WorldWideScience

Sample records for nuclear criticality accident

  1. Criticality accident of nuclear fuel facility. Think back on JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naito, Keiji

    2003-09-01

    This book is written in order to understand the fundamental knowledge of criticality safety or criticality accident of nuclear fuel facility by the citizens. It consists of four chapters such as critical conditions and criticality accident of nuclear facility, risk of criticality accident, prevention of criticality accident and a measure at an occurrence of criticality accident. A definition of criticality, control of critical conditions, an aspect of accident, a rate of incident, damage, three sufferers, safety control method of criticality, engineering and administrative control, safety design of criticality, investigation of failure of safety control of JCO criticality accident, safety culture are explained. JCO criticality accident was caused with intention of disregarding regulation. It is important that we recognize the correct risk of criticality accident of nuclear fuel facility and prevent disasters. On the basis of them, we should establish safety culture. (S.Y.)

  2. Character and consequence of nuclear criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Xinhua; Liu Hua; Wu Deqiang; Li Bing

    2001-01-01

    The author describes some concepts, the process and magnitude of energy release and the destruction of the nuclear criticality accident and also describes the radiation consequence of criticality accidents from three aspects: prompt radiation, contamination in working place and release of fission products to the environment. It shows that the effects of radioactivity release from criticality accidents in the nuclear fuel processing plants on the environment and the public is minor, the main danger is from the external exposure of prompt rays. The paper make as have a correct understanding of the nuclear criticality accident and it would be helpful to take appropriate emergency response to potential criticality accident

  3. Bibliography for nuclear criticality accident experience, alarm systems, and emergency management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Putman, V.L.

    1995-09-01

    The characteristics, detection, and emergency management of nuclear criticality accidents outside reactors has been an important component of criticality safety for as long as the need for this specialized safety discipline has been recognized. The general interest and importance of such topics receives special emphasis because of the potentially lethal, albeit highly localized, effects of criticality accidents and because of heightened public and regulatory concerns for any undesirable event in nuclear and radiological fields. This bibliography lists references which are potentially applicable to or interesting for criticality alarm, detection, and warning systems; criticality accident emergency management; and their associated programs. The lists are annotated to assist bibliography users in identifying applicable: industry and regulatory guidance and requirements, with historical development information and comments; criticality accident characteristics, consequences, experiences, and responses; hazard-, risk-, or safety-analysis criteria; CAS design and qualification criteria; CAS calibration, maintenance, repair, and testing criteria; experiences of CAS designers and maintainers; criticality accident emergency management (planning, preparedness, response, and recovery) requirements and guidance; criticality accident emergency management experience, plans, and techniques; methods and tools for analysis; and additional bibliographies

  4. Criticality accident:

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canavese, Susana I.

    2000-01-01

    A criticality accident occurred at 10:35 on September 30, 1999. It occurred in a precipitation tank in a Conversion Test Building at the JCO Tokai Works site in Tokaimura (Tokai Village) in the Ibaraki Prefecture of Japan. STA provisionally rated this accident a 4 on the seven-level, logarithmic International Nuclear Event Scale (INES). The September 30, 1999 criticality accident at the JCO Tokai Works Site in Tokaimura, Japan in described in preliminary, technical detail. Information is based on preliminary presentations to technical groups by Japanese scientists and spokespersons, translations by technical and non-technical persons of technical web postings by various nuclear authorities, and English-language non-technical reports from various news media and nuclear-interest groups. (author)

  5. Crisis, criticism, change: Regulatory reform in the wake of nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sexton, Kimberly A.; )

    2015-01-01

    Accidents are a forcing function for change in the nuclear industry. While these events can shed light on needed technical safety reforms, they can also shine a light on needed regulatory system reforms. The TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident in Japan is the most recent example of this phenomenon, but it is not the only one. In the wake of the three major accidents that have occurred in the nuclear power industry - Three Mile Island (TMI) in the United States; Chernobyl in Ukraine, in the former Soviet Union; and the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident in Japan - a commission or committee of experts issued a report (or reports) with harsh criticism of the countries' regulatory system. And each of these accidents prompted changes in the respective regulatory systems. In looking at these responses, however, one must ask if this crisis, criticism, change approach is working and whether regulatory bodies around the world should instead undertake their own systematic reviews, un-prompted by crisis, to better ensure safety. This article will attempt to analyse the issue of regulatory reform in the wake of nuclear accidents by first providing a background in nuclear regulatory systems, looking to international and national legal frameworks. Next, the article will detail a cross-section of current regulatory systems around the world. Following that, the article will analyse the before and after of the regulatory systems in the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan in relation to the TMI, Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. Finally, taking all this together, the article will address some of the international and national efforts to define exactly what makes a good regulator and provide conclusions on regulatory reform in the wake of nuclear accidents. (author)

  6. Instructions on the nuclear critical accident and how to correspond to future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimura, Itsuro

    2000-01-01

    The nuclear accident occurred at Tokai Works of the JCO Co., Ltd. is a simple but disallowable one formed by neglecting possibility of nuclear fission chain reaction, one of three dangers specific to nuclear power facilities and by feeding middle concentrated uranium solution with more than critical mass into a precipitation tank. As a man consumed most of his life to nuclear power, it is to occur a critical accident forming about 50 previous examples in the world and about 10 victims at Tokai-mura the most earnestly promoting its experiment and analysis and to generate new victims, what was thought to be the most regrettable in this accident. How the previous experiences and results in Tokai-mura could be transmitted to the JCO Co., Ltd. ? This was a large alarm-bell for persons engaging to R and D on nuclear power. As this accident was much deplorable and apological for the common public, it must be carried out to thoroughly analyze its causes, to establish its future responses, and to promote its essential countermeasures. As it is important to open informations on its contents, it is hopeful not to over-exaggerate and over-differentiate the accident, to calmly and scientifically analyze the risk as well as in the other accidents, and to construct actually effective countermeasures. (G.K.)

  7. Nuclear accident dosimetry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-01-01

    The film presents statistical data on criticality accidents. It outlines past IAEA activities on criticality accident dosimetry and the technical documents that resulted from this work. The film furthermore illustrates an international comparison study on nuclear accident dosimetry conducted at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell, United Kingdom

  8. Nuclear accident dosimetry

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1983-12-31

    The film presents statistical data on criticality accidents. It outlines past IAEA activities on criticality accident dosimetry and the technical documents that resulted from this work. The film furthermore illustrates an international comparison study on nuclear accident dosimetry conducted at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell, United Kingdom

  9. Update of the Nuclear Criticality Slide Rule for the Emergency Response to a Nuclear Criticality Accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Duluc, Matthieu; Bardelay, Aurélie; Celik, Cihangir; Heinrichs, Dave; Hopper, Calvin; Jones, Richard; Kim, Soon; Miller, Thomas; Troisne, Marc; Wilson, Chris

    2017-09-01

    AWE (UK), IRSN (France), LLNL (USA) and ORNL (USA) began a long term collaboration effort in 2015 to update the nuclear criticality Slide Rule for the emergency response to a nuclear criticality accident. This document, published almost 20 years ago, gives order of magnitude estimates of key parameters, such as number of fissions and doses (neutron and gamma), useful for emergency response teams and public authorities. This paper will present, firstly the motivation and the long term objectives for this update, then the overview of the initial configurations for updated calculations and preliminary results obtained with modern 3D codes.

  10. Update of the Nuclear Criticality Slide Rule for the Emergency Response to a Nuclear Criticality Accident

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Duluc Matthieu

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available AWE (UK, IRSN (France, LLNL (USA and ORNL (USA began a long term collaboration effort in 2015 to update the nuclear criticality Slide Rule for the emergency response to a nuclear criticality accident. This document, published almost 20 years ago, gives order of magnitude estimates of key parameters, such as number of fissions and doses (neutron and gamma, useful for emergency response teams and public authorities. This paper will present, firstly the motivation and the long term objectives for this update, then the overview of the initial configurations for updated calculations and preliminary results obtained with modern 3D codes.

  11. Review and compilation of criticality accidents in nuclear fuel processing facilities outside of Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watanabe, Norio; Tamaki, Hitoshi

    2000-04-01

    On September 30, 1999, a criticality accident occurred at the Tokai-mura uranium processing plant operated by JCO Co., Ltd., which resulted in the first nuclear accident involving a fatality, in Japan, and forced the residents in the vicinity of the site to be evacuated and be sheltered indoors. There have now been 21 criticality accidents reported in nuclear fuel processing facilities in foreign countries: seven in the United States, one in the United Kingdom and thirteen in Russia. Most of them occurred during the period from mid-1950's to mid-1960's, but one criticality accident tool place in Russian in 1997. This report reviews and compiles the published information on these accidents, including the latest information, focusing on the event sequence, the consequence of accident, and the cause of accident. The observations from the reviews are summarized as follows: Twenty of the 21 accidents occurred with the fissile material in a liquid. Twenty of the 21 accidents occurred in vessels/tanks with unfavorable geometry but one occurred in the vessel with favorable geometry. There were seven fatalities that were involved in five accidents. Three accidents involved a re-criticality condition caused by inadequate operator actions and two of them led to the death of the operators. One accident reached a re-criticality condition several hours after the first excursion was terminated by injecting borated water into the affected vessel. This accident implies the possibility that the borated water injection might not be effective to the criticality termination due to solubility of boric acid. Mechanisms of the criticality termination vary as follows: ejection or splashing of the solution at the time of power excursion, boiling or evaporation, addition of neutron poisons, or manual draining of solutions. (author)

  12. Review and compilation of criticality accidents in nuclear fuel processing facilities outside of Japan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Watanabe, Norio [Planning and Analysis Division, Nuclear Safety Research Center, Tokai Research Establishment, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan); Tamaki, Hitoshi [Department of Safety Research Technical Support, Tokai Research Establishment, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Tokai, Ibaraki (Japan)

    2000-04-01

    On September 30, 1999, a criticality accident occurred at the Tokai-mura uranium processing plant operated by JCO Co., Ltd., which resulted in the first nuclear accident involving a fatality, in Japan, and forced the residents in the vicinity of the site to be evacuated and be sheltered indoors. There have now been 21 criticality accidents reported in nuclear fuel processing facilities in foreign countries: seven in the United States, one in the United Kingdom and thirteen in Russia. Most of them occurred during the period from mid-1950's to mid-1960's, but one criticality accident tool place in Russian in 1997. This report reviews and compiles the published information on these accidents, including the latest information, focusing on the event sequence, the consequence of accident, and the cause of accident. The observations from the reviews are summarized as follows: Twenty of the 21 accidents occurred with the fissile material in a liquid. Twenty of the 21 accidents occurred in vessels/tanks with unfavorable geometry but one occurred in the vessel with favorable geometry. There were seven fatalities that were involved in five accidents. Three accidents involved a re-criticality condition caused by inadequate operator actions and two of them led to the death of the operators. One accident reached a re-criticality condition several hours after the first excursion was terminated by injecting borated water into the affected vessel. This accident implies the possibility that the borated water injection might not be effective to the criticality termination due to solubility of boric acid. Mechanisms of the criticality termination vary as follows: ejection or splashing of the solution at the time of power excursion, boiling or evaporation, addition of neutron poisons, or manual draining of solutions. (author)

  13. ANSI/ANS-8.23-1997: nuclear criticality accident emergency planning and response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baker, J.S.

    2004-01-01

    American National Standard ANSUANS-8.23 was developed to expand upon the basic emergency response guidance given in American National Standard, 'Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety' ANSI/ANS-8.19-1996 (Ref. 1). This standard provides guidance for minimizing risks to personnel during emergency response to a nuclear criticality accident outside reactors. This standard is intended to apply to those facilities for which a criticality accident alarm system, as specified in American National Standard, 'Criticality Accident Alarm System', ANSI/ANS-8.3-1997 (Ref. 2) is in use. The Working Group was established in 1990, with Norman L. Pruvost as chairman. The Working Group had up to twenty-three members representing a broad range of the nuclear industry, and has included members from Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom. The initial edition of ANSI/ANS-8.23 was approved by the American National Standards Institute on December 30, 1997. It provides guidance for the following topics: (1) Management and technical staff responsibilities; (2) Evaluation of a potential criticality accident; (3) Emergency plan provisions; (4) Evacuation; (5) Re-entry, rescue and stabilization; and (6) Classroom training, exercises and evacuation drills. This guidance is not for generic emergency planning issues, but is specific to nuclear criticality accidents. For example, it assumes that an Emergency Plan is already established at facilities that implement the standard. During the development of the initial edition of ANSI/ANS-8.23, each Working Group member evaluated potential use of the standard at a facility with which the member was familiar. This revealed areas where a facility could have difficulty complying with the standard. These reviews helped identify and eliminate many potential problems and ambiguities with the guidance. The Working Group has received very limited feedback from the user community since the first edition of the standard was published. Suggestions

  14. A neutron dosemeter for nuclear criticality accidents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    d'Errico, F; Curzio, G; Ciolini, R; Del Gratta, A; Nath, R

    2004-01-01

    A neutron dosemeter which offers instant read-out has been developed for nuclear criticality accidents. The system is based on gels containing emulsions of superheated dichlorodifluoromethane droplets, which vaporise into bubbles upon neutron irradiation. The expansion of these bubbles displaces an equivalent volume of gel into a graduated pipette, providing an immediate measure of the dose. Instant read-out is achieved using an array of transmissive optical sensors which consist of coupled LED emitters and phototransistor receivers. When the gel displaced in the pipette crosses the sensing region of the photomicrosensors, it generates a signal collected on a computer through a dedicated acquisition board. The performance of the device was tested during the 2002 International Accident Dosimetry Intercomparison in Valduc, France. The dosemeter was able to follow the initial dose gradient of a simulated accident, providing accurate values of neutron kerma; however, the emulsion was rapidly depleted of all its drops. A model of the depletion effects was developed and it indicates that an adequate dynamic range of the dose response can be achieved by using emulsions of smaller droplets.

  15. A neutron dosemeter for nuclear criticality accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D'Errico, F.; Curzio, G.; Ciolini, R.; Del Gratta, A.; Nath, R.

    2004-01-01

    A neutron dosemeter which offers instant read-out has been developed for nuclear criticality accidents. The system is based on gels containing emulsions of superheated dichlorodifluoromethane droplets, which vaporise into bubbles upon neutron irradiation. The expansion of these bubbles displaces an equivalent volume of gel into a graduated pipette, providing an immediate measure of the dose. Instant read-out is achieved using an array of transmissive optical sensors which consist of coupled LED emitters and phototransistor receivers. When the gel displaced in the pipette crosses the sensing region of the photo microsensors, it generates a signal collected on a computer through a dedicated acquisition board. The performance of the device was tested during the 2002 International Accident Dosimetry Intercomparison in Valduc (France)). The dosemeter was able to follow the initial dose gradient of a simulated accident, providing accurate values of neutron kerma; however, the emulsion was rapidly depleted of all its drops. A model of the depletion effects was developed and it indicates that an adequate dynamic range of the dose response can be achieved by using emulsions of smaller droplets. (authors)

  16. Analysis and evaluation of the nuclear criticality accident in JCO CO. LTD in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Hua; Liu Xinhua; Li Bing

    2001-01-01

    The author describes JCO criticality accident situation including the background, process chronology and emergency countermeasures taken of the accident and its radiation consequence. The analysis about the direct and root causes of the accident and some conclusions are also showed. The direct cause of the accident is the use of geometrically unsafe process equipment and personnel violation. However, the root cause is lack of efficient technical management. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize the criticality safety in nuclear fuel cycle installations and enhance safety culture of regulatory and operational personnel

  17. Organizational factors and reoccurrence protection on the JCO nuclear critical accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takano, Kenichi

    2000-01-01

    A nuclear critical accident formed at a nuclear fuel conversion factory in Tokai-mura on September, 1999 became gradually clear not to be a simple human error formed at a level of workmen but to be an organizational error or accident relating to various organizational factors. As a nuclear power facility adopts a depth protection system fundamentally, a large accident with serious danger would not form only by a single trouble and a human error and unless some factors overlaps. By reviewing recent serious accidents and troubles, all of them seem to have a keyword of 'organizational factor'. In the JCO accident, there are some organizational factors such as a climate deviating from a manual, insufficient and loose check against change of procedure, reduction of operators from a reason of profit priority, attitude on priority of working efficiency, and so forth, which are partially common to the Chernobyl accident. Recently, accidents and troubles impossible to make them a cause of simple human error by a person but to have to say an organizational error, have increased. This trend seems to depend upon not only complication and scale-up of technology system but also graduate change of social and management systems operating them. Therefore, it seems to be necessary to introduce a concept of depth protection (multiple protection) in order to keep its reliability and safety when complicating and scaling-up of system. (G.K.)

  18. JCO criticality accident termination operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanamori, Masashi

    2001-12-01

    On September 30 at around 10:35 AM, criticality accident occurred at the JCO's conversion building in Tokai-mura. Since criticality accident had not been anticipated, neither devices for termination of criticality accident nor neutron detectors were available. Immediately after the information of the accident, our emergency staff (Japan Nuclear Cycle development institute staff) went to JCO site, to measure the intensity of neutrons and gammas. There were four main tasks, first one was to measure the radiation intensity, second one was to terminate the criticality accident, third one is to alert the residents surrounding the JCO site, fourth one is to evacuate the employees in the site. These tasks were successfully performed until October 1. This paper describes about how these operations were performed by the relevant staffs. (author)

  19. Improved dose estimates for nuclear criticality accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilkinson, A.D.; Basoglu, B.; Bentley, C.L.; Dunn, M.E.; Plaster, M.J.; Dodds, H.L.; Yamamoto, T.

    1995-01-01

    Slide rules are improved for estimating doses and dose rates resulting from nuclear criticality accidents. The original slide rules were created for highly enriched uranium solutions and metals using hand calculations along with the decades old Way-Wigner radioactive decay relationship and the inverse square law. This work uses state-of-the-art methods and better data to improve the original slide rules and also to extend the slide rule concept to three additional systems; i.e., highly enriched (93.2 wt%) uranium damp (H/ 235 U = 10) powder (U 3 O 8 ) and low-enriched (5 wt%) uranium mixtures (UO 2 F 2 ) with a H/ 235 U ratio of 200 and 500. Although the improved slide rules differ only slightly from the original slide rules, the improved slide rules and also the new slide rules can be used with greater confidence since they are based on more rigorous methods and better nuclear data

  20. JCO criticality accident termination operation

    OpenAIRE

    金盛 正至

    2010-01-01

    In 2001, we summarized the circumstances surrounding termination of the JCO criticality accident based on testimony in the Mito District Court on December 17, 2001. JCO was the company for uranium fuels production in Japan. That document was assembled based on actual testimony in the belief that a description of the work involved in termination of the accident would be useful in some way for preventing nuclear disasters in the future. This year is the tenth year of the JCO criticality acciden...

  1. First Responders and Criticality Accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Valerie L. Putman; Douglas M. Minnema

    2005-11-01

    Nuclear criticality accident descriptions typically include, but do not focus on, information useful to first responders. We studied these accidents, noting characteristics to help (1) first responders prepare for such an event and (2) emergency drill planners develop appropriate simulations for training. We also provide recommendations to help people prepare for such events in the future.

  2. Lessons learned from early criticality accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malenfant, R.E.

    1996-01-01

    Four accidents involving the approach to criticality occurred during the period July, 1945, through May, 1996. These have been described in the format of the OPERATING EXPERIENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY which is distributed by the Office of Nuclear and Facility Safety. Although the lessons learned have been incorporated in standards, codes, and formal procedures during the last fifty years, this is their first presentation in this format. It is particularly appropriate that they be presented in the forum of the Nuclear Criticality Technology Safety Project Workshop closest to the fiftieth anniversary of the last of the four accidents, and that which was most instrumental in demonstrating the need to incorporate lessons learned

  3. Development of the criticality accident analysis code, AGNES

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakajima, Ken

    1989-01-01

    In the design works for the facilities which handle nuclear fuel, the evaluation of criticality accidents cannot be avoided even if their possibility is as small as negligible. In particular in the system using solution fuel like uranyl nitrate, solution has the property easily becoming dangerous form, and all the past criticality accidents occurred in the case of solution, therefore, the evaluation of criticality accidents becomes the most important item of safety analysis. When a criticality accident occurred in a solution fuel system, due to the generation and movement of radiolysis gas voids, the oscillation of power output and pressure pulses are observed. In order to evaluate the effect of criticality accidents, these output oscillation and pressure pulses must be calculated accurately. For this purpose, the development of the dynamic characteristic code AGNES (Accidentally Generated Nuclear Excursion Simulation code) was carried out. The AGNES is the reactor dynamic characteristic code having two independent void models. Modified energy model and pressure model, and as the benchmark calculation of the AGNES code, the results of the experimental analysis on the CRAC experiment are reported. (K.I.)

  4. Effects of the criticality accident at Tokai-mura on the public's attitude to nuclear power generation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kitada, Atsuko; Hayashi, Chikio

    2000-01-01

    The objective of our study was to clarify the effects on the public's attitude of nuclear power and the criticality accident that occurred at the JCO plant in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki Prefecture. For this purpose, we conducted an awareness survey in the Kansai and Kanto areas two months after the accident. Analysis was made on the basis of the comparison of the survey results with the data that the Institute of Nuclear Safety System had accumulated through continuous awareness surveys on nuclear power generation (regular surveys) since 1993. The public's reactions were twofold. On one hand, there were emotional reactions about accidents in nuclear facilities and a reduction in the sense of security. On the other hand, there were reactions concerning the image of nuclear power plant workers and demand on electricity utilities for enhanced employee education and training. The latter reactions correspond to the problems pointed out after the JCO accident. Regarding the utilization of nuclear power generation, the opinion that 'the utilization of nuclear power generation is unavoidable' accounts for 60% of those surveyed. With the opinion that 'nuclear power generation should be utilized' added, 70% of those surveyed take an affirmative attitude to nuclear power utilization. This situation has remained about the same since 1998, the year before the JCO accident. Using the quantification method III to analyze a number of questionnaires about nuclear power generation such as the anxiety about it, we determined overall attitude indexes regarding nuclear power to perform a time sequence comparison. The comparison shows that the attitude after the JCO accident tended to be more negative than in 1998. However, no significant difference in the overall indexes is seen between 1993 and 1998. Judging the comparison results on the basis of the time span starting in 1993 allows us to conclude that the JCO accident has not greatly contributed to worsening the attitude towards nuclear

  5. Socioeconomic consequences of nuclear reactor accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tawil, J.J.; Callaway, J.W.; Coles, B.L.; Cronin, F.J.; Currie, J.W.; Imhoff, K.L.; Lewis, P.M.; Nesse, R.J.; Strenge, D.L.

    1984-06-01

    This report identifies and characterizes the off-site socioeconomic consequences that would likely result from a severe radiological accident at a nuclear power plant. The types of impacts that are addressed include economic impacts, health impacts, social/psychological impacts and institutional impacts. These impacts are identified for each of several phases of a reactor accident - from the warning phase through the post-resettlement phase. The relative importance of the impact during each accident phase and the degree to which the impact can be predicted are indicated. The report also examines the methods that are currently used for assessing nuclear reactor accidents, including development of accident scenarios and the estimating of socioeconomic accident consequences with various models. Finally, a critical evaluation is made regarding the use of impact analyses in estimating the contribution of socioeconomic consequences to nuclear accident reactor accident risk. 116 references, 7 figures, 15 tables

  6. Process criticality accident likelihoods, magnitudes and emergency planning. A focus on solution accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, Thomas P.

    2003-01-01

    This paper presents analyses and applications of data from reactor and critical experiment research on the dynamics of nuclear excursions in solution media. Available criticality accident information is also discussed and shown to provide strong evidence of the overwhelming likelihood of accidents in liquid media over other forms and to support the measured data. These analyses are shown to provide valuable insights into key parameters important to understanding solution excursion dynamics in general and in evaluating practical upper bounds on criticality accident magnitudes. This understanding and these upper bounds are directly applicable to the evaluation of the consequences of postulated criticality accidents. These bounds are also essential in order to comply with national and international consensus standards and regulatory requirements for emergency planning. (author)

  7. JCO criticality accident termination operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanamori, Masashi

    2010-07-01

    In 2001, we summarized the circumstances surrounding termination of the JCO criticality accident based on testimony in the Mito District Court on December 17, 2001. JCO was the company for uranium fuels production in Japan. That document was assembled based on actual testimony in the belief that a description of the work involved in termination of the accident would be useful in some way for preventing nuclear disasters in the future. The description focuses on the witness' own behavior, and what he saw and heard, and thus is written from the perspective of action by one individual. This was done simply because it was easier for the witness to write down his memories as he remembers them. Description of the activities of other organizations and people is provided only as necessary, to ensure that consistency in the descriptive approach is not lost. The essentials of this report were rewritten as a third-person objective description in the summary of the report by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ). Since then, comments have been received from sources such as former members of the Nuclear Safety Commission (Dr. Kenji Sumita and Dr. Akira Kanagawa), concerned parties from the former Science and Technology Agency, and reports from the JCO Criticality Accident Investigation Committee of the AESJ, and thus this report was rewritten to correct incorrect information, and add material where that was felt to be necessary. This year is the tenth year of the JCO criticality accident. To mark this occasion we have decided to translate the record of what occurred at the accident site into English so that more people can draw lessons from this accident. This report is an English version of JAEA-Technology 2009-073. (author)

  8. Comparison of the dose evaluation methods for criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shimizu, Yoshio; Oka, Tsutomu

    2004-01-01

    The improvement of the dose evaluation method for criticality accidents is important to rationalize design of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The source spectrums of neutron and gamma ray of a criticality accident depend on the condition of the source, its materials, moderation, density and so on. The comparison of the dose evaluation methods for a criticality accident is made. Some methods, which are combination of criticality calculation and shielding calculation, are proposed. Prompt neutron and gamma ray doses from nuclear criticality of some uranium systems have been evaluated as the Nuclear Criticality Slide Rule. The uranium metal source (unmoderated system) and the uranyl nitrate solution source (moderated system) in the rule are evaluated by some calculation methods, which are combinations of code and cross section library, as follows: (a) SAS1X (ENDF/B-IV), (b) MCNP4C (ENDF/B-VI)-ANISN (DLC23E or JSD120), (c) MCNP4C-MCNP4C (ENDF/B-VI). They have consisted of criticality calculation and shielding calculation. These calculation methods are compared about the tissue absorbed dose and the spectrums at 2 m from the source. (author)

  9. Locations of criticality alarms and nuclear accident dosimeters at Hanford

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-08-01

    Hanford facilities that contain fissionable materials capable of achieving critical mass are monitored with nuclear accident dosimeters (NADS) in compliance with the requirements of DOE Order 5480.11, Chapter XI, Section 4.c. (DOE 1988). The US Department of Energy (DOE) Richland Field Office (RL) has assigned the responsibility for maintaining and evaluating the Hanford NAD system to the Instrumentation and External Dosimetry (I ampersand ED) Section of Pacific Northwest Laboratory's (PNL's) Health Physics Department. This manual provides a description of the Hanford NAD, criteria and instructions for proper NAD placement, and the locations of these dosimeters onsite

  10. Criticality accident studies and research performed in the Valduc criticality laboratory, France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barbry, F.; Fouillaud, P.

    2001-01-01

    In 1967, the IPSN (Institut de Protection et de Surete Nucleaire - Nuclear Protection and Safety Institute) started studies and research in France on criticality accidents, with the objective of improving knowledge and modelling of accidents in order to limit consequences to the public, the environment and installations. The criticality accident is accompanied by an intense emission of neutronic and gamma radiation and releases of radioactive products in the form of gas and aerosols, generating irradiation and contamination risks. The main objectives of the studies carried out, particularly using the CRAC installation and the SILENE reactor at Valduc (France), were to model the physics of criticality accidents, to estimate the risks of irradiation and radioactive releases, to elaborate an accident detection system and to provide information for intervention plans. This document summarizes the state of knowledge in the various fields mentioned above. The results of experiments carried out in the Valduc criticality laboratory are used internationally as reference data for the qualification of calculation codes and the assessment of the consequences of a criticality accident. The SILENE installation, that reproduces the various conditions encountered during a criticality accident, is also a unique international research tool for studies and training on those matters. (author)

  11. Plant safety review from mass criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Susanto, B.G.

    2000-01-01

    The review has been done to understand the resent status of the plant in facing postulated mass criticality accident. From the design concept of the plant all the components in the system including functional groups have been designed based on favorable mass/geometry safety principle. The criticality safety for each component is guaranteed because all the dimensions relevant to criticality of the components are smaller than dimensions of 'favorable mass/geometry'. The procedures covering all aspects affecting quality including the safety related are developed and adhered to at all times. Staff are indoctrinated periodically in short training session to warn the important of the safety in process of production. The plant is fully equipped with 6 (six) criticality detectors in strategic places to alert employees whenever the postulated mass criticality accident occur. In the event of Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, PT BATAN TEKNOLOGI has also proposed the organization structure how promptly to report the crisis to Nuclear Energy Control Board (BAPETEN) Indonesia. (author)

  12. An updated nuclear criticality slide rule

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hopper, C.M.; Broadhead, B.L.

    1998-04-01

    This Volume 2 contains the functional version of the updated nuclear criticality slide rule (more accurately, sliding graphs) that is referenced in An Updated Nuclear Criticality Slide Rule: Technical Basis, NUREG/CR-6504, Vol. 1 (ORNL/TM-13322/V1). This functional slide rule provides a readily usable open-quotes in-handclose quotes method for estimating pertinent nuclear criticality accident information from sliding graphs, thereby permitting (1) the rapid estimation of pertinent criticality accident information without laborious or sophisticated calculations in a nuclear criticality emergency situation, (2) the appraisal of potential fission yields and external personnel radiation exposures for facility safety analyses, and (3) a technical basis for emergency preparedness and training programs at nonreactor nuclear facilities. The slide rule permits the estimation of neutron and gamma dose rates and integrated doses based upon estimated fission yields, distance from the fission source, and time-after criticality accidents for five different critical systems. Another sliding graph permits the estimation of critical solution fission yields based upon fissile material concentration, critical vessel geometry, and solution addition rate. Another graph provides neutron and gamma dose-reduction factors for water, steel, and concrete. Graphs from historic documents are provided as references for estimating critical parameters of various fissile material systems. Conversion factors for various English and metric units are provided for quick reference

  13. Personal nuclear accident dosimetry at Sandia National Laboratories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ward, D.C.; Mohagheghi, A.H.; Burrows, R.

    1996-09-01

    DOE installations possessing sufficient quantities of fissile material to potentially constitute a critical mass, such that the excessive exposure of personnel to radiation from a nuclear accident is possible, are required to provide nuclear accident dosimetry services. This document describes the personal nuclear accident dosimeter (PNAD) used by SNL and prescribes methodologies to initially screen, and to process PNAD results. In addition, this report describes PNAD dosimetry results obtained during the Nuclear Accident Dosimeter Intercomparison Study (NAD23), held during 12-16 June 1995, at Los Alamos National Laboratories. Biases for reported neutron doses ranged from -6% to +36% with an average bias of +12%

  14. Criticality Calculations for a Typical Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Plant with Low Enriched Uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elsayed, Hade; Nagy, Mohamed; Agamy, Said; Shaat, Mohmaed

    2013-01-01

    The operations with the fissile materials such as U 235 introduce the risk of a criticality accident that may be lethal to nearby personnel and can lead the facility to shutdown. Therefore, the prevention of a nuclear criticality accident should play a major role in the design of a nuclear facility. The objectives of criticality safety are to prevent a self-sustained nuclear chain reaction and to minimize the consequences. Sixty criticality accidents were occurred in the world. These are accidents divided into two categories, 22 accidents occurred in process facilities and 38 accidents occurred during critical experiments or operations with research reactor. About 21 criticality accidents including Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co. (JCO) accident took place with fuel solution or slurry and only one accident occurred with metal fuel. In this study the nuclear criticality calculations have been performed for a typical nuclear fuel fabrication plant producing nuclear fuel elements for nuclear research reactors with low enriched uranium up to 20%. The calculations were performed for both normal and abnormal operation conditions. The effective multiplication factor (k eff ) during the nuclear fuel fabrication process (Uranium hexafluoride - Ammonium Diuranate conversion process) was determined. Several accident scenarios were postulated and the criticalities of these accidents were evaluated. The computer code MCNP-4B which based on Monte Carlo method was used to calculate neutron multiplication factor. The criticality calculations Monte Carlo method was used to calculate neutron multiplication factor. The criticality calculations were performed for the cases of, change of moderator to fuel ratio, solution density and concentration of the solute in order to prevent or mitigate criticality accidents during the nuclear fuel fabrication process. The calculation results are analyzed and discussed

  15. Effects of the criticality accident at Tokai-mura on the public's attitude to nuclear power generation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kitada, Atsuko [Institute of Social Research, Institute of Nuclear Safety System Inc., Mihama, Fukui (Japan); Hayashi, Chikio [The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Tokyo (Japan)

    2000-09-01

    The objective of our study was to clarify the effects on the public's attitude of nuclear power and the criticality accident that occurred at the JCO plant in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki Prefecture. For this purpose, we conducted an awareness survey in the Kansai and Kanto areas two months after the accident. Analysis was made on the basis of the comparison of the survey results with the data that the Institute of Nuclear Safety System had accumulated through continuous awareness surveys on nuclear power generation (regular surveys) since 1993. The public's reactions were twofold. On one hand, there were emotional reactions about accidents in nuclear facilities and a reduction in the sense of security. On the other hand, there were reactions concerning the image of nuclear power plant workers and demand on electricity utilities for enhanced employee education and training. The latter reactions correspond to the problems pointed out after the JCO accident. Regarding the utilization of nuclear power generation, the opinion that 'the utilization of nuclear power generation is unavoidable' accounts for 60% of those surveyed. With the opinion that 'nuclear power generation should be utilized' added, 70% of those surveyed take an affirmative attitude to nuclear power utilization. This situation has remained about the same since 1998, the year before the JCO accident. Using the quantification method III to analyze a number of questionnaires about nuclear power generation such as the anxiety about it, we determined overall attitude indexes regarding nuclear power to perform a time sequence comparison. The comparison shows that the attitude after the JCO accident tended to be more negative than in 1998. However, no significant difference in the overall indexes is seen between 1993 and 1998. Judging the comparison results on the basis of the time span starting in 1993 allows us to conclude that the JCO accident has not greatly contributed to worsening

  16. Four years after the JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sumita, Kenji

    2003-01-01

    It has been about four years since the first criticality accident in Japan. The JCO accident site was not so far from this auditorium. I have been asked to give a short review of important results from the various technical investigations on the accident that have been performed during the past four years. I will also give a short introduction to the changes that have been made in the nuclear safety regulation systems of the Japanese Government. (author)

  17. Review of the CRAC and SILENE Criticality Accident Studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barbry, F.; Fouillaud, P.; Grivot, P.; Reverdy, L.

    2009-01-01

    In 1967, the Commissariat et l'Energie Atomique (French Atomic Energy Agency) performed its first research on criticality accidents for the purpose of limiting their impact on people, the environment, and nuclear facilities themselves. A criticality accident is accompanied by intense neutron and gamma emissions and release of radioactive fission products-gases and aerosols-gene rating risk of irradiation and contamination. This work has supplemented earlier work in criticality safety, which concentrated on critical mass measurements and computations. Understanding of the consequences of criticality accidents was limited. Emergency planning was hampered by lack of data. Information became available from pulsed reactor experiments, but the experiments were restricted to the established reactor configurations. The objectives of research performed at the Valduc criticality laboratory, mainly on aqueous fissile media, using the CRAC and SILENE facilities, by multidisciplinary teams of physicists, dosimetry specialists, and radio-biologists, were to model criticality accident physics, estimate irradiation risks and radioactive releases, detect excursions, and organize emergency response. The results of the Valduc experiments have contributed toward improved understanding of criticality accident phenomenology and better evaluation of the risks associated with such accidents. (authors)

  18. Review of the CRAC and SILENE Criticality Accident Studies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barbry, F.; Fouillaud, P.; Grivot, P.; Reverdy, L. [CEA Valduc, Serv Rech Neutron and Critcite, 21 - Is-sur-Tille (France)

    2009-02-15

    In 1967, the Commissariat et l'Energie Atomique (French Atomic Energy Agency) performed its first research on criticality accidents for the purpose of limiting their impact on people, the environment, and nuclear facilities themselves. A criticality accident is accompanied by intense neutron and gamma emissions and release of radioactive fission products-gases and aerosols-gene rating risk of irradiation and contamination. This work has supplemented earlier work in criticality safety, which concentrated on critical mass measurements and computations. Understanding of the consequences of criticality accidents was limited. Emergency planning was hampered by lack of data. Information became available from pulsed reactor experiments, but the experiments were restricted to the established reactor configurations. The objectives of research performed at the Valduc criticality laboratory, mainly on aqueous fissile media, using the CRAC and SILENE facilities, by multidisciplinary teams of physicists, dosimetry specialists, and radio-biologists, were to model criticality accident physics, estimate irradiation risks and radioactive releases, detect excursions, and organize emergency response. The results of the Valduc experiments have contributed toward improved understanding of criticality accident phenomenology and better evaluation of the risks associated with such accidents. (authors)

  19. PNNL Results from 2010 CALIBAN Criticality Accident Dosimeter Intercomparison Exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hill, Robin L.; Conrady, Matthew M.

    2011-01-01

    This document reports the results of the Hanford personnel nuclear accident dosimeter (PNAD) and fixed nuclear accident dosimeter (FNAD) during a criticality accident dosimeter intercomparison exercise at the CEA Valduc Center on September 20-23, 2010. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) participated in a criticality accident dosimeter intercomparison exercise at the Commissariat a Energie Atomique (CEA) Valduc Center near Dijon, France on September 20-23, 2010. The intercomparison exercise was funded by the U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory as the lead Laboratory. PNNL was one of six invited DOE Laboratory participants. The other participating Laboratories were: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Savannah River Site (SRS), the Y-12 National Security Complex at Oak Ridge, and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). The goals of PNNL's participation in the intercomparison exercise were to test and validate the procedures and algorithm currently used for the Hanford personnel nuclear accident dosimeters (PNADs) on the metallic reactor, CALIBAN, to test exposures to PNADs from the side and from behind a phantom, and to test PNADs that were taken from a historical batch of Hanford PNADs that had varying degrees of degradation of the bare indium foil. Similar testing of the PNADs was done on the Valduc SILENE test reactor in 2009 (Hill and Conrady, 2010). The CALIBAN results are reported here.

  20. Updated tool for nuclear criticality accident emergency response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broadhead, B.L.; Hopper, C.M.

    1995-01-01

    Some 20 yr ago a hand-held slide rule was developed at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant to aid in the response to several postulated nuclear criticality accidents. These assumed accidents involved highly enriched uranium in either a bare metal or a uranyl nitrate system. The slide rule consisted of a sliding scale based on the total fission yield and four corresponding dose indicators: (1) a prompt radiation dose relationship as a function of distance; (2) a delayed fission product gamma dose rate relationship as a function of time and distance; (3) the total dose relationship with time and distance; and (4) the I-min integrated dose relationship with time and distance. The original slide rule was generated assuming very simplistic numerical procedures such as the inverse-square relationship of dose with distance and the Way-Wigner relationship to express the time dependence of the dose. The simple prescriptions were tied to actual dose measurements from similar systems to yield a meaningful, yet simple approach to emergency planning and response needs. This paper describes the application of an advanced procedure to the updating of the original slide rule for five critical systems. These five systems include (a) an unreflected sphere of 93.2 wt% enriched uranium metal, (b) an unreflected sphere of 93.2 wt% enriched uranyl nitrate solution with a H/ 235 U ratio of 500, (c) an unreflected sphere of damp 93.2 wt% enriched uranium oxide with a H/ 235 U ratio of 10, (d) an unreflected sphere of 4.95 wt% enriched uranyl fluoride solution having a H/ 235 U ratio of 410, and (e) an unreflected sphere of damp 5 wt% enriched uranium dioxide having a H/ 235 U ratio of 200

  1. State of reaction on news media for JCO criticality accident on abroad

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Itoh, Takeshi

    1999-01-01

    The criticality accident, which occurred in JCO Tokai on September 30th 1999, was the first accident accompanied with serious radiation exposure to persons at Japanese nuclear facilities. As an evacuation order for local residents was issued, it caused uneasiness to the public. It also gave great impact to the foreign countries. In this report we have investigated the reactions in such countries, as U.S., France, Germany and U.K. by means of news media like TV, newspapers and magazines. Finding are as follows: They were all surprised to know the cause of the accident, which was by improper procedure of JCO workers. Because they couldn't imagine that such an accident might happen in such a high-tech country as Japan. The Japanese regulator was criticized for their insufficient criticality facility surveillance. There arose some questions for Japanese nuclear reliabilities. Because of the delayed announcement of the accident by Japanese public sector, anti-nuclear groups, like Greenpeace, NCI, etc., have a chance to carry on their campaign. The information from Japanese public sector was not enough to satisfy the foreign news media. We concluded that it is also necessary to develop effective information dissemination to overseas in case of a nuclear accident. (author)

  2. Questionnaire survey report about the criticality accident at a nuclear fuel processing facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Radiation Protection Section of the Japanese Society of Radiological Technology conducted a questionnaire survey on the criticality accident at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokai village on September 30, 1999 in order to identify factors related to the accident and consider countermeasures to deal with such accidents. The questionnaire was distributed to 347 members (122 facilities) of the Japanese Society of Radiological Technology who were working or living in Ibaraki Prefecture, and replies were obtained from 104 members (75 facilities). Questions to elicit the opinions of individuals were as following: method of obtaining information about the accident, knowledge about radiation, opinions about the accident, and requests directed to the Society. Questions regarding facilities concerned the following: communication after the accident, requests for dispatch to the accident site, and possession of radiometry devices. In regard to acquisition of information, 91 of the 104 members (87.5%) answered 'television or radios' followed by newspapers. Forty-five of 101 members were questioned about radiation exposure and radiation effects by the public. There were many opinions that accurate news should be provided rapidly, by the mass media. Many members (75%) felt that they lacked knowledge about radiation, reconfirming the importance of education and instruction concerning radiation. Dispatch was requested of 36 of the 75 facilities (48%), and 44 of 83 facilities (53%) owned radiometry instruments. (K.H.)

  3. An analysis on human factor issues in criticality accident at a uranium processing plant. Investigation on human behavior contributing to the criticality accident. Interim report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sasou, Kuonihide; Goda, Hideki; Hirotsu, Yuko

    1999-01-01

    At 10:30 am, September 30th, 1999, a criticality accident occurred in a conversion building of a uranium processing plant in Tokai, Ibaraki prefecture. 69 people including 3 workers who then worked at the building, 3 fire fighters who dispatched to rescue them were exposed to the radiation. People with a 350 m-radius of the site were recommended to evacuate themselves from the region to a temporarily prepared evacuation center. And about one hundred thousand people within a 10 km-radius were also advised to stay inside of their home. Nuclear Safety Commission's Accident Investigation Committee is investigating causes of this accident and have been revealing that deviation from government-authorized processing method and negligence of its illegal procedure had contributed to the accident. The influence of this accident is expanding not only to the plant operating company, local people but also to Japanese nuclear power policy, the whole nuclear industry in Japan. Especially pervasion of 'Safety Culture' is strongly being required. This report analyses latent factors of some human behavior directly contributing to the criticality accident. It also mentions that 4 critical points on the poor climate for safety in the work place, the inadequate safety management, the unsuitable equipment and the production-biased company's policy are the latent factors of this accident. It also finds that the poor climate and the production-biased policy are the most important factors. It can be said that some people directly or indirectly having caused the accident are the victims of them. (author)

  4. Accidents in nuclear facilities: classification, incidence and impact

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Galicia A, J.; Paredes G, L. C.

    2012-10-01

    A general analysis of the 146 accidents reported officially in nuclear facilities from 1945 to 2012 is presented, among them some took place in: power or research nuclear reactors, critical and subcritical nuclear assemblies, handling of nuclear materials inside laboratories belonging to institutes or universities, in radiochemistry industrial plants and nuclear fuel factories. In form graph the incidence of these accidents is illustrated classified for; category, decades, geographical localization, country classification before the OECD, failure type, and the immediate or later victims. On the other hand, the main learned lessons of the nuclear accidents of Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima are stood out, among those that highlight; the human factors, the necessity of designs more innovative and major technology for the operation, control and surveillance of the nuclear facilities, to increase the criterions of nuclear, radiological and physics safety applied to these facilities, the necessity to carry out probabilistic analysis of safety more detailed for cases of not very probable accidents and their impact, to revalue the selection criterions of the sites for nuclear locations, the methodology of post-accident sites recovery and major instrumentation for parameters evaluation and the radiological monitoring among others. (Author)

  5. Criticality accident in uranium fuel processing plant. Questionnaires from Research Committee of Nuclear Safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kataoka, Isao; Sekimoto, Hiroshi

    2000-01-01

    The Research Committee of Nuclear Safety carried out a research on criticality accident at the JCO plant according to statement of president of the Japan Atomic Energy Society on October 8, 1999, of which results are planned to be summarized by the constitutions shown as follows, for a report on the 'Questionnaires of criticality accident in the Uranium Fuel Processing Plant of the JCO, Inc.': general criticality safety, fuel cycle and the JCO, Inc.; elucidation on progress and fact of accident; cause analysis and problem picking-up; proposals on improvement; and duty of the Society. Among them, on last two items, because of a conclusion to be required for members of the Society at discussions of the Committee, some questionnaires were send to more than 1800 of them on April 5, 2000 with name of chairman of the Committee. As results of the questionnaires contained proposals and opinions on a great numbers of fields, some key-words like words were found on a shape of repeating in most questionnaires. As they were thought to be very important nuclei in these two items, they were further largely classified to use for summarizing proposals and opinions on the questionnaires. This questionnaire had a big characteristic on the duty of the Society in comparison with those in the other organizations. (G.K.)

  6. Some issues on the Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors Amendment after JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanabe, Tomoyuki

    2001-01-01

    As the Amendment of the Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors on an opportunity of the JCO criticality accident can be almost evaluated at a viewpoint of upgrading on effectiveness of safety regulation, it is thought to remain a large problem to rely on only enforcement of regulation due to amendment of the Law at future accident. In future, it can be also said to be important subjects to further expand a philosophy on the regulation (material regulation) focussed to hazards of nuclear material itself, not only to secure effectiveness on the multi-complementary safety regulation due to the administrative agency and the Nuclear Safety Commission but also to prepare a mechanism reflexible of a new information to the safety regulation, and to prepare a mechanism to assist adequate business execution and so forth of enterprises. (G.K.)

  7. ANS-8.23: Criticality accident emergency planning and response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pruvost, N.L.

    1991-01-01

    A study group has been formed under the auspices of ANS-8 to examine the need for a standard on nuclear criticality accident emergency planning and response. This standard would be ANS-8.23. ANSI/ANS-8.19-1984, Administrative Practices for Nuclear Criticality Safety, provides some guidance on the subject in Section 10 titled -- Planned Response to Nuclear Criticality Accidents. However, the study group has formed a consensus that Section 10 is inadequate in that technical guidance in addition to administrative guidance is needed. The group believes that a new standard which specifically addresses emergency planning and response to a perceived criticality accident is needed. Plans for underway to request the study group be designated a writing group to create a draft of such a new standard. The proposed standard will divide responsibility between management and technical staff. Generally, management will be charged with providing the necessary elements of emergency planning such as a criticality detection and alarm system, training, safe evacuation routes and assembly areas, a system for timely accountability of personnel, and an effective emergency response organization. The technical staff, on the other hand, will be made responsible for establishing specific items such as safe and clearly posted evacuation evacuation routes and dose criteria for personnel assembly areas. The key to the question of responsibilities is that management must provide the resources for the technical staff to establish the elements of an emergency response effort

  8. Nuclear fuel cycle facility accident analysis handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ayer, J.E.; Clark, A.T.; Loysen, P.; Ballinger, M.Y.; Mishima, J.; Owczarski, P.C.; Gregory, W.S.; Nichols, B.D.

    1988-05-01

    The Accident Analysis Handbook (AAH) covers four generic facilities: fuel manufacturing, fuel reprocessing, waste storage/solidification, and spent fuel storage; and six accident types: fire, explosion, tornado, criticality, spill, and equipment failure. These are the accident types considered to make major contributions to the radiological risk from accidents in nuclear fuel cycle facility operations. The AAH will enable the user to calculate source term releases from accident scenarios manually or by computer. A major feature of the AAH is development of accident sample problems to provide input to source term analysis methods and transport computer codes. Sample problems and illustrative examples for different accident types are included in the AAH

  9. Cognitive systems engineering analysis of the JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanabe, Fumiya; Yamaguchi, Yukichi

    2000-01-01

    The JCO Criticality Accident is analyzed with a framework based on cognitive systems engineering. With the framework, analysis is conducted integrally both from the system viewpoint and actors viewpoint. The occupational chemical risk was important as safety constraint for the actors as well as the nuclear risk, which is due to criticality accident, to the public and to actors. The inappropriate actor's mental model of the work system played a critical role and several factors (e.g. poor training and education, lack of information on criticality safety control in the procedures and instructions, and lack of warning signs at workplace) contributed to form and shape the mental model. Based on the analysis, several countermeasures, such as warning signs, information system for supporting actors and improved training and education, are derived to prevent such an accident. (author)

  10. Calculation code used in criticality analyses for the accident of JCO precipitation tank

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miyoshi, Yoshinori

    2000-01-01

    In order to evaluate nuclear features on criticality accident formed at the nuclear fuel processing facility in Tokai Works of the JCO, Ltd. (JCO), in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki prefecture, dynamic analyses to calculate output change after occurring the accident as well as criticality analyses to calculate reactivity added to precipitation tank, were carried out according to scenario on accident formation. For the criticality analyses, a continuous energy Monte Carlo code MCNP was used to carry out calculation of reactivity fed into the precipitation tank as correctly as possible. And, SRAC code system was used for calculation on temperature and void reactivity coefficients, effective delayed neutron ratio beta eff , and instantaneous neutron generation time required for parameters controlling transition features at criticality accident. In addition, for the dynamic analyses, because of necessity of considering on volume expansion of solution fuels used as exothermic body and radiation decomposition gas forming into solution, output behavior, numbers of nuclear fission, and so forth at initial burst portion were calculated by using TRACE and quasi-regular code, at a center of AGNES-2 promoting on its development in JAERI. Here were reported on outlines and an analysis example on calculation code using for the nuclear features evaluation. (G.K.)

  11. Nuclear criticality safety: 2-day training course

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schlesser, J.A.

    1997-02-01

    This compilation of notes is presented as a source reference for the criticality safety course. At the completion of this training course, the attendee will: be able to define terms commonly used in nuclear criticality safety; be able to appreciate the fundamentals of nuclear criticality safety; be able to identify factors which affect nuclear criticality safety; be able to identify examples of criticality controls as used as Los Alamos; be able to identify examples of circumstances present during criticality accidents; have participated in conducting two critical experiments; be asked to complete a critique of the nuclear criticality safety training course

  12. Nuclear criticality safety: 2-day training course

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schlesser, J.A. [ed.] [comp.

    1997-02-01

    This compilation of notes is presented as a source reference for the criticality safety course. At the completion of this training course, the attendee will: be able to define terms commonly used in nuclear criticality safety; be able to appreciate the fundamentals of nuclear criticality safety; be able to identify factors which affect nuclear criticality safety; be able to identify examples of criticality controls as used as Los Alamos; be able to identify examples of circumstances present during criticality accidents; have participated in conducting two critical experiments; be asked to complete a critique of the nuclear criticality safety training course.

  13. Nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    On 27 May 1986 the Norwegian government appointed an inter-ministerial committee of senior officials to prepare a report on experiences in connection with the Chernobyl accident. The present second part of the committee's report describes proposals for measures to prevent and deal with similar accidents in the future. The committee's evaluations and proposals are grouped into four main sections: Safety and risk at nuclear power plants; the Norwegian contingency organization for dealing with nuclear accidents; compensation issues; and international cooperation

  14. Nineteenth nuclear accident dosimetry intercomparison study, August 9-13, 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Greene, R.T.; Sims, C.C.; Swaja, R.E.

    1983-11-01

    The Nineteenth Nuclear Accident Dosimetry Intercomparison Study was held August 9 to 13, 1982, at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory using the Health Physics Research Reactor operated in the pulse mode to simulate nuclear criticality accidents. Participants from eight organizations measured neutron and gamma doses at air stations and on phantoms for three different shielding conditions. Measured results were compared to nuclear industry guidelines for criticality accident dosimeters which suggest accuracies of +-25% for neutron dose and +-20% for gamma dose. Seventy-two percent of the neutron dose measurements using foil activation, sodium activation, hair sulfur activation, and thermoluminescent methods met the guidelines while less than 40% of the gamma dose measurements were within +-20% of reference values. The softest neutron energy spectrum (also lowest neutron/gamma dose ratio) provided the most difficulty in measuring neutron and gamma doses. Results of this study indicate the need for continued intercomparison and testing of nuclear accident dosimetry systems and for training of evaluating personnel. 14 references, 7 figures, 16 tables

  15. Big nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, W.; Billingon, D.E.; Cameron, R.F.; Curl, S.J.

    1983-09-01

    Much of the debate on the safety of nuclear power focuses on the large number of fatalities that could, in theory, be caused by extremely unlikely but just imaginable reactor accidents. This, along with the nuclear industry's inappropriate use of vocabulary during public debate, has given the general public a distorted impression of the risks of nuclear power. The paper reviews the way in which the probability and consequences of big nuclear accidents have been presented in the past and makes recommendations for the future, including the presentation of the long-term consequences of such accidents in terms of 'loss of life expectancy', 'increased chance of fatal cancer' and 'equivalent pattern of compulsory cigarette smoking'. The paper presents mathematical arguments, which show the derivation and validity of the proposed methods of presenting the consequences of imaginable big nuclear accidents. (author)

  16. Development of INCTAC code for analyzing criticality accident phenomena

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitake, Susumu; Hayashi, Yamato; Sakurai, Shungo

    2003-01-01

    Aiming at understanding nuclear transients and thermal- and hydraulic-phenomena of the criticality accident, a code named INCTAC has been newly developed at the Institute of Nuclear Safety. The code is applicable to the analysis of criticality accident transients of aqueous homogenous fuel solution system. Neutronic transient model is composed of equations for the kinetics and for the spatial distributions, which are deduced from the time dependent multi-group transport equations with the quasi steady state assumption. Thermal-hydraulic transient model is composed of a complete set of the mass, momentum and energy equations together with the two-phase flow assumptions. Validation tests of INCTAC were made using the data obtained at TRACY, a transient experiment criticality facility of JAERI. The calculated results with INCTAC showed a very good agreement with the experiment data, except a slight discrepancy of the time when the peak of reactor power was attained. But, the discrepancy was resolved with the use of an adequate model for movement and transfer of the void in the fuel solution mostly generated by radiolysis. With a simulation model for the transport of radioactive materials through ventilation systems to the environment, INCTAC will be used as an overall safety evaluation code of the criticality accident. (author)

  17. New approach to managing nuclear criticality risk at Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Green, R.; Droke, R.; Paine, D.

    1992-01-01

    The negative aspects of having a nuclear criticality accident at a fuel fabrication facility have substantially increased in recent years. Although ensuring that the facility is designed and operating in a critically safe manner is a high management priority, practices of managing the risk of a criticality accident have not significantly changed. The method of evaluating risk based on quantitative analysis can enable management to adapt to the increased consequences of a nuclear criticality accident. Additional controls may be placed on high-risk areas within a facility to ensure safe operation of the plant. Areas where controls are in place that impede the productivity of the facility and have negligible impact on criticality safety may be removed or replaced. Management can also streamline the safety analysis efforts applied to facility upgrades by demonstrating that proposed design changes do not compromise criticality safety. Future expansion of quantitative analysis techniques will also allow risk-based management decisions on industrial, radiological, and environmental safety

  18. Program of nuclear criticality safety experiment at JAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kobayashi, Iwao; Tachimori, Shoichi; Takeshita, Isao; Suzaki, Takenori; Ohnishi, Nobuaki

    1983-11-01

    JAERI is promoting the nuclear criticality safety research program, in which a new facility for criticality safety experiments (Criticality Safety Experimental Facility : CSEF) is to be built for the experiments with solution fuel. One of the experimental researches is to measure, collect and evaluate the experimental data needed for evaluation of criticality safety of the nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Another research area is a study of the phenomena themselves which are incidental to postulated critical accidents. Investigation of the scale and characteristics of the influences caused by the accident is also included in this research. The result of the conceptual design of CSEF is summarized in this report. (author)

  19. Nuclear criticality safety: 2-day training course

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schlesser, J.A.

    1992-11-01

    This compilation of notes is presented as a source reference for the criticality safety course. At the completion of this training course, the attendee will: (1) be able to define terms commonly used in nuclear criticality safety; (2) be able to appreciate the fundamentals of nuclear criticality safety; (3) be able to identify factors which affect nuclear criticality safety; (4) be able to identify examples of criticality controls as used at Los Alamos; (5) be able to identify examples of circumstances present during criticality accidents; (6) have participated in conducting two critical experiments

  20. Theoretical Derivation of Simplified Evaluation Models for the First Peak of a Criticality Accident in Nuclear Fuel Solution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nomura, Yasushi

    2000-01-01

    In a reprocessing facility where nuclear fuel solutions are processed, one could observe a series of power peaks, with the highest peak right after a criticality accident. The criticality alarm system (CAS) is designed to detect the first power peak and warn workers near the reacting material by sounding alarms immediately. Consequently, exposure of the workers would be minimized by an immediate and effective evacuation. Therefore, in the design and installation of a CAS, it is necessary to estimate the magnitude of the first power peak and to set up the threshold point where the CAS initiates the alarm. Furthermore, it is necessary to estimate the level of potential exposure of workers in the case of accidents so as to decide the appropriateness of installing a CAS for a given compartment.A simplified evaluation model to estimate the minimum scale of the first power peak during a criticality accident is derived by theoretical considerations only for use in the design of a CAS to set up the threshold point triggering the alarm signal. Another simplified evaluation model is derived in the same way to estimate the maximum scale of the first power peak for use in judging the appropriateness for installing a CAS. Both models are shown to have adequate margin in predicting the minimum and maximum scale of criticality accidents by comparing their results with French CRiticality occurring ACcidentally (CRAC) experimental data

  1. Big nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, W.

    1983-01-01

    Much of the debate on the safety of nuclear power focuses on the large number of fatalities that could, in theory, be caused by extremely unlikely but imaginable reactor accidents. This, along with the nuclear industry's inappropriate use of vocabulary during public debate, has given the general public a distorted impression of the safety of nuclear power. The way in which the probability and consequences of big nuclear accidents have been presented in the past is reviewed and recommendations for the future are made including the presentation of the long-term consequences of such accidents in terms of 'reduction in life expectancy', 'increased chance of fatal cancer' and the equivalent pattern of compulsory cigarette smoking. (author)

  2. USNRC licensing process as related to nuclear criticality safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ketzlach, N.

    1987-01-01

    The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations establishes procedures and criteria for the issuance of licenses to receive title to, own, acquire, deliver, receive, possess, use, and initially transfer special nuclear material; and establishes and provides for the terms and conditions upon which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will issue such licenses. Section 70.22 of the regulations, ''Contents of Applications'', requires that applications for licenses contain proposed procedures to avoid accidental conditions of criticality. These procedures are elements of a nuclear criticality safety program for operations with fissionable materials at fuels and materials facilities (i.e., fuel cycle facilities other than nuclear reactors) in which there exists a potential for criticality accidents. To assist the applicant in providing specific information needed for a nuclear criticality safety program in a license application, the NRC has issued regulatory guides. The NRC requirements for nuclear criticality safety include organizational, administrative, and technical requirements. For purely technical matters on nuclear criticality safety these guides endorse national standards. Others provide guidance on the standard format and content of license applications, guidance on evaluating radiological consequences of criticality accidents, or guidance for dealing with other radiation safety issues. (author)

  3. Nuclear accidents and epidemiology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    A consultation on epidemiology related to the Chernobyl accident was held in Copenhagen in May 1987 as a basis for concerted action. This was followed by a joint IAEA/WHO workshop in Vienna, which reviewed appropriate methodologies for possible long-term effects of radiation following nuclear accidents. The reports of these two meetings are included in this volume, and cover the subjects: 1) Epidemiology related to the Chernobyl nuclear accident. 2) Appropriate methodologies for studying possible long-term effects of radiation on individuals exposed in a nuclear accident. Figs and tabs

  4. Radioactive release during nuclear accidents in Chernobyl and Fukushima

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nur Ain Sulaiman, Siti; Mohamed, Faizal; Rahim, Ahmad Nabil Ab

    2018-01-01

    Nuclear accidents that occurred in Chernobyl and Fukushima have initiated many research interests to understand the cause and mechanism of radioactive release within reactor compound and to the environment. Common types of radionuclide release are the fission products from the irradiated fuel rod itself. In case of nuclear accident, the focus of monitoring will be mostly on the release of noble gases, I-131 and Cs-137. As these are the only accidents have been rated within International Nuclear Events Scale (INES) Level 7, the radioactive release to the environment was one of the critical insights to be monitored. It was estimated that the release of radioactive material to the atmosphere due to Fukushima accident was approximately 10% of the Chernobyl accident. By referring to the previous reports using computational code systems to model the release rate, the release activity of I-131 and Cs-137 in Chernobyl was significantly higher compare to Fukushima. The simulation code also showed that Chernobyl had higher release rate of both radionuclides on the day of accident. Other factors affecting the radioactive release for Fukushima and Chernobyl accidents such as the current reactor technology and safety measures are also compared for discussion.

  5. Six Decades of Nuclear Accidents, Nuclear Compensation, and Issues of Radioactive Waste Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boonsuwan, P.; Songjakkeaw, A.

    2011-11-01

    Thailand has made a serious aim to employ nuclear power by adopting five 1,000 MWt in the 2010 national Power Development Plan (PDP 2010) with the first NPP coming online in 2020. However, after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011, the National Energy Policy Committee had made the resolution to postpone the plan by 3 years. The post-Fukushima atmosphere does not bode well for the public sentiment towards the proposed programme, especially with regards to safety of an NPP. Nonetheless, during the six decades that NPPs have been in operation in 32 countries worldwide, there are only 19 serious accidents involving fatalities and/or damage to properties in excess of 100 million USD. Out of the three significant accidents - Fukushima nuclear accident (2011), Chernobyl nuclear accident (1986), and Three Miles Island nuclear accident (1979) - only the accident at Three Miles Island occurs during normal operation. Such can be implied that the operation of NPPs does maintain a high level of safety. The current technology on nuclear safety has been advancing greatly to the point that the new NPP design claims to render the possibility of a severe accident resulting in core melting insignificant. Along with the technical improvements, laws and regulations have also be progressing in parallel to adequately compensate and limit the liability of operators in case of a nuclear accident. The international agreements such as the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the Convention of the Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy had also been established and also the national laws of countries such as the United States and Japan have been implemented to address such issues to the point that victims of a nuclear accidents are adequately and justly compensated. In addition to the issues of nuclear accident, the dilemma in nuclear waste management, especially with regards to the High Level Waste which is highly radioactive while having very

  6. An emergent proposal on the Committee of Uranium Processing Factory Criticality Accident Survey of the Nuclear Safety Commission. A meantime report dated on November 5, 1999

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Nuclear Safety Commission was received a decision on thorough investigations of accident reason on criticality accident at the Tokai-mura uranium processing factory of the JCO Incorporation occurred on September 30, 1999, to establish the Committee of Uranium Processing Factory Criticality Accident Survey to elucidate its reason thoroughly and contribute to set up a sufficient reforming prevention countermeasure. This Committee judged that it was important to propose a countermeasure directly obtainable by grasping some fact relations clarified before now as soon as possible and intended to conduct this meantime report of 'emergent proposal' by arrangement of such fact relations. Here were described on accidental conditions and their effects, response to the accident (on prevention of the accident), its reasons and their relating conditions, and some emergent proposals. In the last items, safety security at accidental site, health countermeasures to residents and others, establishment of safety security for nuclear business workers and others, and reconstruction on safety regulation in national government. (G.K.)

  7. Tank farm nuclear criticality review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bratzel, D.R.

    1996-01-01

    The technical basis for the nuclear criticality safety of stored wastes at the Hanford Site Tank Farm Complex was reviewed by a team of senior technical personnel whose expertise covered all appropriate aspects of fissile materials chemistry and physics. The team concluded that the detailed and documented nucleonics-related studies underlying the waste tanks criticality safety basis were sound. The team concluded that, under current plutonium inventories and operating conditions, a nuclear criticality accident is incredible in any of the Hanford single-shell tanks (SST), double-shell tanks (DST), or double-contained receiver tanks (DCRTS) on the Hanford Site

  8. Measurement of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant criticality accident alarm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tayloe, R.W. Jr.; D'Aquila, D.M.; McGinnis, R.B.

    1991-01-01

    The nuclear criticality accident radiation alarm system installed at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant was tested extensively at critical facilities located at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The ability of the neutron scintillator radiation detection units to respond to a minimum accident of concern as defined in Standard ANSI/ANS-83.-1986 was demonstrated. Detector placement and the established trip point are based on shielding calculations performed by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and criticality specialists at the Portsmouth plant. Based on these experiments and calculations, a detector trip point of 5 mrad/h in air is used. Any credible criticality accident is expected to produce neutron radiation fields >5 mrad/h in air at one or more radiation alarm locations. Each radiation alarm location has a cluster of three detectors that employs a two-out-of-three alarm logic. Earlier work focused on testing the alarm logic latching circuitry. This work was directed toward measurements involving the actual audible alarm signal delivered

  9. Installation places of criticality accident detectors in the plutonium conversion development facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanada, Yukihisa; Tsujimura, Norio; Shimizu, Yoshio; Izaki, Kenji; Furuta, Sadaaki

    2008-01-01

    At the Plutonium Conversion Development Facility (PCDF) in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories, the co-conversion technologies to purify the mixed plutonium and uranium nitrate solution discharged from a reprocessing plant have been developed. The probability of a criticality accident in PCDF is extremely low. However, the criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) has been in place since 1982 to reduce the radiation dose to workers in case of such a rare criticality accident. The CAAS contains criticality accident detector units (CADs), one unit consisting of three plastic scintillation detectors, and using the 2 out of 3 voting system for the purpose of high reliability. Currently, eight CADs are installed in PCDF evaluating the dose using a simple equation allowing for a safety margin. The purpose of this study is to show the determination procedures for the adequate relocation of the CADs which adequately ensures safety in PCDF. (author)

  10. Accidents in nuclear ships

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oelgaard, P L [Risoe National Lab., Roskilde (Denmark); [Technical Univ. of Denmark, Lyngby (Denmark)

    1996-12-01

    This report starts with a discussion of the types of nuclear vessels accidents, in particular accidents which involve the nuclear propulsion systems. Next available information on 61 reported nuclear ship events in considered. Of these 6 deals with U.S. ships, 54 with USSR ships and 1 with a French ship. The ships are in almost all cases nuclear submarines. Only events that involve the sinking of vessels, the nuclear propulsion plants, radiation exposures, fires/explosions, sea-water leaks into the submarines and sinking of vessels are considered. For each event a summary of available information is presented, and comments are added. In some cases the available information is not credible, and these events are neglected. This reduces the number of events to 5 U.S. events, 35 USSR/Russian events and 1 French event. A comparison is made between the reported Soviet accidents and information available on dumped and damaged Soviet naval reactors. It seems possible to obtain good correlation between the two types of events. An analysis is made of the accident and estimates are made of the accident probabilities which are found to be of the order of 10{sup -3} per ship reactor years. It if finally pointed out that the consequences of nuclear ship accidents are fairly local and does in no way not approach the magnitude of the Chernobyl accident. It is emphasized that some of the information on which this report is based, may not be correct. Consequently some of the results of the assessments made may not be correct. (au).

  11. Accidents in nuclear ships

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oelgaard, P.L.

    1996-12-01

    This report starts with a discussion of the types of nuclear vessels accidents, in particular accidents which involve the nuclear propulsion systems. Next available information on 61 reported nuclear ship events in considered. Of these 6 deals with U.S. ships, 54 with USSR ships and 1 with a French ship. The ships are in almost all cases nuclear submarines. Only events that involve the sinking of vessels, the nuclear propulsion plants, radiation exposures, fires/explosions, sea-water leaks into the submarines and sinking of vessels are considered. For each event a summary of available information is presented, and comments are added. In some cases the available information is not credible, and these events are neglected. This reduces the number of events to 5 U.S. events, 35 USSR/Russian events and 1 French event. A comparison is made between the reported Soviet accidents and information available on dumped and damaged Soviet naval reactors. It seems possible to obtain good correlation between the two types of events. An analysis is made of the accident and estimates are made of the accident probabilities which are found to be of the order of 10 -3 per ship reactor years. It if finally pointed out that the consequences of nuclear ship accidents are fairly local and does in no way not approach the magnitude of the Chernobyl accident. It is emphasized that some of the information on which this report is based, may not be correct. Consequently some of the results of the assessments made may not be correct. (au)

  12. NCIS: a nuclear criticality information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koponen, B.L.; Hampel, V.E.

    1984-01-01

    The NCIS is one of the developments carried out to meet the requirements in the field of criticality safety information. Its primary goal is to enhance nuclear criticality safety by dissemination of data, standards, and training material. This paper presents the ''NCIS'' progess since 1950: computer-searching, database management, nuclear critical experiments bibliography. American Nuclear Society transactions criticality safety publications compilation, edition of a personnel directory representing over 140 organizations located in 16 countries and showing a wide range of specialists involved in the field of nuclear criticality safety. The NCIS uses the information management and communication resources of TIS (Technology Information System): automated access procedures; creation of program-dependent information systems; communications. The NCIS is still in a growing, formative stage; it has concentrated first on collecting and organizing the nuclear criticality literature; nuclear critical data, calculational tools, standards, and training materials will follow. Finally the planned and contemplated resources are dealt with: expansion of bibliographic compilations; news database; fundamental criticality safety reference; criticality benchmarck database; user community; training resources; related resources; criticality accident database; dynamic databook; dynamic textbook; expert knowledge system; and, extraction of intelligence

  13. Elements of a nuclear criticality safety program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hopper, C.M.

    1995-01-01

    Nuclear criticality safety programs throughout the United States are quite successful, as compared with other safety disciplines, at protecting life and property, especially when regarded as a developing safety function with no historical perspective for the cause and effect of process nuclear criticality accidents before 1943. The programs evolved through self-imposed and regulatory-imposed incentives. They are the products of conscientious individuals, supportive corporations, obliged regulators, and intervenors (political, public, and private). The maturing of nuclear criticality safety programs throughout the United States has been spasmodic, with stability provided by the volunteer standards efforts within the American Nuclear Society. This presentation provides the status, relative to current needs, for nuclear criticality safety program elements that address organization of and assignments for nuclear criticality safety program responsibilities; personnel qualifications; and analytical capabilities for the technical definition of critical, subcritical, safety and operating limits, and program quality assurance

  14. Realism in nuclear criticality safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, T. P.

    2009-01-01

    Commercial nuclear power plant operation and regulation have made remarkable progress since the Three Mile Island Accident. This is attributed largely to a heavy dose of introspection and self-regulation by the industry and to a significant infusion of risk-informed and performance-based regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This truly represents reality in action both by the plant operators and the regulators. On the other hand, the implementation of nuclear criticality safety in ex-reactor operations involving significant quantities of fissile material has not progressed, but, tragically, it has regressed. Not only is the practice of the discipline in excess of a factor of ten more expensive than decades ago; the trend continues. This unfortunate reality is attributed to a lack of coordination within the industry (as contrasted to what occurred in the reactor operations sector), and to a lack of implementation of risk-informed and performance-based regulation by the NRC While the criticality safety discipline is orders of magnitude smaller than the reactor safety discipline, both operators and regulators must learn from the progress made in reactor safety and apply it to the former to reduce the waste, inefficiency and potentially increased accident risks associated with current practices. Only when these changes are made will there be progress made toward putting realism back into nuclear criticality safety. (authors)

  15. The Fukushima nuclear accident: insights on the safety aspects

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thome, Zieli D.; Vellozo, Sergio O., E-mail: zielithome@gmail.com, E-mail: vellozo@cbpf.br [Instituto Militar de Engenharia (IME), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil). Secao de Engenharia Nuclear; Gomes, Rogerio S., E-mail: rogeriog@cnen.gov.br [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil); Silva, Fernando C., E-mail: fernando@con.ufrj.br [Coordenacao do Programas de Pos-Graduacao em Engenharia (COPPE/UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2013-07-01

    The Fukushima nuclear accident has generated doubts and questions which need to be properly understood and addressed. This scientific attitude became necessary to allow the use of the nuclear technology for electricity generation around the world. The nuclear stakeholders are working to obtain these technical answers for the Fukushima questions. We believe that, such challenges will be, certainly, implemented in the next reactor generation, following the technological evolution. The purpose of this work is to perform a critical analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident, focusing at the common cause failures produced by tsunami, as well as an analysis of the main redundant systems. This work also assesses the mitigative procedures and the subsequent consequences of such actions, which gave results below expectations to avoid the progression of the accident, discussing the concept of sharing of structures, systems and components at multi-unit nuclear power plants, and its eventual inappropriate use in safety-related devices which can compromise the nuclear safety, as well as its consequent impact on the Fukushima accident scenario. The lessons from Fukushima must be better learned, aiming the development of new procedures and new safety systems. Thus, the nuclear technology could reach a higher evolution level in its safety requirements. This knowledge will establish a conceptual milestone in the safety system design, becoming necessary the review of the current acceptance criteria of safety-related systems. (author)

  16. The Fukushima nuclear accident: insights on the safety aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thome, Zieli D.; Vellozo, Sergio O.; Silva, Fernando C.

    2013-01-01

    The Fukushima nuclear accident has generated doubts and questions which need to be properly understood and addressed. This scientific attitude became necessary to allow the use of the nuclear technology for electricity generation around the world. The nuclear stakeholders are working to obtain these technical answers for the Fukushima questions. We believe that, such challenges will be, certainly, implemented in the next reactor generation, following the technological evolution. The purpose of this work is to perform a critical analysis of the Fukushima nuclear accident, focusing at the common cause failures produced by tsunami, as well as an analysis of the main redundant systems. This work also assesses the mitigative procedures and the subsequent consequences of such actions, which gave results below expectations to avoid the progression of the accident, discussing the concept of sharing of structures, systems and components at multi-unit nuclear power plants, and its eventual inappropriate use in safety-related devices which can compromise the nuclear safety, as well as its consequent impact on the Fukushima accident scenario. The lessons from Fukushima must be better learned, aiming the development of new procedures and new safety systems. Thus, the nuclear technology could reach a higher evolution level in its safety requirements. This knowledge will establish a conceptual milestone in the safety system design, becoming necessary the review of the current acceptance criteria of safety-related systems. (author)

  17. Nuclear criticality safety handbook. Version 2

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-03-01

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook, Version 2 essentially includes the description of the Supplement Report to the Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook, released in 1995, into the first version of Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook, published in 1988. The following two points are new: (1) exemplifying safety margins related to modelled dissolution and extraction processes, (2) describing evaluation methods and alarm system for criticality accidents. Revision is made based on previous studies for the chapter that treats modelling the fuel system: e.g., the fuel grain size that the system can be regarded as homogeneous, non-uniformity effect of fuel solution, and burnup credit. This revision solves the inconsistencies found in the first version between the evaluation of errors found in JACS code system and criticality condition data that were calculated based on the evaluation. (author)

  18. The application of the assessment of nuclear accident status in emergency decision-making during nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Ling

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear accident assessment is one of the bases for emergency decision-making in the situation of nuclear accident in NPP. Usually, the assessment includes accident status and consequence assessment. It is accident status assessment, and its application in emergency decision-making is introduced here. (author)

  19. Modeling of criticality accidents and their environmental consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, W.; Gmal, B.

    1987-01-01

    In the Federal Republic of Germany, potential radiological consequences of accidental nuclear criticality have to be evaluated in the licensing procedure for fuel cycle facilities. A prerequisite to this evaluation is to establish conceivable accident scenarios. First, possibilities for a criticality exceeding the generally applied double contingency principle of safety are identified by screening the equipment and operation of the facility. Identification of undetected accumulations of fissile material or incorrect transfer of fissile solution to unfavorable geometry normally are most important. Second, relevant and credible scenarios causing the most severe consequences are derived from these possibilities. For the identified relevant scenarios, time-dependent fission rates and reasonable numbers for peak power and total fissions must be determined. Experience from real accidents and experiments (KEWB, SPERT, CRAC, SILENE) has been evaluated using empirical formulas. To model the time-dependent behavior of criticality excursions in fissile solutions, a computer program FELIX has been developed

  20. JCO criticality accident as POST-LOCA: Poor structure induced loss of organizational control accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furuhama, Yutaka

    2000-01-01

    Some problems in operation and business management of JCO (Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co.) have been studied as background factors of the criticality accident. Open information about business conditions of JCO suggests that the cause of the accident is not so simple as to be attributed only to economic pressure, but includes immanent problems in JCO. We investigate the problems from five viewpoints, organization of safety management, system of operation management, activities for business improvement, risk awareness, and restructuring of business, and discuss the effects and causality of background factors as well as remedies for them. (author)

  1. Management of foodstuffs after nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    A model for the management of foodstuffs after nuclear accidents is presented. The model is a synthesis of traditions and principles taken from both radioactive protection and management of food. It is based on cooperation between the Nordic countries and on practical experience gained from the Chernobyl accident. The aim of the model is to produce a basis for common plans for critical situations based on criteria for decision making. In the case of radioactive accidents it is important that the protection of the public and of the society is handled in a positive way. The model concerns production, marketing and consumption of food and beverage. The overall aim is that the radiation doses should be as low and harmless to health for individual members of the public. (CLS) 35 refs

  2. Nuclear criticality safety: general. 3. Tokaimura Criticality Accident: Point Model Stochastic Neutronic Interpretation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mechitoua, Boukhmes

    2001-01-01

    This paper shows what can be the stochastic neutronic contribution for the interpretation of criticality accidents. Stochastic neutronic comprehensive texts may be found in refs.1 through 4. We limit our study to the use of initiation probability, which is an important stochastic neutronic tally. Initiation probability P may be defined as the probability for one neutron to initiate an infinite neutron fission chain. The complement probability of P is the extinction probability Q. The probability that the neutron fission chain produced by one neutron will quench is equal to the multiplication of the probability of production of i neutrons g i by the probability of extinction of these i neutrons. We can estimate P by a Newton or by a dichotomic method. We suppose that P S (t) is the probability that an infinite neutron fission chain has been initiated before time t by a neutron produced by the source S(t). P S (t + dt) is the sum of two probabilities: 1. the probability that an infinite neutron fission chain has been initiated before time t by a neutron produced by the source S(t): P S (t); 2. The second probability is a multiplication of two probabilities: the probability that there was no initiation before t that is 1-P S (t), and the probability that a neutron emitted by the source with the probability S dt initiates an infinite neutron fission chain with the probability P(t). This last relation gives the link between P and the source density. The aim of this paper is to show how one can apply the foregoing derivations. We have simplified the Tokaimura criticality accident for this application. We have mono-energetic neutrons with infinite and homogeneous media; we have two reactions: capture and fission. In this section, we show how one can estimate the initiation probability with a source density as a function of time. This estimation makes use of three steps: 1. Reactivity insertion: Estimation of the multiplication coefficient as a function of time K(t). This

  3. Fifteenth nuclear accident dosimetry intercomparison study: August 14--22, 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sims, C.S.

    1979-05-01

    The fifteenth in the continuing series of Nuclear Accident Dosimetry Intercomparison Studies was held August 14--22, 1978 at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The Health Physics Research Reactor, operated in the pulse mode, served as the radiation source. Using different shielding configurations, nuclear accidents with three different neutron and gamma spectra were simulated. Participants from 19 organizations, the most in the history of the studies, exposed dosimeters set up as area monitors as well as dosimeters mounted on phantoms for personnel monitoring. Although many participants performed accurate measurements, the composite dose results, in the majority of cases, failed to meet established nuclear criticality accident dosimetry guidelines which suggest accuracies of +- 25% for neutron dose and +- 20% for gamma dose. This indicates that many participants need to improve their dosimetry systems, their analytical techniques, or both

  4. Nuclear accidents and safety measures of domestic nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song Zurong; Che Shuwei; Pan Xiang

    2012-01-01

    Based on the design standards for the safety of nuclear and radiation in nuclear power plants, the three accidents in the history of nuclear power are analyzed. And the main factors for these accidents are found out, that is, human factors and unpredicted natural calamity. By combining the design and operation parameters of domestic nuclear plants, the same accidents are studied and some necessary preventive schemes are put forward. In the security operation technology of domestic nuclear power plants nowadays, accidents caused by human factors can by prevented completely. But the safety standards have to be reconsidered for the unpredicted neutral disasters. How to reduce the hazard of nuclear radiation and leakage to the level that can be accepted by the government and public when accidents occur under extreme conditions during construction and operation of nuclear power plants must be considered adequately. (authors)

  5. The sensitivity of calculated doses to critical assumptions for the offsite consequences of nuclear power reactor accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moeller, M.P.; Scherpelz, R.I.; Desrosiers, A.E.

    1982-01-01

    This work analyzes the sensitivity of calculated doses to critical assumptions for offsite consequences following a PWR-2 accident at a nuclear power reactor. The calculations include three radiation dose pathways: internal dose resulting from inhalation, external doses from exposure to the plume, and external doses from exposure to contaminated ground. The critical parameters are the time period of integration for internal dose commitment and the duration of residence on contaminated ground. The data indicate the calculated offsite whole body dose will vary by as much as 600% depending upon the parameters assumed. When offsite radiation doses determine the size of emergency planning zones, this uncertainty has significant effect upon the resources allocated to emergency preparedness

  6. International aspects of nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uematsu, K.

    1989-09-01

    The accident at Chernobyl revealed that there were shortcomings and gaps in the existing international mechanisms and brought home to governments the need for stronger measures to provide better protection against the risks of severe accidents. The main thrust of international co-operation with regard to nuclear safety issues is aimed at achieving a uniformly high level of safety in nuclear power plants through continuous exchanges of research findings and feedback from reactor operating experience. The second type of problem posed in the event of an accident resulting in radioactive contamination of several countries relates to the obligation to notify details of the circumstances and nature of the accident speedily so that the countries affected can take appropriate protective measures and, if necessary, organize mutual assistance. Giving the public accurate information is also an important aspect of managing an emergency situation arising from a severe accident. Finally, the confusion resulting from the unwarranted variety of protective measures implemented after the Chernobyl accident has highlighted the need for international harmonization of the principles and scientific criteria applicable to the protection of the public in the event of an accident and for a more consistent approach to emergency plans. The international conventions on third party liability in the nuclear energy sector (Paris/Brussels Conventions and the Vienna Convention) provide for compensation for damage caused by nuclear accidents in accordance with the rules and jurisdiction that they lay down. These provisions impose obligations on the operator responsible for an accident, and the State where the nuclear facility is located, towards the victims of damage caused in another country

  7. Criticality accident alarm system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malenfant, R.E.

    1991-01-01

    The American National Standard ANSI/ANS-8.3-1986, Criticality Accident Alarm System provides guidance for the establishment and maintenance of an alarm system to initiate personnel evacuation in the event of inadvertent criticality. In addition to identifying the physical features of the components of the system, the characteristics of accidents of concern are carefully delineated. Unfortunately, this ANSI Standard has led to considerable confusion in interpretation, and there is evidence that the ''minimum accident of concern'' may not be appropriate. Furthermore, although intended as a guide, the provisions of the standard are being rigorously applied, sometimes with interpretations that are not consistent. Although the standard is clear in the use of absorbed dose in free air of 20 rad, at least one installation has interpreted the requirement to apply to dose in soft tissue. The standard is also clear in specifying the response to both neutrons and gamma rays. An assembly of uranyl fluoride enriched to 5% 235 U was operated to simulate a potential accident. The dose, delivered in a free run excursion 2 m from the surface of the vessel, was greater than 500 rad, without ever exceeding a rate of 20 rad/min, which is the set point for activating an alarm that meets the standard. The presence of an alarm system would not have prevented any of the five major accidents in chemical operations nor is it absolutely certain that the alarms were solely responsible for reducing personnel exposures following the accident. Nevertheless, criticality alarm systems are now the subject of great effort and expense. 13 refs

  8. Safety demonstration analyses on criticality for severe accident during overland transport of fresh nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takahashi, Satoshi; Okuno, Hiroshi; Yamada, Kenji; Watanabe, Kouji; Nomura, Yasushi; Miyoshi, Yoshinori

    2005-01-01

    Criticality safety analysis was performed for transport packages of uranium dioxide powder or of fresh PWR fuel involved in a severe accident during overland transportation, and as a result, sub-criticality was confirmed against impact accident conditions such as loaded by a drop from high position to a concrete or asphalt surface, and fire accident conditions such as caused by collisions with an oil tank trailer carrying lots of inflammable material in open air, or with a commonly used two-ton-truck inside an unventilated tunnel. (author)

  9. Criticality accident in Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliveira, A.R. de.

    1984-01-01

    A recent criticality type accident, ocurred in Argetina, is commented. Considerations about the nature of the facility where this accident took place, its genesis, type of operation carried out on the day of the event, and the medical aspects involved are done. (Author) [pt

  10. Nuclear laws and radiologic accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frois, Fernanda

    1997-01-01

    Some aspects of the nuclear activities in Brazil, specially concerning the Goiania s accident are demonstrated using concepts from environmental and nuclear law. Nuclear and environmental competence, the impossibility of the states of making regional laws, as the lack of regulation about the nuclear waste, are discussed. The situation of Goiania when the accident happened, the present situation of the victims and the nuclear waste provisionally stored in Abadia de Goias is reported

  11. NARCISS critical stand experiments for studying the nuclear safety in accident water immersion of highly enriched uranium dioxide fuel elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Glushkov, E.S.; Bubelev, V.G.

    2005-01-01

    A brief description of the Topaz-2 SNPS designed under scientific supervision of RRC KI in Russia, and of the NARCISS critical facility, is given. At the NARCISS critical facility, neutronic peculiarities and nuclear safety issues of the Topaz-2 system reactor were studied experimentally. This work is devoted to a detailed description of experiments on investigation of criticality safety in accident water immersion og highly enriched uranium dioxide fuel elements, performed at the NARCISS facility. The experiments were carried out at water-moderated critical assemblies with varying height, number, and spacing of fuel elements. The results obtained in the critical experiments, computational models of the investigated critical configurations, and comparison of the computational and experimental results are given [ru

  12. Prevention of the causes and consequences of a criticality accident - measures adopted in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fruchard, Y.; Lavie, J.M.

    1966-01-01

    The question of safety in regard to criticality accident risks has two aspects: prevention of the cause and limitation of the consequences. These two aspects are closely connected. The effort devoted to prevention of the causes depends on the seriousness of the possible human psychologic and economic consequences of the accident. The criticality accidents which have occurred in the nuclear industry, though few in number, do reveal the imperfect nature of the techniques adopted to prevent the causes, and also constitute the only available realistic basis for evaluating the consequences and developing measures to limit them. The authors give a analysis of the known causes and consequences of past criticality accidents and on this basis make a number of comments concerning: the validity of traditional safety criteria, the probability of accidents for different types of operations, characteristic accidents which can serve as models, and the extent of possible radiological consequences. The measures adopted in France to limit the consequences of a possible criticality accident under the headings: location, design and lay-out of the installations, accident detection, and dosimetry for the exposed personnel, are briefly described after a short account of the criteria used in deciding on them. (author) [fr

  13. PNNL Measurement Results for the 2016 Criticality Accident Dosimetry Exercise at the Nevada National Security Stite (IER-148)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rathbone, Bruce A.; Morley, Shannon M.; Stephens, John A.

    2017-05-01

    The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) participated in a criticality accident dosimetry intercomparison exercise held at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) May 24-27, 2016. The exercise was administered by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and consisted of three exposures performed using the Godiva-IV critical assembly housed in the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) located on the NNSS site. The exercise allowed participants to test the ability of their nuclear accident dosimeters to meet the performance criteria in ANSI/HPS N13.3-2013, Dosimetry for Criticality Accidents and to obtain new measurement data for use in revising dose calculation methods and quick sort screening methods where appropriate. PNNL participated with new prototype Personal Nuclear Accident Dosimeter (PNAD) and Fixed Nuclear Accident Dosimeter (FNAD) designs as well as the existing historical PNAD design. The new prototype designs incorporate optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) dosimeters in place of thermoluminescence dosimeters (TLDs), among other design changes, while retaining the same set of activation foils historically used. The default dose calculation methodology established decades ago for use with activation foils in PNNL PNADs and FNADs was used to calculate neutron dose results for both the existing and prototype dosimeters tested in the exercise. The results indicate that the effective cross sections and/or dose conversion factors used historically need to be updated to accurately measure the operational quantities recommended for nuclear accident dosimetry in ANSI/HPS N13.3-2013 and to ensure PNAD and FNAD performance meets the ANSI/HPS N13.3-2013 performance criteria. The operational quantities recommended for nuclear accident dosimetry are personal absorbed dose, Dp(10), and ambient absorbed dose, D*(10).

  14. The Fukushima nuclear accident and its effect on global energy security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hayashi, Masatsugu; Hughes, Larry

    2013-01-01

    The March 2011 nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station affected both short- and long-term energy-security in Japan, resulting in crisis-driven, ad hoc energy policy and, because of the decision to shutter all nuclear reactors, increased the country’s demand for fossil fuels, primarily natural gas. However, the effects of the accident on energy security were not restricted to Japan; for example, the worldwide availability and affordability of liquefied natural gas were affected by Japan’s increased demand; while the accident itself resulted in the loss of public acceptability of nuclear power and led countries, such as Germany and Italy, to immediately shut down some of the nuclear reactors or abandon plans to build new ones. This paper examines some of the short-term effects on global energy security following the accident at Fukushima, focusing on the main replacement fuel, liquefied natural gas. It shows, amongst other things, that the accident increased investment in liquefied natural gas projects around the world. The paper shows that despite Fukushima contributing to nuclear power’s loss of acceptability in most developed countries, it is still seen as an essential way of improving energy security in many countries and, despite what its critics may say, will probably continue to be used as a significant source of low-carbon electricity. - Highlights: ► Japan’s demands for fossil fuels raised the price of LNG and low-sulfur crudes. ► The accident affected the global price of uranium and producer share prices. ► The accident accelerated foreign-direct investment in LNG projects worldwide. ► The change in public perception toward nuclear power was relatively limited. ► A radical shift in global nuclear policy seems to be unrealistic after Fukushima

  15. Nuclear ship accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oelgaard, P.L.

    1993-05-01

    In this report available information on 28 nuclear ship accident and incidents is considered. Of these 5 deals with U.S. ships and 23 with USSR ships. The ships are in almost all cases nuclear submarines. Only events that involve the nuclear propulsion plants, radiation exposures, fires/explosions and sea water leaks into the submarines are considered. Comments are made on each of the events, and at the end of the report an attempt is made to point out the weaknesses of the submarine designs which have resulted in the accidents. It is emphasized that much of the available information is of a rather dubious nature. consequently some of the assessments made may not be correct. (au)

  16. Triage and medical management of criticality accident victims

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lebaron-Jacobs, L.; Flury-Herard, A.; Cavadore, D.

    2002-01-01

    The criticality accident is the result of an uncontrolled chain fission reaction initiated when the quantities of nuclear materials (uranium or plutonium)present accidentally exceed a given limit called the c ritical mass . As soon as the critical state is exceeded, the chain reaction increases exponentially. The result is a fast increase in the number of fission events which occur within the fissile medium. This phenomenon results in a release of energy mainly in the form of heat, accompanied by the intense emission of neutron and gamma radiation and the release of fission gases (Barby, 1983)

  17. Research on consequence analysis method for probabilistic safety assessment of nuclear fuel facilities (5). Evaluation method and trial evaluation of criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamane, Yuichi; Abe, Hitoshi; Nakajima, Ken; Hayashi, Yoshiaki; Arisawa, Jun; Hayami, Satoru

    2010-01-01

    A special committee of 'Research on the analysis methods for accident consequence of nuclear fuel facilities (NFFs)' was organized by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan (AESJ) under the entrustment of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The committee aims to research on the state-of-the-art consequence analysis method for the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of NFFs, such as fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities. The objectives of this research are to obtain information useful for establishing quantitative performance objectives and to demonstrate risk-informed regulation through qualifying issues needed to be resolved for applying PSA to NFFs. The research activities of the committee were mainly focused on the consequence analysis method for postulated accidents with potentially large consequences in NFFs, e.g., events of criticality, spill of molten glass, hydrogen explosion, boiling of radioactive solution and fire (including the rapid decomposition of TBP complexes), resulting in the release of radioactive materials to the environment. The results of the research were summarized in a series of six reports, which consist of a review report and five technical ones. In this report, the evaluation methods of criticality accident, such as simplified methods, one-point reactor kinetics codes and quasi-static method, were investigated and their features were summarized to provide information useful for the safety evaluation of NFFs. In addition, several trial evaluations were performed for a hypothetical scenario of criticality accident using the investigated methods, and their results were compared. The release fraction of volatile fission products in a criticality accident was also investigated. (author)

  18. French policy for managing the post-accident phase of a nuclear accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gallay, F; Godet, J L; Niel, J C

    2015-06-01

    In 2005, at the request of the French Government, the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) established a Steering Committee for the Management of the Post-Accident Phase of a Nuclear Accident or a Radiological Emergency, with the objective of establishing a policy framework. Under the supervision of ASN, this Committee, involving several tens of experts from different backgrounds (e.g. relevant ministerial offices, expert agencies, local information commissions around nuclear installations, non-governmental organisations, elected officials, licensees, and international experts), developed a number of recommendations over a 7-year period. First published in November 2012, these recommendations cover the immediate post-emergency situation, and the transition and longer-term periods of the post-accident phase in the case of medium-scale nuclear accidents causing short-term radioactive release (less than 24 h) that might occur at French nuclear facilities. They also apply to actions to be undertaken in the event of accidents during the transportation of radioactive materials. These recommendations are an important first step in preparation for the management of a post-accident situation in France in the case of a nuclear accident. © The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers 2014.

  19. Dutch National Plan combat nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    This document presents the Dutch National Plan combat nuclear accidents (NPK). Ch. 2 discusses some important starting points which are determining for the framework and the performance of the NPK, in particular the accident typology which underlies the plan. Also the new accident-classification system for the Dutch nuclear power plants, the standardization for the measures to be taken and the staging around nuclear power plants are pursued. In ch. 3 the legal framework of the combat nuclear accidents is described. In particular the Nuclear-power law, the Accident law and the Municipality law are pursued. Also the role of province and municipality are described. Ch. 4 deals with the role of the owner/licensee of the object where the accident occurs, in the combat of accident. In ch. 5 the structure of the nuclear-accident combat at national level is outlined, subdivided in alarm phase, combat phase and the winding-up phase. In ch.'s 6-12 these phases are elaborated more in detail. In ch.'s 10-13 the measures to be taken in nuclear accidents, are described. These measures are distinguished with regard to: protection of the population and medical aspects, water economy, drinking-water supply, agriculture and food supply. Ch. 14 describes the responsibility of the burgomaster. Ch.'s 15 and 16 present an overview of the personnel, material, procedural and juridical modifications and supplements of existing structures which are necessary with regard to the new and modified parts of the structure. Ch. 17 indicates how by means of the appropriate education and exercise it can be achieved that all personnel, services and institutes concerned possess the knowledge and experience necessary for the activities from the NKP to be executed as has been described. Ch. 18 contains a survey of activities to be performed and a proposal how these can be realized. (H.W.). figs.; tabs

  20. STACY and TRACY: nuclear criticality experimental facilities under construction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kobayashi, I.; Takeshita, I.; Yanagisawa, H.; Tsujino, T.

    1992-01-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute is constructing a Nuclear Fuel Cycle Safety Engineering Research Facility, NUCEF, where the following research themes essential for evaluating safety problems relating to back-end technology in nuclear fuel cycle facilities will be studied: nuclear criticality safety research; research on advanced reprocessing processes and partitioning; and research on transuranic waste treatment and disposal. To perform nuclear criticality safety research related to the reprocessing of light water reactor spent fuels, two criticality experimental facilities, STACY and TRACY, are under construction. STACY (Static Criticality Facility) will be used for the study of criticality conditions of solution fuels, uranium, plutonium and their mixtures. TRACY (Transient Criticality Facility) will be used to investigate criticality accident phenomena with uranium solutions. The construction progress and experimental programmes are described in this Paper. (author)

  1. 10 CFR 835.1304 - Nuclear accident dosimetry.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ...) Methods and equipment for analysis of biological materials; (3) A system of fixed nuclear accident... Nuclear accident dosimetry. (a) Installations possessing sufficient quantities of fissile material to... 10 Energy 4 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nuclear accident dosimetry. 835.1304 Section 835.1304...

  2. Research investigation report on Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-03-01

    This report was issued in February 2012 by Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation's Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, which consisted of six members from the private sector in independent positions and with no direct interest in the business of promoting nuclear power. Commission aimed to determine the truth behind the accident by clarifying the various problems and reveal systematic problems behind these issues so as to create a new starting point by identifying clear lessons learned. Report composed of four chapters; (1) progression of Fukushima accident and resulting damage (accident management after Fukushima accident, and effects and countermeasure of radioactive materials discharged into the environment), (2) response against Fukushima accident (emergency response of cabinet office against nuclear disaster, risk communication and on-site response against nuclear disaster), (3) analysis of historical and structural factors (technical philosophy of nuclear safety, problems of nuclear safety regulation of Fukushima accident, safety regulatory governance and social background of 'Safety Myth'), (4) Global Context (implication in nuclear security, Japan in nuclear safety regime, U.S.-Japan relations for response against Fukushima accident, lessons learned from Fukushima accident - aiming at creation of resilience). Report could identify causes of Fukushima accident and factors related to resulting damages, show the realities behind failure to prevent the spread of damage, and analyze the overall structural and historical background behind the accidents. (T. Tanaka)

  3. Current state of the communications program concerning nuclear energy following the JCO accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mitsui, Rie

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Public trust in nuclear energy was significantly affected by a criticality accident that occurred in September 1999 at JCO's uranium re-conversion plant in Tokai-mura Village, Ibaraki Prefecture, some 120 kilometres north-east of Tokyo. An opinion survey was taken with local citizens in December that year, asking them how their views on nuclear energy changed after the accident. The survey findings indicate a grave fact that the citizens, who had lived in harmony with nuclear energy for the past 40 years, lost their confidence in this energy source because of the accident. The mishap also led to severer public opinion on nuclear energy at the nation-wide level, bringing forth a serious impediment to such projects as the siting of new nuclear power plants, the use of plutonium in light water reactors, intermediate storage of spent nuclear fuel, and the promotion of high-level radioactive waste disposal. Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organisation analysed the critical situation surrounding nuclear energy development in the country. Based on the analysis results, JAERO is now actively promoting an interactive, participatory program that meets people's needs, in an effort to regain public trust in nuclear energy. We, at JAERO, believe that greater importance should be attached to the offer of relevant information to the rising generation that will play a leading role in future society. The most typical of JAERO activities for junior and senior high school students include an Essay Content launched in 1968 in commemoration of Atomic Energy Day on October 26 every year and a Radiation Workshop established in 1978. Through more than 11,000 essays collected from junior and senior high school students across the county, this report discusses how these young people think of the JCO criticality accident and what they expect of nuclear energy development in the years ahead. Amid growing public concern with radiation following the JCO accident, the report also

  4. Dosimetric management during a criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lebaron-Jacobs, L.; Fottorino, R.; Racine, Y.; Miele, A.; Barbry, F.; Briot, F.; Distinguin, S.; Le Goff, J.P.; Berard, P.; Boisson, P.; Cavadore, D.; Lecoix, G.; Persico, M.H.; Rongier, E.; Challeton-De Vathaire, C.; Medioni, R.; Voisin, P.; Exmelin, L.; Flury-Herard, A.; Gaillard-Lecanu, E.; Lemaire, G.; Gonin, M.; Riasse, C.

    2008-01-01

    A working group from health occupational and clinical biochemistry services on French sites has issued essential data sheets on the guidelines to follow in managing the victims of a criticality accident. Since the priority of the medical management after a criticality accident is to assess the dose and the distribution of dose, some dosimetric investigations have been selected in order to provide a prompt response and to anticipate the final dose reconstruction. Comparison exercises between clinical biochemistry laboratories on French sites were carried out to confirm that each laboratory maintained the required operational methods for hair treatment and the appropriate equipment for 32 P activity in hair and 24 Na activity in blood measurements, and to demonstrate its ability to rapidly provide neutron dose estimates after a criticality accident. As a result, a relation has been assessed to estimate the dose and the distribution of dose according to the neutron spectrum following a criticality accident. (authors)

  5. The cost of nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    Proposed by a technical section of the SFEN, and based on a meeting with representatives of different organisations (OECD-NEA, IRSN, EDF, and European Nuclear Energy Forum), this publication addresses the economic consequences of a severe accident (level 6 or 7) within an electricity producing nuclear power plant. Such an assessment essentially relies on three pillars: release of radio-elements outside the reactor, the scenario of induced consequences, and the method of economic quantification. After a recall and a comment of safety arrangements, and of the generally admitted probability of such an accident, this document notices that several actors are concerned by nuclear energy and are trying to assess accident costs. The issue of how to assess a cost (or costs) of a nuclear accident is discussed: there are in fact several types of costs and consequences. Thus, some costs can be rather precisely quantified when some others can be difficult to assess or with uncertainty. The relevance of some cost categories appears to be a matter of discussion and one must not forget that consequences can occur on a long term. The need for methodological advances is outlined and three categories of technical objectives are identified for the assessment (efficiency of safety measures to be put forward to mitigate the risk via a better accident management, compensation of victims and nuclear civil responsibility, and comparison of electricity production sectors and assessment of externalisation to guide public choices). It is outlined that the impact of accidents depend on several factors, that the most efficient mean to limit consequences of accidents is of course to limit radioactive emissions

  6. Nuclear law and radiological accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frois, F.

    1998-01-01

    Nuclear activities in Brazil, and particularly the radiological accident of Goiania, are examined in the light of the environmental and nuclear laws of Brazil and the issue of responsibility. The absence of legislation covering radioactive wastes as well as the restrictions on Brazilian States to issue regulations covering nuclear activities are reviewed. The radiological accident and its consequences, including the protection and compensation of the victims, the responsibility of the shareholders of the Instituto Goiano de Radioterapia, operator of the radioactive source, the provisional storage and the final disposal at Abadia de Goias of the radioactive waste generated by the accident are reviewed. Finally, nuclear responsibility, the inapplicability of the Law 6453/77 which deals with nuclear damages, and the state liability regime are analysed in accordance with the principles of the Brazilian Federal Constitution. (author)

  7. The ultimate nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abdus Salam, A.

    1988-01-01

    The estimated energy equivalent of Chernobyl explosion was the 1/150 th of the explosive energy equivalent of atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima; while the devastation that could be caused by the world's stock pile of nuclear weapons, could be equivalent to 160 millions of Chernobyl-like incidents. As known, the number of nuclear weapons is over 50,000 and 2000 nuclear weapons are sufficient to destroy the world. The Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents have been blamed on human factors but also the human element, particularly in the form of psychological stresses on those operating the nuclear weapons, could accidentally bring the world to a nuclear catastrophe. This opinion is encouraged by the London's Sunday Times magazine which gave a graphic description of life inside a nuclear submarine. So, to speak of nuclear reactor accidents and not of nuclear weapons is false security. (author)

  8. Evaluation of LLNL's Nuclear Accident Dosimeters at the CALIBAN Reactor September 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hickman, D.P.; Wysong, A.R.; Heinrichs, D.P.; Wong, C.T.; Merritt, M.J.; Topper, J.D.; Gressmann, F.A.; Madden, D.J.

    2011-01-01

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory uses neutron activation elements in a Panasonic TLD holder as a personnel nuclear accident dosimeter (PNAD). The LLNL PNAD has periodically been tested using a Cf-252 neutron source, however until 2009, it was more than 25 years since the PNAD has been tested against a source of neutrons that arise from a reactor generated neutron spectrum that simulates a criticality. In October 2009, LLNL participated in an intercomparison of nuclear accident dosimeters at the CEA Valduc Silene reactor (Hickman, et.al. 2010). In September 2010, LLNL participated in a second intercomparison of nuclear accident dosimeters at CEA Valduc. The reactor generated neutron irradiations for the 2010 exercise were performed at the Caliban reactor. The Caliban results are described in this report. The procedure for measuring the nuclear accident dosimeters in the event of an accident has a solid foundation based on many experimental results and comparisons. The entire process, from receiving the activated NADs to collecting and storing them after counting was executed successfully in a field based operation. Under normal conditions at LLNL, detectors are ready and available 24/7 to perform the necessary measurement of nuclear accident components. Likewise LLNL maintains processing laboratories that are separated from the areas where measurements occur, but contained within the same facility for easy movement from processing area to measurement area. In the event of a loss of LLNL permanent facilities, the Caliban and previous Silene exercises have demonstrated that LLNL can establish field operations that will very good nuclear accident dosimetry results. There are still several aspects of LLNL's nuclear accident dosimetry program that have not been tested or confirmed. For instance, LLNL's method for using of biological samples (blood and hair) has not been verified since the method was first developed in the 1980's. Because LLNL and the other DOE

  9. Legal aspects of nuclear and radiological accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    El-baroudy, M.M.

    2005-01-01

    Aiming at preventing nuclear and radiological accidents and maintaining safety and security, the State extends its jurisdiction over nuclear and radiological activities through the promulgation of regulatory legislations and providing criminal protection to these activities. The State, in its legislation, defines an authority responsible for the planning of preparedness for emergency situations. That Authority cooperates with other competent authorities in the State as well as with other relevant international organizations and other States in a coordinated way aiming at dealing effectively with and mitigating the consequences of nuclear and radiological accidents through promulgating relevant international conventions and plans for reinforcement of international cooperation in accidents situations. Moreover, the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) can provide specialized consultations and offer assistance in case of accidents. The present study is divided into an introduction and two chapters. In the introduction, the nature of nuclear or radiological accidents is defined. The first chapter deals with the national legal system for preventing the occurrence of nuclear and radiological accidents and mitigating their consequences. The second chapter deals with the international cooperation for facing nuclear or radiological accidents and mitigating their consequences

  10. The Tokai-mura JCO criticality accident and the activities of the accident countermeasure support team of Electric Power Companies, Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ogawa, Junko

    2000-01-01

    A criticality accident occurred at the JCO Tokai-mura nuclear fuel processing plant on September 30, 1999. This accident brought the damages which were unrivaled in the history of atomic energy development in Japan, seriously influencing the citizen life to such an extent as requesting for 320,000 inhabitants within 10 kilometers radius to stay indoors for as long as 18 hours. However, it could be said that though three workers suffered fatal injuries, no substantial hazards were made upon the regional inhabitants due to little release of radioactive substances. This video recorded the activities of the Accident Countermeasure Support Team of the Electric Power Companies immediately after the accident occurred, showing the chronological overview of the particulars of the accident. (author)

  11. Martin Marietta Energy Systems Nuclear Criticality Safety Improvement Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Speas, I.G.

    1987-01-01

    This report addresses questions raised by criticality safety violation at several DOE plants. Two charts are included that define the severity and reporting requirements for the six levels of accidents. A summary is given of all reported criticality incident at the DOE plants involved. The report concludes with Martin Marietta's Nuclear Criticality Safety Policy Statement

  12. Return on experience on nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barre, Bertrand

    2015-09-01

    After a presentation of the International Nuclear and radiological Events Scale (INES scale), of its levels and criteria, this article proposes brief recalls of some nuclear accidents which occurred in nuclear reactors: Chalk River in Canada (1952), Windscale in England (1957), the universal Canadian reactor (NRU in 1958), the SL1 reactor of the Idaho National Laboratory in the USA (1961), the Swiss Lucens reactor (1969), Saint-Laurent des Eaux in France (1969 and 1980). More detailed descriptions are then given for the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and the Fukushima accident in 2011. The main causes of these accidents are identified: loss of control of chain reaction, cooling defect on a stopped reactor, cooling defect on an operated reactor. Some lessons are drawn from these facts, and some characteristics of the EPR are outlined with respect with problems encountered in these accidents

  13. International Intercomparison Exercise for Nuclear Accident Dosimetry at the DAF Using GODIVA-IV

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hickman, David [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Hudson, Becka [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2016-12-15

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Program operated under the direction of Dr. Jerry McKamy completed the first NNSA Nuclear Accident Dosimetry exercise on May 27, 2016. Participants in the exercise were from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), Savanah River Site (SRS), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), US Navy, the Atomic Weapons Establishment (United Kingdom) under the auspices of JOWOG 30, and the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (France) by special invitation and NCSP memorandum of understanding. This exercise was the culmination of a series of Integral Experiment Requests (IER) that included the establishment of the Nuclear Criticality Experimental Research Center, (NCERC) the startup of the Godiva Reactor (IER-194), the establishment of a the Nuclear Accident Dosimetry Laboratory (NAD LAB) in Mercury, NV, and the determination of reference dosimetry values for the mixed neutron and photon radiation field of Godiva within NCERC.

  14. Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook, Version 2. English translation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-08-01

    The Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook, Version 2 essentially includes the description of the Supplement Report to the Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook, released in 1995, into the first version of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook, published in 1988. The following two points are new: (1) exemplifying safety margins related to modeled dissolution and extraction processes, (2) describing evaluation methods and alarm system for criticality accidents. Revision has been made based on previous studies for the chapter that treats modeling the fuel system: e.g., the fuel grain size that the system can be regarded as homogeneous, non-uniformity effect of fuel solution, an burnup credit. This revision has solved the inconsistencies found in the first version between the evaluation of errors found in JACS code system and the criticality condition data that were calculated based on the evaluation. This report is an English translation of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook, Version 2, originally published in Japanese as JAERI 1340 in 1999. (author)

  15. Recalibration of indium foil for personnel screening in criticality accidents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Takada, C; Tsujimura, N; Mikami, S

    2011-03-01

    At the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), small pieces of indium foil incorporated into personal dosemeters have been used for personnel screening in criticality accidents. Irradiation tests of the badges were performed using the SILENE reactor to verify the calibration of the indium activation that had been made in the 1980s and to recalibrate them for simulated criticalities that would be the most likely to occur in the solution process line. In addition, Monte Carlo calculations of the indium activation using the badge model were also made to complement the spectral dependence. The results lead to a screening level of 15 kcpm being determined that corresponds to a total dose of 0.25 Gy, which is also applicable in posterior-anterior exposure. The recalibration based on the latest study will provide a sounder basis for the screening procedure in the event of a criticality accident.

  16. Applications of PRA in nuclear criticality safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, T.P.

    1992-01-01

    Traditionally, criticality accident prevention at Los Alamos has been based on a thorough review and understanding of proposed operations of changes to operations, involving both process supervision and criticality safety staff. The outcome of this communication was usually an agreement, based on professional judgement, that certain accident sequences were credible and had to be reduced in likelihood either by administrative controls or by equipment design and others were not credible, and thus did not warrant expenditures to further reduce their likelihood. The extent of analysis and documentation was generally in proportion to the complexity of the operation but did not include quantified risk assessments. During the last three years nuclear criticality safety related Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) have been preformed on operations in two Los Alamos facilities. Both of these were conducted in order to better understand the cost/benefit aspects of PRA's as they apply to largely ''hands-on'' operations with fissile material for which human errors or equipment failures significant to criticality safety are both rare and unique. Based on these two applications and an appreciation of the historical criticality accident record (frequency and consequences) it is apparent that quantified risk assessments should be performed very selectively

  17. Radiocontamination of agricultural workers due to nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petrovic, B.; Smelcerovic, M.; Djuric, G.; Popovic, D.

    1989-01-01

    In the radiocontamination of the environment due to nuclear accidents, agricultural workers should be considered as a critical group of population. The presented paper discusses this problem from the aspects of folder production. The values of the effective dose equivalent are estimated for different phases of the production process and certain procedures aimed to reduce the radiation risk are proposed (author)

  18. Radiocontamination of agricultural workers due to nuclear accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Petrovic, B [Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Beograd, (Serbia and Montenegro); Smelcerovic, M; Djuric, G; Popovic, D [Institute of Nuclear Sciences Boris Kidric, Vinca, Beograd (Serbia and Montenegro)

    1989-07-01

    In the radiocontamination of the environment due to nuclear accidents, agricultural workers should be considered as a critical group of population. The presented paper discusses this problem from the aspects of folder production. The values of the effective dose equivalent are estimated for different phases of the production process and certain procedures aimed to reduce the radiation risk are proposed (author)

  19. Critical examination of emergency plans for nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Catsaros, Nicolas.

    1986-08-01

    An analysis of emergency plans of various countries for nuclear installations on- and off-site emergency preparedness is presented. The analysis is focused on the off-site organization and countermeasures to protect public health and safety. A critical examination of the different approaches is performed and recommendations for effectiveness improvement and optimization are formulated. (author)

  20. NMC and A and nuclear criticality safety systems integration: A prospective way for enhancement of the nuclear industry facilities safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ryazanov, Boris G.; Sviridov, Victor I.; Frolov, Vladimir V.; Shvedov, Maxim O.; Mclaughlin, Thomas P.; Pruvost, Norman L.

    2003-01-01

    A considerable body of data has now been acquired about the principles, parameters and consequences of nuclear (criticality) accidents at facilities of the atomic industry in Russia, the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The total number of such accidents stands at 22. Russian and US specialists have prepared a rather extensive survey and analysis of these accidents. The final and important section of this survey is the lessons implied by the results of analysis of these 22 accidents. Among these lessons is the necessity of unconditional enforcement of control over the movement and transformations of special nuclear materials (SNM), and in particular fissile materials, (those SNMs with criticality accident concerns) during production and processing. Inadequacies in such control have been among the causes of most of the accidents that have occurred. Nuclear materials control and accounting (MC and A) for the purpose of ensuring storage reliability and nonproliferation safeguards is a major task of nuclear facilities in any nation. MC and A systems use the latest techniques and hardware for periodic control of SNM in specifically organized material balance areas. Immediate checking, periodic inventory of SNM, and measurements of the parameters of SNM at key points are the main sources of data for these systems. Data about the presence and sites of location of SNM in material balance areas that are acquired in inventories can be used for objective assessment of the status of nuclear safety. On the other hand, the inventory itself involves performance of operations that are unlike routine process engineering, and require special consideration of nuclear safety. Use of the techniques and hardware of MC and A systems not only for purposes of storage reliability, but also to ensure nuclear safety, will reduce the risk of nuclear accidents. This paper gives a concise overview of nuclear accidents that have occurred due to inadequacies in MC and A, and demonstrates

  1. Evaluation of coverage of enriched UF6 cylinder storage lots by existing criticality accident alarms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, B.L. Jr.; Dobelbower, M.C.; Woollard, J.E.; Sutherland, P.J.; Tayloe, R.W. Jr.

    1995-03-01

    The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) is leased from the US Department of Energy (DOE) by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), a government corporation formed in 1993. PORTS is in transition from regulation by DOE to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). One regulation is 10 CFR Part 76.89, which requires that criticality alarm systems be provided for the site. PORTS originally installed criticality accident alarm systems in all building for which nuclear criticality accidents were credible. Currently, however, alarm systems are not installed in the enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) cylinder storage lots. This report analyzes and documents the extent to which enriched UF 6 cylinder storage lots at PORTS are covered by criticality detectors and alarms currently installed in adjacent buildings. Monte Carlo calculations are performed on simplified models of the cylinder storage lots and adjacent buildings. The storage lots modelled are X-745B, X-745C, X745D, X-745E, and X-745F. The criticality detectors modelled are located in building X-343, the building X-344A/X-342A complex, and portions of building X-330 (see Figures 1 and 2). These criticality detectors are those located closest to the cylinder storage lots. Results of this analysis indicate that the existing criticality detectors currently installed at PORTS are largely ineffective in detecting neutron radiation from criticality accidents in most of the cylinder storage lots at PORTS, except sometimes along portions of their peripheries

  2. Process criticality accident likelihoods, consequences and emergency planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, T.P.

    1992-01-01

    Evaluation of criticality accident risks in the processing of significant quantities of fissile materials is both complex and subjective, largely due to the lack of accident statistics. Thus, complying with national and international standards and regulations which require an evaluation of the net benefit of a criticality accident alarm system, is also subjective. A review of guidance found in the literature on potential accident magnitudes is presented for different material forms and arrangements. Reasoned arguments are also presented concerning accident prevention and accident likelihoods for these material forms and arrangements. (Author)

  3. Nuclear accident dosimetry. Revision of emergency data sheets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delafield, H.J.

    1976-09-01

    The Emergency Data Sheets on Nuclear Accident Dosimetry have been revealed following the publication of a three part manual on this subject (Delafield, Dennis and Gibson, AERE-R 7485/6/7, 1973). This memo provides an explanation of the action levels adopted for the initial segregation of irradiated persons following a criticality accident, by monitoring the activity of indium foils contained in personnel dosimeters and the induced body sodium activity. The data sheets are given as an Appendix. They provide basic information on; the segregation of irradiated persons, the estimation of radiation exposure, and the assessment of personnel γ-ray and neutron doses. (author)

  4. Nuclear accident evacuee bullying and structural violence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsujiuchi, Takuya

    2018-01-01

    Nuclear accident sufferers should be now referred to as nuclear accident victims. The authors discuss why nuclear accident victims receive not only psychological bullying where no peculiar causes exist, but also corporal and physical bullying and mental suffering, based on the results of questionnaire survey conducted by the authors from January to February 2017, the 'survey on bullying problems related to evacuation from the nuclear accident.' The reasons why the nuclear power evacuation bullying has become a problem at present can be largely classified to the following three categories: (1) opinion that 'bullying' that originally existed just after the nuclear accident became surfaced recently, (2) opinion that latent problems exist as background, and (3) opinion that socially underlying issues are involved in the generation of bullying. Thus, various factors existing under nuclear power evacuation bullying were structurally clarified. In the background of children's nuclear evacuation bullying, adult nuclear power evacuation bullying exists, and there are 'lack of understanding, prejudice, and discrimination against nuclear power and Fukushima' under that. The author thought that 'structural violence' to create the disparity, discrimination, inequality, and injustice of society exists as the basis of such lack of understanding, prejudice, and discrimination, and discussed the 'structural violence' as the basis of bullying. As the upper structure of structural violence associated with nuclear accidents, there are two big phenomena: (1) setting of evacuation/return area not based on reasonable radiation dose standards and (2) fabricated safety and carefreeness myth. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology's report on nuclear bullying could give an impression that 'nuclear power evacuation bullying' is 'not so big problem'. (A.O.)

  5. Criticality accident in uranium fuel processing plant. The estimation of the total number of fissions with related reactor physics parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nishina, Kojiro; Oyamatsu, Kazuhiro; Kondo, Shunsuke; Sekimoto, Hiroshi; Ishitani, Kazuki; Yamane, Yoshihiro; Miyoshi, Yoshinori

    2000-01-01

    This accident occurred when workers were pouring a uranium solution into a precipitation tank with handy operation against the established procedure and both the cylindrical diameter and the total mass exceeded the limited values. As a result, nuclear fission chain reactor in the solution reached not only a 'criticality' state continuing it independently but also an instantly forming criticality state exceed the criticality and increasing further nuclear fission number. The place occurring the accident at this time was not reactor but a place having not to form 'criticality' called by a processing process of uranium fuel. In such place, as because of relating to mechanism of chain reaction, it is required naturally for knowledge on the reactor physics, it is also necessary to understand chemical reaction in chemical process, and functions of tanks, valves and pumps mounted at the processes. For this purpose, some information on uranium concentration ratio, atomic density of nuclides largely affecting to chain reaction such as uranium, hydrogen, and so forth in the solution, shape, inner structure and size of container for the solution, and its temperature and total volume, were necessary for determining criticality volume of the accident uranium solution by using nuclear physics procedures. Here were described on estimation of energy emission in the JCO accident, estimation from analytical results on neutron and solution, calculation of various nuclear physics property estimation on the JCO precipitation tank at JAERI. (G.K.)

  6. Lessons from the Fukushima nuclear power accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hatamura, Yotaro

    2013-01-01

    Through the investigation of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Accident as the chairman of the related Government's Committee, many things had been considered. Essence of the accident could be not only what occurred in the Fukushima nuclear power station, but also dispersed radioactive materials forced many residents to move and not to be returned. Such events as indication errors of water level meter occurring in severe accident could no be thought and remote mechanical operation of valves under high radiation environment were not prepared. Contamination by radioactive clouds caused the evacuation of residents for a long period. Lessons learned from the accident were described such as; (1) the verification of the road to failure connecting selected accident sequence and road to success with another supposed choice, (2) considering what might occur and then what should be needed on the contrary, (3) nuclear power, if should be continued, should be used with the premise of its hazards, and (4) advise to nuclear engineer for adequate information dissemination and technical explanation to the public and keeping nuclear technologies alive. (T. Tanaka)

  7. Nuclear critical safety analysis for UX-30 transport of freight package

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Quan Yanhui; Zhou Qi; Yin Shenggui

    2014-01-01

    The nuclear critical safety analysis and evaluation for UX-30 transport freight package in the natural condition and accident condition were carried out with MONK-9A code and MCNP code. Firstly, the critical benchmark experiment data of public in international were selected, and the deflection and subcritical limiting value with MONK-9A code and MCNP code in calculating same material form were validated and confirmed. Secondly, the neutron efficiency multiplication factors in the natural condition and accident condition were calculated and analyzed, and the safety in transport process was evaluated by taking conservative suppose of nuclear critical safety. The calculation results show that the max value of k eff for UX-30 transport freight package is less than the subcritical limiting value, and the UX-30 transport freight package is in the state of subcritical safety. Moreover, the critical safety index (CSI) for UX-30 package can define zero based on the definition of critical safety index. (authors)

  8. Emergency response and nuclear risk governance. Nuclear safety at nuclear power plant accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuhlen, Johannes

    2014-01-01

    The present study entitled ''Emergency Response and Nuclear Risk Governance: nuclear safety at nuclear power plant accidents'' deals with issues of the protection of the population and the environment against hazardous radiation (the hazards of nuclear energy) and the harmful effects of radioactivity during nuclear power plant accidents. The aim of this study is to contribute to both the identification and remediation of shortcomings and deficits in the management of severe nuclear accidents like those that occurred at Chernobyl in 1986 and at Fukushima in 2011 as well as to the improvement and harmonization of plans and measures taken on an international level in nuclear emergency management. This thesis is divided into a theoretical part and an empirical part. The theoretical part focuses on embedding the subject in a specifically global governance concept, which includes, as far as Nuclear Risk Governance is concerned, the global governance of nuclear risks. Due to their characteristic features the following governance concepts can be assigned to these risks: Nuclear Safety Governance is related to safety, Nuclear Security Governance to security and NonProliferation Governance to safeguards. The subject of investigation of the present study is as a special case of the Nuclear Safety Governance, the Nuclear Emergency governance, which refers to off-site emergency response. The global impact of nuclear accidents and the concepts of security, safety culture and residual risk are contemplated in this context. The findings (accident sequences, their consequences and implications) from the analyses of two reactor accidents prior to Fukushima (Three Mile Iceland in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986) are examined from a historical analytical perspective and the state of the Nuclear Emergency governance and international cooperation aimed at improving nuclear safety after Chernobyl is portrayed by discussing, among other topics, examples of &apos

  9. Civil liability concerning nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2013-01-01

    France and the USA wish to cooperate in order to promote an international regime of civil liability in order to give a fair compensation to victims of nuclear accidents as it is recommended by IAEA. On the other hand the European Commission has launched a consultation to see the necessity or not to harmonize all the civil liability regimes valid throughout Europe. According to the Commission the potential victims of nuclear accidents would not receive equal treatment at the European scale in terms of insurance cover and compensation which might distort competition in the nuclear sector. (A.C.)

  10. Third IAEA nuclear accident intercomparison experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miric, I; Ubovic, Z

    1974-05-15

    The purpose of this report is to present the results of the International Atomic Energy Agency intercomparison experiments held at the 'Boris Kidric' Institute, Vinca, in May 1973. The experiments are parts of a multilaboratory intercomparison programme sponsored by the IAEA for the evaluation of nuclear accident dosimetry systems and eventually recommendation of dosimetry systems that will provide adequate informations in the event of a criticality accident. The previous two studies were held at the Valduc Centre near Dijon (France) in June 1970 and at the ORNL in Oak Ridge (USA), in May 1971. Parts of the intercomparison studies were coordination meetings. The topics and conclusions of the Third coordination meeting are given in the Chairman's Report of F.F. Haywood. This paper will deal, therefore, only with data concerning the Third intercomparison experiments in which the RB reactor at Vinca was used as a source of mixed radiation. (author)

  11. Third IAEA nuclear accident intercomparison experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miric, I.; Ubovic, Z.

    1974-05-01

    The purpose of this report is to present the results of the International Atomic Energy Agency intercomparison experiments held at the 'Boris Kidric' Institute, Vinca, in May 1973. The experiments are parts of a multilaboratory intercomparison programme sponsored by the IAEA for the evaluation of nuclear accident dosimetry systems and eventually recommendation of dosimetry systems that will provide adequate informations in the event of a criticality accident. The previous two studies were held at the Valduc Centre near Dijon (France) in June 1970 and at the ORNL in Oak Ridge (USA), in May 1971. Parts of the intercomparison studies were coordination meetings. The topics and conclusions of the Third coordination meeting are given in the Chairman's Report of F.F. Haywood. This paper will deal, therefore, only with data concerning the Third intercomparison experiments in which the RB reactor at Vinca was used as a source of mixed radiation. (author)

  12. Applications of PRA in nuclear criticality safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, T.P.

    1992-01-01

    Traditionally, criticality accident prevention at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been based on a thorough review and understanding of proposed operations or changes to operations involving both process supervision and criticality safety staff. The outcome of this communication was usually an agreement, based on professional judgment, that certain accident sequences were credible and had to be precluded by design; others were incredible and thus did not warrant expenditures to further reduce their likelihood. The extent of documentation was generally in proportion to the complexity of the operation but never as detailed as that associated with quantified risk assessments. During the last 3 yr, nuclear criticality safety-related probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) have been performed on operations in two LANL facilities. Both of these were conducted in order to better understand the cost/benefit aspects of PRAs as they apply to largely hands-on operations with fissile material

  13. The Impact of Severe Nuclear Accidents on National Decision for Nuclear Decommissioning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suh, Young A; Hornibrook, Carol; Yim, Man Sung

    2016-01-01

    Many researchers have tried to identify the impact of severe nuclear accidents on a country's or international nuclear energy policy [2-3]. However, there is little research on the influence of nuclear accidents and historical events on a country's decision to permanently shutdown an NPP versus international nuclear decommissioning trends. To demonstrate the correlation between a nuclear severe accident and the impact on world nuclear decommissioning, this research reviewed case studies of individual historical events, such as the St. Lucens, TMI, Chernobyl, Fukushima accidents and the series of events leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. For validation of the results of these case studies, a statistical analysis was conducted using the R code. This will be useful in explaining how international and national decommissioning strategies are affected by shutdown reasons, i.e. world historical events. The number of permanently shutdown NPPs was selected as an indicator because any relationship between the number of permanently In conclusion, nuclear severe accidents and historical events have an impact on the number of international NPPs that shutdown permanently and cancelled NPP construction. This directly impacts international nuclear decommissioning policy and nuclear energy policy trends. The number of permanently shutdown NPPs was selected as an indicator because any relationship between the number of permanently

  14. Nuclear criticality safety. Chapter 0530 of AEC manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The programme objectives of this chapter of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission manual on nuclear criticality safety are to protect the health and safety of the public and of the government and contractor personnel working in plants that handle fissionable material and to protect public and private property from the consequences of a criticality accident occurring in AEC-owned plants and other AEC-contracted activities involving fissionable materials

  15. Organization and methods of radiation monitoring while working at nuclear critical assemblies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shishkin, G.V.; Komissarov, L.A.

    1980-01-01

    The organization and methods of environmental radiation monitoring while working at nuclear critical assemblies, are described. Necessary equipment for critical assemblies (signal and Ventilation systems, devices for recording accidental radiation levels of and for measuring radiation field distribution) and the personnel program of actions in case of nuclear accident. The dosimetric control at critical assemblies is usually ensured by telesystems. 8004-01 multi-channel dosimetric device is described as an example of such-system [ru

  16. Are the French authorities beginning to prepare for nuclear accident?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Autret, J.C.

    2008-01-01

    This article, published in issue 80 of 'l'ACROnique du nucleaire', aims to retrace the early steps in the consideration of the possibility of a nuclear accident in France, with the inclusion of 'non-institutional' participants and applying the lessons learned in Belarus in the contaminated territories around the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. After a review of the origin of the involvement of the Association pour le Controle de la Radioactivite dans l'Ouest (ACRO) in addressing post-accident issues alongside the populations living in an environment polluted by radioactivity, it discusses, from the critical viewpoint of an NGO, the context and the working method adopted for this examination. This is followed by some key elements of the programme and unresolved questions about the available body of knowledge which motivates research and about the method adopted for the work. The conclusion, moderately optimistic, highlights some advances and limits arising during this exercise in a French nuclear scene which remains characterised by a centralized mode of management. (author)

  17. Medical consequences of a nuclear plant accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olsson, S.E.; Reizenstein, P.; Stenke, L.

    1987-01-01

    The report gives background information concerning radiation and the biological medical effects and damages caused by radiation. The report also discusses nuclear power plant accidents and efforts from the medical service in the case of a nuclear power plant accident. (L.F.)

  18. Prevention of criticality accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canavese, S.I.

    1982-01-01

    These notes used in the postgraduate course on Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety discuss macro-and microscopic nuclear constants for fissile materials systems. Critical systems: their definition; criteria to analyze the critical state; determination of the critical size; analysis of practical problems about prevention of criticality. Safety of isolated units and of sets of units. Application of standards. Conception of facilities from the criticality control view point. (author) [es

  19. NIRS report of the criticality accident in a uranium conversion test plant in Tokai-mura

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    This report is a detailed account of the roles that National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS) played at the criticality accident in the title, which occurred at around 10:35, on Sep. 30, 1999 and resulted in death of two workers after all, and is published to discharge NIRS responsibilities in regards to the accident. The accident caused many residents concern on their health and rumors had both social and economic consequences. The report involves chapters of detailed outline of the accident; demand for acceptance of the victims and communications until the identification of the criticality'' accident; the acceptance and initial treatment; the exposure dose estimation (based on acute symptoms, on physics, on chromosomal analyses and on neutron-activated dental metals, and detailed analyses for dose distribution); decision made for therapeutic strategies; cooperation with the Network Council for Radiation Emergency and with other medical facilities; the urgent import of medicine; treatment and processes (patients, nursing system and radiation injuries); radiation protection in medical facilities; response to nearby residents of the Plant; international response; press release; Uranium Processing Plant Criticality Accident Investigation Committee and the Health Management Committee organized by the Nuclear Safety Commission; handling of information; and radiation emergency medical preparedness at the NIRS (future issues and prospect). The report is hopefully useful in preventing the occurrence of future accidents. (N.I.)

  20. Energy and angular responses of the criticality accident detector using a plastic scintillator

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsujimura, Norio; Yoshida, Tadayoshi

    2006-01-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories, operates a spent fuel reprocessing plant and MOX (Plutonium-Uranium Mixed Oxide) fuel fabrication plants. Criticality accident detectors have been installed in these facilities. The detector, the Toshiba RD120, is composed of a plastic scintillator coupled to a photomultiplier tube, and an operational amplifier. The alarm triggering point is set to 1.0-3.6 mGy·h -1 in photon dose rate to detect the minimum accident of concern. However, a plastic scintillator is principally sensitive not only to primary photons but also to neutrons by secondary photons and heavy charged particles produced in the detector itself. The authors calculated energy and angular responses of the RD120 criticality accident detector to photons and neutrons using Monte Carlo computer codes. The response to primary photons was evaluated with the MCNP-4B and EGS4 calculations, and photon and X-ray irradiation experiments. The response to neutrons that produce secondary photons and heavy charged particles from neutron interactions was computed using the MCNP-4B and SCINFUL, respectively. As a result, reliable response functions were obtained. These results will be a great help in reassessing the coverage area and in determining the appropriate triggering dose rate level in criticality accidents. (author)

  1. The Impact of Severe Nuclear Accidents on National Decision for Nuclear Decommissioning

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suh, Young A; Hornibrook, Carol; Yim, Man Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    Many researchers have tried to identify the impact of severe nuclear accidents on a country's or international nuclear energy policy [2-3]. However, there is little research on the influence of nuclear accidents and historical events on a country's decision to permanently shutdown an NPP versus international nuclear decommissioning trends. To demonstrate the correlation between a nuclear severe accident and the impact on world nuclear decommissioning, this research reviewed case studies of individual historical events, such as the St. Lucens, TMI, Chernobyl, Fukushima accidents and the series of events leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. For validation of the results of these case studies, a statistical analysis was conducted using the R code. This will be useful in explaining how international and national decommissioning strategies are affected by shutdown reasons, i.e. world historical events. The number of permanently shutdown NPPs was selected as an indicator because any relationship between the number of permanently In conclusion, nuclear severe accidents and historical events have an impact on the number of international NPPs that shutdown permanently and cancelled NPP construction. This directly impacts international nuclear decommissioning policy and nuclear energy policy trends. The number of permanently shutdown NPPs was selected as an indicator because any relationship between the number of permanently.

  2. A review of criticality accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stratton, W.R.; Smith, D.R.

    1989-03-01

    Criticality accidents and the characteristics of prompt power excursions are discussed. Forty-one accidental power transients are reviewed. In each case where available, enough detail is given to help visualize the physical situation, the cause or causes of the accident, the history and characteristics of the transient, the energy release, and the consequences, if any, to personnel and property. Excursions associated with large power reactors are not included in this study, except that some information on the major accident at the Chernobyl reactor in April 1986 is provided in the Appendix. 67 refs., 21 figs., 2 tabs

  3. Explanation of procedure on site medical emergency response for nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Yulong; Jiang Zhong

    2012-01-01

    National occupational health standard-Procedure on Site Medical Emergency Response for Nuclear Accident has been approved and issued by the Ministry of Health. This standard is formulated according to the Emergency Response Law of the People's Republic of China, Law of the People 's Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Occupational Diseases, Regulations on Emergency Measures for Nuclear Accidents at Nuclear Power Plants, and Health Emergency Plans for Nuclear and Radiological Accidents of Ministry of Health, supporting the use of On-site Medical Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Accidents and Off-site Medical Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Accidents. Nuclear accident on-site medical response procedure is a part of the on-site emergency plan. The standard specifies the basic content and requirements of the nuclear accident on-site medical emergency response procedures of nuclear facilities operating units to guide and regulate the work of nuclear accident on-site medical emergency response of nuclear facilities operating units. The criteria-related contents were interpreted in this article. (authors)

  4. Preparation for the second edition of nuclear criticality safety handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okuno, Hiroshi; Nomura, Yasushi

    1997-01-01

    The making of the second edition of Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook entered the final stage of investigation by the working group. In the second edition, the newest results of the researches in Japan were taken. In this report, among the subjects which were examined continuously from the first edition published in 1988, the size of fuel particles which can be regarded as homogeneous even in a heterogeneous system, the reactivity effect when fuel concentration distribution became not uniform in a homogeneous fuel system, the method of evaluating criticality safety in which submersion is not assumed, and the criticality data when fuel burning is considered are explained. Further, about the matters related to the criticality in chemical processes and the matters related to criticality accident, the outlines are introduced. Finally, the state of preparation for aiming at the third edition is mentioned. Criticality safety control is important for overall nuclear fuel cycle including the transportation and storage of fuel. The course of the publication of this Handbook is outlined. The matters which have been successively examined from the first edition, the results of criticality safety analysis for the dissolving tanks of fuel reprocessing, and the analysis code and the simplified evaluation method for criticality accident are reported. (K.I.)

  5. Nuclear laws and radiologic accidents; Direito nuclear e os acidentes radiologicos

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frois, Fernanda [Pontificia Univ. Catolica de Sao Paulo, SP (Brazil)

    1997-12-31

    Some aspects of the nuclear activities in Brazil, specially concerning the Goiania s accident are demonstrated using concepts from environmental and nuclear law. Nuclear and environmental competence, the impossibility of the states of making regional laws, as the lack of regulation about the nuclear waste, are discussed. The situation of Goiania when the accident happened, the present situation of the victims and the nuclear waste provisionally stored in Abadia de Goias is reported 7 refs.; e-mail: froes at sti.com.br

  6. Community response against the nuclear accident. Confusion in Sweden after the Chernobyl nuclear accident and its features

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sato, Yoshihiro

    2014-01-01

    The Chernobyl nuclear accident, which occurred in April 1986, became popular in Sweden after two days, and Sweden was hit by a big mess immediately after that. This paper introduces various actions taken in Sweden at that time. The authors analyzed the situation based on the following materials to tell the situation at that time: (1) materials summarized by researchers upon request of the administrative organs of the country, (2) two diaries that were written by Sven Aner, who was a former reporter of a major daily newspaper published after the accident and an activist of antinuclear groups, and Sven Lofvegerg, who handled the accident as a technical officer at Radiation Protection Agency, and (3) newspaper articles at that time. The situations that was revealed after the accident were summarized from the following viewpoints: (1) governmental remarks toward safety standards and effects on residents, and the anxiety of residents, (2) grazing ban on livestock as an important industry and its lifting, (3) correspondence of antinuclear activists, (4) anxiety against the effects of radiation on humans, and counseling on the safety addressed to the Headquarters for Disaster Control, (5) roles of regional radio stations, (6) defects of bureaucracy, (7) criticism against the actions of the Headquarters for Disaster Control, and (8) influence of extreme experts. (A.O.)

  7. Consequences of nuclear accidents for human beings and the environment; Auswirkungen nuklearer Unfaelle auf den Menschen und die Umwelt

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Huebner, Felix; Jung, Jennifer Jana; Schultmann, Frank

    2017-03-15

    In the 1950s and 1960s many countries believed that they could become energy self-efficient with the help of nuclear power plants. For this reason, nuclear energy experienced internationally an enormous upswing during these years. In the following decades, many nuclear power plants were planned and built. Despite a few critics, who drew attention to the dangers of nuclear power use, an end to the upturn was not foreseeable. But in 1979, the nuclear accident in Three Mile Island in Harrisburg (USA) caused international attention and the critics of the nuclear power became stronger. However, many Europeans only were aware of the danger by nuclear power plants when in 1986 the nuclear disaster occurred in the Ukrainian nuclear power plant in Chernobyl. The effects of this nuclear disaster were also felt in Central Europe. Recently, the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima nuclear power plant has prompted a nuclear phase-out in Germany and the rest of the world. This work focuses not on the political implications of these nuclear accidents, but rather on the impacts of nuclear accidents on human beings, animals and the environment. In particular, reports on the incidents in Chernobyl and Fukushima as well as studies on their effects are analysed and summarised.

  8. National emergency plan for nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-10-01

    The national emergency plan for nuclear accidents is a plan of action designed to provide a response to accidents involving the release or potential release of radioactive substances into the environment, which could give rise to radiation exposure to the public. The plan outlines the measures which are in place to assess and mitigate the effects of nuclear accidents which might pose a radiological hazard in ireland. It shows how accident management will operate, how technical information and monitoring data will be collected, how public information will be provided and what measures may be taken for the protection of the public in the short and long term. The plan can be integrated with the Department of Defence arrangements for wartime emergencies

  9. Improvements in the nuclear accident response system in Brazil

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrada, J.J.S.; Azevedo, E.M.; Knofel, T.M.J.; Recio, J.C.A.; Alves, R.N.

    1998-01-01

    The National Commission on Nuclear Energy has been making outstanding effort to improve its nuclear and radiological accident response systems since the tragic accident in Goiania. Most of this effort is related to nuclear area although the radiological accident has been also considered. This paper describes the improvements in the CNEN response system structure, discusses several topics involving those related to emergency planning and preparedness, and points out some deficiencies that need to be corrected also. The situation during the Goiania accident was more disadvantageous than nowadays, so it is believed that none of the actual deficiencies are sufficient to guess that the population and the environment will not be protected in case of a nuclear or radiological accident

  10. Recommendations about criticality accident dosimetry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-07-01

    The aims of criticality accident dosimetry and the characteristics peculiar to a critical burst being defined, the requirements to be fulfilled by a dosimetric system applied to this type of measurements are presented. The devices chosen by the C.E.A. Radiation Survey Divisions, simple and cheap, are described along with the main processes to be carried out in order to evaluate doses after an accident. The apparatus necessary for detector counting and the directions for use are presented in detail, allowing standardization of measurements. A set of linear formula enables to obtain, from these measurements, all required informations about neutron fluences and spectra, along with the suitable components of the dose at the irradiated people locations [fr

  11. Preparedness against nuclear power accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    This booklet contains information about the organization against nuclear power accidents, which exist in the four Swedish counties with nuclear power plants. It is aimed at classes 7-9 of the Swedish schools. (L.E.)

  12. Nuclear fuel in a reactor accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burns, Peter C; Ewing, Rodney C; Navrotsky, Alexandra

    2012-03-09

    Nuclear accidents that lead to melting of a reactor core create heterogeneous materials containing hundreds of radionuclides, many with short half-lives. The long-lived fission products and transuranium elements within damaged fuel remain a concern for millennia. Currently, accurate fundamental models for the prediction of release rates of radionuclides from fuel, especially in contact with water, after an accident remain limited. Relatively little is known about fuel corrosion and radionuclide release under the extreme chemical, radiation, and thermal conditions during and subsequent to a nuclear accident. We review the current understanding of nuclear fuel interactions with the environment, including studies over the relatively narrow range of geochemical, hydrological, and radiation environments relevant to geological repository performance, and discuss priorities for research needed to develop future predictive models.

  13. Safety demonstration analyses at JAERI for severe accident during overland transport of fresh nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nomura, Yasushi; Kitao, Kohichi; Karasawa, Kiyonori; Yamada, Kenji; Takahashi, Satoshi; Watanabe, Kohji; Okuno, Hiroshi; Miyoshi, Yoshinori

    2005-01-01

    structure was found to be intact to maintain leak tightness even in the severe fire accidents. In addition, criticality safety was assessed by using the continuous energy Monte Carlo code MVP and the nuclear data library JENDL-3.2 for the cask in consideration of the mechanical damages and thermal failure resulted from the above analyses. As a conclusion, integrity of the packages of fresh nuclear fuel materials can be maintained even in the case of the severe accident, and criticality safety can also be secured to prevent radioactive material from releasing into environment. (author)

  14. Workplace Accidents and Self-Organized Criticality

    OpenAIRE

    Mauro, John C.; Diehl, Brett; Marcellin, Richard F.; Vaughn, Daniel J.

    2018-01-01

    The occurrence of workplace accidents is described within the context of self-organized criticality, a theory from statistical physics that governs a wide range of phenomena across physics, biology, geosciences, economics, and the social sciences. Workplace accident data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reveal a power-law relationship between the number of accidents and their severity as measured by the number of days lost from work. This power-law scaling is indicative of workplace a...

  15. Nuclear accidents and protection

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biocanin, R.; Amidzic, B.

    2005-01-01

    The numerous threats are our cruel reality. There is a great arsenal of nuclear weapons. Nuclear terrorism and nuclear accidents are always possible, especially during the transport and handling different nuclear material. Terrorist organisation also goes for coming into the possession of the nuclear means. Specific and important problem is human radioactive contamination in using nuclear energy for peaceful and military purpose. So, realisation of the universal and united system of NBCD gives us a possibility by using the modern communication equipment and very effective mobile units to react in a real time and successfully perform monitoring, alarming, protection and decontamination. (author) [sr

  16. Environmental assessment for consolidation of certain materials and machines for nuclear criticality experiments and training

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    In support of its assigned missions and because of the importance of avoiding nuclear criticality accidents, DOE has adopted a policy to reduce identifiable nuclear criticality safety risks and to protect the public, workers, government property and essential operations from the effects of a criticality accident. In support of this policy, the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Technical Area (TA) 18, provides a program of general purpose critical experiments. This program, the only remaining one of its kind in the United States, seeks to maintain a sound basis of information for criticality control in those physical situations that DOE will encounter in handling and storing fissionable material in the future, and ensuring the presence of a community of individuals competent in practicing this control

  17. The report of the criticality accident in a uranium conversion test plant in Tokai-mura

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murata, Hajime; Akashi, Makoto

    2002-03-01

    The criticality accident in the title occurred at around 10:35, on Sep. 30, 1999, cost the lives of two workers and caused many residents concern on their health. Moreover, rumors had both social and economic consequences. This report is a detailed account of the roles that many individuals and groups in the National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS) performed in a range of the areas, and is published to discharge NIRS responsibilities in regards to the accident. The report involves chapters of detailed outline of the accident; acceptance of the victims and communications until the identification of the ''criticality'' accident; initial treatment; dose estimation (medical, hematological, physical and biological ones and that by dental metals activated by the neutron); decision making for therapeutic strategies; cooperation with the Network Council for Radiation Emergency Medicine and other medical facilities; emergency importation of medical supplies; treatment and progress (nursing system and radiation injuries); protection from radiation in medical facilities; response to nearby residents of the Plant; international response; press release; Uranium Processing Plant Criticality Accident Investigation Committee and the Health Management Committee organized by the Nuclear Safety Commission; handling of information; and radiation emergency medical preparedness at the NIRS (future issues and prospect). The report is hoped to be useful in preventing the occurrence of future accidents. (K.H.)

  18. Framatome-ANP France UO2 fuel fabrication. Criticality safety analysis in the light of the JCO accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doucet, M.; Zheng, S.; Mouton, J.; Porte, R.

    2003-01-01

    In France the 1999' Tokai Mura criticality accident in Japan had a big impact on the nuclear fuel manufacturing facility community. Moreover this accident led to a large public discussion about all the nuclear facilities. The French Safety Authorities made strong requirements to the industrials to revisit completely their safety analysis files mainly those concerning nuclear fuels treatments. The FRAMATOME-ANP production of its French low enriched (5 w/o) UO2 fuel fabrication plant (FBFC/Romans) exceeds 1000 metric tons a year. Special attention was given to the emergency evacuation plan that should be followed in case of a criticality accident. If a criticality accident happens, site internal and external radioprotection requirements need to have an emergency evacuation plan showing the different routes where the absorbed doses will be as low as possible for people. The French Safety Authorities require also an update of the old based neutron source term accounting for state of the art methodology. UO2 blenders units contain a large amount of dry powder strictly controlled by moderation; a hypothetical water leakage inside one of these apparatus is simulated by increasing the water content of the powder. The resulted reactivity insertion is performed by several static calculations. The French IRSN/CEA CRISTAL codes are used to perform these static calculations. The kinetic criticality code POWDER simulates the power excursion versus time and determines the consequent total energy source term. MNCP4B performs the source term propagation (including neutrons and gamma) used to determine the isodose curves needed to define the emergency evacuation plant. This paper deals with the approach FRAMATOME-ANP has taken to assess Safety Authorities demands using the more up to date calculation tools and methodology. (author)

  19. Compensation for damages in case of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leger, M.

    2011-01-01

    This article presents the system of compensation for damages in case of a nuclear accident. This system of civil liability for nuclear damage, as a specific regime, departs on several points from the common rules of civil liability, in order to provide an adequate and equitable compensation for the damages suffered by the victims of nuclear accidents. The French system of civil liability for nuclear damage results from two International Conventions integrated in French law (Paris convention 1960 and Brussels convention 1963) and the French law of 1968, October 30 on civil liability in the area of nuclear energy. These texts define the conditions under which a nuclear operator could be held liable in case of a nuclear accident. The protocols to amend the Paris and Brussels Conventions of 2004, not yet come into force, are also presented. They ensure that increased resources are available to compensate a greater number of victims of a nuclear accident. (author)

  20. An introduction to serious nuclear accident chemistry

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mark Russell St. John Foreman

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available A review of the chemistry occurring inside a nuclear power plant during a serious reactor accident is presented. This includes some aspects of the behavior of nuclear fuel, its cladding, cesium and iodine. This review concentrates on the chemistry of an accident in a water-cooled reactor loaded with uranium dioxide or mixed metal oxide fuel.

  1. Regulatory aspects of nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Caoui, A.

    1988-01-01

    The legislative systems used in different countries insist on requiring the license of the nuclear installations exploitation and on providing a nuclear safety report. For obtaining this license, the operators have to consider all situations of functioning (normal, incidental and accidental) to make workers and the public secure. The licensing procedures depend on the juridical and administrative systems of the country. Usually, protection of people against ionzing radiation is the responsibility of the ministry of health and the ministry of industry. In general, the regulations avoid to fix a definite technical standards by reason of technological development. An emergency plan is normally designed in the stage of the installation project planification. This plan contains the instructions and advices to give to populations in case of accident. The main lesson learnt from the nuclear accidents that happened is to enlarge the international cooperation in the nuclear safety field. 4 refs. (author)

  2. Accident analysis for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Deterministic safety analysis (frequently referred to as accident analysis) is an important tool for confirming the adequacy and efficiency of provisions within the defence in depth concept for the safety of nuclear power plants (NPPs). Owing to the close interrelation between accident analysis and safety, an analysis that lacks consistency, is incomplete or is of poor quality is considered a safety issue for a given NPP. Developing IAEA guidance documents for accident analysis is thus an important step towards resolving this issue. Requirements and guidelines pertaining to the scope and content of accident analysis have, in the past, been partially described in various IAEA documents. Several guidelines relevant to WWER and RBMK type reactors have been developed within the IAEA Extrabudgetary Programme on the Safety of WWER and RBMK NPPs. To a certain extent, accident analysis is also covered in several documents of the revised NUSS series, for example, in the Safety Requirements on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (NS-R-1) and in the Safety Guide on Safety Assessment and Verification for Nuclear Power Plants (NS-G-1.2). Consistent with these documents, the IAEA has developed the present Safety Report on Accident Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. Many experts have contributed to the development of this Safety Report. Besides several consultants meetings, comments were collected from more than fifty selected organizations. The report was also reviewed at the IAEA Technical Committee Meeting on Accident Analysis held in Vienna from 30 August to 3 September 1999. The present IAEA Safety Report is aimed at providing practical guidance for performing accident analyses. The guidance is based on present good practice worldwide. The report covers all the steps required to perform accident analyses, i.e. selection of initiating events and acceptance criteria, selection of computer codes and modelling assumptions, preparation of input data and presentation of the

  3. Immediate medical consequences of nuclear accidents: lessons from Chernobyl

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gale, R.P.

    1987-01-01

    The immediate medical response to the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station involved containment of the radioactivity and evacuation of the nearby population. The next step consisted of assessment of the radiation dose received by individuals, based on biological dosimetry, and treatment of those exposed. Medical care involved treatment of skin burns; measures to support bone marrow failure, gastrointestinal tract injury, and other organ damage (i.e., infection prophylaxis and transfusions) for those with lower radiation dose exposure; and bone marrow transplantation for those exposed to a high dose of radiation. At Chernobyl, two victims died immediately and 29 died of radiation or thermal injuries in the next three months. The remaining victims of the accident are currently well. A nuclear accident anywhere is a nuclear accident everywhere. Prevention and cooperation in response to these accidents are essential goals

  4. Nuclear. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Treaty series 1990 no.21

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1992-12-31

    The States present at this convention are aware that comprehensive measures have been are being taken to ensure a high level of safety in nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and minimizing the consequences of any such accident should it occur. The States are convinced of the need to provide relevant information about nuclear accidents as early as possible in order that transboundary radiological consequences can be minimized. In the event of an accident the State involved will notify, through the International Energy Agency the other States which may be physically affected, as to the nature of the accident, the time of occurrence and its exact location.

  5. Nuclear. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Treaty series 1990 no.21

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-01-01

    The States present at this convention are aware that comprehensive measures have been are being taken to ensure a high level of safety in nuclear activities, aimed at preventing nuclear accidents and minimizing the consequences of any such accident should it occur. The States are convinced of the need to provide relevant information about nuclear accidents as early as possible in order that transboundary radiological consequences can be minimized. In the event of an accident the State involved will notify, through the International Energy Agency the other States which may be physically affected, as to the nature of the accident, the time of occurrence and its exact location

  6. Analysis of the criticality safety of a nuclear fuel deposit

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Landeyro, P.A.; Mincarini, M.

    1987-01-01

    In the present work a safety analysis from criticality accidents of nuclear fuel deposits is performed. The analysis is performed utilizing two methods derived from different physical principes: 1) superficial density method, obtained from experimental research; 2) solid angle method, derived from transport theory

  7. Emergency planning and preparedness for a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rahe, E.P.

    1985-01-01

    Based on current regulations, FEMA approves each site-specific plan of state and local governments for each power reactor site after 1) formal review offsite preparedness, 2) holding a public meeting at which the preparedness status has been reviewed, and 3) a satisfactory joint exercise has been conducted with both utility and local participation. Annually, each state, within any position of the 10-mile emergency planning zone, must conduct a joint exercise with the utility to demonstrate its preparedness for a nuclear accident. While it is unlikely that these extreme measures will be needed as a result of an accident at a nuclear power station, the fact that these plans have been well thought out and implemented have already proven their benefit to society. The preparedness for a nuclear accident can be of great advantage in other types of emergencies. For example, on December 11, 1982, a non-nuclear chemical storage tank exploded at a Union Carbide plant in Louisiana shortly after midnight. More than 20,000 people were evacuated from their homes. They were evacuated under the emergency response plan formulated for use in the event of a nuclear accident at the nearby Waterford Nuclear plants. Clearly, this illustrates how a plan conceived for one purpose is appropriate to handle other types of accidents that occur in a modern industrial society

  8. Safety of Ikata Nuclear Power Station from the accident of Three Mile Island

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nonaka, Hiroshi

    1979-01-01

    The leak of radioactive substances occurred on March 28, 1979, in the No. 2 plant of Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station, and this accident must be put to use to prevent similar accidents and to secure safety hereafter in the nuclear power stations being operated in Japan. In the TMI accident, too many problems concerning the operation management seemed to exist in a series of events. In this paper, a few matters related to the TMI accident among the aspects of the operation management in Ikata Nuclear Power Station are reported. As the problems of operation management, it is considered that the operation of the TMI plant was continued as the exit valve of auxiliary feed line was closed, that it took long time to close the root valve for a pressurizer relief valve manually, and that the ECCS was stopped manually. In TMI, the abnormal phenomenon of losing main feed water has occurred 6 times since the attainment of criticality in March, 1978, and the opening and sticking of pressurizer relief valves occurred at least twice in about 150 times of their actuation in the nuclear reactors designed by Babcock and Wilcox Co. In Ikata Nuclear Power Station, these problems are detected early and the suitable measures are taken immediately, therefore it never happens to continue the operation as the problems are left as they are. It is not conceivable that similar troubles occur many times. (Kako, I.)

  9. Contribution to evaluating nuclear power plant accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Razga, J.; Horacek, P.

    1990-01-01

    Large-scale accidents pose the highest risk in the use of nuclear power. They are the major factor that has to be taken into account when assessing the effect of nuclear power plants on human health and on the environment. In Czechoslovak conditions, the effectiveness of provisions made to reduce the hazard of large-scale nuclear power plant accidents must be considered from the following aspects: effect on human health, consequences of long-term disabling of the infrastructure, potential of human and material reserves in coping with the accident, consequences of power failure for the electricity system, effect on agricultural production and catering, risk of ground and surface water contamination in the Labe or Danube river basin, and international political aspects. (Z.M.). 3 tabs., 18 refs

  10. EPRI nuclear fuel-cycle accident risk assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    The present results of the nuclear fuel-cycle accident risk assessment conducted by the Electric Power Research Institute show that the total risk contribution of the nuclear fuel cycle is only approx. 1% of the accident risk of the power plant; hence, with little error, the accident risk of nuclear electric power is essentially that of the power plant itself. The power-plant risk, assuming a very large usage of nuclear power by the year 2005 is only approx. 0.5% of the radiological risk of natural background. The smallness of the fuel-cycle risk relative to the power-plant risk may be attributed to the lack of internal energy to drive an accident and the small amount of dispersible material. This work aims at a realistic assessment of the process hazards, the effectiveness of confinement and mitigation systems and procedures, and the associated likelihood of errors and the estimated size of errors. The primary probabilistic estimation tool is fault-tree analysis, with the release source terms calculated using physicochemical processes. Doses and health effects are calculated with CRAC (Consequences of Reactor Accident Code). No evacuation or mitigation is considered; source terms may be conservative through the assumption of high fuel burnup (40,000 MWd/t) and short cooling period (90 to 150 d); high-efficiency particulate air filter efficiencies are derived from experiments

  11. The medical implications of nuclear power plant accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tyror, J.G.; Pearson, G.W.

    1989-11-01

    This paper examines the UK position regarding the potential for an accident at a nuclear power plant, the safeguards in place to prevent such an accident occurring and the emergency procedures designed to cope with the consequences should one occur. It focuses on the role of the medical services and examines previous accidents to suggest the nature and likely scale of response that may need to be provided. It is apparent that designs of UK nuclear power stations are robust and that the likelihood of a significant accident occurring is extremely remote. Emergency arrangements are, however, in place to deal with the eventuality should it arise and these incorporate sufficient flexibility to accommodate a wide range of accidents. Analysis of previous nuclear accidents at Windscale, Three Mile Island and Chernobyl provide a limited but valuable insight into the diversity and potential scale of response that may be required. It is concluded that above all, the response must be flexible to enable medical services to deal with the wide range of effects that may arise. (author)

  12. Our reflections and lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsuoka, Takeshi; Sawada, Takashi; Yagawa, Genki

    2017-01-01

    In order to investigate the cause of the accident that began on March 11, 2011 at the Tokyo Electric Power Company Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, the Science Council of Japan set an investigation committee, the 'Sub-Committee on Fukushima Nuclear Accident (SCFNA)' under the Comprehensive Synthetic Engineering Committee. The committee has published a record entitled 'Reflections and Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, (1st report)'. There are still many items about the accident for which the details are not clear. It is important to discuss the reasons why the severe accident could not be prevented and the possibilities that there might have been other proper operations and accident management to prevent or lessen the severity of the accident than those adopted at the time. SCFNA decided to continue its investigation by setting up our working group called the 'Working Group on Fukushima Nuclear Accident'. Our working group have published 'Reflection and Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident (2nd Report)'. We investigated the issues of specific units. Unit 1 were validity of the operation of the isolation condenser, whether or not a loss of coolant accident occurred due to a failure of the cooling piping system by the seismic ground motion, and the cause of the loss of the emergency AC power supply, Unit 2 was the reason why a large amount of radioactive materials was emitted to the environment although the reactor building did not explode, Unit 3 was the reasons why the operator stopped running the high pressure coolant injection system, and Units 1 to 3 was validity of the venting operation. These items were considered to be the key issues in these units that would have prevented progression to the severe accident. (author)

  13. Supplement report to the Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook of Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okuno, Hiroshi; Komuro, Yuichi; Nakajima, Ken

    1995-10-01

    Supplementing works to 'The Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook' of Japan have been continued since 1988, the year the handbook edited by the Science and Technology Agency first appeared. This report publishes the fruits obtained in the supplementing works. Substantial improvements are made in the chapters of 'Modelling the evaluation object' and 'Methodology for analytical safety assessment', and newly added are chapters of 'Criticality safety of chemical processes', 'Criticality accidents and their evaluation methods' and 'Basic principles on design and installation of criticality alarm system'. (author)

  14. Individual feature identification method for nuclear accident emergency decision-making

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen Yingfeng; Wang Jianlong; Lin Xiaoling; Yang Yongxin; Lu Xincheng

    2014-01-01

    According to the individual feature identification method and combining with the characteristics of nuclear accident emergency decision-making, the evaluation index system of the nuclear accident emergency decision-making was determined on the basis of investigation and analysis. The effectiveness of the nuclear accident emergency decision-making was evaluated based on the individual standards by solving the individual features of the individual standard identification decisions. The case study shows that the optimization result is reasonable, objective and reliable, and it can provide an effective analysis method and decision-making support for optimization of nuclear accident emergency protective measures. (authors)

  15. The detection of criticality accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prigent, R.; Renard, C.

    It is necessary to shield the personnel from the radiological consequences of a criticality accident. In the past ten years the study programmes have highlighted fresh data which have led to new thinking on the detection philosophy and as a consequence the design of detection equipment. Concurrently, new recommendations have been drawn up by the Safety Criticality Committee. The new detection equipment was developed by the CEA on the basis of the CRAC and SILENE experiments. Its industrialization was entrusted to the Intertechnique Company and the first network installed dates back to 1976. An examination is made of the problem of accident detection, dealing in turn with detection, the characteristics of the equipment and the installation rules. To clarify the various points discussed, a parallel has been drawn between the equipment existing up to 1975 and the new generation developed since then [fr

  16. Criticality accident studies and methodology implemented at the CEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barbry, Francis; Fouillaud, Patrick; Reverdy, Ludovic; Mijuin, Dominique

    2003-01-01

    Based on the studies and results of experimental programs performed since 1967 in the CRAC, then SILENE facilities, the CEA has devised a methodology for criticality accident studies. This methodology integrates all the main focuses of its approach, from criticality accident phenomenology to emergency planning and response, and thus includes aspects such as criticality alarm detector triggering, airborne releases, and irradiation risk assessment. (author)

  17. Integration of risk aversion in the evaluation of the external cost of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eeckhoudt, L.; Schieber, C.; Schneider, Th.

    1998-01-01

    Full text of publication follows: the external costs of fuel cycles used in the production of electricity are those imposed on society and environment that are not accounted for by the producers and consumers of energy. Within the evaluation of the external cost of the nuclear fuel cycle, the evaluation of a nuclear accident has to be addressed. For this purpose, the basic approach consists in calculating the expected value of various occident scenarios. the main criticism of this approach is that there is a discrepancy between the social acceptability of the risk and the average monetary value which corresponds in principle to the compensation of the consequences for each individual of the population affected by the accident. The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology for the integration of risk aversion, relying on the expected utility approach, as well as a numerical application based on the French data for the external cost of a nuclear accident. Although a huge range of values has been published for the relative risk aversion coefficient, it seems reasonable to adopt a value of 2 for the specific case of nuclear accident. This leads to an estimated multiplying coefficient approximately equal to 20 to be applied to the expected external cost of a nuclear accident corresponding to a release of about 1% of the core. In this case, the external cost of the nuclear accident is estimated to 0.046 mECU/kWh (i.e. about 50% of the total external costs of the nuclear fuel cycle estimated at 0.1 mECU/kWh with a 3% discount rate), instead of 0.0023 mECU/kWh without taking into account risk aversion. (authors)

  18. The relationship of JNC and JCO in the uranium processing plant criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kanamori, Masashi; Yanagibashi, Katsumi; Okamoto, Naritoshi

    2002-12-01

    On September 30th 1999, the criticality accident occurred at JCO's uranium conversion building in Tokai. The accident occurred during reconversion from U 3 O 8 to uranium nitrate solution (UNH) with uranium enriched 18.8% and about 60 kgU. JCO contacted with JNC to supply UNH that is fuel material for the experimental fast breeder reactor 'JOYO'. JNC has contracted with JCO that had started nuclear fuel material processing business following a definite policy of Japanese government and developed SUMITOMO ADU PROCESS'. JNC made the first contract with JCO in 1985 and has made a contact every year. There had never been a problem in their products. JNC inspected products based on contract. JNC discharge our duty as customer inspecting products based on contract. As for safety control, JCO had taken licensing safety review and had been permitted to be 'a processing facility'. Therefore JNC understood that JCO produced following this license. 'The Uranium Processing Plant Criticality Accident Investigation' showed that JCO had been taking a different method from the permit and violating the license. However JNC had never been explained about that and JCO's operation procedures had never described about that. Therefore the Criticality Accident couldn't be avoided. This report describes the relationship of JNC and JCO in the uranium reconversion contract for JOYO, atomic development policy of Japanese government, process to the order and the contents of contract. (author)

  19. An international co-ordinated research programme on nuclear accident dosimetry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flakus, F.N.

    1977-01-01

    Where fissile materials are being processed in quantities exceeding the minimum critical amounts, a radiation risk to workers arises from the possibility of criticality excursions. Despite the fact that techniques for preventing the occurende of such accidental excursions have reached very high standards it is generally agreed that the availability of suitable nuclear accident dosimetry (NAD) systems is very important. Following the recommendations of an Advisory Group meeting on NAD, the IAEA had established in 1969 an international coordinated research programme on NAD systems and elaborating standarized systems. A large number of research groups from 14 Member States throughout the world participated in this co-ordinated work. Since 1970 four international multilaboratory intercomparison experiments on NAD have been organized and the response of a variety of dosimeters examined in different neutron spectra under simulated accident conditions at Valduc (France), Oak Ridge (USA), Vinca (Yugoslavia) and Harwell (UK). The results achieved in these intercomparison studies show that NAD systems have been substantially improved and that several systems are available now in a number of laboratories throughout the world that perform within the criteria laid down by the initiating advisory group in 1969. A compendium of neutron leakage spectra has also been elaborated for facilitating the determination of dose from readings of detectors exposed to various neutron fields in criticality accidents

  20. Severe accidents: in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    A ''severe'' nuclear accident refers to a reactor accident that could exceed reactor design specifications to such a degree as to prevent cooling of the reactor's core by normal means. This report summarizes the work of a NEA Senior Group of Experts who have studied the potential response of existing light-water reactors to severe accidents and have found that current designs of reactors are far more capable of coping with severe accidents than design specifications would suggest. The report emphasises the specific knowledge and means that can be used for diagnosing a severe accident and for managing its progression in order to prevent or mitigate its consequences

  1. Nuclear accident dosimetry, Report on the Third IAEA intercomparison experiment at Vinca, Yugoslavia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1977-03-15

    The objective of this report is to present the results of the third IAEA intercomparison experiment held at the Boris Kidric Institute, Vinca, in May 1973. These experiments were a part of multi laboratory intercomparison programme sponsored by the IAEA for evaluation of nuclear accident dosimetry systems that ought to provide adequate information in the event of criticality accidents. This report deals with the data concerning the Third intercomparison experiments in which the RB reactor at Vinca was used as a source of mixed radiation.

  2. Severe accidents in nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohai, Dumitru; Dumitrescu, Iulia; Tunaru, Mariana

    2004-01-01

    The likelihood of accidents leading to core meltdown in nuclear reactors is low. The consequences of such an event are but so severe that developing and implementing of adequate measures for preventing or diminishing the consequences of such events are of paramount importance. The analysis of major accidents requires sophisticated computation codes but necessary are also relevant experiments for checking the accuracy of the predictions and capability of these codes. In this paper an overview of the severe accidents worldwide with definitions, computation codes and relating experiments is presented. The experimental research activity of severe accidents was conducted in INR Pitesti since 2003, when the Institute jointed the SARNET Excellence Network. The INR activity within SARNET consists in studying scenarios of severe accidents by means of ASTEC and RELAP/SCDAP codes and conducting bench-scale experiments

  3. Severe accidents at nuclear power plants. Their risk assessment and accident management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abe, Kiyoharu.

    1995-05-01

    This document is to explain the severe accident issues. Severe Accidents are defined as accidents which are far beyond the design basis and result in severe damage of the core. Accidents at Three Mild Island in USA and at Chernobyl in former Soviet Union are examples of severe accidents. The causes and progressions of the accidents as well as the actions taken are described. Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is a method to estimate the risk of severe accidents at nuclear reactors. The methodology for PSA is briefly described and current status on its application to safety related issues is introduced. The acceptability of the risks which inherently accompany every technology is then discussed. Finally, provision of accident management in Japan is introduced, including the description of accident management measures proposed for BWRs and PWRs. (author)

  4. Modelling of critical functions of nuclear reactors using Fild Programmable Gate Array

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Teixeira, Pamela Iara Nolasco

    2016-01-01

    This paper proposes the development of a method using FPGA for critical security functions of a nuclear reactor. It was implemented two critical safety functions in VHDL, which is a way to describe, through a program, the behavior of a circuit or digital component. Two critical security functions, FCS Core Cooling, responsible for cooling the reactor core in the charts of the plant and also in the event of accidents involving loss of coolant and FCS Heat Transfer, responsible for cooling the reactor core in the event an accident with loss of coolant were implemented. In this Dissertation it was chosen the use of FPGA, because - due to the effects of aging, obsolescence issues, environmental degradation and mechanical failures - nuclear power plants need to replace their older systems by new ones based on digital technology. The technologies obtained using a system described in hardware language can be implemented in a programmable device, having the advantage of changing the code at any time. (author)

  5. The victim of the nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carvalho, A.B. de.

    1990-01-01

    This paper shows the effects of the nuclear accident in the victims, in their lives, changes in the behaviour, neurosis including all the psychological aspects. The author compare the victims with nuclear accident like AIDS patients, in terms of people's discrimination. There is another kind of victims. They are the people who gave helpness, for example physicians, firemen and everybody involved with the first aids that suffer together with the victims trying to safe them and to diminish their suffering, combating the danger, the discrimination and the no information. (L.M.J.)

  6. Proposal optimization in nuclear accident emergency decision based on IAHP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xin Jing

    2007-01-01

    On the basis of establishing the multi-layer structure of nuclear accident emergency decision, several decision objectives are synthetically analyzed, and an optimization model of decision proposals for nuclear accident emergency based on interval analytic hierarchy process is proposed in the paper. The model makes comparisons among several emergency decision proposals quantified, and the optimum proposal is selected out, which solved the uncertain and fuzzy decision problem of judgments by experts' experiences in nuclear accidents emergency decision. Case study shows that the optimization result is much more reasonable, objective and reliable than subjective judgments, and it could be decision references for nuclear accident emergency. (authors)

  7. A study on the estimation method of nuclear accident risk cost

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsuo, Yuji

    2016-01-01

    The methodology of estimating nuclear accident risk cost, as a part of nuclear power generation cost, has hardly been established due mainly to the extremely wide range of the estimation of the accident frequency. This study estimates the expected nuclear accident frequency for Japan, making use of the method of Bayesian statistics, which exploits both the information obtained by Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and the observed historical accident frequencies. Using the PRA estimation of the Containment Failure Frequency (CFF) for Tomari nuclear power plant unit 3 of Hokkaido Electric Power Company (average: 2.1 x 10 -4 , 95th percentile: 7.7 x 10 -4 ) and the actual large-scale accident frequency (once in 1,460 reactor-years), the posterior CFF was estimated at 3.8 x 10 -4 . This study also took into account the 'external' factor causing unexpected nuclear accidents, concluding that such factor could result in higher CFF estimations, especially with larger observed accident numbers. (author)

  8. Alternative evacuation strategies for nuclear power accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammond, Gregory D.; Bier, Vicki M.

    2015-01-01

    In the U.S., current protective-action strategies to safeguard the public following a nuclear power accident have remained largely unchanged since their implementation in the early 1980s. In the past thirty years, new technologies have been introduced, allowing faster computations, better modeling of predicted radiological consequences, and improved accident mapping using geographic information systems (GIS). Utilizing these new technologies, we evaluate the efficacy of alternative strategies, called adaptive protective action zones (APAZs), that use site-specific and event-specific data to dynamically determine evacuation boundaries with simple heuristics in order to better inform protective action decisions (rather than relying on pre-event regulatory bright lines). Several candidate APAZs were developed and then compared to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s keyhole evacuation strategy (and full evacuation of the emergency planning zone). Two of the APAZs were better on average than existing NRC strategies at reducing either the radiological exposure, the population evacuated, or both. These APAZs are especially effective for larger radioactive plumes and at high population sites; one of them is better at reducing radiation exposure, while the other is better at reducing the size of the population evacuated. - Highlights: • Developed framework to compare nuclear power accident evacuation strategies. • Evacuation strategies were compared on basis of radiological and evacuation risk. • Current strategies are adequate for smaller scale nuclear power accidents. • New strategies reduced radiation exposure and evacuation size for larger accidents

  9. Process criticality accident likelihoods, consequences, and emergency planning

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McLaughlin, T.P.

    1991-01-01

    Evaluation of criticality accident risks in the processing of significant quantities of fissile materials is both complex and subjective, largely due to the lack of accident statistics. Thus, complying with standards such as ISO 7753 which mandates that the need for an alarm system be evaluated, is also subjective. A review of guidance found in the literature on potential accident magnitudes is presented for different material forms and arrangements. Reasoned arguments are also presented concerning accident prevention and accident likelihoods for these material forms and arrangements. 13 refs., 1 fig., 1 tab.

  10. Analysis of emergency response to fukushima nuclear accident in Japan and suggestions for China's nuclear emergency management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Wei; Ding Qihua; Wu Haosong

    2014-01-01

    On March 11, 2011, the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station of the Tokyo Electric Power Company ('TEPCO') was hit and damaged by a magnitude 9 earthquake and accompanying tsunami. The accident is determined to be of the highest rating on the International Nuclear Event Scale. The Government of Japan and TEPCO have taken emergency response actions on-site and off-site at the accident. It became clear through the investigation that the accident had been initiated on the occasion of a natural disaster of an earthquake and tsunami, but there have been various complex problems behind this very serious and large scale accident. For an example, the then-available accident preventive measures and disaster preparedness of TEPCO were insufficient against tsunami and severe accidents; inadequate TEPCO emergency responses to the accident at the site were also identified. The accident rang the alarm for the nuclear safety of nuclear power plants. It also taught us a great of lessons in nuclear emergency management. (authors)

  11. Emergency preparedness and response: compensating victims of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwartz, Julia

    2004-01-01

    The 1986 tragedy at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine motivated the entire international nuclear community to ensure that countries would, in the future, be well prepared to manage the physical, psychological and financial consequences of a serious nuclear accident. Since that event, numerous nuclear emergency preparedness and post-emergency management programmes have been established at national and international levels to ensure that appropriate mechanisms will respond to the threat, and the aftermath, of a nuclear accident. The INEX 2000 Workshop on the Indemnification of Nuclear Damage, jointly organised by the OECD/Nuclear Energy Agency and the French Government, was the first ever international programme to address the manner in which victims of a nuclear accident with trans-boundary consequences would be compensated for damage suffered before, during and after the accident. The Workshop results revealed striking differences in the compensation principles and practices implemented in the 30 participating countries, in the co-ordination measures between different public authorities within an affected state, and in the co-operative procedures between the accident state and its neighbours. All participants agreed on the need for improvement in these areas, particularly for maintaining public confidence in governments' ability to properly manage nuclear emergencies

  12. Outline of Fukushima nuclear accident and future action. Lessons learned from accident and countermeasure plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukuda, Toshihiko

    2012-01-01

    Fukushima nuclear accident was caused by loss of all AC power sources (SBO) and loss of ultimate heat sink (LUHS) at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) hit by the Great East Japan Earthquake. This article reviewed outline of Fukushima nuclear accident progression when on year had passed since and referred to lessons learned from accident and countermeasure plan to prevent severe accident in SBO and LUHS events by earthquake and tsunami as future action. This countermeasure would be taken to (1) prevent serious flooding in case a tsunami overwhelms the breakwater, with improving water tightness of rooms for emergency diesel generator, batteries and power centers, (2) enhance emergency power supply and cooling function with mobile electricity generator, high pressure fire pump car and alternate water supply source, (3) mitigate environmental effects caused by core damage with installing containment filtered venting, and (4) enforce emergency preparedness in case of severe accident. Definite countermeasure plan for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPPs was enumerated. (T. Tanaka)

  13. Policy elements for post-accident management in the event of nuclear accident. Document drawn up by the Steering Committee for the Management of the Post-Accident Phase of a Nuclear Accident (CODIRPA). Final version - 5 October 2012

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Pursuant to the Inter-ministerial Directive on the Action of the Public Authorities, dated 7 April 2005, in the face of an event triggering a radiological emergency, the National directorate on nuclear safety and radiation protection (DGSNR), which became the Nuclear safety authority (ASN) in 2006, was tasked with working the relevant Ministerial offices in order to set out the framework and outline, prepare and implement the provisions needed to address post-accident situations arising from a nuclear accident. In June 2005, the ASN set up a Steering committee for the management of the post-accident phase in the event of nuclear accident or a radiological emergency situation (CODIRPA), put in charge of drafting the related policy elements. To carry out its work, CODIRPA set up a number of thematic working groups from 2005 on, involving in total several hundred experts from different backgrounds (local information commissions, associations, elected officials, health agencies, expertise agencies, authorities, etc.). The working groups reports have been published by the ASN. Experiments on the policy elements under construction were carried out at the local level in 2010 across three nuclear sites and several of the neighbouring municipalities, as well as during national crisis drills conducted since 2008. These works gave rise to two international conferences organised by ASN in 2007 and 2011. The policy elements prepared by CODIRPA were drafted in regard to nuclear accidents of medium scale causing short-term radioactive release (less than 24 hours) that might occur at French nuclear facilities equipped with a special intervention plan (PPI). They also apply to actions to be carried out in the event of accidents during the transport of radioactive materials. Following definitions of each stage of a nuclear accident, this document lists the principles selected by CODIRPA to support management efforts subsequent to a nuclear accident. Then, it presents the main

  14. Review of Cytogenetic analysis of restoration workers for Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suto, Yumiko

    2016-01-01

    Japan faced with the nuclear accident of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) caused by the combined disaster of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the subsequent tsunamis on 11 March 2011. National Institute of Radiological Sciences received all nuclear workers who were engaged in emergency response tasks at the NPS and suspected of being overexposed to acute radiation. Biological dosimetry by dicentric chromosome assay was helpful for medical triage and management of the workers. When an unplanned radiation exposure occurs, biological dosimetry based on cytogenetic assays has been used to estimate the absorbed dose in the exposed individual to get useful information for the medical management of radiological casualties with suspected acute radiation syndrome (ARS). Nowadays, more cytogenetic assays to measure chromosomal aberrations, such as micronuclei in bi-nucleated cells, prematurely condensed chromosomes (PCCs) and inter-chromosomal exchanges detected by fluorescence in situ hybridization (FISH) techniques, are available. However, the dicentric chromosome assay (DCA) using peripheral blood lymphocytes is still considered to be the 'gold standard' of biological dosimetry for the radiation emergency medicine. Experimental protocols of DCA has been standardized and shared among laboratories all over the world. In fact, DCA was useful in previous radiation accidents, e.g. the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the Goiania accident in 1987, the JCO criticality accident in 1999 and the Tokyo electric power company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) accident in 2011. The recent development of microscopic image analysis system with automatic metaphase finding and capturing functions was helpful for rapid detection of dicentric chromosomes to perform DCA for the Fukushima NPS restoration workers. (author)

  15. University of New Mexico short course in nuclear criticality safety: Training for new NCS [nuclear criticality safety] specialists

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Busch, R.D.

    1990-01-01

    Since 1973, the University of New Mexico (UNM) has given ten short courses in nuclear criticality safety (NCS). Generally, thee have been given every other year, although in 1989 it was decided to offer the course on an annual basis. This decision was primarily based on the large demand for NCS specialists and a large turnover rate in the industry. The purpose of the course is to provide a 1-week overview of NCS. The typical student has been involved in NCS for <1 yr, although it many cases they have been associated with the nuclear industry in other capacities for many years. The short course is conducted at several levels. Carefully prepared lectures provide the information framework for selected topics. The following topics are covered in the course: basic reactor theory, criticality accidents and consequences, hand calculations, administration of a criticality safety program, regulators and their processes, computer methods and applications, experimental methods and correlations, overview of some process operations, and transportation and storage issues in NCS

  16. Experience and lessons learned from emergency disposal of Fukushima nuclear power station accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xu Xiegu; Zhen Bei; Yang Xiaoming; Chen Xiaohua

    2012-01-01

    After Fukushima nuclear accident, we visited the related medical aid agencies for nuclear accidents and conducted investigations in disaster-affected areas in Japan. This article summarizes the problems with emergency disposal of Fukushima nuclear accident while disclosing problems should be solved during the emergency force construction for nuclear accidents. (authors)

  17. DOZIM - evaluation dose code for nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oprea, I.; Musat, D.; Ionita, I.

    2008-01-01

    During a nuclear accident an environmentally significant fission products release can happen. In that case it is not possible to determine precisely the air fission products concentration and, consequently, the estimated doses will be affected by certain errors. The stringent requirement to cope with a nuclear accident, even minor, imposes creation of a computation method for emergency dosimetric evaluations needed to compare the measurement data to certain reference levels, previously established. These comparisons will allow a qualified option regarding the necessary actions to diminish the accident effects. DOZIM code estimates the soil contamination and the irradiation doses produced either by radioactive plume or by soil contamination. Irradiations either on whole body or on certain organs, as well as internal contamination doses produced by isotope inhalation during radioactive plume crossing are taken into account. The calculus does not consider neither the internal contamination produced by contaminated food consumption, or that produced by radioactive deposits resuspension. The code is recommended for dose computation on the wind direction, at distances from 10 2 to 2 x 10 4 m. The DOZIM code was utilized for three different cases: - In air TRIGA-SSR fuel bundle destruction with different input data for fission products fractions released into the environment; - Chernobyl-like accident doses estimation; - Intervention areas determination for a hypothetical severe accident at Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant. For the first case input data and results (for a 60 m emission height without iodine retention on active coal filters) are presented. To summarize, the DOZIM code conception allows the dose estimation for any nuclear accident. Fission products inventory, released fractions, emission conditions, atmospherical and geographical parameters are the input data. Dosimetric factors are included in the program. The program is in FORTRAN IV language and was run on

  18. Mitigation of Hydrogen Hazards in Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-07-01

    Consideration of severe accidents in nuclear power plants is an essential component of the defence in depth approach in nuclear safety. Severe accidents have very low probabilities of occurring, but may have significant consequences resulting from the degradation of nuclear fuel. The generation of hydrogen and the risk of hydrogen combustion, as well as other phenomena leading to overpressurization of the reactor containment in case of severe accidents, represent complex safety issues in relation to accident management. The combustion of hydrogen, produced primarily as a result of heated zirconium metal reacting with steam, can create short term overpressure or detonation forces that may exceed the strength of the containment structure. An understanding of these phenomena is crucial for planning and implementing effective accident management measures. Analysis of all the issues relating to hydrogen risk is an important step for any measure that is aimed at the prevention or mitigation of hydrogen combustion in reactor containments. The main objective of this publication is to contribute to the implementation of IAEA Safety Standards, in particular, two IAEA Safety Requirements: Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design and Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation. These Requirements publications discuss computational analysis of severe accidents and accident management programmes in nuclear power plants. Specifically with regard to the risk posed by hydrogen in nuclear power reactors, computational analysis of severe accidents considers hydrogen sources, hydrogen distribution, hydrogen combustion and control and mitigation measures for hydrogen, while accident management programmes are aimed at mitigating hydrogen hazards in reactor containments.

  19. Radiation monitoring using imaging plate technology: A case study of leaves affected by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and JCO criticality accidents

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kimura Shinzo

    2006-01-01

    Full Text Available This paper describes the use of a photostimulable phosphor screen imaging technique to detect radioactive contamination in the leaves of wormwood (Artemisia vulgaris L and fern (Dryopteris filix-max CL. Schoff plants affected by the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident. The imaging plate technology is well known for many striking performances in two-dimensional radiation detection. Since imaging plate comprises an integrated detection system, it has been extensively applied to surface contamination distribution studies. In this study, plant samples were collected from high- and low-contaminated areas of Ukraine and Belarus, which were affected due to the Chernobyl accident and exposed to imaging technique. Samples from the highly contaminated areas revealed the highest photo-stimulated luminescence on the imaging plate. Moreover, the radio nuclides detected in the leaves by gamma and beta ray spectroscopy were 137Cs and 90Sr, respectively. Additionally, in order to assess contamination, a comparison was also made with leaves of plants affected during the JCO criticality accident in Japan. Based on the results obtained, the importance of imaging plate technology in environmental radiation monitoring has been suggested.

  20. Learning from nuclear accident experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaurio, J.K.

    1984-01-01

    Statistical procedures are developed to estimate accident occurrence rates from historical event records, to predict future rates and trends, and to estimate the accuracy of the rate estimates and predictions. Maximum likelihood estimation is applied to several learning models, and results are compared to earlier graphical and analytical estimates. The models are based on (1) the cumulative number of operating years, (2) the cumulative number of plants built, and (3) accidents (explicitly), with the accident rate distinctly different before and after an accident. The statistical accuracies of the parameters estimated are obtained in analytical form using the Fisher information matrix. Using data on core damage accidents in electricity producing plants, it is estimated that the probability for a plant to have a serious flaw has decreased from 0.1 to 0.01 during the developmental phase of the nuclear industry. At the same time the equivalent frequency of accidents has decreased from 0.04 per reactor year to 0.0004 per reactor year, partly due to the increasing population of plants. 10 references, 7 figures, 2 tables

  1. Nuclear energy policy issues after the 3.11 Fukushima nuclear accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Suzuki, Tatsujiro [Japan Atomic Energy Commission (Japan)

    2014-07-01

    The Fukushima nuclear accident has become one of the worst accidents in nuclear history and it is not completely over yet. It will take at least 30 years or more to decontaminate and decommission the crippled nuclear reactors on site. Still, more than 140,000 people are away from home and restoring and assuring the life and welfare of those evacuated people is the top priority of Japanese government's nuclear energy policy. The government will release its new energy policy soon which will state that nuclear power is considered as an important base load electricity source, while committing to reduce its dependence as much as possible. For nuclear energy policy, there are certain important issues to be overcome regardless of future of nuclear power in Japan. They are: (1) spent fuel management and radioactive waste disposal, (2) restoring public trust (3) securing human resources and (4) plutonium stockpile management.

  2. Twenty-first nuclear accident dosimetry intercomparison study, August 6-10, 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swaja, R.E.; Ragan, G.E.; Sims, C.S.

    1985-05-01

    The twenty-first in a series of nuclear accident dosimetry (NAD) intercomparison (NAD) studies was conducted at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Dosimetry Applications Research Facility during August 6-10, 1984. The Health Physics Research Reactor operated in the pulse mode was used to simulate three criticality accidents with different radiation fields. Participants from five organizations measured neutron doses between 0.53 and 4.36 Gy and gamma doses between 0.19 and 1.01 Gy at area monitoring stations and on phantoms. About 75% of all neutron dose estimates based on foil activation, hair activation, simulated blood sodium activation, and thermoluminescent methods were within +-25% of reference values. Approximately 86% of all gamma results measured using thermoluminescent (TLD-700 or CaSO 4 ) systems were within +-20% of reference doses which represents a significant improvement over previous studies. Improvements observed in the ability of intercomparison participants to estimate neutron and gamma doses under criticality accident conditions can be partly attributed to experience in previous NAD studies which have provided practical tests of dosimetry systems, enabled participants to improve evaluation methods, and standardized dose reporting conventions. 16 refs., 15 tabs

  3. Risks of potential accidents of nuclear power plants in Europe

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Slaper H; Eggink GJ; Blaauboer RO

    1993-01-01

    Over 200 nuclear power plants for commercial electricity production are presently operational in Europe. The 1986 accident with the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl has shown that severe accidents with a nuclear power plant can lead to a large scale contamination of Europe. This report is focussed

  4. Engineering design guidelines for nuclear criticality safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waltz, W.R.

    1988-08-01

    This document provides general engineering design guidelines specific to nuclear criticality safety for a facility where the potential for a criticality accident exists. The guide is applicable to the design of new SRP/SRL facilities and to major modifications Of existing facilities. The document is intended an: A guide for persons actively engaged in the design process. A resource document for persons charged with design review for adequacy relative to criticality safety. A resource document for facility operating personnel. The guide defines six basic criticality safety design objectives and provides information to assist in accomplishing each objective. The guide in intended to supplement the design requirements relating to criticality safety contained in applicable Department of Energy (DOE) documents. The scope of the guide is limited to engineering design guidelines associated with criticality safety and does not include other areas of the design process, such as: criticality safety analytical methods and modeling, nor requirements for control of the design process

  5. Environment radiological monitoring by JNC related to the JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watanabe, Hitoshi

    2001-01-01

    Concerning the criticality accident at JCO Co., Ltd. (JCO) which occurred at 10:35 on 30th Sep. 1999, Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) established ''JNC's task force'' at 12:35 on the same data in conjunction with Head Office and Tokai Works. JNC's task force had collaborated on environmental radiological monitoring with the government of Japan and the local governments. This report compiles the results of the environmental monitoring performed by JNC's task force based on the request from the government of Japan and the local governments. (author)

  6. Automations influence on nuclear power plants: a look at three accidents and how automation played a role.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schmitt, Kara

    2012-01-01

    Nuclear power is one of the ways that we can design an efficient sustainable future. Automation is the primary system used to assist operators in the task of monitoring and controlling nuclear power plants (NPP). Automation performs tasks such as assessing the status of the plant's operations as well as making real time life critical situational specific decisions. While the advantages and disadvantages of automation are well studied in variety of domains, accidents remind us that there is still vulnerability to unknown variables. This paper will look at the effects of automation within three NPP accidents and incidents and will consider why automation failed in preventing these accidents from occurring. It will also review the accidents at the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima Daiichi NPP's in order to determine where better use of automation could have resulted in a more desirable outcome.

  7. Containment pressure monitoring method after severe accident in nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Luo Chuanjie; Zhang Shishui

    2011-01-01

    The containment atmosphere monitoring system in nuclear power plant was designed on the basis of design accident. But containment pressure will increase greatly in a severe accident, and pressure instrument in the containment can't satisfy the monitoring requirement. A new method to monitor the pressure change in the containment after a severe accident was considered, through which accident soften methods can be adopted. Under present technical condition, adding a pressure monitoring channel out of containment for post-severe accident is a considerable method. Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant implemented this modification, by which the containment release time can be delayed during severe accident, and nuclear safety can be increased. After analysis, this method is safe and feasible. (authors)

  8. Detection of criticality accidents. The Intertechnique EDAC II system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Prigent, R.

    1991-01-01

    The chief aim of the new generation of EDAC II criticality accidents detection system is to reduce the risks associated to the handling of fissile material by providing a swift and safe warning of the development of any criticality accident. To this function already devolving on the EDAC system of the previous generation, the EDAC II adds the possibility of storing in memory the characteristics of the accident, providing a daily follow-up of the striking events in the system through the print-out of a log book and providing assistance to the operators during the periodical tests. (Author)

  9. Severe accidents in Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valle Cepero, R.; Castillo Alvarez, J.; Ramon Fuente, J.

    1996-01-01

    For the assessment of the safety of nuclear power plants it is of great importance the analyses of severe accidents since they allow to estimate the possible failure models of the containment, and also permit knowing the magnitude and composition of the radioactive material that would be released to the environment in case of an accident upon population and the environment. This paper presents in general terms the basic principles for conducting the analysis of severe accidents, the fundamental sources in the generation of radionuclides and aerosols, the transportation and deposition processes, and also makes reference to de main codes used in the modulation of severe accidents. The final part of the paper contents information on how severe accidents are dialed with the regulatory point view in different countries

  10. How did Fukushima-Dai-ichi core meltdown change the probability of nuclear accidents?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Escobar Rangel, Lina; Leveque, Francois

    2012-10-01

    How to predict the probability of a nuclear accident using past observations? What increase in probability the Fukushima Dai-ichi event does entail? Many models and approaches can be used to answer these questions. Poisson regression as well as Bayesian updating are good candidates. However, they fail to address these issues properly because the independence assumption in which they are based on is violated. We propose a Poisson Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (PEWMA) based in a state-space time series approach to overcome this critical drawback. We find an increase in the risk of a core meltdown accident for the next year in the world by a factor of ten owing to the new major accident that took place in Japan in 2011. (authors)

  11. General principles of the nuclear criticality safety for handling, processing and transportation fissile materials in the USSR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vnukov, V.S.; Rjazanov, B.G.; Sviridov, V.I.; Frolov, V.V.; Zubkov, Y.N.

    1991-01-01

    The paper describes the general principles of nuclear criticality safety for handling, processing, transportation and fissile materials storing. Measures to limit the consequences of critical accidents are discussed for the fuel processing plants and fissile materials storage. The system of scientific and technical measures on nuclear criticality safety as well as the system of control and state supervision based on the rules, limits and requirements are described. The criticality safety aspects for various stages of handling nuclear materials are considered. The paper gives descriptions of the methods and approaches for critical risk assessments for the processing facilities, plants and storages. (Author)

  12. Nuclear accidents and policy. Notes on public perception

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richter, Felix; Steenbeck, Malte; Wilhelm, Markus [Hamburg Univ. (Germany). Lehrstuhl fuer Wirtschaftspolitik

    2013-07-01

    Major nuclear accidents as recently in Fukushima set nuclear power plant security at the top of the public agenda. Using data of the German Socio-Economic Panel we analyze the effects of the Fukushima accident and a subsequent government decision on nuclear power phase-out on several measures of subjective perception in Germany. In the light of current political debates about the strategic orientation of this energy turnaround, such an analysis is of particular interest since non-pecuniary gains in measures of subjective perception might provide further aspects to be taken into consideration when evaluating the economic costs of the policy. We find that the Fukushima accident increases the probability to report greater worries about the environment. Furthermore, we find evidence for a decrease in the probability to be very worried about the security of nuclear power plants as well as for an increase in reported levels of subjective well-being following the government's resolution on nuclear phase-out. Finally we find that the probabilities of reporting very high concerns are related to the distance between the respondents' place of residence and the nearest nuclear power station.

  13. Nuclear accidents and policy. Notes on public perception

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richter, Felix; Steenbeck, Malte; Wilhelm, Markus [Hamburg Univ. (Germany). Lehrstuhl fuer Wirtschaftspolitik

    2013-07-01

    Major nuclear accidents as recently in Fukushima set nuclear power plant security at the top of the public agenda. Using data of the German Socio-Economic Panel we analyze the effects of the Fukushima accident and a subsequent government decision on nuclear power phase-out on several measures of subjective perception in Germany. In the light of current political debates about the strategic orientation of this energy turnaround, such an analysis is of particular interest since non-pecuniary gains in measures of subjective perception might provide further aspects to be taken into consideration when evaluating the economic costs of the policy. We find that the Fukushima accident increases the probability to report greater worries about the environment. Furthermore, we find evidence for a decrease in the probability to be very worried about the security of nuclear power plants as well as for an increase in reported levels of subjective well-being following the government's resolution on nuclear phase-out. Finally we find that the probabilities of reporting very high concerns are related to the distance between the respondents' place of residence and the nearest nuclear power station.

  14. Noticeable aspects of selecting intervention measures for nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guo Yong; Shi Yuanming

    1993-01-01

    Referring to the experience of intervention measures taken for protecting the public after Chernobyl accident and to recent knowledge of source terms of reactor accidents, the noticeable aspects of selecting of intervention measures for nuclear accidents is discussed

  15. Consensus standards utilized and implemented for nuclear criticality safety in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nomura, Yasushi; Okuno, Hiroshi; Naito, Yoshitaka

    1996-01-01

    The fundamental framework for the criticality safety of nuclear fuel facilities regulations is, in many advanced countries, generally formulated so that technical standards or handbook data are utilized to support the licensing safety review and to implement its guidelines. In Japan also, adequacy of the safety design of nuclear fuel facilities is checked and reviewed on the basis of licensing safety review guides. These guides are, first, open-quotes The Basic Guides for Licensing Safety Review of Nuclear Fuel Facilities,close quotes and as its subsidiaries, open-quotes The Uranium Fuel Fabrication Facility Licensing Safety Review Guidesclose quotes and open-quotes The Reprocessing Facility Licensing Safety Review Guides.close quotes The open-quotes Nuclear Criticality Safety Handbook close-quote of Japan and the Technical Data Collection are published and utilized to supply related data and information for the licensing safety review, such as for the Rokkasho reprocessing plant. The well-established technical standards and data abroad such as those by the American Nuclear Society and the American National Standards Institute are also utilized to complement the standards in Japan. The basic principles of criticality safety control for nuclear fuel facilities in Japan are duly stipulated in the aforementioned basic guides as follows: 1. Guide 10: Criticality control for a single unit; 2. Guide 11: Criticality control for multiple units; 3. Guide 12: Consideration for a criticality accident

  16. Note nuclear accidents combat

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    In this document the starting points are described which underlie the new framework for the nuclear-accident combat in the Netherlands. All the elaboration of this is indicated in main lines. The juridical consequences of the proposed structure are enlightened and the sequel activities are indicated. (H.W.). 6 figs.; 8 tabs

  17. National radiological emergency response to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dela Rosa, Alumanda M.

    2011-01-01

    The Fukushima nuclear power plant accident occurred on March 11, 2011, when two natural disasters of unprecedented strengths, an earthquake with magnitude 9 followed one hour later by a powerful tsunami struck northeastern Japan and felled the external power supply and the emergency diesel generators of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, resulting in a loss of coolant accident. There were core meltdowns in three nuclear reactors with the release of radioactivity estimated to be 1/10 of what was released to the environment during the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in April 1986. The Fukushima nuclear accident tested the capability of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) in responding to such radiological emergency as a nuclear power plant accident. The PNRI and NDRRMC activated the RADPLAN for possible radiological emergency. The emergency response was calibrated to the status of the nuclear reactors on site and the environmental monitoring undertaken around the site and off-site, including the marine environment. This orchestrated effort enabled the PNRI and the national agencies concerned to reassure the public that the nuclear accident does not have a significant impact on the Philippines, both on the health and safety of the people and on the safety of the environment. National actions taken during the accident will be presented. The role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency as the central UN agency for nuclear matters will be discussed. (author)

  18. Program for rapid dose assessment in criticality accident, RADAPAS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takahashi, Fumiaki

    2006-09-01

    In a criticality accident, a person near fissile material can receive extremely high dose which can cause acute health effect. For such a case, medical treatment should be carried out for the exposed person, according to severity of the exposure. Then, radiation dose should be rapidly assessed soon after an outbreak of an accident. Dose assessment based upon the quantity of induced 24 Na in human body through neutron exposure is expected as one of useful dosimetry techniques in a criticality accident. A dose assessment program, called RADAPAS (RApid Dose Assessment Program from Activated Sodium in Criticality Accidents), was therefore developed to assess rapidly radiation dose to exposed persons from activity of induced 24 Na. RADAPAS consists of two parts; one is a database part and the other is a part for execution of dose calculation. The database contains data compendiums of energy spectra and dose conversion coefficients from specific activity of 24 Na induced in human body, which had been derived in a previous analysis using Monte Carlo calculation code. Information for criticality configuration or characteristics of radiation in the accident field is to be interactively given with interface displays in the dose calculation. RADAPAS can rapidly derive radiation dose to the exposed person from the given information and measured 24 Na specific activity by using the conversion coefficient in database. This report describes data for dose conversions and dose calculation in RADAPAS and explains how to use the program. (author)

  19. Consequences and countermeasures in a nuclear power accident: Chernobyl experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kirichenko, Vladimir A; Kirichenko, Alexander V; Werts, Day E

    2012-09-01

    Despite the tragic accidents in Fukushima and Chernobyl, the nuclear power industry will continue to contribute to the production of electric energy worldwide until there are efficient and sustainable alternative sources of energy. The Chernobyl nuclear accident, which occurred 26 years ago in the former Soviet Union, released an immense amount of radioactivity over vast territories of Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation, extending into northern Europe, and became the most severe accident in the history of the nuclear industry. This disaster was a result of numerous factors including inadequate nuclear power plant design, human errors, and violation of safety measures. The lessons learned from nuclear accidents will continue to strengthen the safety design of new reactor installations, but with more than 400 active nuclear power stations worldwide and 104 reactors in the Unites States, it is essential to reassess fundamental issues related to the Chernobyl experience as it continues to evolve. This article summarizes early and late events of the incident, the impact on thyroid health, and attempts to reduce agricultural radioactive contamination.

  20. The Chernobyl nuclear accident and its consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-01-01

    An AAEC Task Group was set up shortly after the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant to monitor and evaluate initial reports and to assess the implications for Australia. The Task Group issued a preliminary report on 9 May 1986. On 25-29 August 1986, the USSR released details of the accident and its consequences and further information has become available from the Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD and the World Health Organisation. The Task Group now presents a revised report summarising this information and commenting on the consequences from the Australian viewpoint

  1. Report on the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This report presents the compilation of information obtained by various organizations regarding the accident (and the consequences of the accident) that occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl in the USSR on April 26, 1986. The various authors are identified in a footnote to each chapter. An overview of the report is provided. Very briefly the other chapters cover: the design of the Chernobyl nuclear station Unit 4; safety analyses for Unit 4; the accident scenario; the role of the operator; an assessment of the radioactive release, dispersion, and transport; the activities associated with emergency actions; and information on the health and environmental consequences from the accident. These subjects cover the major aspects of the accident that have the potential to present new information and lessons for the nuclear industry in general

  2. Bayesian methods for chromosome dosimetry following a criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brame, R.S.; Groer, P.G.

    2003-01-01

    Radiation doses received during a criticality accident will be from a combination of fission spectrum neutrons and gamma rays. It is desirable to estimate the total dose, as well as the neutron and gamma doses. Present methods for dose estimation with chromosome aberrations after a criticality accident use point estimates of the neutron to gamma dose ratio obtained from personnel dosemeters and/or accident reconstruction calculations. In this paper a Bayesian approach to dose estimation with chromosome aberrations is developed that allows the uncertainty of the dose ratio to be considered. Posterior probability densities for the total and the neutron and gamma doses were derived. (author)

  3. Effects of the Chernobyl accident on public perceptions of nuclear plant accident risks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lindell, M.K.; Perry, R.W.

    1990-01-01

    Assessments of public perceptions of the characteristics of a nuclear power plant accident and affective responses to its likelihood were conducted 5 months before and 1 month after the Chernobyl accident. Analyses of data from 69 residents of southwestern Washington showed significant test-retest correlations for only 10 of 18 variables--accident likelihood, three measures of impact characteristics, three measures of affective reactions, and hazard knowledge by governmental sources. Of these variables, only two had significant changes in mean ratings; frequency of thought and frequency of discussion about a nearby nuclear power plant both increased. While there were significant changes only for two personal consequences (expectations of cancer and genetic effects), both of these decreased. The results of this study indicate that more attention should be given to assessing the stability of risk perceptions over time. Moreover, the data demonstrate that experience with a major accident can actually decrease rather than increase perceptions of threat

  4. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    Part I: Status lists as of 31 December 1996. A. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (Notification Convention). B. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention). PART II: Texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto Part III: Texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  5. Incorporation of severe accidents in the licensing of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alvarenga, Marco Antonio Bayout; Rabello, Sidney Luiz

    2011-01-01

    Severe accidents are the result of multiple faults that occur in nuclear power plants as a consequence from the combination of latent failures and active faults, such as equipment, procedures and operator failures, which leads to partial or total melting of the reactor core. Regardless of active and latent failures related to the plant management and maintenance, aspects of the latent failures related to the plant design still remain. The lessons learned from the TMI accident in the U.S.A., Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union and, more recently, in Fukushima, Japan, suggest that severe accidents must necessarily be part of design-basis of nuclear power plants. This paper reviews the normative basis of the licensing of nuclear power plants concerning to severe accidents in countries having nuclear power plants under construction or in operation. It was addressed not only the new designs of nuclear power plants in the world, but also the design changes in plants that are in operation for decades. Included in this list are the Brazilian nuclear power plants, Angra-1, Angra-2, and Angra-3. This paper also reviews the current status of licensing in Brazil and Brazilian standards related to severe accidents. It also discusses the impact of severe accidents in the emergency plans of nuclear power plants. (author)

  6. Incorporation of severe accidents in the licensing of nuclear power plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alvarenga, Marco Antonio Bayout; Rabello, Sidney Luiz, E-mail: bayout@cnen.gov.b, E-mail: sidney@cnen.gov.b [Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN) Rio de Janeiro, RJ (Brazil)

    2011-07-01

    Severe accidents are the result of multiple faults that occur in nuclear power plants as a consequence from the combination of latent failures and active faults, such as equipment, procedures and operator failures, which leads to partial or total melting of the reactor core. Regardless of active and latent failures related to the plant management and maintenance, aspects of the latent failures related to the plant design still remain. The lessons learned from the TMI accident in the U.S.A., Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union and, more recently, in Fukushima, Japan, suggest that severe accidents must necessarily be part of design-basis of nuclear power plants. This paper reviews the normative basis of the licensing of nuclear power plants concerning to severe accidents in countries having nuclear power plants under construction or in operation. It was addressed not only the new designs of nuclear power plants in the world, but also the design changes in plants that are in operation for decades. Included in this list are the Brazilian nuclear power plants, Angra-1, Angra-2, and Angra-3. This paper also reviews the current status of licensing in Brazil and Brazilian standards related to severe accidents. It also discusses the impact of severe accidents in the emergency plans of nuclear power plants. (author)

  7. Report from the Special Committee on Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ozawa, Mamoru

    2012-01-01

    The Special Committee on Fukushima Nuclear Accident was established in April 2011 under the Heat Transfer Society of Japan (HTSJ) and discussed (1) how had evolved heat transfer research in progress of nuclear technology, (2) role of expert group in the area of heat transfer academy and technology and (3) energy prospect in Japan after the Fukushima nuclear accident. This report was described by the chairman of the special committee summarizing one year discussions as (1) background of heat transfer research progress, (2) progression of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, (3) energy problem in Japan after the Fukushima accident and (4) social role of the HTSJ. This HTSJ was a unique, nonprofit association in Japan of the people engaged in heat transfers research or in various engineering aspects related to heat transfer, which meant interdisciplinary or common platform of heat transfer as elementary technologies. Such actual complex problems could be discussed in the HTSJ from an overlooking viewpoint in order for the HTSJ to play a social role. (T. Tanaka)

  8. The biotic sample bank of Chernobyl nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Yu; Min Rui; Cai Jianming

    2006-01-01

    Objective: To built a simple and easy biologic sample bank from irradiated people in nuclear accident, for the long time research of biological effect of low dose ionization radiation on people. Methods: The blood sample is fixed on a piece of filter paper rand sealed up in plastic bottle for keeping, blood sample scribble on glass lice, fixed and dyed as routine clinic examination, and still, reserve a slice of hair of the examined people. Results: Having built a biologic sample bank which from 1162 human body. The samples are come from 958 liquidators of Chernobyl nuclear accident, 46 people in other nuclear accident and 158 people as control groups. It is also having much information details. Conclusions: If the biologic sample bank is combined with the modern bimolecular technique, maybe have much meaningful for the theory and practice of radiobiology. (authors)

  9. Applicability of simplified methods to evaluate consequences of criticality accident using past accident data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakajima, Ken

    2003-01-01

    Applicability of four simplified methods to evaluate the consequences of criticality accident was investigated. Fissions in the initial burst and total fissions were evaluated using the simplified methods and those results were compared with the past accident data. The simplified methods give the number of fissions in the initial burst as a function of solution volume; however the accident data did not show such tendency. This would be caused by the lack of accident data for the initial burst with high accuracy. For total fissions, simplified almost reproduced the upper envelope of the accidents. However several accidents, which were beyond the applicable conditions, resulted in the larger total fissions than the evaluations. In particular, the Tokai-mura accident in 1999 gave in the largest total specific fissions, because the activation of cooling system brought the relatively high power for a long time. (author)

  10. Proposal strategy and policy on nuclear safety for no-more severe accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Following the outspoken advice saying 'scientists and engineers concerning with nuclear power promotion and safety should be responsible for clarifying how preventable or what measures should be needed to prevent severe accidents occurring at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants (NPPs)', committee on prevention of severe accidents at NPPs was established by relevant nuclear scientists and engineers involved so as to discuss basic issues to be solved from scientific and technical viewpoints. Based on the review of 'defense in depth' concept and accident analysis at Fukushima nuclear accident, four major proposals and six supplements to be established were identified such as: (1) finding mechanism of beyond imagination events for natural disaster, terrorism, and internal events, (2) reform of comprehensive safety standards and guidelines with performance basis easy to reflect latest knowledge and technology as 'back-fitting', (3) severe accidents measures, their validation, and drilling on accident management to advance procedures and develop human resources, and (4) risk communications and public disclosure of information. This article described backgrounds of committee's proposals on nuclear safety for no-more severe accidents. (T. Tanaka)

  11. Radiation Exposure and Thyroid Cancer Risk After the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident in Comparison with the Chernobyl Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamashita, S.; Takamura, N.; Ohtsuru, A.; Suzuki, S.

    2016-01-01

    The actual implementation of the epidemiological study on human health risk from low dose and low-dose rate radiation exposure and the comprehensive long-term radiation health effects survey are important especially after radiological and nuclear accidents because of public fear and concern about the long-term health effects of low-dose radiation exposure have increased considerably. Since the Great East Japan earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident in Japan, Fukushima Prefecture has started the Fukushima Health Management Survey Project for the purpose of long-term health care administration and medical early diagnosis/treatment for the prefectural residents. Especially on a basis of the lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident, both thyroid examination and mental health care are critically important irrespective of the level of radiation exposure. There are considerable differences between Chernobyl and Fukushima regarding radiation dose to the public, and it is very difficult to estimate retrospectively internal exposure dose from the short-lived radioactive iodines. Therefore, the necessity of thyroid ultrasound examination in Fukushima and the intermediate results of this survey targeting children will be reviewed and discussed in order to avoid any misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the high detection rate of childhood thyroid cancer. (authors)

  12. Nuclear accidents, consumers' perspectives and demands

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alevritou-Goulielmou, H.

    2005-01-01

    The public's reaction to life threatening situations is determined by a variety of factors. In the case of nuclear accidents, the panic experienced by citizens may be reasonably justified. This paper briefly describes the parameters that cause panic reactions from a consumer's point of view and summarizes citizen's demands concerning nuclear crisis management

  13. Radiation doses from contaminated food after a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nielsen, S.P.; Oehlenschlaeger, M.

    1991-03-01

    This report presents estimates of radiation doses from contaminated food after a hypothetical accident at a nuclear power plant. The calculations are made from assumptions intended to represent Swedish conditions. The accident scenario is based on a hypothetical core melt in a nuclear power reactor followed by a release to the atmosphere of iodine and caesium corresponding to 0.6% of the Forsmark unit 3 core inventory. The results are expressed in terms of average effective doses from contaminated food to individuals in the critical group living near the power plant, 2 km from the point of release, and living from locally produced foodstuffs. The calculations are made for a winter release and a summer release, and for dry and rainy conditions. Dynamic radioecological models are used, which have been developed from Danish experience with readioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing and with fallout from the Chernobyl accident. The accidental release is estimated to cause doses in the summer season from 131 I of circa 200 mSv to children and circa 30 mSv to adults based on a deposition during dry conditions of 11 MBq 131 I m -2 . The dosed from 134 Cs and 137 Cs are estimated at circa 20 mSv to children and adults in case of winter release and circa 160 mSv in case of summer release based on a deposition during dry conditions of 0.5 MBQ 134 Cs and 0.4 MBq 137 Cs m -2 . The main reason for the large difference between the winter and the summer releases is the high sensitivity of cerals to direct contamination on month prior to harvest. In case of precipitation the doses are estimated at twice those for dry conditons. (author) 8 tabs., 16 ills., 13 refs

  14. Severe accident analysis and management in nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Golshan, Mina

    2013-01-01

    Within the UK regulatory regime, assessment of risks arising from licensee's activities are expected to cover both normal operations and fault conditions. In order to establish the safety case for fault conditions, fault analysis is expected to cover three forms of analysis: design basis analysis (DBA), probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) and severe accident analysis (SAA). DBA should provide a robust demonstration of the fault tolerance of the engineering design and the effectiveness of the safety measures on a conservative basis. PSA looks at a wider range of fault sequences (on a best estimate basis) including those excluded from the DBA. SAA considers significant but unlikely accidents and provides information on their progression and consequences, within the facility, on the site and off site. The assessment of severe accidents is not limited to nuclear power plants and is expected to be carried out for all plant states where the identified dose targets could be exceeded. This paper sets out the UK nuclear regulatory expectation on what constitutes a severe accident, irrespective of the type of facility, and describes characteristics of severe accidents focusing on nuclear fuel cycle facilities. Key rules in assessment of severe accidents as well as the relationship to other fault analysis techniques are discussed. The role of SAA in informing accident management strategies and offsite emergency plans is covered. The paper also presents generic examples of scenarios that could lead to severe accidents in a range of nuclear fuel cycle facilities. (authors)

  15. The accident at the Harrisburg nuclear reactor - Interim conclusions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yiftah, S.

    1979-07-01

    This work describes the first minutes, first day and first week following the Three Mile Island accident. It shows the failures that occurred and the lessons which should be derived. It is pointed out that the doses of radiation that escaped from the TMI plant were at no time large enough to have had any effect on the 2 million people living on a radius of 80 km from the plant. Although no casualties occurred the Harrisburg accident will create an impulse for a new study and understanding of the nuclear plant safety and might serve as a live safety laboratory. After the TMI accident nuclear plants are already safer, one of the conclusions being that a new planning of the operation room is required, with the operators acquiring a better understanding of what is going on during a nuclear reactor accident. (B.G.)

  16. Soviet medical response to the Chernobyl nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Linnemann, R.E.

    1987-01-01

    The nuclear accident at Chernobyl was the worst in the history of nuclear power. It tested the organized medical response to mass radiation casualties. This article reviews the Soviet response as reported at the 1986 postaccident review meeting in Vienna and as determined from interviews. The Soviets used three levels of care: rescue and first aid at the plant site; emergency treatment at regional hospitals; and definitive evaluation and treatment in Moscow. Diagnosis, triage, patient disposition, attendant exposure, and preventive actions are detailed. The United States would be well advised to organize its resources definitively to cope with future nonmilitary nuclear accidents

  17. Nuclear Accidents: Consequences for Human, Society and Energy Sector

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    L. A. Bolshov

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The article examines radiation and hygienic regulations with regard to the elimination of consequences of the Chernobyl NPP accident in the context of relationships with other aspects, primarily socio-economic and political factors. This experience is reasonable to take into account when defining criteria in other regulatory fields, for example, in radioactive waste classification and remediation of areas. The article presents an analysis of joint features and peculiarities of nuclear accidents in the industry and energy sectors. It is noted that the scale of global consequences of the Chernobyl NPP accident is defined by the large-scale release of radioactivity into the environment, as well as an affiliation of the nuclear installation with the energy sector. Large-scale radiation accidents affect the most diverse spheres of human activities, what, in its turn, evokes the reverse reaction from the society and its institutions, including involvement of political means of settlement. If the latter is seeing for criteria that are scientifically justified and feasible, then the preconditions for minimizing socio-economic impacts are created. In other cases, political decisions, such as nuclear units’ shutdown and phasing out of nuclear energy, appear to be an economic price which society, as a whole and a single industry sector, pay to compensate the negative public response. The article describes fundamental changes in approaches to ensure nuclear and radiation safety that occurred after the Chernobyl NPP accident. Multiple and negative consequences of the Chernobyl accident for human and society are balanced to some extent by a higher level of operational safety, emergency preparedness, and life-cycle safety. The article indicates that harmonization and ensuring consistency of regulations that involve different aspects of nuclear and radiation safety are important to implement practical solutions to the nuclear legacy problems. The

  18. Chernobyl and the problem of international obligations regarding nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strohl, P.

    1988-01-01

    This paper analyses the way nuclear law was put to the test by the Chernobyl accident - in particular international nuclear law - so as to propose a train of thought which might contribute to adopting and revising the legal system presently in force or even new orientations. It deals only with that part of nuclear law which concerns accidents and their consequences (NEA) [fr

  19. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-05-01

    The document refers to the Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident (INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (INFCIRC-336). Part I of the document contains the texts of reservations/declarations made by some of the countries upon or following signature. Part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument, expressing consent to be bound

  20. Nuclear installations abroad the accident risks and their potential consequences

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Turvey, F J [Radiological Protection Inst. of Ireland (Ireland)

    1996-10-01

    This paper endeavors to assess the threat to Ireland from severe accidents at civil nuclear installations. Among the various types of nuclear installations worldwide, reactors and reprocessing plants are considered to be the most threatening and so the paper focuses on these. The threat is assumed to be a function of the risk of severe accidents at the above types of installations and the probability of unfavourable weather conditions carrying the radioactive releases to Ireland. Although nuclear installations designed in eastern Europe and Asia are less safe than others, the greatest threat to Ireland arises from nearby installations in the UK. The difficulty of measuring the probabilities and consequences of severe nuclear accidents at nuclear installations in general is explained. In the case of the UK installations, this difficulty is overcome to some degree by using values of `tolerable` risk adopted by the national nuclear regulator to define the radiotoxic releases from nuclear accidents. These are used as input to atmospheric dispersion models in which unfavourable weather conditions for Ireland are assumed and radiation doses are calculated to members of the Irish public. No countermeasures, such as sheltering, are assumed. In the worst cast scenario no deaths would be expected in Ireland in the immediate aftermath of the accident however, an increase in cancers over a period of 25 years or so would be expected assuming present-day models for the effect of low level radiation are valid.

  1. Nuclear installations abroad the accident risks and their potential consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turvey, F.J.

    1996-01-01

    This paper endeavors to assess the threat to Ireland from severe accidents at civil nuclear installations. Among the various types of nuclear installations worldwide, reactors and reprocessing plants are considered to be the most threatening and so the paper focuses on these. The threat is assumed to be a function of the risk of severe accidents at the above types of installations and the probability of unfavourable weather conditions carrying the radioactive releases to Ireland. Although nuclear installations designed in eastern Europe and Asia are less safe than others, the greatest threat to Ireland arises from nearby installations in the UK. The difficulty of measuring the probabilities and consequences of severe nuclear accidents at nuclear installations in general is explained. In the case of the UK installations, this difficulty is overcome to some degree by using values of 'tolerable' risk adopted by the national nuclear regulator to define the radiotoxic releases from nuclear accidents. These are used as input to atmospheric dispersion models in which unfavourable weather conditions for Ireland are assumed and radiation doses are calculated to members of the Irish public. No countermeasures, such as sheltering, are assumed. In the worst cast scenario no deaths would be expected in Ireland in the immediate aftermath of the accident however, an increase in cancers over a period of 25 years or so would be expected assuming present-day models for the effect of low level radiation are valid

  2. Relative evaluation on decommissioning accident scenarios of nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Kwan-Seong; Choi, Byung-Seon; Moon, Jei-Kwon; Hyun, Dong-Jun; Kim, Geun-Ho; Kim, Tae-Hyoung; Jo, Kyung-Hwa; Seo, Jae-Seok; Jeong, Seong-Young; Lee, Jung-Jun

    2012-01-01

    Highlights: ► This paper suggests relative importance on accident scenarios during decommissioning of nuclear facilities. ► The importance of scenarios can be performed by using AHP and Sugeno fuzzy method. ► The AHP and Sugeno fuzzy method guarantee reliability of the importance evaluation. -- Abstract: This paper suggests the evaluation method of relative importance on accident scenarios during decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The evaluation method consists of AHP method and Sugeno fuzzy integral method. This method will guarantee the reliability of relative importance evaluation for decommissioning accident scenarios.

  3. Links between operating experience feedback of industrial accidents and nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eury, S.P.

    2012-01-01

    Since 1992, the bureau for analysis of industrial risks and pollutions (BARPI) collects, analyzes and publishes information on industrial accidents. The ARIA database lists over 40.000 accidents or incidents, most of which occurred in French classified facilities (ICPE). Events occurring in nuclear facilities are rarely reported in ARIA because they are reported in other databases. This paper describes the process of selection, characterization and review of these accidents, as well as the following consultation with industry trade groups. It is essential to publicize widely the lessons learned from analyzing industrial accidents. To this end, a web site (www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr) gives free access to the accidents summaries, detailed sheets, studies, etc. to professionals and the general public. In addition, the accidents descriptions and characteristics serve as inputs to new regulation projects or risk analyses. Finally, the question of the links between operating experience feedback of industrial accidents and nuclear safety is explored: if the rigorous and well-documented methods of experience feedback in the nuclear field certainly set an example for other activities, nuclear safety can also benefit from inputs coming from the vast diversity of accidents arisen into industrial facilities because of common grounds. Among these common grounds we can find: -) the fuel cycle facilities use many chemicals and chemical processes that are also used by chemical industries; -) the problems resulting from the ageing of equipment affect both heavy and nuclear industries; -) the risk of hydrogen explosion; -) the risk of ammonia, ammonia is a gas used by nuclear power plants as an ingredient in the onsite production of mono-chloramine and ammonia is involved in numerous accidents in the industry: at least 900 entries can be found in the ARIA database. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  4. Report by the 'Fukushima Dai-Ichi major accident' nuclear subgroup

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brezin, Edouard; Balibar, Sebastien; Candel, Sebastien; Cesarsky, Catherine; Dautray, Robert; Gratias, Denis; Guillaumont, Robert; Laval, Guy; Quere, Yves; Tissot, Bernard; Zaoui, Andre; Brechet, Yves; Carpentier, Alain; Duplessy, Jean-Claude; Jerome, Denis; Bamberger, Yves; Barre, Bertrand; Comets, Marie-Pierre; Jamet, Philippe; Schwarz, Michel; Baumont, David; Guilhem, Gilbert; Repussard, Jacques; Billot, Philippe; Boullis, Bernard; Gauche, Francois; Zaetta, Alan; Pouget-Abadie, Xavier

    2011-06-01

    This report comprises a description of the succession of events in the Fukushima-Dai-Ichi power plant, a discussion of the situation of the nuclear industry and energy in France after this accident (French nuclear stock, security organisation), and a discussion on the fuel cycle and on future opportunities (comparison with EPR - Gen II safety measures, perspectives beyond the EPR). Numerous appendices are proposed, made of documents from different bodies involved in nuclear industry, energy and safety. They deal with the Fukushima accident, with light water and pressurized water reactors, with severe accidents in PWRs, and so on

  5. Response to the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nei, Hisanori

    2012-01-01

    This article was reading from the author's plenary lecture at the thermal and nuclear power generation convention 2011, which was summary of the author edited report of Japanese government to IAEA ministerial conference on nuclear safety. The article consisted of (1) outlines of occurrence and development of the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs), (2) comparison of Fukushima Daiichi NPPs with other NPPs (Fukushima Daini, Onagawa and Tokai Daini NPPs), (3) major countermeasures to settle the situation regarding the accident, (4) comprehensive safety evaluation of other NPPs as response to the accident and (5) lessons learned from the accident so far. It was highly important to ensure power supplies and robust cooling functions of reactors, pressure containment vessels and spent fuel pools. 28 lessons were categorized into five groups such as (1) strengthen preventive measures against a severe accident, (2) enhancement of response measures against severe accidents, (3) enhancement of nuclear emergency responses, (4) reinforcement of safety infrastructure and (5) thoroughness of safety culture. (T. Tanaka)

  6. Effects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on goshawk reproduction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Murase, Kaori; Murase, Joe; Horie, Reiko; Endo, Koichi

    2015-01-01

    Although the influence of nuclear accidents on the reproduction of top predators has not been investigated, it is important that we identify the effects of such accidents because humans are also top predators. We conducted field observation for 22 years and analysed the reproductive performance of the goshawk (Accipiter gentilis fujiyamae), a top avian predator in the North Kanto area of Japan, before and after the accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant that occurred in 2011. The reproductive performance declined markedly compared with the pre-accident years and progressively decreased for the three post-accident study years. Moreover, it was suggested that these declines were primarily caused by an increase in the air dose rate of radio-active contaminants measured under the nests caused by the nuclear accidents, rather than by other factors. We consider the trends in the changes of the reproductive success rates and suggest that internal exposure may play an important role in the reproductive performance of the goshawk, as well as external exposure. PMID:25802117

  7. Radiation protection issues on preparedness and response for a severe nuclear accident: experiences of the Fukushima accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Homma, T; Takahara, S; Kimura, M; Kinase, S

    2015-06-01

    Radiation protection issues on preparedness and response for a severe nuclear accident are discussed in this paper based on the experiences following the accident at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The criteria for use in nuclear emergencies in the Japanese emergency preparedness guide were based on the recommendations of International Commission of Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publications 60 and 63. Although the decision-making process for implementing protective actions relied heavily on computer-based predictive models prior to the accident, urgent protective actions, such as evacuation and sheltering, were implemented effectively based on the plant conditions. As there were no recommendations and criteria for long-term protective actions in the emergency preparedness guide, the recommendations of ICRP Publications 103, 109, and 111 were taken into consideration in determining the temporary relocation of inhabitants of heavily contaminated areas. These recommendations were very useful in deciding the emergency protective actions to take in the early stages of the Fukushima accident. However, some suggestions have been made for improving emergency preparedness and response in the early stages of a severe nuclear accident. © The Chartered Institution of Building Services Engineers 2014.

  8. Compensation for damages in case of a nuclear accident; L'indemnisation des prejudices en cas d'accident nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Leger, M. [CEA Saclay, 91 - Gif sur Yvette (France)

    2011-01-15

    This article presents the system of compensation for damages in case of a nuclear accident. This system of civil liability for nuclear damage, as a specific regime, departs on several points from the common rules of civil liability, in order to provide an adequate and equitable compensation for the damages suffered by the victims of nuclear accidents. The French system of civil liability for nuclear damage results from two International Conventions integrated in French law (Paris convention 1960 and Brussels convention 1963) and the French law of 1968, October 30 on civil liability in the area of nuclear energy. These texts define the conditions under which a nuclear operator could be held liable in case of a nuclear accident. The protocols to amend the Paris and Brussels Conventions of 2004, not yet come into force, are also presented. They ensure that increased resources are available to compensate a greater number of victims of a nuclear accident. (author)

  9. A criticism of ANSI/ANS-8.3-1986: Criticality accident alarm system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malenfant, R.E.

    1991-01-01

    The American National Standard on criticality accident alarm systems has given rise to confusion in interpretation and implementation of the requirements. In addition, some of the standards have recently been incorporated into US Department of Energy (DOE) orders, and others have been paraphrased in the DOE orders. Some of the DOE orders referencing these standards are being incorporated into law by means of the Code of Federal Regulations. As such, the intent of the authors of the standards to recommend a code of good practice is now being codified into law with attendant civil and criminal penalties for failure to comply. It is suggested that ANSI/ANS-8.3-1986, Critically Accident Alarm System, be carefully reviewed to alleviate the confusion that has been experienced in practice, to clarify the minimum accident of concern, to further define the dose (or dose rate) criteria for activation, and to stress the fact that a prime consideration in any safety system is the overall reduction of risk

  10. National response plan - Major nuclear or radiological accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-02-01

    France has been implementing stringent radiation protection and nuclear safety and security measures for many years. However, this does not mean that the country is exempt from having to be prepared to deal with an emergency. Changes in France, Europe and other parts of the globe have made it necessary for France to reconsider how it responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies. As the potential impact of a nuclear or radiological accident can affect a wide range of activities, the plan described herein is based on a cross-sector and inter-ministerial approach to emergency response. The Chernobyl and Fukushima-Daiichi disasters are proof that the consequences of a major nuclear or radiological accident can affect all levels of society. These challenges are substantial and relate to: public health: An uncontrolled nuclear accident can have immediate consequences (death, injury, irradiation) as well as long-term consequences that can lead to increased risk of developing radiation-induced diseases (such as certain types of cancer); environmental quality: Radiation contamination can last for several decades and, in some cases, can result in an area being closed off permanently to the public; economic and social continuity: Nuclear accidents bring human activity to a halt in contaminated areas, disrupting the economic and social order of the entire country. It may therefore be necessary to adapt economic and social systems and carry out clean-up operations if people and businesses have been displaced; quality of international relations: Related to fulfillment of obligations to alert and inform European and international partners. This international dimension also covers the protection of French nationals present in countries stricken by a nuclear accident. This national plan provides reference information on how to prepare for a nuclear or radiological emergency and make the appropriate decisions in the event of an emergency. It covers the emergency phase (including

  11. Accidents with nuclear power plants, ch. 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1976-01-01

    A recalculation of the consequences of nuclear power plant accidents is presented taking into account different parameters or different quantities than those usually accepted. A case study of a nuclear power plant planned for the Eems-river estuary in the Netherlands is presented

  12. Supporting system in emergency response plan for nuclear material transport accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakagome, Y.; Aoki, S.

    1993-01-01

    As aiming to provide the detailed information concerning nuclear material transport accidents and to supply it to the concerned organizations by an online computer, the Emergency Response Supporting System has been constructed in the Nuclear Safety Technology Center, Japan. The system consists of four subsystems and four data bases. By inputting initial information such as name of package and date of accident, one can obtain the appropriate initial response procedures and related information for the accident immediately. The system must be useful for protecting the public safety from nuclear material transport accidents. But, it is not expected that the system shall be used in future. (J.P.N.)

  13. Graphical representation of nuclear incidents/accidents by associating network in nuclear technical communication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hibino, Aiko; Niwa, Yuji

    2008-01-01

    Nuclear Information Archives (NUCIA) is a service for information disclosure toward the public on nuclear power plants in Japan. This paper focuses on an experience of how information stored in the NUCIA database is processed for information sharing by a 'sociotechnical interface,' the interface to the general public. Information on nuclear accidents was analyzed by market basket analysis and mapped to some graphical representation in the website for comprehension. The resultant data obtained by questionnaire survey suggests that this graphical conversion is effective for letting the public understand nuclear accidents. In this sense, this attempt gives significant hints of 'how technical communication to the public' should be. (author)

  14. Nuclear safety in light water reactors severe accident phenomenology

    CERN Document Server

    Sehgal, Bal Raj

    2011-01-01

    This vital reference is the only one-stop resource on how to assess, prevent, and manage severe nuclear accidents in the light water reactors (LWRs) that pose the most risk to the public. LWRs are the predominant nuclear reactor in use around the world today, and they will continue to be the most frequently utilized in the near future. Therefore, accurate determination of the safety issues associated with such reactors is central to a consideration of the risks and benefits of nuclear power. This book emphasizes the prevention and management of severe accidents to teach nuclear professionals

  15. Development of Northeast Asia Nuclear Power Plant Accident Simulator.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kim, Juyub; Kim, Juyoul; Po, Li-Chi Cliff

    2017-06-15

    A conclusion from the lessons learned after the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident was that Korea needs a tool to estimate consequences from a major accident that could occur at a nuclear power plant located in a neighboring country. This paper describes a suite of computer-based codes to be used by Korea's nuclear emergency response staff for training and potentially operational support in Korea's national emergency preparedness and response program. The systems of codes, Northeast Asia Nuclear Accident Simulator (NANAS), consist of three modules: source-term estimation, atmospheric dispersion prediction and dose assessment. To quickly assess potential doses to the public in Korea, NANAS includes specific reactor data from the nuclear power plants in China, Japan and Taiwan. The completed simulator is demonstrated using data for a hypothetical release. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  16. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-09-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status lists as of August 31, 1991. Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections there to. Part III contains reservations/declarations made upon signature

  17. Trend of nuclear power development in main countries and perspective of nuclear industry after the Fukushima Daiichi accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murakami, Tomoko

    2011-01-01

    Fukushima Daiichi Accident occurred in March 11, 2011 was of highest interest in the world and had been reported worldwide from relevant Japanese organizations almost in real time just after happened. This article overviewed five month's response of government and energy related organization of each country and international agency and summarized effects of the accident on nuclear power in energy policy of each country as well as perspective of nuclear industry responded to change of market trend. After the accident, basic policy to regard nuclear power as important was maintained with enhancing reactor safety against extreme events in countries choosing nuclear power as important and requisite energy and there appeared such a trend of nuclear power phase-out in countries promoting nuclear power prudently. Choice of nuclear power would be decided on energy state of each country and was not affected before and after the accident. Trend of nuclear business was closely related with that of market and no fundamental change was observed although some industries with revenue from business in nuclear power phase-out country or cancelled project after the accident were obliged to be affected. (T. Tanaka)

  18. Nuclear industry after the Fukushima accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Branche, Thomas; Billes-Garabedian, Laurent; Salha, Bernard; Behar, Christophe; Dupuis, Marie-Claude; Labalette, Thibaud; Lagarde, Dominique; Planchais, Bernard; West, Jean-Pierre; Stubler, Jerome; Lancia, Bruno; Machenaud, Herve; Einaudi, Andre; Anglaret, Philippe; Brachet, Yves; Bonnave, Philippe; Knoche, Philippe; Gasquet, Denis

    2013-01-01

    This special dossier about the situation of nuclear industry two years after the Fukushima accident comprises 15 contributions dealing with: the nuclear industry two years after the Fukushima accident (Bernard Salha); a low-carbon electricity at a reasonable cost (Christophe Behar); nuclear engineering has to gain even more efficiency (Thomas Branche); how to dispose off the most radioactive wastes (Marie-Claude Dupuis, Thibaud Labalette); ensuring the continuation for more than 40 years onward (Denis Gasquet); developing and investing in the future (Philippe Knoche); more than just signing contracts (Dominique Lagarde); immersed power plants, an innovative concept (Bernard Planchais); R and D as a source of innovation for safety and performances (Jean-Pierre West); dismantlement, a very long term market (Jerome Stubler, Bruno Lancia); a reference industrial model (Herve Machenaud); recruiting and training (Andre Einaudi); a diversity of modern reactors and a world market in rebirth (Philippe Anglaret); an industrial revolution is necessary (Yves Brachet); contracts adapted to sensible works (Philippe Bonnave)

  19. Enhancement of organizational resilience in light of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant accident (1). Analysis of responding structure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshizawa, Atsufumi; Furuhama, Yutaka; Mutou, Keiko; Oba, Kyoko; Kitamura, Masaharu

    2014-01-01

    Through the critical situations experienced at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, it became evident that plant personnel are the essential driving force toward resilience for mitigating the severe nuclear accident. In such situation, the key factors are skill and attitude of human operators who struggled sincerely against the accident. It is also evident that future nuclear safety needs to aim at Safety- which is a newly introduced notion of safety proposed in conjunction with resilience engineering. Safety-I was defined as a condition where as little as possible went wrong;. Safety-II is defined as a condition where as much as possible goes wright. Among the four core capabilities (i.e. Learning, Responding, Monitoring, Anticipating) proposed in the framework of resilience engineering, the constituents of 'Responding' is mainly studied in this paper. Four constituents such as Skill Attitude, Health and Environment have been identified through in-depth reviewing of accident reports and reflection of one of the authors who served as a unit director of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. (author)

  20. Design parameters and testing techniques for criticality accident detection systems used in various nuclear establishments - a review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janardhanan, S.; Krishnamony, S.; Krishnamurthi, T.N.; Gopalan, C.S.

    1981-01-01

    Accidental criticality excursion is a potential hazard in operations involving fissile material. In this review paper, design criteria for criticality detection systems, associated requirements for reliable functioning of the instrument and recent advances in the field are discussed. Systems based on integrated dose and rate of change of dose rate concepts are explained. A criticality accident simulator using a pneumatically driven 60 Co source for testing the detector is described. The paper also discusses the relative advantages of gamma and neutron sensing devices. (author)

  1. Design parameters and testing techniques for criticality accident detection systems used in various nuclear establishments - a review

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Janardhanan, S.; Krishnamony, S.; Krishnamurthi, T.N.; Gopalan, C.S. (Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Bombay (India). Health Physics Div.)

    Accidental criticality excursion is a potential hazard in operations involving fissile material. In this review paper, design criteria for criticality detection systems, associated requirements for reliable functioning of the instrument and recent advances in the field are discussed. Systems based on integrated dose and rate of change of dose rate concepts are explained. A criticality accident simulator using a pneumatically driven /sup 60/Co source for testing the detector is described. The paper also discusses the relative advantages of gamma and neutron sensing devices.

  2. Prevention of the causes and consequences of a criticality accident - measures adopted in France; Prevention des causes et des consequences d'un accident de criticite - solutions adoptees en France

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fruchard, Y; Lavie, J M

    1966-07-01

    The question of safety in regard to criticality accident risks has two aspects: prevention of the cause and limitation of the consequences. These two aspects are closely connected. The effort devoted to prevention of the causes depends on the seriousness of the possible human psychologic and economic consequences of the accident. The criticality accidents which have occurred in the nuclear industry, though few in number, do reveal the imperfect nature of the techniques adopted to prevent the causes, and also constitute the only available realistic basis for evaluating the consequences and developing measures to limit them. The authors give a analysis of the known causes and consequences of past criticality accidents and on this basis make a number of comments concerning: the validity of traditional safety criteria, the probability of accidents for different types of operations, characteristic accidents which can serve as models, and the extent of possible radiological consequences. The measures adopted in France to limit the consequences of a possible criticality accident under the headings: location, design and lay-out of the installations, accident detection, and dosimetry for the exposed personnel, are briefly described after a short account of the criteria used in deciding on them. (author) [French] La surete relative aux risques d'accidents de criticite presente deux aspects: la prevention des causes et les parades aux consequences. Ces deux aspects sont tres lies. L'effort consenti a la prevention des causes decoule de l'importance des consequences humaines economiques et psychologiques possibles d'un eventuel accident. Les accidents de criticite survenus dans l'industrie nucleaire, malgre leur rarete, d'une part devoilent les imperfections des techniques de prevention des causes, d'autre part constituent la seule base realiste disponible d'evaluation des consequences et de mise au point des parades a ces consequences. Les auteurs presentent une analyse des

  3. Report of the Fukushima nuclear accident by the National Academy of Science. Lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident for improving safety of U.S. nuclear plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nariai, Hideki

    2014-01-01

    U.S. National Academy of Science investigated the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant initiated by the Great East Japan Earthquake for two years and published a draft report in July 24, 2014. Investigation results were summarized in nine new findings and made ten recommendations in a wide horizon; (1) hardware countermeasures against severe accidents and training of operators, (2) upgrade of risk assessment capability for beyond design basis accident, (3) incorporation of new information about hazards in safety regulations, (4) needed improvement of off-site emergency preparedness, and (5) improvements of nuclear safety culture. New information about hazards related with tsunami assessment, new risk assessment for beyond design basis accident, advice of foreigner resident evacuations, regulatory capture, and safety culture and regulator's specialty were discussed as Japanese issues. (T. Tanaka)

  4. Analysis to the criticality the storage and containers to the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant Fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guerra Valdes, R.

    1998-01-01

    Presently analysis the criticality the warehouses and containers the nuclear fuels in Juragua nuclear power plant the property multiplicity determined in these system and it is verified that for the geometry and operation conditions defined in the design as well as in accidents situations, the arrangement the fuel stays subcritical with an appropriate margin

  5. Radionuclide release rate inversion of nuclear accidents in nuclear facility based on Kalman filter

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tang Xiuhuan; Bao Lihong; Li Hua; Wan Junsheng

    2014-01-01

    The rapidly and continually back-calculating source term is important for nuclear emergency response. The Gaussian multi-puff atmospheric dispersion model was used to produce regional environment monitoring data virtually, and then a Kalman filter was designed to inverse radionuclide release rate of nuclear accidents in nuclear facility and the release rate tracking in real time was achieved. The results show that the Kalman filter combined with Gaussian multi-puff atmospheric dispersion model can successfully track the virtually stable, linear or nonlinear release rate after being iterated about 10 times. The standard error of inversion results increases with the true value. Meanwhile extended Kalman filter cannot inverse the height parameter of accident release as interceptive error is too large to converge. Kalman filter constructed from environment monitoring data and Gaussian multi-puff atmospheric dispersion model can be applied to source inversion in nuclear accident which is characterized by static height and position, short and continual release in nuclear facility. Hence it turns out to be an alternative source inversion method in nuclear emergency response. (authors)

  6. Impacts of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident on Nuclear Development Policies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vance, Robert; Henderson, David; ); Moore, Laurie

    2017-01-01

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident has had an impact on the development of nuclear power around the world. While the accident was followed by thorough technical assessments of the safety of all operating nuclear power plants, and a general increase in safety requirements has been observed worldwide, national policy responses have been more varied. These responses have ranged from countries phasing out or accelerating decisions to phase out nuclear energy to countries reducing their reliance on nuclear power or on the contrary continuing to pursue or expand their nuclear power programs. This study examines changes to policies, and plans and attempts to distinguish the impact of the Fukushima Daiichi accident from other factors that have affected policy-making in relation to nuclear energy, in particular electricity market economics, financing challenges and competition from other sources (gas, coal and renewables). It also examines changes over time to long-term, quantitative country projections, which reveal interesting trends on the possible role of nuclear energy in future energy systems. (authors)

  7. Research on Methodology to Prioritize Critical Digital Assets based on Nuclear Risk Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Wonjik; Kwon, Kookheui; Kim, Hyundoo [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Digital systems are used in nuclear facilities to monitor and control various types of field devices, as well as to obtain and store vital information. Therefore, it is getting important for nuclear facilities to protect digital systems from cyber-attack in terms of safety operation and public health since cyber compromise of these systems could lead to unacceptable radiological consequences. Based on KINAC/RS-015 which is a cyber security regulatory standard, regulatory activities for cyber security at nuclear facilities generally focus on critical digital assets (CDAs) which are safety, security, and emergency preparedness related digital assets. Critical digital assets are estimated over 60% among all digital assets in a nuclear power plant. Therefore, it was required to prioritize critical digital assets to improve efficiency of regulation and implementation. In this paper, the research status on methodology development to prioritize critical digital assets based on nuclear risk assessment will be introduced. In this paper, to derive digital asset directly affect accident, PRA results (ET, FT, and minimal cut set) are analyzed. According to result of analysis, digital systems related to CD are derived ESF-CCS (safety-related component control system) and Process-CCS (non-safety-related component control system) as well as Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS). These digital assets can be identified Vital Digital Asset (VDA). Hereafter, to develop general methodology which was identified VDA related to accident among CDAs, (1) method using result of minimal cut set in PRA model will be studied and (2) method quantifying result of Digital I and C PRA which is performed to reflect all digital cabinet related to system in FT will be studied.

  8. Research on Methodology to Prioritize Critical Digital Assets based on Nuclear Risk Assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Wonjik; Kwon, Kookheui; Kim, Hyundoo

    2016-01-01

    Digital systems are used in nuclear facilities to monitor and control various types of field devices, as well as to obtain and store vital information. Therefore, it is getting important for nuclear facilities to protect digital systems from cyber-attack in terms of safety operation and public health since cyber compromise of these systems could lead to unacceptable radiological consequences. Based on KINAC/RS-015 which is a cyber security regulatory standard, regulatory activities for cyber security at nuclear facilities generally focus on critical digital assets (CDAs) which are safety, security, and emergency preparedness related digital assets. Critical digital assets are estimated over 60% among all digital assets in a nuclear power plant. Therefore, it was required to prioritize critical digital assets to improve efficiency of regulation and implementation. In this paper, the research status on methodology development to prioritize critical digital assets based on nuclear risk assessment will be introduced. In this paper, to derive digital asset directly affect accident, PRA results (ET, FT, and minimal cut set) are analyzed. According to result of analysis, digital systems related to CD are derived ESF-CCS (safety-related component control system) and Process-CCS (non-safety-related component control system) as well as Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS). These digital assets can be identified Vital Digital Asset (VDA). Hereafter, to develop general methodology which was identified VDA related to accident among CDAs, (1) method using result of minimal cut set in PRA model will be studied and (2) method quantifying result of Digital I and C PRA which is performed to reflect all digital cabinet related to system in FT will be studied

  9. Populations protection and territories management in nuclear emergency and post-accident situation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bourrel, M.; Calmon, Ph.; Calvez, M.; Chambrette, V.; Champion, D.; Devin, P.; Godino, O.; Lombard, J.; Rzepka, J.P.; Schneider, Th.; Verhaeghe, B.; Cogez, E.; Kayser, O.; Guenon, C.; Jourdain, J.R.; Bouchot, E.; Murith, Ch.; Lochard, J.; Cluchier, A.; Vandecasteele, Ch.; Pectorin, X.; Dubiau, Ph.; Gerphagnon, O.; Roche, H.; Cessac, B.; Cochard, A.; Machenaud, G.; Jourdain, J.R.; Pirard, Ph.; Leger, M.; Bouchot, E.; Demet, M.; Charre, J.P.; Poumadere, M.; Cogez, E.

    2010-01-01

    This document gathers the slides of the available presentations given during these conference days. Twenty seven presentations out of 29 are assembled in the document and deal with: 1 - radiological and dosimetric consequences in nuclear accident situation: impact on the safety approach and protection stakes (E. Cogez); 2 - organisation of public authorities in case of emergency and in post-event situation (in case of nuclear accident or radiological terror attack in France and abroad), (O. Kayser); 3 - ORSEC plan and 'nuclear' particular intervention plan (PPI), (C. Guenon); 4 - thyroid protection by stable iodine ingestion: European perspective (J.R. Jourdain); 5 - preventive distribution of stable iodine: presentation of the 2009/2010 public information campaign (E. Bouchot); 6 - 2009/2010 iodine campaign: presentation and status (O. Godino); 7 - populations protection in emergency and post-accident situation in Switzerland (C. Murith); 8 - CIPR's recommendations on the management of emergency and post-accident situations (J. Lochard); 9 - nuclear exercises in France - status and perspectives (B. Verhaeghe); 10 - the accidental rejection of uranium at the Socatri plant: lessons learnt from crisis management (D. Champion); 11 - IRE's radiological accident of August 22, 2008 (C. Vandecasteele); 12 - presentation of the CEA's crisis national organisation: coordination centre in case of crisis, technical teams, intervention means (X. Pectorin); 13 - coordination and realisation of environmental radioactivity measurement programs, exploitation and presentation of results: status of IRSN's actions and perspectives (P. Dubiau); 14 - M2IRAGE - measurements management in the framework of geographically-assisted radiological interventions in the environment (O. Gerphagnon and H. Roche); 15 - post-accident management of a nuclear accident - the CODIRPA works (I. Mehl-Auget); 16 - nuclear post-accident: new challenges of crisis expertise (D. Champion); 17 - aid guidebooks

  10. Consideration of Command and Control Performance during Accident Management Process at the Nuclear Power Plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ahmed, Nisrene M. [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Sok Chul [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants shifted the nuclear safety paradigm from risk management to on-site management capability during a severe accident. The kernel of on-site management capability during an accident at a nuclear power plant is situation awareness and agility of command and control. However, little consideration has been given to accident management. After the events of September 11, 2001 and the catastrophic Fukushima nuclear disaster, agility of command and control has emerged as a significant element for effective and efficient accident management, with many studies emphasizing accident management strategies, particularly man-machine interface, which is considered a key role in ensuring nuclear power plant safety during severe accident conditions. This paper proposes a conceptual model for evaluating command and control performance during the accident management process at a nuclear power plant. Communication and information processing while responding to an accident is one of the key issues needed to mitigate the accident. This model will give guidelines for accurate and fast communication response during accident conditions.

  11. Agricultural implications of the Fukushima nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nakanishi, Tomoko M.

    2016-01-01

    More than 4 years has passed since the accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant. Immediately after the accident, 40 to 50 academic staff of the Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences at the University of Tokyo created an independent team to monitor the behavior of the radioactive materials in the field and their effects on agricultural farm lands, forests, rivers, animals, etc. When the radioactive nuclides from the nuclear power plant fell, they were instantly adsorbed at the site where they first touched; consequently, the fallout was found as scattered spots on the surface of anything that was exposed to the air at the time of the accident. The adsorption has become stronger over time, so the radioactive nuclides are now difficult to remove. The findings of our study regarding the wide range of effects on agricultural fields are summarized in this report

  12. Residents call for greater openness, accountability and involvement: Lessons learned from the JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taniguchi, Taketoshi; Tsuchiya, Tomoko; Kosugi, Motoko

    2000-01-01

    This paper discusses the JCO (Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co.) criticality accident from social viewpoints based on the detailed examination of the survey data and experience of participation into Tokai village office's surveys. We focus the mechanisms of amplifying anxieties of the local residents and clarify the key factors affected in the social amplification process. And we discuss the importance of communicating and deliberating among the lay people, public officials and professionals about health, safety and environmental risks associated with nuclear energy, referring to the public opinions about what kinds of information and actions are needed. (J.P.N.)

  13. Nuclear power plant safety - the risk of accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higson, D.; Crancher, D.W.

    1975-08-01

    Although it is physically impossible for any nuclear plant to explode like an atom bomb, an accidental release of radioactive material into the environment is conceivable. Three factors reduce the probability of such releases, in dangerous quantities, to an extremely low level. Firstly, there are many safety features built into the plant including a leaktight containment building to prevent the escape of such material. Secondly, the quality of engineering and standards used are far more demanding than in conventional power engineering. Thirdly, strict government licensing and regulatory control is enforced at all phases from design through construction to operation. No member of the general public is known to have been injured or died as a result of any accident to a commercial nuclear power plant. Ten workers have died as a result of over-exposure to radiation from experimental reactors and laboratory work connected with the development of nuclear plant since 1945. Because of this excellent safety record the risk of serious accidents can only be estimated. On the basis of such estimates, the chance of an accident in a nuclear power reactor which could cause a detectable increase in the incidence of radiation-induced illnesses would be less than one chance in a million per year. In a typical highly industrialised society, such as the USA, the estimated risk of an individual being killed by such accidents, from one hundred operating reactors, is no greater than one chance in sixteen million per year. There are undoubtedly risks from reactor accidents but estimates of these risks show that they are considerably less than from other activities which are accepted by society. (author)

  14. Analytical measurements of fission products during a severe nuclear accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Doizi, D.; Reymond la Ruinaz, S.; Haykal, I.; Manceron, L.; Perrin, A.; Boudon, V.; Vander Auwera, J.; tchana, F. Kwabia; Faye, M.

    2018-01-01

    The Fukushima accident emphasized the fact that ways to monitor in real time the evolution of a nuclear reactor during a severe accident remain to be developed. No fission products were monitored during twelve days; only dose rates were measured, which is not sufficient to carry out an online diagnosis of the event. The first measurements were announced with little reliability for low volatile fission products. In order to improve the safety of nuclear plants and minimize the industrial, ecological and health consequences of a severe accident, it is necessary to develop new reliable measurement systems, operating at the earliest and closest to the emission source of fission products. Through the French program ANR « Projet d'Investissement d'Avenir », the aim of the DECA-PF project (diagnosis of core degradation from fission products measurements) is to monitor in real time the release of the major fission products (krypton, xenon, gaseous forms of iodine and ruthenium) outside the nuclear reactor containment. These products are released at different times during a nuclear accident and at different states of the nuclear core degradation. Thus, monitoring these fission products gives information on the situation inside the containment and helps to apply the Severe Accident Management procedures. Analytical techniques have been proposed and evaluated. The results are discussed here.

  15. Analytical measurements of fission products during a severe nuclear accident

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Doizi D.

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available The Fukushima accident emphasized the fact that ways to monitor in real time the evolution of a nuclear reactor during a severe accident remain to be developed. No fission products were monitored during twelve days; only dose rates were measured, which is not sufficient to carry out an online diagnosis of the event. The first measurements were announced with little reliability for low volatile fission products. In order to improve the safety of nuclear plants and minimize the industrial, ecological and health consequences of a severe accident, it is necessary to develop new reliable measurement systems, operating at the earliest and closest to the emission source of fission products. Through the French program ANR « Projet d’Investissement d’Avenir », the aim of the DECA-PF project (diagnosis of core degradation from fission products measurements is to monitor in real time the release of the major fission products (krypton, xenon, gaseous forms of iodine and ruthenium outside the nuclear reactor containment. These products are released at different times during a nuclear accident and at different states of the nuclear core degradation. Thus, monitoring these fission products gives information on the situation inside the containment and helps to apply the Severe Accident Management procedures. Analytical techniques have been proposed and evaluated. The results are discussed here.

  16. On the Impact to the Human Health from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simic, Zdenko

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear energy has long controversial history with hypes of utopian promises and doom fears; from 'electricity too cheap to meter' to the certain destruction of the world. Three major nuclear accidents (TMI, Chernobyl and Fukushima) helped only to strengthen mostly negative perception of the public. After TMI and Chernobyl understanding of the nuclear accidents impact to human health has considerably improved. This has helped to reduce uncertainty about risk estimates, but too little was achieved regarding the communication of how absolutely and relatively this risk is in fact small. Now with Fukushima there is new potential for even better understanding of the realistic scope of the total nuclear accident impact. Based on the experience with previous accidents obviously there are significant obstacles to achieve that. This paper is presenting current understanding of the impact on the human health from the Fukushima nuclear accident. Focus is given also to the uncertainties, perception, and relative prospective to other non radiation related risks. It is clear from data and assessments that immediate radiation related risk as well as expected long term health impact is even with conservative approach negligible and that it will be most probable impossible to determine it with health monitoring and epidemiological study. However, because of existing perception, lack of thrust and better approach many practical reactions are going to perpetuate negative picture, about radiation and nuclear energy, and perhaps cause some additional psychosocial risk. It is troubling that this induced risk is substantial and it could have been mainly prevented by timely applying experience form previous major accidents thru education, communication and transparency. Because of historical and local circumstance, communication difficulties and lack of sufficient understanding of uncertainties and magnitudes it seems that Fukushima nuclear accident will not be much better case

  17. Human Factors in Nuclear Reactor Accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mustafa, M.E.

    2016-01-01

    While many people would blame nature for the disaster of the “Fukushima Daiichi” accident, experts considered this accident to be also a human-induced disaster. This confirmed the importance of human errors which have been getting a growing interest in the nuclear field after the Three Mile Island accident. Personnel play an important role in design, operation, maintenance, planning, and management. The interface between machine and man is known as a human factor. In the present work, the human factors that have to be considered were discussed. The effect of the control room configuration and equipment design effect on the human behavior was also discussed. Precise reviewing of person’s qualifications and experience was focused. Insufficient training has been a major cause of human error in the nuclear field. The effective training issues were introduced. Avoiding complicated operational processes and non responsive management systems was stressed. Distinguishing between the procedures for normal and emergency operations was emphasised. It was stated that human error during maintenance and testing activities could cause a serious accident. This is because safety systems do not cover much more risk probabilities in the maintenance and testing activities like they do in the normal operation. In nuclear industry, the need for a classification and identification of human errors has been well recognised. As a result of this, human reliability must be assessed. These errors are analyzed by a probabilistic safety assessment which deals with errors in reading, listening and implementing procedures but not with cognitive errors. Much efforts must be accomplished to consider cognitive errors in the probabilistic safety assessment. The ways of collecting human factor data were surveyed. The methods for identifying safe designs, helping decision makers to predict how proposed or current policies will affect safety, and comprehensive understanding of the relationship

  18. The criticality accident in Tokaimura and medical aspects of radiation emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen Xiaohua; Mao Bingzhi

    2003-01-01

    A criticality accident occurred on September 30, 1999 at the uranium processing plant in Tokaimura Japan, which is the most severe accident since Chernobyl catastrophe. 213 people were exposed to radiation, among them 2 workers were exposed to 16-23 Gy and 6-10 Gy individually, one worker was 2 Gy, 2 people was 10 mSv and 208 person was 0-5 mSv. Author was invited to attend an international symposium on 'The Criticality Accident in Tokaimura Medical Aspects of Radiation Emergency' in Chiba Japan on December 2000. An overview of the accident, dose estimation and neutron relative biological effects are discussed in this article

  19. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident: OECD/NEA Nuclear Safety Response and Lessons Learnt

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Following the March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, all NEA member countries took early action to ensure and confirm the continued safety of their nuclear power plants and the protection of the public. After these preliminary safety reviews, all countries with nuclear facilities carried out comprehensive safety reviews, often referred to as 'stress tests', which reassessed safety margins of nuclear facilities with a primary focus on challenges related to conditions experienced at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, for example extreme external events and the loss of safety functions, or capabilities to cope with severe accidents. As appropriate, improvements are being made to safety and emergency response systems to ensure that nuclear power plants are capable of withstanding events that lead to loss of electrical power and/or cooling capability. In the weeks following the accident, the NEA immediately began establishing expert groups in the nuclear safety and radiological protection areas, as well as contributing to information exchange with the Japanese authorities and other international organisations. It promptly provided a forum for high-level decision makers and regulators within the G8-G20 frameworks. The NEA actions taken at the international level in response to the accident have been carried out primarily by the three NEA standing technical committees concerned with nuclear and radiation safety issues - the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA), the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) and the Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) - under the leadership of the CNRA. More than two years following the accident, the NEA continues to assist the Japanese authorities in dealing with their nuclear safety and recovery efforts as well as to facilitate international co-operation on nuclear safety and radiological protection matters. It is strongly supporting the establishment of

  20. A description of nuclear reactor accidents and their consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murray, A.

    1989-01-01

    Nuclear reactor accidents which have caused core damage, released a significant amount of radioactivity, or caused death or serious injury are described. The reactor accidents discussed in detail include Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, SL-1 and Windscale, although information on other less consequential accidents is also provided. The consequences of these accidents are examined in terms of the amounts of radioactivity released, the radiation doses received, and remedial actions and interventions taken following the accident. 10 refs., 1 fig., 2 tabs

  1. Study Of Severe Accident Phenomena In Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sugiyanto; Antariksawan; Anhar, R.; Arifal

    2001-01-01

    Several phenomena that occurred in the light water reactor type of nuclear power plant during severe accident were studied. The study was carried out based on the results of severe accident researches in various countries. In general, severe accident phenomena can be classified into in-vessel phenomena, retention in the reactor coolant system, and ex-vessel phenomena. In-vessel retention has been recommended as a severe accident management strategy

  2. Review of Ontario Hydro Pickering 'A' and Bruce 'A' nuclear generating stations' accident analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Serdula, K.J.

    1988-01-01

    Deterministic safety analysis for the Pickering 'A' and Bruce 'A' nuclear generating stations were reviewed. The methodology used in the evaluation and assessment was based on the concept of 'N' critical parameters defining an N-dimensional safety parameter space. The reviewed accident analyses were evaluated and assessed based on their demonstrated safety coverage for credible values and trajectories of the critical parameters within this N-dimensional safety parameter space. The reported assessment did not consider probability of occurrence of event. The reviewed analyses were extensive for potential occurrence of accidents under normal steady-state operating conditions. These analyses demonstrated an adequate assurance of safety for the analyzed conditions. However, even for these reactor conditions, items have been identified for consideration of review and/or further study, which would provide a greater assurance of safety in the event of an accident. Accident analyses based on a plant in a normal transient operating state or in an off-normal condition but within the allowable operating envelope are not as extensive. Improvements in demonstrations and/or justifications of safety upon potential occurrence of accidents would provide further assurance of adequacy of safety under these conditions. Some events under these conditions have not been analyzed because of their judged low probability; however, accident analyses in this area should be considered. Recommendations are presented relating to these items; it is also recommended that further study is needed of the Pickering 'A' special safety systems

  3. Hazards to nuclear plants from surface traffic accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hornyik, K.

    1975-01-01

    Analytic models have been developed for evaluating hazards to nuclear plants from hazardous-materials accidents in the vicinity of the plant. In particular, these models permit the evaluation of hazards from such accidents occurring on surface traffic routes near the plant. The analysis uses statistical information on accident rates, traffic frequency, and cargo-size distribution along with parameters describing properties of the hazardous cargo, plant design, and atmospheric conditions, to arrive at a conservative estimate of the annual probability of a catastrophic event. Two of the major effects associated with hazardous-materials accidents, explosion and release of toxic vapors, are treated by a common formalism which can be readily applied to any given case by means of a graphic procedure. As an example, for a typical case it is found that railroad shipments of chlorine in 55-ton tank cars constitute a greater hazard to a nearby nuclear plant than equally frequent rail shipments of explosives in amounts of 10 tons. 11 references. (U.S.)

  4. Radiation Exposure and Thyroid Cancer Risk After the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident in Comparison with the Chernobyl Accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yamashita, S; Takamura, N; Ohtsuru, A; Suzuki, S

    2016-09-01

    The actual implementation of the epidemiological study on human health risk from low dose and low-dose rate radiation exposure and the comprehensive long-term radiation health effects survey are important especially after radiological and nuclear accidents because of public fear and concern about the long-term health effects of low-dose radiation exposure have increased considerably. Since the Great East Japan earthquake and the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident in Japan, Fukushima Prefecture has started the Fukushima Health Management Survey Project for the purpose of long-term health care administration and medical early diagnosis/treatment for the prefectural residents. Especially on a basis of the lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident, both thyroid examination and mental health care are critically important irrespective of the level of radiation exposure. There are considerable differences between Chernobyl and Fukushima regarding radiation dose to the public, and it is very difficult to estimate retrospectively internal exposure dose from the short-lived radioactive iodines. Therefore, the necessity of thyroid ultrasound examination in Fukushima and the intermediate results of this survey targeting children will be reviewed and discussed in order to avoid any misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the high detection rate of childhood thyroid cancer. © World Health Organisation 2016. All rights reserved. The World Health Organization has granted Oxford University Press permission for the reproduction of this article.

  5. Effects of the accident at Mihama Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3 on the public's attitude to nuclear power generation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kitada, Atsuko

    2005-01-01

    As part of an ongoing public opinion survey regarding nuclear power generation, which started in 1993, a survey was carried out in the Kansai and Kanto regions two months after the accident at Unit 3 of the Mihama Nuclear Power Plant. In addition to analyzing the statistically significant changes that have taken place since the previous survey (taken in 2003), increase and decrease of the ratio of answers to all the questions related to nuclear power before and after the two accidents were compared in the case of the accidents which occurred in the Mihama Unit 3 and the JCO company's nuclear-fuel plant. In the Kansai region, a feeling of uneasiness about the risky character of nuclear power generation increased to some extent, while the public's trust in the safety of nuclear power plants decreased somewhat. After a safety-related explanation on ''Early detection of troubles'' and Accident prevention'' was given from a managerial standpoint, people felt a little less at ease than they had before. Uneasiness, however, did not increase in relation to the overall safety explanation given about the engineering and technical functioning of the plant. There was no significant negative effect on the respondents' evaluation of or attitude toward nuclear power generation. It was found that the people's awareness about the Mihama Unit 3 accident was lower and the effect of the accident on their awareness of nuclear power generation was more limited and smaller when compared with the case of the JCO accident. In the Kanto region, people knew less about the Mihama Unit 3 accident than those living in the Kansai region, and they remembered the JCO accident, the subsequent cover-up by Tokyo Electric Power Company, and the resulting power shortage better than those living in Kansai. This suggested that there was a little difference in terms of psychological distance in relation to the accidents an incidents depending on the place where the events occurred and the company which

  6. The international nuclear liability and compensation regime put to the test of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reyners, P.; Tetley, M.

    2003-01-01

    Full text: It appears that nuclear emergency plans place generally more emphasis on the nuclear safety and radiation protection aspects of the management of an accident, both inside the installation concerned and off-site, than on the particular requirements of local residents who would find themselves suddenly in such an emergency situation and of possible victims of nuclear damage. In a similar vein, studies focusing on the international nuclear third party liability regime usually take a global perspective and leave little room for the treatment of individual cases. The albeit welcome dearth of practical experience in Western countries in providing compensation for accidents of nuclear origin has, however, meant that public and local authorities are not always fully conscious of the importance of this question which should be dealt with in as practical a manner as possible. In order to cover all the legal and practical questions that could arise during the management of the consequences of a nuclear accident with regard to third party liability, insurance and compensation, the OECD/NEA held in co-operation with French authorities a workshop in November 2001. It was decided to organize this workshop according to three main stages: the alert phase, the accident phase and the post-accident phase; and to examine during these three stages the various roles played by local and national authorities, the nuclear operator and his insurer, as well as the nature and form of their respective actions. These questions were addressed both from the angle of applicable domestic legislation and of the relevant international conventions. From the analysis of different national experiences and of the information exchanged during the workshop, a striking diversity may be noted of solutions adopted or envisaged to address various aspects of civil liability, insurance and indemnification of damage in a nuclear emergency situation. This lack of uniformity should not necessarily be

  7. Replacement of the criticality accident alarm system in the Tokai reprocessing plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanada, Yukihisa; Momose, Takumaro; Suzuki, Kei; Kawai, Keiichi

    2008-01-01

    A Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) was installed as part of criticality safety management for use in reducing the radiation workers could be exposed to in the rare case of a criticality accident. The initial CAAS version was installed the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) in the 1980s. It includes units that can detect gamma-rays or neutron-rays released in criticality accidents (CADs), one of which consists of three plastic scintillation gamma detectors and three solid state neutron detectors with fissile material, and in being highly reliable utilizes the 2 out of 3 voting system. The purpose of this study is to give the design principles and procedures for determining the adequate relocation of the CADs within the TRP. The optimal places for the CADs to be relocated to were determined using a conservative evaluation method. Firstly, equipment needing to be monitored for criticality accidents was selected with consideration given to the risk of excessive exposure to workers. Secondly, the detection threshold of a minimum accident was set to be an increase in power of 10 15 fissions/s occurring within a rise-time of between 0.5 ms and 1 s. The sum of neutron and gamma doses of a minimum accident (10 15 fissions) was 0.3 Gy at an unshielded distance of 1 m. Finally, doses at where the CADs were installed were evaluated using parameters calculated with MCNP and ANISN. As a result, the alarm trip level of both the gamma detector and the neutron detector being set at 2.0 mGy/h enabled minimum criticality accidents to be conservatively detected. These results were then applied to the new CAD positions. (author)

  8. International nuclear accident dosimetry intercomparison: results of Czech participation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spurny, F.; Votockova, I.

    1996-01-01

    An international intercomparison scheme for criticality accident dosimetry systems took place at the SILENE reactor, Valduc, France in June 1993. The dosemeters were exposed both on phantoms and in free air to radiation from the reactor, both shielded by lead and bare. The results obtained during this event by Czech participants are presented and compared with the average values obtained by the complete group of participants and with the reference values. The systems used consisted mostly of Si-diodes and thermoluminescent detectors, some supporting measurements were performed with solid state nuclear track detectors and using the albedo principle. The agreement between the data sets is very good. 7 tabs., 13 refs

  9. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-08-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains reservations/declarations made upon or following signature and Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument expressing consent to be bound. The status of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States or organizations as of 31 July 1990 is presented in two attachments

  10. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident. Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-08-01

    The document refers to the Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident (INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (INFCIRC-336). Part I contains reservations/declarations made upon or following signature and Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument expressing consent to be bound. The status of signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by States or organizations as of 31 July 1989 for the conventions is presented in two attachments

  11. Radiological consequence of Chernobyl nuclear power accident in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uchiyama, Masafumi; Nakamura, Yuji; Kankura, Takako; Iwasaki, Tamiko; Fujimoto, Kenzo; Kobayashi, Sadayoshi.

    1988-03-01

    Two years have elapsed since the accident in Chernobyl nuclear power station shocked those concerned with nuclear power generation. The effect that this accident exerted on human environment has still continued directly and indirectly, and the reports on the effect have been made in various countries and by international organizations. In Japan, about the exposure dose of Japanese people due to this accident, the Nuclear Safety Commission and Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute issued the reports. In this report, the available data concerning the envrionmental radioactivity level in Japan due to the Chernobyl accident are collected, and the evaluation of exposure dose which seems most appropriate from the present day scientific viewpoint was attempted by the detailed analysis in the National Institute of Radiological Sciences. The enormous number of the data observed in various parts of Japan were different in sampling, locality, time and measuring method, so difficulty arose frequently. The maximum concentration of I-131 in floating dust was 2.5 Bq/m 3 observed in Fukui, and the same kinds of radioactive nuclides as those in Europe were detected. (Kako, I.)

  12. Prevention of the causes and consequences of a criticality accident - measures adopted in France; Prevention des causes et des consequences d'un accident de criticite - solutions adoptees en France

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fruchard, Y.; Lavie, J.M

    1966-07-01

    The question of safety in regard to criticality accident risks has two aspects: prevention of the cause and limitation of the consequences. These two aspects are closely connected. The effort devoted to prevention of the causes depends on the seriousness of the possible human psychologic and economic consequences of the accident. The criticality accidents which have occurred in the nuclear industry, though few in number, do reveal the imperfect nature of the techniques adopted to prevent the causes, and also constitute the only available realistic basis for evaluating the consequences and developing measures to limit them. The authors give a analysis of the known causes and consequences of past criticality accidents and on this basis make a number of comments concerning: the validity of traditional safety criteria, the probability of accidents for different types of operations, characteristic accidents which can serve as models, and the extent of possible radiological consequences. The measures adopted in France to limit the consequences of a possible criticality accident under the headings: location, design and lay-out of the installations, accident detection, and dosimetry for the exposed personnel, are briefly described after a short account of the criteria used in deciding on them. (author) [French] La surete relative aux risques d'accidents de criticite presente deux aspects: la prevention des causes et les parades aux consequences. Ces deux aspects sont tres lies. L'effort consenti a la prevention des causes decoule de l'importance des consequences humaines economiques et psychologiques possibles d'un eventuel accident. Les accidents de criticite survenus dans l'industrie nucleaire, malgre leur rarete, d'une part devoilent les imperfections des techniques de prevention des causes, d'autre part constituent la seule base realiste disponible d'evaluation des consequences et de mise au point des parades a ces consequences

  13. Indemnification of damage in the event of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The Workshop on the Indemnification of Damage in the Event of a Nuclear Accident, organised by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency in close co-operation with the French authorities, was held in Paris from 26 to 28 November 2001. This event was an integral part of the International Nuclear Emergency Exercise INEX 2000. It attracted wide participation from national nuclear authorities, regulators, operators of nuclear installations, nuclear insurers and international organisations. The objective was to test the capacity of the existing nuclear liability and compensation mechanisms in the 29 countries represented at the workshop to manage the consequences of a nuclear emergency. This workshop was based upon the scenario used for the INEX 2000 Exercise, i.e. an accident simulated at the Gravelines nuclear power plant in the north of France in May 2001. These proceedings contain a comparative analysis of legislative and regulatory provisions governing emergency response and nuclear third party liability, based upon country replies to a questionnaire. This publication also includes the full responses provided to that questionnaire, as well as the texts of presentations made by special guests from Germany and Japan describing the manner in which the public authorities in their respective countries responded to two nuclear accidents of a very different nature and scale. (authors)

  14. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-09-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (CENNA) (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (CANARE) (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status lists as of 10 September 1992, part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon expressing consent to be bound and objections there to, and part III contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  15. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (CENNA) (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (CANARE) (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status list as of 31 December 1996, Part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto, and Part III contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature

  16. Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident and convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-02-28

    The document refers to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (CENNA) (IAEA-INFCIRC-335) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (CANARE) (IAEA-INFCIRC-336). Part I contains the status list as of 31 December 1996, Part II contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon or following expressing consent to be bound and objections thereto, and Part III contains the texts of reservations/declarations made upon signature.

  17. Analysis of accidents and troubles of nuclear power plants in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kobayashi, Kunio

    1980-01-01

    In Japan, electric power companies are obliged to report the accidents and troubles occurred in nuclear power stations to the MITI according to the relevant laws, and 166 cases in total have been reported as of the end of March, 1980. These accidents and troubles are all trivial, and do not cause problems from the viewpoint of the safety nuclear power stations. Regarding respective accidents and troubles, the causes have been sought thoroughly, and the sufficient countermeasures have been taken on all occasions. But in order to improve the reliability of nuclear power stations further, it is important to treat the accidents and troubles occurred so far statistically and grasp the general trend. Thereupon, 152 accidents and troubles occurred till September, 1979, were analyzed quantitatively, and the results are reported in this paper. From the results, the prospect hereafter is discussed. The number of the reported cases of accidents and troubles in each nuclear power plant in operation every year is tabulated. The accidents and troubles were relatively frequent in the initial two or three years of operation of respective new reactor types, but decreased thereafter. The systems to which troubled equipments belong and the troubled equipments are shown. Most troubles have occurred in reactor cooling systems and valves. The situations and causes of troubles, the operational conditions at the time of the accidents and troubles and the effects and others are reported. (Kako, I.)

  18. Local governments' roles of the compensation for damage by the Tokai JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanabe, Tomoyuki

    2003-01-01

    The Tokai JCO criticality accident on September 30, 1999 was the first case to which The Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage was applied. Although the Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage formulates the outline of the institutional framework for nuclear third party liability together with operator's insurance scheme, details of actual compensation procedure are not specified. By this reason, the compensation procedure in the Tokai accident had been executed without a concrete legal specification and a precedent. In spite of this situation, the compensation procedure with the accident led to an unexpectedly successful result. We observe the several reasons why the compensation procedure was implemented successfully despite the lack of concrete legal specification and a precedent. One of the reasons is that the local governments, Tokai Village and Ibaraki Prefecture, immediately took the leadership in implementing a temporary regime of compensation procedure without wasting time for waiting national government's directives. Upon practicing this compensation procedure, the local governments implemented the following steps. (1) Initial estimation of the amount and scope of damage. (2) Providing the criteria and heads of damage subject to compensation. (3) Unitary compensation procedure at the local levels. (4) Distribution of emergency payments for the victims. (5) Facilitating compensatory negotiation between the victims and JCO as arbitrator. However, some concerns are also pointed out about the fact that the local government directed the whole procedure without sufficient adjustment with the national government for compensation policy. Among all, in the compensation led by the local governments, it was difficult to guarantee fairness of compensation because victims who are influential on the local government such as industrial associations would have unfairly strong negotiation power in the compensatory negotiation, while the operator being responsible for the

  19. Fukushima nuclear accident and the social responsibility of science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshioka, Hitoshi

    2011-01-01

    Five months had passed since Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) accident occurred but still there was no knowing when the accident ended. Released radioactivity seemed to be greater than one million terra Bq and if there occurred an explosive rupture of containment vessel due to the failure of containment vent or occurrence of steam explosion, the amount of released radioactivity might amount to be at least equivalent to or surpass that of Chernobyl NPP accident. There existed still a risk that overheating and meltdown of nuclear fuels might reoccur with loss of cooling due to a possible giant aftershock. This article described total views on significant disaster that the accident brought about on many neighboring residents or wide range of people. After a general discussion about what was social responsibility of scientists, social responsibility of scientists for Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident was discussed. Responsibility of omission was also argued. (T. Tanaka)

  20. A Review of Criticality Accidents 2000 Revision

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thomas P. McLaughlin; Shean P. Monahan; Norman L. Pruvost; Vladimir V. Frolov; Boris G. Ryazanov; Victor I. Sviridov

    2000-05-01

    Criticality accidents and the characteristics of prompt power excursions are discussed. Sixty accidental power excursions are reviewed. Sufficient detail is provided to enable the reader to understand the physical situation, the chemistry and material flow, and when available the administrative setting leading up to the time of the accident. Information on the power history, energy release, consequences, and causes are also included when available. For those accidents that occurred in process plants, two new sections have been included in this revision. The first is an analysis and summary of the physical and neutronic features of the chain reacting systems. The second is a compilation of observations and lessons learned. Excursions associated with large power reactors are not included in this report.

  1. A Review of Criticality Accidents 2000 Revision

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McLaughlin, Thomas P.; Monahan, Shean P.; Pruvost, Norman L.; Frolov, Vladimir V.; Ryazanov, Boris G.; Sviridov, Victor I.

    2000-01-01

    Criticality accidents and the characteristics of prompt power excursions are discussed. Sixty accidental power excursions are reviewed. Sufficient detail is provided to enable the reader to understand the physical situation, the chemistry and material flow, and when available the administrative setting leading up to the time of the accident. Information on the power history, energy release, consequences, and causes are also included when available. For those accidents that occurred in process plants, two new sections have been included in this revision. The first is an analysis and summary of the physical and neutronic features of the chain reacting systems. The second is a compilation of observations and lessons learned. Excursions associated with large power reactors are not included in this report

  2. Japanese Nuclear Accident and U.S. Response

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Douet, Randy

    2011-01-01

    U.S. Government response to the Fukushima accident: • Multi-agency task force (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy, Department of Defense) supporting Japan recovery efforts; • President Obama directed the NRC to perform a comprehensive review of U.S. reactors; • NRC established agency task force to develop lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi accident to provide short-term and long-term analysis of the events

  3. The study of two-phase critical flow characteristics in nuclear reactor coolant system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chung, Moon Ki; Chang, Seok Kyu

    1993-01-01

    This report presents the physical characteristics of two-phase critical flow whcih can be occured in a light water nuclear power plant during LOCA and also reviews the critical flow models and their applications in detail. The existing experimental data base are reviewed and classified. The typical critical flow models which have been applied to the computer code for the accident are also reviewed. Some suggestions are presented for the development of advanced analytical models and the extension of useful experimental database. (Author)

  4. Accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ashrafi, A.; Farnoudi, F.; Tochai, M.T.M.; Mirhabibi, N.

    1986-01-01

    On March 28, 1979, the TMI, unit 2 nuclear power plant experienced a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) which has had a major impact among the others, upon the safety of nuclear power plants. Although a small part of the reactor core melted in this accident, but due to well performance of the vital safety equipment, there was no serious radioactivity release to the environment, and the accident has had no impact on the basic safety goals. A brief scenario of the accident, its consequences and the lessons learned are discussed

  5. Cleanup and decommissioning of a nuclear reactor after a severe accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    Although the development of commercial nuclear power plants has in general been associated with an excellent record of nuclear safety, the possibility of a severe accident resulting in major fuel and core damage cannot be excluded and such accidents have in fact already occurred. For over a decade, IAEA publications have provided technical guidance and recommendations for post-accident planning to be considered by appropriate authorities. Guidance and recommendations have recently been published on the management of damaged nuclear fuel, sealing of the reactor building and related safety and performance assessment aspects. The present technical report on the cleanup and decommissioning of reactors which have undergone a severe accident represents a further publication in the series. Refs, figs and tabs.

  6. JAERI's activities in JCO accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-09-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) was actively involved in a variety of technical supports and cooperative activities, such as advice on terminating the criticality condition, contamination checks of the residents and consultation services for the residents, as emergency response actions to the criticality accident at the uranium processing facility operated by the JCO Co. Ltd., which occurred on September 30, 1999. These activities were carried out in collaborative ways by the JAERI staff from the Tokai Research Establishment, Naka Fusion Research Establishment, Oarai Research Establishment, and Headquarter Office in Tokyo. As well, the JAERI was engaged in the post-accident activities such as identification of accident causes, analyses of the criticality accident, and dose assessment of exposed residents, to support the Headquarter for Accident Countermeasures of the Science and Technology Agency (STA), the Accident Investigation Committee and the Health Control Committee of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC). This report compiles the activities, that the JAERI has conducted to date, including the discussions on measures for terminating the criticality condition, evaluation of the fission number, radiation monitoring in the environment, dose assessment, analyses of criticality dynamics. (author)

  7. The risk of major nuclear accident: calculation and perception of probabilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leveque, Francois

    2013-01-01

    Whereas before the Fukushima accident, already eight major accidents occurred in nuclear power plants, a number which is higher than that expected by experts and rather close to that corresponding of people perception of risk, the author discusses how to understand these differences and reconcile observations, objective probability of accidents and subjective assessment of risks, why experts have been over-optimistic, whether public opinion is irrational regarding nuclear risk, and how to measure risk and its perception. Thus, he addresses and discusses the following issues: risk calculation (cost, calculated frequency of major accident, bias between the number of observed accidents and model predictions), perceived probabilities and aversion for disasters (perception biases of probability, perception biases unfavourable to nuclear), the Bayes contribution and its application (Bayes-Laplace law, statistics, choice of an a priori probability, prediction of the next event, probability of a core fusion tomorrow)

  8. Critical Review of EU Nuclear Stress Tests in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Becker, O.; Lorenz, P.; Wallner, A.

    2012-01-01

    In March 2011, the core melt accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi 1 nuclear power plant (NPP) showed the world that the nuclear industry cannot prevent severe accidents from happening. The accidents in Japan proved that highly unlikely accidents cannot be excluded. The Fukushima accident confirmed the mistrust towards nuclear power among the Japanese but also European citizens. In reaction to the devastating nuclear disaster in Japan the European Council concluded in March 2011, that the safety of all EU nuclear plants should be reviewed on the basis of a comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessment ('stress tests'). The EU Nuclear Safety Regulators Group – ENSREG took over the task to provide a “targeted reassessment of the safety margins of nuclear power plants”, thus examining whether the safety margins which were used in the licensing of NPPs are sufficient to cover unexpected events. It is important to understand that the stress tests could not take into account all key safety issues such as the capability to prevent accidents - the scope of the stress tests defined by ENSREG didn´t promise to deliver a comprehensive risk and safety assessment. According to some observers the stress tests were mainly set up to improve the confidence in the safety of European NPPs. Nevertheless, the stress tests provided some interesting findings concerning safety: This study assesses the safety of the nuclear power plants in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Ukraine. The introduction contains an overview of the content and procedure of the stress tests. This “Critical Review of the Stress Tests” is based on the national stress tests reports written by the national nuclear safety authorities and on the Peer review country reports attached to the Peer review report - Stress tests performed on European nuclear power plants written by the Peer review Teams, the Peer Review Board respectively, and endorsed by ENSREG [ENSREG 2012a, ENSREG 2012c]. It

  9. Critical Review of EU Nuclear Stress Tests in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Becker, O.; Lorenz, P.; Wallner, A.

    2012-07-01

    In March 2011, the core melt accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi 1 nuclear power plant (NPP) showed the world that the nuclear industry cannot prevent severe accidents from happening. The accidents in Japan proved that highly unlikely accidents cannot be excluded. The Fukushima accident confirmed the mistrust towards nuclear power among the Japanese but also European citizens. In reaction to the devastating nuclear disaster in Japan the European Council concluded in March 2011, that the safety of all EU nuclear plants should be reviewed on the basis of a comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessment ('stress tests'). The EU Nuclear Safety Regulators Group – ENSREG took over the task to provide a “targeted reassessment of the safety margins of nuclear power plants”, thus examining whether the safety margins which were used in the licensing of NPPs are sufficient to cover unexpected events. It is important to understand that the stress tests could not take into account all key safety issues such as the capability to prevent accidents - the scope of the stress tests defined by ENSREG didn´t promise to deliver a comprehensive risk and safety assessment. According to some observers the stress tests were mainly set up to improve the confidence in the safety of European NPPs. Nevertheless, the stress tests provided some interesting findings concerning safety: This study assesses the safety of the nuclear power plants in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Ukraine. The introduction contains an overview of the content and procedure of the stress tests. This “Critical Review of the Stress Tests” is based on the national stress tests reports written by the national nuclear safety authorities and on the Peer review country reports attached to the Peer review report - Stress tests performed on European nuclear power plants written by the Peer review Teams, the Peer Review Board respectively, and endorsed by ENSREG [ENSREG 2012a, ENSREG 2012c]. It continues

  10. Technical basis for nuclear accident dosimetry at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerr, G.D.; Mei, G.T.

    1993-08-01

    The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Environmental, Safety, and Health Emergency Response Organization has the responsibility of providing analyses of personnel exposures to neutrons and gamma rays from a nuclear accident. This report presents the technical and philosophical basis for the dose assessment aspects of the nuclear accident dosimetry (NAD) system at ORNL. The issues addressed are regulatory guidelines, ORNL NAD system components and performance, and the interpretation of dosimetric information that would be gathered following a nuclear accident

  11. Global risk of radioactive fallout after major nuclear reactor accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lelieveld, J.; Kunkel, D.; Lawrence, M.G.

    2012-01-01

    Major reactor accidents of nuclear power plants are rare, yet the consequences are catastrophic. But what is meant by ''rare''? And what can be learned from the Chernobyl and Fukushima incidents? Here we assess the cumulative, global risk of exposure to radioactivity due to atmospheric dispersion of gases and particles following severe nuclear accidents (the most severe ones on the International Nuclear Event Scale, INES 7), using particulate "1"3"7Cs and gaseous "1"3"1I as proxies for the fallout. Our results indicate that previously the occurrence of INES 7 major accidents and the risks of radioactive contamination have been underestimated. Using a global model of the atmosphere we compute that on average, in the event of a major reactor accident of any nuclear power plant worldwide, more than 90% of emitted "1"3"7Cs would be transported beyond 50 km and about 50% beyond 1000 km distance before being deposited. This corroborates that such accidents have large-scale and trans-boundary impacts. Although the emission strengths and atmospheric removal processes of "1"3"7Cs and "1"3"1I are quite different, the radioactive contamination patterns over land and the human exposure due to deposition are computed to be similar. High human exposure risks occur around reactors in densely populated regions, notably in West Europe and South Asia, where a major reactor accident can subject around 30 million people to radioactive contamination. The recent decision by Germany to phase out its nuclear reactors will reduce the national risk, though a large risk will still remain from the reactors in neighbouring countries.

  12. Special committee review of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's severe accident risks report (NUREG--1150)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kouts, H.J.C.; Apostolakis, G.; Kastenberg, W.E.; Birkhofer, E.H.A.; Hoegberg, L.G.; LeSage, L.G.; Rasmussen, N.C.; Teague, H.J.; Taylor, J.J.

    1990-08-01

    In April 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) published a draft report ''Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five US Nuclear Power Plants,'' NUREG-1150. This report updated, extended and improved upon the information presented in the 1974 ''Reactor Safety Study,'' WASH-1400. Because the information in NUREG-1150 will play a significant role in implementing the NRC's Severe Accident Policy, its quality and credibility are of critical importance. Accordingly, the Commission requested that the RES conduct a peer review of NUREG-1150 to ensure that the methods, safety insights and conclusions presented are appropriate and adequately reflect the current state of knowledge with respect to reactor safety. To this end, RES formed a special committee in June of 1989 under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Committee, composed of a group of recognized national and international experts in nuclear reactor safety, was charged with preparing a report reflecting their review of NUREG-1150 with respect to the adequacy of the methods, data, analysis and conclusions it set forth. The report which precedes reflects the results of this peer review

  13. Severe accident management program at Cofrentes Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Borondo, L.; Serrano, C.; Fiol, M.J.; Sanchez, A.

    2000-01-01

    Cofrentes Nuclear Power Plant (GE BWR/6) has implemented its specific Severe Accident Management Program within this year 2000. New organization and guides have been developed to successfully undertake the management of a severe accident. In particular, the Technical Support Center will count on a new ''Severe Accident Management Team'' (SAMT) which will be in charge of the Severe Accident Guides (SAG) when Control Room Crew reaches the Emergency Operation Procedures (EOP) step that requires containment flooding. Specific tools and training have also been developed to help the SAMT to mitigate the accident. (author)

  14. Scientific aspects of the Tohoku earthquake and Fukushima nuclear accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Koketsu, Kazuki

    2016-04-01

    We investigated the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, the accident of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, and assessments conducted beforehand for earthquake and tsunami potential in the Pacific offshore region of the Tohoku District. The results of our investigation show that all the assessments failed to foresee the earthquake and its related tsunami, which was the main cause of the accident. Therefore, the disaster caused by the earthquake, and the accident were scientifically unforeseeable at the time. However, for a zone neighboring the reactors, a 2008 assessment showed tsunamis higher than the plant height. As a lesson learned from the accident, companies operating nuclear power plants should be prepared using even such assessment results for neighboring zones.

  15. Sensitivity analysis of parameters important to nuclear criticality safety of Castor X/28F spent nuclear fuel cask

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Leotlela, Mosebetsi J. [Witwatersrand Univ., Johannesburg (South Africa). School of Physics; Koeberg Operating Unit, Johannesburg (South Africa). Regulations and Licensing; Malgas, Isaac [Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, Duinefontein (South Africa). Nuclear Engineering Analysis; Taviv, Eugene [ASARA consultants (PTY) LTD, Johannesburg (South Africa)

    2015-11-15

    In nuclear criticality safety analysis it is essential to ascertain how various components of the nuclear system will perform under certain conditions they may be subjected to, particularly if the components of the system are likely to be affected by environmental factors such as temperature, radiation or material composition. It is therefore prudent that a sensitivity analysis is performed to determine and quantify the response of the output to variation in any of the input parameters. In a fissile system, the output parameter of importance is the k{sub eff}. Therefore, in attempting to prevent reactivity-induced accidents, it is important for the criticality safety analyst to have a quantified degree of response for the neutron multiplication factor to perturbation in a given input parameter. This article will present the results of the perturbation of the parameters that are important to nuclear criticality safety analysis and their respective correlation equations for deriving the sensitivity coefficients.

  16. A review on liability in case of nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gallage-Alwis, Sylvie; Faron, Pauline

    2013-01-01

    After having evoked assessments of the cost of a nuclear accident in France and of that of damages caused by the Fukushima accident, the authors propose an overview of the issue of liability of companies involved in the operation of a nuclear power plant. They outline that this regime is mainly governed by two international conventions: the Paris Convention on third party liability in the field of nuclear energy, and the Brussels Convention. The first one bears on the liability of nuclear installation operators, while the second one aims at ensuring an additional compensation of casualties on public funds. They also evoke the Vienna Convention which aims at defining a world regime for nuclear liability. They outline the limited scope of application of the Paris Convention, and the limitation of compensations. They discuss the liability of companies others than those operating nuclear installations

  17. Accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bajusz, J.; Vamos, G.

    1979-01-01

    A short description of the TMI power plant is given. The course of events leading to the reactor accident and that of the first two weeks is described. The effect on the environment is estimated. The reasons and consequences of the accident are analysed. The probability of such an accident at the Paks Nuclear Power Plant is estimated. (R.J.)

  18. The risk of a major nuclear accident: calculation and perception of probabilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leveque, Francois

    2013-07-01

    The accident at Fukushima Daiichi, Japan, occurred on 11 March 2011. This nuclear disaster, the third on such a scale, left a lasting mark in the minds of hundreds of millions of people. Much as Three Mile Island or Chernobyl, yet another place will be permanently associated with a nuclear power plant which went out of control. Fukushima Daiichi revived the issue of the hazards of civil nuclear power, stirring up all the associated passion and emotion. The whole of this paper is devoted to the risk of a major nuclear accident. By this we mean a failure initiating core meltdown, a situation in which the fuel rods melt and mix with the metal in their cladding. Such accidents are classified as at least level 5 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. The Three Mile Island accident, which occurred in 1979 in the United States, reached this level of severity. The explosion of reactor 4 at the Chernobyl plant in Ukraine in 1986 and the recent accident in Japan were classified as class 7, the highest grade on this logarithmic scale. The main difference between the top two levels and level 5 relates to a significant or major release of radioactive material to the environment. In the event of a level-5 accident, damage is restricted to the inside of the plant, whereas, in the case of level-7 accidents, huge areas of land, above or below the surface, and/or sea may be contaminated. Before the meltdown of reactors 1, 2 and 3 at Fukushima Daiichi, eight major accidents affecting nuclear power plants had occurred worldwide. This is a high figure compared with the one calculated by the experts. Observations in the field do not appear to fit the results of the probabilistic models of nuclear accidents produced since the 1970's. Oddly enough the number of major accidents is closer to the risk as perceived by the general public. In general we tend to overestimate any risk relating to rare, fearsome accidents. What are we to make of this divergence? How are we to reconcile

  19. A NPO project for measurement of environmental neutrons in the peninsula Shimokita after the JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aratani, Michi

    2001-01-01

    The Penin. Shimokita as a Nuclear Peninsula: Past and Present: Since 1967, the Penin. Shimokita is characterized as a Nuclear Peninsula. Then the Shimokita Wharf of Ohminato Port in Mutsu-city was appointed as a home port of the Nuclear Power Ship Mutsu. In 1984 Mutsu Ogawara Region, a southern part of the Penin. around Rokkasho, was paid attention as a target region for reprocessing facilities of burnt nuclear fuels from all the nuclear power stations in this country. At the present stage, uranium enrichment facilities, low-level radioactive waste laying center and high-level vitrified waste storage center are in operation, and the reprocessing facilities are under construction. Burnt fuels are also carried into the site before completion of the facilities mainly for the purpose of cooling in the water pool, because cooling pools of some nuclear power stations are already full of the burnt nuclear fuels. Recently, Mayor of Mutsu has announced that Mutsu City are ready to accept a 'temporary' storage facilities for burnt nuclear fuels. Constructions of two nuclear power stations are in procession. Practice and Results: After the JCO critical accident, members of the Penin. Shimokita Activation Society (SAS) have made voluntarily some chances for learning neutron, which has played a definite role in the accident. Before the time of the accident, they have ever heard nothing about a neutron. So, neutron is entirely a new face radiation for them. Members of NPO EGG (Environmental Guardian of GALA) then obtained information from Urgent Session of the 44th Annual Meeting of Radiochemistry held in Tsukuba by the Japan Society of Nuclear and Radiochemical Sciences, and attended the seminar on the JCO accident held at Institute for Environmental Sciences (IES) in Rokkasho. A title of the seminar was 'Extremely Low Background Gamma Ray Spectroscopy applied to the JCO Accident'. The lecturer was Prof. Komura of LLRL (Low Level Radioactivity Laboratory), Kanazawa University

  20. Criticality accident dosimetry with ESR spectroscopy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    d'Errico, F; Fattibene, P; Onori, S; Pantaloni, M

    1996-01-01

    The suitability of the ESR alanine and sugar detectors for criticality accident dosimetry was experimentally investigated during an intercomparison of dosimetry techniques. Tests were performed irradiating detectors both free-in-air and on-phantom during controlled critcality excursions at the SILENE reactor in Valduc, France. Several grays of absorbed dose were imparted in neutron gamma-ray fields of various relative intensities and spectral distributions. Analysed results confirmed the potential of these systems which can immediately provide an acute dose assessment with an average underestimate of 30%in the various fields. This performance allows for the screening of severely exposed individuals and meets the IAEA recommendations on the early estimate of accident absorbed doses.

  1. Severe accidents and nuclear containment integrity (SANCY). SANCY summary report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lindholm, I. [VTT Processes, Espoo (Finland)

    2004-07-01

    SANCY project investigates physical phenomena related to severe nuclear accidents with importance to Finnish nuclear power plants. Currently the major topics are the ex-vessel coolability issues, long-term severe accident management and containment leak tightness and adoption and development of new calculation tools considering also the needs of the future Olkiluoto 3 plant. SANCY employs both experimental and analytical methods. (orig.)

  2. Modelling of critical functions of nuclear reactors using Fild Programmable Gate Array; Modelagem de funcoes criticas de reatores nucleares utilizando Fild Programmable Gate Array

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Teixeira, Pamela Iara Nolasco

    2016-07-01

    This paper proposes the development of a method using FPGA for critical security functions of a nuclear reactor. It was implemented two critical safety functions in VHDL, which is a way to describe, through a program, the behavior of a circuit or digital component. Two critical security functions, FCS Core Cooling, responsible for cooling the reactor core in the charts of the plant and also in the event of accidents involving loss of coolant and FCS Heat Transfer, responsible for cooling the reactor core in the event an accident with loss of coolant were implemented. In this Dissertation it was chosen the use of FPGA, because - due to the effects of aging, obsolescence issues, environmental degradation and mechanical failures - nuclear power plants need to replace their older systems by new ones based on digital technology. The technologies obtained using a system described in hardware language can be implemented in a programmable device, having the advantage of changing the code at any time. (author)

  3. Using modular neural networks to monitor accident conditions in nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guo, Z.

    1992-01-01

    Nuclear power plants are very complex systems. The diagnoses of transients or accident conditions is very difficult because a large amount of information, which is often noisy, or intermittent, or even incomplete, need to be processed in real time. To demonstrate their potential application to nuclear power plants, neural networks axe used to monitor the accident scenarios simulated by the training simulator of TVA's Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant. A self-organization network is used to compress original data to reduce the total number of training patterns. Different accident scenarios are closely related to different key parameters which distinguish one accident scenario from another. Therefore, the accident scenarios can be monitored by a set of small size neural networks, called modular networks, each one of which monitors only one assigned accident scenario, to obtain fast training and recall. Sensitivity analysis is applied to select proper input variables for modular networks

  4. International Experts' Meeting on Decommissioning and Remediation after a Nuclear Accident. Presentations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    Against the backdrop of the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety in Vienna, Austria, in June 2011. The Conference adopted a Ministerial Declaration which, inter alia, requested the Director General to prepare a draft Action Plan covering all the relevant aspects relating to nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and response, and radiation protection of people and the environment, as well as the relevant international legal framework. On 22 September 2011, the IAEA General Conference unanimously endorsed the draft IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety approved by the Board of Governors. The Action Plan sets out a comprehensive programme of work, in 12 major areas, to strengthen nuclear safety worldwide. Under one of these areas, headed 'Enhance transparency and effectiveness of communication and improve dissemination of information', the IAEA Secretariat was requested to organize an International Experts' Meeting (IEM) on decommissioning, cleanup and remediation of nuclear facilities and contaminated lands after a nuclear accident. This IEM was organized in response to that request. The IEM focussed on the complex technical, societal, environmental and economic issues that need to be considered for decommissioning and remediation activities after a nuclear accident, specifically after the emergency exposure situation of an accident has been declared ended. The objective of the IEM is to assist Member States to prepare for and to be able to manage the consequences resulting from a nuclear accident. The meeting highlighted the specific short term and long term issues that may need to be addressed during decommissioning of facilities and remediation of the off-site environment affected by a nuclear accident. It is of interest to a wide range of experts, such as decision makers, regulators, operators

  5. Management of Radioactive Waste after a Nuclear Power Plant Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strand, Per; Laurent, Gerard; Rindo, Hiroshi; Georges, Christine; Ito, Eiichiro; Yamada, Norikazu; Iablokov, Iuri; Kilochytska, Tatiana; Jefferies, Nick; Byrne, Jim; Siemann, Michael; Koganeya, Toshiyuki; Aoki, Hiroomi

    2016-01-01

    The NEA Expert Group on Fukushima Waste Management and Decommissioning R and D (EGFWMD) was established in 2014 to offer advice to the authorities in Japan on the management of large quantities of on-site waste with complex properties and to share experiences with the international community and NEA member countries on ongoing work at the Fukushima Daiichi site. The group was formed with specialists from around the world who had gained experience in waste management, radiological contamination or decommissioning and waste management R and D after the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. This report provides technical opinions and ideas from these experts on post-accident waste management and R and D at the Fukushima Daiichi site, as well as information on decommissioning challenges. Chapter 1 provides general descriptions and a short introduction to nuclear accidents or radiological contaminations; for instance the Chernobyl NPP accident, the Three Mile Island Unit 2 accident and the Windscale fire accident. Chapter 2 provides experiences on regulator-implementer interaction in both normal and abnormal situations, including after a nuclear accident. Chapter 3 provides experiences on stakeholder involvement after accidents. These two chapters focus on human aspects after an accident and provide recommendations on how to improve communication between stakeholders so as to resolve issues arising after unexpected nuclear accidents. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide information on technical issues related to waste management after accidents. Chapter 4 focuses on the physical and chemical nature of the waste, Chapter 5 on radiological characterisation, and Chapter 6 on waste classification and categorisation. The persons involved in waste management after an accident should address these issues as soon as possible after the accident. Chapters 7 and 8 also focus on technical issues but with a long-term perspective of the waste direction in the future. Chapter 7 relates

  6. Prevention of the Causes and Consequences of Criticality Accidents: Measures Adopted in France; Prevention des Causes et des Consequences d'un Accident de Criticite: Solutions Adoptees en France

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fruchard, Y.; Lavie, J. -M. [Commissariat a l' Energie Atomique, Paris (France)

    1966-05-15

    It is important to guard against the risk of criticality accidents by seeking to prevent their occurrence through the elimination of their causes and also by taking steps to provide against their consequences. These two aspects are closely linked since the efforts made to elaborate preventive procedures are dictated by the importance of the repercussions which such accidents are liable to have in the human, economic and psychological spheres. The criticality accidents which have occurred in the nuclear industry, though small in number, do reveal the imperfect nature of the techniques adopted to prevent them, and they constitute the only available realistic basis for evaluating their consequences and developing suitable precautionary techniques. The authors give a detailed analysis of the known causes and consequences of past criticality accidents and on this basis make a number of comments in connection with the validity of traditional safety criteria, the probability of accidents for different types of operation, the characteristic accidents capable of serving as models, and the extent of possible radiological consequences. The measures adopted in France to limit the consequences of a possible criticality accident (location, design and lay-out of installations, accident detection dosimetry for exposed personnel) are briefly described after a short account of the criteria used in deciding on them. Finally, the authors discuss the economic implications of adopting particular precautionary measures and of applying them uniformly, taking due account of the question of reliability. (author) [French] II est important de se proteger contre les risques d'accidents de criticite en tentant, d'une part, de prevenir les accidents eux-memes par l'elimination de leurs causes, d'autre part, de parer a leurs consequences. Ces deux aspects sont tres lies: l'effort portant sur la prevention des accidents decoule de l'importance de leurs consequences sur les plans humain, economique

  7. How a nuclear power plant accident influences acceptance of nuclear power: results of a longitudinal study before and after the Fukushima disaster.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Visschers, Vivianne H M; Siegrist, Michael

    2013-02-01

    Major nuclear accidents, such as the recent accident in Fukushima, Japan, have been shown to decrease the public's acceptance of nuclear power. However, little is known about how a serious accident affects people's acceptance of nuclear power and the determinants of acceptance. We conducted a longitudinal study (N= 790) in Switzerland: one survey was done five months before and one directly after the accident in Fukushima. We assessed acceptance, perceived risks, perceived benefits, and trust related to nuclear power stations. In our model, we assumed that both benefit and risk perceptions determine acceptance of nuclear power. We further hypothesized that trust influences benefit and risk perceptions and that trust before a disaster relates to trust after a disaster. Results showed that the acceptance and perceptions of nuclear power as well as its trust were more negative after the accident. In our model, perceived benefits and risks determined the acceptance of nuclear power stations both before and after Fukushima. Trust had strong effects on perceived benefits and risks, at both times. People's trust before Fukushima strongly influenced their trust after the accident. In addition, perceived benefits before Fukushima correlated with perceived benefits after the accident. Thus, the nuclear accident did not seem to have changed the relations between the determinants of acceptance. Even after a severe accident, the public may still consider the benefits as relevant, and trust remains important for determining their risk and benefit perceptions. A discussion of the benefits of nuclear power seems most likely to affect the public's acceptance of nuclear power, even after a nuclear accident. © 2012 Society for Risk Analysis.

  8. Methodology used in IRSN nuclear accident cost estimates in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    This report describes the methodology used by IRSN to estimate the cost of potential nuclear accidents in France. It concerns possible accidents involving pressurized water reactors leading to radioactive releases in the environment. These accidents have been grouped in two accident families called: severe accidents and major accidents. Two model scenarios have been selected to represent each of these families. The report discusses the general methodology of nuclear accident cost estimation. The crucial point is that all cost should be considered: if not, the cost is underestimated which can lead to negative consequences for the value attributed to safety and for crisis preparation. As a result, the overall cost comprises many components: the most well-known is offsite radiological costs, but there are many others. The proposed estimates have thus required using a diversity of methods which are described in this report. Figures are presented at the end of this report. Among other things, they show that purely radiological costs only represent a non-dominant part of foreseeable economic consequences. (authors)

  9. External Cost Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Accident considering Public Risk Aversion Behavior: the Korean Case

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Sang Hun; Kang, Hyun Gook [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    The conventional approach for monetary valuation of NPP accident consequence consists of calculating the expected value of various accident scenarios. However, the main criticism of the conventional approach is that there is a discrepancy between the social acceptability of the risk and the estimated expected value of NPP accident. Therefore, an integrated framework for the estimation of the external cost associated with an NPP accident considering the public risk aversion behavior was proposed in this study based on the constructed theoretical framework for estimating both the value of statistical life (VSL) and the risk aversion coefficient associated with an NPP accident to take account of the accident cost into the unit electricity generation cost of NPP. To estimate both parameters, an individual-level survey was conducted on a sample of 1,364 participants in Korea. Based on the collected survey responses, both parameters were estimated based on the proposed framework and the external cost of NPP accident was estimated based on the consequence analysis and considering the direct cost factors for NPP accident. Internalization of external costs into the comprehensive energy production cost has been considered as a potentially efficient policy instrument for a more sustainable energy supply and use. However, the internalization of externalities, such as public health damage, have raised a number of generic policy issues in a nuclear energy sector, with specific challenges resulting from the distinct characteristics of external cost estimation. Especially, the major challenge remained to address the public safety concerns regarding a nuclear accident, which can be specified as low-probability high-consequence accident, driven by the aspects of public risk aversion.

  10. External Cost Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Accident considering Public Risk Aversion Behavior: the Korean Case

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Sang Hun; Kang, Hyun Gook

    2016-01-01

    The conventional approach for monetary valuation of NPP accident consequence consists of calculating the expected value of various accident scenarios. However, the main criticism of the conventional approach is that there is a discrepancy between the social acceptability of the risk and the estimated expected value of NPP accident. Therefore, an integrated framework for the estimation of the external cost associated with an NPP accident considering the public risk aversion behavior was proposed in this study based on the constructed theoretical framework for estimating both the value of statistical life (VSL) and the risk aversion coefficient associated with an NPP accident to take account of the accident cost into the unit electricity generation cost of NPP. To estimate both parameters, an individual-level survey was conducted on a sample of 1,364 participants in Korea. Based on the collected survey responses, both parameters were estimated based on the proposed framework and the external cost of NPP accident was estimated based on the consequence analysis and considering the direct cost factors for NPP accident. Internalization of external costs into the comprehensive energy production cost has been considered as a potentially efficient policy instrument for a more sustainable energy supply and use. However, the internalization of externalities, such as public health damage, have raised a number of generic policy issues in a nuclear energy sector, with specific challenges resulting from the distinct characteristics of external cost estimation. Especially, the major challenge remained to address the public safety concerns regarding a nuclear accident, which can be specified as low-probability high-consequence accident, driven by the aspects of public risk aversion

  11. Prevention of criticality accidents in a fuel cycle plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gatti, A.M.; Canavese, S.I.; Capadona, N.M.

    1990-01-01

    This work reports the basic considerations on criticality accidents applied to an uranium dioxide fuel cycle production plant. The different fabrication stages are briefly described, with the identification of the neutronically isolated areas. Once the areas have been defined, an evaluation is made, setting up the control parameters to be used in each of them and their variation ranges; normal operation limitations based on experimental data or validating calculations, applied specifically to 5% enriched uranium, are established. Afterwards, defined parameters deviations are analyzed due to incidental conditions in order to prevent criticality accidents under normal conditions and maintenance operations. (Author) [es

  12. Nuclear accidents and bone marrow graft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bernard, J.

    1988-01-01

    In case of serious contamination, the only efficacious treatment is the bone marrow grafts. The graft types and conditions have been explained. To restrict the nuclear accidents consequences, it is recommended to: - take osseous medulla of the personnel exposed to radiations and preserve it , that permits to carry out rapidly the auto-graft in case of accidents; - determine, beforehand, the HLA group of the personnel; - to register the voluntary donors names and addresses, and their HLA group, that permits to find easily a compatible donar in case of allo-graft. (author)

  13. Guidelines for attendance and registration for radiological emergencies of nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    Today in Brazil the use of nuclear energy is becoming an usual practice in various activities. Thus, must be a matter of great weight, directions for attendance and registration for radiological emergencies or nuclear accidents. This work shows the planning elaborated by the Comissao Nacional de Energia Nuclear (Brazilian CNEN) for nuclear plants, aiming avoid the injurious effects from the ionizing radiation exposure, radionuclides release or the direct or indirect exposure of ionizing radiation, that proceeding from a radiological emergencies or a nuclear accidents. (J.A.M.M.)

  14. A study into the consequences of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arnott, D.G.

    1987-07-01

    The nuclear industry in Britain would like to believe, and would like the general public to believe, that major accidents such as that at Chernobyl in 1986, could no happen in Britain, because the design and operating procedure have been made as safe as possible. However, because the designers and operators are human, they can make mistakes. Some of these are mentioned; errors of design, errors of maintenance or inspection and errors of judgement. In spite of protestations to the contrary, a major accident could occur at Sizewell-B reactor. Given that this a real possibility, plans should be drawn up to prepare for the situation. The study considers the possible consequences of a nuclear accident under the headings, human error, how nuclear fission works, radioactivity, the truth about Chernobyl, what patterns of reactor accident are possible, what can be done (this includes meteorological information, the issuing of potassium iodate tables, radiation monitoring and evacuation). Practical issues which should concern the local authorities, especially Wrekin Council, are discussed and a recommendation made for an environmental protection officer to be appointed to keep the matter under continuing review. (U.K.)

  15. Public opinion change after the Fukushima nuclear accident: The role of national context revisited

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Latré, Edwin; Perko, Tanja; Thijssen, Peter

    2017-01-01

    This study explores how national context moderated change in support for nuclear energy after the Fukushima accident. The following national contextual variables are tested: geographical distance, nuclear energy production status, freedom of the press, and the building of new nuclear reactors. The results illustrate that previous research has misunderstood the moderating role of national context on opinion change after the Fukushima accident. A survey conducted shortly after the accident with more than 23,000 respondents from 41 countries has shown that geographical distance from the accident mattered: Contradicting a previous study, the decrease in support for nuclear energy was stronger in countries closer to Fukushima. In addition, support for nuclear energy decreased more in countries where new nuclear reactors were under construction. The country's nuclear energy production status and press freedom did not determine opinion change after the Fukushima accident. The non-effect of freedom of the press on opinion change contradicts the role of media after a focusing event as described in the literature. Overall results demonstrate a limited effect of national context on opinion change following a focusing event. Hence, national context provides only limited information to policy makers on how to respond to a nuclear accident. - Highlights: • National context had limited effect on opinion change after Fukushima. • Support for nuclear energy decreased more in counties closer to the accident. • Support for nuclear energy decreased more where the nuclear energy debate was salient. • Freedom of the press did not determine opinion change after Fukushima. • Not all contextual factors are relevant when designing appropriate policy response.

  16. A Review of Accident Modelling Approaches for Complex Critical Sociotechnical Systems

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Qureshi, Zahid H

    2008-01-01

    .... This report provides a review of key traditional accident modelling approaches and their limitations, and describes new system-theoretic approaches to the modelling and analysis of accidents in safety-critical systems...

  17. The nuclear accident risk: a territorial approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ambroise, Pascal

    2011-01-01

    How many people live in the vicinity of French nuclear power stations? Recent events - notably in Japan, but also in France - highlight the urgent need to be able to predict the possible effects of a nuclear accident on surrounding territories. Here, Ambroise Pascal identifies two key criteria for such an estimation: residential density and land use. (author)

  18. Overview of domestic and foreign comments on Fukushima nuclear accident in the past half year

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu Yuanyuan; Chen Haiying; Zhang Chunming

    2011-01-01

    On March 11, 2011, Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant happened severity level nuclear accident, and caused great disasters. To be able to get more experience feedbacks for the safe development of nuclear technology from this accident, this paper investigated the domestic and foreign comments on Fukushima nuclear accident in the past half year, summarized and analyzed the attentions of experts a- bout this accident and improvement methods for the existing nuclear power technology. The results show that most domestic experts focus on improving nuclear power technology and management of emergency response and supervision, while foreign experts pay more attentions to how to deal with the environmental impact of accident on the biological side. All of these attentions and improvement methods will provide more useful information for developing safe nuclear power technology. (authors)

  19. Radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beiriger, J.M.; Failor, R.A.; Marsh, K.V.; Shaw, G.E.

    1987-08-01

    This report describes the detection of fallout in the United States from the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident. As part of its environmental surveillance program, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory maintained detectors for gamma-emitting radionuclides. Following the reactor accident, additional air filters were set out. Several uncommon isotopes were detected at the time the plume passed into the US

  20. Estimation Of 137Cs Using Atmospheric Dispersion Models After A Nuclear Reactor Accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simsek, V.; Kindap, T.; Unal, A.; Pozzoli, L.; Karaca, M.

    2012-04-01

    Nuclear energy will continue to have an important role in the production of electricity in the world as the need of energy grows up. But the safety of power plants will always be a question mark for people because of the accidents happened in the past. Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident which happened in 26 April 1986 was the biggest nuclear accident ever. Because of explosion and fire large quantities of radioactive material was released to the atmosphere. The release of the radioactive particles because of accident affected not only its region but the entire Northern hemisphere. But much of the radioactive material was spread over west USSR and Europe. There are many studies about distribution of radioactive particles and the deposition of radionuclides all over Europe. But this was not true for Turkey especially for the deposition of radionuclides released after Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident and the radiation doses received by people. The aim of this study is to determine the radiation doses received by people living in Turkish territory after Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident and use this method in case of an emergency. For this purpose The Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) Model was used to simulate meteorological conditions after the accident. The results of WRF which were for the 12 days after accident were used as input data for the HYSPLIT model. NOAA-ARL's (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Air Resources Laboratory) dispersion model HYSPLIT was used to simulate the 137Cs distrubition. The deposition values of 137Cs in our domain after Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor Accident were between 1.2E-37 Bq/m2 and 3.5E+08 Bq/m2. The results showed that Turkey was affected because of the accident especially the Black Sea Region. And the doses were calculated by using GENII-LIN which is multipurpose health physics code.

  1. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident final report of the AESJ investigation committee

    CERN Document Server

    Atomic Energy Society of Japan

    2015-01-01

    The Magnitude 9 Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, followed by a massive tsunami struck  TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and triggered an unprecedented core melt/severe accident in Units 1 – 3. The radioactivity release led to the evacuation of local residents, many of whom still have not been able to return to their homes. As a group of nuclear experts, the Atomic Energy Society of Japan established the Investigation Committee on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, to investigate and analyze the accident from scientific and technical perspectives for clarifying the underlying and fundamental causes, and to make recommendations. The results of the investigation by the AESJ Investigation Committee has been compiled herewith as the Final Report. Direct contributing factors of the catastrophic nuclear incident at Fukushima Daiichi NPP initiated by an unprecedented massive earthquake/ tsunami – inadequacies in tsunami measures, severe accident ma...

  2. The nuclear accidents: Causes and consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rochd, M.

    1988-01-01

    The author discussed and compared the real causes of T.M.I. and Chernobyl accidents and cited their consequences. To better understand how these accidents occurred, a brief description of PWR type (reactor type of T.M.I.) and of RBMK type (reactor type of Chernobyl) has been presented. The author has also set out briefly the safety analysis objectives and the three barriers established to protect the public against the radiological consequences. To distinguish failures that cause severe accidents and to analyze them in details, it is necessary to classify the accidents. There are many ways to do it according to their initiator event, or to their frequency, or to their degree of gravity. The safety criteria adopted by nuclear industry have been explained. These criteria specify the limits of certain physical parameters that should not be exceeded in case of incidents or accidents. To compare the real causes of T.M.I. and Chernobyl accidents, the events that led to both have been presented. As observed the main common contributing factors in both cases are that the operators did not pay attention to warnings and signals that were available to them and that they were not trained to handle these accident sequences. The essential conclusions derived from these severe accidents are: -The improvement of operators competence contribute to reduce the accident risks; -The rapid and correct diagnosis of real conditions at each point of the accidents permits an appropriate behavior that would bring the plant to a stable state; -Competent technical teams have to intervene and to assist the operators in case of emergency; -Emergency plans and an international collaboration are necessary to limit the accident risks. 11 figs. (author)

  3. Diversity of Concerns in Recovery after a Nuclear Accident: A Perspective from Fukushima.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sato, Akiko; Lyamzina, Yuliya

    2018-02-16

    Since the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, tremendous resources have been devoted to recovery, and the Japanese Government is gradually lifting evacuation orders. However, public concerns remain prevalent, affecting some people's return to a normal life and threatening their well-being. This study reviews government reports, academic papers, newspaper articles and conference presentations with the aim of obtaining a better understanding of issues which relate to radiation concerns in the recovery process in the aftermath of the accident. It looks extensively at: (1) the current status of the post-accident operations and existing radiation issues in Fukushima, and (2) approaches taken to engage the public during recovery from five previous comparable nuclear and radiological events: Three Mile Island, Buenos Aires (RA-2 facility), Chernobyl, Goiânia and Tokai-mura. The findings indicate that the limitations and emerging challenges of the current recovery operations cause concerns about radiation exposure in various aspects of day-to-day life. Past experiences suggest that long-term management that take a holistic and cohesive approach is critical for restoration of sustainable livelihoods and for social re-integration. Not only actual risks but also public perceptions of risks should be carefully assessed and addressed in the process of environmental remediation.

  4. Diversity of Concerns in Recovery after a Nuclear Accident: A Perspective from Fukushima

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Akiko Sato

    2018-02-01

    Full Text Available Since the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, tremendous resources have been devoted to recovery, and the Japanese Government is gradually lifting evacuation orders. However, public concerns remain prevalent, affecting some people’s return to a normal life and threatening their well-being. This study reviews government reports, academic papers, newspaper articles and conference presentations with the aim of obtaining a better understanding of issues which relate to radiation concerns in the recovery process in the aftermath of the accident. It looks extensively at: (1 the current status of the post-accident operations and existing radiation issues in Fukushima, and (2 approaches taken to engage the public during recovery from five previous comparable nuclear and radiological events: Three Mile Island, Buenos Aires (RA-2 facility, Chernobyl, Goiânia and Tokai-mura. The findings indicate that the limitations and emerging challenges of the current recovery operations cause concerns about radiation exposure in various aspects of day-to-day life. Past experiences suggest that long-term management that take a holistic and cohesive approach is critical for restoration of sustainable livelihoods and for social re-integration. Not only actual risks but also public perceptions of risks should be carefully assessed and addressed in the process of environmental remediation.

  5. Problems of probabilistic safety assessment after Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sugiyama, Naoki

    2011-01-01

    Probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) methodology to assure nuclear safety is had great expectations of lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident and on the other hand this accident made actualized technical problems of PSA. Effectiveness of current PSA methodology for risk assessment was confirmed by comparing the accident development with accident scenario of PSA and equipment failure rate. From a viewpoint of nuclear safety objective and defense in depth approach of IAEA, technical problems of PSA were (1) extension of PSA for spent fuel pool and waste disposal system as well as level 3PSA for broader environmental contamination and (2) overlapping of accident scenario of plural unit site, balance of high quality plant management and preceding negation, treatment of uncertainty of external events, severe accident measure and human reliability analysis and reflection of disaster prevention capability to level 3PSA. In order to upgrade PSA technology, six proposals were described for nuclear safety and defense in depth, comprehensive evaluation scope and catch-up of latest technology, necessity of strategic preparation of PSA standard, human resources fostering and risk communication. (T. Tanaka)

  6. The Chernobyl accident and the Spanish nuclear power plants. Technical report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1986-11-15

    On the morning of April 26, 1986, Unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (Ukraine, USSR) suffered an accident of the greatest magnitude among those which have taken place in nuclear energy installations employed for peaceful uses. The accident reached a degree of severity unknown up to now in nuclear energy generating plants, both with respect to the loss of human lives and the effects caused to the neighboring population (as well as to other nations within a wide radius of radioactivity dispersal), and also with respect to the damage caused in the nuclear plant itself. In the light of the anxiety created internationally, the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy prepared a report (1), based on the conclusions of the Governmental Commission entrusted to study the causes of the accident, which was presented at the international meeting of experts held at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna from August 25 to 29, 1986. The present technical report has been prepared by the Spanish nuclear power plants within the framework of UNIDAD ELECTRICA, S.A. (UNESA) - the Association of Spanish electric utilities - in collaboration with EMPRESARIOS AGRUPADOS, S.A. The report reflects the utilities' analyses of the causes and consequences of the accident and, based on similarities and differences with Spanish plants under construction and in operation, intends to: a. Evaluate the possibility of an accident with similar consequences occurring in a Spanish plant b. Identify possible design and operation modifications indicated by the lessons learned from this accident.

  7. The Chernobyl accident and the Spanish nuclear power plants. Technical report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-11-01

    On the morning of April 26, 1986, Unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (Ukraine, USSR) suffered an accident of the greatest magnitude among those which have taken place in nuclear energy installations employed for peaceful uses. The accident reached a degree of severity unknown up to now in nuclear energy generating plants, both with respect to the loss of human lives and the effects caused to the neighboring population (as well as to other nations within a wide radius of radioactivity dispersal), and also with respect to the damage caused in the nuclear plant itself. In the light of the anxiety created internationally, the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy prepared a report (1), based on the conclusions of the Governmental Commission entrusted to study the causes of the accident, which was presented at the international meeting of experts held at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna from August 25 to 29, 1986. The present technical report has been prepared by the Spanish nuclear power plants within the framework of UNIDAD ELECTRICA, S.A. (UNESA) - the Association of Spanish electric utilities - in collaboration with EMPRESARIOS AGRUPADOS, S.A. The report reflects the utilities' analyses of the causes and consequences of the accident and, based on similarities and differences with Spanish plants under construction and in operation, intends to: a. Evaluate the possibility of an accident with similar consequences occurring in a Spanish plant b. Identify possible design and operation modifications indicated by the lessons learned from this accident

  8. Analysis of articles in weekly magazines on scientific issues related to Fukushima nuclear power plant accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sano, Kazumi; Kikuchi, Macoto

    2012-01-01

    The large area was polluted by the radioactive fallout released after the nuclear fuel meltdown of Fukushima first nuclear plant of Tokyo electric power company. The news media that reported the accident were required to have scientific knowledge on the structure of the nuclear reactor and the physics and health issues of the radioactivity. In this paper, we focus on how the weekly magazines reported this critical accident. The weekly magazines are not regarded as a neutral news media. Rather, their articles in general strongly reflect the editorial opinions. In this sense, the weekly magazines are 'biased media'. So, there are many points to discuss from the view point of the science communication. We analyze the articles appeared in the seven major weekly magazines published during the first half year after the earthquake. We found that the differences in the scientific literacy between magazines are reflected, for example, in selection of the experts who made comments in articles. (author)

  9. Evaluating the consequences of loss of flow accident for a typical VVER-1000 nuclear reactor

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mirvakili, S.M.; Safaei, S. [Shiraz Univ., Shiraz (Iran, Islamic Republic of). Dept. of Nuclear Engineering, School of Mechanical Engineering; Faghihi, F. [Shiraz Univ., Shiraz (Iran, Islamic Republic of). Safety Research Center

    2010-07-01

    The loss of coolant flow in a nuclear reactor can result from a mechanical or electrical failure of the coolant pump. If the reactor is not tripped promptly, the immediate effect is a rapid increase in coolant temperature, decrease in minimum departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) and fuel damage. This study evaluated the shaft seizure of a reactor coolant pump in a VVER-1000 nuclear reactor. The locked rotor results in rapid reduction of flow through the affected reactor coolant loop and in turn leads to an increase in the primary coolant temperature and pressure. The analysis was conducted with regard for superimposing loss of power to the power plant at the initial accident moment. The required transient functions of flow, pressure and power were obtained using system transient calculations applied in COBRA-EN computer code in order to calculate the overall core thermal-hydraulic parameters such as temperature, critical heat flux and DNBR. The study showed that the critical period for the locked rotor accident is the first few seconds during which the maximum values of pressure and temperature are reached. 10 refs., 1 tab., 3 figs.

  10. Empirical Risk Analysis of Severe Reactor Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants after Fukushima

    OpenAIRE

    Kaiser, Jan Christian

    2012-01-01

    Many countries are reexamining the risks connected with nuclear power generation after the Fukushima accidents. To provide updated information for the corresponding discussion a simple empirical approach is applied for risk quantification of severe reactor accidents with International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) level ≥5. The analysis is based on worldwide data of commercial nuclear facilities. An empirical hazard of 21 (95% confidence intervals (CI) 4; 62) severe accidents am...

  11. Analysis of simulation results of damaged nuclear fuel accidents at NPPs with shell-type nuclear reactors

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Igor L. Kozlov

    2015-03-01

    Full Text Available Lessons from the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP made it necessary to reevaluate and intensificate the work on modeling and analyzing various scenarios of severe accidents with damage to the nuclear fuel in the reactor, containment and spent nuclear fuel storage pool with the expansion of the primary initiating event causes group listing. Further development of computational tools for modeling the explosion prevention criteria as to steam and gas mixtures, considering the specific thermal-hydrodynamic conditions and mechanisms of explosive situations arrival at different stages of a severe accident development, is substantiated. Based on the analysis of the known shell-type nuclear reactors accidents results the explosion safety thermodynamic criteria are presented, the parameters defining the steam and gas explosions conditions are found, the need to perform the further verification and validation of deterministic codes serving to simulate general accident processes behavior as well as phase-to-phase interaction calculated dependencies is established. The main parameters controlling and defining the criteria explosion safety effective regulation areas and their optimization conditions are found.

  12. Local governments' roles of the compensation for damage by the Tokai JCO criticality accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tanabe, Tomoyuki [Central Research Inst. of Electric Power Industry, Tokyo (Japan). Socio-Economic Research Center

    2003-03-01

    The Tokai JCO criticality accident on September 30, 1999 was the first case to which The Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage was applied. Although the Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage formulates the outline of the institutional framework for nuclear third party liability together with operator's insurance scheme, details of actual compensation procedure are not specified. By this reason, the compensation procedure in the Tokai accident had been executed without a concrete legal specification and a precedent. In spite of this situation, the compensation procedure with the accident led to an unexpectedly successful result. We observe the several reasons why the compensation procedure was implemented successfully despite the lack of concrete legal specification and a precedent. One of the reasons is that the local governments, Tokai Village and Ibaraki Prefecture, immediately took the leadership in implementing a temporary regime of compensation procedure without wasting time for waiting national government's directives. Upon practicing this compensation procedure, the local governments implemented the following steps. (1) Initial estimation of the amount and scope of damage. (2) Providing the criteria and heads of damage subject to compensation. (3) Unitary compensation procedure at the local levels. (4) Distribution of emergency payments for the victims. (5) Facilitating compensatory negotiation between the victims and JCO as arbitrator. However, some concerns are also pointed out about the fact that the local government directed the whole procedure without sufficient adjustment with the national government for compensation policy. Among all, in the compensation led by the local governments, it was difficult to guarantee fairness of compensation because victims who are influential on the local government such as industrial associations would have unfairly strong negotiation power in the compensatory negotiation, while the operator being

  13. Economic damage caused by a nuclear reactor accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goemans, T.; Schwarz, J.J.

    1988-01-01

    This study is directed towards the estimation of the economic damage which arises from a severe possible accident with a newly built 1000 MWE nuclear power plant in the Netherlands. A number of cases have been considered which are specified by the weather conditions during and the severity of the accident and the location of the nuclear power plant. For each accident case the economic damage has been estimated for the following impact categories: loss of the power plant, public health, evacuation and relocation of population, export of agricultural products, working and living in contaminated regions, decontamination, costs of transportation and incoming foreign tourism. The consequences for drinking water could not be quantified adequately. The total economic damage could reach 30 billion guilders. Besides the power plant itself, loss of export and decreasing incoming foreign tourism determine an important part of the total damage. 12 figs.; 52 tabs

  14. Emergency response and nuclear risk governance. Nuclear safety at nuclear power plant accidents; Notfallschutz und Risk Governance. Zur nuklearen Sicherheit bei Kernkraftwerksunfaellen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kuhlen, Johannes

    2014-07-01

    The present study entitled ''Emergency Response and Nuclear Risk Governance: nuclear safety at nuclear power plant accidents'' deals with issues of the protection of the population and the environment against hazardous radiation (the hazards of nuclear energy) and the harmful effects of radioactivity during nuclear power plant accidents. The aim of this study is to contribute to both the identification and remediation of shortcomings and deficits in the management of severe nuclear accidents like those that occurred at Chernobyl in 1986 and at Fukushima in 2011 as well as to the improvement and harmonization of plans and measures taken on an international level in nuclear emergency management. This thesis is divided into a theoretical part and an empirical part. The theoretical part focuses on embedding the subject in a specifically global governance concept, which includes, as far as Nuclear Risk Governance is concerned, the global governance of nuclear risks. Due to their characteristic features the following governance concepts can be assigned to these risks: Nuclear Safety Governance is related to safety, Nuclear Security Governance to security and NonProliferation Governance to safeguards. The subject of investigation of the present study is as a special case of the Nuclear Safety Governance, the Nuclear Emergency governance, which refers to off-site emergency response. The global impact of nuclear accidents and the concepts of security, safety culture and residual risk are contemplated in this context. The findings (accident sequences, their consequences and implications) from the analyses of two reactor accidents prior to Fukushima (Three Mile Iceland in 1979, Chernobyl in 1986) are examined from a historical analytical perspective and the state of the Nuclear Emergency governance and international cooperation aimed at improving nuclear safety after Chernobyl is portrayed by discussing, among other topics, examples of &apos

  15. Nuclear Measurement Technologies and Solutions Implemented during Nuclear Accident at Fukushima

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morichi, M.; Toubon, H.; Bronson, Frazier; Venkataraman, Ram; Beaujoin, J.; Dubart, P.

    2013-06-01

    Fukushima accident imposed a stretch to nuclear measurement operational approach requiring in such emergency situation: fast concept development, fast system integration, deployment and start-up in a very short time frame. This paper is describing the Nuclear Measurement that AREVA-BUNM (CANBERRA) has realized and foresight at Fukushima accident site describing the technical solution conceived developed and deployed at Fukushima NPP for the process control of the treatment system of contaminated water. A detailed description of all levels design choices, from detection technologies to system architecture is offer in the paper as well as the read-out and global data management system. This paper describes also the technical choices executed and put in place to overcome the challenges related to the high radiological contamination on site. (authors)

  16. Reactor accidents and nuclear catastrophes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kirchhoff, R.; Linde, H.J.

    1979-01-01

    Assuming some preliminary knowledge of the fundamentals of atomic physics, the book describes the effects of ionizing radiation on the human organism. In order to assess the potential hazards of reactor accidents and the extent of a nuclear catastrophe, the technology of power generation in nuclear power stations is presented together with its potential dangers as well as the physical and medical processes occurring during a nuclear weapons explosion. The special medical aspects are presented which range from first aid in the case of a catastrophe to the accute radiation syndrome, the treatment of burns to the therapy of late radiolesions. Finally, it is confirmed that the treatment of radiation injured persons does not give rise to basically new medical problems. (orig./HP) [de

  17. Main lessons based on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident liquidation experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vasil'chenko, V.N.; Nosovskij, A.V.

    2006-01-01

    The authors review the main lessons of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident and the liquidation of its consequences in the area of the nuclear reactors safety operation, any major accident management, liquidation accident consequences criteria, emergency procedures, preventative measures and treatment irradiated victims, the monitoring methods etc. The special emphasis is put on the questions of the emergency response and the antiaccidental measures planning in frame of international cooperation program

  18. Study on public awareness of utilizing nuclear power in China. Changes in public awareness after the accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xu, Ting; Wakabayashi, Toshio

    2012-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to clarify public awareness of utilizing nuclear power in China and to determine the effects of the accident of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants. Web online surveys were carried out before and after the accident of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants. The online survey before the accident of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants had 4,255 adult respondents consisting of 1,851 males and 2,404 females. The online survey after the accident had 721 respondents consisting of 406 males and 315 females. The two online surveys about the attitude toward nuclear power plants consisted of 37 items, such as the necessity of nuclear power plants, the reliability of safety, and government confidence. As a result, respondents of the online surveys in China consider that nuclear energy is more important than the anxiety of accident. On the other hand, women have sensation of fear for the accident of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants and radiation. (author)

  19. Handbook on criticality. Vol. 1. Criticality and nuclear safety; Handbuch zur Kritikalitaet. Bd. 1. Kritikalitaet und nukleare Sicherheit

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2015-04-15

    This handbook was prepared primarily with the aim to provide information to experts in industry, authorities or research facilities engaged in criticality-safety-related problems that will allow an adequate and rapid assessment of criticality safety issues already in the planning and preparation of nuclear facilities. However, it is not the intention of the authors of the handbook to offer ready solutions to complex problems of nuclear safety. Such questions have to remain subject to an in-depth analysis and assessment to be carried out by dedicated criticality safety experts. Compared with the previous edition dated December 1998, this handbook has been further revised and supplemented. The proven basic structure of the handbook remains unchanged. The handbook follows in some ways similar criticality handbooks or instructions published in the USA, UK, France, Japan and the former Soviet Union. The expedient use of the information given in this handbook requires a fundamental understanding of criticality and the terminology of nuclear safety. In Vol. 1, ''Criticality and Nuclear Safety'', therefore, first the most important terms and fundamentals are introduced and explained. Subsequently, experimental techniques and calculation methods for evaluating criticality problems are presented. The following chapters of Vol. 1 deal i. a. with the effect of neutron reflectors and absorbers, neutron interaction, measuring methods for criticality, and organisational safety measures and provide an overview of criticality-relevant operational experience and of criticality accidents and their potential hazardous impact. Vol. 2 parts 1 and 2 finally compile criticality parameters in graphical and tabular form. The individual graph sheets are provided with an initially explained set of identifiers, to allow the quick finding of the information of current interest. Part 1 includes criticality parameters for systems with {sup 235}U as fissile material, while part

  20. Statistical evaluation of design-error related nuclear reactor accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ott, K.O.; Marchaterre, J.F.

    1981-01-01

    In this paper, general methodology for the statistical evaluation of design-error related accidents is proposed that can be applied to a variety of systems that evolves during the development of large-scale technologies. The evaluation aims at an estimate of the combined ''residual'' frequency of yet unknown types of accidents ''lurking'' in a certain technological system. A special categorization in incidents and accidents is introduced to define the events that should be jointly analyzed. The resulting formalism is applied to the development of U.S. nuclear power reactor technology, considering serious accidents (category 2 events) that involved, in the accident progression, a particular design inadequacy. 9 refs

  1. Community emergency response to nuclear power plant accidents: A selected and partially annotated bibliography

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Youngen, G.

    1988-10-01

    The role of responding to emergencies at nuclear power plants is often considered the responsibility of the personnel onsite. This is true for most, if not all, of the incidents that may happen during the course of the plant's operating lifetime. There is however, the possibility of a major accident occurring at anytime. Major nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island have taught their respective countries and communities a significant lesson in local emergency preparedness and response. Through these accidents, the rest of the world can also learn a great deal about planning, preparing and responding to the emergencies unique to nuclear power. This bibliography contains books, journal articles, conference papers and government reports on emergency response to nuclear power plant accidents. It does not contain citations for ''onsite'' response or planning, nor does it cover the areas of radiation releases from transportation accidents. The compiler has attempted to bring together a sampling of the world's collective written experience on dealing with nuclear reactor accidents on the sate, local and community levels. Since the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, that written experience has grown enormously

  2. Community emergency response to nuclear power plant accidents: A selected and partially annotated bibliography

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Youngen, G.

    1988-10-01

    The role of responding to emergencies at nuclear power plants is often considered the responsibility of the personnel onsite. This is true for most, if not all, of the incidents that may happen during the course of the plant`s operating lifetime. There is however, the possibility of a major accident occurring at anytime. Major nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island have taught their respective countries and communities a significant lesson in local emergency preparedness and response. Through these accidents, the rest of the world can also learn a great deal about planning, preparing and responding to the emergencies unique to nuclear power. This bibliography contains books, journal articles, conference papers and government reports on emergency response to nuclear power plant accidents. It does not contain citations for ``onsite`` response or planning, nor does it cover the areas of radiation releases from transportation accidents. The compiler has attempted to bring together a sampling of the world`s collective written experience on dealing with nuclear reactor accidents on the sate, local and community levels. Since the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, that written experience has grown enormously.

  3. Severe accident sequences simulated at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carbajo, J.J.

    1999-01-01

    Different severe accident sequences employing the MELCOR code, version 1.8.4 QK, have been simulated at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (Grand Gulf). The postulated severe accidents simulated are two low-pressure, short-term, station blackouts; two unmitigated small-break (SB) loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs) (SBLOCAs); and one unmitigated large LOCA (LLOCA). The purpose of this study was to calculate best-estimate timings of events and source terms for a wide range of severe accidents and to compare the plant response to these accidents

  4. Report on the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-12-01

    This report presents the compilation of information obtained by various organizations regarding the accident (and the consequences of the accident) that occurred at Unit 4 of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl in the USSR on April 26, 1986. Each organization has independently accepted responsibility for one or more chapters. The specific responsibility of each organization is indicated. The various authors are identified in a footnote to each chapter. Very briefly the other chapters cover: the design of the Chernobyl nuclear station Unit 4; safety analyses for Unit 4; the accident scenario; the role of the operator; an assessment of the radioactive release, dispersion, and transport; the activities associated with emergency actions; and information on the health and environmental consequences from the accident. These subjects cover the major aspects of the accident that have the potential to present new information and lessons for the nuclear industry in general. The task of evaluating the information obtained in these various areas and the assessment of the potential implications has been left to each organization to pursue according to the relevance of the subject to their organization. Those findings will be issued separately by the cognizant organizations. The basic purpose of this report is to provide the information upon which such assessments can be made

  5. The consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident in Greece

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-07-01

    In this report the radioactive fallout on Greece from the Chernobyl nuclear accident is described. The flow pattern to Greece of the radioactive materials released, the measurements performed on environmental samples and samples of the food chain, as well as some estimations of the population doses and of the expected consequences of the accident are presented. The analysis has shown that the radiological impact of the accident in Greece can be considered minor. (J.K.)

  6. Root causes and impacts of severe accidents at large nuclear power plants.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Högberg, Lars

    2013-04-01

    The root causes and impacts of three severe accidents at large civilian nuclear power plants are reviewed: the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011. Impacts include health effects, evacuation of contaminated areas as well as cost estimates and impacts on energy policies and nuclear safety work in various countries. It is concluded that essential objectives for reactor safety work must be: (1) to prevent accidents from developing into severe core damage, even if they are initiated by very unlikely natural or man-made events, and, recognizing that accidents with severe core damage may nevertheless occur; (2) to prevent large-scale and long-lived ground contamination by limiting releases of radioactive nuclides such as cesium to less than about 100 TBq. To achieve these objectives the importance of maintaining high global standards of safety management and safety culture cannot be emphasized enough. All three severe accidents discussed in this paper had their root causes in system deficiencies indicative of poor safety management and poor safety culture in both the nuclear industry and government authorities.

  7. Root Causes and Impacts of Severe Accidents at Large Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoegberg, Lars

    2013-01-01

    The root causes and impacts of three severe accidents at large civilian nuclear power plants are reviewed: the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011. Impacts include health effects, evacuation of contaminated areas as well as cost estimates and impacts on energy policies and nuclear safety work in various countries. It is concluded that essential objectives for reactor safety work must be: (1) to prevent accidents from developing into severe core damage, even if they are initiated by very unlikely natural or man-made events, and, recognizing that accidents with severe core damage may nevertheless occur; (2) to prevent large-scale and long lived ground contamination by limiting releases of radioactive nuclides such as cesium to less than about 100 TBq. To achieve these objectives the importance of maintaining high global standards of safety management and safety culture cannot be emphasized enough. All three severe accidents discussed in this paper had their root causes in system deficiencies indicative of poor safety management and poor safety culture in both the nuclear industry and government authorities

  8. Root Causes and Impacts of Severe Accidents at Large Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hoegberg, Lars

    2013-04-15

    The root causes and impacts of three severe accidents at large civilian nuclear power plants are reviewed: the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011. Impacts include health effects, evacuation of contaminated areas as well as cost estimates and impacts on energy policies and nuclear safety work in various countries. It is concluded that essential objectives for reactor safety work must be: (1) to prevent accidents from developing into severe core damage, even if they are initiated by very unlikely natural or man-made events, and, recognizing that accidents with severe core damage may nevertheless occur; (2) to prevent large-scale and long lived ground contamination by limiting releases of radioactive nuclides such as cesium to less than about 100 TBq. To achieve these objectives the importance of maintaining high global standards of safety management and safety culture cannot be emphasized enough. All three severe accidents discussed in this paper had their root causes in system deficiencies indicative of poor safety management and poor safety culture in both the nuclear industry and government authorities.

  9. The third update of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station accident. September 1 through November 30, 2011

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shibutani, Yu

    2011-01-01

    This article provides the third update of the Fukushima Daiichi accident that occurred on March 11, 2011. In the report of the first update of the Fukushima Daiichi accident on March 11 through May 31, the situation was reported on both on-site and off-site of the Fukushima Daiichi, including; failed cooldown of decay heat and meltdown of stricken reactors; emergency evacuation of local residents, radioactive contamination, spread of biased rumors by the information closure by government, regional cooperation with China, Taiwan and Korea, and visit of IAEA investigation team to Japan. The report of the second update on June 1 through August 31 reported the issues of, harsh public criticism against government and electric power companies, results of the public opinion poll, a sort of gentlemen's agreements between nuclear power companies and local governments which would be peculiar tradition in Japan, the first revision of the road map to cold shutdown of stricken reactors, and submission of report on Fukushima Daiichi accident to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This article provides the third update from September 1 through November 30, particularly on the issues of the second revision of the road map where the “cold shutdown” state should be reached before the end of 2011, the overview of governmental organization on the overall energy and nuclear policy, and the establishment of the nuclear disaster response headquarters (HQ) in the Prime Minister's Office. The HQ in collaboration with Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) decided the framework of road map plans, provision of various assistance and compensation for the residents affected by the nuclear incident, redefinition by the Nuclear Safety Commission for evacuation areas, recovery process of radioactive decontaminated areas, investigation and verification of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, reorganization of TEPCO management and financial system, establishment of damage compensation scheme

  10. Truck accident involving unirradiated nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.W.; Fischer, L.E.

    1992-07-01

    In the early morning of Dec. 16, 1991, a severe accident occurred when a passenger vehicle traveling in the wrong direction collided with a tractor trailer carrying 24 nuclear fuel assemblies in 12 containers on Interstate 1-91 in Springfield, Massachusetts. This paper documents the mechanical circumstances of the accident and the physical environment to which the containers were exposed and the response of the containers and their contents. The accident involved four impacts where the truck was struck by the car, impacted on the center guardrail, impacted on the outer concrete barrier and came to rest against the center guardrail. The impacts were followed by a fire that began in the engine compartment, spread to the.tractor and cab, and eventually spread to the trailer and payload. The fire lasted for about three hours and the packages were involved in the fire for about two hours. As a result of the fire, the tractor-trailer was completely destroyed and the packages were exposed to flames with temperatures between 1300 degrees F and 1800 degrees F. The fuel assemblies remained intact during the accident and there was no release of any radioactive material during the accident. This was a very severe accident; however, the injuries were minor and at no time was the public health and safety at risk

  11. Truck accident involving unirradiated nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.W.; Fischer, L.E.

    1993-01-01

    In the early morning of Dec. 16, 1991, a severe accident occurred when a passenger vehicle traveling in the wrong direction collided with a tractor trailer carrying 24 unirradiated nuclear fuel assemblies in 12 containers on Interstate I-91 in Springfield, Massachusetts. This paper documents the mechanical circumstances of the accident and assesses the physical environment to which the containers were exposed and the response of the containers and their contents. The accident involved four impacts where the truck was struck by the car, impacted on the center guardrail, impacted on the outer concrete barrier and came to rest against the center guardrail. The impacts were followed by a fire that began in the engine compartment, spread to the tractor and cab, and eventually spread to the trailer and payload. The fire lasted for about three hours and the packages were involved in the fire for about two hours. As a result of the fire, the tractor-trailer was completely destroyed and the packages were exposed to flames with temperatures between 1,300 F and 1,800 F. The fuel assemblies remained intact during the accident and there was no release of any radioactive material during the accident. This was a very severe accident; however, the injuries were minor and at no time was the public health and safety at risk

  12. Development of likelihood estimation method for criticality accidents of mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tamaki, Hitoshi; Yoshida, Kazuo; Kimoto, Tatsuya; Hamaguchi, Yoshikane

    2010-01-01

    A criticality accident in a MOX fuel fabrication facility may occur depending on several parameters, such as mass inventory and plutonium enrichment. MOX handling units in the facility are designed and operated based on the double contingency principle to prevent criticality accidents. Control failures of at least two parameters are needed for the occurrence of criticality accident. To evaluate the probability of such control failures, the criticality conditions of each parameter for a specific handling unit are necessary for accident scenario analysis to be clarified quantitatively with a criticality analysis computer code. In addition to this issue, a computer-based control system for mass inventory is planned to be installed into MOX handling equipment in a commercial MOX fuel fabrication plant. The reliability analysis is another important issue in evaluating the likelihood of control failure caused by software malfunction. A likelihood estimation method for criticality accident has been developed with these issues been taken into consideration. In this paper, an example of analysis with the proposed method and the applicability of the method are also shown through a trial application to a model MOX fabrication facility. (author)

  13. Managing Nuclear Reactor Accidents: Issues Raised by Three Mile Island

    OpenAIRE

    Hamilton, G.W.

    1980-01-01

    This paper provides a descriptive account of significant events in the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in March, 1979. It is based upon documents collected as background materials for the IIASA workshop: Procedural and Organizational Measures for Accident Management: Nuclear Reactors. In addition to the references listed, information was supplied by John Lathrop, who conducted interviews with government and industry officials involved in the crisis. There have been ...

  14. Criticality safety and facility design considerations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Waltz, W.R.

    1991-06-01

    Operations with fissile material introduce the risk of a criticality accident that may be lethal to nearby personnel. In addition, concerns over criticality safety can result in substantial delays and shutdown of facility operations. For these reasons, it is clear that the prevention of a nuclear criticality accident should play a major role in the design of a nuclear facility. The emphasis of this report will be placed on engineering design considerations in the prevention of criticality. The discussion will not include other important aspects, such as the physics of calculating limits nor criticality alarm systems

  15. Medical and policy considerations for nuclear and radiation accidents, incidents and terrorism.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gale, Robert Peter

    2017-11-01

    The purpose of this review is to address the increasing medical and public concern regarding the health consequences of radiation exposure, a concern shaped not only by fear of another Chernobyl or Fukushima nuclear power facility accident but also by the intentional use of a nuclear weapon, a radiological dispersion device, a radiological exposure device, or an improved nuclear device by rogue states such as North Korea and terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. The United States has the medical capacity to respond to a limited nuclear or radiation accident or incident but an effective medical response to a catastrophic nuclear event is impossible. Dealing effectively with nuclear and radiation accidents or incidents requires diverse strategies, including policy decisions, public education, and medical preparedness. I review medical consequences of exposures to ionizing radiations, likely concomitant injuries and potential medical intervention. These data should help haematologists and other healthcare professionals understand the principles of medical consequences of nuclear terrorism. However, the best strategy is prevention.

  16. Cleanup of large areas contaminated as a result of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The purposes of the report are to provide an overview of the methodology and technology available to clean up contaminated areas and to give preliminary guidance on matters related to the planning, implementation and management of such cleanups. This report provides an integrated overview of important aspects related to the cleanup of very large areas contaminated as a result of a serious nuclear accident, including information on methods and equipment available to: characterize the affected area and the radioactive fallout; stabilize or isolate the contamination; and clean up contaminated urban, rural and forested areas. The report also includes brief sections on planning and management considerations and the transport and disposal of the large volumes of wastes arising from such cleanups. For the purposes of this report, nuclear accidents which could result in the deposition of decontamination over large areas if the outer containment fails badly include: 1) An accident with a nuclear weapon involving detonation of the chemical high explosive but little, if any, nuclear fission. 2) A major loss of medium/high level liquid waste (HLLW) due to an explosion/fire at a storage site for such waste. 3) An accident at a nuclear power plant (NPP), for example a loss of coolant accident, which results in some core disruption and fuel melting. 4) An accident at an NPP involving an uncontrolled reactivity excursion resulting in the violent ejection of a reactor core material and rupture of the containment building. 117 refs, 32 figs, 12 tabs

  17. 1983 international intercomparison of nuclear accident dosimetry systems at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Swaja, R.E.; Greene, R.T.; Sims, C.S.

    1985-04-01

    An international intercomparison of nuclear accident dosimetry systems was conducted during September 12-16, 1983, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) using the Health Physics Research Reactor operated in the pulse mode to simulate criticality accidents. This study marked the twentieth in a series of annual accident dosimetry intercomparisons conducted at ORNL. Participants from ten organizations attended this intercomparison and measured neutron and gamma doses at area monitoring stations and on phantoms for three different shield conditions. Results of this study indicate that foil activation techniques are the most popular and accurate method of determining accident-level neutron doses at area monitoring stations. For personnel monitoring, foil activation, blood sodium activation, and thermoluminescent (TL) methods are all capable of providing accurate dose estimates in a variety of radiation fields. All participants in this study used TLD's to determine gamma doses with very good results on the average. Chemical dosemeters were also shown to be capable of yielding accurate estimates of total neutron plus gamma doses in a variety of radiation fields. While 83% of all neutron measurements satisfied regulatory standards relative to reference values, only 39% of all gamma results satisfied corresponding guidelines for gamma measurements. These results indicate that continued improvement in accident dosimetry evaluation and measurement techniques is needed

  18. The prevention of the local nuclear accidents in the Republic of Moldova

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahnarel, I.

    1998-01-01

    Although there are no nuclear reactors in Moldova, there are numerous radiation sources situated in a few waste disposal sites as well as the sources applied in medicine, science, education, industry, agriculture, which demand serious concern from safety and radiation protection point of view. Under cooperation with IAEA national Regulatory Control in the Field of Nuclear Protection and Safety was established since 1993. A number of governmental regulatory bodies supervise the following activities: radiation standardization; radiological supervision of sources storage, exploitation and disposal; radiological monitoring of radioactive substances, food products, building materials; supervision of personnel exposure and environmental exposure; investigation of radiological accidents; etc. In 1998, Moldova has joined The International Convention for early Notification of Nuclear Accidents; The Convention on Nuclear Safety; The Convention on Assistance in Case of Nuclear Accident of Radiological Emergency and The Convention on the Physical protection of Nuclear Material

  19. Accidents, disasters and crisis: contribution of epidemiology in the nuclear field

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Verger, P.; Bard, D.; Hubert, P.

    1995-01-01

    The experience of the Chernobyl accident has shown the necessity of being prepared for epidemiological assessment of the health consequences of a nuclear or a radiological accident. We discuss the contribution of epidemiology in such situations, in addition to the existing tools designed to assess or manage radiological risks. From a decisional point of view, three issues are distinguished: the protection of the different population groups against ionizing radiations, the achievement of health care and the communication with the public and media. We discuss the input of epidemiological tools in both perspectives. Epidemiology may also contribute to the analysis of health events that may be observed after an accident, i.e. to assess whether these events are not statistical artifacts, whether they are an effect of the exposure to ionizing radiations or a non specific consequence of any accident. Finally, epidemiological studies should be carried out to improve our knowledge on ionizing radiations effects with a special consideration given to the dose-effect relationships. Examples of past nuclear accidents are used to discuss these issues. The last part of this paper is focused on different research issues that should be developed for preparing epidemiological plans for nuclear accidents. (Author). 48 refs., 1 fig., 3 tabs

  20. The OECD/NEA workshop on the indemnification of nuclear damage in the event of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wagstaff, F.

    2002-01-01

    Since 1993, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) has run the International Nuclear Emergency Exercise (INEX) Program. The program serves to discuss an effective accident management approach on the basis of a simulated nuclear accident situation together with the states involved and their institutions, and also elaborate measures for its further improvement. At the present time, the INEX Program has reached Phase 3 in which, for the first time, also aspects of liability for the consequences of accidents were included. These aspects were made the subject of a workshop held after an emergency exercise. The scenario covered was based on an INES level-4 accident in the French Gravelines Nuclear Power Station situated close to the French-Belgian border. The workshop dealt with these topics, among others: the application of the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability, the Brussels Supplementary Convention, and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage as well as the Supplementary Compensation Convention of 1997. It was seen that there was a clear need for further discussion, especially to shed more light on the interrelationship of these treaties. (orig.) [de

  1. Severe accident management: radiation dose control, Fukushima Daiichi and TMI-2 nuclear plant accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shaw, Roger

    2014-01-01

    This presentation presents valuable dose information related to the Fukushima Daiichi and Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) Nuclear Plant accidents. Dose information is provided for what is well known for TMI-2, and what is available for Fukushima Daiichi. Particular emphasis is placed on the difference between the type of reactors involved, overarching plant damage issues, and radiation worker dose outcomes. For TMI-2, more in depth dose data is available for the accident and the subsequent recovery efforts. The comparisons demonstrate the need to understand the wide variation in potential dose management measures and outcomes for severe reactor accidents. (author)

  2. Tracing nuclear elements released by Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tsujimura, M.; Onda, Y.; Abe, Y.; Hada, M.; Pun, I.

    2011-12-01

    Radioactive contamination has been detected in Fukushima and the neighboring regions due to the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) following the earthquake and tsunami occurred on 11th March 2011. The small experimental catchments have been established in Yamakiya district, Kawamata Town, Fukushima Prefecture, located approximately 35 km west from the Fukushima NPP. The tritium (3H) concentration and stable isotopic compositions of deuterium and oxygen-18 have been determined on the water samples of precipitation, soil water at the depths of 10 to 30 cm, groundwater at the depths of 5 m to 50 m, spring water and stream water taken at the watersheds in the recharge and discharge zones from the view point of the groundwater flow system. The tritium concentration of the rain water fell just a few days after the earthquake showed a value of approximately 17 Tritium Unit (T.U.), whereas the average concentration of the tritium in the precipitation was less than 5 T.U. before the Fukushima accident. The spring water in the recharge zone showed a relatively high tritium concentration of approximately 12 T.U., whereas that of the discharge zone showed less than 5 T.U. Thus, the artificial tritium was apparently injected in the groundwater flow system due to the Fukushima NPP accident, whereas that has not reached at the discharge zone yet. The monitoring of the nuclear elements is now on going from the view points of the hydrological cycles and the drinking water security.

  3. The role of post accident chemistry data in nuclear safety

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bradshaw, R.W.; Caruthers, G.F.

    1982-01-01

    The NRC instituted the NUREG-0737 requirements as implementation of the Post-TMI Action Plan in October, 1980. Among these requirements was the capability to obtain chemistry samples of the reactor coolant and containment building atmosphere under post accident conditions. The quantitative criteria were, in general, beyond the capabilities of existing plant systems. As a consequence the nuclear industry expended substantial efforts to design and install the post-accident sampling systems necessary to comply with these criteria. With such efforts essentially complete, the task remains to establish the role that data provided by these systems would play in mitigating the consequences of a nuclear plant accident. This role definition must include a characterization of the timing and priority for the post accident chemistry data. This paper defines that role using the Safety Level and Safety Function concepts as a matrix

  4. Health effects of the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fabrikant, J.I.

    1980-05-01

    Between March 28 and April 15, 1979 the collective dose resulting from the radioactivity released to the population living within a 50-mile radius of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant was about 2000 person-rems, less than 1% of the annual natural background level. The average dose to a person living within 5 miles of the nuclear plant was less than 10% of annual background radiation. The maximum estimated radiation dose received by any one individual in the general population (excluding the nuclear plant workers) during the accident was 70 mrem. The doses received by the general population as a result of the accident were so small that there will be no detectable additional cases of cancer, developmental abnormalities, or genetic ill-health. Three Three Mile Island nuclear workers received radiation doses of about 3 to 4 rem, exceeding maximum permissible quarterly dose of 3 rem. The major health effect of the accident at Three Mile Island was that of a pronounced demoralizing effect on the general population in the Three Mile Island area, including teenagers and mothers of preschool children and the nuclear plant workers. However, this effect proved transient in all groups studied except the nuclear workers

  5. Impact of accidents on organizational aspects of nuclear utilities

    OpenAIRE

    Spurgin, A. J.; Stupples, D.

    2012-01-01

    This paper applies the Beer Viable Systems Model (VSM) approach to the study of nuclear accidents. It relates how organizational structures and rules are affected by accidents in the attempt to improve safety and reduce risk. The paper illustrates this process with reference to a number of accidents. The dynamic cybernetic aspect of the VSM approach to organizations yields a better understanding of the need for good decision-making to minimize risk and how organizations really operate.

  6. Methodology applied by IRSN for nuclear accident cost estimations in France

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    This report describes the methodology used by IRSN to estimate the cost of potential nuclear accidents in France. It concerns possible accidents involving pressurized water reactors leading to radioactive releases in the environment. These accidents have been grouped in two accident families called: severe accidents and major accidents. Two model scenarios have been selected to represent each of these families. The report discusses the general methodology of nuclear accident cost estimation. The crucial point is that all cost should be considered: if not, the cost is underestimated which can lead to negative consequences for the value attributed to safety and for crisis preparation. As a result, the overall cost comprises many components: the most well-known is offsite radiological costs, but there are many others. The proposed estimates have thus required using a diversity of methods which are described in this report. Figures are presented at the end of this report. Among other things, they show that purely radiological costs only represent a non-dominant part of foreseeable economic consequences

  7. On the Perspective of Nuclear Energy Following the Fukushima Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cavlina, N.; Knapp, V.; Pevec, D.

    2011-01-01

    Future of nuclear energy after accidents on the nuclear power station Daichi at Fukushima has been questioned and discussed. At present 433 nuclear power plants are contributing with about 14% to the world production of electricity. Looking at regional distribution of nuclear power plants, the largest number of nuclear power plants (143) is operating in European Union (EU) producing around one third of its electric energy. EU leads the world in the use of nuclear energy, with very good geopolitical and strategic reasons. Without its own oil and gas resources and with high dependence on external supplier EU has a problem in conducting independent foreign policy. As industrially and technologically developed region of the world EU intends to play a leading role in efforts to reduce C0 2 emission and limit the global temperature increase to below 2 degrees of C. Also, nuclear energy is important for international competitiveness of European industry. After the Fukushima accident, and in the light of that event, many expert groups have revaluated the safety of operating nuclear power plants. Whilst they do not find faults with basic conceptions, some safety related improvements will be recommended. As regards to nuclear energy in EU, irrespectively of short or medium term political decisions, long term geopolitical and strategic reasons that stimulated strong nuclear development in the past, continue to exist. Thus, we may expect continuation of nuclear development in EU without essential delays. As it appears, pending post-Fukushima nuclear safety analysis and applying safety improvements where needed, Fukushima accident will not stop nuclear development in industrially and technologically developed regions of the world. In view of frequently expressed claims that nuclear fuel resources are insufficient for the long term large scale production of nuclear energy we also give a short comment on the sustainability of nuclear energy. (author)

  8. Criticality accident in uranium fuel processing plant. Cause analysis and teachings from a viewpoint of a human factor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furuta, Kazuo

    2000-01-01

    On the JCO criticality accident occurred on September 30, 1999, from relatively earlier time since its occurrence it was elucidated that it was formed not by accident and error operation of apparatus and instruments but by unsafe actions of operators beyond regular manual as its direct cause, and that an organizational factor on business managers and safety administration unable to control such unsafe actions of operators at its background. Then, it was judged to be essential to carry out an accident research from a viewpoint of the human factor (HF) for elucidation on essence of the accident, to establish a 'special workshop on the JCO accident research' to investigate elucidation of the accident cause and countermeasure of reoccurrence at a standpoint of HF. As a result, the essential cause of this accident was summarized that safety information such as ideals, information, teachings and so forth necessary for safety management were failed to share among different organizations. As a teaching of this accident, nuclear energy participants must recognize that safety culture is not finished only in specific organization and range but produced by protecting weathering of danger consciousness and effort of mutually exciting and learning by sharing a safety information beyond different organization, range and time. (G.K.)

  9. Nuclear Accidents Archive Knowledge Organization System Portal “NAAKOS”: An Application of Semantic Technologies in the Nuclear Domain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Atieh, T.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: In line with the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, the IAEA was requested to assist Member States enhancing transparency and effectiveness of communication among operators, regulators and various international organizations, and supporting wide dissemination of safety related technical information on nuclear safety. In this context, the IAEA was further asked to analyse and preserve lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, as well as from past major incidents and radiological events. The IAEA NKM Section has launched the Nuclear Accidents Repository Portal Knowledge Organization System “NAAKOS” initiative which aims at collecting and preserving data, information, and knowledge related to nuclear accidents and making this knowledge available through one single access point, while ensuring their long term preservation. The NKM Section has developed the Nuclear Accidents Taxonomy which will be used, along other nuclear taxonomies, to enhance information retrieval. It would also include the use of semantic technologies, data mining and linked data to support users beyond the traditional search facilities. The overall objective is to assist to find predefined measures in a timely manner that could prevent, or at least minimize the adverse effects of incidents. (author

  10. Nuclear accident dosimeter designed for use with the Panasonic TLD system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hankins, D.E.

    1985-01-01

    A new design for the nuclear accident dosimeter (NAD) compatible with the Panasonic TLD badge has recently been adopted for use at LLNL. This NAD was tested at the 1984 Oak Ridge National Laboratory Intercomparison of Criticality Accident Dosimeters study. We describe the procedures and constants developed to evaluate the NAD components. These constants were averaged to give reasonable results from bare and moderated spectra. Other procedures to evaluate a person's neutron dose using activation of the blood sodium and hair are described. These latter procedures are used to complement the dose determined using the NAD, or to determine a dose if a NAD had not been worn during exposure. If little is known about the configuration of the fissile material or shielding between the material and the exposed person, a procedure which combines the blood and hair activations gives a good estimate of the dose. (DT) 3 refs., 2 figs., 6 tabs

  11. Nuclear energy. Danger only in case of accidents?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scherb, Hagen; Voigt, Kristina; Kusmierz, Ralf

    2014-01-01

    The environmental impacts of nuclear energy are highly underestimated. Nuclear weapons, atomic bomb tests, and nuclear accidents are considered a danger for the environment and a human cancer risk. However, childhood leukemia is consistently elevated near nuclear power plants and the Chernobyl accident entailed elevated human birth sex ratios across Europe. We studied the annual sex ratio near nuclear facilities in Germany, France, and Switzerland at the municipality level. We will demonstrate that low doses of ionizing radiation cause effects in human beings. This is shown by strongly consistent spatial-temporal shifts in the human sex ratio trends in the vicinity of nuclear facilities. In the chosen countries complete official data on over 70 million gender specific annual births at the municipality level are available. By Lambert-93 coordinates (France) and GK3 coordinates (Germany, Switzerland) we determined the minimum distances of municipalities from major nuclear facilities. Spatial-temporal trend analyses of the annual sex ratio depending on municipalities' minimum distances from nuclear facilities were carried out. Applying ordinary linear logistic regression (jump or broken-stick functions) and non-linear logistic regression (Rayleigh functions) we demonstrate that the sex ratio at birth shows the influence of mutagenic ionizing radiation on human health. As important environmental chemical contaminants are also mutagenic, the usefulness of the sex ratio at birth as a genetic health indicator can be inferred by analogy.

  12. Nuclear energy. Danger only in case of accidents?

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Scherb, Hagen; Voigt, Kristina; Kusmierz, Ralf [Helmholtz Zentrum Muenchen, Neuherberg (Germany). Inst. of Computational Biology

    2014-07-01

    The environmental impacts of nuclear energy are highly underestimated. Nuclear weapons, atomic bomb tests, and nuclear accidents are considered a danger for the environment and a human cancer risk. However, childhood leukemia is consistently elevated near nuclear power plants and the Chernobyl accident entailed elevated human birth sex ratios across Europe. We studied the annual sex ratio near nuclear facilities in Germany, France, and Switzerland at the municipality level. We will demonstrate that low doses of ionizing radiation cause effects in human beings. This is shown by strongly consistent spatial-temporal shifts in the human sex ratio trends in the vicinity of nuclear facilities. In the chosen countries complete official data on over 70 million gender specific annual births at the municipality level are available. By Lambert-93 coordinates (France) and GK3 coordinates (Germany, Switzerland) we determined the minimum distances of municipalities from major nuclear facilities. Spatial-temporal trend analyses of the annual sex ratio depending on municipalities' minimum distances from nuclear facilities were carried out. Applying ordinary linear logistic regression (jump or broken-stick functions) and non-linear logistic regression (Rayleigh functions) we demonstrate that the sex ratio at birth shows the influence of mutagenic ionizing radiation on human health. As important environmental chemical contaminants are also mutagenic, the usefulness of the sex ratio at birth as a genetic health indicator can be inferred by analogy.

  13. Iodine Prophylaxis and Nuclear Accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Franic, Z.

    1998-01-01

    Iodine is a highly volatile element therefore being very mobile in the environment. It enters the metabolism of living organisms and is selectively taken up and concentrated in the thyroid gland. The plume (cloud-like formation) of radioactive material that might be released in the environment in the case of a serious nuclear accident, primarily consists of the radioactive isotopes of iodine. Among those, due to its decay properties, is the most important 131 I. The effective means of protecting the thyroid gland against exposure to radioactive iodine is an intake of stable iodine. Therefore, one of the central issues in the emergency planning is to determine whether and at which projected thyroid radiation dose stable iodine should be given to the population. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) set the generic optimized intervention value for iodine prophylaxis to 100 mGy of avertable committed dose to a thyroid.The prophylaxis is implemented by utilizing the pills of pills of potassium iodine (KI). The efficacy of KI in protecting the thyroid gland depends upon the time of intake relative to the start of exposure to radioactive iodine. The best results are obtained if KI is taken 1-2 hours before or immediately after the start of exposure. The recommended dosage, based upon the study performed by Il'in et.al. is 130 mg/day. KI should be taken at least three days after the acute exposure to radioiodine, to prevent accumulation in a thyroid gland of radioiodine excreted from the other compartments of the body. The largest epidemiological study on the effects of KI prophylaxis ever performed was the one in Poland after the Chernobyl accident. Stable iodine was given as single dose of KI solution to 10.5 million of children and 7 millions of adults. Among children no serious side effects were seen while only two adults (with previously recorded iodine sensitivity) had severe respiratory distresses. Polish experiences showed that rapid response to such

  14. Safety study on nuclear heat utilization system - accident delineation and assessment on nuclear steelmaking pilot plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshida, T.; Mizuno, M.; Tsuruoka, K.

    1982-01-01

    This paper presents accident delineation and assessment on a nuclear steelmaking pilot plant as an example of nuclear heat utilization systems. The reactor thermal energy from VHTR is transported to externally located chemical process plant employing helium-heated steam reformer by an intermediate heat transport loop. This paper on the nuclear steelmaking pilot plant will describe (1) system transients under accident conditions, (2) impact of explosion and fire on the nuclear reactor and the public and (3) radiation exposure on the public. The results presented in this paper will contribute considerably to understanding safety features of nuclear heat utilization system that employs the intermediate heat transport loop and the helium-heated steam reformer

  15. Reinforcement of Defence-in-Depth: Modification Practice After the Fukushima Nuclear Accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wang, Y.; Tang, H.; Mao, Q., E-mail: wangyuhong@cgnpc.com.cn [China Nuclear Power Design Co., Ltd Xia Meilin, Futian District, Shenzhen, Guangdong Province (China)

    2014-10-15

    The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident revealed the importance and demand for further reinforcement of defence in- depth. CGN (China General Nuclear Power Group) has made a complete safety assessment on CPR1000 nuclear power plants under construction in China. Dozens of modifications have been implemented based on the assessment findings and lessons learned from Fukushima nuclear accident, taking into account of PSA (Probabilistic Safety Analysis) and comparison analysis of the latest regulations and standards. These modifications help to enhance nuclear safety significantly for nuclear power plants under construction in China, and provide helpful modification guidance for nuclear power plants in operation of the same type. (author)

  16. The accident at the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant and its consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-08-01

    The material is taken from the conclusions of the Government Commission on the causes of the accident at the fourth unit of the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant and was prepared by a team of experts appointed by the USSR State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy. It contains general material describing the accident, its causes, the action taken to contain the accident and to alleviate its consequences, the radioactive contamination and health of the population and some recommendations for improving nuclear power safety. 7 annexes are devoted to the following topics: water-graphite channel reactors and operating experience with RBMK reactors, design of the reactor plant, elimination of the consequences of the accident and decontamination, estimate of the amount, composition and dynamics of the discharge of radioactive substances from the damaged reactor, atmospheric transport and radioactive contamination of the atmosphere and of the ground, expert evaluation and prediction of the radioecological state of the environment in the area of the radiation plume from the Chernobyl' nuclear power station, medical-biological problems. A separate abstract was prepared for each of these annexes. The slides presented at the post-accident review meeting are grouped in two separate volumes

  17. Measuring Risk Aversion for Nuclear Power Plant Accident: Results of Contingent Valuation Survey in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Sang Hun; Kang, Hyun Gook

    2015-01-01

    Within the evaluation of the external cost of nuclear energy, the estimation of the external cost of nuclear power plant (NPP) severe accident is one of the major topics to be addressed. For the evaluation of the external cost of NPP severe accident, the effect of public risk averse behavior against the group accidents, such as NPP accident, dam failure, must be addressed. Although the equivalent fatalities from a single group accident are not common and its risk is very small compared to other accidents, people perceive the group accident more seriously. In other words, people are more concerned about low probability/high consequence events than about high probability/low consequence events having the same mean damage. One of the representative method to integrate the risk aversion in the external costs of severe nuclear reactor accidents was developed by Eeckoudt et al., and he used the risk aversion coefficient, mainly based on the analysis of financial risks in the stock markets to evaluate the external cost of nuclear severe accident. However, the use of financial risk aversion coefficient to nuclear severe accidents is not appropriate, because financial risk and nuclear severe accident risk are entirely different. In this paper, the individual-level survey was conducted to measure the risk aversion coefficient and estimate the multiplication factor to integrate the risk aversion in the external costs of NPP severe accident. This study propose an integrated framework on estimation of the external cost associated with severe accidents of NPP considering public risk aversion behavior. The theoretical framework to estimate the risk aversion coefficient/multiplication factor and to assess economic damages from a hypothetical NPP accident was constructed. Based on the theoretical framework, the risk aversion coefficient can be analyzed by conducting public survey with a carefully designed lottery questions. Compared to the previous studies on estimation of the

  18. Measuring Risk Aversion for Nuclear Power Plant Accident: Results of Contingent Valuation Survey in Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Sang Hun; Kang, Hyun Gook [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    Within the evaluation of the external cost of nuclear energy, the estimation of the external cost of nuclear power plant (NPP) severe accident is one of the major topics to be addressed. For the evaluation of the external cost of NPP severe accident, the effect of public risk averse behavior against the group accidents, such as NPP accident, dam failure, must be addressed. Although the equivalent fatalities from a single group accident are not common and its risk is very small compared to other accidents, people perceive the group accident more seriously. In other words, people are more concerned about low probability/high consequence events than about high probability/low consequence events having the same mean damage. One of the representative method to integrate the risk aversion in the external costs of severe nuclear reactor accidents was developed by Eeckoudt et al., and he used the risk aversion coefficient, mainly based on the analysis of financial risks in the stock markets to evaluate the external cost of nuclear severe accident. However, the use of financial risk aversion coefficient to nuclear severe accidents is not appropriate, because financial risk and nuclear severe accident risk are entirely different. In this paper, the individual-level survey was conducted to measure the risk aversion coefficient and estimate the multiplication factor to integrate the risk aversion in the external costs of NPP severe accident. This study propose an integrated framework on estimation of the external cost associated with severe accidents of NPP considering public risk aversion behavior. The theoretical framework to estimate the risk aversion coefficient/multiplication factor and to assess economic damages from a hypothetical NPP accident was constructed. Based on the theoretical framework, the risk aversion coefficient can be analyzed by conducting public survey with a carefully designed lottery questions. Compared to the previous studies on estimation of the

  19. Application of RASCAL code for multiunit accident in domestic nuclear sites

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Sang Hyun; Jeong, Seung Young [Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    All of domestic nuclear power plant sites are multiunit site (at least 5 - 6 reactors are operating), so this capability has to be quickly secured for nuclear licensee and institutes responsible for nuclear emergency response. In this study, source term and offsite dose from multiunit event were assessed using a computer code, RASCAL. An emergency exercise scenario was chosen to verify applicability of the codes to domestic nuclear site accident. Employing tools and new features of the code, such as merging more than two individual source terms and source term estimate for long term progression accident, main parameters and information in the scenario, release estimates and dose projections were performed. Radiological releases and offsite doses from multiunit accident were calculated using RASCAL.. A scenario, in which three reactors were damaged coincidently by a great natural disaster, was considered. Surrogate plants were chosen for the code calculation. Source terms of each damaged unit were calculated individually first, and then total source term and integrated offsite dose assessment data was acquired using a source term merge function in the code. Also comparison between LTSBO and LOCA source term estimate options was performed. Differences in offsite doses were caused by release characteristics. From LTSBO option, iodines were released much higher than LOCA. Also LTSBO source term release was delayed and the duration was longer than LOCA. This option would be useful to accidents which progress with much longer time frame than LOCA. RASCAL can be useful tool for radiological consequence assessment in domestic nuclear site accidents.

  20. Convention of early notification of a nuclear accident. Convention of assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-05-01

    The document refers to the Convention on early notification of a nuclear accident (INFCIRC-335) and to the Convention on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (INFCIRC-336). Part I of the document contains reservations/declarations made upon or following signature made by Algeria, Iraq and Thailand. Part II contains reservations/declarations made upon or following deposit of instrument expressing consent to be bound made by Australia, Bulgaria, China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Poland, South Africa, United Arab Emirates and Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. The status of signature, notification, acceptance, approval or accession of the two conventions as of 13 May 1988 is presented in two attachments

  1. Enlightenment on international cooperation for nuclear safety in China in light of Fukushima nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fu Jie; Feng Yi; Luan Haiyan; Meng Yue; Zhang Ou

    2013-01-01

    This thesis elaborates on the impact of Fukushima nuclear accident on global nuclear power development and subsequent international activities carried out by major countries. It analyses significance of international cooperation in ensuring nuclear safety and promoting nuclear power development and makes some suggestions to further strengthen the international cooperation on nuclear safety in China. (authors)

  2. Accident assessment under emergency situation in Daya Bay nuclear power station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Ling; Chen Degan; Lin Shumou; Fu Guohui

    2004-01-01

    The accident assessment under emergency situation includes the accident status evaluation and its consequence estimation. This paper introduces evaluation methods for accident status and its assistant computer system (SESAME-GNP) utilized during the emergency situation in Guangdong Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station (GNPS) in detail. At the same time, an improved accident consequence estimation system in GNPS (RACAS-GNP) is briefly described. With the improvement of the accident assessment systems, the capability of emergency response in GNPS is strengthened

  3. The role of nuclear reactor containment in severe accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-04-01

    The containment is a structural envelope which completely surrounds the nuclear reactor system and is designed to confine the radioactive releases in case of an accident. This report summarises the work of an NEA Senior Group of Experts who have studied the potential role of containment in accidents exceeding design specifications (so-called severe accidents). Some possibilities for enhancing the ability of plants to reduce the risk of significant off-site consequences by appropriate management of the acident have been examined

  4. Chairperson's Summary, International Expert Meeting on Decommissioning and Remediation after a Nuclear Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Larsson, Carl Magnus

    2013-01-01

    History has clearly demonstrated, and it has repeated itself in the events and aftermath of March 2011, that a major nuclear accident, just as any other major accident, not only affects public and environmental health, but in addition causes a wide range of direct and indirect effects. These include evacuation and relocation; social unrest; indirect health effects related to anxiety, radiological stigma and symptoms of a post-traumatic nature; as well as effects on property, the economy, public policy and politics. All of these factors influence the setting of targets for decommissioning and remediation; this is often an iterative process involving consideration of the legal framework, finances, processes and methodology and technology. Importantly, decommissioning and remediation is carried out in close interaction with stakeholders, of which the public (affected by both the accident and the recovery from its consequences) form an important part. Today, we have substantial knowledge about the impact of major nuclear accidents as well as a wealth of experience - good and sometimes less so - from a range of decommissioning and remediation projects following nuclear accidents. There are also a number of lessons to be learned from decommissioning and remediation of other legacy sites that have not originated from nuclear accidents but where the problems encountered are of similar nature. Experiences have over the years been discussed in many fora, including a number of IAEA initiatives and UNSCEAR reviews of scientific information on health and environmental effects of accidents and legacies of comparable nature. It is timely to discuss this knowledge in relation to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, to provide guidance to future actions aimed at strengthening our understanding of the exposure situation, and our ability to successfully carry out decommissioning of facilities and environmental remediation after a nuclear accident. (author)

  5. JAERI's activities in JCO accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-09-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) was actively involved in a variety of technical supports and cooperative activities, such as advice on terminating the criticality condition, contamination checks of the residents and consultation services for the residents, as emergency response actions to the criticality accident at the uranium processing facility operated by the JCO Co. Ltd., which occurred on September 30, 1999. These activities were carried out in collaborative ways by the JAERI staff from the Tokai Research Establishment, Naka Fusion Research Establishment, Oarai Research Establishment, and Headquarter Office in Tokyo. As well, the JAERI was engaged in the post-accident activities such as identification of accident causes, analyses of the criticality accident, and dose assessment of exposed residents, to support the Headquarter for Accident Countermeasures of the Science and Technology Agency (STA), the Accident Investigation Committee and the Health Control Committee of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan (NSC). This report compiles the activities, that the JAERI has conducted to date, including the discussions on measures for terminating the criticality condition, evaluation of the fission number, radiation monitoring in the environment, dose assessment, analyses of criticality dynamics. (author)

  6. A digest of the Nuclear Safety Division report on the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident seminar (4). Issues identified by the accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moriyama, Kumiaki; Abe, Kiyoharu

    2013-01-01

    AESJ Nuclear Safety Division published 'Report on the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Seminar - what was wrong and what should been down in future-' which would be published as five special articles of the AESJ journal. The Fukushima Dai-ichi accident identified issues of several activities directly related with nuclear safety in the areas of safety design, severe accident management and safety regulations. PRA, operational experiences and safety research could not always contribute safety assurance of nuclear power plant so much. This article (4) summarized technical issues based on related facts of the accident as much as possible and discussed' what was wrong and what should be down in future'. Important issues were identified from defense-in-depth philosophy and lessons learned on safety design were obtained from accident progression analysis. Activities against external events and continuous improvements of safety standards based on latest knowledge were most indispensable. Strong cooperation among experts in different areas was also needed. (T. Tanaka)

  7. ACCIDENTS AND UNSCHEDULED EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH NON-NUCLEAR ENERGY RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY

    Science.gov (United States)

    Accidents and unscheduled events associated with non-nuclear energy resources and technology are identified for each step in the energy cycle. Both natural and anthropogenic causes of accidents or unscheduled events are considered. Data concerning these accidents are summarized. ...

  8. Application of Whole Body Counter to Neutron Dose Assessment in Criticality Accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kurihara, O.; Tsujimura, N.; Takasaki, K.; Momose, T.; Maruo, Y. [Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, Tokai (Japan)

    2001-09-15

    Neutron dose assessment in criticality accidents using Whole Body Counter (WBC) was proved to be an effective method as rapid neutron dose estimation at the JCO criticality accident in Tokai-mura. The 1.36MeV gamma-ray of {sup 24}Na in a body can be detected easily by a germanium detector. The Minimum Detectable Activity (MDA) of {sup 24}Na is approximately 50Bq for 10minute measurement by the germanium-type whole body counter at JNC Tokai Works. Neutron energy spectra at the typical shielding conditions in criticality accidents were calculated and the conversion factor, whole body activity-to-organ mass weighted neutron absorbed dose, corresponding to each condition were determined. The conversion factor for uncollied fission spectrum is 7.7 [(Bq{sup 24}Na/g{sup 23}Na)/mGy].

  9. The IAEA Conventions on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moser, B.

    1989-01-01

    This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the provisions of both IAEA Conventions. Special attention is paid to the rules of the Convention on Early Notification which identify the events subject to notification and the content and addresses of the information to be provided with regard to a nuclear accident, as well as to the provisions of the Convention on Assistance concerning the request and grant of international assistance with regard to a nuclear accident and the duties attributed in this field to the IAEA. The author also considers the liability questions raised by that Convention. (NEA) [fr

  10. The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-07-01

    In October 2011, the Act regarding Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission was enacted to investigate the Fukushima accident with the authority to request documents and request the legislative branch to use its investigative powers to obtain any necessary documents or evidence required. In December 2011, chairman and nine other members were appointed. After a six-month investigation, Commission had concluded. 'In order to prevent future disasters, fundamental reforms must take place covering both the structure of electric power industry and the structure of related government and regulatory agencies as well as operation processes, for both normal and emergency situations'. Main parts of report consisted of overview, conclusions and recommendations, and six findings; (1) was the accident preventable?, (2) Escalation of the accident, (3) Emergency response to the accident, (4) Spread of the damage, (5) Organizational issues in accident prevention and response and (6) the legal system. Based on the above findings, Commission made seven recommendations regarding (1) Monitoring of the nuclear regulatory body by the National Diet, (2) Reform the crisis management system, (3) Government responsibility for public health and welfare, (4) Monitoring the operators, (5) Criteria for the new regulatory body, (6) Reforming laws related to nuclear energy and (7) Develop a system of independent investigation commissions. National Diet's thorough debate and deliberate on these recommendation was highly encouraged for the future. (T. Tanaka)

  11. The next nuclear power station generation: Beyond-design accident concepts, methods, and action sequence

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Asmolov, V.G.; Khakh, O.Ya.; Shashkov, M.G.

    1993-01-01

    The problem of beyond-design accidents at nuclear stations will not be solved unless a safety culture becomes a basic characteristic of all lines of activity. Only then can the danger of accidents as an objective feature of nuclear stations be eliminated by purposive skilled and responsible activities of those implementing safety. Nuclear-station safety is provided by the following interacting and complementary lines of activity: (1) the design and construction of nuclear stations by properly qualified design and building organizations; (2) monitoring and supervision of safety by special state bodies; (3) control of the station by the exploiting organization; and (4) scientific examination of safety within the above framework and by independent organizations. The distribution of the responsibilities, powers, and right in these lines should be defined by a law on atomic energy, but there is not such law in Russian. The beyond-design accident problem is a key one in nuclear station safety, as it clear from the serious experience with accidents and numerous probabilistic studies. There are four features of the state of this topic in Russia that are of major significance for managing accidents: the lack of an atomic energy law, the inadequacy of the technical standards, the lack of a verified program package for nuclear-station designs in order to calculate the beyond-design accidents and analyze risks, and a lack of approach by designers to such accidents on the basis of international recommendations. This paper gives a brief description of three-forming points in the scientific activity: the general concept of nuclear-station safety, methods of analyzing and providing accident management, and the sequence of actions developed by specialists at this institute in recent years

  12. Importance of risk communication during and after a nuclear accident.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perko, Tanja

    2011-07-01

    Past nuclear accidents highlight communication as one of the most important challenges in emergency management. In the early phase, communication increases awareness and understanding of protective actions and improves the population response. In the medium and long term, risk communication can facilitate the remediation process and the return to normal life. Mass media play a central role in risk communication. The recent nuclear accident in Japan, as expected, induced massive media coverage. Media were employed to communicate with the public during the contamination phase, and they will play the same important role in the clean-up and recovery phases. However, media also have to fulfill the economic aspects of publishing or broadcasting, with the "bad news is good news" slogan that is a well-known phenomenon in journalism. This article addresses the main communication challenges and suggests possible risk communication approaches to adopt in the case of a nuclear accident. Copyright © 2011 SETAC.

  13. Nuclear accident: the EPR, the most dangerous reactor in the world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Large, John

    2007-02-01

    After a brief description of the operation of a nuclear reactor, this document outlines the complexity of this machine and the problems which may happen and result in radioactive releases. It also briefly recalls past accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island) and serious incidents (Fosmark in Sweden, Blayais in France). The author then describes how the nuclear industry and nuclear safety authorities tend to deny the risk, notably as far as the EPR is concerned. He outlines that the hypotheses retained by EDF and safety authorities for the quantity of radioactivity released in case of accident might be under-assessed as it appears when they are compared with data obtained by different models and in reality. The author considers that the use of MOX introduces difficulties to ensure nuclear safety, and that the EPR will therefore be the most dangerous nuclear reactor in the world. Based on a simulation, he shows that, in case of accident in of the EPR in Flamanville, radioactive fallouts will occur at the continental scale in less than two days. He proposes an assessment of consequences for the population in terms of deaths, cancers, evacuation. He indicates the different exposure modes for the population, and the countermeasures to be implemented in case of accident (he proposes an assessment of consequences in terms of morbidity with or without countermeasures)

  14. Japan's compensation system for nuclear damage - As related to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nomura, Toyohiro; Matsuura, Shigekazu; Takahashi, Yasufumi; Takenaka, Chihiro; Hokugo, Taro; Kamada, Toshihiko; Kamai, Hiroyuki

    2012-01-01

    Following the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, extraordinary efforts were undertaken in Japan to implement a compensation scheme for the proper and efficient indemnification of the affected victims. This publication provides English translations of key Japanese legislative and administrative texts and other implementing guidance, as well as several commentaries by Japanese experts in the field of third party nuclear liability. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has prepared this publication in co-operation with the government of Japan to share Japan's recent experience in implementing its nuclear liability and compensation regime. The material presented in the publication should provide valuable insights for those wishing to better understand the regime applied to compensate the victims of the accident and for those working on potential improvements in national regimes and the international framework for third party nuclear liability

  15. Nuclear Security Summit and Workshop 2015: Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents lessons learned from Chernobyl and Fukushima

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-09-01

    Workshop 2015 "Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents"--lessons learned from Chernobyl and Fukushima Distribution Statement...by the factor to get the U.S. customary unit. “Preventing, Understanding and Recovering from Nuclear Accidents” – lessons learned from Chernobyl ...and Fukushima NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT & WORKSHOP 2015 2 Background The 1986 Chernobyl and the 2011 Fukushima accidents provoked world-wide concern

  16. Nuclear criticality safety guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ro, Seong Ki; Shin, Hee Seong; Park, Seong Won; Shin, Young Joon.

    1997-06-01

    Nuclear criticality safety guide was described for handling, transportation and storage of nuclear fissile materials in this report. The major part of the report was excerpted frp, TID-7016(revision 2) and nuclear criticality safety written by Knief. (author). 16 tabs., 44 figs., 5 refs

  17. Thyroid blocking after nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rendl, J.; Reiners, C.

    1999-01-01

    Following the Chernobyl accident a marked increase in thyroid cancer incidence among the children in Belarus, the Ukraine and Russia has been detected, strongly suggesting a causal relationship to the large amounts of radioactive iodine isotopes in the resulting fallout. Taking into account the Chernobyl experience the German Committee on Radiation Protection decided to reduce the intervention levels on the basis of the 1989 WHO recommendations and adopted a new concept concerning thyroid blocking in response to nuclear power plant accidents. Experimental animal studies and theoretical considerations show that thyroid blocking with potassium iodide (KI) in a dose of about 1.4 mg per kg body weight is most effective in reducing irradiation to the thyroid from the intake of radioiodine nuclides, provided KI is given within 2 hours after exposure. According to the new concept, persons over 45 years of age should not take iodine tablets because the drug could cause a greater health risk due to prevalent functional thyroid autonomy in this age group than the radioactive iodine averted by KI. On the basis of accident analysis and the new philosophy suitable distribution strategies and logistics are proposed and discussed. (orig.) [de

  18. Source term estimation during incident response to severe nuclear power plant accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKenna, T.J.; Glitter, J.G.

    1988-10-01

    This document presents a method of source term estimation that reflects the current understanding of source term behavior and that can be used during an event. The various methods of estimating radionuclide release to the environment (source terms) as a result of an accident at a nuclear power reactor are discussed. The major factors affecting potential radionuclide releases off site (source terms) as a result of nuclear power plant accidents are described. The quantification of these factors based on plant instrumentation also is discussed. A range of accident conditions from those within the design basis to the most severe accidents possible are included in the text. A method of gross estimation of accident source terms and their consequences off site is presented. 39 refs., 48 figs., 19 tabs

  19. Risk informed analysis of training effectiveness for mitigating accidents of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chang Ju

    2012-01-01

    A critical area for deriving expected benefits from training and exercise is the measurement of 'training effectiveness'-how well the training inputs are serving the intended purpose. This aspect is often neglected by nuclear organizations, saying that measurement is difficult. However, I believe that a technique in nuclear society has developed sufficiently to measure most important aspects of training by way of human reliability analysis (HRA) used in probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of nuclear power plants (NPPs). The consequences of errors caused by lack of training can be evaluated in terms of the overall vulnerability to human error of the facility under consideration. This study presents current situation and considerations for measures of robustness on nuclear accidents and HRA technique on the training effectiveness. In view of risk informed approach with this consideration and an example case, I'd like to identify appropriate relationship between risk measures of robustness and training effectiveness

  20. The External Cost Evaluation of the Nuclear Severe Accident Using CVM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Yong Suk; Lee, Byung Chul

    2006-01-01

    The external cost of energy can be defined as 'the cost not included in the energy market price', such as air pollution, noise, etc. Within the evaluation of the external cost of nuclear energy, the estimation of the external cost of severe accident is one of the major topics to be addressed. For the evaluation of the external cost of severe accident, the effect of risk aversion of the public against the severe accident must be addressed, because people are more concerned about low probability - high consequence events than about high probability - low consequence events having the same mean damage. It is generally recognized that there is a discrepancy between the social acceptability of the risk and the average monetary value which corresponds in principle to the compensation of the consequences for each individual of the population affected by the accident. In this paper, the CVM (Contingent Valuation Method) is used to integrate the risk aversion in the external costs of nuclear severe accidents in Korea

  1. On the contribution of external cost calculations to energy system governance: The case of a potential large-scale nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laes, Erik; Meskens, Gaston; Sluijs, Jeroen P. van der

    2011-01-01

    The contribution of nuclear power to a sustainable energy future is a contested issue. This paper presents a critical review of an attempt to objectify this debate through the calculation of the external costs of a potential large-scale nuclear accident in the ExternE project. A careful dissection of the ExternE approach resulted in a list of 30 calculation steps and assumptions, from which the 6 most contentious ones were selected through a stakeholder internet survey. The policy robustness and relevance of these key assumptions were then assessed in a workshop using the concept of a 'pedigree of knowledge'. Overall, the workshop outcomes revealed the stakeholder and expert panel's scepticism about the assumptions made: generally these were considered not very plausible, subjected to disagreement, and to a large extent inspired by contextual factors. Such criticism indicates a limited validity and useability of the calculated nuclear accident externality as a trustworthy sustainability indicator. Furthermore, it is our contention that the ExternE project could benefit greatly - in terms of gaining public trust - from employing highly visible procedures of extended peer review such as the pedigree assessment applied to our specific case of the external costs of a potential large-scale nuclear accident. - Highlights: → Six most contentious assumptions were selected through a stakeholder internet survey. → Policy robustness of these assumptions was assessed in a pedigree assessment workshop. → Assumptions were considered implausible, controversial, and inspired by contextual factors. → This indicates a limited validity and useability as a trustworthy sustainability indicator.

  2. Assessment of PASS Effectiveness under Severe Accidents in Nuclear Power Plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Yu Jung; Lee, Sung Bok; Kim, Hyeong Taek; Lee, Jin Yong

    2008-01-01

    Following the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) on March 28, 1979, the USNRC formed a lessons-learned Task Force to identify and evaluate safety concerns originating with the TMI-2 accident. NUREG-0578 documented the results of the task force effort. One of the recommendations of the task force was for licensees to upgrade the capability to obtain samples from the reactor coolant system and containment atmosphere under high radioactivity conditions and to provide the capability for chemical and spectral analyses of high-level samples on site. NUREG-0737 contained the details of the TMI recommendations that were to be implemented by the licensees. Additional criteria for post accident sampling system(PASS) were issued by Regulatory Guide 1.97. As the results, PASS has been installed on nuclear power plants(NPPs) in Korea as well as United States. However, significant improvements have been achieved since the TMI-2 accident in the areas of understanding risks associated with nuclear plant operations and developing better strategies for managing the response to potential severe accidents at NPPs. Thus, the requirements for PASS have been re-evaluated in some reports. According to the reports, the samples and measurements from PASS do not contribute significantly to emergency management response to severe accidents due to the long analyzing time, 3 hours. Hence, this paper focused on the development of the quantitative analysis methodology to analyze the sequence of the severe accident in Yonggwang nuclear power plants (YGN) and presented the results of the analysis according to the developed methodology

  3. Catastrophes and nuclear accidents in the former USSR

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robeau, D.

    2001-01-01

    In the former USSR, the nuclear safety, the environment protection and the preservation of workers and population health were not the first priority for the Soviet Union authorities. The fabrication of nuclear weapons, the construction of nuclear submarines and the production of an abundant energy source were the only goals at that time. This book describes and explains the circumstances of the nuclear catastrophes and accidents that have occurred during this era. It tries to estimate their impacts on populations and environment and their possible consequences in a near or far future. (J.S.)

  4. Study on integrated approach of Nuclear Accident Hazard Predicting, Warning, and Optimized Controlling System based on GIS

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tang Lijuan; Huang Shunxiang; Wang Xinming

    2012-01-01

    The issue of nuclear safety becomes the attention focus of international society after the nuclear accident happened in Fukushima. Aiming at the requirements of the prevention and controlling of Nuclear Accident establishment of Nuclear Accident Hazard Predicting, Warning and optimized Controlling System (NAPWS) is a imperative project that our country and army are desiderating, which includes multiple fields of subject as nuclear physics, atmospheric science, security science, computer science and geographical information technology, etc. Multiplatform, multi-system and multi-mode are integrated effectively based on GIS, accordingly the Predicting, Warning, and Optimized Controlling technology System of Nuclear Accident Hazard is established. (authors)

  5. Estimation of dose distribution and neutron spectra in JCO critical accident by shielding calculations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sakamoto, Yukio

    2001-01-01

    The information about neutrons at the surrounding of JCO site in the critical accident is limited to survey results by neutron Rem counter in the period of accident and activation data very near the test facility measured after the shut down of accident. This caused the big uncertainty in the dose estimation by detailed shielding calculation codes. On the other hand, environmental activity data measured by radiochemical researchers included the information about fast neutrons inside of JCO site and thermal neutrons up to 1 km from test facility. It is important to grasp the actual circumstance and examine the executed evaluation of the critical accident as scientifically as possible. Therefore, it is meaningful for different field researchers to corporate and exchange the information. In the Technical Divisions of Radiation Science and Technology in Atomic Energy Society of Japan, the information about neutron spectra are released from their home page and three groups of JAERI/CRC, Sumitomo Atomic Energy Industry and Nuclear Power Engineering Corp. (NUPEC)/Mitsubishi Research Institute Inc. (MRI), tried the shielding calculation by Monte Carlo Code MCNP-4B. The procedures and main results of shielding calculations were reviewed in this report. The main difference of shielding calculation by three groups was density and water content of autoclaved light-weight concrete (ALC) as the wall and ceiling. From the result by NUPEC/MRI, it was estimated that the water content in ALC was from 0.05 g/cm 3 to 0.10 g/cm 3 . The behavior of dose equivalent attenuation obtained by shielding calculation was very similar with the measured data from 250 m to 1,700 m obtained by survey meter, TLD and monitoring post. For more exact dose estimation, more detail examination of density and water content of ALC will be needed. (author)

  6. Aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in March 2011 - Situation review in March 2016

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2016-03-01

    The first part of this detailed report addresses the consequences of the accident regarding nuclear safety. It proposes a situation review of site damaged installations, of radioactive water management, and of underground water management. It presents and comments lessons learned from this accident for French nuclear installations, gives an overview of researches performed by the IRSN in the field of nuclear safety. The second part addresses health consequences of the accident. It discusses an assessment of epidemiologic studies performed on inhabitants of the Fukushima Prefecture, and comments the situation of workers involved in operations performed in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The third part addresses environmental consequences. It discusses values of radionuclide concentrations in Japanese air five years after the accident, measurements of caesium activities, assessments of contamination of Japanese food products, decontamination actions and waste management, the status of marine contamination in 2015, the evolution of evacuation areas between 2011 and 2016, the first returns and wills to return of evacuated populations, the update of knowledge related to the dispersion and depositions of atmospheric releases of the accident, and the modelling of atmospheric transport and fallouts of releases emitted during the accident. The last part proposes a comparison between the Chernobyl accident and the Fukushima accident in terms of distribution of radioactive depositions within river basins, of knowledge drawn from ecologic studies on fauna and flora performed on the long term in contaminated areas, and of management of forest environments after a nuclear accident

  7. Evaluation of the influences of nuclear accident by hedonic approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Takai, Toru

    2005-01-01

    The purpose of this sturdy is to examine the influences on residential land prices of criticality accident in Tokai-mura. To clarify the influences, three types of hedonic model are used to estimate land prices around JCO before and after the accident. The result of estimation indicates that land prices decreased according to proximity to JCO after the accident. (author)

  8. A cost effective approach for criticality accident analysis of a DOE SNF storage facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garrett, R.L.; Couture, G.F.; Gough, S.T.

    1997-01-01

    This paper presents the methodologies used to derive criticality accident analyses for a spent nuclear fuel receipt, storage, handling, and shipping facility. Two criticality events are considered: process-induced and Natural Phenomena Hazards (NPH)-induced. The criticality analyses required the development of: (1) the frequency at which each sceanario occurred, (2) the estimated number of fissions for each scenario, and (3) the consequences associated with each criticality scenario. A fault tree analysis was performed to quantify the frequency of criticality due to process-induced events. For the frequency analysis of NPH-induced criticality, a probabilistic approach was employed. To estimate the consequences of a criticality event, the resulting fission yield was determined using a probabilistic approach. For estimating the source term, a 95% amount of overall conservatism was targeted. This methodology applied to the facility criticality scenarios indicated that: (1) the 95th percentile yield levels from the historical yield distributions are approximately 5 x 10 17 fissions and 5 x 10 18 fissions for internal event and NPH-induced criticality event, respectively; and (2) using probabilistic Latin Hypercube Sampling, the downwind 95th percentile dose to a receptor at the US DOE reservation boundary is 2.2 mrem. This estimate is compared to the bounding dose of 1.4 rem. 4 refs., 1 fig

  9. Study of source term evaluation from fuel solution under simulated nuclear criticality accident in TRACY

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abe, Hitoshi; Tashiro, Shinsuke; Nagai, Hitoshi; Koike, Tadao; Okagawa, Seigo; Murata, Mikio

    1999-01-01

    In a accident at the dissolver in a reprocessing plant, various fission products and radiolysis gases will be produced in the fuel solution and volatile radioactive nuclides and radiolysis gases and nitrogen oxide will be released into vent-gas spontaneously. Moreover other on-volatile nuclide will be releases as radioactive aerosol (mist) with bursting bubbles at surface of the solution. Therefore quantitative estimation of release and transport behavior of the radioactive material from solution as source term is very important. TRACY is a transient criticality experimental facility for studying the transient criticality characteristics of low enriched uranium. In this paper, experiment methods and results about the release behavior of the hydrogen, radioactive aerosol and iodine species from the fuel solutions are reported. As the results of the experiments, release patterns of H 2 , 140 Ba and 131 I could be grasped. Concentrations of H 2 in the vent-gas and 140 Ba in the gas phase in the core tank attained to the peak just after the transient criticality and decreased exponentially with time. On the other hand, concentrations of 131 I in the gas phase of the tank began to increase with a time lag of several minutes from the transient criticality and attained approximately constant values. (J.P.N.)

  10. Preliminary report about nuclear accident of Chernobylsk reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliveira, A.R. de.

    1986-07-01

    The preliminary report of nuclear accident at Chernobyl, in URSS is presented. The Chernobyl site is located geographically and the RBMK type reactors - initials of russian words which mean high power pressure tube reactors are described. The conditions of reactor operation in beginning of accident, the events which lead to reactor destruction, the means to finish the fire, the measurements adopted by Russian in the accident location, the estimative of radioactive wastes, the meteorological conditions during the accident, the victims and medical assistence, the sanitary aspects and consequences for population, the evaluation of radiation doses received at small and medium distance and the estimative of reffered doses by population attained are presented. The official communication of Russian Minister Council and the declaration of IAEA general manager during a collective interview in Moscou are annexed. (M.C.K.) [pt

  11. Measurement of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant criticality accident alarm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tayloe, R.W. Jr.; McGinnis, B.

    1990-01-01

    Measurements of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant's nuclear criticality accident radiation alarm signal response time, sound wave frequency, and sound volume levels were made to demonstrate compliance with ANSI/ANS-8.3-1986. A steady-state alarm signal is produced within one-half second of obtaining a two-out-of-three detector trip. The fundamental alarm sound wave frequency is 440 hertz. The sound volume levels are greater than 10 decibels above background and ranged from 100 to 125 A-weighted decibels. The requirements of the standard were met; however the recommended maximum sound volume level of 115 dBA was exceeded. Emergency procedures require immediate evacuation upon initiation of a facility's radiation alarm. Comparison with standards for allowable time of exposure at different noise levels indicate that the elevated noise level at this location does not represent an occupational injury hazard. 8 refs., 5 figs

  12. The risk of accident in nuclear power plants - Quotes and questions. National debate on energy transition. Taking the risk of nuclear accident into account. Note to the 'scenarios' subgroup of the group of experts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laponche, Bernard

    2013-01-01

    After an overview of the production of electricity from nuclear energy and of its risks, the author discusses the issue of nuclear safety by distinguishing the different points of view, by describing the different levels between a severe and a major accident, and by recalling the statements made by the ASN and the IRSN on this issue. He describes the various reasons and consequences of accidents: types of accidents which could result in a core fusion, the containment failure as the major accident. He discusses the questions and comments about major issues like: strength of reactor vessels, hydrogen explosion, water vapour explosion, corium crossing the concrete sill plate, corium recovery, MOX as an aggravating situation for safety. In the last part, the author discusses the global assessment of a risk of a nuclear accident: probabilities and occurrences, significant accidents on PWRs, premonitory analysis, demonstration of nuclear safety

  13. The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station - occurrence of the accident, current situation and Future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirose, K.

    2013-01-01

    In this presentation author analyse course of accident on Fukushima Dai-chi NPPs as well as consequences of this disaster. The following parts are presented: (1) Occurrence of the accident; (2) Evacuation of the residential people; (3) Deterioration and protraction of the accident; (4) Impact on society; (5) Situation of decontamination; (6) Long-term steps towards decommissioning; (7) Situation of other nuclear power stations; (8) Conclusions and lessons learned.

  14. Lessons of the accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Veksler, L.M.

    1983-01-01

    Measures taken in the USA for improving safety of NPPs after the accident at ''Three Mile Island'' nuclear power plant are considered. Activities, related to elimination of accident consequences are analyzed. Perspectives of resuming the NPP operation are discussed

  15. Nuclear accident: dosimetric and medical aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oliveira, A.R. de.

    The conservation aspect of the treatment of patients who received whole-body exposure is presented. Such treatment to be started during the first hours after the accident (prodomal phase), as well as the nonconventional measures to be adopted when the critical phase of acute irradiation syndrome is reached. (E.G.) [pt

  16. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Stations of TEPCO —Outline & lessons learned—

    OpenAIRE

    TANAKA, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety o...

  17. Study of typical nuclear containment purge valves in an accident environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Watkins, J.C.; Steele, R. Jr.; Hill, R.C.; DeWall, K.G.

    1986-08-01

    This report presents the results of the containment purge and vent valve test program, conducted under the sponsorship of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research. The test program investigated butterfly valve operability and leak integrity under light-water-reactor design basis and severe accident conditions. Three nuclear-designed butterfly valves typical of those used in domestic nuclear power plant containment purge and vent applications were tested. For a comparison of response, two valve of the same size with differing internal designs were tested. For extrapolation insights, a larger-sized valve similar to one of the smaller valves was also tested. Dynamic flow tests were performed over the range of design basis accident pressures. Leak integrity testing was also performed at both design basis and severe accident temperatures and pressures. The valve experiments were performed with various piping configurations and valve orientations to the flow to simulate the various installation options in field applications. Testing was also performed in a standard ANSI test section

  18. Fast Transient And Spatially Non-Homogenous Accident Analysis Of Two-Dimensional Cylindrical Nuclear Reactor

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yulianti, Yanti; Su'ud, Zaki; Waris, Abdul; Khotimah, S. N.; Shafii, M. Ali

    2010-01-01

    The research about fast transient and spatially non-homogenous nuclear reactor accident analysis of two-dimensional nuclear reactor has been done. This research is about prediction of reactor behavior is during accident. In the present study, space-time diffusion equation is solved by using direct methods which consider spatial factor in detail during nuclear reactor accident simulation. Set of equations that obtained from full implicit finite-difference discretization method is solved by using iterative methods ADI (Alternating Direct Implicit). The indication of accident is decreasing macroscopic absorption cross-section that results large external reactivity. The power reactor has a peak value before reactor has new balance condition. Changing of temperature reactor produce a negative Doppler feedback reactivity. The reactivity will reduce excess positive reactivity. Temperature reactor during accident is still in below fuel melting point which is in secure condition.

  19. A defense in depth approach for nuclear power plant accident management

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chih-Yao Hsieh; Hwai-Pwu Chou [Institute of Nuclear Engineering and Science, National Tsing Hua University, Hsinchu, TW (China)

    2015-07-01

    An initiating event may lead to a severe accident if the plant safety functions have been challenged or operators do not follow the appropriate accident management procedures. Beyond design basis accidents are those corresponding to events of very low occurrence probability but such an accident may lead to significant consequences. The defense in depth approach is important to assure nuclear safety even in a severe accident. Plant Damage States (PDS) can be defined by the combination of the possible values for each of the PDS parameters which are showed on the nuclear power plant simulator. PDS is used to identify what the initiating event is, and can also give the information of safety system's status whether they are bypassed, inoperable or not. Initiating event and safety system's status are used in the construction of Containment Event Tree (CET) to determine containment failure modes by using probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) technique. Different initiating events will correspond to different CETs. With these CETs, the core melt frequency of an initiating event can be found. The use of Plant Damage States (PDS) is a symptom-oriented approach. On the other hand, the use of Containment Event Tree (CET) is an event-oriented approach. In this study, the Taiwan's fourth nuclear power plants, the Lungmen nuclear power station (LNPS), which is an advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR) with fully digitized instrumentation and control (I and C) system is chosen as the target plant. The LNPS full scope engineering simulator is used to generate the testing data for method development. The following common initiating events are considered in this study: loss of coolant accidents (LOCA), total loss of feedwater (TLOFW), loss of offsite power (LOOP), station blackout (SBO). Studies have indicated that the combination of the symptom-oriented approach and the event-oriented approach can be helpful to find mitigation strategies and is useful for the accident

  20. Chemical and nuclear emergencies: Interchanging lessons learned from planning and accident experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adler, V.; Sorensen, J.H.; Rogers, G.O.

    1989-01-01

    Because the goal of emergency preparedness for both chemical and nuclear hazards is to reduce human exposure to hazardous materials, this paper examines the interchange of lessons learned from emergency planning and accident experience in both industries. While the concerns are slightly different, sufficient similarity is found for each to draw implications from the others experience. Principally the chemical industry can learn from the dominant planning experience associated with nuclear power plants, while the nuclear industry can chiefly learn from the chemical industry's accident experience. 23 refs

  1. Recovery operations in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    Much progress has been made over the last decade in the field of emergency planning and preparedness, including the development of guidance, criteria, training programmes, regulations and comprehensive plans in the support of nuclear facilities. To provide a forum for international review and discussion of actual experiences gained and lessons learned from the different aspects of recovery techniques and operations in response to serious accidents at nuclear facilities and accidents associated with radioactive materials, the IAEA organized the International Symposium on Recovery Operations in the Event of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. The symposium was held from 6 to 10 November 1989 in Vienna, Austria, and was attended by over 250 experts from 35 Member State and 7 international organizations. Although the prime focus was on on-site and off-site recovery from nuclear reactor accidents and on recovery from radiological accidents unrelated to nuclear power plants, development of emergency planning and preparedness resources was covered as well. From the experiences reported, lessons learned were identified. While further work remains to be done to improve concepts, plans, materials, communications and mechanisms to assemble quickly all the special resources needed in the event of an accident, there was general agreement that worldwide preparations to handle any possible future radiological emergencies had vastly improved. A special feature of the symposium programme was the inclusion of a full session on an accident involving a chemical explosion in a high level waste tank a a plutonium extraction plant in the Southern Urals in the USSR in 1957. Information was presented on the radioactive release, its dissemination and deposition, the resultant radiation situation, dose estimates, health effects follow-up, and the rehabilitation of contaminated land. This volume contains the full text of the 49 papers presented at the symposium together with a

  2. Simple estimate of fission rate during JCO criticality accident

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oyamatsu, Kazuhiro [Faculty of Studies on Contemporary Society, Aichi Shukutoku Univ., Nagakute, Aichi (Japan)

    2000-03-01

    The fission rate during JCO criticality accident is estimated from fission-product (FP) radioactivities in a uranium solution sample taken from the preparation basin 20 days after the accident. The FP radioactivity data are taken from a report by JAERI released in the Accident Investigation Committee. The total fission number is found quite dependent on the FP radioactivities and estimated to be about 4x10{sup 16} per liter, or 2x10{sup 18} per 16 kgU (assuming uranium concentration 278.9 g/liter). On the contrary, the time dependence of the fission rate is rather insensitive to the FP radioactivities. Hence, it is difficult to determine the fission number in the initial burst from the radioactivity data. (author)

  3. Simple estimate of fission rate during JCO criticality accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oyamatsu, Kazuhiro

    2000-01-01

    The fission rate during JCO criticality accident is estimated from fission-product (FP) radioactivities in a uranium solution sample taken from the preparation basin 20 days after the accident. The FP radioactivity data are taken from a report by JAERI released in the Accident Investigation Committee. The total fission number is found quite dependent on the FP radioactivities and estimated to be about 4x10 16 per liter, or 2x10 18 per 16 kgU (assuming uranium concentration 278.9 g/liter). On the contrary, the time dependence of the fission rate is rather insensitive to the FP radioactivities. Hence, it is difficult to determine the fission number in the initial burst from the radioactivity data. (author)

  4. The estimation economic impacts from severe accidents of a nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, J. T.; Jeong, W. D.

    2001-01-01

    The severe accidents of a nuclear power plant may cause health effects in the exposed population and societal economic impacts or costs. Techniques to assess the consequences of an accident in terms of cost may be applied in studies on the design of plant safety features and in examining countermeasure options as part of emergency planning or in decision making after an accident. In this study, the costs resulting from the severe accidents of a nuclear power plant were estimated for the different combinations of source term release parameters and meteorological data. Also, the costs were estimated for the different scenarios considering seasonal characteristics of Korea. The results can be used as essential inputs in costs/benefit analysis and in developing optimum risk reduction strategies

  5. Characteristics of Hydrogen Monitoring Systems for Severe Accident Management at a Nuclear Power Plant

    Science.gov (United States)

    Petrosyan, V. G.; Yeghoyan, E. A.; Grigoryan, A. D.; Petrosyan, A. P.; Movsisyan, M. R.

    2018-02-01

    One of the main objectives of severe accident management at a nuclear power plant is to protect the integrity of the containment, for which the most serious threat is possible ignition of the generated hydrogen. There should be a monitoring system providing information support of NPP personnel, ensuring data on the current state of a containment gaseous environment and trends in its composition changes. Monitoring systems' requisite characteristics definition issues are considered by the example of a particular power unit. Major characteristics important for proper information support are discussed. Some features of progression of severe accident scenarios at considered power unit are described and a possible influence of the hydrogen concentration monitoring system performance on the information support reliability in a severe accident is analyzed. The analysis results show that the following technical characteristics of the combustible gas monitoring systems are important for the proper information support of NPP personnel in the event of a severe accident at a nuclear power plant: measured parameters, measuring ranges and errors, update rate, minimum detectable concentration of combustible gas, monitoring reference points, environmental qualification parameters of the system components. For NPP power units with WWER-440/270 (230) type reactors, which have a relatively small containment volume, the update period for measurement results is a critical characteristic of the containment combustible gas monitoring system, and the choice of monitoring reference points should be focused not so much on the definition of places of possible hydrogen pockets but rather on the definition of places of a possible combustible mixture formation. It may be necessary for the above-mentioned power units to include in the emergency operating procedures measures aimed at a timely heat removal reduction from the containment environment if there are signs of a severe accident phase

  6. Source term estimation during incident response to severe nuclear power plant accidents. Draft

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKenna, T J; Giitter, J

    1987-07-01

    The various methods of estimating radionuclide release to the environment (source terms) as a result of an accident at a nuclear power reactor are discussed. The major factors affecting potential radionuclide releases off site (source terms) as a result of nuclear power plant accidents are described. The quantification of these factors based on plant instrumentation also is discussed. A range of accident conditions from those within the design basis to the most severe accidents possible are included in the text. A method of gross estimation of accident source terms and their consequences off site is presented. The goal is to present a method of source term estimation that reflects the current understanding of source term behavior and that can be used during an event. (author)

  7. Source term estimation during incident response to severe nuclear power plant accidents. Draft

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKenna, T.J.; Giitter, J.

    1987-01-01

    The various methods of estimating radionuclide release to the environment (source terms) as a result of an accident at a nuclear power reactor are discussed. The major factors affecting potential radionuclide releases off site (source terms) as a result of nuclear power plant accidents are described. The quantification of these factors based on plant instrumentation also is discussed. A range of accident conditions from those within the design basis to the most severe accidents possible are included in the text. A method of gross estimation of accident source terms and their consequences off site is presented. The goal is to present a method of source term estimation that reflects the current understanding of source term behavior and that can be used during an event. (author)

  8. Severe accidents and terrorist threats at nuclear reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pollack, G.L.

    1987-01-01

    Some of the key areas of uncertainty are the nature of the physical and chemical interactions of released fission products and of the interactions between a molten core and concrete, the completeness and validity of the computer codes used to predict accidents, and the behavior of the containment. Because of these and other uncertainties, it is not yet possible to reliably predict the consequences of reactor accidents. It is known that for many accident scenarios, especially less severe ones or where the containment is not seriously compromised, the amount of radioactive material expected to escape the reactor is less, even much less, than was previously calculated. For such accidents, the predictions are easier and more reliable. With severe accidents, however, there is considerable uncertainty as to the predicted results. For accidents of the type that terrorists might cause - for example, where the sequence of failure would be unexpected or where redundant safety features are caused to fail together - the uncertainties are still larger. The conclusion, then, is that there are potential dangers to the public from terrorist actions at a nuclear reactor; however, because of the variety of potential terrorist threats and the incompleteness of the knowledge about the behavior of reactor components and fission products during accidents, the consequences cannot yet be assessed quantitatively

  9. Indemnification of Damage in the Event of a Nuclear Accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The Second International Workshop on the Indemnification of Nuclear Damage was held in Bratislava, Slovak Republic, from 18 to 20 May 2005. The workshop was co-organised by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic. It attracted wide participation from national nuclear authorities, regulators, operators of nuclear installations, nuclear insurers and international organisations. The purpose of the workshop was to assess the third party liability and compensation mechanisms that would be implemented by participating countries in the event of a nuclear accident taking place within or near their borders. To accommodate this objective, two fictitious accident scenarios were developed: one involving a fire in a nuclear installation located in the Slovak Republic and resulting in the release of significant amounts of radioactive materials off-site, and the other a fire on board a ship transporting enriched uranium hexafluoride along the Danube River. The first scenario was designed to involve the greatest possible number of countries, with the second being restricted to countries with a geographical proximity to the Danube. These proceedings contain the papers presented at the workshop, as well as reports on the discussion sessions held. (author)

  10. Design of a High Power Robotic Manipulator for Emergency Response to the Nuclear Accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Jongwon; Bae, Yeong-Geol; Kim, Myoung Ho; Choi, Young Soo

    2016-01-01

    An accident in a nuclear facility causes a great social cost. To prevent an unexpected nuclear accident from spreading to the catastrophic disaster, emergency response action in early stage is required. However, high radiation environment has been proved as a challenging obstacle for human workers to access to the accident site and take an action in previous accident cases. Therefore, emergency response robotic technology to be used in a nuclear accident site instead of human workers are actively conducted in domestically and internationally. Robots in an accident situation are required to carry out a variety of tasks depend on the types and patterns of accidents. An emergency response usually includes removing of debris, make an access road to a certain place and handling valves. These tasks normally involve high payload handling. A small sized high power robotic manipulator can be an appropriate candidate to deal with a wide spectrum of tasks in an emergency situation. In this paper, we discuss about the design of a high power robotic manipulator, which is capable of handling high payloads for an initial response action to the nuclear facility accident. In this paper, we presented a small sized high power robotic manipulator design. Actuator types of manipulator was selected and mechanical structure was discussed. In the future, the servo valve and hydraulic pump systems will be determined. Furthermore, control algorithms and test bed experiments will be also conducted

  11. Design of a High Power Robotic Manipulator for Emergency Response to the Nuclear Accidents

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Jongwon; Bae, Yeong-Geol; Kim, Myoung Ho; Choi, Young Soo [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    An accident in a nuclear facility causes a great social cost. To prevent an unexpected nuclear accident from spreading to the catastrophic disaster, emergency response action in early stage is required. However, high radiation environment has been proved as a challenging obstacle for human workers to access to the accident site and take an action in previous accident cases. Therefore, emergency response robotic technology to be used in a nuclear accident site instead of human workers are actively conducted in domestically and internationally. Robots in an accident situation are required to carry out a variety of tasks depend on the types and patterns of accidents. An emergency response usually includes removing of debris, make an access road to a certain place and handling valves. These tasks normally involve high payload handling. A small sized high power robotic manipulator can be an appropriate candidate to deal with a wide spectrum of tasks in an emergency situation. In this paper, we discuss about the design of a high power robotic manipulator, which is capable of handling high payloads for an initial response action to the nuclear facility accident. In this paper, we presented a small sized high power robotic manipulator design. Actuator types of manipulator was selected and mechanical structure was discussed. In the future, the servo valve and hydraulic pump systems will be determined. Furthermore, control algorithms and test bed experiments will be also conducted.

  12. TEPCO's costs and risks which invited the nuclear power plant accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soeda, Takashi

    2017-01-01

    The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (Diet Accident Investigation Commission) considered two patterns against the tsunami risk of nuclear plant: (1) Risk management for the purpose of safety (Pattern A), and (2) Risk management for the purpose of utilization rate and cost of nuclear reactor (Pattern B). Pattern B emphasizes avoiding 'countermeasure cost generation' and 'operation shutdown' rather than preparing for a tsunami that we do not know when to come. Diet Accident Investigation Commission analyzed that the behavioral principles concerning the crisis response of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) had the stronger tendency of Pattern B. Regarding the accident of TEPCO, there were class actions that asked the responsibility of TEPCO and the government. This paper examined the contents of the opinions of government-side experts submitted for this issue. The government-side experts argued that there was no 'scientific consensus' for tsunami forecast, and that preliminary measures against unexpected tsunami was impossible. However, both of these government's arguments are irrational due to difference from the fact. TEPCO president at the time of accident insisted in the firm that 'cost cut in another dimension' was indispensable and reduced expenses. TEPCO and the government had continued Pattern B, even knowing that tsunami risk measures were insufficient from more than ten years ago. (A.O.)

  13. Criticality accidents in solution (CRAC and SILENE programmes) and complementary studies of accidents; radiation dosimetry in human organism during the CRAC programme

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barbry, M.; Dousset, M.

    C.R.A.C. (CRiticality occurring ACcidentally) programme is intended to study experimentally the development of a criticality accident as it could occur when handling solutions of fissile material as well as the radiological consequences of such an accident. The fissile matter solutions have been chosen (a) for practical considerations of use and (b) because the probability of an accident occurring seems greater with this type of environment, as the known accidents have shown. The programme is twofold: study of accident physics: form of the evolution (peak, plateau, oscillations, boil up of solutions) the most probable maximum power, minimal power, flux and radiation spectra emitted, freed energy, associated effects, radiolysis, constraints, etc., study of radiological consequences: area dosimetry, individual dosimetry, radiobiological studies, etc. Additional criticality Accident experiments have been and continue to be made on the SILENE reactor in the following principal domains: determination of the emission rate of gaseous fission products and aerosols, area dosimetry and health dosimetry in the presence of shields around the core to vary the neutron and gamma components of the radiation field. Improvement in the knowledge of certain particular aspects of the power excursion, radiolysis gas and pressure wave, experiments of the ''boiling'' type [fr

  14. Developing and assessing accident management plans for nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hanson, D.J.; Johnson, S.P.; Blackman, H.S.; Stewart, M.A.

    1992-07-01

    This document is the second of a two-volume NUREG/CR that discusses development of accident management plans for nuclear power plants. The first volume (a) describes a four-phase approach for developing criteria that could be used for assessing the adequacy of accident management plans, (b) identifies the general attributes of accident management plans (Phase 1), (c) presents a prototype process for developing and implementing severe accident management plans (Phase 2), and (d) presents criteria that can be used to assess the adequacy of accident management plans. This volume (a) describes results from an evaluation of the capabilities of the prototype process to produce an accident management plan (Phase 3) and (b), based on these results and preliminary criteria included in NUREG/CR-5543, presents modifications to the criteria where appropriate

  15. Fuel solution criticality accident studies with the SILENE reactor: phenomenology, consequences and simulated intervention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barbry, F.

    1984-01-01

    After defining the content and the objectives of criticality accident studies, the SILENE reactor, a means of studying fuel solution criticality accidents, is presented. Information obtained from the CRAC and SILENE experimental programs are then presented; they concern power excursion phenomenology, radiological consequences, and finally guide-lines for current and future programs

  16. Consequences of severe nuclear accidents in Europe

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seibert, Petra; Arnold, Delia; Mraz, Gabriele; Arnold, Nikolaus; Gufler, Klaus; Kromp-Kolb, Helga; Kromp, Wolfgang; Sutter, Philipp

    2013-04-01

    A first part of the presentation is devoted to the consequences of the severe accident in the 1986 Chernobyl NPP. It lead to a substantial radioactive contaminated of large parts of Europe and thus raised the awareness for off-site nuclear accident consequences. Spatial patterns of the (transient) contamination of the air and (persistent) contamination of the ground were studied by both measurements and model simulations. For a variety of reasons, ground contamination measurements have variability at a range of spatial scales. Results will be reviewed and discussed. Model simulations, including inverse modelling, have shown that the standard source term as defined in the ATMES study (1990) needs to be updated. Sensitive measurements of airborne activities still reveal the presence of low levels of airborne radiocaesium over the northern hemisphere which stems from resuspension. Over time scales of months and years, the distribution of radionuclides in the Earth system is constantly changing, for example relocated within plants, between plants and soil, in the soil, and into water bodies. Motivated by the permanent risk of transboundary impacts from potential major nuclear accidents, the multidisciplinary project flexRISK (see http://flexRISK.boku.ac.at) has been carried out from 2009 to 2012 in Austria to quantify such risks and hazards. An overview of methods and results of flexRISK is given as a second part of the presentation. For each of the 228 NPPs, severe accidents were identified together with relevant inventories, release fractions, and release frequencies. Then, Europe-wide dispersion and dose calculations were performed for 2788 cases, using the Lagrangian particle model FLEXPART. Maps of single-case results as well as various aggregated risk parameters were produced. It was found that substantial consequences (intervention measures) are possible for distances up to 500-1000 km, and occur more frequently for a distance range up to 100-300 km, which is in

  17. Nuclear Accidents Intervention Levels for Protection of the Public

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    The impact of the 1986 Chernobyl accident called attention to the need to improve international harmonization of the principles and criteria for the protection of the public in the event of a nuclear accident. This report provides observations and guidance related to the harmonization of radiological protection criteria, and is intended to be of use to national authorities and international organizations examining the issue of emergency response planning and intervention levels

  18. To What Extent International Law Constitutes an Appropriate Answer to Nuclear Accidents?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Durand-Poudret, E.

    2015-01-01

    Regulating high risks activities has always been an ambitious task as the regime shall both prevent and compensate the potential damage of such activities. It becomes even more complex with nuclear energy as radioactivity possesses this transboundary character which implies an international cooperation. The need for an appropriate framework for nuclear energy started to raise in the 60s, when States realise that the classic liability system was not relevant for that kind of activity. The Paris and Vienna conventions were subsequently adopted in order to fill this legal gap. Nonetheless, the real turning point remains the Chernobyl accident which resulted in a considerable number of new international instruments as 5 conventions were adopted in the fields of safety and emergency preparedness within a 11 years period: the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. This catastrophe was also the occasion to identify and mitigate the shortcomings of the existing regime in undertaking a revision process through several supplementary protocols, the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. 25 years after Chernobyl, another tragic nuclear event occurred in Fukushima. Once again it challenged the efficiency of the existing international regime and raises the question as to whether international law represents a relevant solution to such accident. (author)

  19. Stakeholder involvement facilitates decision making for UK nuclear accident recovery.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alexander, C; Burt, R; Nisbet, A F

    2005-01-01

    The importance of major stakeholders participating in the formulation of strategies for maintaining food safety and agricultural production following a nuclear accident has been successfully demonstrated by the UK 'Agriculture and Food Countermeasures Working Group' (AFCWG). The organisation, membership and terms of reference of the group are described. Details are given of the achievements of the AFCWG and its sub-groups, which include agreeing management options that would be included in a recovery handbook for decision-makers in the UK and tackling the disposal of large volumes of contaminated milk, potentially resulting from a nuclear accident.

  20. Building of communication system for nuclear accident emergency disposal based on IP multimedia subsystem

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Kang; Gao, Guiqing; Qin, Yuanli; He, Xiangyong

    2018-05-01

    The nuclear accident emergency disposal must be supported by an efficient, real-time modularization and standardization communication system. Based on the analysis of communication system for nuclear accident emergency disposal which included many functions such as the internal and external communication, multiply access supporting and command center. Some difficult problems of the communication system were discussed such as variety access device type, complex composition, high mobility, set up quickly, multiply business support, and so on. Taking full advantages of the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), a nuclear accident emergency communication system was build based on the IMS. It was studied and implemented that some key unit and module functions of communication system were included the system framework implementation, satellite access, short-wave access, load/vehicle-mounted communication units. The application tests showed that the system could provide effective communication support for the nuclear accident emergency disposal, which was of great practical value.

  1. Concerning the structure of occupational accidents involving construction workers in the erection of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nowak, B.; Roebenack, K.D.

    1991-01-01

    An investigation of 561 occupational accidents involving construction workers which took place during the construction of nuclear power plants failed to show any significant deviation in comparison with general construction as regards process classification, classification of accidents according to occupation and situation, and accidents severity. Occupational accidents which are typial for nuclear power plant construction are a rare exception. (orig.) [de

  2. Children's reactions to the threat of nuclear plant accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schwebel, M.; Schwebel, B.

    1981-01-01

    In the wake of Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident, questionnaire and interview responses of children in elementary and secondary schools revealed their perceptions of the dangers entailed in the continued use of nuclear reactors. Results are compared with a parallel study conducted close to 20 years ago, and implications for mental health are examined

  3. Generalities on nuclear accidents and their short-dated and middle-dated management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-03-01

    All the nuclear activities present a radiation risk. The radiation exposure of the employees or the public, may occur during normal activity or during an accident. The IRSN realized a document on this radiation risk and the actions of protection. The sanitary and medical aspects of a radiation accident are detailed. The actions of the population protection during an accident and the post accident management are also discussed. (A.L.B.)

  4. Proceedings of the International conference on nuclear accidents and crisis management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stefenson, B.; Landahl, P.A.; Ritchey, T.

    1993-06-01

    This booklet presents the proceedings of the international conference on nuclear accidents and crisis management, held in Stockholm 16-18 March, 1993. It consists of a collection of lectures and discussion notes. The overall purpose of the conference was to promote a greater awareness of crisis management problems during a nuclear accident of potential international scope. Emphasis was placed on information and cooperation, and on experience of different forms of emergency planning and crisis management. The foreign participants in the conference were scientists and representatives from different levels of authority in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Russia, and USA. The second half of the conference was reserved for Swedish national issues. Several additional themes were discussed here, inter alia: *problems of local, regional and central government cooperation. *the need for special laws and directives concerning nuclear accidents. *the need for more research. The lectures and discussion notes from the second part of the conference are in Swedish

  5. Radiological health risks from accidents during transportation of spent nuclear fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen, S.Y.; Yuan, Y.C.

    1988-01-01

    Potential radiological health risks from severe accident scenarios during the transportation of spent nuclear fuels are estimated. These extremely low probability, but potentially credible, scenarios are characterized by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Modal Study in terms of the maximum credible structural responses and/or the maximum credible cask temperature responses. In some accident scenarios, the spent nuclear fuel casks are assumed to be breached, resulting in the release of radioactivity to the atmosphere. Models have been developed to estimate radiological health consequences, including potential short-term exposures and health effects to individuals and potential long-term environmental dose commitments and health effects to the population. The population risks are calculated using state-level data, and the resulting overall health risks are compared for several levels of cleanup effort to determine the relative effects on long-term risks to the population in the event of an accident. 4 refs., 3 figs., 3 tabs

  6. Medical emergency planning in case of severe nuclear power plant accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ohlenschlaeger, L.

    1980-01-01

    This paper is an attempt to discuss a three-step-plan on medical emergency planning in case of severe accidents at nuclear power plants on the basis of own experiences in the regional area as well as on the basis of recommendations of the Federal Minister of the Interior. The medical considerations take account of the severity and extension of an accident whereby the current definitions used in nuclear engineering for accident situations are taken as basis. A comparison between obligatory and actual state is made on the possibilities of medical emergency planning, taking all capacities of staff, facilities, and equipment available in the Federal Republic of Germany into account. To assure a useful and quick utilization of the existing infra-structure as well as nation-wide uniform training of physicians and medical assistants in the field of medical emergency in case of a nuclear catastrophe, a federal law for health protection is regarded urgently necessary. (orig.) [de

  7. Legal responsibility in case of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nabhane, M. F.

    1988-01-01

    Numerous laws have been elaborated in order to determine the legal responsibility in case of a nuclear accident. These laws were made necessary because of intervention of the factor 'error' in the nuclear accident. The legal definition of 'error' assumes that it results from non-respect or negligence of established norms on the part of the persons who manipulate the instruments of radioactive production. Nuclear research should not be undertaken in a country without the formal engagement of the central authorities to take the necessary dispositions to ensure the security and safety of the populations and their possessions. The world community should not admit a scientific activity in the nuclear field in the absence of guarantees for the safety and the security of man. The state that permits the production of nuclear energy is legally responsible for any failure that might result in radioactive spills. Considering the possibility of error and the dangers attached to the manipulation of radioactive material, the legislators have elaborated a series of laws, which take into consideration two principles: a)The inalienable right of man to life as conceived in the monotheistic religions and proclaimed by positive law; and b)The responsibility of the state for the safety and security of its citizens. Of course, error is human; but if man may make an error of judgement in ordinary normal life, he does not have the right to make the least miscalculation when this might lead to a nuclear disaster. (author)

  8. Comparison of the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents: A review of the environmental impacts

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Steinhauser, Georg, E-mail: georg.steinhauser@colostate.edu; Brandl, Alexander; Johnson, Thomas E.

    2014-02-01

    The environmental impacts of the nuclear accidents of Chernobyl and Fukushima are compared. In almost every respect, the consequences of the Chernobyl accident clearly exceeded those of the Fukushima accident. In both accidents, most of the radioactivity released was due to volatile radionuclides (noble gases, iodine, cesium, tellurium). However, the amount of refractory elements (including actinides) emitted in the course of the Chernobyl accident was approximately four orders of magnitude higher than during the Fukushima accident. For Chernobyl, a total release of 5300 PBq (excluding noble gases) has been established as the most cited source term. For Fukushima, we estimated a total source term of 520 (340–800) PBq. In the course of the Fukushima accident, the majority of the radionuclides (more than 80%) was transported offshore and deposited in the Pacific Ocean. Monitoring campaigns after both accidents reveal that the environmental impact of the Chernobyl accident was much greater than of the Fukushima accident. Both the highly contaminated areas and the evacuated areas are smaller around Fukushima and the projected health effects in Japan are significantly lower than after the Chernobyl accident. This is mainly due to the fact that food safety campaigns and evacuations worked quickly and efficiently after the Fukushima accident. In contrast to Chernobyl, no fatalities due to acute radiation effects occurred in Fukushima. - Highlights: • The environmental effects of Chernobyl and Fukushima are compared. • Releases of radionuclides from Chernobyl exceeded Fukushima by an order of magnitude. • Chernobyl caused more severe radiation-related health effects. • Overall, Chernobyl was a much more severe nuclear accident than Fukushima. • Psychological effects are neglected but important consequences of nuclear accidents.

  9. Nuclear ship accidents, description and analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oelgaard, P.L.

    1993-03-01

    In this report available information on 44 reported nuclear ship events is considered. Of these 6 deals with U.S. ships and 38 with USSR ships. The ships are in almost all cases nuclear submarines. Only events that involve the sinking of vessels, the nuclear propulsion plants, radiation exposures, fires/ explosions, sea-water leaks into the submarines and sinking of vessels are considered. Comments are made on each of the events, and at the end of the report an attempt is made to point out the weaknesses of the submarine designs which have resulted in the accidents. It is emphasized that some of the information of which this report is based, may be of dubious nature. Consequently some of the results of the assessments made may not be correct. (au)

  10. Research on classification of nuclear and radiological accident from IAEA threat category with estimation of INES scale

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cha, Seok Ki; Kim, Siu

    2017-01-01

    As there is increasing use of nuclear energy and radiation while information on nuclear related accidents are accumulated, international interest in nuclear and radiation incidents is increasing rapidly. Because of the specificity of nuclear energy and radiation, the damage caused by such accidents will be spread to the larger area around the accident point due to the radiation and cause biological damage and mental-psychological damage. The purpose of this study is to categorize historical incidents using the Threat Category concept described in the publication of IAEA Safety Guide GS-G-2.1. In addition to categorizing actual events and accidents into Threat Categories, causes of occurrences, the type of radioactive source which leads to the main threats, the type of radiation exposure, and the type of patient are organized in detail. As a result of the analysis of representative historical cases, most accident cases caused by 'Nuclear Energy-Related Business Operator' correspond to 1 (Anomaly) ~ 4 (Accident with Local Consequences) in the INES Scale by IAEA. From the some accident cases, while the radiological damage can be seen to be local, but it can be seen that the possibility of 6 (Serious Accident) can not be absolutely excluded.

  11. Reliability analysis of emergency decay heat removal system of nuclear ship under various accident conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matsuoka, Takeshi

    1984-01-01

    A reliability analysis is given for the emergency decay heat removal system of the Nuclear Ship ''Mutsu'' and the emergency sea water cooling system of the Nuclear Ship ''Savannah'', under ten typical nuclear ship accident conditions. Basic event probabilities under these accident conditions are estimated from literature survey. These systems of Mutsu and Savannah have almost the same reliability under the normal condition. The dispersive arrangement of a system is useful to prevent the reduction of the system reliability under the condition of an accident restricted in one room. As for the reliability of these two systems under various accident conditions, it is seen that the configuration and the environmental condition of a system are two main factors which determine the reliability of the system. Furthermore, it was found that, for the evaluation of the effectiveness of safety system of a nuclear ship, it is necessary to evaluate its reliability under various accident conditions. (author)

  12. Radioecological consequences of a potential accident during transport of spent nuclear fuel along an Arctic coastline

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iosjpe, M.; Reistad, O.; Amundsen, I.B.

    2009-01-01

    This article presents results pertaining to a risk assessment of the potential consequences of a hypothetical accident occurring during the transportation by ship of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) along an Arctic coastline. The findings are based on modelling of potential releases of radionuclides, radionuclide transport and uptake in the marine environment. Modelling work has been done using a revised box model developed at the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority. Evaluation of the radioecological consequences of a potential accident in the southern part of the Norwegian Current has been made on the basis of calculated collective dose to man, individual doses for the critical group, concentrations of radionuclides in seafood and doses to marine organisms. The results of the calculations indicate a large variability in the investigated parameters above mentioned. On the basis of the calculated parameters the maximum total activity ('accepted accident activity') in the ship, when the parameters that describe the consequences after the examined potential accident are still in agreement with the recommendations and criterions for protection of the human population and the environment, has been evaluated

  13. The assessment of environmental consequences of nuclear reactor accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beattie, J.R.

    1981-01-01

    Thorough measures are taken throughout all stages of design, construction and operation of nuclear power reactors, and therefore no accident producing any significant environmental impact is likely to occur. Nevertheless as a precaution, such accidents have been the subject of intensive scientific predictive studies. After a historical review of theoretical papers on reactor accidents and their imagined environmental impacts and of those accidents that have indeed occurred, this paper gives an outline of fission products or other radioactive substances that may or may not be released by an accident, and of their possible effects after dispersion in the atmosphere. This general introduction is followed by sections describing what are sometimes called 'design basis accidents' for four of the main reactor types (magnox, AGR, PWR and CDFR), the precautions against these accidents and the probable degree of environmental impact likely. The paper concludes with a reference to those very low probability accidents which might have more serious environmental impacts, and proceeds from there to show that both the individual and community risks from such accidents are numerically moderate compared to other risks apparently accepted by society. A brief reflection on the relevance of numerical values and perceived risk concludes the paper. (author)

  14. Core fusion accidents in nuclear power reactors. Knowledge review

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bentaib, Ahmed; Bonneville, Herve; Clement, Bernard; Cranga, Michel; Fichot, Florian; Koundy, Vincent; Meignen, Renaud; Corenwinder, Francois; Leteinturier, Denis; Monroig, Frederique; Nahas, Georges; Pichereau, Frederique; Van-Dorsselaere, Jean-Pierre; Cenerino, Gerard; Jacquemain, Didier; Raimond, Emmanuel; Ducros, Gerard; Journeau, Christophe; Magallon, Daniel; Seiler, Jean-Marie; Tourniaire, Bruno

    2013-01-01

    This reference document proposes a large and detailed review of severe core fusion accidents occurring in nuclear power reactors. It aims at presenting the scientific aspects of these accidents, a review of knowledge and research perspectives on this issue. After having recalled design and operation principles and safety principles for reactors operating in France, and the main studied and envisaged accident scenarios for the management of severe accidents in French PWRs, the authors describe the physical phenomena occurring during a core fusion accident, in the reactor vessel and in the containment building, their sequence and means to mitigate their effects: development of the accident within the reactor vessel, phenomena able to result in an early failure of the containment building, phenomena able to result in a delayed failure with the corium-concrete interaction, corium retention and cooling in and out of the vessel, release of fission products. They address the behaviour of containment buildings during such an accident (sizing situations, mechanical behaviour, bypasses). They review and discuss lessons learned from accidents (Three Mile Island and Chernobyl) and simulation tests (Phebus-PF). A last chapter gives an overview of software and approaches for the numerical simulation of a core fusion accident

  15. Management of foodstuffs after nuclear accidents. Forvaltning av naeringsmidler etter kjernefysiske ulykker; En nordisk modell for nasjonal respons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1991-04-01

    A model for the management of foodstuffs after nuclear accidents is presented. The model is a synthesis of traditions and principles taken from both radioactive protection and management of food. It is based on cooperation between the Nordic countries and on practical experience gained from the Chernobyl accident. The aim of the model is to produce a basis for common plans for critical situations based on criteria for decision making. In the case of radioactive accidents it is important that the protection of the public and of the society is handled in a positive way. The model concerns production, marketing and consumption of food and beverage. The overall aim is that the radiation doses should be as low and harmless to health for individual members of the public. (CLS) 35 refs.

  16. Human factors review for nuclear power plant severe accident sequence analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krois, P.A.; Haas, P.M.

    1985-01-01

    The paper discusses work conducted to: (1) support the severe accident sequence analysis of a nuclear power plant transient based on an assessment of operator actions, and (2) develop a descriptive model of operator severe accident management. Operator actions during the transient are assessed using qualitative and quantitative methods. A function-oriented accident management model provides a structure for developing technical operator guidance on mitigating core damage preventing radiological release

  17. Thyroid side effects prophylaxis in front of nuclear power plant accidents.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Agopiantz, Mikaël; Elhanbali, Ouifak; Demore, Béatrice; Cuny, Thomas; Demarquet, Léa; Ndiaye, Cumba; Barbe, Françoise; Brunaud, Laurent; Weryha, Georges; Klein, Marc

    2016-02-01

    The better knowledge of the mechanisms of nuclear incidents and lessons learned from accidents in the recent past to improve the effectiveness of measures taken following a nuclear accident exposure to fallout of radioactive iodine isotopes. Thus, immediate, passive measures, such as containment, and stopping consumption of contaminated products are paramount. The earliest possible administration of stable iodine as potassium iodide (KI) reduces significantly (up to 90% if taken at the same time of the accident) thyroid radioactive contamination. These tablets should be given in priority to children and pregnant women. The side effects are minor. KI is not recommended for persons aged over 60 years, or for adults suffering from cardiovascular disorders. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.

  18. An investigation of awareness on the Fukushima nuclear accident and Radioactive contamination

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ha, Jeong Chul; Song, Young Ju [Dept. of Consumer Safety, Korea Consumer Agency, Eumseong (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    The objective of this study was to investigate Korean people's awareness about impact of the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan and radioactive contamination caused by it. The respondents of the survey were 600 adults who resided in the Seoul metropolitan area. The survey results show that the majority of respondents were concerned about impact of radiation leakage that might have an effect on our environment. They were worried about radioactive contamination of foodstuffs, particularly fishery products and preferred to acquire information through TV(49.8%) or the Internet(31.3%). Meanwhile, respondents mentioned that the information on the Fukushima nuclear accident and radioactive contamination had not been sufficient and they didn't know well about the follow-up measures of the government on the accident. Most respondents answered that information on radioactive contamination levels and safety of foods and environment was most needed. The results of this study could be useful to enhance awareness on radioactivity and improve risk communication on nuclear power plant accidents.

  19. Evaluation of the 17 June 1997 Criticality Accident at Arzamas-16

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morris Klein

    1999-01-01

    On June 17, 1997, a critically accident occurred at Arzamas-16, which resulted in the death (within three days) of A. N. Zakharov, a Russian scientist with 20 years' experience conducting multiassembly experiments. In this case, the multiplying assembly was a fast metal system consisting of a 235 U (90% enriched) core and a copper reflector. According to the Russian press, ''Zakharov misjudged the degree of criticality of the breeding system and committed several gross violations of regulations.'' As we see it, there were three major causes of this accident. First, the experiment was flawed by Zakharov's misreading of the appropriate size of the assembly, which he took from a notebook that described the old experiment he was attempting to repeat. Second, he disregarded the appropriate procedures and safety regulations. Third, these two mistakes were compounded by an improperly set audible alarm system and Zakharov's unsafe use of the table. We also discuss our reconstruction of the accident based on information given by the Russians to US scientists and information culled from Russian newspaper and magazine articles. We also describe our thoughts on the behavior of the assembly following the accident and the radiation dose level Zakharov may have received. These levels match values we have lately obtained from translations of Russian news articles. This accident clearly points out the penalty for weak administrative control of work with multiplying systems. Criticality experimentation requires formality of operation. The experimenter, his peers, and a trained safety person need to document that they understand the experiment and how it will be conducted. Knowing that the experiment was successfully run several decades ago does not justify bypassing a safety evaluation

  20. Multiple parameter biodosimetry of exposed workers from the JCO criticality accident in Tokai-mura

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Blakely, William F. [Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, Bethesda, MD (United States)

    2002-03-01

    Full text: On 30 September 1999, three workers at the JCO (Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Corporation) uranium fuel processing facility in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan, were severely exposed to neutrons and gamma rays. In this issue of the journal, Nishimura et al report the measurement of {sup 32}P in urine from the three victims for early estimation of neutron exposure levels. This is one of several reports that estimate doses received by the exposed workers and residents, based on biological responses, radiation monitoring/transport codes, and other opportunistic dosimetric approaches. The higher relative biological effectiveness (RBE) of neutrons for life-threatening radiation injury justifies efforts to establish a neutron biodosimetry capability. Accurate estimation of the exposure dose by cytogenetic-based chromosome aberration assays, however, requires knowledge of the neutron component in the mixed neutron and gamma radiation scenario. Dose responses for dicentric and ring type chromosome aberration yields measured in peripheral blood lymphocytes are responsive to radiation quality. Protocols for dose assessment by cytogenetic-chromosome aberration assays are internationally accepted. Analytic approaches using cytogenetic chromosome aberrations are established for dose assessment in mixed neutron and gamma radiation accidents. Use of the premature chromosome condensation, or PCC, assay now permits these measurements even at unusually high doses of gamma and neutron radiation. Hayata and colleagues measured ring-type chromosome aberrations in interphase cells by use of the PCC-ring assay to estimate dose for the three severely exposed patients in this accident. Ring-type aberrations are formed in higher yields after neutron versus gamma radiation but these ring-aberrations do not provide a unique signature response specific for neutron exposures. Intense research efforts are currently underway to identify more specific chromosome aberration and

  1. 2010 Criticality Accident Alarm System Benchmark Experiments At The CEA Valduc SILENE Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, Thomas Martin; Dunn, Michael E.; Wagner, John C.; McMahan, Kimberly L.; Authier, Nicolas; Jacquet, Xavier; Rousseau, Guillaume; Wolff, Herve; Piot, Jerome; Savanier, Laurence; Baclet, Nathalie; Lee, Yi-kang; Masse, Veronique; Trama, Jean-Christophe; Gagnier, Emmanuel; Naury, Sylvie; Lenain, Richard; Hunter, Richard; Kim, Soon; Dulik, George Michael; Reynolds, Kevin H.

    2011-01-01

    Several experiments were performed at the CEA Valduc SILENE reactor facility, which are intended to be published as evaluated benchmark experiments in the ICSBEP Handbook. These evaluated benchmarks will be useful for the verification and validation of radiation transport codes and evaluated nuclear data, particularly those that are used in the analysis of CAASs. During these experiments SILENE was operated in pulsed mode in order to be representative of a criticality accident, which is rare among shielding benchmarks. Measurements of the neutron flux were made with neutron activation foils and measurements of photon doses were made with TLDs. Also unique to these experiments was the presence of several detectors used in actual CAASs, which allowed for the observation of their behavior during an actual critical pulse. This paper presents the preliminary measurement data currently available from these experiments. Also presented are comparisons of preliminary computational results with Scale and TRIPOLI-4 to the preliminary measurement data.

  2. Severe accident considerations in Canadian nuclear power reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Omar, A.M.; Measures, M.P.; Scott, C.K.; Lewis, M.J.

    1990-08-01

    This paper describes a current study on severe accidents being sponsored by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and provides background on other related Canadian work. Scoping calculations are performed in Phase I of the AECB study to establish the relative consequences of several permutations resulting from six postulated initiating events, nine containment states, and a selection of meteorological conditions and health effects mitigating criteria. In Phase II of the study, selected accidents sequences would be analyzed in detail using models suitable for the design features of the Canadian nuclear power reactors

  3. Severe Accident Mitigation by using Core Catcher applicable for Korea standard nuclear power plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Park, Hae Kyun; Kim, Sang Nyung [Kyung Hee Univ., Yongin (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    Nuclear power plants have been designed and operated in order to prevent severe accident because of their risk that contains tremendous radioactive materials that are potentially hazardous. Moreover, the government requested the nuclear industry to implement a severe accident management strategy for existing reactors to mitigate the risk of potential severe accidents. However, Korea standard nuclear power plant(APR-1400 and OPR-1000) are much more vulnerable for severe accident management than that of developed countries. Due to the design feature of reactor cavity in Korea standard nuclear power plant, inequable and serious Molten Core-Concrete Interaction(MCCI) may cause considerable safety problem to the reactor containment liner. At worst, it brings the release of radioactive materials to the environment. This accident applies to the fourth level of defense in depth(IAEA 1996), 'severe accident'. This study proposes and designs the 'slope' to secure reactor containment liner integrity when the corium spreads out from the destroyed reactor vessel to the reactor cavity due to the core melting accident. For this, make the initial corium distribution evenly exploit the 'slope' on the basis of the study of Ex-vessel corium behavior to prevent inequable and serious MCCI, in order to mitigate severe accident. The viscosity has a dominant position in the calculation. According to the result, the spread out distance on the slope is 10.7146841m, considering the rough surface of the concrete(slope) and margin of reactor cavity end(under 11m). Easy to design, production and economic feasibility are the advantage of the designed slope in this study. However, the slope design may unsuitable when the sequences of the accidents did not satisfy the assumptions as mentioned. Despite of those disadvantages, the slope will show a great performance to mitigate the severe accident. As mentioned in assumption, the corium releasing time property was

  4. Severe Accident Mitigation by using Core Catcher applicable for Korea standard nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, Hae Kyun; Kim, Sang Nyung

    2013-01-01

    Nuclear power plants have been designed and operated in order to prevent severe accident because of their risk that contains tremendous radioactive materials that are potentially hazardous. Moreover, the government requested the nuclear industry to implement a severe accident management strategy for existing reactors to mitigate the risk of potential severe accidents. However, Korea standard nuclear power plant(APR-1400 and OPR-1000) are much more vulnerable for severe accident management than that of developed countries. Due to the design feature of reactor cavity in Korea standard nuclear power plant, inequable and serious Molten Core-Concrete Interaction(MCCI) may cause considerable safety problem to the reactor containment liner. At worst, it brings the release of radioactive materials to the environment. This accident applies to the fourth level of defense in depth(IAEA 1996), 'severe accident'. This study proposes and designs the 'slope' to secure reactor containment liner integrity when the corium spreads out from the destroyed reactor vessel to the reactor cavity due to the core melting accident. For this, make the initial corium distribution evenly exploit the 'slope' on the basis of the study of Ex-vessel corium behavior to prevent inequable and serious MCCI, in order to mitigate severe accident. The viscosity has a dominant position in the calculation. According to the result, the spread out distance on the slope is 10.7146841m, considering the rough surface of the concrete(slope) and margin of reactor cavity end(under 11m). Easy to design, production and economic feasibility are the advantage of the designed slope in this study. However, the slope design may unsuitable when the sequences of the accidents did not satisfy the assumptions as mentioned. Despite of those disadvantages, the slope will show a great performance to mitigate the severe accident. As mentioned in assumption, the corium releasing time property was conservatively calculated

  5. Flood control construction of Shidao Bay nuclear power plant and safety analysis for hypothetical accident of HTR-PM

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chen Yongrong; Zhang Keke; Zhu Li

    2014-01-01

    A series of events triggered by tsunami eventually led to the Fukushima nuclear accident. For drawing lessons from the nuclear accident and applying to Shidao Bay nuclear power plant flood control construction, we compare with the state laws and regulations, and prove the design of Shidao Bay nuclear power plant flood construction. Through introducing the history of domestic tsunamis and the national researches before and after the Fukushima nuclear accident, we expound the tsunami hazards of Shidao Bay nuclear power plant. In addition, in order to verify the safety of HTR-PM, we anticipate the contingent accidents after ''superposition event of earthquake and extreme flood'', and analyse the abilities and measures of HTR-PM to deal with these beyond design basis accidents (BDBA). (author)

  6. Development of the efficient emergency preparedness system for the nuclear critical infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kostadinov, V.; Marn, J.; Petelin, S.

    2007-01-01

    The evaluation of the critical nuclear infrastructure vulnerability to threats like human occurrences, terrorist attacks and natural disasters and the preparation of emergency response plans with the estimation of optimized costs are of the vital importance for the assurance of a safe nuclear facilities operation and the national security. In the past national emergency systems did not include vulnerability assessments of the critical nuclear infrastructure as the important part of the comprehensive preparedness framework. The fundamental aims of the efficient emergency preparedness and response system are to provide a sustained emergency readiness and to prevent an emergency situation and accidents. But when an event happens the mission is to mitigate consequences and to protect the people and environment against the nuclear and radiological damage. The efficient emergency response system, which would be activated in the case of the nuclear and/or radiological emergency and release of the radioactivity to the environment, is an important element of a comprehensive system of the nuclear and radiation safety. In the article the new methodology for the critical nuclear infrastructure vulnerability assessment as a missing part of an efficient emergency preparedness system is presented. It can help the overall national energy sectors to identify and better understand the terrorist threats and vulnerabilities of their critical infrastructure. The presented methodology could also facilitate national agencies to develop and implement a vulnerability awareness and education programs for their critical assets to enhance the security, reliability and safe operation of the whole energy infrastructure. The vulnerability assessment methodology will also assist nuclear power plants to develop, validate, and disseminate the assessment and survey of new efficient countermeasures. The significant benefits of the new vulnerability assessment research are to increase nuclear power

  7. Accident sequences simulated at the Juragua nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carbajo, J.J.

    1998-01-01

    Different hypothetical accident sequences have been simulated at Unit 1 of the Juragua nuclear power plant in Cuba, a plant with two VVER-440 V213 units under construction. The computer code MELCOR was employed for these simulations. The sequences simulated are: (1) a design-basis accident (DBA) large loss of coolant accident (LOCA) with the emergency core coolant system (ECCS) on, (2) a station blackout (SBO), (3) a small LOCA (SLOCA) concurrent with SBO, (4) a large LOCA (LLOCA) concurrent with SBO, and (5) a LLOCA concurrent with SBO and with the containment breached at time zero. Timings of important events and source term releases have been calculated for the different sequences analyzed. Under certain weather conditions, the fission products released from the severe accident sequences may travel to southern Florida

  8. Should evacuation conditions after a nuclear accident be revised?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nifenecker, H.

    2011-01-01

    The author proposes to draw lessons from the Fukushima accident, notably in the field of post-accident management. He discusses the definition of an as widely understandable as possible method of description of risks related to irradiations after a nuclear accident. As these irradiations are mainly low dose ones which have a carcinogenic effect, he proposes to assess the average life expectancy loss due to an irradiation. Then, this risk can be easily compared with other risks like air pollution, smoking and passive smoking, and so on. Then, once this risk assessment method is well defined, it is possible to associate the inhabitants of contaminated areas to the post-accident management. They could then decide to go back to their homes or not with full knowledge of the facts

  9. Absorbed dose by thyroid in case of nuclear accidents

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campos, Laelia; Attie, Marcia Regina Pereira; Amaral, Ademir

    2011-01-01

    Radioisotopes of iodine are produced in abundance in nuclear fission reactions, and great amounts of radioiodine may be released into the environment in case of a nuclear reactor accident. Thyroid gland is among the most radiosensitive organs due to its capacity to concentrate iodine. The aim of this work was to evaluate the importance of contributions of internally deposited iodines ( 131 I, 132 I, 133 I, 134 I and 135 I) to the dose absorbed to thyroid follicle and to the whole organ, after internal contamination by those isotopes. For internal dose calculation, the code of particles transport MCNP4C was employed. The results showed that, in case of nuclear accidents, the contribution of short-lived iodines for total dose is about 45% for thyroid of newborn and about 40% for thyroid of adult. Thus, these contributions should not be neglected in a prospective evaluation of risks associated to internal contamination by radioactive iodine. (author)

  10. Development on Dose Assessment Model of Northeast Asia Nuclear Accident Simulator

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ju Yub; Kim, Ju Youl; Kim, Suk Hoon; Lee, Seung Hee; Yoon, Tae Bin [FNC Techology, Yongin (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    In order to support the emergency response system, the simulator for overseas nuclear accident is under development including source-term estimation, atmospheric dispersion modeling and dose assessment. The simulator is named NANAS (Northeast Asia Nuclear Accident Simulator). For the source-term estimation, design characteristics of each reactor type should be reflected into the model. Since there are a lot of reactor types in neighboring countries, the representative reactors of China, Japan and Taiwan have been selected and the source-term estimation models for each reactor have been developed, respectively. For the atmospheric dispersion modeling, Lagrangian particle model will be integrated into the simulator for the long range dispersion modeling in Northeast Asia region. In this study, the dose assessment model has been developed considering external and internal exposure. The dose assessment model has been developed as a part of the overseas nuclear accidents simulator which is named NANAS. It addresses external and internal pathways including cloudshine, groundshine and inhalation. Also, it uses the output of atmospheric dispersion model (i.e. the average concentrations of radionuclides in air and ground) and various coefficients (e.g. dose conversion factor and breathing rate) as an input. Effective dose and thyroid dose for each grid in the Korean Peninsula region are printed out as a format of map projection and chart. Verification and validation on the dose assessment model will be conducted in further study by benchmarking with the measured data of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident.

  11. Initial medical management of criticality accident victim; Conduite a tenir aux victimes d'un accident de criticite

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Miele, A; Bebaron-Jacobs, L

    2005-07-01

    The extremely severe criticality accidents known to this day, and the subsequent deaths recorded (Sarov 1997 and Tokai Mura 1999), demonstrate the need for sustained surveillance and constant adapted training for the teams in charge of irradiated and/or contaminated victims. The aim of this work group, composed of occupational health services and associated medical biology laboratories, is to present, in leaflet format, the essential data on the documentation and the conduct to be held when facing the victims of a criticality accident. The studies of this work group confirm the difficulties involved in managing this type of accident, both from the dosimetric evaluation point of view and from the therapeutic management point of view. That is why several research themes and perspectives are developed. During the different phases of victim triage, the recommendations given on these leaflets describe the operational conducts to be held. This work will have to be updated according to the evolution in knowledge and means: short and long term effects of exposure to neutrons, multi-competence hospital cooperation, expertise networks related to dosimetric reconstitution. (authors)

  12. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Stations of TEPCO —Outline & lessons learned—

    Science.gov (United States)

    TANAKA, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety of NPSs, as well as radiation protection of residents under the emergency involving the accident. The materials of the current paper are those released by governmental agencies, academic societies, interim reports of committees under the government, and others. PMID:23138450

  13. Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations of TEPCO. Outline and lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tanaka, Shun-ichi

    2012-01-01

    The severe accident that broke out at Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power stations on March 11, 2011, caused seemingly infinite damage to the daily life of residents. Serious and wide-spread contamination of the environment occurred due to radioactive materials discharged from nuclear power stations (NPSs). At the same time, many issues were highlighted concerning countermeasures to severe nuclear accidents. The accident is outlined, and lessons learned are extracted with respect to the safety of NPSs, as well as radiation protection of residents under the emergency involving the accident. The materials of the current paper are those released by governmental agencies, academic societies, interim reports of committees under the government, and others. (author)

  14. Criticality safety analysis of TK-13 cask in Bushehr nuclear power plant

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mohammadi, Ashgar; Omidvari, Nima [Iran Radioactive Waste Management Company, Tehran (Iran, Islamic Republic of); Hassanzadeh, Mostafa [Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute, Tehran (Iran, Islamic Republic of)

    2017-12-15

    Spent fuel production is one of the main problems of nuclear power plants that should be managed properly considering the strategy of each country. Today, in most of nuclear power owner countries, the interim storage has been selected as the temporary solution of spent fuel management because of absence of deep geological repositories and no tendency for reprocessing. On the other side, considering the merits of storage in dual purpose casks based on dry storage, this method was chosen for interim storage. By taking into account that the only operating reactor of Iran is of Water-Water Energetic Reactor (WWER)-1000 type, proposed TK-13 cask by Russia which is the manufacturer of these types of reactors has been considered. In this study, the calculation of basket holding spent fuel assembly criticality of this cask has been analyzed for two modes of fresh and spent fuel by ORIGEN2.1 and MCNPX2.6 nuclear codes. The criterion of the nuclear criticality safety for effective multiplication factor (k{sub eff}) should be 0.95 and 0.98 for many ordinary and accident conditions, respectively. Therefore, the results show that a cylindrical basket with 66 cm diameter and 28 cm pitch with internal holding basket made of borated steel with 0.1% borate and steel free from borate would meet the criticality of cask, respectively.

  15. Criticality safety analysis of TK-13 cask in Bushehr nuclear power plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mohammadi, Ashgar; Omidvari, Nima; Hassanzadeh, Mostafa

    2017-01-01

    Spent fuel production is one of the main problems of nuclear power plants that should be managed properly considering the strategy of each country. Today, in most of nuclear power owner countries, the interim storage has been selected as the temporary solution of spent fuel management because of absence of deep geological repositories and no tendency for reprocessing. On the other side, considering the merits of storage in dual purpose casks based on dry storage, this method was chosen for interim storage. By taking into account that the only operating reactor of Iran is of Water-Water Energetic Reactor (WWER)-1000 type, proposed TK-13 cask by Russia which is the manufacturer of these types of reactors has been considered. In this study, the calculation of basket holding spent fuel assembly criticality of this cask has been analyzed for two modes of fresh and spent fuel by ORIGEN2.1 and MCNPX2.6 nuclear codes. The criterion of the nuclear criticality safety for effective multiplication factor (k eff ) should be 0.95 and 0.98 for many ordinary and accident conditions, respectively. Therefore, the results show that a cylindrical basket with 66 cm diameter and 28 cm pitch with internal holding basket made of borated steel with 0.1% borate and steel free from borate would meet the criticality of cask, respectively.

  16. Policy on stable iodine prophylaxis following nuclear reactor accidents (1989)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-09-01

    This policy considers the alleviation of possible hazards that may arise from any radioiodines inhaled from a plume of fission products emanating from a nuclear reactor accident. Such a nuclear reactor may be land or ship-based. In any accident that releases radioiodines to the environment, one countermeasure that may need to be considered to reduce the effect of inhalation of radioiodines by persons downwind of the point of release is to provide those persons with tablets containing stable iodine. Both potassium iodide (KI) and potassium iodate (KIO 3 ) are recommended as effective prophylactics tablets for this purpose in Australia. Action levels, doses and contraindicatories are briefly outlined

  17. Recent Perspective on the Severe Accident Management Programme for Nuclear Power Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Manwoong; Lee, Sukho; Lee, Jungjae; Chung, Kuyoung

    2017-01-01

    Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs), has been developed to help operators to prevent or mitigate the impacts of accidents at nuclear power plants. Severe accident management was first introduced in the 1990s with the creation of SAMGs following recognition that post-Three Mile Island Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) did not adequately address severe core damage conditions. Establishing and maintaining multiple layers of defence against any internal/external hazards is an important measure to reduce radiological risks to the public and environment. This study is intended to suggest future regulatory perspectives to strengthen the prevention and mitigation strategies for severe accidents by review of the current status of revision of IAEA Safety Standard on Severe Accident Management Programmes for Nuclear Power Plants and the combined PWR SAMG. This new IAEA Safety Guide will address guidelines for preparation, development, implementation and review of severe accident management programs during all operating conditions for both reactor and spent fuel pool. This Guide is used by operating organizations of nuclear power plants and their support organizations. It may also be used by national regulatory bodies and technical support organizations as a reference for developing their relevant safety requirements and for conducting reviews and safety assessments for SAMP including SAMG. The Pressurized Water Reactor Owner’s Group (PWROG) is upgrading the original generic Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) into single Severe Accident Guidelines (SAGs) for the PWR SAMG aims to consolidate the advantages of each of the separate vendor severe accident (SA) mitigation methods. This new PWROG SAGs changes the SAMG process to be made that can improve SA response. Changes have been made that guidance is available for control room operators when the TSC is not activated thus allowing for timely accident response. Other changes were made to the guidance

  18. Decision-making guide for management of agriculture in the case of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fourrie, Laetitia; Grosjean, Francois; Adam, Didier; Pretet, Caroline; Michel, Aurelie; Fostier, Bernard; Bertrand, Sophie; Cessac, Bruno; Reales, Nicolas IRSN; Aubert, Claude

    2007-05-01

    For several years, agricultural and nuclear professionals in France have been working on how to manage the agricultural situation in the event of a nuclear accident. This work resulted in measures at both the national (Aube nuclear safety exercises in 2003, INEX3 in 2005) and international levels (EURATOM Programmes). Following on from the European FARMING (FP5) and EURANOS (FP6) works, ACTA', IRSN and six agricultural technical institutes which are specialized in agricultural production and processing network (arable crop [especially cereals, maize, pulses, potatoes and forage crops], fruits and vegetables, vine and wine, livestock farming [cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, poultry]), created a resource adapted to the French context: the Decision-aiding Tool for the Management of Agriculture in case of a Nuclear Accident. Devised for the Ministry of Agriculture services supporting state officials in a radiation emergency, this manual focuses on the early phase following the accident when the state of emergency would make discussion on countermeasures with a large stakeholder panel impossible. Supported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the French Nuclear Safety Authority, this project increased knowledge of post-accident management strategies and made an important contribution to the national think tank set up within the framework of the French Steering Committee for managing the post-event phase of a nuclear accident (CODIRPA). This article describes how the manual evolved throughout the project and the development of new resources

  19. Decision-making guide for management of agriculture in the case of a nuclear accident

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reales, N.; Fourrie, L.; Quinio, C.; Grastilleur, Ch.

    2008-01-01

    For several years, agricultural and nuclear professionals in France have been working on how to manage the agricultural situation in the event of a nuclear accident. This work resulted in measures at both the national (Aube nuclear safety exercises in 2003, INEX3 in 2005) and international levels (EURATOM Programmes). Following on from the European FARMING (FP5) and EURANOS (FP6) works, ACTA', IRSN and six agricultural technical institutes which are specialized in agricultural production and processing network (arable crop [especially cereals, maize, pulses, potatoes and forage crops], fruits and vegetables, vine and wine, livestock farming [cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, poultry]), created a resource adapted to the French context: the Decision-aiding Tool for the Management of Agriculture in case of a Nuclear Accident. Devised for the Ministry of Agriculture services supporting state officials in a radiation emergency, this manual focuses on the early phase following the accident when the state of emergency would make discussion on countermeasures with a large stakeholder panel impossible. Supported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the French Nuclear Safety Authority, this project increased knowledge of post-accident management strategies and made an important contribution to the national think tank set up within the framework of the French Steering Committee for managing the post-event phase of a nuclear accident (CODIRPA). This article describes how the manual evolved throughout the project and the development of new resources. (authors)

  20. Research on classification of nuclear and radiological accident from IAEA threat category with estimation of INES scale

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cha, Seok Ki [Dept. of Nuclear engineering, Univ of SeJong, Seoul (Korea, Republic of); Kim, Siu [Korea Nuclear International Cooperation Foundation, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2017-04-15

    As there is increasing use of nuclear energy and radiation while information on nuclear related accidents are accumulated, international interest in nuclear and radiation incidents is increasing rapidly. Because of the specificity of nuclear energy and radiation, the damage caused by such accidents will be spread to the larger area around the accident point due to the radiation and cause biological damage and mental-psychological damage. The purpose of this study is to categorize historical incidents using the Threat Category concept described in the publication of IAEA Safety Guide GS-G-2.1. In addition to categorizing actual events and accidents into Threat Categories, causes of occurrences, the type of radioactive source which leads to the main threats, the type of radiation exposure, and the type of patient are organized in detail. As a result of the analysis of representative historical cases, most accident cases caused by 'Nuclear Energy-Related Business Operator' correspond to 1 (Anomaly) ~ 4 (Accident with Local Consequences) in the INES Scale by IAEA. From the some accident cases, while the radiological damage can be seen to be local, but it can be seen that the possibility of 6 (Serious Accident) can not be absolutely excluded.