WorldWideScience

Sample records for nonproliferation export controls

  1. Application of U.S. export controls to DOE technical exchanges: New guidelines on export control and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lisann, E.G.; Hollander, Z.; Rudolph, R.R.

    1995-01-01

    As the Department of Energy's nuclear weapon's complex shrinks, concern regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology through the release of export-controlled equipment, materials and information has come to the fore. In November, 1994 Under Secretary Charles Curtis issued new guidelines on export control and nonproliferation. The new policies and procedures are designed to help Department of Energy Headquarters Offices, Operations Offices, Area Offices, laboratories and contractors implement a consistent and technologically sound policy regarding DOE transfers of unclassified equipment, materials and information that could adversely affect US nuclear nonproliferation objectives or national security. The DOE Export Control Division has developed a multi-faceted program of guidelines and training materials to sensitize DOE and DOE-contractors to their responsibilities and to teach them how to evaluate the proliferation risks of their activities

  2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Control in the Republic of Croatia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valcic, I.; Prah, M.; Mikec, N.

    2006-01-01

    In accordance with its internationally accepted obligations, the Republic of Croatia is actively implementing principles of non-proliferation and export control of nuclear materials and/or equipment. The article deals with treaties, conventions, agreements and other international arrangements that are creating certain obligation for Republic of Croatia related to nuclear non-proliferation. The most important are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Protocol, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the NSG Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. In addition the article describes a national regulative framework, the basis for conducting activities in nuclear material control, export control of dual-use items as well as non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Details are given about the Nuclear Safety Act, the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Act on Export of Dual-Use Items, the Decree on the List of Dual-Use Items, the Law on Production, Repair and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment and the Decree specifying goods subject to export and import licenses. (author)

  3. Analysis of nuclear export control system and implementing international nonproliferation regime in China

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, J. S.; Lee, J. S.; Ahn, J. S.; Kim, B. G.; Min, K. S.

    2000-01-01

    China's exporting behaviour of nuclear items had been disconnected from the international non-proliferation regime such as IAEA safeguards and export control related with peaceful use of nuclear energy since 1970s. Especially, China had been one of principle suppliers of nuclear facility and technologies to Pakistan and Iran which had developed nuclear weapon programs. On the other hand, according to the rapid growth of economic scale after China began to open to the world, an active program for nuclear power plant as an electricity source had established. This means that China have surfaced as a big market to Korean nuclear industries. Regarding this, the paper dealt with the nuclear export control matters, i.e. the history of nuclear export control system and analyzed on background of enforcement of U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement that had been apolitical issue between U.S. and China. Prospects toward conforming its nuclear export policies, laws and regulations to international standards also analyzed in results

  4. Accelerator-driven subcritical systems - An analysis with a focus on non-proliferation and export control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, Per; Nielsen, Fredrik; Sunhede, Daniel

    2013-01-01

    The Department of Nuclear Weapons Related Issues at The Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, as commissioned by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, SSM, conducted a study concerning Accelerator Driven Subcritical Systems, ADS, with emphasis on non-proliferation and export control. An ADS looks at first glance like a traditional nuclear reactor, but the nuclear core is designed to always remain subcritical, both during normal and off-normal conditions. Neutrons are instead supplied by an external source in the form of an proton accelerator and a spallation target. This report gives a short walk-through to the physical processes that governs the neutron flux and reactivity in the core and how they are affected by the design of the core including the accelerator and spallation target. Furthermore is the results from reactor core simulations presented, where the isotopic nuclear fuel inventory has been studied as a function of burn up and initial configuration. Finally the report contains an analysis of the potential risks involved from the perspective of nuclear proliferation and exports. This study shows that ADS in the future could constitute a proliferation concern. The subsystems and components in question share design and materials with the equivalent components in traditional reactors with the exception of the proton accelerator and spallation target, which is unique for accelerator driven systems

  5. A study on strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime through the export control system of sensitive materials, equipment and technology related to nuclear activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro; Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Komizo, Yasuyoshi

    2004-01-01

    The strengthened safeguards caused from safeguards experiences to Iraq and DPRK leads to the expansion of the IAEA's activities for verification of all nuclear activities as well as verification of nuclear material in the States. The purpose of the activities, of course, includes detection of undeclared exports and imports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material. The Additional Protocol to the agreements between States and the IAEA for the application of safeguards requires to the States to declare the exports and imports information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material corresponding to the export control list that is established by the nuclear suppliers group. The Additional Protocol also insists the IAEA's right to access to the location identified by the State to resolve a question related to the declarations. Recently, the IAEA detected the black market group of the sensitive materials, equipment and technologies relevant to the nuclear proliferation through the safeguards activities to Iran and Libya. International community stated deeply concerns to the indecent facts. This paper would discuss and propose the supplemental strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime by effective combination of the safeguards activities under additional protocol and the export control regime. (author)

  6. Export policy and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.A.V.

    1978-01-01

    Developing countries with a nuclear programme are about a dozen according to information obtained by IAEA. They are a group hostile to any restriction imposed on nuclear technology export and consider that such restriction is contrary to the global concept of North/South co-operation which provides for transfer of advanced technology. In particular, they object to the fact that nuclear weapon states make use of Article 4 of the NPT. Industrialised countries are required to keep a balance between a regular and stable supply system and the assurance that exported nuclear installations and materials are placed under international control according to the IAEA Safeguards. (NEA) [fr

  7. Nuclear export policy and regulation for non-proliferation: Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boulanger, Werner.

    1978-01-01

    The nuclear export policy of the Federal Republic of Germany complies with the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Already in 1967 the Federal Government stated in a Peace Note that no export was authorised to countries (outside Euratom) which did not comply with the IAEA Safeguards. In the bilateral agreement the Federal Republic signed with Brasil in 1975, emphasis was put on international safeguards and the control exercised on exported materials to avoid any diversion for military purposes. (NEA) [fr

  8. Nuclear exports and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courteix, Simone.

    1978-01-01

    Increased preoccupation in present times with the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the multiplication of international agreements such as the Non-proliferation Treaty and in the strengthening of consultations between industrialised countries (London Club). After analysing the IAEA safeguards system under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its shortcomings both technically and otherwise, the author considers how this situation can be remedied in the light of the London Agreements and in view of the position of the main countries concerned. The annex to the book contains the texts of many international agreements and relevant national regulations as well as nuclear policy statements. It also includes a detailed bibliograaphy. (NEA) [fr

  9. The new US nuclear non-proliferation and export policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Welck, S. von.

    1981-01-01

    The future American nuclear non-proliferation and export policy will be determined chiefly by three elements: (1) Adherence to the former objective of nuclear non-proliferation. (2) A large and varied assortment of old and new tools for implementing this goal. (3) Much more differentiation in applying these tools in the light of the reliability, with respect to non-proliferation policy, of the respective partner. Consequently, it would make little sense for the new Administration to force upon allied industrialized countries, whose nuclear technologies are at the same level as that of the United States, restrictive rules on reprocessing and breeder technology. The new measures designed to curb proliferation are especially meant to destroy motivations that could cause states to own nuclear explosives. This also applies to the removal of economic motivations. (orig.) [de

  10. Uranium enrichment export control guide: Gaseous diffusion

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1989-09-01

    This document was prepared to serve as a guide for export control officials in their interpretation, understanding, and implementation of export laws that relate to the Zangger International Trigger List for gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment process components, equipment, and materials. Particular emphasis is focused on items that are especially designed or prepared since export controls are required for these by States that are party to the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

  11. Export control training - Experience and pedagogical lessons learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heine, P.

    2013-01-01

    This series of slides draws a picture of the training offerings in export control within the framework of the International Nonproliferation Export Control Program. These courses are organized around 3 topics: licensing, enterprise outreach and enforcement. There are about 10 courses, a brief content of their curricula is given. The goal of these courses is not to make participants into export control experts or trade analysts, but enable them to properly take export controls into account. (A.C.)

  12. Export of nuclear equipment and materials and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courteix, Simone.

    1977-01-01

    The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of great concern today despite the entry into force in the early '70s of the NPT. To master civilian nuclear technology implies the ability to develop nuclear explosive devices; therefore in recent years contacts have strengthened between countries exporting nuclear equipment, specially in the frame of the 'London Club' so as to ensure that their exports will not result in disseminating nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  13. The NPT and nuclear export controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berkhout, F.

    1992-01-01

    Controls on the export of nuclear materials and technology were originally imposed in wartime and under the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to restrict the supply of uranium. But there was no international agreement until the mid 1960s; before that the United States, Canada, France and the Soviet Union imposed export controls on a national basis. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially Articles I-IV, set out the first world wide controls on the nuclear trade. These articles are explained in the context of the relevant Committees (the Zangger Committee, the Committee on the Assurance of Supply, the National Export Committee and the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control) and Guidelines (the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation). Recent developments which have a bearing on nuclear trade, such as the single European market, the emergence of new supplies and the break-up of the Soviet Union, are considered. (UK)

  14. Nuclear export controls - Closing the gaps

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schmidt, Fritz W.

    2005-01-01

    Concerns over a nuclear 'black market' have focused international attention on the effectiveness of nuclear export controls. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has stated that the emergence of a multinational illicit network demonstrated the inadequacy of the present export control system, that international cooperation on export controls lay on informal arrangements that were not only not binding but also limited in membership, and that export control information was not systematically shared with the IAEA. This criticism, often heard on the political level, does not really do justice to the work of export control groups. The emergence of a multinational illicit network does not necessarily prove failures in export control systems. Criminal activities, by definition, try to circumvent existing rules and regulations, or they exploit the absence of such rules on State level. To fight such individual cases is not so much a task of regular export control systems, whose function lies primarily in establishing standards and procedures for export controls on State level, but rather the task for intelligence services and their international cooperation. The basis of the export control regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Export controls can - and do - play an important role in fostering this universality goal by demanding the implementation of internationally agreed security standards in recipient countries before export licenses are granted. Drawn from the deliberations in the NPT conferences, the current standards to be demanded as conditions of supply are the following: Safeguards, Physical Protection, National export control provisions. According to the NPT system, export controls require IAEA verification in the recipient country. In addition, export controls enable States to provide information to the IAEA on exports and imports as required by the Additional Protocol. The 2005 NPT Review Conference will be an opportunity to review developments

  15. Export Control in the AREVA Group

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zero, S.

    2013-01-01

    After the Second World War the nuclear technology was mostly considered inappropriate for the export. It remains strictly regulated today, but the development of the civil applications urged states to facilitate the peaceful uses while establishing a strict control in the domains of the internal security and the nuclear proliferation. AREVA decided to set up an Export Control program applied to all the products and in all the countries where the group operates. AREVA can export products or make transfer of technology considered as sensitive for the non-proliferation and the risks linked to the terrorism. This sensitiveness results from the nature of the products or from the country of destination and in certain cases both of them. AREVA has set up an Export Control program and an interactive e-learning training within the Group to make exports of sensitive products, raw materials and technologies more secure. The subject is rather complex, the regulations are constantly evolving, and becoming familiar with them is necessarily a gradual process, but it must be made in-depth, hence the idea of regular training sessions. The implementation of the Export Control in the AREVA Group declines in four fundamental stages: -) Policy and procedure; -) Appointment of Export Control Officers (ECO); -) Training; and -) Audit and Self Assessment. The training program is composed by the following elements: Ethics (Value Charter) of the Group, Non-proliferation, international regulations and more particularly those that are applicable in Europe (Germany and France) and in the United States. Particular attention is devoted to the Export Control practice in China, Japan and India. (A.C.)

  16. 78 FR 18814 - Amendment to the Export Administration Regulations: List of Items Classified Under Export Control...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-03-28

    ... Controls Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance by phone at (202) 482-3343 or by email... significant military or intelligence advantage to the United States. Immediate imposition of a license... accelerate orders of these items or attempt to have the items exported prior to the imposition of the control...

  17. Nuclear export criteria and controls in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shapar, H.K.

    1979-01-01

    The paper describes the export licensing procedure and the modifications made to it under the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) to achieve greater control over exports of nuclear material and facilities. Export licences from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are now required for certain items connected with nuclear plant construction and the procedure for obtaining the views of the Executive Branch have been formalised. The President is enabled to override the denial of an export licence by the NRC. Amongst the new criteria on the export licensing procedure added to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the NNPA provides that the IAEA Safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty are applicable to exported nuclear material or facilities, together with adequate physical protection measures. (NEA) [fr

  18. US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staats, E.B.

    1980-01-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm US reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonprofileration policies can influence export sales. Based on avavailable data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of US nuclear exports. However, US companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by US technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and complete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for US nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, US companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

  19. Nuclear export controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thorne, C.E.

    1999-01-01

    One approach to describing the multilateral nuclear export controls is to do it according to time. This led to an interesting discovery, i.e. multilateral export controls have been defined by four distinct periods, the forst two of abut five years each, the second two about twice as long. These time periods have another interesting property. The two suppliers groups, which we will discuss in detail, have alternated in dominance over nearly thirty years. After describing the historical developments, the status of the present situation in multilateral nuclear export controls is examined, with the strengths and weaknesses. The future of multilateral nuclear export controls and possible ways that might be taken are considered

  20. Development of Computer-Aided Learning Programs on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hyun Chul

    2011-01-01

    The fulfillment of international norms for nuclear nonproliferation is indispensable to the promotion of nuclear energy. The education and training for personnel and mangers related to the nuclear material are one of crucial factors to avoid unintended non-compliance to international norms. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been providing education and training on nuclear control as its legal duty. One of the legally mandatory educations is 'nuclear control education' performed since 2006 for the observation of the international norms on nuclear nonproliferation and the spread of the nuclear control culture. The other is 'physical protection education' performed since 2010 for maintaining the national physical protection regime effectively and the spread of the nuclear security culture. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. During the Summit, the South Korea was chosen to host the second Nuclear Summit in 2012. South Korean President announced that South Korea would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an international education and training center on nuclear security in 2014. KINAC is making a full effort to set up the center successfully. An important function of the center is education and training in the subjects of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, and nuclear export/import control. With increasing importance of education and training education on nuclear nonproliferation and control, KINAC has been developing computer-aided learning programs on nuclear nonproliferation and control to overcome the weaknesses in classroom educations. This paper shows two learning programs. One is an e-learning system on the nuclear nonproliferation and control and the other is a virtual reality program for training nuclear material accountancy inspection of light water reactor power plants

  1. Development of Computer-Aided Learning Programs on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Hyun Chul [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-10-15

    The fulfillment of international norms for nuclear nonproliferation is indispensable to the promotion of nuclear energy. The education and training for personnel and mangers related to the nuclear material are one of crucial factors to avoid unintended non-compliance to international norms. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been providing education and training on nuclear control as its legal duty. One of the legally mandatory educations is 'nuclear control education' performed since 2006 for the observation of the international norms on nuclear nonproliferation and the spread of the nuclear control culture. The other is 'physical protection education' performed since 2010 for maintaining the national physical protection regime effectively and the spread of the nuclear security culture. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. During the Summit, the South Korea was chosen to host the second Nuclear Summit in 2012. South Korean President announced that South Korea would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an international education and training center on nuclear security in 2014. KINAC is making a full effort to set up the center successfully. An important function of the center is education and training in the subjects of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, and nuclear export/import control. With increasing importance of education and training education on nuclear nonproliferation and control, KINAC has been developing computer-aided learning programs on nuclear nonproliferation and control to overcome the weaknesses in classroom educations. This paper shows two learning programs. One is an e-learning system on the nuclear nonproliferation and control and the other is a virtual reality program for training nuclear material accountancy inspection of light water

  2. Nuclear safeguards and export controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1994-01-01

    Precisely from the perspective of the two most important nonnuclear weapons states, Japan and Germany, the safeguards and arms control agendas have not been finally dealt with. Because of their central position in the nonproliferation regime as nuclear suppliers and states with large nuclear energy industries, both countries are compelled to take a leading role in pursuing future reforms. In the dialogue with the nonaligned, this leadership position is helped by their nonnuclear status. In fact, Japan and Germany have some interests in common with the nonaligned states, such as the expansion of safeguards in the nuclear weapons states. To be sure, both Japan and Germany will pursue such interests with due regard to the interests of their friends and allies. For Japan, maintaining a close relationship with the United States is as important as shaping viable relations with China. Initiatives and controversies on nuclear policy must be weighed against this interest. By the same token, Germany must take into account the dense network of relations with its allies and with Russia, in addition to the German-French friendship. This will always set limits to Germany's readiness to confront the nuclear weapons states on nuclear issues. This, however, does not mean that both countries must shut up when the P 5 speak. The nuclear weapons register and the extension of the ''erga omnes'' rule in export controls, for example, should not be relegated to the dustbin of history, just because some friendly nuclear powers don't like these ideas. (orig.)

  3. A Study on the Export Control System at KAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, I. C.; Lee, B. D.; Kim, H. J.; Kim, H. S.; Jung, J. A.

    2015-01-01

    The current non-proliferation regime requires strengthening the export control from Korea to foreign countries. This means that the ministries related to export control deeply emphasize the prohibition of the illegal proliferation in the domestic society as well as international society. The principle of export control for non-proliferation of WMD is to control the transfer of the strategic items/technology to the countries which intend to develop the WMD in accordance with the multilateral agreements of the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG), Wassenaar Agreement (WA), Austrian Group (AG) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Among them, export controls at KAERI are deeply related to the guidelines of the NSG, an international nuclear export control regime. Since the new concept of an export system was launched in Jan. 2014, KAERI needs to consider new approaches to meet the requirement of the revised domestic law and regulation. To cope with this environmental change, this paper suggests new approaches to effectively conduct the export control at KAERI

  4. The status and latest issues on KAERI export control implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hyun Sook; Park, Ho Jun; Kim, Hyun Jo; Ko, Han Suk; Lee, Byung Doo

    2010-01-01

    There are four informal non-proliferation arrangements which seek to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems and the transfer of conventional weapons and dual-use technologies. The four arrangements are Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) on export controls for conventional arms and dual use goods and technologies, Nuclear Supplies Group(NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) and Australia Group(AG) on chemical and biological weapons materials. ROK participates in four arrangements to seek to encourage responsible practice in the trade of strategic goods and technologies. It is achieved through the implementation of export control list. MKE Notification (Ministry of Knowledge Economy Notification No. 2009-250) specifies those items and technologies subject to control. In this paper, the status and latest issues on KAERI export control implementation are described

  5. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    DOE's nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities are defined by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). The Department's major responsibilities in this area are to: (1) provide technical assistance to the Department of State in negotiating agreements for civil cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other countries and international organizations; (2) join with other agencies to reach executive branch judgments with respect to the issuance of export licenses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (3) be responsible for processing subsequent arrangements with other agencies as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act; (4) control the distribution of special nuclear materials, components, equipment, and nuclear technology exports; (5) participate in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign governments and organizations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (6) act as a primary technical resource with respect to US participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency

  6. Nuclear export controls and the CTBT: Where we've been and challenges ahead - Views of an engineer

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lundy, A.S.

    1998-01-01

    The paper discusses the following topics: the importance of export controls; the uniqueness of nuclear weapons and their export control requirements; ''dual-use'' controls; and recent developments in nonproliferation beyond export control. Also discussed are some non-obvious challenges which include computer modeling and visualization, and fissile material availability and instant nukes. The author concludes by asking the Nuclear Suppliers Group to consider whether there are ways to make its controls more effective

  7. Nuclear export controls and the CTBT: Where we`ve been and challenges ahead -- Views of an engineer

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lundy, A.S.

    1998-09-01

    The paper discusses the following topics: the importance of export controls; the uniqueness of nuclear weapons and their export control requirements; ``dual-use`` controls; and recent developments in nonproliferation beyond export control. Also discussed are some non-obvious challenges which include computer modeling and visualization, and fissile material availability and instant nukes. The author concludes by asking the Nuclear Suppliers Group to consider whether there are ways to make its controls more effective.

  8. Robust Indicators of Nonproliferation Performance

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cowan, Mara R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kurzrok, Andrew J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-02-13

    Understanding how the nuclear industry may benefit from self-regulation is closely linked with understanding how to report compliance activities for nonproliferation and export control objectives, as well as how to distinguish high and low compliance performance. Drawing on the corporate sustainability reporting model, nuclear and dual-use commodities industries can frame socially responsible self-regulatory activities to distinguish themselves as good nonproliferators.

  9. Export controls on high technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frank, N.K.

    1987-01-01

    A overview of the Export Administration Act of 1979 and subsequent regulations and amendments focuses on how licensing requirements and restrictions against boycott affect high technology exports. The purpose of these controls is to limit the export of technology with possible military applications, as well as to advance US foreign policy and protect the economy without imposing too great a restriction on the principles of free trade. Thus, the act encompasses political, economic, and security goals. Problems of predictability arise when embargoes or other controls are imposed for political or foreign policy reasons without regard to economic impacts. Amendments have attempted to streamline the exporting process, particularly in the area of computer and software licensing.

  10. Development of Export Control Comprehensive Management Model for Nuclear Power Plants and Others Projects

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Chansuh; Seo, Hana; Choi, Sundo [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation And Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    It is required that there are lots of managements of care and concern if the project contains strategic items such as NPPs. The Korean nuclear industry and its related companies, such as the Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP), are promoting greater exports of NPPs. It is likely that Korea will export more this technology to newcomer states in the future. As a result, the ROK has been improving its export control management system for NPPs. In keeping with this national effort, Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation And Control (KINAC) developed comprehensive export control management model for NPPs and other projects, in preparation for this projected growth in the industry. This model also applies to the nuclear export case of the UAE, aims to manage the project from bidding to the end of the contract. The recent Export Licensing of Nuclear Facility Technology was reflected in the Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items in January 2014. Through this license, the large-scale project legislation framework was established. It can also minimize nonproliferation concerns of the international community through strict management. It is expected that the Korea will be able to enhance transparency and secure the nuclear use, while meeting nonproliferation purpose.

  11. Development of Export Control Comprehensive Management Model for Nuclear Power Plants and Others Projects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Chansuh; Seo, Hana; Choi, Sundo

    2014-01-01

    It is required that there are lots of managements of care and concern if the project contains strategic items such as NPPs. The Korean nuclear industry and its related companies, such as the Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP), are promoting greater exports of NPPs. It is likely that Korea will export more this technology to newcomer states in the future. As a result, the ROK has been improving its export control management system for NPPs. In keeping with this national effort, Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation And Control (KINAC) developed comprehensive export control management model for NPPs and other projects, in preparation for this projected growth in the industry. This model also applies to the nuclear export case of the UAE, aims to manage the project from bidding to the end of the contract. The recent Export Licensing of Nuclear Facility Technology was reflected in the Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items in January 2014. Through this license, the large-scale project legislation framework was established. It can also minimize nonproliferation concerns of the international community through strict management. It is expected that the Korea will be able to enhance transparency and secure the nuclear use, while meeting nonproliferation purpose

  12. An evaluation of Kazakhstan nuclear export control system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yeligbayeva, G.; Masenov, Ch.

    2002-01-01

    A system to control the export nuclear materials and technologies is a natural part of creating a self-sustaining government. The government of Kazakhstan has made a great deal of progress in building such a system. Control of export and import of nuclear materials and technologies and dual-use materials, related to nuclear activity, became one of the important part of mechanism of Non-Proliferation conditions realization in Kazakhstan. The system of export control has developed well over the 10 years. Kazakhstan is in the midst of a long process of building a functional export control system consistent with World standards. The state system of export control currently exists in Kazakhstan on the legislative base, and is based on efficient cooperation of the KAEC with a number of competent state bodies (Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Customs Committee) each of them has its own specific functions, duties and rights. The export is carried out using licenses, issued by the Ministry of Economy of the RK, according to applications of certain standard which are previously agreed with the KAEC under decision of the RK Government. The KAEC, acting on the base of export control principles and observance of international obligations on non-proliferation matter, makes decisions, only after thorough evaluation of ways of export and reliability of an end-user of the commodity, to agree the application for a license. The most fully developed aspect is the licensing process. General politics of export regulation in Kazakhstan are based on normative acts and rules, which are wholly appropriate (complementary) to the managing principles of nuclear export. There exists a full legal basis for the licensing system. But the process is going, some provisions is changing: in 2000 Kazakhstan corrected the export control law and approved the national control list very similar with EU control list, in 2002 the rules of the process of licensing the export and import

  13. Arms control, nonproliferation, and US national security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1985-01-01

    The continuation of the arms race and the failure of arms control and disarmament negotiations lend support to the belief that US and Soviet power, prestige, and security depend upon nuclear weapons. Therefore, the argument goes, the non-nuclear-weapon states (particularly those that are not allied with nuclear-weapon states and do not share their nuclear shield) may conclude that they would be well served by possession of these weapons. In this sense, the failure of nuclear arms reductions could create incentives for further proliferation

  14. Non-proliferation and the control of atomic energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1977-01-01

    The non-proliferation problem has never ceased to haunt and to influence those responsible for the development of atomic energy. During and after the Second World War, Anglo-American co-operation was reflected in restrictions on the exchange of enrichment and reprocessing know-how. Between 1945 and 1955, the Anglo-Saxon powers continued with the policy of secrecy and uranium monopoly decided on in 1943 at the Quebec summit conference. Starting in 1955, the failure of this policy led - at the suggestion of the United States of America - to a freer flow of information and to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with its safeguards, which permitted widespread application of the policy of technical assistance subject to controls and widespread commerce in research and power reactors - mainly fuelled with enriched uranium and manufactured in the USA. There followed periods characterized by general legal blocks, with two unilateral renunciation treaties - the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, covering non-underground tests, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1968, covering nuclear explosive devices and the entire fuel cycle. The Indian atomic explosion and the acceleration of nuclear programmes owing to the oil crisis prompted - in 1974 - efforts by supplier countries to limit the transfer of sensitive technology and the possession of plants capable of producing substances which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; the USA has even proposed the curtailment of plutonium extraction and of breeder construction, although these are considered by many countries to be essential to the independence of their energy development programmes. This policy of reserving the sensitive stages of the fuel cycles to a few advanced countries and the questioning of existing nuclear agreements have created, in the relations between supplier and recipient countries, a regrettable intensification of the distrust which must be dispelled

  15. U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm U.S. reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonproliferation policies can influence export sales. Based on available data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of U.S. nuclear exports. However, U.S. companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by U.S. technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and compete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for U.S. nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, U.S. companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

  16. Developing Effluent Analysis Technologies to Support Nonproliferation Initiatives, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies, Third quarter 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schubert, S A; Staehle, G; Alonzo, G M [eds.

    1995-01-01

    This issue provides an overview of the Effluent Research Program of the DOE Office of Research and Development, highlighting a number of representative projects within this program in support of nonproliferation initiatives. Technologies reported include portable instruments for on-site inspections, standoff detectors, fieldable, real-time instruments, field collection techniques, and ultrasensitive laboratory techniques.

  17. 78 FR 45168 - Acquisition Regulations: Export Control

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-26

    ... DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 48 CFR Parts 925, 952 and 970 RIN 1991-AB99 Acquisition Regulations: Export... (78 FR 35195) to amend the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) to add export control... ``DEAR: Export Control and RIN 1991-AB99,'' by any of the following methods: Federal eRulemaking Portal...

  18. Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pregenzer, Arian

    2014-01-01

    Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters worldwide provide significant benefits to global public health. PMID:24524501

  19. Computer Language Choices in Arms Control and Nonproliferation Regimes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, G K

    2005-01-01

    The U.S. and Russian Federation continue to make substantive progress in the arms control and nonproliferation transparency regimes. We are moving toward an implementation choice for creating radiation measurement systems that are transparent in both their design and in their implementation. In particular, the choice of a programming language to write software for such regimes can decrease or significantly increase the costs of authentication. In this paper, we compare procedural languages with object-oriented languages. In particular, we examine the C and C++ languages; we compare language features, code generation, implementation details, and executable size and demonstrate how these attributes aid or hinder authentication and backdoor threats. We show that programs in lower level, procedural languages are more easily authenticated than are object-oriented ones. Potential tools and methods for authentication are covered. Possible mitigations are suggested for using object-oriented programming languages

  20. 78 FR 35195 - Acquisition Regulations: Export Control

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-12

    ... DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 48 CFR Parts 925, 952, and 970 RIN 1991-AB99 Acquisition Regulations: Export... Energy (DOE) is proposing to amend the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) to add export... comments, identified by ``DEAR: Export Control and RIN 1991-AB99,'' by any of the following methods...

  1. The European dimension in non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krause, J.

    1996-01-01

    Europe was for decades the focal point of efforts to prevent or constrain nuclear proliferation and the first region in which non-proliferation efforts failed. Paper deals with current proliferation problems in Europe, namely, diversion of weapons, diversion from dismantling, production over-capacity, security concerns. Legal instruments against proliferation in Europe described here include development of international norms; instruments of security assurance and cooperation; disarmament assistance; fissile material management; assistance in creating export control systems; improving and harmonizing export controls for dual-purpose items. Problems in implementing non-proliferation instruments are described separately

  2. The emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potter, W.C.

    1990-01-01

    The number of states capable of exporting nuclear material, technology, equipment, and services is large and growing. Once confined primarily to states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the list of actual and potential nuclear suppliers now includes many countries that do not subscribe to the NPT or to other international nuclear export control agreements. Although international control accords---such as the Nuclear Exporters' (Zangger) Committee and the London Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines---do not prohibit the export of sensitive nuclear materials and equipment, they do reduce the risks of proliferation by imposing international safeguards as a condition for export. The purpose of this book---the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on the emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation---is to remedy, at least in part, this data deficiency

  3. Nuclear power, nuclear exports and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hildenbrand, G.

    1977-01-01

    Developed and developing countries alike unfortunately have no other options in replacing oil in electricity generation than to use coal or nuclear energy. As far as the supplier countries are concerned, there is no doubt that nobody is interested in adding to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the future electricity requirement in the developing countries, especially the need for nuclear power plants, represents a considerable market in the medium and long term which the supplier countries cannot simply ignore because they must seek to secure their export shares in order to protect jobs at home. For the receiver countries it is a matter of principle to achieve the highest possible degree of independence in energy generation so as to be able to guarantee continuity of supply. The interest in building up national fuel cycle activities is also closely linked with the creation of jobs in the receiver countries and with the efforts of these countries to straighten out their balance of payments situation. (orig.) [de

  4. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 742 - Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nonproliferation of Chemical and...—Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Note: Exports and reexports of items in performance of.... Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on...

  5. US legislative proposals for nuclear export controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donnelly, W.H.

    1977-01-01

    Some of the topics covered are: Congress' perception of proliferation; completed legislation for non-proliferation; partially complete legislative initiatives in the 94th Congress; non-proliferation measures defeated or vetoed; and legislation for non-proliferation in the 95th Congress

  6. Role of Non-Government Organizations in strengthening Kazakstan nuclear export control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tazhibaeva, L.; Prokhodtseva, T.

    2002-01-01

    Non-governmental organizations (NGO) are the structures that were born by the time, the time when deep changes in our society led us to new trends in the all spheres of society development, to new decisions and, as a consequence, to new structural findings that where able to govern, to support and put into reality the new ideas the could not be inserted in the structure assemblies of the former society. All non-governmental organizations in Kazakhstan are younger than ten years old, but they already could be considered highly experienced, for intensity of their activity is rather high. The main advantages of NGOs are flexibility and independent source of ideas, basic data and policy assessment. There are several non-government organizations that are working in the field of non-proliferation and export control. Kazakhstan Nuclear Technology Safety Center (NTSC) is among them. Non-proliferation and export control is only a small part of activity that NTSC is involved in. Non-governmental organizations could be of several types: NGOs that are affiliated with university or institute, independent associations, quasi-governmental structures and various foundations. NTSC complementing efforts of Kazakhstan Atomic Energy Committee (KAEC) in the field of non-proliferation and export control. The activity of NTSC in the field of non-proliferation includes: Holding conferences, seminars and workshops; Creating databases and reports; Develop proposal for legislation; Provide specialized training; Analyze data. NTSC is involved in a number of projects devoted to non-proliferation and export control. The following projects are supported by the US Department of Energy cooperation program on nuclear export controls for Russia and the Newly Independent States: System to review Kazakhstan exports (STROKE); Computerization of historical licensing data; Export control reference materials for Kazakhstan organizations; Additional Protocol. STROKE is a technical analysis database for

  7. Nuclear export controls and nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevini, F.

    2013-01-01

    The export control of dual use goods has developed since the early seventies to counter nuclear proliferation. The paper provides an overview of dual-use export control issues also in relation with the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which requires States to provide declarations of the export of the controlled items listed in its Annex II, derived from the Nuclear Suppliers Group Trigger list. Recommendations for improvement are proposed. On the EU level, the paper summarises the framework set by the European Council Regulation 428/2009, requiring Member States to impose control on exports, brokering and transit of dual use goods. The Regulation includes the so-called 'EU dual-use control list' integrating the lists of dual-use items defined by the international regimes and requires also the control on intangible technology transfers as foreseen by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. ESARDA has recently launched a new sub-Working Group on export control, which raised large interest and may evolve to a full-fledged working group. Export control may provide an opportunity of technical collaboration between ESARDA and INMM. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  8. The National Implementation of Nuclear Export Controls: Developing a Best Practices Model

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Viski, Andrea [European University Institute, Department of Law, Badia Fiesolana, S.Domenico di Fiesole, Firenze (Italy)

    2011-12-15

    The nuclear renaissance promises significant benefits to the international community, but also raises security challenges, particularly relating to the trade of nuclear materials and equipment. The objective of this paper is to examine how supply-side non-proliferation efforts can be strengthened by developing a best practices model for national nuclear export control implementation. In order to achieve this goal, nuclear export control measures identified by the 1540 Committee will be used as a framework from which a best practices model can be formed. Such a model concentrates specifically on national legislation and enforcement measures delineated by the Committee in order to bring countries in accordance with international law. Developing a best practices model seeks to deliver an ideal process for national export control law actualization in order to encourage the peaceful development of nuclear energy and develop the infrastructure and framework for precluding nuclear proliferation.

  9. Nuclear exports. Parliamentary control and confidentiality

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feldmann, Ulrike

    2015-01-01

    With its decision taken on 21. October 2014 (Az.: 2 BvE 5/11) the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) decided during court proceedings between administrative bodies on the scope and limits of the parliamentary right of information. Even though the proceeding did not deal with nuclear exports but arm exports, foreign trade law, however, does not only designate an export licence obligation for military weapons but also for so called dual-use goods meaning goods, which can be used both for friendly as well as for military purposes. The export of these goods requires according to the so-called Dual-Use Regulation (EG) 428/2009 a licence. Annex I category 0 of the regulation (EG) 428/2009 lists a variety of nuclear materials, plants and equipment items for which this licence applies. In the same manner as arm exports, also exports of nuclear dual-use goods are being discussed in a special cabinet committee, the Federal Security Council (BSR), which shall coordinate cross-departmentally the German security and defence policy under consideration of economic interests and which categorises its results, according to the rules of procedure, as confidential. Also legally not regulated but common ''preliminary enquiries'' at the responsible Federal Ministry or rather Federal Office of Economics and Export Control by companies which plan an export and want to affirm the general approval for their export business prior to conclusion of contract take not only place for arm exports but also for nuclear dual-use goods. The decision by the Federal Constitutional Court can be applied to consultations about the authorisation of nuclear dual-use goods.

  10. A Study on the cooperation policy in multilateral nuclear control regimes and the advancing of national export control system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, K. B.; Yang, M. H.; Lee, H. M.; Lee, K. S.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Kim, J. S.

    2004-08-01

    This study carried out the analysis of trends of the multilateral nuclear control in four aspects. First, this study analyzes the past trends of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the NPT, the IAEA safeguards system, the international nuclear export control regime and the physical protection of nuclear materials. Second, this study establishes the multilateral cooperation strategies for the effective cooperation in the process of strengthening the nuclear control regimes. Third, this study reviews the major agenda of nuclear control regimes and establishes national positions on each agenda. Fourth, this study also analyzes outstanding issues in nuclear control regimes and derives some factors to reflect national nuclear control system

  11. Import/Export Control for ITT in KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Sung Ho; Kim, In Cheol; Kim, Hyun Jo; Kim, Hyun Sook; Kim, Mun Ja [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-05-15

    The representatives of I/E (Import/Export) control in international society are NSG of nuclear fields, MTCR of missile fields, WA of conventional weapon fields and AG of bio-chemical fields. One of recent issues of the international I/E organizations is to strengthen ITT (Intangible Technology Transfer or Intangible Transfer of Technology). According to the ITT policy, ROK governments reinforced domestic I/E control for the non-proliferation of WMD through the Foreign Trade Law recently modified. There are international transfers of various kinds of items and technologies produced in KAERI as an integrated R and D institute in nuclear fields. In this study, KAERI is to develop a reasonable implementation methodology for the establishment of KAERI I/E control system to meet the requirements of the law. The main purpose of methodology development is to establish a frame of I/E control including ITT in KAERI. According to the methodology, KAERI held seminars twice for the public relations and education and prepared the regulation for I/E control. At present, KAERI is making a provision to check whether each R and D activity is related to the strategic item or technology. In the near future, KAERI will make efforts to get the CP license for effective implementation of I/E control of dual-use item/technology and follow up the changes of I/E control in nuclear field.

  12. Cooperative Remote Monitoring, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: Fourth quarter 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alonzo, G M [ed.

    1995-01-01

    The DOE`s Cooperative Remote Monitoring programs integrate elements from research and development and implementation to achieve DOE`s objectives in arms control and nonproliferation. The contents of this issue are: cooperative remote monitoring--trends in arms control and nonproliferation; Modular Integrated Monitoring System (MIMS); Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring Systems (ATMS); Tracking and Nuclear Materials by Wide-Area Nuclear Detection (WAND); Cooperative Monitoring Center; the International Remote Monitoring Project; international US and IAEA remote monitoring field trials; Project Dustcloud: monitoring the test stands in Iraq; bilateral remote monitoring: Kurchatov-Argonne-West Demonstration; INSENS Sensor System Project.

  13. Arms control and nonproliferation technologies. First quarter 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Staehle, G; Alonzo, G M; Sanford, N M [eds.

    1995-01-01

    This first quarter issue for 1995 highlights the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. The SBIR program is managed by the DOE`s Basic Energy Sciences program within the Office of Energy Research. Each year, the SBIR program solicits research ideas of interest to the DOE. Articles contained in this issue include: The Small Business Innovation Research Program supported by the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security; Automated cueing to man-made objects via multispectral image; Security systems get smart with advanced processing and thermal imaging; A breakthrough in cooling system technology; The APSTNG neutron probe; Lithium-doped fullerene neutron detector; Miniature GC-MS for on-site chemical analysis; and Winner of Sandia President`s Quality Award.

  14. Perspectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koungou, Leon

    2004-01-01

    To join traditional methods and new approaches of 'non-proliferation'. This is a technical method and the best way to fight against 'non-proliferation' which is facing few preoccupations: knowledge's disseminations; technologies; equipments and weapons that should be stopped. As it's important to note the return of nuclear danger as the end of confrontation between west-east which should be reduce. As the adaptation of mechanisms is necessary today, as it is important to react about states' incitations to violate international engagement of non-proliferation. Areas control allows finding out change and evolution, but more insufficient. Functional difficulties show that the IAEA (International Agency of Atomic Energy) does not work good. Safeguard system does not allow to respect 'non-proliferation' engagements; for instance 'junkies states' that they cannot dissuade traditional methods. The fight of 'non-proliferation' shows new progresses with fearing methods of prevention actions and heaviest international controls of exportation. The target of this is very ambitious. This new method is self-successful because it contributes to re-enforce international security when defeating acquisition of nuclear and mass destruction weapons by non-states factors. Therefore non-proliferation regime and especially 'non-proliferation treaty' remains delicate as long as some militaries state such USA will reject their 'non-proliferation' engagement. (author) [fr

  15. 48 CFR 1825.1103-70 - Export control.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Export control. 1825.1103...-70 Export control. (a) Background. (1) NASA contractors and subcontractors are subject to U.S. export... 120 through 130, and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 CFR parts 730 through 799. The...

  16. Challenges to nuclear export controls today

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; Sevini, F.; Janssens, W.; Michel, Q.

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation programs are potentially inter-twinned, which is a point to be taken into account when analysing the development of civil nuclear energy, both domestically and as foreign investment. International agreements ensure that the adhering countries fulfil their obligations and do not abuse civil nuclear programs for the production of nuclear weapons. Uranium enrichment is the process currently most focused on in this respect by recent news and recent technological and commercial developments. But also the so-called reactor-based pathway, with extraction of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel by reprocessing remains in the spotlight of inspectors. Two of the main and complementary pillars on which the prevention of such diversion relies, are Strategic Export Control and International Safeguards. Strategic export control is a key barrier against nuclear proliferation. In many countries including the EU, it is set by a legal framework, envisaging implementation, enforcement and prosecution. The goods that can exported only with authorisations are those identified by the international export control regimes; primarily the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the case of nuclear items. It is complemented by nuclear safeguards measures, and especially in the past few years, by the IAEA State Level concept, which looks at the overall country's potential, including its industrial structure to derive conclusions on the absence of undeclared activities. However, the strict control of goods and knowledge is a moving target, since technological developments, globalisation and the intensifying exchange of information via the worldwide web offer increasing opportunities to proliferators to acquire sensitive items and competencies, and create bigger challenges to enforcement, calling for new responses. Research and development programmes must be directed towards supporting the adaptation of current proliferation containment systems to these new

  17. Export control guide: Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and preparation of plutonium metal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-10-01

    The international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), states in Article III, paragraph 2(b) that open-quotes Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide . . . equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.close quotes This guide was prepared to assist export control officials in the interpretation, understanding, and implementation of export laws and controls relating to the international Trigger List for irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, components, and materials. The guide also contains information related to the production of plutonium metal. Reprocessing and its place in the nuclear fuel cycle are described briefly; the standard procedure to prepare metallic plutonium is discussed; steps used to prepare Trigger List controls are cited; descriptions of controlled items are given; and special materials of construction are noted. This is followed by a comprehensive description of especially designed or prepared equipment, materials, and components of reprocessing and plutonium metal processes and includes photographs and/or pictorial representations. The nomenclature of the Trigger List has been retained in the numbered sections of this document for clarity

  18. Nuclear technology and the export control laws

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Munroe, J.L.; Pankratz, M.C.; Hogsett, V.H.; Lundy, A.S.

    1988-01-01

    Three basic US laws regulate the export of commodities, services, and technical data. People working in nuclear fields need to know of these laws and their impact on professional endeavors. Export of technical data means the communication of any information by oral, written, or any other means to foreign nationals within or outside the US. The medium for the communication may be a model, blueprint, sketch, or any other device that can convey information. If the data relates to items on one of the control lists, a license must be sought from the appropriated federal agency. The Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), though not itself a control list, plays a major role in determining what technical data will require a validated license. The US Department of Energy (DOE), through Technical Working Gorup (TWG) 11, is responsible for the Nuclear Technology chapter of the MCTL. TWG 11 also prepares the Nuclear Technology Reference Book (NTRB), a classified guide to sensitive nuclear technology

  19. NPT, export controls and nuclear trade

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pande, Savita

    1997-01-01

    Nuclear trade has by and large remained unhampered vis-a-vis both the NPT as well as export control regulations. The NPT rules are regarded as insufficient, the guidelines appear to contravene the spirit of cooperation in trade and development between suppliers and recipients and there is no agreement among leading suppliers themselves on what constitutes the proper conduct of trade. Export control regimes are more or less too informal to be able to be implemented. The supplier states have to invariably depend on national legislations which again vary from country to country. The only common formal basis on which action can be taken is, therefore, the NPT, its loopholes notwithstanding. The idea of transparency, and supplier-recipient dialogue continues to be a myth and will continue to be so long as these regimes remain discriminatory, so long as some nations are more powerful than others by virtue of retaining nuclear weapons and superiority in nuclear technology and trade

  20. Political implications of US nuclear-export-policy development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson-Freese, J.S.

    1981-01-01

    There has been a great deal of international debate regarding how effective strict export controls on nuclear-energy supplies are toward a non-proliferation goal. With the Carter Administration, the debate was heightened by a new, more-vigorous US nuclear-export policy, much of which was codified by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). Because of the US position in both the international non-proliferation regime and nuclear export market, the NNPA has had far-reaching consequences. The thesis of this paper is that a nuclear-export policy that fails to consider its short-term ramifications, as the NNPA has been accused of, will be self-defeating. If the US wants a viable worldwide nuclear non-proliferation policy, it must first direct its efforts toward building a domestic non-proliferation consensus, and then worldwide, rather than first setting a highly controversial policy and expecting other nations to fall into line. This work provides a comprehensive case study of US nuclear-export policy between the years 1976 to 1980 in support of the thesis. Further, the behavior and impact of the interest groups which seem to shape US nuclear-export policies is examined, and recommendations made regarding the role of groups in nuclear policy-making and implementation. Finally, recommendations are made regarding non-proliferation policy for the future, as it relates to nuclear exports

  1. Nuclear arbitration: Interpreting non-proliferation agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tzeng, Peter

    2015-01-01

    At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements. These agreements include, inter alia, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements.1 States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, commentators have proposed various enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The inconvenient truth, however, is that states are generally unwilling to consent to enforcement mechanisms concerning issues as critical to national security as nuclear non-proliferation.3 This article suggests an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem: interpretation mechanisms. Although an interpretation mechanism does not have the teeth of an enforcement mechanism, it can induce compliance by providing an authoritative interpretation of a legal obligation. Interpretation mechanisms would help solve the non-compliance problem because, as this article shows, in many cases of alleged non-compliance with a non-proliferation agreement, the fundamental problem has been the lack of an authoritative interpretation of the agreement, not the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, this article proposes arbitration as the proper interpretation mechanism for non-proliferation agreements. It advocates the establishment of a 'Nuclear Arbitration Centre' as an independent branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommends the gradual introduction of arbitration clauses into the texts of non-proliferation agreements. Section I begins with a discussion of international agreements in general and the importance of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section II then discusses nuclear non-proliferation agreements and their lack of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section III examines seven case studies of alleged non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements in order to show that the main problem in many cases

  2. Competitiveness, export control and export promotion of dual-use goods. European and German balancing exercises

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feldmann, Ulrike

    2014-01-01

    The EU Commission Communication of 24 April 2014 to the Council and the European Parliament ''The review of export control policy: Ensuring Security and Competitiveness in a changing world'' as well as the increasingly number of inquiries and applications to the German Federal Government (e.g. the rejection of Hermes guarantees and state funding of nuclear export and termination of bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear technologies) once again reason to discuss the current tension between the principle of free movement of goods, competitiveness and export promotion on the one hand and the export control on the other.

  3. A Study on Improvement of Export Control law's understanding for nuclear control items' exporters in Rep. of Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lim, Dong Hyuk; Choi, Sun Do; Yang, Seung Hyo

    2011-01-01

    According to export of UAE commercial reactor and JRTR(Jordan Research and Training Reactor) in 2009, Korea's international prestige has enhanced and it has been more important for researcher in charge of export control to understand and carry out duties on export control by obeying Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) Guidelines. Currently, the NSG tries to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by harmonising export control systems of participating countries in relation to trade with nuclear commodities and nuclear-related dual-use materials, equipment, software and technology. In addition, through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports, the NSG aims to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field is not hindered unjustly in the process. However, there is still not a little confusion of export businesses owing to lack of understanding of nuclear items in Korea. Therefore, by correctly understanding export control systems, permits and licenses, ITT and persistingly communicating with export businesses, Researchers in charge of export control are able to eliminate confusion of production businesses regarding export and establish a export control culture

  4. Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doyle, James E.; Meek, Elizabeth

    2009-01-01

    The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the

  5. Military Technology and Conventional Weapons Export Controls: The Wassenaar Arrangement

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Grimmett, Richard F

    2006-01-01

    This report provides background on the Wassenaar Arrangement, which was formally established in July 1996 as a multilateral arrangement aimed at controlling exports of conventional weapons and related...

  6. Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and

  7. Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.

    2009-01-01

    nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are

  8. 77 FR 37523 - Proposed Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: Implementation of Export Control...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-21

    ...), respectively, that would implement various aspects of what has become known as the Export Control Reform... spirit and substance. BIS issued a notice soliciting public comment on streamlining its regulations...

  9. 77 FR 22191 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Export Control Classification Number...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-04-13

    ..., Director, Office of National Security and Technology Transfer Controls, by phone at (202) 482-0092 or by... Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Inventions and patents, Research science and technology. 15 CFR...

  10. EXPORT CONTROLS: Change in Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two Sensitive Dual-Use Items

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Spencer, F

    1997-01-01

    This report examines the jurisdiction shift of two items, previously controlled by the State Department to the Department of Commerce, and the implications of this change to export licensing jurisdiction...

  11. Four decades of living with the genie: United States nuclear export policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kramish, A.

    1983-01-01

    The subject is discussed as follows: general introduction (examples of complex nature of nuclear trade); non-proliferation policy - the beginnings (early US action to control dealings with other countries); the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (formulation of US policy on nuclear trade; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation)); the Symington and Glenn Amendments (US legislation to control trade with other countries); the Export-Import Bank Act (US legislation for the same purpose as above); the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the Reagan Policy (US present policy to support IAEA safeguards and Non-Proliferation Treaty); future prospects. (U.K.)

  12. Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration

  13. The nonproliferation predicament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1985-01-01

    This book presents papers on the non-proliferation policy being advocated by the U.S. Topics considered include political aspects, proliferation, national security, government policies, NATO, arms control, nuclear disarmament, the balance of power, U.S. foreign policy, dealing with the problem countries, international cooperation, the nuclear marketplace, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, legislation, congressional interest and input, ethical aspects, military strategy, public opinion, and terrorist groups

  14. Implementation of the Nuclear Export Control at KAERI

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hyun-Jo; Lee, Byung-Doo; Lee, Sung-Ho

    2006-01-01

    Korea has joined multilateral export control regimes which include Wassenaar Arrangement(WA), Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) and Australian Group(AG), and their guideline and control lists are reflected in domestic legislation. Also, Catch-all control entered into force on 1 January 2003 in Korea. The frequency of the exports of product as a result of R and D and cooperation with other countries has been increased at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). Therefore, this report describes the implementation status of a nuclear export control at KAERI and points out the practical issues

  15. Nuclear non-proliferation and arms control: Are we making progress? 7 November 2005, Washington, DC, Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    In recent years, four developments have radically altered the security landscape - the emergence of clandestine nuclear supply networks, the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technology, the efforts by more countries to acquire nuclear weapons, and the declared ambition of terrorists to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. Four 'yardsticks' are proposed against which to gauge the IAEA's recent performance and to set future goals: (1) the effectiveness of nuclear verification; (2) the control of sensitive nuclear technology; (3) the protection of nuclear material; and (4) compliance with commitments. The effectiveness of nuclear verification depends on the extend of access to information and locations in a given country and inspections can only verify what countries declare. The expanded access provided by the Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements enables the Agency to verify possible undeclared activities however both safeguards agreements are focused on nuclear material and therefore the Agency's authority to investigate possible parallel weaponization activity is limited. In addition only 70 countries have the additional protocol on force. A dditional transparency measures' may be required. The IAEA is exploring innovative technologies (such as noble gas sampling) for detecting undeclared nuclear facilities and activities. The Agency has yet to establish a mechanism under which states systematically share information with the IAEA on the export of sensitive nuclear material and certain technology. The control of sensitive nuclear technology focuses on the control over activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. A group of international experts proposes to 1) provide assurance of supply of reactor technology and nuclear fuel; 2) accept a time-limited moratorium (of perhaps 5-10 years) on new uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities - at the very least for countries that do not currently have such technologies; 3

  16. Hydrology and landscape structure control subalpine catchment carbon export

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vincent Jerald Pacific

    2009-01-01

    Carbon export from high elevation ecosystems is a critical component of the global carbon cycle. Ecosystems in northern latitudes have become the focus of much research due to their potential as large sinks of carbon in the atmosphere. However, there exists limited understanding of the controls of carbon export from complex mountain catchments due to strong spatial and...

  17. Export Controls: Controls Over the Export Licensing Process for Chemical and Biological Items

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2005-01-01

    .... foreign policy should read this report. The report discusses the effectiveness of the DoD review process for export license applications and updates to Federal export regulations to prevent the proliferation of items that could pose...

  18. Export Controls and Industry Outreach Mutual Benefits of Business - Government Partnerships (OPCW)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnston, D. R.

    2007-01-01

    This presentation is intended to acquaint one and all with the strategy and benefits for developing a mutually contributory relationship between government and industry as a means to support and strengthen an effective nonproliferation export control regime. The study will provide background into the basis for development of multilateral regimes for export controls along with an overview covering the historical involvement of industry and their responsibility in dual-use research and development. The paper will then offer an examination of the unique composition and status of the dual-use industry which makes them vulnerable to the illicit diversion of their products and identify and discuss the recognized indicators of that process. The focus will then move toward explaining justification for establishing a close working relationship or partnership between industry and government and how the process of that partnership can deter access and opportunity for the illicit diversion of dual-use goods. Finally, in summation the presentation will highlight the mutual benefits that result from that relationship.(author)

  19. 27 CFR 479.193 - Arms Export Control Act.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ..., AND EXPLOSIVES, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION MACHINE GUNS, DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES, AND CERTAIN OTHER FIREARMS Other Laws Applicable § 479.193 Arms Export Control Act. For provisions relating to...

  20. 12 Ministries Control Rare Earth Exports

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2010-01-01

    <正>"It is very natural to reserve rare earth as a strategic resource.Many countries do this,including China."On April 8,Sun Lihui,Vice Director of Metal Section of Chemicals Import & Export Commerce Chamber of China Minmetals Corporation told a reporter that as early as 2006,China has launched a strategic plan for rare earth,"but it was interrupted by the subsequent financial crisis."

  1. Agencies Should Assess Vulnerabilities and Improve Guidance for Protecting Export-Controlled Information at Companies

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2006-01-01

    .... Commerce's and State's export control requirements and processes provide physical checkpoints on the means and methods companies use to export-controlled goods to help them ensure such exports...

  2. Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-01-01

    This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration.

  3. Non-proliferation through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear disarmament and international control of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, Ryukichi

    1993-01-01

    The role of nuclear factors in the international political situation has changed. The emphasis is now on the new circumstance of the post cold-war world. Non-proliferation is dealt with through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear weapons dismantling and international control of plutonium

  4. Current and Future Challenges for Asian Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Regional Response

    Science.gov (United States)

    2004-10-01

    degree of financial interdependence was evidenced by the 1997 financial crisis, which resulted in the Chiang Mai + 3 Initiative.ř Intra-company trade...financial crisis, the finance ministers of ASEAN+3 countries (China, Japan, and South Korea) reached agreement on the " Chiang Mai Initiative," which...stability. The Chiang Mai Initiative has contributed to improving exchange rate stability and in doing so may also have contributed to closer regional

  5. Nuclear Export Control Policy in Korea - Present and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Jongsook

    2008-01-01

    The International community has been facing with the continued challenges for possession and proliferation of WMD over the past years. In addition, it is known that the terrorist groups are interested in acquiring WMD. The black market of WMD related materials and technologies show also the one of seriousness of our challenges. A number of international treaties, agreements and initiatives to control the proliferation of weapons of N, B, C and their delivery system have been existed to deal with these challenges, but their missions are challenged greatly in recent a series of nuclear issues by Iran and North Korea. The paper reviews the current international export control status and Korea export control system and policy. It also addresses some agenda to be done as future export control policy in Korea

  6. Non-proliferation through effective international control. Report of working group I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, S.E.

    1993-01-01

    Working Group I focused on two issues: the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Missile Technology Regime (MTCR). There was wide agreement within the Group on a number of factors that will strongly influence the prospects for the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension Conference. Two points stood out as particularly important: first, emphasis on the obligations for nuclear Powers to move in good faith in direction of nuclear disarmament; and second, inadequacy of security guarantees to non-nuclear States associated with the NPT

  7. The control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear development - present uncertainties

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Machado de Faria, N.G.; Amaral Barros, E.

    1983-01-01

    This report gives the views of Brazilian lawyers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It deals with the present situation and future prospects concerning the uses of nuclear energy. In particular, it proposes the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  8. A Study on Improvement of Export Control law's understanding for nuclear control items' exporters in Rep. of Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lim, Dong Hyuk; Choi, Sun Do; Yang, Seung Hyo [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-10-15

    According to export of UAE commercial reactor and JRTR(Jordan Research and Training Reactor) in 2009, Korea's international prestige has enhanced and it has been more important for researcher in charge of export control to understand and carry out duties on export control by obeying Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) Guidelines. Currently, the NSG tries to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by harmonising export control systems of participating countries in relation to trade with nuclear commodities and nuclear-related dual-use materials, equipment, software and technology. In addition, through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports, the NSG aims to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field is not hindered unjustly in the process. However, there is still not a little confusion of export businesses owing to lack of understanding of nuclear items in Korea. Therefore, by correctly understanding export control systems, permits and licenses, ITT and persistingly communicating with export businesses, Researchers in charge of export control are able to eliminate confusion of production businesses regarding export and establish a export control culture

  9. The Role of Text Mining in Export Control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tae, Jae-woong; Son, Choul-woong; Shin, Dong-hoon [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    Korean government provides classification services to exporters. It is simple to copy technology such as documents and drawings. Moreover, it is also easy that new technology derived from the existing technology. The diversity of technology makes classification difficult because the boundary between strategic and nonstrategic technology is unclear and ambiguous. Reviewers should consider previous classification cases enough. However, the increase of the classification cases prevent consistent classifications. This made another innovative and effective approaches necessary. IXCRS (Intelligent Export Control Review System) is proposed to coincide with demands. IXCRS consists of and expert system, a semantic searching system, a full text retrieval system, and image retrieval system and a document retrieval system. It is the aim of the present paper to observe the document retrieval system based on text mining and to discuss how to utilize the system. This study has demonstrated how text mining technique can be applied to export control. The document retrieval system supports reviewers to treat previous classification cases effectively. Especially, it is highly probable that similarity data will contribute to specify classification criterion. However, an analysis of the system showed a number of problems that remain to be explored such as a multilanguage problem and an inclusion relationship problem. Further research should be directed to solve problems and to apply more data mining techniques so that the system should be used as one of useful tools for export control.

  10. The Role of Text Mining in Export Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tae, Jae-woong; Son, Choul-woong; Shin, Dong-hoon

    2015-01-01

    Korean government provides classification services to exporters. It is simple to copy technology such as documents and drawings. Moreover, it is also easy that new technology derived from the existing technology. The diversity of technology makes classification difficult because the boundary between strategic and nonstrategic technology is unclear and ambiguous. Reviewers should consider previous classification cases enough. However, the increase of the classification cases prevent consistent classifications. This made another innovative and effective approaches necessary. IXCRS (Intelligent Export Control Review System) is proposed to coincide with demands. IXCRS consists of and expert system, a semantic searching system, a full text retrieval system, and image retrieval system and a document retrieval system. It is the aim of the present paper to observe the document retrieval system based on text mining and to discuss how to utilize the system. This study has demonstrated how text mining technique can be applied to export control. The document retrieval system supports reviewers to treat previous classification cases effectively. Especially, it is highly probable that similarity data will contribute to specify classification criterion. However, an analysis of the system showed a number of problems that remain to be explored such as a multilanguage problem and an inclusion relationship problem. Further research should be directed to solve problems and to apply more data mining techniques so that the system should be used as one of useful tools for export control

  11. Exporting Variables in a Hierarchically Distributed Control System

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chamizo Llatas, M

    1995-07-01

    We describe the Remote Variable Access Service (RVAS), a network service developed and used in the distributed control and monitoring system of the TJ-II Heliac, which is under construction at CIEMAT (Madrid, Spain) and devoted to plasma studies in the nuclear fusion field. The architecture of the TJ-II control system consists of one central Sun workstation Sparc 10 and several autonomous subsystems based on VME crates with embedded processors running the OS-9 (V.24) real time operating system. The RVAS service allows state variables in local control processes running in subsystems to be exported to remote processes running in the central control workstation. Thus we extend the concept of exporting of file systems in UNIX machines to variables in processes running in different machines. (Author) 6 refs.

  12. Exporting Variables in a Hierarchically Distributed Control System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Diaz Martin; Martinez Laso, L.

    1995-01-01

    We describe the Remote Variable Access Service (RVAS), a network service developed and use in the distributed control and monitoring system of the TJ-II Heliac, which is under construction at CIEMAT (Madrid, Spain) and devoted to plasma studies in the nuclear fusion field. The architecture of the TJ-II control system consists of one central Sun workstation Sparc 10 and several autonomous subsystems based on VME crates with embedded processors running the os-9 (V.24) real time operating system. The RVAS service allows state variables in local control processes running in subsystems to be exported to remote processes running in the central control workstation. Thus we extend the concept of exporting of file systems in UNIX machines to variables in processes running in different machines. (Author)

  13. Exporting Variables in a Hierarchically Distributed Control System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chamizo Llatas, M.

    1995-01-01

    We describe the Remote Variable Access Service (RVAS), a network service developed and used in the distributed control and monitoring system of the TJ-II Heliac, which is under construction at CIEMAT (Madrid, Spain) and devoted to plasma studies in the nuclear fusion field. The architecture of the TJ-II control system consists of one central Sun workstation Sparc 10 and several autonomous subsystems based on VME crates with embedded processors running the OS-9 (V.24) real time operating system. The RVAS service allows state variables in local control processes running in subsystems to be exported to remote processes running in the central control workstation. Thus we extend the concept of exporting of file systems in UNIX machines to variables in processes running in different machines. (Author) 6 refs

  14. International scientific collaboration in nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Travelli, A.

    1998-01-01

    International collaboration is a vital component of every serious nonproliferation effort. Several examples of the experiences that the Argonne Arms Control and Nonproliferation Program has had in this area are given and, in the process, important components of the program come to light. Some of the main principles that the program has learned to follow while pursuing international collaboration projects are shared, as are the pitfalls that the program has learned to avoid. (author)

  15. Quality control and disinfestation of spices for export

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    George, C.K.

    1998-01-01

    India is the largest producer, consumer and exporter of spices in the world. Other than a few, all spices are grown in this country. The production is estimated at 2.6 million tonnes with an export of about 0.22 million tonnes valued around US $ 333 million. India's share in the world trade is over 40 % in quantity and 20 % in value. Many spices produced in India face quality problems as in other countries. For identifying quality produce, grade specifications have been introduced for all the important spices. With the liberalization of government controls, compulsory pre-shipment inspection has been withdrawn unless insisted by the buyer abroad. To meet the sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, the Spices Board has taken up a massive programme for upgradation of quality of Indian spices. Logo mark and Spice House Certificates are awarded to those spice exporting units having necessary infrastructure for assuring quality. By now, 6 units have been accredited to ISO 9000. Though different chemical and non-chemical treatments are available for improving hygienic quality, irradiation appears to be a reliable method. However, its wide application in the spice industry depends upon the conviction of the consumers of its safety. Because of the comprehensive programmes taken up for quality improvement of spices, India is confident of exporting spices meeting quality specifications prescribed by the importing countries. (author)

  16. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okko, O [ed.

    2012-07-01

    The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

  17. Scientists for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transactions of international seminar

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the Second International Seminar 'Scientists for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. The Seminar took place from 11 to 14 October 1994 in Nakhabino Country Club near Moscow. More than 60 specialists from Russia, USA, France, Belgium as well as IAEA and CEU took part in the seminar. Problems of cooperation in the field of nuclear materials accounting, control and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear export regulations and disarmament control are discussed at the seminar

  18. Notice to exporters on products prohibited from export (nuclear material, equipment and large nuclear units)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-01-01

    In order to ensure that the policy to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons is complied with, the French Administration applies stricter controls over the export of certain sensitive products, materials and equipment. To this effect, lists of such products, materials and equipment are published in the form of Notices to exporters and periodically revised. This Notice repeals and replaces the previous Notice published in the Official Gazette of 21 January 1986. Annex I contains the list of materials whose export is subject to nuclear non-proliferation controls. Annex II lists the equipment whose export is subject to the same controls. Annex III includes the list of large nuclear units for which an application for prior approval of export must be submitted to the Administrations concerned. (NEA) [fr

  19. US Export Controls and Technology Transfer Requirements: A UK Perspective

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-05-01

    34 (La Franchi , 2006). Such requirements make it difficult for partners to participate and generate a large administrative burden on team members, who...if this critical impediment to enhanced cooperation is to be removed. The U.S. export control system is broken; its technology transfer rules ...Retrieved April 3, 2009, from http://www.jsf.mil/news/news2009.htm La Franchi , P. (2006, July 4). Australia demands JSF resolution. Flight International

  20. Romania non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biro, Lucian; Grama, Viviana

    2001-01-01

    respect to non-proliferation policy, Romania ratified bilateral Agreements with USA and Canada concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Romania controls the import export activities through CNCAN and Ministry of Foreign Affairs - National Agency for Control of Strategic Exports and Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. CNCAN authorizes all import and export activities concerning materials, devices, equipment and information pertinent for the proliferation of nuclear weapons or of other explosive nuclear devices referred in the Law on the safe deployment of nuclear activities, no. 111/1996, republished. CNCAN has an active role in preventing and combating the illicit trafficking as a national responsible and to control all nuclear material and nuclear activities. (author)

  1. Radiological control of the junk exports in Cuba

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dominguez L, O.; Capote F, E.; Carrazana G, J.A.; Zerquera, J.T.; Ramos V, O.; Alonso A, D.; Fernandez, I.M.; Caveda R, C.A.; Madrazo M, S.; Barroso P, I.

    2006-01-01

    Even when in Cuba a strict control exists on the radiation sources that enter to the country to be used in the different applications, it can be given the case that sources or contaminated materials that never were under this control due fundamentally to that entered to the country before the same one existed, appear in the junk that is marketed. In our country it is effective the Combined Resolution CITMA-MINCEX dated on April, 2002 that settles down the necessity and obligation that has all that manipulates, imports, exports or process junk of carrying out it a radiological control. From April, 2002 making use of a minimum of resources, an own methodology, a properly qualified personnel and the support of a credited laboratory by the ISO 17025 standard, the radioactivity measurement service in junk belonging to the Center of Protection and Hygiene of the Radiations (CPHR), it has reduced the risks that sources or contaminated materials are found in the junk that is exported in the main exporter companies of this line in Cuba avoiding possible radiological emergency situations that affect the population and the environment. (Author)

  2. Nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neubert, M.

    1992-01-01

    The following motion was put before the United Kingdom House of Commons on 3rd February 1992 and agreed; that this House, recognising the potential dangers of the rapidly changing world order, welcomes the recent proposals for substantial reductions in nuclear weaponry, the growing support for the non-proliferation treaty and progress in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning the dismantling of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities; urges the Government to play their full part in helping the relevant authorities in the Commonwealth of Independent States to dismantle their nuclear devices, to safeguard their nuclear components and to discourage the proliferation of nuclear expertise; and believes it is of the first importance that Britain retains an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent as security in a world where there remain many sources of instability. The record of arguments for and against the motion in the debate is presented. (author)

  3. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-05-01

    Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

  4. How Might Industry Governance Be Broadened To Include Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

    2009-01-01

    Broadening industry governance to support nonproliferation could provide significant new leverage in preventing the spread/diversion of nuclear, radiological, or dual-use material or technology that could be used in making a nuclear or radiological weapon. Industry is defined broadly to include (1) the nuclear industry, (2) dual-use industries, and (3) radioactive source manufacturers and selected radioactive source-user industries worldwide. This paper describes how industry can be an important first line of defense in detecting and thwarting proliferation, such as an illicit trade network or an insider theft case, by complementing and strengthening existing governmental efforts. For example, the dual-use industry can play a critical role by providing export, import, or security control information that would allow a government or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to integrate this information with safeguards, export, import, and physical protection information it has to create a more complete picture of the potential for proliferation. Because industry is closest to users of the goods and technology that could be illicitly diverted throughout the supply chain, industry information can potentially be more timely and accurate than other sources of information. Industry is in an ideal position to help ensure that such illicit activities are detected. This role could be performed more effectively if companies worked together within a particular industry to promote nonproliferation by implementing an industry-wide self-regulation program. Performance measures could be used to ensure their materials and technologies are secure throughout the supply chain and that customers are legitimately using and/or maintaining oversight of these items. Nonproliferation is the overarching driver that industry needs to consider in adopting and implementing a self-regulation approach. A few foreign companies have begun such an approach to date; it is believed that

  5. Broadening Industry Governance to Include Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

    2008-11-11

    As industry is the first line of defense in detecting and thwarting illicit trade networks, the engagement of the private sector is critical to any government effort to strengthen existing mechanisms to protect goods and services throughout the supply chain. This study builds on previous PNNL work to continue to evaluate means for greater industry engagement to complement and strengthen existing governmental efforts to detect and stem the trade of illicit goods and to protect and secure goods that could be used in making a weapon of mass destruction. Specifically, the study evaluates the concept of Industry Self Regulation, defined as a systematic voluntary program undertaken by an industry or by individual companies to anticipate, implement, supplement, or substitute for regulatory requirements in a given field, generally through the adoption of best practices. Through a series of interviews with companies with a past history of non-compliance, trade associations and NGOs, the authors identify gaps in the existing regulatory infrastructure, drivers for a self regulation approach and the form such an approach might take, as well as obstacles to be overcome. The authors conclude that it is at the intersection of industry, government, and security that—through collaborative means—the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation system—can be most effectively strengthened to the mutual benefit of both government and the private sector. Industry has a critical stake in the success of this regime, and has the potential to act as an integrating force that brings together the existing mechanisms of the global nonproliferation regime: export controls, physical protection, and safeguards. The authors conclude that industry compliance is not enough; rather, nonproliferation must become a central tenant of a company’s corporate culture and be viewed as an integral component of corporate social responsibility (CSR).

  6. The nuclear non-proliferation regime: What it is and how it has evolved

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Priest, J.

    1999-01-01

    The nuclear non-proliferation regime commonly denotes the legal norms, voluntary undertakings and policies which the international community has developed to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. The word 'regime' suggests a legally binding order. Some components of the non-proliferation regime are indeed legally binding. Others represent essentially political rather than legal commitments. This lecture describes the various independent but mutually reinforcing components of the non-proliferation regime. It thus touches on and highlights the particular importance of political incentives - or disincentives - to the acquisition of nuclear weapons; legal undertakings in which non-proliferation commitments are anchored; verification (specifically the IAEA Safeguards System); compliance and enforcement; export controls; physical protection measures; regional nuclear non-proliferation initiatives; and measures taken to curb proliferation in general and to strive for arms control and nuclear disarmament. The purpose of the lecture is to provide an over-arching, tour d'horizon for the more specific and detailed lectures which follow. (author)

  7. 76 FR 36986 - Export Controls for High Performance Computers: Wassenaar Arrangement Agreement Implementation...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-24

    ... and export control standards. Croatia is a member of the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group..., Exports, Inventions and patents, Research science and technology. 15 CFR Part 740 Administrative practice...

  8. Policy of Kyrgyz Republic in the field of weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duisheeva, Zh.Z.

    2010-01-01

    Full text: Kyrgyz Republic is principle and sequential member of accepting effective international measures, directed to active prevention to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, its components and means of delivery. Commitment to prevention policy and WMD nonproliferation is one of basic principles of foreign and domestic policy of Kyrgyz Republic. The real measure against WMD proliferation and relating to its production technologies of military, special and dual use is international export control based on national systems of export control including smoothly running national system of account for, control and physical protection of arm materials. Currently juridical basis of export control system in Kyrgyz Republic is actively developing. In 2003 the Law of Kyrgyz Republic On export control, based on principles and norms of international law in the field of export control was adopted. The Law On export control determines basic principles of state policy, legal activity basis of state management and participants of foreign-economic activity in the field of export control, as well as defines their rights, obligations and responsibilities in this field. Also in the law, the requirements of international treaties realization in the field of WMD nonproliferation and means of their delivery, signed by Kyrgyzstan, is defined as one of national systems goals of export control. In article 13, Law On export control it is defined that international cooperation in the field of export control by means of efforts coordination and cooperation with foreign states on prevention of WMD nonproliferation, means of their delivery and technologies on their creation; participation in international regimes of export control and international forums, as well as carrying out negotiations, consultations with foreign states, bilateral information exchange and realization of joint programs and other events in the field of export control on bilateral and multilateral basis. By

  9. Airborne Multisensor Pod System, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: Second quarter 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alonzo, G M; Sanford, N M [eds.

    1995-01-01

    This issue focuses on the Airborne Multisensor Pod System (AMPS) which is a collaboration of many of the DOE national laboratories to provide a scientific environment to research multiple sensors and the new information that can be derived from them. The bulk of the research has been directed at nonproliferation applications, but it has also proven useful in environmental monitoring and assessment, and land/water management. The contents of this issue are: using AMPS technology to detect proliferation and monitor resources; combining multisensor data to monitor facilities and natural resources; planning a AMPS mission; SAR pod produces images day or night, rain or shine; MSI pod combines data from multiple sensors; ESI pod will analyze emissions and effluents; and accessing AMPS information on the Internet.

  10. Safeguards and non-proliferation: current challenges and the implications for Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leask, A.; Carlson, J.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: The expansion of nuclear programs raises the issue of how to ensure this does not increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. The non-proliferation regime - based on the NPT and its verification mechanism, the IAEA safeguards system - has been developed to provide assurance that nuclear programs are exclusively peaceful. Although to date the non-proliferation regime has been remarkably successful, in recent years it has come under serious challenge. Nuclear proliferation is emerging as one of the major issues facing the international community. Addressing technical and institutional aspects of the non-proliferation regime - especially safeguards, but also complementary measures such as export controls, proliferation-resistant technology, and an international framework on sensitive technology - is important. But proliferation is a political problem, and ultimately the success of the non-proliferation regime depends on political resolve to uphold compliance, using incentives and if necessary sanctions. These issues are vitally important to Australia's future. Being a major uranium supplier has strengthened Australia's influence in non-proliferation and safeguards developments

  11. Authentication of monitoring systems for non-proliferation and arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fuller, J.L.; Kouzes, R.T.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Radiation measurement and systems are central to the affirmation of compliance with nuclear material control agreements associated with a variety of arms control and non-proliferation regimes. A number of radiation measurement systems are under development for this purpose, and the correct functioning of these systems will be authenticated. Authentication is the process by which a monitoring party to an agreement is assured that measurement systems are assembled as designed, function as designed, and do not contain hidden features that allow the passing of material inconsistent with an accepted declaration. Attribute measurement systems are specific examples of radiation measurement systems that are being developed in the United States and the Russian Federation. Under one bilateral agreement, the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction (DoD DTRA/CTR) Program is constructing a Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) at Mayak to hold up to 50 tons of plutonium from the disassembly of Russian Federation nuclear weapons. Negotiations are being held between the U.S. and the Russian Federation for cooperative development of attribute measurement systems to provide confidence that the material is of weapons origin and other purposes. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is leading the authentication effort for U.S. interests at FMSF. There are two basic requirements for an attribute measurement system: protection of classified information, and assurance of credible performance of the system for the measurement. The technology used to protect classified information is referred to as an information barrier. An information barrier consists of technology and procedures that prevent the release of host-country classified information to a monitoring party during a joint inspection of a sensitive item. Information barriers are used on monitoring systems that are exposed to host-party classified materials

  12. An analysis on the export license criteria for NSG control items in the US and Japan

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Choi, Young Rok [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

    1995-06-01

    Korea has taken steps to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which is a major part of the international nuclear export control regime. In this connection, it is an urgent task to build a new Korean nuclear export control system that includes NSG guidelines and control items. In addition, it is necessary to review the developed supplier countries` experience in the field of export control. The main purpose of this study is to analyze how the US and Japan have controlled the items listed in NSG part 1 and 2 guidelines. To this end, various relevant regulations of the US and Japan were studied. Among those regulations, the US Export Administration Regulation, US 10 CFR 110 and 810, and the Japan`s Export Administration Order are included. Through the review process, this study identified NSG items which are controlled in the export control systems of the US and Japan. Furthermore, this study summarized and compared the export license criteria that must be satisfied before exporting each NSG item in the two countries. The export license criteria consist of permitted destinations, document requirements, and types of license. The results of this study are expected to contribute to establishing an appropriate Korean nuclear export control system and could be used as references to the practical export licensing policies of the US and Japan. 6 tabs., 13 refs., (Author) .new.

  13. An analysis on the export license criteria for NSG control items in the US and Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Young Rok

    1995-06-01

    Korea has taken steps to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which is a major part of the international nuclear export control regime. In this connection, it is an urgent task to build a new Korean nuclear export control system that includes NSG guidelines and control items. In addition, it is necessary to review the developed supplier countries' experience in the field of export control. The main purpose of this study is to analyze how the US and Japan have controlled the items listed in NSG part 1 and 2 guidelines. To this end, various relevant regulations of the US and Japan were studied. Among those regulations, the US Export Administration Regulation, US 10 CFR 110 and 810, and the Japan's Export Administration Order are included. Through the review process, this study identified NSG items which are controlled in the export control systems of the US and Japan. Furthermore, this study summarized and compared the export license criteria that must be satisfied before exporting each NSG item in the two countries. The export license criteria consist of permitted destinations, document requirements, and types of license. The results of this study are expected to contribute to establishing an appropriate Korean nuclear export control system and could be used as references to the practical export licensing policies of the US and Japan. 6 tabs., 13 refs., (Author) .new

  14. Reagan outlines nonproliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walsh, J.

    1981-01-01

    The Reagan Administration wants to shift from efforts to impose direct control over the fuel cycle and nuclear technology to a framework based on cooperation and initiatives for greater political stability. A nuclear-free zone for the Middle East is one area to explore. Congress responded to this announced plan with a counter move to tighten non-proliferation strategies. Reagan's policy will be to restore the US as an aggressive, but reliable nuclear trading partner operating under adequate safeguards. Critics find this approach dangerous and contradictory. The policy is still too general to answer specific questions about bilateral arrangements, generic permits, plutonium recycling, and other matters

  15. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

  16. Exports and experts:proliferation risks from the new Commonwealth

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potter, W.C.

    1992-01-01

    Ironically, given the Cold War history and Western stereotypes about Soviet misbehavior, the long-standing experience of US-Soviet cooperation on nonproliferation may have made US policy-makers less attentive to, and less concerned about, signs of change in Soviet nuclear export policy. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the nuclear inheritance of its successor states belatedly focused Western attention on the proliferation risks posed by the disintegration of central authority. Most concern to date, however, has continued to emphasize the problems of nuclear command and control. But the nonproliferation threats associated with the unregulated export of sensitive nuclear material, technology, and equipment may be equally great, and present problems that are already real. At the same time, the new nation-building process in the Soviet successor states presents opportunities for expanding the NPT and international safeguards, containing the nuclear brain drain, promoting the cleanup of hazardous nuclear waste, enhancing international capabilities for monitoring proliferation, and building new communities of nonproliferation specialists. A rare occasion now exists for Western policy-makers to have a direct impact on the long-term nuclear export and non-proliferation behavior of the successor states to the Soviet Union. The speed and seriousness with which the West undertakes this task will largely determine how much ground, if any, will be lost from its decades-long effort to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons

  17. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okko, O. (ed.)

    2012-07-01

    The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

  18. URENCO: A Multinational Contribution to Non-Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korbmacher, T.

    2015-01-01

    URENCO was founded in 1970 following the signing of the Treaty of Almelo by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The fundamental principles for effective supervision of URENCO's technology and enrichment operations with respect to non-proliferation issues have been laid down in this treaty. In order to enable the construction of a URENCO enrichment facility in the USA and to permit the transfer of classified information into the USA, another treaty has been concluded in 1992. The US government entered into the Treaty of Washington together with the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to ensure that the same conditions that had been agreed in the Treaty of Almelo would also apply to the US. To allow for the completion of the joint venture with Areva regarding the URENCO Group's technology business ETC, the Treaty of Cardiff has been signed on 12 July 2005 by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France. Through this treaty, France is obliged to adhere to the principles of the Treaty of Almelo. For each treaty, control bodies have been formed with representatives of the governments of the signatory countries. These committees exercise the role of effective supervision of the technology and operations with respect to non-proliferation issues. They also consider all questions concerning the safeguards system (as established by IAEA/Euratom), classification arrangements and security procedures, exports of the technology and enriched uranium, as well as other non-proliferation issues. The presentation describes how the multinational structure of URENCO contributes to Non-Proliferation on the basis of the above mentioned treaties. Beyond that, the international cross linking of operational working groups and committees within the URENCO Group structure is explained. This structure implies an additional assurance to achieve the safeguards goals set. (author)

  19. 77 FR 72917 - Editorial Corrections to the Commerce Control List of the Export Administration Regulations

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-12-07

    ...-01] RIN 0694-AF62 Editorial Corrections to the Commerce Control List of the Export Administration... corrects reference and typographical errors in the Commerce Control List (CCL) in the Export Administration... seven categories of the Commerce Control List (CCL) to correct spelling and typographical errors and...

  20. Arms Control and nonproliferation technologies: Technology options and associated measures for monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban, Second quarter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Casey, Leslie A.

    1994-01-01

    This newsletter contains reprinted papers discussing technology options and associated measures for monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These papers were presented to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in May and June 1994. An interagency Verification Monitoring Task Force developed the papers. The task force included participants from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Intelligence Community, the Department of Interior, and the Department of State. The purpose of this edition of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies is to share these papers with the broad base of stakeholders in a CTBT and to facilitate future technology discussions. The papers in the first group discuss possible technology options for monitoring a CTBT in all environments (underground, underwater, atmosphere, and space). These technologies, along with on-site inspections, would facilitate CTBT monitoring by treaty participants. The papers in the second group present possible associated measures, e.g., information exchanges and transparency measures, that would build confidence among states participating in a CTBT.

  1. Export Controls: Export-Controlled Technology at Contractor, University, and Federally Funded Research and Development Center Facilities (D-2004-061)

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2004-01-01

    .... The report discusses the steps DoD needs to take to identify unclassified export-controlled technology and to ensure that DoD contractors, universities, and Federally Funded Research and Development...

  2. A comparative study on export control systems of nuclear technology in ROK and USA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tae, Jae Woong; Shin, Dong Hoon [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2013-10-15

    Perfect removal of transferred technology is impossible because it is impossible to find all copies of technologies such as files and documents. International community concerns about Terrorists' acquirement of nuclear technologies related to nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing Facilities and heavy water production facilities, which can be used for production of nuclear weapons. Non-state actors as well as concerning countries have tried to possess nuclear technology for developing nuclear weapons. Non-state actors' activities threaten global nuclear security. Korea exported four nuclear power plants to UAE and a research reactor to Jordan. Non-state actors may try to procure nuclear equipment and technology from Korean nuclear industries. Therefore, the export control system should be enhanced for national nuclear security and safety. In this study, the export control system of Korea and the United States were compared concerning to nuclear technology. In summary, controlled activities related to nuclear technology are treated more variously and more diverse activities are controlled in the United States than In Korea. Catch-all control will lose its effectiveness without this. Related to the control of ITT (Intangible Technology Transfer), Korea and the United States are trying to amend the export control regulation. Both of them are trying to control intangible technology transfers effectively. Revised Foreign Trade Act in Korea is expected to introduce a more rigorous system of nuclear technology controls. It focuses on nationality rather than residence. The revised law may face into other problems such as dual nationals like as the United States. However, this satisfies legislative requirements for control of a deemed export. The revised law will enter into force in 2014. Accurate meanings of technology and export will be defined soon in the enforcement decree and the public notice before 2014. However, it is hard to revise the definition

  3. A comparative study on export control systems of nuclear technology in ROK and USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tae, Jae Woong; Shin, Dong Hoon

    2013-01-01

    Perfect removal of transferred technology is impossible because it is impossible to find all copies of technologies such as files and documents. International community concerns about Terrorists' acquirement of nuclear technologies related to nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing Facilities and heavy water production facilities, which can be used for production of nuclear weapons. Non-state actors as well as concerning countries have tried to possess nuclear technology for developing nuclear weapons. Non-state actors' activities threaten global nuclear security. Korea exported four nuclear power plants to UAE and a research reactor to Jordan. Non-state actors may try to procure nuclear equipment and technology from Korean nuclear industries. Therefore, the export control system should be enhanced for national nuclear security and safety. In this study, the export control system of Korea and the United States were compared concerning to nuclear technology. In summary, controlled activities related to nuclear technology are treated more variously and more diverse activities are controlled in the United States than In Korea. Catch-all control will lose its effectiveness without this. Related to the control of ITT (Intangible Technology Transfer), Korea and the United States are trying to amend the export control regulation. Both of them are trying to control intangible technology transfers effectively. Revised Foreign Trade Act in Korea is expected to introduce a more rigorous system of nuclear technology controls. It focuses on nationality rather than residence. The revised law may face into other problems such as dual nationals like as the United States. However, this satisfies legislative requirements for control of a deemed export. The revised law will enter into force in 2014. Accurate meanings of technology and export will be defined soon in the enforcement decree and the public notice before 2014. However, it is hard to revise the definition of export

  4. New U.S. nuclear export legislation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Patermann, C.

    1978-01-01

    The new 1978 Export Control Act of the United States of America introduces a comprehensive arrangement of the criteria, responsibilities and procedures associated with nuclear exports, especially under the nonproliferation aspect. After a detailed analysis of the multitude of provisions it must be feared that, merely as a result of the high degree of formalization, bureaucratization and politicalization of these procedures, the U.S. can henceforth no longer be regarded as a reliable source of nuclear materials and facilities. An aspect received abroad with particular anguish is the fact that this unilateral aggravation of export controls was initiated after the start of the two-year INFCE program for international fuel cycle evaluation and that the new legislation forces the American government to renegotiate existing agreements on cooperation with the receiver countries under the threat of a delivery stop. (orig.) [de

  5. Export Controls: Observations on Selected Countries’ Systems and Proposed Treaties

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-05-01

    suspected violators of arms Investigates suspected criminal viol including potential export control v and dual-use export control lawse Source: GAO...those that present a strategic military conc substances, biological agents , and related items that could be used in the producti chemical and

  6. The formation of nuclear export control in Azerbaijan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garibov, A.A.

    2003-01-01

    Full text: The controlling process of exporting and importing on Azerbaijan borders is being carried out by two state organizations. 1.Border Guard Department; 2.Azerbaijan State Customs Committee. The officers of these organizations have no enough necessary experience and knowledge dealing with the legal and illegal trafficking. There were not special educational institutions in order to train personals for both of these organizations made newly. So there's difference between the professions of the majority of the employees, that's why some of the employees follow the instructions linking to the normative documents while passing the border. When trafficking nuclear and dual-use items officially the controller and other employees should look through the list of all and know them how to behave and to make official, the characteristic parameters of the materials, and the instruction of monitoring. In order to realize all works pointed, the employees of Border Guard Department and Customs Control Check Points have to attend special courses. The employees of both organizations are frequently changed that's why studying courses are to be organized. The analysis of studying considered that will be realized shows mainly there may be two student groups. Mainly, the Institute of Radiation Problems of ANAS (Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences) as the expert laboratory takes part in. On the borders of Azerbaijan Republic the dual-use items and equipment having the type of isotope sources being utilized in the technological process are mainly being transported. In the materials presented the results and the solution of the problems dealing with realizing the controlling expert system of nuclear materials in the existing control checkpoints due to the international standards have been given

  7. Influence of export control policy on the competitiveness of machine tool producing organizations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ahrstrom, Jeffrey D.

    The possible influence of export control policies on producers of export controlled machine tools is examined in this quantitative study. International market competitiveness theories hold that market controlling policies such as export control regulations may influence an organization's ability to compete (Burris, 2010). Differences in domestic application of export control policy on machine tool exports may impose throttling effects on the competitiveness of participating firms (Freedenberg, 2010). Commodity shipments from Japan, Germany, and the United States to the Russian market will be examined using descriptive statistics; gravity modeling of these specific markets provides a foundation for comparison to actual shipment data; and industry participant responses to a user developed survey will provide additional data for analysis using a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance. There is scarce academic research data on the topic of export control effects within the machine tool industry. Research results may be of interest to industry leadership in market participation decisions, advocacy arguments, and strategic planning. Industry advocates and export policy decision makers could find data of interest in supporting positions for or against modifications of export control policies.

  8. Missile non-proliferation: an alternative approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delory, Stephane

    2011-01-01

    In this report, the author first proposes an overview of the notion of missile prohibition. He notices that the association between weapons of mass destruction and missiles is a prelude to the legitimacy of missile control, notably within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime or MTCR. He also comments the notion of total ban. In a second part, the author analyses and discusses the limitations of the control of technology diffusion. He discusses the role of the MTCR, comments the evolution of this regime with the taking of China and Russia into consideration, the impacts of national implementations of export regimes on the MTCR, and economic aspects of control implementation. In the next part, the author addresses other kinds of limitations, i.e. those related with capacity evolutions of proliferating States. The last part addresses the evolution towards a new definition of approach to missile non-proliferation, notably in terms of perception of missile roles and of technology transfer controls

  9. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

  10. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

  11. Final report of the 2. committee of investigation of the 11. legislative period. Nuclear exports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    On the subject of 'nuclear exports' the Committee dealt with political and legal principles of the Federal Government's nuclear export policy, particularly questions concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and scientific-technical cooperation of the FRG with other countries, especially Argentina, Brazil, India, and Pakistan. Individual export transactions were then investigated, followed by a general assessment of the FRG's nuclear policy. - Concerning non-proliferation policy there have been certain administrative weaknesses in converting control measures into practice. Remedy is expected from the duty of terms to report deliveries punctually and completely and subsequent supervision. - The illegal transactions with India and Pakistan require improvements in the legal instruments, in the execution of administrative measures, and in border controls. Decisive steps have been introduced. (HSCH) [de

  12. Act of 18 December 1987 relating to the control of the export of strategic goods, services and technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Act controls the export of nuclear material and equipment and sensitive nuclear technology and services. In particular, it provides for strict controls and verification of certain exports. (NEA) [fr

  13. Synergy between Security and Safeguards in Uranium Concentrate Export Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soumana, T.

    2010-01-01

    This paper is a proposal to the government of Niger and all national institutions involved in the ISSAS and INSSERV Missions held in Niger to optimally coordinate they activities in nuclear field. It is essential to notice that Niger has significant nuclear activities, mainly in uranium prospecting, mining, milling, and export. In Niger, there are also many radioactive sources in non nuclear use. The safeguards agreement of Niger, infcirc/664, is in force since 16 February 2005 and its relating additional protocol since 2 May 2007. For the safeguards implementation in Niger, Government has requested to the IAEA an ISSAS Mission which was completed in February 2008. A main recommendation of this mission is to consider an overall plan for security measures and in this regards, an INSSERV Mission was completed in December 2008. Nuclear safeguards conclusions focus on correctness and completeness of declarations provided by operators. Nuclear security activities (prevention, detection and response) are useful contributions to confirm safeguards conclusions specially, a good detection strategy at national level can help to confirm the absence of undeclared activities in a country like Niger. Many governmental institutions are involved in nuclear activities and there are lacks of communication between them. Creating a synergy between safeguards and security can federate the mechanisms of control at national level and have impact in many aspects specially in (i) awareness of decision makers (ii) optimal use of the equipments (iii) organizing training activities and human resource management and (iv) designing national strategic plans. The institution which hosted the two IAEA consultative missions (Directorate of Peaceful Use of Nuclear Techniques-DUPTN for the ISSAS Mission and Civil Defence for INSSERV Mission) in consultation with other national institutions had to create a framework for this synergy. This framework must be submitted to the IAEA for observation and

  14. The biological control as a strategy to support nontraditional agricultural exports in Peru: An empirical analysis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Franklin Duarte Cueva

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available The study is oriented to explore the general characteristics of agriculture, the biological control as a pest control mechanism and agro export industry. In this context, we try to promote the use of biological control as a strategy to support nontraditional exports related to products such as asparagus and fresh avocados grown in the La Libertad Department (Peru, through an agronomic and management approach. Biological control is the basis of integrated pest management (IPM and contributes to the conservation of agricultural ecosystems allowing to export companies reduce costs, fulfill international phytosanitary measures and supports the preservation of the environment and health. Thus, the Peruvian agro export companies could build a sustainable competitive advantage and seek a positioning as socially responsible firms. We analyze variables such as crop statistics, comparative costs between biological control and chemical control, main destination markets for asparagus and fresh avocados, international standards, among others.

  15. The structure of German non-proliferation policy - past and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1990-01-01

    West German nonproliferation policy has evolved through four phases: First German policy strived to regain the right to nuclear research and industrial development. Then West Germany struggled for participation in NATO nuclear decision-making. Following the conclusion of the NPT, the full development of a mature nuclear industry, including activities in the full fuel cycle, and the promotion of nuclear exports were the focus of national nuclear policy. Starting in the early eighties, political aspects became more important. International security, arms control and disarmament, and foreign reputation had a more prominent role than pure economic interests. In the future, the united Germany must take care not to repeat the sad scandals of the eighties. Its renunciation of nuclear weapons remains a pillar of European stability and a prerequisite for a European peace system. Together with its European partners, Germany can be expected to take a more active, supportive and effective role in international non-proliferation policy. (orig./HSCH) [de

  16. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sandra Colombo

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu. The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous development of this technology in emerging countries. Against this, the article investigates the existence of margins to maneuver in the international system from the case of study of Argentina, one of the few developing countries that have managed to export nuclear technology, and has declared the development of independent nuclear activity as a State policy

  17. Safety controls according to the non-proliferation treaty in EC countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pander, J. von.

    1978-01-01

    Above all, content and extent of the duty conferred upon the IAEA according to article III, paragraph 1 of the NP treaty which implies the conducting of safety controls and the consequences resulting here from are examined. Including the peaceful use of nuclear energy developing under international law the agreement on safety control signed on 5th April 1973 between IAEA and EURATOM as well as its seven non-nuclear-weapon member states is discussed, along with its technical and its implicit legal problems. In detail the manifold technical and judicial problems of IAEA safety controls are shown, their realization requiring a well-working cooperation between IAEA and the European Communities. As only the non-nuclear-weapon member states of the EC are subject to the IAEA safety control system within the frame of this agreement the following questions are discussed: 1. effects on the member status after the signing of the EURATOM contract and 2. granting the principle of equal treatment for all member states as against the nuclear-weapon member states of the EC, France and the United Kingdom. (orig./HP) [de

  18. International nuclear trade and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potter, W.C.

    1990-01-01

    The purpose of this book, the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation, is to explore the international political and economic dimensions of nuclear trade, especially as they pertain to the behavior of eleven emerging nuclear-supplier states. More specifically, the book sets forth a conceptual framework for analyzing international nuclear trade; details the domestic and external factors that shape the nuclear export policies of Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, the People's Republic of China, South Korea, South Africa, Spain and Taiwan; and identifies and assesses alternative strategies for containing the new proliferation risks posed by these emerging suppliers. The book also describes an innovative effort to utilize a computer-based system for tracking international nuclear trade

  19. Some possible applications of measurements on mu mesons to nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation, and arms control activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kane, W.R.; Vanier, P.E.

    1997-01-01

    In the nuclear safeguards and arms control areas, well-developed methodologies exist for determining the properties of nuclear materials via measurements of the gamma rays and neutrons emitted from these materials, or in the arms control area, by the use of radiography. In certain favorable instances, it may by feasible to perform comparable measurements with the use of a ubiquitous, naturally-occurring radiation--cosmic ray mu mesons (muons). At the earth's surface these charged particles have a broad energy distribution peaking at about 500 MeV with a flux of approximately 10 -2 /cm 2 -sec-steradian. In traversing matter, muons lose energy at a rate of approximately 2 MeV/gram almost independent of atomic number. Muons can readily be detected by either plastic scintillators or wire planes. While the flux is small, a scintillator of one meter area, for example, will register about 20,000 events/min. these particles should have utility in the detection and imaging of objects with sectional densities of a few hundred grams/cm 2 . The degree of intrusiveness of the imaging can be controlled through the detector configuration. Some possible applications include: (1) mass measurements on large UF 6 cylinders, (2) determination of the size of treaty-limited objects, e.g., missiles, in rail cars or other containment; (3) verification of single or multiple warheads or components; (4) the detection of concealed, underground cavities. Examples will be presented

  20. Scale and legacy controls on catchment nutrient export regimes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Howden, N. J. K.; Burt, T.; Worrall, F.

    2017-12-01

    Nutrient dynamics in river catchments are complex: water and chemical fluxes are highly variable in low-order streams, but this variability declines as fluxes move through higher-order reaches. This poses a major challenge for process understanding as much effort is focussed on long-term monitoring of the main river channel (a high-order reach), and therefore the data available to support process understanding are predominantly derived from sites where much of the transient response of nutrient export is masked by the effect of averaging over both space and time. This may be further exacerbated at all scales by the accumulation of legacy nutrient sources in soils, aquifers and pore waters, where historical activities have led to nutrient accumulation where the catchment system is transport limited. Therefore it is of particular interest to investigate how the variability of nutrient export changes both with catchment scale (from low to high-order catchment streams) and with the presence of legacy sources, such that the context of infrequent monitoring on high-order streams can be better understood. This is not only a question of characterising nutrient export regimes per se, but also developing a more thorough understanding of how the concepts of scale and legacy may modify the statistical characteristics of observed responses across scales in both space and time. In this paper, we use synthetic data series and develop a model approach to consider how space and timescales combine with impacts of legacy sources to influence observed variability in catchment export. We find that: increasing space and timescales tend to reduce the observed variance in nutrient exports, due to an increase in travel times and greater mixing, and therefore averaging, of sources; increasing the influence of legacy sources inflates the variance, with the level of inflation dictated by the residence time of the respective sources.

  1. Considerations on nonproliferation regime meeting in a changing world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, Hiroyoshi; Kikuchi, Masahiro

    1994-01-01

    This paper summarizes the past history of worldwide nonproliferation regime, then proposes the future improvements on the regime. Present worldwide nonproliferation regime have been formulated during the cold war era. Therefore, the structure and measures of the regime were heavily influenced by the features of cold war era. Though the cold war was over, still new international order does not seem to be on the horizon, we need to review the present regime and to improve the regime compatible to new world situation. Generally speaking, the nonproliferation regime have gained moderate success so far. We could point out the following features as a kind of success: 1) No increase of overt Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), 2) All five NWSs have finally participated to the NPT, 3) South Africa has destroyed its nuclear weapons and became Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS), 4) Successful conclusions of some regional arrangements, such as Tlatelolco, Ralotonga, and 5) Strengthening of export control on sensitive items. On the other hand, we recognize the following points as the failures of the regime. 6) India, Pakistan and Israel reject to join the NPT, 7) Existence of some violation against NPT regime, i.e. Iraqi case and DPRK case, 8) Insufficient effective measures against brain drain problem, 9) Risk exists for the long term extension of NPT, and 10) Insufficient flexibility to meet changing boundary conditions. We would propose the various measures for strengthening to meet changing boundary conditions, as follows: 11) Measures to be taken along with future civil use of Plutonium, 12) Strengthening and rationalizing international safeguards, 13) Countermeasures for emerging new types of nuclear proliferation, 14) Strengthening nuclear material control in NWS, 15) Measures to be taken for nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons, and 16) Nuclear disarmament. (author)

  2. Current nuclear non-proliferation policies in the world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru

    1997-01-01

    Although a global nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has disappeared, many challenges to nuclear non-proliferation have emerged. Sources of concern, like a nuclear weapon program by Iraq and suspicions of North Korea have caused the adoption of a variety of political and technical measures in order to meet these challenges in the post-Cold War era. This paper describes the following ten policies for non-proliferation: 1) Strengthening the NPT; 2) Nuclear reduction; 3) CTBT and cut-off treaty; 4) Establishment of NWFZs; 5) Counterproliferation; 6) Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards; 7) Control and disposal of nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons; 8) Export control; 9) Registration of plutonium; and 10) Actions against nuclear smuggling. The first four measures can be said to be mainly political policies, the fifth measure (counterproliferation), can be categorized as basically a military policy, and the last five measures can be said to be technical. (J.P.N.)

  3. Development of a Prototype for the Export Control List Management System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, GwanYoung

    2011-01-01

    The international society has concerned the possibility of a diversion with strategic items into the nuclear weapon development. So they have regulated those, and our country also has done it. Following a accomplishment of a UAE nuclear power plant export contraction in December, 2009 and a Jordan research reactor export contraction in March, 2010, thousands upon thousands of the strategic goods include the strategic technology will be supposed to transfer to UAE and Jordan. A lot of manpower in the government and the company concerned in addition to an enormous amount of time are needed so as to manage transferred items to UAE and Jordan efficiently. Accordingly, the Export Control List Management System has developed 1) to decrease the administrative time required about implementations such as the classification, the export license 2) and to plan the practical use of manpower 3) and to enhance a convenience of businesses, the government and a company concerned by the KINAC and the KOSTI. That system is scheduled to complete after June, and now a management of export items has done manually. This inconvenience can be solved by developing a prototype of the Export Control List Management System. Also an understanding of the Export Control List Management will be enhanced by doing it. A procedure of a system development and results will be presented in this paper

  4. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Annual report 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haemaelaeinen, M.; Karhu, P.

    2008-04-01

    Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2007 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two licence holders in 2007, setting required actions for them to correct their reporting and to update the descriptions of their procedures. Neither the IAEA nor the European Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards

  5. 77 FR 42973 - Export and Reexport Controls to Rwanda and United Nations Sanctions Under the Export...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-07-23

    ... failure to comply with a collection of information, subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction... extension tubes; complete breech mechanisms; buckshot shotgun shells; except equipment used exclusively to...: 8A918 Marine Boilers. License Requirements Reason for Control: * * * Control(s) Country chart...

  6. Korean system of export control to support the commercial nuclear transfer to UAE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cho, Young Ho

    2011-01-01

    In December 2009, the Republic of Korea won the contract to build 4 1,400 MW nuclear power reactors worth USD 20 billion in the UAE. The states-owned KEPCO will complete the turnkey project to the UAE including design, engineering, construction, nuclear fuel, operations, maintenance and technical support. Since sensitive nuclear technologies convertible to military purpose can be spread by the transfer of commercial nuclear power plant, it is essential prerequisite to implement nuclear export control tenaciously and effectively. About twenty years have passed since the Republic of Korea introduced export control system in domestic laws and regulations. Marking a major historical milestone in 2009 by ranking among global nuclear suppliers, the Korean government made a major step forward in export control framework to support its next nuclear export goal. (orig.)

  7. 78 FR 61743 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: Initial Implementation of Export Control...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-10-03

    .... Munitions List (USML) on the Commerce Control List (CCL), specifically aircraft, gas turbine engines, and... Controlled section, ``Hydraulic and fuel hoses, straight and unbent lines, fittings, clips, couplings, nutplates, and brackets;'' is corrected to read ``Hydraulic and fuel hoses, straight and unbent lines...

  8. Nuclear power generation and nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1978-01-01

    In the future outlook around year 2000 of nuclear power, thought must be given to fuel reprocessing and plutonium utilization. The adverse utilization of plutonium may be prevented by the means balanced with its economical value. As the method of less cost with lower effect of nonproliferation, combination of fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities and mixed plutonium/uranium processing are possible. As the method of more cost with higher effect of nonproliferation the maintenance of high radioactivity and inaccessibility of plutonium is conceivable. As for the agreeable methods in 2000, seven principles may be mentioned, such as the dependence upon the agreements among major nations and upon nuclear exporting countries. These are still inadequate, however. What is important is to provide with the sufficient safeguards to countries concerned to negate the need for nuclear weapons. Efforts are then necessary for leading nuclear countries to extend aids to other nuclear-oriented countries. (Mori, K.)

  9. Working Group 3: Broader Perspectives on Non-proliferation and Nuclear Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, M.; Pregenzer, A.; Stein, G.

    2013-01-01

    This working group (WG) focused on the technical topics related to international security and stability in global nonproliferation and arms control regimes and asked how nonproliferation tools and culture might facilitate verification of future nuclear treaties. The review of existing and future nonproliferation and disarmament regimes (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - CTBT, UNSC Resolution 1540, UK/Norway/VERTIC exercise, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - FMCT) offered a view on challenges, possibilities, and limitations for future initiatives. The concepts that the WG considered, with potential use in implementing future nuclear verification treaties, are: Triple S Culture (Safety, Security, Safeguards), State-Level Approach, Safeguards-by-Design, risk-based approaches, managed access, inspections, and protection of sensitive information. Under these concepts, many existing tools, considered by the WG could be used for nuclear verification. Export control works to control sensitive technology and expertise. Global implementation is complicated and multi-faceted and would benefit from greater consistency and efficiency. In most cases, international cooperation and development international capability would supplement efforts. This document is composed of the slides and the paper of the presentation. (A.C.)

  10. A study for collaborative management for nuclear spent fuel control. Seeking for nuclear non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-03-01

    Because of the rapid increase of power generation with nuclear fuel in East Asia area, the management and control of nuclear spent fuel from nuclear reactors has become an essential and urgent issue in this area. This study focused on the possibility of forming an intergovernmental collaborative management system for nuclear spent fuel with an emphasize on nuclear non-proliferation among East Asian countries, i.e. China, Korea, Taiwan and Japan who own and operate nuclear power plants. First, we studied the present situation for nuclear spent fuel, including the storage measures, the future fore- cast on the accumulation and the government measures to deal with these spent fuel. Then, based upon first step studies, we examined the pros and cons when the collaborative management is realized particularly from the viewpoint of prevention of nuclear proliferation. Further, we estimated possible means for management and control of nuclear spent fuel, including its system size and cost. Finally, we extracted some technological tasks to be solved and political issues to be discussed. Our findings are as follows. 1. The total amount of the power generation in three East Asian counties (China, Korea and Taiwan) is about 17 million KW presently. This will be tripled to 51 million KW by the year 2010. When Japan's ability is added it is 62 million KW currently and 121 million by 2010. 2. The nuclear spent fuel in Taiwan and Korea will be saturated for their storage capacity. On the other hand, Japan will start to operate her reprocessing plant in Aomori prefecture in 2003 and her new storage capability is completed in 1999. Also in China, a reprocessing pilot plant is under construction and its operation is scheduled in 2001. 3. As their national policy, China and Japan does reprocess from spent fuel but Korea and Taiwan don't. Instead, they take non-reprocessing and direct geological disposal. 4. If the collaborative management of nuclear wastes is realized Multi

  11. Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

    2013-01-01

    The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  12. The politics of fading dreams: Britain and the nuclear export business

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boardman, R.; Grieve, M.

    1983-01-01

    The subject is discussed as follows: introduction to a chapter focused on the politics of Britain's foreign nuclear trade; export goals and the nuclear programme (discussion of Magnox, AGR, SGHWR and PWR); the pursuit of exports; nuclear exports and proliferation (reprocessing; fast reactors; plutonium; INFCE); public opinion, nuclear power and exports (interest groups); conclusions (Britain's nuclear exports and non-proliferation). (U.K.)

  13. Precipitation Pattern Controls on the Dynamics and Subsequent Export of Large Wood from River Catchments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seo, J.; Nakamura, F.; Chun, K.; Grant, G. E.

    2011-12-01

    In-stream large wood (LW) has a critical impact on the geomorphic and ecological character in river catchments, yet relatively little is known about variations in its dynamics and subsequent export in relation to different precipitation patterns and intensities. To understand these variations we used the annual volume of LW removed from 42 reservoirs in Japan and daily precipitation at or near the reservoir sites. Daily precipitation data were transformed into effective precipitation to evaluate trends in both current and antecedent precipitation, and these data were then used to explain basin variation in LW export. Model selection with generalized linear mixed models revealed that the precipitation pattern and intensity controlling LW export in small, intermediate, and large watersheds differed with latitude along the Japanese archipelago. LW export in small watersheds was well explained by effective precipitation greater than 120 mm, and showed little latitudinal variation. In contrast, LW export in intermediate and large watersheds was well explained by daily precipitation greater than 40 mm and 60 mm, respectively, and varied with latitude. In small watersheds with narrow channels and low stream discharges, mass movements (such as landslides and debris flows) are major factors in the production and transport of LW. Thus LW export in small watersheds appears to be regulated by the effective precipitation required to initiate mass movements, and shows little latitudinal change. In intermediate and large watersheds with wide channels and high stream discharges, heavy rainfall and subsequent floods regulate buoyant depth influencing the initiation of LW mobility, and thus control the amount of LW exported. In southern and central Japan, intense rainfall accompanying typhoons or localized torrential downpours lead to geomorphic disturbances, which produce massive amounts of LW delivery into channels. However, these pieces are constantly removed by high streamflows

  14. Remote sensing and geoinformation technologies in support of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control verification regimes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Niemeyer, Irmgard [Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH, Institut fuer Energie- und Klimaforschung, IEK-6: Nukleare Entsorgung und Reaktorsicherheit (Germany)

    2013-07-01

    A number of international agreements and export control regimes have been concluded in order to reduce the risk and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In order to provide confidence that Member States are complying with the agreed commitments, most of the treaties and agreements include verification provisions. Different types of verification measures exist, e.g. cooperative measures; national technical means; technical monitoring or measurement devices placed at or near sites; on-site inspections; intelligence information; open-source information, such as commercial internet data and satellite imagery. The study reviews the technical progress in the field of satellite imaging sensors and explores the recent advances in satellite imagery processing and geoinformation technologies as to the extraction of significant observables and signatures. Moreover, it discusses how satellite data and geoinformation technologies could be used complementary for confirming information gathered from other systems or sources. The study also aims at presenting the legal and political aspects and the cost benefits of using imagery from both national and commercial satellites in the verification procedure. The study concludes that satellite imagery and geoinformation technologies are expected to enhance the verification efficiency and effectiveness.

  15. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shea, M.

    2000-01-01

    Fissionable materials are common to all nuclear weapons and controls on the production, storage, processing and use of fissionable materials provides one means to address non-proliferation and disarmament. In this article, the relevance of such controls is examined and the current situation and future prospects are assessed. (authors)

  16. Evaluation of the Administration's proposed nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Dwindling supplies of fossil fuels are causing countries to turn increasingly to nuclear power as a major source of energy. Although nuclear power holds out the promise of energy independence, it has a formidable drawback--it can also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In April, the President announced a new policy designed to curb nuclear proliferation and the executive branch proposed legislation entitled 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977.' The strategy outlined in these documents calls for stricter export controls and safeguards as well as actions affecting uranium enrichment services, reprocessing, storing of spent fuel, and disposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. GAO analyzed this non-proliferation strategy as it relates to: Improving nuclear export controls; Strengthening international nuclear safeguards; Maintaining U.S. reliability as a supplier of uranium enrichment services; Deferring U.S. reprocessing of spent fuel as an example for others; Reducing risk of proliferation by controlling spent reactor fuel. In general, GAO concluded that the administration's strategy is constructive but noted some weaknesses which should be addressed. Some of the problems noted in this report may already have been addressed by congressional committees in their markup of the legislation

  17. Impacts of U.S. Export Control Policies on Science and Technology Activities and Competitiveness

    Science.gov (United States)

    2009-02-25

    coffee table. However, under the current export control regime, the stand was considered ‘ITAR hardware’ and we were required to have two security...should survive without an effective method for pruning items from the control lists when they no longer serve a significant definable national

  18. Export Controls and the Tensions between Academic Freedom and National Security

    Science.gov (United States)

    Evans, Samuel A. W.; Valdivia, Walter D.

    2012-01-01

    In the U.S.A., advocates of academic freedom--the ability to pursue research unencumbered by government controls--have long found sparring partners in government officials who regulate technology trade. From concern over classified research in the 1950s, to the expansion of export controls to cover trade in information in the 1970s, to current…

  19. Sustaining non-proliferation in the 1980s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nye, J.S.

    1984-01-01

    The subject is discussed as follows: introduction; the non-proliferation regime - 1950s to 1970s (IAEA safeguards; Non-proliferation Treaty; oil crisis; proposed sale of facilities for producing weapons-usable materials; USA position); the Carter Administration approach; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation); incentives (USA); export legislation (USA); domestic breeder policy (USA); maintaining the regime in the 1980s (safeguards; Pu and highly enriched uranium management; international spent fuel storage; fuel assurances); the problem of priority; rate vs. degree of proliferation; relations among regimes (international regimes); conclusion. (U.K.)

  20. United States non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1978-01-01

    U.S. non-proliferation policy is aimed at slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, managing the destabilizing effects of nuclear technology for energy purposes, and fostering international standards and institutions to deal responsibly with global nuclear development. These goals assume that nuclear technology has not already precluded social control and recognize the social benefits offered by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Non-proliferation policies recognize that the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is a more-difficult problem than technical ability and will concentrate on reducing those incentives through international agreements and safeguards and by maintaining the separation of commercial nuclear fuel cycles and military uses

  1. Multilateral Cooperation on Nonproliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-10-01

    Nathan E . Busch and Daniel H. Joyner, eds., Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy (Athens, GA...or the World Bank . These organizations receive contributions from member states but have their own...Opening Reception Jack’s Lounge , Portola Hotel Friday, March 30, 2010 Timeline Content Delivery 7:30-8:30 Breakfast and Registration Cottonwood

  2. Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union, Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report

    Science.gov (United States)

    1994-05-01

    international advisory group composed of: Valentin Alexandrov Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minsk Alexander Bolsunovsky Institute of Biophysics, Krasnoyarsk Oleg...Center for Nonproliferation and Export Control, Minsk Alexander Pikayev Inst. of World Economy and Intl. Relations, Moscow Anatoly Scherba Ministry of...Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1994; A. Pikayev and A. Savelyev , "The USSR’s Nuclear Might: On Land, At Sea, At Air," Nezavisimaya Gazeta

  3. Conceptual Design on the System Architecture of Intellectual Export Control System(IXCS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeong, Seung Ho; Yang, Seung Hyo; Tae, Jae Woong; Shin, Dong Hoon

    2013-01-01

    The commodity classification is for identifying strategic commodity, and the export license is for verifying that exports have met the requirement by the national legislation following international obligations (i. e. NSG guidelines) Since 2008, the 'Nuclear Export Promotion Service (NEPS)' System has been used as a total IT system providing various functions for exporters and reviewers. However, reviewers who make the decisions for commodity classification and export license, may have difficulties caused by ambiguity of criteria. For example, it is not sure whether a CVCS (Chemical Volume Control System) of a certain nuclear reactor plant belongs to strategic commodity or not. The NEPS is a useful system helping users save their time, but it cannot provide solutions reducing ambiguity of each classification or license case. To solve these problems and provide more efficient ways to their decisions, various intelligent IT solutions are searched and studied. A functional architecture of IXCS is defined and designed conceptually. This conceptual design will be utilized to make database specification and to find the optimized artificial algorithm for review processes

  4. Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

    1997-01-01

    In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

  5. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

  6. Heavy water and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.M.

    1980-05-01

    This report begins with a historical sketch of heavy water. The report next assesses the nonproliferation implications of the use of heavy water-moderated power reactors; several different reactor types are discussed, but the focus is on the natural uranium, on-power fueled, pressure tube reactor CANDU. The need for and development of on-power fueling safeguards is discussed. Also considered is the use of heavy water in plutonium production reactors as well as the broader issue of the relative nuclear leverage that suppliers can bring to bear on countries with natural uranium-fueled reactors as compared to those using enriched designs. The final chapter reviews heavy water production methods and analyzes the difficulties involved in implementing these on both a large and a small scale. It concludes with an overview of proprietary and nonproliferation constraints on heavy water technology transfer

  7. Effect of International Standards Certification on Firm-Level Exports: An Application of the Control Function Approach

    OpenAIRE

    Tsunehiro Otsuki

    2011-01-01

    Growing number of firms in developing countries have earned certifications such as International Standards Organization (ISO) as it enhances reputation of their company or brand and attract buyers particularly in export market. This study evaluates the effect of international standards certification on firm's export performance in Europe and Central Asia by applying the control function approach with endogenous treatment effect to firm-level data. Certification is found to increase export sha...

  8. Border control and/or control of organized crime members in the scope of WMD non-proliferation politics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gudlin, S.

    2009-01-01

    trade those weapons for profit and the authors will also try to give some of the answers why in such cases the established border control mechanisms are not efficient enough in order to prevent WMD proliferation and how to improve them.(author)

  9. U.S. Nonproliferation Policies and the Future of Nuclear Cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Byoung Jo; Lee, Sang Hyun

    2008-12-01

    In order for Korea to enhance nuclear cooperation with the U.S., the most urgent thing is to prove its nonproliferation commitment to international community, and legislate solid nonproliferation policies. To achieve these goals, Korean government need to consider to create Nonproliferation Task Force in the government and focus on proving Korea's firm commitment for nonproliferation. Along with it, as a civilian counterpart, Nonproliferation Research Center must be created as soon as possible to research, plan, and publicize Korea's nonproliferation policies and measures. At the same time, the government must set up a control tower that will coordinate Korea's nuclear diplomacy and guide proper division of labor among governmental and nongovernmental agencies in nonproliferation area. Finally, to raise general public's awareness about the danger of nuclear proliferation, government must invest on to develop educational programs and public relationship programs to educate the Korean public

  10. The Office of Safeguards and Security Nonproliferation Support Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Desmond, W.J.

    1996-01-01

    The Nonproliferation Support Program was established in the Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security on october 1, 1995. its mission includes providing assistance to Departmental efforts for improved international material protection, control and accounting programs by coordinating and leveraging domestic safeguards and security policy, practice and experience into the international arena. A major objective of the program is to balance US national security requirements with global support of the nonproliferation objectives. This paper describes the organization of the Office of Safeguards and Security and the Nonproliferation Support Program role and responsibility, and presents some of the current areas of program emphasis and activity

  11. Development and current trends in the international nonproliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sessoms, A.L.

    1984-01-01

    The IAEA and its safeguards system is placed into a historical perspective. A personal perspective on the nonproliferation regime and on the Agency's role in it is then presented. This is done initially by discussing some of the landmark events in the history of the nonproliferation regime. Subsequently some of the history of arms control agreements and of the role of the IAEA are noted. Then political motivations of state and ways the Agency has an impact in the political nonproliferation sphere are addressed

  12. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2003-01-01

    Although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has enjoyed considerable success, today the regime has never been under greater threat. Three states have challenged the objectives of the NPT, and there is a technology challenge - the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology and know-how. A major issue confronting the international community is, how to deal with a determined proliferator? Despite this gloomy scenario, however, the non-proliferation regime has considerable strengths - many of which can be developed further. The regime comprises complex interacting and mutually reinforcing elements. At its centre is the NPT - with IAEA safeguards as the Treaty's verification mechanism. Important complementary elements include: restraint in the supply and the acquisition of sensitive technologies; multilateral regimes such as the CTBT and proposed FMCT; various regional and bilateral regimes; the range of security and arms control arrangements outside the nuclear area (including other WMD regimes); and the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. Especially important are political incentives and sanctions in support of non-proliferation objectives. This paper outlines some of the key issues facing the non-proliferation regime

  13. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant Ltd., Vienna (Austria)

    2000-06-15

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  14. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite; Wredberg, L.

    2000-06-01

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  15. Evaluation of selected features of US nuclear non-proliferation law and policy. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    Because other nations now have uranium enrichment facilities, no nation can use nuclear fuel services to dictate actions to others. The United States, therefore, should avoid undue reliance on its uranium enrichment capability as a tool to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1978 nuclear non-proliferation law requires the United States to ensure the availability of US enrichment services to meet foreign demand, but it is not apparent that a new enrichment plant authorized in 1975 is needed to meet this demand. The 1978 law has proven to be administratively workable as a means of exercising control over nuclear exports, but more needs to be done to make Government reviews of nuclear exports predictable and timely. A comprehensive interagency reassessment is needed of the controls the Department of Energy administers over foreign activities of US firms and individuals

  16. Multinational alternatives and nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1981-01-01

    The use of multinational institutional arrangements to control sensitive nuclear-fuel-cycle activities has interested policymakers since the dawn of the nuclear age. Several such ventures have been tried in the past, largely for economic, commercial, or technical reasons, and they have enjoyed varying degrees of success. More recently, with the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, multinational arrangements have received increasing attention as a means of reinforcing international safeguards which, together with political commitments on peaceful use, have been the principal components of the nonproliferation regime. The political acceptability and efficacy of multinational arrangements is related to the historic experience with multinational ventures, the changed political circumstances of the 1970s, and the probable requirements for constructive future cooperation. As part of a comprehensive regime covering the development of sensitive nuclear activities, multinational arrangements can reinforce the regime in a manner that is widely acceptable. A political effort to win support for such arrangements is thus worthwhile. 29 references

  17. Export Control Guide: Loose Parts Monitoring Systems for Nuclear Power Plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Langenberg, Donald W. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2012-12-01

    This report describes a typical LPMS, emphasizing its application to the RCS of a modern NPP. The report also examines the versatility of AE monitoring technology by describing several nuclear applications other than loose parts monitoring, as well as some non-nuclear applications. In addition, LPMS implementation requirements are outlined, and LPMS suppliers are identified. Finally, U.S. export controls applicable to LPMSs are discussed.

  18. A Proven Method for Meeting Export Control Objectives in Postal and Shipping Sectors

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-02-01

    A Proven Method for Meeting Export Control Objectives in Postal and Shipping Sectors Gregory Crabb, U.S. Postal Inspection Service Julia H...mail fraud, mail theft, identity theft, child exploitation, and prohibited mailings such as bombs and biological and chemical threats...April 2012. http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=10085 [Allen 2014a] Allen, Julia H., Crabb, Gregory; Curtis, Pamela D

  19. Reforming U.S. Export Controls Reforms: Advancing U.S. Army Interests

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-12-01

    The author wishes to thank several anonymous and peer re- viewers as well as Alex Barnes, Rachel Bauman, Justin Blaszczyk, William Cardon ...is worth noting in that it requires, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, that: certification be provided to Congress prior to the granting of...security. Otherwise, approval cannot be granted until 15 days after Congress has re- ceived the certification for the manufacturing license or technical

  20. Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manley, I.T.

    1981-01-01

    Proliferation is a problem that can only be solved when the political problems which lead countries to contemplate, the possession of nuclear weapons are solved; in the meantime it can only be managed. Non-proliferation policy has to deal both with the political and the technical aspects of proliferation. It must seek to buy time by addressing the reasons why nations feel the political need to construct nuclear weapons, as well as delaying the moment when such nations feel capable of doing so. The subject is examined and proposals made. (author)

  1. A study on improvement of export control system for the nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ok Joo; Shin, Dong Hoon; Yang, Seung Hyo

    2012-01-01

    The Republic of Korea joined Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) in 1995 and became a major nuclear supplier both in name and reality by contracting the Project of UAE Braka Nuclear Power Plant(BNPP) in 2009 and the Project of Jordan Research and Training Reactor(JRTR) in 2010. And ROK is currently negotiating with several countries such as Finland and Vietnam for more projects, so it is expected to obtain more orders of commercial and research reactor. At this point of time, we found that it is difficult to apply individual export licensing system as it is for the big nuclear project such as BNPP and JRTR Project. Because the nuclear project in foreign country contains transfer of thousands of items and technical documents, including a considerable number of strategic items, issuing individual licenses for all items and documents can cause the inefficiency of the project. So, an appropriate export control system which can support such a project is necessary. In this study, we focused on how to improve the export control system to guarantee not only time efficiency but careful management of strategic goods

  2. 1995 - a pivotal year for nuclear nonproliferation. German nonproliferation policy in the runup to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Preisinger, J.

    1994-01-01

    The paper describes the non-proliferation as a task of preventive security policy, the non-proliferation instruments, the content of an extended non-proliferation system, and tasks of German non-proliferation policy. (DG)

  3. EXPORT CONTROLS: Rapid Advances in China's Semiconductor Industry Underscore Need for Fundamental U.S. Policy Review

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    2002-01-01

    The United States controls the export of certain technology, including some of the equipment and materials used to make semiconductors, to sensitive destinations such as China for national security...

  4. Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and its Application to India and Pakistan

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Grimmett, Jeanne J

    2001-01-01

    Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) requires the President to impose sanctions on any country that he has determined is a "non-nuclear-weapon state" and has received or detonated a "nuclear explosive device...

  5. A study on the revision of nuclear safety act to build the foundation of nuclear export and import control system in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Seung Hyo; Choi, Sun Do

    2012-01-01

    Nuclear related items require export and import control beyond the multilateral export control system according to Safeguard Agreement, Additional Protocol and bilateral agreements. Besides Korea as a nuclear supplier is needed to actively cope with its export control system, which is being reinforced internationally. In regard to this trend, this study drew the revision plan of present Nuclear Safety Act to found the nuclear export and import control system in Korea by examining the related legislations and analyzing the implementation status of nuclear export and import control

  6. A study on the revision of nuclear safety act to build the foundation of nuclear export and import control system in Korea

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yang, Seung Hyo; Choi, Sun Do [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2012-10-15

    Nuclear related items require export and import control beyond the multilateral export control system according to Safeguard Agreement, Additional Protocol and bilateral agreements. Besides Korea as a nuclear supplier is needed to actively cope with its export control system, which is being reinforced internationally. In regard to this trend, this study drew the revision plan of present Nuclear Safety Act to found the nuclear export and import control system in Korea by examining the related legislations and analyzing the implementation status of nuclear export and import control.

  7. Competitiveness, export control and export promotion of dual-use goods. European and German balancing exercises; Wettbewerbsfaehigkeit, Exportkontrolle und Exportfoerderung von Dual-Use-Guetern. Europaeische und deutsche Spagatuebungen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Feldmann, Ulrike

    2014-08-15

    The EU Commission Communication of 24 April 2014 to the Council and the European Parliament ''The review of export control policy: Ensuring Security and Competitiveness in a changing world'' as well as the increasingly number of inquiries and applications to the German Federal Government (e.g. the rejection of Hermes guarantees and state funding of nuclear export and termination of bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear technologies) once again reason to discuss the current tension between the principle of free movement of goods, competitiveness and export promotion on the one hand and the export control on the other.

  8. 78 FR 9768 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-11

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8184] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice...

  9. 78 FR 9769 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-11

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8182] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on Chinese and Iranian Foreign Persons AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The U.S. Government...

  10. Correlations-Adjusted Export Market Diversification

    OpenAIRE

    Jung Joo La

    2011-01-01

    This paper introduces new export market diversification indices incorporated with correlations of business cycles among export partners to identify the actual effects of export market diversification on export instability. Three existing export market diversification indices reflect the dispersion level in terms of the number of export partners and their export shares, without a clear control for correlations among export earnings from export partners. In addition, they are underestimated or ...

  11. Study on the efficient export control for the Intangible Transfer of Technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoon, Sung-ho; Choi, Sun-do; Lee, Chansuh; Kim, Jong-sook [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    Technical Data may take forms such as document, drawing, description, report, manual and instruction. And, it can be written or recorded on storage medium such as disk, tape and read-only memories. Technical assistance may take forms such as instruction, skill, training, working knowledge and consulting services. Technical data or assistance can be transferred by intangible manners such as an electronic means (e.g. email, internet, telephone or fax) and through the oral (e.g. seminar, meeting or workshop). Currently, ROK's export control regulation is not classified between the transfer of listed items (or general technology) and intangible transfer of technology (ITT). It may make a loop hole or cause inefficient implementation of export control. The purpose of this study is to suggest the efficient control method for ITT independent from item control method. From the result of this study, several main feathers in regulations of developed countries are drawn. First, they define that technical assistance (or support) is the object of permission. And, they have a clear distinction between resident and non-resident. Second, The UK and Germany do not control the technical assistance related to construction and operation of nuclear facilities for peaceful use, as long as technology does not transfer to recipient that has a nuclear proliferation concerns such as the DPRK, Iran or Pakistan.

  12. Nuclear exports. Parliamentary control and confidentiality; Parlamentarische Kontrolle und Geheimhaltungsbeduerftigkeit bei Nuklearexporten. Zum Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 21. Oktober 2014

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Feldmann, Ulrike

    2015-03-15

    With its decision taken on 21. October 2014 (Az.: 2 BvE 5/11) the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) decided during court proceedings between administrative bodies on the scope and limits of the parliamentary right of information. Even though the proceeding did not deal with nuclear exports but arm exports, foreign trade law, however, does not only designate an export licence obligation for military weapons but also for so called dual-use goods meaning goods, which can be used both for friendly as well as for military purposes. The export of these goods requires according to the so-called Dual-Use Regulation (EG) 428/2009 a licence. Annex I category 0 of the regulation (EG) 428/2009 lists a variety of nuclear materials, plants and equipment items for which this licence applies. In the same manner as arm exports, also exports of nuclear dual-use goods are being discussed in a special cabinet committee, the Federal Security Council (BSR), which shall coordinate cross-departmentally the German security and defence policy under consideration of economic interests and which categorises its results, according to the rules of procedure, as confidential. Also legally not regulated but common ''preliminary enquiries'' at the responsible Federal Ministry or rather Federal Office of Economics and Export Control by companies which plan an export and want to affirm the general approval for their export business prior to conclusion of contract take not only place for arm exports but also for nuclear dual-use goods. The decision by the Federal Constitutional Court can be applied to consultations about the authorisation of nuclear dual-use goods.

  13. Fast reactors and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Orlov, V.V.

    1997-01-01

    1.Three aspects of nonproliferation relevant to nuclear power are: Pu buildup in NPP spent fuel cooling ponds (∼ 104 t in case of consumption of ∼ 107 t cheap uranium). Danger of illegal radiochemical extraction of Pu for weapons production; Pu extraction from NPP fuel at the plants available in nuclear countries, its burning along with weapon-grade Pu in NPP reactors or in special-purpose burners; increased hazard of nuclear weapons sprawl with breeders and closed fuel cycle technology spreading all over the world. 2.The latter is one of major obstacles to creation of large-scale nuclear power. 3.Nuclear power of the first stage using 235 U will be able to meet the demands of certain fuel-deficient countries and regions, replacing ∼ 5-10% of conventional fuels in the global consumption for a number of decades. 4.Fast reactors of the first generation and the currently employed fuel technology are far from exhausting their potential for solving economic problems and meeting the challenges of safety, radioactive waste and nonproliferation. Development of large-scale nuclear power will become an option accepted by society for solving energy problems in the following century, provided a breeder technology is elaborated and demonstrated in the next 15-20 years, which would comply with the totality of the following requirement: full internal Pu breeding deterministic elimination of severe accidents involving fuel damage and high radioactivity releases: fast runaway, loss of coolant, fires, steam and hydrogen explosions, etc.; reaching a balance between radioactive wastes disposed of and uranium mined in terms of radiation hazard; technology of closed fuel cycle preventing its use for Pu extraction and permitting physical protection from fuel thefts;economic competitiveness of nuclear power for most of countries and regions, i.e. primarily the cost of NPPs with fat reactors is to be below the cost of modern LWR plants, etc

  14. The role of the USNRC in power reactor exports. Legal and procedural aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shapar, H.K.; Stoiber, C.R.

    1978-01-01

    I. Background on the role of NRC in nuclear export activities. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, created in January 1975 to assume the licensing and regulatory responsibilities of the former Atomic Energy Commission, has final licensing authority over US nuclear reactor exports. Independent of direct Presidential control, the Commission gives great weight to Executive Branch views on national security and foreign policy issues. II. The nuclear export review process. Procedures for NRC review of nuclear export licence applications include referral to the Executive Branch for a co-ordinated expression of agency views; analysis of the record by the NRC staff; and final Commission licensing decision based on consideration of safeguards, agreements and understandings to assure that US exports will be used only for their intended peaceful purposes. III. NRC's proposed export/import licensing regulations. NRC has recently proposed to consolidate and simplify all of its export and import licensing provisions into a new Part 110 for the convenience of the public - both US and foreign. IV. Public participation in nuclear reactor export licensing. In the past two years, after formal requests by domestic and foreign interest groups, the NRC has developed procedures for direct public participation in its export licensing proceedings. V. Statutory licensing requirements. During the past two years, the NRC has refined and particularized the extremely general 'common defence and security' standard for export licences set forth in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. Eight questions routinely posed to the Executive Branch in reviewing licence applications has given content to Commission export decisions. Recently enacted non-proliferation legislation gives congressional recognition to even more specific, mandatory nuclear export licensing criteria

  15. Nonproliferation Education at the University of Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, Chris D.; Leek, K.M.

    2006-01-01

    decades ago, the UW has not supported hard science faculty positions that require knowledge of the theoretical and practical dimensions of the nonproliferation of nuclear technologies. Among U.S. National laboratories, PNNL has special strengths in technologies critical to the implementation of arms control treaties and to the detection of activities associated with the production, deployment, and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). PNNL plays a central role in the management of US-Russian programs for protection of fissile materials. In 2000, the PNWCGS initiated outreach to universities and NGOs. The Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security and the Jackson School have sought to bring PNNL expertise to the UW campus and the PNWCGS currently funds several IGRSS course instructors. The PNWCGS has arranged for Russian scientists to teach an experimental course in the IGRSS curriculum. In partnership with the Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security, IGRSS is presently seeking to engage scholars and scientists from other countries in joint teaching programs with the UW. IGRSS permits students to combine their disciplinary and professional specialties with the interdisciplinary and international IGRSS curriculum and its specialized courses on nonproliferation and WMD threats. IGRSS now offers three core courses and several occasional courses on special topics related to WMD issues. The core courses will serve as the requirements for a planned Graduate Certificate and Undergraduate Minor. The three core courses discussed are: (1) Arms control and international law; (2) Weapons of mass destruction; and (3) Arms control simulation.

  16. Interactions between mRNA export commitment, 3'-end quality control, and nuclear degradation

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Libri, Domenico; Dower, Ken; Boulay, Jocelyne

    2002-01-01

    Several aspects of eukaryotic mRNA processing are linked to transcription. In Saccharomyces cerevisiae, overexpression of the mRNA export factor Sub2p suppresses the growth defect of hpr1 null cells, yet the protein Hpr1p and the associated THO protein complex are implicated in transcriptional el...... results show that several classes of defective RNPs are subject to a quality control step that impedes release from transcription site foci and suggest that suboptimal messenger ribonucleoprotein assembly leads to RNA degradation by Rrp6p....

  17. Institutional overviews. Overview of the JAEA and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Senzaki, Masao

    2006-01-01

    The Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was formed within the new Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) to carry out safeguards and material control duties for the JAEA. Development of technologies and procedures for safeguards is an important duty. In addition, the new NPSTC will assume a 'think tank' role in support of the nonproliferation regime, help train nonproliferation experts, and cooperate with academic, government and non-governmental organizations on nonproliferation issues. This report briefly summarizes the formation of the JAEA and describes the duties and structure of the NPSTC in detail. (author)

  18. Radiological control of the junk exports in Cuba; Control radiologico de las exportaciones de chatarra en Cuba

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dominguez L, O; Capote F, E; Carrazana G, J A; Zerquera, J T; Ramos V, O; Alonso A, D; Fernandez, I M; Caveda R, C A; Madrazo M, S; Barroso P, I [CPHR, Calle 20 No. 4113 e/41 y 47, Playa, C.P. 11300, A.P. 6195, C.P. 10600 La Habana (Cuba)

    2006-07-01

    Even when in Cuba a strict control exists on the radiation sources that enter to the country to be used in the different applications, it can be given the case that sources or contaminated materials that never were under this control due fundamentally to that entered to the country before the same one existed, appear in the junk that is marketed. In our country it is effective the Combined Resolution CITMA-MINCEX dated on April, 2002 that settles down the necessity and obligation that has all that manipulates, imports, exports or process junk of carrying out it a radiological control. From April, 2002 making use of a minimum of resources, an own methodology, a properly qualified personnel and the support of a credited laboratory by the ISO 17025 standard, the radioactivity measurement service in junk belonging to the Center of Protection and Hygiene of the Radiations (CPHR), it has reduced the risks that sources or contaminated materials are found in the junk that is exported in the main exporter companies of this line in Cuba avoiding possible radiological emergency situations that affect the population and the environment. (Author)

  19. Scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre - ARSRITP and arms control and nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avrorin, E.N.; Andrusenko, B.A.; Voznyuk, R.I.; Voloshin, N.P.

    1994-01-01

    The activity of scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre (RFNC) -ARSRITP in the field of nuclear disarmament control for the period of 1974 -1993 is discussed. RFNC - ARSRITP scientists in collaboration with american specialists have developed and employed in practice the techniques and equipment to control the bilateral Treaty on the limitation of Nuclear -Weapon Test. Experience of control over nuclear tests of threshold power and realization of new RFNC - ARSRITP scientific and technical projects have made a basis for development of measures and means of possible control methods to observe complete nuclear test ban

  20. Irradiation to control insects in fruits and vegetables for export from Hawaii

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Follett, P.A.

    2004-01-01

    Phytosanitary or quarantine treatments are often required to disinfest host commodities of economically important arthropod pests before they are moved through market channels to areas where the pest does not occur. Irradiation is an accepted treatment to control quarantine pests in 10 fruits and five vegetables for export from Hawaii to the US mainland. Irradiation is the ideal technology for developing generic quarantine treatments because it is effective against most insect and mite pests at dose levels that do not affect the quality of most commodities. A generic dose of 150 Gy has been proposed for tephritid fruit flies. Contrary to the 150 Gy dose, approved irradiation quarantine treatment doses for Mediterranean fruit fly, melon fly, and oriental fruit fly in Hawaii are 210-250 Gy. Irradiation studies were conducted to determine if the approved doses were unnecessarily high and could be reduced. Irradiation is also a viable alternative to methyl bromide fumigation to disinfest Hawaii sweetpotatoes, and studies are in progress to identify an effective dose for two key sweetpotato insect pests. Results indicate that irradiation doses <150 Gy will control Hawaii's fruit flies, which supports the proposed generic dose. The idea of generic doses is appealing because it would greatly accelerate the process of approving irradiation quarantine treatments for specific crops, and thereby rapidly expand exports. Preliminary results show that 250-300 Gy will control Hawaii's sweetpotato pests

  1. Regulating the Academic “Marketplace of Ideas”: Commercialization, Export Controls, and Counterintelligence

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    John Krige

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available Two revolutions, not one, are transforming the research enterprise in American academia. One is the commercialization of research. The other is the regulation of research by the national security state that was accelerated by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and focuses increasingly on the risk of sensitive knowledge leaking to China and other countries of concern. Commercialization temporarily restricts knowledge circulation to secure a patent for personal and institutional gain. Regulation controls the flow of knowledge to select foreign nationals using multiple instruments, including export controls, along with informal surveillance by the FBI. Ironically, the neoliberal urge to roll back the state and commercialize research in a competitive global knowledge economy exposes the American academic research system to the risk of “industrial” espionage and rolls out the regulatory apparatus of the national security state. Alongside offices of technology transfer on campus we now have offices of export control and compliance. Faculty and graduate students have accommodated themselves to this new situation, even while they regret it; many are concerned by the challenge that it poses to academic freedom, intellectual dynamism and political openness.

  2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, June 10, September 13, 14, 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    Senator Frank Church presented the opening statement on the June 10, 1977 hearing concerning the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977, S.1432. S.1432 is designed to establish a nonproliferation framework with specific objectives established for the ERDA nuclear energy programs. The ERDA authorization bill is the budgetary vehicle to implement these objectives. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources obtained joint referral of certain portions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to insure that nonproliferation policy is implemented in a manner consistent with the policy of having sufficent energy for this country and foreign countries in the future. Additionally, the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development must examine the cost and the consequences of various initiatives before they are implemented. For example, the proposal to guarantee uranium enrichment services for foreign nations poses specific requirements on ERDA to expand considerably our enrichment capacity by the year 2000. Without reprocessing, it is expected that spent fuel rods from abroad will be returned to this country for storage with attendant costs and siting decisions. Also, international fuel cycle evaluation programs must be carefully examined to insure that all options, including regional fuel cycle centers with international controls and inspection, are considered in seeking international approaches to the nonproliferation objectives. It is these and related questions to which the subcommittee seeks answers. The hearings on September 13 and 14 focused on S.897, a bill to strengthen U.S. policies on nonproliferation and to reorganize certain export functions of the Federal government to promote more efficient administration of such functions. Statements were presented by experts in government, private firms, and industrial sectors

  3. Export Control Requirements for Tritium Processing Design and R&D

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hollis, William Kirk [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Maynard, Sarah-Jane Wadsworth [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-04-05

    This document will address requirements of export control associated with tritium plant design and processes. Los Alamos National Laboratory has been working in the area of tritium plant system design and research and development (R&D) since the early 1970’s at the Tritium Systems Test Assembly (TSTA). This work has continued to the current date with projects associated with the ITER project and other Office of Science Fusion Energy Science (OS-FES) funded programs. ITER is currently the highest funding area for the DOE OS-FES. Although export control issues have been integrated into these projects in the past a general guidance document has not been available for reference in this area. To address concerns with currently funded tritium plant programs and assist future projects for FES, this document will identify the key reference documents and specific sections within related to tritium research. Guidance as to the application of these sections will be discussed with specific detail to publications and work with foreign nationals.

  4. Export Control Requirements for Tritium Processing Design and R&D

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hollis, William Kirk [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Maynard, Sarah-Jane Wadsworth [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-10-30

    This document will address requirements of export control associated with tritium plant design and processes. Los Alamos National Laboratory has been working in the area of tritium plant system design and research and development (R&D) since the early 1970’s at the Tritium Systems Test Assembly (TSTA). This work has continued to the current date with projects associated with the ITER project and other Office of Science Fusion Energy Science (OS-FES) funded programs. ITER is currently the highest funding area for the DOE OS-FES. Although export control issues have been integrated into these projects in the past a general guidance document has not been available for reference in this area. To address concerns with currently funded tritium plant programs and assist future projects for FES, this document will identify the key reference documents and specific sections within related to tritium research. Guidance as to the application of these sections will be discussed with specific detail to publications and work with foreign nationals.

  5. Common sense and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kennedy, R.T.

    1985-01-01

    Since the dawn of the nuclear age nearly four decades ago, the United States has been firmly commited to the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. That principle is embodied in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), support for which has been a basic tenet of US foreign policy and a basic security interest of the world at large ever since. The Reagan administration remains firmly committed to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Such proliferation could trigger new and grave dangers for America's security and well-being and indeed for that of all the world's peoples. Desperate leaders in future high-stakes conflicts might not shrink from nuclear blackmail or even from the use of nuclear weapons if they were available. A conventional clash between nuclear-armed states in a conflict-prone region might escalate by accident or miscalculation to a local nuclear exchange. It cannot be discounted that such a nuclear clash might threaten to involve the superpowers themselves. With proliferation, also, terrorist groups could more easily acquire nuclear weapons to extort concessions. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, then, is not solely of interest to the superpowers: it is vital to all countries and regions. The security of the countries in those regions to which nuclear weapons might spread would be most immediately and seriously affected. By their adherence to the NPT, more than 100 countries have recognized this fact

  6. Paranoids, pygmies, pariahs and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Betts, R.K.

    1977-01-01

    The spread of nuclear weapons has finally become a central item on the foreign policy agenda. But the fervor of most opponents of proliferation has been matched only by their reluctance to deal with the causes of the threat. The misplaced focus on ways to isolate weapons-related capabilities obscures the importance of the stickier but more salient problem of the incentives many nations have to get a bomb: fear or ambition. As long as antiproliferation strategy goes no further than schemes to keep the genie in a few bottles, we risk doing both more and less than necessary. Distressingly few arms-control enthusiasts have faced up to the full price of nonproliferation. The needed reorientation in thinking, which is really only a return to the ageless problem of balance of power, has been impeded by prevalent fallacies of emphasis about what causes the threat, who the candidates for proliferation are, and what strategies are applicable to which candidates. The author proceeds to discuss: (1) causes (the moralist fallacy, the economic fallacy, the diseconomic fallacy, and the technicist fallacy); (2) candidates (the pygmy states, the paranoid states, the pariah states, and five options of the U.S.); (3) cures (the fatalist fallacy, the multilateral fallacy, the embargo fallacy, the safeguards fallacy, the umbrella fallacy, the two-wrongs-don't-make-a-right fallacy, and the golden key fallacy); and (4) choices

  7. A peptide export-import control circuit modulating bacterial development regulates protein phosphatases of the phosphorelay.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Perego, M

    1997-08-05

    The phosphorelay signal transduction system activates developmental transcription in sporulation of Bacillus subtilis by phosphorylation of aspartyl residues of the Spo0F and Spo0A response regulators. The phosphorylation level of these response regulators is determined by the opposing activities of protein kinases and protein aspartate phosphatases that interpret positive and negative signals for development in a signal integration circuit. The RapA protein aspartate phosphatase of the phosphorelay is regulated by a peptide that directly inhibits its activity. This peptide is proteolytically processed from an inactive pre-inhibitor protein encoded in the phrA gene. The pre-inhibitor is cleaved by the protein export apparatus to a putative pro-inhibitor that is further processed to the active inhibitor peptide and internalized by the oligopeptide permease. This export-import circuit is postulated to be a mechanism for timing phosphatase activity where the processing enzymes regulate the rate of formation of the active inhibitor. The processing events may, in turn, be controlled by a regulatory hierarchy. Chromosome sequencing has revealed several other phosphatase-prepeptide gene pairs in B. subtilis, suggesting that the use of this mechanism may be widespread in signal transduction.

  8. Nuclear exports and international cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McCardle, J.J.

    1981-06-01

    Canada's nuclear export policy together with its non-proliferation and safeguards policy embrace both the country's desire to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its effort to minimize the risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. This policy reflects the belief that only if Canadian parliamentary and public opinion can be convinced that Canada's nuclear exports will not contribute to nuclear proliferation will the long-term health of the country's nuclear industry be assured. Canada requires a political commitment to non-proliferation from its nuclear partners, and looks to the IAEA to administer safeguards on nuclear material of Canadian origin to guarantee that commitment. Agreements reached with its nuclear partners are in accordance with provisions of the non-proliferation treaty and include a contingency provision for fall-back safeguards if the other state should withdraw from the NPT. Provision is made for mutual agreement on reprocessing and enrichment of nuclear material. Agreements have been reached with some twenty nuclear partners, and efforts are continuing to come to new international understanding on reprocessing, enrichment, and plutonium storage

  9. 75 FR 37742 - Addition of New Export Control Classification Number 6A981 Passive Infrasound Sensors to the...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-30

    ... Infrasound Sensors to the Commerce Control List of the Export Administration Regulations, and Related... control passive infrasound sensors because of their military and commercial utility. Items under this new... Thompson, Sensors and Aviation Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, Telephone: (202) 482-4252...

  10. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  11. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  12. On The Export Control Of High Speed Imaging For Nuclear Weapons Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Watson, Scott Avery [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Altherr, Michael Robert [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-09-15

    Since the Manhattan Project, the use of high-speed photography, and its cousins flash radiography1 and schieleren photography have been a technological proliferation concern. Indeed, like the supercomputer, the development of high-speed photography as we now know it essentially grew out of the nuclear weapons program at Los Alamos2,3,4. Naturally, during the course of the last 75 years the technology associated with computers and cameras has been export controlled by the United States and others to prevent both proliferation among non-P5-nations and technological parity among potential adversaries among P5 nations. Here we revisit these issues as they relate to high-speed photographic technologies and make recommendations about how future restrictions, if any, should be guided.

  13. Authority of compact commission to control import/export for disposal and other purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Poling, R.D.

    1995-01-01

    As operational capabilities for radioactive waste disposal expand and as approaching dates for waste exclusion near, the legal question of the authority of compact commissions to control the import and export of low-level radioactive nuclear waste is a legal issue of significance to many regions. This presentation will review the provisions of various compacts and the federal compact approval legislation, consider the interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and discuss possible interpretive perspectives relating to the authority of compact commissions. The discussion will focus on whether waste exclusion authority is confined in application to imported waste for permanent disposal or extends to transported and imported waste for processing, treatment, or other purposes

  14. Authority of compact commission to control import/export for disposal and other purposes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Poling, R.D.

    1995-12-31

    As operational capabilities for radioactive waste disposal expand and as approaching dates for waste exclusion near, the legal question of the authority of compact commissions to control the import and export of low-level radioactive nuclear waste is a legal issue of significance to many regions. This presentation will review the provisions of various compacts and the federal compact approval legislation, consider the interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and discuss possible interpretive perspectives relating to the authority of compact commissions. The discussion will focus on whether waste exclusion authority is confined in application to imported waste for permanent disposal or extends to transported and imported waste for processing, treatment, or other purposes.

  15. Introduction to Technology Export License of Nuclear Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seo, Hana; Lee, Chansuh; Shin, Donghoon

    2014-01-01

    In this regime, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) has authority on final decision making. And the Korea Institute of Nuclear nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has missions to review the classification and export licensing technically. In principle, classification and export licensing are applied and reviewed individually. However, the number of application for classification and licensing has increased geometrically in the last three years. This is largely a due to the contract that the Republic of Korea (ROK) has finalized to build the UAE Barakah Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) and Jordan Research and Training Reactor (JRTR). This circumstance brought an administrative burden for the government and related institutes as well as stakeholders. This article introduces the law related to the 'Technology Export License of Nuclear Facility' which was developed and legislated to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of commodities classification and export licensing. This system could significantly reduce the licensing burden for transferring the technologies. However, the classification and license on this system are still requested when transferring the goods. Therefore, KINAC will continue to figure out the needs for the stakeholders and keep searching for solutions to problems inherent in the industry

  16. Introduction to Technology Export License of Nuclear Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Seo, Hana; Lee, Chansuh; Shin, Donghoon [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    In this regime, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) has authority on final decision making. And the Korea Institute of Nuclear nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has missions to review the classification and export licensing technically. In principle, classification and export licensing are applied and reviewed individually. However, the number of application for classification and licensing has increased geometrically in the last three years. This is largely a due to the contract that the Republic of Korea (ROK) has finalized to build the UAE Barakah Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) and Jordan Research and Training Reactor (JRTR). This circumstance brought an administrative burden for the government and related institutes as well as stakeholders. This article introduces the law related to the 'Technology Export License of Nuclear Facility' which was developed and legislated to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of commodities classification and export licensing. This system could significantly reduce the licensing burden for transferring the technologies. However, the classification and license on this system are still requested when transferring the goods. Therefore, KINAC will continue to figure out the needs for the stakeholders and keep searching for solutions to problems inherent in the industry.

  17. Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

    2012-01-01

    This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

  18. Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

    2012-03-06

    This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

  19. The international nuclear non-proliferation system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, T.

    1985-01-01

    This volume focuses upon the issues raised at this Conference, and attempts to address the international diplomatic, political and trading, rather than technical, questions which surround nuclear non-proliferation policies. It does so by bringing together chapters contributed by participants in non-proliferation diplomacy, those with experience in shaping International Atomic Energy Agency and national policies and academic observers of non-proliferation activities and the international nuclear industry. An analysis is provided of past non-proliferation policies and activities and current issues, and an attempt is made to offer ideas for new initiatives which may sustain the non-proliferation system in the future

  20. Review of GAO report on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, May 21, 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    Three witnesses from the General Accounting Office (GAO) testified at a May 21, 1981 hearing on the results of a three-year review of the impact and implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978. A total of 115 countries have ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), and some have urged a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America. The GAO proposed recommendations for improving NNPA administration and developing a more coherent long-term policy. The GAO questions the need for additional enrichment capacity, and suggests a closer look at the need to complete the centrifuge facility. It notes only limited progress in multinational fuel-supply assurances and the establishment of international spent-fuel repositories. It urges the US to take a more-active role in these areas and in the international control system. A listing of US exports of highly enriched uranium from 1954 to 1981 follows the testimony

  1. Nuclear nonproliferation strategy in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jenkins, F.W.

    1989-07-01

    The most immediate danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons in Asia is in South Asia, where both India and Pakistan have developed the means of producing nuclear explosive materials. In East Asia, North Korea appears to be in the early stages of a weapon-related nuclear program, and before the end of the century South Korea or Taiwan could revive their past efforts to move closer to a nuclear weapons capability. Over the longer run, Japan could conceivably decide to abandon its present strong opposition to the acquisition of nuclear Weapons. At present, the United States has largely separate approaches to the nuclear weapon proliferation problems in South Asia and in East Asia. This paper argues that these separate approaches should be strengthened and integrated into a broader regional nonproliferation strategy. This regional strategy would have three major strands: inducing India and Pakistan to agree not to produce nuclear weapons or test nuclear explosive devices for a specific period; bolstering the existing nonproliferation regime, principally by maintaining nonproliferation incentives and involving China more in the nonproliferation regime; and encouraging regional cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy

  2. 75 FR 18029 - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Export-Controlled Items (DFARS Case 2004-D010)

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-08

    ... regulations and prescribes a contract clause to address those responsibilities. DATES: Effective Date: April 8... activities and communication between the parties to a potential contract, and to have the resulting contract... Government needs to convey to the universities the information that certain work is export-controlled. DoD...

  3. Variable flushing mechanisms and landscape structure control stream DOC export during snowmelt in a set of nested catchments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vincent J. Pacific; Kelsey G. Jencso; Brian L. McGlynn

    2010-01-01

    Stream DOC dynamics during snowmelt have been the focus of much research, and numerous DOC mobilization and delivery mechanisms from riparian and upland areas have been proposed. However, landscape structure controls on DOC export from riparian and upland landscape elements remains poorly understood. We investigated stream and groundwater DOC dynamics across three...

  4. Export Control and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base - Revised. Volume 1: Summary Report and Volume 2: Appendices

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-10-01

    differentiating their products as “ITAR-free”, in the hopes that this can give them a leg up on US producers. To date this “marketing campaign” has...Inspectorate of Strategic Products Slovenia Ministry of Defence Slovakia Ministry of Economy United DTI Export Control Organization [Check] E-41

  5. GABAB receptor cell surface export is controlled by an endoplasmic reticulum gatekeeper

    Science.gov (United States)

    Doly, Stéphane; Shirvani, Hamasseh; Gäta, Gabriel; Meye, Frank; Emerit, Michel-Boris; Enslen, Hervé; Achour, Lamia; Pardo-Lopez, Liliana; Kwon, Yang Seung; Armand, Vincent; Gardette, Robert; Giros, Bruno; Gassmann, Martin; Bettler, Bernhard; Mameli, Manuel; Darmon, Michèle; Marullo, Stefano

    2016-01-01

    Summary Endoplasmic reticulum (ER) release and cell surface export of many G protein-coupled receptors (GPCRs), are tightly regulated. For GABAB receptors of GABA, the major mammalian inhibitory neurotransmitter, the ligand-binding GB1 subunit is maintained in the ER by unknown mechanisms in the absence of hetero-dimerization with the GB2 subunit. We report that GB1 retention is regulated by a specific gatekeeper, PRAF2. This ER resident transmembrane protein binds to GB1, preventing its progression in the biosynthetic pathway. GB1 release occurs upon competitive displacement from PRAF2 by GB2. PRAF2 concentration, relative to that of GB1 and GB2, tightly controls cell surface receptor density and controls GABAB function in neurons. Experimental perturbation of PRAF2 levels in vivo caused marked hyperactivity disorders in mice. These data reveal an unanticipated major impact of specific ER gate-keepers on GPCR function and identify PRAF2 as a new molecular target with therapeutic potential for psychiatric and neurological diseases involving GABAB function. PMID:26033241

  6. The Use of Microorganism for Biological Control of Anthracnose in Nam Dok Mai Mango for Export

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Piadiang, Nattaya

    2006-09-01

    Antagonist were tested inhibition of mycelial growth of Collectorichum gloeosporioides, a causal agent of anthracnose on potato dextrose agar (PDA) revealed that 46 isolated that 46 isolate inhibited the growth of mycelia by 40.01-60.00 5. The selected four isolates inhibit the growth of fungal nycelia by 47.01-50.00 % including YFm1, YFm2, Y18 and AC2-1 were test for the potential reduce anthracnose lesion development on detected Nam Dok Mai mango by application of antagonistic microorganism before inoculation of C. gloeosporioides. This result slow that four isolate antagonistic reduced sized of lesion on Nam Dok Mai mango by 89.23, 75.38, 58.46 and 33.85 %, respectively as compare the control. Five isolate of antagonist including YFm1, YFm2, Y18, CLY35 and CLY23 could inhibited the growth of mycelia on PDA by 44.01-50.00 % were test the potential reduce anthracnose lesion development on detected Nam Dok Mai mango by application of antagonistic microorganism after inoculation of C. gloeosporioides. It was found that this application could not inhibit anthracnose on fruit mango as compare to the control. YFm1 were test for the potential inhibition anthracnose disease under field condition. It was found that YFm1 could control of C. gloeosporioides within 7 and 14 day after spraying antagonistic suspension. The efficiency test of YFm1 for anthracnose controlling on mango was followed by export treatment Azoxystrobin, ET-fon and showed 55.55%, 77.77 % and 88.88 % anthracnose infection and/or spoilage respectively

  7. Nonproliferation issues. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First and Second Sessions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1976-01-01

    Twelve days of hearings were held over an 18-month period to discuss issues relating to the Nonproliferation Treaty and its effectiveness. Nuclear weapons are no longer confined to those nations with economic and technical capability, a fact which jeopardizes the security of all nations. Critics of the treaty felt that it was more the result of maneuvering than negotiation. The committee examined issues raised by the Vladivostok Accords, which limits the nuclear arms race, promotes detente, and allows progress in arms control. Witnesses responded to criticism that the Accords (1) did not limit a qualitative arms race, (2) allowed both sides to modernize all 2,400 permitted delivery vehicles, (3) did not equalize throw weight, and (4) allow extensive new deployment of MIRV's, especially in the Soviet Union. Witnesses representing government, universities, industry, and foreign countries considered the range of weapons, safeguards and control agreements, estimates of war damage, and the Treaty's intended benefits of security assurance and information exchange

  8. Regular Workflow of the Customs on the Supervision and Control over the Import & Export Goods

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2009-01-01

    @@ Declaration & Management Article 25 of Customs Law prescribes that paper declaration form and electronic declaration form must be adopted in the Customs declaration formalities for the import & export goods.

  9. Export Controls: Implementation of the 1998 Legislative Mandate for High Performance Computers

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1999-01-01

    We found that most of the 938 proposed exports of high performance computers to civilian end users in countries of concern from February 3, 1998, when procedures implementing the 1998 authorization...

  10. European Union's Arms Control Regime and Arms Exports to China: Background and Legal Analysis

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Grimmett, Richard F; Papademetriou, Theresa

    2005-01-01

    In recent months, discussions have been held within the European Union (EU) on the question of lifting the embargo on arms exports to the People's Republic of China that was imposed on China on June 27, 1989...

  11. Through Internal Control System, Jatirogo Organic Coconut Sugar Farmers Gained Access to the Export Market

    OpenAIRE

    Setyowati, Theresia Eko

    2014-01-01

    By founding Jatirogo organic coconut sugar ICS, 1,554 farmer members now have stronger bargaining power in marketing organic coconut sugar. Jatirogo organic coconut sugar ICS has succeeded to export its organic gula semut. By obtaining international certifications (EU Regulation, NOP-USDA, and JAS), KSU Jatirogo sends organic gula semut to various countries, such as the United States, Australia, and European and Asian countries, by collaborating with KSU Jatirogo and exporting companies. ...

  12. A Digest of Nonproliferation Literature.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duggan, Ruth A

    2006-04-01

    In preparation for the 2005 US/Russian Weapons Laboratories Directors Meeting, the six laboratories participating in the meeting endeavored to develop a strategy for nonproliferation technology research and development. A literature review was conducted to identify possible areas of technical collaboration and technology opportunities associated with improving nonproliferation associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The issue of multinationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was also researched. This digest is the compilation of one-page summaries used by management of the three US nuclear weapons laboratories in preparation for strategy development. Where possible, the Web site address of the complete paper is referenced.3 AcknowledgementsThe author wishes to thank Jessica Ruyle, Nancy Orlando-Gay, and Barbara Dry for their research assistance and contributions.4

  13. Historical survey of nonproliferation policies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1977-01-01

    This paper briefly surveys the successive nonproliferation policies and their influence on international commerce and the reaction of the countries where they were applied: the war policy, secrecy policy, liberal policy, safeguarded assistance policy, nonproliferation treaty policy, suppliers' policy, French policy, and the no weapon-usable material policy. It is emphasized that any new solution of the problem must not appear to delay or limit in any way a nation's access to nuclear energy, nor to make any countries dependent on others to meet their energy requirements. Therefore, in the choice of a future policy, political considerations are more important than technical or legal ones. The greatest catalyst of proliferation is the spread of national autarchic programs, and these can only be avoided within a general climate of international trust. The escalation of mistrust between the countries possessing the technological information and those desiring it must be dispelled. Such a policy will have to be clear and stable

  14. Future non-proliferation challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yelchenko, Volodymyr

    2008-01-01

    Having chaired the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee Mr. Volodymyr Yelchenko noted that the NPT States parties reaffirmed the important role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. They stressed that non-compliance with the Treaty provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation and placed emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. The universality aspect was brought to the front with the lack of progress in this area. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states, promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring non-proliferation. There is concern that non-States actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. One of the underlying themes at the Second Prepcom was the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation. Negative consequences to nuclear non-proliferation were also mentioned in the context of the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defense systems, with the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the urgent conclusion of such a treaty as a beneficial step towards non-proliferation was stressed. The NPT states parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for

  15. Nuclear export policy of the Reagan Administration

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, J F; Donnelly, W H [Library of Congress, Washington, DC (USA)

    1983-06-01

    The Reagan Administration maintains the Carter Administration's objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as being fundamental to US nuclear export policy. However, it sees the USA as having another important role to play in influencing the use of nuclear power and the trading of related goods and technologies in other countries. While the Administration believes its policies will prove beneficial to the USA, there is concern that trade considerations are being given priority over preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  16. On the structure of nonproliferation measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kano, Takashi

    1994-01-01

    The author proposed a new analysis method of nonproliferation measures depending on full perception of common threat of nuclear proliferation to entire human being. Nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan were analysed by this method and it revealed the following results: 1) There is a large discrepancy between the nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan mainly because of the different standpoints of both nations and partly because of the difference of understanding on the definition of nonproliferation, and the object of nonproliferation measures. 2) The total structure of nuclear nonproliferation measures becomes more visible through categorization of nonproliferation measures, depending on implementater, target for implementation, characteristics of the measures (soft-liner, legal, or hard-liner) and risk factor for reduction of the total risk of nuclear weapon use. 3) The total structure of nonproliferation measures is multi-barrier structure on the process to reach the actual nuclear weapon use, and each barrier is composed of multi-defense in depth structure including various soft-liner, legal, and hard-linear measures. 4) Various nonproliferation measures can be stored in a data base, based on the proposed structural analysis, which enables further comprehensive analysis for specific purposes efficiently. (author)

  17. The handbook of nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, M. H.; Lee, B. W.; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Lee, K. S.

    2003-07-01

    This report analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This report took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and current status. It is here divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this report dealt four multilateral treaties concluded for international non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. And international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are also analyzed focused on UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, regional safeguards system and international conferences. In addition, this report reviewed the nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is a important tool for bilateral regime

  18. U.S. nonproliferation policy in the decade of the eighties: Past dilemmas and prospects for the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, H.R. Jr.

    1986-01-01

    No single event had more effect on the policies concerning nuclear importation and exportation activities than the 1974 detonation of a nuclear explosive device in India. This led eventually to the enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978. The author describes the difficult negotiations of the U.S. administration with Euratom, Japan, China, and Latin America. (CW) [de

  19. Model and Analytic Processes for Export License Assessments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Thompson, Sandra E.; Whitney, Paul D.; Weimar, Mark R.; Wood, Thomas W.; Daly, Don S.; Brothers, Alan J.; Sanfilippo, Antonio P.; Cook, Diane; Holder, Larry

    2011-09-29

    This paper represents the Department of Energy Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22) Simulations, Algorithms and Modeling (SAM) Program's first effort to identify and frame analytical methods and tools to aid export control professionals in effectively predicting proliferation intent; a complex, multi-step and multi-agency process. The report focuses on analytical modeling methodologies that alone, or combined, may improve the proliferation export control license approval process. It is a follow-up to an earlier paper describing information sources and environments related to international nuclear technology transfer. This report describes the decision criteria used to evaluate modeling techniques and tools to determine which approaches will be investigated during the final 2 years of the project. The report also details the motivation for why new modeling techniques and tools are needed. The analytical modeling methodologies will enable analysts to evaluate the information environment for relevance to detecting proliferation intent, with specific focus on assessing risks associated with transferring dual-use technologies. Dual-use technologies can be used in both weapons and commercial enterprises. A decision-framework was developed to evaluate which of the different analytical modeling methodologies would be most appropriate conditional on the uniqueness of the approach, data availability, laboratory capabilities, relevance to NA-22 and Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (NA-24) research needs and the impact if successful. Modeling methodologies were divided into whether they could help micro-level assessments (e.g., help improve individual license assessments) or macro-level assessment. Macro-level assessment focuses on suppliers, technology, consumers, economies, and proliferation context. Macro-level assessment technologies scored higher in the area of uniqueness because less work has been done at the macro level. An

  20. Hydrologic control of nitrogen removal, storage, and export in a mountain stream

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hall, R.O.; Baker, M.A.; Arp, C.D.; Kocha, B.J.

    2009-01-01

    Nutrient cycling and export in streams and rivers should vary with flow regime, yet most studies of stream nutrient transformation do not include hydrologic variability. We used a stable isotope tracer of nitrogen (15N) to measure nitrate (NO3) uptake, storage, and export in a mountain stream, Spring Creek, Idaho, U.S.A. We conducted two tracer tests of 2-week duration during snowmelt and baseflow. Dissolved and particulate forms of 15N were monitored over three seasons to test the hypothesis that stream N cycling would be dominated by export during floods, and storage during low flow. Floods exported more N than during baseflow conditions; however, snowmelt floods had higher than expected demand for NO{3 because of hyporheic exchange. Residence times of benthic N during both tracer tests were longer than 100 d for ephemeral pools such as benthic algae and wood biofilms. Residence times were much longer in fine detritus, insects, and the particulate N from the hyporheic zone, showing that assimilation and hydrologic storage can be important mechanisms for retaining particulate N. Of the tracer N stored in the stream, the primary form of export was via seston during periods of high flows, produced by summer rainstorms or spring snowmelt the following year. Spring Creek is not necessarily a conduit for nutrients during high flow; hydrologic exchange between the stream and its valley represents an important storage mechanism.

  1. Non-proliferation and international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.

    1992-01-01

    Full text: In my view, drastic nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon States could be coupled with universal commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear weapon States by 1995 when the extension of the NPT Will be discussed. The incentives and disincentives for making and stockpiling nuclear weapons are first of all in the political and security fields, (Global and regional detente reduce the incentive, With the cold war gone, the US and Russia are now agreeing on far-reaching cuts in their nuclear arsenals and at some point the other declared nuclear weapon States Will follow.In the regional fields, we have seen how Argentina and Brazil are about to commit themselves to exclusively peaceful uses of the atom through the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty. And we have seen how South Africa has joined the NPT. A new wave of States adhering to the NPT may be expected from countries in the former Soviet Union. Some have already come, others are on the way. Detente in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent would improve the outlook for non-proliferation in these areas. A second barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in export restrictions on sensitive nuclear material and equipment, Following the discoveries in Iraq, these restrictions are being strengthened in a large number of States. A third barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in the economic and political consequences that would follow for a State if IAEA safeguards inspection revealed activities aimed at the production of nuclear weapons. These must have a high degree of reliability. The case of Iraq showed that it was possible for a closed, highly militarized State to hide nuclear activities from the IAEA and the world We are now drawing the lessons from this case. It is not physically possible for inspectors to look into every building and basement in vast countries, They must have information about where to look, and the IAEA is significantly strengthening its information basis. The IAEA has also re

  2. Heme Exporter FLVCR1a Regulates Heme Synthesis and Degradation and Controls Activity of Cytochromes P450

    OpenAIRE

    Vinchi, Francesca; Ingoglia, Giada; Chiabrando, Deborah; Mercurio, Sonia; Turco, Emilia; Silengo, Lorenzo; Altruda, Fiorella; Tolosano, Emanuela

    2014-01-01

    Background & Aims The liver has one of the highest rates of heme synthesis of any organ. More than 50% of the heme synthesized in the liver is used for synthesis of P450 enzymes, which metabolize exogenous and endogenous compounds that include natural products, hormones, drugs, and carcinogens. Feline leukemia virus subgroup C cellular receptor 1a (FLVCR1a) is plasma membrane heme exporter that is ubiquitously expressed and controls intracellular heme content in hematopoietic lineages. We inv...

  3. AKT3 controls mitochondrial biogenesis and autophagy via regulation of the major nuclear export protein CRM-1.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Corum, Daniel G; Tsichlis, Philip N; Muise-Helmericks, Robin C

    2014-01-01

    Our previous work has shown that Akt3 is required for mitochondrial biogenesis in primary human endothelial cells (ECs) and in Akt3-null mice; Akt3 affects subcellular localization of peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor γ coactivator-1 (PGC-1α), the master regulator of mitochondrial biogenesis. The purpose of this study is to determine the mechanism by which Akt3 controls the subcellular distribution of PGC-1α and to explore the effect on mitochondrial biogenesis and turnover during angiogenesis. Here we use standard biochemical analyses and Akt3-knockdown strategies to show that Akt3 controls the stabilization of chromosome maintenance region-1 (CRM-1), the major nuclear export receptor. Site-directed mutagenesis and association analyses show that PGC-1α nuclear export is CRM-1 dependent. Akt3 knockdown and CRM-1 overexpression cause 3-fold reductions in PGC-1α target gene expression, compared to control levels. Akt3 inhibition causes autophagy, as measured by autophagosome formation, in a CRM-1-dependent, Akt1/mTOR-independent pathway. In vivo, Akt3-null and heterozygous mice show dose-dependent decreases in angiogenesis compared to wild-type littermates (~5- and 2.5-fold decreases, respectively), as assessed by Matrigel plug assays. This correlates with an ~1.5-fold decrease in mitochondrial Cox IV expression. Our studies suggest that Akt3 is a regulator of mitochondrial dynamics in the vasculature via regulation of CRM-1-dependent nuclear export.

  4. The legal points at issue concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty and the verification agreement of EURATOM with the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zieger, G.

    1975-01-01

    An excellent and comprehensive but very juridicial contribution on: Development and content of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the problems which this Treaty poses for EURATOM (a common market, common supply, joint enterprises, Non-proliferation Treaty and France), the compatibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty with the EURATOM Treaty, verification agreement EURATOM - IAEA (the IAEA as the supervisory authority, the control system of the IAEA, guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements, national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material IAEA supervision as a secondary control, principles of IAEA supervision, secrecy, conflict management), conclusion of the verification agreement, deviations from the guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements legal reflexions (verification agreement and Non-proliferation Treaty, reservations concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty, questions of competence between EURATOM and member states without nuclear weapons, problems of equal treatment). (HP/LN) [de

  5. Export spillovers

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Choquette, Eliane; Meinen, Philipp

    2015-01-01

    This paper studies the importance of export spillovers in a firm's decision to enter specific export markets and extends the current state of the literature by assessing different mechanisms through which they may occur, namely (i) labour movement, (ii) intra-industry spillovers and (iii) inter......-industry linkages. We do so by exploiting a unique data set covering the universe of manufacturing firms in Denmark for the period 1995–2006 which combines transaction-level export data, firm accounting data, employer–employee linked data and information from yearly input–output tables. We corroborate...... the literature on export spillovers by presenting robust evidence of destination-specific export spillovers. The results suggest that labour mobility as well as intra- and inter-industry linkages (backward linkages) are important channels for export spillovers, while presenting heterogeneous effects across firms...

  6. 76 FR 35275 - Export Control Reform Initiative: Strategic Trade Authorization License Exception

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-06-16

    ... (c)(2) destinations are: Albania, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Malta, Singapore, South Africa, and... Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) authorizes, with conditions, the export, reexport and transfer... BIS's workload and, without adequate preparation, could result in backlogs and delays. BIS is working...

  7. 76 FR 76072 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Control of Gas Turbine Engines and...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-06

    ... intelligence advantage to the United States, and are almost exclusively available from the United States. If an...--other than ``build-to-print technology''-- for the production or development of any types of the listed... not available for the export or reexport of software and technology (other than ``build-to- print...

  8. INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Donnelly, W H

    1980-12-01

    The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. Here the author outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US nonproliferation policy. If the future of nuclear power is to include more sensitive facilities in which plutonium and highly enriched uranium are present, it must be determined whether the risks seen in proliferation are great enough to cause the USA and other governments to place such facilities under some form of international ownership or control in addition to international safeguards. A final crucial problem is deciding what can and should be done to dissuade non-nuclear-weapons states from the direct manufacture of nuclear weapons. 6 references.

  9. Export strategy

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Knudsen, Thorbjørn; Koed Madsen, Tage

    2002-01-01

    It is argued here that traditional export strategy research (encompassing the study of internationalization processes and export performance) is characterized by weak theoretical foundations and could benefit from a reorientation towards a dynamic capabilities perspective (DCP). We seek to draw...... on insights from DCP in order to devise a theoretical basis that could enrich export strategy research. Although our development of DCP insights builds on previous work, it also adds a crucial distinction between knowledge stocks and informational architecture. Changes in architecture are of greater...... importance. Following this elaboration of the dynamic capabilities perspective, we outline some implications and guidelines for future export strategy research....

  10. Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Joeck, N

    2007-02-05

    The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

  11. Brazil and Mexico in the Nonproliferation Regime, Common Structures and Divergent Trajectories in Latin America

    OpenAIRE

    Sotomayor, Arturo C.

    2014-01-01

    Chapter 8 There are multiple options Latin American countries to support and comply with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the global level, states can decide to ratify the core treaties and join their supporting institutions such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the...

  12. The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biad, A.

    1996-01-01

    This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC)

  13. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    OpenAIRE

    Sandra Colombo; Cristian Guglielminotti; María Nevia Vera

    2017-01-01

    The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu). The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous develop...

  14. Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deiseroth, D.; Gustafsson, S.

    1993-01-01

    The issue of Nuclear Non Proliferation has been moved to a leading place on the contemporary international security agenda. What about the situation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belorussia? Why did the IAEA-inspectors totally failed to discover any sign of Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapon programme before the Gulf War? Do the NATO and their nuclear power states violate Art. VI of the Non-Proliferation-Treaty (NPT), because they are - despite the end of the cold war - not willing to renounce of the ''option of the first use of nuclear weapons''? Does the NPT establish a form of nuclear apartheid? What will be the situation if the NPT-Extension-Conference in 1995 will be unable to obtain a majority of the parties for any one extension proposal? Do we need a new international nuclear control agency with severe powers, a sort of nuclear Interpol? The Colloquium ''Saving NPT and abolishing Nuclear Weapons'', held in Stockholm in September 1992, organized by the Swedish and the German Sections of IALANA, tried to analyse some of the raised issues. (orig.) [de

  15. The Export Administration Act of 1979 and Computer Exports to China

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Perez, Elizabeth

    2002-01-01

    .... The statute that regulates computer exports, the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA79), has been interpreted both strictly and loosely by policymakers, executive agencies, and export control regimes...

  16. Pakistan's national legislation entitled: 'Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The Director General has received a letter from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan, dated 4 November 2004, concerning Pakistan's national legislation entitled 'Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004'. As requested by the Permanent Mission of Pakistan, the letter and the Export Control Act of 2004, are reproduced herein for the information of the Member States

  17. Non-proliferation and disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ritter von Wagner, A.

    1993-01-01

    In 1995 the Conference on the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will take place. Will it be extended for a long term, indefinitely or only for a fixed period? The Federal Government of Germany advocates an unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others have different ideas alleging that the Treaty is imperfect and discriminating. It is a thorn in the side of many States, in particular of the Third World, which no longer want to put up with being treated as second-class states. One argument which is considered especially embarrassing by developing countries as a visible expression of such discrimination, are the nuclear tests which are still carried out by nuclear weapon states. Is the political situation still such that one needs those weapons? Strategists gradually find it difficult to argument; over and over again they claim that an abandonment of nuclear weapons would make the world unsafer. But development has gradually passed over them. Nevertheless, one finds it hard to throw overboard considerations which for years have determined one's thinking. (orig./HSCH) [de

  18. 2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koltysheva, G I; Perepelkin, I G [eds.

    1999-12-31

    On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session `History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem` and three sections: (1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests`; (2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex`; (3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences`

  19. Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of Nuclear Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mochiji, Toshiro; Tazaki, Makiko; Keeney, Robin; Puckett, John; Stanbro, William; Nakhleh, Charles

    1998-01-01

    PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet no.21, which was signed in February 1996, 'The Joint Research on 'Transparency' in Nuclear Nonproliferation' under the 'Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation.' The scope of the research was a fundamental study on transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability of nuclear energy from a nuclear nonproliferation viewpoint. The research encompassed three main topics: the policy environment of transparency, the development of transparency options, and technical options for transparency. Each side performed independent research then joint workshops were held to exchange information and views. This paper summarizes the results of these workshops. (author)

  20. 2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

    1998-01-01

    On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session 'History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem' and three sections: 1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests'; 2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex'; 3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences'

  1. Precipitation patterns control the distribution and export of large wood at the catchment scale

    OpenAIRE

    Il Seo, Jung; Nakamura, Futoshi; Chun, Kun Woo; Kim, Suk Woo; Grant, Gordon E.

    2015-01-01

    Large wood (LW) plays an important role in river ecosystems, but LW-laden floods may cause serious damage to human lives and property. The relationship between precipitation patterns and variations in LW distribution and export at the watershed scale is poorly understood. To explore these linkages, we examined differences in LW distribution as a function of channel morphologies in six watersheds located in southern and northern Japan and analysed the impacts of different precipitation pattern...

  2. Hydroclimatic control of sediment and metal export from a rural catchment in Northwest Spain

    OpenAIRE

    L. Palleiro; M. L. Rodríguez-Blanco; M. M. Taboada-Castro; M. T. Taboada-Castro

    2014-01-01

    This paper examines sediment and metal (Al, Fe, Mn, Cu, and Zn) exportation at different time scales (annual, seasonal and event) during a three-year period (2005–2008) in the Mero River headwater, a rural catchment under humid temperate climate. Inter-annual differences were found both in annual loads and their distributions throughout the year. At annual scale, sediment and particulate metal loads followed the same trend as streamflow, while dissolved metals showed differe...

  3. Hydroclimatic control of sediment and metal export from a rural catchment in northwestern Spain

    OpenAIRE

    Palleiro, L.; Rodríguez-Blanco, M. L.; Taboada-Castro, M. M.; Taboada-Castro, M. T.

    2014-01-01

    This paper examines sediment and metal (Al, Fe, Mn, Cu, and Zn) exportation at different timescales (annual, seasonal and event) during a 3-year period (2005–2008) in the Mero River headwater, a rural catchment under humid temperate climate. Interannual differences were found both in annual loads and their distributions throughout the year. At annual scale, sediment and particulate metal loads followed the same trend as streamflow, while dissolved metals showed different pat...

  4. Geomorphic controls on fluvial carbon exports and emissions from upland swamps in eastern Australia.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cowley, Kirsten; Looman, Arun; Maher, Damien T; Fryirs, Kirstie

    2018-03-15

    Temperate Highland Peat Swamps on Sandstone (THPSS) are upland wetlands, similar to fens in the Northern Hemisphere and are found at the headwaters of low-order streams on the plateaus of Eastern Australia. They are classified as endangered ecological communities under State and National legislation. Previous works have identified particular geomorphic characteristics that are important to carbon storage in these low energy sediment accumulation zones. Changes in the geomorphic structure of THPSS, such as channelisation, may have profound implications for carbon storage. To assess the effect of channelisation on carbon budgets in these ecosystems it is essential to identify and quantify differences in carbon export, emissions and stocks of carbon of intact swamps and those that have become channelised. We undertook seasonal sampling of the perched swamp aquifers and surface waters of two intact swamps and two channelised fills in the Blue Mountains of New South Wales, Australia, to investigate differences in carbon exports and emissions between the two swamp types. We found that channelised fills' mean CO 2 emissions were almost four times higher than intact swamps with mean CH 4 emissions up to five times higher. Annual fluvial carbon exports for channelised fills were up to 18 times that of intact swamps. Channelised fill exports and emissions can represent up to 2% of the total swamp carbon stocks per annum which is 40 times higher than the intact swamps. This work clearly demonstrates that changes in geomorphic structure brought about by incision and channelisation results in profound changes to the carbon storage function of THPSS. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  5. Markups and Exporting Behavior

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    De Loecker, Jan; Warzynski, Frederic Michel Patrick

    2012-01-01

    In this paper, we develop a method to estimate markups using plant-level production data. Our approach relies on cost minimizing producers and the existence of at least one variable input of production. The suggested empirical framework relies on the estimation of a production function and provides...... estimates of plant- level markups without specifying how firms compete in the product market. We rely on our method to explore the relationship be- tween markups and export behavior. We find that markups are estimated significantly higher when controlling for unobserved productivity; that exporters charge......, on average, higher markups and that markups increase upon export entry....

  6. Non-proliferation and multinational enterprises

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-04-01

    The paper supplements CC/WG.2/9 in presenting the Japanese delegation's contribution in the areas of non-proliferation and multi-national enterprises. The paper questions whether multinational enrichment enterprises would constitute a significant non-proliferation factor, noting that the nature of the venture might create a potential for the dissemination of sensitive information. The paper also argues that a multi-national venture which was not economically competitive (with national facilities) would have questionable viability. The conclusion is that non-proliferation advantages, if any, would be a result, not an objective of such a venture

  7. Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimura, Naohito; Naoi, Yosuke

    2010-01-01

    In April 2010, at the Nuclear Security Summit, Japan demonstrated its commitment to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security and announced the establishment of the Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), under the guidance and authority of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Science and Technology (MEXT), and in cooperation with other ministries. The goal of the Center is to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and security in emerging nuclear power countries by sharing Japan's accumulated experiences in its peaceful use of nuclear energy. To achieve its goal, the Center serves three functions: (1) human resource and capacity building, (2) infrastructure development and technical assistance and (3) international coordination and cooperation. The Center will offer three types of training courses to strengthen human resources and capacity building in emerging nuclear power countries. In the Training Course on Nuclear Security, the participants will learn the design and evaluation process for physical protection and detection of and response to illegal or unauthorized acts related to nuclear materials. They will learn these issues not only through lectures and training but also using mockup facilities and virtual reality systems. Second, in the Training Course on Safeguards and State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), the Center will teach the experience of advanced safeguards activities in Japan for its full-scale nuclear fuel cycle facilities as a non-nuclear weapon state. The participants will learn the IAEA and national safeguards systems, the material accounting system and inspector activities. Third, in the Training on the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Framework, the participants will learn the international framework of nuclear non-proliferation including the IAEA safeguards system and

  8. Uranium enrichment using gas centrifugation. An analysis focusing export control; Urananrikning med gascentrifugering. En analys med fokus paa exportkontroll

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oliver, Lena; Peterson, Jenny; Wilhelmsen, Katarina [Swedish Defense Research Inst., Stockholm (Sweden)

    2005-08-01

    The Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, has performed a study on uranium enrichment by gas centrifugation. The theory and principles of gas centrifugation is described in this report and relevant equipment used in the process has been identified. Different aspects of operating a gas centrifuge facility - and its indicators - are also presented. The separation efficiency and the flow of material through a centrifuge are very small, and therefore, a large number of centrifuges in cascades is needed to produce a larger amount of enriched uranium within a reasonable time. Countries with nuclear weapons ambitions often show an interest in gas centrifuges to produce weapons grade uranium - if they have managed to acquire the technology - because of the efficiency of the process and since it is relatively easy to conceal. Most equipment used in gas centrifuge facilities is under export control to prevent clandestine uranium enrichment. The Nuclear Suppliers' Group has compiled lists of nuclear related equipment and components that are of importance to export control. The control lists have also been included in the EU legislation.

  9. 21 CFR 1312.22 - Application for export permit.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 9 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Application for export permit. 1312.22 Section... EXPORTATION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Exportation of Controlled Substances § 1312.22 Application for export permit. (a) An application for a permit to export controlled substances shall be made on DEA Form 161...

  10. 78 FR 61873 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) To Make the Commerce Control List (CCL...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-10-04

    ... entitled Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: Military Vehicles; Vessels of War; Submersible...'' references by this rule will require exporters to spend substantially more time to determine the scope of the...

  11. Sensitive products and services in the light of the law of the European Union. Chances and limits of common EU export controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janik, M.

    1995-01-01

    The invasion of Kuwait by the Iraq has made it very clear to the world at large that international exports of sensitive products and services is an urgent international problem. This war demonstrated the absurdity of the fact that the troups of the allied coalition under the roof of the UN had to fight against a military potential of Iraq that these nations themselves had been building up by trade with the Iraq in the years before, having sold not only weaponry but also other technical systems and equipment and technologies to which the term ''sensitive products and services'' applies. Having become aware of the international dimension of this problem, the approach to solutions starts from the following questions: How can the international community prevent unwanted support of political regimes or groups judged to be potentially aggressive in their efforts towards building up a dangerous military potential? What are the instruments to be implemented at an international level, and to which foreign relations, as for example trade relations, and to which objects of trade, shall these instruments and controls apply? These questions show the essential importance of the definition of ''dual-use products''. The book analyses and explains the current legal framework within the EU and the approaches elaborated by working groups and bodies of the EU for the purpose of establishing a Single European exports control system, presenting the survey in five main chapters entitled as follows: Rationale, outline conditions and characteristic features of export controls; Legal basis of export controls for sensitive products and services; Admissibility of national controls of the export of sensitive products and services within the EU; Common EU controls of exports to third countries; EU action and means for harmonization of controls of exports of dual-use products to countries not members of the EU. (orig./CB) [de

  12. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

  13. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

  14. Organizing export strategies.

    OpenAIRE

    G. Lojacono; M. Venzin

    2014-01-01

    The article unfolds as follows: after a brief introduction on the relevance of international trade and the characteristics of export strategies, we describe four distinct archetypes: export manager, centralistic export developer, export skimmer, integrated export developer.

  15. The future of non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gere, F.

    2000-01-01

    This paper comprises two parts. The first part makes a status of the non-proliferation policy: problems of ratification of Start 2 and CTBT treaties, nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in May 1998 etc. The second part makes a prospective reflexion on the evolution of the position of nuclearized countries at the 2015-2030 vista: role of Asia, nuclear perception, evolution of the US perception of non-proliferation, military strategy and European unification. (J.S.)

  16. China's position on nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Qian Jiadong.

    1986-01-01

    The paper discusses China's position on nuclear non-proliferation, in view of the fact that China does not subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China refuses to accede to the NPT because it considers the treaty to be discriminatory, and reasons are given for this point of view. However its stand for nuclear disarmament and disapproval of nuclear proliferation are declared. Nuclear arms race, prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament are also considered. (UK)

  17. Nonproliferation characteristics of advanced fuel cycle concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiatives and safeguards methods and systems. Alternative cycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products

  18. Regulations of 10 January 1989 relating to the implementation of control of the export of strategic goods, services and technology, laid down by the ministry of foreign affairs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    These Regulations were made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in pursuance of Act No. 93 of 18 December 1987 on the control of the export of strategic goods, services and technology, in particular nuclear material, equipment, technology and services. The Regulations entered into force on 15 February 1989. That Ministry compiles lists of goods requiring an export licence or permission which also cover nuclear installations, material and equipment. The Regulations provide that the Ministry may require that an application for export of such goods, etc. be accompanied by a statement on the final use of the goods concerned (end-use statement) ascertaining that they will not be re-exported without the consent of the Norwegian authorities [fr

  19. Some major challenges: Nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear arms control and nuclear terrorism. Vienna, 29 October 2001. Statement to the symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    The main topics dealt with the ensuring of an effective, universal and adequately financed system for the verification of nuclear non-proliferation, namely as follows: Effectiveness of the system; Participation in the system ; Financing of the system; Making Progress in Nuclear Arms Control; Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism. In the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2000, the Agency was able to conclude that for all 140 states with safeguards agreements in place the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. The Agency currently safeguards over 900 facilities in 70 countries on a regular safeguards budget of approximately US $80 million per year. Turning to the major recent challenge, protection against nuclear terrorism, the IAEA has long been active in encouraging States to make security an integral part of the management of their nuclear programmes. The recent attacks in the United States were, however, a wake-up call to all that more can and must be done. In the week immediately following the tragedy, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution which requested a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism

  20. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Haeckel, E.; Haefele, W.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Ungerer, W.

    1991-01-01

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP) [de

  1. Reforming the non-proliferation system in the 1980s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1984-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of the 1970s were based largely on the misconception that the main danger lay in the possible misuse of civil nuclear-power plants for the production of weapon materials. In consequence their aim, whether by means of denial or control, was to ensure that such misuse was made more difficult in all countries with nuclear-power industries. Less attention was paid to the potential for misuse of the nuclear-research plants in the handful of countries outside the non-proliferation system. The resulting difficulties placed in the way of countries developing their nuclear-power industries damaged relations between the supplier and the consumer states, and discredited any new efforts aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation system. By contrast, the 1980s began, first in INFCE and then in the Committee on Assurances of Supply, with a concerted attempt to re-establish a dialogue based on a relationship of trust between the supplier and the customer states. But a restored consensus will not, on its own, deal with the problem of those states that are outside the non-proliferation system and that have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The outcome of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply may help to attract some of those states into the system, but more needs to be done either by adapting the NPT, making adherence to it appear more attractive, or by devising some alternative code of behaviour for states not party to the Treaty and by seeking to remove the political obstacles that lie in the way of at least some of the potential weapon states adhering to the Treaty

  2. Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1978-01-01

    This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

  3. Nonlinear and threshold-dominated runoff generation controls DOC export in a small peat catchment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Birkel, C.; Broder, T.; Biester, H.

    2017-03-01

    We used a relatively simple two-layer, coupled hydrology-biogeochemistry model to simultaneously simulate streamflow and stream dissolved organic carbon (DOC) concentrations in a small lead and arsenic contaminated upland peat catchment in northwestern Germany. The model procedure was informed by an initial data mining analysis, in combination with regression relationships of discharge, DOC, and element export. We assessed the internal model DOC processing based on stream DOC hysteresis patterns and 3-hourly time step groundwater level and soil DOC data for two consecutive summer periods in 2013 and 2014. The parsimonious model (i.e., few calibrated parameters) showed the importance of nonlinear and rapid near-surface runoff generation mechanisms that caused around 60% of simulated DOC load. The total load was high even though these pathways were only activated during storm events on average 30% of the monitoring time—as also shown by the experimental data. Overall, the drier period 2013 resulted in increased nonlinearity but exported less DOC (115 kg C ha-1 yr-1 ± 11 kg C ha-1 yr-1) compared to the equivalent but wetter period in 2014 (189 kg C ha-1 yr-1 ± 38 kg C ha-1 yr-1). The exceedance of a critical water table threshold (-10 cm) triggered a rapid near-surface runoff response with associated higher DOC transport connecting all available DOC pools and subsequent dilution. We conclude that the combination of detailed experimental work with relatively simple, coupled hydrology-biogeochemistry models not only allowed the model to be internally constrained but also provided important insight into how DOC and tightly coupled pollutants or trace elements are mobilized.

  4. 76 FR 30986 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-27

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 7485] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government... of foreign entities and one foreign person have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of...

  5. 21 CFR 1312.23 - Issuance of export permit.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 9 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Issuance of export permit. 1312.23 Section 1312.23... CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Exportation of Controlled Substances § 1312.23 Issuance of export permit. (a) The... regulation in § 1312.30 of this part be exported only pursuant to the issuance of an export permit. The...

  6. Markups and Firm-Level Export Status

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    De Loecker, Jan; Warzynski, Frederic

    and export behavior using plant-level data. We find that i) markups are estimated significantly higher when controlling for unobserved productivity, ii) exporters charge on average higher markups and iii) firms' markups increase (decrease) upon export entry (exit).We see these findings as a first step...... in opening up the productivity-export black box, and provide a potential explanation for the big measured productivity premia for firms entering export markets....

  7. Legislation to amend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. Hearings and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318, August 3, 10; September 8, 15; and December 14, 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1983-01-01

    Witnesses evaluated the effectiveness of non-proliferation policies during five days of hearings on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318 amending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978. The objective is to retain US leadership in nuclear trade while strengthening restrictions that retard the proliferation of weapons-grade material. They examined the economic benefits of new policy initiatives which permit foreign countries to reprocess and recycle US-supplied fuel and permit US companies to export reprocessing technology. The 19 witnesses spoke for the nuclear industry, organizations involved in arms control, and the administration. The 30 appendices include the texts of H.R. 6032, H.R. 6318, and H.R. 7430 and other comments and materials submitted for the record

  8. A prototype system dynamic model of nuclear and radiological export controls in Central Asia and the Caucasus; enhancing the effectiveness of preventing illicit nuclear material trafficking

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferguston, C.D.; Ouagrham, S.B.

    2002-01-01

    An urgent need calls out for improved border security and export control systems in the Central Asian and Caucasus regions to prevent illicit nuclear and radioactive materials trafficking. Effective nuclear and radiological exports controls are essential because these regions contain numerous nuclear facilities and radioactive materials as well as lie at the crossroads between seekers and suppliers of technologies that could be employed in nuclear and radiological weapons. Porous and unprotected borders compound these concerns. Moreover, the states within these regions are struggling with forming new regulations and laws, obtaining sufficient portal monitoring equipment, training customs and border security personnel, and coordinating these activities with neighboring states. Building this infrastructure all at once can severely task any government. Thus, unsurprisingly, most of these states have inadequate export control and border security systems. To enable each state in these regions determine how to better prevent illicit nuclear and radiological materials trafficking, the authors have developed a prototype system dynamics model focused on evaluating and improving of effectiveness of export controls. System dynamics modeling, a management tool that grew out of the field of system engineering and nonlinear dynamics, uses two structures: causal loop diagrams and stock and flow diagrams. The former shows how endogenous systematic factors interact with each other to produce feedback mechanisms that results in either balancing or reinforcing loops. A classic example is a arms race, modeled as a vicious cycle or reinforcing loop. In addition to interacting with each other, causal loops influence the flow of stock, which is material concern. In the export control system dynamics model, the stock represents nuclear and radioactive materials. System dynamics modelling is an iterative process that is continually modified by user input. Therefore, export control

  9. International aspects of non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aucoin, P.A.

    1978-01-01

    There are currently two areas on the national scene and one on the international scene that require immediate attention. The first is relief under contracts for enrichment services, an area in which the US can still demonstrate its desire to become a stable and continuous source of supply. The second national area is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. The United States must proceed very cautiously, however, for if discretion and very careful judgment are not used, the Act will immediately be branded as a blatant effort on the part of the US to control the energy options of other sovereign states. The international area is that of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation program. This medium exists for wise and deliberate growth of a commercial nuclear power program which can serve the global community. The next three years probably allow one remaining chance for successful containment of weapons proliferation. If we do not recognize the rights of every sovereign state to voluntarily participate and agree, we, as members of the global community, will have failed

  10. Flaws in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leventhal, P.

    1986-01-01

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nucler Weapons has the twin objectives of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons and ending the nuclear arms race on the one hand, and promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy on the other. In quantitative and symbolic terms the NPT is a huge success. More than two-thirds of the world's nations have signed on, making this the most popular arms control agreement on earth. Not a single nation has declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons state beyond the original five members of the ''nuclear club'' who qualified for weapons status under the terms of the Treaty itself: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. No party to the Treaty has exercised the permitted option to drop out, and none has been found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to have diverted nuclear material from civil to weapons purposes. Nor has any party been known to have violated NPT prohibitions on developing or assisting other nations to develop nuclear weapons

  11. 75 FR 47548 - President's Export Council Subcommittee on Export Administration; Notice of Recruitment of...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-08-06

    ... DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security President's Export Council Subcommittee on Export Administration; Notice of Recruitment of Private-Sector Members SUMMARY: The President's Export... their services. The PECSEA is seeking private-sector members with senior export control expertise and...

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2004-01-01

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards

  13. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ElBaradei, M

    2004-06-21

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards.

  14. The Asian countries and the non-proliferation treaty prorogation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffmann, N.

    1995-01-01

    This work deals with the non-proliferation treaty prorogation of Asia. The position of the asian countries under the old non-proliferation treaty is given. It includes the 1968 non-proliferation treaty signatories, the calling in question again and the criticisms revealed by the asian countries. The positions and the open forecasts expressed on the non-proliferation treaty prorogation and the article on the elimination of the nuclear weapons are also given. (O.L.)

  15. Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Satkowiak, Lawrence [Director, Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security Programs, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States)

    2014-05-09

    The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

  16. Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

    Science.gov (United States)

    Satkowiak, Lawrence

    2014-05-01

    The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

  17. The non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hannon, W.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    On September 22, 1993, the Department of Energy detonated more than 1.2 million kg of blasting agent in a tunnel in Rainier Mesa at the Nevada Test Site. The resulting explosion generated seismic, electromagnetic, and air pressure signals that were recorded on instruments deployed at distances ranging from a few meters to hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of kilometers. More than 12 organizations made measurements before, during, and after the explosions. The explosion and its associated experiments are known as the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). Analyses of the measurements made during the NPE and comparisons with similar measurements made on previous nearly nuclear explosions and on a co-located smaller explosion detonated at the same site are providing basic phenomenological insights into what is potentially one of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)-distinguishing between nuclear explosions and some of the many conventional explosions that occur each year. The NPE is also providing information on the use of chemical explosions to develop empirical discriminants in regions where no nuclear explosions have been recorded. In another verification application, several NPE projects are examining the utility of on-site, pre-shot, shot-time, and post-shot measurements of gas seepage, seismic activity, and other observables as a means of identifying the source of signals that appear like nuclear explosions at regional distances. Two related activities are being considered. First, challenge on-site inspections, conducted after an event has occurred, may be able to use the characteristics of phenomena that persist after the explosion to detect and identify the source of the signals that appeared ambiguous or explosion-like to remote sensors. Second, cooperative, on-site measurements made at the time of a pre-nounced conventional explosion may provide assurance that a nuclear explosion did not occur as part of or in place of the pre-announced explosion.

  18. Israel's position on non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marom, R.

    1986-01-01

    Israel maintained that the complex international system and worldwide political tension created a situation in which comprehensive plans of disarmament could not produce any positive result. The deadlock in the field of general and complete disarmament has brought Israel to the realization that one possible way to alleviate the stalemate could be progress by stages through partial measures of disarmament. Israel's position on non-proliferation indicates that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ), as it relates to the Middle-East, could serve as a credible alternative to the unilateral adherence to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and an effective measure of non-proliferation in the region. (Author)

  19. 75 FR 69573 - Export Enforcement Coordination Center

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-11-15

    ... Export Enforcement Coordination Center By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and... enforcement of United States export control laws and enhanced intelligence exchange in support of such enforcement efforts, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Policy. Export controls are critical to...

  20. Heme exporter FLVCR1a regulates heme synthesis and degradation and controls activity of cytochromes P450.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vinchi, Francesca; Ingoglia, Giada; Chiabrando, Deborah; Mercurio, Sonia; Turco, Emilia; Silengo, Lorenzo; Altruda, Fiorella; Tolosano, Emanuela

    2014-05-01

    The liver has one of the highest rates of heme synthesis of any organ. More than 50% of the heme synthesized in the liver is used for synthesis of P450 enzymes, which metabolize exogenous and endogenous compounds that include natural products, hormones, drugs, and carcinogens. Feline leukemia virus subgroup C cellular receptor 1a (FLVCR1a) is plasma membrane heme exporter that is ubiquitously expressed and controls intracellular heme content in hematopoietic lineages. We investigated the role of Flvcr1a in liver function in mice. We created mice with conditional disruption of Mfsd7b, which encodes Flvcr1a, in hepatocytes (Flvcr1a(fl/fl);alb-cre mice). Mice were analyzed under basal conditions, after phenylhydrazine-induced hemolysis, and after induction of cytochromes P450 synthesis. Livers were collected and analyzed by histologic, quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction, and immunoblot analyses. Hepatic P450 enzymatic activities were measured. Flvcr1a(fl/fl);alb-cre mice accumulated heme and iron in liver despite up-regulation of heme oxygenase 1, ferroportin, and ferritins. Hepatic heme export activity of Flvcr1a was closely associated with heme biosynthesis, which is required to sustain cytochrome induction. Upon cytochromes P450 stimulation, Flvcr1a(fl/fl);alb-cre mice had reduced cytochrome activity, associated with accumulation of heme in hepatocytes. The expansion of the cytosolic heme pool in these mice was likely responsible for the early inhibition of heme synthesis and increased degradation of heme, which reduced expression and activity of cytochromes P450. In livers of mice, Flvcr1a maintains a free heme pool that regulates heme synthesis and degradation as well as cytochromes P450 expression and activity. These findings have important implications for drug metabolism. Copyright © 2014 AGA Institute. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  1. Heme Exporter FLVCR1a Regulates Heme Synthesis and Degradation and Controls Activity of Cytochromes P450

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vinchi, Francesca; Ingoglia, Giada; Chiabrando, Deborah; Mercurio, Sonia; Turco, Emilia; Silengo, Lorenzo; Altruda, Fiorella; Tolosano, Emanuela

    2014-01-01

    Background & Aims The liver has one of the highest rates of heme synthesis of any organ. More than 50% of the heme synthesized in the liver is used for synthesis of P450 enzymes, which metabolize exogenous and endogenous compounds that include natural products, hormones, drugs, and carcinogens. Feline leukemia virus subgroup C cellular receptor 1a (FLVCR1a) is plasma membrane heme exporter that is ubiquitously expressed and controls intracellular heme content in hematopoietic lineages. We investigated the role of Flvcr1a in liver function in mice. Methods We created mice with conditional disruption of Mfsd7b, which encodes Flvcr1a, in hepatocytes (Flvcr1afl/fl;alb-cre mice). Mice were analyzed under basal conditions, after phenylhydrazine-induced hemolysis, and after induction of cytochromes P450 synthesis. Livers were collected and analyzed by histologic, quantitative real-time polymerase chain reaction, and immunoblot analyses. Hepatic P450 enzymatic activities were measured. Results Flvcr1afl/fl;alb-cre mice accumulated heme and iron in liver despite up-regulation of heme oxygenase 1, ferroportin, and ferritins. Hepatic heme export activity of Flvcr1a was closely associated with heme biosynthesis, which is required to sustain cytochrome induction. Upon cytochromes P450 stimulation, Flvcr1afl/fl;alb-cre mice had reduced cytochrome activity, associated with accumulation of heme in hepatocytes. The expansion of the cytosolic heme pool in these mice was likely responsible for the early inhibition of heme synthesis and increased degradation of heme, which reduced expression and activity of cytochromes P450. Conclusions In livers of mice, Flvcr1a maintains a free heme pool that regulates heme synthesis and degradation as well as cytochromes P450 expression and activity. These findings have important implications for drug metabolism. PMID:24486949

  2. Nuclear export and armament. New threats and peace perspectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kubbig, B.W.; Mueller, H.

    1993-02-01

    The authors give a condensed analysis of safety and politico-economic dimensions regarding the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and carrier systems with which nuclear blasting charges can be transported. From the content: - Proliferation and non-proliferation: technology, economy and (international) law in a political historic survey. - Missile defense: appropriate technological answer to the political proliferation problem? -export strategies: USA and FRG in comparison, interest and policy of the European Community. - Components for an extensive proliferation strategy. (orig./HP) [de

  3. Export regulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gates, D.J.

    1978-01-01

    Australia is a major uranium supplier. Uranium is exported under conditions laid down to avoid any nuclear proliferation. On 24 May 1977 the Prime Minister had stated the main elements of Australian policy: the strengthening of the system of international safeguards and the selection of importing countries. (Non-nuclear weapon states must be Contracting Parties to the NPT. Nuclear weapon states must undertake not to use Australian uranium for this purpose). Australia retains property of the uranium up to the UF 6 stage (uranium hexafluoride) in the fuel cycle; it reserves the right to stop any export if the importing country no longer complies with AIEA Safeguards. Any transfer to a third country, any irradiated fuel reprocessing, requires Australia's prior agreement. Finally, importing countries must satisfy physical protection conditions. (NEA) [fr

  4. 685. Order amending the Order concerning the definition of goods whose export requires a permit in accordance with the Security Control Act

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The list of goods which may not be exported without a permit, in accordance with the Act of 1972 on security control, was amended by this Order. The amendment includes numerous items or equipment involving radiation or radioactive materials. It came into effect on 1 December 1990. (NEA)

  5. 77 FR 35310 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Control of Military Training Equipment...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-13

    ... for foreign made ``military commodities'' that incorporate more than 10% U.S.-origin ``600 series... Military Training Equipment and Related Items the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under the... longer warrant control under Category IX (Military Training Equipment and Training) of the United States...

  6. 77 FR 25932 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Control of Energetic Materials and...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-05-02

    ... 1B608 that is ``specially designed'' for the ``production'' of rocket propellants; oxidizers or mixtures... would control equipment for the ``production'' of explosives and solid propellants, currently controlled...), this rule would move ``equipment'' for the ``production'' of explosives and solid propellants...

  7. Legal problems concerning the export of nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pierer, Heinrich von.

    1977-01-01

    The legal problems raised by the export of nuclear power plants may be divided into three main categories: nuclear operator's liability for nuclear damage, the consequences for the supplier of the licensing requirements in the national laws of the buyer country and finally, the constraints of applying non-proliferation safeguards on export of nuclear equipment. As regards the third party liability regime in particular, the difficulties lie essentially in the insufficiency of the definition of the nuclear operator and the lack of harmonization in, or even the absence of national laws in this field. (NEA) [fr

  8. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-12-19

    NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States.

  9. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States

  10. 78 FR 42430 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations Based on the 2012 Missile Technology Control...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-16

    ... that are generally: a. Characterized by high nickel, very low carbon content and use substitutional... the ``development'' of fly-by-wire control systems), 0E521 No. 6 (for ``technology'' for the...

  11. Engaging China in the International Export Control Process: Options for U.S. Policy

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Goldman, Charles

    1995-01-01

    This documented briefing is intended to provide options for U.S. policy that will enhance China's participation in the control of international transfers of destabilizing military or dual use technology...

  12. EMP at the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bell, J. [AWE, Aldermaston (United Kingdom)

    1994-12-31

    This experiment presented an opportunity to field customized equipment designed to detect and record electromagnetic pulse (EMP) emanations from an explosion over a wide frequency range. Any data recorded could be used in conjunction with the seismic methods to further non-proliferation studies. No EMP emanations were detectable from the four sensors deployed outside the tunnel confines.

  13. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: Concerns With the U.S. International Nuclear Materials Tracking System

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Rezendes, Victor

    1996-01-01

    ...) provide data to policymakers and other government officials. The United States regulates and controls its exports of civilian-use nuclear materials through three mechanisms-agreements for cooperation, export licenses, and subsequent arrangements...

  14. Hydrologic controls on the export dynamics of dissolved and particulate phosphorus in a lowland, headwater agricultural catchment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dupas, Rémi; Grimaldi, Catherine; Gruau, Gérard; Gascuel-Odoux, Chantal

    2014-05-01

    Phosphorus (P) availability controls eutrophication in freshwater ecosystems, since P is generally the limiting nutrient to algal development. The contribution of diffuse P emission to surface waters is significant in intensively livestock farmed catchments as a result of high application rates of P-rich animal waste and subsequent enrichment of soils. This study investigates the transport dynamics of particulate phosphorus (PP), suspended sediments (SS), and dissolved phosphorus (DP) with the aim of elucidating the relationship between PP and DP transport mechanisms and water dynamics in lowland, headwater catchments. The selected catchment (Kervidy-Naizin catchment, France) is particularly suitable for this purpose as it benefits of a 5 years, high-frequency monitoring of PP and DP concentrations at its outlet, including data recovered both during base flow and storm periods, with the monitoring of more than 50 storm flow events. The data analysis includes interpretation of concentration-discharge relationships at the annual time scale and on an event basis, seasonal analysis of flood characteristics and empirical modeling. Annual DP and PP concentration-discharge relationships of interflood samples display a hysteretic pattern, with higher concentrations during the autumn and spring periods, and progressive decrease during winter. No hysteretic pattern is visible for interflood SS concentration, which follows a classical C=a*Qb relationship. During floods, the dynamic of PP export is similar to that of SS during most of the events: the concentration peak occurs during the rising limb of the hydrogram (clockwise hysteresis), suggesting a source close to or within the stream. The amplitude and the hysteresis' loop size for SS and PP are a function of maximum discharge and rate of change in discharge. On the contrary, there is a strong decoupling between DP and SS (and thus PP) during most of the floods (no significant correlation), with DP concentration peaks

  15. 78 FR 45026 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Control of Military Electronic...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-07-25

    ... ECCN 3A611.c and .d should cover microwave monolithic integrated circuits and discrete microwave... and are not controlled. One commenter noted that placing monolithic microware integrated circuit power...: One commenter recommended removing the technical parameters for microwave monolithic integrated...

  16. 76 FR 80291 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Control of Submersible Vessels...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-23

    ... rule and to avoid, to the extent possible, situations where transactions would require licenses from... align the CCL with the WAML and the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment, Software and Technology..., which currently impose a license requirement for five countries. A license also would be required, in...

  17. Approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subrahmanyam, K.

    1981-01-01

    The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)

  18. Mercury exports from a High-Arctic river basin in Northeast Greenland (74°N) largely controlled by glacial lake outburst floods

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Søndergaard, Jens; Tamstorf, Mikkel P.; Elberling, Bo

    2015-01-01

    .025 mg kg(-1). Temporal variations in river Hg were mainly associated with snowmelt, sudden erosion events, and outburst floods from a glacier-dammed lake in the upper part of the ZRB. Annual Hg exports from the 514 km(2) ZRB varied from 0.71 to >1.57 kg and the majority (86-96 was associated...... with sediment-bound Hg. Hg yields from the ZRB varied from 1.4-3.1 g Hg km(-2) yr(-1) and were among the highest yields reported from Arctic river basins. River exports of Hg from ZRB were found to be largely controlled by the frequency, magnitude and timing of the glacial lake outburst floods, which occurred...... in four of the five years in July-August. Floods accounted for 5 to >10% of the annual water discharge, and up to >31% of the annual Hg export. Also, the winter snowfall and the summer temperatures were found to be important indirect controls on the annual Hg export. The occurrence and timing of glacial...

  19. Safeguarding America's Critical Technologies (and Avoiding Personal Risk) An Introduction to Export Control and Critical Technology Restrictions

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Babcock, Wade

    2002-01-01

    .... Use of safes, secure buildings and rooms, proper handling, labeling and storage are all part of the day-to-day world of dealing with classified information but how much do you know about export...

  20. Export channel pricing management for integrated solutions

    OpenAIRE

    Roine, Henna; Sainio, Liisa-Maija; Saarenketo, Sami

    2012-01-01

    This article studies systems integrators' export channel pricing management for integrated solutions. We find support from our empirical case study for the notion that a systems integrator's export channel pricing strategy is multidimensional and dependent on international pricing environment and partner characteristics and that export partnerships have unique implications on a systems integrator's pricing process. The results show that giving up pricing control in export channel context may ...

  1. Fast Reactors and Nuclear Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avrorina, E.N.; Chebeskovb, A.N.

    2013-01-01

    Conclusion remarks: 1. Fast reactor start-up with U-Pu fuel: – dependent on thermal reactors, – no needs in U enrichment, – needs in SNF reprocessing, – Pu is a little suitable for NED, – practically impossible gun-type NED, – difficulties for implosion-type NED: necessary tests, advanced technologies, etc. – Pu in blankets is similar to WPu by isotopic composition, – Use of blanket for production isotopes (e.g. 233 U), – Combined reprocessing of SNF: altogether blanket and core, – Blanket elimination: decrease in Pu production – No pure Pu separation. 2. Fast reactor start-up with U fuel: - Needs in both U enrichment and SNF reprocessing, - Independent of thermal reactors, - Good Pu bred in the core let alone blankets, - NED of simple gun-type design, - Increase of needs in SWU, - Increased demands in U supply. 3. Fast reactors for export: - Uranium shortage, - To replace thermal reactors in future, - No blankets (depends on the country, though), - Fuel supply and SNF take back, - International centers for rendering services of NFC. Time has come to remove from FRs and their NFC the label unfairly identifying them as the most dangerous installations of nuclear power from the standpoint of being a proliferation problem

  2. Systems resilience: a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2011-01-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

  3. Systems resilience : a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2011-12-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

  4. On-stream analysis of iron ore and its potential for improving export quality control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Holmes, R.J.

    1988-01-01

    An on-stream iron ore analyser has been developed in collaboration with Hamersley Iron Pty. Limited for determining the iron content of both lump (-30+6 mm particle size) and fines (-6 mm particle size) on conveyor belts. The analyser, which is called IRONSCAN, is based on pair production, and is now commercially available from Mineral Control Instrumentation Limited (MCI) in Adelaide. It can be mounted under existing conveyor belts with minimal modifications to the conveyor structure, and the presence of steel cables in the belt does not interfere once the analyser has been correctly calibrated. The analyser has been extensively tested on both lump and fines on the shiploading conveyor at Dampier, and typically the root mean square (r.m.s.) deviation between single IRONSCAN measurements and conventional chemical analyses is better than 0.5% Fe. It is currently being evaluated on - 150 mm ore from the primary crusher at Mount Tom Price, and initial results are encouraging. The principal advantage of IRONSCAN is that it provides rapid information on ore grades. But perhaps its greatest potential is at the primary crusher where conventional sampling and analysis is very expensive to implement. 11 figs., 1 tab

  5. US exports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schrage, W.E.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports on the past, present, and future of US coal exports. It is expected that in the 1990's, the following factors will be evident: Significant increases in coal production and port capacity in Australia and South Africa, but little in Canada; Potentially significant increase in coal production and port capacity in Colombia, Venezuela and Indonesia; Continued movement away from subsidized indigenous coal production in Europe and Japan. A substantial growth in world coal trade; Stronger growth in energy demand in the 1990s than in the 1980s; Significantly fewer additions to nuclear generating capacity in the 1990s than in the 1980s; Reduced coal production in Eastern Europe from that of the 1980s; Greater caution will be exercised in putting in new coal production capacity

  6. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-01

    Global Partnership and the UNSC Resolution 1540. However, this is only partially true as there is a growing realisation that radiation protection as well as emergency preparedness is part and parcel of the objectives that the international community is striving towards. Some of the projects have a genuinely humanitarian or civilian nature in the sense that they aim at alleviating for instance natural radiation such as from radon. But on the other hand, certain activities that concern radiation protection in terms of reducing the emissions of radiation from radioactive materials also become a security component with regard to the physical protection measures that in most cases will have to be in place. The projects in this field are implemented in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. There are a total of 22 projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation and security, the geographical scope of SSM's activities is broad and stretching beyond the nearest parts of Russia and other neighbouring states. This has to do with the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies relies on human will and therefore an amount of irradiated nuclear fuel in Siberia may be just as dangerous as a similar or smaller amount much closer to Sweden. It all depends on the people involved and their intentions. Sweden cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in this particular field. The projects include the installation of physical protection at facilities with nuclear and radioactive materials; the application of safeguards or nuclear materials accountancy on nuclear materials; assistance to the improvement of national export control systems as well as education in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. SSM participates in a number of projects that are financed by the EU. The projects were initiated in the framework of TACIS and soon to be formulated in the framework of INSC. TACIS focussed on the

  7. Non-proliferation efforts in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chellaney, B.

    1994-01-01

    Southern Asia is one of the most volatile regions in the world because of inter-State and intra-State conflicts. Security in the region highly depends on the rival capabilities of the involved states, Pakistan, India, China. Increased Confidence building and nuclear transparency are becoming more significant issues in attaining stability in the region, although non-proliferation efforts in this region have attained little headway

  8. Sovereignty and non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimminich, O.

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty seems to violate the fundamental principle of the quality of the states. However, if interpreted in the light of the latest developments of the international law, it is possible to justify the discriminations which it imposes on the non-nuclear states. A crucial point is the implementation of article VI by the nuclear states. If the latter procrastinate in nuclear disarmament the whole NPT-regime will collapse. (orig.) [de

  9. INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Donnelly, W H [Library of Congress, Washington, DC (USA)

    1980-12-01

    The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. This article outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US non-proliferation policy.

  10. Nonproliferation norms in civilian nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawata, Tomio

    2005-01-01

    For sustainable use of nuclear energy in large scale, it seems inevitable to choose a closed cycle option. One of the important questions is, then, whether we can really achieve the compatibility between civilian nuclear fuel cycle and nonproliferation norms. In this aspect, Japan is very unique because she is now only one country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program as a non-nuclear weapon state in NPT regime. In June 2004 in the midst of heightened proliferation concerns in NPT regime, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded that, for Japanese nuclear energy program, non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities were verified through the inspections and examinations under Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol. Based on this conclusion, the IAEA announced the implementation of Integrated Safeguards in Japan in September 2004. This paper reviews how Japan has succeeded in becoming the first country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program to qualify for integrated Safeguards, and identifies five key elements that have made this achievement happen: (1) Obvious need of nuclear fuel cycle program, (2) Country's clear intention for renunciation of nuclear armament, (3) Transparency of national nuclear energy program, (4) Record of excellent compliance with nonproliferation obligations for many decades, and (5) Numerous proactive efforts. These five key elements will constitute a kind of an acceptance model for civilian nuclear fuel cycle in NNWS, and may become the basis for building 'Nonproliferation Culture'. (author)

  11. Synergies between nonproliferation regimes: A pragmatic approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, Trevor; Meier, Oliver

    2001-01-01

    Full text: With the recent progress in establishing international nonproliferation regimes, the question of synergies between different verification and monitoring regimes is becoming more acute. Three multilateral and universal nonproliferation organisations covering safeguards on civil nuclear materials, nuclear testing, and chemical weapons are up and running. A regime on biological weapons is under negotiation. Several regional organisations concerned with monitoring nonproliferation commitments in the nuclear field are in place; others are being established. Past discussions on synergies between these regimes have suffered from being too far-reaching. These discussions often have not reflected adequately the political difficulties of cooperation between regimes with different membership, scope and institutional set-up. This paper takes a pragmatic look at exploiting synergies and identifies some potential and real overlaps in the work between different verification regimes. It argues for a bottom-up approach and identifies building blocks for collaboration between verification regimes. By realising such, more limited potential for cooperation, the ground could be prepared for exploiting other synergies between these regimes. (author)

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation: failures and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, R.; Press, R.

    1980-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of combined political and technical attempts to achieve worldwide acceptance of a commitment to non-proliferation, to note failures to date, and to identify essential factors to be satisfied if greater and necessary success is to be achieved in the immediate future. For this it is necessary to separate the realism and unrealism so often involved in discussing the concept of non-proliferation, as defined above, particularly if treated as a moral principle rather than as part of a general security issue reflecting shifts in regional and global stability. The political nature of the non-proliferation problem is underlined by the fact that whereas five nuclear weapon states are currently accepted, any threatened increase in that number is discouraged by every possible peaceful means. This fact combines political acceptance of an existing international situation with a belief that any addition to the present number must lead to international instability. Success in preventing additions may be more readily achieved through political understanding and perhaps some compromises, in particular cases, rather than through seeking a universal solution to a generalized problem

  13. The Impact of U.S. Export Control and Technology Transfer Regime on the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Project'A UK Perspective

    OpenAIRE

    David Moore; Peter Ito; Stuart Young; Kevin Burgess; Peter Antill

    2011-01-01

    Proceedings Paper (for Acquisition Research Program) The research assessed the international impact of the U.S. export control and technology transfer regime, with a focus on the UK experience with the U.S. requirements as they relate to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the impact on logistical support for the JSF fleet. UK government and industry representatives indicated agreement with the goals of U.S. policy, skepticism regarding the impact of those policies on effective project man...

  14. Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report: Class of 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McMakin, Andrea H.

    2012-08-20

    Annual report for the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Features the Class of 2011. The NGFP is a NNSA program with a mission to cultivate future technical and policy leaders in nonproliferation and international security. Through the NGFP, outstanding graduate students with career interests in nonproliferation are appointed to program offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). During their one-year assignment, Fellows participate in programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  15. 77 FR 71213 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) To Make the Commerce Control List (CCL...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-11-29

    ... correct a grammatical error in 6C992 by removing the word ``which'' and adding in its place the word... introductory portion of Category 2, Product Group E, and the introductory Notes to Category 5, Parts I and II... exporters, reexporters and transferors, stating the following: ``See Categories V and XIV of the United...

  16. Communication from the Permanent Mission of Israel to the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding nuclear export controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency has received a letter dated 13 July 2004 from the Permanent Mission of Israel providing information on Israel's nuclear export policies and practices. As requested by the Permanent Mission, the letter and document attached to it are reproduced herein for the information of Member States

  17. New trends of activity on supporting of non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Issaeva, G.M.; Tyupkina, O.G.

    2002-01-01

    Taking into account the necessity of all possible strengthening of non-proliferation regimes Kazakhstan participates in a number of agreements and associations: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Supplier Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Conference on Disarmament, etc. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) greatly influenced on the development on non-proliferation regime in Kazakhstan. During initial stage of CTR activity (1993-1995) military projects prevailed. Later (1995-1997) the projects on liquidation of infrastructure for nuclear and bio- weapons were successfully realized. Last years, since 1999, the attention was shifted towards proliferation prevention of hazardous nuclear and biological materials. Recent terrorist acts and world community activity on global safety strengthening underline an urgency of quite new problems that entirely applied to Kazakhstan: monitoring of hazardous materials; enhancement of safety systems of 'risky' facilities and technologies; creation and/or upgrading of safety systems for industry infrastructure. The proposals of these new trends of non-proliferation have been developed. Development of physical protection system for oil and gas industry infrastructure of Kazakhstan based on safety concepts of nuclear facilities; Evaluation of radionuclide contamination and safety of oil and gas facilities of the Caspian region; Counteraction to nuclear materials proliferation; Cooperative approaches in preventing/reducing of illicit trafficking and use of WMD-related explosive materials. Implementation of the project would make of substantial contribution to successful solution of either regional or global safety problem

  18. Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirsaidov, U.M.

    2010-01-01

    nuclear weapon creation are also represent serious challenges to nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty regime. That is why it is high time to accept new United Nations Security Council resolution, which puts under a ban countries withdrawal from nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty. Tajikistan gives big consideration to fulfillment of all treaties on weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation and sequentially fulfills its obligations in accordance with these international legal instruments. We understand that obligations fulfillment of these treaties requires conducting a number of measures. It includes: strengthening of physical protection; strengthening of borders and customs services; equipment modernization and personnel training on issues of nuclear materials export and import. A specific consideration Tajikistan gives to improving of legislative basis. Parliament adopted a number of laws, which facilitates to weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation. Republic of Tajikistan signed Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1997 and ratified Agreement on Safeguards and Additional Protocol with IAEA in 2004. All these documents facilitates to weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation. (author)

  19. 75 FR 7548 - Amendments to the Select Agents Controls in Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 1C360 on...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-22

    ... Commerce Control List (CCL) to reflect changes that the Animal Plant and Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Department of Agriculture, recently made to the Plant Protection and Quarantine Programs (PPQ... Plant and Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Department of Agriculture, recently made to the Plant...

  20. Long-Term Observations of Nitrogen and Phosphorus Export in Paired-Agricultural Watersheds under Controlled and Conventional Tile Drainage.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sunohara, M D; Gottschall, N; Wilkes, G; Craiovan, E; Topp, E; Que, Z; Seidou, O; Frey, S K; Lapen, D R

    2015-09-01

    Controlled tile drainage (CTD) regulates water and nutrient export from tile drainage systems. Observations of the effects of CTD imposed en masse at watershed scales are needed to determine the effect on downstream receptors. A paired-watershed approach was used to evaluate the effect of field-to-field CTD at the watershed scale on fluxes and flow-weighted mean concentrations (FWMCs) of N and P during multiple growing seasons. One watershed (467-ha catchment area) was under CTD management (treatment [CTD] watershed); the other (250-ha catchment area) had freely draining or uncontrolled tile drainage (UCTD) (reference [UCTD] watershed). The paired agricultural watersheds are located in eastern Ontario, Canada. Analysis of covariance and paired tests were used to assess daily fluxes and FWMCs during a calibration period when CTD intervention on the treatment watershed was minimal (2005-2006, when only 4-10% of the tile-drained area was under CTD) and a treatment period when the treatment (CTD) watershed had prolific CTD intervention (2007-2011 when 82% of tile drained fields were controlled, occupying >70% of catchment area). Significant linear regression slope changes assessed using ANCOVA ( ≤ 0.1) for daily fluxes from upstream and downstream monitoring sites pooled by calibration and treatment period were -0.06 and -0.20 (stream water) (negative values represent flux declines in CTD watershed), -0.59 and -0.77 (NH-N), -0.14 and -0.15 (NO-N), -1.77 and -2.10 (dissolved reactive P), and -0.28 and 0.45 (total P). Total P results for one site comparison contrasted with other findings likely due to unknown in-stream processes affecting total P loading, not efficacy of CTD. The FWMC results were mixed and inconclusive but suggest physical abatement by CTD is the means by which nutrient fluxes are predominantly reduced at these scales. Overall, our study results indicate that CTD is an effective practice for reducing watershed scale fluxes of stream water, N, and P

  1. Winter Ground Temperatures Control Snowmelt DOC Export From a Discontinuous Permafrost Watershed: A Multi-Year Perspective

    Science.gov (United States)

    Carey, S. K.

    2006-12-01

    For discontinuous and continuous permafrost watersheds, the largest mass flux of dissolved organic carbon (DOC) occurs during the snowmelt period. During this time, available allochtonous organic carbon that has accumulated over the winter in frozen organic soils is rapidly flushed to the basin outlet. While this process has been observed now in many river systems of different size and location, there have been few inter-annual reports on the mass of DOC loss and the factors controlling its variability during freshet. Hydrological and DOC fluxes were recorded for the 2002, 2003 and 2006 snowmelt season with supplementary over-winter data for an 8 square kilometer sub-basin (Granger Basin) of the Wolf Creek Research Basin, Yukon Territory, Canada. Granger Basin is an alpine catchment above treeline underlain with discontinuous permafrost (approximately 70 %) and has widespread surface organic soils up to 0.4 m in thickness. Pre-melt snow water equivalent varied widely throughout the basin, yet was greatest in 2006, followed by 2002 and 2003. Ground temperatures were notably colder throughout the 2003 winter compared with 2006 and 2002. For all years, discharge began in mid-May, and was a continuous event in 2002 and 2006. In 2003 four distinct melt-periods were observed due to rising and falling temperatures. During freshet, stream DOC concentration increased rapidly from 15 mg C/L on the first ascending limb of the hydrograph in each year. In 2003, DOC was largely flushed from the catchment several weeks prior to peak freshet. DOC concentration in wells and piezometers followed a similar pattern to streamflow DOC, with 2003 groundwater DOC concentrations less than 2002 and 2006. The total mass flux of DOC during freshet was 0.85, 0.45 and 1.01 g C/m2 for 2002, 2003 and 2006 respectively. Despite differences in pre-melt snow accumulation, the timing of melt and the volume of discharge, it appears that spring DOC export is largely controlled by over-winter ground

  2. Review on 18{sup th} Revision of 'Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items'

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeon, Jihye; Lee, Chansuh [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-05-15

    Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has established a guideline and continued to revise it in accordance with ever-changing international situation and developing technology. The Part 1 of guideline, 'Guidelines of Nuclear Transfers' covers the Trigger List items which triggers safeguards as a condition of supply. Currently NSG has published the 12{sup th} revised guideline (INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part1) in November 2013. Korean government fully reflected the guideline to its national legislation to implement in accordance with internationally agreed standard. The export control of nuclear strategic items in Korea is responsibility of Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), which entrusted the technical review of the work to Korea Institute of Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). The specific guidelines for the technical review are stipulated in Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items with other strategic items usable to other Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy approved the 18{sup th} revision of Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items on 31 January 2014 as Notice no. 2014-15, which strictly follows the NSG guideline. The 18{sup th} revision of the notice reflects the final proposals agreed from the last Dedicated Meeting of Technical Experts (DMTE) of NSG's Consultative Group (CG) in April 2013. The 3-year-DMTE offered the 'fundamental, holistic approach to the technical review' within the international framework of NSG, rather than sporadic endeavors by individual states in the past. The 18{sup th} version itself has meaning in that the final products of the international technical review were reflected in the Korean national legislation of nuclear export control. It addressed various changes in control text in technical, contextual, and editorial aspects. The revision is analyzed herein concentrating only on technical and semantic changes in control text.

  3. Review on 18th Revision of 'Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeon, Jihye; Lee, Chansuh

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has established a guideline and continued to revise it in accordance with ever-changing international situation and developing technology. The Part 1 of guideline, 'Guidelines of Nuclear Transfers' covers the Trigger List items which triggers safeguards as a condition of supply. Currently NSG has published the 12 th revised guideline (INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part1) in November 2013. Korean government fully reflected the guideline to its national legislation to implement in accordance with internationally agreed standard. The export control of nuclear strategic items in Korea is responsibility of Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), which entrusted the technical review of the work to Korea Institute of Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). The specific guidelines for the technical review are stipulated in Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items with other strategic items usable to other Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy approved the 18 th revision of Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items on 31 January 2014 as Notice no. 2014-15, which strictly follows the NSG guideline. The 18 th revision of the notice reflects the final proposals agreed from the last Dedicated Meeting of Technical Experts (DMTE) of NSG's Consultative Group (CG) in April 2013. The 3-year-DMTE offered the 'fundamental, holistic approach to the technical review' within the international framework of NSG, rather than sporadic endeavors by individual states in the past. The 18 th version itself has meaning in that the final products of the international technical review were reflected in the Korean national legislation of nuclear export control. It addressed various changes in control text in technical, contextual, and editorial aspects. The revision is analyzed herein concentrating only on technical and semantic changes in control text

  4. Non-proliferation and safeguards in South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broodryk, Alta

    2001-01-01

    South Africa occupies a unique position in the history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in being the only country with a nuclear weapons capability that was voluntary terminated before acceding to the Treaty. The first nuclear device built was completed in December 1982, five more devices followed at an orderly pace of less than one per year and on 26 February 1990 cabinet officially implemented the termination of its nuclear deterrent capability. The events that flowed from the termination was that South Africa: Acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (10 July 1991); Signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/394, (16 September 1991); Submitted its initial inventory of nuclear material (30 September 1991); and Received first verification team from the Agency (November 1991). South Africa, being dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became a party to various non-proliferation treaties, regimes and groups. The National Non- Proliferation Policy, as published in a Cabinet memorandum, also clearly states this commitment. To comply with the requirements of the Treaty and Agreement the following two acts were published: The Nuclear Energy Act; The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The Minister of Minerals and Energy is the State Authority for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in South Africa, however, the Minister delegated this Authority to NECSA's Safeguards Division. To implement the requirements of the various acts, control regimes and treaties a State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard, was designed. This standard focuses on customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, the demonstration of commitment and the prevention of non-conformity. To comply with the requirements of the standard the following procedures were established and maintained: A Quality Manual; Customer focus; Control of documents; Control of quality records; Internal Audits

  5. The Chinese Export Displacement Effect Revisited

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Elleby, Christian; Yu, Wusheng; Yu, Qian

    China’s global export share has increased dramatically over the past decades. This development has prompted an empirical literature on whether Chinese exports displace those originated from elsewhere in various destination markets. In this paper we focus on the growth of China’s exports to the East...... African Community (EAC) countries and show how it has affected exports from the European Union (EU) to the EAC. Our main contribution to the literature on the displacement effect of Chinese exports is a set of total and relative displacement estimates based on different specifications of the gravity model...... where we control for country-year fixed effects so as to avoid the “gold medal mistake” of not accounting for time varying “multilateral resistance”. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that Chinese exports have displaced exports from other countries in general. Nor do they support the hypothesis...

  6. Evolution and resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pregenzer, Arian L.

    2014-01-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and the concept of the adaptive cycle. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by increasing international participation in setting the nonproliferation agenda, developing general international response capabilities, focusing on non-coercive approaches to decreasing demand, and applying systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation

  7. Evolution and resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pregenzer, Arian L. [Senior Scientist, Retired, Sandia National Laboratories, 13013 Arroyo de Vista NE, Albuquerque, NM 87111 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and the concept of the adaptive cycle. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by increasing international participation in setting the nonproliferation agenda, developing general international response capabilities, focusing on non-coercive approaches to decreasing demand, and applying systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation.

  8. Twenty years of the Non-proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1990-01-01

    The report assesses the achievements of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and discusses ways in which the non-proliferation regime could be strenghtened. It recommends a series of measures to be taken by the parties of the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, with a view to reinforcing the Treaty and achieving its universality. 198 refs

  9. Non-proliferation aspects of long term assurance of supply

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The meetings in this section deal with the non-proliferation aspects of long-term assurance of supply of the nuclear fuel cycle. A list of 12 fundamental questions concerning the observation and application of the non-proliferation regulations is followed by the comments made by representatives of 10 countries

  10. The Non-Proliferation Malaise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sur, Serge

    2013-01-01

    Issues pertaining to nuclear weapons no longer occupy more than a relatively modest position in the international security field, which is more significantly threatened by recent forms of conflict - particularly asymmetrical -, the contemporary challenges posed by terrorism, the collapse of States and ensuing civil violence, organised crime, massacres, regional destabilisation, and the emerging threats related to deleterious uses of the Internet. Analysing these challenges and threats, and defining and implementing effective responses constitutes the priorities of the international agenda and mobilizes the energy and capabilities of States, alliances and coalitions, and international organisations. The time when the nuclear arms race between the United States and the USSR and the arms control efforts that attempted to frame and control it dominated the international relations scene has passed. This duo has been succeeded by a relative lack of interest on the part of nuclear powers towards their own arms. (author)

  11. Nuclear Nonproliferation Ontology Assessment Team Final Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Strasburg, Jana D.; Hohimer, Ryan E.

    2012-01-01

    Final Report for the NA22 Simulations, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) Ontology Assessment Team's efforts from FY09-FY11. The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.

  12. Carter faces new dilemmas over non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickson, D.

    1979-01-01

    Questions underlying the current domestic debate as to whether the US should revise its attitude towards the relationship between the spread of nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are considered. Problems arising from the provisional conclusions of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, set up at President Carter's suggestion in 1977, are evaluated. The thorny question of how to deal with the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for review in 1980 is discussed. Finally there is the issue, for which it is concluded nobody pretends to have all the answers, of whether a sufficient consensus - involving both developed and developing countries as partners in decision-making - can be forged to develop and apply an effective control regime, or whether increasing competition between both producers and consumers of nuclear power will be such as to limit the possibilities for multilateral action, shifting the focus back to bilateral actions. (UK)

  13. Hydrological Controls on Dissolved Organic Matter Quality and Export in a Coastal River System in Southeastern USA

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bhattacharya, R.; Osburn, C. L.

    2017-12-01

    Dissolved organic matter (DOM) exported from river catchments can influence the biogeochemical processes in coastal environments with implications for water quality and carbon budget. High flow conditions are responsible for most DOM export ("pulses") from watersheds, and these events reduce DOM transformation and production by "shunting" DOM from river networks into coastal waters: the Pulse-Shunt Concept (PSC). Subsequently, the source and quality of DOM is also expected to change as a function of river flow. Here, we used stream dissolved organic carbon concentrations ([DOC]) along with DOM optical properties, such as absorbance at 350 nm (a350) and fluorescence excitation and emission matrices modeled by parallel factor analysis (PARAFAC), to characterize DOM source, quality and fluxes under variable flow conditions for the Neuse River, a coastal river system in the southeastern US. Observations were made at a flow gauged station above head of tide periodically between Aug 2011 and Feb 2013, which captured low flow periods in summer and several high flow events including Hurricane Irene. [DOC] and a350 were correlated and varied positively with river flow, implying that a large portion of the DOM was colored, humic and flow-mobilized. During high flow conditions, PARAFAC results demonstrated the higher influx of terrestrial humic DOM, and lower in-stream phytoplankton production or microbial degradation. However, during low flow, DOM transformation and production increased in response to higher residence times and elevated productivity. Further, 70% of the DOC was exported by above average flows, where 3-4 fold increases in DOC fluxes were observed during episodic events, consistent with PSC. These results imply that storms dramatically affects DOM export to coastal waters, whereby high river flow caused by episodic events primarily shunt terrestrial DOM to coastal waters, whereas low flow promotes in-stream DOM transformation and amendment with microbial DOM.

  14. Political risk and export promotion: evidence from Germany

    OpenAIRE

    Moser, Christoph; Nestmann, Thorsten; Wedow, Michael

    2006-01-01

    Political risk represents an important hidden transaction cost that reduces international trade. This paper investigates the claim that German public export credit guarantees (Hermes guarantees) mitigate this friction to trade flows and hence promote exports. We employ an empirical trade gravity model, where we explicitly control for political risk in the importing country in order to evaluate the effect of export guarantees. The idea behind export promotion through public export credit agenc...

  15. The Nuclear Progress And The Non-Proliferation Policies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Popa-Simil, Liviu [Los Alamos, NM 87544 (United States)

    2009-06-15

    The 2008 fall crisis showed the limits of globalization under the actual rules and de-regulations promoted by few developed countries. It also showed the weakness of the planetary economy induced by strong economic connections that makes the propagation of crises faster than the spread of welfare. The increase in severe weather and natural disasters showed how fast the civilization can be spoiled while the competition for oil resources made the interstate tensions grow. For almost all states, the development of the nuclear power becomes a prime option, even oil producers started to show interest in nuclear technology and also, policies that in particular are clearly oriented towards national development policies. The fact that anybody mastering nuclear technologies and uses for power production is capable in a reasonable time to produce weapons is a well-known fact. Therefore, in order to reduce the proliferation risk it is necessary to contain the nuclear science development. An alternative is to shift the weight in promoting renewable energies, as potential future energy alternative. Considering rigorously the future climate change effects, it becomes obvious that any delay in nuclear development will turn very costly for any nation ignoring all these facts and, the complexity of the real nonproliferation is growing. This new trend raises serious challenges in front of all states regarding the non-proliferation and, in order to keep control and stimulate a sound nuclear development, some of the actual non-proliferation concepts and policies have to be reformulated and enhanced. This has to be done in parallel with a more intensive implication of the international organisms in the real development of the nuclear power at national level. The large diversity of nuclear applications with huge collateral implication in every national economy makes the role of the international organisms orders of magnitude more important. The new challenges posed in front of the

  16. Hydro-ecological controls on dissolved carbon dynamics in groundwater and export to streams in a temperate pine forest

    Science.gov (United States)

    Deirmendjian, Loris; Loustau, Denis; Augusto, Laurent; Lafont, Sébastien; Chipeaux, Christophe; Poirier, Dominique; Abril, Gwenaël

    2018-02-01

    We studied the export of dissolved inorganic carbon (DIC) and dissolved organic carbon (DOC) from forested shallow groundwater to first-order streams, based on groundwater and surface water sampling and hydrological data. The selected watershed was particularly convenient for such study, with a very low slope, with pine forest growing on sandy permeable podzol and with hydrology occurring exclusively through drainage of shallow groundwater (no surface runoff). A forest plot was instrumented for continuous eddy covariance measurements of precipitation, evapotranspiration, and net ecosystem exchanges of sensible and latent heat fluxes as well as CO2 fluxes. Shallow groundwater was sampled with three piezometers located in different plots, and surface waters were sampled in six first-order streams; river discharge and drainage were modeled based on four gauging stations. On a monthly basis and on the plot scale, we found a good consistency between precipitation on the one hand and the sum of evapotranspiration, shallow groundwater storage and drainage on the other hand. DOC and DIC stocks in groundwater and exports to first-order streams varied drastically during the hydrological cycle, in relation with water table depth and amplitude. In the groundwater, DOC concentrations were maximal in winter when the water table reached the superficial organic-rich layer of the soil. In contrast, DIC (in majority excess CO2) in groundwater showed maximum concentrations at low water table during late summer, concomitant with heterotrophic conditions of the forest plot. Our data also suggest that a large part of the DOC mobilized at high water table was mineralized to DIC during the following months within the groundwater itself. In first-order streams, DOC and DIC followed an opposed seasonal trend similar to groundwater but with lower concentrations. On an annual basis, leaching of carbon to streams occurred as DIC and DOC in similar proportion, but DOC export occurred in

  17. Hydro-ecological controls on dissolved carbon dynamics in groundwater and export to streams in a temperate pine forest

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    L. Deirmendjian

    2018-02-01

    Full Text Available We studied the export of dissolved inorganic carbon (DIC and dissolved organic carbon (DOC from forested shallow groundwater to first-order streams, based on groundwater and surface water sampling and hydrological data. The selected watershed was particularly convenient for such study, with a very low slope, with pine forest growing on sandy permeable podzol and with hydrology occurring exclusively through drainage of shallow groundwater (no surface runoff. A forest plot was instrumented for continuous eddy covariance measurements of precipitation, evapotranspiration, and net ecosystem exchanges of sensible and latent heat fluxes as well as CO2 fluxes. Shallow groundwater was sampled with three piezometers located in different plots, and surface waters were sampled in six first-order streams; river discharge and drainage were modeled based on four gauging stations. On a monthly basis and on the plot scale, we found a good consistency between precipitation on the one hand and the sum of evapotranspiration, shallow groundwater storage and drainage on the other hand. DOC and DIC stocks in groundwater and exports to first-order streams varied drastically during the hydrological cycle, in relation with water table depth and amplitude. In the groundwater, DOC concentrations were maximal in winter when the water table reached the superficial organic-rich layer of the soil. In contrast, DIC (in majority excess CO2 in groundwater showed maximum concentrations at low water table during late summer, concomitant with heterotrophic conditions of the forest plot. Our data also suggest that a large part of the DOC mobilized at high water table was mineralized to DIC during the following months within the groundwater itself. In first-order streams, DOC and DIC followed an opposed seasonal trend similar to groundwater but with lower concentrations. On an annual basis, leaching of carbon to streams occurred as DIC and DOC in similar proportion, but DOC export

  18. Nuclear nonproliferation: The long haul

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dunn, L.A.

    1985-01-01

    The policy of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency rests upon the recognition that nuclear proliferation would profoundly threaten international stability and global order. Suspicions among traditional rivals would be exacerbated, regional disputes made more complex, and the possibility of local conflict increased. The security and well-being of the United Sttes and its close friends and allies, but also the security and well-being of the countries acquiring these weapons, would be threatened. Indeed, the greatest chance of use of nuclear weapons stems not from the US-Soviet strategic balance but from the possible emergence of small, unstable nuclear arsenals in many regions of the world characterized by crises and periodic military conflict

  19. The White Paper on Defence and National Security and nonproliferation: between adaptation and traditionalism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sitt, Bernard

    2013-05-01

    The White Paper on Defence and National Security, published on the 29 April, presents France's strategic vision with regard to recent world developments and updates its national and international security postures for the coming fifteen years. The new White Paper notes, in particular, that existing risks and threats, be they military or non-military, and of State or non-State origin, have both intensified and diversified, and may concern all aspects of the life of the Nation. In terms of non-proliferation, the White Paper appears to follow on from its 2008 predecessor. It notes firstly that the most pessimistic forecasts, which predicted the emergence of twenty or so nuclear powers by the turn of the millennium, have not come to pass. Yet, there is cause for concern as a result of the multiplication of clandestine trafficking and transfers of material and immaterial goods, which non-State actors such as terrorist groups could use to acquire know-how and sensitive technology. For that reason, France is implementing a national export control regime for dual-use goods, and will launch an inter-ministerial review with the aim of reinforcing the regime. The other challenge is that posed by regional nuclear and ballistic proliferation and the ensuing crises. The continuing decades-old tension in the Middle East or East Asia is exacerbated by certain States' possession of nuclear weapons, and the risks of proliferation cascades in these two regions should be taken into serious account. The White Paper goes as far as envisaging the catastrophic scenario of an unchecked escalation resulting in the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Chemical and biological weapons constitute a genuine threat, taking into account notably the dual nature of underlying technologies, which makes clandestine programmes all the more difficult to prevent and detect. The requirements of the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their deliver systems thus remain

  20. Markups and Firm-Level Export Status

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    De Loecker, Jan; Warzynski, Frederic

    We derive an estimating equation to estimate markups using the insight of Hall (1986) and the control function approach of Olley and Pakes (1996). We rely on our method to explore the relationship between markups and export behavior using plant-level data. We find significantly higher markups when...... we control for unobserved productivity shocks. Furthermore, we find significant higher markups for exporting firms and present new evidence on markup-export status dynamics. More specifically, we find that firms' markups significantly increase (decrease) after entering (exiting) export markets. We...... see these results as a first step in opening up the productivity-export black box, and provide a potential explanation for the big measured productivity premia for firms entering export markets....

  1. Future technology challenges in non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richardson, J.H.

    2004-01-01

    Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. For example, various gamma ray imaging approaches are being explored to combine spatial resolution with background suppression in order to enhance sensitivity at reasonable standoff distances and acquisition times. New materials and approaches are being developed in order to provide adequate energy resolution in field use without the necessity for liquid nitrogen. Finally, different detectors combined into distributed networks offer promise for detection and tracking of radioactive materials. As the world moves into the 21st century, the possibility of greater reliance on nuclear energy will impose additional technical requirements to prevent proliferation. In addition to proliferation resistant reactors, a careful examination of the various possible fuel cycles from cradle to grave will provide additional technical and nonproliferation challenges in the areas of conversion, enrichment, transportation, recycling and waste disposal. Radiation detection technology and information management have a prominent role in any future global regime for nonproliferation beyond the current Advanced Protocol. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. (author)

  2. Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Redick, J.R.

    1981-01-01

    The regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco supports peace and security in the Latin American region and global nonproliferation efforts. Circumstances leading to the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone include careful preparations and negotiations, individual leadership, existence of certain shared cultural and legal traditions of Latin American countries, and the temporary stimulus of the Cuban missile crisis. The lack of overt superpower pressure on Latin America, compared with more turbulent regions, has permitted continued progress toward full realization of the zone. Tlatelolco's negotiating process, as well as the substance of the Treaty, deserve careful consideration relative to other areas. The Treaty enjoys wide international approval, but full support by certain Latin American States (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba) has been negatively affected by the failure of the US Senate to ratify Tlatelolco's Protocol I. Nuclear programs of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are expanding rapidly and these nations are forming linkages with West European countries, rather than the United States. The May 1980 Argentine-Brazilian nuclear agreement foresees significant cooperation between the two nation's nuclear energy commissions and more coordinated resistance to the nuclear supplier countries. Argentine-Brazilian nuclear convergence and the response accorded to it by the United States will have significant implications for the future of the Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America. 52 references

  3. Evaluation method of nuclear nonproliferation credibility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Eun-ha; Ko, Won Il

    2009-01-01

    This paper presents an integrated multicriteria analysis method for the quantitative evaluation of a state's nuclear nonproliferation credibility level. Underscoring the implications of policy on the sources of political demand for nuclear weapons rather than focusing on efforts to restrict the supply of specific weapons technology from the 'haves' to the 'have-nots', the proposed methodology considers the political, social, and cultural dimensions of nuclear proliferation. This methodology comprises three steps: (1) identifying the factors that influence credibility formation and employing them to construct a criteria tree that will illustrate the relationships among these factors; (2) defining the weight coefficients of each criterion through pairwise comparisons of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP); and (3) assigning numerical scores to a state under each criterion and combining them with the weight coefficients in order to provide an overall assessment of the state. The functionality of this methodology is examined by assessing the current level of nuclear nonproliferation credibility of four countries: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Switzerland.

  4. The Non-Proliferation Treaty increases security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kahiluoto, K.

    1995-01-01

    Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely was a historic decision. The Treaty is the most extensive international agreement on security policy to date; now its obligations have become a permanent part of international justice. Moreover, the NPT represents a political and moral obligation. Through the NPT, the international community has made a permanent commitment to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Increasing pressures will be applied to the few countries still outside the NPT, making it more likely that these countries will eventually change their views. The likelihood of regional bans on nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia, too, will increase. The Treaty promotes the establishment of new nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-free zone in Latin America - the countries covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty - is already very close to its full implementation. Finland is firmly committed to the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT Conference of 1995 was among the first international meetings in which Finland participated, and took an active role, as a Member State of the European Union. (orig.)

  5. Experience of Republic of Macedonia in Providing WMD Non-Proliferation Policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mecinovic, S.

    2007-01-01

    The Republic of Macedonia as a country in transition and as a country which does not posses WMD, has accepted to developed and implemented non-proliferation policy of WMD. First of all, we accepted the definition of WMD as used in international agreements, conventions and protocol and WMD includes nuclear, biological and toxin weapons, agent and precursors. WMD in wide sense includes all toxic chemical substances if they are used as means of attack or if they are the target of attack, all microorganisms and their product, all industrial facilities that use toxic chemicals in their process of production, transport and stockpile if they are a target of military or terrorist attack. For WMD non-proliferation projects to be valid, they must be on the level and carry the weight of international policy and doctrine and involve a most comprehensive sphere of the scientific and professional communities. This is only way to implement the projects in country such is Republic of Macedonia where the public opinion is that WMD are not real security problem because we neither possess nor seek to posses these kinds of weapons. Our WMD non-proliferation policy is tied to control of weapons, agents, precursors, technology and their transfer, market and possibility of use. Because of that we try to control know terrorist organization, groups and individuals. Terrorism caused special concern and attention, particularly when we talk about terrorism with NBC weapons and radiological, chemical and biological warfare agents. Scientific and technological progress led to fact that the instruments for performing terrorism (including WMD) can be produced or procured much easier than before. Rising industry which uses toxic chemicals and microorganisms in the production process created a lot of potential targets for terrorism actions in which they can use be as a target and an executive instrument. The new goal of contemporary treats is safety of life environment, which today includes

  6. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

  7. Export Controls and the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. Volume 1. Summary Report, and Volume 2. Appendices

    Science.gov (United States)

    2007-01-01

    el que se aprueba el reglamento del comercio exterior de material de defensa y de doble uso • Ley Orgánica 12...export restrictions. A-63 S T P I 60 Supplying Other Primes • India (ISRO), Israel ( El -Opt, Israel Aircraft Industries), Japan...200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 A lg er ia Ar ge nt in a A us tra lia B el ar us Br az il C an ad a C hi le Eg yp t In do ne si a Ira n Is ra el

  8. The nuclear export policy of the Reagan administration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.; Donnelly, W.H.

    1983-01-01

    tThe Reagan Administration maintains the Carter Administration's objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as being fundamental to US nuclear export policy. However, it sees the USA as having another important role to play in influencing the use of nuclear power and the trading of related goods and technologies in other countries. While the Administration believes its policies will prove beneficial to the USA, there is concern that trade considerations are being given priority over preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (author)

  9. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the Obama Administration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baek, Jin Hyun; Hwang, Ji Hwan

    2009-12-01

    The objective of this study is to analyze and foresee trends of international nuclear non-proliferation regimes focused on the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the Obama administration, and suggest national policy directions which promote utilization and development of nuclear energy in Korea. For the effective and efficient implementation of the national nuclear use and development program in current international nuclear environment, many efforts should be made: to actively and positively participate in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; to strengthen nuclear diplomacy in a more systematic manner; and to strengthen the international nuclear cooperation

  10. Exports and Job Training

    OpenAIRE

    Bastos, Paulo; Silva, Joana; Proenca, Rafael

    2016-01-01

    This paper examines whether export participation matters for job training. The paper draws on longitudinal worker-firm data for Brazilian manufacturing, linked with detailed records on training activity from the main provider. The analysis uses industry-specific exchange rate movements to generate exogenous variation in export status at the firm-level. The findings indicate that export par...

  11. A Study on Classification Cases in UAE BNPP Focused on Physical Breakdown Structure for the Establishment of Intelligent Export Control System

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Seung Hyo; Tae, Jae Woong; Shin, Dong Hoon

    2013-01-01

    NSG and the international society haven't suggested a clear standard for EDP, but recommended every member of NSG to establish their own standard and control strategic item export. As a result, it is hard to sustain objectivity and consistency in examining thousands of items and technologies related to nuclear power plants through the existing methods that classifies strategic items with limited human resources. Its long processing time may bring about a financial burden to the related companies as well. Accordingly, it is more required to establish Intelligent eXport Control System (IXCS) than ever before so that a great many of strategic items can be effectively processed. To provide basic data used to establish IXCS, this study analyzed classification cases of Braka Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) in UAE mainly focusing on Physical Breakdown Structure (PBS). Due to commercial reactors exported to UAE and research reactors exported to Jordan, the number of classification requests is rapidly increasing in Korea. Therefore, it is required to develop IXCS that can assist an efficient and consistent decision on a great many classification request. This system will be developed to present the possibility that items could be strategic through analyzing characteristics (e.g. name, function, use, purpose, duplication, relation to nuclear activities, etc.). The result in this study that analyzed the linkage between PBS code and items, one of characteristics (use) cited above, will be used as weighting factor to classify items for developing the system. (e. g. PBS code 431 has weighting factor 0.7.) In addition, it can be more efficient to sort items which are likely to be strategic among all requests before processing classification requests growing exponentially. It is concluded that the linkage between PBS code and items will be used as filtering factor to select items which could be strategic accordingly. Henceforth, it is plan to derive highly reliable statistical results

  12. China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy - Actions and Chronology

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Kan, Shirley A

    2001-01-01

    .... Some critics opposed satellite exports to China, while others were concerned that the Clinton Administration relaxed export controls and monitoring of commercial satellites in moving the licensing...

  13. A study on the establishment of national nuclear foreign policy with reference to nuclear export control system, strategy toward IAEA, and NPT review conferences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Choi, Young Myung; Nam, Jang Soo; Lee, Han Myung

    1990-02-01

    The objectives of this study are follows: suggestion for i) our future nuclear development directions, ii) establishment of national export control system, iii) establishment of strategy toward IAEA, and suggestion of our standpoints toward the 4th NPT review conference. This study proposes the following; 1) It is desirable that nuclear power generation strategy is propelled under the premise of economics and proven technology. And international cooperation in connection with the nuclear fuel cycle should be reinforced. 2) It is recommened that nuclear export control system should be government-led. 3) Our country needs to make efforts in increasing the number of Korean staff in the IAEA, and to establish permanent mission which is wholly responsible for the IAEA affairs, and to construct a system which deals with nuclear foregin activities. 4) It is desirable that the basic position of our country toward the 4th NPT review conference should be : i) to urge parties to the NPT to conclude safeguards agreement with IAEA as early as possible, ii) to request nuclear suppliers to mitigate their nuclear technology for peaceful uses to nuclear developing countries, and iii) to urge nuclear weapon states to make further efforts for nuclear disarmament. (author)

  14. Renewable energy export network

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon

    2000-01-01

    A Renewable Energy Exporters Network (REEN) has recently been established, following a meeting of renewable energy exporters and government agencies on 30 October 2000. REEN will assist the Australian renewable energy industry to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the burgeoning global market for renewable energy goods and services. Recent estimates of the significant potential global growth is renewable energy demand have reinforced the industry and Government's view that, in the medium to long-term, growth in the Australian renewable energy industry will largely depend on capturing export market share. Expanding the export market was identified as a crucial component in the Renewable Energy Action Agenda, developed jointly by industry and Government and released in June 2000. It was estimated that, for the industry to achieve its vision of sales of $4 billion per year by 2010, exports would need to comprise approximately 50% of the forecast growth in sales. As such, the need for a specific export strategy for the Australian renewable energy industry was recognised in the Action Agenda, and the establishment of the REEN is one of the first initiatives undertaken as part of the Renewable Energy Export Strategy. The REEN comprises approximately 50 export-ready renewable energy companies, the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Austrade, and Stage Government agencies such as NSW's Sustainable Energy Development Authority. The Export Network will operate electronically, with face-to-face meetings held as appropriate. The Department of Industry, Science and Resources will facilitate the Export Network and has published a website at www.isr.gov.au/industry/reen. The site includes: a members directory; a discussion forum; information on opportunities to showcase Australian renewable; energy products and services; and Iinks to sites containing information that may be useful to renewable energy exporters. Other actions that are being undertaken as

  15. The world's non-proliferation regime in time

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, George

    2005-01-01

    allies of some of the P-5, allies not having nuclear weapons, there are stronger assurances: promises of military help if an ally is attacked or threatened with attack, promises made, for example, to NATO allies. The regime includes various multilateral institutions such as the IAEA, the UN Security Council, the periodic NPT Review Conferences, and the UN General Assembly First Committee which considers non-proliferation recommendations for General Assembly adoption. An important but not sufficiently effective element of the regime is the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. Mohamed ElBaradei has recommended a much stronger requirement, and the G-8 agreed in June of 2004 not to export any uranium enrichment or plutonium separation technology for a year. However, gaining widespread agreement to deny the technology useful for enriching uranium and separating plutonium to any country not now having it will not be easy. The NPT recognized an 'inalienable right' to develop and use nuclear energy 'for peaceful purposes without discrimination,' even for NPT members that had agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons, so long as they did not make nuclear weapons. The enrichment and separation technologies can be used for making weapons as well as for fueling peaceful nuclear reactors. And, some NPT members not having nuclear weapons have argued that they have an 'inalienable right' to acquire these technologies. How this problem will be solved is not yet clear, but it must be if the non-proliferation regime is to survive. The regime is seriously challenged today. It needs strengthening-including this and other steps if it is to continue to be effective

  16. Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richardson, J

    2009-01-21

    The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

  17. 75 FR 33989 - Export Administration Regulations: Technical Corrections

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-16

    ... 0694-AE69 Export Administration Regulations: Technical Corrections AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and... section of Export Control Classification Number 2B001 and the other is in the Technical Note on Adjusted... language regarding certain performance criteria of turning machines covered by Export Control...

  18. Positive steps toward non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Greenhalgh, G.

    1979-08-30

    Russel W. Fox and Mason Willrich in their paper, International Custody of Plutonium Stocks: A First Step Toward an International Regime for Sensitive Nuclear Energy Activities, advocate placing excess plutonium in an international custodial facility; critical criteria governing releases are outlined so that, on one hand the owners can have high confidence that their plutonium will be returned promptly, under appropriate circumstances, and on the other hand, all the other participating and concerned countries can have confidence in the assurance that plutonium will be released only for immediate use in a defined and approved civil purpose. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the 1978 issue of its Year Book, recognizes a move towards a more positive approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation. It is noted that the non-proliferation strategies of the main supply countries have largely concentrated on a two-pronged approach of technology denials with tightening of safeguards. But already, enrichment, reprocessing, and breeder reactor programs extend far beyond the five nuclear weapon states. History testifies to the limitations of a policy of technical denials. SIPRI recognizes that another way to dissuade non-nuclear weapon states from creating their own enrichment or reprocessing plants would be to establish an open market for these services, a market characterized by diversity and competition. So far, there has been no case where a country has developed nuclear explosives by diverting material from a civil power station. Development of nuclear weapons by various countries is briefly noted and areas where strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is needed are noted. (MCW)

  19. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1983-01-01

    The author discusses the reasons of criticism and even rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, dealing in particular with the alledged discriminating nature of the Treaty and with the statement that the Treaty is not apt to prevent proliferation on a vertical plane. He further discusses the motives behind the efforts of potential nuclear weapons states to get nuclear weapons. The system of worldwide and bilateral safeguards and controls covering the transfer of nuclear technologies is explained. In conclusion the author suggests to pay more attention to article IV, sub-section (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as this might offer a suitable approach to restricting the dissemination of nuclear explosives. (HP) [de

  20. 14 CFR 1274.942 - Export licenses.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... writing, that the Agreement Officer authorize it to export ITAR-controlled technical data (including... appropriate licenses or other approvals, if required, for exports of hardware, technical data, and software, or for the provision of technical assistance. (b) The Recipient shall be responsible for obtaining...

  1. 77 FR 34342 - Order Denying Export Privileges

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-11

    ..., Luohu District, Shenzhen, 518001, China. On January 26, 2011, in the U.S. District Court, District of... Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. (2000)) (``IEEPA'') and violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 (2000)) (``AECA''). Specifically, Wu was convicted of illegally exporting...

  2. 77 FR 34340 - Order Denying Export Privileges

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-06-11

    ... Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. (2000)) (``IEEPA'') and Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 (2000)) (``AECA''). Specifically, Chitron- US was convicted of illegally exporting... components designated on the U.S. Munitions List to China through Hong Kong between 2004 and 2007. In...

  3. 78 FR 37785 - Order Denying Export Privileges

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-06-24

    ... DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security Order Denying Export Privileges In the... Order with the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security. The appeal must be filed within 45... the Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783(b)), or section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22...

  4. Non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation - accomplishments and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, H.R. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to assess the accomplishments in non-proliferation and nuclear co-operation since the beginning of President Reagan's administration, and the challenges remaining to be met in those fields. (NEA) [fr

  5. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  6. Exporting and Productivity

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Newman, Carol; Rand, John; Tarp, Finn

    2017-01-01

    different policy stance than typical in Africa. This is especially so in promoting export-oriented industry. If learning by exporting is a key driver of progress, then a fundamental reason for Africa's lack of transformation is likely to be the low policy priority given to export promotion in the past....... To enlarge the body of empirical evidence, we use an extensive 2005–2012 firm-level panel data set from Vietnam and separate out productivity effects of exporting due to self-selection. This allows us to conclude that firms actually learn by exporting. We also examine how this learning takes place. Our...... findings suggest that productivity gains are associated with moving to larger scale for foreign-owned firms with little evidence of subsequent learning on export markets. We find strong evidence to suggest that private domestic firms learn and accumulate knowledge from export markets with learning...

  7. Perspectives and benefits of the non-proliferating fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parker, F.

    2012-01-01

    The world community has faced the issues of nuclear non-proliferation for decades. Frank Parker, Emeritus Distinguished Professor at Vanderbilt University, has proposed a non-proliferating fuel cycle, which greatly reduces the risk of use of nuclear materials for military purpose. A simplified fuel cycle with reduced opportunities for proliferation of nuclear weapons and permanent disposal of radioactive wastes as well as a reference sub-seabed HLW disposal system are described [ru

  8. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-01-01

    The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

  9. Experience in non-proliferation verification: The Treaty of Raratonga

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walker, R.A.

    1998-01-01

    The verification provisions of the Treaty of Raratonga are subdivided into two categories: those performed by IAEA and those performed by other entities. A final provision of the Treaty of Raratonga is relevant to IAEA safeguards according to support of the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. The non-IAEA verification process is described as well

  10. U.S.-Russian cooperation in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Podvig, Pavel

    2010-02-01

    The United States and Russia, the two largest nuclear powers, have a special obligation to provide leadership in nuclear disarmament and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the past year the two countries made an effort to restart the arms control process by concluding a new treaty that would bring their legal disarmament obligations in line with the realities of their post-cold war relationships. The process of negotiating deeper nuclear reductions in the new environment turned out to be rather difficult, since the approaches that the countries used in the past are not well suited to dealing with issues like conversion of strategic nuclear delivery systems to conventional missions, tactical nuclear weapons, or dismantlement of nuclear warheads. This presentation considers the recent progress in U.S.-Russian arms control process and outlines the key issues at the negotiations. It also considers prospects for further progress in bilateral nuclear disarmament and issues that will be encountered at later stages of the process. The author argues that success of the arms reductions will depend on whether the United States and Russia will be able to build an institutional framework for cooperation on a range of issues - from traditional arms control to securing nuclear materials and from missile defense to strengthening the international nuclear safeguards. )

  11. Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime: focus on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saltiel, David H.; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2005-01-01

    the century and could increase even more quickly. Much of the new demand will come from the rapidly expanding economies in China and India, but much of the developing world stands poised to follow the same path. This growth in demand is paralleled by concerns about global warming and the long-term reliability of carbon-based fuel supplies, concerns which expanded use of nuclear power can help to address. For these reasons and others, many countries in Asia have already clearly signaled that nuclear energy will play a key role for years to come. Numerous proposals have been made in the last two years for reducing the proliferation risk of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. These range from a ban on export of enrichment and reprocessing technology to countries not already possessing operational capabilities to multinational management of the nuclear fuel cycle and strengthening existing monitoring and security mechanisms. The need for international willingness to enforce nonproliferation commitments and norms has also been emphasized. Some of these proposals could significantly impact the production of nuclear energy. Because the successful strengthening of the nonproliferation regime and the expansion of nuclear energy are so closely related, any successful approach to resolving these issues will require the creative input of experts from both the nuclear energy and nonproliferation communities. Against this backdrop, Sandia National Laboratories organized its 14th International Security Conference (ISC) around the theme: Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Focus on the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle. The goal of the conference was to begin a constructive dialogue between the nuclear energy and nuclear nonproliferation communities. The conference was held in Chantilly, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C. on April 4-6, 2005, and was attended by approximately 125 participants from fifteen countries. The ISC agenda was structured to produce a systematic

  12. The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

    2015-01-01

    Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

  13. Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

    2015-01-01

    The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

  14. Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mochiji, Toshiro; Keeney, R.; Tazaki, Makiko; Nakhleh, C.; Puckett, J.; Stanbro, W.

    1999-01-01

    PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet No. 21, which was signed in February 1996, ''The Joint Research on Transparency in Nuclear Nonproliferation'' under the ''Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation''. The purpose of Action Sheet 21 is to provide a fundamental study on Transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability for the nuclear energy from the nuclear nonproliferation point of view. This project consists of independent research and then joint discussion at workshops that address a series of topics and issues in transparency. The activities covered in Action Sheet 21 took place over a period of 18 months. Three workshops were held; the first and the third hosted by PNC in Tokyo, Japan and the second hosted by LANL in Los Alamos, New Mexico, US. The following is a summary of the three workshops. The first workshop addressed the policy environment of transparency. Each side presented its perspective on the following issues: (1) a definition of transparency, (2) reasons for transparency, (3) detailed goals of transparency and (4) obstacles to transparency. The topic of the second workshop was ''Development of Transparency Options.'' The activities accomplished were (1) identify type of facilities where transparency might be applied, (2) define criteria for applying transparency, and (3) delineate applicable transparency options. The goal of the third workshop, ''Technical Options for Transparency,'' was to (1) identify conceptual options for transparency system design; (2) identify instrumentation, measurement, data collection and data processing options; (3) identify data display options; and (4) identify technical

  15. Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chrzanowski, P.L.

    1993-01-01

    About 30 specialists in non-proliferation participated in a workshop to explore ideas for US Government preparatory steps leading to the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. To that end, workshop sessions were devoted to reviewing the lessons learned from previous Review Conferences, discussing the threats to the non-proliferation regime together with ways of preserving and strengthening it, and examining the management of international nuclear commerce. A fundamental premise shared by workshop participants was that extension of the NPT is immensely important to international security. The importance of stemming proliferation and, more specifically, extending the Treaty, is growing as a result of the significant changes in the world. If the conferees of the Extension Conference decide on no extension or extension for a short limited duration, some technically advanced states that have foregone development of nuclear weapons may begin to rethink their options. Also, other arms control measures, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could start to unravel. The US must provide strong international leadership to ensure that the Extension Conference is a success, resulting in Treaty extension, perhaps through successive terms, into the indefinite future. Workshop participants were struck by the urgent need for the US to take organizational steps so that it is highly effective in its advance preparations for the Extension Conference. Moreover, the Extension Conference provides both a challenge and an opportunity to mold a cohesive set of US policy actions to define the future role of nuclear weapons and combat their proliferation

  16. Workshop on regional cooperation in remote monitoring for transparency and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olsen, John; Inoue, Naoko; Hori, Masato; Hashimoto, Yu; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2006-06-01

    The Workshop on Regional Cooperation in Remote Monitoring for Transparency and Nonproliferation on 8-9 February at O'arai, Japan, brought together remote monitoring experts to share technical experience and consider potential uses of remote monitoring for nuclear transparency and strengthened nonproliferation. Sponsored by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), this event gathered thirty five attendees from the JAEA, the Republic of Korea's National Nuclear Management and Control Agency (NNCA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA). U.S. technical experts represented Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Workshop discussions and interactions met or surpassed all goals: On the technical front, the JAEA, NNCA, and SNL exchanged presentations on their respective uses and technical approaches to remote monitoring. These included systems for both international safeguards and transparency. The IAEA shared valuable guidance on future remote monitoring system requirements. Following the presentations SNL conducted training in remote monitoring for technical personnel. In parallel project planning discussions, the JAEA, NNCA, SNL and the U.S. DOE reaffirmed mutual interest in regional cooperation in remote monitoring that could eventuate in exchange of safeguards-related data. A productive off-the-record session by all parties considered the path forward and established intermediate steps and time scales. The 15 of the presented papers are indexed individually. (J.P.N.)

  17. Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

  18. Exporter Price Premia?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jäkel, Ina Charlotte; Sørensen, Allan

    This paper provides new evidence on manufacturing firms' output prices: in Denmark, on average, exported varieties are sold at a lower price (i.e. a negative exporter price premium) relative to only domestically sold varieties. This finding stands in sharp contrast to previous studies, which have...... found positive exporter price premia. We also document that the exporter price premium varies substantially across products (both in terms of sign and magnitude). We show that in a standard heterogeneous firms model with heterogeneity in quality as well as production efficiency there is indeed no clear......-cut prediction on the sign of the exporter price premium. However, the model unambiguously predicts a negative exporter price premium in terms of quality-adjusted prices, i.e. prices per unit of quality. This prediction is broadly borne out in the Danish data: while the magnitude of the premium varies across...

  19. The SSAC in international safeguards and non-proliferation aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bett, F.L.; Humphreys, J.J.

    1989-01-01

    The history of international efforts against horizontal proliferation, including the Baruch Plan, bilateral safeguards agreement, IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines and the Physical Protection Convention, is reviewed. The role of IAEA NPT safeguards in verifying nondiversion and ensuring no misuse of supplied nuclear items is discussed. The vital importance of successful performance of this role to peaceful nuclear commerce is stressed. The application of NPT safeguards by the IAEA is described, particularly the IAEA's requirement that a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material be established. Such a State System has two different but complementary areas of responsibility - ensuring that the use of nuclear material is controlled effectively and can be readily accounted for (this includes the area of physical protection), and providing accounts of nuclear material to responsible bodies such as the State's government and equally importantly to the IAEA for safeguards purpose, as the IAEA bases its conclusions about diversion on its verification of the data provided by the State System

  20. 48 CFR 1852.225-70 - Export Licenses.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... writing, that the Contracting Officer authorizes it to export ITAR-controlled technical data (including... licenses or other approvals, if required, for exports of hardware, technical data, and software, or for the provision of technical assistance. (b) The Contractor shall be responsible for obtaining export licenses, if...

  1. 75 FR 842 - Action Affecting Export Privileges: Hailin Lin

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-06

    ... People's Republic of China (PRC) in violation of U.S. export control laws by failing to obtain the proper... (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706). Charge 1: 15 CFR 764.2(d)--Conspiracy To Export Electronic Components to the... was done so that Shipper's Export Declarations, which are filed with the U.S. Government and which...

  2. 75 FR 33682 - Export Administration Regulations; Technical Amendments

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-15

    ...-01] RIN 0694-AE93 Export Administration Regulations; Technical Amendments AGENCY: Bureau of Industry... Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) makes a technical amendment to the Export Administration... review of final decisions and orders issued in BIS export control administrative enforcement proceedings...

  3. 15 CFR 754.5 - Horses for export by sea.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Horses for export by sea. 754.5... CONTROLS § 754.5 Horses for export by sea. (a) License requirement. As indicated by the letters “SS” in the... No. 1 to part 774 of the EAR) a license is required for the export of horses exported by sea to all...

  4. Nonproliferation, disarmament and the security link

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raja Mohan, C.

    1997-01-01

    It is obvious that nuclear weapons are here to stay for a long time to come. Many nation states are likely to operate on the premise that the combination of nuclear weapons and long range missile provides an unrivalled source of power. The United States and India cannot hope to structure cooperation on the hope that nuclear weapons can be marginalised and eventually eliminated from the international calculus of power. Nor can they go by the premise that the existing structure of international power can be frozen through the strengthening of the current nonproliferation regime. Continued diffusion of power and the spread of technology as well as the political dynamics could break the current order. This bleak assessment does not however imply that there are no prospects for cooperation between India and the United States. If both the nations move towards a more realistic policy positions and locate their nuclear dialogue in a broader strategic context, it should not be impossible to develop areas of cooperation

  5. The Export Promoting Effect of Emigration

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hiller, Sanne

    The theoretical claim that ethnic networks encourage trade has found broad empirical support in the literature on migration, business networks and international trade. Ethnic networks matter for the exporting firm, as they exhibit the potential to lower fixed and variable cost of exporting....... This paper provides a first attempt to identify the export-promoting effect of emigration on the firm level. Using detailed Danish firm-level data, we can parsimoniously control for export determinants other than emigration, unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as for self-selection of firms...... into exporting. Additionally accounting for taste similarity between Denmark and its trade partners, our findings suggest a positive effect of emigration on Danish manufacturing trade within Europe, thereby corroborating preceding studies on aggregate data. Nevertheless, as a novel insight, our analysis reveals...

  6. Demand Uncertainty: Exporting Delays and Exporting Failures

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Nguyen, Daniel Xuyen

    2012-01-01

    This paper presents a model of trade that explains why firms wait to export and why many exporters fail. Firms face uncertain demands that are only realized after the firm enters the destination. The model retools the timing of the resolution of uncertainty found in models with heterogeneity...... of firm productivity. This retooling addresses several shortcomings. First, the imperfect correlation of demands reconciles the sales variation observed in and across destinations. Second, since demands for the firm's output are correlated across destinations, a firm can use previously realized demands...... to forecast unknown demands in untested destinations. The option to forecast demands causes firms to delay exporting in order to gather more information about foreign demand. Third, since uncertainty is resolved after entry, many firms enter a destination and then exit after learning that they cannot profit...

  7. Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leek, K.M.

    2006-01-01

    Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat of proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.

  8. 76 FR 68809 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-07

    ..., Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation, Bureau of International Security and... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7678] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Proliferation Sanctions Against a Foreign Person AGENCY...

  9. Learning by Exporting

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Cruz, Antonio; Newman, Carol; Rand, John

    2017-01-01

    In this article, we analyse the learning-by-exporting (LBE) hypothesis in the Mozambican context. Due to the presence of the ‘Born-Global’ phenomenon among exporters, we address the endogeneity introduced by self-selection, combining a generalised Blinder–Oaxaca approach with results from...

  10. Learning by Exporting

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Cruz, Antonio; Newman, Carol; Rand, John

    2017-01-01

    In this article, we analyse the learning-by-exporting (LBE) hypothesis in the Mozambican context. Due to the presence of the ‘Born-Global’ phenomenon among exporters, we address the endogeneity introduced by self-selection, combining a generalised Blinder–Oaxaca approach with results from traditi...

  11. Industrialisation, Exports and Employment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sabolo, Yves

    1980-01-01

    After reviewing trends in industrial production, exports, and employment in the Third World since 1960, the author discusses industrialization strategies based on the local processing of raw materials for export. Such processing has proved to be a major factor in job creation. (Author/SK)

  12. Putting teeth in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 25 March 2006, Karlsruhe, Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2006-01-01

    The factors, contributing to the world's changes in respect to peace, security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are presented in the document. Five necessary and urgent measures are proposed in order to meet the current challenges: 1)tighten control for assess to nuclear fuel cycle technology; 2)accelerate global efforts tp protect nuclear material; 3)support effective nuclear verification; 4) reinvigorate disarmament efforts; 5) increase the effectiveness of the UN Security Council. The importance and necessity to place nuclear operations under multinational control is outlined

  13. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Northeast Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han Yong-Sup

    1995-01-01

    This paper attempted to find out ways to facilitate bilateral and regional arms control regarding nuclear issues in Northeast Asia. This is done in order to reduce uncertainties regarding nuclear policy and capabilities of those countries, and thus to enhance transparency and confidence in the region. In order to bring them into the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process in an effective way, we revisited the issues that contributed to the acceleration of the arms race. The review provided insights into the future course of China, the two Koreas and Japan regarding their nuclear policy and capabilities. The findings of this study indicate a general likelihood of resistance to outside request for arms control and disarmament in the countries in Northeast Asia. Besides their continuation with the conventional arms race, countries in Northeast Asia are reluctant to go ahead with the programmes to enhance transparency, build confidence in the region, and to forgo intentions to go nuclear. China is slowly but steadily increasing its nuclear arsenals. Its nuclear arms control policy is not well integrated with nuclear policy and strategy, and it is subject to the overarching goal of nuclear policy and strategy to advance China's status and national security interests in the international community. Thus, it will be very difficult for other countries to bring China to the arms control process for the time being. North Korea has intended to develop nuclear weapons in order to hedge against uncertainties. This poses a threat to the NPT regime and the peace and security of Northeast Asia. Clearly, North Korea has shown its reluctance to disclose the entirety of its nuclear programme under the IAEA inspections. Although South Korea has taken a bold initiative to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, it has still not fully paid off. Japan adds the problem of plutonium surplus to the uncertain security environments surrounding Northeast Asia

  14. In search of plutonium: A nonproliferation journey

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hecker, Siegfried

    2010-02-01

    In February 1992, I landed in the formerly secret city of Sarov, the Russian Los Alamos, followed a few days later by a visit to Snezhinsk, their Livermore. The briefings we received of the Russian nuclear weapons program and tours of their plutonium, reactor, explosives, and laser facilities were mind boggling considering the Soviet Union was dissolved only two months earlier. This visit began a 17-year, 41 journey relationship with the Russian nuclear complex dedicated to working with them in partnership to protect and safeguard their weapons and fissile materials, while addressing the plight of their scientists and engineers. In the process, we solved a forty-year disagreement about the plutonium-gallium phase diagram and began a series of fundamental plutonium science workshops that are now in their tenth year. At the Yonbyon reprocessing facility in January 2004, my North Korean hosts had hoped to convince me that they have a nuclear deterrent. When I expressed skepticism, they asked if I wanted to see their ``product.'' I asked if they meant the plutonium; they replied, ``Well, yes.'' Thus, I wound up holding 200 grams of North Korean plutonium (in a sealed glass jar) to make sure it was heavy and warm. So began the first of my six journeys to North Korea to provide technical input to the continuing North Korean nuclear puzzle. In Trombay and Kalpakkam a few years later I visited the Indian nuclear research centers to try to understand how India's ambitious plans for nuclear power expansion can be accomplished safely and securely. I will describe these and other attempts to deal with the nonproliferation legacy of the cold war and the new challenges ahead. )

  15. Nonproliferation impacts assessment for the management of the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-12-01

    On May 13, 1996, the US established a new, 10-year policy to accept and manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the US. The goal of this policy is to reduce civilian commerce in weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU), thereby reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Two key disposition options under consideration for managing this fuel include conventional reprocessing and new treatment and packaging technologies. The Record of Decision specified that, while evaluating the reprocessing option, ''DOE will commission or conduct an independent study of the nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and timing) implications of chemical separation of spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors.'' DOE's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation conducted this study consistent with the aforementioned Record of Decision. This report addresses the nonproliferation implications of the technologies under consideration for managing aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site. Because the same technology options are being considered for the foreign research reactor and the other aluminum-based spent nuclear fuels discussed in Section ES.1, this report addresses the nonproliferation implications of managing all the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel, not just the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The combination of the environmental impact information contained in the draft EIS, public comment in response to the draft EIS, and the nonproliferation information contained in this report will enable the Department to make a sound decision regarding how to manage all aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site

  16. Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Streeper, Charles Blamires

    2009-01-01

    In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMD related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the

  17. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Where Next?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, G.

    2013-01-01

    Let me come straight to the point: We are still at a real watershed with respect to the whole nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament project, about which hopes have been so high for most of the last two years, especially following the political breakthrough of the election of a US president totally committed to the ultimate achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world. Unless the key players in the international community, and there are many that matter in this context, not just the United States of America and the Russian Federation, get really serious about moving forward on the multiple critical agenda issues that face us - not just safeguards, the subject of this symposium, but right across the whole spectrum of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful-uses challenges - there is a very real danger that such remaining momentum for change as there is will stall, that the whole project will fall apart, and that we will be condemned to live for the indefinitely foreseeable future in a nuclear world that is very dangerous indeed. The prevailing sentiment after the May Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was one of relief - that the conference had not broken down as it did in 2005 and that catastrophe had been avoided; in effect, that this particular watershed point had been passed. But the positive gains from that conference, when objectively assessed, were negligible on crucial NPT regime strengthening issues, and, with the possible exception of the agreement to hold a Middle East conference in 2012, very slight indeed elsewhere. And, weighing in the negative balance, there have been some serious disappointments on other key benchmark issues spelled out in US President Obama's April 2009 Prague Speech and on which real movement had been hoped for this year. Nothing has moved on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification by the USA or any other major nuclear power; negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) remain

  18. 76 FR 80282 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Control of Vessels of War and Related...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-23

    ... would require licenses from both the State Department and the Commerce Department. Following the... further align the CCL with the WAML and the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment, Software and... antiterrorism (AT Column 1) controls, which currently impose a license requirement for five countries. A license...

  19. Non-proliferation and security: synergy and differences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joly, J.

    2013-01-01

    Operators of nuclear facilities put in place both physical and organisational means to meet in a comprehensive way the requirements associated with Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Safety and Security. The common aim is to protect man and the environment from ionising radiation. The approaches for meeting these requirements have real similarities, but also differences which need to be respected in order to develop an appropriate synergy for obtaining the best possible level of safety, security and non-proliferation. This article aims to show the provisions that have been taken with regard to non-proliferation, security and safety which complement and reinforce each other.The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  20. Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report; ANNUAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NONE

    2000-01-01

    This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community

  1. Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-03-01

    This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community.

  2. Controlling nuclear proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sweet, W.

    1981-01-01

    Nuclear non-proliferation policy depends on the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which countries promise not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for open access to peaceful nuclear technology, and a system of international safeguards that are imposed on exported nuclear equipment and facilities operated by parties to the treaty. Critics have feared all along that non-nuclear countries might circumvent or exploit the system to obtain nuclear weapons and that the Atoms for Peace plan would spread the very technology it sought to control. The nuclear weapons states would like everyone else to believe that atomic bombs are undesirable, but they continue to rely on the bombs for their own defense. Israel's raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor focused world attention on the proliferation problem and helped to broaden and sterengthen its prospects. It also highlighted the weakness that there are no effective sanctions against violators. Until the international community can ageee on enforcement measures powerful enough to prevent nuclear proliferation, individual countries may be tempted to follow Israel's example, 19 references

  3. Open Source and Trade Data for Non-Proliferation: Challenges and Opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, I.; Gillard, N.

    2015-01-01

    This paper explores what more systematic exploitation of trade data can contribute to the state evaluation process. The paper begins by setting out a typology of trade data, which groups the data into five categories: · Government Declared Data, which is prepared and submitted by States to an international authority for non-proliferation purposes. · Government Recorded Data, which includes information collected by the state for its own purposes, and which is not routinely submitted to international authorities for non-proliferation purposes. It includes (some) export licencing data, customs data, and business registration information. · Business-held data, which includes information on a company's own products and customers, but also ''market intelligence''. · Intelligence and Enforcement Derived Information, which can include information on specific procurement attempts, networks, or procurement requirements. · Procurement Requirements Information, which can include information released by a programme for the purpose of seeking goods or services. Challenges and opportunities related to further exploitation of trade data sources in each category are then explored, as are factors related to accessibility (both in terms of mandates and more practical considerations), reliability (including presentation of a typology), completeness, and duplication in data. Next, the paper explores how the IAEA can systematically collect, integrate and analyze the various sources of trade data given the considerations outlined above. In particular, this section focuses on how data in variable structures can be integrated into the state evaluation process. In concluding, the paper will describe how the newly formed ''Collaboration on Open Source and Trade Analysis for Non-proliferation'' (COSTA-NP) is seeking to develop each of the categories of trade data. The paper links to research objectives 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 of the IAEA

  4. Implementation of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Sierra Leone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    George, M.

    2015-01-01

    Sierra Leone under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) has enacted the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (NSRP) Act 2012 and has given numerous powers to the Authority to implement the above mentioned act fully. The NSRP Act 2012 established the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Authority which among other things to regulate, control and supervise the acquisition, importation, exportation, use, transportation and disposal of radioactive sources and devices emitting Ionizing Radiation. The Authority is bounded by law to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of Safeguards Agreement and any protocol thereto between Sierra Leone and the International Atomic Energy Agency including conducting inspections and providing any assistance or information required by designated IAEA inspectors in the fulfillment of their responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, Subsection 2, Article xvi of the NSRP Act 2012. The Authority is also granted powers to adopt all necessary measures including a system of licensing to control the export, re-export, transit and transhipment of any nuclear material, equipment or technology in order to protect the safety and security of Sierra Leone. The Regulatory Authority has established departments for the control of nuclear materials: One of which is The Regulatory Control Department; responsible for Inspections, Authorization and Enforcement actions for all radiation sources and nuclear materials. The Authority has been conducting inspections regularly on various facilities ranging from medical radiation generating equipment to industrial radiography sources. The methodology to be used is the issuance of the standard IAEA checklist which is consistent with the Regulatory Authority’s documents for inspection of sources and is in line with the General Safety Requirements(GSR)Part III. The expected outcomes would be increasing training of regulatory authority’s staff, the procurement of

  5. Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pomper, Miles A.

    2010-01-01

    Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

  6. Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Yong Soo

    2009-07-01

    KAERI has jointly worked with Sandia National Laboratories for Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia for the last five years. This project aims at support activities in this joint project between two states. The annual meetings were held during the project period, the 4th one in 2008 and the 5th one in 2009. In addition code comparison between KAERI and SNL's codes for assessing the back-end fuel cycle options was carried out. This project strongly enhances the close tie for the non-proliferation, transparency and safeguards among Korea Japan China Taiwan the United States Russia Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Thailand Vietnam and others for the project period

  7. Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young

    2015-01-01

    In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation

  8. Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation.

  9. The IAEA and non-proliferation: is quiescence progress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herron, L.W.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current status of more important non-proliferation aspects affecting or involving the IAEA. The questions dealt with cover in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Committee on Assurances of Supply established by the IAEA in 1980 and the International Plutonium Storage Study prepared by an IAEA expert group. The author concludes that in a number of areas involving this Agency, recent considerable activity at both political and technical levels has produced few tangible results althrough the situation is not static. (NEA) [fr

  10. Iran, a gas exporter?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Therme, C.

    2008-01-01

    The development of the gas sector has not allowed, up to now, Iran to become one of the main gas actors, whether it is on the regional or international market. This under-development of the gas sector finds expression, each winter, through the Iranian incapability to satisfy its domestic demand as well as its exportation commitments to Turkey or Armenia. In this study, the author tries to examine the origins of Iranian difficulties to increase its gas production and to abide by its commitments to export gas to other countries. The possibility of gas exportation from Iran to the European Union is also discussed

  11. Guide to software export

    CERN Document Server

    Philips, Roger A

    2014-01-01

    An ideal reference source for CEOs, marketing and sales managers, sales consultants, and students of international marketing, Guide to Software Export provides a step-by-step approach to initiating or expanding international software sales. It teaches you how to examine critically your candidate product for exportability; how to find distributors, agents, and resellers abroad; how to identify the best distribution structure for export; and much, much more!Not content with providing just the guidelines for setting up, expanding, and managing your international sales channels, Guide to Software

  12. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-15

    foreseen by for instance the Global Partnership and the UNSC Resolution 1540. However, this is only partially true as there is a growing realisation that radiation protection as well as emergency preparedness is part and parcel of the objectives that the international community is striving towards. Some of the projects have a genuinely humanitarian or civilian nature in the sense that they aim at alleviating for instance natural radiation such as from radon. But on the other hand, certain activities that concern radiation protection in terms of reducing the emissions of radiation from radioactive materials also become a security component with regard to the physical protection measures that in most cases will have to be in place. The projects in this field are implemented in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. There are a total of 22 projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation and security, the geographical scope of SSM's activities is broad and stretching beyond the nearest parts of Russia and other neighbouring states. This has to do with the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies relies on human will and therefore an amount of irradiated nuclear fuel in Siberia may be just as dangerous as a similar or smaller amount much closer to Sweden. It all depends on the people involved and their intentions. Sweden cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in this particular field. The projects include the installation of physical protection at facilities with nuclear and radioactive materials; the application of safeguards or nuclear materials accountancy on nuclear materials; assistance to the improvement of national export control systems as well as education in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. SSM participates in a number of projects that are financed by the EU. The projects were initiated in the framework of TACIS and soon to be formulated in the framework of

  13. 78 FR 8218 - Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Statutory Debarment Under the Arms Export Control Act and...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-05

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8175] Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Statutory Debarment... INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa Aguirre, Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, Bureau of Political... conviction in a criminal proceeding, conducted by a United States Court, and as such the administrative...

  14. 75 FR 13330 - Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Statutory Debarment Under the Arms Export Control Act and...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-19

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 6924] Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Statutory Debarment... Trade Controls Compliance, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, (202) 663-2980... criminal proceeding, conducted by a United States Court, and as such the administrative debarment...

  15. Nuclear Non-proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 - No 8 of 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Act aims at giving domestic legislative effect to Australia's international non-proliferation obligations and establishes controls over the possession and transport of nuclear materials and equipment by a system of permits. These obligations arise inter alia under the NPT Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Act provides that its provisions shall apply to nuclear material (as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute) and associated items which include associated material, equipment or technology. These are clearly defined in the Act. (NEA) [fr

  16. The Puzzle of Non-proliferation and Disarmament (Part II)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ponga, J. de

    2011-01-01

    Since, in 1945, the World was aware of the devastating power of nuclear weapons there have been many initiatives at international level to avoid nuclear weapon proliferation: the foundation of the IAEA, the NPT, the Safeguards Agreements, the Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, the treaties banning nuclear tests or the export control regime of the NSG, among others. This article aims to offer a general picture of all of them as pieces of a puzzle the purpose of which is not to allow gaps to non pacific uses of nuclear energy. (Author)

  17. National Nuclear Management and Control Agency (NNCA)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoon, Wan Ki

    2006-01-01

    The National Nuclear Management and Control Agency (NNCA) is an independent agency for safeguards and material control for nuclear activities in the Republic of Korea. Formerly subordinate to the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), it is temporarily associated with the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS). In mid-2006 it will become fully independent. The NNCA is responsible for safeguards within the ROK, cooperates with the IAEA, and supports technical needs of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). In addition, it has responsibilities in export controls and physical protection. In the future the NNCA expects to become a national 'think tank' for nuclear control and nonproliferation issues. This presentation enumerated the many responsibilities of the NNCA and explained the structure and staffing of the organization. (author)

  18. Coal exports still growing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blain, M.

    1998-01-01

    It is shown that the swings and roundabouts of the Asian economic shake out and Australian dollar devaluation are starting to work their way through the Australian export coal market. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, at this stage the results are not proving to be as bad as were at first predicted by some market watchers. Export revenue and tonnages are up 12% for the year to July 98. Coal exports totaling $9.5 billion left Australia's shores in the 12 months confirming coal as Australia's single largest export revenue earner. Sales volumes in the present financial year are still increasing, the market being driven by steadily increasing Asian demand for steaming coal from places like Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines

  19. Exploitative Learning by Exporting

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Golovko, Elena; Lopes Bento, Cindy; Sofka, Wolfgang

    Decisions on entering foreign markets are among the most challenging but also potentially rewarding strategy choices managers can make. In this study, we examine the effect of export entry on the firm investment decisions in two activities associated with learning about new technologies...... and learning about new markets ? R&D investments and marketing investments, in search of novel insights into the content and process underlying learning by exporting. We draw from organizational learning theory for predicting changes in both R&D and marketing investment patterns that accompany firm entry......, it is predominantly the marketing-related investment decisions associated with starting to export that lead to increases in firm productivity. We conclude that learning-by-exporting might be more properly characterized as ?learning about and exploiting new markets? rather than ?learning about new technologies...

  20. Quebec's electricity exports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Averyt, W.F.

    1992-01-01

    In 1987 Hydro-Quebec exported over 16 TWh to New England and New York and it plans to export 3,500 MW of firm power, not interruptible, by the early 2000s. It estimates that the northeast US market has an additional potential of 9,000 MW. The export market has become more difficult than anticipated. The federal/state regulatory framework for electricity generation was changing - it encouraged small scale generation, cogeneration and conservation which decreased demand. Demand for power imports has also been influenced by pricing judgements and avoided costs. Environmental concerns and Native protest have become increasingly important factors affecting future export sales and hence the proposed James Bay developments. Regulatory changes affecting supply and pricing, concerns about continental impacts, about further development of electrical sources together with Native requirements will further complicate the Quebec-US electricity trade. (author)

  1. Valie EXPORT Society. Overlok

    Index Scriptorium Estoniae

    2001-01-01

    Valie EXPORT Society asutasid 23. okt. 1999. a. Frankfurdis Kadi Estland, Killu Sukmit ja Mari Laanemets, kui olid külastanud austria naiskunstniku Valie Exporti näitust. Rühmituse aktsioonide kirjeldus

  2. Valie EXPORT Society Rooseumis

    Index Scriptorium Estoniae

    2002-01-01

    Malmös Rooseumi Kaasaegse Kunsti Keskuses näitus "Baltic Babel". Projekt koosneb Läänemeremaade linnades tegutsevate innovatiivsete gruppide aktsioonidest. Kuraator Charles Esche. Esinejatest (Eestist Valie Export Society: Kadi Estland, Killu Sukmit)

  3. Power, leadership and control of the distribution companies in the export of fresh vegetables from Sinaloa, México

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ezequiel Avilés Ochoa

    2012-05-01

    Full Text Available A key concept in the construction of the paradigm of global value chains is governance, for its constitution the variables of power, leadership and control are essential. The research focuses on Sinaloa vegetable distributors in the U.S.A. market, which reveals the interaction between regions of different countries for the formation of a horticultural value chain. The result is an index that defines which of the actors, involved in the fresh produce trade, practices more governance.

  4. Effect of Acetic and Lactic Acid Mixtures on Control of Quarantine Nematode, Bursaphelenchus xylophilus, in Exporting Cymbidium

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yunhee Seo

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available The mixture (MX of acetic acid (AA and lactic acid (LA was examined for its effectiveness in the control of the pine wood nematode Bursaphelenchus xylophilus contaminated in cymbidium culture medium. Nematode mortality in vitro was nearly 100% in AA and MX at the concentrations of 5.0-1.0% (pH 2.6 – 4.2 and in LA only at 5.0% (pH 3.5, but lowered at concentrations of 0.5-0.1% (pH 5.1-6.9 more significantly in LA than AA and MX. MX of most concentrations caused higher nematode mortality than the average response to AA and LA. All treatments of MX (0.5% and 0.25%, fosthiazate (standard and double concentrations and culture dilution of Paenibacillus polymyxa GBR-1 (107colony-forming units/ml reduced significantly the nematode populations in the cymbidium culture medium, compared to non-treatment control, with no significant difference among the treatments. No phytotoxicity occurred in all treatments. pH of the medium with the time after treatment and growths of 2-year-old cymbidium were not significantly different among treatments. Considering the safety and price of the organic acids, use of MX in the processes for culturing cymbidium may be a practically reliable and eco-friendly way in the control of the quarantine nematode in cymbidium.

  5. Canada's reactor exports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morrison, R.W.

    1981-01-01

    A brief sketch of the development of Canada's nuclear exports is presented and some of the factors which influence the ability to export reactors have been identified. The potential market for CANDUs is small and will develop slowly. The competition will be tough. There are few good prospects for immediate export orders in the next two or three years. Nonetheless there are reasonable opportunities for CANDU exports, especially in the mid-to-late 1980s. Such sales could be of great benefit to Canada and could do much to sustain the domestic nuclear industry. Apart from its excellent economic and technical performance, the main attraction of the CANDU seems to be the autonomy it confers on purchasing countries, the effectiveness with which the associated technology can be transferred, and the diversification it offers to countries which wish to reduce their dependence on the major industrial suppliers. Each sales opportunity is unique, and marketing strategy will have to be tailored to the customer's needs. Over the next decade, the factors susceptible to Canadian government action which are most likely to influence CANDU exports will be the political commitment of the government to those reactor exports, the performance established by the four 600 MWe CANDUs now nearing completion, the continuing successful operation of the nuclear program in Ontario, and the co-ordination of the different components of Canada's nuclear program (AECL, nuclear industry, utilities, and government) in putting forth a coherent marketing effort and following through with effective project management

  6. An exporter's checklist

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Englot, P.

    1995-01-01

    The benefits of exporting goods and services was discussed. The article listed a summary of issues which could be referred to to assist with the development of an effective plan to export. Some issues to consider were: (1) analysis of the export market, such as political and cultural issues, local legislation, competition, infrastructure, transportation and logistics, (2) internal issues, such as people, equipment, capital, time, understanding of the risks, relocation and identification of all costs, (3) sources of support such as banks, government and transporters, (4) development of a solid payment plan. It was concluded that exporting was not for the faint-hearted. It can be expensive, and time consuming, however, if approached in the right spirit it could be highly rewarding. As a rule of thumb, the probability of success was said to be directly related to the amount of effort put into the preparatory phase. Potential exporters were reminded of the very strong infrastructure that exists in Canada to promote and support export initiatives, including all levels of government, financial institutions, freight forwarders and innumerable consultant/specialists

  7. Indonesian coal export potential

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Millsteed, Ch.; Jolly, L.; Stuart, R.

    1993-01-01

    Indonesia's coal mining sector is expanding rapidly. Much of the increase in coal production since the mid-1980s has been exported. Indonesian coal mining companies have large expansion programs and continuing strong export growth is projected for the remainder of the 1990s. The low mining costs of indonesian coal, together with proximity to Asian markets, mean that Indonesia is well placed to compete strongly with other thermal coal exporters and win market share in the large and expanding thermal coal market in Asia. However, there is significant uncertainty about the likely future level of Indonesia's exportable surplus of coal. The government's planned expansion in coal fired power generation could constrain export growth, while the ability of producers to meet projected output levels is uncertain. The purpose in this article is to review coal supply and demand developments in Indonesia and, taking account of the key determining factors, to estimate the level of coal exports from Indonesia to the year 2000. This time frame has been chosen because all currently committed mine developments are expected to be on stream by 2000 and because it is difficult to project domestic demand for coal beyond that year. 29 refs., 8 tabs., 7 figs

  8. Export-defective lamB protein is a target for translational control caused by ompC porin overexpression.

    OpenAIRE

    Click, E M; Schnaitman, C A

    1989-01-01

    Overexpression of OmpC protein from an inducible plasmid vector reduced the amount of the precursor form of LamB protein in LamB signal sequence mutants. The stability of the precursor form of LamB protein was not affected, indicating that the effect of OmpC overexpression was on the synthesis of the precursor rather than on degradation. These results indicate that a functional signal sequence is not required on an outer membrane protein for it to be a target for translational control.

  9. New dimensions in nonproliferation -- An International Atomic Energy Agency view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pelland, B.

    1994-01-01

    Four years ago, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait with the intention of annexing it as Iraq's 19th state. The disclosure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the aftermath of the Gulf War--through the IAEA inspections--signaled the end of one proliferation era and the start of the next. In the author's remarks here, he has found it useful to identify four distinct proliferation eras, each with different features, each calling for different emphasis in international nonproliferation efforts. They provide a convenient way to look at the history of nonproliferation, and to look into the future and to the new dimensions in nonproliferation that are slowly emerging. Since the Gulf War, the nuclear world experienced a series of events of fundamental significance that changed the nature of nonproliferation, forcing changes in the mission of the IAEA and its methods. Certainly some of these events came in the form of unpleasant surprises, such as in Iraq, but very positive progress was also made on other fronts. He would like to share some perceptions of the events creating the present situation, and some views anticipating the requirements most likely to emerge in the coming years

  10. Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program, Annual Report, Class of 2012

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McMakin, Andrea H.

    2013-09-23

    This 32-pp annual report/brochure describes the accomplishments of the Class of 2012 of the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (the last class of this program), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The time period covers Sept 2011 through June 2013.

  11. British nuclear non-proliferation policy and the trident purchase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keohane, D.

    1984-01-01

    Since the mid-1950s, the UK has had a policy of making significant and sustained efforts to minimise the spread of nuclear arms. Unlike the global focus of its non-proliferation policy, the decision on Trident in centred upon national and perhaps regional requirements. At a time when non-nuclear countries are charging nuclear-weapon states with a grave failure to meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, Britain is making plans that would further increase the gap between the nuclear 'haves' and have-nots' and that indicate it expects to require nuclear arms in the next century. It would of course be unrealistic to expect a government to fully harmonise its manifold policies and unreasonable to suggest it should give absolute priority to one of its policy concerns, such as non-proliferation. But Britain is emphasising the high value it places upon the independent possession of strategic nuclear arms through its decision to purchase Trident, thus implicitly contradicting the logic underlying its non-proliferation policy. Compared to other factors, the influence of the Trident decision upon the non-proliferation regime appears very marginal, yet it is unlikely to strengthen that regime

  12. Former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow Served at U.S. Mission

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2014-10-01

    Because of her training and professional experiences, Rosalyn Leitch, a Security Specialist at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow with NIS (2012-2013) was able to transition into temporary assignment as UNVIE Acting Nuclear Security Attaché from November 2013 through February 2014.

  13. Infrasonic measurements of the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Whitaker, R.W.; Noel, S.; Meadows, W. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    Two infrasonic arrays were operated for the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). The arrays were located at the Nevada Test Site and at St. George, UT. The results were consistent with experience on underground tests, and therefore close to underground nuclear tests of similar size.

  14. To make a national based historical survey of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Experiences from the example of Sweden

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, T.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: This project was initiated by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and approved by the Agency as a Support Programme Task to increase transparency and support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. A general model of how such a historical survey can be conducted has been worked out in order to serve as help for other countries evaluating their nuclear and nuclear related activities in the framework of the Additional Protocol. The model consists of the following parts: 1. A State's nuclear activities profile since the mid-forties. In this part the task is to analyse the State's civil and military nuclear plans in broad terms, as well as to investigate how these ambitions were carried out in practice. A central ingredient is to map-out how the nuclear energy projects were organised over time; i. e. to pin-point the government authorities, organisations, private companies, universities and research institutions who were involved in the activities and who had the authoritative power at different times since 1945. 2. A description and analysis of the State's role and interactions in the area of international non-proliferation. This part of the model includes a list of the national laws that have regulated the use of nuclear materials since 1945. Are there exceptions in the national jurisdictions that obstruct the international/national inspections to be carried out in practical terms? How have the import and export regulations been designed since 1945? Who are allowed to use sensitive nuclear materials and on what conditions? Another part of the analysis of the State's international policy of non-proliferation includes a description of the international and bilateral agreements that were signed and ratified over the span of the period under consideration. The experiences from the work with the survey of the Swedish nuclear activities show that not all co-operation necessarily went through bilateral (government controlled) agreements

  15. Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly

    OpenAIRE

    David Collie; Roger Clarke

    2006-01-01

    This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsid...

  16. U.S. - India nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yash Thomas, Mannully

    2008-01-01

    The agreement for cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (referred as 123 agreement) acknowledges a shift in international strategies and relations in both countries. As to India, it marks the end of nuclear isolation resulting from constraint, embargoes and controls and instead opens the path for nuclear commerce. With respect to the United States it entails a major geo strategic ally in the evolving South Asia region and promises large commercial benefits to the US nuclear sector. This is called 'nuclear deal' and constitutes one of the major political, economic and strategic relationship developing between the two countries since 2001. It will lead to the separation of military and civilian nuclear installations in India, the latter to be placed under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It thus, de facto accepts India in the club of nuclear weapon states within the meaning of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) although it is not party to this treaty, refuses adhering to it, officially possesses nuclear weapons and is not subject to a comprehensive system of safeguards. This article will examine the developments which led to the 123 agreement and its subsequent implementation in a wider context of international relations and non proliferation. First, the articles gives a brief introduction into the Indian nuclear programme, the legislative framework and the factors which necessitated nuclear cooperation between India and the United States. Secondly, it will address the implementation of the nuclear deal and subsequent developments. Finally, it will analyse the non proliferation issues related to the implementation of the agreement. (N.C.)

  17. Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the DUPIC fuel cycle concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Persiani, P K [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1997-07-01

    The purpose of the study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiative and safeguards systems. Alternative recycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products. The concepts are alternatives to either the direct long-term storage deposition of or the purex reprocessing of the spent fuels. The alternate fuel cycle concepts reviewed include: the dry-recycle processes such as the direct use of reconfigured PWR spent fuel assemblies into CANDU reactors(DUPIC); low-decontamination, single-cycle co-extraction of fast reactor fuels in a wet-purex type of reprocessing; and on a limited scale the thorium-uranium fuel cycle. The nonproliferation advantages usually associated with the above non-separation processes are: the highly radioactive spent fuel presents a barrier to the physical diversion of the nuclear material; avoid the need to dissolve and chemically separate the plutonium from the uranium and fission products; and that the spent fuel isotopic quality of the plutonium vector is further degraded. Although the radiation levels and the need for reprocessing may be perceived as barriers to the terrorist or the subnational level of safeguards, the international level of nonproliferation concerns is addressed primarily by material accountancy and verification activities. On the international level of nonproliferation concerns, the non-separation fuel cycle concepts involved have to be evaluated on the bases of the impact the processes may have on nuclear materials accountancy. (author).

  18. JAEA's efforts for regional transparency in the area of nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffheins, Barbara; Kawakubo, Yoko; Inoue, Naoko

    2014-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has undertaken a joint R and D project with the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) for the purposes of developing an Information Sharing Framework (ISF) for regional nonproliferation cooperation since July 2011. This project builds on nearly twenty years of technical cooperation between JAEA, its predecessor organizations and the DOE including the activities to define, develop and test transparency technologies and other multilateral efforts. The objective of current project is to design a viable information sharing process to support the goals of building confidence in the peaceful nature of regional nuclear programs. At the end of a two-year-effort, project partners, JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), have defined the comprehensive requirements for an ISF that will ensure nonproliferation transparency success and sustainability. In October 2011, a parallel project with the similar title and objective was launched under the arrangement between the US DOE/NNSA and the Republic of Korea Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST). Since then, JAEA, SNL, the Korea Institute for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and Korea Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI) have jointly carried out the project in a form of informal, multilateral cooperation. The project partners have identified needs and audience for ISF, and initiated the discussion to develop requirements for ISF through workshops, meetings, regular telephone conferences, etc. The activities include conducting a survey to identify stakeholders' needs and requirements for an ISF, launching a website to practice information sharing concepts, and presenting papers. This paper provides the historical context of the current project to establish ISF, and reports the progress to date and speculates on future directions. (author)

  19. IAEA Director General welcomes Cuba's intention to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed Cuba's announcement to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. He expressed the hope that Cuba will conclude soon a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required under Article III of the NPT. 'With Cuba's intention to become party to the NPT, we have come a step closer to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime,' Mr. ElBaradei said. Only three countries worldwide with significant nuclear activities now remain outside the NPT. With 188 countries party to the Treaty, the NPT is the most adhered to international agreement after the United Nations Charter and the most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty. The NPT makes it mandatory that all non-nuclear-weapon States conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. The Director General also welcomed Cuba's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which completes the process of having all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as members of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Mr. ElBaradei said that, 'the Tlatelolco Treaty provides a good model for other regional nuclear-weapon-free zones to follow'. He added that 'universal adherence of all countries in regions having nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements is important to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime'. (IAEA)

  20. Conditions applying to Australian uranium exports - safeguards obligations under NPT

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rotsey, W.B.

    1975-08-01

    The Australian Government's expressed desire to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons and its wish to prevent Australia's uranium exports being used for manufacture of nuclear explosives are underwritten by Australia's formal international obligations. Australia is not free to export its material without paying due regard to supra-national requirements. This paper defines two safeguards regimes, one applying to countries such as Australia which are party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the other to those which are not parties. The application of safeguards and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are briefly explained. Australia's obligations under the NPT and those stemming from specific undertakings to the IAEA are stated. The latter require Australia to ensure that Non-Nuclear Weapons States not party to the NPT give assurances that Australian uranium will not be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosives and that they will permit verification by the IAEA. These obligations give rise to a set of minimum conditions applying to exports of Australian uranium which vary according to the NPT status of the importing countries. (author)

  1. Analysis of Developed Country's Export Contract and Contract Risk and Development of Sample Contract and Guide

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, D. S.; Oh, K. B.; Chung, W. S.; Lee, K. S.; Yun, S. W.; Lee, J. H.; Lee, B. W.; Kim, H. J.; Yang, M. H.

    2008-10-01

    This paper aimed at developing legal support for the non nuclear power plant industry's export. This study aids establishing government policy and promoting export of non nuclear power plant industry. This paper treated analysis of contractual risk and caution before entering into contract. To promote continuing export result, governmental and legal aids and guide will be required continuously. This study showed risks related with export contract and explained export control acts and procedures

  2. Export is necessary to maintain high quality supply

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sirugue, S.

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear industry achieves about 20% of its turnover with the export of equipment and services but nuclear trade is submitted to specific constrains like non-proliferation policies. According to IAEA the world capacity of nuclear power is expected to double allowing the development of emerging countries while reducing CO_2 emissions. The French commercial offer focuses on the high-end market with the EPR reactor and an intermediate power range reactor ATMEA-1 designed with MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries). AREVA is the unique world operator able to master the entire chain of spent fuel reprocessing thanks to the La Hague plant. In the framework of the rebuilding of the French nuclear industry, discussions are ongoing to achieve partnerships with foreign partners in exchange of shares in AREVA and AREVA NP. Today's main challenges of AREVA are to reduce EPR cost, to speed EPR construction and to benefit fully of the move into the digital age. (A.C.)

  3. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING RELIABLE NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICE APPROACHES: ECONOMIC AND NON-PROLIFERATION MERITS OF NUCLEAR FUEL LEASING

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kreyling, Sean J.; Brothers, Alan J.; Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.

    2010-01-01

    The goal of international nuclear policy since the dawn of nuclear power has been the peaceful expansion of nuclear energy while controlling the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Numerous initiatives undertaken in the intervening decades to develop international agreements on providing nuclear fuel supply assurances, or reliable nuclear fuel services (RNFS) attempted to control the spread of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. In order to inform the international debate and the development of government policy, PNNL has been developing an analytical framework to holistically evaluate the economics and non-proliferation merits of alternative approaches to managing the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., cradle-to-grave). This paper provides an overview of the analytical framework and discusses preliminary results of an economic assessment of one RNFS approach: full-service nuclear fuel leasing. The specific focus of this paper is the metrics under development to systematically evaluate the non-proliferation merits of fuel-cycle management alternatives. Also discussed is the utility of an integrated assessment of the economics and non-proliferation merits of nuclear fuel leasing.

  4. Transparency and nonproliferation in the Asia-Pacific region. Enhancing transparency, strengthening the nonproliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamada, Kazuko

    2008-01-01

    Driven by the prospect of rapid economic growth and the perceived need for energy security, the Asia-Pacific region is destined to increase its nuclear energy use in the coming decades. This projected increase, however, will bring with it nuclear proliferation concerns, fueling fears about the security of nuclear material and creating suspicions about its use. The increasing use of nuclear energy inevitably necessitates supplementary efforts, designed to ensure nuclear security and a legitimate use of nuclear energy, other than the obligation to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Nuclear transparency measures could be useful tools for building confidence that the increasing nuclear energy use does not contribute to nuclear proliferation. These measures could also foster a cooperative tradition that can address rising concerns over nuclear trafficking and terrorism, which require regional coordination to combat. However, moderate progress in implementing transparency measures suggests a lack of political appreciation of this concept. Thus, this paper describes various forms of potential transparency measures to expand the possibilities of the transparency concept and explore areas in which this concept might be applicable. This paper also clarifies some challenges involving transparency projects, and suggests possible ways to address these challenges. (author)

  5. Evaluating Russian Dual-Use Nuclear Exports

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Bitterman, Blaine S

    2007-01-01

    ...; however, some of its actions contradict its rhetoric. Although Russia's violation of international agreements on nonproliferation is minimal, it is important to understand why Russia transfers nuclear technology...

  6. Counterproliferation, Border Security and Counterterrorism Subject-Related Laws and Regulations, Including Export Control Regimes in South-Eastern European Countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bokan, S.

    2007-01-01

    gaps exist, much less fill them. All this suggests that, to fulfil obligations under UNSC Resolutions 1540 and 1373, States must enact harmonized criminal prohibitions and authorization for law enforcement cooperation in order to establish a seamless web of security among all nations. Failure to do so implicitly poses a threat to international peace and security. One of the main issues which deserve to be further addressed and which prompts the continuation of the Southeast Europe Counterproliferation, Borger Security and Counterterrorism (CBSC) Working Group is to harmonize national laws and regulations that deal with deterring, detecting and interdicting WMD. Inventory of relevant CBSC subject-related laws of the Southeast Europe countries, including Export Control Laws was created and prepared for further consideration and harmonization by judiciary experts, with the aim to develop m odel laws . Let me very briefly present you the main features of the SEDM CBSC subject-related laws and regulations. This paper will present that inventory which includes the membership in the international Conventions, Treaties and Arrangements and also the membership in Multilateral Export Control Regimes of Southeast Europe countries. Also, it will be presented the membership in the international legal instruments that play an integral part in the global fight against terrorism. (author)

  7. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) primary focus is national security-verification and treaty compliance across several regimes addressing weapons of mass destruction-linked to a major facilitation role in regard to industry compliance. The key aspect here is ensuring Australia's treaty commitments are met. Additionally, ASNO's activities are central to Government policy on the mining and export of uranium. Throughout the past year, ASNO continued to make a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. Australia played a key role in the negotiations leading to the adoption by the IAEA in 1997 of the Model Protocol, which provides the IAEA Secretariat with the authority to implement strengthened safeguards measures. In December 1997, Australia was the first country to bring into effect a Protocol with the IAEA based on this model. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Protocol enters general application. ASNO's As mentioned above, ASNO has developed and implemented new safeguards arrangements in Australia under the Protocol for strengthened safeguards, including facilitation of IAEA verification activities at the Ranger uranium mine-this is the first time the IAEA (under the Protocol) has visited a uranium mine and the lessons learned will help the IAEA develop its procedures. One major activity for ASNO is monitoring the progress of the Silex project to ensure that, as soon as appropriate, the technology is declared 'associated technology' and controlled in accordance with relevant legislative and Treaty requirements. In anticipation of this, ASNO has taken steps to protect the Silex technology against unauthorised access. Over the past 12 months, ASNO has established itself as the provisional

  8. Arms control agency faces uncertain future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ember, L.

    1993-01-01

    National security cognoscenti are busy sifting tea leaves trying to puzzle out the fate of arms control and nonproliferation policy in the new Administration. Of special concern to these policy gurus is the future of the semiautonomous Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA's existence as a separate entity on the executive branch's organization chart is precarious. The agency has never functioned as intended since Congress created it in 1961. Its stock over the decades has ebbed and flowed, paralleling the prominence and clout of its director. And except for a few notable successes--the conclusion of the chemical weapons treaty being one--the agency's authority has plummeted in the past 14 years. Today, almost every interested party agrees that something has to be done, that the agency cannot continue as it now functions. Several recent studies have called for its rejuvenation. Still other studies have suggested that ACDA be dismantled, and those activities relevant to national security in a post-Cold War environment be shifted to and integrated into the State Department. Observers expect ACDA to evolve into an agency whose primary focus is on problems of proliferation. In a world in which tighter export controls on dual-use technologies, restraint on arms transfers, and economic assistance conditional on a recipients's security behavior will be the norm for security and stability, a role for ACDA as the U.S.'s nonproliferation nanny is not a bad one

  9. Australia's uranium export potential

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mosher, D.V.

    1981-01-01

    During the period 1954-71 in Australia approximately 9000 MT of U 3 O 8 was produced from five separate localities. Of this, 7000 MT was exported to the United Kingdom and United States and the balance stockpiled by the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC). Australia's uranium ore reserves occur in eight deposits in three states and the Northern Territory. However, 83% of Australia's reserves are contained in four deposits in lower Proterozoic rocks in the East Alligator River region of the Northern Territory. The AAEC has calculated Australia's recoverable uranium reserves by eliminating estimated losses during the mining and milling of the ores. AAEC has estimated reasonably assured resources of 289,000 MT of uranium at a recovery cost of less than US$80 per kilogram uranium. The companies have collectively announced a larger ore reserve than the Australian Atomic Energy Commission. This difference is a result of the companies adopting different ore reserve categories. On August 25, 1977, the federal government announced that Australia would develop its uranium resources subject to stringent environmental controls, recognition of Aboriginal Land Rights, and international safeguards. Australian uranium production should gradually increase from 1981 onward, growing to 10,000 to 15,000 MT by 1985-86. Further increases in capacity may emerge during the second half of the 1980s when expansion plans are implemented. Exploration for uranium has not been intensive due to delays in developing the existing deposits. It is likely that present reserves can be substantially upgraded if more exploration is carried out. 6 figures, 3 tables

  10. Coal export facilitation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eeles, L.

    1998-01-01

    There is a wide range of trade barriers, particularly tariffs, in current and potential coal market. Commonwealth departments in Australia play a crucial role in supporting government industry policies. This article summarises some of more recent activities of the Department of Primary Industries and Energy (DPIE) in facilitating the export of Australian Coals. Coal export facilitation activities are designed to assist the Australian coal industry by directing Commonwealth Government resources towards issues which would be inappropriate or difficult for the industry to address itself

  11. Canada's nuclear export policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Morrison, R W; Wonder, E F [Carleton Univ., Ottawa, Ontario (Canada)

    1978-01-01

    The factors influencing the evolution of Canada's nuclear export policy are examined. Initially, nuclear technology was exported to establish an industry in Canada and to share the technology with other countries. After 1974 an increasingly broad range of political and social factors were taken into account and safeguards became the dominant factor. The indirect impacts of the new policy fall into two groups. One consists of the effects of Canada's leadership in taking a tough stand on safeguards. The second group of effects involve the concern of other countries about access to secure energy supplies and advanced technology.

  12. Canada's nuclear export policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morrison, R.W.; Wonder, E.F.

    1978-01-01

    The factors influencing the evolution of Canada's nuclear export policy are examined. Initially, nuclear technology was exported to establish an industry in Canada and to share the technology with other countries. After 1974 an increasingly broad range of political and social factors were taken into account and safeguards became the dominant factor. The indirect impacts of the new policy fall into two groups. One consists of the effects of Canada's leadership in taking a tough stand on safeguards. The second group of effects involve the concern of other countries about access to secure energy supplies and advanced technology. (O.T.)

  13. Hydrologic controls on DOC, As and Pb export from a polluted peatland - the importance of heavy rain events, antecedent moisture conditions and hydrological connectivity

    Science.gov (United States)

    Broder, T.; Biester, H.

    2015-08-01

    Bogs can store large amounts of lead (Pb) and arsenic (As) from atmospheric deposition of anthropogenic emissions. Pb and As are exported along with dissolved organic carbon (DOC) from these organic-rich systems, but it is not yet clear which hydrological (pre)conditions favor their export. This study combines a 1-year monitoring of precipitation, bog water level and pore water concentration changes with bog discharge and DOC, iron, As and Pb stream concentrations. From these data, annual DOC, As, and Pb exports were calculated. Concentrations ranged from 5 to 30 mg L-1 for DOC, 0.2 to 1.9 μg L-1 for As, and 1.3 to 12 μg L-1 for Pb, with highest concentrations in late summer. As and Pb concentrations significantly correlated with DOC concentrations. Fluxes depended strongly on discharge, as 40 % of As and 43 % of Pb were exported during 10 % of the time with the highest discharge, pointing out the over-proportional contribution of short-time, high-discharge events to annual As, Pb and DOC export. Exponential increase in element export from the bog is explained by connection of additional DOC, As and Pb pools in the acrotelm during water table rise, which is most pronounced after drought. Pb, As and DOC concentrations in pore water provide evidence of an increase in the soluble Pb pool as soon as the peat layer becomes hydrologically connected, while DOC and As peak concentrations in runoff lag behind in comparison to Pb. Our data indicate a distinct bog-specific discharge threshold of 8 L s-1, which is thought to depend mainly on the bogs size and drainage conditions. Above this threshold, element concentrations do not further increase and discharge becomes diluted. Combining pore water and discharge data shows that As and Pb exports are dependent on not only the amount of precipitation and discharge but also on the frequency and depth of water table fluctuations. Comparing the annual bog As and Pb export with element inventories indicates that As is much more

  14. PimT, an amino acid exporter controls polyene production via secretion of the quorum sensing pimaricin-inducer PI-factor in Streptomyces natalensis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Guerra Susana M

    2009-06-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Polyenes represent a major class of antifungal agents characterised by the presence of a series of conjugated double bonds in their planar hydroxylated macrolide ring structure. Despite their general interest, very little is known about the factors that modulate their biosynthesis. Among these factors, we have recently discovered a new inducing compound (PI-factor in the pimaricin producer Streptomyces natalensis, which elicits polyene production in a manner characteristic of quorum sensing. Here, we describe the involvement of an amino-acid exporter from S. natalensis in modulating the expression of pimaricin biosynthetic genes via secretion of the quorum-sensing pimaricin-inducer PI-factor. Results Adjacent to the pimaricin gene cluster lies a member of the RhtB family of amino-acid exporters. Gene deletion and complementation experiments provided evidence for a role for PimT in the export of L-homoserine, L-serine, and L-homoserine lactone. Expression of the gene was shown to be induced by homoserine and by the quorum-sensing pimaricin-inducer PI-factor. Interestingly, the mutant displayed 65% loss of pimaricin production, and also 50% decrease in the production of PI, indicating that PimT is used as PI-factor exporter, and suggesting that the effect in antifungal production might be due to limited secretion of the inducer. Conclusion This report describes the involvement of an amino acid exporter (encoded by pimT in the vicinity of the pimaricin cluster in modulating the expression of antibiotic biosynthetic genes via secretion of the quorum-sensing pimaricin-inducer PI-factor. The discovery of the participation of amino acid exporters in a signal transduction cascade for the production of polyene macrolides is unexpected, and represents an important step forward towards understanding the regulatory network for polyene regulation. Additionally, this finding constitutes the first detailed characterization of an amino

  15. Information, Corruption, and Measures for the Promotion of Manufactured Exports

    OpenAIRE

    Glenn Jenkins; CHUN-YAN KUO

    2007-01-01

    There has been a growing emphasis in many developing countries on export-led growth policies that attract both domestic and foreign investment into activities that will increase exports. Many countries, however, have not achieved the desired response. Among other problems, investors often face foreign exchange controls, tariffs on imported inputs, and a costly system for the exemption or refund of sales inflow of foreign investment and prevented the expansion of export production and sales. T...

  16. Nuclear disarmament and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

    1999-01-01

    The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference reaffirmed 'the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control' and endorsed 'universal application of safeguards once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved'. Hence strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and incremental broadening of its coverage towards the universal application of international safeguards in all States is a high priority albeit for the medium to long term. A tentative attempt is made in this paper to anticipate how the elements of verification under the NPT, FMCT and other conventions and arrangements related to nuclear non-proliferation will evolve against the background of the disarmament process, with the goal of achieving at some future stage an ultimate convergence of verification regimes under a complete nuclear disarmament. We think, however, that most of the new initiatives in the area of disarmament/non-proliferation should be realised during the current disarmament phase. We do not wish our model to be perceived as a rigid time-bound scheme. New initiatives should be implemented in parallel and as soon as practicable. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and should not be taken to represent Australian Government policy. (author)

  17. The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, M.

    2016-01-01

    The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider ''The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.'' We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-roliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what and how much can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-for-attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

  18. The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dreicer, M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2016-08-30

    The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider “The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.” We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-­proliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what—and how much—can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-­for-­attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

  19. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-01

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  20. Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buckner, M.R. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States); Sanders, T.L. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2001-07-01

    The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

  1. Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckner, M.R.; Sanders, T.L.

    2001-01-01

    The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

  2. Nuclear non-proliferation: a guide to the debate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1985-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of 15 countries have been studied and summarized for use by participants of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation (NPT) of Nuclear weapons held in September 1985. The main purpose of the guide is to examine what action must be taken to ensure the Treaty's survival. There are four chapters following an introduction, covering the implementation of the essential provisions of the NPT, the motivations of the countries which have not joined the NPT, together with the motivations of those which have formally renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, even though they possess the technical and economic potential necessary to manufacture them. The last chapter summarises measures which might be taken to strengthen the NPT including ideas put forward at a workshop held in 1984. (author)

  3. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-15

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  4. Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2014-01-01

    The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

  5. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-01-01

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  6. Germany and the nuclear non-proliferation; Current situation and prospects; Deutschland und die nukleare Nichtverbreitung; Zwischenbilanz und Ausblick

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Preisinger, J.

    1993-07-01

    A summary is given of the consequences, both positive and negative, of international non-proliferation policy. The numerous, complex branches and connections of national measures and inter-stake agreements for the peaceful, controlled uses of nuclear technology and related military technologies are expertly described, and assessed on their effectiveness. Weak aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime are pointed out and past reforms are illustrated and assessed in the light of recent developments. The interests of the German Federal Republic from the centre of this analysis. The author shows that, after a certain hesitary, German diplomacy has now become active in the establishment of an international non-proliferation regime. He concludes that Germany should take a strong initiative role in maintaining a peaceful international nuclear order. (orig.) [Deutsch] Es wird ein Resuemee der bisherigen Erfolge und Misserfolge internationaler Nichtverbreitungspolitik gezogen. Die komplexen, vielfach veraestelten und verschachtelten nationalen Massnahmen und zwischenstaatlichen Vereinbarungen zur Ueberwachung und friedlichen Zweckbindung von Nukleartechnologie und militaerisch relevanten Anschlusstechnologien werden sachkundig erlaeutert und auf ihre Wirksamkeit ueberprueft. Schwachstellen des nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregimes werden offengelegt, Reformschritte der vergangenen Jahre werden dargestellt und im Lichte der juengsten Entwicklungen bewertet. Dabei steht die Interessenlage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Zentrum der Analyse. Der Autor zeigt, dass die deutsche Diplomatie sich nach einer gewissen Zurueckhaltung schliesslich aktiv in die Gestaltung des internationalen Nichtverbreitungsregimes eingeschaltet hat. Er plaediert fuer eine kraftvolle Initiativrolle Deutschlands zur Erhaltung einer friedlichen internationalen Nuklearordnung. (orig.)

  7. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-11-15

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  8. 15 CFR 772.1 - Definitions of terms as used in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... of the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency are non-voting members. The...; household utilities and appliances; printing, reproduction, imaging and video recording or playback (but not... (including command, control and intelligence applications) which are controlled by the Department of State on...

  9. Composition of Exports and Export Performance of Eurozone Countries

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Wierts, P.J.; Kerkhoff, H.; de Haan, J.

    2014-01-01

    This article investigates to what extent the composition of exports is related to the export performance of eurozone countries using a data set on exports from the oldest eurozone countries to their top 20 trade partners for the period 1988-2009. The results suggest that a higher share of high

  10. Non-proliferation policies and demand for uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warnecke, S.J.

    1978-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of USA, Canada and Australia are outlined, and the effects on nuclear policy in the consumer countries, particularly the member states of the European Community and Japan are considered. Supply and demand in relation to uranium, security and economic aspects are covered. Reprocessing, the use of plutonium in breeder reactors, and the wider issues of international confidence and trade are discussed. (U.K.)

  11. United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    Science and technology transformed the world in the twentieth century. Living standards improved but warfare was rendered more deadly. Weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical and nuclear - and their means of delivery were developed, as ever more sophisticated conventional armaments were produced and disseminated. The horrors and destruction of armed conflict persist. The need for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training has never been greater. Indeed, changing concepts and perceptions of security and threat magnify the urgency for new thinking to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation goals. More than a decade after the end of the cold war and at the start of the twenty- first century, there is a pressing need to combat ignorance, complacency and a culture of violence. These can be countered through long-term programmes of education and training, especially those related to disarmament and non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with a view to their reduction and complete elimination. At the same time, concern has heightened over the global threat of the excessive and destabilizing proliferation of conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, rendering more acute the need to combat such proliferation in a sustained way through disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Additionally there is a need to raise awareness of new challenges to international security and the process of disarmament. Among them, terrorism, with the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction, is a source of particular concern. Other challenges, such as organized crime, poverty, human rights abuses and environmental concerns must also be taken into account. Education and training remain important but under utilized tools for promoting peace, disarmament and non-proliferation. The present report addresses that issue and proposes ideas for action

  12. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations

  13. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations.

  14. Impasses and mistakes of the nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirst, M.

    1980-01-01

    It is analyzed the limitations for implementing the American Nuclear non-proliferation policy. It is shown the crisis of the North American international relations, with the economic and scientific development of the advanced capitalist nations and some countries of the third world, the penetration of these countries in the world trade commerce of the nuclear industry as sellers and cunsumers, and the Latin American's and Brazil's position in the international panorama of nuclear power. (M.C.K.) [pt

  15. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

  16. INTEGRATION OF FACILITY MODELING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ANALYSIS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

    2011-07-18

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  17. Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garcia, Humberto; Burr, Tom; Coles, Garill A.; Edmunds, Thomas A.; Garrett, Alfred; Gorensek, Maximilian; Hamm, Luther; Krebs, John; Kress, Reid L.; Lamberti, Vincent; Schoenwald, David; Tzanos, Constantine P.; Ward, Richard C.

    2012-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  18. Integration Of Facility Modeling Capabilities For Nuclear Nonproliferation Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

    2011-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  19. Danish energy-sector exports. Products and consulting services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wolter, H.C.

    2000-06-01

    Danish Energy Agency has previously carried out studies of Danish energy-sector exports. The latest results were published in the report, Energisektorens eksport. Produkter og raadgivning. Danish Energy Agency, September 1998. The present survey is an update of the earlier studies, and includes 1998 exports. As previously, the study, carried out in cooperation with the Confederation of Danish Industries and the Danish Council of Consulting Architects and Engineers, is based on questionnaires sent to relevant companies. In addition, information has been obtained from companies that do not belong to these organisations. On the basis of the answers received, 58 Danish companies exported products to a value of approximately DKK 16,000 million, and 22 consulting firms exported consulting services to a value of approximately DKK 370 million. These exports of approximately DKK 16.5 billion accounted for 5% of all Danish exports in 1998. In comparison with 1996, energy-sector exports have risen by more than 40% in a period in which Danish exports in general have risen by an average of 8%. Energy sector exports provide employment for more than 18,000 persons in Denmark - approximately 17,500 employees in companies that export products, and approximately 600 persons in consulting firms. To this must be added a presumably significantly larger number of persons employed by sub-suppliers to the above companies computed by value, 80% of the exports come from relatively few companies, i.e. 13 companies with products, and five offering consulting services. Energy-sector exports fall within the following product areas: 1) Wind turbines (25%). 2) District heating and combined heat and power (CHP) (21%). 3) Energy savings and control (20%). 4) Oil and natural gas (13%). 5) Electricity plants and power supply (13%). 6) Other (8%). 67% of the exports go to Western Europe, 18% to Asia, 7% to Eastern and Central Europe, and 8% to other parts of the world. (EHS)

  20. Croatian National System of Nuclear Materials Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biscan, R.

    1998-01-01

    In the process of economic and technological development of Croatia by using or introducing nuclear power or in the case of international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material, Croatia should establish and implement National System of Nuclear Materials Control. Croatian National System of accounting for and control of all nuclear material will be subjected to safeguards under requirements of Agreement and Additional Protocol between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The decision by NPT parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference to endorse the Fullscope IAEA Safeguards Standard (FSS) as a necessary precondition of nuclear supply means that states are obliged to ensure that the recipient country has a FSS agreement in place before any nuclear transfer can take place (Ref. 1). The FSS standard of nuclear supply is a central element of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines which the NSG adopted in 1992 and should be applied to members and non-members of the NSG. The FSS standard of nuclear supply in general allows for NPT parties or countries which have undertaken the same obligations through other treaty arrangements, to receive favourable treatment in nuclear supply arrangements. However, the Iraqi experience demonstrate that trade in nuclear and dual-use items, if not properly monitored, can contribute to a nuclear weapons program in countries acting contrary to their non-proliferation obligation. Multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms, including the FSS supply standard, provide the basis for co-ordination and standardisation of export control measures. (author)