Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

1997-05-01

This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

1997-05-01

This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

The world's non-proliferation regime in time

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bunn, George

2005-01-01

The idea for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries was supported unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 1961. The NPT permits the P-5 to have nuclear weapons. All other NPT signatories are 'non-nuclear-weapon States' who are prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons. To gain their signatures, the NPT promises assistance to them in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and negotiations toward nuclear disarmament. Besides the P-5, the treaty now has 184 countries that have promised not to have nuclear weapons and that have agreed to accept inspections by the IAEA to verify that they are carrying out their promises. However, India, Pakistan, and Israel refused to join the treaty, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) withdrew from it. Of these four countries, only India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons. Israel and North Korea are assumed to have them. The non-proliferation regime today includes much more than the NPT. The IAEA standards for inspection were the next most important element. The IAEA inspection requirements negotiated in the early 1970s were shown to be inadequate by Iraq's success in hiding its nuclear-weapon efforts before and during the Gulf War of 1991. The Additional Protocol of 1997 is slowly replacing these requirements, but, as of December 2004, was in effect in only 62 NPT member countries. The regime includes the agreements creating nuclear-weapon free zones in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Mongolia. The countries that formed these zones are also members of the NPT. The regime includes suggestions for standards and financial assistance plus requirements for physical protection of nuclear material from theft by terrorists or others. These efforts range from the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to the technical assistance provided by the IAEA and some countries, to the financial assistance offered by the G-8 and some other IAEA

Institutional effectiveness in international regimes. An analysis of the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime coping with the political malignity in the case of Iran

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Oezden, Tugba

2015-07-01

Among the international security regimes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has a prominent ranking due to the destructive power of the nuclear weapons over regional and global peace and stability. The NPT Regime has come across with two major challenges in the recent decade: North Korea and Iran. Contrary to North Korea, Iran is determined to stay as a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Regime still did not confirm the character and extent of Iranian nuclear program. The question of this study is ''why the processes of the NPT Regime cannot specify the nature and scope of Irans nuclear program?'' The three main the processes of the regime, which are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the multilateral negotiations, are examined to determine the weaknesses of the regime. This study argues that the regime is modulated to cope with operational challenges and it remains relatively incompetent when a political challenge arises.

Nuclear disarmament and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

1999-01-01

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference reaffirmed 'the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control' and endorsed 'universal application of safeguards once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved'. Hence strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and incremental broadening of its coverage towards the universal application of international safeguards in all States is a high priority albeit for the medium to long term. A tentative attempt is made in this paper to anticipate how the elements of verification under the NPT, FMCT and other conventions and arrangements related to nuclear non-proliferation will evolve against the background of the disarmament process, with the goal of achieving at some future stage an ultimate convergence of verification regimes under a complete nuclear disarmament. We think, however, that most of the new initiatives in the area of disarmament/non-proliferation should be realised during the current disarmament phase. We do not wish our model to be perceived as a rigid time-bound scheme. New initiatives should be implemented in parallel and as soon as practicable. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and should not be taken to represent Australian Government policy. (author)

Post-Cold War Effects on the Non-proliferation Regime

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kessler, Carol E.

2006-03-31

This journal article analyzes nuclear and security related events of the past 15 years to illustrate the changes in geopolitics and the shifting balance of power following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reflection upon these events establishes the context for strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The author concludes that post Soviet communism hastened the movement towards a unipolar system with hegemonic power vested in the United States, and this geopolitical imbalance fostered insecurities and greater threats. Multilateral cooperation and commitment from the US would help this leader achieve its goal of security through increased global confidence in the international system.

Computer Language Choices in Arms Control and Nonproliferation Regimes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

White, G K

2005-01-01

The U.S. and Russian Federation continue to make substantive progress in the arms control and nonproliferation transparency regimes. We are moving toward an implementation choice for creating radiation measurement systems that are transparent in both their design and in their implementation. In particular, the choice of a programming language to write software for such regimes can decrease or significantly increase the costs of authentication. In this paper, we compare procedural languages with object-oriented languages. In particular, we examine the C and C++ languages; we compare language features, code generation, implementation details, and executable size and demonstrate how these attributes aid or hinder authentication and backdoor threats. We show that programs in lower level, procedural languages are more easily authenticated than are object-oriented ones. Potential tools and methods for authentication are covered. Possible mitigations are suggested for using object-oriented programming languages

Non-proliferation through effective international control. Report of working group I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, S.E.

1993-01-01

Working Group I focused on two issues: the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Missile Technology Regime (MTCR). There was wide agreement within the Group on a number of factors that will strongly influence the prospects for the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension Conference. Two points stood out as particularly important: first, emphasis on the obligations for nuclear Powers to move in good faith in direction of nuclear disarmament; and second, inadequacy of security guarantees to non-nuclear States associated with the NPT

Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xavier, Roberto Salles

2014-01-01

The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

Systems resilience: a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

2011-01-01

This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

Systems resilience : a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

2011-12-01

This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meier, Oliver

2014-01-01

The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Meier, Oliver

2014-11-15

The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-05-01

Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

British nuclear non-proliferation policy and the trident purchase

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keohane, D.

1984-01-01

Since the mid-1950s, the UK has had a policy of making significant and sustained efforts to minimise the spread of nuclear arms. Unlike the global focus of its non-proliferation policy, the decision on Trident in centred upon national and perhaps regional requirements. At a time when non-nuclear countries are charging nuclear-weapon states with a grave failure to meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, Britain is making plans that would further increase the gap between the nuclear 'haves' and have-nots' and that indicate it expects to require nuclear arms in the next century. It would of course be unrealistic to expect a government to fully harmonise its manifold policies and unreasonable to suggest it should give absolute priority to one of its policy concerns, such as non-proliferation. But Britain is emphasising the high value it places upon the independent possession of strategic nuclear arms through its decision to purchase Trident, thus implicitly contradicting the logic underlying its non-proliferation policy. Compared to other factors, the influence of the Trident decision upon the non-proliferation regime appears very marginal, yet it is unlikely to strengthen that regime

Sustaining non-proliferation in the 1980s

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nye, J.S.

1984-01-01

The subject is discussed as follows: introduction; the non-proliferation regime - 1950s to 1970s (IAEA safeguards; Non-proliferation Treaty; oil crisis; proposed sale of facilities for producing weapons-usable materials; USA position); the Carter Administration approach; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation); incentives (USA); export legislation (USA); domestic breeder policy (USA); maintaining the regime in the 1980s (safeguards; Pu and highly enriched uranium management; international spent fuel storage; fuel assurances); the problem of priority; rate vs. degree of proliferation; relations among regimes (international regimes); conclusion. (U.K.)

Nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1990-01-01

This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

Safeguards and non-proliferation: current challenges and the implications for Australia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leask, A.; Carlson, J.

2006-01-01

Full text: The expansion of nuclear programs raises the issue of how to ensure this does not increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. The non-proliferation regime - based on the NPT and its verification mechanism, the IAEA safeguards system - has been developed to provide assurance that nuclear programs are exclusively peaceful. Although to date the non-proliferation regime has been remarkably successful, in recent years it has come under serious challenge. Nuclear proliferation is emerging as one of the major issues facing the international community. Addressing technical and institutional aspects of the non-proliferation regime - especially safeguards, but also complementary measures such as export controls, proliferation-resistant technology, and an international framework on sensitive technology - is important. But proliferation is a political problem, and ultimately the success of the non-proliferation regime depends on political resolve to uphold compliance, using incentives and if necessary sanctions. These issues are vitally important to Australia's future. Being a major uranium supplier has strengthened Australia's influence in non-proliferation and safeguards developments

Working Group 3: Broader Perspectives on Non-proliferation and Nuclear Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, M.; Pregenzer, A.; Stein, G.

2013-01-01

This working group (WG) focused on the technical topics related to international security and stability in global nonproliferation and arms control regimes and asked how nonproliferation tools and culture might facilitate verification of future nuclear treaties. The review of existing and future nonproliferation and disarmament regimes (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - CTBT, UNSC Resolution 1540, UK/Norway/VERTIC exercise, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - FMCT) offered a view on challenges, possibilities, and limitations for future initiatives. The concepts that the WG considered, with potential use in implementing future nuclear verification treaties, are: Triple S Culture (Safety, Security, Safeguards), State-Level Approach, Safeguards-by-Design, risk-based approaches, managed access, inspections, and protection of sensitive information. Under these concepts, many existing tools, considered by the WG could be used for nuclear verification. Export control works to control sensitive technology and expertise. Global implementation is complicated and multi-faceted and would benefit from greater consistency and efficiency. In most cases, international cooperation and development international capability would supplement efforts. This document is composed of the slides and the paper of the presentation. (A.C.)

Nuclear nonproliferation strategy in Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jenkins, F.W.

1989-07-01

The most immediate danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons in Asia is in South Asia, where both India and Pakistan have developed the means of producing nuclear explosive materials. In East Asia, North Korea appears to be in the early stages of a weapon-related nuclear program, and before the end of the century South Korea or Taiwan could revive their past efforts to move closer to a nuclear weapons capability. Over the longer run, Japan could conceivably decide to abandon its present strong opposition to the acquisition of nuclear Weapons. At present, the United States has largely separate approaches to the nuclear weapon proliferation problems in South Asia and in East Asia. This paper argues that these separate approaches should be strengthened and integrated into a broader regional nonproliferation strategy. This regional strategy would have three major strands: inducing India and Pakistan to agree not to produce nuclear weapons or test nuclear explosive devices for a specific period; bolstering the existing nonproliferation regime, principally by maintaining nonproliferation incentives and involving China more in the nonproliferation regime; and encouraging regional cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy

The Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the insertion of the Brazilian State in its regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Silva, Marcos Valle Machado da

2010-01-01

The issue of nuclear weapons continues to appear as a focal point of International Relations. The efforts and concrete actions on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control are still issues that generate recurring tensions between States. However, in Brazil, there is little analysis of an academic nature about these issues and, with respect to current and prospective position of the Brazilian State in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime, studies and analysis are even more scarce, or incipient. The present dissertation has as its object of study to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Regime arisen from NPT, and the Brazilian State insertion process in this Regime. Therefore our research work is structured in three areas: the first one is about the role of nuclear weapons in States security perception, the second is about NPT and its Regime, the third runs over the insertion of the Brazilian state in this regime. So, in summary, the research performed included the reasons that make a State to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT genesis and evolution of the perception of the meaning of that Treaty by the States, and the process and the degree of insertion of Brazil in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime. The inquiry sought to place this object of study in the broader debate on Foreign Relations, based on the approaches of the discipline devoted to the question of managing the security of States, id est, the two approaches that constitute the mainstream of the discipline: the perspective theoretical liberal (and neoliberal variants) and realistic thinking (and neo-realist). Thus, we have used different theoretical lenses, which we think necessary for understanding the specific parts and causal connections between these parts of a complex issue. (author)

The crisis bears the chance. The nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime; In der Krise liegt die Chance. Der Atomkonflikt mit Iran und seine Auswirkungen auf das nukleare Nichtverbreitungsregime

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Meier, Oliver

2014-10-15

The contribution on the nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime covers the following topics: Iran and the verification of non-nuclear -weapon states, the system of nuclear safeguards, the application of new verification instruments, verification of possible military research and development activities, the limitation of proliferation relevant activities, delivery guarantees as mean for non-proliferation, Iran and the handling of contract violations, graded reactions, political issues, problems of harmonization, capacity and process deficiencies, before the ninth non-proliferation verification conference, approaches for strengthening the non-proliferation regime, recommendation to the German politics.

Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards; Accountability e regime de nao proliferacao nuclear: uma avaliacao do modelo de vigilancia mutua brasileiro-argentina de salvaguardas nucleares

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Xavier, Roberto Salles

2014-08-01

The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

Use of open source information and commercial satellite imagery for nuclear nonproliferation regime compliance verification by a community of academics

Science.gov (United States)

Solodov, Alexander

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the Additional Safeguards Protocol. The purpose of the protocol is to enhance the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared production of fissile materials in member states. However, the IAEA does not always have sufficient human and financial resources to accomplish this task. Developed here is a concept for making use of human and technical resources available in academia that could be used to enhance the IAEA's mission. The objective of this research was to study the feasibility of an academic community using commercially or publicly available sources of information and products for the purpose of detecting covert facilities and activities intended for the unlawful acquisition of fissile materials or production of nuclear weapons. In this study, the availability and use of commercial satellite imagery systems, commercial computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification International Monitoring System (IMS), publicly available information sources such as watchdog groups and press reports, and Customs Services information were explored. A system for integrating these data sources to form conclusions was also developed. The results proved that publicly and commercially available sources of information and data analysis can be a powerful tool in tracking violations in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a framework for implementing these tools in academic community was developed. As a result of this study a formation of an International Nonproliferation Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC) is proposed. This would be an independent organization consisting of academics (faculty, staff and students) from both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and

Twenty years of the Non-proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldblat, Jozef.

1990-01-01

The report assesses the achievements of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and discusses ways in which the non-proliferation regime could be strenghtened. It recommends a series of measures to be taken by the parties of the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, with a view to reinforcing the Treaty and achieving its universality. 198 refs

Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime: An international priority. Tokyo, 10 December 2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2002-01-01

The efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons has witnessed steady progress and a number of important milestones. Progress, however, is still required on this and many other fronts, including: the need to work energetically to ensure the universal adherence to safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements; the need for reducing existing nuclear weapon arsenals and adopting concrete steps that move us further towards nuclear disarmament; the need to draw in those States that remain outside the NPT regime; and the need to develop alternative approaches to regional and international security that are functional and inclusive, and that do not incorporate nuclear deterrence as a feature

Regime change?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, K.W.

2004-01-01

Following the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia and later reinforced by revelations about North Korean and Iraqi nuclear activities, there has been growing concern about increasing proliferation dangers. At the same time, the prospects of radiological/nuclear terrorism are seen to be rising - since 9/11, concern over a proliferation/terrorism nexus has never been higher. In the face of this growing danger, there are urgent calls for stronger measures to strengthen the current international nuclear nonproliferation regime, including recommendations to place civilian processing of weapon-useable material under multinational control. As well, there are calls for entirely new tools, including military options. As proliferation and terrorism concerns grow, the regime is under pressure and there is a temptation to consider fundamental changes to the regime. In this context, this paper will address the following: Do we need to change the regime centered on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)? What improvements could ensure it will be the foundation for the proliferation resistance and physical protection needed if nuclear power grows? What will make it a viable centerpiece of future nonproliferation and counterterrorism approaches?

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

From nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament: a need to refocus NPT priorities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sethi, Manpreet

1998-01-01

This paper seeks to suggest that attempts at general and complete nuclear disarmament have largely failed because of an over emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly horizontal, while disarmament has attracted only lip service from the perpetrators of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that is deemed to be the core of the global non-proliferation regime is no less to blame for having indulged in a skewed pursuit of its twin objectives - nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The paper argues that nuclear non-proliferation can be sustainable only if complemented by nuclear disarmament. In the absence of the latter, proliferation of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the NPT and its safeguards regime, would always pose a potential risk

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

Future non-proliferation challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yelchenko, Volodymyr

2008-01-01

Having chaired the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee Mr. Volodymyr Yelchenko noted that the NPT States parties reaffirmed the important role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. They stressed that non-compliance with the Treaty provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation and placed emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. The universality aspect was brought to the front with the lack of progress in this area. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states, promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring non-proliferation. There is concern that non-States actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. One of the underlying themes at the Second Prepcom was the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation. Negative consequences to nuclear non-proliferation were also mentioned in the context of the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defense systems, with the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the urgent conclusion of such a treaty as a beneficial step towards non-proliferation was stressed. The NPT states parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for

The Iranian Atomic program - Energy- versus Safety policy? On the problem of international non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Klimas, Mirko

2007-01-01

The Iranian atomic program: An important part of national energy policy or military way out of the international safety dilemma? In detail the author investigates - against background of Neorealism Theory - the coherences between international non-proliferation regimes - from Atoms for Peace program of the 1950 years up to actual measures of the IAEA - and the development of the Iranian atomic program. Off from superficial discussions on intentions of the Iranian government the book lightens the background of an international policy, which not only favours Iran during production of nuclear weapons as also invites the country to a military utilization of its atomic program. (orig./GL)

Nonproliferation characteristics of advanced fuel cycle concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1998-01-01

The purpose of this study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiatives and safeguards methods and systems. Alternative cycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products

The international nuclear non-proliferation system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simpson, J.; McGrew, T.

1985-01-01

This volume focuses upon the issues raised at this Conference, and attempts to address the international diplomatic, political and trading, rather than technical, questions which surround nuclear non-proliferation policies. It does so by bringing together chapters contributed by participants in non-proliferation diplomacy, those with experience in shaping International Atomic Energy Agency and national policies and academic observers of non-proliferation activities and the international nuclear industry. An analysis is provided of past non-proliferation policies and activities and current issues, and an attempt is made to offer ideas for new initiatives which may sustain the non-proliferation system in the future

2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Koltysheva, G I; Perepelkin, I G [eds.

1999-12-31

On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session `History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem` and three sections: (1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests`; (2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex`; (3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences`

2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

1998-01-01

On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session 'History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem' and three sections: 1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests'; 2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex'; 3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences'

Analysis of nuclear export control system and implementing international nonproliferation regime in China

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, J. S.; Lee, J. S.; Ahn, J. S.; Kim, B. G.; Min, K. S.

2000-01-01

China's exporting behaviour of nuclear items had been disconnected from the international non-proliferation regime such as IAEA safeguards and export control related with peaceful use of nuclear energy since 1970s. Especially, China had been one of principle suppliers of nuclear facility and technologies to Pakistan and Iran which had developed nuclear weapon programs. On the other hand, according to the rapid growth of economic scale after China began to open to the world, an active program for nuclear power plant as an electricity source had established. This means that China have surfaced as a big market to Korean nuclear industries. Regarding this, the paper dealt with the nuclear export control matters, i.e. the history of nuclear export control system and analyzed on background of enforcement of U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement that had been apolitical issue between U.S. and China. Prospects toward conforming its nuclear export policies, laws and regulations to international standards also analyzed in results

Nuclear arbitration: Interpreting non-proliferation agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tzeng, Peter

2015-01-01

At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements. These agreements include, inter alia, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements.1 States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, commentators have proposed various enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The inconvenient truth, however, is that states are generally unwilling to consent to enforcement mechanisms concerning issues as critical to national security as nuclear non-proliferation.3 This article suggests an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem: interpretation mechanisms. Although an interpretation mechanism does not have the teeth of an enforcement mechanism, it can induce compliance by providing an authoritative interpretation of a legal obligation. Interpretation mechanisms would help solve the non-compliance problem because, as this article shows, in many cases of alleged non-compliance with a non-proliferation agreement, the fundamental problem has been the lack of an authoritative interpretation of the agreement, not the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, this article proposes arbitration as the proper interpretation mechanism for non-proliferation agreements. It advocates the establishment of a 'Nuclear Arbitration Centre' as an independent branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommends the gradual introduction of arbitration clauses into the texts of non-proliferation agreements. Section I begins with a discussion of international agreements in general and the importance of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section II then discusses nuclear non-proliferation agreements and their lack of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section III examines seven case studies of alleged non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements in order to show that the main problem in many cases

Institutional overviews. Overview of the JAEA and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Senzaki, Masao

2006-01-01

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was formed within the new Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) to carry out safeguards and material control duties for the JAEA. Development of technologies and procedures for safeguards is an important duty. In addition, the new NPSTC will assume a 'think tank' role in support of the nonproliferation regime, help train nonproliferation experts, and cooperate with academic, government and non-governmental organizations on nonproliferation issues. This report briefly summarizes the formation of the JAEA and describes the duties and structure of the NPSTC in detail. (author)

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-12-01

The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations. While any final assessment of such measures and alternatives would have to examine the circumstances particular to each nation, it is hoped that the more generic assessments conducted here will be useful in suggesting guidelines for developing an improved nonproliferation regime which also helps to meet nuclear-energy needs. One chapter outlines the existing nonproliferation regime, including the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bilateral and multilateral requirements for agreements of cooperation and transfers of technology, and existing provisons for sanctions for violation of nonproliferation commitments. The chapter then proceeds to an assessment of various alternatives for providing assurance of fuel supply in light of this current regime. Another chapter examines a set of technical and institutional measures and alternatives for various components of once-through and closed fuel cycles. The components of the once-through fuel cycle assessed are enrichment services and spent-fuel management; the components of closed fuel cycles assessed are reprocessing and plutonium management and fast-breeder reactor (FBR) deployment

The NPT regime, present and future global security: an American view

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thompson, Sam.

1987-01-01

Although not perfect, an international non-proliferation regime as set out by the IAEA and Non-Proliferation Treaty is in existence. The history of the involvement of the United States in the development of this regime is mentioned as a background to explaining the current approach of the Reagan Administration to non-proliferation. Trends and challenges which may affect future global security are then identified and discussed. The author is optimistic about the future. (U.K.)

Activities of the study group of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation policy. FY Heisei 11

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Oi, Noboru

2000-01-01

The Study Group on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Policy (Chairman: Prof. Kurosawa) was established in FY1999 with the funding from the Science and Technology Agency. The aim of the Study Group is to clearly understand nuclear proliferation issues and to lead international opinion. Nuclear non-proliferation is a matter of rather scanty interest compared to nuclear safety while both of them are important in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Japan. In FY2000, the Study Group held International Symposium 'Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: A Challenge of 21st Century' and in conjunction with this Symposium, dispatched 'The Statement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Action Plan towards 21st Century'. The Statement consists of five propositions: 1) Strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and making it universally applicable, 2) Negative legacy of cold war: rapid solution of problems, 3) Civil (non-military) plutonium, 4) Development of technology to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime internationally, and 5) Strengthening Japanese initiative on nuclear non-proliferation policy. In this report, these activities will be explained in detail. (author)

Naval nuclear propulsion and the international nonproliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guimaraes, Leonam dos Santos

2005-01-01

Nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) acquisition by Non-Proliferation Treaty No- Nuclear Weapon State (NPT-NNWS) Navies does not imply nuclear weapon proliferation risks higher than those related to stationary research and power reactors. It must then be recognized that stringent restraints on supplies and political pressures on governments, both exercised very effectively by No-Proliferation Treaty - Nuclear Weapon State (NPT-NWS) against NPT-NNWS indigenous development of SSN and associated fuel cycle facilities, are fundamentally based on geopolitical and military strategic objectives. This practice is far from being related exclusively to the NPT spirit: in fact, it is a matter of freedom at seas and not of nuclear proliferation. (author)

Nonproliferation norms in civilian nuclear fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kawata, Tomio

2005-01-01

For sustainable use of nuclear energy in large scale, it seems inevitable to choose a closed cycle option. One of the important questions is, then, whether we can really achieve the compatibility between civilian nuclear fuel cycle and nonproliferation norms. In this aspect, Japan is very unique because she is now only one country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program as a non-nuclear weapon state in NPT regime. In June 2004 in the midst of heightened proliferation concerns in NPT regime, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded that, for Japanese nuclear energy program, non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities were verified through the inspections and examinations under Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol. Based on this conclusion, the IAEA announced the implementation of Integrated Safeguards in Japan in September 2004. This paper reviews how Japan has succeeded in becoming the first country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program to qualify for integrated Safeguards, and identifies five key elements that have made this achievement happen: (1) Obvious need of nuclear fuel cycle program, (2) Country's clear intention for renunciation of nuclear armament, (3) Transparency of national nuclear energy program, (4) Record of excellent compliance with nonproliferation obligations for many decades, and (5) Numerous proactive efforts. These five key elements will constitute a kind of an acceptance model for civilian nuclear fuel cycle in NNWS, and may become the basis for building 'Nonproliferation Culture'. (author)

Sovereignty and non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kimminich, O.

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty seems to violate the fundamental principle of the quality of the states. However, if interpreted in the light of the latest developments of the international law, it is possible to justify the discriminations which it imposes on the non-nuclear states. A crucial point is the implementation of article VI by the nuclear states. If the latter procrastinate in nuclear disarmament the whole NPT-regime will collapse. (orig.) [de

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2001-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

Non-proliferation and safeguards in South Africa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Broodryk, Alta

2001-01-01

South Africa occupies a unique position in the history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in being the only country with a nuclear weapons capability that was voluntary terminated before acceding to the Treaty. The first nuclear device built was completed in December 1982, five more devices followed at an orderly pace of less than one per year and on 26 February 1990 cabinet officially implemented the termination of its nuclear deterrent capability. The events that flowed from the termination was that South Africa: Acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (10 July 1991); Signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/394, (16 September 1991); Submitted its initial inventory of nuclear material (30 September 1991); and Received first verification team from the Agency (November 1991). South Africa, being dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became a party to various non-proliferation treaties, regimes and groups. The National Non- Proliferation Policy, as published in a Cabinet memorandum, also clearly states this commitment. To comply with the requirements of the Treaty and Agreement the following two acts were published: The Nuclear Energy Act; The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The Minister of Minerals and Energy is the State Authority for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in South Africa, however, the Minister delegated this Authority to NECSA's Safeguards Division. To implement the requirements of the various acts, control regimes and treaties a State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard, was designed. This standard focuses on customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, the demonstration of commitment and the prevention of non-conformity. To comply with the requirements of the standard the following procedures were established and maintained: A Quality Manual; Customer focus; Control of documents; Control of quality records; Internal Audits

Nuclear non-proliferation: Revisiting the basics. Carnegie international non-proliferation conference 2002. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2002-01-01

some cases discarded. The discoveries of a clandestine nuclear weapon programme in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War made it painfully clear that the IAEA verification system, with its focus on declared nuclear activities and its limited rights of access to information and sites, was not adequate for the IAEA to provide the comprehensive peaceful use assurances required under the NPT. This stark realization prompted the international community to significantly expand the IAEA's verification rights. These new rights were incorporated into a 1997 protocol additional to safeguards agreements, with a request for all States to subscribe to it. The aspect of non-proliferation that receives the most attention relates to compliance questions - currently, the situations in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Consolidation of the Regime appears to be of utmost importance as well as working on new approaches to security

Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects. Key issue paper no. 5

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-06-01

This paper examines the current nuclear non-proliferation regime (Section 2) and the issues most likely to arise as the civil nuclear fuel cycle develops over the next 50 years (Section 3). Section 4 deals with fuel cycles and nuclear material inventories. 14 refs.

Broadening Industry Governance to Include Nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

2008-11-11

As industry is the first line of defense in detecting and thwarting illicit trade networks, the engagement of the private sector is critical to any government effort to strengthen existing mechanisms to protect goods and services throughout the supply chain. This study builds on previous PNNL work to continue to evaluate means for greater industry engagement to complement and strengthen existing governmental efforts to detect and stem the trade of illicit goods and to protect and secure goods that could be used in making a weapon of mass destruction. Specifically, the study evaluates the concept of Industry Self Regulation, defined as a systematic voluntary program undertaken by an industry or by individual companies to anticipate, implement, supplement, or substitute for regulatory requirements in a given field, generally through the adoption of best practices. Through a series of interviews with companies with a past history of non-compliance, trade associations and NGOs, the authors identify gaps in the existing regulatory infrastructure, drivers for a self regulation approach and the form such an approach might take, as well as obstacles to be overcome. The authors conclude that it is at the intersection of industry, government, and security that—through collaborative means—the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation system—can be most effectively strengthened to the mutual benefit of both government and the private sector. Industry has a critical stake in the success of this regime, and has the potential to act as an integrating force that brings together the existing mechanisms of the global nonproliferation regime: export controls, physical protection, and safeguards. The authors conclude that industry compliance is not enough; rather, nonproliferation must become a central tenant of a company’s corporate culture and be viewed as an integral component of corporate social responsibility (CSR).

U.S. Nonproliferation Policies and the Future of Nuclear Cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Byoung Jo; Lee, Sang Hyun

2008-12-01

In order for Korea to enhance nuclear cooperation with the U.S., the most urgent thing is to prove its nonproliferation commitment to international community, and legislate solid nonproliferation policies. To achieve these goals, Korean government need to consider to create Nonproliferation Task Force in the government and focus on proving Korea's firm commitment for nonproliferation. Along with it, as a civilian counterpart, Nonproliferation Research Center must be created as soon as possible to research, plan, and publicize Korea's nonproliferation policies and measures. At the same time, the government must set up a control tower that will coordinate Korea's nuclear diplomacy and guide proper division of labor among governmental and nongovernmental agencies in nonproliferation area. Finally, to raise general public's awareness about the danger of nuclear proliferation, government must invest on to develop educational programs and public relationship programs to educate the Korean public

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: A long-term perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haeckel, E.

1990-01-01

International nuclear policy has been determined for a long time by the exigencies of the status quo. The non-proliferation regime draws its legitimacy from the continuation of extant patterns of power in world politics. Such a static policy cannot succeed forever. Overcoming the threat of nuclear proliferation will require innovative strategy that reaches beyond the status quo. It calls for structural change in the international system to be accomodated instead of resisted. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to hold, nuclear weapon states will finally have to forgo their privileged status. This cannot, however, be accomplished simply through the abolition or renunciation of nuclear weapons since nuclear weapons themselves continue to be instrumental for war prevention and international stability. Rather, what is needed is a new approach to the management of the nuclear world system under international responsibility. Nonproliferation and disarmament objectives together call for a concept of global security in which multilateral institutions assume an increasingly important role of nuclear diplomacy. (orig.) [de

1995 - a pivotal year for nuclear nonproliferation. German nonproliferation policy in the runup to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Preisinger, J.

1994-01-01

The paper describes the non-proliferation as a task of preventive security policy, the non-proliferation instruments, the content of an extended non-proliferation system, and tasks of German non-proliferation policy. (DG)

Multinational alternatives and nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheinman, L.

1981-01-01

The use of multinational institutional arrangements to control sensitive nuclear-fuel-cycle activities has interested policymakers since the dawn of the nuclear age. Several such ventures have been tried in the past, largely for economic, commercial, or technical reasons, and they have enjoyed varying degrees of success. More recently, with the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, multinational arrangements have received increasing attention as a means of reinforcing international safeguards which, together with political commitments on peaceful use, have been the principal components of the nonproliferation regime. The political acceptability and efficacy of multinational arrangements is related to the historic experience with multinational ventures, the changed political circumstances of the 1970s, and the probable requirements for constructive future cooperation. As part of a comprehensive regime covering the development of sensitive nuclear activities, multinational arrangements can reinforce the regime in a manner that is widely acceptable. A political effort to win support for such arrangements is thus worthwhile. 29 references

Implementing the strengthened non-proliferation regime in Georgia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chelidze, L.

2009-01-01

A few years ago Georgia faced complicated problems in nuclear and radiation safety field, namely: weakness of infrastructure for state management, incomplete inventory of radiation sources, orphan sources all over the post soviet military bases and as a result several radiological emergencies, overexposed victims and high risk of attracting international terrorists to use the country as a rout for illegal movement of radiation sources or nuclear materials. IAEA policy and strategy for nonproliferation showed that it is not the one country problem. The coalition of democratic countries immediately responded to aroused problems. Step by step Georgia established a regulatory body, worked out national legislation, developed licensing and inspection activities, nearly finished installation of radiation portals at the whole perimeter of the country. Several successful cases of prevention of the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through borders of Georgia identified country's ability to contribute its shear to the Global Nuclear security.(author)

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1980-06-01

The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations.

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-06-01

The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations

Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mirsaidov, U.M.

2010-01-01

This article is devoted to issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan. Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction arouse serious concern of world community. Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the weapons of mass destruction distributions become the subject of high concern. Besides, during the end of 'cold war', regional conflicts, collapse of Soviet Union, as well as access to sensitive technologies considerably increase the danger of weapons of mass destruction distribution. More than 10 countries have active programs, relating to weapons of mass destruction and, possibly, more than ten countries have potential to start implementing such kinds of programs. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution. After 11 September events, the risk of such weapons of mass destruction components use by such forces for Governments blackmail become real scene, which, despite of low possibility of this threat implementation, could have very serious and disastrous consequences. International community responded to these problems and challenges, basically through the following actions, which is detailed regime development of multilateral international treaties, directed to weapons of mass destruction distribution prevention. Non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, Convention on prohibition of chemical weapons and Convention on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons are some of them. As it is known, Tajikistan signed all these treaties. For different reasons these treaties were subject of serious tests. Nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 year, actual Israel status as state having nuclear weapon and North Korean program on

Lessons from post-war Iraq for the international full-scope safeguards regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheinman, L.

1993-01-01

The discovery after the Gulf War of the extensive Iraqi nuclear weapon program severely shook public confidence in the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general, and the safeguards program of the IAEA under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in particular. Iraq provided the justification for evaluating the safeguards regime under new political circumstances, so that appropriate corrective measures could be taken when necessary. It is now up to the individual states within the international system to take advantage of this opportunity

Missile non-proliferation: an alternative approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Delory, Stephane

2011-01-01

In this report, the author first proposes an overview of the notion of missile prohibition. He notices that the association between weapons of mass destruction and missiles is a prelude to the legitimacy of missile control, notably within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime or MTCR. He also comments the notion of total ban. In a second part, the author analyses and discusses the limitations of the control of technology diffusion. He discusses the role of the MTCR, comments the evolution of this regime with the taking of China and Russia into consideration, the impacts of national implementations of export regimes on the MTCR, and economic aspects of control implementation. In the next part, the author addresses other kinds of limitations, i.e. those related with capacity evolutions of proliferating States. The last part addresses the evolution towards a new definition of approach to missile non-proliferation, notably in terms of perception of missile roles and of technology transfer controls

Carter faces new dilemmas over non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickson, D.

1979-01-01

Questions underlying the current domestic debate as to whether the US should revise its attitude towards the relationship between the spread of nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are considered. Problems arising from the provisional conclusions of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, set up at President Carter's suggestion in 1977, are evaluated. The thorny question of how to deal with the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for review in 1980 is discussed. Finally there is the issue, for which it is concluded nobody pretends to have all the answers, of whether a sufficient consensus - involving both developed and developing countries as partners in decision-making - can be forged to develop and apply an effective control regime, or whether increasing competition between both producers and consumers of nuclear power will be such as to limit the possibilities for multilateral action, shifting the focus back to bilateral actions. (UK)

The non-proliferation regime, vertical proliferation and the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, W.

1988-12-01

The disarmament orientation of the NPT, which stands beside the central aim of avoiding horizontal proliferation, raises a question: Does a compatibility exist between the non-proliferation policy of the Federal Republic and its security policy, which has its basic pillar in the nuclear deterrence strategy? Critics of this deterrence policy therefore, hinting to the disarmament determination of the NPT, demand that the Federal Republic should exercise its influence for the conclusion of a 'Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty' (CTBT), the establishment of a 'Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones' (NWFZ) in Europe, a 'No First Use'-Treaty (NFU) and finally the abolishment of all atomic weapons ('Zero Solution'). According to them such disarmament 'remedies' can reestablish or assure the waning or damaged international consensus for horizontal non-proliferation. This is a contribution for the establishment of a stable world order and will smooth the way for a prolongation of the NPT in the year 1995. An analysis of the history and the structure of interests shows that the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is deeply rooted in the NPT and that a prolongation of the treaty and its own membership is a substantial object of the foreign and security policy. Consequently the Federal Republic has to face the demands for an intensification of 'anti-nuclear measures' and has to examine their acceptability and their usefulness with respect to non-proliferation. The structure of the problem encloses the following aspects: The security conception of the Federal Republic with its military-strategic essence; the provisions in article VI NPT for negotiations with the object of a world free of atomic weapons; the derived disarmament 'remedies' for strengthening the consensus for horizontal non-proliferation and, finally, the real interface between horizontal and vertical proliferation. (orig./DG) [de

Development of Computer-Aided Learning Programs on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Hyun Chul

2011-01-01

The fulfillment of international norms for nuclear nonproliferation is indispensable to the promotion of nuclear energy. The education and training for personnel and mangers related to the nuclear material are one of crucial factors to avoid unintended non-compliance to international norms. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been providing education and training on nuclear control as its legal duty. One of the legally mandatory educations is 'nuclear control education' performed since 2006 for the observation of the international norms on nuclear nonproliferation and the spread of the nuclear control culture. The other is 'physical protection education' performed since 2010 for maintaining the national physical protection regime effectively and the spread of the nuclear security culture. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. During the Summit, the South Korea was chosen to host the second Nuclear Summit in 2012. South Korean President announced that South Korea would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an international education and training center on nuclear security in 2014. KINAC is making a full effort to set up the center successfully. An important function of the center is education and training in the subjects of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, and nuclear export/import control. With increasing importance of education and training education on nuclear nonproliferation and control, KINAC has been developing computer-aided learning programs on nuclear nonproliferation and control to overcome the weaknesses in classroom educations. This paper shows two learning programs. One is an e-learning system on the nuclear nonproliferation and control and the other is a virtual reality program for training nuclear material accountancy inspection of light water reactor power plants

Development of Computer-Aided Learning Programs on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kim, Hyun Chul [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2011-10-15

The fulfillment of international norms for nuclear nonproliferation is indispensable to the promotion of nuclear energy. The education and training for personnel and mangers related to the nuclear material are one of crucial factors to avoid unintended non-compliance to international norms. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been providing education and training on nuclear control as its legal duty. One of the legally mandatory educations is 'nuclear control education' performed since 2006 for the observation of the international norms on nuclear nonproliferation and the spread of the nuclear control culture. The other is 'physical protection education' performed since 2010 for maintaining the national physical protection regime effectively and the spread of the nuclear security culture. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. During the Summit, the South Korea was chosen to host the second Nuclear Summit in 2012. South Korean President announced that South Korea would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an international education and training center on nuclear security in 2014. KINAC is making a full effort to set up the center successfully. An important function of the center is education and training in the subjects of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, and nuclear export/import control. With increasing importance of education and training education on nuclear nonproliferation and control, KINAC has been developing computer-aided learning programs on nuclear nonproliferation and control to overcome the weaknesses in classroom educations. This paper shows two learning programs. One is an e-learning system on the nuclear nonproliferation and control and the other is a virtual reality program for training nuclear material accountancy inspection of light water

78 FR 9768 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-02-11

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8184] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice...

An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

2007-06-01

The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

2007-06-15

The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

Heavy water and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, M.M.

1980-05-01

This report begins with a historical sketch of heavy water. The report next assesses the nonproliferation implications of the use of heavy water-moderated power reactors; several different reactor types are discussed, but the focus is on the natural uranium, on-power fueled, pressure tube reactor CANDU. The need for and development of on-power fueling safeguards is discussed. Also considered is the use of heavy water in plutonium production reactors as well as the broader issue of the relative nuclear leverage that suppliers can bring to bear on countries with natural uranium-fueled reactors as compared to those using enriched designs. The final chapter reviews heavy water production methods and analyzes the difficulties involved in implementing these on both a large and a small scale. It concludes with an overview of proprietary and nonproliferation constraints on heavy water technology transfer

78 FR 9769 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-02-11

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8182] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on Chinese and Iranian Foreign Persons AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The U.S. Government...

New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

1999-01-01

Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

Transparency and nonproliferation in the Asia-Pacific region. Enhancing transparency, strengthening the nonproliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hamada, Kazuko

2008-01-01

Driven by the prospect of rapid economic growth and the perceived need for energy security, the Asia-Pacific region is destined to increase its nuclear energy use in the coming decades. This projected increase, however, will bring with it nuclear proliferation concerns, fueling fears about the security of nuclear material and creating suspicions about its use. The increasing use of nuclear energy inevitably necessitates supplementary efforts, designed to ensure nuclear security and a legitimate use of nuclear energy, other than the obligation to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Nuclear transparency measures could be useful tools for building confidence that the increasing nuclear energy use does not contribute to nuclear proliferation. These measures could also foster a cooperative tradition that can address rising concerns over nuclear trafficking and terrorism, which require regional coordination to combat. However, moderate progress in implementing transparency measures suggests a lack of political appreciation of this concept. Thus, this paper describes various forms of potential transparency measures to expand the possibilities of the transparency concept and explore areas in which this concept might be applicable. This paper also clarifies some challenges involving transparency projects, and suggests possible ways to address these challenges. (author)

Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the DUPIC fuel cycle concept

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Persiani, P K [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

1997-07-01

The purpose of the study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiative and safeguards systems. Alternative recycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products. The concepts are alternatives to either the direct long-term storage deposition of or the purex reprocessing of the spent fuels. The alternate fuel cycle concepts reviewed include: the dry-recycle processes such as the direct use of reconfigured PWR spent fuel assemblies into CANDU reactors(DUPIC); low-decontamination, single-cycle co-extraction of fast reactor fuels in a wet-purex type of reprocessing; and on a limited scale the thorium-uranium fuel cycle. The nonproliferation advantages usually associated with the above non-separation processes are: the highly radioactive spent fuel presents a barrier to the physical diversion of the nuclear material; avoid the need to dissolve and chemically separate the plutonium from the uranium and fission products; and that the spent fuel isotopic quality of the plutonium vector is further degraded. Although the radiation levels and the need for reprocessing may be perceived as barriers to the terrorist or the subnational level of safeguards, the international level of nonproliferation concerns is addressed primarily by material accountancy and verification activities. On the international level of nonproliferation concerns, the non-separation fuel cycle concepts involved have to be evaluated on the bases of the impact the processes may have on nuclear materials accountancy. (author).

On the structure of nonproliferation measures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kano, Takashi

1994-01-01

The author proposed a new analysis method of nonproliferation measures depending on full perception of common threat of nuclear proliferation to entire human being. Nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan were analysed by this method and it revealed the following results: 1) There is a large discrepancy between the nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan mainly because of the different standpoints of both nations and partly because of the difference of understanding on the definition of nonproliferation, and the object of nonproliferation measures. 2) The total structure of nuclear nonproliferation measures becomes more visible through categorization of nonproliferation measures, depending on implementater, target for implementation, characteristics of the measures (soft-liner, legal, or hard-liner) and risk factor for reduction of the total risk of nuclear weapon use. 3) The total structure of nonproliferation measures is multi-barrier structure on the process to reach the actual nuclear weapon use, and each barrier is composed of multi-defense in depth structure including various soft-liner, legal, and hard-linear measures. 4) Various nonproliferation measures can be stored in a data base, based on the proposed structural analysis, which enables further comprehensive analysis for specific purposes efficiently. (author)

A study on strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime through the export control system of sensitive materials, equipment and technology related to nuclear activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kikuchi, Masahiro; Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Komizo, Yasuyoshi

2004-01-01

The strengthened safeguards caused from safeguards experiences to Iraq and DPRK leads to the expansion of the IAEA's activities for verification of all nuclear activities as well as verification of nuclear material in the States. The purpose of the activities, of course, includes detection of undeclared exports and imports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material. The Additional Protocol to the agreements between States and the IAEA for the application of safeguards requires to the States to declare the exports and imports information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material corresponding to the export control list that is established by the nuclear suppliers group. The Additional Protocol also insists the IAEA's right to access to the location identified by the State to resolve a question related to the declarations. Recently, the IAEA detected the black market group of the sensitive materials, equipment and technologies relevant to the nuclear proliferation through the safeguards activities to Iran and Libya. International community stated deeply concerns to the indecent facts. This paper would discuss and propose the supplemental strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime by effective combination of the safeguards activities under additional protocol and the export control regime. (author)

IAEA Director General welcomes Cuba's intention to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed Cuba's announcement to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. He expressed the hope that Cuba will conclude soon a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required under Article III of the NPT. 'With Cuba's intention to become party to the NPT, we have come a step closer to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime,' Mr. ElBaradei said. Only three countries worldwide with significant nuclear activities now remain outside the NPT. With 188 countries party to the Treaty, the NPT is the most adhered to international agreement after the United Nations Charter and the most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty. The NPT makes it mandatory that all non-nuclear-weapon States conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. The Director General also welcomed Cuba's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which completes the process of having all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as members of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Mr. ElBaradei said that, 'the Tlatelolco Treaty provides a good model for other regional nuclear-weapon-free zones to follow'. He added that 'universal adherence of all countries in regions having nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements is important to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime'. (IAEA)

The nonproliferation predicament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, J.F.

1985-01-01

This book presents papers on the non-proliferation policy being advocated by the U.S. Topics considered include political aspects, proliferation, national security, government policies, NATO, arms control, nuclear disarmament, the balance of power, U.S. foreign policy, dealing with the problem countries, international cooperation, the nuclear marketplace, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, legislation, congressional interest and input, ethical aspects, military strategy, public opinion, and terrorist groups

76 FR 30986 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-05-27

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 7485] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government... of foreign entities and one foreign person have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of...

Information management in NACD regimes: a comparative analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Unger, R.

1998-01-01

While all non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) regimes must address the issue of information management, this area has remained an under-explored part of the arms control field. This paper compares information management processes across a variety of NACD regimes for the purpose of identifying potential synergies between regimes and suggesting means by which to strengthen future arms control verification efforts. The paper explores the information management systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq (UNSCOM), the Conventional Forces in Europe Agreement (CFE), and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). (author)

Future technology challenges in non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richardson, J.H.

2004-01-01

Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. For example, various gamma ray imaging approaches are being explored to combine spatial resolution with background suppression in order to enhance sensitivity at reasonable standoff distances and acquisition times. New materials and approaches are being developed in order to provide adequate energy resolution in field use without the necessity for liquid nitrogen. Finally, different detectors combined into distributed networks offer promise for detection and tracking of radioactive materials. As the world moves into the 21st century, the possibility of greater reliance on nuclear energy will impose additional technical requirements to prevent proliferation. In addition to proliferation resistant reactors, a careful examination of the various possible fuel cycles from cradle to grave will provide additional technical and nonproliferation challenges in the areas of conversion, enrichment, transportation, recycling and waste disposal. Radiation detection technology and information management have a prominent role in any future global regime for nonproliferation beyond the current Advanced Protocol. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. (author)

The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

2015-01-01

Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status

Science.gov (United States)

2012-10-25

States has signed such agreements with Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, the Marshall Islands , Mongolia...Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Australia Group. The informal Australia Group...biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes.” The missile nonproliferation regime is founded not

Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

2012-01-01

This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

2012-03-06

This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

Non-proliferation and multinational enterprises

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-04-01

The paper supplements CC/WG.2/9 in presenting the Japanese delegation's contribution in the areas of non-proliferation and multi-national enterprises. The paper questions whether multinational enrichment enterprises would constitute a significant non-proliferation factor, noting that the nature of the venture might create a potential for the dissemination of sensitive information. The paper also argues that a multi-national venture which was not economically competitive (with national facilities) would have questionable viability. The conclusion is that non-proliferation advantages, if any, would be a result, not an objective of such a venture

Evaluation method of nuclear nonproliferation credibility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwon, Eun-ha; Ko, Won Il

2009-01-01

This paper presents an integrated multicriteria analysis method for the quantitative evaluation of a state's nuclear nonproliferation credibility level. Underscoring the implications of policy on the sources of political demand for nuclear weapons rather than focusing on efforts to restrict the supply of specific weapons technology from the 'haves' to the 'have-nots', the proposed methodology considers the political, social, and cultural dimensions of nuclear proliferation. This methodology comprises three steps: (1) identifying the factors that influence credibility formation and employing them to construct a criteria tree that will illustrate the relationships among these factors; (2) defining the weight coefficients of each criterion through pairwise comparisons of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP); and (3) assigning numerical scores to a state under each criterion and combining them with the weight coefficients in order to provide an overall assessment of the state. The functionality of this methodology is examined by assessing the current level of nuclear nonproliferation credibility of four countries: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Switzerland.

The global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Challenges and prospects for the future. Interview with Mr. Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, November 26, 2009

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hautecouverture, Benjamin

2009-01-01

President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs since November 2007, Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala has had a long career as a Sri Lankan diplomat and leader in the field of international security. Among his numerous appointments, Mr. Dhanapala headed the Geneva-based UNIDIR. He chaired the widely acclaimed 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. He was Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs in the United Nations from 1998 to 2003. In this interview, Mr. Dhanapala gives us his thoughts about the nuclear non-proliferation regime, a few months before the 8. NPT Review Conference. (author)

Positive steps toward non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Greenhalgh, G.

1979-08-30

Russel W. Fox and Mason Willrich in their paper, International Custody of Plutonium Stocks: A First Step Toward an International Regime for Sensitive Nuclear Energy Activities, advocate placing excess plutonium in an international custodial facility; critical criteria governing releases are outlined so that, on one hand the owners can have high confidence that their plutonium will be returned promptly, under appropriate circumstances, and on the other hand, all the other participating and concerned countries can have confidence in the assurance that plutonium will be released only for immediate use in a defined and approved civil purpose. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the 1978 issue of its Year Book, recognizes a move towards a more positive approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation. It is noted that the non-proliferation strategies of the main supply countries have largely concentrated on a two-pronged approach of technology denials with tightening of safeguards. But already, enrichment, reprocessing, and breeder reactor programs extend far beyond the five nuclear weapon states. History testifies to the limitations of a policy of technical denials. SIPRI recognizes that another way to dissuade non-nuclear weapon states from creating their own enrichment or reprocessing plants would be to establish an open market for these services, a market characterized by diversity and competition. So far, there has been no case where a country has developed nuclear explosives by diverting material from a civil power station. Development of nuclear weapons by various countries is briefly noted and areas where strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is needed are noted. (MCW)

Nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1984-01-01

DOE's nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities are defined by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). The Department's major responsibilities in this area are to: (1) provide technical assistance to the Department of State in negotiating agreements for civil cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other countries and international organizations; (2) join with other agencies to reach executive branch judgments with respect to the issuance of export licenses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (3) be responsible for processing subsequent arrangements with other agencies as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act; (4) control the distribution of special nuclear materials, components, equipment, and nuclear technology exports; (5) participate in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign governments and organizations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (6) act as a primary technical resource with respect to US participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency

Abstracts of 3. International scientific-practical conference 'Semipalatinsk Test Site. Radiation Legacy and Non-proliferation Issues'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The Conference gathered representatives of more than 25 countries and international organizations. In the Conference among with actual problems of current environment conditions in Kazakhstan, perspective trends in the field of radiation protection, radio-ecological and radiobiological research and issues of international co-operation in support of non-proliferation regime, other advanced scientific projects were considered [ru

Staying ahead of the game [The world's nuclear regime is being tested like never before

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Heinonen, O.J.

2007-01-01

The nuclear non-proliferation regime today faces a number of challenges. Not all would agree that the system is 'in crisis', but we can confidently say that the regime is certainly being tested. It goes without saying that the reported nuclear test by DPRK in October 2006 has not made the situation easier. So we should begin to find innovative solutions to overcome vulnerabilities or the international nuclear safeguards regime will become obsolete. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was ratified more than 30 years ago. Since then the world has undergone rapid social, political and economic changes, which have resulted in a changed non-proliferation landscape. Developments in the three pillars of the NPT -disarmament, technology transfer and verification- have not necessarily been even. The IAEA has a role to play, in particular, in the latter two pillars. Although one might argue that there has been slow progress with regards to disarmament, it is my belief that we should continue to improve nuclear verification methods and techniques to keep up with the changing non-proliferation landscape. If we fail to do so, we might not only impact international safeguards, but also the future prospects of peaceful nuclear applications. During the last two decades we have seen three major developments related to nuclear non-proliferation: the increased dissemination of nuclear technology and nuclear know-how, particularly in light of renewed interest in nuclear power; a renewed drive on the part of a few States to acquire technology suitable for nuclear weapons purpose; the emergence of clandestine procurement networks. Under the NPT regime, there is nothing illegal about any State having enrichment or reprocessing technology. However, we ought to ensure that nuclear material and infrastructure is not used for illicit and non-peaceful purposes. Better control of access to nuclear fuel cycle technology is being explored through initiatives such as

Strengthening the non proliferation regime: French views

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Delaune, P.

2013-01-01

3 main issues can be identified in the French policy concerning the backing of non proliferation: 1) responding resolutely to proliferation crises, 2) reinforcing substantive efforts to prevent and impede proliferation, and 3) strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The first issue is very important because combating proliferation is vital to the security of all. Concerning the second issue, France attaches particular importance to strengthening specific measures to prevent and check proliferation. Let me mention a few proposals that we put forward: exports need to be controlled more effectively, proliferation activities have to be criminalized, or the development of proliferation-resistant technologies should be supported. Concerning the third issue it means the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, France proposes several means: -) aiming at the universalization of the additional protocol; -) ensuring that the Agency continues to have sufficient human, financial and technical resources to fulfill its verification mission effectively; -) encouraging the IAEA to make full use of the authority available to it; -) enhancing the use of information relevant to the delivery of the IAEA mandate; and -) sharing more accurate information concerning the breaches of commitments that happen. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

Problems of the nuclear non-proliferation policy. Contributions to the international discussion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blix, H.; Butler, P. von; Fischer, W.; Caccia Dominioni, F.; Frick, H.; Gmelin, W.; Haeckel, E.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

1994-01-01

The volume assembles a number of essays wherein basic problems of nonproliferation are identified and discussed in view of recent developments and future policy requirements. What is the role of multilateral institutions in the containment of nuclear proliferation? How are Western Europe's security needs to be reconciled with the tenets of the global nonproliferation regime? How can international safeguards be upgraded so as to increase confidence among states? What kinds of disciplinary instruments are needed for the international community to prevent an unco-operative state from gaining access to nuclear weapons? What kinds of obstacles stand in the way of smooth co-operation between the European Union and the United States in the nuclear field? How does the demise of global bipolarity impinge on the need to pursue an international nuclear order? The essays in this volume seek to combine structural analysis of conceptual issues with substantive policy recommendations. (orig./HP) [de

Germany and the nuclear non-proliferation; Current situation and prospects; Deutschland und die nukleare Nichtverbreitung; Zwischenbilanz und Ausblick

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Preisinger, J.

1993-07-01

A summary is given of the consequences, both positive and negative, of international non-proliferation policy. The numerous, complex branches and connections of national measures and inter-stake agreements for the peaceful, controlled uses of nuclear technology and related military technologies are expertly described, and assessed on their effectiveness. Weak aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime are pointed out and past reforms are illustrated and assessed in the light of recent developments. The interests of the German Federal Republic from the centre of this analysis. The author shows that, after a certain hesitary, German diplomacy has now become active in the establishment of an international non-proliferation regime. He concludes that Germany should take a strong initiative role in maintaining a peaceful international nuclear order. (orig.) [Deutsch] Es wird ein Resuemee der bisherigen Erfolge und Misserfolge internationaler Nichtverbreitungspolitik gezogen. Die komplexen, vielfach veraestelten und verschachtelten nationalen Massnahmen und zwischenstaatlichen Vereinbarungen zur Ueberwachung und friedlichen Zweckbindung von Nukleartechnologie und militaerisch relevanten Anschlusstechnologien werden sachkundig erlaeutert und auf ihre Wirksamkeit ueberprueft. Schwachstellen des nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregimes werden offengelegt, Reformschritte der vergangenen Jahre werden dargestellt und im Lichte der juengsten Entwicklungen bewertet. Dabei steht die Interessenlage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Zentrum der Analyse. Der Autor zeigt, dass die deutsche Diplomatie sich nach einer gewissen Zurueckhaltung schliesslich aktiv in die Gestaltung des internationalen Nichtverbreitungsregimes eingeschaltet hat. Er plaediert fuer eine kraftvolle Initiativrolle Deutschlands zur Erhaltung einer friedlichen internationalen Nuklearordnung. (orig.)

Putting teeth in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 25 March 2006, Karlsruhe, Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2006-01-01

The factors, contributing to the world's changes in respect to peace, security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are presented in the document. Five necessary and urgent measures are proposed in order to meet the current challenges: 1)tighten control for assess to nuclear fuel cycle technology; 2)accelerate global efforts tp protect nuclear material; 3)support effective nuclear verification; 4) reinvigorate disarmament efforts; 5) increase the effectiveness of the UN Security Council. The importance and necessity to place nuclear operations under multinational control is outlined

Israel's position on non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marom, R.

1986-01-01

Israel maintained that the complex international system and worldwide political tension created a situation in which comprehensive plans of disarmament could not produce any positive result. The deadlock in the field of general and complete disarmament has brought Israel to the realization that one possible way to alleviate the stalemate could be progress by stages through partial measures of disarmament. Israel's position on non-proliferation indicates that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ), as it relates to the Middle-East, could serve as a credible alternative to the unilateral adherence to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and an effective measure of non-proliferation in the region. (Author)

Non-proliferation and advances in nuclear science

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Iyengar, P.K.

1995-01-01

So far, the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has concentrated on safeguard regimes based on technologies relating to the production of uranium and plutonium in nuclear reactors, and on their potential diversion for use in nuclear weapons. As nuclear science advances, however, nuclear technology both peaceful and for weapons will change, and for the NPT to remain relevant, it must reflect these changes. At this juncture, when the NPT is coming up for review in a year's time, it is important for physicists to take a fresh look at recent advances in nuclear science, and inform the policy-makers and the public at large about their potential for impacting nuclear technology in the future. In this article a few such advances are highlighted and their implications for the NPT are considered. (author). 4 refs

Robust Indicators of Nonproliferation Performance

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cowan, Mara R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kurzrok, Andrew J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

2014-02-13

Understanding how the nuclear industry may benefit from self-regulation is closely linked with understanding how to report compliance activities for nonproliferation and export control objectives, as well as how to distinguish high and low compliance performance. Drawing on the corporate sustainability reporting model, nuclear and dual-use commodities industries can frame socially responsible self-regulatory activities to distinguish themselves as good nonproliferators.

Nonproliferation Education at the University of Washington

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jones, Chris D.; Leek, K.M.

2006-01-01

The nonproliferation curriculum at the University of Washington (UW) is the product of collaboration between Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security (PNWCGS) at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Jackson School of International Studies (JSIS) and Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. This collaboration began in 2001 with the establishment the Institute for Global and Regional Security Studies (IGRSS). IGRSS is housed in the Jackson School, which will celebrate its centenary in 2008 as a center for the study of world regions. PNNL also engages in a number of collaborative relationships with UW units in the natural and applied sciences. The principal goal of IGRSS has been to develop courses that draw graduates and undergraduates into careers in the field of nonproliferation. Since offering its first courses in 2002, IGRSS has assisted a substantial number of UW graduate students in submitting successful applications for nonproliferation positions in U.S. government agencies, including the Nonproliferation Graduate Program at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Since 2001, several UW undergraduates have begun careers in the field of nonproliferation, either by working at national laboratories or enrolling in non-UW graduate programs. The UW brought to its nonproliferation partnership with PNNL long-established programs in a wide range of professional programs and academic disciplines, including the 14 interdisciplinary regional and topical programs of the Jackson School of International Studies. The JSIS is an interdisciplinary and interdepartmental enterprise that brings together faculty and students from across the UW. Since the late 1940s the UW has trained experts for the nation's foreign policy community in programs focused in the languages, cultures, and histories of regions deemed critical to U.S. national security. However, since the termination of its program in nuclear engineering several

The Asian countries and the non-proliferation treaty prorogation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoffmann, N.

1995-01-01

This work deals with the non-proliferation treaty prorogation of Asia. The position of the asian countries under the old non-proliferation treaty is given. It includes the 1968 non-proliferation treaty signatories, the calling in question again and the criticisms revealed by the asian countries. The positions and the open forecasts expressed on the non-proliferation treaty prorogation and the article on the elimination of the nuclear weapons are also given. (O.L.)

Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chrzanowski, P.L.

1993-01-01

About 30 specialists in non-proliferation participated in a workshop to explore ideas for US Government preparatory steps leading to the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. To that end, workshop sessions were devoted to reviewing the lessons learned from previous Review Conferences, discussing the threats to the non-proliferation regime together with ways of preserving and strengthening it, and examining the management of international nuclear commerce. A fundamental premise shared by workshop participants was that extension of the NPT is immensely important to international security. The importance of stemming proliferation and, more specifically, extending the Treaty, is growing as a result of the significant changes in the world. If the conferees of the Extension Conference decide on no extension or extension for a short limited duration, some technically advanced states that have foregone development of nuclear weapons may begin to rethink their options. Also, other arms control measures, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could start to unravel. The US must provide strong international leadership to ensure that the Extension Conference is a success, resulting in Treaty extension, perhaps through successive terms, into the indefinite future. Workshop participants were struck by the urgent need for the US to take organizational steps so that it is highly effective in its advance preparations for the Extension Conference. Moreover, the Extension Conference provides both a challenge and an opportunity to mold a cohesive set of US policy actions to define the future role of nuclear weapons and combat their proliferation

Transition from linear- to nonlinear-focusing regime in filamentation

Science.gov (United States)

Lim, Khan; Durand, Magali; Baudelet, Matthieu; Richardson, Martin

2014-01-01

Laser filamentation in gases is often carried out in the laboratory with focusing optics to better stabilize the filament, whereas real-world applications of filaments frequently involve collimated or near-collimated beams. It is well documented that geometrical focusing can alter the properties of laser filaments and, consequently, a transition between a collimated and a strongly focused filament is expected. Nevertheless, this transition point has not been identified. Here, we propose an analytical method to determine the transition, and show that it corresponds to an actual shift in the balance of physical mechanisms governing filamentation. In high-NA conditions, filamentation is primarily governed by geometrical focusing and plasma effects, while the Kerr nonlinearity plays a more significant role as NA decreases. We find the transition between the two regimes to be relatively insensitive to the intrinsic laser parameters, and our analysis agrees well with a wide range of parameters found in published literature. PMID:25434678

Intense electron-beam transport in the ion-focused regime through the collision-dominated regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanford, T.W.L.; Poukey, J.W.; Welch, D.R.; Mock, R.C.

1993-01-01

This paper reviews the transport of the 19-MeV, 700-kA, 25-ns Hermes-III electron beam in long gas cells filled with N 2 gas spanning six decades in pressure from 10 3 to ∼10 3 Torr. We show through measurements and theoretical analyses that the beam has two windows of stable transport: a low-pressure window (between ∼1 and ∼100 mTorr) that is dominated by propagation in the semi-collisionless IFR (ion-focused regime), and a high-pressure window (between ∼1 and ∼100 Torr) that is dominated by propagation in the resistive CDR (collision-dominated regime). In the CDR, 79±1.5% of the beam energy is transported over 11 m at 20 Torr. In the IFR, we show that intense radiation fields with controllable rise times and pulse widths can be generated on axis at a bremsstrahlung target. In summary, the measurements and analyses presented here provide a quantitative description of the Hermes-III beam transport over six decades in pressure

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

International scientific collaboration in nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Travelli, A.

1998-01-01

International collaboration is a vital component of every serious nonproliferation effort. Several examples of the experiences that the Argonne Arms Control and Nonproliferation Program has had in this area are given and, in the process, important components of the program come to light. Some of the main principles that the program has learned to follow while pursuing international collaboration projects are shared, as are the pitfalls that the program has learned to avoid. (author)

The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

1984-01-01

When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations

Nuclear Nonproliferation Ontology Assessment Team Final Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Strasburg, Jana D.; Hohimer, Ryan E.

2012-01-01

Final Report for the NA22 Simulations, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) Ontology Assessment Team's efforts from FY09-FY11. The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.

Nonproliferation, disarmament and the security link

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Raja Mohan, C.

1997-01-01

It is obvious that nuclear weapons are here to stay for a long time to come. Many nation states are likely to operate on the premise that the combination of nuclear weapons and long range missile provides an unrivalled source of power. The United States and India cannot hope to structure cooperation on the hope that nuclear weapons can be marginalised and eventually eliminated from the international calculus of power. Nor can they go by the premise that the existing structure of international power can be frozen through the strengthening of the current nonproliferation regime. Continued diffusion of power and the spread of technology as well as the political dynamics could break the current order. This bleak assessment does not however imply that there are no prospects for cooperation between India and the United States. If both the nations move towards a more realistic policy positions and locate their nuclear dialogue in a broader strategic context, it should not be impossible to develop areas of cooperation

Policy of Kyrgyz Republic in the field of weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duisheeva, Zh.Z.

2010-01-01

Full text: Kyrgyz Republic is principle and sequential member of accepting effective international measures, directed to active prevention to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, its components and means of delivery. Commitment to prevention policy and WMD nonproliferation is one of basic principles of foreign and domestic policy of Kyrgyz Republic. The real measure against WMD proliferation and relating to its production technologies of military, special and dual use is international export control based on national systems of export control including smoothly running national system of account for, control and physical protection of arm materials. Currently juridical basis of export control system in Kyrgyz Republic is actively developing. In 2003 the Law of Kyrgyz Republic On export control, based on principles and norms of international law in the field of export control was adopted. The Law On export control determines basic principles of state policy, legal activity basis of state management and participants of foreign-economic activity in the field of export control, as well as defines their rights, obligations and responsibilities in this field. Also in the law, the requirements of international treaties realization in the field of WMD nonproliferation and means of their delivery, signed by Kyrgyzstan, is defined as one of national systems goals of export control. In article 13, Law On export control it is defined that international cooperation in the field of export control by means of efforts coordination and cooperation with foreign states on prevention of WMD nonproliferation, means of their delivery and technologies on their creation; participation in international regimes of export control and international forums, as well as carrying out negotiations, consultations with foreign states, bilateral information exchange and realization of joint programs and other events in the field of export control on bilateral and multilateral basis. By

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report: Class of 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McMakin, Andrea H.

2012-08-20

Annual report for the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Features the Class of 2011. The NGFP is a NNSA program with a mission to cultivate future technical and policy leaders in nonproliferation and international security. Through the NGFP, outstanding graduate students with career interests in nonproliferation are appointed to program offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). During their one-year assignment, Fellows participate in programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, M.

2016-01-01

The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider ''The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.'' We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-roliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what and how much can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-for-attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dreicer, M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2016-08-30

The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider “The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.” We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-­proliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what—and how much—can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-­for-­attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

The future of non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gere, F.

2000-01-01

This paper comprises two parts. The first part makes a status of the non-proliferation policy: problems of ratification of Start 2 and CTBT treaties, nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in May 1998 etc. The second part makes a prospective reflexion on the evolution of the position of nuclearized countries at the 2015-2030 vista: role of Asia, nuclear perception, evolution of the US perception of non-proliferation, military strategy and European unification. (J.S.)

Back-end of the fuel cycle and non-proliferation strategies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chebeskov, A.N.; Oussanov, V.I.; Iougai, S.V.; Pshakin, G.M. [Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, State Scientific Center of Russian Federation, Obninsk (Russian Federation)

2001-07-01

The paper focuses on the problem of fissile materials proliferation risk estimation. Some methodological approaches to the solution of this task and results of their application for comparison of different nuclear fuel cycle strategies are discussed. The results of comparative assessment of non-proliferation aspects of plutonium utilization alternatives in Russia using system analysis approach are presented. (author)

Back-end of the fuel cycle and non-proliferation strategies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chebeskov, A.N.; Oussanov, V.I.; Iougai, S.V.; Pshakin, G.M.

2001-01-01

The paper focuses on the problem of fissile materials proliferation risk estimation. Some methodological approaches to the solution of this task and results of their application for comparison of different nuclear fuel cycle strategies are discussed. The results of comparative assessment of non-proliferation aspects of plutonium utilization alternatives in Russia using system analysis approach are presented. (author)

Three-dimensional investigations of the threading regime in a microfluidic flow-focusing channel

Science.gov (United States)

Gowda, Krishne; Brouzet, Christophe; Lefranc, Thibault; Soderberg, L. Daniel; Lundell, Fredrik

2017-11-01

We study the flow dynamics of the threading regime in a microfluidic flow-focusing channel through 3D numerical simulations and experiments. Making strong filaments from cellulose nano-fibrils (CNF) could potentially steer to new high-performance bio-based composites competing with conventional glass fibre composites. CNF filaments can be obtained through hydrodynamic alignment of dispersed CNF by using the concept of flow-focusing. The aligned structure is locked by diffusion of ions resulting in a dispersion-gel transition. Flow-focusing typically refers to a microfluidic channel system where the core fluid is focused by the two sheath fluids, thereby creating an extensional flow at the intersection. In this study, threading regime corresponds to an extensional flow field generated by the water sheath fluid stretching the dispersed CNF core fluid and leading to formation of long threads. The experimental measurements are performed using optical coherence tomography (OCT) and 3D numerical simulations with OpenFOAM. The prime focus is laid on the 3D characteristics of thread formation such as wetting length of core fluid, shape, aspect ratio of the thread and velocity flow-field in the microfluidic channel.

Romania non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biro, Lucian; Grama, Viviana

2001-01-01

is a component of the National Development Strategy for Romania, presented to the European Union, as a main step in the accession process. Cernavoda NPP Unit 1 is in commercial operation from 1996 and assures 10% of the overall national electricity production. Cernavoda Unit 2 is now about 40% complete, and the Government of Romania has declared its completion as a national priority. The national participation in this project planned to be completed by the year 2005 comprises important contribution of the nuclear infrastructure developed in Romania for the CANDU power plants. Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is also regarded as a fundamental element of the non-proliferation regime. Physical Protection comprises those measures that Romania apply to prevent or deter illegal actions taken against nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, particularly when such materials, are transported across the country. Romania received IAEA assistance to enhance its efforts to prevent unclear material and other radioactive sources from being use illegally and to detect and respond to trafficking cases, should they occur. This assistance included an IPASS Mission and training for staff involved in physical protection for nuclear material and nuclear installations. In 1993 Romania ratified the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and has following requirements for nuclear material transport: the material must be classified according to its characteristics, the material may be transported only in approved containers, containers must be marked with safety labels or placards to indicate their contents, for certain radioactive material the shipper must have in place an emergency response assistance plan. CNCAN coordinates at national level the activities regarding preventing and combating illicit trafficking with nuclear materials. From 1993 when the IAEA database was installed, Romania reported 22 incidents involving nuclear material and radioactive sources. In

The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

1984-01-01

When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations.

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the process for its enhanced review on the eve of the 2000 review conference

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pinel, C.

2000-01-01

This article sets out the principle and essentials of the process for reviewing the operation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970. In 1995 the NPT was extended. The 2000 review conference is of considerable importance for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly in the light of the fact that after the indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states urged the nuclear-weapon states to take new steps towards nuclear disarmament. This article presents a review of the 30 year period of the application of NPT

Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

1997-01-01

In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

Non-proliferation and security: synergy and differences

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Joly, J.

2013-01-01

Operators of nuclear facilities put in place both physical and organisational means to meet in a comprehensive way the requirements associated with Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Safety and Security. The common aim is to protect man and the environment from ionising radiation. The approaches for meeting these requirements have real similarities, but also differences which need to be respected in order to develop an appropriate synergy for obtaining the best possible level of safety, security and non-proliferation. This article aims to show the provisions that have been taken with regard to non-proliferation, security and safety which complement and reinforce each other.The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

Very high-current propagation in the ion-focused to collision-dominated regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanford, T.W.L.; Welch, D.R.; Mock, R.C.

1994-01-01

Measurements and analysis show that the 13 TW, Hermes-III [J. J. Ramirez et al., Digest of Technical Papers, 6th IEEE Pulsed Power Conference (Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, New York, 1987), p. 294], pulsed, electron beam has two windows of stable transport in long drift cells filled with N 2 gas terminated by a bremsstrahlung producing target: a low-pressure window (between ∼1 and ∼100 mTorr) that is dominated by propagation in the semicollisionless ion-focused regime (IFR), and a high-pressure window (between ∼1 and ∼100 Torr) that is dominated by propagation in the resistive collisional regime. In the transition region between the two windows, beam plasma--electron instabilities significantly disrupt propagation. Propagation in both regimes (the IFR at early time and the collisional at later time) is observed from ∼5 to ∼100 mTorr, which produces two distinct bremsstrahlung pulses from the single injected beam pulse. As the pressure increases, two-stream instabilities terminate IFR propagation and the associated bremsstrahlung pulse earlier and earlier in time. Above 5 mTorr, the instability is sufficiently quenched by gas collisions that propagation in the collisional regime back in the beam body occurs, leading to a second propagation and associated bremsstrahlung pulse. Above 200 mTorr, the gas breaks down too rapidly for a significant IFR pulse to form, and for higher pressures only a single pulse in the collisional regime is propagated. Reasonable stability in the collisional regime is not achieved until pressures exceed 1 Torr

China's position on nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Qian Jiadong.

1986-01-01

The paper discusses China's position on nuclear non-proliferation, in view of the fact that China does not subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China refuses to accede to the NPT because it considers the treaty to be discriminatory, and reasons are given for this point of view. However its stand for nuclear disarmament and disapproval of nuclear proliferation are declared. Nuclear arms race, prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament are also considered. (UK)

Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects of alternative fuel cycle concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1997-01-01

Timely visibility on the development, evaluation and optimization of fuel cycle concepts with respect to nonproliferation characteristics should be emphasized in the early stage of planning a civilian nuclear power program, by fuel cycle developers, reviewers and decision makers. Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of nonproliferation characteristic profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the nonproliferation concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces these concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the nonproliferation characteristics of fuel cycle concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring the need to develop advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures. (author)

The structure of German non-proliferation policy - past and future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, H.

1990-01-01

West German nonproliferation policy has evolved through four phases: First German policy strived to regain the right to nuclear research and industrial development. Then West Germany struggled for participation in NATO nuclear decision-making. Following the conclusion of the NPT, the full development of a mature nuclear industry, including activities in the full fuel cycle, and the promotion of nuclear exports were the focus of national nuclear policy. Starting in the early eighties, political aspects became more important. International security, arms control and disarmament, and foreign reputation had a more prominent role than pure economic interests. In the future, the united Germany must take care not to repeat the sad scandals of the eighties. Its renunciation of nuclear weapons remains a pillar of European stability and a prerequisite for a European peace system. Together with its European partners, Germany can be expected to take a more active, supportive and effective role in international non-proliferation policy. (orig./HSCH) [de

A Study on the cooperation policy in multilateral nuclear control regimes and the advancing of national export control system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, K. B.; Yang, M. H.; Lee, H. M.; Lee, K. S.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Kim, J. S.

2004-08-01

This study carried out the analysis of trends of the multilateral nuclear control in four aspects. First, this study analyzes the past trends of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the NPT, the IAEA safeguards system, the international nuclear export control regime and the physical protection of nuclear materials. Second, this study establishes the multilateral cooperation strategies for the effective cooperation in the process of strengthening the nuclear control regimes. Third, this study reviews the major agenda of nuclear control regimes and establishes national positions on each agenda. Fourth, this study also analyzes outstanding issues in nuclear control regimes and derives some factors to reflect national nuclear control system

United States non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheinman, L.

1978-01-01

U.S. non-proliferation policy is aimed at slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, managing the destabilizing effects of nuclear technology for energy purposes, and fostering international standards and institutions to deal responsibly with global nuclear development. These goals assume that nuclear technology has not already precluded social control and recognize the social benefits offered by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Non-proliferation policies recognize that the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is a more-difficult problem than technical ability and will concentrate on reducing those incentives through international agreements and safeguards and by maintaining the separation of commercial nuclear fuel cycles and military uses

Report of 'the 2014 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the new strategic energy plan'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yamaga, Chikanobu; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Kobayashi, Naoki; Naoi, Yosuke; Oda, Tetsuzo; Mochiji, Toshiro

2015-10-01

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the New Strategic Energy Plan -' on 3 December 2014, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, and International Nuclear Research Center, Tokyo Institute of Technology as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials and experts from Japan, the United States explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled 'Effective and efficient measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation based on domestic and foreign issues and the direction and role of technology development' and 'Roles of nuclear security COEs and future expectations'. In Panel Discussion 1, as the nuclear non-proliferation regime is facing various problems and challenges under current international circumstances, how to implement effective and efficient safeguards was discussed. In Panel Discussion 2, panelists discussed the following three points: 1. Current status of Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers and COEs, and Good Practice; 2. What these centers can do to enhance nuclear security (New role for COEs); 3. Regional cooperation in the Nuclear Security Training and Support Center (NSSC) and COEs in states, which the IAEA recommends establishing, and international cooperation and partnerships with international initiatives (New Role). Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the

Electron beam propagation in the ion-focused and resistive regimes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hubbard, R.F.; Lampe, M.; Fernsler, R.; Slinker, S.P.

1993-01-01

Pinched propagation of intense relativistic electron beams occurs in several distinct pressure regimes. In low density gases (∼ 1-100 mtorr), the beam propagates in the ion-focused regime (IFR). The beam ionizes the neutral gas, and plasma electrons are ejected, leaving behind a positive ion column which pinches the beam electrostatically. At gas densities near 1 atm, the beam-generated plasma is resistive and the pinch effect is provided by the self-magnetic field of the beam. Beam transport experiments in both regimes have been performed on the Advanced Test Accelerator (ATA) at Lawrence Livermore National Lab. and on SuperIBEX at the Naval Research Lab. IFR methods have been employed in both experiments to transport the beam prior to injection into the air and to introduce a head-to-tail taper in the beam radius. IFR simulations have shown how the resulting beam radius and emittance profiles are influenced by gas density, chamber dimensions and entrance and exit foils. Beam propagation in dense gas is subject to disruption by the resistive hose instability. However, both experiments and simulations have shown that the emittance variation introduced by IFR transport can substantially reduce the growth of the hose instability. Both experiments have also propagated beams in reduced-density channels. Simulations predict that the channel may in some cases produce a moderate stabilizing and tracking effect arising from plasma currents flowing at the edge of the channel

The European dimension in non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Krause, J.

1996-01-01

Europe was for decades the focal point of efforts to prevent or constrain nuclear proliferation and the first region in which non-proliferation efforts failed. Paper deals with current proliferation problems in Europe, namely, diversion of weapons, diversion from dismantling, production over-capacity, security concerns. Legal instruments against proliferation in Europe described here include development of international norms; instruments of security assurance and cooperation; disarmament assistance; fissile material management; assistance in creating export control systems; improving and harmonizing export controls for dual-purpose items. Problems in implementing non-proliferation instruments are described separately

Nuclear exports and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Courteix, Simone.

1978-01-01

Increased preoccupation in present times with the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the multiplication of international agreements such as the Non-proliferation Treaty and in the strengthening of consultations between industrialised countries (London Club). After analysing the IAEA safeguards system under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its shortcomings both technically and otherwise, the author considers how this situation can be remedied in the light of the London Agreements and in view of the position of the main countries concerned. The annex to the book contains the texts of many international agreements and relevant national regulations as well as nuclear policy statements. It also includes a detailed bibliograaphy. (NEA) [fr

Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

2015-01-01

The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.; Haeckel, E.; Haefele, W.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Ungerer, W.

1991-01-01

During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP) [de

On the non-proliferation framework of Japan's peaceful nuclear utilization program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kano, Takashi

1996-01-01

The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the NPT) convened in New York, from April 17 to May 12, 1995 and decided that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely, after reviewing the operation and affirming some aspects of the NPT, while emphasizing the ''Decision on Strengthening the Review Process'' for the NPT and the ''Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,'' also adopted by the Conference. In parallel, Japan made its basic non-proliferation policy clear in the ''Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy'' which was decided by the Atomic Energy Commission (chaired by Mikio Oomi, then Minister of the Science and Technology Agency of Japan) in June 1994. The Long-Term Program discusses various problems facing post-Cold-War international society and describes Japan's policy for establishing international confidence concerning non-proliferation. This paper summarizes Japan's non-proliferation policy as articulated in the Long-Term Program, and describes some results of an analysis comparing the Long-Term Program with the resolutions on the international non-proliferation frameworks adopted by the NPT conference

Inter-relations between regional and global approaches to nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simpson, J.

1995-01-01

It is now becoming evident that the end of the East-West conflict has had a significant effect upon both global and regional security structures. From a situation where regional arrangements were, in the main, determined and driven by pressures arising from the bipolar division which permeated all aspects of the global political system, they increasingly have an independent existence. This has enabled such arrangements to be tailored to local circumstances in a manner which is not possible with global agreements. In particular, it has become apparent that enhanced constraints on peaceful nuclear activities and much more intrusive inspection and monitoring procedures, can more easily be negotiated on a regional basis than a global one. It also appears that nuclear weapon states are prepared to make unconditional commitments about nuclear weapon use on a regional basis, whereas they may not be prepared to do so on a global one. In short, regional approaches enable fine-tuning of the international non-proliferation regime to occur, and for measures to be taken on a regional level that would be politically unacceptable on the global level, due to their discriminatory nature. In the years ahead additional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) agreements may be negotiated, covering more of the land area of the globe. In parallel, regional nuclear cooperation and safeguarding agreements might also be expected to develop along the lines of EURATOM and ABACC. This in turn may move the states which remain outside of the NPT to a similar position to Argentina and Brazil at the moment: to an acceptance that whatever their opposition in principle to the NPT and the system of supplier export guidelines, the commitments they have already accepted on a regional level are more intrusive and constraining than those they would incur if they were to have acceded to the Treaty. In these circumstances, accession to the NPT becomes a distinct possibility, and thus the regional approach to non-proliferation

Proliferation and Nonproliferation in the Early Twenty-First Century. The Permanent Five Hold the Key to Success

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Santoro, David

2012-01-01

It is a truth universally acknowledged that nuclear proliferation constitutes a threat to international peace and security. However little known its causes may be, this truth is so well fixed in international public consciousness that it is considered an utmost requirement to address the problem expeditiously. Is the international community indeed properly geared to respond quickly, strongly, and unanimously to proliferation? If so, how? Writing for Foreign Affairs in 1961, the late Fred Ikle asked, 'After Detection-What?'He expressed concerns that the international community focused too exclusively on how to detect violations to arms control agreements. He explained that determining the consequences of violations after detection was also essential and described 'a program to deter evasion', but remained pessimistic about its prospects for success. Four decades later, in a 2001 article for the Nonproliferation Review, Brad Roberts assessed how the problem had changed. He showed that many policy tools had been developed, but that they did not guarantee success. Anticipating many of the debates of the 2000's, he reflected on the dilemma of resorting to multilateral action (sanctioned by the UN Security Council) or US unilateral action, and concluded that there was a crisis of confidence about the nonproliferation regime and the role of the major powers. Over ten years have passed since Roberts's review article. It is now a good time to stand back and take stock of how the problem has evolved. To this end, this paper begins with an assessment of the nonproliferation landscape between 2001 and 2011 by looking at the changes that affected the proliferation problem itself, the tools to address that problem, and the actors involved in the process to solve it. Although progress was made to better tackle it, the paper suggests that pessimism is in order today. On that basis, it moves on to explore what the 'winning agenda' might be, what it entails, and what the prospects

Non-proliferation aspects of long term assurance of supply

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

The meetings in this section deal with the non-proliferation aspects of long-term assurance of supply of the nuclear fuel cycle. A list of 12 fundamental questions concerning the observation and application of the non-proliferation regulations is followed by the comments made by representatives of 10 countries

A Digest of Nonproliferation Literature.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Duggan, Ruth A

2006-04-01

In preparation for the 2005 US/Russian Weapons Laboratories Directors Meeting, the six laboratories participating in the meeting endeavored to develop a strategy for nonproliferation technology research and development. A literature review was conducted to identify possible areas of technical collaboration and technology opportunities associated with improving nonproliferation associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The issue of multinationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was also researched. This digest is the compilation of one-page summaries used by management of the three US nuclear weapons laboratories in preparation for strategy development. Where possible, the Web site address of the complete paper is referenced.3 AcknowledgementsThe author wishes to thank Jessica Ruyle, Nancy Orlando-Gay, and Barbara Dry for their research assistance and contributions.4

The Office of Safeguards and Security Nonproliferation Support Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Desmond, W.J.

1996-01-01

The Nonproliferation Support Program was established in the Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security on october 1, 1995. its mission includes providing assistance to Departmental efforts for improved international material protection, control and accounting programs by coordinating and leveraging domestic safeguards and security policy, practice and experience into the international arena. A major objective of the program is to balance US national security requirements with global support of the nonproliferation objectives. This paper describes the organization of the Office of Safeguards and Security and the Nonproliferation Support Program role and responsibility, and presents some of the current areas of program emphasis and activity

Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leek, K.M.

2006-01-01

Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat of proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.

Emerging Trends in Development of International Information Security Regime

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Elena S. Zinovieva

2016-01-01

Full Text Available The article discusses the key trends shaping the international regime on information security. International cooperation in this area at the global level encounters contradictions of state interest. The main actors of the information security are the United States, Russia, China and the EU countries (Britain, France and Germany. The main contradiction is developing between the US on one side and Russia and China on the other. EU countries occupy the middle position, gravitating to that of US. The article proves that international cooperation on information security will reflect the overall logic of the development of international cooperation, which is characterized by a new model of cooperation, with the participation of state and non-state actors, known as multi-stakeholder partnerships and multi-level cooperation. The logic of the formation of an international regime on information security is closest to the logic of the formation of the international non-proliferation regime. It is in the interest of Russia to support the trend towards regionalization of information security regime. Russia can form a regional information security regime in the former Soviet Union on the basis of the CSTO and SCO and potentially on a wider Eurasian space. Such regional regime would give Russia an opportunity to shape the international regime and closely monitor emerging information security issues in the former Soviet Union, and remove the potential threat of "color revolutions".

Nuclear non-proliferation: failures and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Imai, R.; Press, R.

1980-01-01

The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of combined political and technical attempts to achieve worldwide acceptance of a commitment to non-proliferation, to note failures to date, and to identify essential factors to be satisfied if greater and necessary success is to be achieved in the immediate future. For this it is necessary to separate the realism and unrealism so often involved in discussing the concept of non-proliferation, as defined above, particularly if treated as a moral principle rather than as part of a general security issue reflecting shifts in regional and global stability. The political nature of the non-proliferation problem is underlined by the fact that whereas five nuclear weapon states are currently accepted, any threatened increase in that number is discouraged by every possible peaceful means. This fact combines political acceptance of an existing international situation with a belief that any addition to the present number must lead to international instability. Success in preventing additions may be more readily achieved through political understanding and perhaps some compromises, in particular cases, rather than through seeking a universal solution to a generalized problem

Verification lessons learned and CTBT's contribution to disarmament and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zerbo, L.

2013-01-01

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all nuclear tests for any purposes. The CTBT is essential for peace and security; it is a core element of the nonproliferation regime. It limits the ability of countries to develop advanced nuclear weapons technology. It is enforced through the extensive International Monitoring System designed to detect and deter nuclear explosions in atmosphere, underwater and underground. In the process of monitoring and detecting a potential nuclear test - the system registers over 30,000 events a year - the vast majority of them are earthquakes. The civil and scientific applications of the CTBT data can be used to gain better understanding of the earth, of climate change, of volcanic ash clouds, of the tsunamis, of the movements of whales and much more. The CTBT sets a new legal and verification standard for nuclear weapons. It is a non-discriminatory Treaty with the same rights and obligations for all Member States. Its verification regime is equally nondiscriminatory and provides equal access for all Member States to CTBTO data. We are driving to achieve 160 ratifications by the end of the year, and this will provide additional momentum towards entry into force (EIF) and universality. (A.C.)

Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoshisaki, M.B.

1993-01-01

The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-proliferation : 60 Years of IAEA and EURATOM

CERN Document Server

Abousahl, Said; Plastino, Wolfango

2018-01-01

This open access book examines key aspects of international cooperation to enhance nuclear safety, security, safeguards, and non-proliferation, thereby assisting in development and maintenance of the verification regime and fostering progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world. The book opens by addressing important political, institutional, and legal dimensions. Current challenges are discussed and attempts made to identify possible solutions and future improvements. Subsequent sections consider scientific developments that have the potential to increase the effectiveness of implementation of international regimes, particularly in critical areas, technology foresight, and the ongoing evaluation of current capabilities. The closing sections examine scientific and technical challenges and discuss the role of international cooperation and actions of the scientific community in leading the world toward peace and security. The book – which celebrates 60 years of IAEA Atoms for Peace and Development and the EURA...

Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, Harald

2011-01-01

The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, R.J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Harry, R J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2015-01-01

The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

Non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Manley, I.T.

1981-01-01

Proliferation is a problem that can only be solved when the political problems which lead countries to contemplate, the possession of nuclear weapons are solved; in the meantime it can only be managed. Non-proliferation policy has to deal both with the political and the technical aspects of proliferation. It must seek to buy time by addressing the reasons why nations feel the political need to construct nuclear weapons, as well as delaying the moment when such nations feel capable of doing so. The subject is examined and proposals made. (author)

Non-proliferation and disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ritter von Wagner, A.

1993-01-01

In 1995 the Conference on the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will take place. Will it be extended for a long term, indefinitely or only for a fixed period? The Federal Government of Germany advocates an unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others have different ideas alleging that the Treaty is imperfect and discriminating. It is a thorn in the side of many States, in particular of the Third World, which no longer want to put up with being treated as second-class states. One argument which is considered especially embarrassing by developing countries as a visible expression of such discrimination, are the nuclear tests which are still carried out by nuclear weapon states. Is the political situation still such that one needs those weapons? Strategists gradually find it difficult to argument; over and over again they claim that an abandonment of nuclear weapons would make the world unsafer. But development has gradually passed over them. Nevertheless, one finds it hard to throw overboard considerations which for years have determined one's thinking. (orig./HSCH) [de

The new US nuclear non-proliferation and export policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Welck, S. von.

1981-01-01

The future American nuclear non-proliferation and export policy will be determined chiefly by three elements: (1) Adherence to the former objective of nuclear non-proliferation. (2) A large and varied assortment of old and new tools for implementing this goal. (3) Much more differentiation in applying these tools in the light of the reliability, with respect to non-proliferation policy, of the respective partner. Consequently, it would make little sense for the new Administration to force upon allied industrialized countries, whose nuclear technologies are at the same level as that of the United States, restrictive rules on reprocessing and breeder technology. The new measures designed to curb proliferation are especially meant to destroy motivations that could cause states to own nuclear explosives. This also applies to the removal of economic motivations. (orig.) [de

The theory and simulation of relativistic electron beam transport in the ion-focused regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Swanekamp, S.B.; Holloway, J.P.; Kammash, T.; Gilgenbach, R.M.

1992-01-01

Several recent experiments involving relativistic electron beam (REB) transport in plasma channels show two density regimes for efficient transport; a low-density regime known as the ion-focused regime (IFR) and a high-pressure regime. The results obtained in this paper use three separate models to explain the dependency of REB transport efficiency on the plasma density in the IFR. Conditions for efficient beam transport are determined by examining equilibrium solutions of the Vlasov--Maxwell equations under conditions relevant to IFR transport. The dynamic force balance required for efficient IFR transport is studied using the particle-in-cell (PIC) method. These simulations provide new insight into the transient beam front physics as well as the dynamic approach to IFR equilibrium. Nonlinear solutions to the beam envelope are constructed to explain oscillations in the beam envelope observed in the PIC simulations but not contained in the Vlasov equilibrium analysis. A test particle analysis is also developed as a method to visualize equilibrium solutions of the Vlasov equation. This not only provides further insight into the transport mechanism but also illustrates the connections between the three theories used to describe IFR transport. Separately these models provide valuable information about transverse beam confinement; together they provide a clear physical understanding of REB transport in the IFR

Multilateral Cooperation on Nonproliferation

Science.gov (United States)

2012-10-01

Nathan E . Busch and Daniel H. Joyner, eds., Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy (Athens, GA...or the World Bank . These organizations receive contributions from member states but have their own...Opening Reception Jack’s Lounge , Portola Hotel Friday, March 30, 2010 Timeline Content Delivery 7:30-8:30 Breakfast and Registration Cottonwood

Experience in non-proliferation verification: The Treaty of Raratonga

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walker, R.A.

1998-01-01

The verification provisions of the Treaty of Raratonga are subdivided into two categories: those performed by IAEA and those performed by other entities. A final provision of the Treaty of Raratonga is relevant to IAEA safeguards according to support of the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. The non-IAEA verification process is described as well

Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant Ltd., Vienna (Austria)

2000-06-15

convinced understanding and opinion of the Swedish Support Programme Management that the States in question are seriously motivated and are carrying out an ambitious work to develop and improve their national non-proliferation regimes, in spite of their shortcomings concerning financial and human resources. For those States, with which Sweden has established support and co-operation programmes with 'full-scope' non-proliferation objectives, it is judged that the goals reached, up till now, are very satisfactory, and that the States in question have come a long way towards the fulfilment of international requirements. The Programme is now entering a third phase and the future Programme plans are currently under consideration. A broad outlook of the future activities is made in chapter D of this report.

Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite; Wredberg, L.

2000-06-01

convinced understanding and opinion of the Swedish Support Programme Management that the States in question are seriously motivated and are carrying out an ambitious work to develop and improve their national non-proliferation regimes, in spite of their shortcomings concerning financial and human resources. For those States, with which Sweden has established support and co-operation programmes with 'full-scope' non-proliferation objectives, it is judged that the goals reached, up till now, are very satisfactory, and that the States in question have come a long way towards the fulfilment of international requirements. The Programme is now entering a third phase and the future Programme plans are currently under consideration. A broad outlook of the future activities is made in chapter D of this report

Environmental sampling: Issues for the cut-off regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fearey, B.L.

1995-01-01

The fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) initiative under the Conference on Disarmament mandate is envisioned to include certain aspects of environmental sampling and monitoring. One of the intents of this treaty is to bring certain non-NPT signatories (e.g., threshold states) under this treaty agreement along with the nuclear weapon states (NWSs). This paper provides a brief overview of some of the relevant issues that may be involved in the implementation and use of environmental monitoring for (1) verification of the cut-off regime declarations, (2) the detection of undeclared activities, and, (3) application in non-routine inspections. The intent is to provide backstopping information important for treaty negotiators. Specific issues addressed within this paper include signature sampling, differences in the proposed detection regime, potential signature integrators, specific examples and spoofing concerns. Many of these issues must be carefully considered and weighed in order to create a credibly verifiable inspection regime. Importantly, the cut-off treaty must enable nondiscriminatory implementation, while carefully assuring that nonproliferation treaty requirements are maintained (i.e., preventing unintentional release of critical weapons design information--potentially through environmental sampling and analysis)

Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-03-01

This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community.

Perspectives and benefits of the non-proliferating fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Parker, F.

2012-01-01

The world community has faced the issues of nuclear non-proliferation for decades. Frank Parker, Emeritus Distinguished Professor at Vanderbilt University, has proposed a non-proliferating fuel cycle, which greatly reduces the risk of use of nuclear materials for military purpose. A simplified fuel cycle with reduced opportunities for proliferation of nuclear weapons and permanent disposal of radioactive wastes as well as a reference sub-seabed HLW disposal system are described [ru

The IAEA and non-proliferation: is quiescence progress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Herron, L.W.

1983-01-01

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current status of more important non-proliferation aspects affecting or involving the IAEA. The questions dealt with cover in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Committee on Assurances of Supply established by the IAEA in 1980 and the International Plutonium Storage Study prepared by an IAEA expert group. The author concludes that in a number of areas involving this Agency, recent considerable activity at both political and technical levels has produced few tangible results althrough the situation is not static. (NEA) [fr

Linear and non-linear calculations of the hose instability in the ion-focused regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buchanan, H.L.

1982-01-01

A simple model is adopted to study the hose instability of an intense relativistic electron beam in a partially neutralized, low density ion channel (ion focused regime). Equations of motion for the beam and the channel are derived and linearized to obtain an approximate dispersion relation. The non-linear equations of motion are then solved numerically and the results compared to linearized data

Historical survey of nonproliferation policies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, B.

1977-01-01

This paper briefly surveys the successive nonproliferation policies and their influence on international commerce and the reaction of the countries where they were applied: the war policy, secrecy policy, liberal policy, safeguarded assistance policy, nonproliferation treaty policy, suppliers' policy, French policy, and the no weapon-usable material policy. It is emphasized that any new solution of the problem must not appear to delay or limit in any way a nation's access to nuclear energy, nor to make any countries dependent on others to meet their energy requirements. Therefore, in the choice of a future policy, political considerations are more important than technical or legal ones. The greatest catalyst of proliferation is the spread of national autarchic programs, and these can only be avoided within a general climate of international trust. The escalation of mistrust between the countries possessing the technological information and those desiring it must be dispelled. Such a policy will have to be clear and stable

Cooperative transparency for nonproliferation. Technology demonstrations at the Joyo test bed for advanced remote monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Betsill, J. David; Hashimoto, Yu

2009-01-01

The term 'Transparency' has been used widely by many authors and practitioners for various purposes, and there is an assortment of definitions for the term. These definitions vary depending on the field in which the term is used and within the context of its usage. For the purposes of our current project on regional, cooperative nonproliferation transparency and remote monitoring, the relevant field is nuclear nonproliferation, and in this context, we define the term Cooperative Nonproliferation Transparency as: 'Providing sufficient and appropriate information to a cooperating party so that they can independently develop their own evaluation and assessment of the reviewed party regarding their consistency with nonproliferation goals.' Key aspects of cooperative nonproliferation transparency activities include mutually agreeing upon the type of information or data that will be shared, how it will be collected, and who has access to that information. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency's (JAEA) Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) has been exploring the possible use, development, and application of methods and technologies for Cooperative Transparency for Nonproliferation to support regional confidence building and cooperation n the peaceful use of nuclear energy throughout the East Asia region. (author)

Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shea, M.

2000-01-01

Fissionable materials are common to all nuclear weapons and controls on the production, storage, processing and use of fissionable materials provides one means to address non-proliferation and disarmament. In this article, the relevance of such controls is examined and the current situation and future prospects are assessed. (authors)

URENCO: A Multinational Contribution to Non-Proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Korbmacher, T.

2015-01-01

URENCO was founded in 1970 following the signing of the Treaty of Almelo by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The fundamental principles for effective supervision of URENCO's technology and enrichment operations with respect to non-proliferation issues have been laid down in this treaty. In order to enable the construction of a URENCO enrichment facility in the USA and to permit the transfer of classified information into the USA, another treaty has been concluded in 1992. The US government entered into the Treaty of Washington together with the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to ensure that the same conditions that had been agreed in the Treaty of Almelo would also apply to the US. To allow for the completion of the joint venture with Areva regarding the URENCO Group's technology business ETC, the Treaty of Cardiff has been signed on 12 July 2005 by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France. Through this treaty, France is obliged to adhere to the principles of the Treaty of Almelo. For each treaty, control bodies have been formed with representatives of the governments of the signatory countries. These committees exercise the role of effective supervision of the technology and operations with respect to non-proliferation issues. They also consider all questions concerning the safeguards system (as established by IAEA/Euratom), classification arrangements and security procedures, exports of the technology and enriched uranium, as well as other non-proliferation issues. The presentation describes how the multinational structure of URENCO contributes to Non-Proliferation on the basis of the above mentioned treaties. Beyond that, the international cross linking of operational working groups and committees within the URENCO Group structure is explained. This structure implies an additional assurance to achieve the safeguards goals set. (author)

Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1978-01-01

This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

New dimensions in nonproliferation -- An International Atomic Energy Agency view

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pelland, B.

1994-01-01

Four years ago, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait with the intention of annexing it as Iraq's 19th state. The disclosure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the aftermath of the Gulf War--through the IAEA inspections--signaled the end of one proliferation era and the start of the next. In the author's remarks here, he has found it useful to identify four distinct proliferation eras, each with different features, each calling for different emphasis in international nonproliferation efforts. They provide a convenient way to look at the history of nonproliferation, and to look into the future and to the new dimensions in nonproliferation that are slowly emerging. Since the Gulf War, the nuclear world experienced a series of events of fundamental significance that changed the nature of nonproliferation, forcing changes in the mission of the IAEA and its methods. Certainly some of these events came in the form of unpleasant surprises, such as in Iraq, but very positive progress was also made on other fronts. He would like to share some perceptions of the events creating the present situation, and some views anticipating the requirements most likely to emerge in the coming years

Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: A status report. Vienna, 14 March 2001

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2001-01-01

For more than half a century, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. Further meaningful progress towards a nuclear weapon free world will demand that we re-examine our fundamental concept of what security means and how it can best be achieved. The following specific areas where our attention should be focused are discussed briefly: the historical perspective, current strategies for non-proliferation and disarmament, and the future prospects

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

Science.gov (United States)

Middleton, Tiffany Willey

2010-01-01

In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation.

Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young

2015-01-01

In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation

Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report; ANNUAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NONE

2000-01-01

This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community

The emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Potter, W.C.

1990-01-01

The number of states capable of exporting nuclear material, technology, equipment, and services is large and growing. Once confined primarily to states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the list of actual and potential nuclear suppliers now includes many countries that do not subscribe to the NPT or to other international nuclear export control agreements. Although international control accords---such as the Nuclear Exporters' (Zangger) Committee and the London Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines---do not prohibit the export of sensitive nuclear materials and equipment, they do reduce the risks of proliferation by imposing international safeguards as a condition for export. The purpose of this book---the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on the emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation---is to remedy, at least in part, this data deficiency

Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nilsson, A.

1999-01-01

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

Speckle-scale focusing in the diffusive regime with time reversal of variance-encoded light (TROVE)

Science.gov (United States)

Judkewitz, Benjamin; Wang, Ying Min; Horstmeyer, Roarke; Mathy, Alexandre; Yang, Changhuei

2013-04-01

Focusing of light in the diffusive regime inside scattering media has long been considered impossible. Recently, this limitation has been overcome with time reversal of ultrasound-encoded light (TRUE), but the resolution of this approach is fundamentally limited by the large number of optical modes within the ultrasound focus. Here, we introduce a new approach, time reversal of variance-encoded light (TROVE), which demixes these spatial modes by variance encoding to break the resolution barrier imposed by the ultrasound. By encoding individual spatial modes inside the scattering sample with unique variances, we effectively uncouple the system resolution from the size of the ultrasound focus. This enables us to demonstrate optical focusing and imaging with diffuse light at an unprecedented, speckle-scale lateral resolution of ~5 µm.

Speckle-scale focusing in the diffusive regime with time-reversal of variance-encoded light (TROVE).

Science.gov (United States)

Judkewitz, Benjamin; Wang, Ying Min; Horstmeyer, Roarke; Mathy, Alexandre; Yang, Changhuei

2013-04-01

Focusing of light in the diffusive regime inside scattering media has long been considered impossible. Recently, this limitation has been overcome with time reversal of ultrasound-encoded light (TRUE), but the resolution of this approach is fundamentally limited by the large number of optical modes within the ultrasound focus. Here, we introduce a new approach, time reversal of variance-encoded light (TROVE), which demixes these spatial modes by variance-encoding to break the resolution barrier imposed by the ultrasound. By encoding individual spatial modes inside the scattering sample with unique variances, we effectively uncouple the system resolution from the size of the ultrasound focus. This enables us to demonstrate optical focusing and imaging with diffuse light at unprecedented, speckle-scale lateral resolution of ~ 5 μm.

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING RELIABLE NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICE APPROACHES: ECONOMIC AND NON-PROLIFERATION MERITS OF NUCLEAR FUEL LEASING

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kreyling, Sean J.; Brothers, Alan J.; Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.

2010-01-01

The goal of international nuclear policy since the dawn of nuclear power has been the peaceful expansion of nuclear energy while controlling the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Numerous initiatives undertaken in the intervening decades to develop international agreements on providing nuclear fuel supply assurances, or reliable nuclear fuel services (RNFS) attempted to control the spread of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. In order to inform the international debate and the development of government policy, PNNL has been developing an analytical framework to holistically evaluate the economics and non-proliferation merits of alternative approaches to managing the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., cradle-to-grave). This paper provides an overview of the analytical framework and discusses preliminary results of an economic assessment of one RNFS approach: full-service nuclear fuel leasing. The specific focus of this paper is the metrics under development to systematically evaluate the non-proliferation merits of fuel-cycle management alternatives. Also discussed is the utility of an integrated assessment of the economics and non-proliferation merits of nuclear fuel leasing.

Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Streeper, Charles Blamires

2009-01-01

In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMD related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the

Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation in East Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hwang, Yong Soo

2009-07-01

KAERI has jointly worked with Sandia National Laboratories for Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia for the last five years. This project aims at support activities in this joint project between two states. The annual meetings were held during the project period, the 4th one in 2008 and the 5th one in 2009. In addition code comparison between KAERI and SNL's codes for assessing the back-end fuel cycle options was carried out. This project strongly enhances the close tie for the non-proliferation, transparency and safeguards among Korea Japan China Taiwan the United States Russia Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Thailand Vietnam and others for the project period

The Rarotonga treaty: regional approach to non-proliferation in the South Pacific

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Papadimitropulos, P.

1988-01-01

The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation in the South-Pacific-the Rarotonga treaty - is discussed. The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation is aimed in a wide sense at the assistance to detante in a certain region and the propagation of measures strengthening confidence there. On December 11, 1975 at the initiative of New Zealand and Fiji the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the nuclear-free zone in the South-Pacific. In compliance with the Rarotonga treaty a large nuclear-free zone is created. The participants of the Rarotonga Treaty assess the values of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kimura, Naohito; Naoi, Yosuke

2010-01-01

In April 2010, at the Nuclear Security Summit, Japan demonstrated its commitment to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security and announced the establishment of the Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), under the guidance and authority of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Science and Technology (MEXT), and in cooperation with other ministries. The goal of the Center is to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and security in emerging nuclear power countries by sharing Japan's accumulated experiences in its peaceful use of nuclear energy. To achieve its goal, the Center serves three functions: (1) human resource and capacity building, (2) infrastructure development and technical assistance and (3) international coordination and cooperation. The Center will offer three types of training courses to strengthen human resources and capacity building in emerging nuclear power countries. In the Training Course on Nuclear Security, the participants will learn the design and evaluation process for physical protection and detection of and response to illegal or unauthorized acts related to nuclear materials. They will learn these issues not only through lectures and training but also using mockup facilities and virtual reality systems. Second, in the Training Course on Safeguards and State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), the Center will teach the experience of advanced safeguards activities in Japan for its full-scale nuclear fuel cycle facilities as a non-nuclear weapon state. The participants will learn the IAEA and national safeguards systems, the material accounting system and inspector activities. Third, in the Training on the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Framework, the participants will learn the international framework of nuclear non-proliferation including the IAEA safeguards system and

Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shinohara, Nobuo; Kokaji, Lisa; Ichimasa, Sukeyuki

2010-01-01

In Global Center of Excellence Program of The University of Tokyo, Non- Proliferation Study Committee by the members of nuclear industries, electricity utilities, nuclear energy institutes and universities has initiated on October 2008 from the viewpoints of investigating a package of measures for nuclear non-proliferation and bringing up young people who will support the near-future nuclear energy system. One of the non-proliferation issues in the Committee is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Objective of this treaty is to cease all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosion. This purpose should be contributed effectively to the political stability of the Asian region by continuous efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons. In the Committee, by extracting several issues related to the CTBT, conception of 'Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation' has been discussed with the aim of the nuclear-weapon security in Asian region, where environmental nuclear-test monitoring data is mainly treated and utilized. In this paper, the conception of the 'network' is presented in detail. (author)

Nuclear power generation and nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walske, C.

1978-01-01

In the future outlook around year 2000 of nuclear power, thought must be given to fuel reprocessing and plutonium utilization. The adverse utilization of plutonium may be prevented by the means balanced with its economical value. As the method of less cost with lower effect of nonproliferation, combination of fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities and mixed plutonium/uranium processing are possible. As the method of more cost with higher effect of nonproliferation the maintenance of high radioactivity and inaccessibility of plutonium is conceivable. As for the agreeable methods in 2000, seven principles may be mentioned, such as the dependence upon the agreements among major nations and upon nuclear exporting countries. These are still inadequate, however. What is important is to provide with the sufficient safeguards to countries concerned to negate the need for nuclear weapons. Efforts are then necessary for leading nuclear countries to extend aids to other nuclear-oriented countries. (Mori, K.)

Establishment of Japan Atomic Energy Agency and strategy for nuclear non-proliferation studies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Senzaki, Masao; Kurasaki, Takaaki; Inoue, Naoko

2005-01-01

Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) was established on October 1, 2005, after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute. JAEA is the only governmental nuclear research and development institute in Japan. It will engage in research activities ranging from basic research to practical applications in the nuclear field and will operate research laboratories, reactors, a reprocessing plant and a fuel fabrication plant. At the same time, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was also established inside of JAEA to conduct the studies on the strategy for nuclear nonproliferation studies. Five roles that JAEA should play for nuclear nonproliferation were identified and four offices were established in the center to carry out those five roles effectively. To conduct the research and development for nuclear nonproliferation efficiently, the center aims to be a 'Research Hub' based on Partnership' with other organizations. (author)

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-12-19

NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States.

First annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to annual report to Congress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

Section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) requires that DOE's Annual Report include views and recommendations regarding non-proliferation policies and actions for which the Department is responsible. The Act also requires a detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative fuel cycles, including an unclassified summary and a comprehensive version containing relevant classified information. The goals of United States non-proliferation policy are to minimize the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a stable international environment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy

The strengthening of international regime of protection of the nuclear materials and other radioactive sources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shiganbayev, E.

2001-01-01

Full text: The widening of export streams satisfies the interest of any state, but at the same time the interests of individual countries and the whole international community requires the limitation of export of goods and technologies which are potentially dangerous. The decision of this problem, finding of the optimal balance between the devotion of the principles of free trade and the necessity of limiting the danger export is one of the main tasks of the national system of security of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a country with a policy of nonproliferation. This important element of the policy of the country, directed to maintenance and strengthening of the international security, becomes the priority trend in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan. The international community decides this problem under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on the Destruction, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction. At present there are four international regimes in control with the aim of nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD): The group of the nuclear supplies which deals with the questions of delivery of special nuclear materials and technologies, and also nuclear materials and double function technologies; Australian group works in the sphere of control for materials and technologies of chemical and biological weapons; The regime of the control of rocket technologies functioning with the aim to prevent the proliferation of rockets as means of delivery of weapon of mass destruction; Wassenaar agreement, regime of export control for usual armament, goods and double function technologies. Kazakhstan does not have nuclear weapons and participants in the Agreement

Developing Effluent Analysis Technologies to Support Nonproliferation Initiatives, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies, Third quarter 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Schubert, S A; Staehle, G; Alonzo, G M [eds.

1995-01-01

This issue provides an overview of the Effluent Research Program of the DOE Office of Research and Development, highlighting a number of representative projects within this program in support of nonproliferation initiatives. Technologies reported include portable instruments for on-site inspections, standoff detectors, fieldable, real-time instruments, field collection techniques, and ultrasensitive laboratory techniques.

Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abdelwahab, Biad

2010-01-01

context marked by conflicting signs in terms of non-proliferation and disarmament, e.g. a new American administration more open to multilateralism and proliferation crises (A). The nuclear non-proliferation regime of which the NPT is the touchstone is based on a complex balance between the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, non-proliferation control requirements and commitment to disarmament. However, major challenges are weakening that balance underpinning the 'global nuclear order'

76 FR 68809 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-11-07

..., Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation, Bureau of International Security and... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7678] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Proliferation Sanctions Against a Foreign Person AGENCY...

Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

1996-01-01

The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage on options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to bum the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the nonproliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

1996-01-01

The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage imposition options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to burn the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the non-proliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

How we think about peace and security. The ABCs of initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation education

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toki, Masako; Potter, William C.

2005-01-01

Education and training are among the most important but underutilized tools for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. Although few national governments or international organizations have invested significantly in such training programs, there is a growing recognition among States of the need to rectify this situation. This positive development is reflected in the broad support for recommendations of a UN study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and in related initiatives within the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the forthcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference, it is useful to take stock of the implementation of the UN study's recommendations. In particular, it is important to observe the progress that has been made within the context of the NPT review process, as well as the obstacles that must be overcome if the full potential for disarmament and non-proliferation education is to be realized. Resources on disarmament and non-proliferation education are increasingly available on the Internet. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs has launched new features on its web site that include links to academic institutes, governmental centers, NGOs and other bodies engaged in educational efforts. As part of its mission to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and raising global public awareness on WMD issues, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) has developed a series of tutorials for non-proliferation and disarmament education. Among these tutorials, the NPT Tutorial has been designed to educate and provide useful material about the treaty through interactive text and enriched multimedia segments, including timelines, maps, and numerous links to relevant resources. Among other resources are teaching guides developed by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies through its Critical Issues Forum (CIF). More

Reforming the non-proliferation system in the 1980s

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilmshurst, M.J.

1984-01-01

The non-proliferation policies of the 1970s were based largely on the misconception that the main danger lay in the possible misuse of civil nuclear-power plants for the production of weapon materials. In consequence their aim, whether by means of denial or control, was to ensure that such misuse was made more difficult in all countries with nuclear-power industries. Less attention was paid to the potential for misuse of the nuclear-research plants in the handful of countries outside the non-proliferation system. The resulting difficulties placed in the way of countries developing their nuclear-power industries damaged relations between the supplier and the consumer states, and discredited any new efforts aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation system. By contrast, the 1980s began, first in INFCE and then in the Committee on Assurances of Supply, with a concerted attempt to re-establish a dialogue based on a relationship of trust between the supplier and the customer states. But a restored consensus will not, on its own, deal with the problem of those states that are outside the non-proliferation system and that have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The outcome of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply may help to attract some of those states into the system, but more needs to be done either by adapting the NPT, making adherence to it appear more attractive, or by devising some alternative code of behaviour for states not party to the Treaty and by seeking to remove the political obstacles that lie in the way of at least some of the potential weapon states adhering to the Treaty

Trends and challenges in global arms control regimes: Implications for the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lehman, R.F. II

1994-06-01

In another sense, however, the nuclear age and ballistic missiles long ago created a much smaller world in which the distinctions between global and regional security have been lessened. In an age of weapons of mass destruction, any point on the earth can find itself suddenly at the center of world attention. This makes it all the more important that we understand all of the arms control tools available, including global approaches. In discussing global arms control regimes, I will focus primarily on those that are open to universal membership such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or which have global reach, such as certain export control and supplier regimes. It is important to remember, however, that certain regional, bilateral, and even unilateral arms control measures can have a global impact as well. One need only witness the impact of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). Despite its mere {open_quotes}Atlantic to the Urals{close_quotes} focus, the CFE treaty helped change the political and strategic calculations of the entire world. Likewise, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with its headquarters in Vienna, is centered on Europe but spreads from Vancouver to Vladivostok (or perhaps we should say from Amchitka to Kamchatka), circumnavigating much of the northern hemisphere when measured the long way around via North America. The political significance of its successes and failures outdistance CSCE`s geographical spread.

Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pomper, Miles A.

2010-01-01

Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

University-level Non-proliferation and Safeguards Education and Human Capital Development Activities at Brookhaven National Laboratory

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bachner K. M.; Pepper, S.; Gomera, J.; Einwechter, M.; Toler, L. T.

2016-07-24

BNL has offered Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century,? referred to as NNSS, every year since 2009 for graduate students in technical and policy fields related to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. The course focuses on relevant policy issues, in addition to technical components, and is part of a larger NGSI short course initiative that includes separate courses that are delivered at three other national laboratories and NNSA headquarters. [SCHOLZ and ROSENTHAL] The course includes lectures from esteemed nonproliferation experts, tours of various BNL facilities and laboratories, and in-field and table-top exercises on both technical and policy subjects. Topics include the history of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other relevant treaties, the history of and advances in international nuclear safeguards, current relevant political situations in countries such as Iran, Iraq, and the Democratic Peoples? Republic of Korea (DPRK), nuclear science and technology, instrumentation and techniques used for verification activities, and associated research and development. The students conduct a mock Design Information Verification (DIV) at BNL?s decommissioned Medical Research Reactor. The capstone of the course includes a series of student presentations in which students act as policy advisors and provide recommendations in response to scenarios involving a current nonproliferation related event that are prepared by the course organizers. ?The course is open to domestic and foreign students, and caters to students in, entering, or recently having completed graduate school. Interested students must complete an application and provide a resume and a statement describing their interest in the course. Eighteen to 22 students attend annually; 165 students have completed the course to date. A stipend helps to defray students? travel and subsistence expenses. In 2015, the course was shortened from three weeks to

Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of Nuclear Nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mochiji, Toshiro; Tazaki, Makiko; Keeney, Robin; Puckett, John; Stanbro, William; Nakhleh, Charles

1998-01-01

PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet no.21, which was signed in February 1996, 'The Joint Research on 'Transparency' in Nuclear Nonproliferation' under the 'Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation.' The scope of the research was a fundamental study on transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability of nuclear energy from a nuclear nonproliferation viewpoint. The research encompassed three main topics: the policy environment of transparency, the development of transparency options, and technical options for transparency. Each side performed independent research then joint workshops were held to exchange information and views. This paper summarizes the results of these workshops. (author)

The Non-Proliferation Treaty increases security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kahiluoto, K.

1995-01-01

Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely was a historic decision. The Treaty is the most extensive international agreement on security policy to date; now its obligations have become a permanent part of international justice. Moreover, the NPT represents a political and moral obligation. Through the NPT, the international community has made a permanent commitment to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Increasing pressures will be applied to the few countries still outside the NPT, making it more likely that these countries will eventually change their views. The likelihood of regional bans on nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia, too, will increase. The Treaty promotes the establishment of new nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-free zone in Latin America - the countries covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty - is already very close to its full implementation. Finland is firmly committed to the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT Conference of 1995 was among the first international meetings in which Finland participated, and took an active role, as a Member State of the European Union. (orig.)

Extending the GEMINI advanced review station development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kadner, S.; Spahn, W.; Pepper, S.

1999-01-01

Recent changes in the objectives of arms control agreements will have a dramatic impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Meeting the demands of the nuclear non-proliferation regime will require the utilisation of the best available technological means for verification. The following discussion focuses on the increasing demands for safeguards with a view towards the possible technological solutions available to meet these demands. Based on the assumption that the gap between the international nonproliferation verification agenda and the available financial means can only be bridged via technology, the following discussion hopes to offer a compelling argument for the adoption of remote monitoring technologies in safeguards applications, specifically, data collection and review. The GEMINI Advanced Review Station (GARS) was developed with initial support from USPOTAS. This poster presentation presents the latest developments in GARS, including its extension to other surveillance systems under IAEA consideration, NDA applications, and networked safeguards. (author)

Infrasonic measurements of the Non-Proliferation Experiment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Whitaker, R.W.; Noel, S.; Meadows, W. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM (United States)

1994-12-31

Two infrasonic arrays were operated for the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). The arrays were located at the Nevada Test Site and at St. George, UT. The results were consistent with experience on underground tests, and therefore close to underground nuclear tests of similar size.

EMP at the Non-Proliferation Experiment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bell, J. [AWE, Aldermaston (United Kingdom)

1994-12-31

This experiment presented an opportunity to field customized equipment designed to detect and record electromagnetic pulse (EMP) emanations from an explosion over a wide frequency range. Any data recorded could be used in conjunction with the seismic methods to further non-proliferation studies. No EMP emanations were detectable from the four sensors deployed outside the tunnel confines.

A open-quotes Newclose quotes regime for nuclear weapons and materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sutcliffe, W.G.

1994-01-01

In this paper, I discuss the principal ideas that I covered in my presentation on December 8, 1993, at the Future of Foreign Nuclear Materials Symposium held by the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. I was asked to discuss issues related to military inventories of plutonium, and I took this opportunity to describe a possible declaratory regime that could encompass military as well as civilian inventories of plutonium. The open-quote newclose quotes in the title does not imply that the regime discussed here is an original idea. Rather, the regime will be open-quotes new,close quotes when it is adopted. The regime proposed here and in other works is one in which all stocks of nuclear weapons and materials are declared. Originally, declarations were proposed as a traditional arms control measure. Here, declarations are proposed to support the prevention of misuse of nuclear weapons and materials, including support for the nonproliferation regime. In the following, I discuss: (1) Worldwide inventories of nuclear weapons and materials, including the fact that military plutonium must be viewed as part of that worldwide inventory. (2) Life cycles of nuclear weapons and materials, including the various stages from the creation of nuclear materials for weapons through deployment and retirement of weapons to the final disposition of the materials. (3) Mechanisms for making declarations. (4) Risks and benefits to be derived from declarations. (5) Possibilities for supporting evidence or verification

Environmental measurements and technology for non-proliferation objectives. Final report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Broadway, J.A.

1998-01-01

The purpose of this study is to identify multi-disciplinary and single focus laboratories from the environmental and public health communities that can serve as technical center of opportunity for nuclear, inorganic and organic analyses. The objectives of the Office of Research and Development effort are twofold: (1) to identify the technology shortcomings and technologies gaps (thus requirements) within these communities that could benefit from state-of-the-art infield analysis technologies currently under development and (2) to promote scientist-to-scientist dialog and technical exchange under such existing US government internship programs (eg SABIT/USDOC) to improve skills and work relationships. Although the data analysis will focus on environmentally sensitive signatures and materials, the office of Research and Development wishes to further its nuclear non-proliferation objectives by assessing the current technical skill and ingenious analytical tools in less-developed countries so as to broaden the base of capability for multi-species measurement technology development

United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

Science and technology transformed the world in the twentieth century. Living standards improved but warfare was rendered more deadly. Weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical and nuclear - and their means of delivery were developed, as ever more sophisticated conventional armaments were produced and disseminated. The horrors and destruction of armed conflict persist. The need for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training has never been greater. Indeed, changing concepts and perceptions of security and threat magnify the urgency for new thinking to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation goals. More than a decade after the end of the cold war and at the start of the twenty- first century, there is a pressing need to combat ignorance, complacency and a culture of violence. These can be countered through long-term programmes of education and training, especially those related to disarmament and non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with a view to their reduction and complete elimination. At the same time, concern has heightened over the global threat of the excessive and destabilizing proliferation of conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, rendering more acute the need to combat such proliferation in a sustained way through disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Additionally there is a need to raise awareness of new challenges to international security and the process of disarmament. Among them, terrorism, with the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction, is a source of particular concern. Other challenges, such as organized crime, poverty, human rights abuses and environmental concerns must also be taken into account. Education and training remain important but under utilized tools for promoting peace, disarmament and non-proliferation. The present report addresses that issue and proposes ideas for action

How Might Industry Governance Be Broadened To Include Nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

2009-01-01

Broadening industry governance to support nonproliferation could provide significant new leverage in preventing the spread/diversion of nuclear, radiological, or dual-use material or technology that could be used in making a nuclear or radiological weapon. Industry is defined broadly to include (1) the nuclear industry, (2) dual-use industries, and (3) radioactive source manufacturers and selected radioactive source-user industries worldwide. This paper describes how industry can be an important first line of defense in detecting and thwarting proliferation, such as an illicit trade network or an insider theft case, by complementing and strengthening existing governmental efforts. For example, the dual-use industry can play a critical role by providing export, import, or security control information that would allow a government or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to integrate this information with safeguards, export, import, and physical protection information it has to create a more complete picture of the potential for proliferation. Because industry is closest to users of the goods and technology that could be illicitly diverted throughout the supply chain, industry information can potentially be more timely and accurate than other sources of information. Industry is in an ideal position to help ensure that such illicit activities are detected. This role could be performed more effectively if companies worked together within a particular industry to promote nonproliferation by implementing an industry-wide self-regulation program. Performance measures could be used to ensure their materials and technologies are secure throughout the supply chain and that customers are legitimately using and/or maintaining oversight of these items. Nonproliferation is the overarching driver that industry needs to consider in adopting and implementing a self-regulation approach. A few foreign companies have begun such an approach to date; it is believed that

The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biad, A.

1996-01-01

This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC)

Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buckner, M.R.; Sanders, T.L.

2001-01-01

The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Buckner, M.R. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States); Sanders, T.L. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2001-07-01

The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 742 - Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nonproliferation of Chemical and...—Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Note: Exports and reexports of items in performance of.... Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on...

The history of Finnish nuclear non-proliferation policy during the cold war. What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ahosniemi, A.

2004-03-01

This article is a summary of the Finnish historical survey during the Cold War. In the article, I try to show how the Finnish Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy during the Cold War is linked to the broader context of the Finnish foreign and security policy. In the research report I have focused on several questions. One of the most important is the following: What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons during the Cold War? And in this context scientific knowledge is meant by knowing something about nuclear weapons. Basically, the Finnish national based survey of nuclear non-proliferation policy attempted to investigate issues like the kind of research concerning Nuclear Technology in general, Nuclear weapons, and Nuclear weapon policies of super powers in Finland during the Cold War era. (author)

Non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation - accomplishments and challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marshall, H.R. Jr.

1983-01-01

The purpose of this paper is to assess the accomplishments in non-proliferation and nuclear co-operation since the beginning of President Reagan's administration, and the challenges remaining to be met in those fields. (NEA) [fr

U.S.-Russian cooperation in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation

Science.gov (United States)

Podvig, Pavel

2010-02-01

The United States and Russia, the two largest nuclear powers, have a special obligation to provide leadership in nuclear disarmament and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the past year the two countries made an effort to restart the arms control process by concluding a new treaty that would bring their legal disarmament obligations in line with the realities of their post-cold war relationships. The process of negotiating deeper nuclear reductions in the new environment turned out to be rather difficult, since the approaches that the countries used in the past are not well suited to dealing with issues like conversion of strategic nuclear delivery systems to conventional missions, tactical nuclear weapons, or dismantlement of nuclear warheads. This presentation considers the recent progress in U.S.-Russian arms control process and outlines the key issues at the negotiations. It also considers prospects for further progress in bilateral nuclear disarmament and issues that will be encountered at later stages of the process. The author argues that success of the arms reductions will depend on whether the United States and Russia will be able to build an institutional framework for cooperation on a range of issues - from traditional arms control to securing nuclear materials and from missile defense to strengthening the international nuclear safeguards. )

Approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Subrahmanyam, K.

1981-01-01

The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)

Between power and justice: current problems and perspectives of the NPT regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, Harald

2010-01-01

The nuclear non-proliferation regime, despite being frequently criticised for an alleged lack of effectiveness, is in fact an amazing success story. The number of states which had conducted nuclear weapons activities in various stages but which have terminated them at one point surpasses the number of Nuclear-Weapon States (NWSs) by far. At the apex of its success, however, the regime is threatened by erosion from three different directions. A small number of rule-breakers and outsiders under-mine its central objective: to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The refusal of the official NWSs to fulfil their undertaking of nuclear disarmament violates the principle of justice enshrined in the treaty and thereby destroys its legitimacy, as does the perceived readiness by nuclear suppliers to impede the development of nuclear technology in developing countries. The Gordian Knot can presumably only be cut by a u-turn towards a world without nuclear weapons. This insight has meanwhile reached the mainstream security establishment of the United States, the president included. Whether this road will really be taken will determine the future of the regime-with far-reaching consequences for global security. (author)

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Control in the Republic of Croatia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Valcic, I.; Prah, M.; Mikec, N.

2006-01-01

In accordance with its internationally accepted obligations, the Republic of Croatia is actively implementing principles of non-proliferation and export control of nuclear materials and/or equipment. The article deals with treaties, conventions, agreements and other international arrangements that are creating certain obligation for Republic of Croatia related to nuclear non-proliferation. The most important are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Protocol, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the NSG Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. In addition the article describes a national regulative framework, the basis for conducting activities in nuclear material control, export control of dual-use items as well as non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Details are given about the Nuclear Safety Act, the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Act on Export of Dual-Use Items, the Decree on the List of Dual-Use Items, the Law on Production, Repair and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment and the Decree specifying goods subject to export and import licenses. (author)

Nuclear non-proliferation: a guide to the debate

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldblat, Jozef.

1985-01-01

The non-proliferation policies of 15 countries have been studied and summarized for use by participants of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation (NPT) of Nuclear weapons held in September 1985. The main purpose of the guide is to examine what action must be taken to ensure the Treaty's survival. There are four chapters following an introduction, covering the implementation of the essential provisions of the NPT, the motivations of the countries which have not joined the NPT, together with the motivations of those which have formally renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, even though they possess the technical and economic potential necessary to manufacture them. The last chapter summarises measures which might be taken to strengthen the NPT including ideas put forward at a workshop held in 1984. (author)

'For good and for bad': the relations between universal obligations and particular efforts in the field of nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dassen Van, L.

2005-01-01

Full text: The world has 'nuclear non-proliferation' on its lips. Presidents, politicians, journalists and others refer to it as the number one peril in our times. This may be right or wrong but irrespective of the real salience of 'nuclear dangers' it has a grip on our minds and wallets. A long range of states now make active investments in the improvement of nuclear security; not only at home as they used to do, but even abroad in other places and countries where there is concern with regard to how safe nuclear and materials are kept and stored. This development is surely an expression of a shared broadening of our sense of responsibility beyond the narrow confines of statehood and borders, and therefore this development should please us. On the other hand, the truly universal measures and instruments of the NPT and the regime round it are in trouble. It is being stated in some quarters that the NPT is inadequate in a new era with new threats from sub-state actors. Nevertheless, the NPT is the only legal instrument that is a framework that either by itself or as a starting-point can serve as a tool box for long-term storage of the proliferation risks. The reason for this is that the NPT is an expression of fairness in terms of rights and balances for all states committed to non-proliferation. And its foundations are those of international law. To the extent the NPT is being questioned will there also be a risk that non-proliferation efforts in the framework of cooperative threat reduction and for instance global partnership will lose legitimacy; simply for the reason that only a small number of the non-proliferation concerns are given attention. This relationship between cooperative threat reduction efforts on the one hand and universal legal instruments for non-proliferation on the other is a double-edged sword. While the two can reinvigorate and strengthen each other, there is also a risk that the one - cooperative threat reduction - when given preference over

Open Source Analysis in Support to Nonproliferation Monitoring and Verification Activities: Using the New Media to Derive Unknown New Information

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pabian, F.; Renda, G.; Jungwirth, R.; Kim, L.; Wolfart, E.; Cojazzi, G.G.M.; )

2015-01-01

This paper will describe evolving techniques that leverage freely available open source social media venues, sometimes referred to as the ''New Media,'' together with geospatial tools and commercial satellite imagery (with its ever improving spatial, spectral, and temporal resolutions), to expand the existing nuclear non-proliferation knowledge base by way of a review of some recent exemplar cases. The application of such techniques can enhance more general data mining, as those techniques can be more directly tailored to IAEA Safeguards monitoring and other non-proliferation verification activities to improve the possibility of the remote detection of undeclared nuclear related facilities and/or activities. As part of what might be called the new ''Societal Verification'' regime, these techniques have enlisted either the passive or active involvement of interested parties (NGOs, academics, and even hobbyists) using open sources and collaboration networks together with previously highlighted geospatial visualization tools and techniques. This paper will show how new significant, and unprecedented, information discoveries have already been made (and published in open source) in the last four years, i.e., since the last IAEA Safeguards Symposium. With respect to the possibility of soliciting active participation (e.g., ''crowd-sourcing'') via social media, one can envision scenarios (one example from open source will be provided) whereby a previously unknown nuclear related facility could be identified or located through the online posting of reports, line drawings, and/or ground photographs. Nonetheless, these techniques should not be viewed as a panacea, as examples of both deception and human error will also be provided. This paper will highlight the use of these remote-means of discovery techniques, and how they have shed entirely new light on important nuclear non-proliferation relevant issues in

Experience of Republic of Macedonia in Providing WMD Non-Proliferation Policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mecinovic, S.

2007-01-01

The Republic of Macedonia as a country in transition and as a country which does not posses WMD, has accepted to developed and implemented non-proliferation policy of WMD. First of all, we accepted the definition of WMD as used in international agreements, conventions and protocol and WMD includes nuclear, biological and toxin weapons, agent and precursors. WMD in wide sense includes all toxic chemical substances if they are used as means of attack or if they are the target of attack, all microorganisms and their product, all industrial facilities that use toxic chemicals in their process of production, transport and stockpile if they are a target of military or terrorist attack. For WMD non-proliferation projects to be valid, they must be on the level and carry the weight of international policy and doctrine and involve a most comprehensive sphere of the scientific and professional communities. This is only way to implement the projects in country such is Republic of Macedonia where the public opinion is that WMD are not real security problem because we neither possess nor seek to posses these kinds of weapons. Our WMD non-proliferation policy is tied to control of weapons, agents, precursors, technology and their transfer, market and possibility of use. Because of that we try to control know terrorist organization, groups and individuals. Terrorism caused special concern and attention, particularly when we talk about terrorism with NBC weapons and radiological, chemical and biological warfare agents. Scientific and technological progress led to fact that the instruments for performing terrorism (including WMD) can be produced or procured much easier than before. Rising industry which uses toxic chemicals and microorganisms in the production process created a lot of potential targets for terrorism actions in which they can use be as a target and an executive instrument. The new goal of contemporary treats is safety of life environment, which today includes

Report of the international forum on nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tazaki, Makiko; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

2013-03-01

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security - Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia-' on 12 and 13 December 2012, co-hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo. In the forum, keynote speakers from Japan, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S., France and Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. In two panel discussions, entitled 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle back end' and 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for nuclear energy use in the Asian region and a multilateral cooperative framework', active discussions were made among panelists from Japan, IAEA, the U.S., France, ROK, Russia and Kazakhstan. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report except presentation materials. (author)

Non-proliferation efforts in South Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chellaney, B.

1994-01-01

Southern Asia is one of the most volatile regions in the world because of inter-State and intra-State conflicts. Security in the region highly depends on the rival capabilities of the involved states, Pakistan, India, China. Increased Confidence building and nuclear transparency are becoming more significant issues in attaining stability in the region, although non-proliferation efforts in this region have attained little headway

Optimal conditions for the generation of the third harmonic of focused radiation in a self-interaction regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kulagin, I A; Usmanov, T

1998-01-01

A method developed for the analysis of the interaction of wave beams in a self-interaction regime is used to determine the changes in the optimal conditions for third-harmonic generation with changes in the degree of focusing of the fundamental-frequency radiation in isotropic media. Conditions under which a redistribution of the intensities and phases of the interacting wave beams reduces the efficiency of third-harmonic generation are identified. It is shown that, under strong focusing conditions, there may be additional extrema in the dependence of the intensity of the harmonic on the density of the medium. (nonlinear optical phenomena)

INTEGRATION OF FACILITY MODELING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ANALYSIS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

2011-07-18

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Garcia, Humberto; Burr, Tom; Coles, Garill A.; Edmunds, Thomas A.; Garrett, Alfred; Gorensek, Maximilian; Hamm, Luther; Krebs, John; Kress, Reid L.; Lamberti, Vincent; Schoenwald, David; Tzanos, Constantine P.; Ward, Richard C.

2012-01-01

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Integration Of Facility Modeling Capabilities For Nuclear Nonproliferation Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

2011-01-01

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Cooperative Remote Monitoring, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: Fourth quarter 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alonzo, G M [ed.

1995-01-01

The DOE`s Cooperative Remote Monitoring programs integrate elements from research and development and implementation to achieve DOE`s objectives in arms control and nonproliferation. The contents of this issue are: cooperative remote monitoring--trends in arms control and nonproliferation; Modular Integrated Monitoring System (MIMS); Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring Systems (ATMS); Tracking and Nuclear Materials by Wide-Area Nuclear Detection (WAND); Cooperative Monitoring Center; the International Remote Monitoring Project; international US and IAEA remote monitoring field trials; Project Dustcloud: monitoring the test stands in Iraq; bilateral remote monitoring: Kurchatov-Argonne-West Demonstration; INSENS Sensor System Project.

INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Donnelly, W H [Library of Congress, Washington, DC (USA)

1980-12-01

The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. This article outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US non-proliferation policy.

Nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neubert, M.

1992-01-01

The following motion was put before the United Kingdom House of Commons on 3rd February 1992 and agreed; that this House, recognising the potential dangers of the rapidly changing world order, welcomes the recent proposals for substantial reductions in nuclear weaponry, the growing support for the non-proliferation treaty and progress in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning the dismantling of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities; urges the Government to play their full part in helping the relevant authorities in the Commonwealth of Independent States to dismantle their nuclear devices, to safeguard their nuclear components and to discourage the proliferation of nuclear expertise; and believes it is of the first importance that Britain retains an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent as security in a world where there remain many sources of instability. The record of arguments for and against the motion in the debate is presented. (author)

Remarks on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, United Nations Security Council, 24 September 2009, New York, USA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2009-01-01

IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) limited his speech to a few key issues. First he stated that the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is fragile and has many shortcomings because the IAEA's legal authority is severely limited in some countries and the IAEA verification mandate is centred on nuclear material and not on weaponization activities. Secondly there is a growing number of states that have mastered uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. Any one of these states could develop nuclear weapons in a short span of time, if, for example, it decided to withdraw from the NPT. There is a need to move from national to multinational control of the nuclear fuel cycle. Thirdly the highest level of protection for nuclear and radioactive material has to be provided. A fourth issue is the need to strengthen the IAEA. A fifth issue is that the IAEA cannot do its work in isolation but depends on a supportive political process, with the Security Council at its core. A sixth issue is that the Security Council must put more emphasis on addressing the insecurities that lie behind many cases of proliferation, such as endemic conflicts, security imbalances and lack of trust. Finally, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is gratified to see nuclear disarmament back at the top of the international agenda, as well as recognition of the intrinsic link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

76 FR 81004 - Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-12-27

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7741] Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign... Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: A determination has been made that a number of foreign entities and one foreign person have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of measures...

Reagan outlines nonproliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walsh, J.

1981-01-01

The Reagan Administration wants to shift from efforts to impose direct control over the fuel cycle and nuclear technology to a framework based on cooperation and initiatives for greater political stability. A nuclear-free zone for the Middle East is one area to explore. Congress responded to this announced plan with a counter move to tighten non-proliferation strategies. Reagan's policy will be to restore the US as an aggressive, but reliable nuclear trading partner operating under adequate safeguards. Critics find this approach dangerous and contradictory. The policy is still too general to answer specific questions about bilateral arrangements, generic permits, plutonium recycling, and other matters

Current nuclear non-proliferation policies in the world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kurosawa, Mitsuru

1997-01-01

Although a global nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has disappeared, many challenges to nuclear non-proliferation have emerged. Sources of concern, like a nuclear weapon program by Iraq and suspicions of North Korea have caused the adoption of a variety of political and technical measures in order to meet these challenges in the post-Cold War era. This paper describes the following ten policies for non-proliferation: 1) Strengthening the NPT; 2) Nuclear reduction; 3) CTBT and cut-off treaty; 4) Establishment of NWFZs; 5) Counterproliferation; 6) Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards; 7) Control and disposal of nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons; 8) Export control; 9) Registration of plutonium; and 10) Actions against nuclear smuggling. The first four measures can be said to be mainly political policies, the fifth measure (counterproliferation), can be categorized as basically a military policy, and the last five measures can be said to be technical. (J.P.N.)

A study on the nuclear foreign policy analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oh, Keun Bae; Choi, Y. M.; Lee, D. J.; Lee, K. S.; Lee, B. W.; Cho, I. H.; Ko, H. S.

1996-12-01

This study aims to analyses recent trends of international situation relating to nuclear non-proliferation and the adverse conditions in Korea's pursuing self-support of such technology, so that it may map out effective strategies for the promotion of nuclear energy. This study analyses developments of international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which plays a main role in preventing the international proliferation of nuclear weapons. This study includes NPT, IAEA safeguards system, international export control regimes, CTBT, and NWFZs as the subjects of analysis. Second theme is international organizations concerning nuclear activities. This study mainly analyses IAEA activities which pursues the promotion of peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation simultaneously as a pivotal body of international nuclear cooperation. Third focus of this study is Northeast Asian circumstances pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation. The study looks into the DPRK nuclear issues, and reviews the developments of the proposed regional body for nuclear cooperation and the discussion on the Northeast Asian NWFZ. Fourth, but the most influential to Korean nuclear activities, is the U. S. nuclear policy, since U. S. takes the overwhelming initiative in the field of international nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore, this study gives much weight in analyzing the structure, procedures, recent trend, and pending issues of U. S. nuclear policy. (author). 78 refs., 5 tabs., 4 figs

Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Joeck, N

2007-02-05

The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

Antecedents of Teachers Fostering Effort within Two Different Management Regimes: An Assessment-Based Accountability Regime and Regime without External Pressure on Results

Science.gov (United States)

Christophersen, Knut-Andreas; Elstad, Eyvind; Turmo, Are

2012-01-01

This article focuses on the comparison of organizational antecedents of teachers' fostering of students' effort in two quite different accountability regimes: one management regime with an external-accountability system and one with no external accountability devices. The methodology involves cross-sectional surveys from two different management…

The legal points at issue concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty and the verification agreement of EURATOM with the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zieger, G.

1975-01-01

An excellent and comprehensive but very juridicial contribution on: Development and content of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the problems which this Treaty poses for EURATOM (a common market, common supply, joint enterprises, Non-proliferation Treaty and France), the compatibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty with the EURATOM Treaty, verification agreement EURATOM - IAEA (the IAEA as the supervisory authority, the control system of the IAEA, guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements, national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material IAEA supervision as a secondary control, principles of IAEA supervision, secrecy, conflict management), conclusion of the verification agreement, deviations from the guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements legal reflexions (verification agreement and Non-proliferation Treaty, reservations concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty, questions of competence between EURATOM and member states without nuclear weapons, problems of equal treatment). (HP/LN) [de

Paranoids, pygmies, pariahs and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Betts, R.K.

1977-01-01

The spread of nuclear weapons has finally become a central item on the foreign policy agenda. But the fervor of most opponents of proliferation has been matched only by their reluctance to deal with the causes of the threat. The misplaced focus on ways to isolate weapons-related capabilities obscures the importance of the stickier but more salient problem of the incentives many nations have to get a bomb: fear or ambition. As long as antiproliferation strategy goes no further than schemes to keep the genie in a few bottles, we risk doing both more and less than necessary. Distressingly few arms-control enthusiasts have faced up to the full price of nonproliferation. The needed reorientation in thinking, which is really only a return to the ageless problem of balance of power, has been impeded by prevalent fallacies of emphasis about what causes the threat, who the candidates for proliferation are, and what strategies are applicable to which candidates. The author proceeds to discuss: (1) causes (the moralist fallacy, the economic fallacy, the diseconomic fallacy, and the technicist fallacy); (2) candidates (the pygmy states, the paranoid states, the pariah states, and five options of the U.S.); (3) cures (the fatalist fallacy, the multilateral fallacy, the embargo fallacy, the safeguards fallacy, the umbrella fallacy, the two-wrongs-don't-make-a-right fallacy, and the golden key fallacy); and (4) choices

Second annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to Secretary's Annual Report to Congress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

This document covers: goals of US nonproliferation policy, agreements for cooperation, technical exchange, US as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuels, IAEA Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage, implementation of US nonproliferation policy, classification, cooperation in strengthening international safeguards and physical security, the US-IAEA voluntary offer safeguards agreement, US spent fuel storage policy, development of proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies, and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

Non-proliferation policies and demand for uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Warnecke, S.J.

1978-01-01

The non-proliferation policies of USA, Canada and Australia are outlined, and the effects on nuclear policy in the consumer countries, particularly the member states of the European Community and Japan are considered. Supply and demand in relation to uranium, security and economic aspects are covered. Reprocessing, the use of plutonium in breeder reactors, and the wider issues of international confidence and trade are discussed. (U.K.)

Environmental effects of additional uranium development required by a non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baca, T.E.; Scudella, G.

1978-01-01

New Mexico can expect to see an accelerated development of its uranium resources. The President's policy on non-proliferation will impact the degree and quantity of uranium ore mined. Environmental impacts are significant and are affected by the mining and milling phase more than any other aspect of the uranium fuel cycle. The state has begun evaluating the resource-associated impacts of uranium mining and milling, although very little reliable data are available. The information gathered, however, shows a need for state and Federal evaluation of both the impacts and the non-proliferation policy. 4 references

Accelerator-driven subcritical systems - An analysis with a focus on non-proliferation and export control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andersson, Per; Nielsen, Fredrik; Sunhede, Daniel

2013-01-01

The Department of Nuclear Weapons Related Issues at The Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, as commissioned by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, SSM, conducted a study concerning Accelerator Driven Subcritical Systems, ADS, with emphasis on non-proliferation and export control. An ADS looks at first glance like a traditional nuclear reactor, but the nuclear core is designed to always remain subcritical, both during normal and off-normal conditions. Neutrons are instead supplied by an external source in the form of an proton accelerator and a spallation target. This report gives a short walk-through to the physical processes that governs the neutron flux and reactivity in the core and how they are affected by the design of the core including the accelerator and spallation target. Furthermore is the results from reactor core simulations presented, where the isotopic nuclear fuel inventory has been studied as a function of burn up and initial configuration. Finally the report contains an analysis of the potential risks involved from the perspective of nuclear proliferation and exports. This study shows that ADS in the future could constitute a proliferation concern. The subsystems and components in question share design and materials with the equivalent components in traditional reactors with the exception of the proton accelerator and spallation target, which is unique for accelerator driven systems

Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2004-01-01

This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards

Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

ElBaradei, M

2004-06-21

This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilmshurst, M.J.

1983-01-01

The author discusses the reasons of criticism and even rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, dealing in particular with the alledged discriminating nature of the Treaty and with the statement that the Treaty is not apt to prevent proliferation on a vertical plane. He further discusses the motives behind the efforts of potential nuclear weapons states to get nuclear weapons. The system of worldwide and bilateral safeguards and controls covering the transfer of nuclear technologies is explained. In conclusion the author suggests to pay more attention to article IV, sub-section (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as this might offer a suitable approach to restricting the dissemination of nuclear explosives. (HP) [de

The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Fifteen years after entry into force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

The need to halt a wider spread of nuclear weapons grew out of the realization that the increase in the number of countries possessing such weapons would increase the threat to world security. As the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons clearly states in its preamble, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty - also known as the non-proliferation Treaty - was concluded in 1968, at a time when there were already five nuclear-weapon Powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. This fact sheet is intended to provide background material on the Treaty, including the events that led to its conclusion, an overview of its provisions and the developments at the two previously held Review Conferences

Airborne Multisensor Pod System, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: Second quarter 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alonzo, G M; Sanford, N M [eds.

1995-01-01

This issue focuses on the Airborne Multisensor Pod System (AMPS) which is a collaboration of many of the DOE national laboratories to provide a scientific environment to research multiple sensors and the new information that can be derived from them. The bulk of the research has been directed at nonproliferation applications, but it has also proven useful in environmental monitoring and assessment, and land/water management. The contents of this issue are: using AMPS technology to detect proliferation and monitor resources; combining multisensor data to monitor facilities and natural resources; planning a AMPS mission; SAR pod produces images day or night, rain or shine; MSI pod combines data from multiple sensors; ESI pod will analyze emissions and effluents; and accessing AMPS information on the Internet.

Role of non-governmental organizations in formation of non-proliferation culture in new independent countries (NIC)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sevchik, M.

2000-01-01

Purpose of the report is demonstrate the non-governmental organizations (NGO) role in formation of non-proliferation culture in former Soviet Union. Activity of Center of Non-proliferation Problems Investigation (CNPI) of Monterey Institute of International Investigations and its collaboration with existing in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) non-governmental organizations is considered as example. Brief information about CNPI and reasons for it representatives opening of in Kazakhstan and in other CIS-countries, as well as cooperation of NGO in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine for creation on Central Asia zone free from nuclear weapon ia given. Some measures which could promote to formation of non-proliferation culture in region are suggested

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program, Annual Report, Class of 2012

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McMakin, Andrea H.

2013-09-23

This 32-pp annual report/brochure describes the accomplishments of the Class of 2012 of the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (the last class of this program), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The time period covers Sept 2011 through June 2013.

Academic perspectives on the non-proliferation problem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gummett, P.

1984-01-01

The USA has demonstrated a greater penchant for a technical focus aimed at denial than any other state, despite a brief interlude under President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger when it displayed a total lack of concern about proliferation. This terminated with the sudden reawakening of interest following the Indian explosion and the announcement that the USA was not prepared to accept additional requests for uranium-enrichment services. According to Brenner, this enrichment crisis was engineered as a deliberate act of policy: yet this act of policy was unrelated to non-proliferation objectives. Rather, the Nixon administration's interest in privatisation in general, and commercialisation of enriched-uranium supply in particular, had led to a bureaucratic battle between the domestic side of the White House, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). This battle was totally unrelated to foreign policy: a situation not without precedent in this area. Nixon's Republican administration deliberately provoked a supply bottleneck by changing the terms of AEC supply contracts, with the intention of forcing the Democrat-dominated JCAE to agree to the entry of private industry into the uranium-enrichment business. The outcome was more dramatic than had been intended

THE ROLE AND RATIONALE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tom COPPEN

2012-12-01

Full Text Available Much has been written about perceived weaknesses of the NPT and the challenges it has been facing over the last decades. Analysing the most important provisions of the NPT, this article demonstrates how the treaty has managed to maintain its central role in the non-proliferation regime since its conclusion, and how it retains enough flexibility within its review mechanism and its managerial approach to supervision to keep this position for the decades to come. The theoretical framework of the article is formed by theory of arms control law, relevant features of which are: a large influence of politics and national interests of states on the rule of law; its flexible yet treaty-based nature; and the distinctive role of supervision in order to ensure compliance with primary rules. The article analyses key NPT provisions. Based on Article VIII, the NPT Review Conferences have both an important political and legal function. They are the NPT’s mechanism for review, implementation and supervision; in legal terms, they enable the evolution of the NPT based on subsequent agreement and practice. The NPT articles on non-proliferation and disarmament illustrate how the NPT has evolved to close off loopholes (Articles I and II and retains its flexibility whilst providing a global platform for negotiations on nuclear disarmament (Article VI. Article III evolved and must be understood to oblige NPT states to sign an Additional Protocol (AP with the IAEA. Article IV sets the parameters for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but leaves room for negotiation and conflict. The supervision of the NPT, illustrated by the case of Iran, is a complicated process involving international organisations such as the IAEA and the UNSC; while these may play important roles, however, the enforcement of the NPT is ultimately left to the NPT states themselves.

A Study on the Nuclear Foreign Policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, Maeng Ho; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Lee, B. W.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Lee, K. S.

2006-12-01

In this study, the changes in international nuclear environments related to nuclear non-proliferation regimes and international nuclear cooperation activities are investigated in order to suggest recommendations for actions and measures in the national policy of Korea, focusing on the trends for strengthening international nuclear non-proliferation regimes, international discussions of multi-lateral fuel supply assurances, USA nuclear energy policy and nuclear cooperation between USA and India. International nuclear non-proliferation regime is expected to be continuously strengthened during the 21st century. Assurance of a fuel supply is a critical issue in the national nuclear power industry of Korea due to a complete dependency of its uranium enrichment services on foreign countries and the declaration of a non-possession of facilities for a uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocessing in Korea. Nuclear energy is indispensable for a national energy security and securing a competitive power of nuclear technologies, and the development and export of nuclear industry products are also very important. It is recommended to strengthen the international cooperation and diplomatic efforts of Korea for protecting the national interests in the international nuclear communities and enhancing for a national power supply as well as securing of confidence and transparency of the national nuclear policy and relevant activities

Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dassen, L. van

1998-03-01

Finland''s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

1998-03-01

Finland``s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

Former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow Served at U.S. Mission

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brim, Cornelia P.

2014-10-01

Because of her training and professional experiences, Rosalyn Leitch, a Security Specialist at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow with NIS (2012-2013) was able to transition into temporary assignment as UNVIE Acting Nuclear Security Attaché from November 2013 through February 2014.

Report of “the 2013 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suda, Kazunori; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

2014-03-01

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held “International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Ensuring Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station –” on 3 and 4 December 2013, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials from Japan, the United States, France and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled “Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security measures of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” and “Roles of safeguards and technical measures for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation for nuclear fuel cycle options”. In the first panel based on the implications of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on the domestic and global nuclear energy use and increased interest in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle, discussion was made on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security challenges on both fuel cycle options from the policy and institutional viewpoints whereas in the second panel the roles of safeguards and proliferation resistant nuclear technology including plutonium burning technology in ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle were discussed. Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France and Republic of Korea participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording

NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2008 - May 2009

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

2010-03-01

In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 16th successful year in support of the NNSA’s mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. We provide this annual report to review program activities from June 2008 through May 2009 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2008. Contents include: Welcome Letter Introduction The NGFP Team Program Management Highlights Class of 2008 Incoming Fellows Orientation Travel Career Development Management of the Fellows Performance Highlights Closing Ceremony Encore Performance Where They Are Now Alumnus Career Highlights: Christine Buzzard Class of 2009 Applicant Database Upgrades Fall Recruitment Activities Interviews Hiring and Clearances Introducing the Class of 2009 Class of 2010 Recruitment Strategy On the Horizon Appendix A: Class of 2009 Fellows

Nonproliferation analysis of the reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1995-01-01

The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

Nonproliferation impacts assessment for the management of the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-12-01

On May 13, 1996, the US established a new, 10-year policy to accept and manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the US. The goal of this policy is to reduce civilian commerce in weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU), thereby reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Two key disposition options under consideration for managing this fuel include conventional reprocessing and new treatment and packaging technologies. The Record of Decision specified that, while evaluating the reprocessing option, ''DOE will commission or conduct an independent study of the nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and timing) implications of chemical separation of spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors.'' DOE's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation conducted this study consistent with the aforementioned Record of Decision. This report addresses the nonproliferation implications of the technologies under consideration for managing aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site. Because the same technology options are being considered for the foreign research reactor and the other aluminum-based spent nuclear fuels discussed in Section ES.1, this report addresses the nonproliferation implications of managing all the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel, not just the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The combination of the environmental impact information contained in the draft EIS, public comment in response to the draft EIS, and the nonproliferation information contained in this report will enable the Department to make a sound decision regarding how to manage all aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site

Fast reactors and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Orlov, V.V.

1997-01-01

1.Three aspects of nonproliferation relevant to nuclear power are: Pu buildup in NPP spent fuel cooling ponds (∼ 104 t in case of consumption of ∼ 107 t cheap uranium). Danger of illegal radiochemical extraction of Pu for weapons production; Pu extraction from NPP fuel at the plants available in nuclear countries, its burning along with weapon-grade Pu in NPP reactors or in special-purpose burners; increased hazard of nuclear weapons sprawl with breeders and closed fuel cycle technology spreading all over the world. 2.The latter is one of major obstacles to creation of large-scale nuclear power. 3.Nuclear power of the first stage using 235 U will be able to meet the demands of certain fuel-deficient countries and regions, replacing ∼ 5-10% of conventional fuels in the global consumption for a number of decades. 4.Fast reactors of the first generation and the currently employed fuel technology are far from exhausting their potential for solving economic problems and meeting the challenges of safety, radioactive waste and nonproliferation. Development of large-scale nuclear power will become an option accepted by society for solving energy problems in the following century, provided a breeder technology is elaborated and demonstrated in the next 15-20 years, which would comply with the totality of the following requirement: full internal Pu breeding deterministic elimination of severe accidents involving fuel damage and high radioactivity releases: fast runaway, loss of coolant, fires, steam and hydrogen explosions, etc.; reaching a balance between radioactive wastes disposed of and uranium mined in terms of radiation hazard; technology of closed fuel cycle preventing its use for Pu extraction and permitting physical protection from fuel thefts;economic competitiveness of nuclear power for most of countries and regions, i.e. primarily the cost of NPPs with fat reactors is to be below the cost of modern LWR plants, etc

Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle; Nukleare Abruestung. Optionen fuer den kommenden Ueberpruefungszyklus des NVV

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mueller, Harald

2011-07-01

The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

Commercial U.S. Vendors Focus on Reducing the Cost of Fast Reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fraser, Dan; Kouhestani, Amir; Parmentola, John; Prince, Robert; Reynolds, Roger

2013-01-01

A US commercial perspective: • Focus on economic benefits of fast reactors (Market Determined): • Compact design, high energy density (modularity); • High temperature output; • Improved energy conversion efficiency; • Process heat application market; • Inherent safety capabilities. • Focus on burn or “breed and burn”; • Helps avoid some non-proliferation challenges. • Focus on reactor alone, not on a re-processing plant; • Reactor is the first place for economic payback; • Happy to burn reprocessed fuel if available

Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

2013-01-01

The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

Non-proliferation and the control of atomic energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, B.

1977-01-01

The non-proliferation problem has never ceased to haunt and to influence those responsible for the development of atomic energy. During and after the Second World War, Anglo-American co-operation was reflected in restrictions on the exchange of enrichment and reprocessing know-how. Between 1945 and 1955, the Anglo-Saxon powers continued with the policy of secrecy and uranium monopoly decided on in 1943 at the Quebec summit conference. Starting in 1955, the failure of this policy led - at the suggestion of the United States of America - to a freer flow of information and to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with its safeguards, which permitted widespread application of the policy of technical assistance subject to controls and widespread commerce in research and power reactors - mainly fuelled with enriched uranium and manufactured in the USA. There followed periods characterized by general legal blocks, with two unilateral renunciation treaties - the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, covering non-underground tests, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1968, covering nuclear explosive devices and the entire fuel cycle. The Indian atomic explosion and the acceleration of nuclear programmes owing to the oil crisis prompted - in 1974 - efforts by supplier countries to limit the transfer of sensitive technology and the possession of plants capable of producing substances which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; the USA has even proposed the curtailment of plutonium extraction and of breeder construction, although these are considered by many countries to be essential to the independence of their energy development programmes. This policy of reserving the sensitive stages of the fuel cycles to a few advanced countries and the questioning of existing nuclear agreements have created, in the relations between supplier and recipient countries, a regrettable intensification of the distrust which must be dispelled

Statement at Inauguration Ceremony for Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 25 February 2011, Vienna, Austria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amano, Y.

2011-01-01

I was a member of the Group of Governmental Experts which drafted the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non proliferation Education in 2002. In my new role at the IAEA, I continue to attach great importance to education. I believe it is vital that we educate the people of the world about how devastating nuclear weapons are and build awareness of the importance of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I have no doubt that the new Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation will make an important contribution in this area. The recent conclusion of the new START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States was a welcome development in the nuclear disarmament field. Reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons is a positive step towards a safe and peaceful world free of nuclear weapons which can impact positively on nuclear non-proliferation efforts. But, of course, further steps are needed. Disarmament and non-proliferation education have an essential role to play in maintaining and strengthening the momentum towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The IAEA has for decades been actively involved in promoting nuclear non-proliferation education. My colleagues and I speak about nuclear non-proliferation throughout the world. We organize briefings here in Vienna for members of parliament, government officials, think tanks, academics and other groups. We host educational seminars for NGOs, diplomats and journalists on the Agency's non-proliferation activities - the latest one was held this week. The IAEA also provides opportunities for on-the-job training and work experience to students and young professionals. Indeed, several Monterey Institute graduates are currently working with us. This is an excellent example of how disarmament and non-proliferation education can contribute to promoting international peace and security. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States took place during my time with Monterey in

Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to Prepare the Next Generation of Experts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Janssens, W.A.M.; Peerani, P.; ); Gariazzo, C.; Ward, S.; Crete, J.-M.; Braunegger-Guelich, A.

2015-01-01

Although nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are a continuous concern of the international community and discussed frequently at international fora and conferences, the academic world is not really on board with these topics. What we mean by this is that nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is only very seldom part of a university curriculum. In the few cases where it does appear in the curriculum, whether in a nuclear engineering course or a political sciences master programme, it is typically covered only partially. Nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are multidisciplinary and embrace, inter alia, historical, legal, technical, and political aspects. This is perhaps the reason why it is challenging for a single professor or university to develop and implement a comprehensive academic course or programme in this area. Professional organizations in this field, like the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), have made first steps to address this issue by implementing specific educational activities. However, much more needs to be done. Therefore, ESARDA, INMM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are in the process of joining efforts to identify key elements and priorities to support universities in establishing appropriate and effective academic programmes in this area. This paper will share best practices, achievements and lessons learned by ESARDA, INMM and the IAEA in providing education and training to develop and maintain the expertise of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards professionals. In addition, it will suggest potential ways on how to assist universities to get prepared for building-up the next generation of experts able to meet any future challenges in the area of non-proliferation and safeguards. (author)

Nuclear nonproliferation: Concerns with US delays in accepting foregin research reactors' spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

One key US nonproliferation goal is to discourage use of highly enriched uranium fuel (HEU), which can be used to make nuclear bombs, in civilian nuclear programs worldwide. DOE's Off-Site Fuels Policy for taking back spent HEU from foreign research reactors was allowed to expire due to environmental reasons. This report provides information on the effects of delays in renewing the Off-Site Fuels Policy on US nonproliferation goals and programs (specifically the reduced enrichment program), DOE's efforts to renew the fuels policy, and the price to be charged to the operators of foreign reactors for DOE's activities in taking back spent fuel

Open Source and Trade Data for Non-Proliferation: Challenges and Opportunities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stewart, I.; Gillard, N.

2015-01-01

This paper explores what more systematic exploitation of trade data can contribute to the state evaluation process. The paper begins by setting out a typology of trade data, which groups the data into five categories: · Government Declared Data, which is prepared and submitted by States to an international authority for non-proliferation purposes. · Government Recorded Data, which includes information collected by the state for its own purposes, and which is not routinely submitted to international authorities for non-proliferation purposes. It includes (some) export licencing data, customs data, and business registration information. · Business-held data, which includes information on a company's own products and customers, but also ''market intelligence''. · Intelligence and Enforcement Derived Information, which can include information on specific procurement attempts, networks, or procurement requirements. · Procurement Requirements Information, which can include information released by a programme for the purpose of seeking goods or services. Challenges and opportunities related to further exploitation of trade data sources in each category are then explored, as are factors related to accessibility (both in terms of mandates and more practical considerations), reliability (including presentation of a typology), completeness, and duplication in data. Next, the paper explores how the IAEA can systematically collect, integrate and analyze the various sources of trade data given the considerations outlined above. In particular, this section focuses on how data in variable structures can be integrated into the state evaluation process. In concluding, the paper will describe how the newly formed ''Collaboration on Open Source and Trade Analysis for Non-proliferation'' (COSTA-NP) is seeking to develop each of the categories of trade data. The paper links to research objectives 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 of the IAEA

Workshop on regional cooperation in remote monitoring for transparency and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olsen, John; Inoue, Naoko; Hori, Masato; Hashimoto, Yu; Mochiji, Toshiro

2006-06-01

The Workshop on Regional Cooperation in Remote Monitoring for Transparency and Nonproliferation on 8-9 February at O'arai, Japan, brought together remote monitoring experts to share technical experience and consider potential uses of remote monitoring for nuclear transparency and strengthened nonproliferation. Sponsored by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), this event gathered thirty five attendees from the JAEA, the Republic of Korea's National Nuclear Management and Control Agency (NNCA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA). U.S. technical experts represented Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Workshop discussions and interactions met or surpassed all goals: On the technical front, the JAEA, NNCA, and SNL exchanged presentations on their respective uses and technical approaches to remote monitoring. These included systems for both international safeguards and transparency. The IAEA shared valuable guidance on future remote monitoring system requirements. Following the presentations SNL conducted training in remote monitoring for technical personnel. In parallel project planning discussions, the JAEA, NNCA, SNL and the U.S. DOE reaffirmed mutual interest in regional cooperation in remote monitoring that could eventuate in exchange of safeguards-related data. A productive off-the-record session by all parties considered the path forward and established intermediate steps and time scales. The 15 of the presented papers are indexed individually. (J.P.N.)

Recommendations for strengthening the national systems and the international regime for combating of illicit trafficking. Keynote address/session 10

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ek, P.; Wredberg, L.

2001-01-01

internal control, quality assurance, security culture and individual responsibilities; Shortage of suitable and modern equipment for monitoring and detection of radioactive material; Shortage of staff and training capabilities and insufficient financial resources concerning supervision and law enforcement authorities; Insufficient access to relevant information and data bases. A first step to improve national systems would be to assist states, by educating key-persons and authority staff, how to establish good, state-of-the-art national systems for combating of illicit trafficking, which would meet the requirements of international legal instruments, recommendations and guidelines. State Governments need to be made more aware of the seriousness of the proliferation threat and be convinced that supervision and law enforcement resources must be reinforced for bringing their national systems up to international standard. On the international level, combating of illicit trafficking would be ameliorated by improving the communication links between national authorities bi-laterally and with the international organisations. Also increased information exchange between national and international databases would improve prevention and detection capabilities. For the effective and consequent combating of illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment, it is, however, necessary that the international non-proliferation regime be strengthened through new initiatives and approaches. These should focus on, inter alia, a set of minimum requirements to be implemented, and to pursue, impose, follow-up and audit the implementation of those requirements into the national systems for combating of illicit trafficking. The IAEA is the recognised international organisation, both for nuclear energy promoting activities, and for the implementation of the international non-proliferation regime. The IAEA has, within its area of competence, relevant know-how and capability, including qualified

TOWARDS FULFILLMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

s. Bagheri

2016-01-01

Full Text Available The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT is an international treaty that should be implemented during both peace and wartime. However, the obligations included in the treaty are dependent upon states' attitudes regarding other issues. Non-use of nuclear weapons is directly related to negotiations done for the purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, non-production or accumulation by other means and disarmament. In our day, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the issues of international law.The present study is of crucial significance due to its endeavor to clarify the general principles of Humanitarian Law in a relationship to the threat of nuclear weapons' up to now, a special norm; significantly limiting or completely prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, has not been accepted in international law. However, customary international humanitarian law regarding the use of nuclear weapons holds great value because of its purpose in eliminating nuclear weapons as a means of war through ascertaining their non-use and also appeasing the importance of nuclear ascendancy. In this respect, the NPT regime and its relationship with international humanitarian law will be discussed. Firstly, the NPT background, formation, main objectives and principles will be analyzed. In order to evaluate the relationship between the NPT and humanitarian law, the humanitarian obligations in general, humanitarian obligations in the context of the NPT and fulfillmen t of these obligations under the NPT should be studied. One of the main parts of the study is nuclear disarmament obligation included in the NPT. In this section, nuclear disarmament obligation in the context of the NPT and the legal framework of possible, general and comprehensive disarmament will be examined.

The impact of non-proliferation policies on the uranium market - an industry view

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stephany, M.

1977-01-01

It is concluded that from an economic point of view, the impact of the present political discussions on non-proliferation (referring particularly to U.S. and Canadian initiatives) on the uranium market (through the choice of reactor programmes in different countries, and other parts of the fuel cycle, such an enrichment, reprocessing, the use of plutonium and the disposal of radioactive waste) cannot be assessed quantitatively. It is believed, however, that in general terms the non-proliferation issue will lead to an increase in the cost of nuclear energy and of all energy. It is also considered that it will tend to strengthen nationalism and thereby to restrict international trade. (U.K.)

Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh

2014-01-01

Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2014-10-15

Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

International nuclear trade and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Potter, W.C.

1990-01-01

The purpose of this book, the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation, is to explore the international political and economic dimensions of nuclear trade, especially as they pertain to the behavior of eleven emerging nuclear-supplier states. More specifically, the book sets forth a conceptual framework for analyzing international nuclear trade; details the domestic and external factors that shape the nuclear export policies of Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, the People's Republic of China, South Korea, South Africa, Spain and Taiwan; and identifies and assesses alternative strategies for containing the new proliferation risks posed by these emerging suppliers. The book also describes an innovative effort to utilize a computer-based system for tracking international nuclear trade

NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2009 - May 2010

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

2011-01-01

In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 17th successful year in support of the NNSA's mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. This annual report to reviews program activities from June 2009 through May 2010 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2009. Contents include: Welcome Letter (Mission Driven: It's all about results), Introduction, Structure of the NGFP, Program Management Highlights, Annual Lifecycle, Class of 2009 Incoming Fellows, Orientation, Global Support of the Mission, Career Development, Management of the Fellows, Performance Highlights, Closing Ceremony, Where They Are Now, Alumni Highlight - Mission Success: Exceptional Leaders from the NGFP, Class of 2009 Fall Recruitment Activities, Established Partnerships, Face-to-Face, Recruiting Results, Interviews, Hiring and Clearances, Introducing the Class of 2010, Class of 2011 Recruitment Strategy, On the Horizon, Appendix A: Class of 2010 Fellow Biographies.

NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2009 - May 2010

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

2011-04-01

In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 17th successful year in support of the NNSA’s mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. This annual report to reviews program activities from June 2009 through May 2010 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2009. Contents include: Welcome Letter (Mission Driven: It’s all about results), Introduction, Structure of the NGFP, Program Management Highlights, Annual Lifecycle, Class of 2009 Incoming Fellows, Orientation, Global Support of the Mission, Career Development, Management of the Fellows, Performance Highlights, Closing Ceremony, Where They Are Now, Alumni Highlight - Mission Success: Exceptional Leaders from the NGFP, Class of 2009 Fall Recruitment Activities, Established Partnerships, Face-to-Face, Recruiting Results, Interviews, Hiring and Clearances, Introducing the Class of 2010, Class of 2011 Recruitment Strategy, On the Horizon, Appendix A: Class of 2010 Fellow Biographies

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear Program of the DPRK

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

- Park Sang Hoon

2012-09-01

Full Text Available The article analyzes the contemporary aspects of the nuclear weapon nonproliferation issue as exemplified by the international approaches to the DPRK nuclear weapons program, as well as the international community efforts to resolve it, in particular via the Six-Party Talks.

The Nuclear Progress And The Non-Proliferation Policies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Popa-Simil, Liviu [Los Alamos, NM 87544 (United States)

2009-06-15

The 2008 fall crisis showed the limits of globalization under the actual rules and de-regulations promoted by few developed countries. It also showed the weakness of the planetary economy induced by strong economic connections that makes the propagation of crises faster than the spread of welfare. The increase in severe weather and natural disasters showed how fast the civilization can be spoiled while the competition for oil resources made the interstate tensions grow. For almost all states, the development of the nuclear power becomes a prime option, even oil producers started to show interest in nuclear technology and also, policies that in particular are clearly oriented towards national development policies. The fact that anybody mastering nuclear technologies and uses for power production is capable in a reasonable time to produce weapons is a well-known fact. Therefore, in order to reduce the proliferation risk it is necessary to contain the nuclear science development. An alternative is to shift the weight in promoting renewable energies, as potential future energy alternative. Considering rigorously the future climate change effects, it becomes obvious that any delay in nuclear development will turn very costly for any nation ignoring all these facts and, the complexity of the real nonproliferation is growing. This new trend raises serious challenges in front of all states regarding the non-proliferation and, in order to keep control and stimulate a sound nuclear development, some of the actual non-proliferation concepts and policies have to be reformulated and enhanced. This has to be done in parallel with a more intensive implication of the international organisms in the real development of the nuclear power at national level. The large diversity of nuclear applications with huge collateral implication in every national economy makes the role of the international organisms orders of magnitude more important. The new challenges posed in front of the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, June 10, September 13, 14, 1977

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1978-01-01

Senator Frank Church presented the opening statement on the June 10, 1977 hearing concerning the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977, S.1432. S.1432 is designed to establish a nonproliferation framework with specific objectives established for the ERDA nuclear energy programs. The ERDA authorization bill is the budgetary vehicle to implement these objectives. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources obtained joint referral of certain portions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to insure that nonproliferation policy is implemented in a manner consistent with the policy of having sufficent energy for this country and foreign countries in the future. Additionally, the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development must examine the cost and the consequences of various initiatives before they are implemented. For example, the proposal to guarantee uranium enrichment services for foreign nations poses specific requirements on ERDA to expand considerably our enrichment capacity by the year 2000. Without reprocessing, it is expected that spent fuel rods from abroad will be returned to this country for storage with attendant costs and siting decisions. Also, international fuel cycle evaluation programs must be carefully examined to insure that all options, including regional fuel cycle centers with international controls and inspection, are considered in seeking international approaches to the nonproliferation objectives. It is these and related questions to which the subcommittee seeks answers. The hearings on September 13 and 14 focused on S.897, a bill to strengthen U.S. policies on nonproliferation and to reorganize certain export functions of the Federal government to promote more efficient administration of such functions. Statements were presented by experts in government, private firms, and industrial sectors

U.S.-China commercial nuclear commerce: Nonproliferation and trade issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

The report concludes that the United States should not be denied access to the Chinese nuclear energy program. To the contrary, the report finds that--provided China meets the requisite nonproliferation criteria--it is strongly in the US national interest to engage in peaceful nuclear, cooperation with China, from security, environmental, safety, and economic perspectives

Non-Proliferation, the IAEA Safeguards System, and the importance of nuclear material measurements

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stevens, Rebecca S. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-09-18

The objective of this project is to explain the contribution of nuclear material measurements to the system of international verification of State declarations and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Towards the fourth review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1990

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

This publication focuses on the background of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), its main provisions and some of the major issues discussed at the three conferences that have thus far been held to review the operation of the Treaty. A fourth conference to review the operation of the Treaty will be held at Geneva from 20 August to 14 September 1990. It will be the last regular review conference before the convening, in 1995, of a conference which will ''decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'' (article X, para.2). A Preparatory Committee (open to all parties) for the Fourth Review Conference has been established by the parties to the NPT, and 95 parties attended the first session, held in New York from 1 to 5 May 1989

Cavity pressure/residual stress measurements from the Non-Proliferation Experiment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Heinle, R.A.; Hudson, B.C. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Hatch, M.A. Jr.

1994-12-31

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments on the Non-Proliferation Experiment to determine post-detonation gas pressure inside the explosive cavity and the residual rock stress in the region immediately outside the cavity. Before detonation there was significant concern that steam and detonation products would create very high temperatures and pressure in the blast cavity that would exist for weeks and months after firing. This could constitute a safety hazard to personnel re-entering the tunnel. Consequently the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was asked to field its Cavity Pressure/Residual stress monitor system on the Non-Proliferation Experiment. We obtained experimental data for the first 600 ms after the explosion and again several weeks after detonation upon tunnel re-entry. We recorded early-time cavity pressure of about 8.3 MPa. In addition we believe that the ends of our sensor hoses were subjected to an ambient driving pressure of about 0.5 MPa (absolute) that persisted until at least three weeks after zero time.

JAEA's actions and contributions to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation

Science.gov (United States)

Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Michiji, Toshiro

2012-06-01

Japan, a non-nuclear weapons state, has established a commercial nuclear fuel cycle including LWRs, and now is developing a fast neutron reactor fuel cycle as part of the next generation nuclear energy system, with commercial operation targeted for 2050. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is the independent administrative agency for conducting comprehensive nuclear R&D in Japan after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA and its predecessors have extensive experience in R&D, facility operations, and safeguards development and implementation for new types of nuclear facilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the operator of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities and numerous nuclear materials, JAEA makes international contributions to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. This paper provides an overview of JAEA's development of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards technologies, including remote monitoring of nuclear facilities, environmental sample analysis methods and new efforts since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

Suggested non-proliferation criteria for commercial nuclear fuel cycles

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Laney, R.V.; Heubotter, P.R.

1978-01-01

Based on the Administration's policy to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation through diversion of fuel from commercial reactor fuel cycles, a ''benchmark'' set of nonproliferation criteria was prepared for the commercial nuclear fuel cycle. These criteria should eliminate incremental risks of proliferation beyond those inherent in the present generation of low-enriched-uranium-fueled reactors operating in a once-through mode, with internationally safeguarded storage of spent fuel. They focus on the balanced application of technical constraints consistent with the state of the technology, with minimal requirements for institutional constraints, to provide a basis for assessing the proliferation resistance of proposed fission power systems. The paper contains: (1) our perception of the nuclear energy policy and of the baseline proliferation risk accepted under this policy; (2) objectives for a reactor and fuel cycle strategy which address the technical, political, and institutional aspects of diversion and proliferation and, at the same time, satisfy the Nation's needs for efficient, timely, and economical utilization of nuclear fuel resources; (3) criteria which are responsive to these objectives and can therefore be used to screen proposed reactor and fuel cycle strategies; and (4) a rationale for these criteria

Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mochiji, Toshiro; Keeney, R.; Tazaki, Makiko; Nakhleh, C.; Puckett, J.; Stanbro, W.

1999-01-01

PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet No. 21, which was signed in February 1996, ''The Joint Research on Transparency in Nuclear Nonproliferation'' under the ''Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation''. The purpose of Action Sheet 21 is to provide a fundamental study on Transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability for the nuclear energy from the nuclear nonproliferation point of view. This project consists of independent research and then joint discussion at workshops that address a series of topics and issues in transparency. The activities covered in Action Sheet 21 took place over a period of 18 months. Three workshops were held; the first and the third hosted by PNC in Tokyo, Japan and the second hosted by LANL in Los Alamos, New Mexico, US. The following is a summary of the three workshops. The first workshop addressed the policy environment of transparency. Each side presented its perspective on the following issues: (1) a definition of transparency, (2) reasons for transparency, (3) detailed goals of transparency and (4) obstacles to transparency. The topic of the second workshop was ''Development of Transparency Options.'' The activities accomplished were (1) identify type of facilities where transparency might be applied, (2) define criteria for applying transparency, and (3) delineate applicable transparency options. The goal of the third workshop, ''Technical Options for Transparency,'' was to (1) identify conceptual options for transparency system design; (2) identify instrumentation, measurement, data collection and data processing options; (3) identify data display options; and (4) identify technical

Review of international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shimizu, Ryo; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Sakurai, Satoshi; Tamai, Hiroshi; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Kuno, Yusuke

2012-02-01

International forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation was held at Gakushi-kaikan, Tokyo on February 2-3, 2011 in cooperation with The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and The University of Tokyo Global COE. In our International Forum, we would like to encourage active discussion of international challenges to and solutions for compatibility between peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, and international cooperation for emerging nuclear energy states. It was successfully carried out with as many as 310 participants and a lot of discussions. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. (author)

JAEA's efforts for regional transparency in the area of nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoffheins, Barbara; Kawakubo, Yoko; Inoue, Naoko

2014-03-01

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has undertaken a joint R and D project with the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) for the purposes of developing an Information Sharing Framework (ISF) for regional nonproliferation cooperation since July 2011. This project builds on nearly twenty years of technical cooperation between JAEA, its predecessor organizations and the DOE including the activities to define, develop and test transparency technologies and other multilateral efforts. The objective of current project is to design a viable information sharing process to support the goals of building confidence in the peaceful nature of regional nuclear programs. At the end of a two-year-effort, project partners, JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), have defined the comprehensive requirements for an ISF that will ensure nonproliferation transparency success and sustainability. In October 2011, a parallel project with the similar title and objective was launched under the arrangement between the US DOE/NNSA and the Republic of Korea Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST). Since then, JAEA, SNL, the Korea Institute for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and Korea Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI) have jointly carried out the project in a form of informal, multilateral cooperation. The project partners have identified needs and audience for ISF, and initiated the discussion to develop requirements for ISF through workshops, meetings, regular telephone conferences, etc. The activities include conducting a survey to identify stakeholders' needs and requirements for an ISF, launching a website to practice information sharing concepts, and presenting papers. This paper provides the historical context of the current project to establish ISF, and reports the progress to date and speculates on future directions. (author)

The Implications of a New ERa in Arms Control -- Perspectives and Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mladineo, Stephen V.; Durbin, Karyn R.; Indusi, Joseph P.; Smoot, John L.; Vannoni, Michael G.; Satkowiak, Lawrence J.

2004-01-01

On November 13, 2003 the INMM hosted a workshop in Washington, DC entitled 'The Implications of a New Era in Arms Control on Regional Nonproliferation and Nuclear Materials Management'. In this paper we summarize the workshop's highlights and provide our analysis of the dominant themes. Ambassador Linton Brooks, Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), delivered the keynote address and focused on four points that are key to understanding the new era: (1) The demise of traditional East/West arms control; (2) The new strategic relationship between Russia and the United States; (3) The blurring of the distinction between nonproliferation and counter-terrorism; (4) The growing recognition that the nonproliferation regime is no longer adequate and needs to be strengthened. He issued a set of challenges to the workshop participants: if his premises were right, what should replace the lexicon of arms control? He described a four-part strategy for nuclear materials protection in Russia, and asked if that model should be replicated globally - potentially by leveraging the new relationship with Russia. Should it be through the IAEA, bilaterally, or some other mechanism? Asserting that the old Nonproliferation Treaty regime was inadequate, he asked what should replace it, and how do we bring it about? Three panel discussions were presented: (1) Implications of a New Era in US/Russia Arms Control Agreements; (2) Implications of a New in Arms Control Upon Regional Nuclear Nonproliferation: South Asia/East Asia/Middle East; and (3) Nuclear Materials Management in a New Era of Arms Control In the first panel, Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association argued that arms control agreements provided predictability in the reduction of arms, and had been successful in advancing the methods of verification. Lucas Fischer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Arms Control at the US State Department acknowledged that INF and START provide a basis

Dynamics of postirradiation intracellular cysteine and aspartic proteinases profiles in proliferating and nonproliferating mammalian cells

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Korbelik, M.; Osmak, M.; Suhar, A.; Turk, V.; Skrk, J.

1990-01-01

Dynamics of postirradiation intracellular cysteine and aspartic proteinases profiles were examined in proliferating and nonproliferating Chinese hamster fibroblasts (V 79). The results show that there are significant alterations in cysteine and aspartic intracellular proteinases activity already in the early postirradiation period, which are different in proliferating and nonproliferating cells. Irradiation of the cells examined to low doses and up to 15 Gy induced an increase in cysteine proteinases activity in the early postexposure period, while at higher irradiation doses applied, the activity of these proteinases was decreased. These observations suggest that intracellular proteinases are actively participating in process involving recovery from radiation injury or cell killing. (orig.) [de

The third review conference of the parties of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recent developments concerning international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canty, M.J.; Richter, B.; Schlupp, C.; Stein, G.

1986-11-01

The non-proliferation activities and instruments are listed in a table. The two main instruments are the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Safeguards, which are supplemented by treaties of regional restricted effects, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the EURATOM treaty. The two-tier structure of the treaties, i.e. to provide for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and at the same time foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, has proven to have a particularly stabilizing effect, which was confirmed by the last Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. The conference members were particularly satisfied with the results of the IAEA Safeguards. Future developments towards improving international safeguards will concentrate on operator-friendly and financially reasonable safeguards measures, such as safeguards effectiveness evaluations and near-real-time accountancy. The results of the CAS discussions on the definition of principles and goals of co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are of importance also to the PUNE conference. The PUNE conference will be held in 1987 and is expected to yield points of orientation for further embedding the non-proliferation principle in the international co-operative activities and the nuclear business in the 1980s. (orig./HP) [de

International arrangements against nuclear terrorism

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bunn, G.

1987-01-01

International efforts to show the spread of nuclear weapons have created an international norm of nonproliferation, backed by a variety of enforcement mechanisms. Together they are often referred to as the nonproliferation regime. This regime is reviewed, starting with the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. The centerpiece of the regime, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968, now has 135 parties, including most of the advanced industrial nuclear countries. Results of the 1985 NPT Review Conference are briefly discussed; the 86 NPT parties that attended reaffirmed the treaty's value, pledged continued support for the IAEA safeguards system, and called upon nonsigners to renounce nuclear weapons and accept IAEA safeguards. A section is devoted to the physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities, and weapons. Finally, recommendations are presented to improve international arrangements against nuclear terrorists

A study on the nuclear foreign policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Byungwook; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Noh, B. C.

2008-12-01

This study addresses four arenas to effectively assist national nuclear foreign policies under international nuclear nonproliferation regimes and organizations. Firstly, this study analyzes the trends of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the international nuclear export control regime, and proposals for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Secondly, this study analyzes the trends of international nuclear organizations, which include the IAEA as a central body of international nuclear diplomacy and technical cooperation and the OECD/NEA as a intergovernmental organization to consist of nuclear advanced countries. Thirdly, this study predicts the nuclear foreign policy of Obama Administration and reviews U. S.-India nuclear cooperation. Lastly, this study analyzes the nuclear issues of North Korea and current issues for regulation of nuclear materials.

Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

Science.gov (United States)

Satkowiak, Lawrence

2014-05-01

The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Satkowiak, Lawrence [Director, Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security Programs, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States)

2014-05-09

The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

A Study on the Nuclear Foreign Policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, Maeng Ho; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Lee, B. W.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.

2004-12-01

It is of the utmost importance in the peaceful use and development of nuclear energy to respond in a timely manner to the changes of international nuclear communities. This study were carried focused on the trends of international movements related to nuclear non-proliferation regime and major trends in the international bi- or multi-lateral technical cooperation activities. This study investigates the major changes of international technical cooperation focusing on nuclear functional organizations, IAEA and OECD/NEA which become competent and important in the international technical cooperation. 9.11 terror and international illegal trafficking of A. Q. Khan network caused the strengthening of international nonproliferation regimes and international efforts and measures against threat of nuclear terror and this movement will kept in the international communities afterwards with GTRI, G8 action plan, UN resolution of WMD and ratification and application of additional protocol of IAEA safeguards agreement into member countries. Upgrade of nuclear diplomatic and technical networks and activities are required to secure the national rights and dignity in the international communities in effective and systematic manners through the enlarged participation and contribution of the national experts to working groups activities of IAEA and OECD/NEA together

Safeguarding and Protecting the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bjornard, Trond; Garcia, Humberto; Desmond, William; Demuth, Scott

2010-01-01

International safeguards as applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a vital cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime - they protect against the peaceful nuclear fuel cycle becoming the undetected vehicle for nuclear weapons proliferation by States. Likewise, domestic safeguards and nuclear security are essential to combating theft, sabotage, and nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. While current approaches to safeguarding and protecting the nuclear fuel cycle have been very successful, there is significant, active interest to further improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards and security, particularly in light of the anticipated growth of nuclear energy and the increase in the global threat environment. This article will address two recent developments called Safeguards-by-Design and Security-by-Design, which are receiving increasing broad international attention and support. Expected benefits include facilities that are inherently more economical to effectively safeguard and protect. However, the technical measures of safeguards and security alone are not enough - they must continue to be broadly supported by dynamic and adaptive nonproliferation and security regimes. To this end, at the level of the global fuel cycle architecture, 'nonproliferation and security by design' remains a worthy objective that is also the subject of very active, international focus.

Good practices in provision of nuclear safeguards and security training courses at the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Kobayashi Naoki

2017-01-01

Full Text Available More than five years have passed since the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN was established under the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA in December 2010 and started its activities, in response to the commitment of Japan at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.. The ISCN has been vigorously involved in capacity building assistance on nuclear nonproliferation (safeguards and nuclear security, mainly in the Asian region. It has provided 105 training courses to 2901 participants in total as of August 2016. The ISCN plays a major role in strengthening nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security in the region, and this can be considered one of the great results of the Nuclear Security Summit process. The ISCN has cooperated with the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL to establish a base of instructors, particularly for the Center's flagship two-week courses, the Regional Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities (RTC on PP and the Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (RTC on SSAC. Furthermore, the ISCN has provided training courses for experts in Japan, making the best use of the Center's knowledge and experience of organizing international courses. The ISCN has also started joint synchronized training with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (EC JRC on nuclear safeguards. This paper describes the good practices at the ISCN through its five years of activities, focusing on its progress in nuclear safeguards and nuclear security training.

Nuclear power generation and nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rathjens, G.

1979-01-01

The main points existing between nuclear energy development and nuclear non-proliferation policy are reviewed. The solar energy and other energy will replace for nuclear fission energy in the twenty first century, but it may not occur in the first half, and the structure has to be established to continue the development of nuclear fission technology, including breeder reactor technology. In the near future, it should be encouraged to use advanced thermal reactors if they are economic and operated with safety. Miserable results may be created in the worldwide scale, if a serious accident occurs anywhere or nuclear power reactors are utilized for military object. It is estimated to be possible to develop the ability of manufacturing nuclear weapons within two or three years in the countries where the industry is highly developed so as to generate nuclear power. It is also difficult to take measures so that nuclear power generation does not increase nuclear proliferation problems, and it is necessary to mitigate the motive and to establish the international organization. Concensus exists that as the minimum security action, the storage and transportation of materials, which can be directly utilized for nuclear weapons, should be decided by the international system. The most portions of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle should be put under the international management, as far as possible. This problem is discussed in INFCE. Related to the nuclear nonproliferation, the difference of policy in fuel cycle problems between USA and the other countries, the enrichment of nuclear fuel material, especially the reasons to inhibit the construction of additional enrichment facilities, nuclear fuel reprocessing problems, radioactive waste disposal, plutonium stock and plutonium recycle problems are reviewed. (Nakai, Y.)

The White Paper on Defence and National Security and nonproliferation: between adaptation and traditionalism

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sitt, Bernard

2013-05-01

The White Paper on Defence and National Security, published on the 29 April, presents France's strategic vision with regard to recent world developments and updates its national and international security postures for the coming fifteen years. The new White Paper notes, in particular, that existing risks and threats, be they military or non-military, and of State or non-State origin, have both intensified and diversified, and may concern all aspects of the life of the Nation. In terms of non-proliferation, the White Paper appears to follow on from its 2008 predecessor. It notes firstly that the most pessimistic forecasts, which predicted the emergence of twenty or so nuclear powers by the turn of the millennium, have not come to pass. Yet, there is cause for concern as a result of the multiplication of clandestine trafficking and transfers of material and immaterial goods, which non-State actors such as terrorist groups could use to acquire know-how and sensitive technology. For that reason, France is implementing a national export control regime for dual-use goods, and will launch an inter-ministerial review with the aim of reinforcing the regime. The other challenge is that posed by regional nuclear and ballistic proliferation and the ensuing crises. The continuing decades-old tension in the Middle East or East Asia is exacerbated by certain States' possession of nuclear weapons, and the risks of proliferation cascades in these two regions should be taken into serious account. The White Paper goes as far as envisaging the catastrophic scenario of an unchecked escalation resulting in the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Chemical and biological weapons constitute a genuine threat, taking into account notably the dual nature of underlying technologies, which makes clandestine programmes all the more difficult to prevent and detect. The requirements of the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their deliver systems thus remain

A Study on Introduction of Nuclear Power Plants in India and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Conditions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, Seung Hyo; Lim, Dong Hyuk

2011-01-01

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which was formed to build nuclear export control has been accepting the nuclear cooperation for the member nation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Korea exported nuclear power plants to United Arab Emirates in 2009 and research and training reactor to Jordan in 2010 based on the forcible non-proliferation regime as a member nation of NSG, so it is strengthening its position in the atomic energy industry. In addition, Korea concluded an agreement with India which is planning the construction of 25.based or more nuclear power plants for the next 20 years in last July, 25, so it will enter the atomic energy market in India. But India has been accepted the exceptionally civilian nuclear cooperation as a de facto Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) and non-member state of NPT, so concerns about nuclear proliferation has been raised. This study aims to introduce the allowance of exceptions background in India, to analyze its effect on the non-proliferation regime and to find nuclear non-proliferation conditions

Impasses and mistakes of the nuclear non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hirst, M.

1980-01-01

It is analyzed the limitations for implementing the American Nuclear non-proliferation policy. It is shown the crisis of the North American international relations, with the economic and scientific development of the advanced capitalist nations and some countries of the third world, the penetration of these countries in the world trade commerce of the nuclear industry as sellers and cunsumers, and the Latin American's and Brazil's position in the international panorama of nuclear power. (M.C.K.) [pt

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Where Next?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Evans, G.

2013-01-01

Let me come straight to the point: We are still at a real watershed with respect to the whole nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament project, about which hopes have been so high for most of the last two years, especially following the political breakthrough of the election of a US president totally committed to the ultimate achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world. Unless the key players in the international community, and there are many that matter in this context, not just the United States of America and the Russian Federation, get really serious about moving forward on the multiple critical agenda issues that face us - not just safeguards, the subject of this symposium, but right across the whole spectrum of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful-uses challenges - there is a very real danger that such remaining momentum for change as there is will stall, that the whole project will fall apart, and that we will be condemned to live for the indefinitely foreseeable future in a nuclear world that is very dangerous indeed. The prevailing sentiment after the May Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was one of relief - that the conference had not broken down as it did in 2005 and that catastrophe had been avoided; in effect, that this particular watershed point had been passed. But the positive gains from that conference, when objectively assessed, were negligible on crucial NPT regime strengthening issues, and, with the possible exception of the agreement to hold a Middle East conference in 2012, very slight indeed elsewhere. And, weighing in the negative balance, there have been some serious disappointments on other key benchmark issues spelled out in US President Obama's April 2009 Prague Speech and on which real movement had been hoped for this year. Nothing has moved on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification by the USA or any other major nuclear power; negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) remain

Non-proliferation and international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blix, H.

1992-01-01

Full text: In my view, drastic nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon States could be coupled with universal commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear weapon States by 1995 when the extension of the NPT Will be discussed. The incentives and disincentives for making and stockpiling nuclear weapons are first of all in the political and security fields, (Global and regional detente reduce the incentive, With the cold war gone, the US and Russia are now agreeing on far-reaching cuts in their nuclear arsenals and at some point the other declared nuclear weapon States Will follow.In the regional fields, we have seen how Argentina and Brazil are about to commit themselves to exclusively peaceful uses of the atom through the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty. And we have seen how South Africa has joined the NPT. A new wave of States adhering to the NPT may be expected from countries in the former Soviet Union. Some have already come, others are on the way. Detente in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent would improve the outlook for non-proliferation in these areas. A second barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in export restrictions on sensitive nuclear material and equipment, Following the discoveries in Iraq, these restrictions are being strengthened in a large number of States. A third barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in the economic and political consequences that would follow for a State if IAEA safeguards inspection revealed activities aimed at the production of nuclear weapons. These must have a high degree of reliability. The case of Iraq showed that it was possible for a closed, highly militarized State to hide nuclear activities from the IAEA and the world We are now drawing the lessons from this case. It is not physically possible for inspectors to look into every building and basement in vast countries, They must have information about where to look, and the IAEA is significantly strengthening its information basis. The IAEA has also re

Fukushima Daiichi: implications for carbon-free energy, nuclear nonproliferation, and community resilience.

Science.gov (United States)

Hall, Howard L

2011-07-01

Implications of the nuclear power plant accidents at Fukushima Daiichi are explored in this commentary. In addition to questions of nuclear reactor regulatory standards, broader implications on noncarbon-emitting energy production, nuclear nonproliferation objectives, and community resilience and emergency response against catastrophic events are explored. Copyright © 2011 SETAC.

Abrupt climate-independent fire regime changes

Science.gov (United States)

Pausas, Juli G.; Keeley, Jon E.

2014-01-01

Wildfires have played a determining role in distribution, composition and structure of many ecosystems worldwide and climatic changes are widely considered to be a major driver of future fire regime changes. However, forecasting future climatic change induced impacts on fire regimes will require a clearer understanding of other drivers of abrupt fire regime changes. Here, we focus on evidence from different environmental and temporal settings of fire regimes changes that are not directly attributed to climatic changes. We review key cases of these abrupt fire regime changes at different spatial and temporal scales, including those directly driven (i) by fauna, (ii) by invasive plant species, and (iii) by socio-economic and policy changes. All these drivers might generate non-linear effects of landscape changes in fuel structure; that is, they generate fuel changes that can cross thresholds of landscape continuity, and thus drastically change fire activity. Although climatic changes might contribute to some of these changes, there are also many instances that are not primarily linked to climatic shifts. Understanding the mechanism driving fire regime changes should contribute to our ability to better assess future fire regimes.

Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration

Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Walter, Andrew

2009-06-01

National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

US policies on combating proliferation of nuclear weapons after the cold war

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tosaki, Hirofumi

2005-01-01

Combating nuclear proliferation has been one of the top priorities for the international community in the post post-Cold War era, and the United States has been taking initiative for tackling the problems. The current Bush administration has placed value high on the effective and concrete actions - including the use of military forces - for such efforts. It is imperative that such actions should be taken in resolving the nuclear proliferation. However, the United States has been criticized that it has disregarded the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, and that its non-proliferation policy has given negative implications to the regime. Combating nuclear proliferation should be pursued in balanced approach with legitimacy, in consideration of the discriminately nature of the regime as well as of its three pillars - nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. (author)

Safeguards as catastrophic risk management: insights and projections

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leffer, T.N.

2013-01-01

The system of international agreements designed to prevent the use of nuclear weapons and to control the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies (collectively referred to as the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation regimes) is posited as humanity.s first attempt to mitigate a man-made global catastrophic risk. By extrapolating general principles of government response to risk from the arms control and nonproliferation regimes, a model of international regime building for catastrophic risk mitigation is constructed. This model provides the context for an examination of the system of safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which serves as the nuclear nonproliferation regime.s verification and enforcement mechanism and thereby constitutes the regime's most completely developed discrete mechanism for risk mitigation (a 'system within a system'). An assessment of the history, evolution and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system in the context of the regimes-as-risk-mitigation model reveals some general principles for risk-mitigation regimes which are then applied to the safeguards system to identify ways in which it may be strengthened. Finally, the IAEA safeguards system is posited as the prototype verification/enforcement mechanism for future risk mitigation regimes that governments will be compelled to create in the face of new global catastrophic risks that technological advance will inevitably create. (author)

Non-proliferation, safeguards, and security for the fissile materials disposition program immobilization alternatives

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Tolk, K.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Moore, L.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

1996-05-01

The Department of Energy is analyzing long-term storage and disposition alternatives for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered. These include facilities for storage, conversion and stabilization of fissile materials, immobilization in glass or ceramic material, fabrication of fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use of reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and disposal of fissile material using geologic alternatives. This paper will focus on how the objectives of reducing security and proliferation risks are being considered, and the possible facility impacts. Some of the areas discussed in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threats, and (4) potential proliferation, safeguards, and security issues and impacts on the facilities. Issues applicable to all of the possible disposition alternatives will be discussed in this paper. However, particular attention is given to the plutonium immobilization alternatives.

Nuclear power and the non-proliferation issue

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-12-01

This leaflet, issued by the British Nuclear Forum on behalf of the industry, seeks first to place the problem of reconciling the need for nuclear power with its possible weapon uses in a historical perspective. Secondly, it describes the technical and political measures which are now taken, and others which could be introduced in order to ensure that nuclear power, which offers the cheapest and safest large-scale energy source for the future, can be made available without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Headings are: introduction; the early years; the IAEA; uranium enrichment; plutonium; secrecy has failed; the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the London Suppliers Group; the situation today; the British position; conclusions. (U.K.)

Abstracts of reports of the International conference on non-proliferation problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

1997-01-01

On August 21, 1947, the USSR Council of Ministers made a decision on creating Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (STS). The first Nuclear Test on the Test Site was conducted on August 29, 1949, the last one was made on October 19, 1989. In all during 40 years on Semipalatinsk Test Site 116 ground and air and 340 underground nuclear tests were conducted. They brought much damage to health and lives of thousands of people who involuntarily participated in those events. On August 29, 1991, by Kazakstan President's decree STS was closed but the problems of people's rehabilitation, natural landscapes recovering, test-site infrastructure conversion remained. These problems are being solved under direct state programs, intergovernmental agreements of Kazakstan with Russia and the USA, cooperation with different international and foreign organizations, enterprises, scientific-research centers. Kazakstan subsequently constantly pursues the policy of nonproliferation, takes measures on ellimination of nuclear tests consequences and relative infrastructure. The Republic is not involved into military nuclear programs. From its territory all the nuclear weapon was taken away. Kazakstan joined the Agreement on Non-proliferation, signed the Agreement on Safeguards to all Nuclear activity on Kazakh territory with the IAEA

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Northeast Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Han Yong-Sup

1995-01-01

This paper attempted to find out ways to facilitate bilateral and regional arms control regarding nuclear issues in Northeast Asia. This is done in order to reduce uncertainties regarding nuclear policy and capabilities of those countries, and thus to enhance transparency and confidence in the region. In order to bring them into the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process in an effective way, we revisited the issues that contributed to the acceleration of the arms race. The review provided insights into the future course of China, the two Koreas and Japan regarding their nuclear policy and capabilities. The findings of this study indicate a general likelihood of resistance to outside request for arms control and disarmament in the countries in Northeast Asia. Besides their continuation with the conventional arms race, countries in Northeast Asia are reluctant to go ahead with the programmes to enhance transparency, build confidence in the region, and to forgo intentions to go nuclear. China is slowly but steadily increasing its nuclear arsenals. Its nuclear arms control policy is not well integrated with nuclear policy and strategy, and it is subject to the overarching goal of nuclear policy and strategy to advance China's status and national security interests in the international community. Thus, it will be very difficult for other countries to bring China to the arms control process for the time being. North Korea has intended to develop nuclear weapons in order to hedge against uncertainties. This poses a threat to the NPT regime and the peace and security of Northeast Asia. Clearly, North Korea has shown its reluctance to disclose the entirety of its nuclear programme under the IAEA inspections. Although South Korea has taken a bold initiative to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, it has still not fully paid off. Japan adds the problem of plutonium surplus to the uncertain security environments surrounding Northeast Asia

Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-01-01

This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration.

Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dassen, L. van

1998-03-01

Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden''s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives

Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

1998-03-01

Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden``s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives. Refs.

Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Doyle, James E.; Meek, Elizabeth

2009-01-01

The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the

The control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear development - present uncertainties

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Machado de Faria, N.G.; Amaral Barros, E.

1983-01-01

This report gives the views of Brazilian lawyers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It deals with the present situation and future prospects concerning the uses of nuclear energy. In particular, it proposes the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

Nuclear energy and non-proliferation in Latin America: the constitution of Tlatelolco system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Armanet, P.

1982-01-01

The nuclear energy as alternative energy resource and its military use are analysed. Then the main characteristics of the Tratelolco treaty and non-proliferation in Latin America are discussed. Finally the importance of the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America is shown. (A.B.T.) [pt

South America and the proliferation of biological weapons

OpenAIRE

Tatiana Coutto

2013-01-01

This article focuses on the role of regional institutions and political practices in strengthening multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Particular attention is devoted to coordination between Brazil and Argentina with a view to forging a "South American position" vis-à-vis the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC). Empirical evidence suggests that informal arrangements between the two countries were capable of involving other South American leaders and promoting t...

Framework for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection for Nonproliferation Impact Assessments

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bari, R.

2008-01-01

This report describes a framework for proliferation resistance and physical protection evaluation for the fuel cycle systems envisioned in the expansion of nuclear power for electricity generation. The methodology is based on an approach developed as part of the Generation IV technical evaluation framework and on a qualitative evaluation approach to policy factors similar to those that were introduced in previous Nonproliferation Impact Assessments performed by DOE

A Study on the Nuclear Foreign Policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Byung Wook; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Oh, K. B.; Yang, M. H.; Lee, K. S.

2007-12-01

This study approaches the international trends related to nuclear non-proliferation in four aspects. First, this study analyzes the trend of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the international nuclear export control regime and proposals for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Second, this study analyzes the trend of international nuclear organizations, which includes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a central body of development of nuclear technology and international nuclear diplomacy, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), a intergovernmental organization to consist of a group of nuclear advanced countries. Third, this study analyzes the trends of the U.S.'s nuclear foreign policies, particularly nuclear non-proliferation. Fourth, this study analyzes the nuclear issues of North Korea and Iran as they cause serious concerns to a international society

A Study on the Nuclear Foreign Policy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Byung Wook; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Oh, K. B.; Yang, M. H.; Lee, K. S

2007-12-15

This study approaches the international trends related to nuclear non-proliferation in four aspects. First, this study analyzes the trend of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the international nuclear export control regime and proposals for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Second, this study analyzes the trend of international nuclear organizations, which includes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a central body of development of nuclear technology and international nuclear diplomacy, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), a intergovernmental organization to consist of a group of nuclear advanced countries. Third, this study analyzes the trends of the U.S.'s nuclear foreign policies, particularly nuclear non-proliferation. Fourth, this study analyzes the nuclear issues of North Korea and Iran as they cause serious concerns to a international society.

American alliances and nuclear non-proliferation. The end of nuclear weapon activities of US allies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schneider, Jonas

2016-01-01

Jonas Schneider tackles a question that is of great interest both to scholars of nuclear proliferation and to practitioners of nonproliferation diplomacy: Why do some political leaders of U.S. allies agree to abandon their nation's nuclear weapons activities, while others - who are often members of the same allied government and sometimes even of the same political party - steadfastly reject such a course reversal? Our existing stock of theories does not fare well in accounting for this important variation in leaders' attitudes. To solve this puzzle, Schneider develops an innovative theory that draws on the individual status conceptions of allied political leaders. Subsequently, the author undertakes to test his theory using four thoroughly researched case studies, and he derives important lessons for international nonproliferation diplomacy toward the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

Suppression of radiation excitation in focusing environment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Huang, Z.; Ruth, R.D.

1996-12-01

Radiation damping and quantum excitation in an electron damping ring and a straight focusing channel are reviewed. They are found to be the two limiting cases in the study of a general bending and focusing combined system. In the intermediate regime where the radiation formation length is comparable to the betatron wavelength, quantum excitation can be exponentially suppressed by focusing field. This new regime may have interesting applications in the generation of ultra-low emittance beams

Monitoring, Accounting and Enforcement in Emissions Trading Regimes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Peterson, S.

2003-01-01

Monitoring, accounting and enforcement have been addressed in quite a number of presentations, papers and discussions in the past four CATEP workshops. Besides drawing conclusions from the experiences with existing trading regimes, different aspects of compliance have been analysed in more detail and finally there has been a special focus on standardised accounting systems. This paper tries to summarise the diverse findings to get a comprehensive picture of what is needed to assure high compliance in emissions trading regimes and identify any specific problems. The first section focuses on real trading regimes that are all local or at most national. It describes the monitoring, accounting and enforcement systems in existing and planned trading regimes to get an idea of what such systems include and to draw conclusions from experience. One focus is on enforcement mechanisms, as different from monitoring and accounting, which are basically a question of regulation and technology, penalties and compliance are a question of choices by participants and can be analysed with analytic tools. Section 3 deals with specific monitoring, accounting and enforcement problems in international emissions trading. It describes the development of internationally standardised systems and discusses the commitment period reserve as one instrument to avoid overselling of permits in international emission trading under the Kyoto Protocol. Section 5 provides a summary and conclusion

Transport of long-pulse relativistic electron beams in preformed plasma channels in the ion focus regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, J.D.

1989-01-01

Experiments have been performed demonstrating efficient transport of long-pulse (380 ns), high-current (200 A), relativistic electron beams (REBs) in preformed plasma channels in the ion focus regime (IFR). Plasma channels were created by low-energy ( e , and channel ion mass, in agreement with theoretical values predicted for the ion hose instability. Microwave emission has also been observed indicative of REB-plasma electron two-stream instability. Plasma channel density measurements indicate that the two-stream instability can become dominant for measured f e values slightly above unity. The author has introduced a theoretical analysis for high-current REB transport and modulation in axially periodic IFR plasma channels. Analytic expression for the electric field are found for the case of a cosine modulation of the channel ion density. Two different types of channels are considered: (i) periodic beam-induced ionization channels, and (ii) periodic plasma slab channels created by an external source. Analytical conditions are derived for the matched radius of the electron beam and for approximate beam envelope motion using a 'smooth' approximation. Numerical solutions to the envelope equation show that by changing the wavelength or the amplitude of the space-charge neutralization fraction of the ion channel density modulation, the beam can be made to focus and diverge, or to undergo stable, modulated transport

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session on S. 897 and S. 1432

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1978-01-01

On April 7, 1977, President Carter announced his nuclear power policy. The policy statement set forth seven specific objectives for the future use of nuclear energy in this country and the rest of the world. The two proposed instruments for implementing this policy are the revised fiscal year 1978 ERDA authorization draft bill and S. 1432, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. These legislative proposals are linked in that S. 1432 is designed to establish a non-proliferation framework with specific objectives established for the ERDA nuclear energy programs. The ERDA authorization bill is the budgetary vehicle to implement those objectives. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources obtained joint referral of certain portions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to insure that non-proliferation policy is implemented in a manner consistent with the policy of having sufficient energy for this country and foreign countries in the future. The Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development must examine the costs and the consequences of various initiatives before they are implemented. F or example, the proposal to guarantee uranium enrichment services for foreign nations poses specific requirements on ERDA to expand considerably our enrichment capacity by the year 2000. Without reprocessing, it is expected that spent fuel rods from abroad will be returned to this country for storage with attendant costs and siting decisions. Also, international fuel-cycle evaluation programs must be carefully examined to insure that all options, including regional fuel cycle centers with international controls and inspection, are considered in seeking international approaches to the non-proliferation objectives. At the June 10 hearing, the subcommittee received testimony on S. 1432, the bill prepared by the administration. The hearings on September 13 and 14 focused on S. 897. Statements by many witnesses are included

Improving Capture-gamma Libraries for Nonproliferation Applications

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sleaford, Brad W. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Hurst, Aaron M. [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States)

2016-11-01

This report describes the measurement, evaluation and incorporation of new -ray spectroscopic data into the Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF) for nonproliferation applications. Analysis and processing techniques are described along with key deliverables that have been met over the course of this project. A total of nine new ENDF libraries have been submitted to the National Nuclear Data Center at the Brookhaven National Laboratory and are now available in the ENDF/B-VIII.beta2 release. Furthermore, this project has led to more than ten peer-reviewed publications and provided theses for ve graduate students. This project is a component of the NA-22 venture collaboration on \\Correlated Nuclear Data in Fission Events" (LA14-V-CorrData-PD2Jb).

The role of the media in establishing international security regimes

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Chanan Naveh

2005-04-01

Full Text Available This article focuses primarily on the media's impact on international security regimes. It explores the ways in which the media affect the lifecycles of international regimes, from the time they are first conceived of, through their establishment, consolidation and stabilization, up until their ultimate demise. Although this paper highlights the media's role in the evolution of security regimes, it is clear that, regardless of the regime in question, media play a role throughout the lifecycle of all international regimes, whatever their character. In order to analyze the relationships of the media with security regimes in general, and specifically their contribution to each stage in their development, the article utilizes methodologies from the field of communication studies. It examines the media's agenda, "news values" and various functions, and their ability to mobilize public support for the particular issue of the regime. To date, most studies have explored the interaction between media communication patterns and global developments at the state level, or in relation to the formulation of foreign policy, while largely ignoring the international dimension of the relationship. This article attempts to remedy this situation, and the relevant processes are analysed in a case study of the anti-Iraq international security regime. It should be noted that although the paper focuses on the specific anti-Iraqi regime, it is part of a more general Anti-Rogue actors regime which includes the war against global terrorism. The study of the development of the anti-Iraq press-security regime teaches us that during international crises the media mobilize and unanimously support the regime fighting the "bad guys." But, when the regime develops and enters disputed turfs and begins to lose its legitimacy, media support diminishes, and the media may even develop into an opposing force and may join the actors fighting against this regime. Moreover, the study of

The fight against weapons of mass destruction at the crossroads; La lutte contre la proliferation des armes de destruction massive a la croisee des chemins

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Biad, A. [Rouen Univ., Faculte de Droit, de Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 76 - Mont-Saint-Aignan (France)

2004-07-01

Under the joint pressure of the US unilateralism and of some proliferating countries, the non-proliferation regimes are today at the crossroads. Despite the enormous efforts mobilized so far, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction appears as inescapable. This article analyzes the reasons of the continuous erosion of non-proliferation regimes and the possible means to delay this phenomenon: counter-proliferation measures, control of exported nuclear technologies and equipments, use of diplomatic and politico-economical means, controlled multilateral disarmament. (J.S.)

The fight against weapons of mass destruction at the crossroads

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biad, A.

2004-01-01

Under the joint pressure of the US unilateralism and of some proliferating countries, the non-proliferation regimes are today at the crossroads. Despite the enormous efforts mobilized so far, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction appears as inescapable. This article analyzes the reasons of the continuous erosion of non-proliferation regimes and the possible means to delay this phenomenon: counter-proliferation measures, control of exported nuclear technologies and equipments, use of diplomatic and politico-economical means, controlled multilateral disarmament. (J.S.)

IAEA safeguards related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons- T.N.P. and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America-Tlatelolco

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodrigues, M.D.F.

1978-04-01

The application of safeguards, focusing mainly the causes that gave origin to this type of control, is studied. The safeguard procedures used by the IAEA are also given, relative to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - Tlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons - T.N.P. and the Euratom safeguards. Some consideration is given to the organizations related to safeguards application such as IAEA, OPANAL and Euratom, their functions and aims. (F.E.) [pt

India and the NPT: separating substantive facts from normative fiction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Srivastava, Anupam; Gahlaut, Seema

2010-01-01

This article examines the feasibility and advisability of India joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It demonstrates that (a) the non-proliferation regime, which is larger and more varied than the NPT, has received significant cooperation from India in the past; (b) that in order to effectively deal with further challenges from nuclear renaissance, nuclear deterrence, and terrorism, the regime will need to craft creative, non-NPT centric solutions like the US-India nuclear agreement, to co-opt India; and (c) that India's interest will be better served by trying to shape the regime from within rather than remaining a reasoned voice from without. (author)

Saving the NPT: past and future non-proliferation bargains

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tertrais, B

2005-07-01

In this thorough study of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the author looks at the origins of the NPT, its original bargains, and the current 'global crisis of compliance'. Then he looks to the 2005 NPT Review Conference for approaches 'to preserve the integrity and the credibility of the Treaty'. He suggests a new set of bargains centered around two issues: increase rewards for members in good standing of their obligations, but promote sanctions for those cheating; and recognize that nuclear disarmament is a distant goal, but satisfy the legitimate worries of NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States)

Saving the NPT: past and future non-proliferation bargains

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tertrais, B.

2005-01-01

In this thorough study of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the author looks at the origins of the NPT, its original bargains, and the current 'global crisis of compliance'. Then he looks to the 2005 NPT Review Conference for approaches 'to preserve the integrity and the credibility of the Treaty'. He suggests a new set of bargains centered around two issues: increase rewards for members in good standing of their obligations, but promote sanctions for those cheating; and recognize that nuclear disarmament is a distant goal, but satisfy the legitimate worries of NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States)

A study on the nuclear foreign policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oh, Keun Bae; Choi, Y. M.; Lee, D. J.; Lee, K. S.; Lee, B. W.; Ko, H. S.

1997-12-01

The objective of this study is to analyze and foresee the international trends related to nuclear activities, especially nuclear non-proliferation activities among others, and to suggest desirable policy direction so as to mitigate hurdles that may hinder the expansion of utilization and development of nuclear energy in Korea. This study approaches the trends of international nuclear arena in five aspects as follows. First, this study analyzes the trends of the global multilateral nuclear non-proliferation regime in Chapter II, which includes the NPT, the IAEA safeguards system, the international export control regime, the CTBT, and the treaties on nuclear weapon-free zone. Second, this study analyzes the trends of various international nuclear organizations in Chapter III, which include IAEA, OECD/NEA, and CTBTO. Third, this study reviews and analyzes regional situations in the northeast Asia surrounding Korea in Chapter IV, inter alia, pending concerns over the North Korean nuclear activities and proposed Northeast Asian nuclear cooperatively bodies such as ASIATOM, etc. Fourth, in Chapter V, this study analyzes issues concerning bilateral nuclear relationship. Especially this study analyzes nuclear cooperating agreements in general, and suggests a model agreement for the government to use when negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries. Furthermore, this study analyzes the trends of bilateral cooperation with the U.S., Canada, and Australia focusing on the standing bilateral nuclear committees. Fifth, Chapter VI especially deals with the framework of the U. S.'s nuclear non-proliferation policy, focusing on the issues such as the disposition of weapons-usable excess plutonium and the nuclear cooperation with China. (author). 44 refs., 15 tabs., 2 figs

Nuclear Non-proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 - No 8 of 1987

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-01-01

This Act aims at giving domestic legislative effect to Australia's international non-proliferation obligations and establishes controls over the possession and transport of nuclear materials and equipment by a system of permits. These obligations arise inter alia under the NPT Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Act provides that its provisions shall apply to nuclear material (as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute) and associated items which include associated material, equipment or technology. These are clearly defined in the Act. (NEA) [fr

The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

2010-01-01

The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

Explosive performance on the non-proliferation experiment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McKown, T.O.

1994-03-01

The non-proliferation experiment, originally called the chemical kiloton experiment, was planned and executed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to investigate the seismic yield relationship and distinguishing seismic signals between a nuclear event and a large mass conventional explosion. The Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments to further their studies of the source function for signals observed seismically. Since all investigations were contingent on the performance of the emplaced chemical explosive, an array of diagnostic measurements was fielded in the emplaced explosive. The CORRTEX system was used to investigate the explosive initiation and to determine the detonation velocities in multiple levels and in numerous directions. A description of the CORRTEX experiments fielded, a review of the data obtained and some interpretations of the data are reported.

Arms control and nonproliferation technologies. First quarter 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Staehle, G; Alonzo, G M; Sanford, N M [eds.

1995-01-01

This first quarter issue for 1995 highlights the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. The SBIR program is managed by the DOE`s Basic Energy Sciences program within the Office of Energy Research. Each year, the SBIR program solicits research ideas of interest to the DOE. Articles contained in this issue include: The Small Business Innovation Research Program supported by the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security; Automated cueing to man-made objects via multispectral image; Security systems get smart with advanced processing and thermal imaging; A breakthrough in cooling system technology; The APSTNG neutron probe; Lithium-doped fullerene neutron detector; Miniature GC-MS for on-site chemical analysis; and Winner of Sandia President`s Quality Award.

Future of US utilities under non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ladesich, J.N.

1978-01-01

The non-proliferation policy, a negative policy that closes the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, is only a small part of a chaotic energy environment characterized by inaction. The impact of this environment on California utilities has resulted in a virtual moratorium on new facilities at a time when the nuclear option can be shown to be vital. Utilities are experiencing uncertainties in future power generation because alternatives to nuclear energy may not be the best choices. Utilities feel frustrated by the inaction; not by the objectives of the accountability and security proposals. The utilities will continue to support nuclear power and the completion of the fuel cycle in spite of these uncertainties

Saturation of backward stimulated scattering of laser in kinetic regime: Wavefront bowing, trapped particle modulational instability, and trapped particle self-focusing of plasma waves

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yin, L.; Albright, B. J.; Bowers, K. J.; Daughton, W.; Rose, H. A.

2008-01-01

Backward stimulated Raman and Brillouin scattering (SRS and SBS) of laser are examined in the kinetic regime using particle-in-cell simulations. The SRS reflectivity measured as a function of the laser intensity in a single hot spot from two-dimensional (2D) simulations shows a sharp onset at a threshold laser intensity and a saturated level at higher intensities, as obtained previously in Trident experiments [D. S. Montgomery et al., Phys. Plasmas 9, 2311 (2002)]. In these simulations, wavefront bowing of electron plasma waves (ion acoustic waves) due to the trapped particle nonlinear frequency shift, which increases with laser intensity, is observed in the SRS (SBS) regime for the first time. Self-focusing from trapped particle modulational instability (TPMI) [H. A. Rose, Phys. Plasmas 12, 12318 (2005)] is shown to occur in both two- and three-dimensional SRS simulations. The key physics underlying nonlinear saturation of SRS is identified as a combination of wavefront bowing, TPMI, and self-focusing of electron plasma waves. The wavefront bowing marks the beginning of SRS saturation and self-focusing alone is sufficient to terminate the SRS reflectivity, both effects resulting from cancellation of the source term for SRS and from greatly increased dissipation rate of the electron plasm waves. Ion acoustic wave bowing also contributes to the SBS saturation. Velocity diffusion by transverse modes and rapid loss of hot electrons in regions of small transverse extent formed from self-focusing lead to dissipation of the wave energy and an increase in the Landau damping rate in spite of strong electron trapping that reduces Landau damping initially. The ranges of wavelength and growth rate associated with transverse breakup of the electron-plasma wave are also examined in 2D speckle simulations as well as in 2D periodic systems from Bernstein-Greene-Kruskal equilibrium and are compared with theory predictions

INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Donnelly, W H

1980-12-01

The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. Here the author outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US nonproliferation policy. If the future of nuclear power is to include more sensitive facilities in which plutonium and highly enriched uranium are present, it must be determined whether the risks seen in proliferation are great enough to cause the USA and other governments to place such facilities under some form of international ownership or control in addition to international safeguards. A final crucial problem is deciding what can and should be done to dissuade non-nuclear-weapons states from the direct manufacture of nuclear weapons. 6 references.

Assessment of Impact of Monoenergetic Photon Sources on Prioritized Nonproliferation Applications: Simulation Study Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Geddes, Cameron [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Ludewigt, Bernhard [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Valentine, John [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Quiter, Brian [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Descalle, Marie-Anne [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Warren, Glen [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kinlaw, Matt [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Thompson, Scott [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Chichester, David [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Miller, Cameron [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Pozzi, Sara [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)

2016-12-30

Near-monoenergetic photon sources (MPSs) have the potential to improve sensitivity at greatly reduced dose in existing applications and enable new capabilities in other applications. MPS advantages include the ability to select energy, energy spread, flux, and pulse structures to deliver only the photons needed for the application, while suppressing extraneous dose and background. Some MPSs also offer narrow divergence photon beams which can target dose and/or mitigate scattering contributions to image contrast degradation. Current broad-band, bremsstrahlung photon sources (e.g., linacs and betatrons) deliver unnecessary dose that in some cases also interferes with the signature to be detected and/or restricts operations, and must be collimated (reducing flux) to generate narrow divergence beams. While MPSs can in principle resolve these issues, they are technically challenging to produce. Candidate MPS technologies for nonproliferation applications are now being developed, each of which have different properties (e.g. broad divergence vs. narrow). Within each technology, source parameters trade off against one another (e.g. flux vs. energy spread), representing a large operation space. To guide development, requirements for each application of interest must be defined and simulations conducted to define MPS parameters that deliver benefit relative to current systems. The present project conducted a broad assessment of potential nonproliferation applications where MPSs may provide new capabilities or significant performance enhancement (reported separately), which led to prioritization of several applications for detailed analysis. The applications prioritized were: cargo screening and interdiction of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), detection of hidden SNM, treaty/dismantlement verification, and spent fuel dry storage cask content verification. High resolution imaging for stockpile stewardship was considered as a sub-area of the treaty topic, as it is also of

Nonlinear focal shift beyond the geometrical focus in moderately focused acoustic beams.

Science.gov (United States)

Camarena, Francisco; Adrián-Martínez, Silvia; Jiménez, Noé; Sánchez-Morcillo, Víctor

2013-08-01

The phenomenon of the displacement of the position along the axis of the pressure, intensity, and radiation force maxima of focused acoustic beams under increasing driving voltages (nonlinear focal shift) is studied for the case of a moderately focused beam. The theoretical and experimental results show the existence of this shift along the axis when the initial pressure in the transducer increases until the acoustic field reaches the fully developed nonlinear regime of propagation. Experimental data show that at high amplitudes and for moderate focusing, the position of the on-axis pressure maximum and radiation force maximum can surpass the geometrical focal length. On the contrary, the on-axis pressure minimum approaches the transducer under increasing driving voltages, increasing the distance between the positive and negative peak pressure in the beam. These results are in agreement with numerical KZK model predictions and the existed data of other authors and can be explained according to the effect of self-refraction characteristic of the nonlinear regime of propagation.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty on the threshold to the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, W.

1991-06-01

The basic outlines of non-proliferation policy, its instruments, the position of the protagonists' interests and the fundamental fields of conflict are to the fore. The history and structure of international non-poliferation policy and, in particular, of the NPT, are described, the instruments for verifying the purely peaceful use of nuclear power (safeguards) are analysed, and important future technological and political challenges of the Treaty are listed. (orig./HP) [de

An adiabatic focuser

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chen, P.; Oide, K.; Sessler, A.M.; Yu, S.S.

1989-08-01

Theoretical analysis is made of an intense relativistic electron beam, such as would be available from a linear collider, moving through a plasma of increasing density, but density always less than that of the beam (underdense). In this situation, the plasma electrons are expelled from the beam channel and the electrons are subject to an ever-increasing focusing force provided by the channel ions. Analysis is made on the beam radiation energy loss in the classical, the transition, and the quantum regimes. It is shown that the focuser is insensitive to the beam energy spread behaviors in the nonclassical regimes, the radiation limit on lenses (the Oide limit) can be exceeded. The sensitivity of the system to the topic mismatch and the nonlinearity is also analyzed. Examples are given with SLC-type and TLC-type parameters. 9 refs., 1 tab

China and the post-cold-war nuclear world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nakatsuji, Keiji

1997-01-01

On May 15, 1995, only a few days after the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, China tested a nuclear bomb. The rapid growth in China's defence spending is also alarming. Against the spirit of international non-proliferation regimes, China has sold missile components to Pakistan, a research reactor and an electromagnetic isotope separation facility to Iran. In addition to the repression of human rights domestically, in China as well as in Tibet, no one can ignore the possibility of a serious international conflict over the Spratly Islands. This paper examines whether China will pose a grave future threat to world peace or whether, fearing international isolation, it will become a guardian of the international non-proliferation regime. In other words, the paper aims to set straight the record of China's recent nuclear policy

Exchange Rate Regimes – A periodical overview and a critical analysis of exchange rate regimes in Kosovo

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Flamur Bunjaku

2015-03-01

Full Text Available Exchange rate regimes and the monetary policy are the key instruments governments use to achieve their economic and financial objectives. Moreover, due to global financial crisis the latter instruments get more importance. Empirical evidences show that exchange rate regimes in Kosovo and its monetary policy throughout their development were mainly influenced by different political and historical developments. In regard of Euroisation of monetary system in Kosovo it was found that this action generated macro - financial stability in terms of inflation and price fluctuation. However, in terms of microeconomic aspects, the unilateral adaptation of Euro as the official currency of Kosovo failed to provide microeconomic advantages such as to export stimulation, and so forth. The main exchange rate regime systems were discussed focusing in their advantages and disadvantages, and it was concluded that there is no commonly accepted theory regarding the optimality of exchange rate regimes. In addition, the global financial crisis impact in the financial system of Kosovo is also discussed and it was found that negative impacts of global financial crisis were moderate and indirect.

Iran's Relations to the East: Nonproliferation and Regional Security in a Changing Southwest Asia

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tehsin, Muhammad [Quaid-I-Azam Univ., Islamabad (Pakistan)

2014-11-01

This study attempts to answer the following questions: would a successful JPOA result in nuclear nonproliferation and regional security in Southwest Asia; and could the Middle East and South Asia work together to contain the threat of Salafi jihadism?

Nuclear proliferation: Some context and consequences

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ford, C. A.

2007-01-01

The article addressed the importance of nonproliferation and supporting and reinforcing nonproliferation commitments. The most important benefit of the NPT has been in its contribution to the security of individual states party, as well as to regional and international security, through the obligations which help to prevent any further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT therefore powerfully augments the national security of every state party, and not merely just the NPT nuclear weapons states. Indeed, it is the countries of the developing world, as well as many other non-nuclear weapon states, that could suffer the most in security terms if a non-nuclear weapons state in the developing world suddenly acquired T he Bomb a nd became emboldened to engage in threats and adventurism against its neighbors. The nonproliferation regime hinges upon the steps that all countries take on their own and with like-minded allies to further nonproliferation goals - and whether the international community can successfully shape the calculations of present-day and future would-be proliferation in useful ways. The nonproliferation regime, therefore, includes not just the NPT and other legally-binding obligations but complex dynamics of persuasion and deterrence that employ many different tools. The NPT helps establish the core nonproliferation obligations toward which many of the tools in the international community's tool kit are directed.

Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Richardson, J

2009-01-21

The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

Passive measurements of mixed-oxide fuel for nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dolan, Jennifer L.; Flaska, Marek; Pozzi, Sara A.; Chichester, David L.

2013-01-01

We present new results on passive measurements and simulations of mixed-oxide fuel-pin assemblies. Potential tools for mixed-oxide fuel pin characterization are discussed for future nuclear-nonproliferation applications. Four EJ-309 liquid scintillation detectors coupled with an accurate pulse timing and digital, offline and optimized pulse-shape discrimination method were used. Measurement analysis included pulse-height distributions to distinguish between purely fission neutron sources and alpha-n plus fission neutrons sources. Time-dependent cross-correlation functions were analyzed to measure the fission neutron contribution to the measured sample's neutron source. The use of Monte Carlo particle transport code MCNPX-PoliMi is discussed in conjunction with the measurements

The non-proliferation policies of non-nuclear-weapon states

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marwah, Onkar

1987-01-01

Eight countries are considered to be capable of producing nuclear weapons and highly suspect in their intentions to actually produce them. These are Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The policies of these suspect Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) are considered in this paper. The first part assesses the non-proliferation (or proliferation) policies of the eight suspect NNWS, the second part evaluates their differences in approach from the policies urged upon them by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and the third and final part attempts to understand the future evolution of NNWS policies in the nuclear military field. (U.K.)

Scientists for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transactions of international seminar

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This publication presents the results of the Second International Seminar 'Scientists for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. The Seminar took place from 11 to 14 October 1994 in Nakhabino Country Club near Moscow. More than 60 specialists from Russia, USA, France, Belgium as well as IAEA and CEU took part in the seminar. Problems of cooperation in the field of nuclear materials accounting, control and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear export regulations and disarmament control are discussed at the seminar

Legitimacy, capability, effectiveness and the future of the NPT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keeley, J.F.

1987-01-01

This chapter looks at the relationship between legitimacy and capability in conceptually and politically contestable regions. This issue was highlighted by India's nuclear test of May 1974 and the Osiraq raid of 1981. These illustrated the general problem of the threat to the coherence and legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime. This threat arose from the spread of nuclear technological capabilities. Two developments in the non-proliferation regime that have helped produce the more specific problems of that regime are discussed. These are the spread of nuclear technological capabilities and the development of complex co-operation networks. The prospects for the modification of the NPT in response to these challenges are considered finally. (U.K.)

Application of U.S. export controls to DOE technical exchanges: New guidelines on export control and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lisann, E.G.; Hollander, Z.; Rudolph, R.R.

1995-01-01

As the Department of Energy's nuclear weapon's complex shrinks, concern regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology through the release of export-controlled equipment, materials and information has come to the fore. In November, 1994 Under Secretary Charles Curtis issued new guidelines on export control and nonproliferation. The new policies and procedures are designed to help Department of Energy Headquarters Offices, Operations Offices, Area Offices, laboratories and contractors implement a consistent and technologically sound policy regarding DOE transfers of unclassified equipment, materials and information that could adversely affect US nuclear nonproliferation objectives or national security. The DOE Export Control Division has developed a multi-faceted program of guidelines and training materials to sensitize DOE and DOE-contractors to their responsibilities and to teach them how to evaluate the proliferation risks of their activities

Evaluation of the Administration's proposed nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Report to the Congress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

Dwindling supplies of fossil fuels are causing countries to turn increasingly to nuclear power as a major source of energy. Although nuclear power holds out the promise of energy independence, it has a formidable drawback--it can also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In April, the President announced a new policy designed to curb nuclear proliferation and the executive branch proposed legislation entitled 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977.' The strategy outlined in these documents calls for stricter export controls and safeguards as well as actions affecting uranium enrichment services, reprocessing, storing of spent fuel, and disposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. GAO analyzed this non-proliferation strategy as it relates to: Improving nuclear export controls; Strengthening international nuclear safeguards; Maintaining U.S. reliability as a supplier of uranium enrichment services; Deferring U.S. reprocessing of spent fuel as an example for others; Reducing risk of proliferation by controlling spent reactor fuel. In general, GAO concluded that the administration's strategy is constructive but noted some weaknesses which should be addressed. Some of the problems noted in this report may already have been addressed by congressional committees in their markup of the legislation

International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament - A possible international regime to cover radiological materials

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hautecouverture, Benjamin

2009-10-01

Even if a 'dirty bomb' has never been used to date, the perception of the existence of a threat is shared by many. Four main types of radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks can be outlined: - acquisition and use of a nuclear weapon, - attacks and acts of sabotage against a nuclear reactor or another nuclear facility, - acquisition of fissile material for the elaboration of an Improvised Nuclear Device, - terrorist use of radiological materials for the elaboration of a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). This paper seeks to evaluate the probability for a terrorist group to acquire and make use of radiological materials in the objective of detonating a RDD, and the current international framework put into place to address such a threat. Is an international regime to cover radiological materials already in place? How comprehensive / integrated is it? Does a new and/or separate system need to be set up? Before 9/11, two events in particular served to illustrate the threat of a radiological or nuclear terrorist attack: Moscow in 1996, Argun in 1998. Since the 9/11 attacks, a few other radiological events have occurred, which could suggest that the threat is becoming more pressing. It must be noted that the use of a dirty bomb by a terrorist group would most probably be aimed at the contamination of a given geographical area, rather than mass destruction and killing. Indeed, the lethal impact of such weapons remains limited. For this reason, dirty bombs are considered by analysts as weapons of mass disruption rather than weapons of mass destruction. Impacts would be more important in the psychological or economic realms: - targeting highly populated environments, such as cities, would most probably not result in a high death toll; - compared with impacts on health, psychological impacts of such an attack would be much more serious, both within and outside the targeted population; - economic damage is probably the greatest threat posed by such attacks, particularly

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2005-01-01

The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

Remote sensing and geoinformation technologies in support of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control verification regimes

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Niemeyer, Irmgard [Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH, Institut fuer Energie- und Klimaforschung, IEK-6: Nukleare Entsorgung und Reaktorsicherheit (Germany)

2013-07-01

A number of international agreements and export control regimes have been concluded in order to reduce the risk and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In order to provide confidence that Member States are complying with the agreed commitments, most of the treaties and agreements include verification provisions. Different types of verification measures exist, e.g. cooperative measures; national technical means; technical monitoring or measurement devices placed at or near sites; on-site inspections; intelligence information; open-source information, such as commercial internet data and satellite imagery. The study reviews the technical progress in the field of satellite imaging sensors and explores the recent advances in satellite imagery processing and geoinformation technologies as to the extraction of significant observables and signatures. Moreover, it discusses how satellite data and geoinformation technologies could be used complementary for confirming information gathered from other systems or sources. The study also aims at presenting the legal and political aspects and the cost benefits of using imagery from both national and commercial satellites in the verification procedure. The study concludes that satellite imagery and geoinformation technologies are expected to enhance the verification efficiency and effectiveness.

Nuclear weapon-free zone, non-proliferation treaty and South Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jayaramu, P.S.

1980-01-01

Emergence of and the motivations behind the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, the conceptual linkage between the nuclear weapon free zone and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the problems involved in the implementation of nuclear weapon free zone proposals put forward from time to time are discussed. Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, motivations behind the proposal, and India's response to it are examined. It is pointed out that both the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone indirectly grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the use of nuclear weapons. (M.G.B.)

Overview of advanced LMR design in the US

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wade, D.C.

1988-01-01

The current generation of US advanced LMR conceptual designs have resulted from a goal to address the economic and institutional issues facing the US nuclear industry in the late 70's and early 80's. They are focused technically on achieving passive safety characteristics and favorable capital and operating costs. The design strategies which have been taken were motivated as well by the coal to favorably impact the institutional and public perception regimes regarding safety, diversion, nonproliferation, and waste. The rationales and tradeoffs influencing the resulting design decisions are discussed in this paper, with a focus on core design issues. 1 fig

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Okko, O [ed.

2012-07-01

The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

2004-01-01

Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

International aspects of non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aucoin, P.A.

1978-01-01

There are currently two areas on the national scene and one on the international scene that require immediate attention. The first is relief under contracts for enrichment services, an area in which the US can still demonstrate its desire to become a stable and continuous source of supply. The second national area is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. The United States must proceed very cautiously, however, for if discretion and very careful judgment are not used, the Act will immediately be branded as a blatant effort on the part of the US to control the energy options of other sovereign states. The international area is that of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation program. This medium exists for wise and deliberate growth of a commercial nuclear power program which can serve the global community. The next three years probably allow one remaining chance for successful containment of weapons proliferation. If we do not recognize the rights of every sovereign state to voluntarily participate and agree, we, as members of the global community, will have failed

Flaws in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leventhal, P.

1986-01-01

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nucler Weapons has the twin objectives of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons and ending the nuclear arms race on the one hand, and promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy on the other. In quantitative and symbolic terms the NPT is a huge success. More than two-thirds of the world's nations have signed on, making this the most popular arms control agreement on earth. Not a single nation has declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons state beyond the original five members of the ''nuclear club'' who qualified for weapons status under the terms of the Treaty itself: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. No party to the Treaty has exercised the permitted option to drop out, and none has been found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to have diverted nuclear material from civil to weapons purposes. Nor has any party been known to have violated NPT prohibitions on developing or assisting other nations to develop nuclear weapons

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Review conference of the States Parties Geneva 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1984-01-01

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1985 with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. The Treaty, commonly referred to as the non-proliferation Treaty, is the fundamental instrument to avert the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons and is, perhaps, the most important multilateral arms regulation agreement of our time. It was negotiated in the 1960s in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and in the United Nations General Assembly. The Treaty was opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on July 1, 1968. On that date, it was signed by the three Depositary Governments - the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States - and by 58 other States. As of December 31, 1983 the number of States parties to the Treaty had risen to 119

Threshold power. Nuclear energy and foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949 until 1980

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Geier, Stephan

2011-01-01

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the most serious problems for international security today. Since the end of the Cold War states like India, Pakistan and North Korea performed tests of nuclear explosive devices and the number of nuclear weapons states seems to be growing even more. Iran is pursuing actively a nuclear programme with unclear prospects and despite the catastrophe at Fukushima other states remain interested in the use of nuclear energy. In principle it is not possible to distinguish clearly between civil and military use of nuclear technology. The international regime to prevent the misuse of nuclear power and the dissemination of nuclear weapons is based on the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970 and several other treaties and informal agreements. While the legal aspects of the nonproliferation regime are well studied, much less attention has been paid to the evolution of this regime, which was set up during the Cold War. Especially the role of the nonnuclear weapons states in this process remains unclear. This work explores the influence of the Federal Republic of Germany, one of the most influential nuclear threshold powers, on the formulation of the international nonproliferation regime as well as the role of nuclear energy in German foreign policy in general.

The political use of psychiatry: A comparison between totalitarian regimes.

Science.gov (United States)

Buoli, Massimiliano; Giannuli, Aldo Sabino

2017-03-01

After the end of Second World War, the recent experience of the Nazi horrors stimulated a debate about the political use of psychiatry. Over the years, the focus shifted on major dictatorships of the time and especially on Soviet Union. This article aims to provide a critical review of the ways in which psychiatry was used by totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. We summarized relevant literature about political use of psychiatry in totalitarian regimes of the 20th century, with particular focus on Fascism, Nazism, Argentina dictatorship, Soviet Union and China. One of the features that are common to most of the dictatorships is that the use of psychiatry has become more prominent when the regimes have had the need to make more acceptable the imprisonment of enemies in the eyes of the world. This for example happened in the Nazi regime when sterilization and killing of psychiatric patients was explained as a kind of euthanasia, or in the Soviet Union after the formal closure of the corrective labor camps and the slow resumption of relations with the capitalistic world, or in China to justify persecution of religious minorities and preserve economic relations with Western countries. Psychiatry has been variously used by totalitarian regimes as a means of political persecution and especially when it was necessary to make acceptable to public opinion the imprisonment of political opponents.

Common sense and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kennedy, R.T.

1985-01-01

Since the dawn of the nuclear age nearly four decades ago, the United States has been firmly commited to the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. That principle is embodied in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), support for which has been a basic tenet of US foreign policy and a basic security interest of the world at large ever since. The Reagan administration remains firmly committed to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Such proliferation could trigger new and grave dangers for America's security and well-being and indeed for that of all the world's peoples. Desperate leaders in future high-stakes conflicts might not shrink from nuclear blackmail or even from the use of nuclear weapons if they were available. A conventional clash between nuclear-armed states in a conflict-prone region might escalate by accident or miscalculation to a local nuclear exchange. It cannot be discounted that such a nuclear clash might threaten to involve the superpowers themselves. With proliferation, also, terrorist groups could more easily acquire nuclear weapons to extort concessions. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, then, is not solely of interest to the superpowers: it is vital to all countries and regions. The security of the countries in those regions to which nuclear weapons might spread would be most immediately and seriously affected. By their adherence to the NPT, more than 100 countries have recognized this fact

U.S. Proliferation Policy and the Campaign Against Transnational Terror: Linking the U.S. Non-Proliferation Regime to Homeland Security Efforts

Science.gov (United States)

2013-12-01

virulent strains escaping from laboratories with inadequate biosecurity and biosafety regimes into a world with insufficient public health surveillance...Unclassified 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89...of codification and legal measures to stop terrorist use and to a lesser degree to the international double standard on beliefs regarding the

Nuclear export policy and regulation for non-proliferation: Federal Republic of Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boulanger, Werner.

1978-01-01

The nuclear export policy of the Federal Republic of Germany complies with the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Already in 1967 the Federal Government stated in a Peace Note that no export was authorised to countries (outside Euratom) which did not comply with the IAEA Safeguards. In the bilateral agreement the Federal Republic signed with Brasil in 1975, emphasis was put on international safeguards and the control exercised on exported materials to avoid any diversion for military purposes. (NEA) [fr

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Okko, O. (ed.)

2012-07-01

The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

Lessons learned from the non-proliferation experiment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McWilliam, C.; Curtis, S. [DOE, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

1994-12-31

The Department of Energy sponsored Non-Proliferation Experiment (formerly known as the Chemical Kiloton) involved the detonation of blasting agent approximately equivalent to one kiloton of energy release on the Nevada Test Site in an effort to determine if (and if so, which) discriminators exist between conventional and nuclear detonations of similar yield. Coordination among hundreds of scientists from at least fifteen different organizations were required to design the experiments necessary to collect and interpret data from this unique and complex event. Stakeholders and members of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament observed the progress of the experiment first hand. The experiment was a success in that a vast majority of the expected data was collected and shared quickly and efficiently throughout the international scientific community. The management of the project was discussed among the major co-sponsoring organizations and the significant {open_quotes}lessons learned{close_quotes} are presented.

Explosive performance on the non-proliferation experiment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McKown, T.O. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

1994-12-31

The Explosive Effects Physics Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments on the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) as part of its effort to define source functions for seismic waves. Since all investigations were contingent on the performance of the emplaced chemical explosive, an array of diagnostic measurements was fielded in the emplaced explosive. The CORRTEX (COntinuous Reflectometry for Radius vs Time EXperiment) system was used to investigate the explosive initiation and to determine the detonation velocities on three levels and in a number of radial directions. The CORRTEX experiments fielded in the explosive chamber will be described, including a description of the explosive emplacement from the perspective of its impact on the CORRTEX results. The data obtained are reviewed and the resulting detonation velocities are reported. A variation of detonation velocity with depth in the explosive and the apparent underdetonation and overdetonation of the explosive in different radial directions is reported.

The Relationship Between the Foreign Exchange Regime and Macroeconomic Performance in Eastern Africa

OpenAIRE

Janet Gale Stotsky; Manuk Ghazanchyan; Olumuyiwa S Adedeji; Nils Øvind Maehle

2012-01-01

This study examines the relationship between the foreign exchange regime and macroeconomic performance in Eastern Africa. The study focuses on seven countries, five of which decisively liberalized their foreign exchange regimes. The study assesses the relationship between (i) growth and various determinants, including the exchange regime, the real exchange rate, and current account liberalization; and (ii) inflation and various determinants, including lagged inflation, the nominal exchange ra...

Autonomia e relevância dos regimes The autonomy and relevance of regimes

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Gustavo Seignemartin de Carvalho

2005-12-01

of norms and rules that create patterns of behavior and allow the convergence of the expectations of their participants in specific issue areas, in order to solve coordination problems that could lead to non-pareto-efficient outcomes. Considering that such definitions based merely on the "efficiency" of regimes do not seem to be sufficient to explain their effectiveness, the present article proposes a different definition for regimes: political arrangements that allow a redistribution of the gains of cooperation among the participants in certain issue areas, within an interdependence context. Regimes would thus be effective due to their autonomy and relevance - that is, due to their objective existence autonomously from their participants and their influence on the participants' behavior and expectations in ways that cannot be reduced to the individual action of any of them. This article begins with a brief discussion about terminological problems related to regime studies and with a definition of the concepts of autonomy and relevance. Then it classifies the authors that take part in this debate according to two distinct perspectives, one that denies (non-autonomists and the other that attributes (autonomists autonomy and relevance to regimes, briefly analyzing the authors and traditions that are more significant for this debate, focusing on autonomist authors and on arguments that back the hypothesis here presented. Finally, the article proposes an analytic decomposition of regimes into four main elements that give them autonomy and relevance: normativity, actors, specificity of the issue area and complex interdependence as context.

Detecting spatial regimes in ecosystems

Science.gov (United States)

Sundstrom, Shana M.; Eason, Tarsha; Nelson, R. John; Angeler, David G.; Barichievy, Chris; Garmestani, Ahjond S.; Graham, Nicholas A.J.; Granholm, Dean; Gunderson, Lance; Knutson, Melinda; Nash, Kirsty L.; Spanbauer, Trisha; Stow, Craig A.; Allen, Craig R.

2017-01-01

Research on early warning indicators has generally focused on assessing temporal transitions with limited application of these methods to detecting spatial regimes. Traditional spatial boundary detection procedures that result in ecoregion maps are typically based on ecological potential (i.e. potential vegetation), and often fail to account for ongoing changes due to stressors such as land use change and climate change and their effects on plant and animal communities. We use Fisher information, an information theory-based method, on both terrestrial and aquatic animal data (U.S. Breeding Bird Survey and marine zooplankton) to identify ecological boundaries, and compare our results to traditional early warning indicators, conventional ecoregion maps and multivariate analyses such as nMDS and cluster analysis. We successfully detected spatial regimes and transitions in both terrestrial and aquatic systems using Fisher information. Furthermore, Fisher information provided explicit spatial information about community change that is absent from other multivariate approaches. Our results suggest that defining spatial regimes based on animal communities may better reflect ecological reality than do traditional ecoregion maps, especially in our current era of rapid and unpredictable ecological change.

The NPT regime: Progress and promises

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dhanapala, Jayantha

2001-01-01

Full text: Thesis. The 'NPT regime' has arrived at a fateful crossroads. Though extended indefinitely in 1995, its future is my no means secure. The future 'progress' of this treaty will depend upon whether the 'promises' of its States parties are fully implemented and, eventually, upon the treaty's success in achieving fully universal membership. Challenges The treaty faces many short-term and longer-term challenges: Short term - The first Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2005 Review Conference will meet next year. NNWS will want to see some evidence of progress on nuclear disarmament (Art. VI), along the lines prescribed in the 13 'practical steps' agreed at the last Review Conference. Yet progress has been set back by: uncertainties over the future of the ABM Treaty; the failure of START II and the CTBT to enter into force; the lack of a FISMAT treaty and a treaty establishing a NWFZ in Central Asia; continued qualitative improvements in nuclear weapons; hints that nuclear testing may one day resume; the persistence of doctrines of first-use, pre-emptive use, and use against states that use CBW. Other compliance-related questions will arise over safeguards (e.g. the inability of the IAEA to conduct inspections in the DPRK; signs of a breakdown of the norm of full-scope IAEA safeguards, e.g. in South Asia). There are also concerns over the implementation of non-proliferation commitments (e.g. persisting allegations about nuclear weapon programmes in existing NNWS). The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. on 11 September should also serve as a reminder of the new terrorist dangers relating to the possible use of weapons of mass destruction and unorthodox delivery systems. Longer term - Selectivity in the enforcement of NPT norms; unilateralism; IAEA funding uncertainties and shortfalls; difficulties in reaching universal membership (India, Pakistan, and Israel); continuing compliance problems with respect to both non-proliferation and

Developments in capture-γ libraries for nonproliferation applications

Science.gov (United States)

Hurst, A. M.; Firestone, R. B.; Sleaford, B. W.; Bleuel, D. L.; Basunia, M. S.; Bečvář, F.; Belgya, T.; Bernstein, L. A.; Carroll, J. J.; Detwiler, B.; Escher, J. E.; Genreith, C.; Goldblum, B. L.; Krtička, M.; Lerch, A. G.; Matters, D. A.; McClory, J. W.; McHale, S. R.; Révay, Zs.; Szentmiklosi, L.; Turkoglu, D.; Ureche, A.; Vujic, J.

2017-09-01

The neutron-capture reaction is fundamental for identifying and analyzing the γ-ray spectrum from an unknown assembly because it provides unambiguous information on the neutron-absorbing isotopes. Nondestructive-assay applications may exploit this phenomenon passively, for example, in the presence of spontaneous-fission neutrons, or actively where an external neutron source is used as a probe. There are known gaps in the Evaluated Nuclear Data File libraries corresponding to neutron-capture γ-ray data that otherwise limit transport-modeling applications. In this work, we describe how new thermal neutron-capture data are being used to improve information in the neutron-data libraries for isotopes relevant to nonproliferation applications. We address this problem by providing new experimentally-deduced partial and total neutron-capture reaction cross sections and then evaluate these data by comparison with statistical-model calculations.

Flow regimes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kh'yuitt, G.

1980-01-01

An introduction into the problem of two-phase flows is presented. Flow regimes arizing in two-phase flows are described, and classification of these regimes is given. Structures of vertical and horizontal two-phase flows and a method of their identification using regime maps are considered. The limits of this method application are discussed. The flooding phenomena and phenomena of direction change (flow reversal) of the flow and interrelation of these phenomena as well as transitions from slug regime to churn one and from churn one to annular one in vertical flows are described. Problems of phase transitions and equilibrium are discussed. Flow regimes in tubes where evaporating liquid is running, are described [ru

The Non-Proliferation Experiment recorded at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Carr, D.B. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

1994-12-31

The Non-Proliferation Experiment was recorded by five different seismic stations operated by Sandia National Laboratories at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility, approximately 7.6{degrees} from the Nevada Test Site. Two stations are different versions of the Deployable Seismic Verification System developed by the Department of Energy to provide seismic data to verify compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Vault and borehole versions of the Designated Seismic Stations also recorded the event. The final station is test instrumentation located at depths of 10, 40 and 1200 feet. Although the event is seen clearly at all the stations, there are variations in the raw data due to the different bandwidths and depths of deployment. One Deployable Seismic Verification System has been operating at Pinedale for over three years and in that time recorded 14 nuclear explosions and 4 earthquakes from the Nevada Test Site, along with numerous other western U.S. earthquakes. Several discriminants based on the work by Taylor et al. (1989) have been applied to this data. First the discriminants were tested by comparing the explosions only to the 4 earthquakes located on the Test Site. Only one discriminant, log(L{sub g}/P{sub g}), did not show clear separation between the earthquakes and nuclear explosions. When other western U.S. events are included, only the M{sub b} vs. M{sub s} discriminant separated the event. In all cases where discrimination was possible, the Non-Proliferation Experiment was indistinguishable from a nuclear explosion.

Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

1986-02-01

The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification

Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O' Brien, J.

1986-02-01

The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

A Non-Proliferating Fuel Cycle: No Enrichment, Reprocessing or Accessible Spent Fuel - 12375

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Parker, Frank L. [Vanderbilt University (United States)

2012-07-01

Current fuel cycles offer a number of opportunities for access to plutonium, opportunities to create highly enriched uranium and access highly radioactive wastes to create nuclear weapons and 'dirty' bombs. The non-proliferating fuel cycle however eliminates or reduces such opportunities and access by eliminating the mining, milling and enrichment of uranium. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces the production of plutonium per unit of energy created, eliminates reprocessing and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel and the creation of a stream of high-level waste. It further simplifies the search for land based deep geologic repositories and interim storage sites for spent fuel in the USA by disposing of the spent fuel in deep sub-seabed sediments after storing the spent fuel at U.S. Navy Nuclear Shipyards that have the space and all of the necessary equipment and security already in place. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces transportation risks by utilizing barges for the collection of spent fuel and transport to the Navy shipyards and specially designed ships to take the spent fuel to designated disposal sites at sea and to dispose of them there in deep sub-seabed sediments. Disposal in the sub-seabed sediments practically eliminates human intrusion. Potential disposal sites include Great Meteor East and Southern Nares Abyssal Plain. Such sites then could easily become international disposal sites since they occur in the open ocean. It also reduces the level of human exposure in case of failure because of the large physical and chemical dilution and the elimination of a major pathway to man-seawater is not potable. Of course, the recovery of uranium from sea water and the disposal of spent fuel in sub-seabed sediments must be proven on an industrial scale. All other technologies are already operating on an industrial scale. If externalities, such as reduced terrorist threats, environmental damage (including embedded

Non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

In the face of improved international relations, regional and subregional issues have acquired additional urgency and importance in the field of disarmament and international security. The pursuit of regional solutions to regional problems is thus being actively encouraged by the international community. Towards this end, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is seeking to promote regional approaches to disarmament either through the united nations regional centres for peace and Disarmament or cooperation with individual Governments. Within this framework this conference was dealing with non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific region

Economic Regime identification and prediction in TAC SCM using sales and procurement information

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Hogenboom, F.P.; Ketter, W.; Dalen, van Jan; Kaymak, U.; Collins, J.; Gupta, Alok

2009-01-01

Our research is focused on the effects of the additionof procurement information (offer prices) to a sales-based economic regime model. This model is used for strategic, tactical, and operational decision making in dynamic supply chains. We evaluate the performance of the regime model through

Export of nuclear equipment and materials and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Courteix, Simone.

1977-01-01

The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of great concern today despite the entry into force in the early '70s of the NPT. To master civilian nuclear technology implies the ability to develop nuclear explosive devices; therefore in recent years contacts have strengthened between countries exporting nuclear equipment, specially in the frame of the 'London Club' so as to ensure that their exports will not result in disseminating nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Song, Yo Taik

2001-01-01

Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented

Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Song, Yo Taik

2001-01-01

Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented.

Bilateral agreements in the field of nuclear trade and technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Di Primio, J.C.

1989-03-01

This report analyses the evolution of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the non-proliferation regime since the nineteen sixties from the angle of an interdisciplinary approach. The medium- and long-term issues of non-proliferation are identified and discussed in connection with the NPT revisional conference to be held in 1990, and the NPT extension conference in 1995. The major subjects under review include: the international safeguards system; NP aspects of new technologies; bilateral agreements on cooperation in nuclear energy; developments on the international nuclear market; arms control issues of relevance to the NPT; the non-proliferation interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. Looking ahead to the conferences in 1990 and 1995, the report reveals some major aspects and recommendations for consideration in decisions on the future line of non-proliferation policy pursued by the Federal German government. (orig./HP) [de

A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01

With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

Non-Proliferation Community, Do We Really Speak the Same Language?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, R.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Michel, Q.; Viski, A.; Sevini, F.; Charatsis, C.; )

2015-01-01

The non-proliferation community, with its many different stakeholders, has issues with a number of terms and concepts which have different meanings, not only in different national languages but also for scientists, diplomats, engineers, law enforcement people, IAEA safeguards staff, and many others. The consequences are not only relevant for translators and seminar participants. This confusion of terms may create misunderstandings with legal, diplomatic and operational consequences. A number of terms, used because of their meaning in English are ''false friends'' in other languages, i.e., they are used because they sound close, but their meaning may be different. The nuances may be about the fact that they cover a narrower, broader, or slightly different concept in another national or professional language. The emblematic example is the English word control, written the same way in many languages but with different connotations. Other examples include terms which have a precise legal definition for some communities whereas other stakeholder see it as generic terms (e.g., technology, transit); terms that are not explicit but have different implicit contents related to the context like outreach or declaration; terms which are distinct in one language but translated into one word in others like specially and especially designed; terms which cover different realities for different work communities like counter-proliferation, analysis; terms which are widely used and hardly defined anywhere like dual-use; or terms which refer to a specific legal or moral reference framework which is not always explicated like illegal, legitimate. This paper will explore issues related to some of these terms used in Western languages, and argue the necessity to take into account these sometimes subtle language differences, realizing the difficulties they may create for practitioners of non-proliferation. Improvements might include revising official reference documents

Key Issues on Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hwang, Yong Soo; Whang, Joo Ho; Lee, Un Chul

2005-01-01

Energy demand in East Asia casts a significant challenge to sustainable economy development and socio-political stability in the region which has experienced tensions throughout the history. The energy demand in this region has been dramatically increased since the start of reform in PRC. DPRK is another challenge. The current electricity consumption in DPRK is around 10% of that in ROK. If the economy of PRC continuously grows to the level of neighboring states and if the living standard of DPRK reaches that of ROK, the energy and electricity demand in the region will certainly be out of control unless the proper measures are taken into actions from today. The only feasible energy option is the nuclear one. PRC already proclaimed its ambitious plan to deploy more than 30 reactors in the near future. In addition, a couple of the South Eastern Asian states expressed their willingness to introduce nuclear power plants in the future. The increase in the use of nuclear energy is expected to bring up the nuclear renaissance in the region. However, without the proper mechanisms to supply fresh fuels and to manage spent nuclear fuels with full compliance of nuclear energy nonproliferation, the new development will inevitably cause the instability in the region. So far many interesting proposals on nuclear cooperation in East Asia were announced. Unfortunately, none of them works out properly yet, partly because the old proposals were too political. To restart the engine of the nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation in the region, it is necessary to find out what would be the common interests of the region not so much related to politics. In this paper, some key technical issues are addressed for future regional joint studies

Nuclear Legislation in OECD and NEA Countries. Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities - Australia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

This country profile provide comprehensive information on the regulatory and Institutional Framework governing nuclear activities as well as a detailed review of a full range of nuclear law topics, including: mining regime; radioactive substances; nuclear installations; trade in nuclear materials and equipment; radiation protection; radioactive waste management; non-proliferation and physical protection; transport; and nuclear third party liability. The profile is complemented by reproductions of the primary legislation regulating nuclear activities in the country. Content: I) - General Regulatory Regime: 1. Introduction; 2. Mining regime; 3. Radioactive substances and equipment; 4. Nuclear installations (Licensing and inspection, including nuclear safety; Protection of the environment against radiation effects); 5. Trade in nuclear materials and equipment; 6. Radiation protection; 7. Radioactive waste management; 8. Non-proliferation and physical protection (Bilateral safeguards agreements; International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement; The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty Act; The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Act; The Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act); 9. Transport; 10. Nuclear third party liability; II) - Institutional Framework: 1. Regulatory and supervisory authorities (Minister for Health and Ageing; Minister for Foreign Affairs; Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts; Minister for, Resources, Energy and Tourism); 2. Advisory bodies (Radiation Health and Safety Advisory Council; Advisory Committees); 3. Public and semi-public agencies (Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA); Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office; Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO); Supervising Scientist)

Prospects for stability in a nuclear subcontinent

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rajagopal, S; Chari, Sridhar K.

2003-01-01

This book explore the prospects for stability in a nuclear sub-continent. The nonproliferation regimes and nuclear threat reduction, nonproliferation regimes and south asia - is there a meeting point?; maintaining a threshold of strategic autonomy at least cost: continuity in the evolution of India's nuclear policies; role of nuclear doctrines and the state of the armed forces in South Asia; nuclear weapons, deterrence and stability in the international system: South Asian dynamics; assessing China's Asian role and security policies; Kargil war to current threat of war: prospects for stability; discussion; international terrorism and its impact on South Asian stability; a view from Bangladesh etc. are some of the topics covered

What Do We Know about Hybrid Regimes after Two Decades of Scholarship?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mariam Mufti

2018-06-01

Full Text Available In two decades of scholarship on hybrid regimes two significant advancements have been made. First, scholars have emphasized that the hybrid regimes that emerged in the post-Cold War era should not be treated as diminished sub-types of democracy, and second, regime type is a multi-dimensional concept. This review essay further contends that losing the lexicon of hybridity and focusing on a single dimension of regime type—flawed electoral competition—has prevented an examination of extra-electoral factors that are necessary for understanding how regimes are differently hybrid, why there is such immense variation in the outcome of elections and why these regimes are constantly in flux. Therefore, a key recommendation emerging from this review of the scholarship is that to achieve a more thorough, multi-dimensional assessment of hybrid regimes, further research ought to be driven by nested research designs in which qualitative and quantitative approaches can be used to advance mid-range theory building.

International workshop on transparency technology for nonproliferation cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Applications of remote monitoring and secure communications for regional confidence building

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Betsill, J. David; Hashimoto, Yu

2009-08-01

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) sponsored an international workshop 20-22 February 2008 on 'Transparency Technology for Nonproliferation Cooperation in the Asia Pacific - Applications of Remote Monitoring and Secure Communications for Regional Confidence Building.' The Workshop focused on identifying appropriate roles and functions for Transparency in addressing nonproliferation concerns associated with the use of nuclear energy, particularly in the East Asia region. Participants from several East Asia countries included representatives from nuclear energy research institutions, Ministries, facility operators, and non-governmental organizations. Regional participation from countries currently developing their nuclear energy infrastructure was also encouraged. Several promising students from the University of Tokyo and the Tokyo Institute of Technology, representing the next generation of nuclear energy experts, also participated in the meeting and added significant value and fresh viewpoints. The participants agreed that transparency has many roles and definitions, and that its usefulness ranges for verification and compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to building trust and confidence in the activities of the state and other regional nuclear energy stakeholders. In addition, they identified a need for further education among the professional community, public, operators, and regulators as a key factor in transparency effectiveness. Also, the education and cultivation of the next generation of nuclear energy experts was identified as crucial to the long-term success and acceptance of nuclear energy development. And finally, that the development, selection, and implementation of technology that is appropriate to the goals and participants of a transparency effort are unique to each situation and are key to the successful acceptance of cooperative transparency and regional confidence building. At the conclusion of the Workshop it was importantly

On the properties of two pulses propagating simultaneously in different dispersion regimes in a nonlinear planar waveguide

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pietrzyk, M.E.

1999-02-01

Properties of two pulses propagating simultaneously in different dispersion regimes, anomalous and normal, in a Kerr-type planar waveguide are studied. It is found that the presence of the pulse propagating in normal dispersion regime can cause termination of catastrophic self-focusing of the pulse propagating in anomalous regime. It is also shown that the coupling between pulses can lead to spatio-temporal splitting of the pulse propagating in anomalous dispersion regime, but it does not lead to catastrophic self-focusing of the pulse propagating in normal dispersion regime. For the limiting case when the dispersive term of the pulse propagating in normal dispersion regime can be neglected an indication (based on the variational estimation) to a possibility of a stable self-trapped propagation of both pulses is obtained. This stabilization is similar to the one which was found earlier in media with saturation-type nonlinearity. (author)

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - crisis of a concept

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eisenbart, C.; Ehrenstein, D. von

1990-01-01

The Working Group of FEST (Protestant Study Community) and VDW (Association of German Scientists) presents twelve theses on the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and deduces recommendations, in particular for the Federal Government. The WG thinks that scope and significance of international nuclear policy has not been sufficiently perceived neither by the German public nor by politicians. The theses are supplemented and explained in more detail by special contributions of the WG's members. The contributions deal with the historical background, with the instruments of NP policy, with international law, with risks and limiting these risks, with economic aspects, with nuclear policy in the Third World, with the chances of nuclear disarmament, and with Federal NP policy. The 'twelve theses' as well as the 22 contributions are individual records. (HSCH) [de

Do family policy regimes matter for children's well-being?

Science.gov (United States)

Engster, Daniel; Stensöta, Helena Olofsdotter

2011-01-01

Researchers have studied the impact of different welfare state regimes, and particularly family policy regimes, on gender equality. Very little research has been conducted, however, on the association between different family policy regimes and children's well-being. This article explores how the different family policy regimes of twenty OECD countries relate to children's well-being in the areas of child poverty, child mortality, and educational attainment and achievement. We focus specifically on three family policies: family cash and tax benefits, paid parenting leaves, and public child care support. Using panel data for the years 1995, 2000, and 2005, we test the association between these policies and child well-being while holding constant for a number of structural and policy variables. Our analysis shows that the dual-earner regimes, combining high levels of support for paid parenting leaves and public child care, are strongly associated with low levels of child poverty and child mortality. We find little long-term effect of family policies on educational achievement, but a significant positive correlation between high family policy support and higher educational attainment. We conclude that family policies have a significant impact on improving children's well-being, and that dual-earner regimes represent the best practice for promoting children's health and development.

Miscalculated Ambiguity: The Effects of US Nuclear Declaratory Policy on Deterrence and Nonproliferation

Science.gov (United States)

2010-06-01

Use. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995) 7. 5 Sagan , Scott. "The Case for No First Use." Survival 51, no. 3 (2009): 163-182. 6 The Stanley Foundation...America’s Nuclear Posture. (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program, 2010) 1. 60 Sagan , Scott. "The Case for No First...Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace. S.l.: s.n., 1971. Nonproliferation--60 Years Later. DVD. Directed by Carla Robbins. Washington D.C

History, framework and perspectives of international policy for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Czakainski, M.

1985-12-01

The study analyses the framework conditions, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international non-proliferation regime and their interlacement with international nuclear energy policies, and evaluates the results achieved so far on an international level by the efforts directed towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conclusion to be drawn as stated by the author is that the classical tool of non-proliferation policy - denial of technology transfer - will lose in importance and give way to enhanced, controlled cooperation between countries of the Third World and the industrialised countries. Another instrument that will maintain its value for non-proliferation policy is cooperation for political stabilisation in those parts of the world where regional conflicts might aggravate. (orig./HP) [de

1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

On 19 July 1995, the Director General received a letter, addressed to him by the Alternate Resident Representative of Canada to the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

The Kyoto protocol: assessment and perspectives. Towards a new regime up to the climate stake

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gautier, Celia

2012-01-01

This report proposes an analysis within the context of transition of the climate regime from the 'before-2012' regime to the 'post-2020' regime. It first gives an overview of international stakes and context (lack of ambition for climate policy, perspective of an international agreement from 2020). Then, the authors recall the history and achievements of the Kyoto protocol which is the basis of the present climate policy regime. They propose an assessment of actions performed by countries during the first period of the protocol, and focus on the present climate regime elements which are to be safeguarded. They analyse the weaknesses of the present regime, and propose possible improvements for the future post-2020 climate regime

A study on the establishment of national nuclear foreign policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Choi, Y.M.; Kim, H.S.; Lee, K.S.; Lee, B.Y.; Lee, J.S.; Choi, Y.L.

1993-01-01

The overall objective of this study is to analyze international non-proliferation circumstances, to suggest national strategies and tactics for international meetings non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to establish domestic non-proliferation systems for international credibility. This study suggests two revision proposals for the IAEA Statute Article VI as a means for the permanent membership in the Board, evaluates benefits and losses of the membership of the international export control regime, and suggests strategies for building a domestics nuclear export control system. This study contributes to enhancing international credibility and promoting self-reliance of nuclear technology in Korea. (Author)

Assuring the success of the non-proliferation treaty extension conference. Excerpts from the panel discussions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This publication presents excerpts from a conference organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament Inc., in cooperation with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, and covers the following issues: status of the comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations, fissile cut-off and ending production of nuclear weapons, how should nuclear weapons states pursue disarmament under Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NPT extension: problems and prospects

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1970-04-22

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [fr

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-10-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [ru

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [es

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-04-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

South America and the proliferation of biological weapons

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Tatiana Coutto

2013-04-01

Full Text Available This article focuses on the role of regional institutions and political practices in strengthening multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Particular attention is devoted to coordination between Brazil and Argentina with a view to forging a "South American position" vis-à-vis the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC. Empirical evidence suggests that informal arrangements between the two countries were capable of involving other South American leaders and promoting the exchange of information among different groups of states, most notably during the 2006 BTWC review conference. This paper also sheds light on the identification of specific features that allow for increasing visibility and actorness of regional powers in promoting universality of multilateral security regimes (MSR, as well as the limitations faced by these players.

[Heath and political regimes: presidential or parliamentary government for Colombia?].

Science.gov (United States)

Idrovo, Alvaro J

2007-01-01

Changing the presidential regime for a parliamentarian one is currently be-ing discussed in Colombia. This preliminary study explores the potential effects on health of both presidential and parliamentary regimes by using world-wide data. An ecological study was undertaken using countries from which comparable information concerning life-expectancy at birth, political regime, economic development, inequality in income, social capital (as measured by general-ised trust or Corruption Perceptions Index), political rights, civil freedom and cultural diversity could be obtained. Life-expectancy at birth and macro-determinants were compared between both political regimes. The co-relationship between these macro-determinants was estimated and the relationship between political regimen and life-expectancy at birth was estimated using robust regression. Crude analysis revealed that parliamentary countries have greater life-expectancy at birth than countries having a presidential regime. Significant co-relationships between all macro-determinants were observed. No differential effects were observed between both political regimes regarding life-expectancy at birth in multiple robust regressions. There is no evidence that presidential or parliamentary regimes provide greater levels of health for the population. It is suggested that public health policies be focused on other macro-determinants having more known effects on health, such as income inequality.

Triggered dynamics in a model of different fault creep regimes.

Science.gov (United States)

Kostić, Srđan; Franović, Igor; Perc, Matjaž; Vasović, Nebojša; Todorović, Kristina

2014-06-23

The study is focused on the effect of transient external force induced by a passing seismic wave on fault motion in different creep regimes. Displacement along the fault is represented by the movement of a spring-block model, whereby the uniform and oscillatory motion correspond to the fault dynamics in post-seismic and inter-seismic creep regime, respectively. The effect of the external force is introduced as a change of block acceleration in the form of a sine wave scaled by an exponential pulse. Model dynamics is examined for variable parameters of the induced acceleration changes in reference to periodic oscillations of the unperturbed system above the supercritical Hopf bifurcation curve. The analysis indicates the occurrence of weak irregular oscillations if external force acts in the post-seismic creep regime. When fault motion is exposed to external force in the inter-seismic creep regime, one finds the transition to quasiperiodic- or chaos-like motion, which we attribute to the precursory creep regime and seismic motion, respectively. If the triggered acceleration changes are of longer duration, a reverse transition from inter-seismic to post-seismic creep regime is detected on a larger time scale.

Verification and nuclear material security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2001-01-01

Full text: The Director General will open the symposium by presenting a series of challenges facing the international safeguards community: the need to ensure a robust system, with strong verification tools and a sound research and development programme; the importance of securing the necessary support for the system, in terms of resources; the effort to achieve universal participation in the non-proliferation regime; and the necessity of re-energizing disarmament efforts. Special focus will be given to the challenge underscored by recent events, of strengthening international efforts to combat nuclear terrorism. (author)

Regime switching model for financial data: Empirical risk analysis

Science.gov (United States)

Salhi, Khaled; Deaconu, Madalina; Lejay, Antoine; Champagnat, Nicolas; Navet, Nicolas

2016-11-01

This paper constructs a regime switching model for the univariate Value-at-Risk estimation. Extreme value theory (EVT) and hidden Markov models (HMM) are combined to estimate a hybrid model that takes volatility clustering into account. In the first stage, HMM is used to classify data in crisis and steady periods, while in the second stage, EVT is applied to the previously classified data to rub out the delay between regime switching and their detection. This new model is applied to prices of numerous stocks exchanged on NYSE Euronext Paris over the period 2001-2011. We focus on daily returns for which calibration has to be done on a small dataset. The relative performance of the regime switching model is benchmarked against other well-known modeling techniques, such as stable, power laws and GARCH models. The empirical results show that the regime switching model increases predictive performance of financial forecasting according to the number of violations and tail-loss tests. This suggests that the regime switching model is a robust forecasting variant of power laws model while remaining practical to implement the VaR measurement.

Predicting linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burr, T.L.

1994-04-01

This report is a primer on the analysis of both linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. We analyze eight simulated and two real time series using both linear and nonlinear modeling techniques. The theoretical treatment is brief but references to pertinent theory are provided. Forecasting is our main goal. However, because our most common approach is to fit models to the data, we also emphasize checking model adequacy by analyzing forecast errors for serial correlation or nonconstant variance

Revisiting democratic civil peace: Electoral regimes and civil conflict

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Bartusevicius, Henrikas; Skaaning, Svend-Erik

2018-01-01

to use force. Building on this framework, we distinguish between five regime types according to their electoral features—non-electoral autocracies, single-party autocracies, multi-party autocracies, minimalist democracies, and polyarchies—and specify hypotheses regarding the likelihood of conflict...... in each. In a global statistical analysis spanning 1817‒2006 and employing the new Lexical Index of Electoral Democracy (LIED), we find that polyarchies, characterized by unconstrained contestation, have a lower risk of conflict than any other regime type (although minimalist democracies are only slightly......) elections and minimal electoral competition. Overall, our study underscores the importance of focusing on the central attributes of democracy and sheds new light on the relationship between particular regime features (or types) and conflict, thereby contributing to the growing efforts in conflict research...

The Upgraded Plasma Focus Installation > - The Installation >

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Krokhin, O.N.; Nikulin, V.Ya.; Babenko, B.A.; Gorbunov, D.N.; Gurei, A.E.; Kalachev, N.V.; Kozlova, T.A.; Malafeev, Yu.S.; Polukhin, S.N.; Sychev, A.A.; Tikhomirov, A.A.; Tsybenko, S.P.; Volobuev, I.V.

1999-01-01

The paper presents the upgraded plasma focus installation > - the installation > and some preliminary experimental results. The total energy stored in capacity bank is now 400 kJ, current - 5 MA with the rise time 3.5 μs. The investigation is targeted on the study of near electrode processes and its influence on plasma dynamics in a special operating regime of Filippov type PF - Hard X-ray regime. (author)

Private actor accountability on international regimes

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Wahyudi Purnomo

2017-12-01

Full Text Available Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs have emerged along with the growing role of corporations in global development. One of the largest forms of PPP today is the UN Global Compact. The UN Global Compact involves of companies, NGOs, IGOs and state governments. All of them are trying to realize globalization with a more humanist face with attention to the protection of human rights, environment, labor standards and anti-corruption. Engaging private actors in global governance, The UN Global Compact raises many issues such as power, authority, and legitimacy. The effort to tackle it all is to increase PPP accountability. This research seeks to describe what efforts can be made to enhance private accountability within the international regime. The research undertaken is a descriptive study, focuses on public-private partnerships in the UN Global Compact regime. The study found that there were two attempts that could be done. First, by involving the stakeholders in the development of procedures, mechanisms, reporting and monitoring associated with trying to improve the company’s reputation. Second, by looking at corporate relations as agent and UN Global Compact as principal in principal-agent relation in the international regime.

THE DEAL WITH IRAN IS THE BEST-CASE SCENARIO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COULD ACHIEVE IN THE CURRENT GEOPOLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Science.gov (United States)

2016-02-16

nonproliferation regime. However, the international community retains all options to achieve the objective of preventing Iran from producing a nuclear weapon...of U.S. Iran policy since 1979 but the imposition of U.N. Security Council and worldwide sanctions escalated after 2006 and increased dramatically...Diplomacy 2011), 333. 15 Celia L/ Reynolds and Wilfred T. Wan, "Empirical trends in sanctions and possitive inducements in nonproliferation ", in

Prospects for regional cooperation. Regional cooperation in remote monitoring for nuclear nonproliferation and transparency

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olsen, John

2006-01-01

The JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have cooperated for a decade in development and testing of remote monitoring technologies in support of international safeguards. With this technology approaching maturity, the JAEA/SNL partnership now envisions regional cooperation to use these technologies to advance nuclear transparency and strengthen nonproliferation, as well. This presentation summarizes the technical evolution and notes the opportunity for regional cooperation to include institutions in the ROK, as well as Japan and the US. (author)

Selection Criteria in Regime Switching Conditional Volatility Models

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Thomas Chuffart

2015-05-01

Full Text Available A large number of nonlinear conditional heteroskedastic models have been proposed in the literature. Model selection is crucial to any statistical data analysis. In this article, we investigate whether the most commonly used selection criteria lead to choice of the right specification in a regime switching framework. We focus on two types of models: the Logistic Smooth Transition GARCH and the Markov-Switching GARCH models. Simulation experiments reveal that information criteria and loss functions can lead to misspecification ; BIC sometimes indicates the wrong regime switching framework. Depending on the Data Generating Process used in the experiments, great care is needed when choosing a criterion.

Comments on fuel cycle concepts and impacts on nonproliferation and safeguards concerns

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1997-01-01

Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of proliferation risk profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the proliferation risk concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces the proliferation risk concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the proliferation risk characteristics of fuel cycles concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on proliferation characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring development of advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures

Post-test geologic observations made at the non-proliferation experiment site, N-tunnel, Nevada Test Site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Townsend, D.R.; Bradford, R.P.; Hopkins, S.P. [Raytheon Services Nevada, Mercury, NV (United States)] [and others

1994-12-31

Qualitative evaluations of damage resulting from an underground explosion can provide valuable information concerning the size of the charge, as well as the location of a clandestine detonation. However, caution must be exercised during the appraisal because the effects of an explosion are a function of many factors in addition to yield. Construction techniques, the physical properties of the surrounding rock, and the depth of burial are all important considerations when evaluating the effects of an underground detonation. Raytheon Services Nevada geologists documented underground and surface effects of the Non-Proliferation Experiment, as they have for all recent underground weapons-effects tests conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. Underground, the extent of the visible damage decreased rapidly from severe at the closest inspection point 100 m from the Working Point, to insignificant 300 m from the Working Point. The severity of damage correlates in some instances with the orientation of the drift with respect to the shock-wave propagation direction. No evidence of the Non-Proliferation explosion was visible on the mesa surface 389 m above the Working Point the day after the explosion.

Applied Anti-neutrino Physics 2013

CERN Document Server

2013-01-01

This year, the 9th annual Applied Antineutrino Physics Workshop will be hosted by Sejong University, at the COEX conference center in Seoul South Korea. The workshop will be held on November 1(Friday) - 2(Saturday), 2013. Conveniently for many travelers, it takes place directly after and at the same venue as the 2013 IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium (http://www.nss-mic.org/2013/NSSMain.asp) Applied Antineutrino Physics describes an ensemble of experimental and theoretical efforts which aim to use the antineutrino signal from nuclear reactors, and from the Earth itself, in order to address practical problems in nonproliferation and geology respectively. Since the 2004 inception of these workshops, groups worldwide have made considerable advances in defining and expanding the field, garnering interest from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which administers the worlds most important nonproliferation regime, and from the geology/geophysics community. This meeting will focus on the current activi...

Geology, geophysics, and physical properties of the U12n.25 non-proliferation experiment site

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Baldwin, M.J.; Bradford, R.P.; Hopkins, S.P. [Raytheon Services Nevada, Mercury, NV (United States)] [and others

1994-12-31

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Experiment was conducted in the U12n.25 drift in N-Tunnel at the Nevada Test Site. The geologic characterization of the site was performed by Raytheon Services Nevada geologists in the standard manner used for all underground nuclear weapons-effects tests executed by the Defense Nuclear Agency. The U12n.25 test bed was constructed in zeolitized ash-fall tuff of the Tunnel Beds Tuff, Subunit 4K, 389.0 m below the surface of Rainier Mesa. The structural geology of the site was simple, with the nearest fault plane projected to be 12 m below the mined cavity at closest approach, and an average bedding dip of seven degrees to the northwest. The cavity excavation revealed several small fractures, including one which produced minor amounts of free water during construction. The physical properties of the site were well within the range of experience for the zeolitized tuff of N-Tunnel and no geology-related problems were encountered during construction. The zeolitized tuff of N-Tunnel has been the site of twenty nuclear tests conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. The similarities of geologic setting, site geometry, and physical properties allow many comparisons of Non-Proliferation Experiment results with the large nuclear-test data base.

Flow regimes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liles, D.R.

1982-01-01

Internal boundaries in multiphase flow greatly complicate fluid-dynamic and heat-transfer descriptions. Different flow regimes or topological configurations can have radically dissimilar interfacial and wall mass, momentum, and energy exchanges. To model the flow dynamics properly requires estimates of these rates. In this paper the common flow regimes for gas-liquid systems are defined and the techniques used to estimate the extent of a particular regime are described. Also, the current computer-code procedures are delineated and introduce a potentially better method is introduced

The non-proliferation experiment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hannon, W.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

1994-12-31

On September 22, 1993, the Department of Energy detonated more than 1.2 million kg of blasting agent in a tunnel in Rainier Mesa at the Nevada Test Site. The resulting explosion generated seismic, electromagnetic, and air pressure signals that were recorded on instruments deployed at distances ranging from a few meters to hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of kilometers. More than 12 organizations made measurements before, during, and after the explosions. The explosion and its associated experiments are known as the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). Analyses of the measurements made during the NPE and comparisons with similar measurements made on previous nearly nuclear explosions and on a co-located smaller explosion detonated at the same site are providing basic phenomenological insights into what is potentially one of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)-distinguishing between nuclear explosions and some of the many conventional explosions that occur each year. The NPE is also providing information on the use of chemical explosions to develop empirical discriminants in regions where no nuclear explosions have been recorded. In another verification application, several NPE projects are examining the utility of on-site, pre-shot, shot-time, and post-shot measurements of gas seepage, seismic activity, and other observables as a means of identifying the source of signals that appear like nuclear explosions at regional distances. Two related activities are being considered. First, challenge on-site inspections, conducted after an event has occurred, may be able to use the characteristics of phenomena that persist after the explosion to detect and identify the source of the signals that appeared ambiguous or explosion-like to remote sensors. Second, cooperative, on-site measurements made at the time of a pre-nounced conventional explosion may provide assurance that a nuclear explosion did not occur as part of or in place of the pre-announced explosion.

The Asia-Pacific region: non-proliferation and other disarmament issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

In the past few years, the United States and the former Soviet Union began to adjust their force structures in Asia-Pacific region. In this respect, a large range of issues have been raised in discussions on the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Apart from the issues and trends related to proliferation, military expenditure, arms transfer and other disarmament matters, the specific situations in the respective subregions of South-East Asia, South Asia and North-East Asia were discussed. Comprehensive and verified commitments not to possess any such weapons is stressed as the main goal of the meeting. It is vitally important that opportunities that were opened should be seized to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological as well as highly destabilizing conventional weapons

Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

Science.gov (United States)

Pregenzer, Arian

2014-01-01

Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters worldwide provide significant benefits to global public health. PMID:24524501

A Risk-Based Ecohydrological Approach to Assessing Environmental Flow Regimes

Science.gov (United States)

Mcgregor, Glenn B.; Marshall, Jonathan C.; Lobegeiger, Jaye S.; Holloway, Dean; Menke, Norbert; Coysh, Julie

2018-03-01

For several decades there has been recognition that water resource development alters river flow regimes and impacts ecosystem values. Determining strategies to protect or restore flow regimes to achieve ecological outcomes is a focus of water policy and legislation in many parts of the world. However, consideration of existing environmental flow assessment approaches for application in Queensland identified deficiencies precluding their adoption. Firstly, in managing flows and using ecosystem condition as an indicator of effectiveness, many approaches ignore the fact that river ecosystems are subjected to threatening processes other than flow regime alteration. Secondly, many focus on providing flows for responses without considering how often they are necessary to sustain ecological values in the long-term. Finally, few consider requirements at spatial-scales relevant to the desired outcomes, with frequent focus on individual places rather than the regions supporting sustainability. Consequently, we developed a risk-based ecohydrological approach that identifies ecosystem values linked to desired ecological outcomes, is sensitive to flow alteration and uses indicators of broader ecosystem requirements. Monitoring and research is undertaken to quantify flow-dependencies and ecological modelling is used to quantify flow-related ecological responses over an historical flow period. The relative risk from different flow management scenarios can be evaluated at relevant spatial-scales. This overcomes the deficiencies identified above and provides a robust and useful foundation upon which to build the information needed to support water planning decisions. Application of the risk assessment approach is illustrated here by two case studies.

Joint U.S./Russian plutonium disposition study: Nonproliferation issues

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jaeger, C.; Erkkila, B.; Fearey, B.; Ehinger, M.; McAllister, S.; Chitaykin, V.; Ptashny, V.

1996-01-01

In an effort to establish joint activities in the disposition of fissile materials from nuclear materials, the US and Russia agreed to conduct joint work to develop consistent comparisons of various alternatives for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Joint working groups were established for the analysis of alternatives for plutonium management for water reactors, fast reactors, storage, geological formations, immobilization and stabilization of solutions and other forms. In addition cross-cutting working groups were established for economic analysis and nonproliferation (NP). This paper reviews the activities of the NP working group in support of these studies. The NP working group provided integrated support in the area of nuclear NP to the other US/Russian Study teams. It involved both domestic safeguards and security and international safeguards. The analysis of NP involved consideration of the resistance to theft or diversion and resistance to retrieval, extraction or reuse

Sharing knowledge, shaping Europe US technological collaboration and nonproliferation

CERN Document Server

Krige, John

2016-01-01

In the 1950s and the 1960s, U.S. administrations were determined to prevent Western European countries from developing independent national nuclear weapons programs. To do so, the United States attempted to use its technological pre-eminence as a tool of “soft power” to steer Western European technological choices toward the peaceful uses of the atom and of space, encouraging options that fostered collaboration, promoted nonproliferation, and defused challenges to U.S. technological superiority. In Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe, John Krige describes these efforts and the varying degrees of success they achieved. Krige explains that the pursuit of scientific and technological leadership, galvanized by America’s Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, was also used for techno-political collaboration with major allies. He examines a series of multinational arrangements involving shared technological platforms and aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation, and he describes the roles of the Department ...

Bistability of bursting and silence regimes in a model of a leech heart interneuron

Science.gov (United States)

Malashchenko, Tatiana; Shilnikov, Andrey; Cymbalyuk, Gennady

2011-10-01

Bursting is one of the primary activity regimes of neurons. Our study is focused on determining a generic biophysical mechanism underlying the coexistence of the bursting and silent regimes observed in a neuron model. We show that the main ingredient for this mechanism is a saddle periodic orbit. The stable manifold of the orbit sets a threshold between the regimes of activity. Thus, the range of the controlling parameters, where the coexistence is observed, is limited by the bifurcations' values at which the saddle orbit appears and disappears. We show that it appears through the subcritical Andronov-Hopf bifurcation, where the equilibrium representing the silent regime loses stability, and disappears at the homoclinic bifurcation. Correspondingly, the bursting regime disappears in close proximity to the homoclinic bifurcation.

U.S. nonproliferation policy in the decade of the eighties: Past dilemmas and prospects for the future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marshall, H.R. Jr.

1986-01-01

No single event had more effect on the policies concerning nuclear importation and exportation activities than the 1974 detonation of a nuclear explosive device in India. This led eventually to the enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978. The author describes the difficult negotiations of the U.S. administration with Euratom, Japan, China, and Latin America. (CW) [de

Selected Examples of LDRD Projects Supporting Test Ban Treaty Verification and Nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jackson, K. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Al-Ayat, R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Walter, W. R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2015-02-23

The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at the DOE National Laboratories was established to ensure the scientific and technical vitality of these institutions and to enhance the their ability to respond to evolving missions and anticipate national needs. LDRD allows the Laboratory directors to invest a percentage of their total annual budget in cutting-edge research and development projects within their mission areas. We highlight a selected set of LDRD-funded projects, in chronological order, that have helped provide capabilities, people and infrastructure that contributed greatly to our ability to respond to technical challenges in support of test ban treaty verification and nonproliferation.

TYPES OF POLITICAL REGIMES IN THE IRKUTSK REGION

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

И В Орлова

2017-12-01

Full Text Available The authors consider contemporary western and Russian classifications of regional political regimes and their applicability for Russia. Based on the analysis of political theories, the authors chose the traditional typology of regional political regimes focusing on the minimalist interpretation of democracy (electoral competition and methods for identifying regional scenarios introduced by V.Ya. Gelman. The authors study the case of the Irkutsk Region as a region with conflicting elites, in which in a short period several regional heads were replaced. Based on the contemporary political history, the authors analyze the regional political regime using the following criteria: democracy/autocracy, consolidation/oligo-poly, compromise/conflict relations within the ruling elite. The results of the analysis prove the existence of checks and balances in the political system of the Irkutsk Region. Such a system restrains strong politicians attempts to monopolize the political power in the region. When any political player gains too much influence, other centers of power unite against him and together return the situation to the status quo. The political regime of the Irkutsk Region ensures a relatively high level of political competition, at the same time it is a part of the uncompetitive political regime of the Russian Federation, therefore it is a ‘hybrid democracy’. The authors’ analysis of intra-elite relations in the region revealed a high predisposition to conflicts with the dominant scenario of ‘war of all against all’.

Confidence-building measures in the Asia-Pacific region

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Qin Huasun

1991-01-01

The regional confidence-building, security and disarmament issues in the Asia-Pacific region, and in particular, support to non-proliferation regime and establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones are reviewed

Challenges in Finding AGNs in the Low Luminosity Regime

Science.gov (United States)

Satyapal, Shobita; Abel, Nick; Secrest, Nathan; Singh, Amrit; Ellison, Sara

2016-08-01

Low luminosity AGNs are an important component of the AGN population. They are often found in the lowest mass galaxies or galaxies that lack classical bulges, a demographic that places important constraints to models of supermassive black hole seed formation and merger-free models of AGN fueling. The detection of AGNs in this low luminosity regime is challenging both because star formation in the host galaxy can dominate the optical spectrum and gas and dust can obscure the central engine at both optical and X-ray wavelengths. Thus while mid-infrared color selection and X-ray observations at energies <10 keV are often powerful tools in uncovering optically unidentified AGNs at higher luminosities, this is not the case in the low luminosity regime. In this talk, I will review the effectiveness of uncovering AGNs in the low luminosity regime using multiwavength investigations, with a focus on infrared spectroscopic signatures.

Adaptation in Collaborative Governance Regimes

Science.gov (United States)

Emerson, Kirk; Gerlak, Andrea K.

2014-10-01

Adaptation and the adaptive capacity of human and environmental systems have been of central concern to natural and social science scholars, many of whom characterize and promote the need for collaborative cross-boundary systems that are seen as flexible and adaptive by definition. Researchers who study collaborative governance systems in the public administration, planning and policy literature have paid less attention to adaptive capacity specifically and institutional adaptation in general. This paper bridges the two literatures and finds four common dimensions of capacity, including structural arrangements, leadership, knowledge and learning, and resources. In this paper, we focus on institutional adaptation in the context of collaborative governance regimes and try to clarify and distinguish collaborative capacity from adaptive capacity and their contributions to adaptive action. We posit further that collaborative capacities generate associated adaptive capacities thereby enabling institutional adaptation within collaborative governance regimes. We develop these distinctions and linkages between collaborative and adaptive capacities with the help of an illustrative case study in watershed management within the National Estuary Program.

MONETARY TRANSMISSION CHANNELS IN FLEXIBLE MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES: THE CASE OF SELECTED TRANSITION ECONOMIES

OpenAIRE

JOSIFIDIS, Kosta; PUCAR, Emilija Beker; SUPIĆ, Novica

2010-01-01

The paper explores selected monetary transmission channels in the case of transition economies. Namely, an exchange rate channel, an interest rate channel, direct and indirect influence to an exchange rate, are focused. Specific (former) transition economies are differentiated according the combination of implemented monetary and exchange rate regimes: exchange rate as a nominal anchor and rigid exchange rate regimes, exchange rate as a nominal anchor and intermediate exchange rate regimes, a...

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. V. 16

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1992-01-01

Throughout 1991 the end of the cold war continued to have a positive impact on international relations. In the Minsk Declaration, proclaiming the establishment of the CIS, the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertook to discharge the international obligations incumbent on them under treaties and agreements entered into by the USSR and in the Alma Ata Declaration, this undertaking was accepted by all the eleven republics constituting the Commonwealth. In the course of 1991 several steps were taken which helped enhance the status of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. France and China had decided to accede. On 10 July, South Africa signed a safeguards agreement with IAEA. By the end of 1991, almost all the front-line States in southern Africa had also acceded to the Treaty. Argentina and Brazil concluded a joint safeguards agreement with IAEA and stated that they were taking measures to permit the full entry into force for them of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (treaty of Tlatelolco). The European Council adopted a Declaration on non-proliferation and arms exports with a view to strengthening the regime of nuclear non-proliferation and, in the light of the Persian Gulf War, further enhancing the effectiveness of ''regimes of non-proliferation''. The heads of State and Government of the seven major industrialized countries reaffirmed their readiness to work in favour of an equitable and stable non-proliferation regime based on balance between nuclear non-proliferation and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to achieve a strengthened and improved IAEA safeguards system. The work carried out in Iraq by the Special Commission, established by the Security Council broke new ground for the United Nations in several respects, in particular, those of intrusive on-site inspection and destruction of weapons and mass destruction and associated facilities under

Cell kinetics of irradiated experimental tumors: cell transition from the non-proliferating to the proliferating pool

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Potmesil, M.; Goldfeder, A.

1980-01-01

In murine mammary carcinomas, parenchymal tumor cells with dense nucleoli traverse the cell cycle and divide, thus constituting the proliferating pool. Cells with trabeculate or ring-shaped nucleoli either proceed slowly through G 1 phase or are arrested in it. The role of these non-proliferating, G 1 phase-confined cells in tumor regeneration was studied in vivo after a subcurative dose of X-irradiation in two transplantable tumor lines. Tumor-bearing mice were continuously injected with methyl[ 3 H]thymidine before and after irradiation. Finally, the labeling was discontinued, mice injected with vincristine sulfate and cells arrested in metaphase were accumulated over 10-hrs. Two clearly delineated groups of vincristine-arrested mitoses emerged in autoradiograms prepared from tumor tissue at the time of starting tumor regrowth: one group with the silver-grain counts corresponding to the background level, the other with heavily labeled mitoses. As the only source of unlabeled mitoses was unlabeled G 1 phase-confined cells persisting in the tumor, this indicated cell transition from the non-proliferating to the proliferating pool, which took place in the initial phase of the tumor regrowth. Unlabeled progenitors have apparently remained in G 1 phase for at least 5-12 days after irradiation. (author)

Anti-neutrino flux in a research reactor for non-proliferation application

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Khakshournia, Samad; Foroughi, Shokoufeh [Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI), Tehran (Iran, Islamic Republic of). Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

2017-11-15

Owing to growing interest in the study of emitted antineutrinos from nuclear reactors to test the Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, antineutrino flux was studied in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) using ORIGEN code. According to our prediction, antineutrino rate was obtained 2.6 x 10{sup 17} (v{sub e}/sec) in the core No. 57F of the TRR. Calculations indicated that evolution of antineutrino flux was very slow with time and the performed refueling had not an observable effect on antineutrino flux curve for a 5 MW reactor with the conventional refueling program. It is seen that for non-proliferation applications the measurement of the contribution of {sup 239}Pu to the fission using an antineutrino detector is not viable in the TRR.

Transition from weak wave turbulence regime to solitonic regime

Science.gov (United States)

Hassani, Roumaissa; Mordant, Nicolas

2017-11-01

The Weak Turbulence Theory (WTT) is a statistical theory describing the interaction of a large ensemble of random waves characterized by very different length scales. For both weak non-linearity and weak dispersion a different regime is predicted where solitons propagate while keeping their shape unchanged. The question under investigation here is which regime between weak turbulence or soliton gas does the system choose ? We report an experimental investigation of wave turbulence at the surface of finite depth water in the gravity-capillary range. We tune the wave dispersion and the level of nonlinearity by modifying the depth of water and the forcing respectively. We use space-time resolved profilometry to reconstruct the deformed surface of water. When decreasing the water depth, we observe a drastic transition between weak turbulence at the weakest forcing and a solitonic regime at stronger forcing. We characterize the transition between both states by studying their Fourier Spectra. We also study the efficiency of energy transfer in the weak turbulence regime. We report a loss of efficiency of angular transfer as the dispersion of the wave is reduced until the system bifurcates into the solitonic regime. This project has recieved funding from the European Research Council (ERC, Grant Agreement No. 647018-WATU).

The future of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Siddiqa, A.

1997-01-01

Nuclear proliferation in South Asia is currently one of the hot topics in world politics. The concern of the international community, and especially the USA, over this issue is coupled with the fear of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. As a result, Washington has been using its 'stick and carrot' policy to persuade the two countries involved not to develop their nuclear programs for military purposes. However both countries have not only continued to develop their nuclear ambitions, but seem to have achieved vertical nuclear proliferation. This paper examines the future non-proliferation in the South Asian region in the 1990s. This will be achieved by looking at the following: the development of the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan; how these programs have been developed; the reasons for acquiring the capability for non-conventional defence; the real fear in terms of nuclear proliferation in the region; the possible options for dealing with nuclear proliferation in South Asia

Conceptual proposals for measuring the impact of international regimes on energy security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sander, Michael

2013-01-01

The paper proposes two concepts to assess the effect of international regimes on energy security. Existing indicators focus mainly on state-level factors, excluding international influences. International relation scholars on the other hand see a clear connection between international regimes and stable energy relations. International regimes stabilise energy relations by providing frameworks for negotiations, defining, controlling and sanctioning compliance and allowing the actors to engage in package deals. The researcher needs to include these factors in a complete assessment of political energy security risks. As first step, the paper uses the effectiveness of control mechanisms as basis for such consideration. It refers specifically to international arbitration as the most important control mechanism in international energy relations. The simplest measurement option is the share of a county's energy imports covered by a certain regime. The paper applies the Oslo-Potsdam-Solution to account for outcome effectiveness. It applies a variant of the International Regimes Data Base protocol to account for effective regime structures. In a last section, the paper proposes some possible paths for future research. - Highlights: • International regimes mitigate political risks for energy supply and must be considered. • The paper proposes two concepts to measure energy regime effectiveness. • The OPS-variant measures output, the IRDB-variant measures structure effectiveness. • The paper offers a preliminary feasibility test for the concepts. • Finally, it suggests further roads for research

Economic and Nonproliferation Analysis Framework for Assessing Reliable Nuclear Fuel Service Arrangements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Phillips, Jon R.; Kreyling, Sean J.; Short, Steven M.; Weimar, Mark R.

2010-01-01

Nuclear power is now broadly recognized as an essential technology in national strategies to provide energy security while meeting carbon management goals. Yet a long standing conundrum remains: how to enable rapid growth in the global nuclear power infrastructure while controlling the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies that lie at the heart of nuclear fuel supply and nuclear weapons programs. Reducing the latent proliferation risk posed by a broader horizontal spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology has been a primary goal of national nuclear supplier policies since the beginning of the nuclear power age. Attempts to control the spread of sensitive nuclear technology have been the subject of numerous initiatives in the intervening decades sometimes taking the form of calls to develop fuel supply and service assurances to reduce market pull to increase the number of states with fuel cycle capabilities. A clear understanding of what characteristics of specific reliable nuclear fuel service (RNFS) and supply arrangements qualify them as 'attractive offers' is critical to the success of current and future efforts. At a minimum, RNFS arrangements should provide economic value to all participants and help reduce latent proliferation risks posed by the global expansion of nuclear power. In order to inform the technical debate and the development of policy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has been developing an analytical framework to evaluate the economics and nonproliferation merits of alternative approaches to RNFS arrangements. This paper provides a brief overview of the economic analysis framework developed and applied to a model problem of current interest: full-service nuclear fuel leasing arrangements. Furthermore, this paper presents an extended outline of a proposed analysis approach to evaluate the non-proliferation merits of various RNFS alternatives.

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) primary focus is national security-verification and treaty compliance across several regimes addressing weapons of mass destruction-linked to a major facilitation role in regard to industry compliance. The key aspect here is ensuring Australia's treaty commitments are met. Additionally, ASNO's activities are central to Government policy on the mining and export of uranium. Throughout the past year, ASNO continued to make a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. Australia played a key role in the negotiations leading to the adoption by the IAEA in 1997 of the Model Protocol, which provides the IAEA Secretariat with the authority to implement strengthened safeguards measures. In December 1997, Australia was the first country to bring into effect a Protocol with the IAEA based on this model. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Protocol enters general application. ASNO's As mentioned above, ASNO has developed and implemented new safeguards arrangements in Australia under the Protocol for strengthened safeguards, including facilitation of IAEA verification activities at the Ranger uranium mine-this is the first time the IAEA (under the Protocol) has visited a uranium mine and the lessons learned will help the IAEA develop its procedures. One major activity for ASNO is monitoring the progress of the Silex project to ensure that, as soon as appropriate, the technology is declared 'associated technology' and controlled in accordance with relevant legislative and Treaty requirements. In anticipation of this, ASNO has taken steps to protect the Silex technology against unauthorised access. Over the past 12 months, ASNO has established itself as the provisional

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-07-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

Investigation of a staged plasma-focus apparatus

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, J.H.; McFarland, D.R.; Harries, W.L.

1978-01-01

A new staged plasma-focus geometry combining two Mather-type plasma-focus guns has been constructed, and the current-sheet dynamics investigated. The production of simultaneous pairs of plasma foci has been achieved. The intensities of X-ray and fusion-neutron emission were measured and found to agree with the scaling law for a plasma focus. Advantages of this new geometry include the possibility of using plasma-focus type pinches in multiple arrays at power levels beyond the validity regime of the current scaling law for a single gun. (author)

European energy security analysing the EU-Russia energy security regime in terms of interdependence theory

CERN Document Server

Esakova, Nataliya

2012-01-01

Nataliya Esakova performs an analysis of the interdependencies and the nature of cooperation between energy producing, consuming and transit countries focusing on the gas sector. For the analysis the theoretical framework of the interdependence theory by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye and the international regime theory are applied to the recent developments within the gas relationship between the European Union and Russia in the last decade. The objective of the analysis is to determine, whether a fundamental regime change in terms of international regime theory is taking place, and, if so, which regime change explanation model in terms of interdependence theory is likely to apply.

European energy security. Analysing the EU-Russia energy security regime in terms of interdependence theory

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Esakova, Nataliya

2012-07-01

Nataliya Esakova performs an analysis of the interdependencies and the nature of cooperation between energy producing, consuming and transit countries focusing on the gas sector. For the analysis the theoretical framework of the interdependence theory by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye and the international regime theory are applied to the recent developments within the gas relationship between the European Union and Russia in the last decade. The objective of the analysis is to determine, whether a fundamental regime change in terms of international regime theory is taking place, and, if so, which regime change explanation model in terms of interdependence theory is likely to apply. (orig.)

Present status of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Netchaev, B.

1976-01-01

The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons plays an important role in enhancing the security of all States. It is essential to maintain in the implementation of the Treaty an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of all the countries Party to the Treaty wether or not nuclear weapon States. These questions were discussed during the Conference on the operation of the Treaty held in Geneva in May 1975. It was emphasized at the Conference that the first five years of application of the Treaty had shown a consistent increase in the number of ratifications and in the safeguards agreements concluded on the basis of the Agreement. (N.E.A.) [fr

Projecting Pyongyang: The Future of North Korea's Kim Jong IL Regime

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Scobell, Andrew

2008-01-01

.... In this monograph, the focus is on the fate of the regime dominated by the Kim Dynasty, initially ruled by Kim Il Sung and then led by his son, Kim Jong Il, following the former's death in 1994...

A Study on the Export Control System at KAERI

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, I. C.; Lee, B. D.; Kim, H. J.; Kim, H. S.; Jung, J. A.

2015-01-01

The current non-proliferation regime requires strengthening the export control from Korea to foreign countries. This means that the ministries related to export control deeply emphasize the prohibition of the illegal proliferation in the domestic society as well as international society. The principle of export control for non-proliferation of WMD is to control the transfer of the strategic items/technology to the countries which intend to develop the WMD in accordance with the multilateral agreements of the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG), Wassenaar Agreement (WA), Austrian Group (AG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Among them, export controls at KAERI are deeply related to the guidelines of the NSG, an international nuclear export control regime. Since the new concept of an export system was launched in Jan. 2014, KAERI needs to consider new approaches to meet the requirement of the revised domestic law and regulation. To cope with this environmental change, this paper suggests new approaches to effectively conduct the export control at KAERI

The international legal regime governing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Talaie, F.

2004-01-01

This paper studies the legal regime governing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It addresses the issue of the prevention of the use by states of the nuclear weapons (as the most destructive weapon of mass destruction) and their elimination as the main purpose for maintaining international peace and security.Then, the paper presents examples of peaceful applications of nuclear energy. It points out that the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technology are not hampered by obligation of States not to divert these materials into nuclear weapons. In this context, the paper analyses the provisions of the main international and regional treaties related to the nuclear energy (especially the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Regional Treaty of TLATELOLCO). It also examines the international mechanism for monitoring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in particular studies the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the application of safeguards agreements and the additional protocol to these agreements. One special part of the paper is dedicated to Iran and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The paper concludes that the existing rules of international law do not prevent any State from using and applying nuclear energy and technology for peaceful uses. These rules only make such uses subject to a comprehensive verification mechanism through the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements and the additional protocol the these agreements

Jatropha Developments in Mozambique: Analysis of Structural Conditions Influencing Niche-Regime Interactions

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Maja Slingerland

2014-10-01

Full Text Available This article investigates the transition dynamics related to Jatropha developments in Mozambique. The analysis focuses on how structural conditions (infrastructure, institutions, interaction and collaboration and capabilities and resources enable or constrain interactions between niche-level Jatropha experiments and incumbent energy, agriculture and rural development regimes in Mozambique. Investors in agro-industrial Jatropha projects focused on establishing projects in areas with relatively good infrastructure, rather than in remote rural areas. Furthermore, they predominantly focused on Jatropha production instead of investing in the entire Jatropha value chain, which turned out to be a challenge in itself, as growing a productive Jatropha crop was much more complex than initially anticipated. The development of institutions that could nurture and protect Jatropha projects from the prevailing regimes lagged behind Jatropha project establishment, leading to an insecure investment climate. Strong inter-ministerial collaboration and organized civil society interaction and representation contrasted with non-organized private sector and rather isolated smallholder Jatropha projects. The global financial crisis and limited adaptive capacity reduced the time and space for experimentation and learning to overcome disappointing crop performance. Together, this hampered Jatropha’s potential to challenge the energy, agricultural and rural development regimes. Nevertheless, the Jatropha experience did initiate the development of policy and regulation and stimulated interaction and collaboration between specific groups of stakeholders, which could provide the basis to capture future biofuel momentum in Mozambique.

Proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. Summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-03-01

The United States Department of Energy and United States Department of State are jointly proposing to adopt a policy to manage spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. Only spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States would be covered by the proposed policy. The purpose of the proposed policy is to promote U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives, specifically by seeking to reduce highly-enriched uranium from civilian commerce. This is a summary of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement. Environmental effects and policy considerations of three Management Alternative approaches for implementation of the proposed policy are assessed. The three Management Alternatives analyzed are: (1) acceptance and management of the spent nuclear fuel by the Department of Energy in the United States, (2) management of the spent nuclear fuel at one or more foreign facilities (under conditions that satisfy United States nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives), and (3) a combination of components of Management Alternatives 1 and 2 (Hybrid Alternative). A No Action Alternative is also analyzed. For each Management Alternative, there are a number of alternatives for its implementation. For Management Alternative 1, this document addresses the environmental effects of various implementation alternatives such as varied policy durations, management of various quantities of spent nuclear fuel, and differing financing arrangements. Environmental impacts at various potential ports of entry, along truck and rail transportation routes, at candidate management sites, and for alternate storage technologies are also examined. For Management Alternative 2, this document addresses two subalternatives: (1) assisting foreign nations with storage; and (2) assisting foreign nations with reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel

Nuclear Legislation in OECD and NEA Countries. Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities - Spain

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

This country profile provide comprehensive information on the regulatory and Institutional Framework governing nuclear activities as well as a detailed review of a full range of nuclear law topics, including: mining regime; radioactive substances; nuclear installations; trade in nuclear materials and equipment; radiation protection; radioactive waste management; non-proliferation and physical protection; transport; and nuclear third party liability. The profile is complemented by reproductions of the primary legislation regulating nuclear activities in the country. Content: I. General regulatory regime: 1. Introduction; 2. Mining regime; 3. Radioactive substances, nuclear fuel and equipment; 4. Nuclear installations (Licensing and inspection, including nuclear safety; Protection of the environment against radiation effects; Emergency response); 5. Trading in nuclear materials and equipment; 6. Radiation protection; 7. Radioactive waste management; 8. Non-proliferation and physical protection (Safeguards and non-proliferation; Physical protection); 9. Transport; 10. Nuclear third party liability; II. Institutional Framework: 1. Regulatory and supervisory authorities (Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade - MITYC; Ministry of the Interior - MIR; Ministry of Economy and the Exchequer - MEH; Ministry of the Environment and Rural and Marine Affairs - MARM); 2. Public and semi-public agencies (Nuclear Safety Council - CSN; Centre for Energy-related, Environmental and Technological Research - CIEMAT; National Energy Commission - CNE; 3. Public capital companies (Enusa Industrias Avanzadas, s.a. - ENUSA; Empresa Nacional de Residuos Radiactivos, s.a. - ENRESA)

Statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-08-01

The document reproduces the following statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, statements on behalf of the depository Governments and statements on behalf of other Governments (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Western Samoa and Nordic Countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)

Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of fuel cycle programs in reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1995-01-01

The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. Reference annual mass flows and inventories for a representative 1,400 Mwe Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel cycle have been investigated for three cases: the 100 percent uranium oxide UO 2 fuel loading once through cycle, and the 33 percent mixed oxide MOX loading configuration for a first and second plutonium recycle. The analysis addresses fuel cycle developments; plutonium and uranium inventory and flow balances; nuclear fuel processing operations; UO 2 once-through and MOX first and second recycles; and the economic incentives to draw-down the excess separated plutonium stores. The preliminary analysis explores several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium arisings and HEU, and the consequences of the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments

Detecting spatial regimes in ecosystems | Science Inventory ...

Science.gov (United States)

Research on early warning indicators has generally focused on assessing temporal transitions with limited application of these methods to detecting spatial regimes. Traditional spatial boundary detection procedures that result in ecoregion maps are typically based on ecological potential (i.e. potential vegetation), and often fail to account for ongoing changes due to stressors such as land use change and climate change and their effects on plant and animal communities. We use Fisher information, an information theory based method, on both terrestrial and aquatic animal data (US Breeding Bird Survey and marine zooplankton) to identify ecological boundaries, and compare our results to traditional early warning indicators, conventional ecoregion maps, and multivariate analysis such as nMDS (non-metric Multidimensional Scaling) and cluster analysis. We successfully detect spatial regimes and transitions in both terrestrial and aquatic systems using Fisher information. Furthermore, Fisher information provided explicit spatial information about community change that is absent from other multivariate approaches. Our results suggest that defining spatial regimes based on animal communities may better reflect ecological reality than do traditional ecoregion maps, especially in our current era of rapid and unpredictable ecological change. Use an information theory based method to identify ecological boundaries and compare our results to traditional early warning

Statement to the 37th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 27 September 1993; Statement to the 48th session of the United Nations General Assembly, 1 November 1993

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blix, H.

1993-11-01

The statements outlines the IAEA activities in promotion of nuclear techniques, development of nuclear power, management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, nuclear safety,nuclear liability, strengthening of safeguards and non-proliferation regime

Regime shifts in the marine environment: the scientific basis and political context.

Science.gov (United States)

Kraberg, Alexandra C; Wasmund, Norbert; Vanaverbeke, Jan; Schiedek, Doris; Wiltshire, Karen H; Mieszkowska, Nova

2011-01-01

Regime shifts in the marine environment have recently received much attention. To date, however, few large-scale meta-analyses have been carried out due to insufficient data coverage and integration between sustained observational datasets because of diverse methodologies used in data collection, recording and archival. Here we review the available data on regime shifts globally, followed by a review of current and planned policies with relevance to regime shifts. We then focus on the North and Baltic Seas, providing examples of existing efforts for data integration in the MarBEF Network of Excellence. Existing gaps in data coverage are identified, and the added value from meta-analyses of multiple datasets demonstrated using examples from the MarBEF integrated data project LargeNet. We discuss whether these efforts are addressing current policy needs and close with recommendations for future integrated data networks to increase our ability to understand, identify and predict recent and future regime shifts. Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Arctic circulation regimes.

Science.gov (United States)

Proshutinsky, Andrey; Dukhovskoy, Dmitry; Timmermans, Mary-Louise; Krishfield, Richard; Bamber, Jonathan L

2015-10-13

Between 1948 and 1996, mean annual environmental parameters in the Arctic experienced a well-pronounced decadal variability with two basic circulation patterns: cyclonic and anticyclonic alternating at 5 to 7 year intervals. During cyclonic regimes, low sea-level atmospheric pressure (SLP) dominated over the Arctic Ocean driving sea ice and the upper ocean counterclockwise; the Arctic atmosphere was relatively warm and humid, and freshwater flux from the Arctic Ocean towards the subarctic seas was intensified. By contrast, during anticylonic circulation regimes, high SLP dominated driving sea ice and the upper ocean clockwise. Meanwhile, the atmosphere was cold and dry and the freshwater flux from the Arctic to the subarctic seas was reduced. Since 1997, however, the Arctic system has been under the influence of an anticyclonic circulation regime (17 years) with a set of environmental parameters that are atypical for this regime. We discuss a hypothesis explaining the causes and mechanisms regulating the intensity and duration of Arctic circulation regimes, and speculate how changes in freshwater fluxes from the Arctic Ocean and Greenland impact environmental conditions and interrupt their decadal variability. © 2015 The Authors.

Causas estruturais e consequências dos regimes internacionais: regimes como variáveis intervenientes

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Stephen D. Krasner

2012-06-01

Full Text Available Os regimes internacionais são definidos como princípios, normas, regras e procedimentos de tomada de decisões ao redor dos quais as expectativas dos atores convergem em uma dada área-tema. Como ponto de partida, os regimes são conceituados como variáveis intervenientes, estando entre fatores causais básicos e os resultados e comportamentos relacionados. Há três visões a respeito da importância dos regimes: as orientações estruturais convencionais desvalorizam os regimes como sendo, na melhor das hipóteses, ineficazes; as orientações grocianas vêem os regimes como componentes íntimos do sistema internacional; as perspectivas estruturalistas modificadas vêem os regimes como significativos somente em certas condições restritas. Para os argumentos grociano e estruturalista modificado - que concordam com a visão de que os regimes podem influenciar resultados e comportamentos - , o desenvolvimento de regimes é visto como uma função de cinco variáveis causais básicas: auto-interesse egoísta; poder político; normas e princípios difusos; usos e costumes; conhecimento.

Report of a workshop on nuclear forces and nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC October 28, 2010

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2010-12-08

A workshop sponsored by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was held at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on October 28, 2010. The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The discussions reflected the importance of the NPR for defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21st century threats and providing guidance for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) programs and, for many but not all participants, highlighted its role in the successful outcome of the NPT RevCon. There was widespread support for the NPR and its role in developing the foundations for a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. However, some participants raised concerns about its implementation and its long-term effectiveness and sustainability.

U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined. Report to the Congress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm U.S. reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonproliferation policies can influence export sales. Based on available data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of U.S. nuclear exports. However, U.S. companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by U.S. technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and compete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for U.S. nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, U.S. companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity