Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1970-04-22

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [fr

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-10-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [ru

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [es

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-04-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

Towards the fourth review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1990

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

This publication focuses on the background of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), its main provisions and some of the major issues discussed at the three conferences that have thus far been held to review the operation of the Treaty. A fourth conference to review the operation of the Treaty will be held at Geneva from 20 August to 14 September 1990. It will be the last regular review conference before the convening, in 1995, of a conference which will ''decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'' (article X, para.2). A Preparatory Committee (open to all parties) for the Fourth Review Conference has been established by the parties to the NPT, and 95 parties attended the first session, held in New York from 1 to 5 May 1989

Assuring the success of the non-proliferation treaty extension conference. Excerpts from the panel discussions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This publication presents excerpts from a conference organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament Inc., in cooperation with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, and covers the following issues: status of the comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations, fissile cut-off and ending production of nuclear weapons, how should nuclear weapons states pursue disarmament under Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NPT extension: problems and prospects

Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abdelwahab, Biad

2010-01-01

The NPT was negotiated during the Cold War period to prevent the emergence of new nuclear players by distinguishing between 'nuclear-weapon states' (NWS) which had carried out nuclear testing before 1 January 1967, that is the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China, and 'non-nuclear-weapon states' (NNWS). Under the NPT, the two groups of states commit to comply with a series of commitments formulated around 'three pillars': 1 - Non-proliferation: the NWSs undertake under Article I not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any NNWS to acquire them, while the NNWSs are bound under Article II to neither develop or acquire nuclear weapons or 'other nuclear explosive devices' nor to receive any assistance in that connection. 2 - Peaceful use of nuclear energy: Article IV guarantees the 'inalienable right' to 'develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination'. 3 - Nuclear disarmament: each state party to the treaty undertakes under Article VI 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'. The treaty entered in force in March 1970 and has since become universal, with 189 states parties in May 2010. At five-year intervals, parties to the treaty convene review conferences in order to review the operation of the treaty, Article VIII(3). The 1975, 1985 and 2000 review conferences culminated in the adoption of a final declaration and the 1995 review conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The preparatory committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 review conference, which met from April 2007 to May 2009, did not adopt any recommendations, in absence of a consensus on essential issues concerning the operation of the treaty. Hence the importance of this 8. review conference of the parties held in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010 in a

The Non-Proliferation Treaty on the threshold to the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, W.

1991-06-01

The basic outlines of non-proliferation policy, its instruments, the position of the protagonists' interests and the fundamental fields of conflict are to the fore. The history and structure of international non-poliferation policy and, in particular, of the NPT, are described, the instruments for verifying the purely peaceful use of nuclear power (safeguards) are analysed, and important future technological and political challenges of the Treaty are listed. (orig./HP) [de

Nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1990-01-01

This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

Nuclear weapon-free zone, non-proliferation treaty and South Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jayaramu, P.S.

1980-01-01

Emergence of and the motivations behind the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, the conceptual linkage between the nuclear weapon free zone and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the problems involved in the implementation of nuclear weapon free zone proposals put forward from time to time are discussed. Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, motivations behind the proposal, and India's response to it are examined. It is pointed out that both the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone indirectly grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the use of nuclear weapons. (M.G.B.)

The third review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was held in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty were being realized. The Conference ended with the adoption by consensus of a Final Declaration, by which the States parties, among other things, solemnly declared their conviction that the Treaty was essential to international peace and security and expressed their support for its objectives. This Fact Sheet provides information on the preparations for the Conference, developments at the Conference and the main features of the Final Declaration. Te text of the Treaty is reproduced in Disarmament Fact Sheet No. 33, and its historical background is contained in Fact Sheet No. 41

IAEA safeguards related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons- T.N.P. and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America-Tlatelolco

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodrigues, M.D.F.

1978-04-01

The application of safeguards, focusing mainly the causes that gave origin to this type of control, is studied. The safeguard procedures used by the IAEA are also given, relative to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - Tlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons - T.N.P. and the Euratom safeguards. Some consideration is given to the organizations related to safeguards application such as IAEA, OPANAL and Euratom, their functions and aims. (F.E.) [pt

The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; La conference d'examen 2000 du TNP et l'avenir du regime de non-proliferation nucleaire

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Grand, C. [Institut d' Etudes Politiques de Paris, 75 (France); Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr-Coetquidan (France)

2001-07-01

The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

On 19 July 1995, the Director General received a letter, addressed to him by the Alternate Resident Representative of Canada to the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Proceedings of the review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Geneva, 5-30 May 1975

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1976-01-01

The proceedings of the 1975 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons review the different Articles of the Treaty and their implementation following a report on the preparations for the Conference. The Annexes contain the text of the Treaty, as well as addresses by various Delegates concerning their countries' positions together with the final declaration and a series of draft resolutions. (NEA) [fr

The nonproliferation treaty and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ehrlich, Thomas [School of Law, Stanford University, CA (United States)

1970-05-01

In the past, nuclear arms control and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives were seen by many proponents of each as competing - if not opposing - interests. At one extreme, some viewed peaceful uses as an annoying irritant on the way to general and complete disarmament. At the other extreme, some considered arms-control arrangements - particularly those limiting nuclear testing - as bothersome barriers to realizing the full benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. Most people found themselves somewhere between those extremes. But most also felt a continuing tension between essentially opposing forces. This polarity has been significantly altered by the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is believed that the future use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes will depend in large measure on the international arrangements worked out under the treaty. I also believe that the success of the treaty in checking proliferation of nuclear weapons is contingent, in substantial part, on those peaceful-uses arrangements. In the areas covered by the treaty, therefore, one could view an active development of peaceful uses for nuclear explosives as complementing rather than conflicting with nuclear arms control. The treaty is primarily a security agreement. It is aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war by establishing permanency in the current separation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations. By its terms, each nuclear-weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient, and each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees not to receive such weapons or devices. The non-nuclear- weapon parties are also obligated to negotiate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency covering peaceful-uses activities. And all signatories agree not to transfer fissionable material to those parties unless they are subject to such agreements. These provisions are all part of a scheme to limit the

The nonproliferation treaty and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ehrlich, Thomas

1970-01-01

In the past, nuclear arms control and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives were seen by many proponents of each as competing - if not opposing - interests. At one extreme, some viewed peaceful uses as an annoying irritant on the way to general and complete disarmament. At the other extreme, some considered arms-control arrangements - particularly those limiting nuclear testing - as bothersome barriers to realizing the full benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. Most people found themselves somewhere between those extremes. But most also felt a continuing tension between essentially opposing forces. This polarity has been significantly altered by the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is believed that the future use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes will depend in large measure on the international arrangements worked out under the treaty. I also believe that the success of the treaty in checking proliferation of nuclear weapons is contingent, in substantial part, on those peaceful-uses arrangements. In the areas covered by the treaty, therefore, one could view an active development of peaceful uses for nuclear explosives as complementing rather than conflicting with nuclear arms control. The treaty is primarily a security agreement. It is aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war by establishing permanency in the current separation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations. By its terms, each nuclear-weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient, and each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees not to receive such weapons or devices. The non-nuclear- weapon parties are also obligated to negotiate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency covering peaceful-uses activities. And all signatories agree not to transfer fissionable material to those parties unless they are subject to such agreements. These provisions are all part of a scheme to limit the

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the process for its enhanced review on the eve of the 2000 review conference

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pinel, C.

2000-01-01

This article sets out the principle and essentials of the process for reviewing the operation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970. In 1995 the NPT was extended. The 2000 review conference is of considerable importance for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly in the light of the fact that after the indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states urged the nuclear-weapon states to take new steps towards nuclear disarmament. This article presents a review of the 30 year period of the application of NPT

Selected Examples of LDRD Projects Supporting Test Ban Treaty Verification and Nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jackson, K. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Al-Ayat, R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Walter, W. R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2015-02-23

The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at the DOE National Laboratories was established to ensure the scientific and technical vitality of these institutions and to enhance the their ability to respond to evolving missions and anticipate national needs. LDRD allows the Laboratory directors to invest a percentage of their total annual budget in cutting-edge research and development projects within their mission areas. We highlight a selected set of LDRD-funded projects, in chronological order, that have helped provide capabilities, people and infrastructure that contributed greatly to our ability to respond to technical challenges in support of test ban treaty verification and nonproliferation.

URENCO: A Multinational Contribution to Non-Proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Korbmacher, T.

2015-01-01

URENCO was founded in 1970 following the signing of the Treaty of Almelo by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The fundamental principles for effective supervision of URENCO's technology and enrichment operations with respect to non-proliferation issues have been laid down in this treaty. In order to enable the construction of a URENCO enrichment facility in the USA and to permit the transfer of classified information into the USA, another treaty has been concluded in 1992. The US government entered into the Treaty of Washington together with the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to ensure that the same conditions that had been agreed in the Treaty of Almelo would also apply to the US. To allow for the completion of the joint venture with Areva regarding the URENCO Group's technology business ETC, the Treaty of Cardiff has been signed on 12 July 2005 by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France. Through this treaty, France is obliged to adhere to the principles of the Treaty of Almelo. For each treaty, control bodies have been formed with representatives of the governments of the signatory countries. These committees exercise the role of effective supervision of the technology and operations with respect to non-proliferation issues. They also consider all questions concerning the safeguards system (as established by IAEA/Euratom), classification arrangements and security procedures, exports of the technology and enriched uranium, as well as other non-proliferation issues. The presentation describes how the multinational structure of URENCO contributes to Non-Proliferation on the basis of the above mentioned treaties. Beyond that, the international cross linking of operational working groups and committees within the URENCO Group structure is explained. This structure implies an additional assurance to achieve the safeguards goals set. (author)

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The text of the Agreement of 22 February 1978 between Paraguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-08-01

The full text of the agreement between Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America is presented

Statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-08-01

The document reproduces the following statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, statements on behalf of the depository Governments and statements on behalf of other Governments (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Western Samoa and Nordic Countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)

Future non-proliferation challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yelchenko, Volodymyr

2008-01-01

Having chaired the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee Mr. Volodymyr Yelchenko noted that the NPT States parties reaffirmed the important role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. They stressed that non-compliance with the Treaty provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation and placed emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. The universality aspect was brought to the front with the lack of progress in this area. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states, promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring non-proliferation. There is concern that non-States actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. One of the underlying themes at the Second Prepcom was the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation. Negative consequences to nuclear non-proliferation were also mentioned in the context of the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defense systems, with the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the urgent conclusion of such a treaty as a beneficial step towards non-proliferation was stressed. The NPT states parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for

China's position on nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Qian Jiadong.

1986-01-01

The paper discusses China's position on nuclear non-proliferation, in view of the fact that China does not subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China refuses to accede to the NPT because it considers the treaty to be discriminatory, and reasons are given for this point of view. However its stand for nuclear disarmament and disapproval of nuclear proliferation are declared. Nuclear arms race, prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament are also considered. (UK)

Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-07-01

The document informs that the Czech Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-07-01

The document informs that the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-12-13

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Okko, O [ed.

2012-07-01

The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

Obsolete treaties

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodionov, S.

1999-01-01

The proliferation of ballistic missile technologies (as opposed to nuclear ones) is not limited actually by any international treaty, there are no treaties of that kind. It is hardly imaginable that the international community could succeed in getting any agreements in the near future that would ban (or seriously limit) missile technology proliferation, similar to Non-proliferation Treaty or CTBT. An optimum option would permit the declared nuclear powers to have intercontinental ballistic missiles until the transition to a nuclear-weapon-free world, while any space activity would be under strict international control

TOWARDS FULFILLMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

s. Bagheri

2016-01-01

Full Text Available The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT is an international treaty that should be implemented during both peace and wartime. However, the obligations included in the treaty are dependent upon states' attitudes regarding other issues. Non-use of nuclear weapons is directly related to negotiations done for the purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, non-production or accumulation by other means and disarmament. In our day, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the issues of international law.The present study is of crucial significance due to its endeavor to clarify the general principles of Humanitarian Law in a relationship to the threat of nuclear weapons' up to now, a special norm; significantly limiting or completely prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, has not been accepted in international law. However, customary international humanitarian law regarding the use of nuclear weapons holds great value because of its purpose in eliminating nuclear weapons as a means of war through ascertaining their non-use and also appeasing the importance of nuclear ascendancy. In this respect, the NPT regime and its relationship with international humanitarian law will be discussed. Firstly, the NPT background, formation, main objectives and principles will be analyzed. In order to evaluate the relationship between the NPT and humanitarian law, the humanitarian obligations in general, humanitarian obligations in the context of the NPT and fulfillmen t of these obligations under the NPT should be studied. One of the main parts of the study is nuclear disarmament obligation included in the NPT. In this section, nuclear disarmament obligation in the context of the NPT and the legal framework of possible, general and comprehensive disarmament will be examined.

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Okko, O. (ed.)

2012-07-01

The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1972-06-01

The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1972-06-15

The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mirsaidov, U.M.

2010-01-01

This article is devoted to issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan. Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction arouse serious concern of world community. Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the weapons of mass destruction distributions become the subject of high concern. Besides, during the end of 'cold war', regional conflicts, collapse of Soviet Union, as well as access to sensitive technologies considerably increase the danger of weapons of mass destruction distribution. More than 10 countries have active programs, relating to weapons of mass destruction and, possibly, more than ten countries have potential to start implementing such kinds of programs. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution. After 11 September events, the risk of such weapons of mass destruction components use by such forces for Governments blackmail become real scene, which, despite of low possibility of this threat implementation, could have very serious and disastrous consequences. International community responded to these problems and challenges, basically through the following actions, which is detailed regime development of multilateral international treaties, directed to weapons of mass destruction distribution prevention. Non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, Convention on prohibition of chemical weapons and Convention on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons are some of them. As it is known, Tajikistan signed all these treaties. For different reasons these treaties were subject of serious tests. Nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 year, actual Israel status as state having nuclear weapon and North Korean program on

1995 - a pivotal year for nuclear nonproliferation. German nonproliferation policy in the runup to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Preisinger, J.

1994-01-01

The paper describes the non-proliferation as a task of preventive security policy, the non-proliferation instruments, the content of an extended non-proliferation system, and tasks of German non-proliferation policy. (DG)

The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1971-05-01

The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [es

The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-04-01

The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [ru

Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

The text of the Agreement between Turkey and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-02-01

The full text of the agreement between Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

Text of the Agreement of 2 March 1978 between Peru and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-09-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 March 1978 between Peru and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 1 August 1979.

The Text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-17

The text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-13

The text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Nuclear exports and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Courteix, Simone.

1978-01-01

Increased preoccupation in present times with the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the multiplication of international agreements such as the Non-proliferation Treaty and in the strengthening of consultations between industrialised countries (London Club). After analysing the IAEA safeguards system under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its shortcomings both technically and otherwise, the author considers how this situation can be remedied in the light of the London Agreements and in view of the position of the main countries concerned. The annex to the book contains the texts of many international agreements and relevant national regulations as well as nuclear policy statements. It also includes a detailed bibliograaphy. (NEA) [fr

THE ROLE AND RATIONALE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tom COPPEN

2012-12-01

Full Text Available Much has been written about perceived weaknesses of the NPT and the challenges it has been facing over the last decades. Analysing the most important provisions of the NPT, this article demonstrates how the treaty has managed to maintain its central role in the non-proliferation regime since its conclusion, and how it retains enough flexibility within its review mechanism and its managerial approach to supervision to keep this position for the decades to come. The theoretical framework of the article is formed by theory of arms control law, relevant features of which are: a large influence of politics and national interests of states on the rule of law; its flexible yet treaty-based nature; and the distinctive role of supervision in order to ensure compliance with primary rules. The article analyses key NPT provisions. Based on Article VIII, the NPT Review Conferences have both an important political and legal function. They are the NPT’s mechanism for review, implementation and supervision; in legal terms, they enable the evolution of the NPT based on subsequent agreement and practice. The NPT articles on non-proliferation and disarmament illustrate how the NPT has evolved to close off loopholes (Articles I and II and retains its flexibility whilst providing a global platform for negotiations on nuclear disarmament (Article VI. Article III evolved and must be understood to oblige NPT states to sign an Additional Protocol (AP with the IAEA. Article IV sets the parameters for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but leaves room for negotiation and conflict. The supervision of the NPT, illustrated by the case of Iran, is a complicated process involving international organisations such as the IAEA and the UNSC; while these may play important roles, however, the enforcement of the NPT is ultimately left to the NPT states themselves.

The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-12-13

The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-19

The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-02-22

The text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Denmark and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-09

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Denmark and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Norway and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-11

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Norway and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Norway and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Norway and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Denmark and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Denmark and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Non-proliferation and disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ritter von Wagner, A.

1993-01-01

In 1995 the Conference on the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will take place. Will it be extended for a long term, indefinitely or only for a fixed period? The Federal Government of Germany advocates an unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others have different ideas alleging that the Treaty is imperfect and discriminating. It is a thorn in the side of many States, in particular of the Third World, which no longer want to put up with being treated as second-class states. One argument which is considered especially embarrassing by developing countries as a visible expression of such discrimination, are the nuclear tests which are still carried out by nuclear weapon states. Is the political situation still such that one needs those weapons? Strategists gradually find it difficult to argument; over and over again they claim that an abandonment of nuclear weapons would make the world unsafer. But development has gradually passed over them. Nevertheless, one finds it hard to throw overboard considerations which for years have determined one's thinking. (orig./HSCH) [de

The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

The IAEA and non-proliferation: is quiescence progress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Herron, L.W.

1983-01-01

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current status of more important non-proliferation aspects affecting or involving the IAEA. The questions dealt with cover in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Committee on Assurances of Supply established by the IAEA in 1980 and the International Plutonium Storage Study prepared by an IAEA expert group. The author concludes that in a number of areas involving this Agency, recent considerable activity at both political and technical levels has produced few tangible results althrough the situation is not static. (NEA) [fr

The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1972-11-17

The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1972-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Proceedings of the Symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment: Results and Implications for Test Ban Treaties, Rockville, Maryland, April 19-21, 1994

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Denny, Marvin D

1994-01-01

To address a critical verification issue for the current Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and for a possible future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Department of Energy sought to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical test in the same geology, so that other explosions could be identified. This was done in a field experiment code-named the NonProliferation Experiment (NPE).This comprehensive experiment was designed to determine the signatures of chemical explosions for a broad range of phenomena for comparison with those of previous nuclear tests. If significant differences can be measured, then these measures can be used to discriminate between the two types of explosions. In addition, when these differences are understood, large chemical explosions can be used to seismically calibrate regions to discriminate earthquakes from explosions. Toward this end, on-site and off-site measurements of transient phenomena were made, and on-site measurements of residual effects are in progress.Perhaps the most striking result was that the source function for the chemical explosion was identical to that of a nuclear one of about twice the yield. These proceedings provide more detailed results of the experiment.

The Text of the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-02-21

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 11 October 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 11 October 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

1997-05-01

This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

1997-05-01

This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

The Text of the Agreement between Cyprus and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Cyprus and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-05-18

The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Cyprus and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-07-03

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Cyprus and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Nepal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-29

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Nepal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Mongolia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-22

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mongolia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-07-10

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Mongolia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mongolia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Nepal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Nepal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1978-01-01

This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

Brazil and Mexico in the Nonproliferation Regime, Common Structures and Divergent Trajectories in Latin America

OpenAIRE

Sotomayor, Arturo C.

2014-01-01

Chapter 8 There are multiple options Latin American countries to support and comply with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the global level, states can decide to ratify the core treaties and join their supporting institutions such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the...

The handbook of nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, M. H.; Lee, B. W.; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Lee, K. S.

2003-07-01

This report analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This report took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and current status. It is here divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this report dealt four multilateral treaties concluded for international non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. And international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are also analyzed focused on UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, regional safeguards system and international conferences. In addition, this report reviewed the nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is a important tool for bilateral regime

The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-01

The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Working Group 3: Broader Perspectives on Non-proliferation and Nuclear Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, M.; Pregenzer, A.; Stein, G.

2013-01-01

This working group (WG) focused on the technical topics related to international security and stability in global nonproliferation and arms control regimes and asked how nonproliferation tools and culture might facilitate verification of future nuclear treaties. The review of existing and future nonproliferation and disarmament regimes (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - CTBT, UNSC Resolution 1540, UK/Norway/VERTIC exercise, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - FMCT) offered a view on challenges, possibilities, and limitations for future initiatives. The concepts that the WG considered, with potential use in implementing future nuclear verification treaties, are: Triple S Culture (Safety, Security, Safeguards), State-Level Approach, Safeguards-by-Design, risk-based approaches, managed access, inspections, and protection of sensitive information. Under these concepts, many existing tools, considered by the WG could be used for nuclear verification. Export control works to control sensitive technology and expertise. Global implementation is complicated and multi-faceted and would benefit from greater consistency and efficiency. In most cases, international cooperation and development international capability would supplement efforts. This document is composed of the slides and the paper of the presentation. (A.C.)

The Text of the Agreement between New Zealand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between New Zealand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between New Zealand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-08

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between New Zealand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1972-03-24

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1972-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

2013-01-01

The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2005-01-01

The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

The text of the Agreement of 14 July 1980 between Indonesia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-09-01

The full text of the agreement between Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

The text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-04-01

The full text of the agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

The text of the agreement of 11 June 1971 between Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for Finland on 1 October 1995. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Finland, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 11 June 1971, which entered into force on 9 February 1972, between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been suspended

The future of non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gere, F.

2000-01-01

This paper comprises two parts. The first part makes a status of the non-proliferation policy: problems of ratification of Start 2 and CTBT treaties, nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in May 1998 etc. The second part makes a prospective reflexion on the evolution of the position of nuclearized countries at the 2015-2030 vista: role of Asia, nuclear perception, evolution of the US perception of non-proliferation, military strategy and European unification. (J.S.)

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002 [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002 [fr

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-07-13

The text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Nicaragua and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 29 December 1976. The Protocol entered into force on the same date pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1976-01-13

The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ecuador and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 March 1975, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Nicaragua and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 29 December 1976. The Protocol entered into force on the same date pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ecuador and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 March 1975, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-05-01

Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-06-10

The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-12-13

The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

UK ignores treaty obligations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roche, P.

1995-01-01

A detailed critique is offered of United Kingdom (UK) political policy with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an interim agreement valid while nuclear disarmament was supposed to occur, by a representative of Greenpeace, the anti-nuclear campaigning group. The author argues that the civil and military nuclear programmes are still firmly linked, and emphasises his opinions by quoting examples of how UK politicians have broken treaty obligations in order to pursue their own political, and in some cases financial, goals. It is argued that the treaty has failed to force nuclear countries to disarm because of its promoted civil nuclear power programmes. (U.K.)

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007 [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in Guatemala City on 14 December 2001

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-05-14

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-04-27

The text of the Agreement between the German Democratic Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-06

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 1 October 1999

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Peru and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Peru and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 December 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 22 March 2000

Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

The Treaty of Tlatelolco enhances the security of the countries of the region by reducing the risk of a nuclear-arms race among them, with all the danger and cost that it would entail, and, as a contribution to the world-wide nuclear non-proliferation regime, it constitutes an important confidence-building measure by ensuring, through its control and verification system, that parties to the Treaty do not posses and will not acquire nuclear weapons. List of parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco as of 31 July 1989: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil (not full party), Chile (not full party), Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. (Argentina and Dominica have signed the Treaty)

The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-12-13

The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria

The Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the insertion of the Brazilian State in its regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Silva, Marcos Valle Machado da

2010-01-01

The issue of nuclear weapons continues to appear as a focal point of International Relations. The efforts and concrete actions on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control are still issues that generate recurring tensions between States. However, in Brazil, there is little analysis of an academic nature about these issues and, with respect to current and prospective position of the Brazilian State in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime, studies and analysis are even more scarce, or incipient. The present dissertation has as its object of study to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Regime arisen from NPT, and the Brazilian State insertion process in this Regime. Therefore our research work is structured in three areas: the first one is about the role of nuclear weapons in States security perception, the second is about NPT and its Regime, the third runs over the insertion of the Brazilian state in this regime. So, in summary, the research performed included the reasons that make a State to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT genesis and evolution of the perception of the meaning of that Treaty by the States, and the process and the degree of insertion of Brazil in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime. The inquiry sought to place this object of study in the broader debate on Foreign Relations, based on the approaches of the discipline devoted to the question of managing the security of States, id est, the two approaches that constitute the mainstream of the discipline: the perspective theoretical liberal (and neoliberal variants) and realistic thinking (and neo-realist). Thus, we have used different theoretical lenses, which we think necessary for understanding the specific parts and causal connections between these parts of a complex issue. (author)

Verification in the international treaty and expected its activities for FMCT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kikuchi, Masahiro

1997-01-01

Cold war had been finished and the international society was going to move detente. The mass destruction weapons decrease its object and they are going to be reduced or reversed. By change of the international conditions in the field of non-proliferation, it is necessary to the activities for decreasing atomic weapons and a countermeasure of diffusion of nuclear materials produced by waste and dissection of excess atomic weapon to other countries and stranger. We understand that non-proliferation means a countermeasure of decreasing nuclear weapon. So that the non-proliferation system should be regulated systematically in order to foresee the international tendency in the future and the verification activities to attain reliability assurance of international treaty for disarmament and non-proliferation. NPT reconsider congress decided to begin early negotiation of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) in 1995. The functions, verification and expected activities of FMCT are discussed. (S.Y.)

The Text of the Agreement between Viet-Nam and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1975-01-24

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 9 January 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Viet-Nam and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 9 January 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001 [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-07-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

IAEA Director General calls for rededication to nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

Speaking at the opening session of the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in New York on April 24, 2000, the Director General of the IAEA urged all nations to commit themselves unequivocally to the basic tenets of the non-proliferation regime

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of El Salvador and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 2002. It was signed on 5 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 May 2004, the date on which Agency received from El Salvador written notification that El Salvador's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1975-12-16

The text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ghana and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The text of the agreement of 5 December 1974 between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1978-04-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 5 December 1974, and the Protocol thereto, between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agreement entered into force on 21 February 1978

The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1975-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ghana and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-08-01

The document reproduces the text of the Exchange of Letters with the Commonwealth of Dominica in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean, which constitutes an agreement confirming that the Safeguards Agreement of 3 May 1996 (IAEA-INFCIRC-513) concluded between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) and the IAEA pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) satisfies the obligation of Dominica under Article 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Graham, Thomas Jr. [7609 Glenbrook Rd., Bethesda, MD 20814 (United States)

2014-05-09

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Jamaica to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Jamaica to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Statement issued on 28 February 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on accession of Argentina to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The statement was issued on 28 February 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on accession of Argentina to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Statement was received from the Resident Representative of France to the International Atomic Energy Agency and is being circulated for the information of all Member States

How to strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eklund, S.

1975-01-01

NPT consists of a complex set of undertakings and obligations, each of which represents in its own right a highly desirable objective that should be pursued whether or not the Treaty itself existed, and irrespective of the success (or lack of it) achieved in pursuit of the other objectives. These objectives are: (a) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries other than the five that possessed them at the end of 1966. Obviously, this is the main purpose of the Treaty. It provides the substance of the first three articles and gives the Treaty its name (Arts. I, II, III); (b) to promote international co-operation in developing the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and particularly to help developing countries in this regard (Art. IV); (c) to afford all parties whatever benefits may be derived from the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions (Art. V); (d) to pursue negotiations towards the cessation of the arms race, nuclear disarmament and eventually a treaty on general and complete disarmament, 'under strict and effective international control'. Although this is not actually said in the relevant article (Article VI), it is generally considered that this obligation falls particularly upon those parties of the Treaty that are 'Nuclear Weapon States'. (Art. VI) The preambular paragraph regarding the 'determination expressed' by the parties to the Moscow Test Ban Treaty to seek a complete and perpetual discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons, is also relevant to the objective of arms control and disarmament. (Art. VI) Since consummation of each of these objectives is 'devoutly to be wished', in Hamlet's words, there should be no question of bargaining or horse-trading between them. Despite some specious arguments to the contrary, history shows that the possession of superior weapons has never prevented war and a further spread of nuclear weapons must inevitably increase, perhaps in geometrical progression, the likelihood of a nuclear conflict

Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Dominican Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1978-07-15

The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-07-01

The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 between Ethiopia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-07-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 and of the Protocol thereto between Ethiopia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 December 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

Agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by exchange of letters with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 September 2000. It was effected by an exchange of letters of 4 and 10 October 2000. The Agreement and the Protocol thereto entered into force on the date upon which the Agency received written confirmation on behalf of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that the constitutional requirements for the entry into force have been met, i.e. on 16 April 2002

Proceedings of the symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE): Results and implications for test ban treaties

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Denny, M.D.; Stull, S.P. [eds.

1994-12-31

The large amounts of chemical explosives used worldwide in mining, quarrying, and civil engineering projects presents a challenge for policy makers molding a test ban, since their use could provide the necessary cover for a clandestine nuclear test. The Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) seeks to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical explosion in the same geology. Two chemical explosions were detonated at the Nevada Test Site to compare their signatures with previous nuclear tests. This conference presents results of these tests and discusses implications for test ban treaties. Conference papers are divided into the following sections: Background; Test preparations; EOS and code simulations; Rainier Mesa structure; Ground motion measurements; Non-seismic technologies; On-site inspection technologies; and a panel discussion. Selected papers are indexed separately for inclusion in the Energy Science and Technology Database.

The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1971-11-19

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-06-12

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-02-19

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1971-10-27

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1971-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document

The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1971-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Control in the Republic of Croatia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Valcic, I.; Prah, M.; Mikec, N.

2006-01-01

In accordance with its internationally accepted obligations, the Republic of Croatia is actively implementing principles of non-proliferation and export control of nuclear materials and/or equipment. The article deals with treaties, conventions, agreements and other international arrangements that are creating certain obligation for Republic of Croatia related to nuclear non-proliferation. The most important are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Protocol, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the NSG Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. In addition the article describes a national regulative framework, the basis for conducting activities in nuclear material control, export control of dual-use items as well as non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Details are given about the Nuclear Safety Act, the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Act on Export of Dual-Use Items, the Decree on the List of Dual-Use Items, the Law on Production, Repair and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment and the Decree specifying goods subject to export and import licenses. (author)

Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Czech Republic on 1 October 2009 [es

Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shinohara, Nobuo; Kokaji, Lisa; Ichimasa, Sukeyuki

2010-01-01

In Global Center of Excellence Program of The University of Tokyo, Non- Proliferation Study Committee by the members of nuclear industries, electricity utilities, nuclear energy institutes and universities has initiated on October 2008 from the viewpoints of investigating a package of measures for nuclear non-proliferation and bringing up young people who will support the near-future nuclear energy system. One of the non-proliferation issues in the Committee is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Objective of this treaty is to cease all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosion. This purpose should be contributed effectively to the political stability of the Asian region by continuous efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons. In the Committee, by extracting several issues related to the CTBT, conception of 'Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation' has been discussed with the aim of the nuclear-weapon security in Asian region, where environmental nuclear-test monitoring data is mainly treated and utilized. In this paper, the conception of the 'network' is presented in detail. (author)

Nuclear non-proliferation: a guide to the debate

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldblat, Jozef.

1985-01-01

The non-proliferation policies of 15 countries have been studied and summarized for use by participants of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation (NPT) of Nuclear weapons held in September 1985. The main purpose of the guide is to examine what action must be taken to ensure the Treaty's survival. There are four chapters following an introduction, covering the implementation of the essential provisions of the NPT, the motivations of the countries which have not joined the NPT, together with the motivations of those which have formally renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, even though they possess the technical and economic potential necessary to manufacture them. The last chapter summarises measures which might be taken to strengthen the NPT including ideas put forward at a workshop held in 1984. (author)

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 March 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Jamaica and the Agency, i.e. on 19 March 2003

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2003-03-28

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 19 March 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Jamaica and the Agency, i.e. on 19 March 2003.

The Text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1976-06-16

The text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-11-01

The text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 14 June 1979.

Perspectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koungou, Leon

2004-01-01

To join traditional methods and new approaches of 'non-proliferation'. This is a technical method and the best way to fight against 'non-proliferation' which is facing few preoccupations: knowledge's disseminations; technologies; equipments and weapons that should be stopped. As it's important to note the return of nuclear danger as the end of confrontation between west-east which should be reduce. As the adaptation of mechanisms is necessary today, as it is important to react about states' incitations to violate international engagement of non-proliferation. Areas control allows finding out change and evolution, but more insufficient. Functional difficulties show that the IAEA (International Agency of Atomic Energy) does not work good. Safeguard system does not allow to respect 'non-proliferation' engagements; for instance 'junkies states' that they cannot dissuade traditional methods. The fight of 'non-proliferation' shows new progresses with fearing methods of prevention actions and heaviest international controls of exportation. The target of this is very ambitious. This new method is self-successful because it contributes to re-enforce international security when defeating acquisition of nuclear and mass destruction weapons by non-states factors. Therefore non-proliferation regime and especially 'non-proliferation treaty' remains delicate as long as some militaries state such USA will reject their 'non-proliferation' engagement. (author) [fr

The Brazilian position during the final transactions the treaty for the proscriptions of nuclear weapons in Latin America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fonseca Costa, C.E.S.C. da.

1979-02-01

The Brazilian position during the final transactions on the treaty for the proscription of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is presented. An analysis of the main clauses of this treaty is given, well as a comparative study between the principle points of Tlatelolco Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty [pt

Sustaining non-proliferation in the 1980s

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nye, J.S.

1984-01-01

The subject is discussed as follows: introduction; the non-proliferation regime - 1950s to 1970s (IAEA safeguards; Non-proliferation Treaty; oil crisis; proposed sale of facilities for producing weapons-usable materials; USA position); the Carter Administration approach; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation); incentives (USA); export legislation (USA); domestic breeder policy (USA); maintaining the regime in the 1980s (safeguards; Pu and highly enriched uranium management; international spent fuel storage; fuel assurances); the problem of priority; rate vs. degree of proliferation; relations among regimes (international regimes); conclusion. (U.K.)

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [ru

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Costa Rica to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Costa Rica to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

The Text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1976-11-19

The text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 May 1974, pursuant to Article 25 thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force for the Slovak Republic on 1 December 2005 [es

Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Republic of Slovenia on 1 September 2006 [es

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 15 September 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Paraguay written notification that Paraguay's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Agreement of 23 August 1974 between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-02-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 25 September 1973. It was signed in Vienna on 30 April 1974 and in La Paz on 23 August 1974. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 February 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

Agreement of 23 August 1974 between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-02-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Bolivia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 September 1973. It was signed in Vienna on 30 April 1974 and in La Paz on 23 August 1974. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 February 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-03-11

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 18 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Nicaragua written notification that Nicaragua's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

Agreement of 18 April 1975 between Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Honduras to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 18 April 1975 between the Republic of Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Statement issued on 30 January 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union in connection with the accession of Algeria to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The statement was issued on 30 January 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union in connection with Algeria's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Statement was received from the Resident Representative of France to the International Atomic Energy Agency and is being circulated for the information of all Member States

Non-proliferation and safeguards in South Africa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Broodryk, Alta

2001-01-01

South Africa occupies a unique position in the history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in being the only country with a nuclear weapons capability that was voluntary terminated before acceding to the Treaty. The first nuclear device built was completed in December 1982, five more devices followed at an orderly pace of less than one per year and on 26 February 1990 cabinet officially implemented the termination of its nuclear deterrent capability. The events that flowed from the termination was that South Africa: Acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (10 July 1991); Signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/394, (16 September 1991); Submitted its initial inventory of nuclear material (30 September 1991); and Received first verification team from the Agency (November 1991). South Africa, being dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became a party to various non-proliferation treaties, regimes and groups. The National Non- Proliferation Policy, as published in a Cabinet memorandum, also clearly states this commitment. To comply with the requirements of the Treaty and Agreement the following two acts were published: The Nuclear Energy Act; The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The Minister of Minerals and Energy is the State Authority for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in South Africa, however, the Minister delegated this Authority to NECSA's Safeguards Division. To implement the requirements of the various acts, control regimes and treaties a State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard, was designed. This standard focuses on customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, the demonstration of commitment and the prevention of non-conformity. To comply with the requirements of the standard the following procedures were established and maintained: A Quality Manual; Customer focus; Control of documents; Control of quality records; Internal Audits

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 14 September 2004. It was signed on 9 December 2004 in Vienna

Nuclear non-proliferation: Revisiting the basics. Carnegie international non-proliferation conference 2002. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2002-01-01

The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort - and despite recent challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But the international community has to move forward, it is essential that a number of the basic assumptions should be revisited, and a number of new approaches reconsidered. A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually disappear. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has overall been successful - but with some shortcomings. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force - and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the 'unequivocal undertaking' by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament - such as 'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further 'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,' 'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT - left without concrete follow-up actions and in

Third Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference and 29th regular session of the general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, November 20, 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1985-01-01

Ambassador Lewis A. Dunn of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Danny J. Boggs of DOE reported on two recent international conferences relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and arms control. Dunn summarized the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review conference and its final declaration in which participants reaffirmed treaty principles and made recommendations for strengthening its efforts and enhancing its implementation. Boggs summarized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference, and noted the significance of China's recent entry into IAEA. They stressed that energy security is a key factor in the success of IAEA safeguards because it affects trade and international cooperation. US contributions to the success of non-proliferation policies depend upon our ability to share technological information with less advanced nations. Questions and responses and an appendix with the final declaration of the Review Conference follow the testimony

Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

2003-01-01

Although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has enjoyed considerable success, today the regime has never been under greater threat. Three states have challenged the objectives of the NPT, and there is a technology challenge - the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology and know-how. A major issue confronting the international community is, how to deal with a determined proliferator? Despite this gloomy scenario, however, the non-proliferation regime has considerable strengths - many of which can be developed further. The regime comprises complex interacting and mutually reinforcing elements. At its centre is the NPT - with IAEA safeguards as the Treaty's verification mechanism. Important complementary elements include: restraint in the supply and the acquisition of sensitive technologies; multilateral regimes such as the CTBT and proposed FMCT; various regional and bilateral regimes; the range of security and arms control arrangements outside the nuclear area (including other WMD regimes); and the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. Especially important are political incentives and sanctions in support of non-proliferation objectives. This paper outlines some of the key issues facing the non-proliferation regime

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Annual report 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haemaelaeinen, M.; Karhu, P.

2008-04-01

Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2007 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two licence holders in 2007, setting required actions for them to correct their reporting and to update the descriptions of their procedures. Neither the IAEA nor the European Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards

Agreement between the Republic of Chile and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Agreement by exchange of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 with the Republic of Chile in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

The document reproduces the Agreement by exchange of letters with the Republic of Chile on Safeguards Agreement of 5 April 1995 concluded between Chile and the IAEA, in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty). The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 1996. The texts of letters of 6 November 1995 and 25 June 1996 are also included

Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for the Republic of Estonia on 1 December 2005 [es

The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1978-03-15

The text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between Japan and the Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-03-01

The text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between Japan and the Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced for the information of all Members

Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Mexican States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Mexican States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the United Mexican States written notification that Mexico's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

2015-01-01

Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

Guidelines for the International Observation by the Agency of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes under the Provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Analogous Provisions in Other International Agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

On 21 June 1972 the Board of Governors approved guidelines for the international observation by the Agency of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or analogous provisions in other international agreements. These guidelines are now reproduced herein for the information of all Members

Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-02-09

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997.

Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 September 2001. It was signed in Vienna on 5 December 2001

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997

Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Redick, J.R.

1981-01-01

The regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco supports peace and security in the Latin American region and global nonproliferation efforts. Circumstances leading to the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone include careful preparations and negotiations, individual leadership, existence of certain shared cultural and legal traditions of Latin American countries, and the temporary stimulus of the Cuban missile crisis. The lack of overt superpower pressure on Latin America, compared with more turbulent regions, has permitted continued progress toward full realization of the zone. Tlatelolco's negotiating process, as well as the substance of the Treaty, deserve careful consideration relative to other areas. The Treaty enjoys wide international approval, but full support by certain Latin American States (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba) has been negatively affected by the failure of the US Senate to ratify Tlatelolco's Protocol I. Nuclear programs of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are expanding rapidly and these nations are forming linkages with West European countries, rather than the United States. The May 1980 Argentine-Brazilian nuclear agreement foresees significant cooperation between the two nation's nuclear energy commissions and more coordinated resistance to the nuclear supplier countries. Argentine-Brazilian nuclear convergence and the response accorded to it by the United States will have significant implications for the future of the Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America. 52 references

The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biad, A.

1996-01-01

This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC)

The Text of the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between The Netherlands and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards with respect to Surinam in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1976-01-12

The text of the Agreement of 5 April 1973, and of the two Protocols thereto, between The Netherlands and the Agency for the application of safeguards with respect to Surinam in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and with Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.The Agreement and the two Protocols thereto entered into force on 5 June 1975, pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement and to Article II of each of the Protocols.

The Text of the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between The Netherlands and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards with respect to Surinam in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 5 April 1973, and of the two Protocols thereto, between The Netherlands and the Agency for the application of safeguards with respect to Surinam in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and with Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.The Agreement and the two Protocols thereto entered into force on 5 June 1975, pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement and to Article II of each of the Protocols.

Sovereignty and non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kimminich, O.

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty seems to violate the fundamental principle of the quality of the states. However, if interpreted in the light of the latest developments of the international law, it is possible to justify the discriminations which it imposes on the non-nuclear states. A crucial point is the implementation of article VI by the nuclear states. If the latter procrastinate in nuclear disarmament the whole NPT-regime will collapse. (orig.) [de

Treaty aids 'detensioning of southern Africa'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stumpf, W.

1991-01-01

South Africa's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a significant step forward in trading non-weapons related nuclear technology with other world powers. In an interview with Dr Waldo Stumpf, chief executive officer of the Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, the impact of this decision on the Corporation and the whole of southern Africa is discussed

Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998 [fr

Agreement between the Republic of San Marino and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of San Marino and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Agreement was signed in Vienna on 3 March 1995 and in San Marino on 7 September 1998. It entered into force on 15 September 1998. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

Benefits from an exchange of knowledge in the treaty-related science and technologies: A personal perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marshall, P.D.

1999-01-01

This paper describes benefits from an exchange of knowledge in the non-proliferation treaty related science and technologies concerning science and technology development. Benefits to State Parties are concerned with non-treaty uses of seismic, hydro acoustic, infrasound and radionuclides data, their evaluation and measuring techniques

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

The Text of the Agreement of 5 April 1973 between The Netherlands and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Respect to The Netherlands Antilles in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Additional Protocol 1 to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1976-01-09

The text of the Agreement of 5 April 1973, and of the two Protocols thereto, between The Netherlands and the Agency for the application of safeguards with respect to The Netherlands Antilles in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and with Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement and the two Protocols thereto entered into force on 5 June 1975, pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement and to Article II of each of the Protocols.

New trends of activity on supporting of non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Issaeva, G.M.; Tyupkina, O.G.

2002-01-01

Taking into account the necessity of all possible strengthening of non-proliferation regimes Kazakhstan participates in a number of agreements and associations: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Supplier Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Conference on Disarmament, etc. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) greatly influenced on the development on non-proliferation regime in Kazakhstan. During initial stage of CTR activity (1993-1995) military projects prevailed. Later (1995-1997) the projects on liquidation of infrastructure for nuclear and bio- weapons were successfully realized. Last years, since 1999, the attention was shifted towards proliferation prevention of hazardous nuclear and biological materials. Recent terrorist acts and world community activity on global safety strengthening underline an urgency of quite new problems that entirely applied to Kazakhstan: monitoring of hazardous materials; enhancement of safety systems of 'risky' facilities and technologies; creation and/or upgrading of safety systems for industry infrastructure. The proposals of these new trends of non-proliferation have been developed. Development of physical protection system for oil and gas industry infrastructure of Kazakhstan based on safety concepts of nuclear facilities; Evaluation of radionuclide contamination and safety of oil and gas facilities of the Caspian region; Counteraction to nuclear materials proliferation; Cooperative approaches in preventing/reducing of illicit trafficking and use of WMD-related explosive materials. Implementation of the project would make of substantial contribution to successful solution of either regional or global safety problem

Non-proliferation through effective international control. Report of working group I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, S.E.

1993-01-01

Working Group I focused on two issues: the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Missile Technology Regime (MTCR). There was wide agreement within the Group on a number of factors that will strongly influence the prospects for the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension Conference. Two points stood out as particularly important: first, emphasis on the obligations for nuclear Powers to move in good faith in direction of nuclear disarmament; and second, inadequacy of security guarantees to non-nuclear States associated with the NPT

From nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament: a need to refocus NPT priorities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sethi, Manpreet

1998-01-01

This paper seeks to suggest that attempts at general and complete nuclear disarmament have largely failed because of an over emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly horizontal, while disarmament has attracted only lip service from the perpetrators of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that is deemed to be the core of the global non-proliferation regime is no less to blame for having indulged in a skewed pursuit of its twin objectives - nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The paper argues that nuclear non-proliferation can be sustainable only if complemented by nuclear disarmament. In the absence of the latter, proliferation of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the NPT and its safeguards regime, would always pose a potential risk

Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-04-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-05-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-04-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994.

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-05-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000.

Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-07-28

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000.

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-06-20

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000.

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-04-18

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000.

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-10-29

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999.

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977 between Maldives and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-11-29

The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Maldives and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 between Sudan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-06-10

The text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 and of the Protocol thereto, between Sudan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 January 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975 between Swaziland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1975-12-18

The text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Swaziland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 July 1975, pursuant to Article 24 thereof. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 24 April 1977 between Afghanistan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-04-01

The text of the Agreement of 24 April 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Afghanistan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 February 1978. The Protocol entered into force on the same date pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Morocco and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 18 February 1975, pursuant to Article 25. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977 between Maldives and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Maldives and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 between Sudan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 and of the Protocol thereto, between Sudan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 January 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

Nuclear arbitration: Interpreting non-proliferation agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tzeng, Peter

2015-01-01

At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements. These agreements include, inter alia, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements.1 States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, commentators have proposed various enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The inconvenient truth, however, is that states are generally unwilling to consent to enforcement mechanisms concerning issues as critical to national security as nuclear non-proliferation.3 This article suggests an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem: interpretation mechanisms. Although an interpretation mechanism does not have the teeth of an enforcement mechanism, it can induce compliance by providing an authoritative interpretation of a legal obligation. Interpretation mechanisms would help solve the non-compliance problem because, as this article shows, in many cases of alleged non-compliance with a non-proliferation agreement, the fundamental problem has been the lack of an authoritative interpretation of the agreement, not the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, this article proposes arbitration as the proper interpretation mechanism for non-proliferation agreements. It advocates the establishment of a 'Nuclear Arbitration Centre' as an independent branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommends the gradual introduction of arbitration clauses into the texts of non-proliferation agreements. Section I begins with a discussion of international agreements in general and the importance of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section II then discusses nuclear non-proliferation agreements and their lack of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section III examines seven case studies of alleged non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements in order to show that the main problem in many cases

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-08-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/258) concluded between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1998 and it entered into force on 28 july 1998

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-09-14

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 2005

Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria [fr

Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria

Saving the NPT: past and future non-proliferation bargains

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tertrais, B

2005-07-01

In this thorough study of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the author looks at the origins of the NPT, its original bargains, and the current 'global crisis of compliance'. Then he looks to the 2005 NPT Review Conference for approaches 'to preserve the integrity and the credibility of the Treaty'. He suggests a new set of bargains centered around two issues: increase rewards for members in good standing of their obligations, but promote sanctions for those cheating; and recognize that nuclear disarmament is a distant goal, but satisfy the legitimate worries of NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States)

Saving the NPT: past and future non-proliferation bargains

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tertrais, B.

2005-01-01

In this thorough study of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the author looks at the origins of the NPT, its original bargains, and the current 'global crisis of compliance'. Then he looks to the 2005 NPT Review Conference for approaches 'to preserve the integrity and the credibility of the Treaty'. He suggests a new set of bargains centered around two issues: increase rewards for members in good standing of their obligations, but promote sanctions for those cheating; and recognize that nuclear disarmament is a distant goal, but satisfy the legitimate worries of NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States)

Naval nuclear propulsion and the international nonproliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guimaraes, Leonam dos Santos

2005-01-01

Nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) acquisition by Non-Proliferation Treaty No- Nuclear Weapon State (NPT-NNWS) Navies does not imply nuclear weapon proliferation risks higher than those related to stationary research and power reactors. It must then be recognized that stringent restraints on supplies and political pressures on governments, both exercised very effectively by No-Proliferation Treaty - Nuclear Weapon State (NPT-NWS) against NPT-NNWS indigenous development of SSN and associated fuel cycle facilities, are fundamentally based on geopolitical and military strategic objectives. This practice is far from being related exclusively to the NPT spirit: in fact, it is a matter of freedom at seas and not of nuclear proliferation. (author)

Reforming the non-proliferation system in the 1980s

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilmshurst, M.J.

1984-01-01

The non-proliferation policies of the 1970s were based largely on the misconception that the main danger lay in the possible misuse of civil nuclear-power plants for the production of weapon materials. In consequence their aim, whether by means of denial or control, was to ensure that such misuse was made more difficult in all countries with nuclear-power industries. Less attention was paid to the potential for misuse of the nuclear-research plants in the handful of countries outside the non-proliferation system. The resulting difficulties placed in the way of countries developing their nuclear-power industries damaged relations between the supplier and the consumer states, and discredited any new efforts aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation system. By contrast, the 1980s began, first in INFCE and then in the Committee on Assurances of Supply, with a concerted attempt to re-establish a dialogue based on a relationship of trust between the supplier and the customer states. But a restored consensus will not, on its own, deal with the problem of those states that are outside the non-proliferation system and that have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The outcome of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply may help to attract some of those states into the system, but more needs to be done either by adapting the NPT, making adherence to it appear more attractive, or by devising some alternative code of behaviour for states not party to the Treaty and by seeking to remove the political obstacles that lie in the way of at least some of the potential weapon states adhering to the Treaty

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997 [es

Text of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Succession by the Czech Republic

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-07-01

In a communication received on 24 March 1993, the Government of the Czech Republic informed the Director General, inter alia, that by virtue of succession to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, it was a Party, with effect from 1 January 1993, to the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-02-16

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997 [fr

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force; Tratado Sobre la no Proliferacion de las Armas Nucleares. Notificacion de la Entrada en Vigor

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1970-04-22

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [Spanish] En sus cartas dirigidas al Director General con fecha 5, 6 y 20 de marzo de 1970, respectivamente, el Reino Unido de Gran Bretana e Irlanda del Norte, los Estados Unidos de America y la Union de Republicas Socialistas Sovieticas, designados Gobiernos depositarios en el parrafo 2 del Articulo IX del Tratado sobre la no proliferacion de las armas nucleares, han comunicado al Organismo que dicho Tratado entro en vigor el 5 de marzo de 1970.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [fr

Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-03-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 2 December 1993 and signed in Vienna on 6 December 1993 and in Riga on 21 December 1993

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-10-29

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2004-08-18

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cuba and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 3 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Cuba written notification that Cuba's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

On the non-proliferation framework of Japan's peaceful nuclear utilization program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kano, Takashi

1996-01-01

The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the NPT) convened in New York, from April 17 to May 12, 1995 and decided that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely, after reviewing the operation and affirming some aspects of the NPT, while emphasizing the ''Decision on Strengthening the Review Process'' for the NPT and the ''Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,'' also adopted by the Conference. In parallel, Japan made its basic non-proliferation policy clear in the ''Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy'' which was decided by the Atomic Energy Commission (chaired by Mikio Oomi, then Minister of the Science and Technology Agency of Japan) in June 1994. The Long-Term Program discusses various problems facing post-Cold-War international society and describes Japan's policy for establishing international confidence concerning non-proliferation. This paper summarizes Japan's non-proliferation policy as articulated in the Long-Term Program, and describes some results of an analysis comparing the Long-Term Program with the resolutions on the international non-proliferation frameworks adopted by the NPT conference

Non-proliferation and the control of atomic energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, B.

1977-01-01

The non-proliferation problem has never ceased to haunt and to influence those responsible for the development of atomic energy. During and after the Second World War, Anglo-American co-operation was reflected in restrictions on the exchange of enrichment and reprocessing know-how. Between 1945 and 1955, the Anglo-Saxon powers continued with the policy of secrecy and uranium monopoly decided on in 1943 at the Quebec summit conference. Starting in 1955, the failure of this policy led - at the suggestion of the United States of America - to a freer flow of information and to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with its safeguards, which permitted widespread application of the policy of technical assistance subject to controls and widespread commerce in research and power reactors - mainly fuelled with enriched uranium and manufactured in the USA. There followed periods characterized by general legal blocks, with two unilateral renunciation treaties - the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, covering non-underground tests, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1968, covering nuclear explosive devices and the entire fuel cycle. The Indian atomic explosion and the acceleration of nuclear programmes owing to the oil crisis prompted - in 1974 - efforts by supplier countries to limit the transfer of sensitive technology and the possession of plants capable of producing substances which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; the USA has even proposed the curtailment of plutonium extraction and of breeder construction, although these are considered by many countries to be essential to the independence of their energy development programmes. This policy of reserving the sensitive stages of the fuel cycles to a few advanced countries and the questioning of existing nuclear agreements have created, in the relations between supplier and recipient countries, a regrettable intensification of the distrust which must be dispelled

The emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Potter, W.C.

1990-01-01

The number of states capable of exporting nuclear material, technology, equipment, and services is large and growing. Once confined primarily to states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the list of actual and potential nuclear suppliers now includes many countries that do not subscribe to the NPT or to other international nuclear export control agreements. Although international control accords---such as the Nuclear Exporters' (Zangger) Committee and the London Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines---do not prohibit the export of sensitive nuclear materials and equipment, they do reduce the risks of proliferation by imposing international safeguards as a condition for export. The purpose of this book---the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on the emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation---is to remedy, at least in part, this data deficiency

Approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Subrahmanyam, K.

1981-01-01

The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-10-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria [es

Agreement of 30 September 1993 between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-09-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 September 1993 and signed in Vienna on 30 September 1993. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 5 May 1994

Agreement of 22 September 1994 between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-10-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 22 September 1994

Agreement of 18 November 1993 between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-02-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 February 1975 and signed in Vienna on 31 October 1990 and in Nuku'Alofa on 18 November 1993

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria

Communication received from the Resident Representatives of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to the Agency concerning multilateral cooperation on energy security in support of Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The Director General has received a letter dated 13 September 2007 from the Resident Representatives of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, attaching a declaration concerning multilateral cooperation on energy security in support of Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The letter and, as requested therein, the declaration, are herewith circulated for information

Historical survey of nonproliferation policies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, B.

1977-01-01

This paper briefly surveys the successive nonproliferation policies and their influence on international commerce and the reaction of the countries where they were applied: the war policy, secrecy policy, liberal policy, safeguarded assistance policy, nonproliferation treaty policy, suppliers' policy, French policy, and the no weapon-usable material policy. It is emphasized that any new solution of the problem must not appear to delay or limit in any way a nation's access to nuclear energy, nor to make any countries dependent on others to meet their energy requirements. Therefore, in the choice of a future policy, political considerations are more important than technical or legal ones. The greatest catalyst of proliferation is the spread of national autarchic programs, and these can only be avoided within a general climate of international trust. The escalation of mistrust between the countries possessing the technological information and those desiring it must be dispelled. Such a policy will have to be clear and stable

Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Amendment of Article 17

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the amendment to the Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The amendment was approved by the Board of Governors in June 1999, and entered into force on 10 September 1999

Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna

How we think about peace and security. The ABCs of initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation education

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toki, Masako; Potter, William C.

2005-01-01

Education and training are among the most important but underutilized tools for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. Although few national governments or international organizations have invested significantly in such training programs, there is a growing recognition among States of the need to rectify this situation. This positive development is reflected in the broad support for recommendations of a UN study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and in related initiatives within the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the forthcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference, it is useful to take stock of the implementation of the UN study's recommendations. In particular, it is important to observe the progress that has been made within the context of the NPT review process, as well as the obstacles that must be overcome if the full potential for disarmament and non-proliferation education is to be realized. Resources on disarmament and non-proliferation education are increasingly available on the Internet. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs has launched new features on its web site that include links to academic institutes, governmental centers, NGOs and other bodies engaged in educational efforts. As part of its mission to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and raising global public awareness on WMD issues, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) has developed a series of tutorials for non-proliferation and disarmament education. Among these tutorials, the NPT Tutorial has been designed to educate and provide useful material about the treaty through interactive text and enriched multimedia segments, including timelines, maps, and numerous links to relevant resources. Among other resources are teaching guides developed by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies through its Critical Issues Forum (CIF). More

Protocol between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)1 is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 9 April 2003

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: A long-term perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haeckel, E.

1990-01-01

International nuclear policy has been determined for a long time by the exigencies of the status quo. The non-proliferation regime draws its legitimacy from the continuation of extant patterns of power in world politics. Such a static policy cannot succeed forever. Overcoming the threat of nuclear proliferation will require innovative strategy that reaches beyond the status quo. It calls for structural change in the international system to be accomodated instead of resisted. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to hold, nuclear weapon states will finally have to forgo their privileged status. This cannot, however, be accomplished simply through the abolition or renunciation of nuclear weapons since nuclear weapons themselves continue to be instrumental for war prevention and international stability. Rather, what is needed is a new approach to the management of the nuclear world system under international responsibility. Nonproliferation and disarmament objectives together call for a concept of global security in which multilateral institutions assume an increasingly important role of nuclear diplomacy. (orig.) [de

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Withdrawal Clause

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boutherin, Gregory

2008-01-01

Like any international agreement, the NPT includes a withdrawal clause. The North Korean withdrawal, which was announced in 1993 and became effective in 2003, shows how difficult it is to preserve this possibility, while guaranteeing compliance with signed agreements. To achieve this target, two conditions are required: first, enhancing the means by which the reasons for withdrawals can be made clear and second, to allow the Security Council to draw all the consequences of withdrawals that could imply that a treaty has been violated

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article 111(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 25(a) thereof, on 21 February 1977 [es

The non-proliferation regime, vertical proliferation and the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, W.

1988-12-01

The disarmament orientation of the NPT, which stands beside the central aim of avoiding horizontal proliferation, raises a question: Does a compatibility exist between the non-proliferation policy of the Federal Republic and its security policy, which has its basic pillar in the nuclear deterrence strategy? Critics of this deterrence policy therefore, hinting to the disarmament determination of the NPT, demand that the Federal Republic should exercise its influence for the conclusion of a 'Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty' (CTBT), the establishment of a 'Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones' (NWFZ) in Europe, a 'No First Use'-Treaty (NFU) and finally the abolishment of all atomic weapons ('Zero Solution'). According to them such disarmament 'remedies' can reestablish or assure the waning or damaged international consensus for horizontal non-proliferation. This is a contribution for the establishment of a stable world order and will smooth the way for a prolongation of the NPT in the year 1995. An analysis of the history and the structure of interests shows that the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is deeply rooted in the NPT and that a prolongation of the treaty and its own membership is a substantial object of the foreign and security policy. Consequently the Federal Republic has to face the demands for an intensification of 'anti-nuclear measures' and has to examine their acceptability and their usefulness with respect to non-proliferation. The structure of the problem encloses the following aspects: The security conception of the Federal Republic with its military-strategic essence; the provisions in article VI NPT for negotiations with the object of a world free of atomic weapons; the derived disarmament 'remedies' for strengthening the consensus for horizontal non-proliferation and, finally, the real interface between horizontal and vertical proliferation. (orig./DG) [de

Nuclear energy and non-proliferation in Latin America: the constitution of Tlatelolco system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Armanet, P.

1982-01-01

The nuclear energy as alternative energy resource and its military use are analysed. Then the main characteristics of the Tratelolco treaty and non-proliferation in Latin America are discussed. Finally the importance of the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America is shown. (A.B.T.) [pt

The comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty eight years after the opening of the treaty for signature: what is the situation?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Le Goff, G.; Rousseau, D.

2004-01-01

The International community has just celebrated the eight anniversary of the opening for signature, on 24 September 1996, of the Comprehensive Nuclear -test-Ban Treaty (C.T.B.T.). This event provides an opportunity to review briefly the current situation with regard to the Treaty and the international organisation responsible for preparing the various steps necessary for its implementation. The purpose of this paper is not to give once again a detailed description of the history of the Treaty, the issues at stake and its prospects. It is simply recalled that the major undertaking by States Parties to the Treaty is not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. It is also useful to note that the Treaty provides for a verification regime consisting of the following four elements: creation of a permanent International Monitoring system; consultation and clarification procedures to be followed by states in the event of a suspicious occurrence; on-site inspections, carried out at the request of a State Party; confidence-building measures. On the eve of important deadlines particularly during 2005 for disarmament and nonproliferation, it was useful to give a brief factual picture of the current Treaty situation and above all of the results obtained to date by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. (N.C.)

The comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations: a view from Geneva

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Weston, Michael.

1995-01-01

The United Kingdom- one of the alliance's three nuclear powers is fully and actively involved in the search for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which would play an important role in both non-proliferation and disarmament objectives. This article considers how the negotiations are proceeding and assesses the prospects in a number of key areas. (author)

Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 5 June 2012. It was signed on 6 June 2012 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 4 April 2013, the date on which the Agency received from Bosnia and Herzegovina written notification that Bosnia and Herzegovina's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-10-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Additional Protocol entered into force on 28 June 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Armenia written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 6 July 2000

The Text of the Agreement between Iceland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Iceland to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement between Iceland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Iceland to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

The Text of the Agreement of 6 September 1976 between The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1978-10-15

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

The Text of the Agreement of 6 September 1976 between The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-10-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2010. It was signed on 7 October 2011 in Banjul, The Gambia, and on 18 October 2011 in Vienna, Austria

Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995

Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-05-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994.

Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995.

Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-05-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994

Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoshisaki, M.B.

1993-01-01

The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leek, K.M.

2006-01-01

Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat of proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.

Agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 21 September 2000. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 August 2002. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 20 March 2001. It was signed on 11 June 2002 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 16 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Niger written notification that Niger's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [fr

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 3 May 2005 in New York. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of the Marshall Islands and the Agency

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [ru

Protocol Additional to the agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 January 2006, the date on which the Agency received from Ukraine written notification that Ukraine's constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-02-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-02-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

Verification arrangements for the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bragin, V.

2001-01-01

Since the mid-1950's, an agreement to terminate the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons has been on the agenda. On December 16, 1993, the UNGA adopted Resolution A/RES/48/75/L which recommends ''the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices''. The proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) is still one of the most important items on the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. Successful achievement of the FMCT would be an important step towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. (author)

Protocol between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 June 1999, signed in Vienna on 11 June 1999, and entered into force on 7 July 2000

Protocol between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-07-28

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 June 1999, signed in Vienna on 11 June 1999, and entered into force on 7 July 2000.

An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

2007-06-01

The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

2007-06-15

The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Additional Protocol), the Additional Protocol, which had been applied provisionally from 17 February 2010, entered into force on 10 October 2012, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Iraq that Iraq's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 19 July 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 July 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Afghanistan and the Agency

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Iceland and the Agency, i.e., on 12 September 2003

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-08-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-08-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

Agreement of 20 April 1995 between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-06-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 20 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 April 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

Agreement of 20 April 1995 between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-06-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 20 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 April 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2003-12-23

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003.

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2003-12-23

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Iceland and the Agency, i.e., on 12 September 2003.

Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Streeper, Charles Blamires

2009-01-01

In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMD related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the

Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992, It was signed on 28 July 1992 in Vienna and on 26 August 1992 in Geneva. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Canada written notification that Canada's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 8 September 2000

Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-05-01

The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1991 and signed in Vienna on 30 January 1992. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 10 April 1992 [fr

Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-05-01

The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1991 and signed in Vienna on 30 January 1992. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 10 April 1992 [es

Agreement of 30 January 1992 between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-05-01

The text of the Agreement between the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1991 and signed in Vienna on 30 January 1992. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 10 April 1992

Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Morocco to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neubert, M.

1992-01-01

The following motion was put before the United Kingdom House of Commons on 3rd February 1992 and agreed; that this House, recognising the potential dangers of the rapidly changing world order, welcomes the recent proposals for substantial reductions in nuclear weaponry, the growing support for the non-proliferation treaty and progress in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning the dismantling of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities; urges the Government to play their full part in helping the relevant authorities in the Commonwealth of Independent States to dismantle their nuclear devices, to safeguard their nuclear components and to discourage the proliferation of nuclear expertise; and believes it is of the first importance that Britain retains an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent as security in a world where there remain many sources of instability. The record of arguments for and against the motion in the debate is presented. (author)

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-11-25

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

Agreement of 7 May 1996 between the Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-06-01

The text of the Agreement (and protocol thereof) between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Basseterre on 7 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

Agreement of 7 May 1996 between the Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-06-01

The text of the Agreement (and protocol thereof) between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Basseterre on 7 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

Current nuclear non-proliferation policies in the world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kurosawa, Mitsuru

1997-01-01

Although a global nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has disappeared, many challenges to nuclear non-proliferation have emerged. Sources of concern, like a nuclear weapon program by Iraq and suspicions of North Korea have caused the adoption of a variety of political and technical measures in order to meet these challenges in the post-Cold War era. This paper describes the following ten policies for non-proliferation: 1) Strengthening the NPT; 2) Nuclear reduction; 3) CTBT and cut-off treaty; 4) Establishment of NWFZs; 5) Counterproliferation; 6) Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards; 7) Control and disposal of nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons; 8) Export control; 9) Registration of plutonium; and 10) Actions against nuclear smuggling. The first four measures can be said to be mainly political policies, the fifth measure (counterproliferation), can be categorized as basically a military policy, and the last five measures can be said to be technical. (J.P.N.)

Romania non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biro, Lucian; Grama, Viviana

2001-01-01

Full text: Non-proliferation concept in Romania is based on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was ratified in 1970. According to the Article III of the Treaty, Romania ratified in 1972, the Agreement between Romania and IAEA for the application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 2000 Romania ratified the Additional Protocol to contribute through increased transparency, to confidence that no undeclared nuclear activities are concealed within the declared programme or make use of elements of that programme. Under the Additional Protocol Romania understands to increase the transparency of its nuclear activities lengthways fuel cycle. Romania has a strong legal framework to control nuclear material and nuclear activities. The Law 111/1996, republished is the Law on the safe deployment of nuclear activities. CNCAN issued National Regulations for Safeguards and Physical Protection. Prospecting for uranium in Romania was initiated in 1950. Between 1962 and 1978 all the uranium ore production was stockpiled at the mine sites. In 1978 the Feldioara Powder Plant was commissioned, since then both ore stockpiles and ore exploited have been processed to uranium chemical concentrates. The Powder Plant Feldioara was conceived and built following the necessity of milling and processing the uranium ore to UO 2 , in concordance with the national nuclear programme in order to produce electric energy from nuclear fuel. The Nuclear Fuel Plant has capability to manufacture CANDU-6 nuclear fuel. Nuclear Fuel Plant consists of two Production areas, the Quality Assurance and Engineering Departments. There are two Production Departments: Pelleting area including granulation, pressing, sintering, pellet grinding, uranium recycling and Assembling area including components fabrication, beryllium coating, brazing, graphite coating, fuel element and bundle assembly welding. Romania's Strategy for Energy Sector

Agreement between the State of Qatar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the State of Qatar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 24 September 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 19 January 2009. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 21 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the State of Qatar written notification that Qatar's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 1999. It was signed on 28 June 2001 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 5 September 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Oman written notification that Oman's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force the same date

Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Safeguards Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Abu Dhabi on 15 December 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 9 October 2003, the date upon which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Agreement between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 11 September 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 19 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 10 May 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Kingdom of Bahrain written notification that Bahrain's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dassen, L. van

1998-03-01

Finland''s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

1998-03-01

Finland``s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

1999-01-01

Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

The text of the amended Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the amended Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 28 November 2002. It was signed on 24 April 2003 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 12 July 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Malta written notification that Malta's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-12-24

The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia`s statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [fr

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Mali and the Agency, i.e. on 12 September 2002

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and Its Relevance for the Global Security

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Dáša ADAŠKOVÁ

2013-06-01

Full Text Available The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT is one of important international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measures. One of its pillars is the verification mechanism that has been built as an international system of nuclear testing detection to enable the control of observance of the obligations anchored in the CTBT. Despite the great relevance to the global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, the CTBT is still not in force. The main aim of the article is to summarize the importance of the CTBT and its entry into force not only from the international relations perspective but also from the perspective of the technical implementation of the monitoring system.

Policy of Kyrgyz Republic in the field of weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duisheeva, Zh.Z.

2010-01-01

Full text: Kyrgyz Republic is principle and sequential member of accepting effective international measures, directed to active prevention to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, its components and means of delivery. Commitment to prevention policy and WMD nonproliferation is one of basic principles of foreign and domestic policy of Kyrgyz Republic. The real measure against WMD proliferation and relating to its production technologies of military, special and dual use is international export control based on national systems of export control including smoothly running national system of account for, control and physical protection of arm materials. Currently juridical basis of export control system in Kyrgyz Republic is actively developing. In 2003 the Law of Kyrgyz Republic On export control, based on principles and norms of international law in the field of export control was adopted. The Law On export control determines basic principles of state policy, legal activity basis of state management and participants of foreign-economic activity in the field of export control, as well as defines their rights, obligations and responsibilities in this field. Also in the law, the requirements of international treaties realization in the field of WMD nonproliferation and means of their delivery, signed by Kyrgyzstan, is defined as one of national systems goals of export control. In article 13, Law On export control it is defined that international cooperation in the field of export control by means of efforts coordination and cooperation with foreign states on prevention of WMD nonproliferation, means of their delivery and technologies on their creation; participation in international regimes of export control and international forums, as well as carrying out negotiations, consultations with foreign states, bilateral information exchange and realization of joint programs and other events in the field of export control on bilateral and multilateral basis. By

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2005-03-11

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones: Pursuing security, region by region. Conference of States Parties and Signatories of treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2005-01-01

The development of nuclear-weapon-free zones, over the past four decades, is a testament to what nations can do, region by region, to achieve common security objectives. In fact, when considering the history of nuclear non-proliferation efforts, it might be said that here in Mexico City is w here it all began . The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first multilateral treaty to establish a region free of nuclear weapons and a requirement for comprehensive IAEA safeguards for its parties - and clearly gave impetus to the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear-weapon-free zones provide tangible security benefits. They help to reassure the larger international community of the peaceful nuclear intentions of countries in these regions. They provide their members with security assurances against the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons by a nuclear-weapon State. They include control mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance in a regional setting. And in all cases, they prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. An important benefit of these zones is that they open a forum for expanded regional dialogue on issues of security. Because the causes of insecurity vary from region to region, security solutions do not come in a 'one-size-fits-all' package. It is for this reason that regional dialogues, as we see in the nuclear-weapon-free zones, are so beneficial. It is clear that such treaties, and such security dialogues, would be invaluable in other areas of the world, such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. Since the end of the Cold War, the international security landscape has undergone dramatic changes. For example, the rise in terrorism, the discovery of clandestine nuclear programmes, and the emergence of covert nuclear procurement networks have heightened our awareness of vulnerabilities in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This statement focuses on two issues

Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 12 September 1995. It was signed on 27 September 1995 in Vienna and 14 June 1996 in Chisinau. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 May 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Moldova written notification that Moldova's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 22 March 2013, upon signature by the representatives of the Denmark and the Agency.

Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001

Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2001-05-04

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001.

The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 21 April 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Kingdom of Morocco written notification that Morocco's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 13 June 2007. It was signed on 26 May 2008 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Montenegro written notification that Montenegro's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2003-03-12

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 29 July 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2003, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Cyprus written notification that Cyprus' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 29 July 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2003, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Cyprus written notification that Cyprus' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 5 July 2000. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Azerbaijan written notification that Azerbaijan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 29 November 2000

Agreement Between the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 22 February 1989. It was signed in Vienna on 22 November 1991. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on the date upon which the Agency received from Laos written notification that Laos' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 5 April 2001. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 16 June 2005. 2. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 January 2009, the date upon which the Agency received from Saudi Arabia written notification that Saudi Arabia's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 28 September 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from the Czech Republic written notification that the Czech Republic's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 1 July 2002

Nuclear power and the non-proliferation issue

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-12-01

This leaflet, issued by the British Nuclear Forum on behalf of the industry, seeks first to place the problem of reconciling the need for nuclear power with its possible weapon uses in a historical perspective. Secondly, it describes the technical and political measures which are now taken, and others which could be introduced in order to ensure that nuclear power, which offers the cheapest and safest large-scale energy source for the future, can be made available without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Headings are: introduction; the early years; the IAEA; uranium enrichment; plutonium; secrecy has failed; the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the London Suppliers Group; the situation today; the British position; conclusions. (U.K.)

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 13 December 2005. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Union of the Comoros written notification that Comoros' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-06-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-06-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II.

Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2002-03-28

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001.

Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001

The text of the agreement of 29 February 1988 between Nigeria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-10-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 29 February 1988 and of the Protocol thereto, between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Nigeria to accept safeguards on all sources or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement and the Protocol entered into force on 29 February 1988

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Additional Protocol, which was applied provisionally from 12 June 1998, entered into force on 11 June 2004, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Ghana that Ghana's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. The text of the Additional Protocol is reproduced in document INFCIRC/226/Add.1

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional, the Protocol entered into force on 13 October 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Seychelles written notification that the Republic of Seychelles's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 22 November 2007. It was signed on 23 June 2010 in Lisbon, Portugal, and on 8 July 2010 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Mozambique written notification that Mozambique's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Ghana to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 13 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of South Africa and the Agency, i.e. on 13 September 2002

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [fr

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Spanish Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Chinese Edition)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

Nuclear: agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Slovak Republic for co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (with annexes). Treaty series 1996/30

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

Canada and the Slovak Republic are both non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and as such have undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that each Party has concluded an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty

Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2005-03-07

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2005-02-23

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-03-01

The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency`s Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one.

Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-03-01

The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

Statement to the Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Vienna, 3 September 2003

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2003-01-01

Full text: The Third Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is being held at a time of major challenges to the nuclear arms control and disarmament regime. A verified, permanent, global ban on all types of nuclear explosive tests has been a key item on the international security agenda for nearly half a century. More than 2,000 nuclear explosive detonations have taken place since 1945, with the most recent ones in 1998. The CTBT has been characterized as the longest sought, hardest fought prize in the history of arms control. The Treaty, when implemented, will prohibit all nuclear explosions, in all environments, for all time. It will curb the development and testing of new, more advanced and more dangerous nuclear weapons, and will limit the possibilities for further nuclear proliferation. The Treaty will lead to the establishment of a comprehensive International Monitoring System to provide independent, impartial verification of compliance. The CTBT, along with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and a future Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices (FMCT), forms an essential element of a network of negotiated, global treaties that will strengthen international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament leading in time hopefully to a world without nuclear weapons. In the meantime, with the early entry into force of the CTBT, it would indeed be a significant achievement if this new century were to remain free of any nuclear test explosions. In this context, I encourage all signatory States to ratify the CTBT, and all those States that have yet to sign to do so and to ratify the Treaty, as soon as possible - so that another crucial pillar can be raised to support the edifice of global nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament norms. (IAEA)

Non-proliferation and advances in nuclear science

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iyengar, P.K.

1995-01-01

So far, the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has concentrated on safeguard regimes based on technologies relating to the production of uranium and plutonium in nuclear reactors, and on their potential diversion for use in nuclear weapons. As nuclear science advances, however, nuclear technology both peaceful and for weapons will change, and for the NPT to remain relevant, it must reflect these changes. At this juncture, when the NPT is coming up for review in a year's time, it is important for physicists to take a fresh look at recent advances in nuclear science, and inform the policy-makers and the public at large about their potential for impacting nuclear technology in the future. In this article a few such advances are highlighted and their implications for the NPT are considered. (author). 4 refs

The world's non-proliferation regime in time

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bunn, George

2005-01-01

The idea for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries was supported unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 1961. The NPT permits the P-5 to have nuclear weapons. All other NPT signatories are 'non-nuclear-weapon States' who are prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons. To gain their signatures, the NPT promises assistance to them in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and negotiations toward nuclear disarmament. Besides the P-5, the treaty now has 184 countries that have promised not to have nuclear weapons and that have agreed to accept inspections by the IAEA to verify that they are carrying out their promises. However, India, Pakistan, and Israel refused to join the treaty, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) withdrew from it. Of these four countries, only India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons. Israel and North Korea are assumed to have them. The non-proliferation regime today includes much more than the NPT. The IAEA standards for inspection were the next most important element. The IAEA inspection requirements negotiated in the early 1970s were shown to be inadequate by Iraq's success in hiding its nuclear-weapon efforts before and during the Gulf War of 1991. The Additional Protocol of 1997 is slowly replacing these requirements, but, as of December 2004, was in effect in only 62 NPT member countries. The regime includes the agreements creating nuclear-weapon free zones in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Mongolia. The countries that formed these zones are also members of the NPT. The regime includes suggestions for standards and financial assistance plus requirements for physical protection of nuclear material from theft by terrorists or others. These efforts range from the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to the technical assistance provided by the IAEA and some countries, to the financial assistance offered by the G-8 and some other IAEA

Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna [es

Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

The text of the Protocol between the Republic of the Fiji Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Fiji and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed on 7 July 2006 in Sydney and 14 July 2006 in Vienna

University-level Non-proliferation and Safeguards Education and Human Capital Development Activities at Brookhaven National Laboratory

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bachner K. M.; Pepper, S.; Gomera, J.; Einwechter, M.; Toler, L. T.

2016-07-24

BNL has offered Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century,? referred to as NNSS, every year since 2009 for graduate students in technical and policy fields related to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. The course focuses on relevant policy issues, in addition to technical components, and is part of a larger NGSI short course initiative that includes separate courses that are delivered at three other national laboratories and NNSA headquarters. [SCHOLZ and ROSENTHAL] The course includes lectures from esteemed nonproliferation experts, tours of various BNL facilities and laboratories, and in-field and table-top exercises on both technical and policy subjects. Topics include the history of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other relevant treaties, the history of and advances in international nuclear safeguards, current relevant political situations in countries such as Iran, Iraq, and the Democratic Peoples? Republic of Korea (DPRK), nuclear science and technology, instrumentation and techniques used for verification activities, and associated research and development. The students conduct a mock Design Information Verification (DIV) at BNL?s decommissioned Medical Research Reactor. The capstone of the course includes a series of student presentations in which students act as policy advisors and provide recommendations in response to scenarios involving a current nonproliferation related event that are prepared by the course organizers. ?The course is open to domestic and foreign students, and caters to students in, entering, or recently having completed graduate school. Interested students must complete an application and provide a resume and a statement describing their interest in the course. Eighteen to 22 students attend annually; 165 students have completed the course to date. A stipend helps to defray students? travel and subsistence expenses. In 2015, the course was shortened from three weeks to

Positive steps toward non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Greenhalgh, G.

1979-08-30

Russel W. Fox and Mason Willrich in their paper, International Custody of Plutonium Stocks: A First Step Toward an International Regime for Sensitive Nuclear Energy Activities, advocate placing excess plutonium in an international custodial facility; critical criteria governing releases are outlined so that, on one hand the owners can have high confidence that their plutonium will be returned promptly, under appropriate circumstances, and on the other hand, all the other participating and concerned countries can have confidence in the assurance that plutonium will be released only for immediate use in a defined and approved civil purpose. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the 1978 issue of its Year Book, recognizes a move towards a more positive approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation. It is noted that the non-proliferation strategies of the main supply countries have largely concentrated on a two-pronged approach of technology denials with tightening of safeguards. But already, enrichment, reprocessing, and breeder reactor programs extend far beyond the five nuclear weapon states. History testifies to the limitations of a policy of technical denials. SIPRI recognizes that another way to dissuade non-nuclear weapon states from creating their own enrichment or reprocessing plants would be to establish an open market for these services, a market characterized by diversity and competition. So far, there has been no case where a country has developed nuclear explosives by diverting material from a civil power station. Development of nuclear weapons by various countries is briefly noted and areas where strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is needed are noted. (MCW)

A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01

With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

Act of 20 July 1978 establishing provisions enabling the International Atomic Energy Agency to undertake inspections and verifications on Belgian territory, in implementation of the International Agreement of 5 April 1973 made in application of 1 and 4 paragraphs of Article III of the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Belgium concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA which enables the latter to verify the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by Belgium in accordance with the NPT, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT enter into such agreements. (NEA) [fr

Nonproliferation Education at the University of Washington

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jones, Chris D.; Leek, K.M.

2006-01-01

decades ago, the UW has not supported hard science faculty positions that require knowledge of the theoretical and practical dimensions of the nonproliferation of nuclear technologies. Among U.S. National laboratories, PNNL has special strengths in technologies critical to the implementation of arms control treaties and to the detection of activities associated with the production, deployment, and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). PNNL plays a central role in the management of US-Russian programs for protection of fissile materials. In 2000, the PNWCGS initiated outreach to universities and NGOs. The Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security and the Jackson School have sought to bring PNNL expertise to the UW campus and the PNWCGS currently funds several IGRSS course instructors. The PNWCGS has arranged for Russian scientists to teach an experimental course in the IGRSS curriculum. In partnership with the Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security, IGRSS is presently seeking to engage scholars and scientists from other countries in joint teaching programs with the UW. IGRSS permits students to combine their disciplinary and professional specialties with the interdisciplinary and international IGRSS curriculum and its specialized courses on nonproliferation and WMD threats. IGRSS now offers three core courses and several occasional courses on special topics related to WMD issues. The core courses will serve as the requirements for a planned Graduate Certificate and Undergraduate Minor. The three core courses discussed are: (1) Arms control and international law; (2) Weapons of mass destruction; and (3) Arms control simulation.

The new generation of nuclear submarines: in violation of the non proliferation treaty - Booklet No. 3, June 2000

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-06-01

The Observatory of French nuclear weapons looks forwards to the elimination of nuclear weapons in conformity with the aims of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. The object of this booklet of the Observatory of French nuclear weapons about the program of new generation missile-launching nuclear submarines is to show the amplitude of this program that is going to mobilize considerable industrial resources and energies to the detriment of other security alternatives

The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Texto Del Acuerdo Concertado Entre El Iran Y El Organismo Para La Aplicacion De Salvaguardias En Relacion Con El Tratado Sobre La No Proliferacion De Las Armas Nucleares

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-12-17

The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [Spanish] Para informacion de todos los Estados Miembros, en el presente documento se trans cribe el texto del Acuerdo concertado entre el Iran y el Organismo para la aplicacion de salvaguardias en relacion con el Tratado sobre la no proliferacion de las armas nucle ares.

Assessment of Impact of Monoenergetic Photon Sources on Prioritized Nonproliferation Applications: Simulation Study Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Geddes, Cameron [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Ludewigt, Bernhard [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Valentine, John [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Quiter, Brian [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Descalle, Marie-Anne [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Warren, Glen [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kinlaw, Matt [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Thompson, Scott [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Chichester, David [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Miller, Cameron [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Pozzi, Sara [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)

2016-12-30

Near-monoenergetic photon sources (MPSs) have the potential to improve sensitivity at greatly reduced dose in existing applications and enable new capabilities in other applications. MPS advantages include the ability to select energy, energy spread, flux, and pulse structures to deliver only the photons needed for the application, while suppressing extraneous dose and background. Some MPSs also offer narrow divergence photon beams which can target dose and/or mitigate scattering contributions to image contrast degradation. Current broad-band, bremsstrahlung photon sources (e.g., linacs and betatrons) deliver unnecessary dose that in some cases also interferes with the signature to be detected and/or restricts operations, and must be collimated (reducing flux) to generate narrow divergence beams. While MPSs can in principle resolve these issues, they are technically challenging to produce. Candidate MPS technologies for nonproliferation applications are now being developed, each of which have different properties (e.g. broad divergence vs. narrow). Within each technology, source parameters trade off against one another (e.g. flux vs. energy spread), representing a large operation space. To guide development, requirements for each application of interest must be defined and simulations conducted to define MPS parameters that deliver benefit relative to current systems. The present project conducted a broad assessment of potential nonproliferation applications where MPSs may provide new capabilities or significant performance enhancement (reported separately), which led to prioritization of several applications for detailed analysis. The applications prioritized were: cargo screening and interdiction of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), detection of hidden SNM, treaty/dismantlement verification, and spent fuel dry storage cask content verification. High resolution imaging for stockpile stewardship was considered as a sub-area of the treaty topic, as it is also of

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-12-01

The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations. While any final assessment of such measures and alternatives would have to examine the circumstances particular to each nation, it is hoped that the more generic assessments conducted here will be useful in suggesting guidelines for developing an improved nonproliferation regime which also helps to meet nuclear-energy needs. One chapter outlines the existing nonproliferation regime, including the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bilateral and multilateral requirements for agreements of cooperation and transfers of technology, and existing provisons for sanctions for violation of nonproliferation commitments. The chapter then proceeds to an assessment of various alternatives for providing assurance of fuel supply in light of this current regime. Another chapter examines a set of technical and institutional measures and alternatives for various components of once-through and closed fuel cycles. The components of the once-through fuel cycle assessed are enrichment services and spent-fuel management; the components of closed fuel cycles assessed are reprocessing and plutonium management and fast-breeder reactor (FBR) deployment

The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, M.

2016-01-01

The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider ''The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.'' We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-roliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what and how much can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-for-attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dreicer, M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2016-08-30

The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider “The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.” We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-­proliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what—and how much—can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-­for-­attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Nuclear disarmament and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

1999-01-01

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference reaffirmed 'the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control' and endorsed 'universal application of safeguards once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved'. Hence strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and incremental broadening of its coverage towards the universal application of international safeguards in all States is a high priority albeit for the medium to long term. A tentative attempt is made in this paper to anticipate how the elements of verification under the NPT, FMCT and other conventions and arrangements related to nuclear non-proliferation will evolve against the background of the disarmament process, with the goal of achieving at some future stage an ultimate convergence of verification regimes under a complete nuclear disarmament. We think, however, that most of the new initiatives in the area of disarmament/non-proliferation should be realised during the current disarmament phase. We do not wish our model to be perceived as a rigid time-bound scheme. New initiatives should be implemented in parallel and as soon as practicable. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and should not be taken to represent Australian Government policy. (author)

Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nilsson, A.

1999-01-01

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

78 FR 9768 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-02-11

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8184] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice...

Who's bound by the former Soviet Union's arms control treaties?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rhinelander, J.B.; Bunn, G.

1991-01-01

A crucial issue raised by the disintegration of the Soviet central government is what happens to Soviet arms control obligations. As the Soviet government transforms or collapses in the wake of the failed August coup, which of the resulting entities will be bound by the treaties the Soviet Union entered into? Under international law, the obligations of a state are not affected by even such dramatic changes in government. No one yet knows, however, what the end result of the ongoing devolution of power in the erstwhile Soviet Union will be. As illustrations of what could happen to Soviet arms control obligations - not predictions of the future - the authors pose two alternative scenarios. In the first, they assume that most of the current 12 republics, including all of the big four where substantial nuclear forces and the largest conventional forces are located (Russia, Ukraine, Khazakhstan, and Belarus), ultimately form a loose confederation with sufficient central authority to be called a nation-state and to carry out the essence of Soviet obligations under major arms control treaties. In the second, they assume that the union disintegrates further, with these four key republics seceding entirely and recognizing one another as independent states - a step which is apparently one of the US criteria for granting its own recognition. In this scenario, the Russian republic maintains its basic territory and replaces the central government as the power center for military and foreign affairs. In each of these cases, they will describe the general issues affecting the Soviet Union's international obligations, and consider specifically the two most important arms control agreements now in force - the multilateral nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the bilateral Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, R.J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Harry, R J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

Carter faces new dilemmas over non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickson, D.

1979-01-01

Questions underlying the current domestic debate as to whether the US should revise its attitude towards the relationship between the spread of nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are considered. Problems arising from the provisional conclusions of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, set up at President Carter's suggestion in 1977, are evaluated. The thorny question of how to deal with the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for review in 1980 is discussed. Finally there is the issue, for which it is concluded nobody pretends to have all the answers, of whether a sufficient consensus - involving both developed and developing countries as partners in decision-making - can be forged to develop and apply an effective control regime, or whether increasing competition between both producers and consumers of nuclear power will be such as to limit the possibilities for multilateral action, shifting the focus back to bilateral actions. (UK)

Verification lessons learned and CTBT's contribution to disarmament and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zerbo, L.

2013-01-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all nuclear tests for any purposes. The CTBT is essential for peace and security; it is a core element of the nonproliferation regime. It limits the ability of countries to develop advanced nuclear weapons technology. It is enforced through the extensive International Monitoring System designed to detect and deter nuclear explosions in atmosphere, underwater and underground. In the process of monitoring and detecting a potential nuclear test - the system registers over 30,000 events a year - the vast majority of them are earthquakes. The civil and scientific applications of the CTBT data can be used to gain better understanding of the earth, of climate change, of volcanic ash clouds, of the tsunamis, of the movements of whales and much more. The CTBT sets a new legal and verification standard for nuclear weapons. It is a non-discriminatory Treaty with the same rights and obligations for all Member States. Its verification regime is equally nondiscriminatory and provides equal access for all Member States to CTBTO data. We are driving to achieve 160 ratifications by the end of the year, and this will provide additional momentum towards entry into force (EIF) and universality. (A.C.)

Treaty implementation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dunn, L.A.

1990-01-01

This paper touches on three aspects of the relationship between intelligence and treaty implementation, a two-way association. First the author discusses the role of intelligence as a basis for compliance monitoring and treaty verification. Second the authors discusses payoffs of intelligence gathering and the intelligence process of treaty implementation, in particular on-site inspection. Third, the author goes in another direction and discusses some of the tensions between the intelligence gathering and treaty-implementation processes, especially with regard to extensive use of on-site inspection, such as we are likely to see in monitoring compliance of future arms control treaties

78 FR 9769 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-02-11

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8182] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on Chinese and Iranian Foreign Persons AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The U.S. Government...

Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

Science.gov (United States)

Pregenzer, Arian

2014-01-01

Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters worldwide provide significant benefits to global public health. PMID:24524501

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS OF THE REFORM TREATY (THE LISBON TREATY

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Emilian Ciongaru

2017-12-01

Full Text Available The Lisbon Treaty also known as the Reform Treaty provides only an amendment of the treaties considered as fundamental, namely the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and is the result of the constitutional process triggered by the Laeken Declaration adopted by the European Council. The Lisbon Treaty is still built on the content of the European Constitution from which they eliminated the most controversial provisions, first of all the title of Constitution that might produce concern and panic among the European Union population through the symbolic power it contained, and for Romania this new treaty was the first it signed in quality of a Union member state. Even if does not bear the name of European Constitution, the Lisbon Treaty is a European Constitution for the following reasons: first it is a Constitution because it gathers together most of the fundamental elements of the Constitutional Treaty, even if it does not have the structure or the name thereof, and second the treaties after the Lisbon reform have become small constitutions from the operational viewpoint, they develop the functions of a constitution, limit power and organize the operation of the organization.

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Slovenia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement [es

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement [fr

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999 and signed in Vienna on 21 June 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Korea written notification that the Republic of Korea's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2004-06-10

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999 and signed in Vienna on 21 June 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Korea written notification that the Republic of Korea's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Cyprus

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Slovenia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

Problems in future negotiations for a treaty on the cut-off of fissile material for nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schaper, A.

1999-01-01

A treaty to end the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, the so-called cutoff, is one of the most important next steps on the disarmament agenda.' But meanwhile, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is deadlocked, and confidence in negotiations taking place in the near future is replaced by bewilderment at the inaction. The underlying conflict of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations can be summarized as nuclear disarmament versus nuclear nonproliferation. The same conflict is now blocking progress with negotiations in the CD on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Nevertheless, the cut-off would be the major policy driver to insert transparency and irreversibility into the disarmament process,' and we need to harness all our efforts to overcome the current difficulties. The CTBT can be regarded as a tool to cap the qualitative nuclear arms race, for example to hinder the future development of qualitatively new nuclear explosives, and an FMCT can be seen as its quantitative counterpart, capping the amount of material available for new nuclear weapons. The complex questions involve political, technical, legal, and economic aspects and constitute a challenge for diplomats and decision makers

A new approach to linking the NPT to nuclear disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pinguelli Rosa, L.

1997-01-01

After about 25 years of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in the post-Cold War era, the situation was: five declared nuclear-weapon states and more than 170 non-nuclear-weapon states signatories. The asymmetry in global conflicts changed from the East-West conflict due to ideological and military reasons, to the South-North conflict caused by economic reasons. Towards the reduction of nuclear arsenals different tools were used: Northern initiatives, Non-proliferation Treaty (worldwide), CTBT (all nuclear weapon states), START (USA and Russia); Southern initiatives, Tlatelolco treaty (Latin America), Bilateral agreement (Brazil and Argentina), Nuclear-Free Zones (proposed for Africa and New Zealand, Pelindaba Treaty. It is suggested that Pugwash movement should propose implementation of an additional resolution to the Non-proliferation Treaty in such a way as to advance concrete and practical actions towards nuclear disarmament. The instruments for that could be: a convention to be added to the Non-proliferation Treaty; a task for the Conference on Disarmament; a new commission within the United Nations