Accelerator-driven subcritical systems - An analysis with a focus on non-proliferation and export control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Andersson, Per; Nielsen, Fredrik; Sunhede, Daniel

2013-01-01

The Department of Nuclear Weapons Related Issues at The Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, as commissioned by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, SSM, conducted a study concerning Accelerator Driven Subcritical Systems, ADS, with emphasis on non-proliferation and export control. An ADS looks at first glance like a traditional nuclear reactor, but the nuclear core is designed to always remain subcritical, both during normal and off-normal conditions. Neutrons are instead supplied by an external source in the form of an proton accelerator and a spallation target. This report gives a short walk-through to the physical processes that governs the neutron flux and reactivity in the core and how they are affected by the design of the core including the accelerator and spallation target. Furthermore is the results from reactor core simulations presented, where the isotopic nuclear fuel inventory has been studied as a function of burn up and initial configuration. Finally the report contains an analysis of the potential risks involved from the perspective of nuclear proliferation and exports. This study shows that ADS in the future could constitute a proliferation concern. The subsystems and components in question share design and materials with the equivalent components in traditional reactors with the exception of the proton accelerator and spallation target, which is unique for accelerator driven systems

Robust Indicators of Nonproliferation Performance

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Cowan, Mara R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kurzrok, Andrew J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

2014-02-13

Understanding how the nuclear industry may benefit from self-regulation is closely linked with understanding how to report compliance activities for nonproliferation and export control objectives, as well as how to distinguish high and low compliance performance. Drawing on the corporate sustainability reporting model, nuclear and dual-use commodities industries can frame socially responsible self-regulatory activities to distinguish themselves as good nonproliferators.

78 FR 18814 - Amendment to the Export Administration Regulations: List of Items Classified Under Export Control...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-03-28

... Controls Division, Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance by phone at (202) 482-3343 or by email... significant military or intelligence advantage to the United States. Immediate imposition of a license... accelerate orders of these items or attempt to have the items exported prior to the imposition of the control...

U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined. Report to the Congress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm U.S. reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonproliferation policies can influence export sales. Based on available data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of U.S. nuclear exports. However, U.S. companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by U.S. technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and compete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for U.S. nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, U.S. companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

A study on strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime through the export control system of sensitive materials, equipment and technology related to nuclear activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kikuchi, Masahiro; Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Komizo, Yasuyoshi

2004-01-01

The strengthened safeguards caused from safeguards experiences to Iraq and DPRK leads to the expansion of the IAEA's activities for verification of all nuclear activities as well as verification of nuclear material in the States. The purpose of the activities, of course, includes detection of undeclared exports and imports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material. The Additional Protocol to the agreements between States and the IAEA for the application of safeguards requires to the States to declare the exports and imports information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material corresponding to the export control list that is established by the nuclear suppliers group. The Additional Protocol also insists the IAEA's right to access to the location identified by the State to resolve a question related to the declarations. Recently, the IAEA detected the black market group of the sensitive materials, equipment and technologies relevant to the nuclear proliferation through the safeguards activities to Iran and Libya. International community stated deeply concerns to the indecent facts. This paper would discuss and propose the supplemental strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime by effective combination of the safeguards activities under additional protocol and the export control regime. (author)

An evaluation of Kazakhstan nuclear export control system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yeligbayeva, G.; Masenov, Ch.

2002-01-01

A system to control the export nuclear materials and technologies is a natural part of creating a self-sustaining government. The government of Kazakhstan has made a great deal of progress in building such a system. Control of export and import of nuclear materials and technologies and dual-use materials, related to nuclear activity, became one of the important part of mechanism of Non-Proliferation conditions realization in Kazakhstan. The system of export control has developed well over the 10 years. Kazakhstan is in the midst of a long process of building a functional export control system consistent with World standards. The state system of export control currently exists in Kazakhstan on the legislative base, and is based on efficient cooperation of the KAEC with a number of competent state bodies (Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Customs Committee) each of them has its own specific functions, duties and rights. The export is carried out using licenses, issued by the Ministry of Economy of the RK, according to applications of certain standard which are previously agreed with the KAEC under decision of the RK Government. The KAEC, acting on the base of export control principles and observance of international obligations on non-proliferation matter, makes decisions, only after thorough evaluation of ways of export and reliability of an end-user of the commodity, to agree the application for a license. The most fully developed aspect is the licensing process. General politics of export regulation in Kazakhstan are based on normative acts and rules, which are wholly appropriate (complementary) to the managing principles of nuclear export. There exists a full legal basis for the licensing system. But the process is going, some provisions is changing: in 2000 Kazakhstan corrected the export control law and approved the national control list very similar with EU control list, in 2002 the rules of the process of licensing the export and import

Policy of Kyrgyz Republic in the field of weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Duisheeva, Zh.Z.

2010-01-01

Full text: Kyrgyz Republic is principle and sequential member of accepting effective international measures, directed to active prevention to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, its components and means of delivery. Commitment to prevention policy and WMD nonproliferation is one of basic principles of foreign and domestic policy of Kyrgyz Republic. The real measure against WMD proliferation and relating to its production technologies of military, special and dual use is international export control based on national systems of export control including smoothly running national system of account for, control and physical protection of arm materials. Currently juridical basis of export control system in Kyrgyz Republic is actively developing. In 2003 the Law of Kyrgyz Republic On export control, based on principles and norms of international law in the field of export control was adopted. The Law On export control determines basic principles of state policy, legal activity basis of state management and participants of foreign-economic activity in the field of export control, as well as defines their rights, obligations and responsibilities in this field. Also in the law, the requirements of international treaties realization in the field of WMD nonproliferation and means of their delivery, signed by Kyrgyzstan, is defined as one of national systems goals of export control. In article 13, Law On export control it is defined that international cooperation in the field of export control by means of efforts coordination and cooperation with foreign states on prevention of WMD nonproliferation, means of their delivery and technologies on their creation; participation in international regimes of export control and international forums, as well as carrying out negotiations, consultations with foreign states, bilateral information exchange and realization of joint programs and other events in the field of export control on bilateral and multilateral basis. By

US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Staats, E.B.

1980-01-01

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm US reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonprofileration policies can influence export sales. Based on avavailable data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of US nuclear exports. However, US companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by US technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and complete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for US nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, US companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

Political implications of US nuclear-export-policy development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson-Freese, J.S.

1981-01-01

There has been a great deal of international debate regarding how effective strict export controls on nuclear-energy supplies are toward a non-proliferation goal. With the Carter Administration, the debate was heightened by a new, more-vigorous US nuclear-export policy, much of which was codified by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). Because of the US position in both the international non-proliferation regime and nuclear export market, the NNPA has had far-reaching consequences. The thesis of this paper is that a nuclear-export policy that fails to consider its short-term ramifications, as the NNPA has been accused of, will be self-defeating. If the US wants a viable worldwide nuclear non-proliferation policy, it must first direct its efforts toward building a domestic non-proliferation consensus, and then worldwide, rather than first setting a highly controversial policy and expecting other nations to fall into line. This work provides a comprehensive case study of US nuclear-export policy between the years 1976 to 1980 in support of the thesis. Further, the behavior and impact of the interest groups which seem to shape US nuclear-export policies is examined, and recommendations made regarding the role of groups in nuclear policy-making and implementation. Finally, recommendations are made regarding non-proliferation policy for the future, as it relates to nuclear exports

The status and latest issues on KAERI export control implementation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Hyun Sook; Park, Ho Jun; Kim, Hyun Jo; Ko, Han Suk; Lee, Byung Doo

2010-01-01

There are four informal non-proliferation arrangements which seek to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems and the transfer of conventional weapons and dual-use technologies. The four arrangements are Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) on export controls for conventional arms and dual use goods and technologies, Nuclear Supplies Group(NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) and Australia Group(AG) on chemical and biological weapons materials. ROK participates in four arrangements to seek to encourage responsible practice in the trade of strategic goods and technologies. It is achieved through the implementation of export control list. MKE Notification (Ministry of Knowledge Economy Notification No. 2009-250) specifies those items and technologies subject to control. In this paper, the status and latest issues on KAERI export control implementation are described

Nuclear export controls and the CTBT: Where we`ve been and challenges ahead -- Views of an engineer

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lundy, A.S.

1998-09-01

The paper discusses the following topics: the importance of export controls; the uniqueness of nuclear weapons and their export control requirements; ``dual-use`` controls; and recent developments in nonproliferation beyond export control. Also discussed are some non-obvious challenges which include computer modeling and visualization, and fissile material availability and instant nukes. The author concludes by asking the Nuclear Suppliers Group to consider whether there are ways to make its controls more effective.

Nuclear export controls and the CTBT: Where we've been and challenges ahead - Views of an engineer

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lundy, A.S.

1998-01-01

The paper discusses the following topics: the importance of export controls; the uniqueness of nuclear weapons and their export control requirements; ''dual-use'' controls; and recent developments in nonproliferation beyond export control. Also discussed are some non-obvious challenges which include computer modeling and visualization, and fissile material availability and instant nukes. The author concludes by asking the Nuclear Suppliers Group to consider whether there are ways to make its controls more effective

Nuclear export controls - Closing the gaps

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schmidt, Fritz W.

2005-01-01

Concerns over a nuclear 'black market' have focused international attention on the effectiveness of nuclear export controls. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has stated that the emergence of a multinational illicit network demonstrated the inadequacy of the present export control system, that international cooperation on export controls lay on informal arrangements that were not only not binding but also limited in membership, and that export control information was not systematically shared with the IAEA. This criticism, often heard on the political level, does not really do justice to the work of export control groups. The emergence of a multinational illicit network does not necessarily prove failures in export control systems. Criminal activities, by definition, try to circumvent existing rules and regulations, or they exploit the absence of such rules on State level. To fight such individual cases is not so much a task of regular export control systems, whose function lies primarily in establishing standards and procedures for export controls on State level, but rather the task for intelligence services and their international cooperation. The basis of the export control regime is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Export controls can - and do - play an important role in fostering this universality goal by demanding the implementation of internationally agreed security standards in recipient countries before export licenses are granted. Drawn from the deliberations in the NPT conferences, the current standards to be demanded as conditions of supply are the following: Safeguards, Physical Protection, National export control provisions. According to the NPT system, export controls require IAEA verification in the recipient country. In addition, export controls enable States to provide information to the IAEA on exports and imports as required by the Additional Protocol. The 2005 NPT Review Conference will be an opportunity to review developments

Perspectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koungou, Leon

2004-01-01

To join traditional methods and new approaches of 'non-proliferation'. This is a technical method and the best way to fight against 'non-proliferation' which is facing few preoccupations: knowledge's disseminations; technologies; equipments and weapons that should be stopped. As it's important to note the return of nuclear danger as the end of confrontation between west-east which should be reduce. As the adaptation of mechanisms is necessary today, as it is important to react about states' incitations to violate international engagement of non-proliferation. Areas control allows finding out change and evolution, but more insufficient. Functional difficulties show that the IAEA (International Agency of Atomic Energy) does not work good. Safeguard system does not allow to respect 'non-proliferation' engagements; for instance 'junkies states' that they cannot dissuade traditional methods. The fight of 'non-proliferation' shows new progresses with fearing methods of prevention actions and heaviest international controls of exportation. The target of this is very ambitious. This new method is self-successful because it contributes to re-enforce international security when defeating acquisition of nuclear and mass destruction weapons by non-states factors. Therefore non-proliferation regime and especially 'non-proliferation treaty' remains delicate as long as some militaries state such USA will reject their 'non-proliferation' engagement. (author) [fr

Nuclear exports and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Courteix, Simone.

1978-01-01

Increased preoccupation in present times with the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the multiplication of international agreements such as the Non-proliferation Treaty and in the strengthening of consultations between industrialised countries (London Club). After analysing the IAEA safeguards system under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its shortcomings both technically and otherwise, the author considers how this situation can be remedied in the light of the London Agreements and in view of the position of the main countries concerned. The annex to the book contains the texts of many international agreements and relevant national regulations as well as nuclear policy statements. It also includes a detailed bibliograaphy. (NEA) [fr

15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 742 - Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nonproliferation of Chemical and...—Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Note: Exports and reexports of items in performance of.... Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on...

Export policy and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.A.V.

1978-01-01

Developing countries with a nuclear programme are about a dozen according to information obtained by IAEA. They are a group hostile to any restriction imposed on nuclear technology export and consider that such restriction is contrary to the global concept of North/South co-operation which provides for transfer of advanced technology. In particular, they object to the fact that nuclear weapon states make use of Article 4 of the NPT. Industrialised countries are required to keep a balance between a regular and stable supply system and the assurance that exported nuclear installations and materials are placed under international control according to the IAEA Safeguards. (NEA) [fr

The National Implementation of Nuclear Export Controls: Developing a Best Practices Model

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Viski, Andrea [European University Institute, Department of Law, Badia Fiesolana, S.Domenico di Fiesole, Firenze (Italy)

2011-12-15

The nuclear renaissance promises significant benefits to the international community, but also raises security challenges, particularly relating to the trade of nuclear materials and equipment. The objective of this paper is to examine how supply-side non-proliferation efforts can be strengthened by developing a best practices model for national nuclear export control implementation. In order to achieve this goal, nuclear export control measures identified by the 1540 Committee will be used as a framework from which a best practices model can be formed. Such a model concentrates specifically on national legislation and enforcement measures delineated by the Committee in order to bring countries in accordance with international law. Developing a best practices model seeks to deliver an ideal process for national export control law actualization in order to encourage the peaceful development of nuclear energy and develop the infrastructure and framework for precluding nuclear proliferation.

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

Export control guide: Spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and preparation of plutonium metal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-10-01

The international Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), states in Article III, paragraph 2(b) that open-quotes Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide . . . equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.close quotes This guide was prepared to assist export control officials in the interpretation, understanding, and implementation of export laws and controls relating to the international Trigger List for irradiated nuclear fuel reprocessing equipment, components, and materials. The guide also contains information related to the production of plutonium metal. Reprocessing and its place in the nuclear fuel cycle are described briefly; the standard procedure to prepare metallic plutonium is discussed; steps used to prepare Trigger List controls are cited; descriptions of controlled items are given; and special materials of construction are noted. This is followed by a comprehensive description of especially designed or prepared equipment, materials, and components of reprocessing and plutonium metal processes and includes photographs and/or pictorial representations. The nomenclature of the Trigger List has been retained in the numbered sections of this document for clarity

Notice to exporters on products prohibited from export (nuclear material, equipment and large nuclear units)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-01-01

In order to ensure that the policy to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons is complied with, the French Administration applies stricter controls over the export of certain sensitive products, materials and equipment. To this effect, lists of such products, materials and equipment are published in the form of Notices to exporters and periodically revised. This Notice repeals and replaces the previous Notice published in the Official Gazette of 21 January 1986. Annex I contains the list of materials whose export is subject to nuclear non-proliferation controls. Annex II lists the equipment whose export is subject to the same controls. Annex III includes the list of large nuclear units for which an application for prior approval of export must be submitted to the Administrations concerned. (NEA) [fr

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-05-01

Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

The nuclear non-proliferation regime: What it is and how it has evolved

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Priest, J.

1999-01-01

The nuclear non-proliferation regime commonly denotes the legal norms, voluntary undertakings and policies which the international community has developed to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. The word 'regime' suggests a legally binding order. Some components of the non-proliferation regime are indeed legally binding. Others represent essentially political rather than legal commitments. This lecture describes the various independent but mutually reinforcing components of the non-proliferation regime. It thus touches on and highlights the particular importance of political incentives - or disincentives - to the acquisition of nuclear weapons; legal undertakings in which non-proliferation commitments are anchored; verification (specifically the IAEA Safeguards System); compliance and enforcement; export controls; physical protection measures; regional nuclear non-proliferation initiatives; and measures taken to curb proliferation in general and to strive for arms control and nuclear disarmament. The purpose of the lecture is to provide an over-arching, tour d'horizon for the more specific and detailed lectures which follow. (author)

Four decades of living with the genie: United States nuclear export policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kramish, A.

1983-01-01

The subject is discussed as follows: general introduction (examples of complex nature of nuclear trade); non-proliferation policy - the beginnings (early US action to control dealings with other countries); the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (formulation of US policy on nuclear trade; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation)); the Symington and Glenn Amendments (US legislation to control trade with other countries); the Export-Import Bank Act (US legislation for the same purpose as above); the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the Reagan Policy (US present policy to support IAEA safeguards and Non-Proliferation Treaty); future prospects. (U.K.)

Nuclear arbitration: Interpreting non-proliferation agreements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tzeng, Peter

2015-01-01

At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements. These agreements include, inter alia, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements.1 States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, commentators have proposed various enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The inconvenient truth, however, is that states are generally unwilling to consent to enforcement mechanisms concerning issues as critical to national security as nuclear non-proliferation.3 This article suggests an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem: interpretation mechanisms. Although an interpretation mechanism does not have the teeth of an enforcement mechanism, it can induce compliance by providing an authoritative interpretation of a legal obligation. Interpretation mechanisms would help solve the non-compliance problem because, as this article shows, in many cases of alleged non-compliance with a non-proliferation agreement, the fundamental problem has been the lack of an authoritative interpretation of the agreement, not the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, this article proposes arbitration as the proper interpretation mechanism for non-proliferation agreements. It advocates the establishment of a 'Nuclear Arbitration Centre' as an independent branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommends the gradual introduction of arbitration clauses into the texts of non-proliferation agreements. Section I begins with a discussion of international agreements in general and the importance of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section II then discusses nuclear non-proliferation agreements and their lack of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section III examines seven case studies of alleged non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements in order to show that the main problem in many cases

Safeguards and non-proliferation: current challenges and the implications for Australia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leask, A.; Carlson, J.

2006-01-01

Full text: The expansion of nuclear programs raises the issue of how to ensure this does not increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. The non-proliferation regime - based on the NPT and its verification mechanism, the IAEA safeguards system - has been developed to provide assurance that nuclear programs are exclusively peaceful. Although to date the non-proliferation regime has been remarkably successful, in recent years it has come under serious challenge. Nuclear proliferation is emerging as one of the major issues facing the international community. Addressing technical and institutional aspects of the non-proliferation regime - especially safeguards, but also complementary measures such as export controls, proliferation-resistant technology, and an international framework on sensitive technology - is important. But proliferation is a political problem, and ultimately the success of the non-proliferation regime depends on political resolve to uphold compliance, using incentives and if necessary sanctions. These issues are vitally important to Australia's future. Being a major uranium supplier has strengthened Australia's influence in non-proliferation and safeguards developments

Exports and experts:proliferation risks from the new Commonwealth

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Potter, W.C.

1992-01-01

Ironically, given the Cold War history and Western stereotypes about Soviet misbehavior, the long-standing experience of US-Soviet cooperation on nonproliferation may have made US policy-makers less attentive to, and less concerned about, signs of change in Soviet nuclear export policy. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the nuclear inheritance of its successor states belatedly focused Western attention on the proliferation risks posed by the disintegration of central authority. Most concern to date, however, has continued to emphasize the problems of nuclear command and control. But the nonproliferation threats associated with the unregulated export of sensitive nuclear material, technology, and equipment may be equally great, and present problems that are already real. At the same time, the new nation-building process in the Soviet successor states presents opportunities for expanding the NPT and international safeguards, containing the nuclear brain drain, promoting the cleanup of hazardous nuclear waste, enhancing international capabilities for monitoring proliferation, and building new communities of nonproliferation specialists. A rare occasion now exists for Western policy-makers to have a direct impact on the long-term nuclear export and non-proliferation behavior of the successor states to the Soviet Union. The speed and seriousness with which the West undertakes this task will largely determine how much ground, if any, will be lost from its decades-long effort to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons

Final report of the 2. committee of investigation of the 11. legislative period. Nuclear exports

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-01-01

On the subject of 'nuclear exports' the Committee dealt with political and legal principles of the Federal Government's nuclear export policy, particularly questions concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and scientific-technical cooperation of the FRG with other countries, especially Argentina, Brazil, India, and Pakistan. Individual export transactions were then investigated, followed by a general assessment of the FRG's nuclear policy. - Concerning non-proliferation policy there have been certain administrative weaknesses in converting control measures into practice. Remedy is expected from the duty of terms to report deliveries punctually and completely and subsequent supervision. - The illegal transactions with India and Pakistan require improvements in the legal instruments, in the execution of administrative measures, and in border controls. Decisive steps have been introduced. (HSCH) [de

Working Group 3: Broader Perspectives on Non-proliferation and Nuclear Verification

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, M.; Pregenzer, A.; Stein, G.

2013-01-01

This working group (WG) focused on the technical topics related to international security and stability in global nonproliferation and arms control regimes and asked how nonproliferation tools and culture might facilitate verification of future nuclear treaties. The review of existing and future nonproliferation and disarmament regimes (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - CTBT, UNSC Resolution 1540, UK/Norway/VERTIC exercise, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - FMCT) offered a view on challenges, possibilities, and limitations for future initiatives. The concepts that the WG considered, with potential use in implementing future nuclear verification treaties, are: Triple S Culture (Safety, Security, Safeguards), State-Level Approach, Safeguards-by-Design, risk-based approaches, managed access, inspections, and protection of sensitive information. Under these concepts, many existing tools, considered by the WG could be used for nuclear verification. Export control works to control sensitive technology and expertise. Global implementation is complicated and multi-faceted and would benefit from greater consistency and efficiency. In most cases, international cooperation and development international capability would supplement efforts. This document is composed of the slides and the paper of the presentation. (A.C.)

A Study on the cooperation policy in multilateral nuclear control regimes and the advancing of national export control system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, K. B.; Yang, M. H.; Lee, H. M.; Lee, K. S.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Kim, J. S.

2004-08-01

This study carried out the analysis of trends of the multilateral nuclear control in four aspects. First, this study analyzes the past trends of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the NPT, the IAEA safeguards system, the international nuclear export control regime and the physical protection of nuclear materials. Second, this study establishes the multilateral cooperation strategies for the effective cooperation in the process of strengthening the nuclear control regimes. Third, this study reviews the major agenda of nuclear control regimes and establishes national positions on each agenda. Fourth, this study also analyzes outstanding issues in nuclear control regimes and derives some factors to reflect national nuclear control system

Export Controls and Industry Outreach Mutual Benefits of Business - Government Partnerships (OPCW)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnston, D. R.

2007-01-01

This presentation is intended to acquaint one and all with the strategy and benefits for developing a mutually contributory relationship between government and industry as a means to support and strengthen an effective nonproliferation export control regime. The study will provide background into the basis for development of multilateral regimes for export controls along with an overview covering the historical involvement of industry and their responsibility in dual-use research and development. The paper will then offer an examination of the unique composition and status of the dual-use industry which makes them vulnerable to the illicit diversion of their products and identify and discuss the recognized indicators of that process. The focus will then move toward explaining justification for establishing a close working relationship or partnership between industry and government and how the process of that partnership can deter access and opportunity for the illicit diversion of dual-use goods. Finally, in summation the presentation will highlight the mutual benefits that result from that relationship.(author)

Current nuclear non-proliferation policies in the world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kurosawa, Mitsuru

1997-01-01

Although a global nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has disappeared, many challenges to nuclear non-proliferation have emerged. Sources of concern, like a nuclear weapon program by Iraq and suspicions of North Korea have caused the adoption of a variety of political and technical measures in order to meet these challenges in the post-Cold War era. This paper describes the following ten policies for non-proliferation: 1) Strengthening the NPT; 2) Nuclear reduction; 3) CTBT and cut-off treaty; 4) Establishment of NWFZs; 5) Counterproliferation; 6) Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards; 7) Control and disposal of nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons; 8) Export control; 9) Registration of plutonium; and 10) Actions against nuclear smuggling. The first four measures can be said to be mainly political policies, the fifth measure (counterproliferation), can be categorized as basically a military policy, and the last five measures can be said to be technical. (J.P.N.)

Sustaining non-proliferation in the 1980s

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nye, J.S.

1984-01-01

The subject is discussed as follows: introduction; the non-proliferation regime - 1950s to 1970s (IAEA safeguards; Non-proliferation Treaty; oil crisis; proposed sale of facilities for producing weapons-usable materials; USA position); the Carter Administration approach; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation); incentives (USA); export legislation (USA); domestic breeder policy (USA); maintaining the regime in the 1980s (safeguards; Pu and highly enriched uranium management; international spent fuel storage; fuel assurances); the problem of priority; rate vs. degree of proliferation; relations among regimes (international regimes); conclusion. (U.K.)

How Might Industry Governance Be Broadened To Include Nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

2009-01-01

Broadening industry governance to support nonproliferation could provide significant new leverage in preventing the spread/diversion of nuclear, radiological, or dual-use material or technology that could be used in making a nuclear or radiological weapon. Industry is defined broadly to include (1) the nuclear industry, (2) dual-use industries, and (3) radioactive source manufacturers and selected radioactive source-user industries worldwide. This paper describes how industry can be an important first line of defense in detecting and thwarting proliferation, such as an illicit trade network or an insider theft case, by complementing and strengthening existing governmental efforts. For example, the dual-use industry can play a critical role by providing export, import, or security control information that would allow a government or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to integrate this information with safeguards, export, import, and physical protection information it has to create a more complete picture of the potential for proliferation. Because industry is closest to users of the goods and technology that could be illicitly diverted throughout the supply chain, industry information can potentially be more timely and accurate than other sources of information. Industry is in an ideal position to help ensure that such illicit activities are detected. This role could be performed more effectively if companies worked together within a particular industry to promote nonproliferation by implementing an industry-wide self-regulation program. Performance measures could be used to ensure their materials and technologies are secure throughout the supply chain and that customers are legitimately using and/or maintaining oversight of these items. Nonproliferation is the overarching driver that industry needs to consider in adopting and implementing a self-regulation approach. A few foreign companies have begun such an approach to date; it is believed that

Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Sandra Colombo

2017-01-01

Full Text Available The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu. The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous development of this technology in emerging countries. Against this, the article investigates the existence of margins to maneuver in the international system from the case of study of Argentina, one of the few developing countries that have managed to export nuclear technology, and has declared the development of independent nuclear activity as a State policy

Evaluation of the Administration's proposed nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Report to the Congress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

Dwindling supplies of fossil fuels are causing countries to turn increasingly to nuclear power as a major source of energy. Although nuclear power holds out the promise of energy independence, it has a formidable drawback--it can also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In April, the President announced a new policy designed to curb nuclear proliferation and the executive branch proposed legislation entitled 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977.' The strategy outlined in these documents calls for stricter export controls and safeguards as well as actions affecting uranium enrichment services, reprocessing, storing of spent fuel, and disposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. GAO analyzed this non-proliferation strategy as it relates to: Improving nuclear export controls; Strengthening international nuclear safeguards; Maintaining U.S. reliability as a supplier of uranium enrichment services; Deferring U.S. reprocessing of spent fuel as an example for others; Reducing risk of proliferation by controlling spent reactor fuel. In general, GAO concluded that the administration's strategy is constructive but noted some weaknesses which should be addressed. Some of the problems noted in this report may already have been addressed by congressional committees in their markup of the legislation

Romania non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biro, Lucian; Grama, Viviana

2001-01-01

respect to non-proliferation policy, Romania ratified bilateral Agreements with USA and Canada concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Romania controls the import export activities through CNCAN and Ministry of Foreign Affairs - National Agency for Control of Strategic Exports and Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. CNCAN authorizes all import and export activities concerning materials, devices, equipment and information pertinent for the proliferation of nuclear weapons or of other explosive nuclear devices referred in the Law on the safe deployment of nuclear activities, no. 111/1996, republished. CNCAN has an active role in preventing and combating the illicit trafficking as a national responsible and to control all nuclear material and nuclear activities. (author)

Scientists for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transactions of international seminar

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This publication presents the results of the Second International Seminar 'Scientists for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. The Seminar took place from 11 to 14 October 1994 in Nakhabino Country Club near Moscow. More than 60 specialists from Russia, USA, France, Belgium as well as IAEA and CEU took part in the seminar. Problems of cooperation in the field of nuclear materials accounting, control and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear export regulations and disarmament control are discussed at the seminar

New U.S. nuclear export legislation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Patermann, C.

1978-01-01

The new 1978 Export Control Act of the United States of America introduces a comprehensive arrangement of the criteria, responsibilities and procedures associated with nuclear exports, especially under the nonproliferation aspect. After a detailed analysis of the multitude of provisions it must be feared that, merely as a result of the high degree of formalization, bureaucratization and politicalization of these procedures, the U.S. can henceforth no longer be regarded as a reliable source of nuclear materials and facilities. An aspect received abroad with particular anguish is the fact that this unilateral aggravation of export controls was initiated after the start of the two-year INFCE program for international fuel cycle evaluation and that the new legislation forces the American government to renegotiate existing agreements on cooperation with the receiver countries under the threat of a delivery stop. (orig.) [de

Nuclear export controls

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Thorne, C.E.

1999-01-01

One approach to describing the multilateral nuclear export controls is to do it according to time. This led to an interesting discovery, i.e. multilateral export controls have been defined by four distinct periods, the forst two of abut five years each, the second two about twice as long. These time periods have another interesting property. The two suppliers groups, which we will discuss in detail, have alternated in dominance over nearly thirty years. After describing the historical developments, the status of the present situation in multilateral nuclear export controls is examined, with the strengths and weaknesses. The future of multilateral nuclear export controls and possible ways that might be taken are considered

Nuclear exports and international cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

McCardle, J.J.

1981-06-01

Canada's nuclear export policy together with its non-proliferation and safeguards policy embrace both the country's desire to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its effort to minimize the risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. This policy reflects the belief that only if Canadian parliamentary and public opinion can be convinced that Canada's nuclear exports will not contribute to nuclear proliferation will the long-term health of the country's nuclear industry be assured. Canada requires a political commitment to non-proliferation from its nuclear partners, and looks to the IAEA to administer safeguards on nuclear material of Canadian origin to guarantee that commitment. Agreements reached with its nuclear partners are in accordance with provisions of the non-proliferation treaty and include a contingency provision for fall-back safeguards if the other state should withdraw from the NPT. Provision is made for mutual agreement on reprocessing and enrichment of nuclear material. Agreements have been reached with some twenty nuclear partners, and efforts are continuing to come to new international understanding on reprocessing, enrichment, and plutonium storage

Import/Export Control for ITT in KAERI

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Sung Ho; Kim, In Cheol; Kim, Hyun Jo; Kim, Hyun Sook; Kim, Mun Ja [KAERI, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2016-05-15

The representatives of I/E (Import/Export) control in international society are NSG of nuclear fields, MTCR of missile fields, WA of conventional weapon fields and AG of bio-chemical fields. One of recent issues of the international I/E organizations is to strengthen ITT (Intangible Technology Transfer or Intangible Transfer of Technology). According to the ITT policy, ROK governments reinforced domestic I/E control for the non-proliferation of WMD through the Foreign Trade Law recently modified. There are international transfers of various kinds of items and technologies produced in KAERI as an integrated R and D institute in nuclear fields. In this study, KAERI is to develop a reasonable implementation methodology for the establishment of KAERI I/E control system to meet the requirements of the law. The main purpose of methodology development is to establish a frame of I/E control including ITT in KAERI. According to the methodology, KAERI held seminars twice for the public relations and education and prepared the regulation for I/E control. At present, KAERI is making a provision to check whether each R and D activity is related to the strategic item or technology. In the near future, KAERI will make efforts to get the CP license for effective implementation of I/E control of dual-use item/technology and follow up the changes of I/E control in nuclear field.

Missile non-proliferation: an alternative approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Delory, Stephane

2011-01-01

In this report, the author first proposes an overview of the notion of missile prohibition. He notices that the association between weapons of mass destruction and missiles is a prelude to the legitimacy of missile control, notably within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime or MTCR. He also comments the notion of total ban. In a second part, the author analyses and discusses the limitations of the control of technology diffusion. He discusses the role of the MTCR, comments the evolution of this regime with the taking of China and Russia into consideration, the impacts of national implementations of export regimes on the MTCR, and economic aspects of control implementation. In the next part, the author addresses other kinds of limitations, i.e. those related with capacity evolutions of proliferating States. The last part addresses the evolution towards a new definition of approach to missile non-proliferation, notably in terms of perception of missile roles and of technology transfer controls

The politics of fading dreams: Britain and the nuclear export business

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boardman, R.; Grieve, M.

1983-01-01

The subject is discussed as follows: introduction to a chapter focused on the politics of Britain's foreign nuclear trade; export goals and the nuclear programme (discussion of Magnox, AGR, SGHWR and PWR); the pursuit of exports; nuclear exports and proliferation (reprocessing; fast reactors; plutonium; INFCE); public opinion, nuclear power and exports (interest groups); conclusions (Britain's nuclear exports and non-proliferation). (U.K.)

Cooperative Remote Monitoring, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: Fourth quarter 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alonzo, G M [ed.

1995-01-01

The DOE`s Cooperative Remote Monitoring programs integrate elements from research and development and implementation to achieve DOE`s objectives in arms control and nonproliferation. The contents of this issue are: cooperative remote monitoring--trends in arms control and nonproliferation; Modular Integrated Monitoring System (MIMS); Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring Systems (ATMS); Tracking and Nuclear Materials by Wide-Area Nuclear Detection (WAND); Cooperative Monitoring Center; the International Remote Monitoring Project; international US and IAEA remote monitoring field trials; Project Dustcloud: monitoring the test stands in Iraq; bilateral remote monitoring: Kurchatov-Argonne-West Demonstration; INSENS Sensor System Project.

Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

2013-01-01

The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

The structure of German non-proliferation policy - past and future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, H.

1990-01-01

West German nonproliferation policy has evolved through four phases: First German policy strived to regain the right to nuclear research and industrial development. Then West Germany struggled for participation in NATO nuclear decision-making. Following the conclusion of the NPT, the full development of a mature nuclear industry, including activities in the full fuel cycle, and the promotion of nuclear exports were the focus of national nuclear policy. Starting in the early eighties, political aspects became more important. International security, arms control and disarmament, and foreign reputation had a more prominent role than pure economic interests. In the future, the united Germany must take care not to repeat the sad scandals of the eighties. Its renunciation of nuclear weapons remains a pillar of European stability and a prerequisite for a European peace system. Together with its European partners, Germany can be expected to take a more active, supportive and effective role in international non-proliferation policy. (orig./HSCH) [de

URENCO: A Multinational Contribution to Non-Proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Korbmacher, T.

2015-01-01

URENCO was founded in 1970 following the signing of the Treaty of Almelo by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The fundamental principles for effective supervision of URENCO's technology and enrichment operations with respect to non-proliferation issues have been laid down in this treaty. In order to enable the construction of a URENCO enrichment facility in the USA and to permit the transfer of classified information into the USA, another treaty has been concluded in 1992. The US government entered into the Treaty of Washington together with the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to ensure that the same conditions that had been agreed in the Treaty of Almelo would also apply to the US. To allow for the completion of the joint venture with Areva regarding the URENCO Group's technology business ETC, the Treaty of Cardiff has been signed on 12 July 2005 by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France. Through this treaty, France is obliged to adhere to the principles of the Treaty of Almelo. For each treaty, control bodies have been formed with representatives of the governments of the signatory countries. These committees exercise the role of effective supervision of the technology and operations with respect to non-proliferation issues. They also consider all questions concerning the safeguards system (as established by IAEA/Euratom), classification arrangements and security procedures, exports of the technology and enriched uranium, as well as other non-proliferation issues. The presentation describes how the multinational structure of URENCO contributes to Non-Proliferation on the basis of the above mentioned treaties. Beyond that, the international cross linking of operational working groups and committees within the URENCO Group structure is explained. This structure implies an additional assurance to achieve the safeguards goals set. (author)

The nonproliferation predicament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, J.F.

1985-01-01

This book presents papers on the non-proliferation policy being advocated by the U.S. Topics considered include political aspects, proliferation, national security, government policies, NATO, arms control, nuclear disarmament, the balance of power, U.S. foreign policy, dealing with the problem countries, international cooperation, the nuclear marketplace, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, legislation, congressional interest and input, ethical aspects, military strategy, public opinion, and terrorist groups

Nuclear safeguards and export controls

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, H.

1994-01-01

Precisely from the perspective of the two most important nonnuclear weapons states, Japan and Germany, the safeguards and arms control agendas have not been finally dealt with. Because of their central position in the nonproliferation regime as nuclear suppliers and states with large nuclear energy industries, both countries are compelled to take a leading role in pursuing future reforms. In the dialogue with the nonaligned, this leadership position is helped by their nonnuclear status. In fact, Japan and Germany have some interests in common with the nonaligned states, such as the expansion of safeguards in the nuclear weapons states. To be sure, both Japan and Germany will pursue such interests with due regard to the interests of their friends and allies. For Japan, maintaining a close relationship with the United States is as important as shaping viable relations with China. Initiatives and controversies on nuclear policy must be weighed against this interest. By the same token, Germany must take into account the dense network of relations with its allies and with Russia, in addition to the German-French friendship. This will always set limits to Germany's readiness to confront the nuclear weapons states on nuclear issues. This, however, does not mean that both countries must shut up when the P 5 speak. The nuclear weapons register and the extension of the ''erga omnes'' rule in export controls, for example, should not be relegated to the dustbin of history, just because some friendly nuclear powers don't like these ideas. (orig.)

A Study on Improvement of Export Control law's understanding for nuclear control items' exporters in Rep. of Korea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lim, Dong Hyuk; Choi, Sun Do; Yang, Seung Hyo

2011-01-01

According to export of UAE commercial reactor and JRTR(Jordan Research and Training Reactor) in 2009, Korea's international prestige has enhanced and it has been more important for researcher in charge of export control to understand and carry out duties on export control by obeying Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) Guidelines. Currently, the NSG tries to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by harmonising export control systems of participating countries in relation to trade with nuclear commodities and nuclear-related dual-use materials, equipment, software and technology. In addition, through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports, the NSG aims to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field is not hindered unjustly in the process. However, there is still not a little confusion of export businesses owing to lack of understanding of nuclear items in Korea. Therefore, by correctly understanding export control systems, permits and licenses, ITT and persistingly communicating with export businesses, Researchers in charge of export control are able to eliminate confusion of production businesses regarding export and establish a export control culture

Nuclear power generation and nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walske, C.

1978-01-01

In the future outlook around year 2000 of nuclear power, thought must be given to fuel reprocessing and plutonium utilization. The adverse utilization of plutonium may be prevented by the means balanced with its economical value. As the method of less cost with lower effect of nonproliferation, combination of fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities and mixed plutonium/uranium processing are possible. As the method of more cost with higher effect of nonproliferation the maintenance of high radioactivity and inaccessibility of plutonium is conceivable. As for the agreeable methods in 2000, seven principles may be mentioned, such as the dependence upon the agreements among major nations and upon nuclear exporting countries. These are still inadequate, however. What is important is to provide with the sufficient safeguards to countries concerned to negate the need for nuclear weapons. Efforts are then necessary for leading nuclear countries to extend aids to other nuclear-oriented countries. (Mori, K.)

Broadening Industry Governance to Include Nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

2008-11-11

As industry is the first line of defense in detecting and thwarting illicit trade networks, the engagement of the private sector is critical to any government effort to strengthen existing mechanisms to protect goods and services throughout the supply chain. This study builds on previous PNNL work to continue to evaluate means for greater industry engagement to complement and strengthen existing governmental efforts to detect and stem the trade of illicit goods and to protect and secure goods that could be used in making a weapon of mass destruction. Specifically, the study evaluates the concept of Industry Self Regulation, defined as a systematic voluntary program undertaken by an industry or by individual companies to anticipate, implement, supplement, or substitute for regulatory requirements in a given field, generally through the adoption of best practices. Through a series of interviews with companies with a past history of non-compliance, trade associations and NGOs, the authors identify gaps in the existing regulatory infrastructure, drivers for a self regulation approach and the form such an approach might take, as well as obstacles to be overcome. The authors conclude that it is at the intersection of industry, government, and security that—through collaborative means—the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation system—can be most effectively strengthened to the mutual benefit of both government and the private sector. Industry has a critical stake in the success of this regime, and has the potential to act as an integrating force that brings together the existing mechanisms of the global nonproliferation regime: export controls, physical protection, and safeguards. The authors conclude that industry compliance is not enough; rather, nonproliferation must become a central tenant of a company’s corporate culture and be viewed as an integral component of corporate social responsibility (CSR).

Model and Analytic Processes for Export License Assessments

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Thompson, Sandra E.; Whitney, Paul D.; Weimar, Mark R.; Wood, Thomas W.; Daly, Don S.; Brothers, Alan J.; Sanfilippo, Antonio P.; Cook, Diane; Holder, Larry

2011-09-29

This paper represents the Department of Energy Office of Nonproliferation Research and Development (NA-22) Simulations, Algorithms and Modeling (SAM) Program's first effort to identify and frame analytical methods and tools to aid export control professionals in effectively predicting proliferation intent; a complex, multi-step and multi-agency process. The report focuses on analytical modeling methodologies that alone, or combined, may improve the proliferation export control license approval process. It is a follow-up to an earlier paper describing information sources and environments related to international nuclear technology transfer. This report describes the decision criteria used to evaluate modeling techniques and tools to determine which approaches will be investigated during the final 2 years of the project. The report also details the motivation for why new modeling techniques and tools are needed. The analytical modeling methodologies will enable analysts to evaluate the information environment for relevance to detecting proliferation intent, with specific focus on assessing risks associated with transferring dual-use technologies. Dual-use technologies can be used in both weapons and commercial enterprises. A decision-framework was developed to evaluate which of the different analytical modeling methodologies would be most appropriate conditional on the uniqueness of the approach, data availability, laboratory capabilities, relevance to NA-22 and Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (NA-24) research needs and the impact if successful. Modeling methodologies were divided into whether they could help micro-level assessments (e.g., help improve individual license assessments) or macro-level assessment. Macro-level assessment focuses on suppliers, technology, consumers, economies, and proliferation context. Macro-level assessment technologies scored higher in the area of uniqueness because less work has been done at the macro level. An

Nuclear export controls and nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sevini, F.

2013-01-01

The export control of dual use goods has developed since the early seventies to counter nuclear proliferation. The paper provides an overview of dual-use export control issues also in relation with the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which requires States to provide declarations of the export of the controlled items listed in its Annex II, derived from the Nuclear Suppliers Group Trigger list. Recommendations for improvement are proposed. On the EU level, the paper summarises the framework set by the European Council Regulation 428/2009, requiring Member States to impose control on exports, brokering and transit of dual use goods. The Regulation includes the so-called 'EU dual-use control list' integrating the lists of dual-use items defined by the international regimes and requires also the control on intangible technology transfers as foreseen by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540. ESARDA has recently launched a new sub-Working Group on export control, which raised large interest and may evolve to a full-fledged working group. Export control may provide an opportunity of technical collaboration between ESARDA and INMM. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

US legislative proposals for nuclear export controls

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Donnelly, W.H.

1977-01-01

Some of the topics covered are: Congress' perception of proliferation; completed legislation for non-proliferation; partially complete legislative initiatives in the 94th Congress; non-proliferation measures defeated or vetoed; and legislation for non-proliferation in the 95th Congress

Considerations on nonproliferation regime meeting in a changing world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kurihara, Hiroyoshi; Kikuchi, Masahiro

1994-01-01

This paper summarizes the past history of worldwide nonproliferation regime, then proposes the future improvements on the regime. Present worldwide nonproliferation regime have been formulated during the cold war era. Therefore, the structure and measures of the regime were heavily influenced by the features of cold war era. Though the cold war was over, still new international order does not seem to be on the horizon, we need to review the present regime and to improve the regime compatible to new world situation. Generally speaking, the nonproliferation regime have gained moderate success so far. We could point out the following features as a kind of success: 1) No increase of overt Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), 2) All five NWSs have finally participated to the NPT, 3) South Africa has destroyed its nuclear weapons and became Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS), 4) Successful conclusions of some regional arrangements, such as Tlatelolco, Ralotonga, and 5) Strengthening of export control on sensitive items. On the other hand, we recognize the following points as the failures of the regime. 6) India, Pakistan and Israel reject to join the NPT, 7) Existence of some violation against NPT regime, i.e. Iraqi case and DPRK case, 8) Insufficient effective measures against brain drain problem, 9) Risk exists for the long term extension of NPT, and 10) Insufficient flexibility to meet changing boundary conditions. We would propose the various measures for strengthening to meet changing boundary conditions, as follows: 11) Measures to be taken along with future civil use of Plutonium, 12) Strengthening and rationalizing international safeguards, 13) Countermeasures for emerging new types of nuclear proliferation, 14) Strengthening nuclear material control in NWS, 15) Measures to be taken for nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons, and 16) Nuclear disarmament. (author)

Evaluation of selected features of US nuclear non-proliferation law and policy. Report to the Congress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

Because other nations now have uranium enrichment facilities, no nation can use nuclear fuel services to dictate actions to others. The United States, therefore, should avoid undue reliance on its uranium enrichment capability as a tool to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1978 nuclear non-proliferation law requires the United States to ensure the availability of US enrichment services to meet foreign demand, but it is not apparent that a new enrichment plant authorized in 1975 is needed to meet this demand. The 1978 law has proven to be administratively workable as a means of exercising control over nuclear exports, but more needs to be done to make Government reviews of nuclear exports predictable and timely. A comprehensive interagency reassessment is needed of the controls the Department of Energy administers over foreign activities of US firms and individuals

48 CFR 1825.1103-70 - Export control.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 6 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 true Export control. 1825.1103...-70 Export control. (a) Background. (1) NASA contractors and subcontractors are subject to U.S. export... 120 through 130, and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 CFR parts 730 through 799. The...

Export controls on high technology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frank, N.K.

1987-01-01

A overview of the Export Administration Act of 1979 and subsequent regulations and amendments focuses on how licensing requirements and restrictions against boycott affect high technology exports. The purpose of these controls is to limit the export of technology with possible military applications, as well as to advance US foreign policy and protect the economy without imposing too great a restriction on the principles of free trade. Thus, the act encompasses political, economic, and security goals. Problems of predictability arise when embargoes or other controls are imposed for political or foreign policy reasons without regard to economic impacts. Amendments have attempted to streamline the exporting process, particularly in the area of computer and software licensing.

A Study on Improvement of Export Control law's understanding for nuclear control items' exporters in Rep. of Korea

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lim, Dong Hyuk; Choi, Sun Do; Yang, Seung Hyo [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2011-10-15

According to export of UAE commercial reactor and JRTR(Jordan Research and Training Reactor) in 2009, Korea's international prestige has enhanced and it has been more important for researcher in charge of export control to understand and carry out duties on export control by obeying Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) Guidelines. Currently, the NSG tries to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by harmonising export control systems of participating countries in relation to trade with nuclear commodities and nuclear-related dual-use materials, equipment, software and technology. In addition, through the implementation of two sets of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports, the NSG aims to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field is not hindered unjustly in the process. However, there is still not a little confusion of export businesses owing to lack of understanding of nuclear items in Korea. Therefore, by correctly understanding export control systems, permits and licenses, ITT and persistingly communicating with export businesses, Researchers in charge of export control are able to eliminate confusion of production businesses regarding export and establish a export control culture

1995 - a pivotal year for nuclear nonproliferation. German nonproliferation policy in the runup to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Preisinger, J.

1994-01-01

The paper describes the non-proliferation as a task of preventive security policy, the non-proliferation instruments, the content of an extended non-proliferation system, and tasks of German non-proliferation policy. (DG)

Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union, Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report

Science.gov (United States)

1994-05-01

international advisory group composed of: Valentin Alexandrov Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minsk Alexander Bolsunovsky Institute of Biophysics, Krasnoyarsk Oleg...Center for Nonproliferation and Export Control, Minsk Alexander Pikayev Inst. of World Economy and Intl. Relations, Moscow Anatoly Scherba Ministry of...Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1994; A. Pikayev and A. Savelyev , "The USSR’s Nuclear Might: On Land, At Sea, At Air," Nezavisimaya Gazeta

Introduction to Technology Export License of Nuclear Facility

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Seo, Hana; Lee, Chansuh; Shin, Donghoon [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2014-05-15

In this regime, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) has authority on final decision making. And the Korea Institute of Nuclear nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has missions to review the classification and export licensing technically. In principle, classification and export licensing are applied and reviewed individually. However, the number of application for classification and licensing has increased geometrically in the last three years. This is largely a due to the contract that the Republic of Korea (ROK) has finalized to build the UAE Barakah Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) and Jordan Research and Training Reactor (JRTR). This circumstance brought an administrative burden for the government and related institutes as well as stakeholders. This article introduces the law related to the 'Technology Export License of Nuclear Facility' which was developed and legislated to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of commodities classification and export licensing. This system could significantly reduce the licensing burden for transferring the technologies. However, the classification and license on this system are still requested when transferring the goods. Therefore, KINAC will continue to figure out the needs for the stakeholders and keep searching for solutions to problems inherent in the industry.

Introduction to Technology Export License of Nuclear Facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Seo, Hana; Lee, Chansuh; Shin, Donghoon

2014-01-01

In this regime, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) has authority on final decision making. And the Korea Institute of Nuclear nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has missions to review the classification and export licensing technically. In principle, classification and export licensing are applied and reviewed individually. However, the number of application for classification and licensing has increased geometrically in the last three years. This is largely a due to the contract that the Republic of Korea (ROK) has finalized to build the UAE Barakah Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) and Jordan Research and Training Reactor (JRTR). This circumstance brought an administrative burden for the government and related institutes as well as stakeholders. This article introduces the law related to the 'Technology Export License of Nuclear Facility' which was developed and legislated to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of commodities classification and export licensing. This system could significantly reduce the licensing burden for transferring the technologies. However, the classification and license on this system are still requested when transferring the goods. Therefore, KINAC will continue to figure out the needs for the stakeholders and keep searching for solutions to problems inherent in the industry

78 FR 45168 - Acquisition Regulations: Export Control

Science.gov (United States)

2013-07-26

... DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 48 CFR Parts 925, 952 and 970 RIN 1991-AB99 Acquisition Regulations: Export... (78 FR 35195) to amend the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) to add export control... ``DEAR: Export Control and RIN 1991-AB99,'' by any of the following methods: Federal eRulemaking Portal...

Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

1997-01-01

In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

International scientific collaboration in nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Travelli, A.

1998-01-01

International collaboration is a vital component of every serious nonproliferation effort. Several examples of the experiences that the Argonne Arms Control and Nonproliferation Program has had in this area are given and, in the process, important components of the program come to light. Some of the main principles that the program has learned to follow while pursuing international collaboration projects are shared, as are the pitfalls that the program has learned to avoid. (author)

Non-proliferation and the control of atomic energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, B.

1977-01-01

The non-proliferation problem has never ceased to haunt and to influence those responsible for the development of atomic energy. During and after the Second World War, Anglo-American co-operation was reflected in restrictions on the exchange of enrichment and reprocessing know-how. Between 1945 and 1955, the Anglo-Saxon powers continued with the policy of secrecy and uranium monopoly decided on in 1943 at the Quebec summit conference. Starting in 1955, the failure of this policy led - at the suggestion of the United States of America - to a freer flow of information and to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with its safeguards, which permitted widespread application of the policy of technical assistance subject to controls and widespread commerce in research and power reactors - mainly fuelled with enriched uranium and manufactured in the USA. There followed periods characterized by general legal blocks, with two unilateral renunciation treaties - the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, covering non-underground tests, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1968, covering nuclear explosive devices and the entire fuel cycle. The Indian atomic explosion and the acceleration of nuclear programmes owing to the oil crisis prompted - in 1974 - efforts by supplier countries to limit the transfer of sensitive technology and the possession of plants capable of producing substances which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; the USA has even proposed the curtailment of plutonium extraction and of breeder construction, although these are considered by many countries to be essential to the independence of their energy development programmes. This policy of reserving the sensitive stages of the fuel cycles to a few advanced countries and the questioning of existing nuclear agreements have created, in the relations between supplier and recipient countries, a regrettable intensification of the distrust which must be dispelled

International nuclear trade and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Potter, W.C.

1990-01-01

The purpose of this book, the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation, is to explore the international political and economic dimensions of nuclear trade, especially as they pertain to the behavior of eleven emerging nuclear-supplier states. More specifically, the book sets forth a conceptual framework for analyzing international nuclear trade; details the domestic and external factors that shape the nuclear export policies of Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, the People's Republic of China, South Korea, South Africa, Spain and Taiwan; and identifies and assesses alternative strategies for containing the new proliferation risks posed by these emerging suppliers. The book also describes an innovative effort to utilize a computer-based system for tracking international nuclear trade

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, R.J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Harry, R J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

U.S. Nonproliferation Policies and the Future of Nuclear Cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Byoung Jo; Lee, Sang Hyun

2008-12-01

In order for Korea to enhance nuclear cooperation with the U.S., the most urgent thing is to prove its nonproliferation commitment to international community, and legislate solid nonproliferation policies. To achieve these goals, Korean government need to consider to create Nonproliferation Task Force in the government and focus on proving Korea's firm commitment for nonproliferation. Along with it, as a civilian counterpart, Nonproliferation Research Center must be created as soon as possible to research, plan, and publicize Korea's nonproliferation policies and measures. At the same time, the government must set up a control tower that will coordinate Korea's nuclear diplomacy and guide proper division of labor among governmental and nongovernmental agencies in nonproliferation area. Finally, to raise general public's awareness about the danger of nuclear proliferation, government must invest on to develop educational programs and public relationship programs to educate the Korean public

78 FR 9768 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-02-11

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8184] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice...

78 FR 35195 - Acquisition Regulations: Export Control

Science.gov (United States)

2013-06-12

... DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 48 CFR Parts 925, 952, and 970 RIN 1991-AB99 Acquisition Regulations: Export... Energy (DOE) is proposing to amend the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) to add export... comments, identified by ``DEAR: Export Control and RIN 1991-AB99,'' by any of the following methods...

Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carlson, J.

2003-01-01

Although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has enjoyed considerable success, today the regime has never been under greater threat. Three states have challenged the objectives of the NPT, and there is a technology challenge - the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology and know-how. A major issue confronting the international community is, how to deal with a determined proliferator? Despite this gloomy scenario, however, the non-proliferation regime has considerable strengths - many of which can be developed further. The regime comprises complex interacting and mutually reinforcing elements. At its centre is the NPT - with IAEA safeguards as the Treaty's verification mechanism. Important complementary elements include: restraint in the supply and the acquisition of sensitive technologies; multilateral regimes such as the CTBT and proposed FMCT; various regional and bilateral regimes; the range of security and arms control arrangements outside the nuclear area (including other WMD regimes); and the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. Especially important are political incentives and sanctions in support of non-proliferation objectives. This paper outlines some of the key issues facing the non-proliferation regime

Implementation of the Nuclear Export Control at KAERI

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Hyun-Jo; Lee, Byung-Doo; Lee, Sung-Ho

2006-01-01

Korea has joined multilateral export control regimes which include Wassenaar Arrangement(WA), Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) and Australian Group(AG), and their guideline and control lists are reflected in domestic legislation. Also, Catch-all control entered into force on 1 January 2003 in Korea. The frequency of the exports of product as a result of R and D and cooperation with other countries has been increased at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). Therefore, this report describes the implementation status of a nuclear export control at KAERI and points out the practical issues

78 FR 9769 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on...

Science.gov (United States)

2013-02-11

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8182] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on Chinese and Iranian Foreign Persons AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The U.S. Government...

Competitiveness, export control and export promotion of dual-use goods. European and German balancing exercises

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Feldmann, Ulrike

2014-01-01

The EU Commission Communication of 24 April 2014 to the Council and the European Parliament ''The review of export control policy: Ensuring Security and Competitiveness in a changing world'' as well as the increasingly number of inquiries and applications to the German Federal Government (e.g. the rejection of Hermes guarantees and state funding of nuclear export and termination of bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear technologies) once again reason to discuss the current tension between the principle of free movement of goods, competitiveness and export promotion on the one hand and the export control on the other.

Development and current trends in the international nonproliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sessoms, A.L.

1984-01-01

The IAEA and its safeguards system is placed into a historical perspective. A personal perspective on the nonproliferation regime and on the Agency's role in it is then presented. This is done initially by discussing some of the landmark events in the history of the nonproliferation regime. Subsequently some of the history of arms control agreements and of the role of the IAEA are noted. Then political motivations of state and ways the Agency has an impact in the political nonproliferation sphere are addressed

Legal problems concerning the export of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pierer, Heinrich von.

1977-01-01

The legal problems raised by the export of nuclear power plants may be divided into three main categories: nuclear operator's liability for nuclear damage, the consequences for the supplier of the licensing requirements in the national laws of the buyer country and finally, the constraints of applying non-proliferation safeguards on export of nuclear equipment. As regards the third party liability regime in particular, the difficulties lie essentially in the insufficiency of the definition of the nuclear operator and the lack of harmonization in, or even the absence of national laws in this field. (NEA) [fr

Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shea, M.

2000-01-01

Fissionable materials are common to all nuclear weapons and controls on the production, storage, processing and use of fissionable materials provides one means to address non-proliferation and disarmament. In this article, the relevance of such controls is examined and the current situation and future prospects are assessed. (authors)

United States non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheinman, L.

1978-01-01

U.S. non-proliferation policy is aimed at slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, managing the destabilizing effects of nuclear technology for energy purposes, and fostering international standards and institutions to deal responsibly with global nuclear development. These goals assume that nuclear technology has not already precluded social control and recognize the social benefits offered by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Non-proliferation policies recognize that the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is a more-difficult problem than technical ability and will concentrate on reducing those incentives through international agreements and safeguards and by maintaining the separation of commercial nuclear fuel cycles and military uses

Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh

2014-01-01

Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2014-10-15

Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

Nuclear exports. Parliamentary control and confidentiality

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Feldmann, Ulrike

2015-01-01

With its decision taken on 21. October 2014 (Az.: 2 BvE 5/11) the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) decided during court proceedings between administrative bodies on the scope and limits of the parliamentary right of information. Even though the proceeding did not deal with nuclear exports but arm exports, foreign trade law, however, does not only designate an export licence obligation for military weapons but also for so called dual-use goods meaning goods, which can be used both for friendly as well as for military purposes. The export of these goods requires according to the so-called Dual-Use Regulation (EG) 428/2009 a licence. Annex I category 0 of the regulation (EG) 428/2009 lists a variety of nuclear materials, plants and equipment items for which this licence applies. In the same manner as arm exports, also exports of nuclear dual-use goods are being discussed in a special cabinet committee, the Federal Security Council (BSR), which shall coordinate cross-departmentally the German security and defence policy under consideration of economic interests and which categorises its results, according to the rules of procedure, as confidential. Also legally not regulated but common ''preliminary enquiries'' at the responsible Federal Ministry or rather Federal Office of Economics and Export Control by companies which plan an export and want to affirm the general approval for their export business prior to conclusion of contract take not only place for arm exports but also for nuclear dual-use goods. The decision by the Federal Constitutional Court can be applied to consultations about the authorisation of nuclear dual-use goods.

Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration

2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Koltysheva, G I; Perepelkin, I G [eds.

1999-12-31

On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session `History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem` and three sections: (1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests`; (2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex`; (3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences`

2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

1998-01-01

On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session 'History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem' and three sections: 1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests'; 2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex'; 3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences'

Non-proliferation through effective international control. Report of working group I

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, S.E.

1993-01-01

Working Group I focused on two issues: the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Missile Technology Regime (MTCR). There was wide agreement within the Group on a number of factors that will strongly influence the prospects for the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension Conference. Two points stood out as particularly important: first, emphasis on the obligations for nuclear Powers to move in good faith in direction of nuclear disarmament; and second, inadequacy of security guarantees to non-nuclear States associated with the NPT

Challenges to nuclear export controls today

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chatelus, R.; Sevini, F.; Janssens, W.; Michel, Q.

2014-01-01

Nuclear energy and nuclear proliferation programs are potentially inter-twinned, which is a point to be taken into account when analysing the development of civil nuclear energy, both domestically and as foreign investment. International agreements ensure that the adhering countries fulfil their obligations and do not abuse civil nuclear programs for the production of nuclear weapons. Uranium enrichment is the process currently most focused on in this respect by recent news and recent technological and commercial developments. But also the so-called reactor-based pathway, with extraction of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel by reprocessing remains in the spotlight of inspectors. Two of the main and complementary pillars on which the prevention of such diversion relies, are Strategic Export Control and International Safeguards. Strategic export control is a key barrier against nuclear proliferation. In many countries including the EU, it is set by a legal framework, envisaging implementation, enforcement and prosecution. The goods that can exported only with authorisations are those identified by the international export control regimes; primarily the Nuclear Suppliers Group in the case of nuclear items. It is complemented by nuclear safeguards measures, and especially in the past few years, by the IAEA State Level concept, which looks at the overall country's potential, including its industrial structure to derive conclusions on the absence of undeclared activities. However, the strict control of goods and knowledge is a moving target, since technological developments, globalisation and the intensifying exchange of information via the worldwide web offer increasing opportunities to proliferators to acquire sensitive items and competencies, and create bigger challenges to enforcement, calling for new responses. Research and development programmes must be directed towards supporting the adaptation of current proliferation containment systems to these new

Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mirsaidov, U.M.

2010-01-01

nuclear weapon creation are also represent serious challenges to nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty regime. That is why it is high time to accept new United Nations Security Council resolution, which puts under a ban countries withdrawal from nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty. Tajikistan gives big consideration to fulfillment of all treaties on weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation and sequentially fulfills its obligations in accordance with these international legal instruments. We understand that obligations fulfillment of these treaties requires conducting a number of measures. It includes: strengthening of physical protection; strengthening of borders and customs services; equipment modernization and personnel training on issues of nuclear materials export and import. A specific consideration Tajikistan gives to improving of legislative basis. Parliament adopted a number of laws, which facilitates to weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation. Republic of Tajikistan signed Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1997 and ratified Agreement on Safeguards and Additional Protocol with IAEA in 2004. All these documents facilitates to weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation. (author)

On the structure of nonproliferation measures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kano, Takashi

1994-01-01

The author proposed a new analysis method of nonproliferation measures depending on full perception of common threat of nuclear proliferation to entire human being. Nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan were analysed by this method and it revealed the following results: 1) There is a large discrepancy between the nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan mainly because of the different standpoints of both nations and partly because of the difference of understanding on the definition of nonproliferation, and the object of nonproliferation measures. 2) The total structure of nuclear nonproliferation measures becomes more visible through categorization of nonproliferation measures, depending on implementater, target for implementation, characteristics of the measures (soft-liner, legal, or hard-liner) and risk factor for reduction of the total risk of nuclear weapon use. 3) The total structure of nonproliferation measures is multi-barrier structure on the process to reach the actual nuclear weapon use, and each barrier is composed of multi-defense in depth structure including various soft-liner, legal, and hard-linear measures. 4) Various nonproliferation measures can be stored in a data base, based on the proposed structural analysis, which enables further comprehensive analysis for specific purposes efficiently. (author)

U.S. nonproliferation policy in the decade of the eighties: Past dilemmas and prospects for the future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marshall, H.R. Jr.

1986-01-01

No single event had more effect on the policies concerning nuclear importation and exportation activities than the 1974 detonation of a nuclear explosive device in India. This led eventually to the enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978. The author describes the difficult negotiations of the U.S. administration with Euratom, Japan, China, and Latin America. (CW) [de

Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant Ltd., Vienna (Austria)

2000-06-15

At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite; Wredberg, L.

2000-06-01

At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

The international nuclear non-proliferation system

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simpson, J.; McGrew, T.

1985-01-01

This volume focuses upon the issues raised at this Conference, and attempts to address the international diplomatic, political and trading, rather than technical, questions which surround nuclear non-proliferation policies. It does so by bringing together chapters contributed by participants in non-proliferation diplomacy, those with experience in shaping International Atomic Energy Agency and national policies and academic observers of non-proliferation activities and the international nuclear industry. An analysis is provided of past non-proliferation policies and activities and current issues, and an attempt is made to offer ideas for new initiatives which may sustain the non-proliferation system in the future

The role of the USNRC in power reactor exports. Legal and procedural aspects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shapar, H.K.; Stoiber, C.R.

1978-01-01

I. Background on the role of NRC in nuclear export activities. The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, created in January 1975 to assume the licensing and regulatory responsibilities of the former Atomic Energy Commission, has final licensing authority over US nuclear reactor exports. Independent of direct Presidential control, the Commission gives great weight to Executive Branch views on national security and foreign policy issues. II. The nuclear export review process. Procedures for NRC review of nuclear export licence applications include referral to the Executive Branch for a co-ordinated expression of agency views; analysis of the record by the NRC staff; and final Commission licensing decision based on consideration of safeguards, agreements and understandings to assure that US exports will be used only for their intended peaceful purposes. III. NRC's proposed export/import licensing regulations. NRC has recently proposed to consolidate and simplify all of its export and import licensing provisions into a new Part 110 for the convenience of the public - both US and foreign. IV. Public participation in nuclear reactor export licensing. In the past two years, after formal requests by domestic and foreign interest groups, the NRC has developed procedures for direct public participation in its export licensing proceedings. V. Statutory licensing requirements. During the past two years, the NRC has refined and particularized the extremely general 'common defence and security' standard for export licences set forth in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. Eight questions routinely posed to the Executive Branch in reviewing licence applications has given content to Commission export decisions. Recently enacted non-proliferation legislation gives congressional recognition to even more specific, mandatory nuclear export licensing criteria

Government influence on international trade in uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

The subject is dealt with in sections, entitled; introduction (history of uncertainty in the uranium market, opposition to nuclear power); unsatisfactory features of today's trade conditions (including discussion of restrictions in production, exports and imports); desirable principles governing international trade in uranium, apart from the non-proliferation issue (limitation on governmental intervention for economic purposes, reservation of adequate uranium resources in exporting countries, government export price control); desirable principles for achieving balance between security of supply and non-proliferation (need for consensus, reprocessing and fast breeder reactors, principles guiding government controls established for non-proliferation purposes). (U.K.)

Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-01-01

This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy`s Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration.

The Office of Safeguards and Security Nonproliferation Support Program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Desmond, W.J.

1996-01-01

The Nonproliferation Support Program was established in the Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security on october 1, 1995. its mission includes providing assistance to Departmental efforts for improved international material protection, control and accounting programs by coordinating and leveraging domestic safeguards and security policy, practice and experience into the international arena. A major objective of the program is to balance US national security requirements with global support of the nonproliferation objectives. This paper describes the organization of the Office of Safeguards and Security and the Nonproliferation Support Program role and responsibility, and presents some of the current areas of program emphasis and activity

Developing Effluent Analysis Technologies to Support Nonproliferation Initiatives, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies, Third quarter 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Schubert, S A; Staehle, G; Alonzo, G M [eds.

1995-01-01

This issue provides an overview of the Effluent Research Program of the DOE Office of Research and Development, highlighting a number of representative projects within this program in support of nonproliferation initiatives. Technologies reported include portable instruments for on-site inspections, standoff detectors, fieldable, real-time instruments, field collection techniques, and ultrasensitive laboratory techniques.

Nuclear export policy of the Reagan Administration

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pilat, J F; Donnelly, W H [Library of Congress, Washington, DC (USA)

1983-06-01

The Reagan Administration maintains the Carter Administration's objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as being fundamental to US nuclear export policy. However, it sees the USA as having another important role to play in influencing the use of nuclear power and the trading of related goods and technologies in other countries. While the Administration believes its policies will prove beneficial to the USA, there is concern that trade considerations are being given priority over preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

1997-05-01

This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

1997-05-01

This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

76 FR 30986 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-05-27

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 7485] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government... of foreign entities and one foreign person have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of...

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Okko, O [ed.

2012-07-01

The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

OpenAIRE

Sandra Colombo; Cristian Guglielminotti; María Nevia Vera

2017-01-01

The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu). The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous develop...

The nuclear export policy of the Reagan administration

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, J.F.; Donnelly, W.H.

1983-01-01

tThe Reagan Administration maintains the Carter Administration's objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as being fundamental to US nuclear export policy. However, it sees the USA as having another important role to play in influencing the use of nuclear power and the trading of related goods and technologies in other countries. While the Administration believes its policies will prove beneficial to the USA, there is concern that trade considerations are being given priority over preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. (author)

Institutional overviews. Overview of the JAEA and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Senzaki, Masao

2006-01-01

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was formed within the new Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) to carry out safeguards and material control duties for the JAEA. Development of technologies and procedures for safeguards is an important duty. In addition, the new NPSTC will assume a 'think tank' role in support of the nonproliferation regime, help train nonproliferation experts, and cooperate with academic, government and non-governmental organizations on nonproliferation issues. This report briefly summarizes the formation of the JAEA and describes the duties and structure of the NPSTC in detail. (author)

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Okko, O. (ed.)

2012-07-01

The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

Nonproliferation Education at the University of Washington

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jones, Chris D.; Leek, K.M.

2006-01-01

decades ago, the UW has not supported hard science faculty positions that require knowledge of the theoretical and practical dimensions of the nonproliferation of nuclear technologies. Among U.S. National laboratories, PNNL has special strengths in technologies critical to the implementation of arms control treaties and to the detection of activities associated with the production, deployment, and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). PNNL plays a central role in the management of US-Russian programs for protection of fissile materials. In 2000, the PNWCGS initiated outreach to universities and NGOs. The Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security and the Jackson School have sought to bring PNNL expertise to the UW campus and the PNWCGS currently funds several IGRSS course instructors. The PNWCGS has arranged for Russian scientists to teach an experimental course in the IGRSS curriculum. In partnership with the Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security, IGRSS is presently seeking to engage scholars and scientists from other countries in joint teaching programs with the UW. IGRSS permits students to combine their disciplinary and professional specialties with the interdisciplinary and international IGRSS curriculum and its specialized courses on nonproliferation and WMD threats. IGRSS now offers three core courses and several occasional courses on special topics related to WMD issues. The core courses will serve as the requirements for a planned Graduate Certificate and Undergraduate Minor. The three core courses discussed are: (1) Arms control and international law; (2) Weapons of mass destruction; and (3) Arms control simulation.

Nuclear Export Control Policy in Korea - Present and future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Jongsook

2008-01-01

The International community has been facing with the continued challenges for possession and proliferation of WMD over the past years. In addition, it is known that the terrorist groups are interested in acquiring WMD. The black market of WMD related materials and technologies show also the one of seriousness of our challenges. A number of international treaties, agreements and initiatives to control the proliferation of weapons of N, B, C and their delivery system have been existed to deal with these challenges, but their missions are challenged greatly in recent a series of nuclear issues by Iran and North Korea. The paper reviews the current international export control status and Korea export control system and policy. It also addresses some agenda to be done as future export control policy in Korea

Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

2012-01-01

This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

2012-03-06

This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

Influence of export control policy on the competitiveness of machine tool producing organizations

Science.gov (United States)

Ahrstrom, Jeffrey D.

The possible influence of export control policies on producers of export controlled machine tools is examined in this quantitative study. International market competitiveness theories hold that market controlling policies such as export control regulations may influence an organization's ability to compete (Burris, 2010). Differences in domestic application of export control policy on machine tool exports may impose throttling effects on the competitiveness of participating firms (Freedenberg, 2010). Commodity shipments from Japan, Germany, and the United States to the Russian market will be examined using descriptive statistics; gravity modeling of these specific markets provides a foundation for comparison to actual shipment data; and industry participant responses to a user developed survey will provide additional data for analysis using a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance. There is scarce academic research data on the topic of export control effects within the machine tool industry. Research results may be of interest to industry leadership in market participation decisions, advocacy arguments, and strategic planning. Industry advocates and export policy decision makers could find data of interest in supporting positions for or against modifications of export control policies.

Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Doyle, James E.; Meek, Elizabeth

2009-01-01

The President's arms control and nonproliferation agenda is still evolving and the details of initiatives supporting it remain undefined. This means that DOE, NNSA, NA-20, NA-24 and the national laboratories can help define the agenda, and the policies and the initiatives to support it. This will require effective internal and interagency coordination. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda is broad and includes the path-breaking goal of creating conditions for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Responsibility for various elements of the agenda will be widely scattered across the interagency. Therefore an interagency mapping exercise should be performed to identify the key points of engagement within NNSA and other agencies for creating effective policy coordination mechanisms. These can include informal networks, working groups, coordinating committees, interagency task forces, etc. It will be important for NA-20 and NA-24 to get a seat at the table and a functional role in many of these coordinating bodies. The arms control and nonproliferation agenda comprises both mature and developing policy initiatives. The more mature elements such as CTBT ratification and a follow-on strategic nuclear arms treaty with Russia have defined milestones. However, recent press reports indicate that even the START follow-on strategic arms pact that is planned to be complete by the end of 2009 may take significantly longer and be more expansive in scope. The Russians called for proposals to count non-deployed as well as deployed warheads. Other elements of the agenda such as FMCT, future bilateral nuclear arms reductions following a START follow-on treaty, nuclear posture changes, preparations for an international nuclear security summit, strengthened international safeguards and multilateral verification are in much earlier stages of development. For this reason any survey of arms control capabilities within the USG should be structured to address potential needs across the

The handbook of nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, M. H.; Lee, B. W.; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Lee, K. S.

2003-07-01

This report analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This report took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and current status. It is here divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this report dealt four multilateral treaties concluded for international non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. And international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are also analyzed focused on UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, regional safeguards system and international conferences. In addition, this report reviewed the nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is a important tool for bilateral regime

Non-proliferation and multinational enterprises

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-04-01

The paper supplements CC/WG.2/9 in presenting the Japanese delegation's contribution in the areas of non-proliferation and multi-national enterprises. The paper questions whether multinational enrichment enterprises would constitute a significant non-proliferation factor, noting that the nature of the venture might create a potential for the dissemination of sensitive information. The paper also argues that a multi-national venture which was not economically competitive (with national facilities) would have questionable viability. The conclusion is that non-proliferation advantages, if any, would be a result, not an objective of such a venture

Systems resilience: a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

2011-01-01

This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

Systems resilience : a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

2011-12-01

This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

Nuclear export and armament. New threats and peace perspectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kubbig, B.W.; Mueller, H.

1993-02-01

The authors give a condensed analysis of safety and politico-economic dimensions regarding the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and carrier systems with which nuclear blasting charges can be transported. From the content: - Proliferation and non-proliferation: technology, economy and (international) law in a political historic survey. - Missile defense: appropriate technological answer to the political proliferation problem? -export strategies: USA and FRG in comparison, interest and policy of the European Community. - Components for an extensive proliferation strategy. (orig./HP) [de

Evolution and resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pregenzer, Arian L.

2014-01-01

This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and the concept of the adaptive cycle. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by increasing international participation in setting the nonproliferation agenda, developing general international response capabilities, focusing on non-coercive approaches to decreasing demand, and applying systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation

Evolution and resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pregenzer, Arian L. [Senior Scientist, Retired, Sandia National Laboratories, 13013 Arroyo de Vista NE, Albuquerque, NM 87111 (United States)

2014-05-09

This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and the concept of the adaptive cycle. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by increasing international participation in setting the nonproliferation agenda, developing general international response capabilities, focusing on non-coercive approaches to decreasing demand, and applying systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation.

EXPORT CONTROLS: Change in Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two Sensitive Dual-Use Items

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Spencer, F

1997-01-01

This report examines the jurisdiction shift of two items, previously controlled by the State Department to the Department of Commerce, and the implications of this change to export licensing jurisdiction...

Computer Language Choices in Arms Control and Nonproliferation Regimes

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

White, G K

2005-01-01

The U.S. and Russian Federation continue to make substantive progress in the arms control and nonproliferation transparency regimes. We are moving toward an implementation choice for creating radiation measurement systems that are transparent in both their design and in their implementation. In particular, the choice of a programming language to write software for such regimes can decrease or significantly increase the costs of authentication. In this paper, we compare procedural languages with object-oriented languages. In particular, we examine the C and C++ languages; we compare language features, code generation, implementation details, and executable size and demonstrate how these attributes aid or hinder authentication and backdoor threats. We show that programs in lower level, procedural languages are more easily authenticated than are object-oriented ones. Potential tools and methods for authentication are covered. Possible mitigations are suggested for using object-oriented programming languages

Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

Science.gov (United States)

Pregenzer, Arian

2014-01-01

Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters worldwide provide significant benefits to global public health. PMID:24524501

A comparative study on export control systems of nuclear technology in ROK and USA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tae, Jae Woong; Shin, Dong Hoon [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2013-10-15

Perfect removal of transferred technology is impossible because it is impossible to find all copies of technologies such as files and documents. International community concerns about Terrorists' acquirement of nuclear technologies related to nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing Facilities and heavy water production facilities, which can be used for production of nuclear weapons. Non-state actors as well as concerning countries have tried to possess nuclear technology for developing nuclear weapons. Non-state actors' activities threaten global nuclear security. Korea exported four nuclear power plants to UAE and a research reactor to Jordan. Non-state actors may try to procure nuclear equipment and technology from Korean nuclear industries. Therefore, the export control system should be enhanced for national nuclear security and safety. In this study, the export control system of Korea and the United States were compared concerning to nuclear technology. In summary, controlled activities related to nuclear technology are treated more variously and more diverse activities are controlled in the United States than In Korea. Catch-all control will lose its effectiveness without this. Related to the control of ITT (Intangible Technology Transfer), Korea and the United States are trying to amend the export control regulation. Both of them are trying to control intangible technology transfers effectively. Revised Foreign Trade Act in Korea is expected to introduce a more rigorous system of nuclear technology controls. It focuses on nationality rather than residence. The revised law may face into other problems such as dual nationals like as the United States. However, this satisfies legislative requirements for control of a deemed export. The revised law will enter into force in 2014. Accurate meanings of technology and export will be defined soon in the enforcement decree and the public notice before 2014. However, it is hard to revise the definition

A comparative study on export control systems of nuclear technology in ROK and USA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tae, Jae Woong; Shin, Dong Hoon

2013-01-01

Perfect removal of transferred technology is impossible because it is impossible to find all copies of technologies such as files and documents. International community concerns about Terrorists' acquirement of nuclear technologies related to nuclear reactors, enrichment and reprocessing Facilities and heavy water production facilities, which can be used for production of nuclear weapons. Non-state actors as well as concerning countries have tried to possess nuclear technology for developing nuclear weapons. Non-state actors' activities threaten global nuclear security. Korea exported four nuclear power plants to UAE and a research reactor to Jordan. Non-state actors may try to procure nuclear equipment and technology from Korean nuclear industries. Therefore, the export control system should be enhanced for national nuclear security and safety. In this study, the export control system of Korea and the United States were compared concerning to nuclear technology. In summary, controlled activities related to nuclear technology are treated more variously and more diverse activities are controlled in the United States than In Korea. Catch-all control will lose its effectiveness without this. Related to the control of ITT (Intangible Technology Transfer), Korea and the United States are trying to amend the export control regulation. Both of them are trying to control intangible technology transfers effectively. Revised Foreign Trade Act in Korea is expected to introduce a more rigorous system of nuclear technology controls. It focuses on nationality rather than residence. The revised law may face into other problems such as dual nationals like as the United States. However, this satisfies legislative requirements for control of a deemed export. The revised law will enter into force in 2014. Accurate meanings of technology and export will be defined soon in the enforcement decree and the public notice before 2014. However, it is hard to revise the definition of export

A study on the establishment of national nuclear foreign policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Choi, Y.M.; Kim, H.S.; Lee, K.S.; Lee, B.Y.; Lee, J.S.; Choi, Y.L.

1993-01-01

The overall objective of this study is to analyze international non-proliferation circumstances, to suggest national strategies and tactics for international meetings non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to establish domestic non-proliferation systems for international credibility. This study suggests two revision proposals for the IAEA Statute Article VI as a means for the permanent membership in the Board, evaluates benefits and losses of the membership of the international export control regime, and suggests strategies for building a domestics nuclear export control system. This study contributes to enhancing international credibility and promoting self-reliance of nuclear technology in Korea. (Author)

Export Controls: Observations on Selected Countries’ Systems and Proposed Treaties

Science.gov (United States)

2010-05-01

suspected violators of arms Investigates suspected criminal viol including potential export control v and dual-use export control lawse Source: GAO...those that present a strategic military conc substances, biological agents , and related items that could be used in the producti chemical and

Agencies Should Assess Vulnerabilities and Improve Guidance for Protecting Export-Controlled Information at Companies

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

2006-01-01

.... Commerce's and State's export control requirements and processes provide physical checkpoints on the means and methods companies use to export-controlled goods to help them ensure such exports...

Development of a Prototype for the Export Control List Management System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, GwanYoung

2011-01-01

The international society has concerned the possibility of a diversion with strategic items into the nuclear weapon development. So they have regulated those, and our country also has done it. Following a accomplishment of a UAE nuclear power plant export contraction in December, 2009 and a Jordan research reactor export contraction in March, 2010, thousands upon thousands of the strategic goods include the strategic technology will be supposed to transfer to UAE and Jordan. A lot of manpower in the government and the company concerned in addition to an enormous amount of time are needed so as to manage transferred items to UAE and Jordan efficiently. Accordingly, the Export Control List Management System has developed 1) to decrease the administrative time required about implementations such as the classification, the export license 2) and to plan the practical use of manpower 3) and to enhance a convenience of businesses, the government and a company concerned by the KINAC and the KOSTI. That system is scheduled to complete after June, and now a management of export items has done manually. This inconvenience can be solved by developing a prototype of the Export Control List Management System. Also an understanding of the Export Control List Management will be enhanced by doing it. A procedure of a system development and results will be presented in this paper

Israel's position on non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marom, R.

1986-01-01

Israel maintained that the complex international system and worldwide political tension created a situation in which comprehensive plans of disarmament could not produce any positive result. The deadlock in the field of general and complete disarmament has brought Israel to the realization that one possible way to alleviate the stalemate could be progress by stages through partial measures of disarmament. Israel's position on non-proliferation indicates that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ), as it relates to the Middle-East, could serve as a credible alternative to the unilateral adherence to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and an effective measure of non-proliferation in the region. (Author)

The Role of Text Mining in Export Control

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tae, Jae-woong; Son, Choul-woong; Shin, Dong-hoon [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

Korean government provides classification services to exporters. It is simple to copy technology such as documents and drawings. Moreover, it is also easy that new technology derived from the existing technology. The diversity of technology makes classification difficult because the boundary between strategic and nonstrategic technology is unclear and ambiguous. Reviewers should consider previous classification cases enough. However, the increase of the classification cases prevent consistent classifications. This made another innovative and effective approaches necessary. IXCRS (Intelligent Export Control Review System) is proposed to coincide with demands. IXCRS consists of and expert system, a semantic searching system, a full text retrieval system, and image retrieval system and a document retrieval system. It is the aim of the present paper to observe the document retrieval system based on text mining and to discuss how to utilize the system. This study has demonstrated how text mining technique can be applied to export control. The document retrieval system supports reviewers to treat previous classification cases effectively. Especially, it is highly probable that similarity data will contribute to specify classification criterion. However, an analysis of the system showed a number of problems that remain to be explored such as a multilanguage problem and an inclusion relationship problem. Further research should be directed to solve problems and to apply more data mining techniques so that the system should be used as one of useful tools for export control.

The Role of Text Mining in Export Control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tae, Jae-woong; Son, Choul-woong; Shin, Dong-hoon

2015-01-01

Korean government provides classification services to exporters. It is simple to copy technology such as documents and drawings. Moreover, it is also easy that new technology derived from the existing technology. The diversity of technology makes classification difficult because the boundary between strategic and nonstrategic technology is unclear and ambiguous. Reviewers should consider previous classification cases enough. However, the increase of the classification cases prevent consistent classifications. This made another innovative and effective approaches necessary. IXCRS (Intelligent Export Control Review System) is proposed to coincide with demands. IXCRS consists of and expert system, a semantic searching system, a full text retrieval system, and image retrieval system and a document retrieval system. It is the aim of the present paper to observe the document retrieval system based on text mining and to discuss how to utilize the system. This study has demonstrated how text mining technique can be applied to export control. The document retrieval system supports reviewers to treat previous classification cases effectively. Especially, it is highly probable that similarity data will contribute to specify classification criterion. However, an analysis of the system showed a number of problems that remain to be explored such as a multilanguage problem and an inclusion relationship problem. Further research should be directed to solve problems and to apply more data mining techniques so that the system should be used as one of useful tools for export control

Export Controls: Export-Controlled Technology at Contractor, University, and Federally Funded Research and Development Center Facilities (D-2004-061)

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

2004-01-01

.... The report discusses the steps DoD needs to take to identify unclassified export-controlled technology and to ensure that DoD contractors, universities, and Federally Funded Research and Development...

Exporting Variables in a Hierarchically Distributed Control System

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Chamizo Llatas, M

1995-07-01

We describe the Remote Variable Access Service (RVAS), a network service developed and used in the distributed control and monitoring system of the TJ-II Heliac, which is under construction at CIEMAT (Madrid, Spain) and devoted to plasma studies in the nuclear fusion field. The architecture of the TJ-II control system consists of one central Sun workstation Sparc 10 and several autonomous subsystems based on VME crates with embedded processors running the OS-9 (V.24) real time operating system. The RVAS service allows state variables in local control processes running in subsystems to be exported to remote processes running in the central control workstation. Thus we extend the concept of exporting of file systems in UNIX machines to variables in processes running in different machines. (Author) 6 refs.

Exporting Variables in a Hierarchically Distributed Control System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Diaz Martin; Martinez Laso, L.

1995-01-01

We describe the Remote Variable Access Service (RVAS), a network service developed and use in the distributed control and monitoring system of the TJ-II Heliac, which is under construction at CIEMAT (Madrid, Spain) and devoted to plasma studies in the nuclear fusion field. The architecture of the TJ-II control system consists of one central Sun workstation Sparc 10 and several autonomous subsystems based on VME crates with embedded processors running the os-9 (V.24) real time operating system. The RVAS service allows state variables in local control processes running in subsystems to be exported to remote processes running in the central control workstation. Thus we extend the concept of exporting of file systems in UNIX machines to variables in processes running in different machines. (Author)

Exporting Variables in a Hierarchically Distributed Control System

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chamizo Llatas, M.

1995-01-01

We describe the Remote Variable Access Service (RVAS), a network service developed and used in the distributed control and monitoring system of the TJ-II Heliac, which is under construction at CIEMAT (Madrid, Spain) and devoted to plasma studies in the nuclear fusion field. The architecture of the TJ-II control system consists of one central Sun workstation Sparc 10 and several autonomous subsystems based on VME crates with embedded processors running the OS-9 (V.24) real time operating system. The RVAS service allows state variables in local control processes running in subsystems to be exported to remote processes running in the central control workstation. Thus we extend the concept of exporting of file systems in UNIX machines to variables in processes running in different machines. (Author) 6 refs

Export Controls: Controls Over the Export Licensing Process for Chemical and Biological Items

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

2005-01-01

.... foreign policy should read this report. The report discusses the effectiveness of the DoD review process for export license applications and updates to Federal export regulations to prevent the proliferation of items that could pose...

Review of GAO report on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, May 21, 1981

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1981-01-01

Three witnesses from the General Accounting Office (GAO) testified at a May 21, 1981 hearing on the results of a three-year review of the impact and implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978. A total of 115 countries have ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), and some have urged a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America. The GAO proposed recommendations for improving NNPA administration and developing a more coherent long-term policy. The GAO questions the need for additional enrichment capacity, and suggests a closer look at the need to complete the centrifuge facility. It notes only limited progress in multinational fuel-supply assurances and the establishment of international spent-fuel repositories. It urges the US to take a more-active role in these areas and in the international control system. A listing of US exports of highly enriched uranium from 1954 to 1981 follows the testimony

77 FR 37523 - Proposed Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations: Implementation of Export Control...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-06-21

...), respectively, that would implement various aspects of what has become known as the Export Control Reform... spirit and substance. BIS issued a notice soliciting public comment on streamlining its regulations...

NPT, export controls and nuclear trade

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pande, Savita

1997-01-01

Nuclear trade has by and large remained unhampered vis-a-vis both the NPT as well as export control regulations. The NPT rules are regarded as insufficient, the guidelines appear to contravene the spirit of cooperation in trade and development between suppliers and recipients and there is no agreement among leading suppliers themselves on what constitutes the proper conduct of trade. Export control regimes are more or less too informal to be able to be implemented. The supplier states have to invariably depend on national legislations which again vary from country to country. The only common formal basis on which action can be taken is, therefore, the NPT, its loopholes notwithstanding. The idea of transparency, and supplier-recipient dialogue continues to be a myth and will continue to be so long as these regimes remain discriminatory, so long as some nations are more powerful than others by virtue of retaining nuclear weapons and superiority in nuclear technology and trade

Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1978-01-01

This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

77 FR 22191 - Revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR): Export Control Classification Number...

Science.gov (United States)

2012-04-13

..., Director, Office of National Security and Technology Transfer Controls, by phone at (202) 482-0092 or by... Administrative practice and procedure, Exports, Inventions and patents, Research science and technology. 15 CFR...

Radiological control of the junk exports in Cuba

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dominguez L, O.; Capote F, E.; Carrazana G, J.A.; Zerquera, J.T.; Ramos V, O.; Alonso A, D.; Fernandez, I.M.; Caveda R, C.A.; Madrazo M, S.; Barroso P, I.

2006-01-01

Even when in Cuba a strict control exists on the radiation sources that enter to the country to be used in the different applications, it can be given the case that sources or contaminated materials that never were under this control due fundamentally to that entered to the country before the same one existed, appear in the junk that is marketed. In our country it is effective the Combined Resolution CITMA-MINCEX dated on April, 2002 that settles down the necessity and obligation that has all that manipulates, imports, exports or process junk of carrying out it a radiological control. From April, 2002 making use of a minimum of resources, an own methodology, a properly qualified personnel and the support of a credited laboratory by the ISO 17025 standard, the radioactivity measurement service in junk belonging to the Center of Protection and Hygiene of the Radiations (CPHR), it has reduced the risks that sources or contaminated materials are found in the junk that is exported in the main exporter companies of this line in Cuba avoiding possible radiological emergency situations that affect the population and the environment. (Author)

Hydrology and landscape structure control subalpine catchment carbon export

Science.gov (United States)

Vincent Jerald Pacific

2009-01-01

Carbon export from high elevation ecosystems is a critical component of the global carbon cycle. Ecosystems in northern latitudes have become the focus of much research due to their potential as large sinks of carbon in the atmosphere. However, there exists limited understanding of the controls of carbon export from complex mountain catchments due to strong spatial and...

The legal points at issue concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty and the verification agreement of EURATOM with the IAEA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zieger, G.

1975-01-01

An excellent and comprehensive but very juridicial contribution on: Development and content of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the problems which this Treaty poses for EURATOM (a common market, common supply, joint enterprises, Non-proliferation Treaty and France), the compatibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty with the EURATOM Treaty, verification agreement EURATOM - IAEA (the IAEA as the supervisory authority, the control system of the IAEA, guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements, national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material IAEA supervision as a secondary control, principles of IAEA supervision, secrecy, conflict management), conclusion of the verification agreement, deviations from the guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements legal reflexions (verification agreement and Non-proliferation Treaty, reservations concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty, questions of competence between EURATOM and member states without nuclear weapons, problems of equal treatment). (HP/LN) [de

Future non-proliferation challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yelchenko, Volodymyr

2008-01-01

Having chaired the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee Mr. Volodymyr Yelchenko noted that the NPT States parties reaffirmed the important role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. They stressed that non-compliance with the Treaty provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation and placed emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. The universality aspect was brought to the front with the lack of progress in this area. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states, promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring non-proliferation. There is concern that non-States actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. One of the underlying themes at the Second Prepcom was the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation. Negative consequences to nuclear non-proliferation were also mentioned in the context of the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defense systems, with the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the urgent conclusion of such a treaty as a beneficial step towards non-proliferation was stressed. The NPT states parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for

Nuclear nonproliferation strategy in Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jenkins, F.W.

1989-07-01

The most immediate danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons in Asia is in South Asia, where both India and Pakistan have developed the means of producing nuclear explosive materials. In East Asia, North Korea appears to be in the early stages of a weapon-related nuclear program, and before the end of the century South Korea or Taiwan could revive their past efforts to move closer to a nuclear weapons capability. Over the longer run, Japan could conceivably decide to abandon its present strong opposition to the acquisition of nuclear Weapons. At present, the United States has largely separate approaches to the nuclear weapon proliferation problems in South Asia and in East Asia. This paper argues that these separate approaches should be strengthened and integrated into a broader regional nonproliferation strategy. This regional strategy would have three major strands: inducing India and Pakistan to agree not to produce nuclear weapons or test nuclear explosive devices for a specific period; bolstering the existing nonproliferation regime, principally by maintaining nonproliferation incentives and involving China more in the nonproliferation regime; and encouraging regional cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States

The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-12-19

NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States.

The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biad, A.

1996-01-01

This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC)

An analysis on the export license criteria for NSG control items in the US and Japan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Choi, Young Rok

1995-06-01

Korea has taken steps to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which is a major part of the international nuclear export control regime. In this connection, it is an urgent task to build a new Korean nuclear export control system that includes NSG guidelines and control items. In addition, it is necessary to review the developed supplier countries' experience in the field of export control. The main purpose of this study is to analyze how the US and Japan have controlled the items listed in NSG part 1 and 2 guidelines. To this end, various relevant regulations of the US and Japan were studied. Among those regulations, the US Export Administration Regulation, US 10 CFR 110 and 810, and the Japan's Export Administration Order are included. Through the review process, this study identified NSG items which are controlled in the export control systems of the US and Japan. Furthermore, this study summarized and compared the export license criteria that must be satisfied before exporting each NSG item in the two countries. The export license criteria consist of permitted destinations, document requirements, and types of license. The results of this study are expected to contribute to establishing an appropriate Korean nuclear export control system and could be used as references to the practical export licensing policies of the US and Japan. 6 tabs., 13 refs., (Author) .new

An analysis on the export license criteria for NSG control items in the US and Japan

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Choi, Young Rok [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Taejon (Korea, Republic of)

1995-06-01

Korea has taken steps to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which is a major part of the international nuclear export control regime. In this connection, it is an urgent task to build a new Korean nuclear export control system that includes NSG guidelines and control items. In addition, it is necessary to review the developed supplier countries` experience in the field of export control. The main purpose of this study is to analyze how the US and Japan have controlled the items listed in NSG part 1 and 2 guidelines. To this end, various relevant regulations of the US and Japan were studied. Among those regulations, the US Export Administration Regulation, US 10 CFR 110 and 810, and the Japan`s Export Administration Order are included. Through the review process, this study identified NSG items which are controlled in the export control systems of the US and Japan. Furthermore, this study summarized and compared the export license criteria that must be satisfied before exporting each NSG item in the two countries. The export license criteria consist of permitted destinations, document requirements, and types of license. The results of this study are expected to contribute to establishing an appropriate Korean nuclear export control system and could be used as references to the practical export licensing policies of the US and Japan. 6 tabs., 13 refs., (Author) .new.

Non-proliferation through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear disarmament and international control of plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Imai, Ryukichi

1993-01-01

The role of nuclear factors in the international political situation has changed. The emphasis is now on the new circumstance of the post cold-war world. Non-proliferation is dealt with through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear weapons dismantling and international control of plutonium

The Asian countries and the non-proliferation treaty prorogation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoffmann, N.

1995-01-01

This work deals with the non-proliferation treaty prorogation of Asia. The position of the asian countries under the old non-proliferation treaty is given. It includes the 1968 non-proliferation treaty signatories, the calling in question again and the criticisms revealed by the asian countries. The positions and the open forecasts expressed on the non-proliferation treaty prorogation and the article on the elimination of the nuclear weapons are also given. (O.L.)

Review on 18th Revision of 'Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jeon, Jihye; Lee, Chansuh

2014-01-01

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has established a guideline and continued to revise it in accordance with ever-changing international situation and developing technology. The Part 1 of guideline, 'Guidelines of Nuclear Transfers' covers the Trigger List items which triggers safeguards as a condition of supply. Currently NSG has published the 12 th revised guideline (INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part1) in November 2013. Korean government fully reflected the guideline to its national legislation to implement in accordance with internationally agreed standard. The export control of nuclear strategic items in Korea is responsibility of Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), which entrusted the technical review of the work to Korea Institute of Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). The specific guidelines for the technical review are stipulated in Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items with other strategic items usable to other Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy approved the 18 th revision of Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items on 31 January 2014 as Notice no. 2014-15, which strictly follows the NSG guideline. The 18 th revision of the notice reflects the final proposals agreed from the last Dedicated Meeting of Technical Experts (DMTE) of NSG's Consultative Group (CG) in April 2013. The 3-year-DMTE offered the 'fundamental, holistic approach to the technical review' within the international framework of NSG, rather than sporadic endeavors by individual states in the past. The 18 th version itself has meaning in that the final products of the international technical review were reflected in the Korean national legislation of nuclear export control. It addressed various changes in control text in technical, contextual, and editorial aspects. The revision is analyzed herein concentrating only on technical and semantic changes in control text

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, June 10, September 13, 14, 1977

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1978-01-01

Senator Frank Church presented the opening statement on the June 10, 1977 hearing concerning the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977, S.1432. S.1432 is designed to establish a nonproliferation framework with specific objectives established for the ERDA nuclear energy programs. The ERDA authorization bill is the budgetary vehicle to implement these objectives. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources obtained joint referral of certain portions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to insure that nonproliferation policy is implemented in a manner consistent with the policy of having sufficent energy for this country and foreign countries in the future. Additionally, the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development must examine the cost and the consequences of various initiatives before they are implemented. For example, the proposal to guarantee uranium enrichment services for foreign nations poses specific requirements on ERDA to expand considerably our enrichment capacity by the year 2000. Without reprocessing, it is expected that spent fuel rods from abroad will be returned to this country for storage with attendant costs and siting decisions. Also, international fuel cycle evaluation programs must be carefully examined to insure that all options, including regional fuel cycle centers with international controls and inspection, are considered in seeking international approaches to the nonproliferation objectives. It is these and related questions to which the subcommittee seeks answers. The hearings on September 13 and 14 focused on S.897, a bill to strengthen U.S. policies on nonproliferation and to reorganize certain export functions of the Federal government to promote more efficient administration of such functions. Statements were presented by experts in government, private firms, and industrial sectors

27 CFR 479.193 - Arms Export Control Act.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

..., AND EXPLOSIVES, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION MACHINE GUNS, DESTRUCTIVE DEVICES, AND CERTAIN OTHER FIREARMS Other Laws Applicable § 479.193 Arms Export Control Act. For provisions relating to...

Review on 18{sup th} Revision of 'Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items'

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jeon, Jihye; Lee, Chansuh [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2014-05-15

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has established a guideline and continued to revise it in accordance with ever-changing international situation and developing technology. The Part 1 of guideline, 'Guidelines of Nuclear Transfers' covers the Trigger List items which triggers safeguards as a condition of supply. Currently NSG has published the 12{sup th} revised guideline (INFCIRC/254/Rev.12/Part1) in November 2013. Korean government fully reflected the guideline to its national legislation to implement in accordance with internationally agreed standard. The export control of nuclear strategic items in Korea is responsibility of Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), which entrusted the technical review of the work to Korea Institute of Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). The specific guidelines for the technical review are stipulated in Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items with other strategic items usable to other Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy approved the 18{sup th} revision of Notice on Export and Import of Strategic Items on 31 January 2014 as Notice no. 2014-15, which strictly follows the NSG guideline. The 18{sup th} revision of the notice reflects the final proposals agreed from the last Dedicated Meeting of Technical Experts (DMTE) of NSG's Consultative Group (CG) in April 2013. The 3-year-DMTE offered the 'fundamental, holistic approach to the technical review' within the international framework of NSG, rather than sporadic endeavors by individual states in the past. The 18{sup th} version itself has meaning in that the final products of the international technical review were reflected in the Korean national legislation of nuclear export control. It addressed various changes in control text in technical, contextual, and editorial aspects. The revision is analyzed herein concentrating only on technical and semantic changes in control text.

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report: Class of 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McMakin, Andrea H.

2012-08-20

Annual report for the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Features the Class of 2011. The NGFP is a NNSA program with a mission to cultivate future technical and policy leaders in nonproliferation and international security. Through the NGFP, outstanding graduate students with career interests in nonproliferation are appointed to program offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). During their one-year assignment, Fellows participate in programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The future of non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gere, F.

2000-01-01

This paper comprises two parts. The first part makes a status of the non-proliferation policy: problems of ratification of Start 2 and CTBT treaties, nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in May 1998 etc. The second part makes a prospective reflexion on the evolution of the position of nuclearized countries at the 2015-2030 vista: role of Asia, nuclear perception, evolution of the US perception of non-proliferation, military strategy and European unification. (J.S.)

Nuclear technology and the export control laws

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Munroe, J.L.; Pankratz, M.C.; Hogsett, V.H.; Lundy, A.S.

1988-01-01

Three basic US laws regulate the export of commodities, services, and technical data. People working in nuclear fields need to know of these laws and their impact on professional endeavors. Export of technical data means the communication of any information by oral, written, or any other means to foreign nationals within or outside the US. The medium for the communication may be a model, blueprint, sketch, or any other device that can convey information. If the data relates to items on one of the control lists, a license must be sought from the appropriated federal agency. The Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), though not itself a control list, plays a major role in determining what technical data will require a validated license. The US Department of Energy (DOE), through Technical Working Gorup (TWG) 11, is responsible for the Nuclear Technology chapter of the MCTL. TWG 11 also prepares the Nuclear Technology Reference Book (NTRB), a classified guide to sensitive nuclear technology

Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of Nuclear Nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mochiji, Toshiro; Tazaki, Makiko; Keeney, Robin; Puckett, John; Stanbro, William; Nakhleh, Charles

1998-01-01

PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet no.21, which was signed in February 1996, 'The Joint Research on 'Transparency' in Nuclear Nonproliferation' under the 'Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation.' The scope of the research was a fundamental study on transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability of nuclear energy from a nuclear nonproliferation viewpoint. The research encompassed three main topics: the policy environment of transparency, the development of transparency options, and technical options for transparency. Each side performed independent research then joint workshops were held to exchange information and views. This paper summarizes the results of these workshops. (author)

Korean system of export control to support the commercial nuclear transfer to UAE

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cho, Young Ho

2011-01-01

In December 2009, the Republic of Korea won the contract to build 4 1,400 MW nuclear power reactors worth USD 20 billion in the UAE. The states-owned KEPCO will complete the turnkey project to the UAE including design, engineering, construction, nuclear fuel, operations, maintenance and technical support. Since sensitive nuclear technologies convertible to military purpose can be spread by the transfer of commercial nuclear power plant, it is essential prerequisite to implement nuclear export control tenaciously and effectively. About twenty years have passed since the Republic of Korea introduced export control system in domestic laws and regulations. Marking a major historical milestone in 2009 by ranking among global nuclear suppliers, the Korean government made a major step forward in export control framework to support its next nuclear export goal. (orig.)

Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2004-01-01

This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards

Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

ElBaradei, M

2004-06-21

This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards.

Non-proliferation and international safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blix, H.

1992-01-01

Full text: In my view, drastic nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon States could be coupled with universal commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear weapon States by 1995 when the extension of the NPT Will be discussed. The incentives and disincentives for making and stockpiling nuclear weapons are first of all in the political and security fields, (Global and regional detente reduce the incentive, With the cold war gone, the US and Russia are now agreeing on far-reaching cuts in their nuclear arsenals and at some point the other declared nuclear weapon States Will follow.In the regional fields, we have seen how Argentina and Brazil are about to commit themselves to exclusively peaceful uses of the atom through the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty. And we have seen how South Africa has joined the NPT. A new wave of States adhering to the NPT may be expected from countries in the former Soviet Union. Some have already come, others are on the way. Detente in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent would improve the outlook for non-proliferation in these areas. A second barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in export restrictions on sensitive nuclear material and equipment, Following the discoveries in Iraq, these restrictions are being strengthened in a large number of States. A third barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in the economic and political consequences that would follow for a State if IAEA safeguards inspection revealed activities aimed at the production of nuclear weapons. These must have a high degree of reliability. The case of Iraq showed that it was possible for a closed, highly militarized State to hide nuclear activities from the IAEA and the world We are now drawing the lessons from this case. It is not physically possible for inspectors to look into every building and basement in vast countries, They must have information about where to look, and the IAEA is significantly strengthening its information basis. The IAEA has also re

Non-proliferation and safeguards in South Africa

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Broodryk, Alta

2001-01-01

South Africa occupies a unique position in the history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in being the only country with a nuclear weapons capability that was voluntary terminated before acceding to the Treaty. The first nuclear device built was completed in December 1982, five more devices followed at an orderly pace of less than one per year and on 26 February 1990 cabinet officially implemented the termination of its nuclear deterrent capability. The events that flowed from the termination was that South Africa: Acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (10 July 1991); Signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/394, (16 September 1991); Submitted its initial inventory of nuclear material (30 September 1991); and Received first verification team from the Agency (November 1991). South Africa, being dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became a party to various non-proliferation treaties, regimes and groups. The National Non- Proliferation Policy, as published in a Cabinet memorandum, also clearly states this commitment. To comply with the requirements of the Treaty and Agreement the following two acts were published: The Nuclear Energy Act; The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The Minister of Minerals and Energy is the State Authority for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in South Africa, however, the Minister delegated this Authority to NECSA's Safeguards Division. To implement the requirements of the various acts, control regimes and treaties a State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard, was designed. This standard focuses on customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, the demonstration of commitment and the prevention of non-conformity. To comply with the requirements of the standard the following procedures were established and maintained: A Quality Manual; Customer focus; Control of documents; Control of quality records; Internal Audits

Arms control and nonproliferation technologies. First quarter 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Staehle, G; Alonzo, G M; Sanford, N M [eds.

1995-01-01

This first quarter issue for 1995 highlights the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. The SBIR program is managed by the DOE`s Basic Energy Sciences program within the Office of Energy Research. Each year, the SBIR program solicits research ideas of interest to the DOE. Articles contained in this issue include: The Small Business Innovation Research Program supported by the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security; Automated cueing to man-made objects via multispectral image; Security systems get smart with advanced processing and thermal imaging; A breakthrough in cooling system technology; The APSTNG neutron probe; Lithium-doped fullerene neutron detector; Miniature GC-MS for on-site chemical analysis; and Winner of Sandia President`s Quality Award.

The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grand, C.

2001-01-01

The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Annual report 2007

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haemaelaeinen, M.; Karhu, P.

2008-04-01

Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2007 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two licence holders in 2007, setting required actions for them to correct their reporting and to update the descriptions of their procedures. Neither the IAEA nor the European Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards

Conditions applying to Australian uranium exports - safeguards obligations under NPT

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rotsey, W.B.

1975-08-01

The Australian Government's expressed desire to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons and its wish to prevent Australia's uranium exports being used for manufacture of nuclear explosives are underwritten by Australia's formal international obligations. Australia is not free to export its material without paying due regard to supra-national requirements. This paper defines two safeguards regimes, one applying to countries such as Australia which are party to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the other to those which are not parties. The application of safeguards and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are briefly explained. Australia's obligations under the NPT and those stemming from specific undertakings to the IAEA are stated. The latter require Australia to ensure that Non-Nuclear Weapons States not party to the NPT give assurances that Australian uranium will not be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosives and that they will permit verification by the IAEA. These obligations give rise to a set of minimum conditions applying to exports of Australian uranium which vary according to the NPT status of the importing countries. (author)

Non-proliferation and security: synergy and differences

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Joly, J.

2013-01-01

Operators of nuclear facilities put in place both physical and organisational means to meet in a comprehensive way the requirements associated with Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Safety and Security. The common aim is to protect man and the environment from ionising radiation. The approaches for meeting these requirements have real similarities, but also differences which need to be respected in order to develop an appropriate synergy for obtaining the best possible level of safety, security and non-proliferation. This article aims to show the provisions that have been taken with regard to non-proliferation, security and safety which complement and reinforce each other.The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

76 FR 36986 - Export Controls for High Performance Computers: Wassenaar Arrangement Agreement Implementation...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-06-24

... and export control standards. Croatia is a member of the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group..., Exports, Inventions and patents, Research science and technology. 15 CFR Part 740 Administrative practice...

Reagan outlines nonproliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walsh, J.

1981-01-01

The Reagan Administration wants to shift from efforts to impose direct control over the fuel cycle and nuclear technology to a framework based on cooperation and initiatives for greater political stability. A nuclear-free zone for the Middle East is one area to explore. Congress responded to this announced plan with a counter move to tighten non-proliferation strategies. Reagan's policy will be to restore the US as an aggressive, but reliable nuclear trading partner operating under adequate safeguards. Critics find this approach dangerous and contradictory. The policy is still too general to answer specific questions about bilateral arrangements, generic permits, plutonium recycling, and other matters

Twenty years of the Non-proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldblat, Jozef.

1990-01-01

The report assesses the achievements of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and discusses ways in which the non-proliferation regime could be strenghtened. It recommends a series of measures to be taken by the parties of the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, with a view to reinforcing the Treaty and achieving its universality. 198 refs

New trends of activity on supporting of non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Issaeva, G.M.; Tyupkina, O.G.

2002-01-01

Taking into account the necessity of all possible strengthening of non-proliferation regimes Kazakhstan participates in a number of agreements and associations: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Supplier Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Conference on Disarmament, etc. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) greatly influenced on the development on non-proliferation regime in Kazakhstan. During initial stage of CTR activity (1993-1995) military projects prevailed. Later (1995-1997) the projects on liquidation of infrastructure for nuclear and bio- weapons were successfully realized. Last years, since 1999, the attention was shifted towards proliferation prevention of hazardous nuclear and biological materials. Recent terrorist acts and world community activity on global safety strengthening underline an urgency of quite new problems that entirely applied to Kazakhstan: monitoring of hazardous materials; enhancement of safety systems of 'risky' facilities and technologies; creation and/or upgrading of safety systems for industry infrastructure. The proposals of these new trends of non-proliferation have been developed. Development of physical protection system for oil and gas industry infrastructure of Kazakhstan based on safety concepts of nuclear facilities; Evaluation of radionuclide contamination and safety of oil and gas facilities of the Caspian region; Counteraction to nuclear materials proliferation; Cooperative approaches in preventing/reducing of illicit trafficking and use of WMD-related explosive materials. Implementation of the project would make of substantial contribution to successful solution of either regional or global safety problem

Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

Experience of Republic of Macedonia in Providing WMD Non-Proliferation Policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mecinovic, S.

2007-01-01

The Republic of Macedonia as a country in transition and as a country which does not posses WMD, has accepted to developed and implemented non-proliferation policy of WMD. First of all, we accepted the definition of WMD as used in international agreements, conventions and protocol and WMD includes nuclear, biological and toxin weapons, agent and precursors. WMD in wide sense includes all toxic chemical substances if they are used as means of attack or if they are the target of attack, all microorganisms and their product, all industrial facilities that use toxic chemicals in their process of production, transport and stockpile if they are a target of military or terrorist attack. For WMD non-proliferation projects to be valid, they must be on the level and carry the weight of international policy and doctrine and involve a most comprehensive sphere of the scientific and professional communities. This is only way to implement the projects in country such is Republic of Macedonia where the public opinion is that WMD are not real security problem because we neither possess nor seek to posses these kinds of weapons. Our WMD non-proliferation policy is tied to control of weapons, agents, precursors, technology and their transfer, market and possibility of use. Because of that we try to control know terrorist organization, groups and individuals. Terrorism caused special concern and attention, particularly when we talk about terrorism with NBC weapons and radiological, chemical and biological warfare agents. Scientific and technological progress led to fact that the instruments for performing terrorism (including WMD) can be produced or procured much easier than before. Rising industry which uses toxic chemicals and microorganisms in the production process created a lot of potential targets for terrorism actions in which they can use be as a target and an executive instrument. The new goal of contemporary treats is safety of life environment, which today includes

Safeguards agreement and additional protocol - IAEA instruments for control of nuclear materials distribution and their application in Tajikistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nasrulloev, Kh.; Mirsaidov, U.

2010-01-01

regime. For strengthening of nuclear materials non-proliferation regime it is necessary to: strengthen safeguards; more effective export control and efforts on black market network liquidation; effective activities on search of orphan sources; efforts exhorting demand reduce for nuclear weapons. For safeguards strengthening it is necessary to conduct annual IAEA inspections. Taking into account that Additional protocol provides to IAEA considerably more wide access to information and IAEA should make use of its privileges. Some countries signed Nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty but unfortunately didn't signed Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol. That's why Additional Protocol should be ratified by all countries, which can be universal standard of nuclear inspection. Provider states should make Additional protocol as condition for license issuance on nuclear materials, services and technology export. Tajikistan provides necessary information to IAEA in accordance with Additional Protocol: location where nuclear material is available or might be available; information about all buildings where nuclear material could be available; ready to provide assistance for IAEA missions on environmental sampling; provides to IAEA inspectors multiple visas; information about scientific and research works. Exclusive importance for IAEA safeguards agreement is high safeguards culture. IAEA should regularly conduct seminars on advanced assessment of safeguards culture - exactly as recommends to nuclear sites regularly to assess safety culture, and to undertake steps on elimination of any revealed shortcomings. One of the important safeguards criteria is nuclear knowledge preservation. IAEA member-states should advocate initiative on attraction and next generation specialists training and provide them a stimulus to make a carrier in IAEA. Important safeguards element is more effective export control and efforts to liquidate black markets network. The experience

The Export Administration Act of 1979 and Computer Exports to China

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Perez, Elizabeth

2002-01-01

.... The statute that regulates computer exports, the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA79), has been interpreted both strictly and loosely by policymakers, executive agencies, and export control regimes...

China's position on nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Qian Jiadong.

1986-01-01

The paper discusses China's position on nuclear non-proliferation, in view of the fact that China does not subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China refuses to accede to the NPT because it considers the treaty to be discriminatory, and reasons are given for this point of view. However its stand for nuclear disarmament and disapproval of nuclear proliferation are declared. Nuclear arms race, prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament are also considered. (UK)

Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects of alternative fuel cycle concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1997-01-01

Timely visibility on the development, evaluation and optimization of fuel cycle concepts with respect to nonproliferation characteristics should be emphasized in the early stage of planning a civilian nuclear power program, by fuel cycle developers, reviewers and decision makers. Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of nonproliferation characteristic profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the nonproliferation concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces these concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the nonproliferation characteristics of fuel cycle concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring the need to develop advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures. (author)

Brazil and Mexico in the Nonproliferation Regime, Common Structures and Divergent Trajectories in Latin America

OpenAIRE

Sotomayor, Arturo C.

2014-01-01

Chapter 8 There are multiple options Latin American countries to support and comply with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the global level, states can decide to ratify the core treaties and join their supporting institutions such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the...

Quality control and disinfestation of spices for export

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

George, C.K.

1998-01-01

India is the largest producer, consumer and exporter of spices in the world. Other than a few, all spices are grown in this country. The production is estimated at 2.6 million tonnes with an export of about 0.22 million tonnes valued around US $ 333 million. India's share in the world trade is over 40 % in quantity and 20 % in value. Many spices produced in India face quality problems as in other countries. For identifying quality produce, grade specifications have been introduced for all the important spices. With the liberalization of government controls, compulsory pre-shipment inspection has been withdrawn unless insisted by the buyer abroad. To meet the sanitary and phytosanitary requirements, the Spices Board has taken up a massive programme for upgradation of quality of Indian spices. Logo mark and Spice House Certificates are awarded to those spice exporting units having necessary infrastructure for assuring quality. By now, 6 units have been accredited to ISO 9000. Though different chemical and non-chemical treatments are available for improving hygienic quality, irradiation appears to be a reliable method. However, its wide application in the spice industry depends upon the conviction of the consumers of its safety. Because of the comprehensive programmes taken up for quality improvement of spices, India is confident of exporting spices meeting quality specifications prescribed by the importing countries. (author)

Legislation to amend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. Hearings and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318, August 3, 10; September 8, 15; and December 14, 1982

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1983-01-01

Witnesses evaluated the effectiveness of non-proliferation policies during five days of hearings on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318 amending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978. The objective is to retain US leadership in nuclear trade while strengthening restrictions that retard the proliferation of weapons-grade material. They examined the economic benefits of new policy initiatives which permit foreign countries to reprocess and recycle US-supplied fuel and permit US companies to export reprocessing technology. The 19 witnesses spoke for the nuclear industry, organizations involved in arms control, and the administration. The 30 appendices include the texts of H.R. 6032, H.R. 6318, and H.R. 7430 and other comments and materials submitted for the record

Development of Core Design Model for Small-Sized Research Reactor and Establishment of Infrastructure for Reactor Export

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, M. H.; Win, Naing; Lim, J. Y.

2007-02-01

Within 10 years a growing world-wide demand of new research reactor construction is expected because of obsolescence. In Korea, a new research reactor is also required in order to meet domestic demand of utilization. KAERI has been devoted to develop an export-oriented research reactors for these kinds of demand. A next generation research reactor should comply with general requirements for safety, economics, environment-friendliness and non-proliferation as well as high performance requirement of high flux level. A export-tailored reactor should be developed for the demand of developing counties or under-developed countries. A new design concept is to be developed for a long cycle length core which has excellent irradiation facility with high flux

Reforming the non-proliferation system in the 1980s

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilmshurst, M.J.

1984-01-01

The non-proliferation policies of the 1970s were based largely on the misconception that the main danger lay in the possible misuse of civil nuclear-power plants for the production of weapon materials. In consequence their aim, whether by means of denial or control, was to ensure that such misuse was made more difficult in all countries with nuclear-power industries. Less attention was paid to the potential for misuse of the nuclear-research plants in the handful of countries outside the non-proliferation system. The resulting difficulties placed in the way of countries developing their nuclear-power industries damaged relations between the supplier and the consumer states, and discredited any new efforts aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation system. By contrast, the 1980s began, first in INFCE and then in the Committee on Assurances of Supply, with a concerted attempt to re-establish a dialogue based on a relationship of trust between the supplier and the customer states. But a restored consensus will not, on its own, deal with the problem of those states that are outside the non-proliferation system and that have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The outcome of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply may help to attract some of those states into the system, but more needs to be done either by adapting the NPT, making adherence to it appear more attractive, or by devising some alternative code of behaviour for states not party to the Treaty and by seeking to remove the political obstacles that lie in the way of at least some of the potential weapon states adhering to the Treaty

Nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1990-01-01

This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

The control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear development - present uncertainties

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Machado de Faria, N.G.; Amaral Barros, E.

1983-01-01

This report gives the views of Brazilian lawyers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It deals with the present situation and future prospects concerning the uses of nuclear energy. In particular, it proposes the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

77 FR 72917 - Editorial Corrections to the Commerce Control List of the Export Administration Regulations

Science.gov (United States)

2012-12-07

...-01] RIN 0694-AF62 Editorial Corrections to the Commerce Control List of the Export Administration... corrects reference and typographical errors in the Commerce Control List (CCL) in the Export Administration... seven categories of the Commerce Control List (CCL) to correct spelling and typographical errors and...

Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime: focus on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Saltiel, David H.; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

2005-01-01

the century and could increase even more quickly. Much of the new demand will come from the rapidly expanding economies in China and India, but much of the developing world stands poised to follow the same path. This growth in demand is paralleled by concerns about global warming and the long-term reliability of carbon-based fuel supplies, concerns which expanded use of nuclear power can help to address. For these reasons and others, many countries in Asia have already clearly signaled that nuclear energy will play a key role for years to come. Numerous proposals have been made in the last two years for reducing the proliferation risk of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. These range from a ban on export of enrichment and reprocessing technology to countries not already possessing operational capabilities to multinational management of the nuclear fuel cycle and strengthening existing monitoring and security mechanisms. The need for international willingness to enforce nonproliferation commitments and norms has also been emphasized. Some of these proposals could significantly impact the production of nuclear energy. Because the successful strengthening of the nonproliferation regime and the expansion of nuclear energy are so closely related, any successful approach to resolving these issues will require the creative input of experts from both the nuclear energy and nonproliferation communities. Against this backdrop, Sandia National Laboratories organized its 14th International Security Conference (ISC) around the theme: Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Focus on the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle. The goal of the conference was to begin a constructive dialogue between the nuclear energy and nuclear nonproliferation communities. The conference was held in Chantilly, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C. on April 4-6, 2005, and was attended by approximately 125 participants from fifteen countries. The ISC agenda was structured to produce a systematic

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilmshurst, M.J.

1983-01-01

The author discusses the reasons of criticism and even rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, dealing in particular with the alledged discriminating nature of the Treaty and with the statement that the Treaty is not apt to prevent proliferation on a vertical plane. He further discusses the motives behind the efforts of potential nuclear weapons states to get nuclear weapons. The system of worldwide and bilateral safeguards and controls covering the transfer of nuclear technologies is explained. In conclusion the author suggests to pay more attention to article IV, sub-section (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as this might offer a suitable approach to restricting the dissemination of nuclear explosives. (HP) [de

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the Obama Administration

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baek, Jin Hyun; Hwang, Ji Hwan

2009-12-01

The objective of this study is to analyze and foresee trends of international nuclear non-proliferation regimes focused on the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the Obama administration, and suggest national policy directions which promote utilization and development of nuclear energy in Korea. For the effective and efficient implementation of the national nuclear use and development program in current international nuclear environment, many efforts should be made: to actively and positively participate in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; to strengthen nuclear diplomacy in a more systematic manner; and to strengthen the international nuclear cooperation

Competitiveness, export control and export promotion of dual-use goods. European and German balancing exercises; Wettbewerbsfaehigkeit, Exportkontrolle und Exportfoerderung von Dual-Use-Guetern. Europaeische und deutsche Spagatuebungen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Feldmann, Ulrike

2014-08-15

The EU Commission Communication of 24 April 2014 to the Council and the European Parliament ''The review of export control policy: Ensuring Security and Competitiveness in a changing world'' as well as the increasingly number of inquiries and applications to the German Federal Government (e.g. the rejection of Hermes guarantees and state funding of nuclear export and termination of bilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear technologies) once again reason to discuss the current tension between the principle of free movement of goods, competitiveness and export promotion on the one hand and the export control on the other.

Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kimura, Naohito; Naoi, Yosuke

2010-01-01

In April 2010, at the Nuclear Security Summit, Japan demonstrated its commitment to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security and announced the establishment of the Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), under the guidance and authority of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Science and Technology (MEXT), and in cooperation with other ministries. The goal of the Center is to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and security in emerging nuclear power countries by sharing Japan's accumulated experiences in its peaceful use of nuclear energy. To achieve its goal, the Center serves three functions: (1) human resource and capacity building, (2) infrastructure development and technical assistance and (3) international coordination and cooperation. The Center will offer three types of training courses to strengthen human resources and capacity building in emerging nuclear power countries. In the Training Course on Nuclear Security, the participants will learn the design and evaluation process for physical protection and detection of and response to illegal or unauthorized acts related to nuclear materials. They will learn these issues not only through lectures and training but also using mockup facilities and virtual reality systems. Second, in the Training Course on Safeguards and State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), the Center will teach the experience of advanced safeguards activities in Japan for its full-scale nuclear fuel cycle facilities as a non-nuclear weapon state. The participants will learn the IAEA and national safeguards systems, the material accounting system and inspector activities. Third, in the Training on the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Framework, the participants will learn the international framework of nuclear non-proliferation including the IAEA safeguards system and

Military Technology and Conventional Weapons Export Controls: The Wassenaar Arrangement

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Grimmett, Richard F

2006-01-01

This report provides background on the Wassenaar Arrangement, which was formally established in July 1996 as a multilateral arrangement aimed at controlling exports of conventional weapons and related...

Controlling nuclear proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sweet, W.

1981-01-01

Nuclear non-proliferation policy depends on the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which countries promise not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for open access to peaceful nuclear technology, and a system of international safeguards that are imposed on exported nuclear equipment and facilities operated by parties to the treaty. Critics have feared all along that non-nuclear countries might circumvent or exploit the system to obtain nuclear weapons and that the Atoms for Peace plan would spread the very technology it sought to control. The nuclear weapons states would like everyone else to believe that atomic bombs are undesirable, but they continue to rely on the bombs for their own defense. Israel's raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor focused world attention on the proliferation problem and helped to broaden and sterengthen its prospects. It also highlighted the weakness that there are no effective sanctions against violators. Until the international community can ageee on enforcement measures powerful enough to prevent nuclear proliferation, individual countries may be tempted to follow Israel's example, 19 references

Heavy water and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Miller, M.M.

1980-05-01

This report begins with a historical sketch of heavy water. The report next assesses the nonproliferation implications of the use of heavy water-moderated power reactors; several different reactor types are discussed, but the focus is on the natural uranium, on-power fueled, pressure tube reactor CANDU. The need for and development of on-power fueling safeguards is discussed. Also considered is the use of heavy water in plutonium production reactors as well as the broader issue of the relative nuclear leverage that suppliers can bring to bear on countries with natural uranium-fueled reactors as compared to those using enriched designs. The final chapter reviews heavy water production methods and analyzes the difficulties involved in implementing these on both a large and a small scale. It concludes with an overview of proprietary and nonproliferation constraints on heavy water technology transfer

The biological control as a strategy to support nontraditional agricultural exports in Peru: An empirical analysis

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Franklin Duarte Cueva

2012-12-01

Full Text Available The study is oriented to explore the general characteristics of agriculture, the biological control as a pest control mechanism and agro export industry. In this context, we try to promote the use of biological control as a strategy to support nontraditional exports related to products such as asparagus and fresh avocados grown in the La Libertad Department (Peru, through an agronomic and management approach. Biological control is the basis of integrated pest management (IPM and contributes to the conservation of agricultural ecosystems allowing to export companies reduce costs, fulfill international phytosanitary measures and supports the preservation of the environment and health. Thus, the Peruvian agro export companies could build a sustainable competitive advantage and seek a positioning as socially responsible firms. We analyze variables such as crop statistics, comparative costs between biological control and chemical control, main destination markets for asparagus and fresh avocados, international standards, among others.

Approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Subrahmanyam, K.

1981-01-01

The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)

Croatian National System of Nuclear Materials Control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biscan, R.

1998-01-01

In the process of economic and technological development of Croatia by using or introducing nuclear power or in the case of international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material, Croatia should establish and implement National System of Nuclear Materials Control. Croatian National System of accounting for and control of all nuclear material will be subjected to safeguards under requirements of Agreement and Additional Protocol between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The decision by NPT parties at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference to endorse the Fullscope IAEA Safeguards Standard (FSS) as a necessary precondition of nuclear supply means that states are obliged to ensure that the recipient country has a FSS agreement in place before any nuclear transfer can take place (Ref. 1). The FSS standard of nuclear supply is a central element of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Guidelines which the NSG adopted in 1992 and should be applied to members and non-members of the NSG. The FSS standard of nuclear supply in general allows for NPT parties or countries which have undertaken the same obligations through other treaty arrangements, to receive favourable treatment in nuclear supply arrangements. However, the Iraqi experience demonstrate that trade in nuclear and dual-use items, if not properly monitored, can contribute to a nuclear weapons program in countries acting contrary to their non-proliferation obligation. Multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms, including the FSS supply standard, provide the basis for co-ordination and standardisation of export control measures. (author)

Correlations-Adjusted Export Market Diversification

OpenAIRE

Jung Joo La

2011-01-01

This paper introduces new export market diversification indices incorporated with correlations of business cycles among export partners to identify the actual effects of export market diversification on export instability. Three existing export market diversification indices reflect the dispersion level in terms of the number of export partners and their export shares, without a clear control for correlations among export earnings from export partners. In addition, they are underestimated or ...

On the non-proliferation framework of Japan's peaceful nuclear utilization program

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kano, Takashi

1996-01-01

The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the NPT) convened in New York, from April 17 to May 12, 1995 and decided that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely, after reviewing the operation and affirming some aspects of the NPT, while emphasizing the ''Decision on Strengthening the Review Process'' for the NPT and the ''Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,'' also adopted by the Conference. In parallel, Japan made its basic non-proliferation policy clear in the ''Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy'' which was decided by the Atomic Energy Commission (chaired by Mikio Oomi, then Minister of the Science and Technology Agency of Japan) in June 1994. The Long-Term Program discusses various problems facing post-Cold-War international society and describes Japan's policy for establishing international confidence concerning non-proliferation. This paper summarizes Japan's non-proliferation policy as articulated in the Long-Term Program, and describes some results of an analysis comparing the Long-Term Program with the resolutions on the international non-proliferation frameworks adopted by the NPT conference

Non-proliferation aspects of long term assurance of supply

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

The meetings in this section deal with the non-proliferation aspects of long-term assurance of supply of the nuclear fuel cycle. A list of 12 fundamental questions concerning the observation and application of the non-proliferation regulations is followed by the comments made by representatives of 10 countries

A Digest of Nonproliferation Literature.

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Duggan, Ruth A

2006-04-01

In preparation for the 2005 US/Russian Weapons Laboratories Directors Meeting, the six laboratories participating in the meeting endeavored to develop a strategy for nonproliferation technology research and development. A literature review was conducted to identify possible areas of technical collaboration and technology opportunities associated with improving nonproliferation associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The issue of multinationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was also researched. This digest is the compilation of one-page summaries used by management of the three US nuclear weapons laboratories in preparation for strategy development. Where possible, the Web site address of the complete paper is referenced.3 AcknowledgementsThe author wishes to thank Jessica Ruyle, Nancy Orlando-Gay, and Barbara Dry for their research assistance and contributions.4

Institute of Nuclear Materials Management 36. annual meeting: Proceedings. Volume 24

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1995-01-01

The sessions at this meeting covered the following topics: international safeguards; physical protection; material control and accountability (MC and A) training; waste overview; nonproliferation and arms control -- US/former Soviet Union; MC and A/physical protection -- SNM storage; spent fuel storage; physical protection -- intrusion sensors and access delay; MC and A -- gamma ray and holdup measurements; MC and A -- neutron based measurements; MC and A/nonproliferation and arms control -- fissile materials disposition; low level waste; packaging and transportation; international safeguards and nonproliferation and arms control -- IAEA verification in the US; international safeguards and physical protection -- video systems; poster and demonstrations; international safeguards and physical protection -- T.I.D.'s, tags and seals; high level wastes and mixed waste; MC and A -- bulk measurements; MC and A and physical protection -- policy; nonproliferation and arms control -- detection and monitoring techniques; nonproliferation and arms control -- US-Russian lab-to-lab safeguards cooperation; MC and A -- information systems; physical protection and MC and A -- vulnerability assessments; waste management -- measurement; international safeguards -- integrated and remote monitoring systems; MC and A -- material control and accountability and indicators; nonproliferation and arms control -- treaties and analysis; nonproliferation and arms control -- plutonium/HEU nonproliferation; MC and A -- measurement control and verification; and international safeguards and nonproliferation and arms control -- environmental monitoring and export control. Separate abstracts were prepared for some of the papers in this volume

Nonproliferation characteristics of advanced fuel cycle concepts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1998-01-01

The purpose of this study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiatives and safeguards methods and systems. Alternative cycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products

75 FR 47548 - President's Export Council Subcommittee on Export Administration; Notice of Recruitment of...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-08-06

... DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security President's Export Council Subcommittee on Export Administration; Notice of Recruitment of Private-Sector Members SUMMARY: The President's Export... their services. The PECSEA is seeking private-sector members with senior export control expertise and...

Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leek, K.M.

2006-01-01

Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat of proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.

The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; La conference d'examen 2000 du TNP et l'avenir du regime de non-proliferation nucleaire

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Grand, C. [Institut d' Etudes Politiques de Paris, 75 (France); Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr-Coetquidan (France)

2001-07-01

The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

Nuclear non-proliferation: failures and prospects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Imai, R.; Press, R.

1980-01-01

The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of combined political and technical attempts to achieve worldwide acceptance of a commitment to non-proliferation, to note failures to date, and to identify essential factors to be satisfied if greater and necessary success is to be achieved in the immediate future. For this it is necessary to separate the realism and unrealism so often involved in discussing the concept of non-proliferation, as defined above, particularly if treated as a moral principle rather than as part of a general security issue reflecting shifts in regional and global stability. The political nature of the non-proliferation problem is underlined by the fact that whereas five nuclear weapon states are currently accepted, any threatened increase in that number is discouraged by every possible peaceful means. This fact combines political acceptance of an existing international situation with a belief that any addition to the present number must lead to international instability. Success in preventing additions may be more readily achieved through political understanding and perhaps some compromises, in particular cases, rather than through seeking a universal solution to a generalized problem

Conceptual Design on the System Architecture of Intellectual Export Control System(IXCS)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jeong, Seung Ho; Yang, Seung Hyo; Tae, Jae Woong; Shin, Dong Hoon

2013-01-01

The commodity classification is for identifying strategic commodity, and the export license is for verifying that exports have met the requirement by the national legislation following international obligations (i. e. NSG guidelines) Since 2008, the 'Nuclear Export Promotion Service (NEPS)' System has been used as a total IT system providing various functions for exporters and reviewers. However, reviewers who make the decisions for commodity classification and export license, may have difficulties caused by ambiguity of criteria. For example, it is not sure whether a CVCS (Chemical Volume Control System) of a certain nuclear reactor plant belongs to strategic commodity or not. The NEPS is a useful system helping users save their time, but it cannot provide solutions reducing ambiguity of each classification or license case. To solve these problems and provide more efficient ways to their decisions, various intelligent IT solutions are searched and studied. A functional architecture of IXCS is defined and designed conceptually. This conceptual design will be utilized to make database specification and to find the optimized artificial algorithm for review processes

The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

2015-01-01

Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

A common high standard for nuclear power plant exports: overview and analysis of the Nuclear Power Plant Exporters' Principles of Conduct

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Perkovich, George; Radzinsky, Brian

2012-01-01

At this time, there is no overarching global framework to regulate the development of the nuclear power industry. Laws concerning the export of nuclear technology vary across jurisdictions, and politically-binding arrangements such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) help ensure that weapons-usable or dual-use technologies are not exported, but no single international regime or agreement manages the gamut of potential risks that may arise from the export of civilian nuclear power plants. Accordingly in 2008, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace convened internationally-recognised experts in nuclear energy to begin a dialogue with nuclear power plant vendors about defining common criteria for the socially responsible export of nuclear power plants. The goal was to articulate a comprehensive set of principles and best practices that would raise the overall standard of practice for exports of nuclear power plants while enjoying widespread support and adherence. The outcome of this process is the Nuclear Power Plant Exporters' Principles of Conduct - an export-oriented code of conduct for nuclear power plant vendors. The Principles of Conduct help ensure that the participating companies will proceed with the sale of a new nuclear power plant only after a careful assessment of the legal, political, and technical contexts surrounding potential customers. It comprises six 'principles' that each address a major area of concern involved in the export of a nuclear power plant: safety, physical security, environmental protection and spent fuel management, systems of compensation for nuclear damage, non-proliferation and safeguards, and business ethics. The Principles of Conduct entail vendor responsibilities to apply specific standards or engage in certain practices before signing contracts and during the marketing and construction phases of a nuclear power plant export project. Conformity with the Principles of Conduct is voluntary and not-legally binding, but the

21 CFR 1312.22 - Application for export permit.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 9 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Application for export permit. 1312.22 Section... EXPORTATION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Exportation of Controlled Substances § 1312.22 Application for export permit. (a) An application for a permit to export controlled substances shall be made on DEA Form 161...

Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, Harald

2011-01-01

The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

A study on the revision of nuclear safety act to build the foundation of nuclear export and import control system in Korea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, Seung Hyo; Choi, Sun Do

2012-01-01

Nuclear related items require export and import control beyond the multilateral export control system according to Safeguard Agreement, Additional Protocol and bilateral agreements. Besides Korea as a nuclear supplier is needed to actively cope with its export control system, which is being reinforced internationally. In regard to this trend, this study drew the revision plan of present Nuclear Safety Act to found the nuclear export and import control system in Korea by examining the related legislations and analyzing the implementation status of nuclear export and import control

A study on the revision of nuclear safety act to build the foundation of nuclear export and import control system in Korea

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Yang, Seung Hyo; Choi, Sun Do [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2012-10-15

Nuclear related items require export and import control beyond the multilateral export control system according to Safeguard Agreement, Additional Protocol and bilateral agreements. Besides Korea as a nuclear supplier is needed to actively cope with its export control system, which is being reinforced internationally. In regard to this trend, this study drew the revision plan of present Nuclear Safety Act to found the nuclear export and import control system in Korea by examining the related legislations and analyzing the implementation status of nuclear export and import control.

Synergies between nonproliferation regimes: A pragmatic approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Findlay, Trevor; Meier, Oliver

2001-01-01

Full text: With the recent progress in establishing international nonproliferation regimes, the question of synergies between different verification and monitoring regimes is becoming more acute. Three multilateral and universal nonproliferation organisations covering safeguards on civil nuclear materials, nuclear testing, and chemical weapons are up and running. A regime on biological weapons is under negotiation. Several regional organisations concerned with monitoring nonproliferation commitments in the nuclear field are in place; others are being established. Past discussions on synergies between these regimes have suffered from being too far-reaching. These discussions often have not reflected adequately the political difficulties of cooperation between regimes with different membership, scope and institutional set-up. This paper takes a pragmatic look at exploiting synergies and identifies some potential and real overlaps in the work between different verification regimes. It argues for a bottom-up approach and identifies building blocks for collaboration between verification regimes. By realising such, more limited potential for cooperation, the ground could be prepared for exploiting other synergies between these regimes. (author)

Act of 18 December 1987 relating to the control of the export of strategic goods, services and technology

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-01-01

This Act controls the export of nuclear material and equipment and sensitive nuclear technology and services. In particular, it provides for strict controls and verification of certain exports. (NEA) [fr

From nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament: a need to refocus NPT priorities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sethi, Manpreet

1998-01-01

This paper seeks to suggest that attempts at general and complete nuclear disarmament have largely failed because of an over emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly horizontal, while disarmament has attracted only lip service from the perpetrators of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that is deemed to be the core of the global non-proliferation regime is no less to blame for having indulged in a skewed pursuit of its twin objectives - nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The paper argues that nuclear non-proliferation can be sustainable only if complemented by nuclear disarmament. In the absence of the latter, proliferation of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the NPT and its safeguards regime, would always pose a potential risk

Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2015-01-01

The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

The emerging nuclear suppliers: some guidelines for policy (U)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dunn, Lewis A.

1988-04-01

Lewis A. Dunn, a former Assistant Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and now a senior analyst with Science Applications International Corporation, looks to the future to offer "The Emerging Nuclear Suppliers: Some Guidelines for Policy ." Mr. Dunn notes that although most emerging suppliers are cautious, many are not party to existing nonproliferation treaties. He calls upon the nonproliferation community to continue the present policy of not supporting unsafeguarded nuclear activities. He suggests that the nonproliferation community work within existing standards and infrastructures of nuclear suppliers to convince emerging supplier nations of the merits of nuclear export control.

Non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Manley, I.T.

1981-01-01

Proliferation is a problem that can only be solved when the political problems which lead countries to contemplate, the possession of nuclear weapons are solved; in the meantime it can only be managed. Non-proliferation policy has to deal both with the political and the technical aspects of proliferation. It must seek to buy time by addressing the reasons why nations feel the political need to construct nuclear weapons, as well as delaying the moment when such nations feel capable of doing so. The subject is examined and proposals made. (author)

British nuclear non-proliferation policy and the trident purchase

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keohane, D.

1984-01-01

Since the mid-1950s, the UK has had a policy of making significant and sustained efforts to minimise the spread of nuclear arms. Unlike the global focus of its non-proliferation policy, the decision on Trident in centred upon national and perhaps regional requirements. At a time when non-nuclear countries are charging nuclear-weapon states with a grave failure to meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, Britain is making plans that would further increase the gap between the nuclear 'haves' and have-nots' and that indicate it expects to require nuclear arms in the next century. It would of course be unrealistic to expect a government to fully harmonise its manifold policies and unreasonable to suggest it should give absolute priority to one of its policy concerns, such as non-proliferation. But Britain is emphasising the high value it places upon the independent possession of strategic nuclear arms through its decision to purchase Trident, thus implicitly contradicting the logic underlying its non-proliferation policy. Compared to other factors, the influence of the Trident decision upon the non-proliferation regime appears very marginal, yet it is unlikely to strengthen that regime

Nuclear power, nuclear exports and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hildenbrand, G.

1977-01-01

Developed and developing countries alike unfortunately have no other options in replacing oil in electricity generation than to use coal or nuclear energy. As far as the supplier countries are concerned, there is no doubt that nobody is interested in adding to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the future electricity requirement in the developing countries, especially the need for nuclear power plants, represents a considerable market in the medium and long term which the supplier countries cannot simply ignore because they must seek to secure their export shares in order to protect jobs at home. For the receiver countries it is a matter of principle to achieve the highest possible degree of independence in energy generation so as to be able to guarantee continuity of supply. The interest in building up national fuel cycle activities is also closely linked with the creation of jobs in the receiver countries and with the efforts of these countries to straighten out their balance of payments situation. (orig.) [de

Open Source and Trade Data for Non-Proliferation: Challenges and Opportunities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stewart, I.; Gillard, N.

2015-01-01

This paper explores what more systematic exploitation of trade data can contribute to the state evaluation process. The paper begins by setting out a typology of trade data, which groups the data into five categories: · Government Declared Data, which is prepared and submitted by States to an international authority for non-proliferation purposes. · Government Recorded Data, which includes information collected by the state for its own purposes, and which is not routinely submitted to international authorities for non-proliferation purposes. It includes (some) export licencing data, customs data, and business registration information. · Business-held data, which includes information on a company's own products and customers, but also ''market intelligence''. · Intelligence and Enforcement Derived Information, which can include information on specific procurement attempts, networks, or procurement requirements. · Procurement Requirements Information, which can include information released by a programme for the purpose of seeking goods or services. Challenges and opportunities related to further exploitation of trade data sources in each category are then explored, as are factors related to accessibility (both in terms of mandates and more practical considerations), reliability (including presentation of a typology), completeness, and duplication in data. Next, the paper explores how the IAEA can systematically collect, integrate and analyze the various sources of trade data given the considerations outlined above. In particular, this section focuses on how data in variable structures can be integrated into the state evaluation process. In concluding, the paper will describe how the newly formed ''Collaboration on Open Source and Trade Analysis for Non-proliferation'' (COSTA-NP) is seeking to develop each of the categories of trade data. The paper links to research objectives 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 of the IAEA

Non-proliferation and disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ritter von Wagner, A.

1993-01-01

In 1995 the Conference on the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will take place. Will it be extended for a long term, indefinitely or only for a fixed period? The Federal Government of Germany advocates an unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others have different ideas alleging that the Treaty is imperfect and discriminating. It is a thorn in the side of many States, in particular of the Third World, which no longer want to put up with being treated as second-class states. One argument which is considered especially embarrassing by developing countries as a visible expression of such discrimination, are the nuclear tests which are still carried out by nuclear weapon states. Is the political situation still such that one needs those weapons? Strategists gradually find it difficult to argument; over and over again they claim that an abandonment of nuclear weapons would make the world unsafer. But development has gradually passed over them. Nevertheless, one finds it hard to throw overboard considerations which for years have determined one's thinking. (orig./HSCH) [de

Radiological control of the junk exports in Cuba; Control radiologico de las exportaciones de chatarra en Cuba

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dominguez L, O; Capote F, E; Carrazana G, J A; Zerquera, J T; Ramos V, O; Alonso A, D; Fernandez, I M; Caveda R, C A; Madrazo M, S; Barroso P, I [CPHR, Calle 20 No. 4113 e/41 y 47, Playa, C.P. 11300, A.P. 6195, C.P. 10600 La Habana (Cuba)

2006-07-01

Even when in Cuba a strict control exists on the radiation sources that enter to the country to be used in the different applications, it can be given the case that sources or contaminated materials that never were under this control due fundamentally to that entered to the country before the same one existed, appear in the junk that is marketed. In our country it is effective the Combined Resolution CITMA-MINCEX dated on April, 2002 that settles down the necessity and obligation that has all that manipulates, imports, exports or process junk of carrying out it a radiological control. From April, 2002 making use of a minimum of resources, an own methodology, a properly qualified personnel and the support of a credited laboratory by the ISO 17025 standard, the radioactivity measurement service in junk belonging to the Center of Protection and Hygiene of the Radiations (CPHR), it has reduced the risks that sources or contaminated materials are found in the junk that is exported in the main exporter companies of this line in Cuba avoiding possible radiological emergency situations that affect the population and the environment. (Author)

Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

2015-01-01

The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

Export Control Requirements for Tritium Processing Design and R&D

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hollis, William Kirk [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Maynard, Sarah-Jane Wadsworth [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-04-05

This document will address requirements of export control associated with tritium plant design and processes. Los Alamos National Laboratory has been working in the area of tritium plant system design and research and development (R&D) since the early 1970’s at the Tritium Systems Test Assembly (TSTA). This work has continued to the current date with projects associated with the ITER project and other Office of Science Fusion Energy Science (OS-FES) funded programs. ITER is currently the highest funding area for the DOE OS-FES. Although export control issues have been integrated into these projects in the past a general guidance document has not been available for reference in this area. To address concerns with currently funded tritium plant programs and assist future projects for FES, this document will identify the key reference documents and specific sections within related to tritium research. Guidance as to the application of these sections will be discussed with specific detail to publications and work with foreign nationals.

Export Control Requirements for Tritium Processing Design and R&D

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hollis, William Kirk [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Maynard, Sarah-Jane Wadsworth [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2015-10-30

This document will address requirements of export control associated with tritium plant design and processes. Los Alamos National Laboratory has been working in the area of tritium plant system design and research and development (R&D) since the early 1970’s at the Tritium Systems Test Assembly (TSTA). This work has continued to the current date with projects associated with the ITER project and other Office of Science Fusion Energy Science (OS-FES) funded programs. ITER is currently the highest funding area for the DOE OS-FES. Although export control issues have been integrated into these projects in the past a general guidance document has not been available for reference in this area. To address concerns with currently funded tritium plant programs and assist future projects for FES, this document will identify the key reference documents and specific sections within related to tritium research. Guidance as to the application of these sections will be discussed with specific detail to publications and work with foreign nationals.

Multilateral Cooperation on Nonproliferation

Science.gov (United States)

2012-10-01

Nathan E . Busch and Daniel H. Joyner, eds., Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy (Athens, GA...or the World Bank . These organizations receive contributions from member states but have their own...Opening Reception Jack’s Lounge , Portola Hotel Friday, March 30, 2010 Timeline Content Delivery 7:30-8:30 Breakfast and Registration Cottonwood

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pilat, Joseph F.

2009-01-01

nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and other activities are

Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01

vision of a nuclear-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and uncertain. And the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism would remain a concern that was largely unaffected by US and other nuclear-weapon decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects for warfare could rise. In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to take advantage of moves toward disarmament, while friends and allies who are not reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if deterrence declined. To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorismincluding defenses and consequence management-are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 'renaissance' in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes efforts to: (1) Strengthen International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system; (2) Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the Additional Protocol as a condition of supply; (3) Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism; (4) Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and (5) Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. These and

Experience in non-proliferation verification: The Treaty of Raratonga

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walker, R.A.

1998-01-01

The verification provisions of the Treaty of Raratonga are subdivided into two categories: those performed by IAEA and those performed by other entities. A final provision of the Treaty of Raratonga is relevant to IAEA safeguards according to support of the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. The non-IAEA verification process is described as well

National Nuclear Management and Control Agency (NNCA)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoon, Wan Ki

2006-01-01

The National Nuclear Management and Control Agency (NNCA) is an independent agency for safeguards and material control for nuclear activities in the Republic of Korea. Formerly subordinate to the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), it is temporarily associated with the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS). In mid-2006 it will become fully independent. The NNCA is responsible for safeguards within the ROK, cooperates with the IAEA, and supports technical needs of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). In addition, it has responsibilities in export controls and physical protection. In the future the NNCA expects to become a national 'think tank' for nuclear control and nonproliferation issues. This presentation enumerated the many responsibilities of the NNCA and explained the structure and staffing of the organization. (author)

Export Controls and the Tensions between Academic Freedom and National Security

Science.gov (United States)

Evans, Samuel A. W.; Valdivia, Walter D.

2012-01-01

In the U.S.A., advocates of academic freedom--the ability to pursue research unencumbered by government controls--have long found sparring partners in government officials who regulate technology trade. From concern over classified research in the 1950s, to the expansion of export controls to cover trade in information in the 1970s, to current…

Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-03-01

This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community.

Markups and Firm-Level Export Status

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

De Loecker, Jan; Warzynski, Frederic

We derive an estimating equation to estimate markups using the insight of Hall (1986) and the control function approach of Olley and Pakes (1996). We rely on our method to explore the relationship between markups and export behavior using plant-level data. We find significantly higher markups when...... we control for unobserved productivity shocks. Furthermore, we find significant higher markups for exporting firms and present new evidence on markup-export status dynamics. More specifically, we find that firms' markups significantly increase (decrease) after entering (exiting) export markets. We...... see these results as a first step in opening up the productivity-export black box, and provide a potential explanation for the big measured productivity premia for firms entering export markets....

Perspectives and benefits of the non-proliferating fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Parker, F.

2012-01-01

The world community has faced the issues of nuclear non-proliferation for decades. Frank Parker, Emeritus Distinguished Professor at Vanderbilt University, has proposed a non-proliferating fuel cycle, which greatly reduces the risk of use of nuclear materials for military purpose. A simplified fuel cycle with reduced opportunities for proliferation of nuclear weapons and permanent disposal of radioactive wastes as well as a reference sub-seabed HLW disposal system are described [ru

The IAEA and non-proliferation: is quiescence progress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Herron, L.W.

1983-01-01

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current status of more important non-proliferation aspects affecting or involving the IAEA. The questions dealt with cover in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Committee on Assurances of Supply established by the IAEA in 1980 and the International Plutonium Storage Study prepared by an IAEA expert group. The author concludes that in a number of areas involving this Agency, recent considerable activity at both political and technical levels has produced few tangible results althrough the situation is not static. (NEA) [fr

Effect of International Standards Certification on Firm-Level Exports: An Application of the Control Function Approach

OpenAIRE

Tsunehiro Otsuki

2011-01-01

Growing number of firms in developing countries have earned certifications such as International Standards Organization (ISO) as it enhances reputation of their company or brand and attract buyers particularly in export market. This study evaluates the effect of international standards certification on firm's export performance in Europe and Central Asia by applying the control function approach with endogenous treatment effect to firm-level data. Certification is found to increase export sha...

Historical survey of nonproliferation policies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldschmidt, B.

1977-01-01

This paper briefly surveys the successive nonproliferation policies and their influence on international commerce and the reaction of the countries where they were applied: the war policy, secrecy policy, liberal policy, safeguarded assistance policy, nonproliferation treaty policy, suppliers' policy, French policy, and the no weapon-usable material policy. It is emphasized that any new solution of the problem must not appear to delay or limit in any way a nation's access to nuclear energy, nor to make any countries dependent on others to meet their energy requirements. Therefore, in the choice of a future policy, political considerations are more important than technical or legal ones. The greatest catalyst of proliferation is the spread of national autarchic programs, and these can only be avoided within a general climate of international trust. The escalation of mistrust between the countries possessing the technological information and those desiring it must be dispelled. Such a policy will have to be clear and stable

21 CFR 1312.23 - Issuance of export permit.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

... 21 Food and Drugs 9 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Issuance of export permit. 1312.23 Section 1312.23... CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Exportation of Controlled Substances § 1312.23 Issuance of export permit. (a) The... regulation in § 1312.30 of this part be exported only pursuant to the issuance of an export permit. The...

Nonproliferation impacts assessment for the management of the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-12-01

On May 13, 1996, the US established a new, 10-year policy to accept and manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the US. The goal of this policy is to reduce civilian commerce in weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU), thereby reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Two key disposition options under consideration for managing this fuel include conventional reprocessing and new treatment and packaging technologies. The Record of Decision specified that, while evaluating the reprocessing option, ''DOE will commission or conduct an independent study of the nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and timing) implications of chemical separation of spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors.'' DOE's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation conducted this study consistent with the aforementioned Record of Decision. This report addresses the nonproliferation implications of the technologies under consideration for managing aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site. Because the same technology options are being considered for the foreign research reactor and the other aluminum-based spent nuclear fuels discussed in Section ES.1, this report addresses the nonproliferation implications of managing all the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel, not just the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The combination of the environmental impact information contained in the draft EIS, public comment in response to the draft EIS, and the nonproliferation information contained in this report will enable the Department to make a sound decision regarding how to manage all aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site

IAEA Director General calls for rededication to nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

Speaking at the opening session of the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in New York on April 24, 2000, the Director General of the IAEA urged all nations to commit themselves unequivocally to the basic tenets of the non-proliferation regime

The strengthening of international regime of protection of the nuclear materials and other radioactive sources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shiganbayev, E.

2001-01-01

Full text: The widening of export streams satisfies the interest of any state, but at the same time the interests of individual countries and the whole international community requires the limitation of export of goods and technologies which are potentially dangerous. The decision of this problem, finding of the optimal balance between the devotion of the principles of free trade and the necessity of limiting the danger export is one of the main tasks of the national system of security of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is a country with a policy of nonproliferation. This important element of the policy of the country, directed to maintenance and strengthening of the international security, becomes the priority trend in the foreign policy of Kazakhstan. The international community decides this problem under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on the Destruction, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction. At present there are four international regimes in control with the aim of nonproliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD): The group of the nuclear supplies which deals with the questions of delivery of special nuclear materials and technologies, and also nuclear materials and double function technologies; Australian group works in the sphere of control for materials and technologies of chemical and biological weapons; The regime of the control of rocket technologies functioning with the aim to prevent the proliferation of rockets as means of delivery of weapon of mass destruction; Wassenaar agreement, regime of export control for usual armament, goods and double function technologies. Kazakhstan does not have nuclear weapons and participants in the Agreement

Cooperative transparency for nonproliferation. Technology demonstrations at the Joyo test bed for advanced remote monitoring

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Betsill, J. David; Hashimoto, Yu

2009-01-01

The term 'Transparency' has been used widely by many authors and practitioners for various purposes, and there is an assortment of definitions for the term. These definitions vary depending on the field in which the term is used and within the context of its usage. For the purposes of our current project on regional, cooperative nonproliferation transparency and remote monitoring, the relevant field is nuclear nonproliferation, and in this context, we define the term Cooperative Nonproliferation Transparency as: 'Providing sufficient and appropriate information to a cooperating party so that they can independently develop their own evaluation and assessment of the reviewed party regarding their consistency with nonproliferation goals.' Key aspects of cooperative nonproliferation transparency activities include mutually agreeing upon the type of information or data that will be shared, how it will be collected, and who has access to that information. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency's (JAEA) Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) has been exploring the possible use, development, and application of methods and technologies for Cooperative Transparency for Nonproliferation to support regional confidence building and cooperation n the peaceful use of nuclear energy throughout the East Asia region. (author)

A study on improvement of export control system for the nuclear facility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kim, Ok Joo; Shin, Dong Hoon; Yang, Seung Hyo

2012-01-01

The Republic of Korea joined Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) in 1995 and became a major nuclear supplier both in name and reality by contracting the Project of UAE Braka Nuclear Power Plant(BNPP) in 2009 and the Project of Jordan Research and Training Reactor(JRTR) in 2010. And ROK is currently negotiating with several countries such as Finland and Vietnam for more projects, so it is expected to obtain more orders of commercial and research reactor. At this point of time, we found that it is difficult to apply individual export licensing system as it is for the big nuclear project such as BNPP and JRTR Project. Because the nuclear project in foreign country contains transfer of thousands of items and technical documents, including a considerable number of strategic items, issuing individual licenses for all items and documents can cause the inefficiency of the project. So, an appropriate export control system which can support such a project is necessary. In this study, we focused on how to improve the export control system to guarantee not only time efficiency but careful management of strategic goods

New dimensions in nonproliferation -- An International Atomic Energy Agency view

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pelland, B.

1994-01-01

Four years ago, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait with the intention of annexing it as Iraq's 19th state. The disclosure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the aftermath of the Gulf War--through the IAEA inspections--signaled the end of one proliferation era and the start of the next. In the author's remarks here, he has found it useful to identify four distinct proliferation eras, each with different features, each calling for different emphasis in international nonproliferation efforts. They provide a convenient way to look at the history of nonproliferation, and to look into the future and to the new dimensions in nonproliferation that are slowly emerging. Since the Gulf War, the nuclear world experienced a series of events of fundamental significance that changed the nature of nonproliferation, forcing changes in the mission of the IAEA and its methods. Certainly some of these events came in the form of unpleasant surprises, such as in Iraq, but very positive progress was also made on other fronts. He would like to share some perceptions of the events creating the present situation, and some views anticipating the requirements most likely to emerge in the coming years

Nuclear non-proliferation and arms control: Are we making progress? 7 November 2005, Washington, DC, Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2005-01-01

In recent years, four developments have radically altered the security landscape - the emergence of clandestine nuclear supply networks, the spread of nuclear fuel cycle technology, the efforts by more countries to acquire nuclear weapons, and the declared ambition of terrorists to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. Four 'yardsticks' are proposed against which to gauge the IAEA's recent performance and to set future goals: (1) the effectiveness of nuclear verification; (2) the control of sensitive nuclear technology; (3) the protection of nuclear material; and (4) compliance with commitments. The effectiveness of nuclear verification depends on the extend of access to information and locations in a given country and inspections can only verify what countries declare. The expanded access provided by the Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements enables the Agency to verify possible undeclared activities however both safeguards agreements are focused on nuclear material and therefore the Agency's authority to investigate possible parallel weaponization activity is limited. In addition only 70 countries have the additional protocol on force. A dditional transparency measures' may be required. The IAEA is exploring innovative technologies (such as noble gas sampling) for detecting undeclared nuclear facilities and activities. The Agency has yet to establish a mechanism under which states systematically share information with the IAEA on the export of sensitive nuclear material and certain technology. The control of sensitive nuclear technology focuses on the control over activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. A group of international experts proposes to 1) provide assurance of supply of reactor technology and nuclear fuel; 2) accept a time-limited moratorium (of perhaps 5-10 years) on new uranium enrichment and plutonium separation facilities - at the very least for countries that do not currently have such technologies; 3

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

Science.gov (United States)

Middleton, Tiffany Willey

2010-01-01

In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation.

Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young

2015-01-01

In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation

Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report; ANNUAL

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

NONE

2000-01-01

This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community

Workshop on regional cooperation in remote monitoring for transparency and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Olsen, John; Inoue, Naoko; Hori, Masato; Hashimoto, Yu; Mochiji, Toshiro

2006-06-01

The Workshop on Regional Cooperation in Remote Monitoring for Transparency and Nonproliferation on 8-9 February at O'arai, Japan, brought together remote monitoring experts to share technical experience and consider potential uses of remote monitoring for nuclear transparency and strengthened nonproliferation. Sponsored by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), this event gathered thirty five attendees from the JAEA, the Republic of Korea's National Nuclear Management and Control Agency (NNCA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA). U.S. technical experts represented Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Workshop discussions and interactions met or surpassed all goals: On the technical front, the JAEA, NNCA, and SNL exchanged presentations on their respective uses and technical approaches to remote monitoring. These included systems for both international safeguards and transparency. The IAEA shared valuable guidance on future remote monitoring system requirements. Following the presentations SNL conducted training in remote monitoring for technical personnel. In parallel project planning discussions, the JAEA, NNCA, SNL and the U.S. DOE reaffirmed mutual interest in regional cooperation in remote monitoring that could eventuate in exchange of safeguards-related data. A productive off-the-record session by all parties considered the path forward and established intermediate steps and time scales. The 15 of the presented papers are indexed individually. (J.P.N.)

Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

75 FR 69573 - Export Enforcement Coordination Center

Science.gov (United States)

2010-11-15

... Export Enforcement Coordination Center By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and... enforcement of United States export control laws and enhanced intelligence exchange in support of such enforcement efforts, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Policy. Export controls are critical to...

Precipitation Pattern Controls on the Dynamics and Subsequent Export of Large Wood from River Catchments

Science.gov (United States)

Seo, J.; Nakamura, F.; Chun, K.; Grant, G. E.

2011-12-01

In-stream large wood (LW) has a critical impact on the geomorphic and ecological character in river catchments, yet relatively little is known about variations in its dynamics and subsequent export in relation to different precipitation patterns and intensities. To understand these variations we used the annual volume of LW removed from 42 reservoirs in Japan and daily precipitation at or near the reservoir sites. Daily precipitation data were transformed into effective precipitation to evaluate trends in both current and antecedent precipitation, and these data were then used to explain basin variation in LW export. Model selection with generalized linear mixed models revealed that the precipitation pattern and intensity controlling LW export in small, intermediate, and large watersheds differed with latitude along the Japanese archipelago. LW export in small watersheds was well explained by effective precipitation greater than 120 mm, and showed little latitudinal variation. In contrast, LW export in intermediate and large watersheds was well explained by daily precipitation greater than 40 mm and 60 mm, respectively, and varied with latitude. In small watersheds with narrow channels and low stream discharges, mass movements (such as landslides and debris flows) are major factors in the production and transport of LW. Thus LW export in small watersheds appears to be regulated by the effective precipitation required to initiate mass movements, and shows little latitudinal change. In intermediate and large watersheds with wide channels and high stream discharges, heavy rainfall and subsequent floods regulate buoyant depth influencing the initiation of LW mobility, and thus control the amount of LW exported. In southern and central Japan, intense rainfall accompanying typhoons or localized torrential downpours lead to geomorphic disturbances, which produce massive amounts of LW delivery into channels. However, these pieces are constantly removed by high streamflows

The fight against weapons of mass destruction at the crossroads; La lutte contre la proliferation des armes de destruction massive a la croisee des chemins

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Biad, A. [Rouen Univ., Faculte de Droit, de Sciences Economiques et de Gestion, 76 - Mont-Saint-Aignan (France)

2004-07-01

Under the joint pressure of the US unilateralism and of some proliferating countries, the non-proliferation regimes are today at the crossroads. Despite the enormous efforts mobilized so far, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction appears as inescapable. This article analyzes the reasons of the continuous erosion of non-proliferation regimes and the possible means to delay this phenomenon: counter-proliferation measures, control of exported nuclear technologies and equipments, use of diplomatic and politico-economical means, controlled multilateral disarmament. (J.S.)

The fight against weapons of mass destruction at the crossroads

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Biad, A.

2004-01-01

Under the joint pressure of the US unilateralism and of some proliferating countries, the non-proliferation regimes are today at the crossroads. Despite the enormous efforts mobilized so far, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction appears as inescapable. This article analyzes the reasons of the continuous erosion of non-proliferation regimes and the possible means to delay this phenomenon: counter-proliferation measures, control of exported nuclear technologies and equipments, use of diplomatic and politico-economical means, controlled multilateral disarmament. (J.S.)

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: A long-term perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haeckel, E.

1990-01-01

International nuclear policy has been determined for a long time by the exigencies of the status quo. The non-proliferation regime draws its legitimacy from the continuation of extant patterns of power in world politics. Such a static policy cannot succeed forever. Overcoming the threat of nuclear proliferation will require innovative strategy that reaches beyond the status quo. It calls for structural change in the international system to be accomodated instead of resisted. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to hold, nuclear weapon states will finally have to forgo their privileged status. This cannot, however, be accomplished simply through the abolition or renunciation of nuclear weapons since nuclear weapons themselves continue to be instrumental for war prevention and international stability. Rather, what is needed is a new approach to the management of the nuclear world system under international responsibility. Nonproliferation and disarmament objectives together call for a concept of global security in which multilateral institutions assume an increasingly important role of nuclear diplomacy. (orig.) [de

Markups and Firm-Level Export Status

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

De Loecker, Jan; Warzynski, Frederic

and export behavior using plant-level data. We find that i) markups are estimated significantly higher when controlling for unobserved productivity, ii) exporters charge on average higher markups and iii) firms' markups increase (decrease) upon export entry (exit).We see these findings as a first step...... in opening up the productivity-export black box, and provide a potential explanation for the big measured productivity premia for firms entering export markets....

A Study on Introduction of Nuclear Power Plants in India and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Conditions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, Seung Hyo; Lim, Dong Hyuk

2011-01-01

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which was formed to build nuclear export control has been accepting the nuclear cooperation for the member nation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Korea exported nuclear power plants to United Arab Emirates in 2009 and research and training reactor to Jordan in 2010 based on the forcible non-proliferation regime as a member nation of NSG, so it is strengthening its position in the atomic energy industry. In addition, Korea concluded an agreement with India which is planning the construction of 25.based or more nuclear power plants for the next 20 years in last July, 25, so it will enter the atomic energy market in India. But India has been accepted the exceptionally civilian nuclear cooperation as a de facto Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) and non-member state of NPT, so concerns about nuclear proliferation has been raised. This study aims to introduce the allowance of exceptions background in India, to analyze its effect on the non-proliferation regime and to find nuclear non-proliferation conditions

AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING RELIABLE NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICE APPROACHES: ECONOMIC AND NON-PROLIFERATION MERITS OF NUCLEAR FUEL LEASING

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kreyling, Sean J.; Brothers, Alan J.; Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.

2010-01-01

The goal of international nuclear policy since the dawn of nuclear power has been the peaceful expansion of nuclear energy while controlling the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Numerous initiatives undertaken in the intervening decades to develop international agreements on providing nuclear fuel supply assurances, or reliable nuclear fuel services (RNFS) attempted to control the spread of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. In order to inform the international debate and the development of government policy, PNNL has been developing an analytical framework to holistically evaluate the economics and non-proliferation merits of alternative approaches to managing the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., cradle-to-grave). This paper provides an overview of the analytical framework and discusses preliminary results of an economic assessment of one RNFS approach: full-service nuclear fuel leasing. The specific focus of this paper is the metrics under development to systematically evaluate the non-proliferation merits of fuel-cycle management alternatives. Also discussed is the utility of an integrated assessment of the economics and non-proliferation merits of nuclear fuel leasing.

Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation in East Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hwang, Yong Soo

2009-07-01

KAERI has jointly worked with Sandia National Laboratories for Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia for the last five years. This project aims at support activities in this joint project between two states. The annual meetings were held during the project period, the 4th one in 2008 and the 5th one in 2009. In addition code comparison between KAERI and SNL's codes for assessing the back-end fuel cycle options was carried out. This project strongly enhances the close tie for the non-proliferation, transparency and safeguards among Korea Japan China Taiwan the United States Russia Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Thailand Vietnam and others for the project period

Export is necessary to maintain high quality supply

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sirugue, S.

2016-01-01

Nuclear industry achieves about 20% of its turnover with the export of equipment and services but nuclear trade is submitted to specific constrains like non-proliferation policies. According to IAEA the world capacity of nuclear power is expected to double allowing the development of emerging countries while reducing CO_2 emissions. The French commercial offer focuses on the high-end market with the EPR reactor and an intermediate power range reactor ATMEA-1 designed with MHI (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries). AREVA is the unique world operator able to master the entire chain of spent fuel reprocessing thanks to the La Hague plant. In the framework of the rebuilding of the French nuclear industry, discussions are ongoing to achieve partnerships with foreign partners in exchange of shares in AREVA and AREVA NP. Today's main challenges of AREVA are to reduce EPR cost, to speed EPR construction and to benefit fully of the move into the digital age. (A.C.)

Nuclear technology and the developing world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walsh, Kathleen

2005-01-01

The early 21st century has magnified the dangers posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Nonetheless, cooperative efforts to thwart this trade have grown considerably more difficult and the challenges more complicated. The ubiquitous nature of dual-use technology, the application of terrorist tactics for mass destruction on 9/11, the emergence of a more unilateralist US foreign policy, and the world's ever-expanding economic relations have all made more arduous the task of stemming proliferation of WMD, their precursors, and delivery systems. All of these challenges have been highlighted in recent years, but it is the last of these - the changing nature of the global economy- that is perhaps least analyzed but also most essential to improving international cooperation on nonproliferation. Many of today's proliferation concerns are familiar problems exacerbated by accelerating levels of international trade and investment. For example, controlling sensitive exports has become more complicated as officials, industry leaders, and nonproliferation experts must struggle simultaneously to find ways to ensure the flow of exports to legitimate buyers and supply chain partners who increasingly span the globe. Similarly, competitive enterprises today place a premium on rapid delivery and the speed of transactions. This in turn has increased pressures placed on officials around the world to reduce the time they spend evaluating each licensing decision, even as these assessments become more difficult as global investors move deeper into the developing world. Furthermore, the emergence of developing economies as second-tier suppliers with the potential to transship critically sensitive technologies to third parties is another complicating factor and a consequence of the globalizing economy. Science, technology, and industry research and development activities with dual-use applications are also becoming increasingly international endeavors, facilitated

The Rarotonga treaty: regional approach to non-proliferation in the South Pacific

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Papadimitropulos, P.

1988-01-01

The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation in the South-Pacific-the Rarotonga treaty - is discussed. The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation is aimed in a wide sense at the assistance to detante in a certain region and the propagation of measures strengthening confidence there. On December 11, 1975 at the initiative of New Zealand and Fiji the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the nuclear-free zone in the South-Pacific. In compliance with the Rarotonga treaty a large nuclear-free zone is created. The participants of the Rarotonga Treaty assess the values of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Inter-relations between regional and global approaches to nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simpson, J.

1995-01-01

It is now becoming evident that the end of the East-West conflict has had a significant effect upon both global and regional security structures. From a situation where regional arrangements were, in the main, determined and driven by pressures arising from the bipolar division which permeated all aspects of the global political system, they increasingly have an independent existence. This has enabled such arrangements to be tailored to local circumstances in a manner which is not possible with global agreements. In particular, it has become apparent that enhanced constraints on peaceful nuclear activities and much more intrusive inspection and monitoring procedures, can more easily be negotiated on a regional basis than a global one. It also appears that nuclear weapon states are prepared to make unconditional commitments about nuclear weapon use on a regional basis, whereas they may not be prepared to do so on a global one. In short, regional approaches enable fine-tuning of the international non-proliferation regime to occur, and for measures to be taken on a regional level that would be politically unacceptable on the global level, due to their discriminatory nature. In the years ahead additional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) agreements may be negotiated, covering more of the land area of the globe. In parallel, regional nuclear cooperation and safeguarding agreements might also be expected to develop along the lines of EURATOM and ABACC. This in turn may move the states which remain outside of the NPT to a similar position to Argentina and Brazil at the moment: to an acceptance that whatever their opposition in principle to the NPT and the system of supplier export guidelines, the commitments they have already accepted on a regional level are more intrusive and constraining than those they would incur if they were to have acceded to the Treaty. In these circumstances, accession to the NPT becomes a distinct possibility, and thus the regional approach to non-proliferation

Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the DUPIC fuel cycle concept

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Persiani, P K [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

1997-07-01

The purpose of the study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiative and safeguards systems. Alternative recycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products. The concepts are alternatives to either the direct long-term storage deposition of or the purex reprocessing of the spent fuels. The alternate fuel cycle concepts reviewed include: the dry-recycle processes such as the direct use of reconfigured PWR spent fuel assemblies into CANDU reactors(DUPIC); low-decontamination, single-cycle co-extraction of fast reactor fuels in a wet-purex type of reprocessing; and on a limited scale the thorium-uranium fuel cycle. The nonproliferation advantages usually associated with the above non-separation processes are: the highly radioactive spent fuel presents a barrier to the physical diversion of the nuclear material; avoid the need to dissolve and chemically separate the plutonium from the uranium and fission products; and that the spent fuel isotopic quality of the plutonium vector is further degraded. Although the radiation levels and the need for reprocessing may be perceived as barriers to the terrorist or the subnational level of safeguards, the international level of nonproliferation concerns is addressed primarily by material accountancy and verification activities. On the international level of nonproliferation concerns, the non-separation fuel cycle concepts involved have to be evaluated on the bases of the impact the processes may have on nuclear materials accountancy. (author).

Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chrzanowski, P.L.

1993-01-01

About 30 specialists in non-proliferation participated in a workshop to explore ideas for US Government preparatory steps leading to the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. To that end, workshop sessions were devoted to reviewing the lessons learned from previous Review Conferences, discussing the threats to the non-proliferation regime together with ways of preserving and strengthening it, and examining the management of international nuclear commerce. A fundamental premise shared by workshop participants was that extension of the NPT is immensely important to international security. The importance of stemming proliferation and, more specifically, extending the Treaty, is growing as a result of the significant changes in the world. If the conferees of the Extension Conference decide on no extension or extension for a short limited duration, some technically advanced states that have foregone development of nuclear weapons may begin to rethink their options. Also, other arms control measures, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could start to unravel. The US must provide strong international leadership to ensure that the Extension Conference is a success, resulting in Treaty extension, perhaps through successive terms, into the indefinite future. Workshop participants were struck by the urgent need for the US to take organizational steps so that it is highly effective in its advance preparations for the Extension Conference. Moreover, the Extension Conference provides both a challenge and an opportunity to mold a cohesive set of US policy actions to define the future role of nuclear weapons and combat their proliferation

Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shinohara, Nobuo; Kokaji, Lisa; Ichimasa, Sukeyuki

2010-01-01

In Global Center of Excellence Program of The University of Tokyo, Non- Proliferation Study Committee by the members of nuclear industries, electricity utilities, nuclear energy institutes and universities has initiated on October 2008 from the viewpoints of investigating a package of measures for nuclear non-proliferation and bringing up young people who will support the near-future nuclear energy system. One of the non-proliferation issues in the Committee is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Objective of this treaty is to cease all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosion. This purpose should be contributed effectively to the political stability of the Asian region by continuous efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons. In the Committee, by extracting several issues related to the CTBT, conception of 'Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation' has been discussed with the aim of the nuclear-weapon security in Asian region, where environmental nuclear-test monitoring data is mainly treated and utilized. In this paper, the conception of the 'network' is presented in detail. (author)

75 FR 33989 - Export Administration Regulations: Technical Corrections

Science.gov (United States)

2010-06-16

... 0694-AE69 Export Administration Regulations: Technical Corrections AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and... section of Export Control Classification Number 2B001 and the other is in the Technical Note on Adjusted... language regarding certain performance criteria of turning machines covered by Export Control...

Evaluation method of nuclear nonproliferation credibility

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kwon, Eun-ha; Ko, Won Il

2009-01-01

This paper presents an integrated multicriteria analysis method for the quantitative evaluation of a state's nuclear nonproliferation credibility level. Underscoring the implications of policy on the sources of political demand for nuclear weapons rather than focusing on efforts to restrict the supply of specific weapons technology from the 'haves' to the 'have-nots', the proposed methodology considers the political, social, and cultural dimensions of nuclear proliferation. This methodology comprises three steps: (1) identifying the factors that influence credibility formation and employing them to construct a criteria tree that will illustrate the relationships among these factors; (2) defining the weight coefficients of each criterion through pairwise comparisons of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP); and (3) assigning numerical scores to a state under each criterion and combining them with the weight coefficients in order to provide an overall assessment of the state. The functionality of this methodology is examined by assessing the current level of nuclear nonproliferation credibility of four countries: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Switzerland.

Establishment of Japan Atomic Energy Agency and strategy for nuclear non-proliferation studies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Senzaki, Masao; Kurasaki, Takaaki; Inoue, Naoko

2005-01-01

Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) was established on October 1, 2005, after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute. JAEA is the only governmental nuclear research and development institute in Japan. It will engage in research activities ranging from basic research to practical applications in the nuclear field and will operate research laboratories, reactors, a reprocessing plant and a fuel fabrication plant. At the same time, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was also established inside of JAEA to conduct the studies on the strategy for nuclear nonproliferation studies. Five roles that JAEA should play for nuclear nonproliferation were identified and four offices were established in the center to carry out those five roles effectively. To conduct the research and development for nuclear nonproliferation efficiently, the center aims to be a 'Research Hub' based on Partnership' with other organizations. (author)

First annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to annual report to Congress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

Section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) requires that DOE's Annual Report include views and recommendations regarding non-proliferation policies and actions for which the Department is responsible. The Act also requires a detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative fuel cycles, including an unclassified summary and a comprehensive version containing relevant classified information. The goals of United States non-proliferation policy are to minimize the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a stable international environment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy

US Export Controls and Technology Transfer Requirements: A UK Perspective

Science.gov (United States)

2010-05-01

34 (La Franchi , 2006). Such requirements make it difficult for partners to participate and generate a large administrative burden on team members, who...if this critical impediment to enhanced cooperation is to be removed. The U.S. export control system is broken; its technology transfer rules ...Retrieved April 3, 2009, from http://www.jsf.mil/news/news2009.htm La Franchi , P. (2006, July 4). Australia demands JSF resolution. Flight International

Nonproliferation norms in civilian nuclear fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kawata, Tomio

2005-01-01

For sustainable use of nuclear energy in large scale, it seems inevitable to choose a closed cycle option. One of the important questions is, then, whether we can really achieve the compatibility between civilian nuclear fuel cycle and nonproliferation norms. In this aspect, Japan is very unique because she is now only one country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program as a non-nuclear weapon state in NPT regime. In June 2004 in the midst of heightened proliferation concerns in NPT regime, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded that, for Japanese nuclear energy program, non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities were verified through the inspections and examinations under Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol. Based on this conclusion, the IAEA announced the implementation of Integrated Safeguards in Japan in September 2004. This paper reviews how Japan has succeeded in becoming the first country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program to qualify for integrated Safeguards, and identifies five key elements that have made this achievement happen: (1) Obvious need of nuclear fuel cycle program, (2) Country's clear intention for renunciation of nuclear armament, (3) Transparency of national nuclear energy program, (4) Record of excellent compliance with nonproliferation obligations for many decades, and (5) Numerous proactive efforts. These five key elements will constitute a kind of an acceptance model for civilian nuclear fuel cycle in NNWS, and may become the basis for building 'Nonproliferation Culture'. (author)

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.; Haeckel, E.; Haefele, W.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Ungerer, W.

1991-01-01

During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP) [de

Nuclear Non-proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 - No 8 of 1987

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1987-01-01

This Act aims at giving domestic legislative effect to Australia's international non-proliferation obligations and establishes controls over the possession and transport of nuclear materials and equipment by a system of permits. These obligations arise inter alia under the NPT Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Act provides that its provisions shall apply to nuclear material (as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute) and associated items which include associated material, equipment or technology. These are clearly defined in the Act. (NEA) [fr

Arms control agency faces uncertain future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ember, L.

1993-01-01

National security cognoscenti are busy sifting tea leaves trying to puzzle out the fate of arms control and nonproliferation policy in the new Administration. Of special concern to these policy gurus is the future of the semiautonomous Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA's existence as a separate entity on the executive branch's organization chart is precarious. The agency has never functioned as intended since Congress created it in 1961. Its stock over the decades has ebbed and flowed, paralleling the prominence and clout of its director. And except for a few notable successes--the conclusion of the chemical weapons treaty being one--the agency's authority has plummeted in the past 14 years. Today, almost every interested party agrees that something has to be done, that the agency cannot continue as it now functions. Several recent studies have called for its rejuvenation. Still other studies have suggested that ACDA be dismantled, and those activities relevant to national security in a post-Cold War environment be shifted to and integrated into the State Department. Observers expect ACDA to evolve into an agency whose primary focus is on problems of proliferation. In a world in which tighter export controls on dual-use technologies, restraint on arms transfers, and economic assistance conditional on a recipients's security behavior will be the norm for security and stability, a role for ACDA as the U.S.'s nonproliferation nanny is not a bad one

76 FR 68809 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-11-07

..., Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation, Bureau of International Security and... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7678] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Proliferation Sanctions Against a Foreign Person AGENCY...

Impacts of U.S. Export Control Policies on Science and Technology Activities and Competitiveness

Science.gov (United States)

2009-02-25

coffee table. However, under the current export control regime, the stand was considered ‘ITAR hardware’ and we were required to have two security...should survive without an effective method for pruning items from the control lists when they no longer serve a significant definable national

How we think about peace and security. The ABCs of initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation education

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Toki, Masako; Potter, William C.

2005-01-01

Education and training are among the most important but underutilized tools for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. Although few national governments or international organizations have invested significantly in such training programs, there is a growing recognition among States of the need to rectify this situation. This positive development is reflected in the broad support for recommendations of a UN study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and in related initiatives within the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the forthcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference, it is useful to take stock of the implementation of the UN study's recommendations. In particular, it is important to observe the progress that has been made within the context of the NPT review process, as well as the obstacles that must be overcome if the full potential for disarmament and non-proliferation education is to be realized. Resources on disarmament and non-proliferation education are increasingly available on the Internet. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs has launched new features on its web site that include links to academic institutes, governmental centers, NGOs and other bodies engaged in educational efforts. As part of its mission to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and raising global public awareness on WMD issues, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) has developed a series of tutorials for non-proliferation and disarmament education. Among these tutorials, the NPT Tutorial has been designed to educate and provide useful material about the treaty through interactive text and enriched multimedia segments, including timelines, maps, and numerous links to relevant resources. Among other resources are teaching guides developed by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies through its Critical Issues Forum (CIF). More

The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

1984-01-01

When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations

Multinational alternatives and nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheinman, L.

1981-01-01

The use of multinational institutional arrangements to control sensitive nuclear-fuel-cycle activities has interested policymakers since the dawn of the nuclear age. Several such ventures have been tried in the past, largely for economic, commercial, or technical reasons, and they have enjoyed varying degrees of success. More recently, with the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, multinational arrangements have received increasing attention as a means of reinforcing international safeguards which, together with political commitments on peaceful use, have been the principal components of the nonproliferation regime. The political acceptability and efficacy of multinational arrangements is related to the historic experience with multinational ventures, the changed political circumstances of the 1970s, and the probable requirements for constructive future cooperation. As part of a comprehensive regime covering the development of sensitive nuclear activities, multinational arrangements can reinforce the regime in a manner that is widely acceptable. A political effort to win support for such arrangements is thus worthwhile. 29 references

JAEA's efforts for regional transparency in the area of nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hoffheins, Barbara; Kawakubo, Yoko; Inoue, Naoko

2014-03-01

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has undertaken a joint R and D project with the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) for the purposes of developing an Information Sharing Framework (ISF) for regional nonproliferation cooperation since July 2011. This project builds on nearly twenty years of technical cooperation between JAEA, its predecessor organizations and the DOE including the activities to define, develop and test transparency technologies and other multilateral efforts. The objective of current project is to design a viable information sharing process to support the goals of building confidence in the peaceful nature of regional nuclear programs. At the end of a two-year-effort, project partners, JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), have defined the comprehensive requirements for an ISF that will ensure nonproliferation transparency success and sustainability. In October 2011, a parallel project with the similar title and objective was launched under the arrangement between the US DOE/NNSA and the Republic of Korea Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST). Since then, JAEA, SNL, the Korea Institute for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and Korea Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI) have jointly carried out the project in a form of informal, multilateral cooperation. The project partners have identified needs and audience for ISF, and initiated the discussion to develop requirements for ISF through workshops, meetings, regular telephone conferences, etc. The activities include conducting a survey to identify stakeholders' needs and requirements for an ISF, launching a website to practice information sharing concepts, and presenting papers. This paper provides the historical context of the current project to establish ISF, and reports the progress to date and speculates on future directions. (author)

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: Concerns With the U.S. International Nuclear Materials Tracking System

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Rezendes, Victor

1996-01-01

...) provide data to policymakers and other government officials. The United States regulates and controls its exports of civilian-use nuclear materials through three mechanisms-agreements for cooperation, export licenses, and subsequent arrangements...

Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mochiji, Toshiro; Keeney, R.; Tazaki, Makiko; Nakhleh, C.; Puckett, J.; Stanbro, W.

1999-01-01

PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet No. 21, which was signed in February 1996, ''The Joint Research on Transparency in Nuclear Nonproliferation'' under the ''Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation''. The purpose of Action Sheet 21 is to provide a fundamental study on Transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability for the nuclear energy from the nuclear nonproliferation point of view. This project consists of independent research and then joint discussion at workshops that address a series of topics and issues in transparency. The activities covered in Action Sheet 21 took place over a period of 18 months. Three workshops were held; the first and the third hosted by PNC in Tokyo, Japan and the second hosted by LANL in Los Alamos, New Mexico, US. The following is a summary of the three workshops. The first workshop addressed the policy environment of transparency. Each side presented its perspective on the following issues: (1) a definition of transparency, (2) reasons for transparency, (3) detailed goals of transparency and (4) obstacles to transparency. The topic of the second workshop was ''Development of Transparency Options.'' The activities accomplished were (1) identify type of facilities where transparency might be applied, (2) define criteria for applying transparency, and (3) delineate applicable transparency options. The goal of the third workshop, ''Technical Options for Transparency,'' was to (1) identify conceptual options for transparency system design; (2) identify instrumentation, measurement, data collection and data processing options; (3) identify data display options; and (4) identify technical

Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pomper, Miles A.

2010-01-01

Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

Activities of the study group of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation policy. FY Heisei 11

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Oi, Noboru

2000-01-01

The Study Group on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Policy (Chairman: Prof. Kurosawa) was established in FY1999 with the funding from the Science and Technology Agency. The aim of the Study Group is to clearly understand nuclear proliferation issues and to lead international opinion. Nuclear non-proliferation is a matter of rather scanty interest compared to nuclear safety while both of them are important in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Japan. In FY2000, the Study Group held International Symposium 'Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: A Challenge of 21st Century' and in conjunction with this Symposium, dispatched 'The Statement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Action Plan towards 21st Century'. The Statement consists of five propositions: 1) Strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and making it universally applicable, 2) Negative legacy of cold war: rapid solution of problems, 3) Civil (non-military) plutonium, 4) Development of technology to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime internationally, and 5) Strengthening Japanese initiative on nuclear non-proliferation policy. In this report, these activities will be explained in detail. (author)

The Non-Proliferation Treaty increases security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kahiluoto, K.

1995-01-01

Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely was a historic decision. The Treaty is the most extensive international agreement on security policy to date; now its obligations have become a permanent part of international justice. Moreover, the NPT represents a political and moral obligation. Through the NPT, the international community has made a permanent commitment to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Increasing pressures will be applied to the few countries still outside the NPT, making it more likely that these countries will eventually change their views. The likelihood of regional bans on nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia, too, will increase. The Treaty promotes the establishment of new nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-free zone in Latin America - the countries covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty - is already very close to its full implementation. Finland is firmly committed to the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT Conference of 1995 was among the first international meetings in which Finland participated, and took an active role, as a Member State of the European Union. (orig.)

Regulating the Academic “Marketplace of Ideas”: Commercialization, Export Controls, and Counterintelligence

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

John Krige

2015-04-01

Full Text Available Two revolutions, not one, are transforming the research enterprise in American academia. One is the commercialization of research. The other is the regulation of research by the national security state that was accelerated by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and focuses increasingly on the risk of sensitive knowledge leaking to China and other countries of concern. Commercialization temporarily restricts knowledge circulation to secure a patent for personal and institutional gain. Regulation controls the flow of knowledge to select foreign nationals using multiple instruments, including export controls, along with informal surveillance by the FBI. Ironically, the neoliberal urge to roll back the state and commercialize research in a competitive global knowledge economy exposes the American academic research system to the risk of “industrial” espionage and rolls out the regulatory apparatus of the national security state. Alongside offices of technology transfer on campus we now have offices of export control and compliance. Faculty and graduate students have accommodated themselves to this new situation, even while they regret it; many are concerned by the challenge that it poses to academic freedom, intellectual dynamism and political openness.

The Nuclear Progress And The Non-Proliferation Policies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Popa-Simil, Liviu [Los Alamos, NM 87544 (United States)

2009-06-15

The 2008 fall crisis showed the limits of globalization under the actual rules and de-regulations promoted by few developed countries. It also showed the weakness of the planetary economy induced by strong economic connections that makes the propagation of crises faster than the spread of welfare. The increase in severe weather and natural disasters showed how fast the civilization can be spoiled while the competition for oil resources made the interstate tensions grow. For almost all states, the development of the nuclear power becomes a prime option, even oil producers started to show interest in nuclear technology and also, policies that in particular are clearly oriented towards national development policies. The fact that anybody mastering nuclear technologies and uses for power production is capable in a reasonable time to produce weapons is a well-known fact. Therefore, in order to reduce the proliferation risk it is necessary to contain the nuclear science development. An alternative is to shift the weight in promoting renewable energies, as potential future energy alternative. Considering rigorously the future climate change effects, it becomes obvious that any delay in nuclear development will turn very costly for any nation ignoring all these facts and, the complexity of the real nonproliferation is growing. This new trend raises serious challenges in front of all states regarding the non-proliferation and, in order to keep control and stimulate a sound nuclear development, some of the actual non-proliferation concepts and policies have to be reformulated and enhanced. This has to be done in parallel with a more intensive implication of the international organisms in the real development of the nuclear power at national level. The large diversity of nuclear applications with huge collateral implication in every national economy makes the role of the international organisms orders of magnitude more important. The new challenges posed in front of the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Ontology Assessment Team Final Report

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Strasburg, Jana D.; Hohimer, Ryan E.

2012-01-01

Final Report for the NA22 Simulations, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) Ontology Assessment Team's efforts from FY09-FY11. The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.

Airborne Multisensor Pod System, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: Second quarter 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Alonzo, G M; Sanford, N M [eds.

1995-01-01

This issue focuses on the Airborne Multisensor Pod System (AMPS) which is a collaboration of many of the DOE national laboratories to provide a scientific environment to research multiple sensors and the new information that can be derived from them. The bulk of the research has been directed at nonproliferation applications, but it has also proven useful in environmental monitoring and assessment, and land/water management. The contents of this issue are: using AMPS technology to detect proliferation and monitor resources; combining multisensor data to monitor facilities and natural resources; planning a AMPS mission; SAR pod produces images day or night, rain or shine; MSI pod combines data from multiple sensors; ESI pod will analyze emissions and effluents; and accessing AMPS information on the Internet.

Study on the efficient export control for the Intangible Transfer of Technology

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Yoon, Sung-ho; Choi, Sun-do; Lee, Chansuh; Kim, Jong-sook [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-10-15

Technical Data may take forms such as document, drawing, description, report, manual and instruction. And, it can be written or recorded on storage medium such as disk, tape and read-only memories. Technical assistance may take forms such as instruction, skill, training, working knowledge and consulting services. Technical data or assistance can be transferred by intangible manners such as an electronic means (e.g. email, internet, telephone or fax) and through the oral (e.g. seminar, meeting or workshop). Currently, ROK's export control regulation is not classified between the transfer of listed items (or general technology) and intangible transfer of technology (ITT). It may make a loop hole or cause inefficient implementation of export control. The purpose of this study is to suggest the efficient control method for ITT independent from item control method. From the result of this study, several main feathers in regulations of developed countries are drawn. First, they define that technical assistance (or support) is the object of permission. And, they have a clear distinction between resident and non-resident. Second, The UK and Germany do not control the technical assistance related to construction and operation of nuclear facilities for peaceful use, as long as technology does not transfer to recipient that has a nuclear proliferation concerns such as the DPRK, Iran or Pakistan.

Consideration on non-proliferation regime meeting in a changing world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kurihara, Hiroyoshi; Kikuchi, Masahiro

1995-01-01

This paper presents some proposals for improvement of non-proliferation regime including safeguards structures with historical changes of international regime. Current non-proliferation regime was established under the circumstances of Cold War, and it's structure and measures were influenced by the situation of these time. Although, a couple of years have passed from end of Cold War, new world order has not established yet. Therefore, it is expected that the current regime could be improved in accordance with new world order. Generally speaking, it could be welcomed that the current regime has got some successes from two points of views, namely no new nuclear weapon states have emerged and after the establishment of NPT and all nuclear weapon state is joined NPT finally. However, it is the authors' concern that some gray countries, such as India, Pakistan and Israel, have not joined the NPT yet and cases of Iraqi and DPRK have occurred. After reviewing of such new situation, some proposals will be presented in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime to meet current world conditions

Markups and Exporting Behavior

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

De Loecker, Jan; Warzynski, Frederic Michel Patrick

2012-01-01

In this paper, we develop a method to estimate markups using plant-level production data. Our approach relies on cost minimizing producers and the existence of at least one variable input of production. The suggested empirical framework relies on the estimation of a production function and provides...... estimates of plant- level markups without specifying how firms compete in the product market. We rely on our method to explore the relationship be- tween markups and export behavior. We find that markups are estimated significantly higher when controlling for unobserved productivity; that exporters charge......, on average, higher markups and that markups increase upon export entry....

Infrasonic measurements of the Non-Proliferation Experiment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Whitaker, R.W.; Noel, S.; Meadows, W. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM (United States)

1994-12-31

Two infrasonic arrays were operated for the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). The arrays were located at the Nevada Test Site and at St. George, UT. The results were consistent with experience on underground tests, and therefore close to underground nuclear tests of similar size.

EMP at the Non-Proliferation Experiment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bell, J. [AWE, Aldermaston (United Kingdom)

1994-12-31

This experiment presented an opportunity to field customized equipment designed to detect and record electromagnetic pulse (EMP) emanations from an explosion over a wide frequency range. Any data recorded could be used in conjunction with the seismic methods to further non-proliferation studies. No EMP emanations were detectable from the four sensors deployed outside the tunnel confines.

48 CFR 1852.225-70 - Export Licenses.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-10-01

... writing, that the Contracting Officer authorizes it to export ITAR-controlled technical data (including... licenses or other approvals, if required, for exports of hardware, technical data, and software, or for the provision of technical assistance. (b) The Contractor shall be responsible for obtaining export licenses, if...

Export Control Guide: Loose Parts Monitoring Systems for Nuclear Power Plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Langenberg, Donald W. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

2012-12-01

This report describes a typical LPMS, emphasizing its application to the RCS of a modern NPP. The report also examines the versatility of AE monitoring technology by describing several nuclear applications other than loose parts monitoring, as well as some non-nuclear applications. In addition, LPMS implementation requirements are outlined, and LPMS suppliers are identified. Finally, U.S. export controls applicable to LPMSs are discussed.

United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2003-01-01

Science and technology transformed the world in the twentieth century. Living standards improved but warfare was rendered more deadly. Weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical and nuclear - and their means of delivery were developed, as ever more sophisticated conventional armaments were produced and disseminated. The horrors and destruction of armed conflict persist. The need for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training has never been greater. Indeed, changing concepts and perceptions of security and threat magnify the urgency for new thinking to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation goals. More than a decade after the end of the cold war and at the start of the twenty- first century, there is a pressing need to combat ignorance, complacency and a culture of violence. These can be countered through long-term programmes of education and training, especially those related to disarmament and non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with a view to their reduction and complete elimination. At the same time, concern has heightened over the global threat of the excessive and destabilizing proliferation of conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, rendering more acute the need to combat such proliferation in a sustained way through disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Additionally there is a need to raise awareness of new challenges to international security and the process of disarmament. Among them, terrorism, with the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction, is a source of particular concern. Other challenges, such as organized crime, poverty, human rights abuses and environmental concerns must also be taken into account. Education and training remain important but under utilized tools for promoting peace, disarmament and non-proliferation. The present report addresses that issue and proposes ideas for action

The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

1984-01-01

When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations.

Sensitive products and services in the light of the law of the European Union. Chances and limits of common EU export controls

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Janik, M.

1995-01-01

The invasion of Kuwait by the Iraq has made it very clear to the world at large that international exports of sensitive products and services is an urgent international problem. This war demonstrated the absurdity of the fact that the troups of the allied coalition under the roof of the UN had to fight against a military potential of Iraq that these nations themselves had been building up by trade with the Iraq in the years before, having sold not only weaponry but also other technical systems and equipment and technologies to which the term ''sensitive products and services'' applies. Having become aware of the international dimension of this problem, the approach to solutions starts from the following questions: How can the international community prevent unwanted support of political regimes or groups judged to be potentially aggressive in their efforts towards building up a dangerous military potential? What are the instruments to be implemented at an international level, and to which foreign relations, as for example trade relations, and to which objects of trade, shall these instruments and controls apply? These questions show the essential importance of the definition of ''dual-use products''. The book analyses and explains the current legal framework within the EU and the approaches elaborated by working groups and bodies of the EU for the purpose of establishing a Single European exports control system, presenting the survey in five main chapters entitled as follows: Rationale, outline conditions and characteristic features of export controls; Legal basis of export controls for sensitive products and services; Admissibility of national controls of the export of sensitive products and services within the EU; Common EU controls of exports to third countries; EU action and means for harmonization of controls of exports of dual-use products to countries not members of the EU. (orig./CB) [de

Nuclear disarmament and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

1999-01-01

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference reaffirmed 'the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control' and endorsed 'universal application of safeguards once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved'. Hence strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and incremental broadening of its coverage towards the universal application of international safeguards in all States is a high priority albeit for the medium to long term. A tentative attempt is made in this paper to anticipate how the elements of verification under the NPT, FMCT and other conventions and arrangements related to nuclear non-proliferation will evolve against the background of the disarmament process, with the goal of achieving at some future stage an ultimate convergence of verification regimes under a complete nuclear disarmament. We think, however, that most of the new initiatives in the area of disarmament/non-proliferation should be realised during the current disarmament phase. We do not wish our model to be perceived as a rigid time-bound scheme. New initiatives should be implemented in parallel and as soon as practicable. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and should not be taken to represent Australian Government policy. (author)

Export channel pricing management for integrated solutions

OpenAIRE

Roine, Henna; Sainio, Liisa-Maija; Saarenketo, Sami

2012-01-01

This article studies systems integrators' export channel pricing management for integrated solutions. We find support from our empirical case study for the notion that a systems integrator's export channel pricing strategy is multidimensional and dependent on international pricing environment and partner characteristics and that export partnerships have unique implications on a systems integrator's pricing process. The results show that giving up pricing control in export channel context may ...

Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O'Brien, J.

1986-02-01

The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification

Long-term proliferation and safeguards issues in future technologies

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Keisch, B.; Auerbach, C.; Fainberg, A.; Fiarman, S.; Fishbone, L.G.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Lemley, J.R.; O' Brien, J.

1986-02-01

The purpose of the task was to assess the effect of potential new technologies, nuclear and non-nuclear, on safeguards needs and non-proliferation policies, and to explore possible solutions to some of the problems envisaged. Eight subdivisions were considered: New Enrichment Technologies; Non-Aqueous Reprocessing Technologies; Fusion; Accelerator-Driven Reactor Systems; New Reactor Types; Heavy Water and Deuterium; Long-Term Storage of Spent Fuel; and Other Future Technologies (Non-Nuclear). For each of these subdivisions, a careful review of the current world-wide effort in the field provided a means of subjectively estimating the viability and qualitative probability of fruition of promising technologies. Technologies for which safeguards and non-proliferation requirements have been thoroughly considered by others were not restudied here (e.g., the Fast Breeder Reactor). The time scale considered was 5 to 40 years for possible initial demonstration although, in some cases, a somewhat optimistic viewpoint was embraced. Conventional nuclear-material safeguards are only part of the overall non-proliferation regime. Other aspects are international agreements, export controls on sensitive technologies, classification of information, intelligence gathering, and diplomatic initiatives. The focus here is on safeguards, export controls, and classification.

Sovereignty and non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kimminich, O.

1990-01-01

The Non-Proliferation Treaty seems to violate the fundamental principle of the quality of the states. However, if interpreted in the light of the latest developments of the international law, it is possible to justify the discriminations which it imposes on the non-nuclear states. A crucial point is the implementation of article VI by the nuclear states. If the latter procrastinate in nuclear disarmament the whole NPT-regime will collapse. (orig.) [de

Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Buckner, M.R.; Sanders, T.L.

2001-01-01

The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Buckner, M.R. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States); Sanders, T.L. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2001-07-01

The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

The Wassenaar Arrangement and Russian High-Tech Export

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Lilia S. Revenko

2016-01-01

Full Text Available The current military and political situation in the world raises the necessity of use by Russia of all existing tools to counter actions targeted against it. Participation of the country in international export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement (the WA, is one of these tools. Membership in the WA allows to Russia to maintain its international status, to contribute to strengthening of international stability, to ensure the non-targeting of this forum against the country, to participate in the development of decisions affecting its interests. Participation in the WA is also important from the view of modernizations of Russian economy towards transition to a new technological mode accompanied by emergence of new groups of innovative products and modification of existing ones. Control of crossing the country's borders by dual-use goods and services is one of conditions for carrying out their export. The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in 1995 to replace COCOM in order to contribute to regional and international security and stability. A huge work is carried out within the forum aimed at enhancing control over transfers of conventional weapons and high-tech dual-use goods. Russian export control system fully meets requirements of international export control regime, including the WA, and effectively functions. Export of the controlled goods from Russia or their transfer to foreign individuals and legal entities are possible only on the basis of decisions of the Export control Commission of the Russian Federation. The dilemma between the need to support exporters by reducing administrative barriers and the ensuring security interests of the country gain momentum in current stage of scientific-and-technological advance development.

Non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation - accomplishments and challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marshall, H.R. Jr.

1983-01-01

The purpose of this paper is to assess the accomplishments in non-proliferation and nuclear co-operation since the beginning of President Reagan's administration, and the challenges remaining to be met in those fields. (NEA) [fr

The Chinese Export Displacement Effect Revisited

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Elleby, Christian; Yu, Wusheng; Yu, Qian

China’s global export share has increased dramatically over the past decades. This development has prompted an empirical literature on whether Chinese exports displace those originated from elsewhere in various destination markets. In this paper we focus on the growth of China’s exports to the East...... African Community (EAC) countries and show how it has affected exports from the European Union (EU) to the EAC. Our main contribution to the literature on the displacement effect of Chinese exports is a set of total and relative displacement estimates based on different specifications of the gravity model...... where we control for country-year fixed effects so as to avoid the “gold medal mistake” of not accounting for time varying “multilateral resistance”. Our findings do not support the hypothesis that Chinese exports have displaced exports from other countries in general. Nor do they support the hypothesis...

Political risk and export promotion: evidence from Germany

OpenAIRE

Moser, Christoph; Nestmann, Thorsten; Wedow, Michael

2006-01-01

Political risk represents an important hidden transaction cost that reduces international trade. This paper investigates the claim that German public export credit guarantees (Hermes guarantees) mitigate this friction to trade flows and hence promote exports. We employ an empirical trade gravity model, where we explicitly control for political risk in the importing country in order to evaluate the effect of export guarantees. The idea behind export promotion through public export credit agenc...

Reforming U.S. Export Controls Reforms: Advancing U.S. Army Interests

Science.gov (United States)

2015-12-01

The author wishes to thank several anonymous and peer re- viewers as well as Alex Barnes, Rachel Bauman, Justin Blaszczyk, William Cardon ...is worth noting in that it requires, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, that: certification be provided to Congress prior to the granting of...security. Otherwise, approval cannot be granted until 15 days after Congress has re- ceived the certification for the manufacturing license or technical

Nuclear non-proliferation: a guide to the debate

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goldblat, Jozef.

1985-01-01

The non-proliferation policies of 15 countries have been studied and summarized for use by participants of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation (NPT) of Nuclear weapons held in September 1985. The main purpose of the guide is to examine what action must be taken to ensure the Treaty's survival. There are four chapters following an introduction, covering the implementation of the essential provisions of the NPT, the motivations of the countries which have not joined the NPT, together with the motivations of those which have formally renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, even though they possess the technical and economic potential necessary to manufacture them. The last chapter summarises measures which might be taken to strengthen the NPT including ideas put forward at a workshop held in 1984. (author)

IAEA Director General welcomes Cuba's intention to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed Cuba's announcement to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. He expressed the hope that Cuba will conclude soon a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required under Article III of the NPT. 'With Cuba's intention to become party to the NPT, we have come a step closer to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime,' Mr. ElBaradei said. Only three countries worldwide with significant nuclear activities now remain outside the NPT. With 188 countries party to the Treaty, the NPT is the most adhered to international agreement after the United Nations Charter and the most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty. The NPT makes it mandatory that all non-nuclear-weapon States conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. The Director General also welcomed Cuba's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which completes the process of having all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as members of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Mr. ElBaradei said that, 'the Tlatelolco Treaty provides a good model for other regional nuclear-weapon-free zones to follow'. He added that 'universal adherence of all countries in regions having nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements is important to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime'. (IAEA)

Arms Control and nonproliferation technologies: Technology options and associated measures for monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban, Second quarter

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Casey, Leslie A.

1994-01-01

This newsletter contains reprinted papers discussing technology options and associated measures for monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These papers were presented to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in May and June 1994. An interagency Verification Monitoring Task Force developed the papers. The task force included participants from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Intelligence Community, the Department of Interior, and the Department of State. The purpose of this edition of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies is to share these papers with the broad base of stakeholders in a CTBT and to facilitate future technology discussions. The papers in the first group discuss possible technology options for monitoring a CTBT in all environments (underground, underwater, atmosphere, and space). These technologies, along with on-site inspections, would facilitate CTBT monitoring by treaty participants. The papers in the second group present possible associated measures, e.g., information exchanges and transparency measures, that would build confidence among states participating in a CTBT.

Report of the international forum on nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tazaki, Makiko; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

2013-03-01

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security - Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia-' on 12 and 13 December 2012, co-hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo. In the forum, keynote speakers from Japan, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S., France and Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. In two panel discussions, entitled 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle back end' and 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for nuclear energy use in the Asian region and a multilateral cooperative framework', active discussions were made among panelists from Japan, IAEA, the U.S., France, ROK, Russia and Kazakhstan. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report except presentation materials. (author)

75 FR 33682 - Export Administration Regulations; Technical Amendments

Science.gov (United States)

2010-06-15

...-01] RIN 0694-AE93 Export Administration Regulations; Technical Amendments AGENCY: Bureau of Industry... Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) makes a technical amendment to the Export Administration... review of final decisions and orders issued in BIS export control administrative enforcement proceedings...

Export performance and investment in R&D

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Smith, Valdemar; Madsen, Erik Strøjer; Dilling-Hansen, Mogens

2002-01-01

This paper analyses the role of R&D in the export behaviour of Danish firms. Export behaviour is defined as the export intensity and the likelihood of a firm being an exporter. In the theoretical part of the paper it is argued that export and being R&D active are endogenous with respect to each...... other, and an empirical model is formulated in order to estimate which factors affect the firm's export. It is argued that besides R&D, firm size, wages and a number of other firm-specific factors controlling for risks are highly important for the export performance. In the empirical part of the paper...... the model is tested on a sample of 3,500 Danish firms. Using a FIML estimation form in order to deal with endogeneity problems between the R&D and export decisions of the firms, the computation clearly verifies the theoretical model put forward. Moreover, R&D is an important factor for being an exporting...

Do R&D Investments Affect Export Performance?

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Smith, Valdemar; Madsen, Erik Strøjer; Dilling-Hansen, Mogens

2002-01-01

This paper analyses the role of R&D in the export behaviour of Danish firms. Export behaviour is defined as the export intensity and the likelihood of a firm being an exporter. In the theoretical part of the paper it is argued that export and being R&D active are endogenous with respect to each...... other, and an empirical model is formulated in order to estimate which factors affect the firm's export. It is argued that besides R&D, firm size, wages and a number of other firm-specific factors controlling for risks are highly important for the export performance. In the empirical part of the paper...... the model is tested on a sample of 3,500 Danish firms. Using a FIML estimation form in order to deal with endogeneity problems between the R&D and export decisions of the firms, the computation clearly verifies the theoretical model put forward. Moreover, R&D is an important factor for being an exporting...

Non-proliferation efforts in South Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chellaney, B.

1994-01-01

Southern Asia is one of the most volatile regions in the world because of inter-State and intra-State conflicts. Security in the region highly depends on the rival capabilities of the involved states, Pakistan, India, China. Increased Confidence building and nuclear transparency are becoming more significant issues in attaining stability in the region, although non-proliferation efforts in this region have attained little headway

The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dreicer, M.

2016-01-01

The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider ''The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.'' We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-roliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what and how much can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-for-attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dreicer, M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

2016-08-30

The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider “The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.” We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-­proliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what—and how much—can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-­for-­attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xavier, Roberto Salles

2014-01-01

The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1999-07-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

INTEGRATION OF FACILITY MODELING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ANALYSIS

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

2011-07-18

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Garcia, Humberto; Burr, Tom; Coles, Garill A.; Edmunds, Thomas A.; Garrett, Alfred; Gorensek, Maximilian; Hamm, Luther; Krebs, John; Kress, Reid L.; Lamberti, Vincent; Schoenwald, David; Tzanos, Constantine P.; Ward, Richard C.

2012-01-01

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

Integration Of Facility Modeling Capabilities For Nuclear Nonproliferation Analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

2011-01-01

Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

14 CFR 1274.942 - Export licenses.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... writing, that the Agreement Officer authorize it to export ITAR-controlled technical data (including... appropriate licenses or other approvals, if required, for exports of hardware, technical data, and software, or for the provision of technical assistance. (b) The Recipient shall be responsible for obtaining...

INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Donnelly, W H

1980-12-01

The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. Here the author outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US nonproliferation policy. If the future of nuclear power is to include more sensitive facilities in which plutonium and highly enriched uranium are present, it must be determined whether the risks seen in proliferation are great enough to cause the USA and other governments to place such facilities under some form of international ownership or control in addition to international safeguards. A final crucial problem is deciding what can and should be done to dissuade non-nuclear-weapons states from the direct manufacture of nuclear weapons. 6 references.

An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

2007-06-01

The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

2007-06-15

The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

The system of nuclear material control of Kazakhstan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yeligbayeva, G.Zh.

2001-01-01

Full text: The State system for nuclear material control consists of three integral components. The efficiency of each is to guarantee the non-proliferation regime in Kazakhstan. The components are the following: accounting, export and import control and physical protection of nuclear materials. First, the implementation of the goals of accounting and control bring into force, by the organization of the system for accounting and measurement of nuclear materials to determine present quantity. Organizing the accounting for nuclear material at facilities will ensure the efficiency of accountancy and reporting information. This defines the effectiveness of the state system for the accounting for the Kazakhstan's nuclear materials. Currently, Kazakhstan's nuclear material is fully safeguarded in designated secure locations. Kazakhstan has a nuclear power plant, 4 research reactors and a fuel fabrication plant. The governmental information system for nuclear materials control consist of two level: Governmental level - KAEA collects reports from facilities and prepares the reports for International Atomic Energy Agency, keeping of supporting documents and other necessary information, a data base of export and import, a data base of nuclear material inventory. Facility level - registration and processing information from key measurement points, formation the facility's nuclear materials accounting database. All facilities have computerized systems. Currently, all facilities are safeguarded under IAEA safeguarding standards, through IAEA inspections. Annually, IAEA verifies all nuclear materials at all Kazakhstan nuclear facilities. The government reporting system discloses the existence of all nuclear material and its transfer intended for interaction through the export control system and the nuclear control accounting system. Nuclear material export is regulated by the regulations of the Nuclear Export Control Law. The standard operating procedure is the primary means for

New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

1999-01-01

Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

The Export Promoting Effect of Emigration

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Hiller, Sanne

The theoretical claim that ethnic networks encourage trade has found broad empirical support in the literature on migration, business networks and international trade. Ethnic networks matter for the exporting firm, as they exhibit the potential to lower fixed and variable cost of exporting....... This paper provides a first attempt to identify the export-promoting effect of emigration on the firm level. Using detailed Danish firm-level data, we can parsimoniously control for export determinants other than emigration, unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as for self-selection of firms...... into exporting. Additionally accounting for taste similarity between Denmark and its trade partners, our findings suggest a positive effect of emigration on Danish manufacturing trade within Europe, thereby corroborating preceding studies on aggregate data. Nevertheless, as a novel insight, our analysis reveals...

INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Donnelly, W H [Library of Congress, Washington, DC (USA)

1980-12-01

The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. This article outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US non-proliferation policy.

Irradiation to control insects in fruits and vegetables for export from Hawaii

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Follett, P.A.

2004-01-01

Phytosanitary or quarantine treatments are often required to disinfest host commodities of economically important arthropod pests before they are moved through market channels to areas where the pest does not occur. Irradiation is an accepted treatment to control quarantine pests in 10 fruits and five vegetables for export from Hawaii to the US mainland. Irradiation is the ideal technology for developing generic quarantine treatments because it is effective against most insect and mite pests at dose levels that do not affect the quality of most commodities. A generic dose of 150 Gy has been proposed for tephritid fruit flies. Contrary to the 150 Gy dose, approved irradiation quarantine treatment doses for Mediterranean fruit fly, melon fly, and oriental fruit fly in Hawaii are 210-250 Gy. Irradiation studies were conducted to determine if the approved doses were unnecessarily high and could be reduced. Irradiation is also a viable alternative to methyl bromide fumigation to disinfest Hawaii sweetpotatoes, and studies are in progress to identify an effective dose for two key sweetpotato insect pests. Results indicate that irradiation doses <150 Gy will control Hawaii's fruit flies, which supports the proposed generic dose. The idea of generic doses is appealing because it would greatly accelerate the process of approving irradiation quarantine treatments for specific crops, and thereby rapidly expand exports. Preliminary results show that 250-300 Gy will control Hawaii's sweetpotato pests

EXPORT CONTROLS: Rapid Advances in China's Semiconductor Industry Underscore Need for Fundamental U.S. Policy Review

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

2002-01-01

The United States controls the export of certain technology, including some of the equipment and materials used to make semiconductors, to sensitive destinations such as China for national security...

Scale and legacy controls on catchment nutrient export regimes

Science.gov (United States)

Howden, N. J. K.; Burt, T.; Worrall, F.

2017-12-01

Nutrient dynamics in river catchments are complex: water and chemical fluxes are highly variable in low-order streams, but this variability declines as fluxes move through higher-order reaches. This poses a major challenge for process understanding as much effort is focussed on long-term monitoring of the main river channel (a high-order reach), and therefore the data available to support process understanding are predominantly derived from sites where much of the transient response of nutrient export is masked by the effect of averaging over both space and time. This may be further exacerbated at all scales by the accumulation of legacy nutrient sources in soils, aquifers and pore waters, where historical activities have led to nutrient accumulation where the catchment system is transport limited. Therefore it is of particular interest to investigate how the variability of nutrient export changes both with catchment scale (from low to high-order catchment streams) and with the presence of legacy sources, such that the context of infrequent monitoring on high-order streams can be better understood. This is not only a question of characterising nutrient export regimes per se, but also developing a more thorough understanding of how the concepts of scale and legacy may modify the statistical characteristics of observed responses across scales in both space and time. In this paper, we use synthetic data series and develop a model approach to consider how space and timescales combine with impacts of legacy sources to influence observed variability in catchment export. We find that: increasing space and timescales tend to reduce the observed variance in nutrient exports, due to an increase in travel times and greater mixing, and therefore averaging, of sources; increasing the influence of legacy sources inflates the variance, with the level of inflation dictated by the residence time of the respective sources.

Nuclear nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Neubert, M.

1992-01-01

The following motion was put before the United Kingdom House of Commons on 3rd February 1992 and agreed; that this House, recognising the potential dangers of the rapidly changing world order, welcomes the recent proposals for substantial reductions in nuclear weaponry, the growing support for the non-proliferation treaty and progress in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning the dismantling of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities; urges the Government to play their full part in helping the relevant authorities in the Commonwealth of Independent States to dismantle their nuclear devices, to safeguard their nuclear components and to discourage the proliferation of nuclear expertise; and believes it is of the first importance that Britain retains an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent as security in a world where there remain many sources of instability. The record of arguments for and against the motion in the debate is presented. (author)

Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

2004-01-01

Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

Communications received from Members regarding the export of nuclear material and of certain categories of equipment and other material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-02-01

The document reproduces the text of the letters and their annex dated 1 December 1989 received by the Director General of the IAEA from the Resident Representatives to the Agency of the following Member States: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America concerning the commitments of these Member States under Article III paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It refers to the export of the equipment especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium

76 FR 81004 - Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S...

Science.gov (United States)

2011-12-27

... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7741] Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign... Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: A determination has been made that a number of foreign entities and one foreign person have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of measures...

Export Margins, Price and Quantity of Belarus’s Export Growth

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Otamurodov Shavkat

2017-03-01

Full Text Available This paper examines the sources of Belarus’s export growth and decomposes export growth into extensive and intensive margins. This study also aims to determine export margins for intermediate and final goods and to determine the price and quantity components of the intensive export margin. In order to achieve the desired objectives, we use two methods for decomposing export growth, the count method and the export shares method. We analyse Belarus's export growth using export data at the HS-6 digit level for the 2004-2014 period. Our results show that Belarus's exports grew mainly due to growth in the price margin during the studied period 2004-2014. However, the extensive margin was important in export growth to some extent. Comparing the growth rate across final and intermediate goods reveals that although the share of final products in Belarus’s exports is not very big (18.9% in 2014, the average annual growth in exports of final products is higher than that of intermediate goods. Our investigation also shows that Belarus produces a wide range of commodities, but the share of the most of these commodities is not large; its exports depend on a restricted range of commodities. Moreover, most of the commodities are exported to Russia and Ukraine. Our results give us reason to assume that finding new markets for their new products is one of the main challenges for developing countries wishing to increase their exports by an extensive margin. This has important implications for how policy makers promote the trade and diversification of exports.

15 CFR 754.5 - Horses for export by sea.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Horses for export by sea. 754.5... CONTROLS § 754.5 Horses for export by sea. (a) License requirement. As indicated by the letters “SS” in the... No. 1 to part 774 of the EAR) a license is required for the export of horses exported by sea to all...

Putting teeth in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 25 March 2006, Karlsruhe, Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2006-01-01

The factors, contributing to the world's changes in respect to peace, security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are presented in the document. Five necessary and urgent measures are proposed in order to meet the current challenges: 1)tighten control for assess to nuclear fuel cycle technology; 2)accelerate global efforts tp protect nuclear material; 3)support effective nuclear verification; 4) reinvigorate disarmament efforts; 5) increase the effectiveness of the UN Security Council. The importance and necessity to place nuclear operations under multinational control is outlined

15 CFR 772.1 - Definitions of terms as used in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-01

... of the Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency are non-voting members. The...; household utilities and appliances; printing, reproduction, imaging and video recording or playback (but not... (including command, control and intelligence applications) which are controlled by the Department of State on...

Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Joeck, N

2007-02-05

The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

12 Ministries Control Rare Earth Exports

Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

2010-01-01

<正>"It is very natural to reserve rare earth as a strategic resource.Many countries do this,including China."On April 8,Sun Lihui,Vice Director of Metal Section of Chemicals Import & Export Commerce Chamber of China Minmetals Corporation told a reporter that as early as 2006,China has launched a strategic plan for rare earth,"but it was interrupted by the subsequent financial crisis."

Nuclear non-proliferation: Revisiting the basics. Carnegie international non-proliferation conference 2002. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2002-01-01

The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort - and despite recent challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But the international community has to move forward, it is essential that a number of the basic assumptions should be revisited, and a number of new approaches reconsidered. A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually disappear. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has overall been successful - but with some shortcomings. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force - and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the 'unequivocal undertaking' by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament - such as 'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further 'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,' 'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT - left without concrete follow-up actions and in

Second annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to Secretary's Annual Report to Congress

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

This document covers: goals of US nonproliferation policy, agreements for cooperation, technical exchange, US as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuels, IAEA Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage, implementation of US nonproliferation policy, classification, cooperation in strengthening international safeguards and physical security, the US-IAEA voluntary offer safeguards agreement, US spent fuel storage policy, development of proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies, and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

Organizing export strategies.

OpenAIRE

G. Lojacono; M. Venzin

2014-01-01

The article unfolds as follows: after a brief introduction on the relevance of international trade and the characteristics of export strategies, we describe four distinct archetypes: export manager, centralistic export developer, export skimmer, integrated export developer.

IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1999-01-01

The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

Non-proliferation policies and demand for uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Warnecke, S.J.

1978-01-01

The non-proliferation policies of USA, Canada and Australia are outlined, and the effects on nuclear policy in the consumer countries, particularly the member states of the European Community and Japan are considered. Supply and demand in relation to uranium, security and economic aspects are covered. Reprocessing, the use of plutonium in breeder reactors, and the wider issues of international confidence and trade are discussed. (U.K.)

Environmental effects of additional uranium development required by a non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baca, T.E.; Scudella, G.

1978-01-01

New Mexico can expect to see an accelerated development of its uranium resources. The President's policy on non-proliferation will impact the degree and quantity of uranium ore mined. Environmental impacts are significant and are affected by the mining and milling phase more than any other aspect of the uranium fuel cycle. The state has begun evaluating the resource-associated impacts of uranium mining and milling, although very little reliable data are available. The information gathered, however, shows a need for state and Federal evaluation of both the impacts and the non-proliferation policy. 4 references

A Study on the Nuclear Foreign Policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Byung Wook; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Oh, K. B.; Yang, M. H.; Lee, K. S.

2007-12-01

This study approaches the international trends related to nuclear non-proliferation in four aspects. First, this study analyzes the trend of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the international nuclear export control regime and proposals for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Second, this study analyzes the trend of international nuclear organizations, which includes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a central body of development of nuclear technology and international nuclear diplomacy, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), a intergovernmental organization to consist of a group of nuclear advanced countries. Third, this study analyzes the trends of the U.S.'s nuclear foreign policies, particularly nuclear non-proliferation. Fourth, this study analyzes the nuclear issues of North Korea and Iran as they cause serious concerns to a international society

A Study on the Nuclear Foreign Policy

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Lee, Byung Wook; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Oh, K. B.; Yang, M. H.; Lee, K. S

2007-12-15

This study approaches the international trends related to nuclear non-proliferation in four aspects. First, this study analyzes the trend of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the international nuclear export control regime and proposals for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Second, this study analyzes the trend of international nuclear organizations, which includes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a central body of development of nuclear technology and international nuclear diplomacy, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), a intergovernmental organization to consist of a group of nuclear advanced countries. Third, this study analyzes the trends of the U.S.'s nuclear foreign policies, particularly nuclear non-proliferation. Fourth, this study analyzes the nuclear issues of North Korea and Iran as they cause serious concerns to a international society.

Positive steps toward non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Greenhalgh, G.

1979-08-30

Russel W. Fox and Mason Willrich in their paper, International Custody of Plutonium Stocks: A First Step Toward an International Regime for Sensitive Nuclear Energy Activities, advocate placing excess plutonium in an international custodial facility; critical criteria governing releases are outlined so that, on one hand the owners can have high confidence that their plutonium will be returned promptly, under appropriate circumstances, and on the other hand, all the other participating and concerned countries can have confidence in the assurance that plutonium will be released only for immediate use in a defined and approved civil purpose. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the 1978 issue of its Year Book, recognizes a move towards a more positive approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation. It is noted that the non-proliferation strategies of the main supply countries have largely concentrated on a two-pronged approach of technology denials with tightening of safeguards. But already, enrichment, reprocessing, and breeder reactor programs extend far beyond the five nuclear weapon states. History testifies to the limitations of a policy of technical denials. SIPRI recognizes that another way to dissuade non-nuclear weapon states from creating their own enrichment or reprocessing plants would be to establish an open market for these services, a market characterized by diversity and competition. So far, there has been no case where a country has developed nuclear explosives by diverting material from a civil power station. Development of nuclear weapons by various countries is briefly noted and areas where strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is needed are noted. (MCW)

Future technology challenges in non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Richardson, J.H.

2004-01-01

Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. For example, various gamma ray imaging approaches are being explored to combine spatial resolution with background suppression in order to enhance sensitivity at reasonable standoff distances and acquisition times. New materials and approaches are being developed in order to provide adequate energy resolution in field use without the necessity for liquid nitrogen. Finally, different detectors combined into distributed networks offer promise for detection and tracking of radioactive materials. As the world moves into the 21st century, the possibility of greater reliance on nuclear energy will impose additional technical requirements to prevent proliferation. In addition to proliferation resistant reactors, a careful examination of the various possible fuel cycles from cradle to grave will provide additional technical and nonproliferation challenges in the areas of conversion, enrichment, transportation, recycling and waste disposal. Radiation detection technology and information management have a prominent role in any future global regime for nonproliferation beyond the current Advanced Protocol. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. (author)

Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meier, Oliver

2014-01-01

The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Meier, Oliver

2014-11-15

The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

International aspects of non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Aucoin, P.A.

1978-01-01

There are currently two areas on the national scene and one on the international scene that require immediate attention. The first is relief under contracts for enrichment services, an area in which the US can still demonstrate its desire to become a stable and continuous source of supply. The second national area is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. The United States must proceed very cautiously, however, for if discretion and very careful judgment are not used, the Act will immediately be branded as a blatant effort on the part of the US to control the energy options of other sovereign states. The international area is that of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation program. This medium exists for wise and deliberate growth of a commercial nuclear power program which can serve the global community. The next three years probably allow one remaining chance for successful containment of weapons proliferation. If we do not recognize the rights of every sovereign state to voluntarily participate and agree, we, as members of the global community, will have failed

Flaws in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Leventhal, P.

1986-01-01

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nucler Weapons has the twin objectives of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons and ending the nuclear arms race on the one hand, and promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy on the other. In quantitative and symbolic terms the NPT is a huge success. More than two-thirds of the world's nations have signed on, making this the most popular arms control agreement on earth. Not a single nation has declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons state beyond the original five members of the ''nuclear club'' who qualified for weapons status under the terms of the Treaty itself: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. No party to the Treaty has exercised the permitted option to drop out, and none has been found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to have diverted nuclear material from civil to weapons purposes. Nor has any party been known to have violated NPT prohibitions on developing or assisting other nations to develop nuclear weapons

The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Fifteen years after entry into force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

The need to halt a wider spread of nuclear weapons grew out of the realization that the increase in the number of countries possessing such weapons would increase the threat to world security. As the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons clearly states in its preamble, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty - also known as the non-proliferation Treaty - was concluded in 1968, at a time when there were already five nuclear-weapon Powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. This fact sheet is intended to provide background material on the Treaty, including the events that led to its conclusion, an overview of its provisions and the developments at the two previously held Review Conferences

Export spillovers

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Choquette, Eliane; Meinen, Philipp

2015-01-01

This paper studies the importance of export spillovers in a firm's decision to enter specific export markets and extends the current state of the literature by assessing different mechanisms through which they may occur, namely (i) labour movement, (ii) intra-industry spillovers and (iii) inter......-industry linkages. We do so by exploiting a unique data set covering the universe of manufacturing firms in Denmark for the period 1995–2006 which combines transaction-level export data, firm accounting data, employer–employee linked data and information from yearly input–output tables. We corroborate...... the literature on export spillovers by presenting robust evidence of destination-specific export spillovers. The results suggest that labour mobility as well as intra- and inter-industry linkages (backward linkages) are important channels for export spillovers, while presenting heterogeneous effects across firms...

A Proven Method for Meeting Export Control Objectives in Postal and Shipping Sectors

Science.gov (United States)

2015-02-01

A Proven Method for Meeting Export Control Objectives in Postal and Shipping Sectors Gregory Crabb, U.S. Postal Inspection Service Julia H...mail fraud, mail theft, identity theft, child exploitation, and prohibited mailings such as bombs and biological and chemical threats...April 2012. http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=10085 [Allen 2014a] Allen, Julia H., Crabb, Gregory; Curtis, Pamela D

Carter faces new dilemmas over non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dickson, D.

1979-01-01

Questions underlying the current domestic debate as to whether the US should revise its attitude towards the relationship between the spread of nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are considered. Problems arising from the provisional conclusions of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, set up at President Carter's suggestion in 1977, are evaluated. The thorny question of how to deal with the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for review in 1980 is discussed. Finally there is the issue, for which it is concluded nobody pretends to have all the answers, of whether a sufficient consensus - involving both developed and developing countries as partners in decision-making - can be forged to develop and apply an effective control regime, or whether increasing competition between both producers and consumers of nuclear power will be such as to limit the possibilities for multilateral action, shifting the focus back to bilateral actions. (UK)

Role of non-governmental organizations in formation of non-proliferation culture in new independent countries (NIC)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sevchik, M.

2000-01-01

Purpose of the report is demonstrate the non-governmental organizations (NGO) role in formation of non-proliferation culture in former Soviet Union. Activity of Center of Non-proliferation Problems Investigation (CNPI) of Monterey Institute of International Investigations and its collaboration with existing in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) non-governmental organizations is considered as example. Brief information about CNPI and reasons for it representatives opening of in Kazakhstan and in other CIS-countries, as well as cooperation of NGO in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine for creation on Central Asia zone free from nuclear weapon ia given. Some measures which could promote to formation of non-proliferation culture in region are suggested

Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program, Annual Report, Class of 2012

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

McMakin, Andrea H.

2013-09-23

This 32-pp annual report/brochure describes the accomplishments of the Class of 2012 of the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (the last class of this program), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The time period covers Sept 2011 through June 2013.

Nuclear exports. Parliamentary control and confidentiality; Parlamentarische Kontrolle und Geheimhaltungsbeduerftigkeit bei Nuklearexporten. Zum Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 21. Oktober 2014

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Feldmann, Ulrike

2015-03-15

With its decision taken on 21. October 2014 (Az.: 2 BvE 5/11) the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) decided during court proceedings between administrative bodies on the scope and limits of the parliamentary right of information. Even though the proceeding did not deal with nuclear exports but arm exports, foreign trade law, however, does not only designate an export licence obligation for military weapons but also for so called dual-use goods meaning goods, which can be used both for friendly as well as for military purposes. The export of these goods requires according to the so-called Dual-Use Regulation (EG) 428/2009 a licence. Annex I category 0 of the regulation (EG) 428/2009 lists a variety of nuclear materials, plants and equipment items for which this licence applies. In the same manner as arm exports, also exports of nuclear dual-use goods are being discussed in a special cabinet committee, the Federal Security Council (BSR), which shall coordinate cross-departmentally the German security and defence policy under consideration of economic interests and which categorises its results, according to the rules of procedure, as confidential. Also legally not regulated but common ''preliminary enquiries'' at the responsible Federal Ministry or rather Federal Office of Economics and Export Control by companies which plan an export and want to affirm the general approval for their export business prior to conclusion of contract take not only place for arm exports but also for nuclear dual-use goods. The decision by the Federal Constitutional Court can be applied to consultations about the authorisation of nuclear dual-use goods.

Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dassen, L. van

1998-03-01

Finland''s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

1998-03-01

Finland``s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abdelwahab, Biad

2010-01-01

The NPT was negotiated during the Cold War period to prevent the emergence of new nuclear players by distinguishing between 'nuclear-weapon states' (NWS) which had carried out nuclear testing before 1 January 1967, that is the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China, and 'non-nuclear-weapon states' (NNWS). Under the NPT, the two groups of states commit to comply with a series of commitments formulated around 'three pillars': 1 - Non-proliferation: the NWSs undertake under Article I not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any NNWS to acquire them, while the NNWSs are bound under Article II to neither develop or acquire nuclear weapons or 'other nuclear explosive devices' nor to receive any assistance in that connection. 2 - Peaceful use of nuclear energy: Article IV guarantees the 'inalienable right' to 'develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination'. 3 - Nuclear disarmament: each state party to the treaty undertakes under Article VI 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'. The treaty entered in force in March 1970 and has since become universal, with 189 states parties in May 2010. At five-year intervals, parties to the treaty convene review conferences in order to review the operation of the treaty, Article VIII(3). The 1975, 1985 and 2000 review conferences culminated in the adoption of a final declaration and the 1995 review conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The preparatory committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 review conference, which met from April 2007 to May 2009, did not adopt any recommendations, in absence of a consensus on essential issues concerning the operation of the treaty. Hence the importance of this 8. review conference of the parties held in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010 in a

Former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow Served at U.S. Mission

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brim, Cornelia P.

2014-10-01

Because of her training and professional experiences, Rosalyn Leitch, a Security Specialist at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow with NIS (2012-2013) was able to transition into temporary assignment as UNVIE Acting Nuclear Security Attaché from November 2013 through February 2014.

75 FR 842 - Action Affecting Export Privileges: Hailin Lin

Science.gov (United States)

2010-01-06

... People's Republic of China (PRC) in violation of U.S. export control laws by failing to obtain the proper... (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706). Charge 1: 15 CFR 764.2(d)--Conspiracy To Export Electronic Components to the... was done so that Shipper's Export Declarations, which are filed with the U.S. Government and which...

75 FR 37742 - Addition of New Export Control Classification Number 6A981 Passive Infrasound Sensors to the...

Science.gov (United States)

2010-06-30

... Infrasound Sensors to the Commerce Control List of the Export Administration Regulations, and Related... control passive infrasound sensors because of their military and commercial utility. Items under this new... Thompson, Sensors and Aviation Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, Telephone: (202) 482-4252...

Report of “the 2013 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suda, Kazunori; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

2014-03-01

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held “International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Ensuring Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station –” on 3 and 4 December 2013, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials from Japan, the United States, France and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled “Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security measures of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” and “Roles of safeguards and technical measures for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation for nuclear fuel cycle options”. In the first panel based on the implications of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on the domestic and global nuclear energy use and increased interest in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle, discussion was made on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security challenges on both fuel cycle options from the policy and institutional viewpoints whereas in the second panel the roles of safeguards and proliferation resistant nuclear technology including plutonium burning technology in ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle were discussed. Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France and Republic of Korea participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording

Transcending sovereignty. In the management and control of nuclear material

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheinman, Lawrence

2001-01-01

Effective control of nuclear material is fundamentally important to the credibility and reliability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), international safeguards are applied to non-nuclear- weapon State Parties for the purpose of verifying compliance with their undertakings not to seek to acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices by assuring that safeguarded nuclear activities and material are not diverted from their intended peaceful use. Reflecting the sovereign State basis upon which the international system rests, the control and protection of nuclear materials within the State are the responsibility of the national authority. This division of responsibility between international verification of non-diversion on the one hand and national responsibility for material protection on the other has worked quite well over time. But it has not created a seamless web of fully effective control over nuclear material. 34 In so far as safeguards are concerned, six points are to be made: 1. INFCIRC/153 Agreements: Completion by all NPT Parties of the required safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Fifty States Party to the NPT still have not entered into treaty-obligated safeguards agreements with the IAEA. 2. Adherence by all States having full-scope safeguards INFCIRC/540. As noted, very few States have thus far negotiated and implemented the strengthened safeguards arrangements. 3. United Nations Security Council action to take its 1992 assertions (related to compliance and enforcement) on proliferation and safeguards a step further. 4. Non-NPT Party support for international Safeguards. 5. Safeguards financing. 6. IAEA Access to export license information

77 FR 34342 - Order Denying Export Privileges

Science.gov (United States)

2012-06-11

..., Luohu District, Shenzhen, 518001, China. On January 26, 2011, in the U.S. District Court, District of... Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. (2000)) (``IEEPA'') and violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 (2000)) (``AECA''). Specifically, Wu was convicted of illegally exporting...

NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2008 - May 2009

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

2010-03-01

In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 16th successful year in support of the NNSA’s mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. We provide this annual report to review program activities from June 2008 through May 2009 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2008. Contents include: Welcome Letter Introduction The NGFP Team Program Management Highlights Class of 2008 Incoming Fellows Orientation Travel Career Development Management of the Fellows Performance Highlights Closing Ceremony Encore Performance Where They Are Now Alumnus Career Highlights: Christine Buzzard Class of 2009 Applicant Database Upgrades Fall Recruitment Activities Interviews Hiring and Clearances Introducing the Class of 2009 Class of 2010 Recruitment Strategy On the Horizon Appendix A: Class of 2009 Fellows

Protein export through the bacterial flagellar type III export pathway.

Science.gov (United States)

Minamino, Tohru

2014-08-01

For construction of the bacterial flagellum, which is responsible for bacterial motility, the flagellar type III export apparatus utilizes both ATP and proton motive force across the cytoplasmic membrane and exports flagellar proteins from the cytoplasm to the distal end of the nascent structure. The export apparatus consists of a membrane-embedded export gate made of FlhA, FlhB, FliO, FliP, FliQ, and FliR and a water-soluble ATPase ring complex consisting of FliH, FliI, and FliJ. FlgN, FliS, and FliT act as substrate-specific chaperones that do not only protect their cognate substrates from degradation and aggregation in the cytoplasm but also efficiently transfer the substrates to the export apparatus. The ATPase ring complex facilitates the initial entry of the substrates into the narrow pore of the export gate. The export gate by itself is a proton-protein antiporter that uses the two components of proton motive force, the electric potential difference and the proton concentration difference, for different steps of the export process. A specific interaction of FlhA with FliJ located in the center of the ATPase ring complex allows the export gate to efficiently use proton motive force to drive protein export. The ATPase ring complex couples ATP binding and hydrolysis to its assembly-disassembly cycle for rapid and efficient protein export cycle. This article is part of a Special Issue entitled: Protein trafficking and secretion in bacteria. Guest Editors: Anastassios Economou and Ross Dalbey. © 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Mercury exports from a High-Arctic river basin in Northeast Greenland (74°N) largely controlled by glacial lake outburst floods

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Søndergaard, Jens; Tamstorf, Mikkel P.; Elberling, Bo

2015-01-01

.025 mg kg(-1). Temporal variations in river Hg were mainly associated with snowmelt, sudden erosion events, and outburst floods from a glacier-dammed lake in the upper part of the ZRB. Annual Hg exports from the 514 km(2) ZRB varied from 0.71 to >1.57 kg and the majority (86-96 was associated...... with sediment-bound Hg. Hg yields from the ZRB varied from 1.4-3.1 g Hg km(-2) yr(-1) and were among the highest yields reported from Arctic river basins. River exports of Hg from ZRB were found to be largely controlled by the frequency, magnitude and timing of the glacial lake outburst floods, which occurred...... in four of the five years in July-August. Floods accounted for 5 to >10% of the annual water discharge, and up to >31% of the annual Hg export. Also, the winter snowfall and the summer temperatures were found to be important indirect controls on the annual Hg export. The occurrence and timing of glacial...

The Effect of Export Tax on Indonesia’s Cocoa Export Competitiveness

OpenAIRE

Rifin, Amzul; Nauly, Dahlia

2013-01-01

The government of Indonesia implemented an export tax policy on cocoa beans since April 2010 in order to develop cocoa processing industry. The objective of this article is to analyze the effect of export tax on Indonesia’s cocoa export competitiveness. The results indicate that with the implementation of export tax, cocoa export product composition shift from cocoa beans to processed cocoa products. On the other hand, Indonesia’s cocoa export growth is lower than the growth of cocoa world de...

Fuel cycle of nuclear power plants and safeguards system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Malek, Z.

1980-10-01

The international safeguard system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguard system are briefly described. In Czechoslovakia, a decree was issued in 1977 governing the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The contents of the decree are presented. Described are computer processing of accounting data, technical criteria for the safeguard system application, containment and inspection in the IAEA safeguard system. The method is shown of the control of and accounting for nuclear materials in nuclear power plants and in fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and enrichment plants. Nondestructive and destructive methods of nuclear materials analysis are discussed. Nondestructive methods used include gamma spectrometry, neutron techniques, X-ray fluores--cence techniques. (J.P.)

Can Production Subsidies Explain China's Export Performance? Evidence from Firm-level Data

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Gong, Yundan; Yu, Zhihong; Girma, Sourafel

2009-01-01

This paper analyses the relationship between production subsidies and firms" export performance using a very comprehensive and recent firm-level database and controlling for the endogeneity of subsidies. It documents robust evidence that production subsidies stimulate export activity at the inten......This paper analyses the relationship between production subsidies and firms" export performance using a very comprehensive and recent firm-level database and controlling for the endogeneity of subsidies. It documents robust evidence that production subsidies stimulate export activity...

77 FR 34340 - Order Denying Export Privileges

Science.gov (United States)

2012-06-11

... Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. (2000)) (``IEEPA'') and Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778 (2000)) (``AECA''). Specifically, Chitron- US was convicted of illegally exporting... components designated on the U.S. Munitions List to China through Hong Kong between 2004 and 2007. In...

78 FR 37785 - Order Denying Export Privileges

Science.gov (United States)

2013-06-24

... DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Bureau of Industry and Security Order Denying Export Privileges In the... Order with the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security. The appeal must be filed within 45... the Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 783(b)), or section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22...

19 CFR 19.38 - Supervision of exportation.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

... 19 Customs Duties 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Supervision of exportation. 19.38 Section 19.38 Customs Duties U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY CUSTOMS WAREHOUSES, CONTAINER STATIONS AND CONTROL OF MERCHANDISE THEREIN Duty-Free Stores § 19.38 Supervision of exportation. (a) Sales...

A study on the nuclear foreign policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lee, Byungwook; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Noh, B. C.

2008-12-01

This study addresses four arenas to effectively assist national nuclear foreign policies under international nuclear nonproliferation regimes and organizations. Firstly, this study analyzes the trends of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the international nuclear export control regime, and proposals for assurance of nuclear fuel supply. Secondly, this study analyzes the trends of international nuclear organizations, which include the IAEA as a central body of international nuclear diplomacy and technical cooperation and the OECD/NEA as a intergovernmental organization to consist of nuclear advanced countries. Thirdly, this study predicts the nuclear foreign policy of Obama Administration and reviews U. S.-India nuclear cooperation. Lastly, this study analyzes the nuclear issues of North Korea and current issues for regulation of nuclear materials.

The White Paper on Defence and National Security and nonproliferation: between adaptation and traditionalism

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sitt, Bernard

2013-05-01

The White Paper on Defence and National Security, published on the 29 April, presents France's strategic vision with regard to recent world developments and updates its national and international security postures for the coming fifteen years. The new White Paper notes, in particular, that existing risks and threats, be they military or non-military, and of State or non-State origin, have both intensified and diversified, and may concern all aspects of the life of the Nation. In terms of non-proliferation, the White Paper appears to follow on from its 2008 predecessor. It notes firstly that the most pessimistic forecasts, which predicted the emergence of twenty or so nuclear powers by the turn of the millennium, have not come to pass. Yet, there is cause for concern as a result of the multiplication of clandestine trafficking and transfers of material and immaterial goods, which non-State actors such as terrorist groups could use to acquire know-how and sensitive technology. For that reason, France is implementing a national export control regime for dual-use goods, and will launch an inter-ministerial review with the aim of reinforcing the regime. The other challenge is that posed by regional nuclear and ballistic proliferation and the ensuing crises. The continuing decades-old tension in the Middle East or East Asia is exacerbated by certain States' possession of nuclear weapons, and the risks of proliferation cascades in these two regions should be taken into serious account. The White Paper goes as far as envisaging the catastrophic scenario of an unchecked escalation resulting in the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Chemical and biological weapons constitute a genuine threat, taking into account notably the dual nature of underlying technologies, which makes clandestine programmes all the more difficult to prevent and detect. The requirements of the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their deliver systems thus remain

Nonproliferation analysis of the reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Persiani, P.J.

1995-01-01

The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

76 FR 52935 - President's Export Council, Subcommittee on Export Administration; Notice of Open Meeting

Science.gov (United States)

2011-08-24

... with all countries with which the United States has diplomatic or trading relations and of controlling... and Vice Chair. 2. Export Control Reform Update. 3. Presentation of Papers or Comments by the Public. 4. Review of Field Hearing. 5. Status of 2011 Workplan. 6. Discussion of 2012 Workplan. 7...

Implementation of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Sierra Leone

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

George, M.

2015-01-01

Sierra Leone under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) has enacted the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection (NSRP) Act 2012 and has given numerous powers to the Authority to implement the above mentioned act fully. The NSRP Act 2012 established the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Authority which among other things to regulate, control and supervise the acquisition, importation, exportation, use, transportation and disposal of radioactive sources and devices emitting Ionizing Radiation. The Authority is bounded by law to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of Safeguards Agreement and any protocol thereto between Sierra Leone and the International Atomic Energy Agency including conducting inspections and providing any assistance or information required by designated IAEA inspectors in the fulfillment of their responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, Subsection 2, Article xvi of the NSRP Act 2012. The Authority is also granted powers to adopt all necessary measures including a system of licensing to control the export, re-export, transit and transhipment of any nuclear material, equipment or technology in order to protect the safety and security of Sierra Leone. The Regulatory Authority has established departments for the control of nuclear materials: One of which is The Regulatory Control Department; responsible for Inspections, Authorization and Enforcement actions for all radiation sources and nuclear materials. The Authority has been conducting inspections regularly on various facilities ranging from medical radiation generating equipment to industrial radiography sources. The methodology to be used is the issuance of the standard IAEA checklist which is consistent with the Regulatory Authority’s documents for inspection of sources and is in line with the General Safety Requirements(GSR)Part III. The expected outcomes would be increasing training of regulatory authority’s staff, the procurement of

19 CFR 18.45 - Supervision of exportation.

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-01

... 19 Customs Duties 1 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Supervision of exportation. 18.45 Section 18.45 Customs Duties U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY TRANSPORTATION IN BOND AND MERCHANDISE IN TRANSIT Merchandise Not Otherwise Subject to Customs Control Exported Under Cover of A Tir Carnet ...

Fast reactors and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Orlov, V.V.

1997-01-01

1.Three aspects of nonproliferation relevant to nuclear power are: Pu buildup in NPP spent fuel cooling ponds (∼ 104 t in case of consumption of ∼ 107 t cheap uranium). Danger of illegal radiochemical extraction of Pu for weapons production; Pu extraction from NPP fuel at the plants available in nuclear countries, its burning along with weapon-grade Pu in NPP reactors or in special-purpose burners; increased hazard of nuclear weapons sprawl with breeders and closed fuel cycle technology spreading all over the world. 2.The latter is one of major obstacles to creation of large-scale nuclear power. 3.Nuclear power of the first stage using 235 U will be able to meet the demands of certain fuel-deficient countries and regions, replacing ∼ 5-10% of conventional fuels in the global consumption for a number of decades. 4.Fast reactors of the first generation and the currently employed fuel technology are far from exhausting their potential for solving economic problems and meeting the challenges of safety, radioactive waste and nonproliferation. Development of large-scale nuclear power will become an option accepted by society for solving energy problems in the following century, provided a breeder technology is elaborated and demonstrated in the next 15-20 years, which would comply with the totality of the following requirement: full internal Pu breeding deterministic elimination of severe accidents involving fuel damage and high radioactivity releases: fast runaway, loss of coolant, fires, steam and hydrogen explosions, etc.; reaching a balance between radioactive wastes disposed of and uranium mined in terms of radiation hazard; technology of closed fuel cycle preventing its use for Pu extraction and permitting physical protection from fuel thefts;economic competitiveness of nuclear power for most of countries and regions, i.e. primarily the cost of NPPs with fat reactors is to be below the cost of modern LWR plants, etc

The formation of nuclear export control in Azerbaijan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Garibov, A.A.

2003-01-01

Full text: The controlling process of exporting and importing on Azerbaijan borders is being carried out by two state organizations. 1.Border Guard Department; 2.Azerbaijan State Customs Committee. The officers of these organizations have no enough necessary experience and knowledge dealing with the legal and illegal trafficking. There were not special educational institutions in order to train personals for both of these organizations made newly. So there's difference between the professions of the majority of the employees, that's why some of the employees follow the instructions linking to the normative documents while passing the border. When trafficking nuclear and dual-use items officially the controller and other employees should look through the list of all and know them how to behave and to make official, the characteristic parameters of the materials, and the instruction of monitoring. In order to realize all works pointed, the employees of Border Guard Department and Customs Control Check Points have to attend special courses. The employees of both organizations are frequently changed that's why studying courses are to be organized. The analysis of studying considered that will be realized shows mainly there may be two student groups. Mainly, the Institute of Radiation Problems of ANAS (Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences) as the expert laboratory takes part in. On the borders of Azerbaijan Republic the dual-use items and equipment having the type of isotope sources being utilized in the technological process are mainly being transported. In the materials presented the results and the solution of the problems dealing with realizing the controlling expert system of nuclear materials in the existing control checkpoints due to the international standards have been given

Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle; Nukleare Abruestung. Optionen fuer den kommenden Ueberpruefungszyklus des NVV

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mueller, Harald

2011-07-01

The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-12-01

The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations. While any final assessment of such measures and alternatives would have to examine the circumstances particular to each nation, it is hoped that the more generic assessments conducted here will be useful in suggesting guidelines for developing an improved nonproliferation regime which also helps to meet nuclear-energy needs. One chapter outlines the existing nonproliferation regime, including the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bilateral and multilateral requirements for agreements of cooperation and transfers of technology, and existing provisons for sanctions for violation of nonproliferation commitments. The chapter then proceeds to an assessment of various alternatives for providing assurance of fuel supply in light of this current regime. Another chapter examines a set of technical and institutional measures and alternatives for various components of once-through and closed fuel cycles. The components of the once-through fuel cycle assessed are enrichment services and spent-fuel management; the components of closed fuel cycles assessed are reprocessing and plutonium management and fast-breeder reactor (FBR) deployment

Composition of Exports and Export Performance of Eurozone Countries

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Wierts, P.J.; Kerkhoff, H.; de Haan, J.

2014-01-01

This article investigates to what extent the composition of exports is related to the export performance of eurozone countries using a data set on exports from the oldest eurozone countries to their top 20 trade partners for the period 1988-2009. The results suggest that a higher share of high

AKT3 controls mitochondrial biogenesis and autophagy via regulation of the major nuclear export protein CRM-1.

Science.gov (United States)

Corum, Daniel G; Tsichlis, Philip N; Muise-Helmericks, Robin C

2014-01-01

Our previous work has shown that Akt3 is required for mitochondrial biogenesis in primary human endothelial cells (ECs) and in Akt3-null mice; Akt3 affects subcellular localization of peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor γ coactivator-1 (PGC-1α), the master regulator of mitochondrial biogenesis. The purpose of this study is to determine the mechanism by which Akt3 controls the subcellular distribution of PGC-1α and to explore the effect on mitochondrial biogenesis and turnover during angiogenesis. Here we use standard biochemical analyses and Akt3-knockdown strategies to show that Akt3 controls the stabilization of chromosome maintenance region-1 (CRM-1), the major nuclear export receptor. Site-directed mutagenesis and association analyses show that PGC-1α nuclear export is CRM-1 dependent. Akt3 knockdown and CRM-1 overexpression cause 3-fold reductions in PGC-1α target gene expression, compared to control levels. Akt3 inhibition causes autophagy, as measured by autophagosome formation, in a CRM-1-dependent, Akt1/mTOR-independent pathway. In vivo, Akt3-null and heterozygous mice show dose-dependent decreases in angiogenesis compared to wild-type littermates (~5- and 2.5-fold decreases, respectively), as assessed by Matrigel plug assays. This correlates with an ~1.5-fold decrease in mitochondrial Cox IV expression. Our studies suggest that Akt3 is a regulator of mitochondrial dynamics in the vasculature via regulation of CRM-1-dependent nuclear export.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2001-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

Renewable energy export network

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon

2000-01-01

A Renewable Energy Exporters Network (REEN) has recently been established, following a meeting of renewable energy exporters and government agencies on 30 October 2000. REEN will assist the Australian renewable energy industry to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the burgeoning global market for renewable energy goods and services. Recent estimates of the significant potential global growth is renewable energy demand have reinforced the industry and Government's view that, in the medium to long-term, growth in the Australian renewable energy industry will largely depend on capturing export market share. Expanding the export market was identified as a crucial component in the Renewable Energy Action Agenda, developed jointly by industry and Government and released in June 2000. It was estimated that, for the industry to achieve its vision of sales of $4 billion per year by 2010, exports would need to comprise approximately 50% of the forecast growth in sales. As such, the need for a specific export strategy for the Australian renewable energy industry was recognised in the Action Agenda, and the establishment of the REEN is one of the first initiatives undertaken as part of the Renewable Energy Export Strategy. The REEN comprises approximately 50 export-ready renewable energy companies, the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Austrade, and Stage Government agencies such as NSW's Sustainable Energy Development Authority. The Export Network will operate electronically, with face-to-face meetings held as appropriate. The Department of Industry, Science and Resources will facilitate the Export Network and has published a website at www.isr.gov.au/industry/reen. The site includes: a members directory; a discussion forum; information on opportunities to showcase Australian renewable; energy products and services; and Iinks to sites containing information that may be useful to renewable energy exporters. Other actions that are being undertaken as

Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects. Key issue paper no. 5

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-06-01

This paper examines the current nuclear non-proliferation regime (Section 2) and the issues most likely to arise as the civil nuclear fuel cycle develops over the next 50 years (Section 3). Section 4 deals with fuel cycles and nuclear material inventories. 14 refs.

The world's non-proliferation regime in time

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bunn, George

2005-01-01

allies of some of the P-5, allies not having nuclear weapons, there are stronger assurances: promises of military help if an ally is attacked or threatened with attack, promises made, for example, to NATO allies. The regime includes various multilateral institutions such as the IAEA, the UN Security Council, the periodic NPT Review Conferences, and the UN General Assembly First Committee which considers non-proliferation recommendations for General Assembly adoption. An important but not sufficiently effective element of the regime is the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. Mohamed ElBaradei has recommended a much stronger requirement, and the G-8 agreed in June of 2004 not to export any uranium enrichment or plutonium separation technology for a year. However, gaining widespread agreement to deny the technology useful for enriching uranium and separating plutonium to any country not now having it will not be easy. The NPT recognized an 'inalienable right' to develop and use nuclear energy 'for peaceful purposes without discrimination,' even for NPT members that had agreed not to acquire nuclear weapons, so long as they did not make nuclear weapons. The enrichment and separation technologies can be used for making weapons as well as for fueling peaceful nuclear reactors. And, some NPT members not having nuclear weapons have argued that they have an 'inalienable right' to acquire these technologies. How this problem will be solved is not yet clear, but it must be if the non-proliferation regime is to survive. The regime is seriously challenged today. It needs strengthening-including this and other steps if it is to continue to be effective

Exporting and Productivity

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Newman, Carol; Rand, John; Tarp, Finn

2017-01-01

different policy stance than typical in Africa. This is especially so in promoting export-oriented industry. If learning by exporting is a key driver of progress, then a fundamental reason for Africa's lack of transformation is likely to be the low policy priority given to export promotion in the past....... To enlarge the body of empirical evidence, we use an extensive 2005–2012 firm-level panel data set from Vietnam and separate out productivity effects of exporting due to self-selection. This allows us to conclude that firms actually learn by exporting. We also examine how this learning takes place. Our...... findings suggest that productivity gains are associated with moving to larger scale for foreign-owned firms with little evidence of subsequent learning on export markets. We find strong evidence to suggest that private domestic firms learn and accumulate knowledge from export markets with learning...

Statement at Inauguration Ceremony for Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 25 February 2011, Vienna, Austria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amano, Y.

2011-01-01

I was a member of the Group of Governmental Experts which drafted the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non proliferation Education in 2002. In my new role at the IAEA, I continue to attach great importance to education. I believe it is vital that we educate the people of the world about how devastating nuclear weapons are and build awareness of the importance of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I have no doubt that the new Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation will make an important contribution in this area. The recent conclusion of the new START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States was a welcome development in the nuclear disarmament field. Reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons is a positive step towards a safe and peaceful world free of nuclear weapons which can impact positively on nuclear non-proliferation efforts. But, of course, further steps are needed. Disarmament and non-proliferation education have an essential role to play in maintaining and strengthening the momentum towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The IAEA has for decades been actively involved in promoting nuclear non-proliferation education. My colleagues and I speak about nuclear non-proliferation throughout the world. We organize briefings here in Vienna for members of parliament, government officials, think tanks, academics and other groups. We host educational seminars for NGOs, diplomats and journalists on the Agency's non-proliferation activities - the latest one was held this week. The IAEA also provides opportunities for on-the-job training and work experience to students and young professionals. Indeed, several Monterey Institute graduates are currently working with us. This is an excellent example of how disarmament and non-proliferation education can contribute to promoting international peace and security. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States took place during my time with Monterey in

Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to Prepare the Next Generation of Experts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Janssens, W.A.M.; Peerani, P.; ); Gariazzo, C.; Ward, S.; Crete, J.-M.; Braunegger-Guelich, A.

2015-01-01

Although nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are a continuous concern of the international community and discussed frequently at international fora and conferences, the academic world is not really on board with these topics. What we mean by this is that nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is only very seldom part of a university curriculum. In the few cases where it does appear in the curriculum, whether in a nuclear engineering course or a political sciences master programme, it is typically covered only partially. Nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are multidisciplinary and embrace, inter alia, historical, legal, technical, and political aspects. This is perhaps the reason why it is challenging for a single professor or university to develop and implement a comprehensive academic course or programme in this area. Professional organizations in this field, like the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), have made first steps to address this issue by implementing specific educational activities. However, much more needs to be done. Therefore, ESARDA, INMM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are in the process of joining efforts to identify key elements and priorities to support universities in establishing appropriate and effective academic programmes in this area. This paper will share best practices, achievements and lessons learned by ESARDA, INMM and the IAEA in providing education and training to develop and maintain the expertise of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards professionals. In addition, it will suggest potential ways on how to assist universities to get prepared for building-up the next generation of experts able to meet any future challenges in the area of non-proliferation and safeguards. (author)

Current and Future Challenges for Asian Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Regional Response

Science.gov (United States)

2004-10-01

degree of financial interdependence was evidenced by the 1997 financial crisis, which resulted in the Chiang Mai + 3 Initiative.ř Intra-company trade...financial crisis, the finance ministers of ASEAN+3 countries (China, Japan, and South Korea) reached agreement on the " Chiang Mai Initiative," which...stability. The Chiang Mai Initiative has contributed to improving exchange rate stability and in doing so may also have contributed to closer regional

Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Redick, J.R.

1981-01-01

The regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco supports peace and security in the Latin American region and global nonproliferation efforts. Circumstances leading to the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone include careful preparations and negotiations, individual leadership, existence of certain shared cultural and legal traditions of Latin American countries, and the temporary stimulus of the Cuban missile crisis. The lack of overt superpower pressure on Latin America, compared with more turbulent regions, has permitted continued progress toward full realization of the zone. Tlatelolco's negotiating process, as well as the substance of the Treaty, deserve careful consideration relative to other areas. The Treaty enjoys wide international approval, but full support by certain Latin American States (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba) has been negatively affected by the failure of the US Senate to ratify Tlatelolco's Protocol I. Nuclear programs of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are expanding rapidly and these nations are forming linkages with West European countries, rather than the United States. The May 1980 Argentine-Brazilian nuclear agreement foresees significant cooperation between the two nation's nuclear energy commissions and more coordinated resistance to the nuclear supplier countries. Argentine-Brazilian nuclear convergence and the response accorded to it by the United States will have significant implications for the future of the Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America. 52 references

The SSAC in international safeguards and non-proliferation aspects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bett, F.L.; Humphreys, J.J.

1989-01-01

The history of international efforts against horizontal proliferation, including the Baruch Plan, bilateral safeguards agreement, IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines and the Physical Protection Convention, is reviewed. The role of IAEA NPT safeguards in verifying nondiversion and ensuring no misuse of supplied nuclear items is discussed. The vital importance of successful performance of this role to peaceful nuclear commerce is stressed. The application of NPT safeguards by the IAEA is described, particularly the IAEA's requirement that a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material be established. Such a State System has two different but complementary areas of responsibility - ensuring that the use of nuclear material is controlled effectively and can be readily accounted for (this includes the area of physical protection), and providing accounts of nuclear material to responsible bodies such as the State's government and equally importantly to the IAEA for safeguards purpose, as the IAEA bases its conclusions about diversion on its verification of the data provided by the State System

75 FR 18029 - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Export-Controlled Items (DFARS Case 2004-D010)

Science.gov (United States)

2010-04-08

... regulations and prescribes a contract clause to address those responsibilities. DATES: Effective Date: April 8... activities and communication between the parties to a potential contract, and to have the resulting contract... Government needs to convey to the universities the information that certain work is export-controlled. DoD...

Nuclear nonproliferation: Concerns with US delays in accepting foregin research reactors' spent fuel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

One key US nonproliferation goal is to discourage use of highly enriched uranium fuel (HEU), which can be used to make nuclear bombs, in civilian nuclear programs worldwide. DOE's Off-Site Fuels Policy for taking back spent HEU from foreign research reactors was allowed to expire due to environmental reasons. This report provides information on the effects of delays in renewing the Off-Site Fuels Policy on US nonproliferation goals and programs (specifically the reduced enrichment program), DOE's efforts to renew the fuels policy, and the price to be charged to the operators of foreign reactors for DOE's activities in taking back spent fuel

Germany and the nuclear non-proliferation; Current situation and prospects; Deutschland und die nukleare Nichtverbreitung; Zwischenbilanz und Ausblick

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Preisinger, J.

1993-07-01

A summary is given of the consequences, both positive and negative, of international non-proliferation policy. The numerous, complex branches and connections of national measures and inter-stake agreements for the peaceful, controlled uses of nuclear technology and related military technologies are expertly described, and assessed on their effectiveness. Weak aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime are pointed out and past reforms are illustrated and assessed in the light of recent developments. The interests of the German Federal Republic from the centre of this analysis. The author shows that, after a certain hesitary, German diplomacy has now become active in the establishment of an international non-proliferation regime. He concludes that Germany should take a strong initiative role in maintaining a peaceful international nuclear order. (orig.) [Deutsch] Es wird ein Resuemee der bisherigen Erfolge und Misserfolge internationaler Nichtverbreitungspolitik gezogen. Die komplexen, vielfach veraestelten und verschachtelten nationalen Massnahmen und zwischenstaatlichen Vereinbarungen zur Ueberwachung und friedlichen Zweckbindung von Nukleartechnologie und militaerisch relevanten Anschlusstechnologien werden sachkundig erlaeutert und auf ihre Wirksamkeit ueberprueft. Schwachstellen des nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregimes werden offengelegt, Reformschritte der vergangenen Jahre werden dargestellt und im Lichte der juengsten Entwicklungen bewertet. Dabei steht die Interessenlage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Zentrum der Analyse. Der Autor zeigt, dass die deutsche Diplomatie sich nach einer gewissen Zurueckhaltung schliesslich aktiv in die Gestaltung des internationalen Nichtverbreitungsregimes eingeschaltet hat. Er plaediert fuer eine kraftvolle Initiativrolle Deutschlands zur Erhaltung einer friedlichen internationalen Nuklearordnung. (orig.)

Export strategy

DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

Knudsen, Thorbjørn; Koed Madsen, Tage

2002-01-01

It is argued here that traditional export strategy research (encompassing the study of internationalization processes and export performance) is characterized by weak theoretical foundations and could benefit from a reorientation towards a dynamic capabilities perspective (DCP). We seek to draw...... on insights from DCP in order to devise a theoretical basis that could enrich export strategy research. Although our development of DCP insights builds on previous work, it also adds a crucial distinction between knowledge stocks and informational architecture. Changes in architecture are of greater...... importance. Following this elaboration of the dynamic capabilities perspective, we outline some implications and guidelines for future export strategy research....

Evaluating Russian Dual-Use Nuclear Exports

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Bitterman, Blaine S

2007-01-01

...; however, some of its actions contradict its rhetoric. Although Russia's violation of international agreements on nonproliferation is minimal, it is important to understand why Russia transfers nuclear technology...

Perceived impediments to export involvement among small and medium sized firms : non-exporters perspective

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Mercy Mpinganjira

2011-12-01

Full Text Available Purpose: The main purpose of this paper is to examine perceived impediments to export involvement among non-exporting small and medium sized firms (SME's in Malawi. The study also examines levels of interest in exporting among the firms. Problem investigated: Many countries have programs aimed at promoting export involvement among SME's. Despite this, most SME's continue to ignore exporting as a viable business strategy. Information on perceived impediments to export involvement especially from the non-exporters' perspective is often lacking hence the need for this study. Methodology: Data was collected from 80 owner managers of non-exporting SME's. A structured questionnaire was the main instrument used to collect data. Personal interviews were also held with managers for the purposes of probing their answers to the questions in the questionnaire. Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS version 18 was used to analyse the quantitative data obtained from use of the structured questionnaire. Qualitative data obtained through personal interviews was analysed used thematic analysis. Findings: The findings of the study showed significant levels of interest in exporting among the firms. The majority of the owner managers indicated willingness to exploit export opportunities that may be readily available to them. The findings however showed that just over half of the respondents had discussed or investigated the possibility of exporting before. On impediments to exporting, the findings showed that managers perceive many factors as important impediments to their firm's involvement in exporting. The top two most important impediments were internal to the firm and related to human resource issues. They included insufficient knowledge about export opportunities and lack of personnel knowledgeable in exporting. Originality and value of the research: A review of literature shows that most export promotion studies tend to focus more on issues relating to

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

Pakistan's national legislation entitled: 'Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2004-01-01

The Director General has received a letter from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan, dated 4 November 2004, concerning Pakistan's national legislation entitled 'Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004'. As requested by the Permanent Mission of Pakistan, the letter and the Export Control Act of 2004, are reproduced herein for the information of the Member States

A prototype system dynamic model of nuclear and radiological export controls in Central Asia and the Caucasus; enhancing the effectiveness of preventing illicit nuclear material trafficking

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ferguston, C.D.; Ouagrham, S.B.

2002-01-01

An urgent need calls out for improved border security and export control systems in the Central Asian and Caucasus regions to prevent illicit nuclear and radioactive materials trafficking. Effective nuclear and radiological exports controls are essential because these regions contain numerous nuclear facilities and radioactive materials as well as lie at the crossroads between seekers and suppliers of technologies that could be employed in nuclear and radiological weapons. Porous and unprotected borders compound these concerns. Moreover, the states within these regions are struggling with forming new regulations and laws, obtaining sufficient portal monitoring equipment, training customs and border security personnel, and coordinating these activities with neighboring states. Building this infrastructure all at once can severely task any government. Thus, unsurprisingly, most of these states have inadequate export control and border security systems. To enable each state in these regions determine how to better prevent illicit nuclear and radiological materials trafficking, the authors have developed a prototype system dynamics model focused on evaluating and improving of effectiveness of export controls. System dynamics modeling, a management tool that grew out of the field of system engineering and nonlinear dynamics, uses two structures: causal loop diagrams and stock and flow diagrams. The former shows how endogenous systematic factors interact with each other to produce feedback mechanisms that results in either balancing or reinforcing loops. A classic example is a arms race, modeled as a vicious cycle or reinforcing loop. In addition to interacting with each other, causal loops influence the flow of stock, which is material concern. In the export control system dynamics model, the stock represents nuclear and radioactive materials. System dynamics modelling is an iterative process that is continually modified by user input. Therefore, export control

Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

2009-10-01

Global Partnership and the UNSC Resolution 1540. However, this is only partially true as there is a growing realisation that radiation protection as well as emergency preparedness is part and parcel of the objectives that the international community is striving towards. Some of the projects have a genuinely humanitarian or civilian nature in the sense that they aim at alleviating for instance natural radiation such as from radon. But on the other hand, certain activities that concern radiation protection in terms of reducing the emissions of radiation from radioactive materials also become a security component with regard to the physical protection measures that in most cases will have to be in place. The projects in this field are implemented in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. There are a total of 22 projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation and security, the geographical scope of SSM's activities is broad and stretching beyond the nearest parts of Russia and other neighbouring states. This has to do with the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies relies on human will and therefore an amount of irradiated nuclear fuel in Siberia may be just as dangerous as a similar or smaller amount much closer to Sweden. It all depends on the people involved and their intentions. Sweden cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in this particular field. The projects include the installation of physical protection at facilities with nuclear and radioactive materials; the application of safeguards or nuclear materials accountancy on nuclear materials; assistance to the improvement of national export control systems as well as education in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. SSM participates in a number of projects that are financed by the EU. The projects were initiated in the framework of TACIS and soon to be formulated in the framework of INSC. TACIS focussed on the

Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

2009-10-15

foreseen by for instance the Global Partnership and the UNSC Resolution 1540. However, this is only partially true as there is a growing realisation that radiation protection as well as emergency preparedness is part and parcel of the objectives that the international community is striving towards. Some of the projects have a genuinely humanitarian or civilian nature in the sense that they aim at alleviating for instance natural radiation such as from radon. But on the other hand, certain activities that concern radiation protection in terms of reducing the emissions of radiation from radioactive materials also become a security component with regard to the physical protection measures that in most cases will have to be in place. The projects in this field are implemented in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. There are a total of 22 projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In the field of nuclear non-proliferation and security, the geographical scope of SSM's activities is broad and stretching beyond the nearest parts of Russia and other neighbouring states. This has to do with the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons, materials and technologies relies on human will and therefore an amount of irradiated nuclear fuel in Siberia may be just as dangerous as a similar or smaller amount much closer to Sweden. It all depends on the people involved and their intentions. Sweden cooperates with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia in this particular field. The projects include the installation of physical protection at facilities with nuclear and radioactive materials; the application of safeguards or nuclear materials accountancy on nuclear materials; assistance to the improvement of national export control systems as well as education in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. SSM participates in a number of projects that are financed by the EU. The projects were initiated in the framework of TACIS and soon to be formulated in the framework of

Paranoids, pygmies, pariahs and nonproliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Betts, R.K.

1977-01-01

The spread of nuclear weapons has finally become a central item on the foreign policy agenda. But the fervor of most opponents of proliferation has been matched only by their reluctance to deal with the causes of the threat. The misplaced focus on ways to isolate weapons-related capabilities obscures the importance of the stickier but more salient problem of the incentives many nations have to get a bomb: fear or ambition. As long as antiproliferation strategy goes no further than schemes to keep the genie in a few bottles, we risk doing both more and less than necessary. Distressingly few arms-control enthusiasts have faced up to the full price of nonproliferation. The needed reorientation in thinking, which is really only a return to the ageless problem of balance of power, has been impeded by prevalent fallacies of emphasis about what causes the threat, who the candidates for proliferation are, and what strategies are applicable to which candidates. The author proceeds to discuss: (1) causes (the moralist fallacy, the economic fallacy, the diseconomic fallacy, and the technicist fallacy); (2) candidates (the pygmy states, the paranoid states, the pariah states, and five options of the U.S.); (3) cures (the fatalist fallacy, the multilateral fallacy, the embargo fallacy, the safeguards fallacy, the umbrella fallacy, the two-wrongs-don't-make-a-right fallacy, and the golden key fallacy); and (4) choices

Hydrologic control of nitrogen removal, storage, and export in a mountain stream

Science.gov (United States)

Hall, R.O.; Baker, M.A.; Arp, C.D.; Kocha, B.J.

2009-01-01

Nutrient cycling and export in streams and rivers should vary with flow regime, yet most studies of stream nutrient transformation do not include hydrologic variability. We used a stable isotope tracer of nitrogen (15N) to measure nitrate (NO3) uptake, storage, and export in a mountain stream, Spring Creek, Idaho, U.S.A. We conducted two tracer tests of 2-week duration during snowmelt and baseflow. Dissolved and particulate forms of 15N were monitored over three seasons to test the hypothesis that stream N cycling would be dominated by export during floods, and storage during low flow. Floods exported more N than during baseflow conditions; however, snowmelt floods had higher than expected demand for NO{3 because of hyporheic exchange. Residence times of benthic N during both tracer tests were longer than 100 d for ephemeral pools such as benthic algae and wood biofilms. Residence times were much longer in fine detritus, insects, and the particulate N from the hyporheic zone, showing that assimilation and hydrologic storage can be important mechanisms for retaining particulate N. Of the tracer N stored in the stream, the primary form of export was via seston during periods of high flows, produced by summer rainstorms or spring snowmelt the following year. Spring Creek is not necessarily a conduit for nutrients during high flow; hydrologic exchange between the stream and its valley represents an important storage mechanism.

Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yoshisaki, M.B.

1993-01-01

The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

Economic and Nonproliferation Analysis Framework for Assessing Reliable Nuclear Fuel Service Arrangements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Phillips, Jon R.; Kreyling, Sean J.; Short, Steven M.; Weimar, Mark R.

2010-01-01

Nuclear power is now broadly recognized as an essential technology in national strategies to provide energy security while meeting carbon management goals. Yet a long standing conundrum remains: how to enable rapid growth in the global nuclear power infrastructure while controlling the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies that lie at the heart of nuclear fuel supply and nuclear weapons programs. Reducing the latent proliferation risk posed by a broader horizontal spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology has been a primary goal of national nuclear supplier policies since the beginning of the nuclear power age. Attempts to control the spread of sensitive nuclear technology have been the subject of numerous initiatives in the intervening decades sometimes taking the form of calls to develop fuel supply and service assurances to reduce market pull to increase the number of states with fuel cycle capabilities. A clear understanding of what characteristics of specific reliable nuclear fuel service (RNFS) and supply arrangements qualify them as 'attractive offers' is critical to the success of current and future efforts. At a minimum, RNFS arrangements should provide economic value to all participants and help reduce latent proliferation risks posed by the global expansion of nuclear power. In order to inform the technical debate and the development of policy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has been developing an analytical framework to evaluate the economics and nonproliferation merits of alternative approaches to RNFS arrangements. This paper provides a brief overview of the economic analysis framework developed and applied to a model problem of current interest: full-service nuclear fuel leasing arrangements. Furthermore, this paper presents an extended outline of a proposed analysis approach to evaluate the non-proliferation merits of various RNFS alternatives.

The impact of non-proliferation policies on the uranium market - an industry view

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)