defense (DOD) has identified nuclear deterrence as its highest priority mission. In 2014, in response to several incidents involving the...nation’s nuclear deterrent forces and their senior leadership, the Secretary of Defense directed two reviews of DOD’s nuclear enterprise. These two...adversely affecting the nuclear deterrence mission. The reviews also made recommendations to address these problems. The National Defense Authorization

  6. Deterrence and the New Global Security Environment - Lecture note

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sitt, Bernard

    2006-01-01

    This lecture note makes an analysis of a collective publication entitled 'Deterrence and the New Global Security Environment', edited by Ian Kenyon and John Simpson (Routledge, New York, 2006). This collection of papers rigorously examines the current place of deterrence in international security relations, delivering the best of contemporary thinking. This is a special issue of the leading journal 'Contemporary Security Policy'. The present Lecture note emphasises a particular deterrence situation mentioned in this publication which is the one involving terrorist actors

  7. U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-02-10

    abandon the strategy of nuclear deterrence that has served as a core concept in U.S. national security strategy for more than 60 years. In a speech in......stated that “the continuous at-sea deterrence provided by a robust and modern fleet of nuclear -powered ballistic missile submarines is critical to

  8. U.S. Nuclear Declaratory Policy The Question of Nuclear First Use

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Gompert, David

    1995-01-01

    The motivation behind this reexamination of American nuclear declaratory policy is the striking absence of deterrence from the debate over how to counter the widening threat from nuclear, biological...

  9. Experiments on the use of sound as a fish deterrent

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turnpenny, A.W.H.; Thatcher, K.P.; Wood, R.; Loeffelman, P.H.

    1993-01-01

    This report describes a series of experimental studies into the potential use of acoustic stimuli to deter fish from water intakes at thermal and hydroelectric power stations. The aim was to enlarge the range of candidate signals for testing, and to apply these in more rigorous laboratory trials and to a wider range of estuarine and marine fish species than was possible in previous initial preliminary studies. The trials were also required to investigate the degree to which fish might become habituated to the sound signals, consequently reducing their effectiveness. The species of fish which were of interest in this study were the Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar), sea trout (Salmo trutta), the shads (Alosa fallax, A. alosa), the European eel (Anguilla anguilla), bass (Dicentrarchus labrax), herring (Clupea harengus), whiting (Merlangius merlangus) and cod (Gadus morhua). All of these species are considered to be of conservation and/or commercial importance in Britain today and are potentially vulnerable to capture by nuclear, fossil-fuelled and tidal generating stations. Based on the effectiveness of the signals observed in these trials, a properly developed and sited acoustic fish deterrent system is expected to reduce fish impingement significantly at water intakes. Field trials at an estuarine power station are recommended. (author)

  10. MAD with aliens? Interstellar deterrence and its implications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Korhonen, Janne M.

    2013-05-01

    The possibility that extraterrestrial intelligences (ETIs) could be hostile to humanity has been raised as a reason to avoid even trying to contact ETIs. However, there is a distinct shortage of analytical discussion about the risks of an attack, perhaps because of an implicit premise that we cannot analyze the decision making of an alien civilization. This paper argues that we can draw some inferences from the history of the Cold War and nuclear deterrence in order to show that at least some attack scenarios are likely to be exaggerated. In particular, it would seem to be unlikely that the humanity would be attacked simply because it might, sometime in the future, present a threat to the ETI. Even if communication proves to be difficult, rational decision-makers should avoid unprovoked attacks, because their success would be very difficult to assure. In general, it seems believable that interstellar conflicts between civilizations would remain rare. The findings advise caution for proposed interstellar missions, however, as starfaring capability itself might be seen as a threat. On the other hand, attempting to contact ETIs seems to be a relatively low-risk strategy: paranoid ETIs must also consider the possibility that the messages are a deception designed to lure out hostile civilizations and preemptively destroy them.

  11. China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Magnus Hjortdal

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available This article presents three reasons for states to use cyber warfare and shows that cyberspace is—and will continue to be—a decisive element in China's strategy to ascend in the international system. The three reasons are: deterrence through infiltration of critical infrastructure; military technological espionage to gain military knowledge; and industrial espionage to gain economic advantage. China has a greater interest in using cyberspace offensively than other actors, such as the United States, since it has more to gain from spying on and deterring the United States than the other way around. The article also documents China's progress in cyber warfare and shows how it works as an extension of its traditional strategic thinking and the current debate within the country. Several examples of cyber attacks traceable to China are also presented. This includes cyber intrusions on a nuclear arms laboratory, attacks on defense ministries (including the Joint Strike Fighter and an airbase and the U.S. electric grid, as well as the current Google affair, which has proved to be a small part of a broader attack that also targeted the U.S. Government. There are, however, certain constraints that qualify the image of China as an aggressive actor in cyberspace. Some believe that China itself is the victim of just as many attacks from other states. Furthermore, certain actors in the United States and the West have an interest in overestimating China's capabilities in cyberspace in order to maintain their budgets.

  12. Can Deterrence Be Tailored? Strategic Forum, Number 225, January 2007

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Bunn, M. E

    2007-01-01

    .... The Bush administration has outlined a concept for tailored deterrence to address the distinctive challenges posed by advanced military competitors, regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD...

  13. Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Cyber Deterrence

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-02-01

    Adversary-Specific Campaign Planning and Wargaming Findings: Because deterrence operates by affecting the calculations of specific decision -making...a strategic threat to U.S. critical infrastructure, or to be able to significantly affect the U.S. military’s ability to deploy and operate globally...bolster U.S. cyber deterrence and strengthen U.S. national security. The Task Force notes that the cyber threat to U.S. critical infrastructure is

  14. Can we do without nuclear?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cothier, Philippe

    2013-01-01

    The author first recalls the background of nuclear deterrence and the history of the French nuclear arsenal within the Cold War context. He comments the evolution of this arsenal after the US initiatives during the 1980's, and then analyses the situation at the beginning of the 21. century: end of the East-West confrontation, increase of NATO's interventions abroad, war against terrorism by the USA. But the Iranian and North-Korean nuclear programs gave a new momentum to the nuclear. The author discusses the various concepts and approaches of nuclear doctrines and deterrence, and wanders whether France still needs a doctrine relying on nuclear weapons as nuclear weapons are actually present, as the French deterrence doctrine is put in question again, and as some countries seem to be an actual nuclear threat (North Korea, Iran)

  15. Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Vulnerabilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian D. [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-06-18

    The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

  16. Deterrence by risk of detection? An inquiry into how elite athletes perceive the deterrent effect of the doping testing regime in their sport

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Overbye, Marie Birch

    2017-01-01

    Aims: A central paradigm of global anti-doping policy is detection-based deterrence, i.e. the risk of testing and exclusion from sport are effective doping deterrents. This paper investigates how elite athletes perceive the deterrent effect of the testing strategy in their sport and explores...... the likelihood of testing nor detection as deterrents. 8% did not consider the likelihood of testing and detection nor the ban from sport as deterrents.  Conclusions: Testing programmes–as a strategy to detect and deter doping–are no great deterrent for many athletes. The results highlight the limitations...... whether and how specific factors such as the frequency of testing influence athletes’ perceptions of testing as a deterrent.  Methods: 645 Danish elite athletes completed a web-based questionnaire about their perceptions of testing efforts in their sport.  Findings: 75% of the athletes considered...

  17. Strategic Entry Deterrence Modeling: Literature Review

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    D. A. Seliverstov

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The prime focus in this article is on key findings concerning theoretical aspects of strategic behavior by incumbents to deter market entry of new firms. The author summarizes main lines of scientific research in the topic which give an insight into the patterns of the incumbent’s impact on the behavior of the entrants, the entry deterrence instruments and the consequences of these actions. Today the free entry markets are considered to be a rare phenomenon. The market entry of new firms is associated with significant entry costs, which allow the incumbents to take advantage of their dominant position and derive positive economic profits. In case of entry threat by potential competitors the incumbents take strategic actions aimed at deterring entry and preserving their dominant position. Among the most efficient strategic actions one can emphasize the erection of additional barriers to entry for the newcomers through producing the limit output and price, investments in sunk assets, capacity expansion and product differentiation. Meanwhile by taking strategic actions the incumbents are not always trying to affect the entrant’s costs and profit directly, they often aim at changing the entrant’s expectations regarding future intentions of the incumbents to preserve dominant position.

  18. Information report published in application of article 145 of the regulation by the Commission of national defence and armed forces in conclusion of works of a mission of information on industrial and technological stakes of a renewal of both components of deterrence - Nr 4301

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bridey, Jean-Jacques; Lamblin, Jacques

    2016-01-01

    This official report first highlights reasons for a renewal of French means of nuclear deterrence: to keep power and to protect the country (deterrence is a component of France power and must be adapted to threats), and to be a contribution to competitiveness (deterrence irrigates the French industrial and technology fields, and has effect on the civil sector). The authors then discuss how to be able to renew means of deterrence during 60 years while facing some challenges (disappearance of the industrial structure, loss of skills), but with more positive objectives and challenges such as an identification of deterrence abilities and skills, ensuring a continuous activity, protection of companies, management of technology, education. These objectives are discussed, and interviews and visits made by the information mission are reported

  19. Pokhran II and Beyond (Emerging Indian Nuclear Posture)

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Mishra, Jeetendra

    2002-01-01

    .... The nuclear forces, however, are sought only to be minimum possible to credibly deter nuclear weapons use or coercion against India, Considering the imperatives of the Indian deterrence posture...

  20. The value of vengeance and the demand for deterrence.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Crockett, Molly J; Özdemir, Yagiz; Fehr, Ernst

    2014-12-01

    Humans will incur costs to punish others who violate social norms. Theories of justice highlight 2 motives for punishment: a forward-looking deterrence of future norm violations and a backward-looking retributive desire to harm. Previous studies of costly punishment have not isolated how much people are willing to pay for retribution alone, because typically punishment both inflicts damage (satisfying the retributive motive) and communicates a norm violation (satisfying the deterrence motive). Here, we isolated retributive motives by examining how much people will invest in punishment when the punished individual will never learn about the punishment. Such "hidden" punishment cannot deter future norm violations but was nevertheless frequently used by both 2nd-party victims and 3rd-party observers of norm violations, indicating that retributive motives drive punishment decisions independently from deterrence goals. While self-reports of deterrence motives correlated with deterrence-related punishment behavior, self-reports of retributive motives did not correlate with retributive punishment behavior. Our findings reveal a preference for pure retribution that can lead to punishment without any social benefits. PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved.

  1. Cyber security deterrence and it protection for critical infrastructures

    CERN Document Server

    Martellini, Maurizio

    2013-01-01

    The experts of the International Working Group-Landau Network Centro Volta (IWG-LNCV) discuss aspects of cyber security and present possible methods of deterrence, defense and resilience against cyber attacks. This SpringerBrief covers state-of-the-art documentation on the deterrence power of cyber attacks and argues that nations are entering a new cyber arms race. The brief also provides a technical analysis of possible cyber attacks towards critical infrastructures in the chemical industry and chemical safety industry. The authors also propose modern analyses and a holistic approach to resil

  2. France's Nuclear Arsenal: What Sort of Renewal?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brustlein, Corentin

    2017-01-01

    Over the course of the next few years, France will have to renew its nuclear arsenal to ensure that it remains a credible deterrent in the eyes of its potential enemies. This update must occur within an unfavourable context: the strategic environment, marked by the multiplication of Jihadi fronts, has deteriorated, and budgetary discipline is the order of the day. Sacrificing nuclear deterrence at the altar of the fight against terrorism would, however, be a fatal error

  3. Dealing with a Nuclear Iran: Applying Historical Lessons in Deterrence

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-02-15

    is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government. Biography Colonel Mark Doria is a U.S. Air Force fighter pilot...contaminated with radiation, including two of the most significant. Located in Jerusalem , just 25 miles from Tel Aviv, they are the Dome of the Rock

  4. Boom or Bust: Britain’s Nuclear Deterrent Beyond 2025

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-04-26

    paper in March 2012 recommending that "the UK should withdraw Trident from service immediately, and plough the savings into British conventional...clearly demonstrated in June 2010 when a submarine from the North torpedoed and sank the South Korean frigate CHEONAN killing 50 sailors. Tensions on...track record for using chemical munitions, with horrific consequences, against his own Kurdish population in the town of Halahbja in 1988, killing

  5. Atomic power engineering as military and nuclear deterrence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koryakin, Yu.I.

    2000-01-01

    The consequences of the NPP destruction in the course of the military actions, which are related to the powerful release of radioactivity, are analyzed. The ways of protection of the NPPs and other industrial objects during the war are considered. Special attention is paid to the advisability of the NPPs underground location. The data on the costs of the NPP units underground construction in the USA, Canada, Norway and Sweden are presented. The conclusion is made, that the NPPs underground location by itself does not increase their failure-proof operation and does not solve all safety problems during the military actions [ru

  6. Examining the Application of Deterrence in Sentencing in Malawi

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    MJM Venter

    2017-12-18

    Dec 18, 2017 ... Various UN and regional instruments and the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies echo the need for a prospect of release: see Gumboh 2017 JAL. 35. Van Den Haag 1982 J Crim L & Criminology 1034. 36. Andenaes Punishment and Deterrence 22. 37. Cavadino and Dignan Penal System ...

  7. Deterrents to Women's Participation in Continuing Professional Development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chuang, Szu-Fang

    2015-01-01

    This study was designed to explore and define key factors that deter women from participating in continuing professional development (CPD) in the workplace. Four dimensions of deterrents that are caused by women's social roles, gender inequality and gender dimensions are discussed: family and time constraints, cost and work constraints, lack of…

  8. Here to Help: Third Party Deterrence Against Insurgent Groups

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-05-22

    that the new threat “of delinquent states and shadowy terrorist groups” was beyond the effects of deterrence.8 However, for those seeking an alternative...foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/08/portrait-of-the-army-as-a-work-in-progress. 28 Statistically , there is reason to favor joint training programs, with the aim

  9. 2015 Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar Summary Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Juarez, A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2016-01-11

    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) hosted the 2nd Annual Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar on November 17th, 2015 in Livermore, CA. The seminar was sponsored by LLNL’s Center for Global Security Research (CGSR), National Security Office (NSO), and Global Security program. This summary covers the seminar’s panels and subsequent discussions.

  10. The Effect of Type-1 Error on Deterrence

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Lando, Henrik; Mungan, Murat C.

    2018-01-01

    According to a conventional view, type-1 error (wrongful conviction) is as detrimental to deterrence as type-2 error (wrongful acquittal), because type-1 error lowers the pay-off from acting within the law. This view has led to the claim that the pro-defendant bias of criminal procedure, and its ...

  11. Phytochemical feeding deterrents for stored product insect pests

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Nawrot, J.; Harmatha, Juraj

    2012-01-01

    Roč. 11, č. 4 (2012), s. 543-566 ISSN 1568-7767 Institutional support: RVO:61388963 Keywords : insect feeding deterrence * antifeedant phytochemicals * isoprenoids * sesquiterpene lactones * polyphenols Subject RIV: CC - Organic Chemistry Impact factor: 4.147, year: 2012

  12. Israeli Deterrence And the 2nd Lebanon War

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-04-06

    06 April 2017 DISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. Disclaimer The views expressed in this academic ...peace and stability on the Israel-Lebanon border. This stability owes to strong Israeli deterrence, whose roots stem at the 2006 war. This essay claims

  13. Give Deterrence a Chance: A Strategy Against Al Qaeda

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-03-28

    Al Qaeda Terrorists have been described as sociopaths , narcissists, fanatics, extremists, zealots, true-believers, jihadists or demented criminals...If terrorists are sociopaths or other deviants (and it is probable that some are), then it is unlikely that deterrence with its reliance on rational

  14. Towards A Better U.S. Nuclear Strategy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    John J. Klein

    2014-10-01

    Full Text Available The U.S. nuclear posture and the future role of nuclear deterrence is a topic that continues to be hotly debated. This situation will continue because of changes in the international security environment and the pressure to find reductions within the U.S. defense budget. Regardless of claims to the contrary, nuclear deterrence remains critical in ensuring future peace and stability.

  15. What transformations in the international system are prerequisites for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsipis, K.

    1993-01-01

    The author reviews prerequisites for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons (NW), among which are: symmetry of NW possession; stopping the NW tests; establishment of a multinational nuclear deterrent force; common security regional arrangements aimed at denuclearization

  16. The resumption-stopping of nuclear tests: between fear and hope

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gillis, B.

    1996-01-01

    The situation of French deterrence, with the resumption of nuclear weapons tests until the nuclear explosions simulation with the mega joules laser and the PALEN programme, is described here. (N.C.). 1 map

  17. Symposium on nuclear doctrines

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The world is cold-war free for a decade, but there is a growing concern about continued reliance by the most powerful military states on nuclear weapons of inconceivable mass destructive capacity. Question revolve around not only the amount of nuclear weapons deployed and in storage, but also the reasons why stets need to retain military doctrines that include the possible use of their awesome power. NATO adopted a new strategic concept at the Washington summit in April 1999, at the heart of which still is nuclear deterrence. The US Senate rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in October 1999. The Russian Federation draft nuclear doctrine is increasing reliance on nuclear weapons. The nuclear test in South Asia in May 1998 challenged the viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Earlier in 1999, India floated a nuclear doctrine in draft that includes reliance on a minimum nuclear deterrent. This publication aimed to extend the insights and opinions on the disarmament and real effectiveness of nuclear deterrence

  18. The nuclear debate: ethics versus effectiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lambert, D.

    2009-01-01

    Following some political maneuvering, a new debate on the future of nuclear deterrence is about to resurface. And a first deadline has been set by the need to restore the strategic balance between the United States and Russia before the START Treaty ends on 5 December 2009, as well as by preparation for the next NPT Review Conference. Perception of the main threat has changed, but so have concepts of deterrence. Far from outmoded, deterrence forms part of a broader vision in which realism has the edge over idealism. (author)

  19. Achieving compliance when legal sanctions are non-deterrent

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Tyran, Jean-Robert; Feld, Lars P.

    2006-01-01

    Law backed by nondeterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of public goods by comparing it to severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law. The results show that exog......Law backed by nondeterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of public goods by comparing it to severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law. The results show...... that exogenously imposing mild law does not achieve compliance, but compliance is much improved if mild law is endogenously chosen, i.e., selfimposed. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to comply with the law if they expect many others to do so...

  20. Spatial Competition with Entry Deterrence considering Horizontal Product Differentiations

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ai-nong Zhou

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available Spatial competition plays important roles in economics, which attracts extensive research. This paper addresses spatial competitions along with horizontal product differentiations and entry deterrence. By the dynamic game theory model about one firm and a potential entrant with different cost in a linear city, this paper finds that both the higher fixed setup cost and the higher transportation cost deter entrants. To efficiently deter the entrants, the establisher is inclined to locating at the middle point of the linear city.

  1. Assuring adequate deterrence in tort: A public good experiment

    OpenAIRE

    Eisenberg, Theodore; Engel, Christoph

    2012-01-01

    To explore damage rules’ deterrent effect, we use a public good experiment to tailor allowable punishment to rules used in actual civil litigation. The experimental treatments are analogous to: (1) damages limited to harm to an individual litigant, (2) damages limited to harm to a group available in aggregate litigation, such as class actions, and (3) damages allowed beyond actual harm to victims, such as punitive damages. The treatment with damages limited to harm to an individual does not p...

  2. Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy After 9/11

    OpenAIRE

    Knopf, Jeffrey W.

    2008-01-01

    The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260802284076 After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, many observers concluded that the central American strategies of the Cold War – containment and deterrence – no longer applied. Deterring suicide terrorists is a daunting challenge, as people who plan to kill themselves to carry out an attack have no reason to care about a threat to punish them after the fact. Deterring the organizat...

  3. Minimum deterrence and regional security. Section 2. Other regions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Azikiwe, A.E.

    1993-01-01

    Compared to European political and security circumstance, minimum deterrence is less an illusion in other regions where weapon free zones already exist. It will continue to be relevant to the security of other regions. Strategic arms limitation should be pursued vigorously in a constructive and pragmatic manner, bearing in mind the need to readjust to new global challenges. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is the linchpin on which the Non-proliferation Treaty rests

  4. Deterrence and constrained enforcement: Alternative regimes to deal with bribery

    OpenAIRE

    Graf Lambsdorff, Johann

    2010-01-01

    This study embeds transaction cost analysis into a Law and Economics model to produce general recommendations on how to deter bribery. Governments may deter bribery either by high penalties and risks of detection, potentially supported by leniency given to those who report their infraction (deterrence regime). Another local optimum is achieved if the government amplifies the risk of opportunism, aggravating the difficulties of enforcing a bribe transaction. This involves a low probability of ...

  5. From War to Deterrence? Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Since 2006

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-05-01

    Israeli Air Force (IAF) strike on a Syrian reactor in September 2007, the issue of the Lebanese front, although unsettled, was moved to the...widespread con- fusion over the exact level of readiness and coverage of its missile defense architecture. Given the current passion of Israeli...Variations on a Theme: The Conceptual - ization of Deterrence in Israeli Strategic Thinking,” Security Stud- ies, Vol. 7, No. 3, Spring 1998, pp. 145-181

  6. Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the

  7. Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.

    2009-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a

  8. Strategy for terminating a nuclear war

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Abt, C.C.

    1985-01-01

    Avoiding a nuclear war, or ending one if avoidance fails, is an important but relatively unexplored aspect of nuclear doctrine. Dr. Abt examines the feasibility of antagonists agreeing to exclude their open cities from nuclear targeting and to replace strategic bombardment with retaliatory invasion to create less of a hair-trigger deterrent. Critical net assessments by US strategists and the effects of such a strategy on the Soviet Union and the US allies are considered, along with problems implementation might pose. The author contends that both deterrence and the potential for limiting damage are strengthened by prewar plans for a nuclear ceasefire and stalemate short of holocaust.

  9. Nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neubert, M.

    1992-01-01

    The following motion was put before the United Kingdom House of Commons on 3rd February 1992 and agreed; that this House, recognising the potential dangers of the rapidly changing world order, welcomes the recent proposals for substantial reductions in nuclear weaponry, the growing support for the non-proliferation treaty and progress in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning the dismantling of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities; urges the Government to play their full part in helping the relevant authorities in the Commonwealth of Independent States to dismantle their nuclear devices, to safeguard their nuclear components and to discourage the proliferation of nuclear expertise; and believes it is of the first importance that Britain retains an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent as security in a world where there remain many sources of instability. The record of arguments for and against the motion in the debate is presented. (author)

  10. The Relative Effectiveness of Various Incentives and Deterrents as Judged by Pupils and Teachers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burns, Robert B.

    1978-01-01

    Compares opinions of British teachers and students toward educational incentives and deterrents. Little change has occurred in the responses of teachers and students over the 24 years. Differences of opinion are evident between pupils and teachers, especially with regard to corporal punishment as a deterrent and adult approval as an incentive.…

  11. Settle for now but block for tomorrow: the deterrence effects of merger policy tools

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Seldeslachts, J.; Clougherty, J.A.; Barros, P.P.

    2009-01-01

    Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anticompetitive behavior but also an important deterrence effect. Neither scholars nor policy makers have fully researched the deterrence effects of merger policy tools because they have been unable to empirically measure these effects. We

  12. Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2012-08-15

    The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

  13. On China's Nuclear Doctrine

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Xia Liping

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available Nuclear weapons have played an important role in China's national strategy. China’s nuclear doctrine has a very strong continuity. Nevertheless, China has made readjustments in its nuclear doctrine according to the changes of its internal and external situation and its general strategic threat perception. China’s nuclear doctrine has experienced a process of evolution from anti-nuclear blackmail to minimum deterrence. There are five major parts in China's nuclear doctrine: policy of declaration, nuclear development, nuclear deployment, nuclear employment, and nuclear disarmament. Because China is faced with a different situation from other nuclear powers and has its own strategic culture, China has a nuclear doctrine with its own characteristics. China’s nuclear doctrine has been affiliated with and has served the national development strategy, national security strategy, national defense policy and military strategy of China.

  14. PLA Reforms and Chinas Nuclear Forces

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-10-01

    Specifically, “the value and the capability of the Rocket Force should lie in the strengthening of the credible and reliable nuclear deterrence and... deterrent imply a cap on the size of nuclear forces and the missions as- signed to them.41 However, the Rocket Force could seek to capitalize on its...JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Logan 57 PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces By David C. Logan C hina is in the midst of sweeping military reforms that

  15. Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security: A Need for Weapons Programs?

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Woolf, Amy F

    2003-01-01

    .... nuclear weapons that goes beyond the concept of deterrence from the Cold War. It also identified a new targeting strategy that would seek to threaten specific capabilities in adversary nations...

  16. Nuclear stockpiles globalization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jouffray, Fabien

    2016-01-01

    For technological reasons, but more importantly political ones, the spread of nuclear weapons is foreseen as inevitable especially with the multiplication of so-called 'threshold states'. On the one hand, technological barriers will gradually disappear with globalization and information sharing in our societies. Furthermore, becoming a threshold power appears today as key to get freedom of action, a tool of counter-deterrence or blackmail according to the camp you belong to, like in the Iranian and north Korean cases. For proliferant countries, it will now consist in an enforcement of an embryonic, even though rather deterrent or even threatening, nuclear program thanks to new technologies, reducing completion times and even allowing to skip the final nuclear test

  17. Deterring nuclear-armed Third World dictators: a targeting strategy for the emerging threat.

    OpenAIRE

    Gellene, David J.

    1992-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. The continuing efforts of several developing nations to acquire nuclear weapons indicates that the United States may be required to implement a deterrence policy aimed at authoritarian regimes in the Third World. Therefore. U. S. decision-makers must re-evaluate the conceptual foundations of American deterrence policy. This research suggests a solution to the problem of deterring nuclear-capable Third World nations from using...

  18. Deterrence and transmission as mechanisms ensuring reliability of gossip.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Giardini, Francesca

    2012-10-01

    Spreading information about the members of one's group is one of the most universal human behaviors. Thanks to gossip, individuals can acquire the information about their peers without sustaining the burden of costly interactions with cheaters, but they can also create and revise social bonds. Gossip has also several positive functions at the group level, promoting cohesion and norm compliance. However, gossip can be unreliable, and can be used to damage others' reputation or to circulate false information, thus becoming detrimental to people involved and useless for the group. In this work, we propose a theoretical model in which reliability of gossip depends on the joint functioning of two distinct mechanisms. Thanks to the first, i.e., deterrence, individuals tend to avoid informational cheating because they fear punishment and the disruption of social bonds. On the other hand, transmission provides humans with the opportunity of reducing the consequences of cheating through a manipulation of the source of gossip.

  19. On international fisheries agreements, entry deterrence, and ecological uncertainty.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ellefsen, Hans; Grønbæk, Lone; Ravn-Jonsen, Lars

    2017-05-15

    A prerequisite for an international fisheries agreement (IFA) to be stable is that parties expect the benefits from joining the agreement to exceed the benefits from free riding on the agreement, and parties only comply with the agreement as long as this is true. The agreement, therefore, implicitly builds on an expectation of the ecological condition of the natural resource. Game theoretical models often assume that all parties have the same (often perfect) information about the resource and that the exploitation is an equilibrium use of the stock. As stated by experts in natural science, the fish ecology still has many open questions, for example how to predict population dynamics, migration patterns, food availability, etc. In some cases, parties disagree about the state, abundance, and migration of a stock, which can reduce the possibilities of reaching an agreement for exploitation of the stock. This paper develops a model and applies it to the North-East Atlantic mackerel fishery, in order to analyze an IFA under different ecological scenarios, and also combines the model with the economic theory of entry deterrence. The model is used empirically to determine whether the parties with original access to the resource have an advantage when forming an agreement with a new party in having the ability to fish the stock down to a smaller size and thereby prevent another party from entering into the fishery. With a basis in entry deterrence, combined with lack of information, the paper illustrates the obstacles that have made an agreement for the North-East Atlantic mackerel so difficult to achieve. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  20. The role of nuclear weapons in the year 2000

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    This publication presents the proceedings for the workshop, The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2000, held on October 22--24, 1990. The workshop participants considered the changing nature of deterrence and of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, the impact of nuclear proliferation on regional conflicts, and ways that the nuclear forces might be restructured to reflect new political circumstances.

  1. Nuclear Strategy and World Order: The United States Imperative.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Beres, Louis Rene

    The current U.S. nuclear strategy goes beyond the legitimate objective of survivable strategic forces to active preparation for nuclear war. The Reagan administration strategy rejects minimum deterrence and prepares for a nuclear war that might be protracted and controlled. The strategy reflects the understanding that a combination of counterforce…

  2. Military Exercises in Korea: A Provocation or a Deterrent to War?

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Chu, John S

    2006-01-01

    The 53-year alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) has been a deterrent to the Stalinist North Korean state along the most heavily militarized zone remaining of the Cold War era...

  3. An application of the game theory to evaluate the deterrence effect of an unannounced inspection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro

    2008-01-01

    An unannounced inspection is expected to have not only detection capability of diversions but also a deterrence effect to such activity since it is naturally recognized that such inspection scheme calls for the unpredictability toward facility operators who could not notice the inspection date. However, the method to evaluate effectiveness of unpredictability as a deterrence effect is not established. Previously, the game theory was applied as a missionary to introduce the random sampling method at the equilibrium point under the zero-sum game between inspectors and facility operators. In the case of unannounced inspection, the unpredictability plays an advantageous condition of inspector for setting of new equilibrium point. A scale of difference between the two points can be assigned as an index of effectiveness for the deterrence. This paper reports the result of an application of the game theory to evaluate the deterrence effects of an unannounced inspection. (author)

  4. Use of intermediaries in DWI deterrence. Volume 1, Phase 2 report : development of intermediary programs

    Science.gov (United States)

    1983-04-01

    One potential approach to DWI deterrence and prevention involves encouraging people present in potential drunk driving situations to intervene in order to prevent a trip by an impaired driver. Potential "intermediaries" include service personnel in c...

  5. Deterrence and WMD Terrorism: Calibrating Its Potential Contributions to Risk Reduction

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-06-01

    ideology and aspiration (so-called franchisees ) • operational enablers (financiers etc.) • moral legitimizers • state sponsors • passive state...of al Qaeda • groups affiliated by ideology and aspiration (so-called franchisees ) • operational enablers (financiers etc.) • moral legitimizers...of deterrence.14 One is “deterrence by the threat of punishment,” which compels the adversary to try to calculate whether the potential benefits of

  6. Language and the nuclear arms debate: Nukespeak today

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1985-01-01

    This book presents papers on the political, cultural and ethical aspects of nuclear weapons. Topics considered include language and ideology, the pragmatics of speeches against the peace movement in Britain, the rhetoric of national defense in the US, pro-nuclear arguments, nuclear deterrence, the media's coverage of anti-nuclear demonstrations, news reports, an analysis of the television film The Day After, nuclear disarmament, an analysis of anti-nuclear humor, psychological models, and sociological models.

  7. Coming to grips with nuclear winter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scherr, S.J.

    1985-01-01

    This editorial examines the politics related to the concept of nuclear winter which is a term used to describe temperature changes brought on by the injection of smoke into the atmosphere by the massive fires set off by nuclear explosions. The climate change alone could cause crop failures and lead to massive starvation. The author suggests that the prospect of a nuclear winter should be a deterrent to any nuclear exchange

  8. Deterrence's Element of Sanction Certainty: Friendships, Vicarious Experiences, and Underage Alcohol Use.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mowen, Thomas J; Boman, John H

    2018-01-09

    Underage drinking remains a pressing issue on college campuses across the United States. Though the most common form of addressing underage alcohol use on campuses is through deterrence-based policies, evidence suggests deterrence-based methods are ineffective and may produce negative outcomes. Using dyadic data, the objective of this study is to use a friendship-informed perspective on deterrence theory to examine how an individual's and his/her friend's perceptions of sanction certainty relate to self-reported underage alcohol use. Using multilevel mixed models which fall under the actor-partner interdependence modeling class, results demonstrate that respondents who perceive high levels of sanction certainty drink and heavily use alcohol more frequently than those who perceive low levels of sanction certainty. Additionally, those who have friends who perceive high levels of sanction certainty tend to drink at young ages significantly more frequently and in more dangerous patterns than those who have friends who perceive a low sanction certainty. The dyad members' levels of sanction certainty do not interact in relation to alcohol use. The significant relationships of the friends' sanction certainty support the notion of friendship-based deterrence. However, the consistent positive direction of all sanction certainty measures is the opposite of what deterrence theory hypothesizes. As such, it appears that deterrence is not only ineffective at stopping underage alcohol use on college campuses, but may be harmful due to increased rates of both drinking and high-risk drinking.

  9. China's nuclear programs and policies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wang, C.

    1983-01-01

    Economics and the futility of arms competition with the US and USSR has forced China to shift its nuclear effort to peaceful uses, although its current nuclear-deterrent warrants including China in arms negotiations. China's nuclear program began during the 1950s with an emphasis on weaponry and some development in space technology. Proponents of nuclear power now appear to have refuted the earlier arguments that nuclear-plant construction would be too slow, too dangerous and polluting, and too expensive and the idea that hydro resources would be adequate. The current leadership supports a serious nuclear-power-plant construction program. 6 references

  10. The nuclear case book

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stephenson, M.; Hearn, R.

    1983-01-01

    The subject is covered in sections, entitled: the truth about nukes; disarmament, arms control and arms limitation; directory of nuclear weapons; tables of principal nuclear weapons; points of view 1 (Anglican); proliferation of nuclear technology; the just war; preventing proliferation; the numbers business; war scenario 1 (the Gulf); points of view 2 (Roman Catholic); deterrence; European Nuclear Balance; war scenario 2 (Germany); arguing about war and peace; points of view 3 (Jewish); is there a Soviet military threat; the view from Omsk; points of view 4 (Pugwash); the British deterrent; points of view 5 (generals for peace and disarmament); 'broken arrows'; costs of nuclear weapons; war scenario 3 (Pakistan); nuclear weapons - what is the moral response; non-use of nuclear weapons; points of view 6 (women and families for defence); dear Mr. Heseltine; why acquire nuclear weapons; the effects of nuclear weapons; war scenario 4 (Central America and the Middle East); civil defence; alternatives to nuclear defence; points of view 7 (Quaker). (U.K.)

  11. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  12. Deterring and Dissuading Nuclear Terrorism

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    John J. Klein

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available While nuclear deterrence theory may be well-suited to dealing with nuclear-armed states, its suitability for deterring nuclear terrorism has frequently been questioned since 9/11. While terrorist organizations do not necessarily act uniformly or according to the same underlying beliefs, many of the most aggressive organizations are motivated by an ideology that embraces martyrdom and an apocalyptic vision.1 This ideology may be based on religion or a desire to overthrow a government. Consequently, terrorists motivated by ideology who intend to use a stolen or improvised nuclear device against the United States or its interests may not care about the resulting military repercussions following a nuclear attack. In such a scenario, some strategists think a terrorist organization's leadership may prove "undeterrable" by traditional military means. Nevertheless, deterrence is still a critical element in U.S. national strategy to prevent a nuclear attack. Furthermore, deterrence combined with dissuasion works to reduce the likelihood of nuclear terrorism being used against the United States, while also mitigating the consequences should such an act actually occur.

  13. The nuclear debate: ethics versus effectiveness; Morale et efficacite dans le debat nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lambert, D

    2009-04-15

    Following some political maneuvering, a new debate on the future of nuclear deterrence is about to resurface. And a first deadline has been set by the need to restore the strategic balance between the United States and Russia before the START Treaty ends on 5 December 2009, as well as by preparation for the next NPT Review Conference. Perception of the main threat has changed, but so have concepts of deterrence. Far from outmoded, deterrence forms part of a broader vision in which realism has the edge over idealism. (author)

  14. Deterrence, the spiral model, and intentions of the adversary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jervis, R.

    1986-01-01

    This paper is not concerned with the many subtleties and complexities of deterrence theory, but only with the central argument that great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve. This belief will lead the former to test its opponents, usually starting with a small and apparently unimportant issue. If the status quo powers retreat, they will not only lose the specific value at stake but, more important in the long run, will encourage the aggressor to press harder. Even if the defenders later recognize their plight and are willing to pay a higher price to prevent further retreats, they will find it increasingly difficult to convince the aggressor of their new-found resolve. The choice will then be between continuing to retreat and thereby sacrificing basic values or fighting. To avoid this disastrous situation, the state must display the ability and willingness to wage war. It may not be able to ignore minor conflicts or to judge disputes on their merits. Issues of little intrinsic value become highly significant as indices of resolve

  15. Video Tracking Protocol to Screen Deterrent Chemistries for Honey Bees.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Larson, Nicholas R; Anderson, Troy D

    2017-06-12

    The European honey bee, Apis mellifera L., is an economically and agriculturally important pollinator that generates billions of dollars annually. Honey bee colony numbers have been declining in the United States and many European countries since 1947. A number of factors play a role in this decline, including the unintentional exposure of honey bees to pesticides. The development of new methods and regulations are warranted to reduce pesticide exposures to these pollinators. One approach is the use of repellent chemistries that deter honey bees from a recently pesticide-treated crop. Here, we describe a protocol to discern the deterrence of honey bees exposed to select repellent chemistries. Honey bee foragers are collected and starved overnight in an incubator 15 h prior to testing. Individual honey bees are placed into Petri dishes that have either a sugar-agarose cube (control treatment) or sugar-agarose-compound cube (repellent treatment) placed into the middle of the dish. The Petri dish serves as the arena that is placed under a camera in a light box to record the honey bee locomotor activities using video tracking software. A total of 8 control and 8 repellent treatments were analyzed for a 10 min period with each treatment was duplicated with new honey bees. Here, we demonstrate that honey bees are deterred from the sugar-agarose cubes with a compound treatment whereas honey bees are attracted to the sugar-agarose cubes without an added compound.

  16. Role of methyl salicylate on oviposition deterrence in Arabidopsis thaliana.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Groux, Raphaël; Hilfiker, Olivier; Gouhier-Darimont, Caroline; Peñaflor, Maria Fernanda Gomes Villalba; Erb, Matthias; Reymond, Philippe

    2014-07-01

    Plants attacked by herbivores have evolved different strategies that fend off their enemies. Insect eggs deposited on leaves have been shown to inhibit further oviposition through visual or chemical cues. In some plant species, the volatile methyl salicylate (MeSA) repels gravid insects but whether it plays the same role in the model species Arabidopsis thaliana is currently unknown. Here we showed that Pieris brassicae butterflies laid fewer eggs on Arabidopsis plants that were next to a MeSA dispenser or on plants with constitutively high MeSA emission than on control plants. Surprisingly, the MeSA biosynthesis mutant bsmt1-1 treated with egg extract was still repellent to butterflies when compared to untreated bsmt1-1. Moreover, the expression of BSMT1 was not enhanced by egg extract treatment but was induced by herbivory. Altogether, these results provide evidence that the deterring activity of eggs on gravid butterflies is independent of MeSA emission in Arabidopsis, and that MeSA might rather serve as a deterrent in plants challenged by feeding larvae.

  17. Enhancement of the Public Acceptance of Nuclear Energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, K. C.; Jeong, S. M.; Noh, T. W.

    2010-02-01

    To enhance the public acceptance of nuclear energy in Korea we translate the 'The Power to Save the World - The Truth about Nuclear Energy' written by the American novelist Gwyneth Cravens into Korean. 'Power to Save the World' is an eloquent, convincing argument for nuclear power as a safe energy source and an essential deterrent to global warming. To promote national power by keeping nuclear industry healthy, we need to supply the variety of material which enhances the public acceptance of nuclear energy

  18. Restart 2.0 of substrategic nuclear weapon disarmament? Negotiation approaches and models; Neustart 2.0 zur Abruestung substrategischer Nuklearwaffen? Verhandlungsansaetze und -modelle

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Paul, Michael

    2011-05-15

    The author discusses the following topics with respect a possible restart of nuclear disarmament negotiations: nuclear disarmament versus nuclear deterrence; substrategic nuclear weapons; initial positions for the negotiations (American position, Russian position, German position); strategic and substrategic nuclear weapon disarmament (including the questions of transparency and verification); imponderables.

  19. Oviposition deterrent activities of Pachyrhizus erosus seed extract and other natural products on Plutella xylostella (Lepidoptera: Plutellidae).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Basukriadi, Adi; Wilkins, Richard M

    2014-01-01

    An extract of a rotenone-containing plant yam bean, Pachyrhizus erosus (L.) Urban, seeds was tested against the diamondback moth, Plutella xylostella (L.) in a greenhouse to determine its potential as an oviposition deterrent and compared with coumarin and rutin, known as diamondback moth oviposition deterrent compounds, rotenone, and an extract of Peruvian cube root, at a concentration of 0.5% (w/v). Oviposition deterrent index (ODI) was used to determine effects of extracts or compounds in inhibiting oviposition of diamondback moth. Coumarin showed a stronger deterrent effect than the yam bean seed extract with a higher ODI value. On the contrary, rotenone, rutin, and the cube root extract, containing 6.7% (w/w) of rotenone, showed no significant deterrent effects having low or negative ODI values, suggesting that the deterrent effect of the yam bean seed extract is not due to rotenone content of the yam bean seeds. The extract of yam bean seed and coumarin partially deterred the moth from laying eggs on treated leaves in a concentration-dependent manner. The effective concentration for 50% deterrency of coumarin and the yam bean seed extract were 0.11 and 0.83% (w/v), respectively. However, the yam bean seed extract showed a residual deterrent effect on the moth even at 3 d after the treatment and is probably because of its low volatile nature. A long-term deterrency of the yam bean seed extract is an advantage over coumarins. Both the yam bean seed extract and coumarin deterred diamondback moth from laying eggs in total darkness, indicating their nonvisual deterrent effect. This made the extract an effective deterrence to diamondback moth in light and in darkness. To conclude, this study revealed the potential of the crude extract of the yam bean seed to prevent diamondback moth from ovipositing on its plant host. © The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Entomological Society of America.

  20. India's draft nuclear doctrine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kapur, A.

    2000-01-01

    India's draft nuclear doctrine and its nuclear and missile testing are a response to recent international, regional and domestic developments. Nehru's policy of nuclear disarmament, non-discriminatory international arrangements and unilateral restraint has been overturned in favour of self-reliant security and negotiated nuclear restraints. The draft nuclear doctrine is aimed at transparency and formalization of existing capacities. It is anchored in the United Nations Charter, based on the legitimacy of self-defence and espouses minimum nuclear deterrence. After the launching of Pokhran II, the debate in India has been settled on weaponization and deployment. The doctrine is not country-specific with respect to threat perceptions, but the author posits that the long-term focus is on China and the short-term on Pakistan. The doctrine emphasizes civilian command and control. India's decision to test incurred diplomatic and other economic costs, but afforded new opportunities for the country to assert itself militarily and politically in Asia and in the world. There were no diplomatic costs in issuing the draft nuclear doctrine, but the author estimates the economic costs of a full-blown (triad) Indian nuclear deterrent. (author)

  1. Research design considerations for clinical studies of abuse-deterrent opioid analgesics: IMMPACT recommendations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Turk, Dennis C.; O’Connor, Alec B.; Dworkin, Robert H.; Chaudhry, Amina; Katz, Nathaniel P.; Adams, Edgar H.; Brownstein, John S.; Comer, Sandra D.; Dart, Richard; Dasgupta, Nabarun; Denisco, Richard A.; Klein, Michael; Leiderman, Deborah B.; Lubran, Robert; Rappaport, Bob A.; Zacny, James P.; Ahdieh, Harry; Burke, Laurie B.; Cowan, Penney; Jacobs, Petra; Malamut, Richard; Markman, John; Michna, Edward; Palmer, Pamela; Peirce-Sandner, Sarah; Potter, Jennifer S.; Raja, Srinivasa N.; Rauschkolb, Christine; Roland, Carl L.; Webster, Lynn R.; Weiss, Roger D.; Wolf, Kerry

    2013-01-01

    Opioids are essential to the management of pain in many patients, but they also are associated with potential risks for abuse, overdose, and diversion. A number of efforts have been devoted to the development of abuse-deterrent formulations of opioids to reduce these risks. This article summarizes a consensus meeting that was organized to propose recommendations for the types of clinical studies that can be used to assess the abuse deterrence of different opioid formulations. Due to the many types of individuals who may be exposed to opioids, an opioid formulation will need to be studied in several populations using various study designs in order to determine its abuse-deterrent capabilities. It is recommended that the research conducted to evaluate abuse deterrence should include studies assessing: (1) abuse liability; (2) the likelihood that opioid abusers will find methods to circumvent the deterrent properties of the formulation; (3) measures of misuse and abuse in randomized clinical trials involving pain patients with both low risk and high risk of abuse; and (4) post-marketing epidemiological studies. PMID:22770841

  2. The Link Between Economic Growth, Crime and Deterrence Measures in Nigeria

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Adekoya Adenuga Fabian

    2016-11-01

    Full Text Available The level of crime in Nigeria has become devastating and in order to put more sanity into the economy and the country at large, the Government has embarked on different deterrence measures in curbing crime. Thus, this study examined the interaction of deterrence measures with crime in order to see how economic growth was affected when they were used in curbing crime at different instances. That is, the interaction of deterrence measures with crime informed us how they have helped in lowering crime in Nigeria for a better economic growth to subsist. The deterrence measures considered in this work are in line with the rational choice theory being the cost of crime imposed on the society. Furthermore, this study considered data from 1975 to 2013 with the use of autoregressive distributed lag model. Moreover, the results showed that crime dependency on deterrence measures asymmetrically constituted means of lowering economic growth in the country. Hence, this study suggested that prosecution should be well funded and in order to curb crime and improve economic growth in Nigeria. That is, this would afford the country to reduce the congestion of prison inmates and thus, it would discourage long waiting trials.

  3. Ethics and Nuclear Arms: European and American Perspectives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    English, Raymond, Ed.

    In these 10 essays, 5 European and 5 American political and religious leaders examine the ethics of possessing and using nuclear weapons. They appraise the policy of nuclear deterrence. Protestant and Catholic viewpoints are represented. There are disagreements on details and differences in emphasis on positions and policies. There is general…

  4. Progress in counterfeit deterrence: the contribution of information exchange

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lancaster, Ian M.; Kontnik, Lewis T.

    1996-03-01

    In this paper we establish the need for communication between organizations involved in the fight against counterfeiting crime. We also examine the paradox in providing information that could serve the criminal as well as those attempting to protect themselves from criminal activity. Counterfeiting is estimated to account for over 5% of world trade. It is a global operation with no respect for international borders. It is increasingly sophisticated and increasingly the province of organized crime, which applies the techniques developed for drug distribution to the production and distribution of counterfeit articles. To fight this crime there is an increasing plethora of authenticating features and technologies available. Many companies do not recognize the problem and the number of anticounterfeit technologies can be confusing for potential users. There is therefore a need for information about them, their comparative characteristics, to be easily available. At present there is inadequate communication between those who develop and produce anti-counterfeiting devices and those who use them, notwithstanding the marketing efforts of the former. Communication which stimulates and encourages the spread of information between those engaged in the fight against counterfeit crime can only help in that fight. But what we term 'the communication paradox' requires circumspection and care in the content and the distribution of such information. The communication paradox is that the better the channels of communication, the easier it is for criminals to get hold of that information. The challenge is to institute communications which are effective but restrictive. More communication of information between those engaged in counterfeit deterrence will enhance individual companies' and organizations' anticounterfeit efforts and thus contribute to an overall improvement in the fight against counterfeit crime.

  5. Deterrent activity of hops flavonoids and their derivatives against stored product pests.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jackowski, J; Popłoński, J; Twardowska, K; Magiera-Dulewicz, J; Hurej, M; Huszcza, E

    2017-10-01

    Five flavonoids from hops, two of their derivatives, along with naringenin used as a model compound, were tested for their antifeedant activity against three coleopteran stored product pests: Sitophilus granarius L., Tribolium confusum Duv. and Trogoderma granarium Everts. The introduction, into the tested flavonoid molecules, of additional structural fragments such as prenyl or dimethylpyran moiety, is proposed to significantly alter the deterrent activity of the compounds. The prenyl moiety in flavonoids increased the deterrent activity of these compounds in all three of the grain feeding species used in the tests. It is also concluded that the introduction of dimethylpyran moiety to the flavonoid structure increases its deterrent activity in S. granarius and T. confusum, but in one of the test insects, T. granarium, an increased feeding was observed in response to the introduction of dimethylpyran moiety to the flavonoid structure.

  6. Conference day - Dissuasion, proliferation, disarmament: the nuclear debate beyond 2010. Conference proceedings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-09-01

    A first set of contributions (round tables) addresses the relationship between NATO, nuclear deterrence and antimissile defence. The second set of contributions addresses nuclear policies of emerging powers (Russia, China, Iran...) and proliferation risks. The third one addresses the perspectives of non proliferation, civil nuclear energy actors, and disarmament

  7. Nuclear EMP induced chaos

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dance, B

    1983-08-01

    In the event of nuclear war, the availability of first class communications facilities and of reliable electricity supplies would be of absolutely vital importance to any of the population surviving the first onslaught not only for their own welfare, but also for the preservation of their nation's retaliation deterrent capability. However, it is to be expected that a single nuclear explosion of adequate size on the outside of the atmosphere would generate a pulse of sufficient intensity to damage communications equipment (including telephones, radio transmitters and receivers) and to interrupt main supplies. The situation caused by electromagnetic pulses (EMP) is discussed.

  8. 2012: the world on the brink of a nuclear proliferation crisis; Annee 2012: le monde au bord d'une crise de proliferation nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Norlain, Bernard

    2012-02-15

    The author's determined plea that France gives up its dogmatic position on nuclear weapons and takes the lead in a nuclear disarmament movement is based on a conviction that the concept of nuclear deterrence is outdated, the fear of rapidly-growing proliferation in 2012 and the excessive cost of ownership of the French nuclear arsenal

  9. Identification of the mosquito biting deterrent constituents from the Indian folk remedy plant Jatropha curcas

    Science.gov (United States)

    An investigation of the Indian folk remedy plant, Jatropha curcas, was performed to specifically identify the constituents responsible for the mosquito biting deterrent activity of the oil as a whole. Jatropha curcas seed oil is burned in oil lamps in India and part of Africa to repel biting insect...

  10. Target-oriented utility theory for modeling the deterrent effects of counterterrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bier, Vicki M.; Kosanoglu, Fuat

    2015-01-01

    Optimal resource allocation in security has been a significant challenge for critical infrastructure protection. Numerous studies use game theory as the method of choice, because of the fact that an attacker can often observe the defender’s investment in security and adapt his choice of strategies accordingly. However, most of these models do not explicitly consider deterrence, with the result that they may lead to wasted resources if less investment would be sufficient to deter an attack. In this paper, we assume that the defender is uncertain about the level of defensive investment that would deter an attack, and use the target-oriented utility to optimize the level of defensive investment, taking into account the probability of deterrence. - Highlights: • We propose a target-oriented utility model for attacker deterrence. • We model attack deterrence as a function of attacker success probability. • We compare target-oriented utility model and conventional game-theoretical model. • Results show that our model results better value of the defender’s objective function. • Results support that defending series systems is more difficult than parallel systems

  11. Juvenile Transfer and Deterrence: Reexamining the Effectiveness of a "Get-Tough" Policy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jordan, Kareem L.; Myers, David L.

    2011-01-01

    Although research has examined the effectiveness of juvenile transfer on recidivism, there has been a lack of research done in assessing how well juvenile waiver to adult court meets the criteria necessary for deterrence to occur (i.e., certainty, severity, and swiftness of punishment). The purpose of this study is to assess how well juvenile…

  12. Assessing the Deterrence Value of Carrier Presence Against Adversary Aggression in a Coalition Environment

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-09-01

    provides statistics on nations’ military forces and defense expenditures. The cost for a player to seek an alliance with a nation, defined as the...summary. Report, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Barnes J, Kleck G (2014) Do more police lead to more crime deterrence? Crime & Delinquency

  13. Age, gender and deterrability: Are younger male drivers more likely to discount the future?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Freeman, James; Kaye, Sherrie-Anne; Truelove, Verity; Davey, Jeremy

    2017-07-01

    Utilizing the Classical Deterrence theory and Stafford and Warr's (1993) reconceptualized model of deterrence, the current study examined whether age, gender, and discounting the future tendencies influence perceptions of being apprehended for speeding offences. Licensed motorists (N=700; 57% female) in Queensland (Australia) were recruited to complete a self-report questionnaire that measured perceptual deterrence, speeding related behaviors and discounting the future tendencies. Data were analyzed utilizing descriptive, bivariate and multivariate regressions. Significant (albeit weak) positive correlations were found between age and perceptions of apprehension certainty. Males were significantly more likely to report higher incidences of speeding (including while avoiding detection) compared to females. In contrast, females were more likely to perceive high levels of apprehension certainty and consider impending penalties to be more severe. At a multivariate level, discounting the future tendencies (in addition to being male, reporting lower levels of perceptual severity and swiftness, and more instances of punishment avoidance) were predictive of lower perceptual certainty levels. This study is one of the first to reveal that being male and having a tendency to discount the consequences of the future may directly influence drivers' perceptual deterrence levels. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  14. Feeding deterrence and inhibitory effects of bee balm (Monarda didyma) leaves on fall armyworm

    Science.gov (United States)

    The fall armyworm [Spodoptera frugiperda (J.E. Smith)] is a serious pest of many field and horticulture crops. Because of the many advantages for the use of plant-derived pesticides, we tested whether bee balm (Monarda didyma L.) leaves could have feeding deterrence on fall armyworm. When S. frugipe...

  15. NATO’s Changing its Posture Against Russia from Assurance to Deterrence: Does it Matter

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-04-06

    resurgence.73 However, this spending must continue in an upward trajectory and delinquent NATO members must hasten their attainment of the stated...accessed 17 Dec 2016) 2 http://www.nato.int/ history /nato-history.html 3 Paulauskas, Kestutis, (2016). On Deterrence. Retrieved from http

  16. U.S. Strategic Command Chief Talks Deterrence, Partnerships During Latest SGL

    OpenAIRE

    Ochoa, Victoria

    2017-01-01

    Today@NPS The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) welcomed U.S. Air Force Gen. John E. Hyten, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), for its latest Secretary of the Navy Guest Lecture (SGL), May 18 in King Auditorium. Hyten spoke about the importance of maintaining strategic deterrence and NPS' inclusion into the USSTRATCOM's Academic Alliance.

  17. Experimental evaluation of a dedicated underwater air gun for diver deterrence

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Driessen, F.P.G.; Raa, L.A. te; Dreschler, J.

    2010-01-01

    To improve port security capability there is a need for systems for detection, warning and deterrence of unwanted divers in harbour environments. In a complex environment such as a harbour, these topics present challenging problems and as such are subject to research and development. Already a few

  18. Psychology of the nuclear balance

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sonntag, P

    1981-10-01

    The balance of military forces is meant to prevent war. But it is a very precarious balance, which becomes all the more dubious when the deterrent is no longer psychologically effective: when the country attacked is deterred from striking back with nuclear weapons. A unilateral disarmament above the overkill level would be possible without endangering the balance. It would improve the climate for mutual disarmament.

  19. Nuclear

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    This document proposes a presentation and discussion of the main notions, issues, principles, or characteristics related to nuclear energy: radioactivity (presence in the environment, explanation, measurement, periods and activities, low doses, applications), fuel cycle (front end, mining and ore concentration, refining and conversion, fuel fabrication, in the reactor, back end with reprocessing and recycling, transport), the future of the thorium-based fuel cycle (motivations, benefits and drawbacks), nuclear reactors (principles of fission reactors, reactor types, PWR reactors, BWR, heavy-water reactor, high temperature reactor of HTR, future reactors), nuclear wastes (classification, packaging and storage, legal aspects, vitrification, choice of a deep storage option, quantities and costs, foreign practices), radioactive releases of nuclear installations (main released radio-elements, radioactive releases by nuclear reactors and by La Hague plant, gaseous and liquid effluents, impact of releases, regulation), the OSPAR Convention, management and safety of nuclear activities (from control to quality insurance, to quality management and to sustainable development), national safety bodies (mission, means, organisation and activities of ASN, IRSN, HCTISN), international bodies, nuclear and medicine (applications of radioactivity, medical imagery, radiotherapy, doses in nuclear medicine, implementation, the accident in Epinal), nuclear and R and D (past R and D programmes and expenses, main actors in France and present funding, main R and D axis, international cooperation)

  20. Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management. Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Schlesinger, James R; Carns, Michael P; Crouch, II, J. D; Gansler, Jacques S; Giambastiani, Jr., Edmund P; Hamre, John J; Miller, Franklin C; Williams, Christopher A; Blackwell, Jr, James A

    2008-01-01

    ...). This report covers Phase II findings and recommendations. In Phase II, the Task Force found that the lack of interest in and attention to the nuclear mission and nuclear deterrence, as discussed in our Phase I report, go well beyond the Air...

  1. Nuclear Weapons in Russia's approach to conflict

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, Dave

    2016-11-01

    President Putin has moved nuclear weapons to the foreground of the European security landscape. New risks and dangers arise from the apparent coupling of nuclear weapons capabilities with Moscow's revanchist and irredentist foreign and defence policies toward its neighbours. Nuclear weapons are the central feature and capstone capability in Russia's evolving concept of strategic deterrence and are important tools for achieving Russia's geopolitical aims. Russian thinking on the role and place of nuclear weapons in upholding national security and in achieving strategic aims is reflected in military policy, force structure and posture, and exercises and operations. Russia's political and military leaders are not only re-conceptualising the role of nuclear weapons. They are also building the military capabilities that can credibly threaten the calibrated employment of nuclear weapons for deterrence, de-escalation and war-fighting from the regional to large-scale and global levels of conflict. New and still developing concepts for the employment of conventional long-range precision weapons in tandem with nuclear weapons for regional deterrence and containment of local and regional conflicts add volatility to the regional tensions and uncertainties created by recent Russian aggression. Russia's reliance upon integrated conventional and nuclear capabilities in reasserting its influence in its perceived sphere of special interest, intended to contain conflicts at a manageable level, could actually increase the risk of the potential employment of nuclear weapons. NATO nations collectively, and the three NATO nuclear powers (Great Britain, France, and the United States) individually, have recognized this new reality and have begun to adapt to it. In that context, the aim of this paper is to elaborate a clearer understanding of the place and role of nuclear weapons in Russia's approach to conflict, based on nuclear-related policy statements and military-theoretical writing

  2. Prospects for stability in a nuclear subcontinent

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rajagopal, S; Chari, Sridhar K.

    2003-01-01

    This book explore the prospects for stability in a nuclear sub-continent. The nonproliferation regimes and nuclear threat reduction, nonproliferation regimes and south asia - is there a meeting point?; maintaining a threshold of strategic autonomy at least cost: continuity in the evolution of India's nuclear policies; role of nuclear doctrines and the state of the armed forces in South Asia; nuclear weapons, deterrence and stability in the international system: South Asian dynamics; assessing China's Asian role and security policies; Kargil war to current threat of war: prospects for stability; discussion; international terrorism and its impact on South Asian stability; a view from Bangladesh etc. are some of the topics covered

  3. Nuclear inheritance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delpech, Therese

    1997-01-01

    Since the end of the East-West confronting, the nuclear weapon issue has been focused in an international debate with obvious repercussions in Europe, because it is the European continent which indicated first the significance of nuclear deterrence. This debate refers first upon the past, as the German unification allowed capturing numerous documents of Warsaw treaty which revealed the intentions and the plans of Soviet Union during the cold war, and secondly concerns the future, since the role of nuclear weapons must be re-thought in a new context. This is the subject of this book, which refers also to the problem of the nuclear proliferation in the world and evolution of different countries in a political and regional context. The extension of the non-proliferation treaty for an undefined duration, in May 1995, is a incontestable victory because this treaty rules the renouncement to nuclear weapons of 185 countries. However, it does not solve most sensible problems like the Iraq case, for which a specific inspection regime has been instituted, or the case of Iran, which is suspected to acquire the bomb, although no clear evidence has been provided up to now. This is also the case of Israel, India and Pakistan which allege plainly their willingness of keeping open, from security reasons, their nuclear option. The content is displayed in five chapters: 1. Introduction; 2. The role of the nuclear weapons after the cold war; 3. The nuclear proliferation at crossroads; 4. Undefined extension of the NPT, a striking but fragile victory; 5. Conclusions. An appendix containing the text of the Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty and a chronology are added

  4. REPELLENT AND OVIPOSITION DETERRENT ACTIVITIES OFTHE ESSENTIAL OIL FROM MIKANIA MICRANTHA AND ITS COMPOUNDS ON PLUTELLA XYLOSTELLA

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Mao-xinZhang; BingLing; Shao-yingChen; Guang-wenLiang; Xiong-feiPang

    2004-01-01

    Repellent and oviposition deterrent activities of the essential oil from Mikania micrantha and five volatile compounds including limonene, a-terpinene, linalool, B-caryophylene and verbenone on the diamondback moth (DBM), Plutella xylostella, was investigated in door and in net-house. The results showed that the essential oil of the M. micrantha had significant repellant effect (at flow 100-180 mL/min) and oviposition deterrent activity at dose 1020 uL/seedling for the DBM. In five volatile compounds, a-terpinene, limonene and linalool had significant effect on repellent and oviposition deterrent of the DBM moths, but verbenone and B-caryophylene, no significantly effect was observed in repellent and oviposition deterrent.

  5. How Close is too Close? The Effect of a Non-Lethal Electric Shark Deterrent on White Shark Behaviour

    OpenAIRE

    Kempster, Ryan M.; Egeberg, Channing A.; Hart, Nathan S.; Ryan, Laura; Chapuis, Lucille; Kerr, Caroline C.; Schmidt, Carl; Huveneers, Charlie; Gennari, Enrico; Yopak, Kara E.; Meeuwig, Jessica J.; Collin, Shaun P.

    2016-01-01

    Sharks play a vital role in the health of marine ecosystems, but the potential threat that sharks pose to humans is a reminder of our vulnerability when entering the ocean. Personal shark deterrents are being marketed as the solution to mitigate the threat that sharks pose. However, the effectiveness claims of many personal deterrents are based on our knowledge of shark sensory biology rather than robust testing of the devices themselves, as most have not been subjected to independent scienti...

  6. Third-Party Retaliation and the Psychology of Deterrence: Mapping the Psychological Mechanisms that Regulate Retaliation on Behalf of Others

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-09-03

    variously that its function is, for example, to re-build threatened self - esteem , to obtain enjoyment or satisfaction, or to balance a moral ledger...AFRL-AFOSR-VA-TR-2015-0334 Third-Party Retaliation and the psychology of deterrence: Mapping the psychological mechanisms that regulateretaliation...3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 05/01/2012-04/30/2015 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Third-Party Retaliation and the psychology of deterrence: mapping the

  7. The fragile peace - a nuclear review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    Cosmetic military superiority has reached its zenith now that the USA's superiority has been matched by that of the USSR. It is only the decision by the USA government to continue the development of the neutron warhead that could in any way maintain USA parity on the international conference bargaining tables. The USA nuclear policy is still that of deterrence. The arrival of the neutron bomb has opened a vast new horizon for use as a nuclear deterrent. On its own it seems an insignificant part of the USA nuclear arsenal. Combined as a multiple independent re-entry vehicle with any missile, it might prove to be the most fearsome weapon yet unleashed on mankind

  8. Countering Putin’s Nuclear Backed Aggression with a Continuous Nuclear Capable Bomber Presence

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-05-13

    bribery and propaganda to instigate protesting within the populace and thus destabilize Ukraine. 16 Russia was very careful to legally qualify any...proved again that Putin is willing to use different tactics to secure their buffer zone. Though the aggression into the Ukraine was called “an act of...Credible Nuclear Deterrent.” Air and Space Journal. (Fall, 2010 ). 29 Pifer, Steven. “Obama’s Faltering Nuclear Legacy: The 3 Rs.” The Washington

  9. The power of the will and the French nuclear programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boureille, P.

    2010-01-01

    Using certain key episodes in the development of the French nuclear deterrent as examples, the author illustrates the extent to which boldness of decision-making, combined with far-thinking and resolute vision, is the foundation of any international defence policy built for the long term. (author)

  10. The nuclear weapon; L'arme nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2008-07-01

    The author presents the technology, the concept of deterrence, the today means and the international control, concerning the nuclear weapon. The conclusion is pessimistic. The author sees only two issues: the substitution of a new weapon more powerful, or its use. (A.L.B.)

  11. The rise of India and its nuclear ambitions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pant, H.V.

    2007-01-01

    India, an emerging world power, has relations with all the major powers, and is seen as an element of stability in the world balance. As a nuclear power, India aim is to compete with China for leadership of the Asia-Pacific region. In this article the author describes the coherence in its foreign policy, its deterrent strategy and its ambitions. (author)

  12. Strengthening Deterrence for 21st Century Strategic Conflicts and Competition: Accelerating Adaptation and Integration - Annotated Bibliography

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Roberts, B. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Durkalec, J. J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2017-11-01

    This was the fourth in a series of annual events convened at Livermore to exploring the emerging place of the “new domains” in U.S. deterrence strategies. The purposes of the series are to facilitate the emergence of a community of interest that cuts across the policy, military, and technical communities and to inform laboratory strategic planning. U.S. allies have also been drawn into the conversation, as U.S. deterrence strategies are in part about their protection. Discussion in these workshops is on a not-for-attribution basis. It is also makes no use of classified information. On this occasion, there were nearly 100 participants from a dozen countries.

  13. Blood donors' perceptions, motivators and deterrents in Sub-Saharan Africa - a scoping review of evidence.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Asamoah-Akuoko, Lucy; Hassall, Oliver W; Bates, Imelda; Ullum, Henrik

    2017-06-01

    Achieving an adequate blood supply in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) through donor mobilization and retention is crucial. Factors that motivate or deter blood donors vary according to beliefs and social norms. Understanding the factors that influence blood donation behaviour in SSA is vital to developing effective strategies to address blood donor motivation and retention. This review of 35 studies from 16 SSA countries collates available evidence concerning the perceptions, motivators and deterrents that influence blood donors in SSA. The review revealed a common understanding that blood and blood donation save lives. The main deterrent to blood donation was fear due to lack of knowledge and discouraging spiritual, religious and cultural perceptions of blood donation. The main motivators for blood donation were altruism, donating blood for family and incentives. The findings support the need for targeted, culturally sensitive education, recruitment and retention strategies to improve the blood supply in SSA. © 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  14. Blood donors' perceptions, motivators and deterrents in Sub-Saharan Africa - a scoping review of evidence

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Asamoah-Akuoko, Lucy; Hassall, Oliver W; Bates, Imelda

    2017-01-01

    Achieving an adequate blood supply in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) through donor mobilization and retention is crucial. Factors that motivate or deter blood donors vary according to beliefs and social norms. Understanding the factors that influence blood donation behaviour in SSA is vital to developing...... effective strategies to address blood donor motivation and retention. This review of 35 studies from 16 SSA countries collates available evidence concerning the perceptions, motivators and deterrents that influence blood donors in SSA. The review revealed a common understanding that blood and blood donation...... save lives. The main deterrent to blood donation was fear due to lack of knowledge and discouraging spiritual, religious and cultural perceptions of blood donation. The main motivators for blood donation were altruism, donating blood for family and incentives. The findings support the need for targeted...

  15. Nuclear War. The moral dimension

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Child, J.W.

    1985-01-01

    U.S. nuclear policy has become the target of increasing criticism during the past decade. Critics often argue that the use of nuclear weapons would be irrational, would destroy humankind, and thus could not serve any rational policy goal. Other critics point to the immortality of the use of nuclear weapons. Both groups condemn U.S. military policy. In Nuclear War, James Child considers and rejects both these lines of criticism. He argues that a policy of deterrence can be both rational and moral; that U.S. nuclear policy is, on balance, based on rational and moral foundations. Child examines near-term consequences of a nuclear war and finds them ghastly but not unthinkable or incomparable to the havoc produced by previous wars. He also analyzes long-term consequences, such as those proposed by the ''nuclear winter'' theory, and finds the fear of total annihilation of humankind to be unfounded.

  16. Advanced techniques for the analysis of crisis stability, deterrence, and latency

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Canavan, G.H.

    1997-12-01

    Studies on crisis stability, deterrence, and latency are presented in chronological order, which also reflects their logical order of development, captures the main features of stability analysis; relates first strike, crisis, and arms control stability as seen from US and Russian perspective; and addresses questions such as whether uncertainty in damage preference or defense deployment can be destabilizing. It illustrates the problems with alternative metrics, latency and reconstitution, and deep unilateral and proportional force reductions.

  17. Deterrence and Influence: The Navy’s Role in Preventing War. Revision 1

    Science.gov (United States)

    2009-03-01

    issues of ex- tended deterrence - the protection and defense of South Korea and Taiwan . Similarly, many concerns about direct Russian or Iranian...A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999); Guntram H. Herb and David H...although dwindling) presence of U.S. forces in Europe, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, military equipment sales to Taiwan , and the U.S. presence in the

  18. Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Ultrasonic Acoustic Deterrent for Reducing Bat Fatalities at Wind Turbines.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arnett, Edward B; Hein, Cris D; Schirmacher, Michael R; Huso, Manuela M P; Szewczak, Joseph M

    2013-01-01

    Large numbers of bats are killed by wind turbines worldwide and minimizing fatalities is critically important to bat conservation and acceptance of wind energy development. We implemented a 2-year study testing the effectiveness of an ultrasonic acoustic deterrent for reducing bat fatalities at a wind energy facility in Pennsylvania. We randomly selected control and treatment turbines that were searched daily in summer and fall 2009 and 2010. Estimates of fatality, corrected for field biases, were compared between treatment and control turbines. In 2009, we estimated 21-51% fewer bats were killed per treatment turbine than per control turbine. In 2010, we determined an approximate 9% inherent difference between treatment and control turbines and when factored into our analysis, variation increased and between 2% more and 64% fewer bats were killed per treatment turbine relative to control turbines. We estimated twice as many hoary bats were killed per control turbine than treatment turbine, and nearly twice as many silver-haired bats in 2009. In 2010, although we estimated nearly twice as many hoary bats and nearly 4 times as many silver-haired bats killed per control turbine than at treatment turbines during the treatment period, these only represented an approximate 20% increase in fatality relative to the pre-treatment period for these species when accounting for inherent differences between turbine sets. Our findings suggest broadband ultrasound broadcasts may reduce bat fatalities by discouraging bats from approaching sound sources. However, effectiveness of ultrasonic deterrents is limited by distance and area ultrasound can be broadcast, in part due to rapid attenuation in humid conditions. We caution that an operational deterrent device is not yet available and further modifications and experimentation are needed. Future efforts must also evaluate cost-effectiveness of deterrents in relation to curtailment strategies to allow a cost-benefit analysis for

  19. Evaluating the Effectiveness of an Ultrasonic Acoustic Deterrent for Reducing Bat Fatalities at Wind Turbines

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arnett, Edward B.; Hein, Cris D.; Schirmacher, Michael R.; Huso, Manuela M. P.; Szewczak, Joseph M.

    2013-01-01

    Large numbers of bats are killed by wind turbines worldwide and minimizing fatalities is critically important to bat conservation and acceptance of wind energy development. We implemented a 2-year study testing the effectiveness of an ultrasonic acoustic deterrent for reducing bat fatalities at a wind energy facility in Pennsylvania. We randomly selected control and treatment turbines that were searched daily in summer and fall 2009 and 2010. Estimates of fatality, corrected for field biases, were compared between treatment and control turbines. In 2009, we estimated 21–51% fewer bats were killed per treatment turbine than per control turbine. In 2010, we determined an approximate 9% inherent difference between treatment and control turbines and when factored into our analysis, variation increased and between 2% more and 64% fewer bats were killed per treatment turbine relative to control turbines. We estimated twice as many hoary bats were killed per control turbine than treatment turbine, and nearly twice as many silver-haired bats in 2009. In 2010, although we estimated nearly twice as many hoary bats and nearly 4 times as many silver-haired bats killed per control turbine than at treatment turbines during the treatment period, these only represented an approximate 20% increase in fatality relative to the pre-treatment period for these species when accounting for inherent differences between turbine sets. Our findings suggest broadband ultrasound broadcasts may reduce bat fatalities by discouraging bats from approaching sound sources. However, effectiveness of ultrasonic deterrents is limited by distance and area ultrasound can be broadcast, in part due to rapid attenuation in humid conditions. We caution that an operational deterrent device is not yet available and further modifications and experimentation are needed. Future efforts must also evaluate cost-effectiveness of deterrents in relation to curtailment strategies to allow a cost-benefit analysis for

  20. Evaluating the effectiveness of an ultrasonic acoustic deterrent for reducing bat fatalities at wind turbines

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arnett, Edward B.; Hein, Cris D.; Schirmacher, Michael R.; Huso, Manuela M.P.; Szewczak, Joseph M.

    2013-01-01

    Large numbers of bats are killed by wind turbines worldwide and minimizing fatalities is critically important to bat conservation and acceptance of wind energy development. We implemented a 2-year study testing the effectiveness of an ultrasonic acoustic deterrent for reducing bat fatalities at a wind energy facility in Pennsylvania. We randomly selected control and treatment turbines that were searched daily in summer and fall 2009 and 2010. Estimates of fatality, corrected for field biases, were compared between treatment and control turbines. In 2009, we estimated 21–51% fewer bats were killed per treatment turbine than per control turbine. In 2010, we determined an approximate 9% inherent difference between treatment and control turbines and when factored into our analysis, variation increased and between 2% more and 64% fewer bats were killed per treatment turbine relative to control turbines. We estimated twice as many hoary bats were killed per control turbine than treatment turbine, and nearly twice as many silver-haired bats in 2009. In 2010, although we estimated nearly twice as many hoary bats and nearly 4 times as many silver-haired bats killed per control turbine than at treatment turbines during the treatment period, these only represented an approximate 20% increase in fatality relative to the pre-treatment period for these species when accounting for inherent differences between turbine sets. Our findings suggest broadband ultrasound broadcasts may reduce bat fatalities by discouraging bats from approaching sound sources. However, effectiveness of ultrasonic deterrents is limited by distance and area ultrasound can be broadcast, in part due to rapid attenuation in humid conditions. We caution that an operational deterrent device is not yet available and further modifications and experimentation are needed. Future efforts must also evaluate cost-effectiveness of deterrents in relation to curtailment strategies to allow a cost-benefit analysis for

  1. Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-01-01

    SUMMARY ■ C O R P O R A T I O N Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics David A. Shlapak and Michael...and stability between Moscow and its Western neighbors and raised concerns about its larger intentions. From the perspective of the North Atlantic...After eastern Ukraine, the next most likely targets for an attempted Russian coercion are the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

  2. NATOs Deterrence Strategy is Failing. The Enhanced Forward Presence: Delusion or Renewal

    Science.gov (United States)

    2018-04-20

    with serving, senior leaders across the NATO Alliance. Research reveals a variety of shortcomings and associated recommendations to improve the EFP...levers, answerable to a single NDCC exploits Russia’s autocratic politics and grand strategy of mobilization. Routine, democratic checks and...the reduction of commitment in Afghanistan. Senior leaders are aligned on the requirement for an updated deterrence strategy and what might be termed

  3. What Military Deterrence cannot do, Cyber Deterrence can do to Iran: Exploring the Implications of Manipulative Incessant Usage of the Term ‘Pre-Emptive’

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sanghamitra Nath

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available Does international politics today face a crisis in conceptual clarity? Curiously so.The Israeli threat ofpre-emptivemilitary strikes against Iran for its currenturanium enrichment program is essentially a threat ofpreventiveattack inanticipation of a probable security riskin the distant future. Conversely, it is Iranwhich faces an imminent threat from Israel and can resort topre-emptivemeasureson grounds of self-defense. This terminologicalconfusion is a politicalmanipulation to avail of the exception to the threat or use of force under Article51 of the UN Charter as well as legitimize the exercise ofcyber deterrencethrough Stuxnet and Flame viruses.Cyber deterrence must be the latestadditionto the conventional military deterrence strategies as it embodies the threat ofUnilaterally inflicted Assured Destruction (UAD, particularly through cyber war.Sincecyber wars can transform conflicts or wars into asymmetrical battles forpower,they can dangerously impede self-defense. Thus, the internationalcommunityshouldunanimously consent to abandon the use of cyber deterrencestrategiesfor a peaceful and safe present and future.

  4. No fly zones : oilsands mines use wide variety of bird deterrents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harrison, L.

    2010-10-15

    This article discussed the bird deterrent practices that several Canadian operators have in place at their tailings ponds. Regulations require that oilsands operators prevent birds from coming into contact with toxic tailings. Canadian Natural Resources Limited has a 2-man team constantly monitoring bird landings at its Horizon tailings pond. The team fires flares at birds or harasses them in boats to stop them from landing on the pond. Remote sensing technologies are used, including long-range acoustic devices, propane cannons, human effigies, balloons, and pyrotechnics. The vegetation around the pond is controlled to make the area inhospitable to birds, and highly desirable bird habitat was created as an alternative bird landing site. Following a high-mortality incident in 2008, Syncrude now deploys 190 shore-based sound canons at all tailings settling basins and open-water areas and uses scarecrows and effigies fitted with reflectors to deter waterfowl from landing. A radar-based migration monitoring system helps the company to optimize its deterrent system. At its Muskeg River Mine, Shell Canada Limited uses an on-demand radar-activated bird-deterrent program, which is what major airports use to deter birds. In the presence of a bird, the system launches a radio signal that sets off strobe lights, propane cannons, scarecrows, and mechanical models of falcons. 1 fig.

  5. Risk based In Vitro Performance Assessment of Extended Release Abuse Deterrent Formulations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xu, Xiaoming; Gupta, Abhay; Al-Ghabeish, Manar; Calderon, Silvia N.; Khan, Mansoor A.

    2016-01-01

    High strength extended release opioid products, which are indispensable tools in the management of pain, are associated with serious risks of unintentional and potentially fatal overdose, as well as of misuse and abuse that might lead to addiction. The issue of drug abuse becomes increasingly prominent when the dosage forms can be readily manipulated to release a high amount of opioid or to extract the drug in certain products or solvents. One approach to deter opioid drug abuse is by providing novel abuse deterrent formulations (ADF), with properties that may be viewed as barriers to abuse of the product. However, unlike regular extended release formulations, assessment of ADF technologies are challenging, in part due to the great variety of formulation designs available to achieve deterrence of abuse by oral, parenteral, nasal and respiratory routes. With limited prior history or literature information, and lack of compendial standards, evaluation and regulatory approval of these novel drug products become increasingly difficult. The present article describes a risk-based standardized in-vitro approach that can be utilized in general evaluation of abuse deterrent features for all ADF products. PMID:26784976

  6. Donating blood: a meta-analytic review of self-reported motivators and deterrents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bednall, Timothy C; Bove, Liliana L

    2011-10-01

    Although research on blood donor motivation abounds, most studies have typically focused on small sets of variables, used different terminology to label equivalent constructs, and have not attempted to generalize findings beyond their individual settings. The current study sought to synthesize past findings into a unified taxonomy of blood donation drivers and deterrents and to estimate the prevalence of each factor across the worldwide population of donors and eligible nondonors. Primary studies were collected, and cross-validated categories of donation motivators and deterrents were developed. Proportions of first-time, repeat, lapsed, apheresis, and eligible nondonors endorsing each category were calculated. In terms of motivators, first-time and repeat donors most frequently cited convenience, prosocial motivation, and personal values; apheresis donors similarly cited the latter 2 motivators and money. Conversely, lapsed donors more often cited collection agency reputation, perceived need for donation, and marketing communication as motivators. In terms of deterrents, both donors and nondonors most frequently referred to low self-efficacy to donate, low involvement, inconvenience, absence of marketing communication, ineffective incentives, lack of knowledge about donating, negative service experiences, and fear. The integration of past findings has yielded a comprehensive taxonomy of factors influencing blood donation and has provided insight into the prevalence of each factor across multiple stages of donors' careers. Implications for collection agencies are discussed. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  7. The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global Refugee Policy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen

    2017-02-01

    Full Text Available Asylum seekers and refugees continue to face serious obstacles in their efforts to access asylum. Some of these obstacles are inherent to irregular migration, including dangerous border crossings and the risk of exploitation. Yet, refugees also face state-made obstacles in the form of sophisticated migration control measures. As a result, refugees are routinely denied access to asylum as developed states close their borders in the hope of shifting the flow of asylum seekers to neighboring countries. Restrictive migration control policies are today the primary, some might say only, response of the developed world to rising numbers of  asylum seekers and refugees. This has produced a distorted refugee regime both in Europe and globally – a regime fundamentally based on the principle of deterrence rather than human rights protection. While the vast majority of European states still formally laud the international legal framework to protect refugees, most of these countries simultaneously do everything in their power to exclude those fleeing international protection and offer only a minimalist engagement to assist those countries hosting the largest number of refugees. By deterring or blocking onward movement for refugees, an even larger burden is placed upon these host countries. Today, 86 percent of the world’s refugees reside in a low- or middle-income country, against 70 percent 20 years ago (Edwards 2016; UNHCR 2015, 15. The humanitarian consequences of this approach are becoming increasingly clear. Last year more than 5,000 migrants and refugees were registered dead or missing in the Mediterranean (IOM 2016. A record number, this makes the Mediterranean account for more than two-thirds of all registered migrant fatalities worldwide (IOM 2016. Many more  asylum seekers are subjected to various forms of violence and abuse during the migratory process as a result of their inherently vulnerable and clandestine position. As the industry

  8. Asia and nuclear revival in the relationships between powers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farghen, Morgane

    2016-01-01

    The author notices that the nuclear gravity is moving eastward: North Korea keeps on developing its sensitive nuclear and armament programmes, China is then to play a crucial role in this respect as Japan and South Korea feel seriously threatened, and China, India and Pakistan are developing at high rate nuclear programmes (with a still high tension between India and Pakistan). The author also notices that the Russian influence on these issues is weaker than before, and that Asian countries represent a more important concern for the USA who are facing difficulties to ensure their extended deterrence. Moreover, China's nuclear power becomes more present on the oceans, notably in the Indian and Pacific oceans. The author discusses some common nuclear and strategic interests and approaches between China and Russia. After having evoked issues and situations regarding the interactions between Asia and Europe in different crisis locations, the author discusses possible adaptations for the American deterrence policy and defence posture

  9. Democracy and Deterrence: Foundations for an Enduring World Peace

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-05-01

    countries. Imports of medicines and new health care systems have improved living conditions. Modern technol- ogy and new methods of production have moved...Serbia & Montenegro DEM CI 3 7.02 71 Trinidad & Tobago DEM CO 6 7.01 72 El Salvador DEM CI 7 6.99 73 Croatia DEM CI 6 6.98 74 Mongolia DEM CI 6 6.94...determine what its position would be should the USSR attack Chinese nuclear plants , Nixon secretly warned the USSR not to do so. During the 1973 Yom

  10. From Just War to Nuclear Pacifism: The Evolution of U.S. Christian Thinking about War in the Nuclear Age, 1946–1989

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stephen R. Rock

    2018-05-01

    Full Text Available During the Cold War, two basic schools of thought emerged among U.S. Christian leaders and ethicists concerning the implications of the nuclear revolution for the use of force by the United States. The just war thinkers held that nuclear war could in fact be conducted within the bounds of traditional just war principles, particularly those of discrimination and proportionality. Since nuclear weapons could be used in war, it followed that they could and should be developed and produced for that purpose and for the purpose of deterrence. The nuclear pacifists held that nuclear war could not be conducted within the confines of traditional just war principles. Since by its nature nuclear war could not be moral, there was no reason for the development and production of nuclear weapons, except for the purpose of deterrence. And since nuclear deterrence required one to make threats of nuclear destruction that it would not be moral to carry out, and, moreover, carried unacceptable risks of miscalculation and inadvertent or accidental use of nuclear weapons, deterrence itself could not be justified, except perhaps as a temporary way station on the path to nuclear disarmament. Although the just war thinkers initially held sway, over time they became less dominant. By the middle of the 1980s, the U.S. Catholic Church and most of the largest Mainline Protestant denominations had formally adopted a nuclear pacifist position. This essay chronicles the victory of nuclear pacifism in these churches, explains it as a reaction to the nuclear weapons and doctrine advocated by the just war thinkers, and implemented by the U.S. government and military, as well as other events and trends in American society, and inquires as to whether or not the just war thinkers and nuclear pacifists influenced the course of U.S. policy.

  11. Predicting DUI decisions in different legal environments: investigating deterrence with a conjoint experiment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yao, Jie; Johnson, Mark B; Beck, Kenneth H

    2014-01-01

    Driving under the influence (DUI) enforcement practices and sanctions contribute differentially to the certainty, swiftness, and severity of punishment, which are the key components of general deterrence theory. This study used a conjoint experiment to understand the decision-making process of potential DUI offenders and tested how variation in enforcement and legal punishment affects drinking and driving decisions. It sought to verify and quantify the unique deterrent effects of certainty, severity, and swiftness and to predict the rates of drinking and driving in different legal environments. One hundred twenty-one college seniors and graduate students at the University of Maryland participated in the Web-based conjoint experiment. They were randomly assigned to 4 blocks, each of which included 9 hypothetical scenarios composed of different levels of DUI enforcement and penalties. Respondents were asked to state their likelihood of drinking and driving under each scenario, as well as their estimated chance of being caught by the police for DUI. Intensified enforcement, harsh jail penalty, and immediate long license suspension were found to be the strongest deterrents to drinking and driving. Alternative ways to get home were also important in reducing people's willingness to drive. These factors accounted for most of the attribute effect on the DUI decision, whereas delayed punishment due to judicial processing, fine penalty, and legal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit had negligible effects. For the personal characteristics, college seniors and those who had previously driven after drinking were more likely to choose to drink and drive, whereas those who expect a jail penalty for a DUI offense were less likely to drive. Our research confirmed and quantified certainty of punishment as the greatest deterrent to DUI, but it also indicated the equally important effect of a severe jail penalty. It provides evidence on the feasibility of using a conjoint

  12. Crossed glances at a nuclearized Iran; Regards croises sur un Iran nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grandperrier, Catherine

    2011-11-01

    Nuclearizing Iran is a sensible topic which disturbs the established deterrence equilibrium of the main nuclearized powers and the interests of all signatories of the non-proliferation treaty. This book analyses the Iranian nuclear crisis, the US perception of the Iranian threat, the perception of the threat against Israel, and in parallel, the perspectives of evolution of the Iranian economy. The question of a possible change of the European Union and US standpoints with respect to the Iranian nuclear activity is addressed

  13. The threat of nuclear war

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    This report aims to describe the present threat of nuclear war, with particular reference to New Zealand, and the increasing concern felt by many scientists, from a scientific viewpoint but in non-technical language. It surveys what is known about nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use, and attention is drawn to the importance of penetrating the language and examining the assumptions made in the propaganda about n uclear deterrence . The tasks involved in maintaining the present peace and attempting to establish an agreed disarmament is examined. The report pays particular attention to the roles of scientists in these endeavours

  14. Nuclear weapons in Europe: Why zero is better

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Daalder, I.H.

    1993-01-01

    Given the fundamental changes in the political context and NATO's perception of nuclear weapons, what role remains for US nuclear weapons in preserving security in Europe? Are US nuclear deployments on the continent still necessary? Is there a requirement for extended deterrence and, if so, does its credibility depend on the continued basing of US nuclear weapons in Europe? And what is the role of arms control in effecting any desirable restructuring in nuclear force postures? In addressing these questions, it becomes clear that US nuclear weapons can now be removed from Europe - they no longer serve the political and military functions they once did

  15. Nuclear Forensics and Attribution for Improved Energy Security: The Use of Taggants in Nuclear Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kristo, M J; Robel, M; Hutcheon, I D

    2007-01-01

    The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), recently announced by DOE Secretary Bodman, poses significant new challenges with regard to securing, safeguarding, monitoring and tracking nuclear materials. In order to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, new technologies must be developed to reduce the risk that nuclear material can be diverted from its intended use. Regardless of the specific nature of the fuel cycle, nuclear forensics and attribution will play key roles to ensure the effectiveness of nonproliferation controls and to deter the likelihood of illicit activities. As the leader of the DHS nuclear and radiological pre-detonation attribution program, LLNL is uniquely positioned to play a national leadership role in this effort. Ensuring that individuals or organizations engaged in illicit trafficking are rapidly identified and apprehended following theft or diversion of nuclear material provides a strong deterrent against unlawful activities. Key to establishing this deterrent is developing the ability to rapidly and accurately determine the identity, source and prior use history of any interdicted nuclear material. Taggants offer one potentially effective means for positively identifying lost or stolen nuclear fuels. Taggants are materials that can be encoded with a unique signature and introduced into nuclear fuel during fuel fabrication. During a nuclear forensics investigation, the taggant signature can be recovered and the nuclear material identified through comparison with information stored in an appropriate database. Unlike serial numbers or barcodes, microtaggants can provide positive identification with only partial recovery, providing extreme resistance to any attempt to delete or alter them

  16. Nuclear

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2000-01-01

    The first text deals with a new circular concerning the collect of the medicine radioactive wastes, containing radium. This campaign wants to incite people to let go their radioactive wastes (needles, tubes) in order to suppress any danger. The second text presents a decree of the 31 december 1999, relative to the limitations of noise and external risks resulting from the nuclear facilities exploitation: noise, atmospheric pollution, water pollution, wastes management and fire prevention. (A.L.B.)

  17. EXTENDING THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR DETERRENCE UMBRELLA TO THE MIDDLE EAST

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-05-01

    22 Robert D. Kaplan , Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific (New York: Random House, 2014), 166. 23 Office of the...25 Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, NY: W. W. Norton and Company, 1992), 416. 26 Anderson and... Kaplan , Robert D. Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific. New York: Random House, 2014. Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle

  18. The DTIC Review. Volume 1, Number 1: Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence in a Changing Political World

    Science.gov (United States)

    1995-08-01

    Mathematical Expectation" by David Schmeidler and Peter Wakker, "Expected Utility Hypothesis" by Mark Machina, "Rational Behavior" by Amartya Sen ...other regional adversaries are not secure and, hence, are highly sen - sitive to this form of pressure. The question is whether such threats can be used...Warsaw Pact." Moreover, conventional military capabilities are constantly changing through advances in armor, avionics, sen - sors, munitions. etc

  19. An Analysis of the Morality of Intention in Nuclear Deterrence, with Special Reference to Final Retaliation

    Science.gov (United States)

    1990-01-01

    conditions taken together stress the relative value to the agent of the two intentions. 3.3 Nonfulfillment of the Evil Intention The third condition...caant coditionally isnted to do what one is cumin one will now have occeaj o So me.’ Dasard William (p. 107) offm-aad Michal Doummo (p M2) atua-a

  20. Ovipositional Deterrence of Methanolic and Etherial Extracts of Five Plants to the Cowpea Bruchid, Callosobruchus maculatus (F. (Coleoptera: Bruchidae

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    E.A. Elhag

    1999-06-01

    Full Text Available Methanol and diethyl ether extracts of Harmal, Rhazya stricta Decne.; neem seed kernels, Azadirachta indica A.Juss; cloves, Syzygeum aromarticum (L.; citrus peel and Ramram, Heliotropium bacciferum (Forssk- were evaluated for their deterrence to oviposition by Callosobruchus maculatus (F. on chickpeas in choice tests. Both extracts of all materials significantly reduced oviposition on treated seeds. Maximum deterrent effects (91.8% were obtained in the neem seed methanol extract at 0.5% concentration, citrus peel O. l% ether extract (90.9%, R stricta 0.5% methanol extract (83.9%, and clove 0. 1% ether extract (80.0%. Methanol extracts of neem seeds and R. stricta evoked higher deterrent effects than their etherial extracts, whereas the responses for cloves and citrus peel were more pronounced in their ether extracts. H. bacirferum % deterrency due to both types of extracts were practically identical. The results encourage future incorporation of such plant extracts as ovipositional deterrents in stored-product lPM programmes.

  1. The introduction of a potentially abuse deterrent oxycodone formulation: Early findings from the Australian National Opioid Medications Abuse Deterrence (NOMAD) study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Degenhardt, Louisa; Bruno, Raimondo; Ali, Robert; Lintzeris, Nicholas; Farrell, Michael; Larance, Briony

    2015-06-01

    There is increasing concern about tampering of pharmaceutical opioids. We describe early findings from an Australian study examining the potential impact of the April 2014 introduction of an abuse-deterrent sustained-release oxycodone formulation (Reformulated OxyContin(®)). Data on pharmaceutical opioid sales; drug use by people who inject drugs regularly (PWID); client visits to the Sydney Medically Supervised Injecting Centre (MSIC); and last drug injected by clients of inner-Sydney needle-syringe programmes (NSPs) were obtained, 2009-2014. A cohort of n=606 people tampering with pharmaceutical opioids was formed pre-April 2014, and followed up May-August 2014. There were declines in pharmacy sales of 80mg OxyContin(®) post-introduction of the reformulated product, the dose most commonly diverted and injected by PWID. Reformulated OxyContin(®) was among the least commonly used and injected drugs among PWID. This was supported by Sydney NSP data. There was a dramatic reduction in MSIC visits for injection of OxyContin(®) post-introduction of the new formulation (from 62% of monthly visits pre-introduction to 5% of visits, August 2014). The NOMAD cohort confirmed a reduction in OxyContin(®) use/injection post-introduction. Reformulated OxyContin(®) was cheaper and less attractive for tampering than Original OxyContin(®). These data suggest that, in the short term, introduction of an abuse-deterrent formulation of OxyContin(®) in Australia was associated with a reduction in injection of OxyContin(®), with no clear switch to other drugs. Reformulated OxyContin(®), in this short follow-up, does not appear to be considered as attractive for tampering. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  2. Moves to withdraw nuclear weapons from NATO?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dumoulin, A.

    2008-01-01

    The American nuclear landscape in Europe could change in the coming months. The signs are already there, and a new strategic posture will have major implications for the Europeans as well as for the visibility of France deterrent force. Nonetheless, the Georgian crisis, tensions with Iran, Russian muscle flexing and NATO's line cast doubt on the idea that a partial or even complete withdrawal of American B-61 bombs could be on the agenda at the Alliance's 60. anniversary in April 2009. (author)

  3. The psychology of the nuclear balance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonntag, P.

    1981-01-01

    The balance of military forces is meant to prevent war. But it is a very precarious balance, which becomes all the more dubious when the deterrent is no longer psychologically effective: when the country attacked is deterred from striking back with nuclear weapons. A unilateral disarmament above the overkill level would be possible without endangering the balance. It would improve the climate for mutual disarmament. (orig.) [de

  4. Development of an advanced safeguards system as a proliferation deterrent

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayers, A.A.; Barnes, L.D.

    1978-11-01

    The Advanced Safeguards System consists of Computerized Nuclear Materials Control and Accounting System, Physical Protection System, and Safeguards Coordination Center (SCC). Should all the computer-based monitoring systems be overcome (i.e., the NMC computer programmed not to recognize a materials inventory change, the SCC computer programmed to accept a falsified area and personnel authorization, and the physical security system programmed not to alarm for area intrusion), the requirements of the physical security system remain formidable barriers to successful theft since all SNM is separated from the uncontrolled areas by at least one entry control portal. An egress from the protected area--by either a vehicle through the vehicle access portal, or on foot through the personnel access portal--requires that the individuals be subjected to a search for metal and SNM before egress is permitted. The material access areas are further controlled by an interior access portal imposing the same SNM and metal search criteria. The portal search criteria are not subject to computer interpretation, but direct positive--negative indications to the portal patrolman. The physical security system then provides an independent backup should the computerized systems be defeated. Thus, the computer systems themselves will not, if defeated, guarantee an adversary success. The corollary also holds true; a defeat of the physical search elements of the physical security system will not guarantee adversary success because of the monitoring/surveillance function of the computerized systems. The complementary and overlapping nature of the safeguards systems is intended to provide multiple layers of safeguards, each layer providing an effective element of protection. Tests to date indicate that it appears feasible to meet operational objectives and maintain a high safeguards performance level using these concepts which are being incorporated into the Advanced Safeguards System.None

  5. Conference day - Dissuasion, proliferation, disarmament: the nuclear debate beyond 2010. Conference proceedings; Journee d'etude - Dissuasion, proliferation, desarmement: le debat nucleaire apres 2010. Actes de la conference

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-09-15

    A first set of contributions (round tables) addresses the relationship between NATO, nuclear deterrence and antimissile defence. The second set of contributions addresses nuclear policies of emerging powers (Russia, China, Iran...) and proliferation risks. The third one addresses the perspectives of non proliferation, civil nuclear energy actors, and disarmament

  6. Larvicidal, ovicidal, and oviposition-deterrent activities of four plant extracts against three mosquito species.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Prathibha, K P; Raghavendra, B S; Vijayan, V A

    2014-05-01

    In mosquito control programs, insecticides of botanical origin have the potential to eliminate eggs, larvae, and adults. So, the larvicidal, ovicidal, and oviposition-deterrent activities of petroleum ether and ethyl acetate extracts of the leaves of Eugenia jambolana, Solidago canadensis, Euodia ridleyi, and Spilanthes mauritiana were assayed against the three vector mosquito species, namely Anopheles stephensi, Aedes aegypti, and Culex quinquefasciatus. The larval bioassay was conducted following the World Health Organization method. The maximum larval mortality was found with ethyl acetate extract of S. mauritiana against the larvae of A. stephensi, A. aegypti, and C. quinquefasciatus with LC50 values of 11.51, 28.1, 14.10 ppm, respectively. The mean percent hatchability of the ovicidal activity was observed at 48-h post-treatment. The percent hatchability was found to be inversely proportional to the concentration of the extract and directly proportional to the number of eggs. The flower head extract of S. mauritiana gave 100% mortality followed by E. ridleyi, S. canadensis, and E. jambolana against the eggs of the three mosquito vectors. For oviposition-deterrent effect, out of the five concentrations tested (20, 40, 60, 80, and 100 ppm), the concentration of 100 ppm showed a significant egg laying-deterrent capacity. The oviposition activity index value of E. jambolana, E. ridleyi, S. canadensis, and S. mauritiana against A. aegypti, A. stephensi, C. quinquefasciatus at 100 ppm were -0.71, -0.71, -0.90, -0.93, -0.85, -0.91, -1, -1, -0.71, -0.85, -1, and -1, respectively. These results suggest that the leaf/flower extracts of certain local plants have the potential to be developed as possible eco-friendly means for the control of mosquitoes.

  7. Production, perceptions, and punishment: restrictive deterrence in the context of cannabis cultivation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nguyen, Holly; Malm, Aili; Bouchard, Martin

    2015-03-01

    American authorities have invested extraordinary resources to keep up with the growth in cannabis cultivation, and state-level cannabis laws have been changing rapidly. Despite these changes, little research on the relationship between criminal justice sanctions and grower behaviours exist, in particular research that examines restrictive deterrence - the altering of an illegal behaviour as opposed to desisting from it completely. We examine restrictive deterrence in the context of cannabis cultivation by modelling the relationship between the threat of sanctions and the size of cultivation site and number of co-offenders. We use data from an anonymous web survey where participants were recruited through advertisements on websites related to cannabis use and cultivation. Negative binomial regression were used on 337 cases that contain valid data on size of cultivation site and 338 cases that contain valid data on the number of co-offenders. Our study found some evidence that the severity of state sanctions reduces the size of cultivation sites among growers who reside in the state. However, the number of contacts with the police had the opposite effect. In addition, we did not find a restrictive deterrent effect for the number of co-offenders, suggesting that different factors affect different decision points. Interestingly, objective skill and subjective skill had positive and independent effects on size of site. Results suggest that state-level sanctions have a structuring effect by restricting the size of cultivation sites but further increases in sanctions or enforcement are unlikely to deter more individuals from growing cannabis. In fact, there may be some potential dangers of increased enforcement on cannabis growers. Copyright © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  8. Feeding and oviposition deterrent activities of microencapsulated cardamom oleoresin and eucalyptol against Cydia pomonella

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Orkun Baris Kovanci

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available Behavioral manipulation of codling moth with spice-based deterrents may provide an alternative control strategy. Microencapsulation technology could lead to more effective use of spice essential oils and oleoresins in the field by extending their residual activity. The feeding and oviposition deterrent potential of the microencapsulated cardamom (Elettaria cardamomum [L.] Maton oleoresin (MEC-C and eucalyptol (MEC-E were evaluated against codling moth, Cydia pomonella Linnaeus, 1758. MEC-C capsules contained both 1,8-cineole and a-terpinyl acetate, whereas MEC-E capsules contained only 1,8-cineole. In larval feeding bioassays, MEC-E exhibited the lowest feeding deterrent activity (33% while MEC-C at 100 mg mL-1 had the highest (91%. The highest oviposition deterrence activity against gravid females was also shown by MEC-C at 100 mg mL-1 with 84% effective repellency. In 2010 and 2011, two apple orchards were divided into four 1 ha blocks and sprayed with the following treatments in ultra-low volume sprays: (a MEC-E at 100 g L-1, (b MEC-C at 50 g L-1, (c MEC-C at 100 g L-1, and (d MEC-pyrethrin at 15 mL L-1. Water-treated abandoned orchards were used as negative controls. Moth catches were monitored weekly using Ajar traps baited with the combination of codlemone, pear ester, and terpinyl acetate. Based on pooled data, mean cumulative moth catch per trap per week was significantly higher in the MEC-E blocks (26.3 male and 13.5 female moths than those in other treatments except the abandoned blocks. At mid-season and pre-harvest damage assessment, the percentage of infested fruits with live larvae in the high dose MEC-C-treated blocks was reduced to 1.9% and 2.3% in 2010 and to 1.1% and 1.8% in 2011, respectively. Since fruit damage exceeded the economic damage threshold of 1%, high-dose MEC-C treatment may only offer supplementary protection against codling moth in integrated pest management programs.

  9. Advanced techniques for the analysis of crisis stability, deterrence, and latency

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Canavan, G.H.

    1998-12-31

    This is the final report of a one-year, Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The principal results of studies on crisis stability, deterrence, and latency are presented in their order of development. They capture the main features of stability analysis; relate first strike, crisis, and arms control stability as seen from US and Russian perspective; and address whether different metrics, uncertain damage preferences, or the deployment of defenses can be destabilizing. The report explores differences between unilateral and proportional force reductions in the region of deep reductions where concern shifts from stability to latency.

  10. Assessing the Impact of a Focused Deterrence Strategy to Combat Intimate Partner Domestic Violence.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sechrist, Stacy M; Weil, John D

    2018-03-01

    The Offender Focused Domestic Violence Initiative (OFDVI) represents for the first time anywhere the application of the evidence-based focused deterrence policing approach to combat intimate partner domestic violence (IPDV). Through holding offenders accountable, the strategy has resulted in 20% reductions each in IPDV-related calls for police service and arrests. Victim injuries have been significantly reduced and the 1-year IPDV offender recidivism rate is about 16-17%. The backbone of the OFDVI strategy is the multidisciplinary collaboration of law enforcement and community partners which has resulted in identification and resolving system issues which have historically allowed offenders to repeat IPDV without consequence.

  11. Deterrence of device counterfeiting, cloning, and subversion by substitution using hardware fingerprinting

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hamlet, Jason R; Bauer, Todd M; Pierson, Lyndon G

    2014-09-30

    Deterrence of device subversion by substitution may be achieved by including a cryptographic fingerprint unit within a computing device for authenticating a hardware platform of the computing device. The cryptographic fingerprint unit includes a physically unclonable function ("PUF") circuit disposed in or on the hardware platform. The PUF circuit is used to generate a PUF value. A key generator is coupled to generate a private key and a public key based on the PUF value while a decryptor is coupled to receive an authentication challenge posed to the computing device and encrypted with the public key and coupled to output a response to the authentication challenge decrypted with the private key.

  12. Challenges Involved in the Development and Delivery of Abuse-deterrent Formulations of Opioid Analgesics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cohen, Joshua P; Mendoza, Mario; Roland, Carl

    2018-02-01

    This commentary examines the development, regulatory, and reimbursement challenges facing abuse-deterrent formulation (ADF) products. In January 2017, the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development convened a roundtable to explore clinical development, regulatory, and reimbursement challenges with respect to ADFs of opioid analgesics. Roundtable participants, who included a range of pharmaceutical industry and other experts, discussed multiple challenges. First, several key clinical development challenges were identified and discussed. These challenges pertain to prodrug development and development of deterrents against oral abuse. Second, experts suggested that more clarity is needed from regulatory authorities regarding standards for proving ADF labeling claims and for being rewarded with 3-year data exclusivity. Similarly, given the substantial burdens associated with the development of postapproval evidence generation, experts raised the need for a consistent regulatory policy related to postapproval evidence generation for all ADFs (branded and generic). Third, despite the public health benefits of certain ADF products, current coverage and access policies impede patient access. Payer justification for restrictive policies appears to be based more on budget impact considerations than cost-effectiveness. Fourth, there remains a need to further expand the evidence base regarding clinical and cost-effectiveness as well as abuse deterrence in a real-world setting for all ADF products. Clinical development challenges need to be overcome with respect to novel ADF technologies, such as prodrugs and deterrents against oral abuse. More clarity is needed from regulatory authorities on labeling claims and data exclusivity eligibility with respect to ADFs. Ensuring prescriber training and awareness of various options for treating pain, including ADF products, is an important step, as is educating payers about the public health benefits of ADFs in appropriate

  13. Testing the effectiveness of an acoustic deterrent for gray whales along the Oregon coast

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lagerquist, Barbara [Oregon State University Marine Mammal Institute; Winsor, Martha [Oregon State University Marine Mammal Institute; Mate, Bruce [Oregon State University Marine Mammal Institute

    2012-12-31

    This study was conducted to determine whether a low-powered sound source could be effective at deterring gray whales from areas that may prove harmful to them. With increased interest in the development of marine renewal energy along the Oregon coast the concern that such development may pose a collision or entanglement risk for gray whales. A successful acoustic deterrent could act as a mitigation tool to prevent harm to whales from such risks. In this study, an acoustic device was moored on the seafloor in the pathway of migrating gray whales off Yaquina Head on the central Oregon coast. Shore-based observers tracked whales with a theodolite (surveyor’s tool) to accurately locate whales as they passed the headland. Individual locations of different whales/whale groups as well as tracklines of the same whale/whale groups were obtained and compared between times with the acoustic device was transmitting and when it was off. Observations were conducted on 51 d between January 1 and April 15, 2012. A total of 143 individual whale locations were collected for a total of 243 whales, as well as 57 tracklines for a total of 142 whales. Inclement weather and equipment problems resulted in very small sample sizes, especially during experimental periods, when the device was transmitting. Because of this, the results of this study were inconclusive. We feel that another season of field testing is warranted to successfully test the effectiveness of the deterrent, but recommend increasing the zone of influence to 3 km to ensure the collection of adequate sample sizes. Steps have been taken to acquire the necessary federal research permit modification to authorize the increased zone of influence and to modify the acoustic device for the increased power. With these changes we are confident we will be able to determine whether the deterrent is effective at deflecting gray whales. A successful deterrent device may serve as a valuable mitigation tool to protect gray whales, and

  14. Nuclear Forensics Technologies in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shinohara, N.; Kimura, Y.; Okubo, A.; Tomikawa, H.

    2015-01-01

    Nuclear forensics is the analysis of intercepted illicit nuclear or radioactive material and any associated material to provide evidence for nuclear attribution by determining origin, history, transit routes and purpose involving such material. Nuclear forensics activities include sampling of the illicit material, analysis of the samples and evaluation of the attribution by comparing the analysed data with database or numerical simulation. Because the nuclear forensics methodologies provide hints of the origin of the nuclear materials used in illegal dealings or nuclear terrorism, it contributes to identify and indict offenders, hence to enhance deterrent effect against such terrorism. Worldwide network on nuclear forensics can lead to strengthening global nuclear security regime. In the ESARDA Symposium 2015, the results of research and development of fundamental nuclear forensics technologies performed in Japan Atomic Energy Agency during the term of 2011-2013 were reported, namely (1) technique to analyse isotopic composition of nuclear material, (2) technique to identify the impurities contained in the material, (3) technique to determine the age of the purified material by measuring the isotopic ratio of daughter thorium to parent uranium, (4) technique to make image data by observing particle shapes with electron microscope, and (5) prototype nuclear forensics library for comparison of the analysed data with database in order to evaluate its evidence such as origin and history. Japan’s capability on nuclear forensics and effective international cooperation are also mentioned for contribution to the international nuclear forensics community.

  15. Security culture for nuclear facilities

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gupta, Deeksha; Bajramovic, Edita

    2017-01-01

    Natural radioactive elements are part of our environment and radioactivity is a natural phenomenon. There are numerous beneficial applications of radioactive elements (radioisotopes) and radiation, starting from power generation to usages in medical, industrial and agriculture applications. But the risk of radiation exposure is always attached to operational workers, the public and the environment. Hence, this risk has to be assessed and controlled. The main goal of safety and security measures is to protect human life, health, and the environment. Currently, nuclear security considerations became essential along with nuclear safety as nuclear facilities are facing rapidly increase in cybersecurity risks. Therefore, prevention and adequate protection of nuclear facilities from cyberattacks is the major task. Historically, nuclear safety is well defined by IAEA guidelines while nuclear security is just gradually being addressed by some new guidance, especially the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS), IEC 62645 and some national regulations. At the overall level, IAEA NSS 7 describes nuclear security as deterrence and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear, other radioactive substances and their associated facilities. Nuclear security should be included throughout nuclear facilities. Proper implementation of a nuclear security culture leads to staff vigilance and a high level of security posture. Nuclear security also depends on policy makers, regulators, managers, individual employees and members of public. Therefore, proper education and security awareness are essential in keeping nuclear facilities safe and secure.

  16. For a convention for nuclear weapon elimination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-03-01

    This document contains two texts linked with the project of an international convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons (the text of this project has been sent to the UN General Secretary and is part of an international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, ICAN). These two texts are contributions presented in London at the Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-free World. The first one calls into question the deterrence principle and the idea of a nuclear weapon-based security. It calls for different forms of action to promote a nuclear weapon-free world. The second text stresses the role and the responsibility of states with nuclear weapons in nuclear disarmament and in the reinforcement of the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT)

  17. A Biomimetic Ultrasonic Whistle for Use as a Bat Deterrent on Wind Turbines

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sievert, Paul; Seyed-Aghazadeh, Banafsheh; Carlson, Daniel; Dowling, Zara; Modarres-Sadeghi, Yahya

    2016-11-01

    As wind energy continues to gain worldwide prominence, more and more turbines are detrimentally influencing bat colonies. In 2012 alone, an estimated 600,000 bats were killed by wind turbines in the United States. Bats show a tendency to fly towards turbines. The objective of this work is to deter bats from the proximity of the swept area of operational wind turbine blades. Established field studies have shown that bats avoid broadband ultrasonic noise on the same frequency spectrum as their echolocation chirps. A biomimetic ultrasonic pulse generator for use as a bat deterrent on wind turbines is designed and studied experimentally. This device, which works based on the fundamentals of flow-induced oscillations of a flexible sheet is a whistle-like device inspired by a bat larynx, mechanically powered via air flow on a wind turbine blade. Current device prototypes have proven robust at producing ultrasound across the 20 - 70 kHz range for flow inlet velocities of 4 - 14 m/s. Ultimately, a deterrent as described here could provide a reliable, cost-effective means of alerting bats to the presence of moving turbine blades, reducing bat mortality at wind facilities, and reducing regulatory uncertainty for wind facility developers. The financial support provided by the US Department of Energy, and the Massachusetts Clean Energy center is acknowledged.

  18. Structure-activity relationship studies on the mosquito toxicity and biting deterrency of callicarpenal derivatives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cantrell, Charles L; Klun, Jerome A; Pridgeon, Julia; Becnel, James; Green, Solomon; Fronczek, Frank R

    2009-04-01

    Callicarpenal (=13,14,15,16-tetranorclerod-3-en-12-al=[(1S,2R,4aR,8aR)-1,2,3,4,4a,7,8,8a-octahydro-1,2,4a,5-tetramethylnaphthalen-1-yl]acetaldehyde; 1) has previously demonstrated significant mosquito bite-deterring activity against Aedes aegypti and Anopheles stephensi in addition to repellent activity against host-seeking nymphs of the blacklegged tick, Ixodes scapularis. In the present study, structural modifications were performed on callicarpenal (1) in an effort to understand the functional groups necessary for maintaining and/or increasing its activity and to possibly lead to more effective insect control agents. All modifications in this study targeted the C(12) aldehyde or the C(3) alkene functionalities or combinations thereof. Mosquito biting deterrency appeared to be influenced most by C(3) alkene modification as evidenced by catalytic hydrogenation that resulted in a compound having significantly less effectiveness than 1 at a test amount of 25 nmol/cm2. Oxidation and/or reduction of the C(12) aldehyde did not diminish mosquito biting deterrency, but, at the same time, none of the modifications were more effective than 1 in deterring mosquito biting. Toxicities of synthesized compounds towards Ae. aegypti ranged from an LD50 value of 2.36 to 40.11 microg per mosquito. Similarly, LD95 values ranged from a low of 5.59 to a high of 104.9 microg.

  19. Active Travel Behavior in a Border Region of Texas and New Mexico: Motivators, Deterrents, and Characteristics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sener, Ipek N; Lee, Richard J

    2017-08-01

    Active travel has been linked with improved transportation and health outcomes, such as reduced traffic congestion and air pollution, improved mobility, accessibility, and equity, and increased physical and mental health. The purpose of this study was to better understand active travel characteristics, motivators, and deterrents in the El Paso, TX, region. A multimodal transportation survey brought together elements of transportation and health, with a focus on attitudinal characteristics. The analysis consisted of an initial descriptive analysis, spatial analysis, and multivariate binary and ordered-response models of walking and bicycling behavior. The motivators and deterrents of active travel differed for walkers, bicyclists, and noncyclists interested in bicycling. The link between active travel and life satisfaction was moderated by age, with a negative association for older travelers. This effect was stronger for bicycling than it was for walking. Based on the findings, several interventions to encourage walking and bicycling were suggested. These included infrastructure and built environment enhancements, workplace programs, and interventions targeting specific subpopulations.

  20. Effects of an electric field on white sharks: in situ testing of an electric deterrent.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Charlie Huveneers

    Full Text Available Elasmobranchs can detect minute electromagnetic fields, <1 nV cm(-1, using their ampullae of Lorenzini. Behavioural responses to electric fields have been investigated in various species, sometimes with the aim to develop shark deterrents to improve human safety. The present study tested the effects of the Shark Shield Freedom7™ electric deterrent on (1 the behaviour of 18 white sharks (Carcharodon carcharias near a static bait, and (2 the rates of attacks on a towed seal decoy. In the first experiment, 116 trials using a static bait were performed at the Neptune Islands, South Australia. The proportion of baits taken during static bait trials was not affected by the electric field. The electric field, however, increased the time it took them to consume the bait, the number of interactions per approach, and decreased the proportion of interactions within two metres of the field source. The effect of the electric field was not uniform across all sharks. In the second experiment, 189 tows using a seal decoy were conducted near Seal Island, South Africa. No breaches and only two surface interactions were observed during the tows when the electric field was activated, compared with 16 breaches and 27 surface interactions without the electric field. The present study suggests that the behavioural response of white sharks and the level of risk reduction resulting from the electric field is contextually specific, and depends on the motivational state of sharks.

  1. Effects of an Electric Field on White Sharks: In Situ Testing of an Electric Deterrent

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huveneers, Charlie; Rogers, Paul J.; Semmens, Jayson M.; Beckmann, Crystal; Kock, Alison A.; Page, Brad; Goldsworthy, Simon D.

    2013-01-01

    Elasmobranchs can detect minute electromagnetic fields, shark deterrents to improve human safety. The present study tested the effects of the Shark Shield Freedom7™ electric deterrent on (1) the behaviour of 18 white sharks (Carcharodon carcharias) near a static bait, and (2) the rates of attacks on a towed seal decoy. In the first experiment, 116 trials using a static bait were performed at the Neptune Islands, South Australia. The proportion of baits taken during static bait trials was not affected by the electric field. The electric field, however, increased the time it took them to consume the bait, the number of interactions per approach, and decreased the proportion of interactions within two metres of the field source. The effect of the electric field was not uniform across all sharks. In the second experiment, 189 tows using a seal decoy were conducted near Seal Island, South Africa. No breaches and only two surface interactions were observed during the tows when the electric field was activated, compared with 16 breaches and 27 surface interactions without the electric field. The present study suggests that the behavioural response of white sharks and the level of risk reduction resulting from the electric field is contextually specific, and depends on the motivational state of sharks. PMID:23658766

  2. Choosing Psychiatry as a Career: Motivators and Deterrents at a Critical Decision-Making Juncture

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wiesenfeld, Lesley; Abbey, Susan; Takahashi, Sue Glover; Abrahams, Caroline

    2014-01-01

    Objective To examine factors influencing the choice of psychiatry as a career between residency program application and ranking decision making. Methods: Using an online questionnaire, applicants to the largest Canadian psychiatry residency program were surveyed about the impact of various factors on their ultimate decision to enter psychiatry residency training. Results: Applicants reported that patient-related stigma was a motivator in considering psychiatry as a career, but that negative comments from colleagues, friends, and family about choosing psychiatry was a deterrent. Training program length, limited treatments, and insufficient clerkship exposure were noted as deterrents to choosing psychiatry, though future job prospects, the growing role of neuroscience, and diagnostic complexity positively influenced choosing psychiatry as a specialty. Research and elective time away opportunities were deemed relatively unimportant to ranking decisions, compared with more highly weighted factors, such as program flexibility, emphasis on psychotherapy, service– training balance, and training program location. Most applicants also reported continuing to fine tune ranking decisions between the application and ranking submission deadline. Conclusions: Stigma, exposure to psychiatry, diagnostic complexity, and an encouraging job market were highlighted as positive influences on the choice to enter psychiatry residency. Interview and information days represent opportunities for continued targeted recruitment activity for psychiatry residency programs. PMID:25161070

  3. Nuclear challenges for the 21. century in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farghen, Morgane

    2015-01-01

    The author proposes an analysis of the issues of nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons in Asia. She notices a new trend under the form of a strategic arms race under the influence of different factors, notably the increasing political, economic and military power of China. She analyses how this increasing power is present at the international level, impacts the Asian political environment, how nuclear deterrence acts, and how China can use this power to provoke tensions with Japan about territorial disputes. She comments the more traditional issues of proliferation related to North Korea and Pakistan, the challenge that regional disarmament raises for the international community, the challenges raised for deterrence by the re-sizing of strategic forces in Asia, programme diversification and technological competition

  4. The power of the will and the French nuclear programme; Volontarisme du programme nucleaire francais

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Boureille, P. [Ministre de la Defense, Dept. Marine, Service Historique de la Defense, 75 - Paris (France)

    2010-03-15

    Using certain key episodes in the development of the French nuclear deterrent as examples, the author illustrates the extent to which boldness of decision-making, combined with far-thinking and resolute vision, is the foundation of any international defence policy built for the long term. (author)

  5. Nuclear disarmament: France as a model; Desarmement nucleaire: prendre la France pour modele

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wodka-Gallien, Philippe [Institut francais d' analyse strategique, 12-14 rue du general Niox, 75016 Paris (France)

    2012-02-15

    The path taken by the French nuclear weapon programme shows unceasing pragmatism combined with a will to maintain the deterrence capability of the arsenal and the position it accords the country in the world's strategic structure. The abolition recommended by the US President would leave military matters open to conventional superpowers

  6. Nuclear propulsion: an indispensable know-how to national sovereignty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Picard, Michel; Tertrais, Bruno

    2006-01-01

    This report proposes a detailed presentation of the role nuclear-powered submarines in the French defence strategy, policy and security, and also a focus on the role of nuclear propulsion in these respects. The first part presents an overview of the role of submarines in the French strategy. It addresses the choice and interest of a deterrence policy for France, describes the role of submarines in this deterrence, and the role of SSNs in the French defence and security policy (support to deterrence, other strategic functions, protection). In the second part, the authors highlight the crucial role of nuclear propulsion by proposing an overview of a century of submarine evolution, by outlining their stealth and detection in above water and underwater warfare, by presenting SSBNs, by giving an overview of the different capacities of modern SSNs (weapons, above water warfare, under water warfare, ground strike capacities, special operations). It finally proposes an assessment of submarine operations. The last part addresses perspectives of evolution of operational requirements within the framework of the French strategy, its consequences on submarine acquisition programmes (for France and for the USA), its consequences in terms of numbers of SSNs and SSBNs, and its consequences in terms necessity of an industrial background. It also addresses European perspectives in terms of design, construction and abilities in the field of nuclear propulsion, and briefly other applications in marine nuclear propulsion. Issues of export and proliferation are also briefly addressed. Appendices propose presentations of the existing fleet of SSNs and SSBNs in the world

  7. Post-Cold War frameworks for US nuclear policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mackay, L.S. Jr.

    1993-01-01

    This thesis contends that the passing of the Cold War has produced a disintegration of the fit between the grand strategy of containment and the nuclear policy of strategic deterrence. The primary sources of that disintegration are: the altered political circumstances from both of largescale military conflict; and the emergence of nuclear proclivities and capabilities in developing states. This thesis uses a three step process to construct a framework for a successor U.S. nuclear policy given the national goals of economic liberty, conservation of national institutions, promotion of democratic principles, and collegiality with like-minded states. The first part is dedicated to the construction of a policy-relevant and paradigmatic description of the nascent security environment. The most useful description is one which emphasizes the structural antipathy between the coterie of economically advanced, culturally similar, and politicially liberal states of western Europe, North America, and northeast Asia, and other, lesser developed polities. The second part, with the aid of simple analytic models, examines the theory of nuclear weapons doctrine as it pertains to an archetypally defined deterrence. Further models incorporating sequential decision making, relative gains analysis, and power/preference asymmetries demonstrate the prevalence and relative strengths and limitations of Prisoner's Dilemma as a deterrence system. The third part integrates the core-periphery paradigm and the analytic insights into a two-tiered framework of companion U.S. nuclear policies. A fourth part summarizes the implications of this analysis for U.S. forces and doctrine

  8. Russian's nuclear gambit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rostow, E.V.

    1984-01-01

    The Soviet strategy is to use arms control agreements to neutralize Western Europe by separating it from the US by building political pressure to allow the Soviets to have nuclear superiority. Rostow believes that an adequate nuclear deterrent and a solid alliance system can withstand the pressure of the Soviet arms buildup and propaganda without succumbing to defeatist view. Soviet-American equality is the basic issue in the I.N.F. and START talks. It is essential to counter the Soviet position that the British, French, and Chinese weapons must be included even though they are not significant to the Soviet Union. Criticism of the Reagan administration's ''hard line'' on this matter plays into Soviet hands. Reagan's greatest contribution may come if he resists the temptation to compromise for political gain

  9. Nuclear Security and the Way Forward

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mrabit, Khammar

    2013-01-01

    Nuclear security has always been taken seriously. There is ample evidence that traditional deterrence does not necessarily obstruct those with malicious intent, who can also operate across borders. This understanding of the threat has highlighted the need to adopt a vigorous approach to protecting nuclear materials, associated facilities and activities in order to strengthen nuclear security worldwide. States recognize that there is a credible threat of nuclear or other radioactive material falling into the wrong hands and that this threat is global. An international legal framework for nuclear security, national nuclear security infrastructures, and the IAEA's leading role are some of the building blocks of an effective international nuclear security framework that contributes to effectively addressing this threat

  10. Feeding deterrent compounds to the boll weevil,Anthonomus grandis Boheman in Rose-of-Sharon,Hibiscus syriacus L.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bird, T G; Hedin, P A; Burks, M L

    1987-05-01

    The Rose-of-Sharon,Hibiscus syriacus (L.), can be a significant alternate host plant for the boll weevil,Anthonomus gradis (Boh.). Boll weevils are known to be deterred from feeding and ovipositing in the buds unless the calyx is removed. This investigation was initiated to identify calyx allelochemicals that deter feeding with the eventual strategy of breeding for cotton lines high in these allelochemicals in the appropriate tissues. The feeding deterrency of calyx tissue from the buds of Rose-of-Sharon for the boll weevil was confirmed. The most active deterrent fraction was found to contain mostly fatty acids and their methyl esters. Saturated fatty acids and their methyl esters were generally found to be stimulatory, while the unsaturated species were found to be deterrent. Higher quantities of the fatty acids, particularly the unsaturated species, were found in Rose-of-Sharon calyx tissue than in the buds without calyx. This supports the hypothesis developed through the isolational work and testing of standards that the unsaturated fatty acids are significant deterrents of boll weevil feeding.

  11. Bioassay-guided isolation and identification of Aedes aegypti larvicidal and biting deterrent compounds from Veratrum lobelianum

    Science.gov (United States)

    An ethanol extract from Veratrum lobelianum Bernh. rhizomes was evaluated for biting deterrent and larvicidal activity against Aedes aegypti. V. lobelianum extract showed larvicidal activity with LC50 values of 11.79 ppm and 89.9 ppm against 1st and 4th instar larvae, respectively, at 24 h post-trea...

  12. Which future for nuclear counter-proliferation?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duval, M.

    2010-01-01

    Dealing with the case of nuclear weapons possessed by nuclear states (but not eventually by terrorists), the author first identifies the constants of counter-proliferation: it is linked to interest conflicts between those who try to preserve their monopoly and those who try to acquire a new weapon either because of a threat or for reasons of regional prestige, the evolution from use to deterrence, the appearance of new actors after the USA and Russia, the role of nuclear tactical weapons, and the future of Russian weapons and know-how. He presents the international counter-proliferation context: the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA and its controls, the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the nuclear-free zones, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). He describes how and why proliferation occurs: uranium enrichment and plutonium technology, political reasons in different parts of the world. Then, he gives an overview of the proliferation status by commenting the cases of Israel, Iraq, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. He discusses the future of proliferation (involved countries, existence of a nuclear black market) and of counter-proliferation as far as Middle-East and North Korea are concerned. He tries finally to anticipate the consequences for nuclear deterrence strategy, and more particularly for Europe and France

  13. How Close is too Close? The Effect of a Non-Lethal Electric Shark Deterrent on White Shark Behaviour.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kempster, Ryan M; Egeberg, Channing A; Hart, Nathan S; Ryan, Laura; Chapuis, Lucille; Kerr, Caroline C; Schmidt, Carl; Huveneers, Charlie; Gennari, Enrico; Yopak, Kara E; Meeuwig, Jessica J; Collin, Shaun P

    2016-01-01

    Sharks play a vital role in the health of marine ecosystems, but the potential threat that sharks pose to humans is a reminder of our vulnerability when entering the ocean. Personal shark deterrents are being marketed as the solution to mitigate the threat that sharks pose. However, the effectiveness claims of many personal deterrents are based on our knowledge of shark sensory biology rather than robust testing of the devices themselves, as most have not been subjected to independent scientific studies. Therefore, there is a clear need for thorough testing of commercially available shark deterrents to provide the public with recommendations of their effectiveness. Using a modified stereo-camera system, we quantified behavioural interactions between white sharks (Carcharodon carcharias) and a baited target in the presence of a commercially available, personal electric shark deterrent (Shark Shield Freedom7™). The stereo-camera system enabled an accurate assessment of the behavioural responses of C. carcharias when encountering a non-lethal electric field many times stronger than what they would naturally experience. Upon their first observed encounter, all C. carcharias were repelled at a mean (± std. error) proximity of 131 (± 10.3) cm, which corresponded to a mean voltage gradient of 9.7 (± 0.9) V/m. With each subsequent encounter, their proximity decreased by an average of 11.6 cm, which corresponded to an increase in tolerance to the electric field by an average of 2.6 (± 0.5) V/m per encounter. Despite the increase in tolerance, sharks continued to be deterred from interacting for the duration of each trial when in the presence of an active Shark Shield™. Furthermore, the findings provide no support to the theory that electric deterrents attract sharks. The results of this study provide quantitative evidence of the effectiveness of a non-lethal electric shark deterrent, its influence on the behaviour of C. carcharias, and an accurate method for testing

  14. How Close is too Close? The Effect of a Non-Lethal Electric Shark Deterrent on White Shark Behaviour.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ryan M Kempster

    Full Text Available Sharks play a vital role in the health of marine ecosystems, but the potential threat that sharks pose to humans is a reminder of our vulnerability when entering the ocean. Personal shark deterrents are being marketed as the solution to mitigate the threat that sharks pose. However, the effectiveness claims of many personal deterrents are based on our knowledge of shark sensory biology rather than robust testing of the devices themselves, as most have not been subjected to independent scientific studies. Therefore, there is a clear need for thorough testing of commercially available shark deterrents to provide the public with recommendations of their effectiveness. Using a modified stereo-camera system, we quantified behavioural interactions between white sharks (Carcharodon carcharias and a baited target in the presence of a commercially available, personal electric shark deterrent (Shark Shield Freedom7™. The stereo-camera system enabled an accurate assessment of the behavioural responses of C. carcharias when encountering a non-lethal electric field many times stronger than what they would naturally experience. Upon their first observed encounter, all C. carcharias were repelled at a mean (± std. error proximity of 131 (± 10.3 cm, which corresponded to a mean voltage gradient of 9.7 (± 0.9 V/m. With each subsequent encounter, their proximity decreased by an average of 11.6 cm, which corresponded to an increase in tolerance to the electric field by an average of 2.6 (± 0.5 V/m per encounter. Despite the increase in tolerance, sharks continued to be deterred from interacting for the duration of each trial when in the presence of an active Shark Shield™. Furthermore, the findings provide no support to the theory that electric deterrents attract sharks. The results of this study provide quantitative evidence of the effectiveness of a non-lethal electric shark deterrent, its influence on the behaviour of C. carcharias, and an accurate

  15. The continuing nuclear challenge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Karp, R.C.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that Declining threat perceptions in the superpower relationship make the need for compellent threats less pressing and reduce demands upon the credibility of extended deterrence. Nuclear arms control and reductions can create survivable forces forestalling all but irrational incentives for a first strike. Conventional arms control can restructure national armies to such an extent that crises can be weathered without recourse to arms, thus reducing the risk of nuclear escalation. The post-cold war era presents an opportunity to make meaningful progress in these areas and should serve to remind states that their security may not need to be based on the threat to use nuclear weapons. States that place a high status value on nuclear weapons and those at the nuclear threshold may not agree with this assessment. But if co-operative security structures can be found and acted upon, the allure of nuclear status may also decline. And, with an improving US-Soviet relationship, regional security problems that have led states to acquire nuclear weapons may become more amenable to solution by joint diplomatic initiatives. None of these measures are easily achievable not are they likely to be undertaken in a concerted fashion. However, unlike in the past, the post-cold war environment makes these steps feasible

  16. CYBER DETERRENCE

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-02-11

    credibility in building alliances, deterring enemies, and preventing costly wars. Dr. Press identified the relationship of a country’s credibility...separate networks with different security administrators and 9 firewalls . Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary...question when forming the basis for retaliation.42 Attribution when possible can be very costly and time consuming. This can be best explained in

  17. Routes of abuse of prescription opioid analgesics: a review and assessment of the potential impact of abuse-deterrent formulations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gasior, Maciej; Bond, Mary; Malamut, Richard

    2016-01-01

    Prescription opioid analgesics are an important treatment option for patients with chronic pain; however, misuse, abuse and diversion of these medications are a major global public health concern. Prescription opioid analgesics can be abused via intended and non-intended routes of administration, both intact or after manipulation of the original formulation to alter the drug-delivery characteristics. Available data indicate that ingestion (with or without manipulation of the prescribed formulation) is the most prevalent route of abuse, followed by inhalation (snorting, smoking and vaping) and injection. However, reported routes of abuse vary considerably between different formulations. A number of factors have been identified that appear to be associated with non-oral routes of abuse, including a longer duration of abuse, younger age, male sex and a rural or socially deprived location. The development of abuse-deterrent formulations of prescription opioid analgesics is an important step toward reducing abuse of these medications. Available abuse-deterrent formulations aim to hinder extraction of the active ingredient, prevent administration through alternative routes and/or make abuse of the manipulated product less attractive, less rewarding or even aversive. There are currently five opioid analgesics with a Food and Drug Administration abuse-deterrent label, and a number of other products are under review. A growing body of evidence suggests that introduction of abuse-deterrent opioid analgesics in the USA has been associated with decreased rates of abuse of these formulations. The availability of abuse-deterrent formulations therefore appears to represent an important step toward curbing the epidemic of abuse of prescription opioid analgesics, while ensuring the availability of effective pain medications for patients with legitimate medical need.

  18. Is a nuclear weapon-free world desirable?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, Bruno

    2009-01-01

    In this article, the author shows that a nuclear weapon-free world would probably be more dangerous than today's world because benefits of the existence of nuclear weapons are probably more important that the risks related to their existence. He outlines that nuclear deterrence has been very efficient for these last 65 years. He states that the disappearance of nuclear weapons could be envisaged only after a large transformation of safety conditions, but that such transformations are actually not at all under way. It would indeed require peaceful and democratic world governance

  19. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

  20. Independence and deterrence. Britain and atomic energy 1945-1952. References to official papers

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gowing, M.

    1979-01-01

    This booklet contains a list of references which were not published in Independence and Deterrence because they related to papers still closed under the 1958 and 1967 Public Records Acts. Since 1974, some post-war records have been reviewed by departments and the UKAEA and have been transferred to the Public Record Office; the earliest are already open and more will, of course, be opened in January each year. This list, unfortunately, cannot distinguish between papers open in the Public Record Office and those still closed in departmental archives. Even if it could, the distinction would become progressively out-of-date. We have however given as much information as we can to assist searchers. (author)

  1. Long-term effects of alternative deterrence policies: Panel data evidence from traffic punishments in Denmark

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Abay, Kibrom Araya; Kahsay, Goytom Abraha

    2018-01-01

    This paper aims to quantify the long-term effects of alternative traffic punishments, ranging from demerit point assignment to conditional suspension of driving privileges. We employ unique longitudinal traffic offense data and exploit the introduction of a point-recording scheme in Denmark. We....... In contrast, a stricter traffic punishment that conditionally suspends the driving license seems to have significant short-run and long-run effects. Our investigation into the types of offenses suggests that the deterrence effects are specific to the offense type for which they are imposed rather than generic...... improvements in driving behavior. These results imply that the effects of some of the existing traffic punishments are not only short-lived but also provide “specific deterrence”....

  2. Beyond just deserts and deterrence: An evolutionary psychology of punishment and rehabilitation

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Petersen, Michael Bang

    2007-01-01

    Recent studies indicate that punishment is driven by just deserts motives rather than deterrence motives. In the just deserts perspective, punishment is based on the seriousness of the crime, and rehabilitative alternatives to punishment are only expected to be considered when the seriousness...... is low. By drawing on recent advances in evolutionary psychology, a range of contrasting expectations are developed. Especially, it is expected that the choice between punishment and rehabilitation is determined by assessing the future social value of the criminal. The expectations are supported by data...... from a large-scale survey, and it is shown that the seriousness of the crime only have direct effects on less psychologically salient dimensions of our reactions. Finally, it is discussed why previous studies have reached different conclusions....

  3. Nesting bird deterrents for the Federal Republic of Germany glass log storage pad

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitchell, R.M.

    1997-01-01

    A proposed storage pad wi11 be constructed in the 200 West Area for the storage of isotopic heat and radiation sources from the Federal Republic of Germany. The pad will be constructed in the southern portion of the Solid Waste Operations Complex near the existing Sodium Storage Pad (Figure 1). Following a biological review by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) personnel (Brandt 1996), it was determined that in order for construction to take place after March 15, 1997, actions would need to be taken to prevent migratory birds from nesting in the project area. Special attention was focused on preventing sage sparrows and loggerhead shrikes, both Hanford Site species of concern (DOE/RL 1996), from nesting in the area. This activity plan details the methods and procedures that will be used to implement these nesting deterrents

  4. The efficacy of control environment as fraud deterrence in local government

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nuswantara Dian Anita

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available In a globalised scenario, the topic of an enormous increase of malfeasance in the local governments, posing catastrophic threats which come from vicious bureaucratic apparatus, becomes a global phenomenon. This current study uses case study material on the risk management control system specially the control environment in Indonesia local governments to extend existing theory by developing a contingency theory for the public sector. Within local government, contingency theory has emerged as a lens for exploring the links between public sector initiatives to improve risk mitigation and the structure of the control system. The case illustrates that the discretion of control environment - the encouragement of a local government’s control environment - is considered as a springboard for fraud deterrence and might be the loopholes in the government control systems.

  5. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities: Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  6. Key Nuclear Verification Priorities - Safeguards and Beyond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2010-01-01

    In addressing nuclear verification priorities, we should look beyond the current safeguards system. Non-proliferation, which the safeguards system underpins, is not an end in itself, but an essential condition for achieving and maintaining nuclear disarmament. Effective safeguards are essential for advancing disarmament, and safeguards issues, approaches and techniques are directly relevant to the development of future verification missions. The extent to which safeguards challenges are successfully addressed - or otherwise - will impact not only on confidence in the safeguards system, but on the effectiveness of, and confidence in, disarmament verification. To identify the key nuclear verification priorities, we need to consider the objectives of verification, and the challenges to achieving these. The strategic objective of IAEA safeguards might be expressed as: To support the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by: - Providing credible assurance that states are honouring their safeguards commitments - thereby removing a potential motivation to proliferate; and - Early detection of misuse of nuclear material and technology - thereby deterring proliferation by the risk of early detection, enabling timely intervention by the international community. Or to summarise - confidence-building, detection capability, and deterrence. These will also be essential objectives for future verification missions. The challenges to achieving these involve a mix of political, technical and institutional dimensions. Confidence is largely a political matter, reflecting the qualitative judgment of governments. Clearly assessments of detection capability and deterrence have a major impact on confidence. Detection capability is largely thought of as 'technical', but also involves issues of legal authority, as well as institutional issues. Deterrence has both political and institutional aspects - including judgments on risk of detection and risk of enforcement action being taken. The

  7. Wind Energy Industry Eagle Detection and Deterrents: Research Gaps and Solutions Workshop Summary Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sinclair, Karin [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); DeGeorge, Elise [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States)

    2016-04-13

    The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA) prohibits the 'take' of these birds. The act defines take as to 'pursue, shoot, shoot at, poison, wound, kill, capture, trap, collect, destroy, molest or disturb.' The 2009 Eagle Permit Rule (74 FR 46836) authorizes the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) to issue nonpurposeful (i.e., incidental) take permits, and the USFWS 2013 Eagle Conservation Plan Guidance provides a voluntary framework for issuing programmatic take permits to wind facilities that incorporate scientifically supportable advanced conservation practices (ACPs). Under these rules, the Service can issue permits that authorize individual instances of take of bald and golden eagles when the take is associated with, but not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful activity, and cannot practicably be avoided. To date, the USFWS has not approved any ACPs, citing the lack of evidence for 'scientifically supportable measures.' The Eagle Detection and Deterrents Research Gaps and Solutions Workshop was convened at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in December 2015 with a goal to comprehensively assess the current state of technologies to detect and deter eagles from wind energy sites and the key gaps concerning reducing eagle fatalities and facilitating permitting under the BGEPA. During the workshop, presentations and discussions focused primarily on existing knowledge (and limitations) about the biology of eagles as well as technologies and emerging or novel ideas, including innovative applications of tools developed for use in other sectors, such as the U.S. Department of Defense and aviation. The main activity of the workshop was the breakout sessions, which focused on the current state of detection and deterrent technologies and novel concepts/applications for detecting and minimizing eagle collisions with wind turbines. Following the breakout sessions, participants were asked about their individual impressions of the

  8. U.S. Nuclear Policy, Strategy, and Force Structure: Insights and Issues from the 1994, 2001, and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-09-01

    community.”251 Senator Jeff Sessions, in the April 17, 2013 Hearing to Receive Testimony on Nuclear Forces and Policies, expressed concern that allies...Sagan’s NFU argument, Timothy Fischer , in a U.S. Army War College study from 2012, countered that the United States should retain a policy of possible...nuclear response to WMD because of the important role of ambiguity in national security policy flexibility and deterrence. Fischer recommended that the

  9. U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and force structure: insights and issues from the 1994, 2001, and 2010 nuclear posture reviews

    OpenAIRE

    Lyons, Marco J.

    2014-01-01

    Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited This thesis examines the main decisions taken in the 1994, 2001, and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews regarding U.S. nuclear capabilities and declaratory strategy, and the policy debates that followed the publication of each NPR, focusing on deterrence and other objectives of U.S. national security strategy. It analyzes and compares the post–Cold War NPRs to understand how each administration attempted to shape and direct policy, and how k...

  10. Impact of antimissile defence on nuclear strategies in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delory, Stephane

    2015-01-01

    As antimissile defence has become a mean to compensate the limitations of nuclear deterrence in Asia, notably within the frame of the US-North Korea relationship, but has also influence on the relationships between countries which do not possess an actual operational antimissile defence like Pakistan and India, the author proposes an assessment of the consequences antimissile defence may have on deterrence logics in Asia. He also notices that various issues must be taken into account: arsenal sizes, the slow rate of ballistic modernisation processes, the weaknesses of C4ISR systems and advanced alarm systems. He recalls the peculiarities of antimissile defence, and then addresses the cases of North Korea, India and Pakistan, and China. For each country, he analyses and discusses the influence of a choice or of the existence of an antimissile defence on the nuclear strategy and doctrine, but also on the posture of other countries like the USA

  11. Going Tactical: Pakistan's Nuclear Posture and Implications for Stability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khan, Feroz Hassan

    2015-09-01

    For decades, the Asian security environment has been characterized by multiple strategic rivalries with cascading effects. Due to its competition with China, India modernizes its armed forces, thus reinforcing its conventional advantage over Pakistan. In the subcontinent, geography, military imbalance, the legacy of past conflicts and infiltration of extremist groups considerably weaken strategic stability. To strengthen its deterrent capability against its stronger neighbour, Pakistan faces significant challenges in developing a conventional response to perceived threats from India. Islamabad thus committed to a 'full spectrum' build-up of its nuclear forces, which includes the development of tactical nuclear weapons. As Cold War experience informs, far from simply strengthening its deterrent vis-a-vis India, this move poses numerous operational dilemmas for Pakistan. The ongoing regional quantitative and qualitative arms race combines with continued political tensions between India and Pakistan to create a worrying strategic dynamic in South Asia. (author)

  12. Feeding and oviposition deterrent activities of flower buds of globemallow,Sphaeralcea emoryi torrey, against boll weevil,Anthonomus grandis Boheman (Coleoptera: Curculionidae).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Honda, H; Bowers, W S

    1996-01-01

    The globemallow,Sphaeralcea emoryi Torrey, a plant native to Arizona was evaluated as a source of feeding or oviposition deterrents to the boll weevil,Anthonomus grandis Boheman. Feeding and oviposition responses of reproductive weevils to the flower buds and artificial diets spiked with dry powder or extracts of the globemallow buds were determined. Boll weevils were deterred from feeding and ovipositing in the flower buds unless the calyxes were removed. Male and virgin female weevils were discouraged from feeding as much as gravid weevils. Secondary chemicals in the flower buds served primarily as feeding deterrents but also prevented oviposition. The concentration of these chemicals was highest in the calyxes of the buds, and potent deterrent activity could be extracted from the calyxes with methanol. Boll weevils were able to perceive the deterrents by contact chemosensory organs on the antennae, maxillary palps and labial palps.

  13. Isolation and identification of mosquito (Aedes aegypti) biting deterrent fatty acids from male inflorescences of breadfruit (Artocarpus altilis (Parkinson)Fosberg)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dried male inflorescences of breadfruit (Artocarpus altilis, Moraceae) are burned in communities throughout Oceania to repel flying insects, including mosquitoes. This study was conducted to identify chemicals responsible for mosquito deterrence. Various crude extracts were evaluated, and the most a...

  14. India's tryst with the atom: unfolding the nuclear story

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sabherwal, O.P.

    2004-01-01

    India's tryst with the atom is the story of a nuclear dream come true. All nuclear weapons states (as per NPT definition) launched their nuclear programmes by acquiring weapon capacity first, and later moved on to peaceful nuclear technologies. India took the reverse route: First building capacity for nuclear power generation and other areas of peaceful application, then having built a nuclear infrastructure and R and D base, moving on to nuclear weapon deterrence. Spectacular results followed. As this book notes: That India with minuscule investment in the weapon programme had jumped into the league of nuclear weapon powers-all of whom had years been throwing a good chunk of their fortune into nuclear weapon making was amazing

  15. What About the Children? The Threat of Nuclear War and Our Responsibility to Preserve this Planet for Future Generations.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hawkes, Glenn W.

    Part of a global effort, this brochure was written to increase understanding of the threat nuclear war poses to children. Several issues are raised and briefly discussed, including (1) the present capacity for annihilating the next generation or ending human life on this planet, (2) the inadequacy of deterrence, (3) the suffering of children after…

  16. Confidence in Nuclear Weapons as Numbers Decrease and Time Since Testing Increases

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adams, Marvin

    2011-04-01

    As numbers and types of nuclear weapons are reduced, the U.S. objective is to maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent without nuclear-explosive testing. A host of issues combine to make this a challenge. An evolving threat environment may prompt changes to security systems. Aging of weapons has led to ``life extension programs'' that produce weapons that differ in some ways from the originals. Outdated and changing facilities pose difficulties for life-extension, surveillance, and dismantlement efforts. A variety of factors can make it a challenge to recruit, develop, and retain outstanding people with the skills and experience that are needed to form the foundation of a credible deterrent. These and other issues will be discussed in the framework of proposals to reduce and perhaps eliminate nuclear weapons.

  17. Nuclear Munitions and Missile Maintenance Officer Attraction and Retention

    Science.gov (United States)

    2009-03-24

    longer provide motivation . Job security, high pay, and good benefits fit in Maslow’s second lowest level, security or safety needs. Frederick Herzberg ...themselves about other subjects, such as nuclear deterrence theory However, a some of Cohen’s other seven motivators also yield insights relative to the 21M...GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR( S ) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME( S ) AND

  18. New nuclear strategy: extreme wrong on the extreme right

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsipis, K.

    1982-01-01

    The author quotes and refutes sixteen statements from an article by L. Beilenson and S. Cohen in the January 24, 1982 New York Times Sunday Magazine. He finds statements of US military inferiority and pleas for increased spending for weapons and civil defense to be not only radical and impractical, but based upon false assumptions. The conservative approach of nuclear deterrence and arms control will require hard work, but is worth the risk

  19. Which future for the nuclear counter-proliferation?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duval, M.

    2004-01-01

    After a recall of the permanent data about proliferation and of the safeguards implemented by the international community, the author demonstrates that proliferation has moved towards Asia where a real 'black market' has been created. Then he analyzes the consequences of this change on the future of nuclear deterrent. Finally, he expresses his nostalgia in front of this drift and worries about the future uselessness of the means devoted to this 'pacifying' strategy. (J.S.)

  20. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: A status report. Vienna, 14 March 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    For more than half a century, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. Further meaningful progress towards a nuclear weapon free world will demand that we re-examine our fundamental concept of what security means and how it can best be achieved. The following specific areas where our attention should be focused are discussed briefly: the historical perspective, current strategies for non-proliferation and disarmament, and the future prospects

  1. Field testing of behavioral barriers for cooling water intake structures -test site 1 - Pickering Nuclear Generating Station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patrick, P.H.; McKinley, R.S.; Micheletti, W.C.

    1988-01-01

    A multi-year research program was developed by the Electric Power Research Institute to evaluate the effectiveness of selected behavioral systems for fish exclusion at sites representative of different aquatic environments. The first test site was the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station (NGS) located on Lake Ontario which represented the Great Lakes environment. A single pneumatic popper, a low frequency, high amplitude sound deterrent, was found to effectively exclude adult alewife, the principal species impinged at Pickering NGS. An air bubble curtain, used either alone or combined with strobe lights, was not a consistent deterrent. Effectiveness of air bubbles was only enhanced when used in association with a popper. Strobe lights were the least effective of the three devices tested. Operation of all three devices together did not surpass the effectiveness of the popper when used alone. Sound deterrents show promise for fish exclusion at generating stations located on the Great Lakes

  2. Grower perception of the significance of weaver ants as a fruit fly deterrent in Tanzanian smallholder mango production

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kirkegaard, Nina; Msogoya, Theodosy; Offenberg, Joachim

    2017-01-01

    Managed populations of weaver ants in mango trees have been used successfully in Australia, SE Asia and parts of Western Africa to deter fruit flies from ovipositing in ripening fruits. The presence of indigenous weaver ants in mango trees of smallholder growers in Tanzania offers the possibility...... of exploiting them as an affordable, environmentally -friendly method to improve marketable fruit yield and quality. In a preliminary interview study in a mango-growing region of rural Tanzania, the farmers were not convinced of any beneficial, deterrent effect attributable to the indigenous weaver ants...... the development of a significant proportion of any deposited eggs. Subsequent field studies supported the grower perceptions as they recorded only an erratic and limited deterrent effect....

  3. Grower Perception of the Significance of Weaver Ants as a Fruit Fly Deterrent in Tanzanian Smallholder Mango Production

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kirkegaard, Nina; Msogoya, Theodosy; Offenberg, Hans Joachim

    2017-01-01

    of exploiting them as an affordable, environmentally -friendly method to improve marketable fruit yield and quality. In a preliminary interview study in a mango-growing region of rural Tanzania, the farmers were not convinced of any beneficial, deterrent effect attributable to the indigenous weaver ants...... in their trees and were sceptical of any likely value as a biological control technique. Additionally, fruit fly infestation was not seen as a priority problem and subsequent enquiry and investigation showed that, fortuitously, traditional, local practices for storage and enhancing ripening prevented...... the development of a significant proportion of any deposited eggs. Subsequent field studies supported the grower perceptions as they recorded only an erratic and limited deterrent effect....

  4. Nuclear test - The French nuclear strike force in the 21. century: challenges, ambitions and strategy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wodka-Gallien, Philippe

    2014-01-01

    This bibliographical note presents a book in which the author, after having recalled the history of the French nuclear force since the first nuclear test in 1960, and outlined the fact that France has been living under the protection of its own nuclear deterrence force since that date, presents the components of this nuclear strike force with its four nuclear submarines equipped to launch new generation missiles, its fifty fighter bomber aircraft equipped with the ASMP-A missile. He presents and discusses the mission of this nuclear force, discusses the relevancy of the deterrence strategy in the present context, and the significance of such a strategy for a European country like France. He wanders whether this strike force is still affordable for our country, which can be its benefits, whether this arsenal remains useful as it has been designed in the Cold War context. He also discusses the disarmament perspectives in an unsteady international environment where power and arms race logics prevail again

  5. Risks of nuclear crisis in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grand, Camille

    2015-01-01

    The author first recalls the history of the emergence of a nuclear Asia, its evolution during and after the Cold War. As Asia appears to be a region combining phenomena of proliferation and of arms race, the author outlines the multiple possibilities of emergence of a nuclear crisis in this region: possibility of conflict between Pakistan and India, the unpredictable behaviour of North Korea, a crisis between China and Taiwan or China and Japan that might result in a US commitment. The author then identifies some peculiarities of Asian nuclear challenges: a context of arms race with rather opaque nuclear postures and doctrines of Asian countries, development of antimissile capacities and of autonomous ballistic programmes in different Asian countries, project of development of anti satellite weapons by China. For all that, nuclear deterrence appears not to be surely operative in Asia

  6. Some issues on Japanese nuclear armament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Endo, Tetsuya

    2007-01-01

    The author considers the possibility that Japanese nuclear armament might be a realistic political option. Firstly introducing various issues on Japanese nuclear armament existing since long time ago, he classifies them according to the view point from internal and international problems. Internally, the armament is not possible at present on the ground of the nation's non-nuclear policy but it might be conditionally a choice in such case as the reliability of US nuclear deterrence declines or possibility of nuclear attack to Japan actually may be predicted. The armament may be possible technically and legally based on the consensus of the people. Various concerns by neighboring countries are discussed. Finally, the author stresses the importance of continuing to consolidate bilateral relationship with US, to deploy missile defensive system and to make every effort in the diplomatic activity for strong international ties and cooperation. (S. Ohno)

  7. Commentary from Westminster. Medical effects of nuclear war.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deitch, R

    1983-03-12

    A British Medical Association report on the medical consequences of nuclear war, scheduled for commercial publication in April 1983, could damage the Government's arguments for maintaining a nuclear deterrent. The gist of the BMA's findings is that Britain could not possibly cope with the aftermath of nuclear attack. Although Prime Minister Thatcher has made no comment, both the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Security have criticized the report's negative conclusions. The BMA is expected to take up the issue at its annual meeting, and the Labour party has called for a Parliamentary debate on the report and its implications.

  8. Motivators and deterrents to blood donation among Black South Africans: a qualitative analysis of focus group data

    Science.gov (United States)

    Muthivhi, T. N.; Olmsted, M. G.; Park, H.; Sha, M.; Raju, V.; Mokoena, T.; Bloch, E. M.; Murphy, E. L.; Reddy, R.

    2015-01-01

    SUMMARY Background and Objectives South Africa has a markedly skewed representation where the majority of blood (62%) is presently collected from an ethnically White minority. This study seeks to identify culturally specific factors affecting motivation of donors in South Africa. Materials and Methods We performed a qualitative study to evaluate motivators and deterrents to blood donation among Black South Africans. A total of 13 focus groups, comprising a total of 97 Black South Africans, stratified by age and geographic location were conducted. Transcripts of the interviews were analysed using a coding framework by Bednall & Bove. Results Participants made 463 unique comments about motivators focusing primarily on promotional communications (28%), incentives (20%) and prosocial motivation (16%). Participants made 376 comments about deterrents which focused primarily on fear (41%), negative attitudes (14%) and lack of knowledge (10%). Conclusion Although prosocial motivation (altruism) was the most frequently mentioned individual motivator, promotional communication elicited more overall comments by participants. As reported by many authors, fear and lack of awareness were strong deterrents, but scepticism engendered by perceived racial discrimination in blood collection were unique to the South African environment. PMID:26104809

  9. Motivators and deterrents to blood donation among Black South Africans: a qualitative analysis of focus group data.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Muthivhi, T N; Olmsted, M G; Park, H; Sha, M; Raju, V; Mokoena, T; Bloch, E M; Murphy, E L; Reddy, R

    2015-08-01

    South Africa has a markedly skewed representation where the majority of blood (62%) is presently collected from an ethnically White minority. This study seeks to identify culturally specific factors affecting motivation of donors in South Africa. We performed a qualitative study to evaluate motivators and deterrents to blood donation among Black South Africans. A total of 13 focus groups, comprising a total of 97 Black South Africans, stratified by age and geographic location were conducted. Transcripts of the interviews were analysed using a coding framework by Bednall & Bove. Participants made 463 unique comments about motivators focusing primarily on promotional communications (28%), incentives (20%) and prosocial motivation (16%). Participants made 376 comments about deterrents which focused primarily on fear (41%), negative attitudes (14%) and lack of knowledge (10%). Although prosocial motivation (altruism) was the most frequently mentioned individual motivator, promotional communication elicited more overall comments by participants. As reported by many authors, fear and lack of awareness were strong deterrents, but scepticism engendered by perceived racial discrimination in blood collection were unique to the South African environment. © 2015 British Blood Transfusion Society.

  10. Waging modern war: An analysis of the moral literature on the nuclear arms debate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palmer-Fernandez, G.F.

    1992-01-01

    The primary aim was to examine the dominant views on the subject of deterrence and the use of nuclear weapons, to compare them with each other, and to consider objections that have or might be made against them. A second, more controversial and substantive, aim was to show that nuclear weapons and war-fighting plans engender some disturbing moral dilemmas that call into question fundamental ways of thinking about morality and some of the common intuitions on the relation of intentions and actions. The author examines the moral literature, both religious and secular, on nuclear arms policy written between the early 1960s and the late 1980s. Three different schools of thought, or 'parties,' are identified. To establish the differences among these parties, the author shows the various ways in which judgments on the use of nuclear weapons and on deterrence are linked either by a prohibitive moral principle which draws a moral equivalence going from action to intention or by a factual assumption about the nature of nuclear weapons. He concludes with the suggestion that the dilemmas that arise in the moral evaluation of nuclear deterrence represent a profound and much wider problem in moral theory between the ideals of character and the moral claims of politics

  11. Attitudes of the Japanese elite toward nuclear issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanaka, Yasumasa

    1979-01-01

    The results of a survey by questionnaire on ''the attitudes of Japanese elite toward nuclear issues'' are described as follows: post-TMI Japanese attitude toward nuclear issues, dominant 'must-is-master' attitude toward nuclear power, domestic enrichment and reprocessing seen as more proliferation-prone, high consensus gained on internationalization of enrichment and reprocessing, diminishing psychological deterrent against nuclear proliferation, dim future of nuclear non-proliferation and growing importance of nuclear-age nationalism, knowledge of leaders concerning the number of nuclear power reactors in Japan. For so-called 'consistency' operating in attitude system, the data were cross-tabulated by the question ''Japan should increase nuclear power to free itself from excessive dependence upon oil imports,'' and the resultant cross-tabulations were submitted to chi-square test. Throughout, the presence of attitudinal consistency was confirmed. (J.P.N.)

  12. Low-dose naloxone provides an abuse-deterrent effect to buprenorphine

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Webster LR

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available Lynn R Webster,1 Michael D Smith,1 Cemal Unal,2 Andrew Finn3 1PRA Health Sciences, Salt Lake City, UT, USA; 2Biometrical Solutions LLC, Raleigh, NC, USA; 3BioDelivery Sciences International, Inc., Raleigh, NC, USA Abstract: In developmental research, plasma buprenorphine concentrations comparable to a 2 mg buprenorphine–naloxone (BN sublingual tablet have been achieved with a 0.75 mg dose of BN buccal film, a small, bioerodible polymer film for application to mucosal membranes. This was a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, single-dose, four-period crossover study in opioid-dependent subjects with chronic pain receiving >100 mg oral morphine equivalents daily who experienced withdrawal following a naloxone challenge dose. The objective of the study was to determine if intravenous (IV naloxone doses of 0.1 and 0.2 mg would produce a withdrawal response when coadministered with a 0.75 mg IV dose of buprenorphine. Fifteen subjects receiving 90–1,260 mg oral morphine equivalents per day enrolled and completed the study. Precipitated withdrawal occurred in 13% (2/15 of placebo-treated subjects and 47% (7/15 of buprenorphine-treated subjects. When combined with the 0.75 mg dose of buprenorphine, a 0.1 mg dose of naloxone increased the incidence of precipitated withdrawal to 60%, and a 0.2 mg dose of naloxone increased the incidence to 73%. By 15 minutes postdose, the mean change in Clinical Opioid Withdrawal Scale (COWS score from predose was 3.0 for placebo, 6.9 for buprenorphine, 9.8 for BN 0.1 mg, and 12.4 for BN 0.2 mg. The mean COWS score with each active treatment was significantly greater than placebo (P<0.001, and the mean COWS score for each of the naloxone-containing treatments was significantly greater than for buprenorphine alone (P<0.001. Naloxone doses as low as 0.1 mg added an abuse-deterrent effect to a 0.75 mg IV dose of buprenorphine. Keywords: opioid dependence, withdrawal symptoms, abuse-deterrent, buprenorphine

  13. The Challenges of Maintaining Nuclear Cultures. US and UK Perspectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brooks, Linton; McKane, Tom

    2016-01-01

    After the world entered the nuclear age, civilian and military organizations have witnessed the slow emergence of nuclear cultures, defined as the set of values and knowledge, shared among the national security community, about the relative importance of nuclear weapons in the country's defense posture, the distinctive features of nuclear weapons in terms of security, safety and operational requirements, and the workings of deterrence. Nuclear cultures have helped to ensure some level of coherence in policy-making and, most importantly, to maintain safe and effective deterrents. At a national level, however, each nuclear culture is confronted with significant challenges, such as generational change, decreasing levels of understanding or attention among the political and military leadership, insufficient funding or a growing inability to meet manpower requirements in both the nuclear weapons complexes and the armed forces. This paper looks at the United States and United Kingdom's recent efforts to maintain their nuclear culture, and at the key challenges these two countries face while pursuing this aim. (authors)

  14. Illicit diversion of nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bett, F.L.

    1975-08-01

    This paper discusses the means of preventing illegal use of nuclear material by terrorists or other sub-national groups and by governments. With respect to sub-national groups, it concludes that the preventive measures of national safeguards systems, when taken together with the practical difficulties of using nuclear material, would make the diversion and illegal use of nuclear material unattractive in comparison with other avenues open to these groups to attain their ends. It notes that there are only certain areas in the nuclear fuel cycle, e.g. production of some types of nuclear fuel embodying highly enriched uranium and shipment of strategically significant nuclear material, which contain material potentially useful to these groups. It also discusses the difficult practical problems, e.g. coping with radiation, which would face the groups in making use of the materials for terrorist purposes. Concerning illegal use by Governments, the paper describes the role of international safeguards, as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the real deterrent effect of these safeguards which is achieved through the requirements to maintain comprehensive operating records of the use of nuclear material and by regular inspections to verify these records. The paper makes the point that Australia would not consider supplying nuclear material unless it were subject to international safeguards. (author)

  15. A Waterborne Pursuit-Deterrent Signal Deployed by a Sea Urchin.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sheppard-Brennand, Hannah; Poore, Alistair G B; Dworjanyn, Symon A

    2017-06-01

    Selection by consumers has led to the evolution of a vast array of defenses in animals and plants. These defenses include physical structures, behaviors, and chemical signals that mediate interactions with predators. Some of the strangest defensive structures in nature are the globiferous pedicellariae of the echinoderms. These are small venomous appendages with jaws and teeth that cover the test of many sea urchins and sea stars. In this study, we report a unique use of these defensive structures by the collector sea urchin Tripneustes gratilla. In both the laboratory and the field, globiferous pedicellariae were unpalatable to fish consumers. When subject to simulated predator attack, sea urchins released a cloud of pedicellaria heads into the water column. Flume experiments established the presence of a waterborne cue associated with this release of pedicellariae that is deterrent to predatory fish. These novel results add to our understanding of how the ecosystem-shaping sea urchin T. gratilla is able to reach high densities in many reef habitats, with subsequent impacts on algal cover.

  16. A Deterrence Approach to Regulate Nurses' Compliance with Electronic Medical Records Privacy Policy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kuo, Kuang-Ming; Talley, Paul C; Hung, Ming-Chien; Chen, Yen-Liang

    2017-11-03

    Hospitals have become increasingly aware that electronic medical records (EMR) may bring about tangible/intangible benefits to managing institutions, including reduced medical errors, improved quality-of-care, curtailed costs, and allowed access to patient information by healthcare professionals regardless of limitations. However, increased dependence on EMR has led to a corresponding increase in the influence of EMR breaches. Such incursions, which have been significantly facilitated by the introduction of mobile devices for accessing EMR, may induce tangible/intangible damage to both hospitals and concerned individuals. The purpose of this study was to explore factors which may tend to inhibit nurses' intentions to violate privacy policy concerning EMR based upon the deterrence theory perspective. Utilizing survey methodology, 262 responses were analyzed via structural equation modeling. Results revealed that punishment certainty, detection certainty, and subjective norm would most certainly and significantly reduce nurses' intentions to violate established EMR privacy policy. With these findings, recommendations for health administrators in planning and designing effective strategies which may potentially inhibit nurses from violating EMR privacy policy are discussed.

  17. Implications of the Ukraine Crisis for Security, Non-Proliferation and Deterrence in North East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farghen, Morgane

    2014-01-01

    The Ukraine crisis has been a 'wake up' call for Europe but its implication in Asia should be also be considered. The Russian 'coup de force' in Ukraine has created a psychological trauma in Western countries not only amongst political and military leaders but also in the general population by its reminiscence of Cold war thinking and by pointing to the risk of a military conflict in Europe. Moreover the Russian attempt to change the borders by force could create a dangerous precedent and produce an undesirable 'butterfly effects' in the rest of the world. In North East Asia, the stability in a context of rising powers and proliferation risks, relies on a status quo based upon the partition of the Korean peninsula, a de facto autonomy of Taiwan and a Japanese administration over the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands. As the status quo is increasingly challenged by revisionist powers, the question is worth to be raised: what are the implications of the Ukraine crisis for security, non-proliferation, and deterrence in North East Asia?

  18. The Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) (Amendment) Act (No. 37 of 1988).

    Science.gov (United States)

    1988-01-01

    This act amends the Bangladesh Cruelty to Women (Deterrent Punishment) Ordinance 1983 to do the following: 1) change the maximum penalty under Sections 4 and 6-8 from transportation for life to imprisonment for life; 2) change the penalty under Section 5 from "punishable with transportation for life or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 14 years" to "punishable with death or with imprisonment for life or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 14 years and shall not be less than seven years;" and 3) add a new offense of attempting to commit offenses under Sections 4 and 5 of the Ordinance. Section 4 of the Ordinance deals with the kidnapping or abduction of women for unlawful or immoral purposes; Section 5 with trafficking in women; Section 6 with causing death or grievous hurt for dowry; Section 7 with causing death in committing rape; and Section 8 with attempting to cause death or causing grievous hurt in committing rape. full text

  19. Estimating attractiveness for abuse of a not-yet-marketed "abuse-deterrent" prescription opioid formulation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Butler, Stephen F; Black, Ryan; Grimes Serrano, Jill M; Folensbee, Lesley; Chang, Alan; Katz, Nathaniel

    2010-01-01

    The present study builds on research to model abusers' perceptions of particular analgesics' attractiveness for abuse and extends these methods to derive an estimate of attractiveness for abuse of a not-yet-marketed abuse-deterrent formulation (ADF) of a prescription opioid (Remoxy), Pain Therapeutics, Inc., San Mateo, CA, and King Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Bristol, TN). In a previous study, the Opioid Attractiveness Technology Scaling (OATS) method identified, from a drug abuser's point of view, the particular features of a prescription opioid relevant to its attractiveness for recreational use. A second online sample rated the extent to which these features applied to particular products they had actually used/abused. These data were used to model the abusers' overall preference for prescription opioids they had used/abused. In the present study, this method was applied to a not-yet-marketed ADF using substance abuse counselors as proxies for prescription opioid abusers. Thirty-eight counselors were given materials describing the new ADF along with four known products. Thirty-two counselors demonstrated sufficient agreement with abusers' ratings of the overall attractiveness of these drugs. The overall model yielded a significant pseudo R(2) of 0.15 (P marketing estimates of attractiveness for abuse of not-yet-marketed ADFs.

  20. Trading on extinction: An open-access deterrence model for the South African abalone fishery

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Douglas J. Crookes

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available South African rhinoceros (e.g.Diceros bicornis and abalone (Haliotis midae have in common that they both are harvested under open-access conditions, are high-value commodities and are traded illegally. The difference is that a legal market for abalone already exists. An open-access deterrence model was developed for South African abalone, using Table Mountain National Park as a case study. It was found that illegal poaching spiked following the closure of the recreational fishery. The resource custodian's objective is to maximise returns from confiscations. This study showed that a legal trade results in a trading on extinction resource trap, with a race for profits, an increase in the probability of detection after a poaching event and the depletion of populations. In contrast with HS Gordon's seminal article (J Polit Econ 1954;62:124-142, profit maximisation does not automatically improve the sustainability of the resource. Under certain conditions (e.g. a legal trade with costly enforcement, profit maximisation may actually deplete abalone populations. The article also has implications for rhino populations, as a legal trade is currently proposed.

  1. The rise of India and its nuclear ambitions; La montee en puissance de l'Inde et ses ambitions nucleaires

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pant, H.V

    2007-07-15

    India, an emerging world power, has relations with all the major powers, and is seen as an element of stability in the world balance. As a nuclear power, India aim is to compete with China for leadership of the Asia-Pacific region. In this article the author describes the coherence in its foreign policy, its deterrent strategy and its ambitions. (author)

  2. International humanitarian law, nuclear weapons and the prospects for nuclear disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anastassov, Anguel

    2013-11-01

    The author first recalls the general principles of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and outlines its main gaps (application of the notion of protected person, classification between own territory and occupied territory). Then and in this respect, he comments the various characteristics of nuclear weapons considered as explosive devices, and notably as they are thus addressed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). He comments the legal status of the ICJ advisory opinions, and more particularly the relationship between the ICJ advisory opinion on nuclear weapons and the IHL. Different aspects are addressed and discussed: the principle of distinction, the prohibition of the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. The author then comments NATO's nuclear policy in the international environment, and discusses the status and condition of nuclear deterrence. In order to address prospects for nuclear disarmament, the author notably compares differences between the arms control and non-proliferation approach, and the humanitarian disarmament approach

  3. Changing relations between civil and military nuclear technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walker, W.B.

    1999-01-01

    Nuclear energy has inhabited two distinct environments since its inception - the environments of nuclear deterrence and of electricity supply. The relationships between the technologies and institutions inhabiting these environments have been both intimate and troublesome. As both nuclear weapons and nuclear power rely upon the fission energy of uranium and plutonium, and as both generate harmful by-products, they are bound to have technologies, materials and liabilities in common. However, nuclear deterrence belongs in the realm of high politics, whilst electricity production is part of the commercial world rooted in civil society. Establishing a political, industrial and regulatory framework that allows nuclear activities to develop safely and acceptably in both domains has been a difficult and contentious task. In this paper I wish to make some observations about the relations between military and civil nuclear technology at the end of this century, and about their likely character in years ahead. My main contention is that developments in the military sector and in international security will remain influential, but that their consequences will be of a different kind than in the past. (orig.)

  4. Iran. Nuclear crisis: towards an overrun?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cherief, Hamza

    2012-01-01

    In this article, the author first shows that the Iranian crisis is a failure of the struggle against nuclear proliferation as Iran seems to possess the technical and scientific abilities to produce nuclear weapons on a medium term. He also notices that this crisis is characterised by a deadlock of legal mechanisms of control of the Iranian nuclear programme: despite UN resolutions and sanctions, the IAEA will not be able able to visit Iranian facilities until Iran decides to enter negotiations again, and the decision by the UN of military actions seems not very likely, at least because of the opposition of China and Russia. In the second part, the author analyses the strategic and geopolitical stakes of the Iranian crisis: the will of Iran to become a regional leader and to counterbalance the Israeli nuclear deterrence, differences of regional interests between western countries, domestic evolutions in Iran. According to the author, both parties share a common interest in a smooth crisis recovery

  5. Perspectives on NATO Nuclear Policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lunn, Simon [Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies - RUSI, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2ET (United Kingdom); Larsen, Jeffrey [Larsen Consulting Group, 3710 Woodland Dr Ste 2100, Anchorage, AK 99517 (United States); Yost, David [Naval Postgraduate School, 1 University Circle, Monterey, CA 93943 (United States); Kamp, Karl-Heinz [NATO Defense College, Via Giorgio Pelosi 1, 00143, Roma (Italy); Edelman, Eric [Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments - CSBA, 1667 K Sreet NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC, 20006 (United States); Valasek, Tomas [Centre for European Reform - CER, 14 Great College Street, Westminster, London, SW1P 3RX (United Kingdom); Garcia Cantalapiedra, David [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Ciudad Universitaria, 28040 Madrid (Spain)

    2011-05-26

    NATO will shortly revisit the question of its nuclear policy and posture as part of the ongoing deterrence and defense posture review (DDPR). This assessment of its nuclear requirements will be take place against the background of two parallel and potentially competing commitments: first, the general support for the goal of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons with the related question of how NATO should contribute to this goal; second, the commitment that in considering the role of nuclear weapons the priority for NATO members is the maintenance of solidarity and cohesion and the consequent determination that decisions on nuclear policy will be taken by the Alliance collectively. There are forcefully expressed arguments on both sides of the debate over whether to maintain or eliminate the remaining arsenal of U.S. nuclear weapons assigned to NATO. On the one hand, they provide coupling, transatlantic links, military capabilities against an uncertain future, and risk and burden sharing. On the other, some allies see benefits to further reductions in the remaining arsenal in the cause of global disarmament. This study presents first the questions and issues for NATO and the future alternatives for NATO nuclear policy. Then, the views from United States, Germany, Turkey, Central and Eastern Europe, Italy and Spain are successively reviewed

  6. Perspectives on NATO Nuclear Policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lunn, Simon; Larsen, Jeffrey; Yost, David; Kamp, Karl-Heinz; Edelman, Eric; Valasek, Tomas; Garcia Cantalapiedra, David

    2011-01-01

    NATO will shortly revisit the question of its nuclear policy and posture as part of the ongoing deterrence and defense posture review (DDPR). This assessment of its nuclear requirements will be take place against the background of two parallel and potentially competing commitments: first, the general support for the goal of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons with the related question of how NATO should contribute to this goal; second, the commitment that in considering the role of nuclear weapons the priority for NATO members is the maintenance of solidarity and cohesion and the consequent determination that decisions on nuclear policy will be taken by the Alliance collectively. There are forcefully expressed arguments on both sides of the debate over whether to maintain or eliminate the remaining arsenal of U.S. nuclear weapons assigned to NATO. On the one hand, they provide coupling, transatlantic links, military capabilities against an uncertain future, and risk and burden sharing. On the other, some allies see benefits to further reductions in the remaining arsenal in the cause of global disarmament. This study presents first the questions and issues for NATO and the future alternatives for NATO nuclear policy. Then, the views from United States, Germany, Turkey, Central and Eastern Europe, Italy and Spain are successively reviewed

  7. Insecticidal and Feeding Deterrent Effects of Fraxinellone from Dictamnus dasycarpus against Four Major Pests

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Huixia Liu

    2013-03-01

    Full Text Available Fraxinellone, a well-known and significant naturally occurring compound isolated from Meliaceae and Rutaceae spp. has been widely used as a drug for the treatment of tumors. On the other hand, fraxinellone exhibited a variety of insecticidal activities including feeding-deterrent activity, inhibition of growth, and larvicidal activity. The present study focused on the antifeedant and larvicidal activities of fraxinellone against the larvae of Lepidoptera, including Mythimna separata, Agrotis ypsilon, Plutella xylostella, and one kind of sanitary pest, Culux pipiens pallens. Meanwhile, the ovicidal activities and the effects of fraxinellone on the larval development of M. separata were also observed. The LC50 values of fraxinellone against 3rd instar larvae of M. separata, 2nd instar larvae of P. xylostella and 4th instar larvae of C. pipiens pallens were 15.95/6.43/3.60 × 10−2 mg mL−1, and its AFC50 values against 5th instar larvae of M. separata, 2nd instar larvae of P. xylostella and 2nd instar larvae of A. ypsilon were 10.73/7.93/12.58 mg mL−1, respectively. Compared with the control group, fraxinellone obviously inhibited the pupation rate and the growth of M. separata. Once M. separata was treated with fraxinellone at concentrations of 5.0, 10.0, and 20.0 mg mL−1, respectively, the stages from the larvae to adulthood and the egg hatching duration were prolonged to 1/2/3, and 4/3/4 days, respectively. Additionally, fraxinellone strongly inhibited the development rate and the egg hatch proportion of M. separata.

  8. Deterrent effect evaluation of vegetal extracts on Papilio thoas brasiliensis (Lepidoptera: Papilionidae Rothschild & Jordan, 1906

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Cupertino de Souza Débora María

    2010-10-01

    Full Text Available A crescente preocupação mundial tem motivado pesquisadores a buscarem alternativas consideradas saudáveis e que controlem insetos-praga e doenças. Dentre estas alternativas, destaca-se a utilização de aleloquímicos extraídos de plantas (Jacobson 1989, pois são produtos naturais que reduzem os efeitos negativos ocasionados pela aplicação descontrolada de inseticidas organossintéticos (Medeiros et al 2005, reduzindo o desenvolvimento de populações resistentes do inseto, e o aparecimento de novas pragas ou a ressurgência de outras (Souza 2004. O uso de extratos de plantas medicinais faz com que determinados componentes ativos presentes nos vegetais, quando utilizados de forma concentrada, atuem no controle de insetos, inibindo sua alimentação ou prejudicando-os após a ingestão (Costa et al 2004. Muitas apresentam sobre os insetos efeito tóxico, inibição de crescimento, redução de fecundidade, fertilidade e repelência dado os compostos metabólicos secundários que apresentam como alcalóides, terpenos, flavonóides e esteróides com propriedades medicinais comprovadas (Di Stasi 1996, se justificado, portanto, o uso delas no controle de pragas. Assim, a presente pesquisa teve por objetivo avaliar o efeito deterrente de extratos de espécies medicinais de Atropa belladonna L. (belladona; Azadirachta indica A. Juss. (nim; Mikania glomerata Spreng. (guaco; Symphytum officinale L. (confrei; Ruta graveolens L. (arruda; sobre Papilio thoas brasiliensis (Lepidoptera: Papilionidae. Na presente pesquisa o destaque deve ser dado ao confrei e nim pelo efeito deterrente apresentado. No presente estudo foi possível determinar que houve deterrência, mas não há como informar se outros efeitos ocorreram somados a esse.

  9. Analysis of pharmacy student motivators and deterrents for professional organization involvement.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Petersen, Erin; Wascher, Molly; Kier, Karen

    2017-07-01

    The purpose of this study was to determine motivators and deterrents impacting a student pharmacist's decision to join professional organizations. The goal was to create a list of meaningful factors that organizations can use for membership recruitment. This descriptive study utilized a blinded electronic survey sent to eight accredited pharmacy schools in Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky. The survey assessed motivating and hindering factors, as well as demographic data. Eight-hundred fifty-six students completed the survey, a 15.05% participation rate. Professional development and networking were the top two endorsed motivational factors, selected as significant by 88.0% and 87.5% respectively. Upon chi-square analysis, networking (pmotivating factors with which membership was found to be significantly influenced. Networking and involvement opportunities were more significant for members while scholarships were a greater motivator among nonmembers. Time required for involvement and cost were the most commonly selected hindrances with 78% and 76% respectively identifying these as significant barriers. The hindering factor found to be significantly different between active members and nonmembers was bylaws/rules of the organization (p=0.032), with non-members rating this as a greater consideration than current members. Multiple factors contribute to a student's decision to join a professional organization. Those active members find greater significance in networking involvement opportunities. Non-member students found scholarships more motivating and recognize bylaws as a consideration for membership more than current members. These results emphasize the multifactorial nature of membership and may direct future membership initiatives. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  10. Deterrents to Organ Donation: A Multivariate Analysis of 766 Survey Respondents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sellers, Marty T; McGinnis, H Scott; Alperin, Melissa; Sweeney, John F; Dodson, Thomas F

    2018-04-01

    Although successful on many fronts, solid organ transplantation fails patients who die on waitlists. Too few organ donors beget this failure. Dispelling misperceptions associated with donation and transplantation would expectedly increase donation and decrease waitlist mortality; recipients would also receive transplants earlier in their disease process, leading to better post-transplantation outcomes. Survey responses to 7 questions pertaining to organ donation and transplantation were analyzed to determine their association with willingness to donate. Subgroup analyses according to race, residence status (rural vs nonrural), and education level were performed. There were 766 respondents; 84.6% were willing to be a donor, 76.2% were female, 79.7% were Caucasian, and 16.5% were African-American. Having concerns about getting inadequate medical care if registered as a donor was the strongest independent predictor of willingness to donate overall (odds ratio 0.21; 95% CI 0.13 to 0.36) and in each subgroup; African Americans were more likely than Caucasians to have this concern (20.2% vs 9.5%; p donate a family member's organs depended on whether a discussion about donation had hypothetically occurred: 61.0% would donate if there had been no discussion; 95.2% would donate if the family member had said "yes" to donation; and 11.0% would donate if the family member had said "no" (p donate a family member's organs (odds ratio 0.40; 95% CI 0.25 to 0.65). The strongest deterrent of willingness to donate one's own or a family member's organs is a misperception that should be correctable. Race and age are less predictive. Efforts to dispel misperceptions and increase donation remain desperately needed to improve waitlist mortality and post-transplantation outcomes. Copyright © 2018 American College of Surgeons. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  11. Russia's nuclear policy in the 21. century environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Trenin, D.

    2005-01-01

    While little noticed by the public, the nuclear standoff that had long been associated with the Soviet-U.S. confrontation continues to exist even a decade and a half after the official end of the Cold War. Nuclear weapons, developed and perfected in the environment of the U.S.-Soviet politico-military confrontation, which they soon came to epitomize, continue to play a prominent role in Washington's and Moscow's defense and security policies. Nuclear deterrence has not been abolished by official zero targeting of missiles and warheads. Even as arsenals are being reduced, modernization and research go ahead. Moreover, in the 21. century's strategic environment, whose principal features include the spread of weapons of mass destruction and catastrophic terrorism; the rise of China as America's future competitor, and the nuclearization of India; and, finally, a general politico-strategic uncertainty, the usability of nuclear weapons, both political and military, is being subtly reconsidered. In the opinion of some experts, a second nuclear age has come. This paper discusses the official nuclear policy of the Russian Federation and the evolution of Russian thinking on the role of nuclear weapons in the 21. century. It seeks to explain the importance of nuclear weapons for post-Soviet Russia; the post-Cold War deterrence strategy; the development of the nuclear forces structure and their missions; as well as Russia's approaches to nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation. Finally, the paper examines the place and role of Russia in the multipolar nuclear constellation of this new century. (author)

  12. Without Testing: Stockpile Stewardship in the Second Nuclear Age

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Martz, Joseph C. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2014-01-07

    Stockpile stewardship is a topic dear to my heart. I’ve been fascinated by it, and I’ve lived it—mostly on the technical side but also on the policy side from 2009 to 2010 at Stanford University as a visiting scholar and the inaugural William J. Perry Fellow. At Stanford I worked with Perry, former secretary of defense, and Sig Hecker, former Los Alamos Lab director (1986–1997), looking at nuclear deterrence, nuclear policy, and stockpile stewardship and at where all this was headed.

  13. Joseph A. Burton Forum Award: Some Nuclear Weapons Dilemmas

    Science.gov (United States)

    May, Michael

    2014-03-01

    Nuclear weapons pose a combination of political and ethical dilemmas the solution to which has not been found. On one hand, in the view of both US government leaders and US allies, nuclear deterrence continues to play an essential part in the US role as the ultimate source of military strength for the alliances among the major democratic countries. It also continues to be in demand by countries that believe themselves to be isolated and threatened. On the other hand, nuclear weapons, besides being effective deterrents, can cause unprecedented loss of life and risk the demise of civilizations. No ban or technical precaution could prevent the rebuilding of nuclear weapons in a crisis. No diplomatic arrangement to date has erased the threat of invasion and war in the world. Only the abandonment of war and the threat of war as instruments of policy can make nuclear weapons obsolete. The slow, halting, risky road to that end remains the only hope for a world in which lasting solutions to the nuclear dilemmas are possible.

  14. (E-Caryophyllene and α-Humulene: Aedes aegypti Oviposition Deterrents Elucidated by Gas Chromatography-Electrophysiological Assay of Commiphora leptophloeos Leaf Oil.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rayane Cristine Santos da Silva

    Full Text Available Aedes aegypti is responsible for the transmission of dengue, a disease that infects millions of people each year. Although essential oils are well recognized as sources of compounds with repellent and larvicidal activities against the dengue mosquito, much less is known about their oviposition deterrent effects. Commiphora leptophloeos, a tree native to South America, has important pharmacological properties, but the chemical profile and applicability of its essential oil in controlling the spread of the dengue mosquito have not been investigated. The aim of this study was to determine the composition of C. leptophloeos leaf oil and to evaluate its larvicidal and oviposition deterrent effects against A. aegypti. Fifty-five components of the essential oil were detected by gas chromatography (GC-mass spectrometry, with α-phellandrene (26.3%, (E-caryophyllene (18.0% and β-phellandrene (12.9% identified as the major constituents. Bioassays showed that the oil exhibited strong oviposition deterrent effects against A. aegypti at concentrations between 25 and 100 ppm, and possessed good larvicidal activity (LC50 = 99.4 ppm. Analysis of the oil by GC coupled with electroantennographic detection established that seven constituents could trigger antennal depolarization in A. aegypti gravid females. Two of these components, namely (E-caryophyllene and α-humulene, were present in substantial proportions in the oil, and oviposition deterrence assays confirmed that both were significantly active at concentrations equivalent to those present in the oil. It is concluded that these sesquiterpenes are responsible, at least in part, for the deterrent effect of the oil. The oviposition deterrent activity of the leaf oil of C. leptophloeos is one of the most potent reported so far, suggesting that it could represent an interesting alternative to synthetic insecticides. The results of this study highlight the importance of integrating chemical and

  15. Numerology in the second nuclear age

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Krepon, M.

    2009-07-01

    The nuclear numbers game has changed. During the Cold War - the first nuclear age - deterrence strategists such as Henry Kissinger, Paul Nitze and Albert Wohlstetter claimed that the nuclear balance mattered, even at extraordinarily high numbers. ' As a result, one great irony of the first nuclear age was that the 'absolute' weapon still lent itself to the twin impulses of seeking advantage and seeking to avoid being placed at a disadvantage. This factor, among others, led to the production of approximately 125,000 U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Nuclear 'numerology' during the Cold War centered around deployed capabilities in various categories, especially 'prompt hard-target kill' capabilities, missile 'throw-weight' and nuclear exchange ratios. By this musty logic, the United States now has more deterrence leverage against Russia than at any time since the Soviet nuclear build-up in the 1960's. This may help explain why the Kremlin feels so protective of its large stocks of tactical nuclear weapons, despite Washington's preferences. US leverage on Moscow also appears to be limited on other matters pertaining to the nuclear order, including ways to persuade North Korea and Iran to adhere to UN Security Council resolutions. Critics of the Obama administration ascribe this lack of suasion to 'soft' leadership that does not command respect or compel preferred behavior. But the 'hard' policies they preferred during the presidency of George W. Bush produced, to put it charitably, mixed results. Whatever value the nuclear numbers game had during the first nuclear age related primarily to contests played out with computers and hand calculators, not to real battlefields where nuclear-armed states fought with weaker foes, including contests between states with and without nuclear weapons. Numerical imbalances have been far more profound between the United States and China. For

  16. Numerology in the second nuclear age

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krepon, M.

    2009-01-01

    The nuclear numbers game has changed. During the Cold War - the first nuclear age - deterrence strategists such as Henry Kissinger, Paul Nitze and Albert Wohlstetter claimed that the nuclear balance mattered, even at extraordinarily high numbers. ' As a result, one great irony of the first nuclear age was that the 'absolute' weapon still lent itself to the twin impulses of seeking advantage and seeking to avoid being placed at a disadvantage. This factor, among others, led to the production of approximately 125,000 U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Nuclear 'numerology' during the Cold War centered around deployed capabilities in various categories, especially 'prompt hard-target kill' capabilities, missile 'throw-weight' and nuclear exchange ratios. By this musty logic, the United States now has more deterrence leverage against Russia than at any time since the Soviet nuclear build-up in the 1960's. This may help explain why the Kremlin feels so protective of its large stocks of tactical nuclear weapons, despite Washington's preferences. US leverage on Moscow also appears to be limited on other matters pertaining to the nuclear order, including ways to persuade North Korea and Iran to adhere to UN Security Council resolutions. Critics of the Obama administration ascribe this lack of suasion to 'soft' leadership that does not command respect or compel preferred behavior. But the 'hard' policies they preferred during the presidency of George W. Bush produced, to put it charitably, mixed results. Whatever value the nuclear numbers game had during the first nuclear age related primarily to contests played out with computers and hand calculators, not to real battlefields where nuclear-armed states fought with weaker foes, including contests between states with and without nuclear weapons. Numerical imbalances have been far more profound between the United States and China. For financial and other reasons, Beijing did not play the nuclear numbers game

  17. Web-based child pornography: The global impact of deterrence efforts and its consumption on mobile platforms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Steel, Chad M S

    2015-06-01

    Our study is the first to look at mobile device use for child sexual exploitation material (CSEM) consumption, and at the global impact of deterrence efforts by search providers. We used data from Google, Bing, and Yandex to assess how web searches for CSEM are being conducted, both at present and historically. Our findings show that the blocking efforts by Google and Microsoft have resulted in a 67% drop in the past year in web-based searches for CSEM. Additionally, our findings show that mobile devices are a substantial platform for web-based consumption of CSEM, with tablets and smartphones representing 32% of all queries associated with CSEM conducted on Bing. Further, our findings show that a major search engine not located in the United States, Yandex, did not undertake blocking efforts similar to those implemented by Google and Microsoft and has seen no commensurate drop in CSEM searches and continues to profit from ad revenue on these queries. While the efforts by Google and Microsoft have had a deterrence effect in the United States, searchers from Russia and other locations where child pornography possession is not criminalized have continued to use these services. Additionally, the same lax enforcement environment has allowed searchers from the United States to utilize Yandex with little fear of detection or referral to United States law enforcement from the Russian authorities. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  18. Blunt impact as deterrent: human approach-avoidance behaviors and other stress responses studied within a paintball gaming context

    Science.gov (United States)

    Short, Kenneth R.; Bergen, Michael T.; DeMarco, Robert M.; Chua, Florence B.; Servatius, Richard J.

    2006-05-01

    Blunt impact munitions are often used by civilian law enforcement and in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) missions to dissuade individuals and groups from approaching valued assets. The use of blunt munitions (rubber-ball or sponge) is predicated on their effectiveness as aversive stimuli; the effectiveness is weighed against the risk of serious injury or death. However, little empirical evidence supports effectiveness. Here, we use a paintball gaming context to study the effects of blunt impact on performance and approach behaviors. Volunteers individually traversed a course in which targets offer the opportunity to gain for accuracy. While completing the targeting task, subjects were bombarded with paintballs, which progressively became more numerous and the impact more intense as the subjects neared goal locations. Initial data suggest that over 30 blunt impacts by paintballs delivered at 280 ft/sec over 30 to 100 ft are insufficient to overcome intrinsic and extrinsic approach motivations or impair targeting or advance performance in an overwhelming majority of subjects. Our apparent ceiling effect was surprising. A sub-comparison of the few subjects who stopped the game before the end with those who did not suggests that personality factors influence the effectiveness of blunt impact as a deterrent. While paintballs differ from traditional blunt impact munitions on a number of physical characteristics, impact that was sufficient to repeatedly bruise volunteers was not an effective deterrent.

  19. Which future for the nuclear counter-proliferation?; Quel avenir pour la contre-proliferation nucleaire?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duval, M

    2004-10-01

    After a recall of the permanent data about proliferation and of the safeguards implemented by the international community, the author demonstrates that proliferation has moved towards Asia where a real 'black market' has been created. Then he analyzes the consequences of this change on the future of nuclear deterrent. Finally, he expresses his nostalgia in front of this drift and worries about the future uselessness of the means devoted to this 'pacifying' strategy. (J.S.)

  20. Evaluation of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad. Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, First Session, June 10, 1993

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1994-01-01

    These hearings address the issue of the US nuclear deterrent bassed on a triad of land-based, air-based, and sea-based ability to deliver nuclear weapons and how the decisions about such a policy were made. The goal is to apply this information to consideration about new weapons systems. Testimony is from the following: Chelimsky, General Accounting Office; Perry, Deputy Secretary of Defense. Written testimony and documents comprise a large part of the hearing

  1. Mitigating the Impact of Bats in Historic Churches: The Response of Natterer’s Bats Myotis nattereri to Artificial Roosts and Deterrence

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zeale, Matt R. K.; Bennitt, Emily; Newson, Stuart E.; Packman, Charlotte; Browne, William J.; Harris, Stephen; Jones, Gareth; Stone, Emma

    2016-01-01

    Bats frequently roost in historic churches, and these colonies are of considerable conservation value. Inside churches, bat droppings and urine can cause damage to the historic fabric of the building and to items of cultural significance. In extreme cases, large quantities of droppings can restrict the use of a church for worship and/or other community functions. In the United Kingdom, bats and their roosts are protected by law, and striking a balance between conserving the natural and cultural heritage can be a significant challenge. We investigated mitigation strategies that could be employed in churches and other historic buildings to alleviate problems caused by bats without adversely affecting their welfare or conservation status. We used a combination of artificial roost provision and deterrence at churches in Norfolk, England, where significant maternity colonies of Natterer’s bats Myotis nattereri damage church features. Radio-tracking data and population modelling showed that excluding M. nattereri from churches is likely to have a negative impact on their welfare and conservation status, but that judicious use of deterrents, especially high intensity ultrasound, can mitigate problems caused by bats. We show that deterrence can be used to move bats humanely from specific roosting sites within a church and limit the spread of droppings and urine so that problems to congregations and damage to cultural heritage can be much reduced. In addition, construction of bespoke roost spaces within churches can allow bats to continue to roost within the fabric of the building without flying in the church interior. We highlight that deterrence has the potential to cause serious harm to M. nattereri populations if not used judiciously, and so the effects of deterrents will need careful monitoring, and their use needs strict regulation. PMID:26771548

  2. Deterrence, Missile Defense, and Collateral Damage in the Iranian-Israeli Strategic Relationship

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Terrill, W. A

    2008-01-01

    One of the central concerns of U.S. strategic analysts examining the Middle East is the danger that Iran may develop a nuclear weapons capability which it could use to threaten the security of other regional states...

  3. A nuclear-armed Iran: a difficult but not impossible policy problem - Lecture note

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sitt, Bernard

    2006-01-01

    This lecture note makes an analysis of a report by Barry R. Posen from The Century Foundation (TCF) and entitled: 'A nuclear-armed Iran: a difficult but not impossible policy problem' (28 Dec 2006). In this report, the author believes that diplomacy would be the ideal outcome in handling the nuclear bomb situation in Iran, but containment and deterrence will be effective if diplomacy fails. He challenges the common fears that arise from Iran's potential possession of a bomb: The fear that Iran would use nuclear threats against nonnuclear neighbors; The fear that Iran would use nuclear weapons to annihilate the state of Israel. To ensure effective deterrence, the United States would need to pursue a strategy of coexistence with a nuclear Iran. In order to do so, the US would have to renew its commitment to the security of the Middle East; US involvement would be required to prevent regional proliferation and to ensure the protection of Iran's neighbors. The present Lecture note analyzes and discusses the 4 threats of a nuclear Iran that need to be dissuaded: a risky and more violent foreign policy; the blackmailing of some neighbor countries; the supply of nuclear weapons to non-state actors; and nuclear strikes against Israel despite inevitable retaliatory measures

  4. Nuclear Legislation in OECD and NEA Countries. Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities - France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    This country profile provide comprehensive information on the regulatory and Institutional Framework governing nuclear activities as well as a detailed review of a full range of nuclear law topics, including: mining regime; radioactive substances; nuclear installations; trade in nuclear materials and equipment; radiation protection; radioactive waste management; non-proliferation and physical protection; transport; and nuclear third party liability. The profile is complemented by reproductions of the primary legislation regulating nuclear activities in the country. Content: I. General Regulatory Framework: 1. General (The French nuclear power programme and its main players; French nuclear law); 2. Mining Regime; 3. Radioactive Substances and Nuclear Equipment (Regulatory diversity; Radioactive sources; Medical activities); 4. Trade in Nuclear Materials and Equipment (Basic nuclear installations - INB; Tax on basic nuclear installations, Additional taxes, Funding nuclear costs; Installations classified for environmental protection purposes (ICPE) using radioactive substances; Nuclear pressure equipment - ESPN; Defence-related nuclear installations and activities - IANID; Emergency plans); 5. Trade in Nuclear Materials and Equipment (General provisions; Patents); 6. Radiation protection (Protection of the public; Protection of workers; Radiation protection inspectors; Labour inspectors; Protection of individuals in a radiological emergency); 7. Radioactive Waste Management (General regulations; Radioactive waste regulations; Discharge of effluents); 8. Non-proliferation and physical protection (Materials not used for the nuclear deterrent; Materials used for the nuclear deterrent); 9. Transport (Licensing and notification regime: Transport of radioactive materials, Transport of nuclear materials, Transport of radioactive substances between member states of the European Union; Methods of transport: Land transport, Sea transport, Air transport, Transport by post); 10

  5. Intermittent sequential pneumatic compression of the legs and thromboembolism-deterrent stockings in the prevention of postoperative deep venous thrombosis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nicolaides, A.N.; Miles, C.; Hoare, M.; Jury, P.; Helmis, E.; Venniker, R.

    1983-01-01

    One hundred fifty patients over the age of 30 who had undergone major abdominal operations were stratified according to the risk of deep venous thrombosis and randomized into three groups to receive different prophylactic regimens: group A, electrical calf stimulation; group B, low-dose subcutaneous heparin; group C, intermittent sequential compression and thromboembolism-deterrent (TED) stockings. All the patients were scanned with the 125 I-fibrinogen test for the whole stay in hospital. The incidence of 125 I-fibrinogen detected deep venous thrombi was 18% in group A, 9% in group B, and 4% in group C. The results indicate that the regimen of intermittent sequential compression and TED stockings is as effective as low-dose subcutaneous heparin. Electrical calf stimulation is less effective

  6. Recent and prospective developments in nuclear arsenals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, M.

    1993-01-01

    Arms controllers have long complained that the only weapons states give up in arms control negotiations are strategically insignificant weapons. This is why the United States and Soviet Union shied away from giving up much in SALT I and SALT II: each side felt that it could not significantly reduce its nuclear forces, or take any step that might give the other side an advantage. Do not be fooled: policy makers in Washington and Moscow still believe that it is important to hang on to strategically significant weapons. But, because the world has changed in fundamental ways, fewer weapons are strategically significant today. Now that extended deterrence requirements have virtually disappeared, the main reason for having nuclear weapons is to deter other nuclear powers from attacking with their nuclear weapons. There is, therefore, no compelling reason for having large nuclear forces. Given concerns about unauthorized attacks, accidental launches, and high levels of defense spending, there are good reasons for deploying smaller forces. This is why Washington and Moscow have been cutting their nuclear arsenals to levels that were unimaginable even in 1990. How far this process will go is impossible to say at this juncture. What is clear is that Washington and Moscow can - and should - make even deeper cuts in their nuclear forces. If the United States and Russia retain arsenals with thousands of nuclear weapons, Britain, France, and China - whose arsenals contain hundreds of nuclear weapons - will not join the arms reduction process. Countries that have promised to give up the nuclear weapons currently stationed on their territory - Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Belorussia - will be more inclined to retain them, on the grounds that nuclear weapons are seen to have strategic and political value. For the same reasons, countries on the nuclear threshold, such as India, will be more inclined to acquire nuclear weapons. If the United States and Russia retain massive nuclear

  7. Russia's Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and Modernization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Podvig, Pavel

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear weapons have traditionally occupied an important place in Russia's national security strategy. This tradition goes back to the Soviet times, when the country invested considerable efforts into building its nuclear arsenal and achieving strategic parity with the United States. As Russia and the United States have been reducing their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, their relationship has undergone a complex transformation toward cooperation and partnership mixed with suspicion and rivalry. The focus of Russia's nuclear policy, however, has remained essentially unchanged - it still considers strategic balance with the United States to be an important element of national security and pays considerable attention to maintaining the deterrent potential of its strategic forces. Russia does recognize the emergence of new threats - it cannot ignore the threats related to regional instabilities and conflicts on its own territory and in bordering states, such as the tensions in the Caucasus or the war in Afghanistan, the terrorist activity that is associated with these conflicts, as well as the problems that stem from nuclear and missile proliferation. These, however, are not given a high priority in Russia's security policy. For example, the new military doctrine adopted in February 2010, opens the list of military threats with the expansion of geographical and political reach of NATO, which is followed by the threat to strategic stability and then by deployment of missile defense. Nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and destabilizing local conflicts are placed much further down the list. Even when it comes to confronting the issues of local instabilities and terrorism, Russia's leadership tends to see these issues through the prism of its strategic strength, alleging that terrorist attacks are a reaction to Russia's perceived weakness. This way of looking at the issues effectively redefines national security problems to conform to the traditional view

  8. Which future for nuclear counter-proliferation?; Quel avenir pour la contre-proliferation nucleaire?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duval, M.

    2010-07-15

    Dealing with the case of nuclear weapons possessed by nuclear states (but not eventually by terrorists), the author first identifies the constants of counter-proliferation: it is linked to interest conflicts between those who try to preserve their monopoly and those who try to acquire a new weapon either because of a threat or for reasons of regional prestige, the evolution from use to deterrence, the appearance of new actors after the USA and Russia, the role of nuclear tactical weapons, and the future of Russian weapons and know-how. He presents the international counter-proliferation context: the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the IAEA and its controls, the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the nuclear-free zones, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). He describes how and why proliferation occurs: uranium enrichment and plutonium technology, political reasons in different parts of the world. Then, he gives an overview of the proliferation status by commenting the cases of Israel, Iraq, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. He discusses the future of proliferation (involved countries, existence of a nuclear black market) and of counter-proliferation as far as Middle-East and North Korea are concerned. He tries finally to anticipate the consequences for nuclear deterrence strategy, and more particularly for Europe and France

  9. Larvicidal and Biting Deterrent Activity of Essential Oils of Curcuma longa, Ar-turmerone, and Curcuminoids Against Aedes aegypti and Anopheles quadrimaculatus (Culicidae: Diptera).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ali, Abbas; Wang, Yan-Hong; Khan, Ikhlas A

    2015-09-01

    Essential oils and extract of Curcuma longa, ar-turmerone, and curcuminoids were evaluated for their larvicidal and deterrent activity against mosquitoes. Ar-turmerone and curcuminoids constituted 36.9, 24.9 and 50.6% of rhizome oil, leaf oil, and rhizome extract, respectively. Ar-turmerone was the major compound of the rhizome oil (36.9%) and leaf oil (24.9%). The ethanolic extract had 15.4% ar-turmerone with 6.6% bisdesmethoxycurcumin, 6.1% desmethoxycurcumin, and 22.6% curcumin. In in vitro studies, essential oils of the leaf (biting deterrence index [BDI] = 0.98), rhizome (BDI = 0.98), and rhizome ethanolic extract (BDI = 0.96) at 10 µg/cm(2) showed biting deterrent activity similar to DEET at 25 nmol/cm(2) against Aedes aegypti L. Among the pure compounds, ar-turmerone (BDI = 1.15) showed the biting deterrent activity higher than DEET at 25 nmol/cm(2) whereas the activity of other compounds was lower than DEET. In Anopheles quadrimaculatus Say, only ar-turmerone showed deterrent activity similar to DEET. In dose-response bioassay, ar-turmerone showed significantly higher biting deterrence than DEET at all the dosages. Ar-turmerone, at 15 nmol/cm(2), showed activity similar to DEET at 25 nmol/cm(2) and activity at 5 nmol/cm(2) was similar to DEET at 20 and 15 nmol/cm(2). Leaf essential oil with LC(50) values of 1.8 and 8.9 ppm against larvae of An. quadrimaculatus and Ae. aegypti, respectively, showed highest toxicity followed by rhizome oil and ethanolic extract. Among the pure compounds, ar-turmerone with LC(50) values of 2.8 and 2.5 ppm against larvae of An. quadrimaculatus and Ae. aegypti, respectively, was most toxic followed by bisdesmethoxycurcumin, curcumin, and desmethoxycurcumin. © The Authors 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Entomological Society of America. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  10. Institutional Strain and Precarious Values in Meeting Future Nuclear Challenges

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bruce Matthews; Todd R. LaPorte

    1998-11-01

    This paper explores the implications of moderately expanding plutonium "pit" production capability within the strongly R&D culture of Los Alamos National Laboratory, especially in terms of the lab's current capacity or "fitness for the future" in which institutional stewardship of the nation's nuclear deterrent capability becomes a primary objective. The institutional properties needed to assure "future fitness" includes the organizational requisites highly reliable operations and sustained institutional constancy in a manner that evokes deep public trust and confidence. Estimates are made of the degree to which the key Division and most relevant Program office in this evolution already exhibits them.

  11. Simulation in the service of deterrence; Le Programme Simulation au service de la dissuasion

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rannou, Jean

    2012-02-15

    From this detailed account of the work and challenges of the Directorate of Military Applications of the French Atomic Energy Commission we can gain a measure of the demanding scientific and diplomatic structure within which nuclear weapons are maintained in France. Simulation is now at the heart of the matter

  12. Deterrence, denuclearization, and proliferation: Alternative visions of the next fifty years

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lehman, R.F. II

    1994-02-12

    The great library of Alexandria may have contained fewer volumes than the number which have been written on the subject of nuclear weapons in the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, a new nuclear library is in the making. Much thought is being given to the next steps in nuclear policy, strategy, forces, arms control, and nonproliferation. For this very distinguished conference, however, I have been asked to look further ahead indeed, forward fifty-years. Prognostication is always a risky business. Detailed predictions beyond the shortest duration are difficult to label as ``scientific`` even in the social sciences. Forecasting ahead fifty years in an age of ever accelerating change would seem to be hopeless. Projecting the future of nuclear weapons, however, may not be as complex as one might think. Detailing the future fifty years from now is not necessary. We want to inform upcoming decisions by examining the possibilities, not write a history in advance of what is to happen. Our look forward con benefit from a brief look back fifty years. In retrospect, those years passed quickly, and with each additional year, analysts make them appear more simple than they seemed at the time. This paper contributes further to this process of oversimplification, as we say, ``for heuristic purposes.`` When in doubt, I have erred on the side of being provocative.

  13. Deterrence, denuclearization, and proliferation: Alternative visions of the next fifty years

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lehman, R.F. II.

    1994-01-01

    The great library of Alexandria may have contained fewer volumes than the number which have been written on the subject of nuclear weapons in the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, a new nuclear library is in the making. Much thought is being given to the next steps in nuclear policy, strategy, forces, arms control, and nonproliferation. For this very distinguished conference, however, I have been asked to look further ahead indeed, forward fifty-years. Prognostication is always a risky business. Detailed predictions beyond the shortest duration are difficult to label as ''scientific'' even in the social sciences. Forecasting ahead fifty years in an age of ever accelerating change would seem to be hopeless. Projecting the future of nuclear weapons, however, may not be as complex as one might think. Detailing the future fifty years from now is not necessary. We want to inform upcoming decisions by examining the possibilities, not write a history in advance of what is to happen. Our look forward con benefit from a brief look back fifty years. In retrospect, those years passed quickly, and with each additional year, analysts make them appear more simple than they seemed at the time. This paper contributes further to this process of oversimplification, as we say, ''for heuristic purposes.'' When in doubt, I have erred on the side of being provocative

  14. West European and East Asian Perspectives on Defense, Deterrence and Strategy. Volume 1. Main Report.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1984-05-16

    this School -- especially in the SDP under David Owen’s leadership -- in raising the nuclear threshold in Europe by strengthening conventional...ConrolDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS US European Commnand ATTN: ECJ-3 Grumman-CTEC. Inc ATTM: ECJ-5 ATTN: S. Shrier us National Military

  15. French nuclear doctrine: in keeping with continuity and orthodoxy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sitt, Bernard

    2012-09-01

    Debate surrounding French nuclear doctrine was lively last July, and the noted opponents of the French deterrent, such as General Norlain and Paul Quiles, took the opportunity provided by the election of a new French President to speak out in favour of reviving the debate in favour of nuclear disarmament on the grounds that nuclear weapons have become ineffectual since the end of the Cold War, even though this argument was dealt with in detail in the White Paper on Defence publishing during the spring of 1994. Yet the President's choices suggest an unequivocal policy direction: The President boarded SSBN le Terrible on the 4 July, something none of his predecessors has done since Valery Giscard d'Estaing in 1974. As the Elysee Palace underlined, this gesture was meant to 'reaffirm French commitment to its deterrent'. It also follows on from the positions Mr Hollande adopted in December 2011 and March 2012 during the electoral campaign. During a simultaneous visit to the Ile Longue base, the Defence Minister made it clear that the French position revolved around sufficiency, thereby reiterating the previous posture, following President Sarkozy's announcement that the aerial component would be reduced by one third and the overall warheads capped at 300. On the 13 July, at the launch of the commission tasked with drafting a new White Paper on defence and security, the President confirmed from the outset 'the preservation of the nuclear deterrence strategy', thereby defining an unambiguous conceptual framework for this important exercise of strategic reflection. In his speech to open the Conference of the Ambassadors on the 27 August, he did not fail to recall that France is a permanent member of the Security Council Nuclear-Weapon State, following on from the tradition established by his predecessors. The continuation of the French deterrent thus appears fairly certain, even if the White Paper committee will also be tasked with formulating the best course between

  16. Principles of protection against nuclear smuggling

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Erickson, S.A.; Martin, D.D.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The smuggling of nuclear materials is a matter of grave consequence, and if allowed to occur in sufficient amount, could lead to nuclear terrorism or nuclear proliferation. This paper describes a framework created for the Department of Energy's contribution to national and international efforts to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling. With such a framework, opportunities for rapid gains in smuggling prevention can be found as well as funding gaps. It is useful first to define the threat, which is then used to drive specifications and planning for technology and tactics. The exact numbers involved in the threat are not important here. It is enough to understand that the goal is to prevent the smuggling of sufficient quantities of weapon-usable material from a protected site to anywhere where it could be used for proliferation or terrorism. However, this should not be interpreted as a definition of some minimum amount of nuclear material that would be useful to detect and interdict. The useful amount can be smuggled in two, three or many individual smuggling trips, and so the quantity searched for may be considerably less. Next, a range of possible actions can be listed. One category involves promoting deterrence of nuclear smuggling by portraying the likely consequences of nuclear smuggling as mostly negative for smugglers. Another category involves detecting nuclear materials, by anyone at anytime. Increasing the probability of detection is not the same thing as enhancing deterrence. What deters is perception. If the perception that nuclear smuggling is unlikely to succeed is spread to potential smugglers, deterrence will be achieved. The cost of such a campaign is likely less than actually enhancing the probability of detection. There are major pitfalls in such a campaign, however. These include the release of information that might enhance the capability of smugglers and the chance that the campaign will be unconvincing. Another mode of deterrence

  17. West German alternatives for reducing reliance on nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brauch, H.G.

    1988-01-01

    Nuclear deterrence in general and the US doctrinal concept of mutual assured destruction as well as the common strategic understanding of mutual vulnerability, codified by the SALT process, and the nuclear first use option of NATO's flexible response strategy (MC14/3) have come under attack, both from official and unofficial circles, in the United States and Europe likewise. In spite of the general agreement, that the time may have come to search for alternatives, to move from MAD to MAS (mutual assured security), as President Reagan indicated in a New York Times interview or for a Common Security posture, as called for by the Palme Commission, nevertheless major disagreements and contradictions exist as to how European security could be enhanced with a defensive posture beyond deterrence. Two groups of alternatives are being distinguished in this paper: official efforts in the United States and in Europe, to use the anti-nuclear sentiment, to legitimate changes in the operative doctrine of the US and of NATO forces and to obtain funds both for a comprehensive buildup and modernization of conventional forces in Europe and for a Strategic (SDI) and probably soon also for a European Defence Initiative (EDI) or an extended air defence, and unofficial proposals by American, European and West German Experts for a non-provocative, inoffensive defence or for a gradual defensivity consisting of static and mobile components

  18. For a convention for nuclear weapon elimination; Pour une convention d'elimination des armes nucleaires

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2008-03-15

    This document contains two texts linked with the project of an international convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons (the text of this project has been sent to the UN General Secretary and is part of an international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, ICAN). These two texts are contributions presented in London at the Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-free World. The first one calls into question the deterrence principle and the idea of a nuclear weapon-based security. It calls for different forms of action to promote a nuclear weapon-free world. The second text stresses the role and the responsibility of states with nuclear weapons in nuclear disarmament and in the reinforcement of the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT)

  19. Conceptions of nuclear threshold status

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quester, G.H.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reviews some alternative definitions of nuclear threshold status. Each of them is important, and major analytical confusions would result if one sense of the term is mistaken for another. The motives for nations entering into such threshold status are a blend of civilian and military gains, and of national interests versus parochial or bureaucratic interests. A portion of the rationale for threshold status emerges inevitably from the pursuit of economic goals, and another portion is made more attraction by the derives of the domestic political process. Yet the impact on international security cannot be dismissed, especially where conflicts among the states remain real. Among the military or national security motives are basic deterrence, psychological warfare, war-fighting and, more generally, national prestige. In the end, as the threshold phenomenon is assayed for lessons concerning the role of nuclear weapons more generally in international relations and security, one might conclude that threshold status and outright proliferation coverage to a degree in the motives for all of the states involved and in the advantages attained. As this paper has illustrated, nuclear threshold status is more subtle and more ambiguous than outright proliferation, and it takes considerable time to sort out the complexities. Yet the world has now had a substantial amount of time to deal with this ambiguous status, and this may tempt more states to exploit it

  20. Essential Oils of Echinophora lamondiana (Apiales: Umbelliferae): A Relationship Between Chemical Profile and Biting Deterrence and Larvicidal Activity Against Mosquitoes (Diptera: Culicidae)

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-01-01

    Science and Letters, Gazi Univer- sity, 06500 Ankara, Turkey. 5 USDA-ARS, Center for Medical, Agricultural and Veterinary Ento- mology, Gainesville, FL... Microbiology Department, College of Science, King Saud University, 11451 Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 8 Department of Pharmacognosy, School of Pharmacy, University of...Agricultural and Veterinary Entomology, U.S. Department of Agriculture–Agricultural Research Service (USDA- ARS), Gainesville, FL. For biting deterrence

  1. Dancing the Two-Step in Ontario's Long-term Care Sector: More Deterrence-oriented Regulation = Ownership and Management Consolidation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Daly, Tamara

    2015-03-01

    This paper explores shifts in public and private delivery over time through an analysis of Ontario's approach to LTC funding and regulation in relation to other jurisdictions in Canada and abroad. The case of Ontario's long-term care (LTC) policy evolution - from the 1940s until early 2013 -- shows how moving from compliance to deterrence oriented regulation can support consolidation of commercial providers' ownership and increase the likelihood of non-profit and public providers outsourcing their management.

  2. Testing and Contrasting Road Safety Education, Deterrence, and Social Capital Theories: A Sociological Approach to the Understanding of Male Drink-Driving in Chile's Metropolitan Region.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nazif, José Ignacio

    2011-01-01

    Three theories offer different explanations to the understanding of male drink-driving. In order to test road safety education, deterrence, and social capital theories, logistic regression analysis was applied to predict respondents' statements of having or not having engaged in actual drink-driving (DD). Variable for road safety education theory was whether a driver had graduated from a professional driving school or not. Deterrence theory was operationalized with a variable of whether a driver had been issued a traffic ticket or not. Social capital theory was operationalized with two variables, having children or not and having religion identification or not. Since both variables 'years of formal education' and 'years of driving experience' have been reported to be correlated to alcohol consumption and DD respectively, these were introduced as controls. In order to assess the significance of each variable statistically, Wald tests were applied in seven models. Results indicate on the one hand that road safety education variable is not statistically significant; and on the other, deterrence theory variable and social capital theory variable 'having children' were both statistically significant at the level of .01. Findings are discussed in reference to Chile's context. Data were taken from the "Road Users Attitudes and Behaviors towards Traffic Safety" survey from the National Commission of Road Safety of the Government of Chile (2005). The sample size was reported to be 2,118 (N of male drivers was 396). This survey was representative of Chile's Metropolitan Region road users' population.

  3. Laboratory-based testing to evaluate abuse-deterrent formulations and satisfy the Food and Drug Administration's recommendation for Category 1 Testing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Altomare, Christopher; Kinzler, Eric R; Buchhalter, August R; Cone, Edward J; Costantino, Anthony

    The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) considers the development of abuse-deterrent formulations of solid oral dosage forms a public health priority and has outlined a series of premarket studies that should be performed prior to submitting an application to the Agency. Category 1 studies are performed to characterize whether the abuse-deterrent properties of a new formulation can be easily defeated. Study protocols are designed to evaluate common abuse patterns of prescription medications as well as more advanced methods that have been reported on drug abuse websites and forums. Because FDA believes Category 1 testing should fully characterize the abuse-deterrent characteristics of an investigational formulation, Category 1 testing is time consuming and requires specialized laboratory resources as well as advanced knowledge of prescription medication abuse. Recent Advisory Committee meetings at FDA have shown that Category 1 tests play a critical role in FDA's evaluation of an investigational formulation. In this article, we will provide a general overview of the methods of manipulation and routes of administration commonly utilized by prescription drug abusers, how those methods and routes are evaluated in a laboratory setting, and discuss data intake, analysis, and reporting to satisfy FDA's Category 1 testing requirements.

  4. Terrorism and global security: The nuclear threat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beres, L.R.

    1987-01-01

    In the seven years since this book was first published, the threat of nuclear terrorism has increased dramatically. The enormous destructive potential of nuclear technology inevitably raises the specter of the use of nuclear explosives or radioactivity by insurgent groups. The author explores the political bases of terrorism by considering the factors that might foster nuclear terrorism, the forms it could take, and the probable consequences of such acts. New to this edition is the author's examination of the essential distinctions between lawful insurgencies and terrorism, as well as his analysis of the impact of recent U.S. foreign policy. The author explores the United State's all-consuming rivalry with the Soviet Union, arguing that it has created an atmosphere ripe for anti-U.S. terrorism and that the only viable option for the super-powers is cooperation in an effort to control terrorist activities. He also discusses the ''Reagan doctrine,'' which he believes has increased the long-term threat of nuclear terrorism against the U.S. by its continuing support of authoritarian regimes and by its active opposition to Marxist regimes such as those in Nicaragua and Angola. The book concludes by presenting the first coherent strategy for countering nuclear terrorism-embracing both technological and behavioral measures. The proposal includes policies for deterrence and situation management on national and international scales and emphasizes the logic of a major reshaping of world order

  5. International perceptions of US nuclear policy.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stanley, Elizabeth A. (Georgetown Universtiy, Washington, DC)

    2006-02-01

    The report presents a summary of international perceptions and beliefs about US nuclear policy, focusing on four countries--China, Iran, Pakistan and Germany--chosen because they span the spectrum of states with which the United States has relationships. A paradox is pointed out: that although the goal of US nuclear policy is to make the United States and its allies safer through a policy of deterrence, international perceptions of US nuclear policy may actually be making the US less safe by eroding its soft power and global leadership position. Broadly held perceptions include a pattern of US hypocrisy and double standards--one set for the US and its allies, and another set for all others. Importantly, the US nuclear posture is not seen in a vacuum, but as one piece of the United States behavior on the world stage. Because of this, the potential direct side effects of any negative international perceptions of US nuclear policy can be somewhat mitigated, dependent on other US policies and actions. The more indirect and long term relation of US nuclear policy to US international reputation and soft power, however, matters immensely to successful multilateral and proactive engagement on other pressing global issues.

  6. International perceptions of US nuclear policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanley, Elizabeth A.

    2006-01-01

    The report presents a summary of international perceptions and beliefs about US nuclear policy, focusing on four countries--China, Iran, Pakistan and Germany--chosen because they span the spectrum of states with which the United States has relationships. A paradox is pointed out: that although the goal of US nuclear policy is to make the United States and its allies safer through a policy of deterrence, international perceptions of US nuclear policy may actually be making the US less safe by eroding its soft power and global leadership position. Broadly held perceptions include a pattern of US hypocrisy and double standards--one set for the US and its allies, and another set for all others. Importantly, the US nuclear posture is not seen in a vacuum, but as one piece of the United States behavior on the world stage. Because of this, the potential direct side effects of any negative international perceptions of US nuclear policy can be somewhat mitigated, dependent on other US policies and actions. The more indirect and long term relation of US nuclear policy to US international reputation and soft power, however, matters immensely to successful multilateral and proactive engagement on other pressing global issues

  7. China's nuclear arsenal and missile defence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rappai, M.V.

    2002-01-01

    Over the last few years, major focus of the nuclear debate has been turned towards the United States' proposal to erect a National Missile Defence (NMD) shield for itself. Of the existing nuclear weapon powers, China has been the most vociferous critic of this proposal. As and when this shield does become a reality, China will be the first to lose credibility as a deterrent against USA's existing nuclear arsenal. Therefore taking countermeasures against such a proposal is quite natural. China's approach towards non-proliferation mechanisms is steeped in realpolitik and its ability to manoeuvre them in its favour as a P5 and N5 power. Further, the Chinese leadership have been clear about the capabilities and limitations of nuclear weapons and treated them as diplomatic and political tools. The underlying aim is to preserve China's status as a dominant player in the international system while checkmating other possible challengers. Such a pragmatic approach is of far-reaching significance to all nations, especially those that possess nuclear weapons themselves. It will also be in India's long-term strategic interest to assess and take necessary corrective measures in its national security strategy, and make the composition of Indian nuclear strategy meet the desired goal. (author)

  8. Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eaton, M.A.

    2007-01-01

    This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians' ideas about nuclear weapons

  9. Rates of opioid dispensing and overdose after introduction of abuse-deterrent extended-release oxycodone and withdrawal of propoxyphene.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Larochelle, Marc R; Zhang, Fang; Ross-Degnan, Dennis; Wharam, J Frank

    2015-06-01

    In the second half of 2010, abuse-deterrent extended-release oxycodone hydrochloride (OxyContin; Purdue Pharma) was introduced and propoxyphene was withdrawn from the US market. The effect of these pharmaceutical market changes on opioid dispensing and overdose rates is unknown. To evaluate the association between 2 temporally proximate changes in the opioid market and opioid dispensing and overdose rates. Claims from a large national US health insurer were analyzed, using an interrupted time series study design. Participants included an open cohort of 31.3 million commercially insured members aged 18 to 64 years between January 1, 2003, and December 31, 2012, with median follow-up of 20 months (last follow-up, December 31, 2012). Introduction of abuse-deterrent OxyContin (resistant to crushing or dissolving) on August 9, 2010, and market withdrawal of propoxyphene on November 19, 2010. Standardized opioid dispensing rates and prescription opioid and heroin overdose rates were the primary outcomes. We used segmented regression to analyze changes in outcomes from 30 quarters before to 8 quarters after the 2 interventions. Two years after the opioid market changes, total opioid dispensing decreased by 19% from the expected rate (absolute change, -32.2 mg morphine-equivalent dose per member per quarter [95% CI, -38.1 to -26.3]). By opioid subtype, the absolute change in dispensing by milligrams of morphine-equivalent dose per member per quarter at 2 years was -11.3 (95% CI, -12.4 to -10.1) for extended-release oxycodone, 3.26 (95% CI, 1.40 to 5.12) for other long-acting opioids, -8.19 (95% CI, -9.30 to -7.08) for propoxyphene, and -16.2 (95% CI, -18.8 to -13.5) for other immediate-release opioids. Two years after the market changes, the estimated overdose rate attributed to prescription opioids decreased by 20% (absolute change, -1.10 per 100,000 members per quarter [95% CI, -1.47 to -0.74]), but heroin overdose increased by 23% (absolute change, 0.26 per 100

  10. Nuclear law - Nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontier, Jean-Marie; Roux, Emmanuel; Leger, Marc; Deguergue, Maryse; Vallar, Christian; Pissaloux, Jean-Luc; Bernie-Boissard, Catherine; Thireau, Veronique; Takahashi, Nobuyuki; Spencer, Mary; Zhang, Li; Park, Kyun Sung; Artus, J.C.

    2012-01-01

    This book contains the contributions presented during a one-day seminar. The authors propose a framework for a legal approach to nuclear safety, a discussion of the 2009/71/EURATOM directive which establishes a European framework for nuclear safety in nuclear installations, a comment on nuclear safety and environmental governance, a discussion of the relationship between citizenship and nuclear, some thoughts about the Nuclear Safety Authority, an overview of the situation regarding the safety in nuclear waste burying, a comment on the Nome law with respect to electricity price and nuclear safety, a comment on the legal consequences of the Fukushima accident on nuclear safety in the Japanese law, a presentation of the USA nuclear regulation, an overview of nuclear safety in China, and a discussion of nuclear safety in the medical sector

  11. History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine and a Path Forward

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chyba, Christopher

    2007-04-01

    During the Cold War, the United States considered a number of approaches for living in a world with nuclear weapons, including disarmament, preventive war, the incorporation of nuclear weapons into military strategy, passive and active defense, and deterrence. With the failure of early approaches to disarmament, and the rejection of preventive war against the Soviet Union (and later, China), deterrence became central to key nuclear relationships, though arms control continued to play an important role. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty made preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons another central component of U.S. policy. The Bush Administration has tried to devise a new policy for the post-Cold War period. Their approach has three salient pillars. First, it is characterized by an overall skepticism toward multilateral agreements, on the grounds that bad actors will not obey them, that agreements can lead to a false sense of security, and that such agreements are too often a way for the Lilliputians of the world to tie down Gulliver. The March 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy declared that U.S. strength ``will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak, using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism.'' Second, the Bush Administration declared its intention to maintain a military dominance so great that other states simply would not try to catch up. The 2002 National Security Strategy states that ``Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.'' Third, the 2002 National Security Strategy (reaffirmed by the 2006 National Security Strategy) moved preventive war (which the strategies called ``preemptive war'') to a central position, rather than deterrence and nonproliferation. In part this was because of the claim that certain ``rogue'' states, and terrorist groups, were not deterrable. This talk

  12. Liberal democracy and nuclear despotism: two ethical foreign policy dilemmas

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Thomas E. Doyle

    2013-09-01

    Full Text Available This article advances a critical analysis of John Rawls's justification of liberal democratic nuclear deterrence in the post-Cold War era as found in The Law of Peoples. Rawls's justification overlooked how nuclear-armed liberal democracies are ensnared in two intransigent ethical dilemmas: one in which the mandate to secure liberal constitutionalism requires both the preservation and violation of important constitutional provisions in domestic affairs, and the other in which this same mandate requires both the preservation and violation of the liberal commitment to international legal arrangements and to the rule of law generally. On this view, the choice to violate constitutional provisions and international legal arrangements is evidence of nuclear despotism. Moreover, this choice does not imply that the ethical foreign policy dilemmas were resolved. Instead, it implies that the dilemmas force liberal democratic governments into implementing ethically paradoxical policy outcomes.

  13. Nuclear strategy: the doctrine of just war

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raman, Sudha

    2006-01-01

    It is essential that there be growth in a man's moral standing if he has to deal with the great powers given to him-the greatest being the power to destroy. The bequest of history, diplomacy and war is undeniably disconcerting for the evidence it provides on the role of morality, in life. A return to the ancient and forgotten art of moral reasoning, especially while formulating strategic policies, is de rigueur. The discovery of the nuclear weapons has indeed been serendipitous. And the environment in which one fashions the strategic doctrine for use of nuclear weapons is dynamic. The usefulness of these nuclear weapons is narrow and specific in that its sole purpose is to deter a nuclear attack. History has been witness to strategies been woven around this central theme of deterring a rival or enemy nation, in the process forgetting the existence of the moral threshold. Deterrence is a policy that fashions a situation whereby war can be limited if not averted. It rests on the capability of a nation to deter the enemy and ensure that the credibility of the threat is maintained and respected and employed when necessary. Nuclear weapons deter but there is the pursuit of the absolute means to seek foolproof deterrence. Herein lies the dilemma. The stakes involved in a nuclear war and the use of these weapons stimulate varied and worried debates. To justify a war, arguments tend to get grounded on 'justwar'. The doctrine of Just War is concerned not with what men did in war but what they ought to do or refrain from doing; the jus ad bellum or justification of war and the jus in bello or the limitation of war. The U.S. now stands as the sole 'super' power that is willing to use its military and technical might for a 'just cause'. This has only ensured that though the uniquely perilous results of the use of nuclear weapons have been understood, its use remains entrenched in the mind while future policy decisions are being made. And nuclear weapons 'explode the theory of

  14. The Sandys White Paper of 1957 and the move to the British new look. An analysis of nuclear weapons, conventional forces and strategic planning 1955-57

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Navias, Martin Stephen

    1989-01-01

    This study seeks to analyse the significance of the 1957 Defence White Paper in the context of British strategic planning during the mid-1950s. Claims that the White Paper represented a culmination of trends already prevalent in British defence planning are assessed while continuities and discontinuities in strategic policies are identified. This is done by highlighting the main features of the document and then tracing their development in the 1955-57 period. A major theme throughout is the relationship between the growing declaratory emphasis on nuclear deterrence and the determination of the shape and size of conventional forces and capabilities. It is contended that the defence decision making process that was in place prior to January 1957 was incapable of generating a British New Look - that is a consistent set of declaratory and action policies which reflected a cutback in conventional forces accompanied by a greater reliance on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Prior to Duncan Sandys becoming Minister of Defence, the inability of that ministry to readily impose itself on the service departments meant that the latter's attachment to preparations for global war and the national service programme could not be overruled. It is also unclear whether during the 1955-56 period the basis for a truly independent deterrent was being established. An analysis of the negotiations surrounding the 1957 White Paper indicates that Sandys was able to overrule traditional service preferences. The result was a policy which rejected the imposition of a conventional strategy on a nuclear one in favour of a British New Look. Consequently, conventional forces were reduced, greater relative importance was placed on the nuclear deterrent, but once more the requirements of a unilateral independent deterrent did not receive priority. (author)

  15. Prenuptial perfume: Alloanointing in the social rituals of the crested auklet ( Aethia cristatella) and the transfer of arthropod deterrents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Douglas, Hector D.

    2008-01-01

    Alloanointing, the transfer of chemicals between conspecifics, is known among mammals, but hitherto, the behavior has not been documented for birds. The crested auklet ( Aethia cristatella), a colonial seabird of Alaskan and Siberian waters, alloanoints during courtship with fragrant aldehydes that are released from specialized wick-like feathers located in the interscapular region. Crested auklets solicit anointment at the colony, and prospective mates rub bill, breast, head, and neck over wick feathers of their partners. This distributes aldehydes over the head, neck, and face where the birds cannot self-preen. The resulting chemical concentrations are sufficient to deter ectoparasites. Auklets that emit more odorant can transfer more defensive chemicals to mates and are thus more sexually attractive. Behavioral studies showed that crested auklets are attracted to their scent. Wild birds searched for dispensers that emitted their scent and rubbed their bills on the dispensers and engaged in vigorous anointment behaviors. In captive experiments, naïve crested auklets responded more strongly to synthetic auklet scent than controls, and the greatest behavioral response occurred during early courtship. This study extends scientific knowledge regarding functions of alloanointing. Alloanointing had previously been attributed to scent marking and individual recognition in vertebrates. Alloanointing is described here in the context of an adaptive social cue — the transfer of arthropod deterrents between prospective mates.

  16. Nuclear proliferation: dealing with problem countries. Hearing before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, July 23, 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    A panel of representatives of the Hudson Institute, the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the Ripon Society examined policy options at this hearing. At issue is how to deal with countries which are pursuing nuclear weapons and a nuclear-weapons capability. The panel also examined the role of international sanctions as a deterrent, consistent supplier export policies, and policies dealing with specific countries and regions. The hearing record includes their testimony and two appendices

  17. The Future of Deterrent Capability for Medium-Sized Western Powers in the New Environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quinlan, Michael

    2001-01-01

    What should be the longer-term future for the nuclear-weapons capabilities of France and the United Kingdom? I plan to tackle the subject in concrete terms. My presentation will be divided into three parts, and, though they are distinct rather than separate, they interact extensively. The first and largest part will relate to strategic context and concept: what aims, justifications and limitations should guide the future, or the absence of a future, for our capabilities? The second part, a good deal briefer, will be the practical content and character of the capabilities: what questions for decision will arise, and in what timescale, about the preservation, improvement or adjustment of the present capabilities? And the third part, still more briefly, will concern the political and institutional framework into which their future should or might be fitted. (author)

  18. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime: An international priority. Tokyo, 10 December 2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons has witnessed steady progress and a number of important milestones. Progress, however, is still required on this and many other fronts, including: the need to work energetically to ensure the universal adherence to safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements; the need for reducing existing nuclear weapon arsenals and adopting concrete steps that move us further towards nuclear disarmament; the need to draw in those States that remain outside the NPT regime; and the need to develop alternative approaches to regional and international security that are functional and inclusive, and that do not incorporate nuclear deterrence as a feature

  19. A Northeast Asia nuclear-free zone: Problems and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mack, A.

    1995-01-01

    Northeast Asia is the only region in the world in which the technological potential to make nuclear weapons is combined with deep-seated (though currently attenuated) historical animosities. In South Asia the technical potential to go nuclear has already been realised and curbing vertical proliferation in India and Pakistan has become the name of the game. The traditional - and mostly American - argument against nuclear-free zones was that they encouraged the 'nuclear allergy' and in so doing undermined deterrence. In the post-Cold War era this argument is no longer relevant. The instruments of deterrence - the still huge nuclear arsenals of Russia and America - remain largely in place, yet the fear of aggression which provided their only justification has almost completely disappeared. The case for Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) today relates to the modest role they may play in the global campaign against nuclear proliferation. Ideally, as suggested in the North Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NEANFZ) proposal outlined above, the zones should be broad in scope with the various elements acting synergistically to reinforce each other. While each of the technical provisions of an NFZ is important in its own right, and while the total effect should be greater than the sum of the parts, the most important consequence of creating such regimes is ultimately political. It is the enhancement of what the US and its allies sought throughout the Cold War to suppress - namely 'the nuclear allergy'. NFZs are, above all, about creating norms which delegitimise nuclearism. The promotion of a NEANFZ, initially modest in scope but with optional protocols outlining an agenda for expansion, should be supported not least as a means of generating public debate on the dangers of proliferation in the region. The anti-proliferation debate is too important to be left to the arms control experts who have too great a predilection for technical supply-side solutions. In the last analysis

  20. Deterrence of ballistic missile systems and their effects on today's air operations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Durak, Hasan

    2015-05-01

    Lately, the effect-based approach has gained importance in executing air operations. Thus, it makes more successful in obtaining the desired results by breaking the enemy's determination in a short time. Air force is the first option to be chosen in order to defuse the strategic targets. However, the problems such as the defense of targets and country, radars, range…etc. becoming serious problems. At this level ballistic missiles emerge as a strategic weapon. Ultimate emerging technologies guided by the INS and GPS can also be embedded with multiple warheads and reinforced with conventional explosive, ballistic missiles are weapons that can destroy targets with precision. They have the advantage of high speed, being easily launched from every platform and not being easily detected by air defense systems contrary to other air platforms. While these are the advantages, there are also disadvantages of the ballistic missiles. The high cost, unavailability of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and its limited effect while using conventional explosives against destroying the fortified targets are the disadvantages. The features mentioned above should be considered as limitation to the impact of the ballistic missiles. The aim is to impose the requests on enemies without starting a war with all components and to ensure better implementation of the operation functions during the air operations. In this study, effects of ballistic missiles in the future on air battle theatre will be discussed in the beginning, during the process and at the end phase of air operations within the scope of an effect-based approach.

  1. Graduated driver licensing and differential deterrence: The effect of license type on intentions to violate road rules.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Poirier, Brigitte; Blais, Etienne; Faubert, Camille

    2018-01-01

    In keeping with the differential deterrence theory, this article assesses the moderating effect of license type on the relationship between social control and intention to violate road rules. More precisely, the article has two objectives: (1) to assess the effect of license type on intentions to infringe road rules; and (2) to pinpoint mechanisms of social control affecting intentions to violate road rules based on one's type of driver license (a restricted license or a full license). This effect is examined among a sample of 392 young drivers in the province of Quebec, Canada. Drivers taking part in the Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) program have limited demerit points and there is zero tolerance for drinking-and-driving. Propensity score matching techniques were used to assess the effect of the license type on intentions to violate road rules and on various mechanisms of social control. Regression analyses were then conducted to estimate the moderating effect of license type. Average treatment effects from propensity score matching analyses indicate that respondents with a restricted license have lower levels of intention to infringe road rules. While moral commitment and, to a lesser extent, the perceived risk of arrest are both negatively associated with intentions to violate road rules, the license type moderates the relationship between delinquent peers and intentions to violate road rules. The effect of delinquent peers is reduced among respondents with a restricted driver license. Finally, a diminished capability to resist peer pressure could explain the increased crash risk in months following full licensing. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  2. Nuclear Issues in the Post-September 11 era

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunn, Lewis; Wheeler, Michael; May, Michael; Pikayev, Alexander; Wolfstahl, Jon; Roberts, Brad; Tertrais, Bruno; Umbach, Frank

    2003-03-01

    In the fall of 2002, the Foundation for Strategic Research convened a small group of high-level experts on nuclear policy issues to discuss the consequences of September 11 and of the 'war on terrorism' for nuclear debates. Participants met in Paris on September 26-27, 2002, and later provided papers which are reproduced here. This project was sponsored by the French Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA). Contents: 1 - Nuclear Issues in the Post-September 11 era: emerging Trends (Bruno Tertrais); 2 - Nuclear energy Issues: Global Dimensions and Security Challenges (Frank Umbach); 3 - Proliferation and Non-Proliferation: What's Changed-What Hasn't? (Jon B. Wolfstahl); 4 - Non-Proliferation: Possible New Trends after September 11 (Alexander A. Pikayev); 5 - Nuclear Deterrence Issues in the Post-September 11 World: An American Perspective (Michael O. Wheeler); 6 - The Nuclear Balance of Terror and September 11 (Brad Roberts); 7 - Nuclear Weapons after September 11 (Lewis A. Dunn); 8 - September 11 and the Need for International Nuclear Agreements (Michael May)

  3. Managing severe pain and abuse potential: the potential impact of a new abuse-deterrent formulation oxycodone/naltrexone extended-release product

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pergolizzi, J

    2018-02-01

    Full Text Available Joseph V Pergolizzi, Jr,1 Robert Taylor Jr,1 Jo Ann LeQuang,1 Robert B Raffa2,3 On behalf of the NEMA Research Group 1NEMA Research Inc., Naples, FL, USA; 2University of Arizona College of Pharmacy, Tucson, AZ, USA; 3Temple University School of Pharmacy, Philadelphia, PA, USA Abstract: Proper management of severe pain represents one of the most challenging clinical dilemmas. Two equally important goals must be attained: the humanitarian/medical goal to relieve suffering and the societal/legal goal to not contribute to the drug abuse problem. This is an age-old problem, and the prevailing emphasis placed on one or the other goal has resulted in pendulum swings that have resulted in either undertreatment of pain or the current epidemic of misuse and abuse. In an effort to provide efficacious strong pain relievers (opioids that are more difficult to abuse by the most dangerous routes of administration, pharmaceutical companies are developing products in which the opioid is manufactured in a formulation that is designed to be tamper resistant. Such a product is known as an abuse-deterrent formulation (ADF. ADF opioid products are designed to deter or resist abuse by making it difficult to tamper with the product and extracting the opioid for inhalation or injection. To date, less than a dozen opioid formulations have been approved by the US Food and Drug Administration to carry specific ADF labeling, but this number will likely increase in the coming years. Most of these products are extended-release formulations. Keywords: oxycodone/naltrexone, abuse-deterrent formulation, abuse-deterrent opioid, oxycodone, abuse liability

  4. Nuclear Medicine

    Science.gov (United States)

    ... Parents/Teachers Resource Links for Students Glossary Nuclear Medicine What is nuclear medicine? What are radioactive tracers? ... funded researchers advancing nuclear medicine? What is nuclear medicine? Nuclear medicine is a medical specialty that uses ...

  5. Assessing the optimism-pessimism debate: Nuclear proliferation, nuclear risks, and theories of state action

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Busch, Nathan Edward

    2001-01-01

    This dissertation focuses on the current debate in international relations literature over the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On this subject, IR scholars are divided into roughly two schools: proliferation 'optimists,' who argue that proliferation can be beneficial and that its associated hazards are at least surmountable, and proliferation 'pessimists,' who believe the opposite. This debate centers upon a theoretical disagreement about how best to explain and predict the behavior of states. Optimists generally ground their arguments on rational deterrence theory and maintain that nuclear weapons can actually increase stability among states, while pessimists often ground their arguments on 'organization theory,' which contends that organizational, bureaucratic, and other factors prevent states from acting rationally. A major difficulty with the proliferation debate, however, is that both sides tend to advance their respective theoretical positions without adequately supporting them with solid empirical evidence. This dissertation detailed analyses of the nuclear programs in the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan to determine whether countries with nuclear weapons have adequate controls over their nuclear arsenals and tissue material stockpiles (such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium). These case studies identify the strengths and weaknesses of different systems of nuclear controls and help predict what types of controls proliferating states are likely to employ. On the basis of the evidence gathered from these cases, this dissertation concludes that a further spread of nuclear weapons would tend to have seriously negative effects on international stability by increasing risks of accidental, unauthorized, or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and risks of thefts of fissile materials for use in nuclear or radiological devices by aspiring nuclear states or terrorist groups. (author)

  6. Dancing the Two-Step in Ontario’s Long-term Care Sector: More Deterrence-oriented Regulation = Ownership and Management Consolidation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Daly, Tamara

    2016-01-01

    This paper explores shifts in public and private delivery over time through an analysis of Ontario’s approach to LTC funding and regulation in relation to other jurisdictions in Canada and abroad. The case of Ontario’s long-term care (LTC) policy evolution – from the 1940s until early 2013 -- shows how moving from compliance to deterrence oriented regulation can support consolidation of commercial providers’ ownership and increase the likelihood of non-profit and public providers outsourcing their management. PMID:27777495

  7. Nuclear and Radiological Forensics and Attribution Overview

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D K; Niemeyer, S

    2005-01-01

    The goal of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Nuclear and Radiological Forensics and Attribution Program is to develop the technical capability for the nation to rapidly, accurately, and credibly attribute the origins and pathways of interdicted or collected materials, intact nuclear devices, and radiological dispersal devices. A robust attribution capability contributes to threat assessment, prevention, and deterrence of nuclear terrorism; it also supports the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in its investigative mission to prevent and respond to nuclear terrorism. Development of the capability involves two major elements: (1) the ability to collect evidence and make forensic measurements, and (2) the ability to interpret the forensic data. The Program leverages the existing capability throughout the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratory complex in a way that meets the requirements of the FBI and other government users. At the same time the capability is being developed, the Program also conducts investigations for a variety of sponsors using the current capability. The combination of operations and R and D in one program helps to ensure a strong linkage between the needs of the user community and the scientific development

  8. Nuclear proliferation: Some context and consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ford, C. A.

    2007-01-01

    The article addressed the importance of nonproliferation and supporting and reinforcing nonproliferation commitments. The most important benefit of the NPT has been in its contribution to the security of individual states party, as well as to regional and international security, through the obligations which help to prevent any further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT therefore powerfully augments the national security of every state party, and not merely just the NPT nuclear weapons states. Indeed, it is the countries of the developing world, as well as many other non-nuclear weapon states, that could suffer the most in security terms if a non-nuclear weapons state in the developing world suddenly acquired T he Bomb a nd became emboldened to engage in threats and adventurism against its neighbors. The nonproliferation regime hinges upon the steps that all countries take on their own and with like-minded allies to further nonproliferation goals - and whether the international community can successfully shape the calculations of present-day and future would-be proliferation in useful ways. The nonproliferation regime, therefore, includes not just the NPT and other legally-binding obligations but complex dynamics of persuasion and deterrence that employ many different tools. The NPT helps establish the core nonproliferation obligations toward which many of the tools in the international community's tool kit are directed.

  9. Nuclear safety. Seguranca nuclear

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Aveline, A [Rio Grande do Sul Univ., Porto Alegre, RS (Brazil). Inst. de Fisica

    1981-01-01

    What is nuclear safety Is there any technical way to reduce risks Is it possible to put them at reasonable levels Are there competitiveness and economic reliability to employ the nuclear energy by means of safety technics Looking for answers to these questions the author describes the sources of potential risks to nuclear reactors and tries to apply the answers to the Brazilian Nuclear Programme. (author).

  10. Russia's Nuclear Forces: Between Disarmament and Modernization

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Podvig, Pavel

    2011-04-01

    Nuclear weapons have traditionally occupied an important place in Russia's national security strategy. This tradition goes back to the Soviet times, when the country invested considerable efforts into building its nuclear arsenal and achieving strategic parity with the United States. As Russia and the United States have been reducing their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, their relationship has undergone a complex transformation toward cooperation and partnership mixed with suspicion and rivalry. The focus of Russia's nuclear policy, however, has remained essentially unchanged - it still considers strategic balance with the United States to be an important element of national security and pays considerable attention to maintaining the deterrent potential of its strategic forces. Russia does recognize the emergence of new threats - it cannot ignore the threats related to regional instabilities and conflicts on its own territory and in bordering states, such as the tensions in the Caucasus or the war in Afghanistan, the terrorist activity that is associated with these conflicts, as well as the problems that stem from nuclear and missile proliferation. These, however, are not given a high priority in Russia's security policy. For example, the new military doctrine adopted in February 2010, opens the list of military threats with the expansion of geographical and political reach of NATO, which is followed by the threat to strategic stability and then by deployment of missile defense. Nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and destabilizing local conflicts are placed much further down the list. Even when it comes to confronting the issues of local instabilities and terrorism, Russia's leadership tends to see these issues through the prism of its strategic strength, alleging that terrorist attacks are a reaction to Russia's perceived weakness. This way of looking at the issues effectively redefines national security problems to conform

  11. Invisible nuclear; converting nuclear

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Jongmoon

    1993-03-01

    This book consists of 14 chapters which are CNN era and big science, from East and West to North and South, illusory nuclear strategy, UN and nuclear arms reduction, management of armaments, advent of petroleum period, the track of nuclear power generation, view of energy, internationalization of environment, the war over water in the Middle East, influence of radiation and an isotope technology transfer and transfer armament into civilian industry, the end of nuclear period and the nuclear Nonproliferation, national scientific and technological power and political organ and executive organ.

  12. Nuclear weapons, scientists, and the post-Cold War challenge selected papers on arms control

    CERN Document Server

    Drell, Sidney D

    2007-01-01

    This volume includes a representative selection of Sidney Drell's recent writings and speeches (circa 1993 to the present) on public policy issues with substantial scientific components. Most of the writings deal with national security, nuclear weapons, and arms control and reflect the author's personal involvement in such issues dating back to 1960. Fifteen years after the demise of the Soviet Union, the gravest danger presented by nuclear weapons is the spread of advanced technology that may result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of most concern would be their acquisition by hostile governments and terrorists who are unconstrained by accepted norms of civilized behavior. The current challenges are to prevent this from happening and, at the same time, to pursue aggressively the opportunity to escape from an outdated nuclear deterrence trap.

  13. Nuclear waste disposal technology for Pacific Basin countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Langley, R.A. Jr.; Brothers, G.W.

    1981-01-01

    Safe long-term disposal of nuclear wastes is technically feasible. Further technological development offers the promise of reduced costs through elimination of unnecessary conservatism and redundance in waste disposal systems. The principal deterrents to waste disposal are social and political. The issues of nuclear waste storage and disposal are being confronted by many nuclear power countries including some of the Pacific Basin nuclear countries. Both mined geologic and subseabed disposal schemes are being developed actively. The countries of the Pacific Basin, because of their geographic proximity, could benefit by jointly planning their waste disposal activities. A single repository, of a design currently being considered, could hold all the estimated reprocessing waste from all the Pacific Basin countries past the year 2010. As a start, multinational review of alterntive disposal schemes would be beneficial. This review should include the subseabed disposal of radwastes. A multinational review of radwaste packaging is also suggested. Packages destined for a common repository, even though they may come from several countries, should be standardized to maximize repository efficiency and minimize operator exposure. Since package designs may be developed before finalization of a repository scheme and design, the packages should not have characteristics that would preclude or adversely affect operation of desirable repository options. The sociopolitical problems of waste disposal are a major deterrent to a multinational approach to waste disposal. The elected representatives of a given political entity have generally been reluctant to accept the waste from another political entity. Initial studies would, nevertheless, be beneficial either to a common solution to the problem, or to aid in separate solutions

  14. Nuclear Forensics: Report of the AAAS/APS Working Group

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tannenbaum, Benn

    2008-04-01

    This report was produced by a Working Group of the American Physical Society's Program on Public Affairs in conjunction with the American Association for the Advancement of Science Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. The primary purpose of this report is to provide the Congress, U.S. government agencies and other institutions involved in nuclear forensics with a clear unclassified statement of the state of the art of nuclear forensics; an assessment of its potential for preventing and identifying unattributed nuclear attacks; and identification of the policies, resources and human talent to fulfill that potential. In the course of its work, the Working Group observed that nuclear forensics was an essential part of the overall nuclear attribution process, which aims at identifying the origin of unidentified nuclear weapon material and, in the event, an unidentified nuclear explosion. A credible nuclear attribution capability and in particular nuclear forensics capability could deter essential participants in the chain of actors needed to smuggle nuclear weapon material or carry out a nuclear terrorist act and could also encourage states to better secure such materials and weapons. The Working Group also noted that nuclear forensics result would take some time to obtain and that neither internal coordination, nor international arrangements, nor the state of qualified personnel and needed equipment were currently enough to minimize the time needed to reach reliable results in an emergency such as would be caused by a nuclear detonation or the intercept of a weapon-size quantity of material. The Working Group assesses international cooperation to be crucial for forensics to work, since the material would likely come from inadequately documented foreign sources. In addition, international participation, if properly managed, could enhance the credibility of the deterrent effect of attribution. Finally the Working Group notes that the U.S. forensics

  15. The enforcement program of the nuclear regulatory commission in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thornburg, H.D.

    1977-01-01

    The enforcement program of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission consists of a clearly spelled out, evenly applied program of deterrents which escalate according to the nature of the offense and the past history of the licensee's noncompliances. Ninety-eight percent of all enforcement actions are normally handled by the five Regional offices. Only one percent of noncompliances have been classed as violations where significant safety consequences occurred. A strong and timely enforcement program is essential to insure that licensees fulfill their obligations to protect the public and the environment. (Auth.) [fr

  16. In Search of the Nuclear Taboo. Past, Present, and Future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potter, W.C.

    2010-01-01

    One of the most puzzling - if positive - phenomena of the past half century is the non-use of nuclear weapons. The puzzle relates to the absence of use despite the demonstrated technical effectiveness of the weapon, the enormous size of nuclear weapons stockpiles globally, the spread of nuclear weapons to states in most regions of the world, the centrality of nuclear weapons in the strategic doctrines and operational war plans of a growing number of states with very different cultures, political systems, and military traditions, and the observation of the tradition of non-use despite the lack of international legal prohibitions - unlike those in place with respect to chemical and biological weapons. This essay seeks to probe the underpinnings of nuclear weapons restraint, the strength and durability of the so-called nuclear 'taboo' - especially in light of the rise of non-states actors who covet nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence - and the most likely paths by which existing restraints might be breached, broken, or dissolved. Particular emphasis is placed on alternative futures as a number of other studies, including several important new volumes, have explored in depth the sources of non-use. (author)

  17. In Search of the Nuclear Taboo. Past, Present, and Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Potter, W.C.

    2010-07-01

    One of the most puzzling - if positive - phenomena of the past half century is the non-use of nuclear weapons. The puzzle relates to the absence of use despite the demonstrated technical effectiveness of the weapon, the enormous size of nuclear weapons stockpiles globally, the spread of nuclear weapons to states in most regions of the world, the centrality of nuclear weapons in the strategic doctrines and operational war plans of a growing number of states with very different cultures, political systems, and military traditions, and the observation of the tradition of non-use despite the lack of international legal prohibitions - unlike those in place with respect to chemical and biological weapons. This essay seeks to probe the underpinnings of nuclear weapons restraint, the strength and durability of the so-called nuclear 'taboo' - especially in light of the rise of non-states actors who covet nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence - and the most likely paths by which existing restraints might be breached, broken, or dissolved. Particular emphasis is placed on alternative futures as a number of other studies, including several important new volumes, have explored in depth the sources of non-use. (author)

  18. Subcontinental Nuclear Instability: The Spiralling Nightmare

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Vijay Shankar

    2015-07-01

    Full Text Available The scheme that carved world order during the Cold War was a pitched battle for 'containment' against burgeoning communism. In turn, rationality gave way to the threat of catastrophic nuclear force as the basis of stability. If at all there is a historical lesson to be learned from that experience then it is that stability begins with serious and sustained dialogue between leadership; the alternative being what Kennedy termed "the peace of the grave." An appraisal of the contemporary global state of nuclear affairs will suggest that the three pillars of nuclear stability, namely, non-proliferation, control of fissile material production, and transparency of nuclear arsenals are wobbly for lack of foundational support. In the truancy of global foundational support the answer may well lie in reconstituting a framework for détente. In the Subcontinental context there looms a very real nuclear nightmare. It takes the form of a hair-trigger, opaque nuclear arsenal that has embraced tactical use under decentralized military control, is steered by an ambiguous doctrine, and guided by a military strategy that carouses with non-state actors. The effect of an weakened civilian leadership in Pakistan that is incapable of action to remove the military finger from the nuclear trigger can do little to dispel the nightmare. A singular feature of the deterrent relationship in the region is its tri-polar character. As is well known today, it is the collusive nature of the Sino-Pak nuclear relationship which created and sustains the Pakistan nuclear weapons program. This in stark contrast to the Indian nuclear doctrine that went public in 2003. The unleashing of Islamic radicals in the wake of US withdrawal from the Af-Pak region and their mounting internalization in the Pakistan military and political establishments brings into question the state and motivation of the nuclear command and control structures there. Stability in this context would suggest the

  19. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East: “More May Be Better”? - 10.5102/uri.v4i2.228

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Amena Yassine

    2007-10-01

    Full Text Available The present paper assesses the post-Cold War debate on whether the spread of nuclear weapons is either central or peripheral to stability in the Middle East. The argument here is that in the current unipolar structure the spread of such weapons is a major destabilising force in the Middle East. Nuclear deterrence is no guarantee of stability to the region. As security dilemmas are mutable overtime, this paper argues that a condition precedent to stability in the Middle East is a refinement of intersubjective knowledge.

  20. Nuclear arms control in the post-Cold War era. New conditions, new requirements, and nonproliferation (with special emphasis on Japan and East Asia)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, Ryukichi

    1994-01-01

    The paper starts with a general survey of post-Cold War nuclear disarmament, pointing out Japan's positions, policies, and problems in the process. The discussion is not Japan-centered, nor is it an explanation of the Japanese view. It is useful, in this context, to recall that during the Cold War period, Japan was firmly in the ''Western Camp'', relying on the protection of the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States. This article is written with that history very much in mind, and by an author who for some years was in a position to represent Japan in such a context. (orig./DG)

  1. [Nuclear theory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haxton, W.

    1990-01-01

    This report discusses research in nuclear physics. Topics covered in this paper are: symmetry principles; nuclear astrophysics; nuclear structure; quark-gluon plasma; quantum chromodynamics; symmetry breaking; nuclear deformation; and cold fusion

  2. Nuclear topics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lukner, C.

    1982-07-01

    The pamphlet touches on all aspects of nuclear energy, from the world energy demands and consumption, the energy program of the Federal Government, nuclear power plants in the world, nuclear fusion, nuclear liability up to the nuclear fuel cycle and the shutdown of nuclear power plants. (HSCH) [de

  3. Nuclear power after three mile island. Last of four articles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Faltermayer, E.

    1979-01-01

    This final and fourth article on nuclear power reviews the March 28, 1979 accident at Three Mile Island-2 Reactor. The most lasting effect will probably be the jarring of the public's confidence and acceptance of nuclear technology. Even before Three Mile Island, electric utilities were starting to desert uranium and switch to coal-fired power plants. Cost overruns, Federal indecision on fuel reprocessing and waste disposal, long licensing procedures, and many other regulatory mandates are cited as deterrents to nuclear power. Coal is the only real alternative for utilities in the U.S., at least for some time to come, even though it is hazardous to mine and dirty to burn. Its use will probably cause far more fatalities than all the nuclear mishaps that may occur. Most unbiased studies indicate economic advantages of nuclear plants over coal-fired plants, even when decommissioning costs are added; it is felt, though, that the somewhat debatable advantages might easily disappear with the new safety and regulatory costs that will be imposed. It remains to be seen how many insurance claims will result from Three Mile Island and whether Congress may raise, or even remove, the controversial $560-million liability limit for nuclear power plants

  4. US-French nuclear cooperation: its past, present and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lewis, Jeffrey; Tertrais, Bruno

    2015-10-01

    It is now a matter of public record that France and the United States conducted in-depth cooperation on ballistic missiles and, later, on nuclear weapons safety and security starting with the Nixon and Pompidou Administrations. The existence of a deep France-US strategic nuclear cooperation exists as a historical counter-narrative to the notion of France as a fully independent nuclear power, but also as a reluctant US strategic partner. Today, both countries conceive of their interests globally, and share similar outlooks regarding strategic challenges from countries such as Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. The United States and France have worked particularly closely in the P5+1 context to reach a diplomatic solution to Iran's growing nuclear capabilities. As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, they are key partners on crisis management, regarding Libya, Syria, or Ukraine. Cooperation on counter-terrorism has been stepped up since the events of January 2015 in France. The two countries cooperate closely in Sahel and in Iraq. This short briefing provides new information on past nuclear cooperation and seeks to address the following question: given the existence of deep US-UK and UK-French nuclear ties, would enhanced US-French cooperation - the 'third side of the triangle' - be useful either strategically, in terms of enhancing the stability of deterrence, or financially? (authors)

  5. Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaughen, V.C.A.

    1983-01-01

    The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described

  6. Nuclear war in the Middle East: where is the voice of medicine and public health.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dallas, Cham E; Burkle, Frederick M

    2011-10-01

    Once again, the politically volatile Middle East and accompanying rhetoric has escalated the risk of a major nuclear exchange. Diplomatic efforts have failed to make the medical consequences of such an exchange a leading element in negotiations. The medical and academic communities share this denial. Without exaggeration, the harsh reality of the enormous consequences of an imminently conceivable nuclear war between Iran and Israel will encompass an unprecedented millions of dead and an unavoidable decline in public health and environmental devastation that would impact major populations in the Middle East for decades to come. Nuclear deterrence and the uncomfortable but real medical and public health consequences must become an integral part of a broader global health diplomacy that emphasizes health security along with poverty reduction and good governance.

  7. Nuclear moments

    CERN Document Server

    Kopferman, H; Massey, H S W

    1958-01-01

    Nuclear Moments focuses on the processes, methodologies, reactions, and transformations of molecules and atoms, including magnetic resonance and nuclear moments. The book first offers information on nuclear moments in free atoms and molecules, including theoretical foundations of hyperfine structure, isotope shift, spectra of diatomic molecules, and vector model of molecules. The manuscript then takes a look at nuclear moments in liquids and crystals. Discussions focus on nuclear paramagnetic and magnetic resonance and nuclear quadrupole resonance. The text discusses nuclear moments and nucl

  8. Moves to withdraw nuclear weapons from NATO?; Vers un retrait des armes nucleaires de l'Otan?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dumoulin, A. [Ecole Royale Militaire, Bruxelles (Belgium)

    2008-11-15

    The American nuclear landscape in Europe could change in the coming months. The signs are already there, and a new strategic posture will have major implications for the Europeans as well as for the visibility of France deterrent force. Nonetheless, the Georgian crisis, tensions with Iran, Russian muscle flexing and NATO's line cast doubt on the idea that a partial or even complete withdrawal of American B-61 bombs could be on the agenda at the Alliance's 60. anniversary in April 2009. (author)

  9. World atlas of nuclear industry: civil and military

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alexandre, Nicolas

    2011-01-01

    Todays, with the energy supplies and global warming concerns, nuclear energy in making a come-back, witness the numerous nuclear programs launched or re-launched in the US, in Europe, China and India. In parallel, on the military side, the deterrence strategy remains in the center of security politics of big powers. This atlas takes stock of the overall issues linked with the nuclear technology: production, civil applications (power generation, medicine etc..), military usages (naval propulsion, weapons). It answers the main questions of this complex world, often dominated by secrecy: who does what in the nuclear domain in France? Is an accident, like the Chernobyl's one, possible today in Europe? What solutions for radioactive wastes? Do we take risks when we export our reactor technologies to Middle-East countries? Are we at the dawn of a new arms rush? What do international agreements foresee in this domain? Taking into account the costs, the hazards and the advantages of nuclear industry, the atlas shows that it is possible to establish solid technical and legal barriers between its civil and military sides. (J.S.)

  10. Between Allies and Rivals: Turkey, Nuclear Weapons, and BMD

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kibaroglu, Mustafa

    2014-01-01

    This paper discusses Turkey's attitudes vis-a-vis nuclear weapons and Ballistic Missile Defense in the light of recent developments in the Iranian nuclear program and NATO's evolving concept of extended deterrence. On the one hand, the long-standing forward deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey and the country's role in the US Phased Adaptive Approach BMD architecture are still considered to be key elements of national security. On the other, security guarantees offered to Turkey by NATO and the US appear less and less credible in the face of rising regional threats. As this paper shows, there is a growing gap between official policy and public perceptions inside Turkey vis-a-vis the US, Iran, and nuclear weapons, as well as a growing Turkish aspiration to autonomy in its security and defense policy. While one should not expect Turkey to develop nuclear weapons anytime soon, an unchecked Iranian regional power could bring Ankara to hedge its bets in the long term. Turkey's controversial recent decision to buy a Chinese system for its national air and missile defense rather than European or US equipment should be seen in the light of this search for autonomy. (author)

  11. Public perspectives on nuclear security. US national security surveys, 1993--1997

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Herron, K.G.; Jenkins-Smith, H.C. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States). UNM Inst. for Public Policy

    1998-08-01

    This is the third report in a series of studies to examine how US attitudes about nuclear security are evolving in the post-Cold War era and to identify trends in public perceptions and preferences relevant to the evolution of US nuclear security policy. It presents findings from three surveys: a nationwide telephone survey of randomly selected members of the US general public; a written survey of randomly selected members of American Men and Women of Science; and a written survey of randomly selected state legislators from all fifty US states. Key areas of investigation included nuclear security, cooperation between US and Russian scientists about nuclear issues, vulnerabilities of critical US infrastructures and responsibilities for their protection, and broad areas of US national science policy. While international and US national security were seen to be slowly improving, the primary nuclear threat to the US was perceived to have shifted from Russia to China. Support was found for nuclear arms control measures, including mutual reductions in stockpiles. However, respondents were pessimistic about eliminating nuclear armaments, and nuclear deterrence continued to be highly values. Participants favored decreasing funding f/or developing and testing new nuclear weapons, but supported increased investments in nuclear weapons infrastructure. Strong concerns were expressed about nuclear proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism. Support was evident for US scientific cooperation with Russia to strengthen security of Russian nuclear assets. Elite and general public perceptions of external and domestic nuclear weapons risks and external and domestic nuclear weapons benefits were statistically significantly related to nuclear weapons policy options and investment preferences. Demographic variables and individual belief systems were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and to policy and spending preferences.

  12. From proliferation to arms race. Nuclear challenges in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farghen, Morgane

    2015-01-01

    If there is a region in the world where the 21. Century will be defined, it is Asia. When the rise of powers meets with old rivalries, competition for regional leadership and pending territorial disputes, the risk of conflict resurfaces and the balance of powers shifts. With changes come new trends, and with new trends come new dynamics. The nuclear realm is one of those where the changes are the most significant, the future the most uncertain, and where ongoing evolutions warrant the most scrutiny. What are these evolutions' main characteristics and what are their consequences for security, deterrence, non-proliferation and disarmament? Five major trends are currently shaping the strategic landscape and one of them has the potential for global ramifications: the advent of a regional arms race. (author)

  13. Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Eaton, M.A

    2007-07-01

    This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians

  14. A resurgence of the nuclear threat in Europe?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2014-09-01

    The first months of the Ukraine crisis were observed without any real consideration of the nuclear aspect of what will undoubtedly go down as an historical event. Several recent pieces of evidence mean that can no longer be the case. Firstly, nuclear weapons are now an integral part of Russian discourse in the framework of this crisis. Speaking at the end of August at the Seliger 2014 10. National Youth Forum, President Putin said, 'Let me remind you that Russia is one of the world's biggest nuclear powers. These are not just words - this is the reality. What's more, we are strengthening our nuclear deterrent capability and developing our armed forces. They have become more compact and effective and are becoming more modern in terms of the weapons at their disposal. We are continuing to work to build up our potential and will keep doing so (...)'. Certain Russian generals have alluded to the option of a limited use of nuclear weapons, even the option of preemptive use. The latest NATO summit in Newport reaffirmed the centrality of nuclear deterrence in the Alliance's security configuration. Moreover, the Ukraine crisis is continuing whereas bilateral nuclear arms control is at a standstill; over the summer, the United States accused Russian of violating its obligations under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and Russian diplomats are no longer concealing the country's desire to suspend its disarmament efforts. Finally, the modernisation of Russian forces is continuing while Russia's doctrinal re-evaluation is scheduled for the end of this year. The use of nuclear weapons in Europe is difficult to envisage. However, whether we like it or not, events over the past few months have confirmed that nuclear defence is still one of the factors of international relations on the continent. Have we been appearing to forget this fact in recent years, as the number of warheads and delivery systems in nuclear arsenals has declined, as has the role of nu-clear weapons

  15. Chinese perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons. Prospects and potential problems in disarmament

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jing-dong, Yuan

    2010-07-01

    The Obama administration is putting nuclear disarmament back on the agenda. In a major speech in Prague in April 2009, he envisioned a world free of nuclear weapons and called on nations to work toward that end. Reversing years of setbacks and stagnation, Washington and Moscow agreed on renewing negotiation on extending the START I Treaty last year and concluded the New START treaty in March 2010. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review indicates a shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine in that Washington pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The prospects of nuclear disarmament look much promising as the momentum generated could also exert pressure on the second-tier nuclear-weapon States: Britain, France, and China. Beijing's responses to these developments have been favorable, viewing them as positive contribution to international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In particular China endorses President Obama's call for securing global nuclear materials and safeguarding vulnerable nuclear facilities to prevent nuclear terrorism. However, Chinese perspectives and policies on important international nuclear arms control and disarmament, and on the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain largely declaratory and less specific on its own commitments and participation. Chinese analyses, at the same time, point out the difficulties ahead on the road toward a nuclear weapons free world. Indeed, rhetoric notwithstanding, Beijing continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal to develop a secure and reliable second-strike deterrence capability. This paper takes a careful look at China's perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy and defense posture. This is important because China is perceived to be the only country among the five original nuclear-weapon States that is actually expanding its nuclear arsenal, as indicated by the recent

  16. Chinese perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons. Prospects and potential problems in disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jing-dong, Yuan

    2010-01-01

    The Obama administration is putting nuclear disarmament back on the agenda. In a major speech in Prague in April 2009, he envisioned a world free of nuclear weapons and called on nations to work toward that end. Reversing years of setbacks and stagnation, Washington and Moscow agreed on renewing negotiation on extending the START I Treaty last year and concluded the New START treaty in March 2010. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review indicates a shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine in that Washington pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The prospects of nuclear disarmament look much promising as the momentum generated could also exert pressure on the second-tier nuclear-weapon States: Britain, France, and China. Beijing's responses to these developments have been favorable, viewing them as positive contribution to international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In particular China endorses President Obama's call for securing global nuclear materials and safeguarding vulnerable nuclear facilities to prevent nuclear terrorism. However, Chinese perspectives and policies on important international nuclear arms control and disarmament, and on the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain largely declaratory and less specific on its own commitments and participation. Chinese analyses, at the same time, point out the difficulties ahead on the road toward a nuclear weapons free world. Indeed, rhetoric notwithstanding, Beijing continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal to develop a secure and reliable second-strike deterrence capability. This paper takes a careful look at China's perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy and defense posture. This is important because China is perceived to be the only country among the five original nuclear-weapon States that is actually expanding its nuclear arsenal, as indicated by the recent deployment of the long

  17. Is the nuclear weapon taboo? The nuclear weapon is useless and expensive. Let us not leave the nuclear weapon as an inheritance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gauchet, Nathalie; Norlain, Bernard; Beach, Hugh; Beckett, Margaret; Quiles, Paul; Rocard, Michel; Ramsbotham, David

    2012-03-01

    Starting with the definition of the word taboo as stated in a dictionary (a topic it would be unbecoming to evoke, under social and moral proprieties), the author of the first article discusses the status of the nuclear weapon, outlining that it is expensive, useless and monstrous. She notices that conventions on chemical weapons seem to be more efficient than the NPT, that, even if the reasons for abolition are known as well as ways to reach it, it seems difficult to actually address this issue. She evokes different voices coming from different countries or international bodies calling for this abolition. She also states that the nuclear weapon is not a deterrent weapon but a weapon of domination, and calls for the mobilisation of the civil society throughout the world. A second article states that the nuclear weapon is useless and expensive, and that we have to get rid of this hazard for the sake of the planet. Former ministers, Prime ministers, and generals consider that we can and must give up nuclear weapons, notably because the strategic context has completely changed since the fall of the Berlin wall, and support the action of Global Zero

  18. Nuclear power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abd Khalik Wood

    2005-01-01

    This chapter discussed the following topics related to the nuclear power: nuclear reactions, nuclear reactors and its components - reactor fuel, fuel assembly, moderator, control system, coolants. The topics titled nuclear fuel cycle following subtopics are covered: , mining and milling, tailings, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor operations, radioactive waste and fuel reprocessing. Special topic on types of nuclear reactor highlighted the reactors for research, training, production, material testing and quite detail on reactors for electricity generation. Other related topics are also discussed: sustainability of nuclear power, renewable nuclear fuel, human capital, environmental friendly, emission free, impacts on global warming and air pollution, conservation and preservation, and future prospect of nuclear power

  19. Nuclear verification: What it is, how it works, the assurances it can provide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fortakov, V.

    1998-01-01

    International nuclear safeguards consist of a complex control system based on material accountancy with the technical objective of providing for 'the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection' (INFCIR 153). This paper addresses the many technical principles of nuclear safeguards as implemented today. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements undertake to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material within the State territory or under its jurisdiction or control. The basic procedural elements of the safeguards system are facility design examination and verification, maintenance of records by facility operators, provision of reports to the IAEA and on-site inspections by IAEA staff. The system requires the concerted action of nuclear facility operators, State Authorities and the IAEA inspectorate and is constantly improved to strengthen it and make it more cost-efficient

  20. Public views on multiple dimensions of security: nuclear weapons, terrorism, energy, and the environment: 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herron, Kerry Gale; Jenkins-Smith, Hank C.

    2008-01-01

    We analyze and compare findings from identical national surveys of the US general public on nuclear security and terrorism administered by telephone and Internet in mid-2007. Key areas of investigation include assessments of threats to US security; valuations of US nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; perspectives on nuclear proliferation, including the specific cases of North Korea and Iran; and support for investments in nuclear weapons capabilities. Our analysis of public views on terrorism include assessments of the current threat, progress in the struggle against terrorism, preferences for responding to terrorist attacks at different levels of assumed casualties, and support for domestic policies intended to reduce the threat of terrorism. Also we report findings from an Internet survey conducted in mid 2007 that investigates public views of US energy security, to include: energy supplies and reliability; energy vulnerabilities and threats, and relationships among security, costs, energy dependence, alternative sources, and research and investment priorities. We analyze public assessments of nuclear energy risks and benefits, nuclear materials management issues, and preferences for the future of nuclear energy in the US. Additionally, we investigate environmental issues as they relate to energy security, to include expected implications of global climate change, and relationships among environmental issues and potential policy options.