WorldWideScience

Sample records for nonproliferation advanced defense

  1. Nonproliferation characteristics of advanced fuel cycle concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiatives and safeguards methods and systems. Alternative cycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products

  2. Non-proliferation and advances in nuclear science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iyengar, P.K.

    1995-01-01

    So far, the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has concentrated on safeguard regimes based on technologies relating to the production of uranium and plutonium in nuclear reactors, and on their potential diversion for use in nuclear weapons. As nuclear science advances, however, nuclear technology both peaceful and for weapons will change, and for the NPT to remain relevant, it must reflect these changes. At this juncture, when the NPT is coming up for review in a year's time, it is important for physicists to take a fresh look at recent advances in nuclear science, and inform the policy-makers and the public at large about their potential for impacting nuclear technology in the future. In this article a few such advances are highlighted and their implications for the NPT are considered. (author). 4 refs

  3. Advanced thermal management technologies for defense electronics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bloschock, Kristen P.; Bar-Cohen, Avram

    2012-05-01

    Thermal management technology plays a key role in the continuing miniaturization, performance improvements, and higher reliability of electronic systems. For the past decade, and particularly, the past 4 years, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has aggressively pursued the application of micro- and nano-technology to reduce or remove thermal constraints on the performance of defense electronic systems. The DARPA Thermal Management Technologies (TMT) portfolio is comprised of five technical thrust areas: Thermal Ground Plane (TGP), Microtechnologies for Air-Cooled Exchangers (MACE), NanoThermal Interfaces (NTI), Active Cooling Modules (ACM), and Near Junction Thermal Transport (NJTT). An overview of the TMT program will be presented with emphasis on the goals and status of these efforts relative to the current State-of-the-Art. The presentation will close with future challenges and opportunities in the thermal management of defense electronics.

  4. Cooperative transparency for nonproliferation. Technology demonstrations at the Joyo test bed for advanced remote monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Betsill, J. David; Hashimoto, Yu

    2009-01-01

    The term 'Transparency' has been used widely by many authors and practitioners for various purposes, and there is an assortment of definitions for the term. These definitions vary depending on the field in which the term is used and within the context of its usage. For the purposes of our current project on regional, cooperative nonproliferation transparency and remote monitoring, the relevant field is nuclear nonproliferation, and in this context, we define the term Cooperative Nonproliferation Transparency as: 'Providing sufficient and appropriate information to a cooperating party so that they can independently develop their own evaluation and assessment of the reviewed party regarding their consistency with nonproliferation goals.' Key aspects of cooperative nonproliferation transparency activities include mutually agreeing upon the type of information or data that will be shared, how it will be collected, and who has access to that information. The Japan Atomic Energy Agency's (JAEA) Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) has been exploring the possible use, development, and application of methods and technologies for Cooperative Transparency for Nonproliferation to support regional confidence building and cooperation n the peaceful use of nuclear energy throughout the East Asia region. (author)

  5. Terminating Safeguards on Excess Special Nuclear Material: Defense TRU Waste Clean-up and Nonproliferation - 12426

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hayes, Timothy [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Carlsbad Operations Group (United States); Nelson, Roger [Department Of Energy, Carlsbad Operations Office (United States)

    2012-07-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) manages defense nuclear material that has been determined to be excess to programmatic needs and declared waste. When these wastes contain plutonium, they almost always meet the definition of defense transuranic (TRU) waste and are thus eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The DOE operates the WIPP in a manner that physical protections for attractiveness level D or higher special nuclear material (SNM) are not the normal operating condition. Therefore, there is currently a requirement to terminate safeguards before disposal of these wastes at the WIPP. Presented are the processes used to terminate safeguards, lessons learned during the termination process, and how these approaches might be useful for future defense TRU waste needing safeguards termination prior to shipment and disposal at the WIPP. Also described is a new criticality control container, which will increase the amount of fissile material that can be loaded per container, and how it will save significant taxpayer dollars. Retrieval, compliant packaging and shipment of retrievably stored legacy TRU waste has dominated disposal operations at WIPP since it began operations 12 years ago. But because most of this legacy waste has successfully been emplaced in WIPP, the TRU waste clean-up focus is turning to newly-generated TRU materials. A major component will be transuranic SNM, currently managed in safeguards-protected vaults around the weapons complex. As DOE and NNSA continue to consolidate and shrink the weapons complex footprint, it is expected that significant quantities of transuranic SNM will be declared surplus to the nation's needs. Safeguards termination of SNM varies due to the wide range of attractiveness level of the potential material that may be directly discarded as waste. To enhance the efficiency of shipping waste with high TRU fissile content to WIPP, DOE designed an

  6. Programs that support non-proliferation and defense conversion funded by the US Government

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rutkowski, H.L.

    1994-08-01

    The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons is a serious problem for international security. Consequently the U.S. government has established an array of programs to fund activities that will inhibit this activity. The problem of proliferation and defense conversion, in general, is quite complicated. The most immediate concern is the actual diversion of weapons materials. In the long term; however, weapons of mass destruction must be destroyed in a safe and environmentally sound manner. Ultimately the solution of the proliferation problem lies in the redirection of the intellectual skills of weapons scientists and engineers to peaceful commercial activities. At the present time the economic conditions in the New Independent States create severe pressure on people with critical weapons knowledge to sell their skills to political entities that are dangerous. There are four programs to be discussed in this paper. The first is the open-quotes Nunn-Lugarclose quotes program which is the largest and is administered by the Department of Defense. Between FY92 and FY94 Congress authorized $1.2B for this activity which is aimed at weapons destruction, storage, and safeguards. The second is the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and the Science Center about to open in Ukraine. These are joint efforts involving the U.S., the European Community, and Japan to fund projects to prevent proliferation and foster commercial technological activity in Russia, Georgia, and Ukraine. The New Independent States - Industrial Partnering Program is a $35M (FY94) program jointly administered by the Department of Energy and the Department of State

  7. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented

  8. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented.

  9. Defense Department funds advanced military wireless networks research

    OpenAIRE

    Crumbley, Liz

    2005-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Defense has awarded a $246,000 Defense University Research Instrumentation Program (DURIP) grant to researchers in Virginia Tech's Bradley Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering for advanced research on wireless communications networks that are critical during military maneuvers.

  10. On the structure of nonproliferation measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kano, Takashi

    1994-01-01

    The author proposed a new analysis method of nonproliferation measures depending on full perception of common threat of nuclear proliferation to entire human being. Nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan were analysed by this method and it revealed the following results: 1) There is a large discrepancy between the nuclear nonproliferation policies of the US and Japan mainly because of the different standpoints of both nations and partly because of the difference of understanding on the definition of nonproliferation, and the object of nonproliferation measures. 2) The total structure of nuclear nonproliferation measures becomes more visible through categorization of nonproliferation measures, depending on implementater, target for implementation, characteristics of the measures (soft-liner, legal, or hard-liner) and risk factor for reduction of the total risk of nuclear weapon use. 3) The total structure of nonproliferation measures is multi-barrier structure on the process to reach the actual nuclear weapon use, and each barrier is composed of multi-defense in depth structure including various soft-liner, legal, and hard-linear measures. 4) Various nonproliferation measures can be stored in a data base, based on the proposed structural analysis, which enables further comprehensive analysis for specific purposes efficiently. (author)

  11. Nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neubert, M.

    1992-01-01

    The following motion was put before the United Kingdom House of Commons on 3rd February 1992 and agreed; that this House, recognising the potential dangers of the rapidly changing world order, welcomes the recent proposals for substantial reductions in nuclear weaponry, the growing support for the non-proliferation treaty and progress in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning the dismantling of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities; urges the Government to play their full part in helping the relevant authorities in the Commonwealth of Independent States to dismantle their nuclear devices, to safeguard their nuclear components and to discourage the proliferation of nuclear expertise; and believes it is of the first importance that Britain retains an effective and credible minimum nuclear deterrent as security in a world where there remain many sources of instability. The record of arguments for and against the motion in the debate is presented. (author)

  12. Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report: Class of 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McMakin, Andrea H.

    2012-08-20

    Annual report for the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Features the Class of 2011. The NGFP is a NNSA program with a mission to cultivate future technical and policy leaders in nonproliferation and international security. Through the NGFP, outstanding graduate students with career interests in nonproliferation are appointed to program offices within the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). During their one-year assignment, Fellows participate in programs designed to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  13. Department of Defense Strategic Plan for Advanced Distributed Learning

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1999-01-01

    ...), requires the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategic plan for guiding and expanding distance learning initiatives within the Department of Defense, to include a provision for the expansion...

  14. State Department Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) Policy: A Nod to Non-Proliferation

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Cabot, Jr, Nelson

    2003-01-01

    ...) in regions where a like capability has yet to be introduced. The policy was conceived as an attempt to foster regional stability in regions where the proliferation of advanced weaponry may lead to the start of a local arms race...

  15. Future non-proliferation challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yelchenko, Volodymyr

    2008-01-01

    Having chaired the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee Mr. Volodymyr Yelchenko noted that the NPT States parties reaffirmed the important role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. They stressed that non-compliance with the Treaty provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation and placed emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. The universality aspect was brought to the front with the lack of progress in this area. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states, promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring non-proliferation. There is concern that non-States actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. One of the underlying themes at the Second Prepcom was the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation. Negative consequences to nuclear non-proliferation were also mentioned in the context of the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defense systems, with the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the urgent conclusion of such a treaty as a beneficial step towards non-proliferation was stressed. The NPT states parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for

  16. Recent advances in computational intelligence in defense and security

    CERN Document Server

    Falcon, Rafael; Zincir-Heywood, Nur; Abbass, Hussein

    2016-01-01

    This volume is an initiative undertaken by the IEEE Computational Intelligence Society’s Task Force on Security, Surveillance and Defense to consolidate and disseminate the role of CI techniques in the design, development and deployment of security and defense solutions. Applications range from the detection of buried explosive hazards in a battlefield to the control of unmanned underwater vehicles, the delivery of superior video analytics for protecting critical infrastructures or the development of stronger intrusion detection systems and the design of military surveillance networks. Defense scientists, industry experts, academicians and practitioners alike will all benefit from the wide spectrum of successful applications compiled in this volume. Senior undergraduate or graduate students may also discover uncharted territory for their own research endeavors.

  17. 75 FR 40857 - Webinar About Advanced Defense Technologies RFP

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-07-14

    ... regional innovation clusters, as well as experience fostering small business development and growth... from existing regional innovation clusters specializing in defense technologies to provide counseling... cluster areas and industries. SBA intends to make awards to multiple regional innovation clusters that can...

  18. The nonproliferation predicament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.

    1985-01-01

    This book presents papers on the non-proliferation policy being advocated by the U.S. Topics considered include political aspects, proliferation, national security, government policies, NATO, arms control, nuclear disarmament, the balance of power, U.S. foreign policy, dealing with the problem countries, international cooperation, the nuclear marketplace, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, legislation, congressional interest and input, ethical aspects, military strategy, public opinion, and terrorist groups

  19. Allowable residual contamination levels: transuranic advanced disposal systems for defense waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kennedy, W.E. Jr.; Napier, B.A.

    1982-01-01

    An evaluation of advanced disposal systems for defense transuranic (TRU) wastes is being conducted using the Allowable Residual Contamination Level (ARCL) method. The ARCL method is based on compliance with a radiation dose rate limit through a site-specific analysis of the potential for radiation exposure to individuals. For defense TRU wastes at the Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, various advanced disposal techniques are being studied to determine their potential for application. This paper presents a discussion of the results of the first stage of the TRU advanced disposal systems project

  20. Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Strategies for Advanced Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threats

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-01-01

    annual investment of about $2.5 billion. The study also recommended that the Department of Defense enhance its ab ility to perform the kinds of broad...homeland fundamentally change the nature of the problem to one of strategic deterrence and that the spirit of the terms of reference was more...adversary investments in regional, precision attack cruise and ballistic threaten that foundation, investments that have dramatically increased both

  1. Leveraging U.S. nuclear weapons policy to advance U.S. nonproliferation goals : implications of major theories of international relations.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Walter, Andrew

    2009-06-01

    National policymakers are currently considering a dilemma of critical importance to the continued security of the United States: how can U.S. nuclear weapons policies be leveraged to benefit U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals in the near-term, without sacrificing U.S. national security? In its role supporting U.S. nuclear weapons policy, Sandia National Laboratories has a responsibility to provide objective technical advice to support policy deliberations on this question. However, to best fulfill this duty Sandia must have a broader understanding of the context of the problem. To help develop this understanding, this paper analyzes the two predominant analytical perspectives of international relations theory to explore their prescriptions for how nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policies interact. As lenses with which to view and make sense of the world, theories of international relations must play a crucial role in framing the trade-offs at the intersection of the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation policy domains. An analysis of what these theories suggest as courses of action to leverage nuclear weapons policies to benefit nonproliferation goals is then offered, with particular emphasis on where the policy prescriptions resulting from the respective theories align to offer near-term policy changes with broad theoretical support. These policy prescriptions are then compared to the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to understand what the theories indicate policymakers may have gotten right in their dealing with the nuclear dilemma, and where they may have gone wrong. Finally, a brief international relations research agenda is proposed to help address the dilemma between nuclear deterrence and nuclear nonproliferation policies, with particular emphasis on how such an agenda can best support the needs of the policy community and a potential 'all things nuclear' policy deliberation and decision-support framework.

  2. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    DOE's nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities are defined by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). The Department's major responsibilities in this area are to: (1) provide technical assistance to the Department of State in negotiating agreements for civil cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other countries and international organizations; (2) join with other agencies to reach executive branch judgments with respect to the issuance of export licenses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (3) be responsible for processing subsequent arrangements with other agencies as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act; (4) control the distribution of special nuclear materials, components, equipment, and nuclear technology exports; (5) participate in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign governments and organizations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (6) act as a primary technical resource with respect to US participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency

  3. Advanced Optical Technologies for Defense Trauma and Critical Care

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Berns, Michael W

    2008-01-01

    ...: High Resolution F-OCT and MPM/SHG Imaging of the Oral-Nasal Cavity Diffuse Optical Spectroscopy in Critical Patient Medicine, Optical Therapeutics in Cartilage for the Treatment of Traumatic Injuries and Degenerative Disease, Advanced Optical Technologies for Orthopedic Applications.

  4. Attacks and their Defenses for Advanced Metering Infrastructure

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Lighari, Sheeraz Niaz; Hussain, Dil Muhammad Akbar; Bak-Jensen, Birgitte

    2014-01-01

    The smart grid is the digitized, modernized, updated version of archaic traditional electric grid. Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is an imperative part of the smart grid. It has replaced legacy metering, as it reports the energy consumption to the utility automatically through communicati...

  5. In Defense of Advance Organizers: A Reply to the Critics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ausubel, David P.

    1978-01-01

    The most common criticism of advance organizers is that their definition and instructions for construction are vague. Ausubel's books and research articles offer a precise operational definition. Construction can only be described generally because it varies according to nature of learning material, age of learner, and learner's degree of…

  6. Multilateral Cooperation on Nonproliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-10-01

    Nathan E . Busch and Daniel H. Joyner, eds., Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy (Athens, GA...or the World Bank . These organizations receive contributions from member states but have their own...Opening Reception Jack’s Lounge , Portola Hotel Friday, March 30, 2010 Timeline Content Delivery 7:30-8:30 Breakfast and Registration Cottonwood

  7. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

  8. Heavy water and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.M.

    1980-05-01

    This report begins with a historical sketch of heavy water. The report next assesses the nonproliferation implications of the use of heavy water-moderated power reactors; several different reactor types are discussed, but the focus is on the natural uranium, on-power fueled, pressure tube reactor CANDU. The need for and development of on-power fueling safeguards is discussed. Also considered is the use of heavy water in plutonium production reactors as well as the broader issue of the relative nuclear leverage that suppliers can bring to bear on countries with natural uranium-fueled reactors as compared to those using enriched designs. The final chapter reviews heavy water production methods and analyzes the difficulties involved in implementing these on both a large and a small scale. It concludes with an overview of proprietary and nonproliferation constraints on heavy water technology transfer

  9. Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report; ANNUAL

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    NONE

    2000-01-01

    This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community

  10. Chemical and biological nonproliferation program. FY99 annual report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-03-01

    This document is the first of what will become an annual report documenting the progress made by the Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program (CBNP). It is intended to be a summary of the program's activities that will be of interest to both policy and technical audiences. This report and the annual CBNP Summer Review Meeting are important vehicles for communication with the broader chemical and biological defense and nonproliferation communities. The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program Strategic Plan is also available and provides additional detail on the program's context and goals. The body of the report consists of an overview of the program's philosophy, goals and recent progress in the major program areas. In addition, an appendix is provided with more detailed project summaries that will be of interest to the technical community.

  11. Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manley, I.T.

    1981-01-01

    Proliferation is a problem that can only be solved when the political problems which lead countries to contemplate, the possession of nuclear weapons are solved; in the meantime it can only be managed. Non-proliferation policy has to deal both with the political and the technical aspects of proliferation. It must seek to buy time by addressing the reasons why nations feel the political need to construct nuclear weapons, as well as delaying the moment when such nations feel capable of doing so. The subject is examined and proposals made. (author)

  12. Reagan outlines nonproliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walsh, J.

    1981-01-01

    The Reagan Administration wants to shift from efforts to impose direct control over the fuel cycle and nuclear technology to a framework based on cooperation and initiatives for greater political stability. A nuclear-free zone for the Middle East is one area to explore. Congress responded to this announced plan with a counter move to tighten non-proliferation strategies. Reagan's policy will be to restore the US as an aggressive, but reliable nuclear trading partner operating under adequate safeguards. Critics find this approach dangerous and contradictory. The policy is still too general to answer specific questions about bilateral arrangements, generic permits, plutonium recycling, and other matters

  13. 1995 - a pivotal year for nuclear nonproliferation. German nonproliferation policy in the runup to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Preisinger, J.

    1994-01-01

    The paper describes the non-proliferation as a task of preventive security policy, the non-proliferation instruments, the content of an extended non-proliferation system, and tasks of German non-proliferation policy. (DG)

  14. 78 FR 9768 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-11

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8184] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice...

  15. 78 FR 9769 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-02-11

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 8182] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on Chinese and Iranian Foreign Persons AGENCY: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: The U.S. Government...

  16. Fast reactors and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Orlov, V.V.

    1997-01-01

    1.Three aspects of nonproliferation relevant to nuclear power are: Pu buildup in NPP spent fuel cooling ponds (∼ 104 t in case of consumption of ∼ 107 t cheap uranium). Danger of illegal radiochemical extraction of Pu for weapons production; Pu extraction from NPP fuel at the plants available in nuclear countries, its burning along with weapon-grade Pu in NPP reactors or in special-purpose burners; increased hazard of nuclear weapons sprawl with breeders and closed fuel cycle technology spreading all over the world. 2.The latter is one of major obstacles to creation of large-scale nuclear power. 3.Nuclear power of the first stage using 235 U will be able to meet the demands of certain fuel-deficient countries and regions, replacing ∼ 5-10% of conventional fuels in the global consumption for a number of decades. 4.Fast reactors of the first generation and the currently employed fuel technology are far from exhausting their potential for solving economic problems and meeting the challenges of safety, radioactive waste and nonproliferation. Development of large-scale nuclear power will become an option accepted by society for solving energy problems in the following century, provided a breeder technology is elaborated and demonstrated in the next 15-20 years, which would comply with the totality of the following requirement: full internal Pu breeding deterministic elimination of severe accidents involving fuel damage and high radioactivity releases: fast runaway, loss of coolant, fires, steam and hydrogen explosions, etc.; reaching a balance between radioactive wastes disposed of and uranium mined in terms of radiation hazard; technology of closed fuel cycle preventing its use for Pu extraction and permitting physical protection from fuel thefts;economic competitiveness of nuclear power for most of countries and regions, i.e. primarily the cost of NPPs with fat reactors is to be below the cost of modern LWR plants, etc

  17. Broadening Industry Governance to Include Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

    2008-11-11

    As industry is the first line of defense in detecting and thwarting illicit trade networks, the engagement of the private sector is critical to any government effort to strengthen existing mechanisms to protect goods and services throughout the supply chain. This study builds on previous PNNL work to continue to evaluate means for greater industry engagement to complement and strengthen existing governmental efforts to detect and stem the trade of illicit goods and to protect and secure goods that could be used in making a weapon of mass destruction. Specifically, the study evaluates the concept of Industry Self Regulation, defined as a systematic voluntary program undertaken by an industry or by individual companies to anticipate, implement, supplement, or substitute for regulatory requirements in a given field, generally through the adoption of best practices. Through a series of interviews with companies with a past history of non-compliance, trade associations and NGOs, the authors identify gaps in the existing regulatory infrastructure, drivers for a self regulation approach and the form such an approach might take, as well as obstacles to be overcome. The authors conclude that it is at the intersection of industry, government, and security that—through collaborative means—the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation system—can be most effectively strengthened to the mutual benefit of both government and the private sector. Industry has a critical stake in the success of this regime, and has the potential to act as an integrating force that brings together the existing mechanisms of the global nonproliferation regime: export controls, physical protection, and safeguards. The authors conclude that industry compliance is not enough; rather, nonproliferation must become a central tenant of a company’s corporate culture and be viewed as an integral component of corporate social responsibility (CSR).

  18. NATO Advanced Study Institute on Laser Control & Monitoring in New Materials, Biomedicine, Environment, Security & Defense

    CERN Document Server

    Hall, Trevor J; Paredes, Sofia A; Extreme Photonics & Applications

    2010-01-01

    "Extreme Photonics & Applications" arises from the 2008 NATO Advanced Study Institute in Laser Control & Monitoring in New Materials, Biomedicine, Environment, Security and Defense. Leading experts in the manipulation of light offered by recent advances in laser physics and nanoscience were invited to give lectures in their fields of expertise and participate in discussions on current research, applications and new directions. The sum of their contributions to this book is a primer for the state of scientific knowledge and the issues within the subject of photonics taken to the extreme frontiers: molding light at the ultra-finest scales, which represents the beginning of the end to limitations in optical science for the benefit of 21st Century technological societies. Laser light is an exquisite tool for physical and chemical research. Physicists have recently developed pulsed lasers with such short durations that one laser shot takes the time of one molecular vibration or one electron rotation in an ...

  19. International scientific collaboration in nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Travelli, A.

    1998-01-01

    International collaboration is a vital component of every serious nonproliferation effort. Several examples of the experiences that the Argonne Arms Control and Nonproliferation Program has had in this area are given and, in the process, important components of the program come to light. Some of the main principles that the program has learned to follow while pursuing international collaboration projects are shared, as are the pitfalls that the program has learned to avoid. (author)

  20. Robust Indicators of Nonproliferation Performance

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cowan, Mara R. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kurzrok, Andrew J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2014-02-13

    Understanding how the nuclear industry may benefit from self-regulation is closely linked with understanding how to report compliance activities for nonproliferation and export control objectives, as well as how to distinguish high and low compliance performance. Drawing on the corporate sustainability reporting model, nuclear and dual-use commodities industries can frame socially responsible self-regulatory activities to distinguish themselves as good nonproliferators.

  1. First annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to annual report to Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) requires that DOE's Annual Report include views and recommendations regarding non-proliferation policies and actions for which the Department is responsible. The Act also requires a detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative fuel cycles, including an unclassified summary and a comprehensive version containing relevant classified information. The goals of United States non-proliferation policy are to minimize the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a stable international environment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy

  2. Common sense and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kennedy, R.T.

    1985-01-01

    Since the dawn of the nuclear age nearly four decades ago, the United States has been firmly commited to the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. That principle is embodied in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), support for which has been a basic tenet of US foreign policy and a basic security interest of the world at large ever since. The Reagan administration remains firmly committed to the goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Such proliferation could trigger new and grave dangers for America's security and well-being and indeed for that of all the world's peoples. Desperate leaders in future high-stakes conflicts might not shrink from nuclear blackmail or even from the use of nuclear weapons if they were available. A conventional clash between nuclear-armed states in a conflict-prone region might escalate by accident or miscalculation to a local nuclear exchange. It cannot be discounted that such a nuclear clash might threaten to involve the superpowers themselves. With proliferation, also, terrorist groups could more easily acquire nuclear weapons to extort concessions. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, then, is not solely of interest to the superpowers: it is vital to all countries and regions. The security of the countries in those regions to which nuclear weapons might spread would be most immediately and seriously affected. By their adherence to the NPT, more than 100 countries have recognized this fact

  3. Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects of alternative fuel cycle concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1997-01-01

    Timely visibility on the development, evaluation and optimization of fuel cycle concepts with respect to nonproliferation characteristics should be emphasized in the early stage of planning a civilian nuclear power program, by fuel cycle developers, reviewers and decision makers. Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of nonproliferation characteristic profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the nonproliferation concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces these concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the nonproliferation characteristics of fuel cycle concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring the need to develop advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures. (author)

  4. MLDS: Multi-Layer Defense System for Preventing Advanced Persistent Threats

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Daesung Moon

    2014-12-01

    Full Text Available Here we report on the issue of Advanced Persistent Threats (APT, which use malware for the purpose of leaking the data of large corporations and government agencies. APT attacks target systems continuously by utilizing intelligent and complex technologies. To overthrow the elaborate security network of target systems, it conducts an attack after undergoing a pre-reconnaissance phase. An APT attack causes financial loss, information leakage, etc. They can easily bypass the antivirus system of a target system. In this paper, we propose a Multi-Layer Defense System (MLDS that can defend against APT. This system applies a reinforced defense system by collecting and analyzing log information and various information from devices, by installing the agent on the network appliance, server and end-user. It also discusses how to detect an APT attack when one cannot block the initial intrusion while continuing to conduct other activities. Thus, this system is able to minimize the possibility of initial intrusion and damages of the system by promptly responding through rapid detection of an attack when the target system is attacked.

  5. Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

    2012-01-01

    This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

  6. Management Principles for Nonproliferation Organizations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Hund, Gretchen

    2012-03-06

    This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited

  7. The international nuclear non-proliferation system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, T.

    1985-01-01

    This volume focuses upon the issues raised at this Conference, and attempts to address the international diplomatic, political and trading, rather than technical, questions which surround nuclear non-proliferation policies. It does so by bringing together chapters contributed by participants in non-proliferation diplomacy, those with experience in shaping International Atomic Energy Agency and national policies and academic observers of non-proliferation activities and the international nuclear industry. An analysis is provided of past non-proliferation policies and activities and current issues, and an attempt is made to offer ideas for new initiatives which may sustain the non-proliferation system in the future

  8. Future technology challenges in non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richardson, J.H.

    2004-01-01

    Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. For example, various gamma ray imaging approaches are being explored to combine spatial resolution with background suppression in order to enhance sensitivity at reasonable standoff distances and acquisition times. New materials and approaches are being developed in order to provide adequate energy resolution in field use without the necessity for liquid nitrogen. Finally, different detectors combined into distributed networks offer promise for detection and tracking of radioactive materials. As the world moves into the 21st century, the possibility of greater reliance on nuclear energy will impose additional technical requirements to prevent proliferation. In addition to proliferation resistant reactors, a careful examination of the various possible fuel cycles from cradle to grave will provide additional technical and nonproliferation challenges in the areas of conversion, enrichment, transportation, recycling and waste disposal. Radiation detection technology and information management have a prominent role in any future global regime for nonproliferation beyond the current Advanced Protocol. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. (author)

  9. Nuclear nonproliferation strategy in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jenkins, F.W.

    1989-07-01

    The most immediate danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons in Asia is in South Asia, where both India and Pakistan have developed the means of producing nuclear explosive materials. In East Asia, North Korea appears to be in the early stages of a weapon-related nuclear program, and before the end of the century South Korea or Taiwan could revive their past efforts to move closer to a nuclear weapons capability. Over the longer run, Japan could conceivably decide to abandon its present strong opposition to the acquisition of nuclear Weapons. At present, the United States has largely separate approaches to the nuclear weapon proliferation problems in South Asia and in East Asia. This paper argues that these separate approaches should be strengthened and integrated into a broader regional nonproliferation strategy. This regional strategy would have three major strands: inducing India and Pakistan to agree not to produce nuclear weapons or test nuclear explosive devices for a specific period; bolstering the existing nonproliferation regime, principally by maintaining nonproliferation incentives and involving China more in the nonproliferation regime; and encouraging regional cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy

  10. Linear-drive cryocoolers for the Department of Defense standard advanced dewar assembly (SADA)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tate, Garin S.

    2005-05-01

    The Standard Advanced Dewar Assembly (SADA) is the critical module in the Department of Defense (DoD) standardization of scanning second-generation thermal imaging systems. The DoD has established a family of SADAs to fulfill a range of performance requirements for various platforms. The SADA consists of the Infrared Focal Plane Array (IRFPA), Dewar, Command & Control Electronics (C&CE), and the cryogenic cooler, and is used in platforms such as the Apache helicopter, the M1A2 Abrams main battle tank, the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, and the Javelin Command Launch Unit (CLU). In support of the family of SADAs, the DoD defined a complementary family of tactical linear drive cryocoolers. The Stirling cycle linear drive cryocoolers are utilized to cool the Infrared Focal Plane Arrays (IRFPAs) in the SADAs. These coolers are required to have low input power, a quick cool-down time, low vibration output, low audible noise, and a higher reliability than currently fielded rotary coolers. These coolers must also operate in a military environment with its inherent high vibration level and temperature extremes. This paper will (1) outline the characteristics of each cryocooler, (2) present the status and results of qualification tests, (3) present the status of production efforts, and (4) present the status of efforts to increase linear drive cooler reliability.

  11. A Digest of Nonproliferation Literature.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duggan, Ruth A

    2006-04-01

    In preparation for the 2005 US/Russian Weapons Laboratories Directors Meeting, the six laboratories participating in the meeting endeavored to develop a strategy for nonproliferation technology research and development. A literature review was conducted to identify possible areas of technical collaboration and technology opportunities associated with improving nonproliferation associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The issue of multinationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle was also researched. This digest is the compilation of one-page summaries used by management of the three US nuclear weapons laboratories in preparation for strategy development. Where possible, the Web site address of the complete paper is referenced.3 AcknowledgementsThe author wishes to thank Jessica Ruyle, Nancy Orlando-Gay, and Barbara Dry for their research assistance and contributions.4

  12. Historical survey of nonproliferation policies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1977-01-01

    This paper briefly surveys the successive nonproliferation policies and their influence on international commerce and the reaction of the countries where they were applied: the war policy, secrecy policy, liberal policy, safeguarded assistance policy, nonproliferation treaty policy, suppliers' policy, French policy, and the no weapon-usable material policy. It is emphasized that any new solution of the problem must not appear to delay or limit in any way a nation's access to nuclear energy, nor to make any countries dependent on others to meet their energy requirements. Therefore, in the choice of a future policy, political considerations are more important than technical or legal ones. The greatest catalyst of proliferation is the spread of national autarchic programs, and these can only be avoided within a general climate of international trust. The escalation of mistrust between the countries possessing the technological information and those desiring it must be dispelled. Such a policy will have to be clear and stable

  13. Impasses and mistakes of the nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirst, M.

    1980-01-01

    It is analyzed the limitations for implementing the American Nuclear non-proliferation policy. It is shown the crisis of the North American international relations, with the economic and scientific development of the advanced capitalist nations and some countries of the third world, the penetration of these countries in the world trade commerce of the nuclear industry as sellers and cunsumers, and the Latin American's and Brazil's position in the international panorama of nuclear power. (M.C.K.) [pt

  14. Review of Cyber-Physical Attacks and Counter Defense Mechanisms for Advanced Metering Infrastructure in Smart Grid

    OpenAIRE

    Wei, Longfei; Rondon, Luis Puche; Moghadasi, Amir; Sarwat, Arif I.

    2018-01-01

    The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is a vital element in the current development of the smart grid. AMI technologies provide electric utilities with an effective way of continuous monitoring and remote control of smart grid components. However, owing to its increasing scale and cyber-physical nature, the AMI has been faced with security threats in both cyber and physical domains. This paper provides a comprehensive review of the crucial cyber-physical attacks and counter defense mecha...

  15. The handbook of nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, M. H.; Lee, B. W.; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Lee, K. S.

    2003-07-01

    This report analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This report took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and current status. It is here divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this report dealt four multilateral treaties concluded for international non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. And international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are also analyzed focused on UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, regional safeguards system and international conferences. In addition, this report reviewed the nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is a important tool for bilateral regime

  16. How Might Industry Governance Be Broadened To Include Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hund, Gretchen; Seward, Amy M.

    2009-01-01

    Broadening industry governance to support nonproliferation could provide significant new leverage in preventing the spread/diversion of nuclear, radiological, or dual-use material or technology that could be used in making a nuclear or radiological weapon. Industry is defined broadly to include (1) the nuclear industry, (2) dual-use industries, and (3) radioactive source manufacturers and selected radioactive source-user industries worldwide. This paper describes how industry can be an important first line of defense in detecting and thwarting proliferation, such as an illicit trade network or an insider theft case, by complementing and strengthening existing governmental efforts. For example, the dual-use industry can play a critical role by providing export, import, or security control information that would allow a government or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to integrate this information with safeguards, export, import, and physical protection information it has to create a more complete picture of the potential for proliferation. Because industry is closest to users of the goods and technology that could be illicitly diverted throughout the supply chain, industry information can potentially be more timely and accurate than other sources of information. Industry is in an ideal position to help ensure that such illicit activities are detected. This role could be performed more effectively if companies worked together within a particular industry to promote nonproliferation by implementing an industry-wide self-regulation program. Performance measures could be used to ensure their materials and technologies are secure throughout the supply chain and that customers are legitimately using and/or maintaining oversight of these items. Nonproliferation is the overarching driver that industry needs to consider in adopting and implementing a self-regulation approach. A few foreign companies have begun such an approach to date; it is believed that

  17. Nuclear World Order and Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Joeck, N

    2007-02-05

    The decision by India and Pakistan in May 1998 to conduct nuclear weapon tests and declare themselves as nuclear weapon states challenged South Asian regional stability calculations, US nonproliferation policy, and prevailing assumptions about international security. A decade later, the effects of those tests are still being felt and policies are still adjusting to the changed global conditions. This paper will consider non- and counter-proliferation policy options for the United States and Pakistan as they work as partners to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology and further nuclear proliferation.

  18. Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimura, Naohito; Naoi, Yosuke

    2010-01-01

    In April 2010, at the Nuclear Security Summit, Japan demonstrated its commitment to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security and announced the establishment of the Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), under the guidance and authority of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Science and Technology (MEXT), and in cooperation with other ministries. The goal of the Center is to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and security in emerging nuclear power countries by sharing Japan's accumulated experiences in its peaceful use of nuclear energy. To achieve its goal, the Center serves three functions: (1) human resource and capacity building, (2) infrastructure development and technical assistance and (3) international coordination and cooperation. The Center will offer three types of training courses to strengthen human resources and capacity building in emerging nuclear power countries. In the Training Course on Nuclear Security, the participants will learn the design and evaluation process for physical protection and detection of and response to illegal or unauthorized acts related to nuclear materials. They will learn these issues not only through lectures and training but also using mockup facilities and virtual reality systems. Second, in the Training Course on Safeguards and State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), the Center will teach the experience of advanced safeguards activities in Japan for its full-scale nuclear fuel cycle facilities as a non-nuclear weapon state. The participants will learn the IAEA and national safeguards systems, the material accounting system and inspector activities. Third, in the Training on the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Framework, the participants will learn the international framework of nuclear non-proliferation including the IAEA safeguards system and

  19. Non-proliferation and disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ritter von Wagner, A.

    1993-01-01

    In 1995 the Conference on the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will take place. Will it be extended for a long term, indefinitely or only for a fixed period? The Federal Government of Germany advocates an unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others have different ideas alleging that the Treaty is imperfect and discriminating. It is a thorn in the side of many States, in particular of the Third World, which no longer want to put up with being treated as second-class states. One argument which is considered especially embarrassing by developing countries as a visible expression of such discrimination, are the nuclear tests which are still carried out by nuclear weapon states. Is the political situation still such that one needs those weapons? Strategists gradually find it difficult to argument; over and over again they claim that an abandonment of nuclear weapons would make the world unsafer. But development has gradually passed over them. Nevertheless, one finds it hard to throw overboard considerations which for years have determined one's thinking. (orig./HSCH) [de

  20. Goals, Objectives, and Requirements (GOR) of the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team for the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Casey, Leslie A.

    2014-01-01

    The goal, objectives, and requirements (GOR) presented in this document define a framework for describing research directed specifically by the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The intent of this document is to provide a communication tool for the GNDD Team with NNSA management and with its stakeholder community. It describes the GNDD expectation that much of the improvement in the proficiency of nuclear explosion monitoring will come from better understanding of the science behind the generation, propagation, recording, and interpretation of seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, and radionuclide signals and development of 'game-changer' advances in science and technology.

  1. Goals, Objectives, and Requirements (GOR) of the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team for the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN R&D)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Casey, Leslie A.

    2014-01-13

    The goal, objectives, and requirements (GOR) presented in this document define a framework for describing research directed specifically by the Ground-based Nuclear Detonation Detection (GNDD) Team of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The intent of this document is to provide a communication tool for the GNDD Team with NNSA management and with its stakeholder community. It describes the GNDD expectation that much of the improvement in the proficiency of nuclear explosion monitoring will come from better understanding of the science behind the generation, propagation, recording, and interpretation of seismic, infrasound, hydroacoustic, and radionuclide signals and development of "game-changer" advances in science and technology.

  2. Non-proliferation and multinational enterprises

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-04-01

    The paper supplements CC/WG.2/9 in presenting the Japanese delegation's contribution in the areas of non-proliferation and multi-national enterprises. The paper questions whether multinational enrichment enterprises would constitute a significant non-proliferation factor, noting that the nature of the venture might create a potential for the dissemination of sensitive information. The paper also argues that a multi-national venture which was not economically competitive (with national facilities) would have questionable viability. The conclusion is that non-proliferation advantages, if any, would be a result, not an objective of such a venture

  3. International nuclear trade and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potter, W.C.

    1990-01-01

    The purpose of this book, the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation, is to explore the international political and economic dimensions of nuclear trade, especially as they pertain to the behavior of eleven emerging nuclear-supplier states. More specifically, the book sets forth a conceptual framework for analyzing international nuclear trade; details the domestic and external factors that shape the nuclear export policies of Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, the People's Republic of China, South Korea, South Africa, Spain and Taiwan; and identifies and assesses alternative strategies for containing the new proliferation risks posed by these emerging suppliers. The book also describes an innovative effort to utilize a computer-based system for tracking international nuclear trade

  4. Multinational alternatives and nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1981-01-01

    The use of multinational institutional arrangements to control sensitive nuclear-fuel-cycle activities has interested policymakers since the dawn of the nuclear age. Several such ventures have been tried in the past, largely for economic, commercial, or technical reasons, and they have enjoyed varying degrees of success. More recently, with the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, multinational arrangements have received increasing attention as a means of reinforcing international safeguards which, together with political commitments on peaceful use, have been the principal components of the nonproliferation regime. The political acceptability and efficacy of multinational arrangements is related to the historic experience with multinational ventures, the changed political circumstances of the 1970s, and the probable requirements for constructive future cooperation. As part of a comprehensive regime covering the development of sensitive nuclear activities, multinational arrangements can reinforce the regime in a manner that is widely acceptable. A political effort to win support for such arrangements is thus worthwhile. 29 references

  5. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-05-01

    Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

  6. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

  7. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

  8. Advancing the defensive explanation for anxiety disorders: lorazepam effects on human defense are systematically modulated by personality and threat-type

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Perkins, A. M.; Ettinger, U.; Weaver, K.; Schmechtig, A.; Schrantee, A.; Morrison, P. D.; Sapara, A.; Kumari, V.; Williams, S. C. R.; Corr, P. J.

    2013-01-01

    Clinically effective drugs against human anxiety and fear systematically alter the innate defensive behavior of rodents, suggesting that in humans these emotions reflect defensive adaptations. Compelling experimental human evidence for this theory is yet to be obtained. We report the clearest test

  9. The future of non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gere, F.

    2000-01-01

    This paper comprises two parts. The first part makes a status of the non-proliferation policy: problems of ratification of Start 2 and CTBT treaties, nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in May 1998 etc. The second part makes a prospective reflexion on the evolution of the position of nuclearized countries at the 2015-2030 vista: role of Asia, nuclear perception, evolution of the US perception of non-proliferation, military strategy and European unification. (J.S.)

  10. China's position on nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Qian Jiadong.

    1986-01-01

    The paper discusses China's position on nuclear non-proliferation, in view of the fact that China does not subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China refuses to accede to the NPT because it considers the treaty to be discriminatory, and reasons are given for this point of view. However its stand for nuclear disarmament and disapproval of nuclear proliferation are declared. Nuclear arms race, prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament are also considered. (UK)

  11. Romania non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biro, Lucian; Grama, Viviana

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Non-proliferation concept in Romania is based on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was ratified in 1970. According to the Article III of the Treaty, Romania ratified in 1972, the Agreement between Romania and IAEA for the application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 2000 Romania ratified the Additional Protocol to contribute through increased transparency, to confidence that no undeclared nuclear activities are concealed within the declared programme or make use of elements of that programme. Under the Additional Protocol Romania understands to increase the transparency of its nuclear activities lengthways fuel cycle. Romania has a strong legal framework to control nuclear material and nuclear activities. The Law 111/1996, republished is the Law on the safe deployment of nuclear activities. CNCAN issued National Regulations for Safeguards and Physical Protection. Prospecting for uranium in Romania was initiated in 1950. Between 1962 and 1978 all the uranium ore production was stockpiled at the mine sites. In 1978 the Feldioara Powder Plant was commissioned, since then both ore stockpiles and ore exploited have been processed to uranium chemical concentrates. The Powder Plant Feldioara was conceived and built following the necessity of milling and processing the uranium ore to UO 2 , in concordance with the national nuclear programme in order to produce electric energy from nuclear fuel. The Nuclear Fuel Plant has capability to manufacture CANDU-6 nuclear fuel. Nuclear Fuel Plant consists of two Production areas, the Quality Assurance and Engineering Departments. There are two Production Departments: Pelleting area including granulation, pressing, sintering, pellet grinding, uranium recycling and Assembling area including components fabrication, beryllium coating, brazing, graphite coating, fuel element and bundle assembly welding. Romania's Strategy for Energy Sector

  12. 76 FR 30986 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-27

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice 7485] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government... of foreign entities and one foreign person have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of...

  13. Nuclear arbitration: Interpreting non-proliferation agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tzeng, Peter

    2015-01-01

    At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements. These agreements include, inter alia, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements.1 States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, commentators have proposed various enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The inconvenient truth, however, is that states are generally unwilling to consent to enforcement mechanisms concerning issues as critical to national security as nuclear non-proliferation.3 This article suggests an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem: interpretation mechanisms. Although an interpretation mechanism does not have the teeth of an enforcement mechanism, it can induce compliance by providing an authoritative interpretation of a legal obligation. Interpretation mechanisms would help solve the non-compliance problem because, as this article shows, in many cases of alleged non-compliance with a non-proliferation agreement, the fundamental problem has been the lack of an authoritative interpretation of the agreement, not the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, this article proposes arbitration as the proper interpretation mechanism for non-proliferation agreements. It advocates the establishment of a 'Nuclear Arbitration Centre' as an independent branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommends the gradual introduction of arbitration clauses into the texts of non-proliferation agreements. Section I begins with a discussion of international agreements in general and the importance of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section II then discusses nuclear non-proliferation agreements and their lack of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section III examines seven case studies of alleged non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements in order to show that the main problem in many cases

  14. Paranoids, pygmies, pariahs and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Betts, R.K.

    1977-01-01

    The spread of nuclear weapons has finally become a central item on the foreign policy agenda. But the fervor of most opponents of proliferation has been matched only by their reluctance to deal with the causes of the threat. The misplaced focus on ways to isolate weapons-related capabilities obscures the importance of the stickier but more salient problem of the incentives many nations have to get a bomb: fear or ambition. As long as antiproliferation strategy goes no further than schemes to keep the genie in a few bottles, we risk doing both more and less than necessary. Distressingly few arms-control enthusiasts have faced up to the full price of nonproliferation. The needed reorientation in thinking, which is really only a return to the ageless problem of balance of power, has been impeded by prevalent fallacies of emphasis about what causes the threat, who the candidates for proliferation are, and what strategies are applicable to which candidates. The author proceeds to discuss: (1) causes (the moralist fallacy, the economic fallacy, the diseconomic fallacy, and the technicist fallacy); (2) candidates (the pygmy states, the paranoid states, the pariah states, and five options of the U.S.); (3) cures (the fatalist fallacy, the multilateral fallacy, the embargo fallacy, the safeguards fallacy, the umbrella fallacy, the two-wrongs-don't-make-a-right fallacy, and the golden key fallacy); and (4) choices

  15. The Receptor for Advanced Glycation End Products Impairs Host Defense in Pneumococcal Pneumonia

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Zoelen, Marieke A. D.; Schouten, Marcel; de Vos, Alex F.; Florquin, Sandrine; Meijers, Joost C. M.; Nawroth, Peter P.; Bierhaus, Angelika; van der Poll, Tom

    2009-01-01

    Streptococcus pneumoniae is the most common cause of community-acquired pneumonia. The receptor for advanced glycation end products (RAGE) is a multiligand receptor that is expressed ubiquitously in the lungs. Engagement of RAGE leads to activation of multiple intracellular signaling pathways,

  16. The Asian countries and the non-proliferation treaty prorogation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffmann, N.

    1995-01-01

    This work deals with the non-proliferation treaty prorogation of Asia. The position of the asian countries under the old non-proliferation treaty is given. It includes the 1968 non-proliferation treaty signatories, the calling in question again and the criticisms revealed by the asian countries. The positions and the open forecasts expressed on the non-proliferation treaty prorogation and the article on the elimination of the nuclear weapons are also given. (O.L.)

  17. Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Satkowiak, Lawrence [Director, Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security Programs, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (United States)

    2014-05-09

    The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

  18. Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

    Science.gov (United States)

    Satkowiak, Lawrence

    2014-05-01

    The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

  19. The non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hannon, W.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    On September 22, 1993, the Department of Energy detonated more than 1.2 million kg of blasting agent in a tunnel in Rainier Mesa at the Nevada Test Site. The resulting explosion generated seismic, electromagnetic, and air pressure signals that were recorded on instruments deployed at distances ranging from a few meters to hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of kilometers. More than 12 organizations made measurements before, during, and after the explosions. The explosion and its associated experiments are known as the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). Analyses of the measurements made during the NPE and comparisons with similar measurements made on previous nearly nuclear explosions and on a co-located smaller explosion detonated at the same site are providing basic phenomenological insights into what is potentially one of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)-distinguishing between nuclear explosions and some of the many conventional explosions that occur each year. The NPE is also providing information on the use of chemical explosions to develop empirical discriminants in regions where no nuclear explosions have been recorded. In another verification application, several NPE projects are examining the utility of on-site, pre-shot, shot-time, and post-shot measurements of gas seepage, seismic activity, and other observables as a means of identifying the source of signals that appear like nuclear explosions at regional distances. Two related activities are being considered. First, challenge on-site inspections, conducted after an event has occurred, may be able to use the characteristics of phenomena that persist after the explosion to detect and identify the source of the signals that appeared ambiguous or explosion-like to remote sensors. Second, cooperative, on-site measurements made at the time of a pre-nounced conventional explosion may provide assurance that a nuclear explosion did not occur as part of or in place of the pre-announced explosion.

  20. Israel's position on non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marom, R.

    1986-01-01

    Israel maintained that the complex international system and worldwide political tension created a situation in which comprehensive plans of disarmament could not produce any positive result. The deadlock in the field of general and complete disarmament has brought Israel to the realization that one possible way to alleviate the stalemate could be progress by stages through partial measures of disarmament. Israel's position on non-proliferation indicates that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ), as it relates to the Middle-East, could serve as a credible alternative to the unilateral adherence to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and an effective measure of non-proliferation in the region. (Author)

  1. Non-proliferation and the control of atomic energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1977-01-01

    The non-proliferation problem has never ceased to haunt and to influence those responsible for the development of atomic energy. During and after the Second World War, Anglo-American co-operation was reflected in restrictions on the exchange of enrichment and reprocessing know-how. Between 1945 and 1955, the Anglo-Saxon powers continued with the policy of secrecy and uranium monopoly decided on in 1943 at the Quebec summit conference. Starting in 1955, the failure of this policy led - at the suggestion of the United States of America - to a freer flow of information and to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with its safeguards, which permitted widespread application of the policy of technical assistance subject to controls and widespread commerce in research and power reactors - mainly fuelled with enriched uranium and manufactured in the USA. There followed periods characterized by general legal blocks, with two unilateral renunciation treaties - the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, covering non-underground tests, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1968, covering nuclear explosive devices and the entire fuel cycle. The Indian atomic explosion and the acceleration of nuclear programmes owing to the oil crisis prompted - in 1974 - efforts by supplier countries to limit the transfer of sensitive technology and the possession of plants capable of producing substances which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; the USA has even proposed the curtailment of plutonium extraction and of breeder construction, although these are considered by many countries to be essential to the independence of their energy development programmes. This policy of reserving the sensitive stages of the fuel cycles to a few advanced countries and the questioning of existing nuclear agreements have created, in the relations between supplier and recipient countries, a regrettable intensification of the distrust which must be dispelled

  2. The European dimension in non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krause, J.

    1996-01-01

    Europe was for decades the focal point of efforts to prevent or constrain nuclear proliferation and the first region in which non-proliferation efforts failed. Paper deals with current proliferation problems in Europe, namely, diversion of weapons, diversion from dismantling, production over-capacity, security concerns. Legal instruments against proliferation in Europe described here include development of international norms; instruments of security assurance and cooperation; disarmament assistance; fissile material management; assistance in creating export control systems; improving and harmonizing export controls for dual-purpose items. Problems in implementing non-proliferation instruments are described separately

  3. United States non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1978-01-01

    U.S. non-proliferation policy is aimed at slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, managing the destabilizing effects of nuclear technology for energy purposes, and fostering international standards and institutions to deal responsibly with global nuclear development. These goals assume that nuclear technology has not already precluded social control and recognize the social benefits offered by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Non-proliferation policies recognize that the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is a more-difficult problem than technical ability and will concentrate on reducing those incentives through international agreements and safeguards and by maintaining the separation of commercial nuclear fuel cycles and military uses

  4. Report on the status of linear drive coolers for the Department of Defense Standard Advanced Dewar Assembly (SADA)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Salazar, William

    2003-01-01

    The Standard Advanced Dewar Assembly (SADA) is the critical module in the Department of Defense (DoD) standardization effort of scanning second-generation thermal imaging systems. DoD has established a family of SADA's to address requirements for high performance (SADA I), mid-to-high performance (SADA II), and compact class (SADA III) systems. SADA's consist of the Infrared Focal Plane Array (IRFPA), Dewar, Command and Control Electronics (C&CE), and the cryogenic cooler. SADA's are used in weapons systems such as Comanche and Apache helicopters, the M1 Abrams Tank, the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Line of Sight Antitank (LOSAT) system, the Improved Target Acquisition System (ITAS), and Javelin's Command Launch Unit (CLU). DOD has defined a family of tactical linear drive coolers in support of the family of SADA's. The Stirling linear drive cryo-coolers are utilized to cool the SADA's Infrared Focal Plane Arrays (IRFPAs) to their operating cryogenic temperatures. These linear drive coolers are required to meet strict cool-down time requirements along with lower vibration output, lower audible noise, and higher reliability than currently fielded rotary coolers. This paper will (1) outline the characteristics of each cooler, (2) present the status and results of qualification tests, and (3) present the status and test results of efforts to increase linear drive cooler reliability.

  5. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

  6. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2003-01-01

    Although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has enjoyed considerable success, today the regime has never been under greater threat. Three states have challenged the objectives of the NPT, and there is a technology challenge - the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology and know-how. A major issue confronting the international community is, how to deal with a determined proliferator? Despite this gloomy scenario, however, the non-proliferation regime has considerable strengths - many of which can be developed further. The regime comprises complex interacting and mutually reinforcing elements. At its centre is the NPT - with IAEA safeguards as the Treaty's verification mechanism. Important complementary elements include: restraint in the supply and the acquisition of sensitive technologies; multilateral regimes such as the CTBT and proposed FMCT; various regional and bilateral regimes; the range of security and arms control arrangements outside the nuclear area (including other WMD regimes); and the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. Especially important are political incentives and sanctions in support of non-proliferation objectives. This paper outlines some of the key issues facing the non-proliferation regime

  7. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shea, M.

    2000-01-01

    Fissionable materials are common to all nuclear weapons and controls on the production, storage, processing and use of fissionable materials provides one means to address non-proliferation and disarmament. In this article, the relevance of such controls is examined and the current situation and future prospects are assessed. (authors)

  8. Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

    1997-01-01

    In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

  9. EMP at the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bell, J. [AWE, Aldermaston (United Kingdom)

    1994-12-31

    This experiment presented an opportunity to field customized equipment designed to detect and record electromagnetic pulse (EMP) emanations from an explosion over a wide frequency range. Any data recorded could be used in conjunction with the seismic methods to further non-proliferation studies. No EMP emanations were detectable from the four sensors deployed outside the tunnel confines.

  10. Systems resilience: a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2011-01-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

  11. Systems resilience : a new analytical framework for nuclear nonproliferation.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2011-12-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of nonproliferation. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. The nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system, and key themes from the literature on systems resilience can be applied to the nonproliferation system. Most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience, and the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies, increasing its vulnerability to collapse. The resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by diversifying nonproliferation strategies to include general international capabilities to respond to proliferation and focusing more attention on reducing the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place. Ideas for future research, include understanding unintended consequences and feedbacks among nonproliferation strategies, developing methodologies for measuring the resilience of the nonproliferation system, and accounting for interactions of the nonproliferation system with other systems on larger and smaller scales.

  12. Arms control and nonproliferation technologies. First quarter 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Staehle, G; Alonzo, G M; Sanford, N M [eds.

    1995-01-01

    This first quarter issue for 1995 highlights the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. The SBIR program is managed by the DOE`s Basic Energy Sciences program within the Office of Energy Research. Each year, the SBIR program solicits research ideas of interest to the DOE. Articles contained in this issue include: The Small Business Innovation Research Program supported by the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security; Automated cueing to man-made objects via multispectral image; Security systems get smart with advanced processing and thermal imaging; A breakthrough in cooling system technology; The APSTNG neutron probe; Lithium-doped fullerene neutron detector; Miniature GC-MS for on-site chemical analysis; and Winner of Sandia President`s Quality Award.

  13. Nuclear power generation and nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1978-01-01

    In the future outlook around year 2000 of nuclear power, thought must be given to fuel reprocessing and plutonium utilization. The adverse utilization of plutonium may be prevented by the means balanced with its economical value. As the method of less cost with lower effect of nonproliferation, combination of fuel reprocessing and fuel fabrication facilities and mixed plutonium/uranium processing are possible. As the method of more cost with higher effect of nonproliferation the maintenance of high radioactivity and inaccessibility of plutonium is conceivable. As for the agreeable methods in 2000, seven principles may be mentioned, such as the dependence upon the agreements among major nations and upon nuclear exporting countries. These are still inadequate, however. What is important is to provide with the sufficient safeguards to countries concerned to negate the need for nuclear weapons. Efforts are then necessary for leading nuclear countries to extend aids to other nuclear-oriented countries. (Mori, K.)

  14. Nonproliferation Education at the University of Washington

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, Chris D.; Leek, K.M.

    2006-01-01

    The nonproliferation curriculum at the University of Washington (UW) is the product of collaboration between Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security (PNWCGS) at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Jackson School of International Studies (JSIS) and Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. This collaboration began in 2001 with the establishment the Institute for Global and Regional Security Studies (IGRSS). IGRSS is housed in the Jackson School, which will celebrate its centenary in 2008 as a center for the study of world regions. PNNL also engages in a number of collaborative relationships with UW units in the natural and applied sciences. The principal goal of IGRSS has been to develop courses that draw graduates and undergraduates into careers in the field of nonproliferation. Since offering its first courses in 2002, IGRSS has assisted a substantial number of UW graduate students in submitting successful applications for nonproliferation positions in U.S. government agencies, including the Nonproliferation Graduate Program at the National Nuclear Security Administration. Since 2001, several UW undergraduates have begun careers in the field of nonproliferation, either by working at national laboratories or enrolling in non-UW graduate programs. The UW brought to its nonproliferation partnership with PNNL long-established programs in a wide range of professional programs and academic disciplines, including the 14 interdisciplinary regional and topical programs of the Jackson School of International Studies. The JSIS is an interdisciplinary and interdepartmental enterprise that brings together faculty and students from across the UW. Since the late 1940s the UW has trained experts for the nation's foreign policy community in programs focused in the languages, cultures, and histories of regions deemed critical to U.S. national security. However, since the termination of its program in nuclear engineering several

  15. Nuclear exports and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courteix, Simone.

    1978-01-01

    Increased preoccupation in present times with the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the multiplication of international agreements such as the Non-proliferation Treaty and in the strengthening of consultations between industrialised countries (London Club). After analysing the IAEA safeguards system under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its shortcomings both technically and otherwise, the author considers how this situation can be remedied in the light of the London Agreements and in view of the position of the main countries concerned. The annex to the book contains the texts of many international agreements and relevant national regulations as well as nuclear policy statements. It also includes a detailed bibliograaphy. (NEA) [fr

  16. The emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potter, W.C.

    1990-01-01

    The number of states capable of exporting nuclear material, technology, equipment, and services is large and growing. Once confined primarily to states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the list of actual and potential nuclear suppliers now includes many countries that do not subscribe to the NPT or to other international nuclear export control agreements. Although international control accords---such as the Nuclear Exporters' (Zangger) Committee and the London Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines---do not prohibit the export of sensitive nuclear materials and equipment, they do reduce the risks of proliferation by imposing international safeguards as a condition for export. The purpose of this book---the culmination of one phase of an ongoing international research project on the emerging nuclear suppliers and nonproliferation---is to remedy, at least in part, this data deficiency

  17. Prospects for regional cooperation. Regional cooperation in remote monitoring for nuclear nonproliferation and transparency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olsen, John

    2006-01-01

    The JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have cooperated for a decade in development and testing of remote monitoring technologies in support of international safeguards. With this technology approaching maturity, the JAEA/SNL partnership now envisions regional cooperation to use these technologies to advance nuclear transparency and strengthen nonproliferation, as well. This presentation summarizes the technical evolution and notes the opportunity for regional cooperation to include institutions in the ROK, as well as Japan and the US. (author)

  18. Non-proliferation efforts in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chellaney, B.

    1994-01-01

    Southern Asia is one of the most volatile regions in the world because of inter-State and intra-State conflicts. Security in the region highly depends on the rival capabilities of the involved states, Pakistan, India, China. Increased Confidence building and nuclear transparency are becoming more significant issues in attaining stability in the region, although non-proliferation efforts in this region have attained little headway

  19. Sovereignty and non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimminich, O.

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty seems to violate the fundamental principle of the quality of the states. However, if interpreted in the light of the latest developments of the international law, it is possible to justify the discriminations which it imposes on the non-nuclear states. A crucial point is the implementation of article VI by the nuclear states. If the latter procrastinate in nuclear disarmament the whole NPT-regime will collapse. (orig.) [de

  20. INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Donnelly, W H [Library of Congress, Washington, DC (USA)

    1980-12-01

    The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. This article outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US non-proliferation policy.

  1. Abstracts of 3. International scientific-practical conference 'Semipalatinsk Test Site. Radiation Legacy and Non-proliferation Issues'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The Conference gathered representatives of more than 25 countries and international organizations. In the Conference among with actual problems of current environment conditions in Kazakhstan, perspective trends in the field of radiation protection, radio-ecological and radiobiological research and issues of international co-operation in support of non-proliferation regime, other advanced scientific projects were considered [ru

  2. Nonproliferation norms in civilian nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawata, Tomio

    2005-01-01

    For sustainable use of nuclear energy in large scale, it seems inevitable to choose a closed cycle option. One of the important questions is, then, whether we can really achieve the compatibility between civilian nuclear fuel cycle and nonproliferation norms. In this aspect, Japan is very unique because she is now only one country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program as a non-nuclear weapon state in NPT regime. In June 2004 in the midst of heightened proliferation concerns in NPT regime, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded that, for Japanese nuclear energy program, non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities were verified through the inspections and examinations under Comprehensive Safeguards and the Additional Protocol. Based on this conclusion, the IAEA announced the implementation of Integrated Safeguards in Japan in September 2004. This paper reviews how Japan has succeeded in becoming the first country with full-scope nuclear fuel cycle program to qualify for integrated Safeguards, and identifies five key elements that have made this achievement happen: (1) Obvious need of nuclear fuel cycle program, (2) Country's clear intention for renunciation of nuclear armament, (3) Transparency of national nuclear energy program, (4) Record of excellent compliance with nonproliferation obligations for many decades, and (5) Numerous proactive efforts. These five key elements will constitute a kind of an acceptance model for civilian nuclear fuel cycle in NNWS, and may become the basis for building 'Nonproliferation Culture'. (author)

  3. Synergies between nonproliferation regimes: A pragmatic approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, Trevor; Meier, Oliver

    2001-01-01

    Full text: With the recent progress in establishing international nonproliferation regimes, the question of synergies between different verification and monitoring regimes is becoming more acute. Three multilateral and universal nonproliferation organisations covering safeguards on civil nuclear materials, nuclear testing, and chemical weapons are up and running. A regime on biological weapons is under negotiation. Several regional organisations concerned with monitoring nonproliferation commitments in the nuclear field are in place; others are being established. Past discussions on synergies between these regimes have suffered from being too far-reaching. These discussions often have not reflected adequately the political difficulties of cooperation between regimes with different membership, scope and institutional set-up. This paper takes a pragmatic look at exploiting synergies and identifies some potential and real overlaps in the work between different verification regimes. It argues for a bottom-up approach and identifies building blocks for collaboration between verification regimes. By realising such, more limited potential for cooperation, the ground could be prepared for exploiting other synergies between these regimes. (author)

  4. Nuclear non-proliferation: failures and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, R.; Press, R.

    1980-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of combined political and technical attempts to achieve worldwide acceptance of a commitment to non-proliferation, to note failures to date, and to identify essential factors to be satisfied if greater and necessary success is to be achieved in the immediate future. For this it is necessary to separate the realism and unrealism so often involved in discussing the concept of non-proliferation, as defined above, particularly if treated as a moral principle rather than as part of a general security issue reflecting shifts in regional and global stability. The political nature of the non-proliferation problem is underlined by the fact that whereas five nuclear weapon states are currently accepted, any threatened increase in that number is discouraged by every possible peaceful means. This fact combines political acceptance of an existing international situation with a belief that any addition to the present number must lead to international instability. Success in preventing additions may be more readily achieved through political understanding and perhaps some compromises, in particular cases, rather than through seeking a universal solution to a generalized problem

  5. The Nuclear Progress And The Non-Proliferation Policies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Popa-Simil, Liviu [Los Alamos, NM 87544 (United States)

    2009-06-15

    The 2008 fall crisis showed the limits of globalization under the actual rules and de-regulations promoted by few developed countries. It also showed the weakness of the planetary economy induced by strong economic connections that makes the propagation of crises faster than the spread of welfare. The increase in severe weather and natural disasters showed how fast the civilization can be spoiled while the competition for oil resources made the interstate tensions grow. For almost all states, the development of the nuclear power becomes a prime option, even oil producers started to show interest in nuclear technology and also, policies that in particular are clearly oriented towards national development policies. The fact that anybody mastering nuclear technologies and uses for power production is capable in a reasonable time to produce weapons is a well-known fact. Therefore, in order to reduce the proliferation risk it is necessary to contain the nuclear science development. An alternative is to shift the weight in promoting renewable energies, as potential future energy alternative. Considering rigorously the future climate change effects, it becomes obvious that any delay in nuclear development will turn very costly for any nation ignoring all these facts and, the complexity of the real nonproliferation is growing. This new trend raises serious challenges in front of all states regarding the non-proliferation and, in order to keep control and stimulate a sound nuclear development, some of the actual non-proliferation concepts and policies have to be reformulated and enhanced. This has to be done in parallel with a more intensive implication of the international organisms in the real development of the nuclear power at national level. The large diversity of nuclear applications with huge collateral implication in every national economy makes the role of the international organisms orders of magnitude more important. The new challenges posed in front of the

  6. U.S.-Russian cooperation in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Podvig, Pavel

    2010-02-01

    The United States and Russia, the two largest nuclear powers, have a special obligation to provide leadership in nuclear disarmament and in strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the past year the two countries made an effort to restart the arms control process by concluding a new treaty that would bring their legal disarmament obligations in line with the realities of their post-cold war relationships. The process of negotiating deeper nuclear reductions in the new environment turned out to be rather difficult, since the approaches that the countries used in the past are not well suited to dealing with issues like conversion of strategic nuclear delivery systems to conventional missions, tactical nuclear weapons, or dismantlement of nuclear warheads. This presentation considers the recent progress in U.S.-Russian arms control process and outlines the key issues at the negotiations. It also considers prospects for further progress in bilateral nuclear disarmament and issues that will be encountered at later stages of the process. The author argues that success of the arms reductions will depend on whether the United States and Russia will be able to build an institutional framework for cooperation on a range of issues - from traditional arms control to securing nuclear materials and from missile defense to strengthening the international nuclear safeguards. )

  7. Nuclear power generation and nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rathjens, G.

    1979-01-01

    The main points existing between nuclear energy development and nuclear non-proliferation policy are reviewed. The solar energy and other energy will replace for nuclear fission energy in the twenty first century, but it may not occur in the first half, and the structure has to be established to continue the development of nuclear fission technology, including breeder reactor technology. In the near future, it should be encouraged to use advanced thermal reactors if they are economic and operated with safety. Miserable results may be created in the worldwide scale, if a serious accident occurs anywhere or nuclear power reactors are utilized for military object. It is estimated to be possible to develop the ability of manufacturing nuclear weapons within two or three years in the countries where the industry is highly developed so as to generate nuclear power. It is also difficult to take measures so that nuclear power generation does not increase nuclear proliferation problems, and it is necessary to mitigate the motive and to establish the international organization. Concensus exists that as the minimum security action, the storage and transportation of materials, which can be directly utilized for nuclear weapons, should be decided by the international system. The most portions of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle should be put under the international management, as far as possible. This problem is discussed in INFCE. Related to the nuclear nonproliferation, the difference of policy in fuel cycle problems between USA and the other countries, the enrichment of nuclear fuel material, especially the reasons to inhibit the construction of additional enrichment facilities, nuclear fuel reprocessing problems, radioactive waste disposal, plutonium stock and plutonium recycle problems are reviewed. (Nakai, Y.)

  8. Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chrzanowski, P.L.

    1993-01-01

    About 30 specialists in non-proliferation participated in a workshop to explore ideas for US Government preparatory steps leading to the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. To that end, workshop sessions were devoted to reviewing the lessons learned from previous Review Conferences, discussing the threats to the non-proliferation regime together with ways of preserving and strengthening it, and examining the management of international nuclear commerce. A fundamental premise shared by workshop participants was that extension of the NPT is immensely important to international security. The importance of stemming proliferation and, more specifically, extending the Treaty, is growing as a result of the significant changes in the world. If the conferees of the Extension Conference decide on no extension or extension for a short limited duration, some technically advanced states that have foregone development of nuclear weapons may begin to rethink their options. Also, other arms control measures, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could start to unravel. The US must provide strong international leadership to ensure that the Extension Conference is a success, resulting in Treaty extension, perhaps through successive terms, into the indefinite future. Workshop participants were struck by the urgent need for the US to take organizational steps so that it is highly effective in its advance preparations for the Extension Conference. Moreover, the Extension Conference provides both a challenge and an opportunity to mold a cohesive set of US policy actions to define the future role of nuclear weapons and combat their proliferation

  9. Developing Effluent Analysis Technologies to Support Nonproliferation Initiatives, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies, Third quarter 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schubert, S A; Staehle, G; Alonzo, G M [eds.

    1995-01-01

    This issue provides an overview of the Effluent Research Program of the DOE Office of Research and Development, highlighting a number of representative projects within this program in support of nonproliferation initiatives. Technologies reported include portable instruments for on-site inspections, standoff detectors, fieldable, real-time instruments, field collection techniques, and ultrasensitive laboratory techniques.

  10. Fast Reactors and Nuclear Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avrorina, E.N.; Chebeskovb, A.N.

    2013-01-01

    Conclusion remarks: 1. Fast reactor start-up with U-Pu fuel: – dependent on thermal reactors, – no needs in U enrichment, – needs in SNF reprocessing, – Pu is a little suitable for NED, – practically impossible gun-type NED, – difficulties for implosion-type NED: necessary tests, advanced technologies, etc. – Pu in blankets is similar to WPu by isotopic composition, – Use of blanket for production isotopes (e.g. 233 U), – Combined reprocessing of SNF: altogether blanket and core, – Blanket elimination: decrease in Pu production – No pure Pu separation. 2. Fast reactor start-up with U fuel: - Needs in both U enrichment and SNF reprocessing, - Independent of thermal reactors, - Good Pu bred in the core let alone blankets, - NED of simple gun-type design, - Increase of needs in SWU, - Increased demands in U supply. 3. Fast reactors for export: - Uranium shortage, - To replace thermal reactors in future, - No blankets (depends on the country, though), - Fuel supply and SNF take back, - International centers for rendering services of NFC. Time has come to remove from FRs and their NFC the label unfairly identifying them as the most dangerous installations of nuclear power from the standpoint of being a proliferation problem

  11. Overview of Accelerator Applications for Security and Defense

    Science.gov (United States)

    Antolak, Arlyn J.

    Particle accelerators play a key role in a broad set of defense and security applications, including war-fighter and asset protection, cargo inspection, nonproliferation, materials characterization, and stockpile stewardship. Accelerators can replace the high activity radioactive sources that pose a security threat to developing a radiological dispersal device, and, can be used to produce isotopes for medical, industrial, and research purposes. An overview of current and emerging accelerator technologies relevant to addressing the needs of defense and security is presented.

  12. Evolution and resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pregenzer, Arian L.

    2014-01-01

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and the concept of the adaptive cycle. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by increasing international participation in setting the nonproliferation agenda, developing general international response capabilities, focusing on non-coercive approaches to decreasing demand, and applying systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation

  13. Evolution and resilience of the nuclear nonproliferation regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pregenzer, Arian L. [Senior Scientist, Retired, Sandia National Laboratories, 13013 Arroyo de Vista NE, Albuquerque, NM 87111 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    This paper introduces the concept of systems resilience as a new framework for thinking about the future of the nonproliferation regime. Resilience refers to the ability of a system to maintain its vital functions in the face of continuous and unpredictable change. First, I make the case that the nonproliferation regime can be viewed as a complex system. Next, I discuss key themes from the literature on systems resilience and apply them to the nonproliferation system: the difference between resilience and stability; the need for evolution to maintain function; the importance of functional diversity; and the concept of the adaptive cycle. I show that most existing nonproliferation strategies are aimed at stability rather than resilience and that the current nonproliferation system may be over-constrained by the cumulative evolution of strategies. According to the literature on systems resilience, this increases its vulnerability to collapse. I argue that the resilience of the nonproliferation system can be enhanced by increasing international participation in setting the nonproliferation agenda, developing general international response capabilities, focusing on non-coercive approaches to decreasing demand, and applying systems thinking more rigorously to nonproliferation.

  14. Twenty years of the Non-proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1990-01-01

    The report assesses the achievements of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and discusses ways in which the non-proliferation regime could be strenghtened. It recommends a series of measures to be taken by the parties of the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, with a view to reinforcing the Treaty and achieving its universality. 198 refs

  15. Non-proliferation aspects of long term assurance of supply

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The meetings in this section deal with the non-proliferation aspects of long-term assurance of supply of the nuclear fuel cycle. A list of 12 fundamental questions concerning the observation and application of the non-proliferation regulations is followed by the comments made by representatives of 10 countries

  16. Perspectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koungou, Leon

    2004-01-01

    To join traditional methods and new approaches of 'non-proliferation'. This is a technical method and the best way to fight against 'non-proliferation' which is facing few preoccupations: knowledge's disseminations; technologies; equipments and weapons that should be stopped. As it's important to note the return of nuclear danger as the end of confrontation between west-east which should be reduce. As the adaptation of mechanisms is necessary today, as it is important to react about states' incitations to violate international engagement of non-proliferation. Areas control allows finding out change and evolution, but more insufficient. Functional difficulties show that the IAEA (International Agency of Atomic Energy) does not work good. Safeguard system does not allow to respect 'non-proliferation' engagements; for instance 'junkies states' that they cannot dissuade traditional methods. The fight of 'non-proliferation' shows new progresses with fearing methods of prevention actions and heaviest international controls of exportation. The target of this is very ambitious. This new method is self-successful because it contributes to re-enforce international security when defeating acquisition of nuclear and mass destruction weapons by non-states factors. Therefore non-proliferation regime and especially 'non-proliferation treaty' remains delicate as long as some militaries state such USA will reject their 'non-proliferation' engagement. (author) [fr

  17. Geology, geophysics, and physical properties of the U12n.25 non-proliferation experiment site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baldwin, M.J.; Bradford, R.P.; Hopkins, S.P. [Raytheon Services Nevada, Mercury, NV (United States)] [and others

    1994-12-31

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Experiment was conducted in the U12n.25 drift in N-Tunnel at the Nevada Test Site. The geologic characterization of the site was performed by Raytheon Services Nevada geologists in the standard manner used for all underground nuclear weapons-effects tests executed by the Defense Nuclear Agency. The U12n.25 test bed was constructed in zeolitized ash-fall tuff of the Tunnel Beds Tuff, Subunit 4K, 389.0 m below the surface of Rainier Mesa. The structural geology of the site was simple, with the nearest fault plane projected to be 12 m below the mined cavity at closest approach, and an average bedding dip of seven degrees to the northwest. The cavity excavation revealed several small fractures, including one which produced minor amounts of free water during construction. The physical properties of the site were well within the range of experience for the zeolitized tuff of N-Tunnel and no geology-related problems were encountered during construction. The zeolitized tuff of N-Tunnel has been the site of twenty nuclear tests conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. The similarities of geologic setting, site geometry, and physical properties allow many comparisons of Non-Proliferation Experiment results with the large nuclear-test data base.

  18. Nuclear Nonproliferation Ontology Assessment Team Final Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Strasburg, Jana D.; Hohimer, Ryan E.

    2012-01-01

    Final Report for the NA22 Simulations, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) Ontology Assessment Team's efforts from FY09-FY11. The Ontology Assessment Team began in May 2009 and concluded in September 2011. During this two-year time frame, the Ontology Assessment team had two objectives: (1) Assessing the utility of knowledge representation and semantic technologies for addressing nuclear nonproliferation challenges; and (2) Developing ontological support tools that would provide a framework for integrating across the Simulation, Algorithm and Modeling (SAM) program. The SAM Program was going through a large assessment and strategic planning effort during this time and as a result, the relative importance of these two objectives changed, altering the focus of the Ontology Assessment Team. In the end, the team conducted an assessment of the state of art, created an annotated bibliography, and developed a series of ontological support tools, demonstrations and presentations. A total of more than 35 individuals from 12 different research institutions participated in the Ontology Assessment Team. These included subject matter experts in several nuclear nonproliferation-related domains as well as experts in semantic technologies. Despite the diverse backgrounds and perspectives, the Ontology Assessment team functioned very well together and aspects could serve as a model for future inter-laboratory collaborations and working groups. While the team encountered several challenges and learned many lessons along the way, the Ontology Assessment effort was ultimately a success that led to several multi-lab research projects and opened up a new area of scientific exploration within the Office of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Verification.

  19. Fusion connection: contributions to industry, defense, and basic science resulting from scientific advances made in the Magnetic Fusion Energy Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finn, T.; Woo, J.; Temkin, R.

    1985-10-01

    Fusion research has led to significant contributions in many different areas of industry, defense, and basic science. This diversity is represented visually in the introductory figure which shows both a radio galaxy, and a microchip produced by plasma etching. Some of these spin-off technologies are discussed

  20. A Summary of the Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, Docking, and Undocking (RPODU) Lessons Learned from the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) Orbital Express (OE) Demonstration System Mission

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dennehy, Cornelius J.; Carpenter, James R.

    2011-01-01

    The Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) Technical Discipline Team (TDT) sponsored Dr. J. Russell Carpenter, a Navigation and Rendezvous Subject Matter Expert (SME) from NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), to provide support to the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) Orbital Express (OE) rendezvous and docking flight test that was conducted in 2007. When that DARPA OE mission was completed, Mr. Neil Dennehy, NASA Technical Fellow for GN&C, requested Dr. Carpenter document his findings (lessons learned) and recommendations for future rendezvous missions resulting from his OE support experience. This report captures lessons specifically from anomalies that occurred during one of OE's unmated operations.

  1. Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Redick, J.R.

    1981-01-01

    The regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco supports peace and security in the Latin American region and global nonproliferation efforts. Circumstances leading to the creation of the nuclear-weapon-free zone include careful preparations and negotiations, individual leadership, existence of certain shared cultural and legal traditions of Latin American countries, and the temporary stimulus of the Cuban missile crisis. The lack of overt superpower pressure on Latin America, compared with more turbulent regions, has permitted continued progress toward full realization of the zone. Tlatelolco's negotiating process, as well as the substance of the Treaty, deserve careful consideration relative to other areas. The Treaty enjoys wide international approval, but full support by certain Latin American States (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba) has been negatively affected by the failure of the US Senate to ratify Tlatelolco's Protocol I. Nuclear programs of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are expanding rapidly and these nations are forming linkages with West European countries, rather than the United States. The May 1980 Argentine-Brazilian nuclear agreement foresees significant cooperation between the two nation's nuclear energy commissions and more coordinated resistance to the nuclear supplier countries. Argentine-Brazilian nuclear convergence and the response accorded to it by the United States will have significant implications for the future of the Tlatelolco regime and nonproliferation in Latin America. 52 references

  2. Evaluation method of nuclear nonproliferation credibility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kwon, Eun-ha; Ko, Won Il

    2009-01-01

    This paper presents an integrated multicriteria analysis method for the quantitative evaluation of a state's nuclear nonproliferation credibility level. Underscoring the implications of policy on the sources of political demand for nuclear weapons rather than focusing on efforts to restrict the supply of specific weapons technology from the 'haves' to the 'have-nots', the proposed methodology considers the political, social, and cultural dimensions of nuclear proliferation. This methodology comprises three steps: (1) identifying the factors that influence credibility formation and employing them to construct a criteria tree that will illustrate the relationships among these factors; (2) defining the weight coefficients of each criterion through pairwise comparisons of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP); and (3) assigning numerical scores to a state under each criterion and combining them with the weight coefficients in order to provide an overall assessment of the state. The functionality of this methodology is examined by assessing the current level of nuclear nonproliferation credibility of four countries: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Switzerland.

  3. The Non-Proliferation Treaty increases security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kahiluoto, K.

    1995-01-01

    Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely was a historic decision. The Treaty is the most extensive international agreement on security policy to date; now its obligations have become a permanent part of international justice. Moreover, the NPT represents a political and moral obligation. Through the NPT, the international community has made a permanent commitment to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Increasing pressures will be applied to the few countries still outside the NPT, making it more likely that these countries will eventually change their views. The likelihood of regional bans on nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia, too, will increase. The Treaty promotes the establishment of new nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-free zone in Latin America - the countries covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty - is already very close to its full implementation. Finland is firmly committed to the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT Conference of 1995 was among the first international meetings in which Finland participated, and took an active role, as a Member State of the European Union. (orig.)

  4. Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

    2015-01-01

    The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

  5. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the Obama Administration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baek, Jin Hyun; Hwang, Ji Hwan

    2009-12-01

    The objective of this study is to analyze and foresee trends of international nuclear non-proliferation regimes focused on the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the Obama administration, and suggest national policy directions which promote utilization and development of nuclear energy in Korea. For the effective and efficient implementation of the national nuclear use and development program in current international nuclear environment, many efforts should be made: to actively and positively participate in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; to strengthen nuclear diplomacy in a more systematic manner; and to strengthen the international nuclear cooperation

  6. The Office of Safeguards and Security Nonproliferation Support Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Desmond, W.J.

    1996-01-01

    The Nonproliferation Support Program was established in the Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security on october 1, 1995. its mission includes providing assistance to Departmental efforts for improved international material protection, control and accounting programs by coordinating and leveraging domestic safeguards and security policy, practice and experience into the international arena. A major objective of the program is to balance US national security requirements with global support of the nonproliferation objectives. This paper describes the organization of the Office of Safeguards and Security and the Nonproliferation Support Program role and responsibility, and presents some of the current areas of program emphasis and activity

  7. Development and current trends in the international nonproliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sessoms, A.L.

    1984-01-01

    The IAEA and its safeguards system is placed into a historical perspective. A personal perspective on the nonproliferation regime and on the Agency's role in it is then presented. This is done initially by discussing some of the landmark events in the history of the nonproliferation regime. Subsequently some of the history of arms control agreements and of the role of the IAEA are noted. Then political motivations of state and ways the Agency has an impact in the political nonproliferation sphere are addressed

  8. Nuclear Deterrence in the Age of Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Richardson, J

    2009-01-21

    The fallacy of zero nuclear weapons, even as a virtual goal, is discussed. Because the complete abolition of nuclear weapons is not verifiable, nuclear weapons will always play a role in the calculus of assure, dissuade, deter and defeat (ADDD). However, the relative contribution of nuclear weapons to international security has diminished. To reconstitute the Cold War nuclear capability, with respect to both the nuclear weapons capability and their associated delivery systems, is fiscally daunting and not warranted due to competing budgetary pressures and their relative contribution to international security and nonproliferation. A proposed pathway to a sustainable nuclear weapons capability end-state is suggested which provides enough ADDD; a Dyad composed of fewer delivery and weapon systems, with trickle production at the National Laboratories and private sector to maintain capability and guard against technological surprise.

  9. INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Donnelly, W H

    1980-12-01

    The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. Here the author outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US nonproliferation policy. If the future of nuclear power is to include more sensitive facilities in which plutonium and highly enriched uranium are present, it must be determined whether the risks seen in proliferation are great enough to cause the USA and other governments to place such facilities under some form of international ownership or control in addition to international safeguards. A final crucial problem is deciding what can and should be done to dissuade non-nuclear-weapons states from the direct manufacture of nuclear weapons. 6 references.

  10. Positive steps toward non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Greenhalgh, G.

    1979-08-30

    Russel W. Fox and Mason Willrich in their paper, International Custody of Plutonium Stocks: A First Step Toward an International Regime for Sensitive Nuclear Energy Activities, advocate placing excess plutonium in an international custodial facility; critical criteria governing releases are outlined so that, on one hand the owners can have high confidence that their plutonium will be returned promptly, under appropriate circumstances, and on the other hand, all the other participating and concerned countries can have confidence in the assurance that plutonium will be released only for immediate use in a defined and approved civil purpose. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the 1978 issue of its Year Book, recognizes a move towards a more positive approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation. It is noted that the non-proliferation strategies of the main supply countries have largely concentrated on a two-pronged approach of technology denials with tightening of safeguards. But already, enrichment, reprocessing, and breeder reactor programs extend far beyond the five nuclear weapon states. History testifies to the limitations of a policy of technical denials. SIPRI recognizes that another way to dissuade non-nuclear weapon states from creating their own enrichment or reprocessing plants would be to establish an open market for these services, a market characterized by diversity and competition. So far, there has been no case where a country has developed nuclear explosives by diverting material from a civil power station. Development of nuclear weapons by various countries is briefly noted and areas where strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is needed are noted. (MCW)

  11. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

  12. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

  13. Non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation - accomplishments and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, H.R. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to assess the accomplishments in non-proliferation and nuclear co-operation since the beginning of President Reagan's administration, and the challenges remaining to be met in those fields. (NEA) [fr

  14. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  15. Verification lessons learned and CTBT's contribution to disarmament and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zerbo, L.

    2013-01-01

    The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all nuclear tests for any purposes. The CTBT is essential for peace and security; it is a core element of the nonproliferation regime. It limits the ability of countries to develop advanced nuclear weapons technology. It is enforced through the extensive International Monitoring System designed to detect and deter nuclear explosions in atmosphere, underwater and underground. In the process of monitoring and detecting a potential nuclear test - the system registers over 30,000 events a year - the vast majority of them are earthquakes. The civil and scientific applications of the CTBT data can be used to gain better understanding of the earth, of climate change, of volcanic ash clouds, of the tsunamis, of the movements of whales and much more. The CTBT sets a new legal and verification standard for nuclear weapons. It is a non-discriminatory Treaty with the same rights and obligations for all Member States. Its verification regime is equally nondiscriminatory and provides equal access for all Member States to CTBTO data. We are driving to achieve 160 ratifications by the end of the year, and this will provide additional momentum towards entry into force (EIF) and universality. (A.C.)

  16. Utilization of atomic energy in Asia and nuclear nonproliferation system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ishii, Makoto

    1995-01-01

    The economical growth in East Asia is conspicuous as it was called East Asian Miracle, and also the demand of energy increased rapidly. The end of Cold War created the condition for the further development in this district. Many countries advanced positively the plan of atomic energy utilization, and it can be said that the smooth progress of atomic energy utilization is the key for the continuous growth in this district in view of the restriction of petroleum resources and its price rise in future and the deterioration of global environment. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) has accomplished large role, but also its limitation became clear. At present, there is not the local security system in Asia, but in order that the various countries in Asia make the utilization of atomic energy and the security compatible, it is useful to jointly develop safety technology, execute security measures and form the nuclear fuel cycle as Asia. Energy and environmental problems in Asia are reported. Threat is essentially intention and capability, and the regulation only by capability regardless of intention brings about unrealistic result. The limitation of the NPT is discussed. The international relation of interdependence deepends after Cold War, and the security in Asia after Cold War is considered. As the mechanism of forming the nuclear fuel cycle for whole Asia, it is desirable to realize ASIATOM by accumulating the results of possible cooperation. (K.I.)

  17. Perspectives and benefits of the non-proliferating fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parker, F.

    2012-01-01

    The world community has faced the issues of nuclear non-proliferation for decades. Frank Parker, Emeritus Distinguished Professor at Vanderbilt University, has proposed a non-proliferating fuel cycle, which greatly reduces the risk of use of nuclear materials for military purpose. A simplified fuel cycle with reduced opportunities for proliferation of nuclear weapons and permanent disposal of radioactive wastes as well as a reference sub-seabed HLW disposal system are described [ru

  18. Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gilligan, Kimberly V. [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States); Kirk, Bernadette Lugue [Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)

    2015-01-01

    The Modeling and Simulation for Safeguards and Nonproliferation Workshop was held December 15–18, 2014, at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This workshop was made possible by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Human Capital Development (NGSI HCD) Program. The idea of the workshop was to move beyond the tried-and-true boot camp training of nonproliferation concepts to spend several days on the unique perspective of applying modeling and simulation (M&S) solutions to safeguards challenges.

  19. Experience in non-proliferation verification: The Treaty of Raratonga

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walker, R.A.

    1998-01-01

    The verification provisions of the Treaty of Raratonga are subdivided into two categories: those performed by IAEA and those performed by other entities. A final provision of the Treaty of Raratonga is relevant to IAEA safeguards according to support of the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. The non-IAEA verification process is described as well

  20. The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, M.

    2016-01-01

    The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider ''The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.'' We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-roliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what and how much can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-for-attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

  1. The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Environment: A Workshop Summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dreicer, M. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2016-08-30

    The Center for Global Security Research and Global Security Principal Directorate at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory convened a workshop in July 2016 to consider “The Future of Nonproliferation in a Changed and Changing Security Environment.” We took a broad view of nonproliferation, encompassing not just the treaty regime but also arms control, threat reduction, counter-­proliferation, and countering nuclear terrorism. We gathered a group of approximately 60 experts from the technical, academic, political, defense and think tank communities and asked them what—and how much—can reasonably be accomplished in each of these areas in the 5 to 10 years ahead. Discussion was on a not-­for-­attribution basis. This document provides a summary of key insights and lessons learned, and is provided to help stimulate broader public discussion of these issues. It is a collection of ideas as informally discussed and debated among a group of experts. The ideas reported here are the personal views of individual experts and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

  2. Comments on fuel cycle concepts and impacts on nonproliferation and safeguards concerns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1997-01-01

    Fuel cycle technologies have inherently differing levels of proliferation risk profiles. Institutional and/or multi-national arrangements have been effective in reducing the proliferation risk concerns. The implementation of international safeguards further reduces the proliferation risk concerns by the timely detection of a possible physical diversion of SNM from fuel cycle facilities. Fuel cycles are safeguardable, but the proliferation risk characteristics of fuel cycles concepts differ significantly with consequent impacts on the international level of technical safeguards measures. The paper comments on proliferation characteristics of some of the fuel cycle concepts for the purpose of exploring development of advanced nonproliferation and safeguards measures

  3. Joint Department of Defense, Advance Planning Briefing to Industry, Held at Kissimmee, Florida, on 30 April - 2 May 1996

    Science.gov (United States)

    1996-05-01

    Systems 17 Motion Bases Upgraded Aero Misc > Contact Info • AMC, Lt Col Letica , Phone (618) 256-5696 L8 Upgrade Flow Plan Advance Planning Briefing...Projected Schedule: FY 05 > Requirement Document: AMMP >• Projected Program Size: ? < $40M > Funding Status/Stability: > POCs: • AMC, Lt Col Letica

  4. Receptor for Advanced Glycation End Products Facilitates Host Defense during Escherichia coli-Induced Abdominal Sepsis in Mice

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Zoelen, Marieke A. D.; Schmidt, Ann-Marie; Florquin, Sandrine; Meijers, Joost C.; de Beer, Regina; de Vos, Alex F.; Nawroth, Peter P.; Bierhaus, Angelika; van der Poll, Tom

    2009-01-01

    Background. The receptor for advanced glycation end products (RAGE) mediates a variety of inflammatory responses. Methods. To determine the role of RAGE in the innate immune response to abdominal sepsis caused by Escherichia coli, RAGE-deficient (RAGE(-/-)) and normal wild-type mice were

  5. Non-proliferation and international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.

    1992-01-01

    Full text: In my view, drastic nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon States could be coupled with universal commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear weapon States by 1995 when the extension of the NPT Will be discussed. The incentives and disincentives for making and stockpiling nuclear weapons are first of all in the political and security fields, (Global and regional detente reduce the incentive, With the cold war gone, the US and Russia are now agreeing on far-reaching cuts in their nuclear arsenals and at some point the other declared nuclear weapon States Will follow.In the regional fields, we have seen how Argentina and Brazil are about to commit themselves to exclusively peaceful uses of the atom through the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty. And we have seen how South Africa has joined the NPT. A new wave of States adhering to the NPT may be expected from countries in the former Soviet Union. Some have already come, others are on the way. Detente in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent would improve the outlook for non-proliferation in these areas. A second barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in export restrictions on sensitive nuclear material and equipment, Following the discoveries in Iraq, these restrictions are being strengthened in a large number of States. A third barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in the economic and political consequences that would follow for a State if IAEA safeguards inspection revealed activities aimed at the production of nuclear weapons. These must have a high degree of reliability. The case of Iraq showed that it was possible for a closed, highly militarized State to hide nuclear activities from the IAEA and the world We are now drawing the lessons from this case. It is not physically possible for inspectors to look into every building and basement in vast countries, They must have information about where to look, and the IAEA is significantly strengthening its information basis. The IAEA has also re

  6. Advanced technologies for maintenance of electrical systems and equipment at the Savannah River Site Defense Waste Processing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Husler, R.O.; Weir, T.J.

    1991-01-01

    An enhanced maintenance program is being established to characterize and monitor cables, components, and process response at the Savannah River Site, Defense Waste Processing Facility. This facility was designed and constructed to immobilize the radioactive waste currently stored in underground storage tanks and is expected to begin operation in 1993. The plant is initiating the program to baseline and monitor instrument and control (I ampersand C) and electrical equipment, remote process equipment, embedded instrument and control cables, and in-cell jumper cables used in the facility. This program is based on the electronic characterization and diagnostic (ECAD) system which was modified to include process response analysis and to meet rigid Department of Energy equipment requirements. The system consists of computer-automated, state-of-the-art electronics. The data that are gathered are stored in a computerized database for analysis, trending, and troubleshooting. It is anticipated that the data which are gathered and trended will aid in life extension for the facility

  7. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Haeckel, E.; Haefele, W.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Ungerer, W.

    1991-01-01

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP) [de

  8. Nonproliferation, disarmament and the security link

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Raja Mohan, C.

    1997-01-01

    It is obvious that nuclear weapons are here to stay for a long time to come. Many nation states are likely to operate on the premise that the combination of nuclear weapons and long range missile provides an unrivalled source of power. The United States and India cannot hope to structure cooperation on the hope that nuclear weapons can be marginalised and eventually eliminated from the international calculus of power. Nor can they go by the premise that the existing structure of international power can be frozen through the strengthening of the current nonproliferation regime. Continued diffusion of power and the spread of technology as well as the political dynamics could break the current order. This bleak assessment does not however imply that there are no prospects for cooperation between India and the United States. If both the nations move towards a more realistic policy positions and locate their nuclear dialogue in a broader strategic context, it should not be impossible to develop areas of cooperation

  9. International aspects of non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aucoin, P.A.

    1978-01-01

    There are currently two areas on the national scene and one on the international scene that require immediate attention. The first is relief under contracts for enrichment services, an area in which the US can still demonstrate its desire to become a stable and continuous source of supply. The second national area is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. The United States must proceed very cautiously, however, for if discretion and very careful judgment are not used, the Act will immediately be branded as a blatant effort on the part of the US to control the energy options of other sovereign states. The international area is that of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation program. This medium exists for wise and deliberate growth of a commercial nuclear power program which can serve the global community. The next three years probably allow one remaining chance for successful containment of weapons proliferation. If we do not recognize the rights of every sovereign state to voluntarily participate and agree, we, as members of the global community, will have failed

  10. Missile non-proliferation: an alternative approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delory, Stephane

    2011-01-01

    In this report, the author first proposes an overview of the notion of missile prohibition. He notices that the association between weapons of mass destruction and missiles is a prelude to the legitimacy of missile control, notably within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime or MTCR. He also comments the notion of total ban. In a second part, the author analyses and discusses the limitations of the control of technology diffusion. He discusses the role of the MTCR, comments the evolution of this regime with the taking of China and Russia into consideration, the impacts of national implementations of export regimes on the MTCR, and economic aspects of control implementation. In the next part, the author addresses other kinds of limitations, i.e. those related with capacity evolutions of proliferating States. The last part addresses the evolution towards a new definition of approach to missile non-proliferation, notably in terms of perception of missile roles and of technology transfer controls

  11. Flaws in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leventhal, P.

    1986-01-01

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nucler Weapons has the twin objectives of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons and ending the nuclear arms race on the one hand, and promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy on the other. In quantitative and symbolic terms the NPT is a huge success. More than two-thirds of the world's nations have signed on, making this the most popular arms control agreement on earth. Not a single nation has declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons state beyond the original five members of the ''nuclear club'' who qualified for weapons status under the terms of the Treaty itself: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. No party to the Treaty has exercised the permitted option to drop out, and none has been found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to have diverted nuclear material from civil to weapons purposes. Nor has any party been known to have violated NPT prohibitions on developing or assisting other nations to develop nuclear weapons

  12. Transforming Defense

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Lamb, Christopher J; Bunn, M. E; Lutes, Charles; Cavoli, Christopher

    2005-01-01

    .... Despite the resources and attention consumed by the war on terror, and recent decisions by the White House to curtail the growth of defense spending, the senior leadership of the Department of Defense (DoD...

  13. A synopsis of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) investment in additive manufacture and what challenges remain

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maher, Michael; Smith, Adrien; Margiotta, Jesse

    2014-03-01

    DARPA's interest in additive manufacture dates back to the mid-80s with seedling programs that developed the foundational knowledge and equipment that led to the Solid Freeform Fabrication program in 1990. The drivers for this program included reducing development times by enabling "tool-less" manufacturing as well as integration of design and fabrication tools. DARPA consistently pushed the boundaries of additive manufacture with follow-on programs that expanded the material suite available for 3-D printing as well as new processes that expanded the technology's capability base. Programs such as the Mesoscopic Integrated Conformal Electronics (MICE) program incorporated functionality to the manufacturing processes through direct write of electronics. DARPA's investment in additive manufacture continues to this day but the focus has changed. DARPA's early investments were focused on developing and demonstrating the technology's capabilities. Now that the technology has been demonstrated, there is serious interest in taking advantage of the attributes unique to the processing methodology (such as customization and new design possibilities) for producing production parts. Accordingly, today's investment at DARPA addresses the systematic barriers to implementation rather than the technology itself. The Open Manufacturing program is enabling rapid qualification of new technologies for the manufacturing environment through the development of new modeling and informatics tools. While the technology is becoming more mainstream, there are plenty of challenges that need to be addressed. And as the technology continues to mature, the agency will continue to look for those "DARPA-hard" challenges that enable revolutionary changes in capability and performance for the Department of Defense.

  14. Special Issue on University Nonproliferation Education and Training Introduction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leek, K.M.

    2006-01-01

    Nonproliferation, like many aspects of security, has not played out as many expected following the end of the cold war. The peace dividend has been elusive in many countries. The notion that the world would become a safer and more secure place as nuclear weapons stockpiles were reduced has been trumped by the rise in international terrorism. Hopes that nuclear weapons would lose their salience as markers of elite status among nations along with pressures to acquire them have been dashed. The drive by some countries and terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons has not diminished, and the threat of proliferation has increased. At the level of the nation state, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself is under pressure as more nations acquire nuclear weapons, de facto weapons states fail to join, and nations that want to acquire them leave or threaten to leave. At the sub-state level, the convergence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has introduced an element of uncertainty into nonproliferation that is unprecedented. Another feature of the post-cold war era that has taken many by surprise is the continued, and growing need for trained specialists in nonproliferation and nuclear materials management. Contained within the notion of disarmament and reduced strategic importance of nuclear weapons was the expectation of a diminishing workforce of trained nonproliferation and nuclear materials specialists. Events have overtaken this assumption.

  15. 76 FR 68809 - Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-07

    ..., Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation, Bureau of International Security and... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7678] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Termination of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Proliferation Sanctions Against a Foreign Person AGENCY...

  16. Expected very-near-field thermal environments for advanced spent-fuel and defense high-level waste packages

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rickertsen, L.D.; Misplon, M.A.; Claiborne, H.C.

    1982-03-01

    The very-near-field thermal environments expected in a nuclear waste repository in a salt formation have been evaluated for the Westinghouse Form I advanced waste package concepts. The repository descriptions used to supplement the waste package designs in these analyses are realistic and take into account design constraints to assure conservatism. As a result, areal loadings are well below the acceptable values established for salt repositories. Predicted temperatures are generally well below any temperature limits which have been discussed for waste packages in a salt formation. These low temperatures result from the conservative repository designs. Investigations are also made of the sensitivity of these temperatures to areal loading, canister separation, and other design features

  17. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Northeast Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han Yong-Sup

    1995-01-01

    This paper attempted to find out ways to facilitate bilateral and regional arms control regarding nuclear issues in Northeast Asia. This is done in order to reduce uncertainties regarding nuclear policy and capabilities of those countries, and thus to enhance transparency and confidence in the region. In order to bring them into the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process in an effective way, we revisited the issues that contributed to the acceleration of the arms race. The review provided insights into the future course of China, the two Koreas and Japan regarding their nuclear policy and capabilities. The findings of this study indicate a general likelihood of resistance to outside request for arms control and disarmament in the countries in Northeast Asia. Besides their continuation with the conventional arms race, countries in Northeast Asia are reluctant to go ahead with the programmes to enhance transparency, build confidence in the region, and to forgo intentions to go nuclear. China is slowly but steadily increasing its nuclear arsenals. Its nuclear arms control policy is not well integrated with nuclear policy and strategy, and it is subject to the overarching goal of nuclear policy and strategy to advance China's status and national security interests in the international community. Thus, it will be very difficult for other countries to bring China to the arms control process for the time being. North Korea has intended to develop nuclear weapons in order to hedge against uncertainties. This poses a threat to the NPT regime and the peace and security of Northeast Asia. Clearly, North Korea has shown its reluctance to disclose the entirety of its nuclear programme under the IAEA inspections. Although South Korea has taken a bold initiative to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, it has still not fully paid off. Japan adds the problem of plutonium surplus to the uncertain security environments surrounding Northeast Asia

  18. In search of plutonium: A nonproliferation journey

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hecker, Siegfried

    2010-02-01

    In February 1992, I landed in the formerly secret city of Sarov, the Russian Los Alamos, followed a few days later by a visit to Snezhinsk, their Livermore. The briefings we received of the Russian nuclear weapons program and tours of their plutonium, reactor, explosives, and laser facilities were mind boggling considering the Soviet Union was dissolved only two months earlier. This visit began a 17-year, 41 journey relationship with the Russian nuclear complex dedicated to working with them in partnership to protect and safeguard their weapons and fissile materials, while addressing the plight of their scientists and engineers. In the process, we solved a forty-year disagreement about the plutonium-gallium phase diagram and began a series of fundamental plutonium science workshops that are now in their tenth year. At the Yonbyon reprocessing facility in January 2004, my North Korean hosts had hoped to convince me that they have a nuclear deterrent. When I expressed skepticism, they asked if I wanted to see their ``product.'' I asked if they meant the plutonium; they replied, ``Well, yes.'' Thus, I wound up holding 200 grams of North Korean plutonium (in a sealed glass jar) to make sure it was heavy and warm. So began the first of my six journeys to North Korea to provide technical input to the continuing North Korean nuclear puzzle. In Trombay and Kalpakkam a few years later I visited the Indian nuclear research centers to try to understand how India's ambitious plans for nuclear power expansion can be accomplished safely and securely. I will describe these and other attempts to deal with the nonproliferation legacy of the cold war and the new challenges ahead. )

  19. Non-proliferation and security: synergy and differences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joly, J.

    2013-01-01

    Operators of nuclear facilities put in place both physical and organisational means to meet in a comprehensive way the requirements associated with Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Safety and Security. The common aim is to protect man and the environment from ionising radiation. The approaches for meeting these requirements have real similarities, but also differences which need to be respected in order to develop an appropriate synergy for obtaining the best possible level of safety, security and non-proliferation. This article aims to show the provisions that have been taken with regard to non-proliferation, security and safety which complement and reinforce each other.The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  20. The new US nuclear non-proliferation and export policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Welck, S. von.

    1981-01-01

    The future American nuclear non-proliferation and export policy will be determined chiefly by three elements: (1) Adherence to the former objective of nuclear non-proliferation. (2) A large and varied assortment of old and new tools for implementing this goal. (3) Much more differentiation in applying these tools in the light of the reliability, with respect to non-proliferation policy, of the respective partner. Consequently, it would make little sense for the new Administration to force upon allied industrialized countries, whose nuclear technologies are at the same level as that of the United States, restrictive rules on reprocessing and breeder technology. The new measures designed to curb proliferation are especially meant to destroy motivations that could cause states to own nuclear explosives. This also applies to the removal of economic motivations. (orig.) [de

  1. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage on options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to bum the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the nonproliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

  2. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage imposition options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to burn the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the non-proliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

  3. Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2009-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the

  4. Nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament and extended deterrence in the new security environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.

    2009-01-01

    With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces has altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-free world. It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central than during the Cold War to the security of the United States, its friends and allies. Nuclear weapons remain important for the US, but for a far more limited set of roles and missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic US consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these weapons for Russia, China and so-called 'rogue' states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of NATO during Cold War - the need for nuclear weapons to counter vastly superior conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact - is today heard from Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. While the vision of a

  5. Development of advanced spent fuel management process. System analysis of advanced spent fuel management process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ro, S.G.; Kang, D.S.; Seo, C.S.; Lee, H.H.; Shin, Y.J.; Park, S.W.

    1999-03-01

    The system analysis of an advanced spent fuel management process to establish a non-proliferation model for the long-term spent fuel management is performed by comparing the several dry processes, such as a salt transport process, a lithium process, the IFR process developed in America, and DDP developed in Russia. In our system analysis, the non-proliferation concept is focused on the separation factor between uranium and plutonium and decontamination factors of products in each process, and the non-proliferation model for the long-term spent fuel management has finally been introduced. (Author). 29 refs., 17 tabs., 12 figs

  6. Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pomper, Miles A.

    2010-01-01

    Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

  7. Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Yong Soo

    2009-07-01

    KAERI has jointly worked with Sandia National Laboratories for Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia for the last five years. This project aims at support activities in this joint project between two states. The annual meetings were held during the project period, the 4th one in 2008 and the 5th one in 2009. In addition code comparison between KAERI and SNL's codes for assessing the back-end fuel cycle options was carried out. This project strongly enhances the close tie for the non-proliferation, transparency and safeguards among Korea Japan China Taiwan the United States Russia Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Thailand Vietnam and others for the project period

  8. Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young

    2015-01-01

    In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation

  9. Examination of Relationship between Nuclear Transparency and Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ha, Jee-Min; Yim, Man-Sung; Park, Hyeon Seok; Kim, So Young [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    In this study, we define the state-level nuclear transparency as a set of the condition that shows how clearly the state's information related to peaceful nuclear power program and nuclear proliferation is revealed to the international community. For conducting expert survey on state-level nuclear transparency, the concept of nuclear transparency should be clearly defined. Based on that concept, the survey was carried out and results show that it tend to score high when nonproliferation activities happen. It means that higher transparency is positively related to nuclear proliferation. Therefore, higher nuclear transparency is positively related to nuclear nonproliferation.

  10. Sustaining non-proliferation in the 1980s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nye, J.S.

    1984-01-01

    The subject is discussed as follows: introduction; the non-proliferation regime - 1950s to 1970s (IAEA safeguards; Non-proliferation Treaty; oil crisis; proposed sale of facilities for producing weapons-usable materials; USA position); the Carter Administration approach; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation); incentives (USA); export legislation (USA); domestic breeder policy (USA); maintaining the regime in the 1980s (safeguards; Pu and highly enriched uranium management; international spent fuel storage; fuel assurances); the problem of priority; rate vs. degree of proliferation; relations among regimes (international regimes); conclusion. (U.K.)

  11. The IAEA and non-proliferation: is quiescence progress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herron, L.W.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current status of more important non-proliferation aspects affecting or involving the IAEA. The questions dealt with cover in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Committee on Assurances of Supply established by the IAEA in 1980 and the International Plutonium Storage Study prepared by an IAEA expert group. The author concludes that in a number of areas involving this Agency, recent considerable activity at both political and technical levels has produced few tangible results althrough the situation is not static. (NEA) [fr

  12. Security Guarantees and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bruno Tertrais

    2011-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the value of 'security guarantees', that is, positive security assurances that include a formal or informal defense commitment, in preventing nuclear proliferation. It demonstrates that such guarantees have proven to be a very effective instrument in preventing States from going nuclear. It would thus seem logical to reinforce or extend them. However, this path is fraught with obstacles and dilemmas

  13. Security Guarantees and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bruno Tertrais

    2011-07-01

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the value of 'security guarantees', that is, positive security assurances that include a formal or informal defense commitment, in preventing nuclear proliferation. It demonstrates that such guarantees have proven to be a very effective instrument in preventing States from going nuclear. It would thus seem logical to reinforce or extend them. However, this path is fraught with obstacles and dilemmas

  14. University-level Non-proliferation and Safeguards Education and Human Capital Development Activities at Brookhaven National Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bachner K. M.; Pepper, S.; Gomera, J.; Einwechter, M.; Toler, L. T.

    2016-07-24

    BNL has offered Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century,? referred to as NNSS, every year since 2009 for graduate students in technical and policy fields related to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. The course focuses on relevant policy issues, in addition to technical components, and is part of a larger NGSI short course initiative that includes separate courses that are delivered at three other national laboratories and NNSA headquarters. [SCHOLZ and ROSENTHAL] The course includes lectures from esteemed nonproliferation experts, tours of various BNL facilities and laboratories, and in-field and table-top exercises on both technical and policy subjects. Topics include the history of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other relevant treaties, the history of and advances in international nuclear safeguards, current relevant political situations in countries such as Iran, Iraq, and the Democratic Peoples? Republic of Korea (DPRK), nuclear science and technology, instrumentation and techniques used for verification activities, and associated research and development. The students conduct a mock Design Information Verification (DIV) at BNL?s decommissioned Medical Research Reactor. The capstone of the course includes a series of student presentations in which students act as policy advisors and provide recommendations in response to scenarios involving a current nonproliferation related event that are prepared by the course organizers. ?The course is open to domestic and foreign students, and caters to students in, entering, or recently having completed graduate school. Interested students must complete an application and provide a resume and a statement describing their interest in the course. Eighteen to 22 students attend annually; 165 students have completed the course to date. A stipend helps to defray students? travel and subsistence expenses. In 2015, the course was shortened from three weeks to

  15. Supporting the President's Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agenda: Transparency and Verification for Nuclear Arms Reductions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doyle, James E.; Meek, Elizabeth

    2009-01-01

    near-term (1-4) years and longer-term (5-10) years planning horizons. Some final observations include acknowledging the enduring nature of several key objectives on the Obama Administration's arms control and nonproliferation agenda. The CTBT, FMCT, bilateral nuclear arms reductions and strengthening the NPT have been sought by successive U.S. Administrations for nearly thirty years. Efforts towards negotiated arms control, although de-emphasized by the G.W. Bush Administration, have remained a pillar of U.S. national security strategy for decades and are likely to be of enduring if not increasing importance for decades to come. Therefore revitalization and expansion of USG capabilities in this area can be a positive legacy no matter what near-term arms control goals are achieved over the next four years. This is why it is important to reconstruct integrated bureaucratic, legislative, budgetary and diplomatic strategies to sustain the arms control and nonproliferation agenda. In this endeavor some past lessons must be taken to heart to avoid bureaucratic overkill and keep interagency policy-making and implementation structures lean and effective. On the Technical side a serious, sustained multilateral program to develop, down select and performance test nuclear weapons dismantlement verification technologies and procedures should be immediately initiated. In order to make this happen the United States and Russia should join with the UK and other interested states in creating a sustained, full-scale research and development program for verification at their respective nuc1ear weapons and defense establishments. The goals include development of effective technologies and procedures for: (1) Attribute measurement systems to certify nuclear warheads and military fissile materials; (2) Chain-of-custody methods to track items after they are authenticated and enter accountability; (3) Transportation monitoring; (4) Storage monitoring; (5) Fissile materials conversion

  16. U.S. Nonproliferation Policies and the Future of Nuclear Cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Byoung Jo; Lee, Sang Hyun

    2008-12-01

    In order for Korea to enhance nuclear cooperation with the U.S., the most urgent thing is to prove its nonproliferation commitment to international community, and legislate solid nonproliferation policies. To achieve these goals, Korean government need to consider to create Nonproliferation Task Force in the government and focus on proving Korea's firm commitment for nonproliferation. Along with it, as a civilian counterpart, Nonproliferation Research Center must be created as soon as possible to research, plan, and publicize Korea's nonproliferation policies and measures. At the same time, the government must set up a control tower that will coordinate Korea's nuclear diplomacy and guide proper division of labor among governmental and nongovernmental agencies in nonproliferation area. Finally, to raise general public's awareness about the danger of nuclear proliferation, government must invest on to develop educational programs and public relationship programs to educate the Korean public

  17. New dimensions in nonproliferation -- An International Atomic Energy Agency view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pelland, B.

    1994-01-01

    Four years ago, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait with the intention of annexing it as Iraq's 19th state. The disclosure of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program in the aftermath of the Gulf War--through the IAEA inspections--signaled the end of one proliferation era and the start of the next. In the author's remarks here, he has found it useful to identify four distinct proliferation eras, each with different features, each calling for different emphasis in international nonproliferation efforts. They provide a convenient way to look at the history of nonproliferation, and to look into the future and to the new dimensions in nonproliferation that are slowly emerging. Since the Gulf War, the nuclear world experienced a series of events of fundamental significance that changed the nature of nonproliferation, forcing changes in the mission of the IAEA and its methods. Certainly some of these events came in the form of unpleasant surprises, such as in Iraq, but very positive progress was also made on other fronts. He would like to share some perceptions of the events creating the present situation, and some views anticipating the requirements most likely to emerge in the coming years

  18. Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program, Annual Report, Class of 2012

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McMakin, Andrea H.

    2013-09-23

    This 32-pp annual report/brochure describes the accomplishments of the Class of 2012 of the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (the last class of this program), which PNNL administers for the National Nuclear Security Administration. The time period covers Sept 2011 through June 2013.

  19. British nuclear non-proliferation policy and the trident purchase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keohane, D.

    1984-01-01

    Since the mid-1950s, the UK has had a policy of making significant and sustained efforts to minimise the spread of nuclear arms. Unlike the global focus of its non-proliferation policy, the decision on Trident in centred upon national and perhaps regional requirements. At a time when non-nuclear countries are charging nuclear-weapon states with a grave failure to meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, Britain is making plans that would further increase the gap between the nuclear 'haves' and have-nots' and that indicate it expects to require nuclear arms in the next century. It would of course be unrealistic to expect a government to fully harmonise its manifold policies and unreasonable to suggest it should give absolute priority to one of its policy concerns, such as non-proliferation. But Britain is emphasising the high value it places upon the independent possession of strategic nuclear arms through its decision to purchase Trident, thus implicitly contradicting the logic underlying its non-proliferation policy. Compared to other factors, the influence of the Trident decision upon the non-proliferation regime appears very marginal, yet it is unlikely to strengthen that regime

  20. Former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow Served at U.S. Mission

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Brim, Cornelia P.

    2014-10-01

    Because of her training and professional experiences, Rosalyn Leitch, a Security Specialist at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and former Nonproliferation Graduate Fellow with NIS (2012-2013) was able to transition into temporary assignment as UNVIE Acting Nuclear Security Attaché from November 2013 through February 2014.

  1. Infrasonic measurements of the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Whitaker, R.W.; Noel, S.; Meadows, W. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    Two infrasonic arrays were operated for the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). The arrays were located at the Nevada Test Site and at St. George, UT. The results were consistent with experience on underground tests, and therefore close to underground nuclear tests of similar size.

  2. Preshot predictions for the near-source region in the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patch, D.F.; Welch, J.E.; Zerkle, J. [SAIC/Simulation Technology Operation, San Diego, CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    This paper summarizes a number of one and two-dimensional, ground motion calculations made in support of the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), a 1KT high explosive shot fired on 22 September 1993 at the Nevada Test Site. These calculations were sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency`s late-time containment program, and were completed well before the test was executed. They addressed a variety of test design, analysis and construction issues, and sought to identify any potential safety concerns. The test site model used in these calculations was based in large part on earlier work performed at SAIC and by other Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) contractors for the nearby underground nuclear test, code named MISTY ECHO. In particular, to obtain physical property and quasi-static material response data for the site, a number of core samples recovered near the MISTY ECHO working point (WP) were tested by TerraTek. We then used these data to develop a numerical response model for the site.

  3. Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the DUPIC fuel cycle concept

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Persiani, P K [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States)

    1997-07-01

    The purpose of the study is to comment on the proliferation characteristic profiles of some of the proposed fuel cycle alternatives to help ensure that nonproliferation concerns are introduced into the early stages of a fuel cycle concept development program, and to perhaps aid in the more effective implementation of the international nonproliferation regime initiative and safeguards systems. Alternative recycle concepts proposed by several countries involve the recycle of spent fuel without the separation of plutonium from uranium and fission products. The concepts are alternatives to either the direct long-term storage deposition of or the purex reprocessing of the spent fuels. The alternate fuel cycle concepts reviewed include: the dry-recycle processes such as the direct use of reconfigured PWR spent fuel assemblies into CANDU reactors(DUPIC); low-decontamination, single-cycle co-extraction of fast reactor fuels in a wet-purex type of reprocessing; and on a limited scale the thorium-uranium fuel cycle. The nonproliferation advantages usually associated with the above non-separation processes are: the highly radioactive spent fuel presents a barrier to the physical diversion of the nuclear material; avoid the need to dissolve and chemically separate the plutonium from the uranium and fission products; and that the spent fuel isotopic quality of the plutonium vector is further degraded. Although the radiation levels and the need for reprocessing may be perceived as barriers to the terrorist or the subnational level of safeguards, the international level of nonproliferation concerns is addressed primarily by material accountancy and verification activities. On the international level of nonproliferation concerns, the non-separation fuel cycle concepts involved have to be evaluated on the bases of the impact the processes may have on nuclear materials accountancy. (author).

  4. Transparency and nonproliferation in the Asia-Pacific region. Enhancing transparency, strengthening the nonproliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hamada, Kazuko

    2008-01-01

    Driven by the prospect of rapid economic growth and the perceived need for energy security, the Asia-Pacific region is destined to increase its nuclear energy use in the coming decades. This projected increase, however, will bring with it nuclear proliferation concerns, fueling fears about the security of nuclear material and creating suspicions about its use. The increasing use of nuclear energy inevitably necessitates supplementary efforts, designed to ensure nuclear security and a legitimate use of nuclear energy, other than the obligation to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Nuclear transparency measures could be useful tools for building confidence that the increasing nuclear energy use does not contribute to nuclear proliferation. These measures could also foster a cooperative tradition that can address rising concerns over nuclear trafficking and terrorism, which require regional coordination to combat. However, moderate progress in implementing transparency measures suggests a lack of political appreciation of this concept. Thus, this paper describes various forms of potential transparency measures to expand the possibilities of the transparency concept and explore areas in which this concept might be applicable. This paper also clarifies some challenges involving transparency projects, and suggests possible ways to address these challenges. (author)

  5. Verification of excess defense material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fearey, B.L.; Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.

    1997-01-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has expressed an interest in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) using its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring excess materials, which include both classified and unclassified materials. Although the IAEA has suggested the need to address inspections of both types of materials, the most troublesome and potentially difficult problems involve approaches to the inspection of classified materials. The key issue for placing classified nuclear components and materials under IAEA safeguards is the conflict between these traditional IAEA materials accounting procedures and the US classification laws and nonproliferation policy designed to prevent the disclosure of critical weapon-design information. Possible verification approaches to classified excess defense materials could be based on item accountancy, attributes measurements, and containment and surveillance. Such approaches are not wholly new; in fact, they are quite well established for certain unclassified materials. Such concepts may be applicable to classified items, but the precise approaches have yet to be identified, fully tested, or evaluated for technical and political feasibility, or for their possible acceptability in an international inspection regime. Substantial work remains in these areas. This paper examines many of the challenges presented by international inspections of classified materials

  6. Planetary Defense

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-05-01

    4 Abstract Planetary defense against asteroids should be a major concern for every government in the world . Millions of asteroids and...helps make Planetary Defense viable because defending the Earth against asteroids benefits from all the above technologies. So if our planet security...information about their physical characteristics so we can employ the right strategies. It is a crucial difference if asteroids are made up of metal

  7. Report of a workshop on nuclear forces and nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC October 28, 2010

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pilat, Joseph F [Los Alamos National Laboratory

    2010-12-08

    A workshop sponsored by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was held at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on October 28, 2010. The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The discussions reflected the importance of the NPR for defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21st century threats and providing guidance for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) programs and, for many but not all participants, highlighted its role in the successful outcome of the NPT RevCon. There was widespread support for the NPR and its role in developing the foundations for a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. However, some participants raised concerns about its implementation and its long-term effectiveness and sustainability.

  8. Post-test geologic observations made at the non-proliferation experiment site, N-tunnel, Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Townsend, D.R.; Bradford, R.P.; Hopkins, S.P. [Raytheon Services Nevada, Mercury, NV (United States)] [and others

    1994-12-31

    Qualitative evaluations of damage resulting from an underground explosion can provide valuable information concerning the size of the charge, as well as the location of a clandestine detonation. However, caution must be exercised during the appraisal because the effects of an explosion are a function of many factors in addition to yield. Construction techniques, the physical properties of the surrounding rock, and the depth of burial are all important considerations when evaluating the effects of an underground detonation. Raytheon Services Nevada geologists documented underground and surface effects of the Non-Proliferation Experiment, as they have for all recent underground weapons-effects tests conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. Underground, the extent of the visible damage decreased rapidly from severe at the closest inspection point 100 m from the Working Point, to insignificant 300 m from the Working Point. The severity of damage correlates in some instances with the orientation of the drift with respect to the shock-wave propagation direction. No evidence of the Non-Proliferation explosion was visible on the mesa surface 389 m above the Working Point the day after the explosion.

  9. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-01

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  10. Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Buckner, M.R. [Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States); Sanders, T.L. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2001-07-01

    The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

  11. Activities of the ANS special committee on nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buckner, M.R.; Sanders, T.L.

    2001-01-01

    The American Nuclear Society (ANS) Special Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation (SCNN) believes that to reverse current trends, U.S. policy must revisit the fundamental premise of Atoms for Peace: A collaborative nuclear enterprise enhances rather than diminishes national security. To accomplish this, the U.S. Government must develop an integrated policy on energy, nuclear technology, and national security. The policy must recognize that these are interrelated and that an integrated policy will require substantial investments in nuclear research and development and in nuclear education. This paper describes the current activities of the SCNN to heighten awareness of nonproliferation issues for decision makers and ANS members, and alert them to the need for action to resolve these concerns. (author)

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation: a guide to the debate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1985-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of 15 countries have been studied and summarized for use by participants of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation (NPT) of Nuclear weapons held in September 1985. The main purpose of the guide is to examine what action must be taken to ensure the Treaty's survival. There are four chapters following an introduction, covering the implementation of the essential provisions of the NPT, the motivations of the countries which have not joined the NPT, together with the motivations of those which have formally renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, even though they possess the technical and economic potential necessary to manufacture them. The last chapter summarises measures which might be taken to strengthen the NPT including ideas put forward at a workshop held in 1984. (author)

  13. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-15

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  14. Reforming the non-proliferation system in the 1980s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1984-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of the 1970s were based largely on the misconception that the main danger lay in the possible misuse of civil nuclear-power plants for the production of weapon materials. In consequence their aim, whether by means of denial or control, was to ensure that such misuse was made more difficult in all countries with nuclear-power industries. Less attention was paid to the potential for misuse of the nuclear-research plants in the handful of countries outside the non-proliferation system. The resulting difficulties placed in the way of countries developing their nuclear-power industries damaged relations between the supplier and the consumer states, and discredited any new efforts aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation system. By contrast, the 1980s began, first in INFCE and then in the Committee on Assurances of Supply, with a concerted attempt to re-establish a dialogue based on a relationship of trust between the supplier and the customer states. But a restored consensus will not, on its own, deal with the problem of those states that are outside the non-proliferation system and that have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The outcome of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply may help to attract some of those states into the system, but more needs to be done either by adapting the NPT, making adherence to it appear more attractive, or by devising some alternative code of behaviour for states not party to the Treaty and by seeking to remove the political obstacles that lie in the way of at least some of the potential weapon states adhering to the Treaty

  15. Non-proliferation policies and demand for uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warnecke, S.J.

    1978-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of USA, Canada and Australia are outlined, and the effects on nuclear policy in the consumer countries, particularly the member states of the European Community and Japan are considered. Supply and demand in relation to uranium, security and economic aspects are covered. Reprocessing, the use of plutonium in breeder reactors, and the wider issues of international confidence and trade are discussed. (U.K.)

  16. URENCO: A Multinational Contribution to Non-Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korbmacher, T.

    2015-01-01

    URENCO was founded in 1970 following the signing of the Treaty of Almelo by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The fundamental principles for effective supervision of URENCO's technology and enrichment operations with respect to non-proliferation issues have been laid down in this treaty. In order to enable the construction of a URENCO enrichment facility in the USA and to permit the transfer of classified information into the USA, another treaty has been concluded in 1992. The US government entered into the Treaty of Washington together with the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to ensure that the same conditions that had been agreed in the Treaty of Almelo would also apply to the US. To allow for the completion of the joint venture with Areva regarding the URENCO Group's technology business ETC, the Treaty of Cardiff has been signed on 12 July 2005 by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France. Through this treaty, France is obliged to adhere to the principles of the Treaty of Almelo. For each treaty, control bodies have been formed with representatives of the governments of the signatory countries. These committees exercise the role of effective supervision of the technology and operations with respect to non-proliferation issues. They also consider all questions concerning the safeguards system (as established by IAEA/Euratom), classification arrangements and security procedures, exports of the technology and enriched uranium, as well as other non-proliferation issues. The presentation describes how the multinational structure of URENCO contributes to Non-Proliferation on the basis of the above mentioned treaties. Beyond that, the international cross linking of operational working groups and committees within the URENCO Group structure is explained. This structure implies an additional assurance to achieve the safeguards goals set. (author)

  17. United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    Science and technology transformed the world in the twentieth century. Living standards improved but warfare was rendered more deadly. Weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical and nuclear - and their means of delivery were developed, as ever more sophisticated conventional armaments were produced and disseminated. The horrors and destruction of armed conflict persist. The need for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training has never been greater. Indeed, changing concepts and perceptions of security and threat magnify the urgency for new thinking to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation goals. More than a decade after the end of the cold war and at the start of the twenty- first century, there is a pressing need to combat ignorance, complacency and a culture of violence. These can be countered through long-term programmes of education and training, especially those related to disarmament and non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with a view to their reduction and complete elimination. At the same time, concern has heightened over the global threat of the excessive and destabilizing proliferation of conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, rendering more acute the need to combat such proliferation in a sustained way through disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Additionally there is a need to raise awareness of new challenges to international security and the process of disarmament. Among them, terrorism, with the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction, is a source of particular concern. Other challenges, such as organized crime, poverty, human rights abuses and environmental concerns must also be taken into account. Education and training remain important but under utilized tools for promoting peace, disarmament and non-proliferation. The present report addresses that issue and proposes ideas for action

  18. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations

  19. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations.

  20. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

  1. INTEGRATION OF FACILITY MODELING CAPABILITIES FOR NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ANALYSIS

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

    2011-07-18

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  2. Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1978-01-01

    This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

  3. Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garcia, Humberto; Burr, Tom; Coles, Garill A.; Edmunds, Thomas A.; Garrett, Alfred; Gorensek, Maximilian; Hamm, Luther; Krebs, John; Kress, Reid L.; Lamberti, Vincent; Schoenwald, David; Tzanos, Constantine P.; Ward, Richard C.

    2012-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  4. Integration Of Facility Modeling Capabilities For Nuclear Nonproliferation Analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gorensek, M.; Hamm, L.; Garcia, H.; Burr, T.; Coles, G.; Edmunds, T.; Garrett, A.; Krebs, J.; Kress, R.; Lamberti, V.; Schoenwald, D.; Tzanos, C.; Ward, R.

    2011-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclear nonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facility modeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facility modeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facility modeling capabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferation analysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facility modeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facility modeling capabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  5. Priming of antiherbivore defensive responses in plants

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Jinwon Kim; Gary W.Felton

    2013-01-01

    Defense priming is defined as increased readiness of defense induction.A growing body of literature indicates that plants (or intact parts of a plant) are primed in anticipation of impending environmental stresses,both biotic and abiotic,and upon the following stimulus,induce defenses more quickly and strongly.For instance,some plants previously exposed to herbivore-inducible plant volatiles (HIPVs) from neighboring plants under herbivore attack show faster or stronger defense activation and enhanced insect resistance when challenged with secondary insect feeding.Research on priming of antiherbivore defense has been limited to the HIPV-mediated mechanism until recently,but significant advances were made in the past three years,including non-HIPV-mediated defense priming,epigenetic modifications as the molecular mechanism of priming,and others.It is timely to consider the advances in research on defense priming in the plantinsect interactions.

  6. Institutional overviews. Overview of the JAEA and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Senzaki, Masao

    2006-01-01

    The Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was formed within the new Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) to carry out safeguards and material control duties for the JAEA. Development of technologies and procedures for safeguards is an important duty. In addition, the new NPSTC will assume a 'think tank' role in support of the nonproliferation regime, help train nonproliferation experts, and cooperate with academic, government and non-governmental organizations on nonproliferation issues. This report briefly summarizes the formation of the JAEA and describes the duties and structure of the NPSTC in detail. (author)

  7. Export policy and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.A.V.

    1978-01-01

    Developing countries with a nuclear programme are about a dozen according to information obtained by IAEA. They are a group hostile to any restriction imposed on nuclear technology export and consider that such restriction is contrary to the global concept of North/South co-operation which provides for transfer of advanced technology. In particular, they object to the fact that nuclear weapon states make use of Article 4 of the NPT. Industrialised countries are required to keep a balance between a regular and stable supply system and the assurance that exported nuclear installations and materials are placed under international control according to the IAEA Safeguards. (NEA) [fr

  8. Defense Business Board

    Science.gov (United States)

    Skip to main content (Press Enter). Toggle navigation Defense Business Board Search Search Defense Business Board: Search Search Defense Business Board: Search Defense Business Board Business Excellence in Defense of the Nation Defense Business Board Home Charter Members Meetings Studies Contact Us The Defense

  9. WMD Nonproliferation: Biosecurity in the Age of Terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phillips, C. J.; Chesser, R. K.

    2007-01-01

    The international community has cooperated in arenas where diplomacy, treaties and conventions, and international bodies such as the IAEA and UN Security Council can have successful roles controlling WMD proliferation. This especially is the case for nuclear and chemical weapons. In our view, the potential use of biological agents and toxins presents a distinctive challenge not necessarily amenable to standard solutions and legal controls. Commercial biotechnology, basic biological research, and public and animal health are intertwined and of global significance. Advancements in these civilian activities have legitimate value, but also can serve the needs of state-sponsored defensive and offensive biological weapons programs. More important, technical and scientific advances and development of public bioinformatics databases also simplifies an otherwise complex world for trans-national terrorists. In our paper we will draw upon our personal international experiences, including in the former Soviet Union and Iraq, to explain our concept of 'shared risk' within the scientific community. Personal engagement, meaningful collaboration, adherence to uniform ethics and standards, and common scientific goals on an international scale are the best hedge against bio-terrorism. The global scientific community already is based upon shared principles that cross both cultural and political boundaries and thus are pre-adapted to play a major role in preventing the use of biology as a terrorist weapon.(author)

  10. WMD Nonproliferation: Biosecurity in the Age of Terrorism

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Phillips, C J [Department of Biological Sciences, Texas Tech University, Lubbock (United States); Chesser, R K [Center for Environmental Radiation Studies and Department of Biology, Texas Tech University, Lubbock (United States)

    2007-07-01

    The international community has cooperated in arenas where diplomacy, treaties and conventions, and international bodies such as the IAEA and UN Security Council can have successful roles controlling WMD proliferation. This especially is the case for nuclear and chemical weapons. In our view, the potential use of biological agents and toxins presents a distinctive challenge not necessarily amenable to standard solutions and legal controls. Commercial biotechnology, basic biological research, and public and animal health are intertwined and of global significance. Advancements in these civilian activities have legitimate value, but also can serve the needs of state-sponsored defensive and offensive biological weapons programs. More important, technical and scientific advances and development of public bioinformatics databases also simplifies an otherwise complex world for trans-national terrorists. In our paper we will draw upon our personal international experiences, including in the former Soviet Union and Iraq, to explain our concept of 'shared risk' within the scientific community. Personal engagement, meaningful collaboration, adherence to uniform ethics and standards, and common scientific goals on an international scale are the best hedge against bio-terrorism. The global scientific community already is based upon shared principles that cross both cultural and political boundaries and thus are pre-adapted to play a major role in preventing the use of biology as a terrorist weapon.(author)

  11. Nuclear non-proliferation and security culture within EDF nuclear fleet

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Debes, M.

    2013-01-01

    This document describes the nuclear non-proliferation strategy and the safety culture of EDF. The author lists all the mandatory rules and regulations at international and national levels EDF has to comply with. All these requirements are applied in EDF nuclear facilities through adequate procedures that assure a nuclear material accountancy, a follow-up of any item containing nuclear material in the facility, and internal controls. External independent controls are also performed. The EDF security policy goal is to protect human, material and knowledge assets, and to preserve operational capacity, competitiveness and public confidence, within national regulatory framework and regulation on 'vital importance facilities'. The treatment of events or incident (detection, analysis, lessons drawn, experience feedback) is a tool to progress, along with reporting, internal control process and audits. The security requirements cover the different related domains important to EDF industrial assets: security of employees against assaults; security of data according to their sensibility level; security of the information system and telecom; awareness and training of employees; relations with external suppliers or contractors; business premises; security of staff and projects abroad. For industrial facilities and grids (facilities of 'vital importance'...), the defense in depth principles are applied against the different threat scenarios. Security measures are studied at the design stage in a consistent way with nuclear safety measures, while taking into account the protective means deployed by public authorities. These risk analysis are periodically reassessed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  12. Humble Expectations (on Non-proliferation and Disarmament)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persbo, Andreas

    2014-04-01

    The last few years have been, to paraphrase Charles Dickens, an epoch of belief and an epoch of incredulity. The optimistic tide triggered in the spring of 2009 by President Obama's Prague speech appears to be receding. Recent developments in Ukraine provide ammunition for those who doubted the value and wisdom of nuclear arms reductions. It is easy, indeed comfortable, to point to the value of deterrence in times of political fears and tension between those who are nuclear armed. However, Ukraine is not a validation of nuclear weapons possession, nor is it proof that deterrence works. If it were, it carries with it the uncomfortable thought that nuclear weapons deter countries from stepping up in the defence of smaller nations. The consequences of such a chain of thought are unsettling: by extension, it may well be that nuclear force - while securing the borders of those states that can wield it - ultimately undermines the principle of collective security embodied in Article I of the UN Charter. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently stated, 'disarmament in its classic 'meaning' is more and more of the past'. But what has really changed? The prospects for multilateral disarmament efforts have been slim throughout the nuclear age. Disarmament, even a simple reduction of nuclear arms not required for defence needs, has always been a long-term effort, requiring patience and careful planning, and is not suitable for people more who prefer high rhetoric, lofty ambition, and quixotic goals. Things are progressing, albeit slowly. The P-5 process is making small but important advances in formulating joint terminology. While the outcome (expected in 2015) is likely to be under-whelming for many, the effort should not be dismissed, but encouraged. Further work is required to lay the substratum on which disarmament can occur, especially so in regards to the mechanics of multilateral verification, and the future role of international

  13. 15 CFR Supplement No. 1 to Part 742 - Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 15 Commerce and Foreign Trade 2 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Nonproliferation of Chemical and...—Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Note: Exports and reexports of items in performance of.... Contract sanctity dates are established in the course of the imposition of foreign policy controls on...

  14. IAEA Director General calls for rededication to nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Speaking at the opening session of the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in New York on April 24, 2000, the Director General of the IAEA urged all nations to commit themselves unequivocally to the basic tenets of the non-proliferation regime

  15. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    Science.gov (United States)

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  16. Considerations on nonproliferation regime meeting in a changing world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, Hiroyoshi; Kikuchi, Masahiro

    1994-01-01

    This paper summarizes the past history of worldwide nonproliferation regime, then proposes the future improvements on the regime. Present worldwide nonproliferation regime have been formulated during the cold war era. Therefore, the structure and measures of the regime were heavily influenced by the features of cold war era. Though the cold war was over, still new international order does not seem to be on the horizon, we need to review the present regime and to improve the regime compatible to new world situation. Generally speaking, the nonproliferation regime have gained moderate success so far. We could point out the following features as a kind of success: 1) No increase of overt Nuclear Weapon State (NWS), 2) All five NWSs have finally participated to the NPT, 3) South Africa has destroyed its nuclear weapons and became Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS), 4) Successful conclusions of some regional arrangements, such as Tlatelolco, Ralotonga, and 5) Strengthening of export control on sensitive items. On the other hand, we recognize the following points as the failures of the regime. 6) India, Pakistan and Israel reject to join the NPT, 7) Existence of some violation against NPT regime, i.e. Iraqi case and DPRK case, 8) Insufficient effective measures against brain drain problem, 9) Risk exists for the long term extension of NPT, and 10) Insufficient flexibility to meet changing boundary conditions. We would propose the various measures for strengthening to meet changing boundary conditions, as follows: 11) Measures to be taken along with future civil use of Plutonium, 12) Strengthening and rationalizing international safeguards, 13) Countermeasures for emerging new types of nuclear proliferation, 14) Strengthening nuclear material control in NWS, 15) Measures to be taken for nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons, and 16) Nuclear disarmament. (author)

  17. Approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subrahmanyam, K.

    1981-01-01

    The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)

  18. Saving the NPT: past and future non-proliferation bargains

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tertrais, B

    2005-07-01

    In this thorough study of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the author looks at the origins of the NPT, its original bargains, and the current 'global crisis of compliance'. Then he looks to the 2005 NPT Review Conference for approaches 'to preserve the integrity and the credibility of the Treaty'. He suggests a new set of bargains centered around two issues: increase rewards for members in good standing of their obligations, but promote sanctions for those cheating; and recognize that nuclear disarmament is a distant goal, but satisfy the legitimate worries of NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States)

  19. Saving the NPT: past and future non-proliferation bargains

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tertrais, B.

    2005-01-01

    In this thorough study of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the author looks at the origins of the NPT, its original bargains, and the current 'global crisis of compliance'. Then he looks to the 2005 NPT Review Conference for approaches 'to preserve the integrity and the credibility of the Treaty'. He suggests a new set of bargains centered around two issues: increase rewards for members in good standing of their obligations, but promote sanctions for those cheating; and recognize that nuclear disarmament is a distant goal, but satisfy the legitimate worries of NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States)

  20. From nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament: a need to refocus NPT priorities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sethi, Manpreet

    1998-01-01

    This paper seeks to suggest that attempts at general and complete nuclear disarmament have largely failed because of an over emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly horizontal, while disarmament has attracted only lip service from the perpetrators of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that is deemed to be the core of the global non-proliferation regime is no less to blame for having indulged in a skewed pursuit of its twin objectives - nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The paper argues that nuclear non-proliferation can be sustainable only if complemented by nuclear disarmament. In the absence of the latter, proliferation of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the NPT and its safeguards regime, would always pose a potential risk

  1. New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

    1999-01-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

  2. Current nuclear non-proliferation policies in the world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru

    1997-01-01

    Although a global nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has disappeared, many challenges to nuclear non-proliferation have emerged. Sources of concern, like a nuclear weapon program by Iraq and suspicions of North Korea have caused the adoption of a variety of political and technical measures in order to meet these challenges in the post-Cold War era. This paper describes the following ten policies for non-proliferation: 1) Strengthening the NPT; 2) Nuclear reduction; 3) CTBT and cut-off treaty; 4) Establishment of NWFZs; 5) Counterproliferation; 6) Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards; 7) Control and disposal of nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons; 8) Export control; 9) Registration of plutonium; and 10) Actions against nuclear smuggling. The first four measures can be said to be mainly political policies, the fifth measure (counterproliferation), can be categorized as basically a military policy, and the last five measures can be said to be technical. (J.P.N.)

  3. Analyzing Department of Defense's Use of Other Transactions as a Method for Accessing Non-Traditional Technology

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Gilliland, John

    2001-01-01

    ... technological superiority To attract advanced technology companies that normally do not participate in defense business to the defense market, Congress provided a new contracting authority, Section 845...

  4. Defense Human Resources Activity > PERSEREC

    Science.gov (United States)

    Skip to main content (Press Enter). Toggle navigation Defense Human Resources Activity Search Search Defense Human Resources Activity: Search Search Defense Human Resources Activity: Search Defense Human Resources Activity U.S. Department of Defense Defense Human Resources Activity Overview

  5. Extending the GEMINI advanced review station development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kadner, S.; Spahn, W.; Pepper, S.

    1999-01-01

    Recent changes in the objectives of arms control agreements will have a dramatic impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Meeting the demands of the nuclear non-proliferation regime will require the utilisation of the best available technological means for verification. The following discussion focuses on the increasing demands for safeguards with a view towards the possible technological solutions available to meet these demands. Based on the assumption that the gap between the international nonproliferation verification agenda and the available financial means can only be bridged via technology, the following discussion hopes to offer a compelling argument for the adoption of remote monitoring technologies in safeguards applications, specifically, data collection and review. The GEMINI Advanced Review Station (GARS) was developed with initial support from USPOTAS. This poster presentation presents the latest developments in GARS, including its extension to other surveillance systems under IAEA consideration, NDA applications, and networked safeguards. (author)

  6. Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

  7. The Rarotonga treaty: regional approach to non-proliferation in the South Pacific

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Papadimitropulos, P.

    1988-01-01

    The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation in the South-Pacific-the Rarotonga treaty - is discussed. The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation is aimed in a wide sense at the assistance to detante in a certain region and the propagation of measures strengthening confidence there. On December 11, 1975 at the initiative of New Zealand and Fiji the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the nuclear-free zone in the South-Pacific. In compliance with the Rarotonga treaty a large nuclear-free zone is created. The participants of the Rarotonga Treaty assess the values of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

  8. Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, Harald

    2011-01-01

    The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

  9. Carter faces new dilemmas over non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickson, D.

    1979-01-01

    Questions underlying the current domestic debate as to whether the US should revise its attitude towards the relationship between the spread of nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are considered. Problems arising from the provisional conclusions of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, set up at President Carter's suggestion in 1977, are evaluated. The thorny question of how to deal with the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for review in 1980 is discussed. Finally there is the issue, for which it is concluded nobody pretends to have all the answers, of whether a sufficient consensus - involving both developed and developing countries as partners in decision-making - can be forged to develop and apply an effective control regime, or whether increasing competition between both producers and consumers of nuclear power will be such as to limit the possibilities for multilateral action, shifting the focus back to bilateral actions. (UK)

  10. Developments in capture-γ libraries for nonproliferation applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hurst, A. M.; Firestone, R. B.; Sleaford, B. W.; Bleuel, D. L.; Basunia, M. S.; Bečvář, F.; Belgya, T.; Bernstein, L. A.; Carroll, J. J.; Detwiler, B.; Escher, J. E.; Genreith, C.; Goldblum, B. L.; Krtička, M.; Lerch, A. G.; Matters, D. A.; McClory, J. W.; McHale, S. R.; Révay, Zs.; Szentmiklosi, L.; Turkoglu, D.; Ureche, A.; Vujic, J.

    2017-09-01

    The neutron-capture reaction is fundamental for identifying and analyzing the γ-ray spectrum from an unknown assembly because it provides unambiguous information on the neutron-absorbing isotopes. Nondestructive-assay applications may exploit this phenomenon passively, for example, in the presence of spontaneous-fission neutrons, or actively where an external neutron source is used as a probe. There are known gaps in the Evaluated Nuclear Data File libraries corresponding to neutron-capture γ-ray data that otherwise limit transport-modeling applications. In this work, we describe how new thermal neutron-capture data are being used to improve information in the neutron-data libraries for isotopes relevant to nonproliferation applications. We address this problem by providing new experimentally-deduced partial and total neutron-capture reaction cross sections and then evaluate these data by comparison with statistical-model calculations.

  11. Improving Capture-gamma Libraries for Nonproliferation Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sleaford, Brad W. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Hurst, Aaron M. [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Univ. of California, Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2016-11-01

    This report describes the measurement, evaluation and incorporation of new -ray spectroscopic data into the Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF) for nonproliferation applications. Analysis and processing techniques are described along with key deliverables that have been met over the course of this project. A total of nine new ENDF libraries have been submitted to the National Nuclear Data Center at the Brookhaven National Laboratory and are now available in the ENDF/B-VIII.beta2 release. Furthermore, this project has led to more than ten peer-reviewed publications and provided theses for ve graduate students. This project is a component of the NA-22 venture collaboration on \\Correlated Nuclear Data in Fission Events" (LA14-V-CorrData-PD2Jb).

  12. Joint U.S./Russian plutonium disposition study: Nonproliferation issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.; Erkkila, B.; Fearey, B.; Ehinger, M.; McAllister, S.; Chitaykin, V.; Ptashny, V.

    1996-01-01

    In an effort to establish joint activities in the disposition of fissile materials from nuclear materials, the US and Russia agreed to conduct joint work to develop consistent comparisons of various alternatives for the disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. Joint working groups were established for the analysis of alternatives for plutonium management for water reactors, fast reactors, storage, geological formations, immobilization and stabilization of solutions and other forms. In addition cross-cutting working groups were established for economic analysis and nonproliferation (NP). This paper reviews the activities of the NP working group in support of these studies. The NP working group provided integrated support in the area of nuclear NP to the other US/Russian Study teams. It involved both domestic safeguards and security and international safeguards. The analysis of NP involved consideration of the resistance to theft or diversion and resistance to retrieval, extraction or reuse

  13. Nuclear power and the non-proliferation issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    This leaflet, issued by the British Nuclear Forum on behalf of the industry, seeks first to place the problem of reconciling the need for nuclear power with its possible weapon uses in a historical perspective. Secondly, it describes the technical and political measures which are now taken, and others which could be introduced in order to ensure that nuclear power, which offers the cheapest and safest large-scale energy source for the future, can be made available without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Headings are: introduction; the early years; the IAEA; uranium enrichment; plutonium; secrecy has failed; the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the London Suppliers Group; the situation today; the British position; conclusions. (U.K.)

  14. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - crisis of a concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eisenbart, C.; Ehrenstein, D. von

    1990-01-01

    The Working Group of FEST (Protestant Study Community) and VDW (Association of German Scientists) presents twelve theses on the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and deduces recommendations, in particular for the Federal Government. The WG thinks that scope and significance of international nuclear policy has not been sufficiently perceived neither by the German public nor by politicians. The theses are supplemented and explained in more detail by special contributions of the WG's members. The contributions deal with the historical background, with the instruments of NP policy, with international law, with risks and limiting these risks, with economic aspects, with nuclear policy in the Third World, with the chances of nuclear disarmament, and with Federal NP policy. The 'twelve theses' as well as the 22 contributions are individual records. (HSCH) [de

  15. Implementing the strengthened non-proliferation regime in Georgia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chelidze, L.

    2009-01-01

    A few years ago Georgia faced complicated problems in nuclear and radiation safety field, namely: weakness of infrastructure for state management, incomplete inventory of radiation sources, orphan sources all over the post soviet military bases and as a result several radiological emergencies, overexposed victims and high risk of attracting international terrorists to use the country as a rout for illegal movement of radiation sources or nuclear materials. IAEA policy and strategy for nonproliferation showed that it is not the one country problem. The coalition of democratic countries immediately responded to aroused problems. Step by step Georgia established a regulatory body, worked out national legislation, developed licensing and inspection activities, nearly finished installation of radiation portals at the whole perimeter of the country. Several successful cases of prevention of the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials through borders of Georgia identified country's ability to contribute its shear to the Global Nuclear security.(author)

  16. Non-proliferation and safeguards in South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broodryk, Alta

    2001-01-01

    South Africa occupies a unique position in the history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in being the only country with a nuclear weapons capability that was voluntary terminated before acceding to the Treaty. The first nuclear device built was completed in December 1982, five more devices followed at an orderly pace of less than one per year and on 26 February 1990 cabinet officially implemented the termination of its nuclear deterrent capability. The events that flowed from the termination was that South Africa: Acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (10 July 1991); Signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/394, (16 September 1991); Submitted its initial inventory of nuclear material (30 September 1991); and Received first verification team from the Agency (November 1991). South Africa, being dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became a party to various non-proliferation treaties, regimes and groups. The National Non- Proliferation Policy, as published in a Cabinet memorandum, also clearly states this commitment. To comply with the requirements of the Treaty and Agreement the following two acts were published: The Nuclear Energy Act; The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The Minister of Minerals and Energy is the State Authority for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in South Africa, however, the Minister delegated this Authority to NECSA's Safeguards Division. To implement the requirements of the various acts, control regimes and treaties a State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard, was designed. This standard focuses on customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, the demonstration of commitment and the prevention of non-conformity. To comply with the requirements of the standard the following procedures were established and maintained: A Quality Manual; Customer focus; Control of documents; Control of quality records; Internal Audits

  17. Naval nuclear propulsion and the international nonproliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Guimaraes, Leonam dos Santos

    2005-01-01

    Nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) acquisition by Non-Proliferation Treaty No- Nuclear Weapon State (NPT-NNWS) Navies does not imply nuclear weapon proliferation risks higher than those related to stationary research and power reactors. It must then be recognized that stringent restraints on supplies and political pressures on governments, both exercised very effectively by No-Proliferation Treaty - Nuclear Weapon State (NPT-NWS) against NPT-NNWS indigenous development of SSN and associated fuel cycle facilities, are fundamentally based on geopolitical and military strategic objectives. This practice is far from being related exclusively to the NPT spirit: in fact, it is a matter of freedom at seas and not of nuclear proliferation. (author)

  18. Future of US utilities under non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ladesich, J.N.

    1978-01-01

    The non-proliferation policy, a negative policy that closes the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, is only a small part of a chaotic energy environment characterized by inaction. The impact of this environment on California utilities has resulted in a virtual moratorium on new facilities at a time when the nuclear option can be shown to be vital. Utilities are experiencing uncertainties in future power generation because alternatives to nuclear energy may not be the best choices. Utilities feel frustrated by the inaction; not by the objectives of the accountability and security proposals. The utilities will continue to support nuclear power and the completion of the fuel cycle in spite of these uncertainties

  19. The future of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siddiqa, A.

    1997-01-01

    Nuclear proliferation in South Asia is currently one of the hot topics in world politics. The concern of the international community, and especially the USA, over this issue is coupled with the fear of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. As a result, Washington has been using its 'stick and carrot' policy to persuade the two countries involved not to develop their nuclear programs for military purposes. However both countries have not only continued to develop their nuclear ambitions, but seem to have achieved vertical nuclear proliferation. This paper examines the future non-proliferation in the South Asian region in the 1990s. This will be achieved by looking at the following: the development of the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan; how these programs have been developed; the reasons for acquiring the capability for non-conventional defence; the real fear in terms of nuclear proliferation in the region; the possible options for dealing with nuclear proliferation in South Asia

  20. Lessons learned from the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McWilliam, C.; Curtis, S. [DOE, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Department of Energy sponsored Non-Proliferation Experiment (formerly known as the Chemical Kiloton) involved the detonation of blasting agent approximately equivalent to one kiloton of energy release on the Nevada Test Site in an effort to determine if (and if so, which) discriminators exist between conventional and nuclear detonations of similar yield. Coordination among hundreds of scientists from at least fifteen different organizations were required to design the experiments necessary to collect and interpret data from this unique and complex event. Stakeholders and members of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament observed the progress of the experiment first hand. The experiment was a success in that a vast majority of the expected data was collected and shared quickly and efficiently throughout the international scientific community. The management of the project was discussed among the major co-sponsoring organizations and the significant {open_quotes}lessons learned{close_quotes} are presented.

  1. Explosive performance on the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKown, T.O. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Explosive Effects Physics Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments on the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) as part of its effort to define source functions for seismic waves. Since all investigations were contingent on the performance of the emplaced chemical explosive, an array of diagnostic measurements was fielded in the emplaced explosive. The CORRTEX (COntinuous Reflectometry for Radius vs Time EXperiment) system was used to investigate the explosive initiation and to determine the detonation velocities on three levels and in a number of radial directions. The CORRTEX experiments fielded in the explosive chamber will be described, including a description of the explosive emplacement from the perspective of its impact on the CORRTEX results. The data obtained are reviewed and the resulting detonation velocities are reported. A variation of detonation velocity with depth in the explosive and the apparent underdetonation and overdetonation of the explosive in different radial directions is reported.

  2. Sharing knowledge, shaping Europe US technological collaboration and nonproliferation

    CERN Document Server

    Krige, John

    2016-01-01

    In the 1950s and the 1960s, U.S. administrations were determined to prevent Western European countries from developing independent national nuclear weapons programs. To do so, the United States attempted to use its technological pre-eminence as a tool of “soft power” to steer Western European technological choices toward the peaceful uses of the atom and of space, encouraging options that fostered collaboration, promoted nonproliferation, and defused challenges to U.S. technological superiority. In Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe, John Krige describes these efforts and the varying degrees of success they achieved. Krige explains that the pursuit of scientific and technological leadership, galvanized by America’s Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, was also used for techno-political collaboration with major allies. He examines a series of multinational arrangements involving shared technological platforms and aimed at curbing nuclear proliferation, and he describes the roles of the Department ...

  3. Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Counterterrorism: Impacts on Public Health

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pregenzer, Arian

    2014-01-01

    Reducing the risks of nuclear war, limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and reducing global nuclear weapons stockpiles are key national and international security goals. They are pursued through a variety of international arms control, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism treaties and agreements. These legally binding and political commitments, together with the institutional infrastructure that supports them, work to establish global norms of behavior and have limited the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Beyond the primary security objectives, reducing the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, preventing environmental releases of radioactive material, increasing the availability of safe and secure nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and providing scientific data relevant to predicting and managing the consequences of natural or human-caused disasters worldwide provide significant benefits to global public health. PMID:24524501

  4. Passive measurements of mixed-oxide fuel for nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dolan, Jennifer L.; Flaska, Marek; Pozzi, Sara A.; Chichester, David L.

    2013-01-01

    We present new results on passive measurements and simulations of mixed-oxide fuel-pin assemblies. Potential tools for mixed-oxide fuel pin characterization are discussed for future nuclear-nonproliferation applications. Four EJ-309 liquid scintillation detectors coupled with an accurate pulse timing and digital, offline and optimized pulse-shape discrimination method were used. Measurement analysis included pulse-height distributions to distinguish between purely fission neutron sources and alpha-n plus fission neutrons sources. Time-dependent cross-correlation functions were analyzed to measure the fission neutron contribution to the measured sample's neutron source. The use of Monte Carlo particle transport code MCNPX-PoliMi is discussed in conjunction with the measurements

  5. Explosive performance on the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKown, T.O.

    1994-03-01

    The non-proliferation experiment, originally called the chemical kiloton experiment, was planned and executed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to investigate the seismic yield relationship and distinguishing seismic signals between a nuclear event and a large mass conventional explosion. The Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments to further their studies of the source function for signals observed seismically. Since all investigations were contingent on the performance of the emplaced chemical explosive, an array of diagnostic measurements was fielded in the emplaced explosive. The CORRTEX system was used to investigate the explosive initiation and to determine the detonation velocities in multiple levels and in numerous directions. A description of the CORRTEX experiments fielded, a review of the data obtained and some interpretations of the data are reported.

  6. Computer Language Choices in Arms Control and Nonproliferation Regimes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, G K

    2005-01-01

    The U.S. and Russian Federation continue to make substantive progress in the arms control and nonproliferation transparency regimes. We are moving toward an implementation choice for creating radiation measurement systems that are transparent in both their design and in their implementation. In particular, the choice of a programming language to write software for such regimes can decrease or significantly increase the costs of authentication. In this paper, we compare procedural languages with object-oriented languages. In particular, we examine the C and C++ languages; we compare language features, code generation, implementation details, and executable size and demonstrate how these attributes aid or hinder authentication and backdoor threats. We show that programs in lower level, procedural languages are more easily authenticated than are object-oriented ones. Potential tools and methods for authentication are covered. Possible mitigations are suggested for using object-oriented programming languages

  7. The Inflammasome in Host Defense

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Gang Chen

    2009-12-01

    Full Text Available Nod-like receptors have emerged as an important family of sensors in host defense. These receptors are expressed in macrophages, dendritic cells and monocytes and play an important role in microbial immunity. Some Nod-like receptors form the inflammasome, a protein complex that activates caspase-1 in response to several stimuli. Caspase-1 activation leads to processing and secretion of pro-inflammatory cytokines such as interleukin (IL-1β and IL-18. Here, we discuss recent advances in the inflammasome field with an emphasis on host defense. We also compare differential requirements for inflammasome activation in dendritic cells, macrophages and monocytes.

  8. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

  9. 2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koltysheva, G I; Perepelkin, I G [eds.

    1999-12-31

    On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session `History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem` and three sections: (1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests`; (2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex`; (3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences`

  10. Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of Nuclear Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mochiji, Toshiro; Tazaki, Makiko; Keeney, Robin; Puckett, John; Stanbro, William; Nakhleh, Charles

    1998-01-01

    PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet no.21, which was signed in February 1996, 'The Joint Research on 'Transparency' in Nuclear Nonproliferation' under the 'Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation.' The scope of the research was a fundamental study on transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability of nuclear energy from a nuclear nonproliferation viewpoint. The research encompassed three main topics: the policy environment of transparency, the development of transparency options, and technical options for transparency. Each side performed independent research then joint workshops were held to exchange information and views. This paper summarizes the results of these workshops. (author)

  11. Non-Proliferation, the IAEA Safeguards System, and the importance of nuclear material measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stevens, Rebecca S. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-09-18

    The objective of this project is to explain the contribution of nuclear material measurements to the system of international verification of State declarations and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  12. 2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

    1998-01-01

    On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session 'History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem' and three sections: 1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests'; 2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex'; 3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences'

  13. Establishment of Japan Atomic Energy Agency and strategy for nuclear non-proliferation studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Senzaki, Masao; Kurasaki, Takaaki; Inoue, Naoko

    2005-01-01

    Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) was established on October 1, 2005, after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute. JAEA is the only governmental nuclear research and development institute in Japan. It will engage in research activities ranging from basic research to practical applications in the nuclear field and will operate research laboratories, reactors, a reprocessing plant and a fuel fabrication plant. At the same time, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) was also established inside of JAEA to conduct the studies on the strategy for nuclear nonproliferation studies. Five roles that JAEA should play for nuclear nonproliferation were identified and four offices were established in the center to carry out those five roles effectively. To conduct the research and development for nuclear nonproliferation efficiently, the center aims to be a 'Research Hub' based on Partnership' with other organizations. (author)

  14. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grand, C.

    2001-01-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  15. Second annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to Secretary's Annual Report to Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    This document covers: goals of US nonproliferation policy, agreements for cooperation, technical exchange, US as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuels, IAEA Expert Group on International Plutonium Storage, implementation of US nonproliferation policy, classification, cooperation in strengthening international safeguards and physical security, the US-IAEA voluntary offer safeguards agreement, US spent fuel storage policy, development of proliferation-resistant fuel cycle technologies, and the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

  16. Brazil and Mexico in the Nonproliferation Regime, Common Structures and Divergent Trajectories in Latin America

    OpenAIRE

    Sotomayor, Arturo C.

    2014-01-01

    Chapter 8 There are multiple options Latin American countries to support and comply with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the global level, states can decide to ratify the core treaties and join their supporting institutions such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the...

  17. The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biad, A.

    1996-01-01

    This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC)

  18. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    OpenAIRE

    Sandra Colombo; Cristian Guglielminotti; María Nevia Vera

    2017-01-01

    The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu). The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous develop...

  19. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume 1. Program summary

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1979-12-01

    This report summarizes the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP): its background, its studies, and its results. This introductory chapter traces the growth of the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and the organization and objectives of NASAP. Chapter 2 summarizes the program's assessments, findings and recommendations. Each of Volumes II-VII reports on an individual assessment (Volume II: Proliferation Resistance; Volume III: Resources and Fuel Cycle Facilities; Volume IV: Commercial Potential; Volume V: Economics and Systems Analysis; Volume VI: Safety and Environmental Considerations for Licensing; Volume VII: International Perspectives). Volume VIII (Advanced Concepts) presents a combined assessment of several less fully developed concepts, and Volume IX (Reactor and Fuel Cycle Descriptions) provides detailed descriptions of the reactor and fuel-cycle systems studied by NASAP.

  20. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume 1. Program summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    This report summarizes the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP): its background, its studies, and its results. This introductory chapter traces the growth of the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and the organization and objectives of NASAP. Chapter 2 summarizes the program's assessments, findings and recommendations. Each of Volumes II-VII reports on an individual assessment (Volume II: Proliferation Resistance; Volume III: Resources and Fuel Cycle Facilities; Volume IV: Commercial Potential; Volume V: Economics and Systems Analysis; Volume VI: Safety and Environmental Considerations for Licensing; Volume VII: International Perspectives). Volume VIII (Advanced Concepts) presents a combined assessment of several less fully developed concepts, and Volume IX (Reactor and Fuel Cycle Descriptions) provides detailed descriptions of the reactor and fuel-cycle systems studied by NASAP

  1. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume I. Program summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    This report summarizes the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP): its background, its studies, and its results. The introductory chapter traces the growth of the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and the organization and objectives of NASAP. Chapter 2 summarizes the program's assessments, findings, and recommendations. Each of Volumes II-VII reports on an individual assessment (Volumn II: Proliferation Resistance; Volume III: Resources and Fuel Cycle Facilities; Volume IV: Commercial Potential; Volume V: Economics and Systems Analysis; Volume VI: Safety and Environmental Considerations for Licensing; Volume VII: International Perspectives). Volume VIII (Advanced Concepts) presents a combined assessment of several less fully developed concepts, and Volume IX (Reactor and Fuel Cycle Descriptions) provides detailed descriptions of the reactor and fuel-cycle systems studied by NASAP

  2. On the non-proliferation framework of Japan's peaceful nuclear utilization program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kano, Takashi

    1996-01-01

    The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the NPT) convened in New York, from April 17 to May 12, 1995 and decided that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely, after reviewing the operation and affirming some aspects of the NPT, while emphasizing the ''Decision on Strengthening the Review Process'' for the NPT and the ''Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,'' also adopted by the Conference. In parallel, Japan made its basic non-proliferation policy clear in the ''Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy'' which was decided by the Atomic Energy Commission (chaired by Mikio Oomi, then Minister of the Science and Technology Agency of Japan) in June 1994. The Long-Term Program discusses various problems facing post-Cold-War international society and describes Japan's policy for establishing international confidence concerning non-proliferation. This paper summarizes Japan's non-proliferation policy as articulated in the Long-Term Program, and describes some results of an analysis comparing the Long-Term Program with the resolutions on the international non-proliferation frameworks adopted by the NPT conference

  3. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IX. Reactor and fuel cycle description

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    The Nonproliferation Alterntive Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) has characterized and assessed various reactor/fuel-cycle systems. Volume IX provides, in summary form, the technical descriptions of the reactor/fuel-cycle systems studied. This includes the status of the system technology, as well as a discussion of the safety, environmental, and licensing needs from a technical perspective. This information was then used in developing the research, development, and demonstration (RD and D) program, including its cost and time frame, to advance the existing technology to the level needed for commercial use. Wherever possible, the cost data are given as ranges to reflect the uncertainties in the estimates

  4. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IX. Reactor and fuel cycle description

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-06-01

    The Nonproliferation Alterntive Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) has characterized and assessed various reactor/fuel-cycle systems. Volume IX provides, in summary form, the technical descriptions of the reactor/fuel-cycle systems studied. This includes the status of the system technology, as well as a discussion of the safety, environmental, and licensing needs from a technical perspective. This information was then used in developing the research, development, and demonstration (RD and D) program, including its cost and time frame, to advance the existing technology to the level needed for commercial use. Wherever possible, the cost data are given as ranges to reflect the uncertainties in the estimates.

  5. Home - Defense Technology Security Administration

    Science.gov (United States)

    by @dtsamil Defense Technology Security Administration Mission, Culture, and History Executive Official seal of Defense Technology Security Administration Official seal of Defense Technology Security Administration OFFICE of the SECRETARY of DEFENSE Defense Technology Security Administration

  6. Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

  7. Ballistic missile defense effectiveness

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lewis, George N.

    2017-11-01

    The potential effectiveness of ballistic missile defenses today remains a subject of debate. After a brief discussion of terminal and boost phase defenses, this chapter will focus on long-range midcourse defenses. The problems posed by potential countermeasures to such midcourse defenses are discussed as are the sensor capabilities a defense might have available to attempt to discriminate the actual missile warhead in a countermeasures environment. The role of flight testing in assessing ballistic missile defense effectiveness is discussed. Arguments made about effectiveness by missile defense supporters and critics are summarized.

  8. Third Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference and 29th regular session of the general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, November 20, 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1985-01-01

    Ambassador Lewis A. Dunn of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Danny J. Boggs of DOE reported on two recent international conferences relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and arms control. Dunn summarized the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review conference and its final declaration in which participants reaffirmed treaty principles and made recommendations for strengthening its efforts and enhancing its implementation. Boggs summarized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conference, and noted the significance of China's recent entry into IAEA. They stressed that energy security is a key factor in the success of IAEA safeguards because it affects trade and international cooperation. US contributions to the success of non-proliferation policies depend upon our ability to share technological information with less advanced nations. Questions and responses and an appendix with the final declaration of the Review Conference follow the testimony

  9. Optimizing Active Cyber Defense

    OpenAIRE

    Lu, Wenlian; Xu, Shouhuai; Yi, Xinlei

    2016-01-01

    Active cyber defense is one important defensive method for combating cyber attacks. Unlike traditional defensive methods such as firewall-based filtering and anti-malware tools, active cyber defense is based on spreading "white" or "benign" worms to combat against the attackers' malwares (i.e., malicious worms) that also spread over the network. In this paper, we initiate the study of {\\em optimal} active cyber defense in the setting of strategic attackers and/or strategic defenders. Specific...

  10. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2004-01-01

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards

  11. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ElBaradei, M

    2004-06-21

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards.

  12. Development of Computer-Aided Learning Programs on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hyun Chul

    2011-01-01

    The fulfillment of international norms for nuclear nonproliferation is indispensable to the promotion of nuclear energy. The education and training for personnel and mangers related to the nuclear material are one of crucial factors to avoid unintended non-compliance to international norms. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been providing education and training on nuclear control as its legal duty. One of the legally mandatory educations is 'nuclear control education' performed since 2006 for the observation of the international norms on nuclear nonproliferation and the spread of the nuclear control culture. The other is 'physical protection education' performed since 2010 for maintaining the national physical protection regime effectively and the spread of the nuclear security culture. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. During the Summit, the South Korea was chosen to host the second Nuclear Summit in 2012. South Korean President announced that South Korea would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an international education and training center on nuclear security in 2014. KINAC is making a full effort to set up the center successfully. An important function of the center is education and training in the subjects of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, and nuclear export/import control. With increasing importance of education and training education on nuclear nonproliferation and control, KINAC has been developing computer-aided learning programs on nuclear nonproliferation and control to overcome the weaknesses in classroom educations. This paper shows two learning programs. One is an e-learning system on the nuclear nonproliferation and control and the other is a virtual reality program for training nuclear material accountancy inspection of light water reactor power plants

  13. Development of Computer-Aided Learning Programs on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Hyun Chul [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2011-10-15

    The fulfillment of international norms for nuclear nonproliferation is indispensable to the promotion of nuclear energy. The education and training for personnel and mangers related to the nuclear material are one of crucial factors to avoid unintended non-compliance to international norms. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) has been providing education and training on nuclear control as its legal duty. One of the legally mandatory educations is 'nuclear control education' performed since 2006 for the observation of the international norms on nuclear nonproliferation and the spread of the nuclear control culture. The other is 'physical protection education' performed since 2010 for maintaining the national physical protection regime effectively and the spread of the nuclear security culture. The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, DC to enhance international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. During the Summit, the South Korea was chosen to host the second Nuclear Summit in 2012. South Korean President announced that South Korea would share its expertise and support the Summit's mission by setting up an international education and training center on nuclear security in 2014. KINAC is making a full effort to set up the center successfully. An important function of the center is education and training in the subjects of nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear safeguards, nuclear security, and nuclear export/import control. With increasing importance of education and training education on nuclear nonproliferation and control, KINAC has been developing computer-aided learning programs on nuclear nonproliferation and control to overcome the weaknesses in classroom educations. This paper shows two learning programs. One is an e-learning system on the nuclear nonproliferation and control and the other is a virtual reality program for training nuclear material accountancy inspection of light water

  14. Academic perspectives on the non-proliferation problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gummett, P.

    1984-01-01

    The USA has demonstrated a greater penchant for a technical focus aimed at denial than any other state, despite a brief interlude under President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger when it displayed a total lack of concern about proliferation. This terminated with the sudden reawakening of interest following the Indian explosion and the announcement that the USA was not prepared to accept additional requests for uranium-enrichment services. According to Brenner, this enrichment crisis was engineered as a deliberate act of policy: yet this act of policy was unrelated to non-proliferation objectives. Rather, the Nixon administration's interest in privatisation in general, and commercialisation of enriched-uranium supply in particular, had led to a bureaucratic battle between the domestic side of the White House, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). This battle was totally unrelated to foreign policy: a situation not without precedent in this area. Nixon's Republican administration deliberately provoked a supply bottleneck by changing the terms of AEC supply contracts, with the intention of forcing the Democrat-dominated JCAE to agree to the entry of private industry into the uranium-enrichment business. The outcome was more dramatic than had been intended

  15. The world's non-proliferation regime in time

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, George

    2005-01-01

    The idea for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries was supported unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 1961. The NPT permits the P-5 to have nuclear weapons. All other NPT signatories are 'non-nuclear-weapon States' who are prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons. To gain their signatures, the NPT promises assistance to them in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and negotiations toward nuclear disarmament. Besides the P-5, the treaty now has 184 countries that have promised not to have nuclear weapons and that have agreed to accept inspections by the IAEA to verify that they are carrying out their promises. However, India, Pakistan, and Israel refused to join the treaty, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) withdrew from it. Of these four countries, only India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons. Israel and North Korea are assumed to have them. The non-proliferation regime today includes much more than the NPT. The IAEA standards for inspection were the next most important element. The IAEA inspection requirements negotiated in the early 1970s were shown to be inadequate by Iraq's success in hiding its nuclear-weapon efforts before and during the Gulf War of 1991. The Additional Protocol of 1997 is slowly replacing these requirements, but, as of December 2004, was in effect in only 62 NPT member countries. The regime includes the agreements creating nuclear-weapon free zones in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Mongolia. The countries that formed these zones are also members of the NPT. The regime includes suggestions for standards and financial assistance plus requirements for physical protection of nuclear material from theft by terrorists or others. These efforts range from the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to the technical assistance provided by the IAEA and some countries, to the financial assistance offered by the G-8 and some other IAEA

  16. The SSAC in international safeguards and non-proliferation aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bett, F.L.; Humphreys, J.J.

    1989-01-01

    The history of international efforts against horizontal proliferation, including the Baruch Plan, bilateral safeguards agreement, IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines and the Physical Protection Convention, is reviewed. The role of IAEA NPT safeguards in verifying nondiversion and ensuring no misuse of supplied nuclear items is discussed. The vital importance of successful performance of this role to peaceful nuclear commerce is stressed. The application of NPT safeguards by the IAEA is described, particularly the IAEA's requirement that a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material be established. Such a State System has two different but complementary areas of responsibility - ensuring that the use of nuclear material is controlled effectively and can be readily accounted for (this includes the area of physical protection), and providing accounts of nuclear material to responsible bodies such as the State's government and equally importantly to the IAEA for safeguards purpose, as the IAEA bases its conclusions about diversion on its verification of the data provided by the State System

  17. Atoms for peace and the nonproliferation treaty: unintended consequences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Streeper, Charles Blamires

    2009-01-01

    In April 2009, President Obama revived nonproliferation and arms control efforts with a speech calling for the worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. His speech correctly acknowledged the threat of nuclear terrorism and the vulnerabilities of the related unsecure nuclear materials. Unfortunately, the president did not mention and has not mentioned in any speech the threat posed by at-risk radiological materials. Nonproliferation efforts have a well documented history of focus on special nuclear materials (fissionable weapons usable materials or SNM), and other key materials (chemical and biological) and technologies for a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such intense focus on WMD related materials/technologies is essential for international safety and security and merit continued attention and funding. However, the perception that radioactive sealed sources (sources) are of less concern than WMD is unfortunate. These perceptions are based solely on the potentially enormous and tragic consequences associated with their deliberate or accidental misuse and proliferation concerns. However, there is a documented history of overemphasis on the nuclear threat at the expense of ignoring the far more likely and also devastating chemical and biological threats. The radiological threat should not be minimized or excluded from policy discussions and decisions on these far ranging scopes of threat to the international community. Sources have a long history of use; and a wider distribution worldwide than fissile materials. Pair this with their broad ranges in isotopes/activities along with scant national and international attention and mechanisms for their safe and secure management and it is not difficult to envision a deadly threat. Arguments that minimize or divert attention away from sources may have the effect of distracting necessary policy attention on preventing/mitigating a radiological dispersal event. The terrorist attacks on 9/11 should be a clear reminder of the

  18. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Where Next?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, G.

    2013-01-01

    Let me come straight to the point: We are still at a real watershed with respect to the whole nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament project, about which hopes have been so high for most of the last two years, especially following the political breakthrough of the election of a US president totally committed to the ultimate achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world. Unless the key players in the international community, and there are many that matter in this context, not just the United States of America and the Russian Federation, get really serious about moving forward on the multiple critical agenda issues that face us - not just safeguards, the subject of this symposium, but right across the whole spectrum of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful-uses challenges - there is a very real danger that such remaining momentum for change as there is will stall, that the whole project will fall apart, and that we will be condemned to live for the indefinitely foreseeable future in a nuclear world that is very dangerous indeed. The prevailing sentiment after the May Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was one of relief - that the conference had not broken down as it did in 2005 and that catastrophe had been avoided; in effect, that this particular watershed point had been passed. But the positive gains from that conference, when objectively assessed, were negligible on crucial NPT regime strengthening issues, and, with the possible exception of the agreement to hold a Middle East conference in 2012, very slight indeed elsewhere. And, weighing in the negative balance, there have been some serious disappointments on other key benchmark issues spelled out in US President Obama's April 2009 Prague Speech and on which real movement had been hoped for this year. Nothing has moved on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification by the USA or any other major nuclear power; negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) remain

  19. Non-proliferation policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shkol'nik, V.S.; Zhantikin, T.M.

    1997-01-01

    The present abstract reveals the aspects of Kazakstan's non-proliferation policy. After acquiring independence in Kazakstan there remained a huge nuclear inheritance of the USSR. Kazakstan had to determine its policy regarding nuclear stuff. One of the most important test sites of the former USSR - Semipalatinsk test site - was closed. The Republic signed the Lisbon Protocols to the Treaty between the USSR and USA on the reduction and limitation of strategic and offensive arms. On December 13, 1993, Kazakstan and the IAEA concluded the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. All nuclear weapons were removed from Kazakstan territory, work resulting in military nuclear power use was terminated. A wide program on conversion of the former military research infrastructure is being performed with the support of some foreign countries. For instance Kazakstan / USA jointly work on withdrawing highly enriched nuclear materials from Ulba Metallurgical Plant to the USA enterprises for processing ('Sapphere'). Another conversion activity is liquidation of the former testing holes at Semipalatinsk test site. In relation to this there appeared an agreement between U.S. Department of defence and Ministry of Sciences and New Technologies of the Republic of Kazakstan (October, 3, 1995). A sensitive information is present at the area of the former test site. The traditional IAEA safeguards are used to nuclear facilities and nuclear materials

  20. Suggested non-proliferation criteria for commercial nuclear fuel cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laney, R.V.; Heubotter, P.R.

    1978-01-01

    Based on the Administration's policy to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation through diversion of fuel from commercial reactor fuel cycles, a ''benchmark'' set of nonproliferation criteria was prepared for the commercial nuclear fuel cycle. These criteria should eliminate incremental risks of proliferation beyond those inherent in the present generation of low-enriched-uranium-fueled reactors operating in a once-through mode, with internationally safeguarded storage of spent fuel. They focus on the balanced application of technical constraints consistent with the state of the technology, with minimal requirements for institutional constraints, to provide a basis for assessing the proliferation resistance of proposed fission power systems. The paper contains: (1) our perception of the nuclear energy policy and of the baseline proliferation risk accepted under this policy; (2) objectives for a reactor and fuel cycle strategy which address the technical, political, and institutional aspects of diversion and proliferation and, at the same time, satisfy the Nation's needs for efficient, timely, and economical utilization of nuclear fuel resources; (3) criteria which are responsive to these objectives and can therefore be used to screen proposed reactor and fuel cycle strategies; and (4) a rationale for these criteria

  1. Ionospheric measurements for the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fitzgerald, T.J.

    1994-01-01

    The detection of explosions using ionospheric techniques relies on measuring perturbations induced in radio propagation by acoustics waves which disturb the electron density of the ionosphere. Such techniques have been applied to the detection of atmospheric explosions, underground nuclear tests, earthquakes, and surface mining explosions. The nighttime ionosphere presents a difficulty for the detection of explosions because in the absence of solar ionization radiation the electron density in the altitude range of 90 to 200 km decays after sunset and perturbation effects are correspondingly reduced. On the other hand, acoustic waves produced by weak sources reach a maximum amplitude in the altitude range of 100 to 150 km and are highly attenuated at altitudes above 200 km. For safety reasons, most planned explosions are conducted during daylight which has limited the experimental measurements during nighttime. However a recent opportunity for a nighttime measurement occurred in connection with the Non-Proliferation Experiment which consisted of the detonation of a large chemical charge underground at the Nevada Test Site near midnight local time. the results, based on a new technique of using medium frequency radio transmissions provided by commercial broadcasts to detect explosion effects, were negative. The most likely explanation for the negative result is that the radio transmissions did not reflect at a low enough altitude to sense the perturbations produced by the acoustic waves

  2. Integration of facility modeling capabilities for nuclear nonproliferation analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, Tom; Gorensek, M.B.; Krebs, John; Kress, Reid L.; Lamberti, Vincent; Schoenwald, David; Ward, Richard C.

    2012-01-01

    Developing automated methods for data collection and analysis that can facilitate nuclearnonproliferation assessment is an important research area with significant consequences for the effective global deployment of nuclear energy. Facilitymodeling that can integrate and interpret observations collected from monitored facilities in order to ascertain their functional details will be a critical element of these methods. Although improvements are continually sought, existing facilitymodeling tools can characterize all aspects of reactor operations and the majority of nuclear fuel cycle processing steps, and include algorithms for data processing and interpretation. Assessing nonproliferation status is challenging because observations can come from many sources, including local and remote sensors that monitor facility operations, as well as open sources that provide specific business information about the monitored facilities, and can be of many different types. Although many current facility models are capable of analyzing large amounts of information, they have not been integrated in an analyst-friendly manner. This paper addresses some of these facilitymodelingcapabilities and illustrates how they could be integrated and utilized for nonproliferationanalysis. The inverse problem of inferring facility conditions based on collected observations is described, along with a proposed architecture and computer framework for utilizing facilitymodeling tools. After considering a representative sampling of key facilitymodelingcapabilities, the proposed integration framework is illustrated with several examples.

  3. Arms Control and nonproliferation technologies: Technology options and associated measures for monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban, Second quarter

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Casey, Leslie A.

    1994-01-01

    This newsletter contains reprinted papers discussing technology options and associated measures for monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These papers were presented to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in May and June 1994. An interagency Verification Monitoring Task Force developed the papers. The task force included participants from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Intelligence Community, the Department of Interior, and the Department of State. The purpose of this edition of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Technologies is to share these papers with the broad base of stakeholders in a CTBT and to facilitate future technology discussions. The papers in the first group discuss possible technology options for monitoring a CTBT in all environments (underground, underwater, atmosphere, and space). These technologies, along with on-site inspections, would facilitate CTBT monitoring by treaty participants. The papers in the second group present possible associated measures, e.g., information exchanges and transparency measures, that would build confidence among states participating in a CTBT.

  4. Cost Effective Regional Ballistic Missile Defense

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-02-16

    deploying advanced air defense systems18, such as the Russian S-300 and S-500, and concealing them in hardened, camouflaged sites, such as extensive... Russian objections to the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and fund homeland defense priorities.39 Furthermore, the PTSS system was also... Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Capability Becomes Operational,” Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, 1 February 2011. 55 Joseph W. Kirschbaum, REGIONAL MISSILE

  5. Safeguards and non-proliferation: current challenges and the implications for Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leask, A.; Carlson, J.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: The expansion of nuclear programs raises the issue of how to ensure this does not increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. The non-proliferation regime - based on the NPT and its verification mechanism, the IAEA safeguards system - has been developed to provide assurance that nuclear programs are exclusively peaceful. Although to date the non-proliferation regime has been remarkably successful, in recent years it has come under serious challenge. Nuclear proliferation is emerging as one of the major issues facing the international community. Addressing technical and institutional aspects of the non-proliferation regime - especially safeguards, but also complementary measures such as export controls, proliferation-resistant technology, and an international framework on sensitive technology - is important. But proliferation is a political problem, and ultimately the success of the non-proliferation regime depends on political resolve to uphold compliance, using incentives and if necessary sanctions. These issues are vitally important to Australia's future. Being a major uranium supplier has strengthened Australia's influence in non-proliferation and safeguards developments

  6. The nuclear non-proliferation regime: What it is and how it has evolved

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Priest, J.

    1999-01-01

    The nuclear non-proliferation regime commonly denotes the legal norms, voluntary undertakings and policies which the international community has developed to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. The word 'regime' suggests a legally binding order. Some components of the non-proliferation regime are indeed legally binding. Others represent essentially political rather than legal commitments. This lecture describes the various independent but mutually reinforcing components of the non-proliferation regime. It thus touches on and highlights the particular importance of political incentives - or disincentives - to the acquisition of nuclear weapons; legal undertakings in which non-proliferation commitments are anchored; verification (specifically the IAEA Safeguards System); compliance and enforcement; export controls; physical protection measures; regional nuclear non-proliferation initiatives; and measures taken to curb proliferation in general and to strive for arms control and nuclear disarmament. The purpose of the lecture is to provide an over-arching, tour d'horizon for the more specific and detailed lectures which follow. (author)

  7. Impact of Monoenergetic Photon Sources on Nonproliferation Applications Final Report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Geddes, Cameron [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Ludewigt, Bernhard [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Valentine, John [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Quiter, Brian [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Descalle, Marie-Anne [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Warren, Glen [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kinlaw, Matt [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Thompson, Scott [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Chichester, David [Idaho National Lab. (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States); Miller, Cameron [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States); Pozzi, Sara [Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)

    2017-03-01

    Near-monoenergetic photon sources (MPSs) have the potential to improve sensitivity at greatly reduced dose in existing applications and enable new capabilities in other applications, particularly where passive signatures do not penetrate or are insufficiently accurate. MPS advantages include the ability to select energy, energy spread, flux, and pulse structures to deliver only the photons needed for the application, while suppressing extraneous dose and background. Some MPSs also offer narrow angular divergence photon beams which can target dose and/or mitigate scattering contributions to image contrast degradation. Current bremsstrahlung photon sources (e.g., linacs and betatrons) produce photons over a broad range of energies, thus delivering unnecessary dose that in some cases also interferes with the signature to be detected and/or restricts operations. Current sources must be collimated (reducing flux) to generate narrow divergence beams. While MPSs can in principle resolve these issues, they remain at relatively low TRL status. Candidate MPS technologies for nonproliferation applications are now being developed, each of which has different properties (e.g. broad vs. narrow angular divergence). Within each technology, source parameters trade off against one another (e.g. flux vs. energy spread), representing a large operation space. This report describes a broad survey of potential applications, identification of high priority applications, and detailed simulations addressing those priority applications. Requirements were derived for each application, and analysis and simulations were conducted to define MPS parameters that deliver benefit. The results can inform targeting of MPS development to deliver strong impact relative to current systems.

  8. U.S. - India nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yash Thomas, Mannully

    2008-01-01

    The agreement for cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (referred as 123 agreement) acknowledges a shift in international strategies and relations in both countries. As to India, it marks the end of nuclear isolation resulting from constraint, embargoes and controls and instead opens the path for nuclear commerce. With respect to the United States it entails a major geo strategic ally in the evolving South Asia region and promises large commercial benefits to the US nuclear sector. This is called 'nuclear deal' and constitutes one of the major political, economic and strategic relationship developing between the two countries since 2001. It will lead to the separation of military and civilian nuclear installations in India, the latter to be placed under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It thus, de facto accepts India in the club of nuclear weapon states within the meaning of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) although it is not party to this treaty, refuses adhering to it, officially possesses nuclear weapons and is not subject to a comprehensive system of safeguards. This article will examine the developments which led to the 123 agreement and its subsequent implementation in a wider context of international relations and non proliferation. First, the articles gives a brief introduction into the Indian nuclear programme, the legislative framework and the factors which necessitated nuclear cooperation between India and the United States. Secondly, it will address the implementation of the nuclear deal and subsequent developments. Finally, it will analyse the non proliferation issues related to the implementation of the agreement. (N.C.)

  9. 76 FR 81004 - Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-12-27

    ... DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 7741] Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign... Nonproliferation, Department of State. ACTION: Notice. SUMMARY: A determination has been made that a number of foreign entities and one foreign person have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of measures...

  10. Advanced Missile Signature Center

    Data.gov (United States)

    Federal Laboratory Consortium — The Advanced Missile Signature Center (AMSC) is a national facility supporting the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and other DoD programs and customers with analysis,...

  11. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1995-12-19

    NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States.

  12. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the issue of nonproliferation. Final study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    NIF, the next step proposed by DOE in a progression of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) facilities, is expected to reach the goal of ICF capsule ignition in the laboratory. This report is in response to a request of a Congressman that DOE resolve the question of whether NIF will aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Both technical and policy aspects are addressed, and public participation was part of the decision process. Since the technical proliferation concerns at NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals, it is concluded that NIF supports the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the United States

  13. Strategic Defense Initiative Overview

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1990-01-01

    ... to Third World and other nations. I will then discuss the scope of the SDI effort, the evolving strategic defense system architectures and theater defense, our compliancy with the ABM Treaty, technology spinoffs resulting from SDI...

  14. The legal points at issue concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty and the verification agreement of EURATOM with the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zieger, G.

    1975-01-01

    An excellent and comprehensive but very juridicial contribution on: Development and content of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the problems which this Treaty poses for EURATOM (a common market, common supply, joint enterprises, Non-proliferation Treaty and France), the compatibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty with the EURATOM Treaty, verification agreement EURATOM - IAEA (the IAEA as the supervisory authority, the control system of the IAEA, guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements, national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material IAEA supervision as a secondary control, principles of IAEA supervision, secrecy, conflict management), conclusion of the verification agreement, deviations from the guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements legal reflexions (verification agreement and Non-proliferation Treaty, reservations concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty, questions of competence between EURATOM and member states without nuclear weapons, problems of equal treatment). (HP/LN) [de

  15. Rethinking Defensive Information Warfare

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    French, Geoffrey S

    2004-01-01

    .... This paper examines defensive tactics and strategies from the German defense in depth that emerged from World War I to the American Active Defense that developed in the Cold War and proposes a new mindset for DIW that draws on these operational concepts from military history.

  16. Recognizing Plant Defense Priming

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Martinez-Medina, Ainhoa; Flors, Victor; Heil, Martin; Mauch-Mani, Brigitte; Pieterse, Corné M J|info:eu-repo/dai/nl/113115113; Pozo, Maria J; Ton, Jurriaan; van Dam, Nicole M; Conrath, Uwe

    2016-01-01

    Defense priming conditions diverse plant species for the superinduction of defense, often resulting in enhanced pest and disease resistance and abiotic stress tolerance. Here, we propose a guideline that might assist the plant research community in a consistent assessment of defense priming in

  17. Recognizing Plant Defense Priming.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Martinez-Medina, Ainhoa; Flors, Victor; Heil, Martin; Mauch-Mani, Brigitte; Pieterse, Corné M J; Pozo, Maria J; Ton, Jurriaan; van Dam, Nicole M; Conrath, Uwe

    2016-10-01

    Defense priming conditions diverse plant species for the superinduction of defense, often resulting in enhanced pest and disease resistance and abiotic stress tolerance. Here, we propose a guideline that might assist the plant research community in a consistent assessment of defense priming in plants. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  18. Recognizing plant defense priming

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Martinez-Medina, A.; Flors, V.; Heil, M.; Mauch-Mani, B.; Pieterse, C.M.J.; Pozo, M.J.; Ton, J.; Van Dam, N.M.; Conrath, U.

    2016-01-01

    Defense priming conditions diverse plant species for the superinduction of defense, often resulting in enhanced pest and disease resistance and abiotic stress tolerance. Here, we propose a guideline that might assist the plant research community in a consistent assessment of defense priming in

  19. Nuclear nonproliferation: Concerns with US delays in accepting foregin research reactors' spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    One key US nonproliferation goal is to discourage use of highly enriched uranium fuel (HEU), which can be used to make nuclear bombs, in civilian nuclear programs worldwide. DOE's Off-Site Fuels Policy for taking back spent HEU from foreign research reactors was allowed to expire due to environmental reasons. This report provides information on the effects of delays in renewing the Off-Site Fuels Policy on US nonproliferation goals and programs (specifically the reduced enrichment program), DOE's efforts to renew the fuels policy, and the price to be charged to the operators of foreign reactors for DOE's activities in taking back spent fuel

  20. Dynamics of postirradiation intracellular cysteine and aspartic proteinases profiles in proliferating and nonproliferating mammalian cells

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korbelik, M.; Osmak, M.; Suhar, A.; Turk, V.; Skrk, J.

    1990-01-01

    Dynamics of postirradiation intracellular cysteine and aspartic proteinases profiles were examined in proliferating and nonproliferating Chinese hamster fibroblasts (V 79). The results show that there are significant alterations in cysteine and aspartic intracellular proteinases activity already in the early postirradiation period, which are different in proliferating and nonproliferating cells. Irradiation of the cells examined to low doses and up to 15 Gy induced an increase in cysteine proteinases activity in the early postexposure period, while at higher irradiation doses applied, the activity of these proteinases was decreased. These observations suggest that intracellular proteinases are actively participating in process involving recovery from radiation injury or cell killing. (orig.) [de

  1. Cooperative Remote Monitoring, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: Fourth quarter 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alonzo, G M [ed.

    1995-01-01

    The DOE`s Cooperative Remote Monitoring programs integrate elements from research and development and implementation to achieve DOE`s objectives in arms control and nonproliferation. The contents of this issue are: cooperative remote monitoring--trends in arms control and nonproliferation; Modular Integrated Monitoring System (MIMS); Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring Systems (ATMS); Tracking and Nuclear Materials by Wide-Area Nuclear Detection (WAND); Cooperative Monitoring Center; the International Remote Monitoring Project; international US and IAEA remote monitoring field trials; Project Dustcloud: monitoring the test stands in Iraq; bilateral remote monitoring: Kurchatov-Argonne-West Demonstration; INSENS Sensor System Project.

  2. Non-proliferation through effective international control. Report of working group I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, S.E.

    1993-01-01

    Working Group I focused on two issues: the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Missile Technology Regime (MTCR). There was wide agreement within the Group on a number of factors that will strongly influence the prospects for the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension Conference. Two points stood out as particularly important: first, emphasis on the obligations for nuclear Powers to move in good faith in direction of nuclear disarmament; and second, inadequacy of security guarantees to non-nuclear States associated with the NPT

  3. Nonproliferation analysis of the reduction of excess separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1995-01-01

    The purpose of this preliminary investigation is to explore alternatives and strategies aimed at the gradual reduction of the excess inventories of separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian nuclear power industry. The study attempts to establish a technical and economic basis to assist in the formation of alternative approaches consistent with nonproliferation and safeguards concerns. The analysis addresses several options in reducing the excess separated plutonium and HEU, and the consequences on nonproliferation and safeguards policy assessments resulting from the interacting synergistic effects between fuel cycle processes and isotopic signatures of nuclear materials

  4. Environmental effects of additional uranium development required by a non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baca, T.E.; Scudella, G.

    1978-01-01

    New Mexico can expect to see an accelerated development of its uranium resources. The President's policy on non-proliferation will impact the degree and quantity of uranium ore mined. Environmental impacts are significant and are affected by the mining and milling phase more than any other aspect of the uranium fuel cycle. The state has begun evaluating the resource-associated impacts of uranium mining and milling, although very little reliable data are available. The information gathered, however, shows a need for state and Federal evaluation of both the impacts and the non-proliferation policy. 4 references

  5. MicroRNA-Mediated Gene Silencing in Plant Defense and Viral Counter-Defense

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sheng-Rui Liu

    2017-09-01

    Full Text Available MicroRNAs (miRNAs are non-coding RNAs of approximately 20–24 nucleotides in length that serve as central regulators of eukaryotic gene expression by targeting mRNAs for cleavage or translational repression. In plants, miRNAs are associated with numerous regulatory pathways in growth and development processes, and defensive responses in plant–pathogen interactions. Recently, significant progress has been made in understanding miRNA-mediated gene silencing and how viruses counter this defense mechanism. Here, we summarize the current knowledge and recent advances in understanding the roles of miRNAs involved in the plant defense against viruses and viral counter-defense. We also document the application of miRNAs in plant antiviral defense. This review discusses the current understanding of the mechanisms of miRNA-mediated gene silencing and provides insights on the never-ending arms race between plants and viruses.

  6. The control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear development - present uncertainties

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Machado de Faria, N.G.; Amaral Barros, E.

    1983-01-01

    This report gives the views of Brazilian lawyers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It deals with the present situation and future prospects concerning the uses of nuclear energy. In particular, it proposes the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  7. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Control in the Republic of Croatia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valcic, I.; Prah, M.; Mikec, N.

    2006-01-01

    In accordance with its internationally accepted obligations, the Republic of Croatia is actively implementing principles of non-proliferation and export control of nuclear materials and/or equipment. The article deals with treaties, conventions, agreements and other international arrangements that are creating certain obligation for Republic of Croatia related to nuclear non-proliferation. The most important are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Protocol, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the NSG Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. In addition the article describes a national regulative framework, the basis for conducting activities in nuclear material control, export control of dual-use items as well as non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Details are given about the Nuclear Safety Act, the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Act on Export of Dual-Use Items, the Decree on the List of Dual-Use Items, the Law on Production, Repair and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment and the Decree specifying goods subject to export and import licenses. (author)

  8. New trends of activity on supporting of non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Issaeva, G.M.; Tyupkina, O.G.

    2002-01-01

    Taking into account the necessity of all possible strengthening of non-proliferation regimes Kazakhstan participates in a number of agreements and associations: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Supplier Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Conference on Disarmament, etc. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) greatly influenced on the development on non-proliferation regime in Kazakhstan. During initial stage of CTR activity (1993-1995) military projects prevailed. Later (1995-1997) the projects on liquidation of infrastructure for nuclear and bio- weapons were successfully realized. Last years, since 1999, the attention was shifted towards proliferation prevention of hazardous nuclear and biological materials. Recent terrorist acts and world community activity on global safety strengthening underline an urgency of quite new problems that entirely applied to Kazakhstan: monitoring of hazardous materials; enhancement of safety systems of 'risky' facilities and technologies; creation and/or upgrading of safety systems for industry infrastructure. The proposals of these new trends of non-proliferation have been developed. Development of physical protection system for oil and gas industry infrastructure of Kazakhstan based on safety concepts of nuclear facilities; Evaluation of radionuclide contamination and safety of oil and gas facilities of the Caspian region; Counteraction to nuclear materials proliferation; Cooperative approaches in preventing/reducing of illicit trafficking and use of WMD-related explosive materials. Implementation of the project would make of substantial contribution to successful solution of either regional or global safety problem

  9. Fukushima Daiichi: implications for carbon-free energy, nuclear nonproliferation, and community resilience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hall, Howard L

    2011-07-01

    Implications of the nuclear power plant accidents at Fukushima Daiichi are explored in this commentary. In addition to questions of nuclear reactor regulatory standards, broader implications on noncarbon-emitting energy production, nuclear nonproliferation objectives, and community resilience and emergency response against catastrophic events are explored. Copyright © 2011 SETAC.

  10. Back-end of the fuel cycle and non-proliferation strategies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chebeskov, A.N.; Oussanov, V.I.; Iougai, S.V.; Pshakin, G.M. [Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, State Scientific Center of Russian Federation, Obninsk (Russian Federation)

    2001-07-01

    The paper focuses on the problem of fissile materials proliferation risk estimation. Some methodological approaches to the solution of this task and results of their application for comparison of different nuclear fuel cycle strategies are discussed. The results of comparative assessment of non-proliferation aspects of plutonium utilization alternatives in Russia using system analysis approach are presented. (author)

  11. Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects. Key issue paper no. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-06-01

    This paper examines the current nuclear non-proliferation regime (Section 2) and the issues most likely to arise as the civil nuclear fuel cycle develops over the next 50 years (Section 3). Section 4 deals with fuel cycles and nuclear material inventories. 14 refs.

  12. U.S.-China commercial nuclear commerce: Nonproliferation and trade issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The report concludes that the United States should not be denied access to the Chinese nuclear energy program. To the contrary, the report finds that--provided China meets the requisite nonproliferation criteria--it is strongly in the US national interest to engage in peaceful nuclear, cooperation with China, from security, environmental, safety, and economic perspectives

  13. Nuclear energy and non-proliferation in Latin America: the constitution of Tlatelolco system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armanet, P.

    1982-01-01

    The nuclear energy as alternative energy resource and its military use are analysed. Then the main characteristics of the Tratelolco treaty and non-proliferation in Latin America are discussed. Finally the importance of the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America is shown. (A.B.T.) [pt

  14. Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear Program of the DPRK

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    - Park Sang Hoon

    2012-09-01

    Full Text Available The article analyzes the contemporary aspects of the nuclear weapon nonproliferation issue as exemplified by the international approaches to the DPRK nuclear weapons program, as well as the international community efforts to resolve it, in particular via the Six-Party Talks.

  15. Back-end of the fuel cycle and non-proliferation strategies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chebeskov, A.N.; Oussanov, V.I.; Iougai, S.V.; Pshakin, G.M.

    2001-01-01

    The paper focuses on the problem of fissile materials proliferation risk estimation. Some methodological approaches to the solution of this task and results of their application for comparison of different nuclear fuel cycle strategies are discussed. The results of comparative assessment of non-proliferation aspects of plutonium utilization alternatives in Russia using system analysis approach are presented. (author)

  16. Defense Science Board Report on Advanced Computing

    Science.gov (United States)

    2009-03-01

    computers  will  require extensive  research and development  to have a chance of  reaching  the  exascale   level.  Even  if  exascale   level machines  can...generations of petascale and then  exascale   level  computing  capability.  This  includes  both  the  hardware  and  the  complex  software  that  may  be...required  for  the  architectures  needed  for  exacscale  capability.  The  challenges  are  extremely  daunting,  especially  at  the  exascale

  17. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency: Strategic Plan

    Science.gov (United States)

    2009-05-01

    technologies to detect, prevent, or mitigate asymmetric attacks, including suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, and weapons of mass destruction...the Army’s Command Post of the Future (CPOF) to amplify the capabilities of overworked combat command and control staffs. Working with CPOF, PAL

  18. Activities of the study group of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation policy. FY Heisei 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Oi, Noboru

    2000-01-01

    The Study Group on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Policy (Chairman: Prof. Kurosawa) was established in FY1999 with the funding from the Science and Technology Agency. The aim of the Study Group is to clearly understand nuclear proliferation issues and to lead international opinion. Nuclear non-proliferation is a matter of rather scanty interest compared to nuclear safety while both of them are important in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Japan. In FY2000, the Study Group held International Symposium 'Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: A Challenge of 21st Century' and in conjunction with this Symposium, dispatched 'The Statement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Action Plan towards 21st Century'. The Statement consists of five propositions: 1) Strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and making it universally applicable, 2) Negative legacy of cold war: rapid solution of problems, 3) Civil (non-military) plutonium, 4) Development of technology to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime internationally, and 5) Strengthening Japanese initiative on nuclear non-proliferation policy. In this report, these activities will be explained in detail. (author)

  19. The nonproliferation treaty and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ehrlich, Thomas

    1970-01-01

    In the past, nuclear arms control and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives were seen by many proponents of each as competing - if not opposing - interests. At one extreme, some viewed peaceful uses as an annoying irritant on the way to general and complete disarmament. At the other extreme, some considered arms-control arrangements - particularly those limiting nuclear testing - as bothersome barriers to realizing the full benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. Most people found themselves somewhere between those extremes. But most also felt a continuing tension between essentially opposing forces. This polarity has been significantly altered by the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is believed that the future use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes will depend in large measure on the international arrangements worked out under the treaty. I also believe that the success of the treaty in checking proliferation of nuclear weapons is contingent, in substantial part, on those peaceful-uses arrangements. In the areas covered by the treaty, therefore, one could view an active development of peaceful uses for nuclear explosives as complementing rather than conflicting with nuclear arms control. The treaty is primarily a security agreement. It is aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war by establishing permanency in the current separation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations. By its terms, each nuclear-weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient, and each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees not to receive such weapons or devices. The non-nuclear- weapon parties are also obligated to negotiate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency covering peaceful-uses activities. And all signatories agree not to transfer fissionable material to those parties unless they are subject to such agreements. These provisions are all part of a scheme to limit the

  20. The nonproliferation treaty and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ehrlich, Thomas [School of Law, Stanford University, CA (United States)

    1970-05-01

    In the past, nuclear arms control and peaceful uses of nuclear explosives were seen by many proponents of each as competing - if not opposing - interests. At one extreme, some viewed peaceful uses as an annoying irritant on the way to general and complete disarmament. At the other extreme, some considered arms-control arrangements - particularly those limiting nuclear testing - as bothersome barriers to realizing the full benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions. Most people found themselves somewhere between those extremes. But most also felt a continuing tension between essentially opposing forces. This polarity has been significantly altered by the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It is believed that the future use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes will depend in large measure on the international arrangements worked out under the treaty. I also believe that the success of the treaty in checking proliferation of nuclear weapons is contingent, in substantial part, on those peaceful-uses arrangements. In the areas covered by the treaty, therefore, one could view an active development of peaceful uses for nuclear explosives as complementing rather than conflicting with nuclear arms control. The treaty is primarily a security agreement. It is aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war by establishing permanency in the current separation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon nations. By its terms, each nuclear-weapon state agrees not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient, and each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees not to receive such weapons or devices. The non-nuclear- weapon parties are also obligated to negotiate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency covering peaceful-uses activities. And all signatories agree not to transfer fissionable material to those parties unless they are subject to such agreements. These provisions are all part of a scheme to limit the

  1. Technologies for distributed defense

    Science.gov (United States)

    Seiders, Barbara; Rybka, Anthony

    2002-07-01

    For Americans, the nature of warfare changed on September 11, 2001. Our national security henceforth will require distributed defense. One extreme of distributed defense is represented by fully deployed military troops responding to a threat from a hostile nation state. At the other extreme is a country of 'citizen soldiers', with families and communities securing their common defense through heightened awareness, engagement as good neighbors, and local support of and cooperation with local law enforcement, emergency and health care providers. Technologies - for information exploitation, biological agent detection, health care surveillance, and security - will be critical to ensuring success in distributed defense.

  2. Dynamic defense workshop :

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Crosby, Sean Michael; Doak, Justin E.; Haas, Jason Juedes.; Helinski, Ryan; Lamb, Christopher C.

    2013-02-01

    On September 5th and 6th, 2012, the Dynamic Defense Workshop: From Research to Practice brought together researchers from academia, industry, and Sandia with the goals of increasing collaboration between Sandia National Laboratories and external organizations, de ning and un- derstanding dynamic, or moving target, defense concepts and directions, and gaining a greater understanding of the state of the art for dynamic defense. Through the workshop, we broadened and re ned our de nition and understanding, identi ed new approaches to inherent challenges, and de ned principles of dynamic defense. Half of the workshop was devoted to presentations of current state-of-the-art work. Presentation topics included areas such as the failure of current defenses, threats, techniques, goals of dynamic defense, theory, foundations of dynamic defense, future directions and open research questions related to dynamic defense. The remainder of the workshop was discussion, which was broken down into sessions on de ning challenges, applications to host or mobile environments, applications to enterprise network environments, exploring research and operational taxonomies, and determining how to apply scienti c rigor to and investigating the eld of dynamic defense.

  3. Experience of Republic of Macedonia in Providing WMD Non-Proliferation Policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mecinovic, S.

    2007-01-01

    The Republic of Macedonia as a country in transition and as a country which does not posses WMD, has accepted to developed and implemented non-proliferation policy of WMD. First of all, we accepted the definition of WMD as used in international agreements, conventions and protocol and WMD includes nuclear, biological and toxin weapons, agent and precursors. WMD in wide sense includes all toxic chemical substances if they are used as means of attack or if they are the target of attack, all microorganisms and their product, all industrial facilities that use toxic chemicals in their process of production, transport and stockpile if they are a target of military or terrorist attack. For WMD non-proliferation projects to be valid, they must be on the level and carry the weight of international policy and doctrine and involve a most comprehensive sphere of the scientific and professional communities. This is only way to implement the projects in country such is Republic of Macedonia where the public opinion is that WMD are not real security problem because we neither possess nor seek to posses these kinds of weapons. Our WMD non-proliferation policy is tied to control of weapons, agents, precursors, technology and their transfer, market and possibility of use. Because of that we try to control know terrorist organization, groups and individuals. Terrorism caused special concern and attention, particularly when we talk about terrorism with NBC weapons and radiological, chemical and biological warfare agents. Scientific and technological progress led to fact that the instruments for performing terrorism (including WMD) can be produced or procured much easier than before. Rising industry which uses toxic chemicals and microorganisms in the production process created a lot of potential targets for terrorism actions in which they can use be as a target and an executive instrument. The new goal of contemporary treats is safety of life environment, which today includes

  4. Iran's Relations to the East: Nonproliferation and Regional Security in a Changing Southwest Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Tehsin, Muhammad [Quaid-I-Azam Univ., Islamabad (Pakistan)

    2014-11-01

    This study attempts to answer the following questions: would a successful JPOA result in nuclear nonproliferation and regional security in Southwest Asia; and could the Middle East and South Asia work together to contain the threat of Salafi jihadism?

  5. The methodological defense of realism scrutinized.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wray, K Brad

    2015-12-01

    I revisit an older defense of scientific realism, the methodological defense, a defense developed by both Popper and Feyerabend. The methodological defense of realism concerns the attitude of scientists, not philosophers of science. The methodological defense is as follows: a commitment to realism leads scientists to pursue the truth, which in turn is apt to put them in a better position to get at the truth. In contrast, anti-realists lack the tenacity required to develop a theory to its fullest. As a consequence, they are less likely to get at the truth. My aim is to show that the methodological defense is flawed. I argue that a commitment to realism does not always benefit science, and that there is reason to believe that a research community with both realists and anti-realists in it may be better suited to advancing science. A case study of the Copernican Revolution in astronomy supports this claim. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  6. Defense Mechanisms: A Bibliography.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pedrini, D. T.; Pedrini, Bonnie C.

    This bibliography includes studies of defense mechanisms, in general, and studies of multiple mechanisms. Defense mechanisms, briefly and simply defined, are the unconscious ego defendants against unpleasure, threat, or anxiety. Sigmund Freud deserves the clinical credit for studying many mechanisms and introducing them in professional literature.…

  7. Defense Business Transformation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2009-12-01

    Defense Business Transformation by Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn The Center for Technology and National...REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Defense Business Transformation 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER...vii Part One: DoD Business Transformation

  8. Unfolding Green Defense

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Larsen, Kristian Knus

    2015-01-01

    In recent years, many states have developed and implemented green solutions for defense. Building on these initiatives NATO formulated the NATO Green Defence Framework in 2014. The framework provides a broad basis for cooperation within the Alliance on green solutions for defense. This report aims...... to inform and support the further development of green solutions by unfolding how green technologies and green strategies have been developed and used to handle current security challenges. The report, initially, focuses on the security challenges that are being linked to green defense, namely fuel...... consumption in military operations, defense expenditure, energy security, and global climate change. The report then proceeds to introduce the NATO Green Defence Framework before exploring specific current uses of green technologies and green strategies for defense. The report concludes that a number...

  9. Current situation and countermeasures of the defense technology industry intellectual property management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fan Fei

    2014-01-01

    In Defense technology industry is a strategic industry of our country, is an important foundation for China to achieve modernization of national defense, is also important driving force of our national economy. Intellectual property plays a very important role in the defense industry ' strengthen the basis of capacity, combining military and civilian, leapfrog development' strategy. Defense-related science, technology and industry advanced nature of intellectual property management and its ownership is a direct reflection of the capability of independent innovation and sustainable development of the defense industry. Therefore, how to make the effective protection and management of intellectual property rights in the Defense Industry has also become a new issue that we face. In this paper, by analyzing the status of the defense technology industry intellectual property management, at home and abroad, and other industry advanced experience in intellectual property management, put forward recommendations to strengthen our national defense science and technology industry intellectual property management. (author)

  10. The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Fifteen years after entry into force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    The need to halt a wider spread of nuclear weapons grew out of the realization that the increase in the number of countries possessing such weapons would increase the threat to world security. As the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons clearly states in its preamble, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty - also known as the non-proliferation Treaty - was concluded in 1968, at a time when there were already five nuclear-weapon Powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. This fact sheet is intended to provide background material on the Treaty, including the events that led to its conclusion, an overview of its provisions and the developments at the two previously held Review Conferences

  11. The impact of non-proliferation policies on the uranium market - an industry view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stephany, M.

    1977-01-01

    It is concluded that from an economic point of view, the impact of the present political discussions on non-proliferation (referring particularly to U.S. and Canadian initiatives) on the uranium market (through the choice of reactor programmes in different countries, and other parts of the fuel cycle, such an enrichment, reprocessing, the use of plutonium and the disposal of radioactive waste) cannot be assessed quantitatively. It is believed, however, that in general terms the non-proliferation issue will lead to an increase in the cost of nuclear energy and of all energy. It is also considered that it will tend to strengthen nationalism and thereby to restrict international trade. (U.K.)

  12. NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2009 - May 2010

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

    2011-01-01

    In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 17th successful year in support of the NNSA's mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. This annual report to reviews program activities from June 2009 through May 2010 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2009. Contents include: Welcome Letter (Mission Driven: It's all about results), Introduction, Structure of the NGFP, Program Management Highlights, Annual Lifecycle, Class of 2009 Incoming Fellows, Orientation, Global Support of the Mission, Career Development, Management of the Fellows, Performance Highlights, Closing Ceremony, Where They Are Now, Alumni Highlight - Mission Success: Exceptional Leaders from the NGFP, Class of 2009 Fall Recruitment Activities, Established Partnerships, Face-to-Face, Recruiting Results, Interviews, Hiring and Clearances, Introducing the Class of 2010, Class of 2011 Recruitment Strategy, On the Horizon, Appendix A: Class of 2010 Fellow Biographies.

  13. NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2008 - May 2009

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

    2010-03-01

    In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 16th successful year in support of the NNSA’s mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. We provide this annual report to review program activities from June 2008 through May 2009 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2008. Contents include: Welcome Letter Introduction The NGFP Team Program Management Highlights Class of 2008 Incoming Fellows Orientation Travel Career Development Management of the Fellows Performance Highlights Closing Ceremony Encore Performance Where They Are Now Alumnus Career Highlights: Christine Buzzard Class of 2009 Applicant Database Upgrades Fall Recruitment Activities Interviews Hiring and Clearances Introducing the Class of 2009 Class of 2010 Recruitment Strategy On the Horizon Appendix A: Class of 2009 Fellows

  14. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1983-01-01

    The author discusses the reasons of criticism and even rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, dealing in particular with the alledged discriminating nature of the Treaty and with the statement that the Treaty is not apt to prevent proliferation on a vertical plane. He further discusses the motives behind the efforts of potential nuclear weapons states to get nuclear weapons. The system of worldwide and bilateral safeguards and controls covering the transfer of nuclear technologies is explained. In conclusion the author suggests to pay more attention to article IV, sub-section (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as this might offer a suitable approach to restricting the dissemination of nuclear explosives. (HP) [de

  15. American alliances and nuclear non-proliferation. The end of nuclear weapon activities of US allies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schneider, Jonas

    2016-01-01

    Jonas Schneider tackles a question that is of great interest both to scholars of nuclear proliferation and to practitioners of nonproliferation diplomacy: Why do some political leaders of U.S. allies agree to abandon their nation's nuclear weapons activities, while others - who are often members of the same allied government and sometimes even of the same political party - steadfastly reject such a course reversal? Our existing stock of theories does not fare well in accounting for this important variation in leaders' attitudes. To solve this puzzle, Schneider develops an innovative theory that draws on the individual status conceptions of allied political leaders. Subsequently, the author undertakes to test his theory using four thoroughly researched case studies, and he derives important lessons for international nonproliferation diplomacy toward the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

  16. The structure of German non-proliferation policy - past and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1990-01-01

    West German nonproliferation policy has evolved through four phases: First German policy strived to regain the right to nuclear research and industrial development. Then West Germany struggled for participation in NATO nuclear decision-making. Following the conclusion of the NPT, the full development of a mature nuclear industry, including activities in the full fuel cycle, and the promotion of nuclear exports were the focus of national nuclear policy. Starting in the early eighties, political aspects became more important. International security, arms control and disarmament, and foreign reputation had a more prominent role than pure economic interests. In the future, the united Germany must take care not to repeat the sad scandals of the eighties. Its renunciation of nuclear weapons remains a pillar of European stability and a prerequisite for a European peace system. Together with its European partners, Germany can be expected to take a more active, supportive and effective role in international non-proliferation policy. (orig./HSCH) [de

  17. Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirsaidov, U.M.

    2010-01-01

    This article is devoted to issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan. Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction arouse serious concern of world community. Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the weapons of mass destruction distributions become the subject of high concern. Besides, during the end of 'cold war', regional conflicts, collapse of Soviet Union, as well as access to sensitive technologies considerably increase the danger of weapons of mass destruction distribution. More than 10 countries have active programs, relating to weapons of mass destruction and, possibly, more than ten countries have potential to start implementing such kinds of programs. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution. After 11 September events, the risk of such weapons of mass destruction components use by such forces for Governments blackmail become real scene, which, despite of low possibility of this threat implementation, could have very serious and disastrous consequences. International community responded to these problems and challenges, basically through the following actions, which is detailed regime development of multilateral international treaties, directed to weapons of mass destruction distribution prevention. Non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, Convention on prohibition of chemical weapons and Convention on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons are some of them. As it is known, Tajikistan signed all these treaties. For different reasons these treaties were subject of serious tests. Nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 year, actual Israel status as state having nuclear weapon and North Korean program on

  18. Review of international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shimizu, Ryo; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Sakurai, Satoshi; Tamai, Hiroshi; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Kuno, Yusuke

    2012-02-01

    International forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation was held at Gakushi-kaikan, Tokyo on February 2-3, 2011 in cooperation with The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and The University of Tokyo Global COE. In our International Forum, we would like to encourage active discussion of international challenges to and solutions for compatibility between peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, and international cooperation for emerging nuclear energy states. It was successfully carried out with as many as 310 participants and a lot of discussions. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. (author)

  19. Problems of the nuclear non-proliferation policy. Contributions to the international discussion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.; Butler, P. von; Fischer, W.; Caccia Dominioni, F.; Frick, H.; Gmelin, W.; Haeckel, E.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Richter, B.; Stein, G.

    1994-01-01

    The volume assembles a number of essays wherein basic problems of nonproliferation are identified and discussed in view of recent developments and future policy requirements. What is the role of multilateral institutions in the containment of nuclear proliferation? How are Western Europe's security needs to be reconciled with the tenets of the global nonproliferation regime? How can international safeguards be upgraded so as to increase confidence among states? What kinds of disciplinary instruments are needed for the international community to prevent an unco-operative state from gaining access to nuclear weapons? What kinds of obstacles stand in the way of smooth co-operation between the European Union and the United States in the nuclear field? How does the demise of global bipolarity impinge on the need to pursue an international nuclear order? The essays in this volume seek to combine structural analysis of conceptual issues with substantive policy recommendations. (orig./HP) [de

  20. NNSA Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report June 2009 - May 2010

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.

    2011-04-01

    In 2009, the Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) completed its 17th successful year in support of the NNSA’s mission by developing future leaders in nonproliferation and promoting awareness of career opportunities. This annual report to reviews program activities from June 2009 through May 2010 - the fellowship term for the Class of 2009. Contents include: Welcome Letter (Mission Driven: It’s all about results), Introduction, Structure of the NGFP, Program Management Highlights, Annual Lifecycle, Class of 2009 Incoming Fellows, Orientation, Global Support of the Mission, Career Development, Management of the Fellows, Performance Highlights, Closing Ceremony, Where They Are Now, Alumni Highlight - Mission Success: Exceptional Leaders from the NGFP, Class of 2009 Fall Recruitment Activities, Established Partnerships, Face-to-Face, Recruiting Results, Interviews, Hiring and Clearances, Introducing the Class of 2010, Class of 2011 Recruitment Strategy, On the Horizon, Appendix A: Class of 2010 Fellow Biographies

  1. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sandra Colombo

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu. The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous development of this technology in emerging countries. Against this, the article investigates the existence of margins to maneuver in the international system from the case of study of Argentina, one of the few developing countries that have managed to export nuclear technology, and has declared the development of independent nuclear activity as a State policy

  2. The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

    2015-01-01

    Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

  3. The non-proliferation regime, vertical proliferation and the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, W.

    1988-12-01

    The disarmament orientation of the NPT, which stands beside the central aim of avoiding horizontal proliferation, raises a question: Does a compatibility exist between the non-proliferation policy of the Federal Republic and its security policy, which has its basic pillar in the nuclear deterrence strategy? Critics of this deterrence policy therefore, hinting to the disarmament determination of the NPT, demand that the Federal Republic should exercise its influence for the conclusion of a 'Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty' (CTBT), the establishment of a 'Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones' (NWFZ) in Europe, a 'No First Use'-Treaty (NFU) and finally the abolishment of all atomic weapons ('Zero Solution'). According to them such disarmament 'remedies' can reestablish or assure the waning or damaged international consensus for horizontal non-proliferation. This is a contribution for the establishment of a stable world order and will smooth the way for a prolongation of the NPT in the year 1995. An analysis of the history and the structure of interests shows that the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is deeply rooted in the NPT and that a prolongation of the treaty and its own membership is a substantial object of the foreign and security policy. Consequently the Federal Republic has to face the demands for an intensification of 'anti-nuclear measures' and has to examine their acceptability and their usefulness with respect to non-proliferation. The structure of the problem encloses the following aspects: The security conception of the Federal Republic with its military-strategic essence; the provisions in article VI NPT for negotiations with the object of a world free of atomic weapons; the derived disarmament 'remedies' for strengthening the consensus for horizontal non-proliferation and, finally, the real interface between horizontal and vertical proliferation. (orig./DG) [de

  4. Assuring the success of the non-proliferation treaty extension conference. Excerpts from the panel discussions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This publication presents excerpts from a conference organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament Inc., in cooperation with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, and covers the following issues: status of the comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations, fissile cut-off and ending production of nuclear weapons, how should nuclear weapons states pursue disarmament under Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NPT extension: problems and prospects

  5. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1970-04-22

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

  6. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: A status report. Vienna, 14 March 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    For more than half a century, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. Further meaningful progress towards a nuclear weapon free world will demand that we re-examine our fundamental concept of what security means and how it can best be achieved. The following specific areas where our attention should be focused are discussed briefly: the historical perspective, current strategies for non-proliferation and disarmament, and the future prospects

  7. Framework for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection for Nonproliferation Impact Assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bari, R.

    2008-01-01

    This report describes a framework for proliferation resistance and physical protection evaluation for the fuel cycle systems envisioned in the expansion of nuclear power for electricity generation. The methodology is based on an approach developed as part of the Generation IV technical evaluation framework and on a qualitative evaluation approach to policy factors similar to those that were introduced in previous Nonproliferation Impact Assessments performed by DOE

  8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  9. Export of nuclear equipment and materials and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courteix, Simone.

    1977-01-01

    The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of great concern today despite the entry into force in the early '70s of the NPT. To master civilian nuclear technology implies the ability to develop nuclear explosive devices; therefore in recent years contacts have strengthened between countries exporting nuclear equipment, specially in the frame of the 'London Club' so as to ensure that their exports will not result in disseminating nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  10. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [fr

  11. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [ru

  12. The Non-Proliferation Treaty on the threshold to the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, W.

    1991-06-01

    The basic outlines of non-proliferation policy, its instruments, the position of the protagonists' interests and the fundamental fields of conflict are to the fore. The history and structure of international non-poliferation policy and, in particular, of the NPT, are described, the instruments for verifying the purely peaceful use of nuclear power (safeguards) are analysed, and important future technological and political challenges of the Treaty are listed. (orig./HP) [de

  13. Nuclear export policy and regulation for non-proliferation: Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boulanger, Werner.

    1978-01-01

    The nuclear export policy of the Federal Republic of Germany complies with the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Already in 1967 the Federal Government stated in a Peace Note that no export was authorised to countries (outside Euratom) which did not comply with the IAEA Safeguards. In the bilateral agreement the Federal Republic signed with Brasil in 1975, emphasis was put on international safeguards and the control exercised on exported materials to avoid any diversion for military purposes. (NEA) [fr

  14. Joint DOE-PNC research on the use of transparency in support of nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mochiji, Toshiro; Keeney, R.; Tazaki, Makiko; Nakhleh, C.; Puckett, J.; Stanbro, W.

    1999-01-01

    PNC and LANL collaborated in research on the concept of transparency in nuclear nonproliferation. The research was based on the Action Sheet No. 21, which was signed in February 1996, ''The Joint Research on Transparency in Nuclear Nonproliferation'' under the ''Agreement between the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) for Cooperation in Research and Development Concerning Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Measures for Safeguards and Nonproliferation''. The purpose of Action Sheet 21 is to provide a fundamental study on Transparency to clarify the means to improve worldwide acceptability for the nuclear energy from the nuclear nonproliferation point of view. This project consists of independent research and then joint discussion at workshops that address a series of topics and issues in transparency. The activities covered in Action Sheet 21 took place over a period of 18 months. Three workshops were held; the first and the third hosted by PNC in Tokyo, Japan and the second hosted by LANL in Los Alamos, New Mexico, US. The following is a summary of the three workshops. The first workshop addressed the policy environment of transparency. Each side presented its perspective on the following issues: (1) a definition of transparency, (2) reasons for transparency, (3) detailed goals of transparency and (4) obstacles to transparency. The topic of the second workshop was ''Development of Transparency Options.'' The activities accomplished were (1) identify type of facilities where transparency might be applied, (2) define criteria for applying transparency, and (3) delineate applicable transparency options. The goal of the third workshop, ''Technical Options for Transparency,'' was to (1) identify conceptual options for transparency system design; (2) identify instrumentation, measurement, data collection and data processing options; (3) identify data display options; and (4) identify technical

  15. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-10-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  16. Scientists for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transactions of international seminar

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the Second International Seminar 'Scientists for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. The Seminar took place from 11 to 14 October 1994 in Nakhabino Country Club near Moscow. More than 60 specialists from Russia, USA, France, Belgium as well as IAEA and CEU took part in the seminar. Problems of cooperation in the field of nuclear materials accounting, control and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear export regulations and disarmament control are discussed at the seminar

  17. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [es

  18. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-04-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  19. Department of Defense perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Devine, R.

    1985-01-01

    This paper examines radiation instrumentation from the Department of Defense perspective. Radiation survey instruments and calibration, or RADIAC, as it is called in the services, while administratively falling under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, has generally been managed at a lower level. The Naval Electronics Systems Command and Army Signal Corp are the two principles in the Department of Defense for RADIAC. The actions of the services are coordinated through the tri-service RADIAC working group, which meets about every year and a half. Several points from this organization are highlighted

  20. Working Group 3: Broader Perspectives on Non-proliferation and Nuclear Verification

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dreicer, M.; Pregenzer, A.; Stein, G.

    2013-01-01

    This working group (WG) focused on the technical topics related to international security and stability in global nonproliferation and arms control regimes and asked how nonproliferation tools and culture might facilitate verification of future nuclear treaties. The review of existing and future nonproliferation and disarmament regimes (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - CTBT, UNSC Resolution 1540, UK/Norway/VERTIC exercise, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - FMCT) offered a view on challenges, possibilities, and limitations for future initiatives. The concepts that the WG considered, with potential use in implementing future nuclear verification treaties, are: Triple S Culture (Safety, Security, Safeguards), State-Level Approach, Safeguards-by-Design, risk-based approaches, managed access, inspections, and protection of sensitive information. Under these concepts, many existing tools, considered by the WG could be used for nuclear verification. Export control works to control sensitive technology and expertise. Global implementation is complicated and multi-faceted and would benefit from greater consistency and efficiency. In most cases, international cooperation and development international capability would supplement efforts. This document is composed of the slides and the paper of the presentation. (A.C.)

  1. Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

    2013-01-01

    The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  2. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

  3. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: A long-term perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haeckel, E.

    1990-01-01

    International nuclear policy has been determined for a long time by the exigencies of the status quo. The non-proliferation regime draws its legitimacy from the continuation of extant patterns of power in world politics. Such a static policy cannot succeed forever. Overcoming the threat of nuclear proliferation will require innovative strategy that reaches beyond the status quo. It calls for structural change in the international system to be accomodated instead of resisted. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to hold, nuclear weapon states will finally have to forgo their privileged status. This cannot, however, be accomplished simply through the abolition or renunciation of nuclear weapons since nuclear weapons themselves continue to be instrumental for war prevention and international stability. Rather, what is needed is a new approach to the management of the nuclear world system under international responsibility. Nonproliferation and disarmament objectives together call for a concept of global security in which multilateral institutions assume an increasingly important role of nuclear diplomacy. (orig.) [de

  4. Consideration on non-proliferation regime meeting in a changing world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, Hiroyoshi; Kikuchi, Masahiro

    1995-01-01

    This paper presents some proposals for improvement of non-proliferation regime including safeguards structures with historical changes of international regime. Current non-proliferation regime was established under the circumstances of Cold War, and it's structure and measures were influenced by the situation of these time. Although, a couple of years have passed from end of Cold War, new world order has not established yet. Therefore, it is expected that the current regime could be improved in accordance with new world order. Generally speaking, it could be welcomed that the current regime has got some successes from two points of views, namely no new nuclear weapon states have emerged and after the establishment of NPT and all nuclear weapon state is joined NPT finally. However, it is the authors' concern that some gray countries, such as India, Pakistan and Israel, have not joined the NPT yet and cases of Iraqi and DPRK have occurred. After reviewing of such new situation, some proposals will be presented in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime to meet current world conditions

  5. Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shinohara, Nobuo; Kokaji, Lisa; Ichimasa, Sukeyuki

    2010-01-01

    In Global Center of Excellence Program of The University of Tokyo, Non- Proliferation Study Committee by the members of nuclear industries, electricity utilities, nuclear energy institutes and universities has initiated on October 2008 from the viewpoints of investigating a package of measures for nuclear non-proliferation and bringing up young people who will support the near-future nuclear energy system. One of the non-proliferation issues in the Committee is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Objective of this treaty is to cease all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosion. This purpose should be contributed effectively to the political stability of the Asian region by continuous efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons. In the Committee, by extracting several issues related to the CTBT, conception of 'Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation' has been discussed with the aim of the nuclear-weapon security in Asian region, where environmental nuclear-test monitoring data is mainly treated and utilized. In this paper, the conception of the 'network' is presented in detail. (author)

  6. Workshop on regional cooperation in remote monitoring for transparency and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olsen, John; Inoue, Naoko; Hori, Masato; Hashimoto, Yu; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2006-06-01

    The Workshop on Regional Cooperation in Remote Monitoring for Transparency and Nonproliferation on 8-9 February at O'arai, Japan, brought together remote monitoring experts to share technical experience and consider potential uses of remote monitoring for nuclear transparency and strengthened nonproliferation. Sponsored by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Science and Technology Center (NPSTC) of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), this event gathered thirty five attendees from the JAEA, the Republic of Korea's National Nuclear Management and Control Agency (NNCA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA). U.S. technical experts represented Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Workshop discussions and interactions met or surpassed all goals: On the technical front, the JAEA, NNCA, and SNL exchanged presentations on their respective uses and technical approaches to remote monitoring. These included systems for both international safeguards and transparency. The IAEA shared valuable guidance on future remote monitoring system requirements. Following the presentations SNL conducted training in remote monitoring for technical personnel. In parallel project planning discussions, the JAEA, NNCA, SNL and the U.S. DOE reaffirmed mutual interest in regional cooperation in remote monitoring that could eventuate in exchange of safeguards-related data. A productive off-the-record session by all parties considered the path forward and established intermediate steps and time scales. The 15 of the presented papers are indexed individually. (J.P.N.)

  7. Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshisaki, M.B.

    1993-01-01

    The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

  8. How we think about peace and security. The ABCs of initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation education

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toki, Masako; Potter, William C.

    2005-01-01

    Education and training are among the most important but underutilized tools for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. Although few national governments or international organizations have invested significantly in such training programs, there is a growing recognition among States of the need to rectify this situation. This positive development is reflected in the broad support for recommendations of a UN study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and in related initiatives within the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the forthcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference, it is useful to take stock of the implementation of the UN study's recommendations. In particular, it is important to observe the progress that has been made within the context of the NPT review process, as well as the obstacles that must be overcome if the full potential for disarmament and non-proliferation education is to be realized. Resources on disarmament and non-proliferation education are increasingly available on the Internet. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs has launched new features on its web site that include links to academic institutes, governmental centers, NGOs and other bodies engaged in educational efforts. As part of its mission to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and raising global public awareness on WMD issues, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) has developed a series of tutorials for non-proliferation and disarmament education. Among these tutorials, the NPT Tutorial has been designed to educate and provide useful material about the treaty through interactive text and enriched multimedia segments, including timelines, maps, and numerous links to relevant resources. Among other resources are teaching guides developed by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies through its Critical Issues Forum (CIF). More

  9. Cruise Missile Defense

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Hichkad, Ravi R; Bolkcom, Christopher

    2005-01-01

    Congress has expressed interest in cruise missile defense for years. Cruise missiles (CMs) are essentially unmanned attack aircraft -- vehicles composed of an airframe, propulsion system, guidance system, and weapons payload...

  10. Cruise Missile Defense

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Hichkad, Ravi R; Bolkcom, Christopher

    2004-01-01

    Congress has expressed interest in cruise missile defense for years. Cruise missiles (CMs) are essentially unmanned attack aircraft -- vehicles composed of an airframe, propulsion system, guidance system, and weapons payload...

  11. Defense Transportation; The Army

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1998-01-01

    .... The statement of managers in the conference report on the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997, directed us to validate the results and savings achieved from this and any other personal property pilot program...

  12. The Defense Science Board 2001 Summer Study on Defense Science and Technology

    Science.gov (United States)

    2002-05-01

    HIT” The threat of biological weapons arises in part from a decades-old megatrend in the life sciences. New advances in molecular biology, genetics...99 The Technology Landscape Today.................................... 101 Biological Warfare Defense...planning and programming, today’s environment comprises a broader, more diffuse set of concerns: terrorism, biological warfare, regional tensions

  13. Defense Primer: DOD Contractors

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-02-10

    functions, from intelligence analysis or software development to landscaping or food service. Why does DOD use individual contractors? Going back to...that provide professional services, from research to management support. The bulk of contractors—more than 70%—provide products, and these include...10 U.S.C. Part IV: Service, Supply, and Procurement. CRS Products CRS In Focus IF10548, Defense Primer: U.S. Defense Industrial Base, by Daniel

  14. Ballistic Missile Defense

    OpenAIRE

    Mayer, Michael

    2011-01-01

    At the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, the alliance decided to move forward on the development of a territorial ballistic missile defense (BMD) system and explore avenues for cooperation with Russia in this endeavor. Substantial progress on BMD has been made over the past decade, but some questions remain regarding the ultimate strategic utility of such a system and whether its benefi ts outweigh the possible opportunity costs. Missile defense has been a point of contention between the US and its...

  15. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Finland``s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  16. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant Ltd., Vienna (Austria)

    2000-06-15

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  17. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite; Wredberg, L.

    2000-06-01

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  18. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Finland''s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  19. International workshop on transparency technology for nonproliferation cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Applications of remote monitoring and secure communications for regional confidence building

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Betsill, J. David; Hashimoto, Yu

    2009-08-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) sponsored an international workshop 20-22 February 2008 on 'Transparency Technology for Nonproliferation Cooperation in the Asia Pacific - Applications of Remote Monitoring and Secure Communications for Regional Confidence Building.' The Workshop focused on identifying appropriate roles and functions for Transparency in addressing nonproliferation concerns associated with the use of nuclear energy, particularly in the East Asia region. Participants from several East Asia countries included representatives from nuclear energy research institutions, Ministries, facility operators, and non-governmental organizations. Regional participation from countries currently developing their nuclear energy infrastructure was also encouraged. Several promising students from the University of Tokyo and the Tokyo Institute of Technology, representing the next generation of nuclear energy experts, also participated in the meeting and added significant value and fresh viewpoints. The participants agreed that transparency has many roles and definitions, and that its usefulness ranges for verification and compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to building trust and confidence in the activities of the state and other regional nuclear energy stakeholders. In addition, they identified a need for further education among the professional community, public, operators, and regulators as a key factor in transparency effectiveness. Also, the education and cultivation of the next generation of nuclear energy experts was identified as crucial to the long-term success and acceptance of nuclear energy development. And finally, that the development, selection, and implementation of technology that is appropriate to the goals and participants of a transparency effort are unique to each situation and are key to the successful acceptance of cooperative transparency and regional confidence building. At the conclusion of the Workshop it was importantly

  20. 76 FR 72391 - Defense Logistics Agency Revised Regulation 1000.22, Environmental Considerations in Defense...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-11-23

    ... DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary [Docket ID DOD-2011-OS-0055] Defense Logistics Agency Revised Regulation 1000.22, Environmental Considerations in Defense Logistics Agency Actions AGENCY: Defense Logistics Agency, Department of Defense. ACTION: Revised Defense Logistics Agency...

  1. 75 FR 76423 - Defense Intelligence Agency National Defense Intelligence College Board of Visitors Closed Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-12-08

    ... DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary Defense Intelligence Agency National Defense Intelligence College Board of Visitors Closed Meeting AGENCY: National Defense Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense. ACTION: Notice of Closed Meeting. SUMMARY: Pursuant to the...

  2. 76 FR 28960 - Defense Intelligence Agency National Defense Intelligence College Board of Visitors Closed Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-05-19

    ... DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary Defense Intelligence Agency National Defense Intelligence College Board of Visitors Closed Meeting AGENCY: National Defense Intelligence College, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense. ACTION: Notice of Closed Meeting. SUMMARY: Pursuant to the...

  3. 78 FR 20624 - Information Collection Requirement; Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-04-05

    ... Identification Advance Shipment Notices AGENCY: Defense Acquisition Regulations System, Department of Defense (Do...) Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of... at 252.211; Radio Frequency Identification Advance Shipment Notices, OMB Control Number 0704-0434...

  4. Authentication of monitoring systems for non-proliferation and arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fuller, J.L.; Kouzes, R.T.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Radiation measurement and systems are central to the affirmation of compliance with nuclear material control agreements associated with a variety of arms control and non-proliferation regimes. A number of radiation measurement systems are under development for this purpose, and the correct functioning of these systems will be authenticated. Authentication is the process by which a monitoring party to an agreement is assured that measurement systems are assembled as designed, function as designed, and do not contain hidden features that allow the passing of material inconsistent with an accepted declaration. Attribute measurement systems are specific examples of radiation measurement systems that are being developed in the United States and the Russian Federation. Under one bilateral agreement, the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction (DoD DTRA/CTR) Program is constructing a Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) at Mayak to hold up to 50 tons of plutonium from the disassembly of Russian Federation nuclear weapons. Negotiations are being held between the U.S. and the Russian Federation for cooperative development of attribute measurement systems to provide confidence that the material is of weapons origin and other purposes. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is leading the authentication effort for U.S. interests at FMSF. There are two basic requirements for an attribute measurement system: protection of classified information, and assurance of credible performance of the system for the measurement. The technology used to protect classified information is referred to as an information barrier. An information barrier consists of technology and procedures that prevent the release of host-country classified information to a monitoring party during a joint inspection of a sensitive item. Information barriers are used on monitoring systems that are exposed to host-party classified materials

  5. Report of the international forum on nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2013-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security - Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia-' on 12 and 13 December 2012, co-hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo. In the forum, keynote speakers from Japan, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S., France and Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. In two panel discussions, entitled 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle back end' and 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for nuclear energy use in the Asian region and a multilateral cooperative framework', active discussions were made among panelists from Japan, IAEA, the U.S., France, ROK, Russia and Kazakhstan. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report except presentation materials. (author)

  6. Defense in Depth Added to Malicious Activities Simulation Tools (MAST)

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-09-01

    5 a. Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES)..............................13 b. Advanced Encryption Standard ( AES ...10 Figure 4. DES Encryption , from [5] ................................................................................12 Figure 5. AES Encryption ...Associated Data AES Advanced Encryption System CBC Cipher Block Chaining DES Data Encryption Standard DOD Department of Defense DSA Digital Signature

  7. For a NATO defensive deterrent

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smoke, R.

    1988-01-01

    This paper proposes that NATO should adopt, in a gradual and orderly fashion, a grand strategy and accompanying posture distinctly different from its present one. The strategy the author recommends has variously been termed non-provocative defence, defence-only defence, or defensive deterrence, employs the latter term here. By it the author means a militarily sound strategy relying solely on conventional weapons so long as the enemy uses only conventional weapons, and a posture that is unambiguously capable only of defence. Secure, second-strike nuclear forces would be retained for deterrence of any nuclear use by the opponent. This goal is consistent with the goal stated in Frank Barnaby's companion paper in this volume; here however the author lays the emphasis on political and politico-military rationales for a defensive deterrent. The paper begins with two brief arguments why a shift in NATO strategy is needed, advances some distinctions among the possible alternatives, and then presents some seven rationales for its recommended policy

  8. Energetic Techniques For Planetary Defense

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barbee, B.; Bambacus, M.; Bruck Syal, M.; Greenaugh, K. C.; Leung, R. Y.; Plesko, C. S.

    2017-12-01

    Near-Earth Objects (NEOs) are asteroids and comets whose heliocentric orbits tend to approach or cross Earth's heliocentric orbit. NEOs of various sizes periodically collide with Earth, and efforts are currently underway to discover, track, and characterize NEOs so that those on Earth-impacting trajectories are discovered far enough in advance that we would have opportunities to deflect or destroy them prior to Earth impact, if warranted. We will describe current efforts by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to assess options for energetic methods of deflecting or destroying hazardous NEOs. These methods include kinetic impactors, which are spacecraft designed to collide with an NEO and thereby alter the NEO's trajectory, and nuclear engineering devices, which are used to rapidly vaporize a layer of NEO surface material. Depending on the amount of energy imparted, this can result in either deflection of the NEO via alteration of its trajectory, or robust disruption of the NEO and dispersal of the remaining fragments. We have studied the efficacies and limitations of these techniques in simulations, and have combined the techniques with corresponding spacecraft designs and mission designs. From those results we have generalized planetary defense mission design strategies and drawn conclusions that are applicable to a range of plausible scenarios. We will present and summarize our research efforts to date, and describe approaches to carrying out planetary defense missions with energetic NEO deflection or disruption techniques.

  9. Nonproliferation and safeguard considerations: Pebble Bed reactor fuel cycle evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-09-01

    Nuclear fuel cycles were evaluated for the Pebble Bed Gas Cooled Reactor under development in the Federal Republic of Germany. The basic fuel cycle specified for the HTR-K and PNP is well qualified and will meet the requirements of these reactors. Twenty alternate fuel cycles are described, including high-conversion cycles, net-breeding cycles, and proliferation-resistant cycles. High-conversion cycles, which have a high probability of being successfully developed, promise a significant improvement in resource utilization. Proliferation-resistant cycles, also with a high probability of successful development, conpare very favorably with those for other types of reactors. Most of the advanced cycles could be adapted to first-generation pebble bed reactors with no significant modifications

  10. Policy of Kyrgyz Republic in the field of weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duisheeva, Zh.Z.

    2010-01-01

    Full text: Kyrgyz Republic is principle and sequential member of accepting effective international measures, directed to active prevention to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, its components and means of delivery. Commitment to prevention policy and WMD nonproliferation is one of basic principles of foreign and domestic policy of Kyrgyz Republic. The real measure against WMD proliferation and relating to its production technologies of military, special and dual use is international export control based on national systems of export control including smoothly running national system of account for, control and physical protection of arm materials. Currently juridical basis of export control system in Kyrgyz Republic is actively developing. In 2003 the Law of Kyrgyz Republic On export control, based on principles and norms of international law in the field of export control was adopted. The Law On export control determines basic principles of state policy, legal activity basis of state management and participants of foreign-economic activity in the field of export control, as well as defines their rights, obligations and responsibilities in this field. Also in the law, the requirements of international treaties realization in the field of WMD nonproliferation and means of their delivery, signed by Kyrgyzstan, is defined as one of national systems goals of export control. In article 13, Law On export control it is defined that international cooperation in the field of export control by means of efforts coordination and cooperation with foreign states on prevention of WMD nonproliferation, means of their delivery and technologies on their creation; participation in international regimes of export control and international forums, as well as carrying out negotiations, consultations with foreign states, bilateral information exchange and realization of joint programs and other events in the field of export control on bilateral and multilateral basis. By

  11. Strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime: focus on the civilian nuclear fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Saltiel, David H.; Pregenzer, Arian Leigh

    2005-01-01

    Leaders around the world and across the ideological spectrum agree that the global nonproliferation regime is facing a serious test. The emergence of sophisticated terrorist networks, black markets in nuclear technology, and technological leaps associated with globalization have conspired to threaten one of the most successful examples of international cooperation in history. The rampant proliferation of nuclear weapons that was predicted at the start of the nuclear age has been largely held in check and the use of those weapons avoided. Nonetheless, with the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the threat of nuclear proliferation seems more serious than ever. Although experts readily concede that there exist many pathways to proliferation, the threat posed by the misuse of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle has received considerable recent attention. While the connection between nuclear energy and nonproliferation has been a topic of discussion since the dawn of the nuclear age, world events have brought the issue to the forefront once again. United States President George W. Bush and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohammad ElBaradei are among those who have highlighted proliferation risks associated with civilian nuclear power programs and called for revitalizing the nuclear nonproliferation regime to address new threats. From the possibility of diversion or theft of nuclear material or technology, to the use of national civilian programs as a cover for weapons programs - what some have called latent proliferation - the fuel cycle appears to many to represent a glaring proliferation vulnerability. Just as recognition of these risks is not new, neither is recognition of the many positive benefits of nuclear energy. In fact, a renewed interest in exploiting these benefits has increased the urgency of addressing the risks. Global energy demand is expected to at least double by the middle of

  12. Defense Logistics Standard Systems Functional Requirements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    1987-03-01

    the design of retaillintermediate-level data bases to support end-user requisition control files. The wholesale system could then be restructured to... organza - Sale tions, the residual is sold Sales and merchandising responsibility rests Vitl the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Regions Those...File (DDF) advanced by ANSI Technical Committee X3L5 and ISO TC97/SC15 • The Data Extraction, Processing, and Restructuring System (EXPRESS) designed by

  13. COP21: defense stakes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coldefy, Alain; Hulot, Nicolas; Aichi, Leila; Tertrais, Bruno; Paillard, Christophe-Alexandre; Piodi, Jerome; Regnier, Serge; Volpi, Jean-Luc; Descleves, Emmanuel; Garcin, Thierry; Granholm, Niklas; Wedin, Lars; Pouvreau, Ana; Henninger, Laurent

    2015-01-01

    The 21. Conference of the Parties (COP21) from the UN Framework Convention took place in Paris between November 30 and December 11, 2015. The challenge is to reach a universal agreement of fight against global warming and to control the carbon footprint of human activities. This topic is in the core of the Defense Ministry preoccupations. This special dossier takes stock of the question of defense issues linked with global warming. The dossier comprises 13 papers dealing with: 1 - COP21: defense stakes (Coldefy, A.); 2 - Warfare climate, a chance for peace (Hulot, N.); 3 - COP21 and defense (Aichi, L.); 4 - A war climate? (Tertrais, B.); 5 - Challenges the World has to face in the 21. century (Paillard, C.A.); 6 - Desertification: a time bomb in the heart of Sahel (Piodi, J.); 7 - The infrastructure department of defense in the fight against climate disturbance (Regnier, S.); 8 - Fight against global warming, a chance for the forces? (Volpi, J.L.); 9 - Sea and sustainable development (Descleves, E.); 10 - Rationales of Arctic's surrounding powers (Garcin, T.); 11 - Arctic: strategic stake (Granholm, N.; Wedin, L.); 12 - Strategic impact of Turkey's new energy choices (Pouvreau, A.); 13 - Climate and war: a brief historical outlook (Henninger, L.)

  14. Nuclear non-proliferation: Revisiting the basics. Carnegie international non-proliferation conference 2002. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort - and despite recent challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But the international community has to move forward, it is essential that a number of the basic assumptions should be revisited, and a number of new approaches reconsidered. A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually disappear. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has overall been successful - but with some shortcomings. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force - and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the 'unequivocal undertaking' by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament - such as 'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further 'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,' 'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT - left without concrete follow-up actions and in

  15. Next Generation Nuclear Plant Defense-in-Depth Approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wallace, Edward G.; Fleming, Karl N.; Burns, Edward M.

    2009-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to (1) document the definition of defense-in-depth and the pproach that will be used to assure that its principles are satisfied for the NGNP project and (2) identify the specific questions proposed for preapplication discussions with the NRC. Defense-in-depth is a safety philosophy in which multiple lines of defense and conservative design and evaluation methods are applied to assure the safety of the public. The philosophy is also intended to deliver a design that is tolerant to uncertainties in knowledge of plant behavior, component reliability or operator performance that might compromise safety. This paper includes a review of the regulatory foundation for defense-in-depth, a definition of defense-in-depth that is appropriate for advanced reactor designs based on High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) technology, and an explanation of how this safety philosophy is achieved in the NGNP.

  16. Collaborative human-machine nuclear non-proliferation analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Greitzer, F.L.; Badalamente, R.V.; Stewart, T.S.

    1993-10-01

    The purpose of this paper is to report on the results of a project investigating support concepts for the information treatment needs of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, also referred to as the Agency) and its attempts to strengthen international safeguards. The aim of the research was to define user/computer interface concepts and intelligent support features that will enhance the analyst`s access to voluminous and diverse information, the ability to recognize and evaluate uncertain data, and the capability to make decisions and recommendations. The objective was to explore techniques for enhancing safeguards analysis through application of (1) more effective user-computer interface designs and (2) advanced concepts involving human/system collaboration. The approach was to identify opportunities for human/system collaboration that would capitalize on human strengths and still accommodate human limitations. This paper documents the findings and describes a concept prototype, Proliferation Analysis Support System (PASS), developed for demonstration purposes. The research complements current and future efforts to enhance the information systems used by the IAEA, but has application elsewhere, as well.

  17. Defense waste management plan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-06-01

    Defense high-level waste (HLW) and defense transuranic (TRU) waste are in interim storage at three sites, namely: at the Savannah River Plant, in South Carolina; at the Hanford Reservation, in Washington; and at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, in Idaho. Defense TRU waste is also in interim storage at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in Tennessee; at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in New Mexico; and at the Nevada Test Site, in Nevada. (Figure E-2). This document describes a workable approach for the permanent disposal of high-level and transuranic waste from atomic energy defense activities. The plan does not address the disposal of suspect waste which has been conservatively considered to be high-level or transuranic waste but which can be shown to be low-level waste. This material will be processed and disposed of in accordance with low-level waste practices. The primary goal of this program is to utilize or dispose of high-level and transuranic waste routinely, safely, and effectively. This goal will include the disposal of the backlog of stored defense waste. A Reference Plan for each of the sites describes the sequence of steps leading to permanent disposal. No technological breakthroughs are required to implement the reference plan. Not all final decisions concerning the activities described in this document have been made. These decisions will depend on: completion of the National Environmental Policy Act process, authorization and appropriation of funds, agreements with states as appropriate, and in some cases, the results of pilot plant experiments and operational experience. The major elements of the reference plan for permanent disposal of defense high-level and transuranic waste are summarized

  18. Defensive Federal Litigation

    Science.gov (United States)

    1998-08-20

    requires that all affirmative defenses be pleaded in the answer. The rule lists 19 specific affirmative defenses, such as estoppel , laches, res judicata...Brown, 22 F.3d 516 (2d Cir. 1994); Poole v. Rourke, 779 F. Supp. 1546 (E.D. Cal. 1991). 3-40 potential collateral estoppel .4. effect of the district...the back pay claim, which was over $10,000, to the Court of Claims. The court of appeals found that ൸Collateral estoppel prohibits relitigation of

  19. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

  20. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden''s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives

  1. JAEA's efforts for regional transparency in the area of nuclear nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffheins, Barbara; Kawakubo, Yoko; Inoue, Naoko

    2014-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has undertaken a joint R and D project with the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) for the purposes of developing an Information Sharing Framework (ISF) for regional nonproliferation cooperation since July 2011. This project builds on nearly twenty years of technical cooperation between JAEA, its predecessor organizations and the DOE including the activities to define, develop and test transparency technologies and other multilateral efforts. The objective of current project is to design a viable information sharing process to support the goals of building confidence in the peaceful nature of regional nuclear programs. At the end of a two-year-effort, project partners, JAEA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), have defined the comprehensive requirements for an ISF that will ensure nonproliferation transparency success and sustainability. In October 2011, a parallel project with the similar title and objective was launched under the arrangement between the US DOE/NNSA and the Republic of Korea Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST). Since then, JAEA, SNL, the Korea Institute for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) and Korea Atomic Energy Institute (KAERI) have jointly carried out the project in a form of informal, multilateral cooperation. The project partners have identified needs and audience for ISF, and initiated the discussion to develop requirements for ISF through workshops, meetings, regular telephone conferences, etc. The activities include conducting a survey to identify stakeholders' needs and requirements for an ISF, launching a website to practice information sharing concepts, and presenting papers. This paper provides the historical context of the current project to establish ISF, and reports the progress to date and speculates on future directions. (author)

  2. IAEA Director General welcomes Cuba's intention to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed Cuba's announcement to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. He expressed the hope that Cuba will conclude soon a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required under Article III of the NPT. 'With Cuba's intention to become party to the NPT, we have come a step closer to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime,' Mr. ElBaradei said. Only three countries worldwide with significant nuclear activities now remain outside the NPT. With 188 countries party to the Treaty, the NPT is the most adhered to international agreement after the United Nations Charter and the most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty. The NPT makes it mandatory that all non-nuclear-weapon States conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. The Director General also welcomed Cuba's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which completes the process of having all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as members of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Mr. ElBaradei said that, 'the Tlatelolco Treaty provides a good model for other regional nuclear-weapon-free zones to follow'. He added that 'universal adherence of all countries in regions having nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements is important to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime'. (IAEA)

  3. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden``s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives. Refs.

  4. Role of non-governmental organizations in formation of non-proliferation culture in new independent countries (NIC)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevchik, M.

    2000-01-01

    Purpose of the report is demonstrate the non-governmental organizations (NGO) role in formation of non-proliferation culture in former Soviet Union. Activity of Center of Non-proliferation Problems Investigation (CNPI) of Monterey Institute of International Investigations and its collaboration with existing in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) non-governmental organizations is considered as example. Brief information about CNPI and reasons for it representatives opening of in Kazakhstan and in other CIS-countries, as well as cooperation of NGO in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine for creation on Central Asia zone free from nuclear weapon ia given. Some measures which could promote to formation of non-proliferation culture in region are suggested

  5. Defense styles of pedophilic offenders.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Drapeau, Martin; Beretta, Véronique; de Roten, Yves; Koerner, Annett; Despland, Jean-Nicolas

    2008-04-01

    This pilot study investigated the defense styles of pedophile sexual offenders. Interviews with 20 pedophiles and 20 controls were scored using the Defense Mechanisms Rating Scales. Results showed that pedophiles had a significantly lower overall defensive functioning score than the controls. Pedophiles used significantly fewer obsessional-level defenses but more major image-distorting and action-level defenses. Results also suggested differences in the prevalence of individual defenses where pedophiles used more dissociation, displacement, denial, autistic fantasy, splitting of object, projective identification, acting out, and passive aggressive behavior but less intellectualization and rationalization.

  6. Predicting linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Burr, T.L.

    1994-04-01

    This report is a primer on the analysis of both linear and nonlinear time series with applications in nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. We analyze eight simulated and two real time series using both linear and nonlinear modeling techniques. The theoretical treatment is brief but references to pertinent theory are provided. Forecasting is our main goal. However, because our most common approach is to fit models to the data, we also emphasize checking model adequacy by analyzing forecast errors for serial correlation or nonconstant variance

  7. Statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-08-01

    The document reproduces the following statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, statements on behalf of the depository Governments and statements on behalf of other Governments (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Western Samoa and Nordic Countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)

  8. Putting teeth in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 25 March 2006, Karlsruhe, Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2006-01-01

    The factors, contributing to the world's changes in respect to peace, security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are presented in the document. Five necessary and urgent measures are proposed in order to meet the current challenges: 1)tighten control for assess to nuclear fuel cycle technology; 2)accelerate global efforts tp protect nuclear material; 3)support effective nuclear verification; 4) reinvigorate disarmament efforts; 5) increase the effectiveness of the UN Security Council. The importance and necessity to place nuclear operations under multinational control is outlined

  9. Non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    In the face of improved international relations, regional and subregional issues have acquired additional urgency and importance in the field of disarmament and international security. The pursuit of regional solutions to regional problems is thus being actively encouraged by the international community. Towards this end, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is seeking to promote regional approaches to disarmament either through the united nations regional centres for peace and Disarmament or cooperation with individual Governments. Within this framework this conference was dealing with non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific region

  10. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh [Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2014-10-15

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  11. Miscalculated Ambiguity: The Effects of US Nuclear Declaratory Policy on Deterrence and Nonproliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-06-01

    Use. (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995) 7. 5 Sagan , Scott. "The Case for No First Use." Survival 51, no. 3 (2009): 163-182. 6 The Stanley Foundation...America’s Nuclear Posture. (Cambridge, MA: Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program, 2010) 1. 60 Sagan , Scott. "The Case for No First...Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace. S.l.: s.n., 1971. Nonproliferation--60 Years Later. DVD. Directed by Carla Robbins. Washington D.C

  12. Nuclear Non-proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 - No 8 of 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Act aims at giving domestic legislative effect to Australia's international non-proliferation obligations and establishes controls over the possession and transport of nuclear materials and equipment by a system of permits. These obligations arise inter alia under the NPT Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Act provides that its provisions shall apply to nuclear material (as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute) and associated items which include associated material, equipment or technology. These are clearly defined in the Act. (NEA) [fr

  13. Definition of Nuclear Material in Aspects of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jeon, Ji Hye; Lee, Chan Suh

    2014-01-01

    Nuclear safety accidents directly affect human health but nuclear security incidents indirectly influence human, which demonstrates the reason why security receives less attention. However, it is acknowledged that nuclear terrorism is indeed one of the most dreadful threat humanity faces. As part of strengthening nuclear security as well as nonproliferation to response to the threat, we need a better understanding of the nuclear material which needs to be safe under the objective of nuclear security. In reality, practitioners implement safeguards and physical protection in compliance with the regulation text in domestic legislation. Thus, it is important to specify nuclear material clearly in law for effective implementation. Therefore, the definition of terminology related to nuclear material is explored herein, within the highest-level legislation on the safeguards and physical protection. First the definition in Korean legislation is analyzed. Then, so as to suggest some improvements, other international efforts are examined and some case studies are conducted on other states which have similar level of nuclear technology and industry to Korea. Finally, a draft of definition on nuclear material in perspective of nuclear nonproliferation and security is suggested based on the analysis below. The recommendation showed the draft nuclear material definition in nuclear control. The text will facilitate the understanding of nuclear material in the context of nuclear nonproliferation and security. It might provide appropriate provision for future legislation related to nuclear nonproliferation and security. For effective safeguards and physical protection measures, nuclear material should be presented with in a consistent manner as shown in the case of United Kingdom. It will be much more helpful if further material engineering studies on each nuclear material are produced. Multi-dimensional approach is required for the studies on the degree of efforts to divert

  14. Selected Examples of LDRD Projects Supporting Test Ban Treaty Verification and Nonproliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jackson, K. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Al-Ayat, R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Walter, W. R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2015-02-23

    The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program at the DOE National Laboratories was established to ensure the scientific and technical vitality of these institutions and to enhance the their ability to respond to evolving missions and anticipate national needs. LDRD allows the Laboratory directors to invest a percentage of their total annual budget in cutting-edge research and development projects within their mission areas. We highlight a selected set of LDRD-funded projects, in chronological order, that have helped provide capabilities, people and infrastructure that contributed greatly to our ability to respond to technical challenges in support of test ban treaty verification and nonproliferation.

  15. Post-Cold War Effects on the Non-proliferation Regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kessler, Carol E.

    2006-03-31

    This journal article analyzes nuclear and security related events of the past 15 years to illustrate the changes in geopolitics and the shifting balance of power following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reflection upon these events establishes the context for strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The author concludes that post Soviet communism hastened the movement towards a unipolar system with hegemonic power vested in the United States, and this geopolitical imbalance fostered insecurities and greater threats. Multilateral cooperation and commitment from the US would help this leader achieve its goal of security through increased global confidence in the international system.

  16. The non-proliferation policies of non-nuclear-weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marwah, Onkar

    1987-01-01

    Eight countries are considered to be capable of producing nuclear weapons and highly suspect in their intentions to actually produce them. These are Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The policies of these suspect Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) are considered in this paper. The first part assesses the non-proliferation (or proliferation) policies of the eight suspect NNWS, the second part evaluates their differences in approach from the policies urged upon them by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and the third and final part attempts to understand the future evolution of NNWS policies in the nuclear military field. (U.K.)

  17. Nuclear weapon-free zone, non-proliferation treaty and South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jayaramu, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    Emergence of and the motivations behind the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, the conceptual linkage between the nuclear weapon free zone and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the problems involved in the implementation of nuclear weapon free zone proposals put forward from time to time are discussed. Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, motivations behind the proposal, and India's response to it are examined. It is pointed out that both the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone indirectly grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the use of nuclear weapons. (M.G.B.)

  18. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Fiscal Year 1982 Research & Development Program. Summary Statement by Dr. Robert R. Fossum, Director Before the Research & Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee

    Science.gov (United States)

    1981-03-12

    progressive burning rocket motors , and advanced warheads in a low-cost, high-performance, day/night, fire-and-forget missile that would be a...for advanced homopolar generators (energy storage systems) were completed in FY 1979; detailed engineering drawings of the generators were completed

  19. Strategic Framework for the Defense Acquisition System Understanding Defense Consolidation

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Potts, Anthony W

    2007-01-01

    The 1993 policy to promote the consolidation of the United States defense industry began a series of acquisitions and mergers that went beyond the intent of the policy and left the Department of Defense (DoD...

  20. Strategic Framework for the Defense Acquisition System Understanding Defense Consolidation

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Potts, Anthony W

    2007-01-01

    ...% of defense product sales annually. Defense consolidation has diminished the flexibility required for surge capacity, diminished competitive innovations in products, and reduced competitive pricing based on multiple sources for products...

  1. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations. While any final assessment of such measures and alternatives would have to examine the circumstances particular to each nation, it is hoped that the more generic assessments conducted here will be useful in suggesting guidelines for developing an improved nonproliferation regime which also helps to meet nuclear-energy needs. One chapter outlines the existing nonproliferation regime, including the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, bilateral and multilateral requirements for agreements of cooperation and transfers of technology, and existing provisons for sanctions for violation of nonproliferation commitments. The chapter then proceeds to an assessment of various alternatives for providing assurance of fuel supply in light of this current regime. Another chapter examines a set of technical and institutional measures and alternatives for various components of once-through and closed fuel cycles. The components of the once-through fuel cycle assessed are enrichment services and spent-fuel management; the components of closed fuel cycles assessed are reprocessing and plutonium management and fast-breeder reactor (FBR) deployment

  2. For the Common Defense of Cyberspace: Implications of a US Cyber Militia on Department of Defense Cyber Operations

    Science.gov (United States)

    2015-06-12

    the Common Defense of Cyberspace: Implications of a US Cyber Militia on Department of Defense Cyber Operations 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT ...20130423/ NEWS/304230016/Navy-wants-1-000-more-cyber-warriors. 33 Edward Cardon , “Army Cyber Capabilities” (Lecture, Advanced Operations Course...Finally, once a cyber security professional is trained, many argue, to include the head of Army’s Cyber Command, Lieutenant General Edward Cardon

  3. Nonproliferation and arms control assessment of weapons-usable fissile material storage and excess plutonium disposition alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    This report has been prepared by the Department of Energy's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation (DOE-NN) with support from the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (DOE-MD). Its purpose is to analyze the nonproliferation and arms reduction implications of the alternatives for storage of plutonium and HEU, and disposition of excess plutonium, to aid policymakers and the public in making final decisions. While this assessment describes the benefits and risks associated with each option, it does not attempt to rank order the options or choose which ones are best. It does, however, identify steps which could maximize the benefits and mitigate any vulnerabilities of the various alternatives under consideration

  4. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-06-01

    The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations.

  5. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume VII. International perspectives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    The purpose of this volume is to assess the proliferation vulnerabilities of the present deployment of civilian nuclear-power systems within the current nonproliferation regime and, in light of their prospective deployment, to consider technical and institutional measures and alternatives which may contribute to an improved regime in which nuclear power could play a significant part. An assessment of these measures must include consideration of their nonproliferation effectiveness as well as their bearing upon energy security, and their operational, economic, and political implications. The nature of these considerations can provide some measure of their likely acceptability to various nations

  6. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; La conference d'examen 2000 du TNP et l'avenir du regime de non-proliferation nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grand, C. [Institut d' Etudes Politiques de Paris, 75 (France); Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr-Coetquidan (France)

    2001-07-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  7. Defensive Passivity in Adolescence

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rosenheim, Eliyahu; Gaoni, Bracha

    1977-01-01

    There are potentially healthy adolescents who display excessive reluctance to move toward independent decision and action. This research presents a clinical description of this "syndrome", conceptualizes it as a defensive maneuver against mourning over cherished childhood dreams and offers steps for therapeutic intervention. (Editor/RK)

  8. Defense radioactive waste management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hindman, T.B. Jr.

    1988-01-01

    The Office of Defense Programs (DP), U.S. Department of Energy, is responsible for the production of nuclear weapons and materials for national defense. Pursuant to this mission, DP operates a large industrial complex that employs over 60,000 people at various installations across the country. As a byproduct of their activities, these installations generate radioactive, hazardous, or mixed wastes that must be managed in a safe and cost-effective manner in compliance with all applicable Federal and STate environmental requirements. At the Federal level such requirements derive primarily from the Atomic Energy Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). Responsibility for DP activities in connection with the disposal of defense wastes is consolidated within the Office of Defense Waste and Transportation Management (DWTM). This paper discusses these activities which consist of five principal elements: the environmental restoration of inactive DP facilities and sites, the processing storage and disposal of wastes associated with ongoing operations at active DP facilities, research and development directed toward the long-term disposal of radioactive, hazardous, mixed wastes, technology development directly supporting regulatory compliance, and the development of policies, procedures, and technologies for assuring the safe transportation of radioactive and hazardous materials

  9. Auxins in defense strategies

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Čarná, Mária; Repka, V.; Skůpa, Petr; Šturdík, E.

    2014-01-01

    Roč. 69, č. 10 (2014), s. 1255-1263 ISSN 0006-3088 R&D Projects: GA TA ČR TA01011802 Institutional support: RVO:61389030 Keywords : auxin * defense responses * JA Subject RIV: GF - Plant Pathology, Vermin, Weed, Plant Protection Impact factor: 0.827, year: 2014

  10. Hanford defense waste studies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Napier, B.A.; Zimmerman, M.G.; Soldat, J.K.

    1981-01-01

    PNL is assisting Rockwell Hanford Operations to prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement for the management of Hanford defense nuclear waste. The Ecological Sciences Department is leading the task of calculation of public radiation doses from a large matrix of potential routine and accidental releases of radionuclides to the environment

  11. Rethinking Defensive Information Warfare

    Science.gov (United States)

    2004-06-01

    Countless studies, however, have demonstrated the weakness in this system.15 The tension between easily remembered passwords and suffi...vulnerabilities Undiscovered flaws The patch model for Internet security has failed spectacularly. Caida , 2004 Signature-Based Defense Anti virus, intrusion

  12. Defense Logistics Agency Revenue Eliminations

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    1996-01-01

    The issue of revenue eliminations was identified during our work on the Defense Logistics Agency portion of the Audit of Revenue Accounts in the FY 1996 Financial Statements of the Defense Business Operations Fund...

  13. Preemptive strikes: Fear, hope, and defensive aggression.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Halevy, Nir

    2017-02-01

    Preemptive strikes are costly and harmful. Existing models of defensive aggression focus narrowly on the role fear plays in motivating preemptive strikes. Theoretically integrating the literatures on conflict, decision making, and emotion, the current research investigated how specific emotions associated with certainty or uncertainty, including fear, anger, disgust, hope, and happiness, influence preemptive strikes. Study 1 demonstrated that hope negatively predicts defensive exits from relationships in choice dilemmas. Studies 2 and 3 experimentally manipulated risk of being attacked in an incentivized, interactive decision making task-the Preemptive Strike Game. Risk of being attacked fueled preemptive strikes; reduced feelings of hope partially mediated this effect in Study 3. Studies 4 and 5 investigated preemptive strikes under uncertainty (rather than risk). In Study 4, reasoning about the factors that make one trustful of others curbed preemptive strikes; cogitating about the factors that underlie discrete emotions, however, did not influence defensive aggression. Study 5 demonstrated that the valence and uncertainty appraisals of incidental emotions interact in shaping preemptive strikes. Specifically, recalling an autobiographical emotional experience that produced hope significantly decreased attack rates relative to fear, happiness, and a control condition. Fear, anger, disgust, and happiness were either unrelated to preemptive strikes or showed inconsistent relationships with preemptive strikes across the 5 studies. These findings shed light on how emotions shape defensive aggression, advance knowledge on strategic choice under risk and uncertainty, and demonstrate hope's positive effects on social interactions and relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).

  14. JAEA's actions and contributions to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Michiji, Toshiro

    2012-06-01

    Japan, a non-nuclear weapons state, has established a commercial nuclear fuel cycle including LWRs, and now is developing a fast neutron reactor fuel cycle as part of the next generation nuclear energy system, with commercial operation targeted for 2050. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is the independent administrative agency for conducting comprehensive nuclear R&D in Japan after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA and its predecessors have extensive experience in R&D, facility operations, and safeguards development and implementation for new types of nuclear facilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the operator of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities and numerous nuclear materials, JAEA makes international contributions to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. This paper provides an overview of JAEA's development of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards technologies, including remote monitoring of nuclear facilities, environmental sample analysis methods and new efforts since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

  15. Nuclear disarmament and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

    1999-01-01

    The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference reaffirmed 'the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control' and endorsed 'universal application of safeguards once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved'. Hence strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and incremental broadening of its coverage towards the universal application of international safeguards in all States is a high priority albeit for the medium to long term. A tentative attempt is made in this paper to anticipate how the elements of verification under the NPT, FMCT and other conventions and arrangements related to nuclear non-proliferation will evolve against the background of the disarmament process, with the goal of achieving at some future stage an ultimate convergence of verification regimes under a complete nuclear disarmament. We think, however, that most of the new initiatives in the area of disarmament/non-proliferation should be realised during the current disarmament phase. We do not wish our model to be perceived as a rigid time-bound scheme. New initiatives should be implemented in parallel and as soon as practicable. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and should not be taken to represent Australian Government policy. (author)

  16. Abstracts of reports of the International conference on non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

    1997-01-01

    On August 21, 1947, the USSR Council of Ministers made a decision on creating Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (STS). The first Nuclear Test on the Test Site was conducted on August 29, 1949, the last one was made on October 19, 1989. In all during 40 years on Semipalatinsk Test Site 116 ground and air and 340 underground nuclear tests were conducted. They brought much damage to health and lives of thousands of people who involuntarily participated in those events. On August 29, 1991, by Kazakstan President's decree STS was closed but the problems of people's rehabilitation, natural landscapes recovering, test-site infrastructure conversion remained. These problems are being solved under direct state programs, intergovernmental agreements of Kazakstan with Russia and the USA, cooperation with different international and foreign organizations, enterprises, scientific-research centers. Kazakstan subsequently constantly pursues the policy of nonproliferation, takes measures on ellimination of nuclear tests consequences and relative infrastructure. The Republic is not involved into military nuclear programs. From its territory all the nuclear weapon was taken away. Kazakstan joined the Agreement on Non-proliferation, signed the Agreement on Safeguards to all Nuclear activity on Kazakh territory with the IAEA

  17. Evaluation of the Administration's proposed nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Dwindling supplies of fossil fuels are causing countries to turn increasingly to nuclear power as a major source of energy. Although nuclear power holds out the promise of energy independence, it has a formidable drawback--it can also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In April, the President announced a new policy designed to curb nuclear proliferation and the executive branch proposed legislation entitled 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977.' The strategy outlined in these documents calls for stricter export controls and safeguards as well as actions affecting uranium enrichment services, reprocessing, storing of spent fuel, and disposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. GAO analyzed this non-proliferation strategy as it relates to: Improving nuclear export controls; Strengthening international nuclear safeguards; Maintaining U.S. reliability as a supplier of uranium enrichment services; Deferring U.S. reprocessing of spent fuel as an example for others; Reducing risk of proliferation by controlling spent reactor fuel. In general, GAO concluded that the administration's strategy is constructive but noted some weaknesses which should be addressed. Some of the problems noted in this report may already have been addressed by congressional committees in their markup of the legislation

  18. Cavity pressure/residual stress measurements from the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heinle, R.A.; Hudson, B.C. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Hatch, M.A. Jr.

    1994-12-31

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments on the Non-Proliferation Experiment to determine post-detonation gas pressure inside the explosive cavity and the residual rock stress in the region immediately outside the cavity. Before detonation there was significant concern that steam and detonation products would create very high temperatures and pressure in the blast cavity that would exist for weeks and months after firing. This could constitute a safety hazard to personnel re-entering the tunnel. Consequently the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was asked to field its Cavity Pressure/Residual stress monitor system on the Non-Proliferation Experiment. We obtained experimental data for the first 600 ms after the explosion and again several weeks after detonation upon tunnel re-entry. We recorded early-time cavity pressure of about 8.3 MPa. In addition we believe that the ends of our sensor hoses were subjected to an ambient driving pressure of about 0.5 MPa (absolute) that persisted until at least three weeks after zero time.

  19. 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    On 19 July 1995, the Director General received a letter, addressed to him by the Alternate Resident Representative of Canada to the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

  20. U.S. nonproliferation policy in the decade of the eighties: Past dilemmas and prospects for the future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, H.R. Jr.

    1986-01-01

    No single event had more effect on the policies concerning nuclear importation and exportation activities than the 1974 detonation of a nuclear explosive device in India. This led eventually to the enactment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) in 1978. The author describes the difficult negotiations of the U.S. administration with Euratom, Japan, China, and Latin America. (CW) [de

  1. Defense Primer: Procurement

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-02-10

    Usually, incremental funding is used to mitigate peaks and valleys in annual budgets caused by the cost of one item significantly changing the...base defense budget . DOD uses these funds to buy several different types of materiel, including  new items easily recognizable as military...pursues a policy of full funding for procurement, meaning that the total estimated cost of each unit must be funded in the year it is budgeted . In a

  2. Quadrennial Defense Review Report

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-02-01

    medicine , and computer network operations. While we continue to employ a mix of programs and incentives to recruit quality personnel, we are also...Lithuania* Singapore Australia Finland Luxembourg* Slovakia* Austria France* Macedonia Slovenia* Azerbaijan Georgia Montenegro Spain* Belgium...20,000 positions by 2015. We will continue to significantly enhance Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates meets with plant workers during a tour of an

  3. Whither Ballistic Missile Defense?

    Science.gov (United States)

    1992-11-30

    important that technology today is placing enormous power in the many camps-not only information that enables timely decision-making, but also the...WHITHER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE? BY AMBASSADOR HENRY F. COOPER NOVEMBER 30,1992 TECHNICAL MARKETING SOCIETY OF AMERICA WASHINGTON, DC...Conference on Technical Marketing 2000: Opportunities and Strategies for a Changing World) I intend to discuss the prospects for SDI in a changing

  4. Plant defense against insect herbivores

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Fürstenberg-Hägg, Joel; Zagrobelny, Mika; Bak, Søren

    2013-01-01

    , defense compounds. These bioactive specialized plant defense compounds may repel or intoxicate insects, while defense proteins often interfere with their digestion. Volatiles are released upon herbivory to repel herbivores, attract predators or for communication between leaves or plants, and to induce......Plants have been interacting with insects for several hundred million years, leading to complex defense approaches against various insect feeding strategies. Some defenses are constitutive while others are induced, although the insecticidal defense compound or protein classes are often similar...... defense responses. Plants also apply morphological features like waxes, trichomes and latices to make the feeding more difficult for the insects. Extrafloral nectar, food bodies and nesting or refuge sites are produced to accommodate and feed the predators of the herbivores. Meanwhile, herbivorous insects...

  5. Advanced Safeguards Technology Road-map for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.C.; Tobin, S.; Smith, L.E.; Ehinger, M.; Dougan, A.; Cipiti, B.; Bakel, A.; Bean, R.

    2008-01-01

    Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including advanced safeguards, is a cornerstone of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To meet these challenges, the Safeguards Campaign was formed, whose mission is to provide research and technology development for the foundation of next generation safeguards systems for implementation in U.S. GNEP facilities. The Safeguards Campaign works closely with the Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security department (NA-24) of NNSA (National Nuclear Safety Administration) to ensure that technology developed for domestic safeguards applications are optimum with respect to international safeguards use. A major milestone of the program this year has been the development of the advanced safeguards technology road-map. This paper will broadly describe the road-map, which provides a path to next generation safeguards systems including advanced instrumentation; process monitoring; data integration, protection, and analysis; and system level evaluation and knowledge extraction for real time applications. (authors)

  6. Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to Prepare the Next Generation of Experts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens, W.A.M.; Peerani, P.; ); Gariazzo, C.; Ward, S.; Crete, J.-M.; Braunegger-Guelich, A.

    2015-01-01

    Although nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are a continuous concern of the international community and discussed frequently at international fora and conferences, the academic world is not really on board with these topics. What we mean by this is that nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is only very seldom part of a university curriculum. In the few cases where it does appear in the curriculum, whether in a nuclear engineering course or a political sciences master programme, it is typically covered only partially. Nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are multidisciplinary and embrace, inter alia, historical, legal, technical, and political aspects. This is perhaps the reason why it is challenging for a single professor or university to develop and implement a comprehensive academic course or programme in this area. Professional organizations in this field, like the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), have made first steps to address this issue by implementing specific educational activities. However, much more needs to be done. Therefore, ESARDA, INMM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are in the process of joining efforts to identify key elements and priorities to support universities in establishing appropriate and effective academic programmes in this area. This paper will share best practices, achievements and lessons learned by ESARDA, INMM and the IAEA in providing education and training to develop and maintain the expertise of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards professionals. In addition, it will suggest potential ways on how to assist universities to get prepared for building-up the next generation of experts able to meet any future challenges in the area of non-proliferation and safeguards. (author)

  7. Nonproliferation impacts assessment for the management of the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-12-01

    On May 13, 1996, the US established a new, 10-year policy to accept and manage foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the US. The goal of this policy is to reduce civilian commerce in weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU), thereby reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Two key disposition options under consideration for managing this fuel include conventional reprocessing and new treatment and packaging technologies. The Record of Decision specified that, while evaluating the reprocessing option, ''DOE will commission or conduct an independent study of the nonproliferation and other (e.g., cost and timing) implications of chemical separation of spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors.'' DOE's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation conducted this study consistent with the aforementioned Record of Decision. This report addresses the nonproliferation implications of the technologies under consideration for managing aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site. Because the same technology options are being considered for the foreign research reactor and the other aluminum-based spent nuclear fuels discussed in Section ES.1, this report addresses the nonproliferation implications of managing all the Savannah River Site aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel, not just the foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. The combination of the environmental impact information contained in the draft EIS, public comment in response to the draft EIS, and the nonproliferation information contained in this report will enable the Department to make a sound decision regarding how to manage all aluminum-based spent nuclear fuel at the Savannah River Site

  8. Nonproliferation Sanctions

    Science.gov (United States)

    2001-01-01

    ILSA). On May 18, 1998, the Administration announced that in- vestment by French, Malaysian , and Russian firms in Iran’s oil and gas industry...for the participation in royalties , earnings, or profits in that development, without regard to the form of the participation. The term "investment

  9. A Non-Proliferating Fuel Cycle: No Enrichment, Reprocessing or Accessible Spent Fuel - 12375

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, Frank L. [Vanderbilt University (United States)

    2012-07-01

    Current fuel cycles offer a number of opportunities for access to plutonium, opportunities to create highly enriched uranium and access highly radioactive wastes to create nuclear weapons and 'dirty' bombs. The non-proliferating fuel cycle however eliminates or reduces such opportunities and access by eliminating the mining, milling and enrichment of uranium. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces the production of plutonium per unit of energy created, eliminates reprocessing and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel and the creation of a stream of high-level waste. It further simplifies the search for land based deep geologic repositories and interim storage sites for spent fuel in the USA by disposing of the spent fuel in deep sub-seabed sediments after storing the spent fuel at U.S. Navy Nuclear Shipyards that have the space and all of the necessary equipment and security already in place. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces transportation risks by utilizing barges for the collection of spent fuel and transport to the Navy shipyards and specially designed ships to take the spent fuel to designated disposal sites at sea and to dispose of them there in deep sub-seabed sediments. Disposal in the sub-seabed sediments practically eliminates human intrusion. Potential disposal sites include Great Meteor East and Southern Nares Abyssal Plain. Such sites then could easily become international disposal sites since they occur in the open ocean. It also reduces the level of human exposure in case of failure because of the large physical and chemical dilution and the elimination of a major pathway to man-seawater is not potable. Of course, the recovery of uranium from sea water and the disposal of spent fuel in sub-seabed sediments must be proven on an industrial scale. All other technologies are already operating on an industrial scale. If externalities, such as reduced terrorist threats, environmental damage (including embedded

  10. Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle; Nukleare Abruestung. Optionen fuer den kommenden Ueberpruefungszyklus des NVV

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mueller, Harald

    2011-07-01

    The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

  11. 77 FR 43413 - Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures on Five Syrian Entities

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-07-24

    ... Program Management, Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury (202-622-2500). On U.S... imposition of measures pursuant to sections 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d) of Executive Order 12938: Business Lab...) transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles and defense services from foreign destinations to the above-named...

  12. DEFENSE PROGRAMS RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Constantin PREDA

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available For the past years defense programs have faced delays in delivering defense capabilities and budget overruns. Stakeholders are looking for ways to improve program management and the decision making process given the very fluid and uncertain economic and political environment. Consequently, they have increasingly resorted to risk management as the main management tool for achieving defense programs objectives and for delivering the defense capabilities strongly needed for the soldiers on the ground on time and within limited defense budgets. Following a risk management based decision-making approach the stakeholders are expected not only to protect program objectives against a wide range of risks but, at the same time, to take advantage of the opportunities to increase the likelihood of program success. The prerequisite for making risk management the main tool for achieving defense programs objectives is the design and implementation of a strong risk management framework as a foundation providing an efficient and effective application of the best risk management practices. The aim of this paper is to examine the risk management framework for defense programs based on the ISO 31000:2009 standard, best risk management practices and the defense programs’ needs and particularities. For the purposes of this article, the term of defense programs refers to joint defense programs.

  13. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

  14. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association Addresses Safeguards and Nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens-Maenhout, Greet; Kusumi, R.; Daures, Pascal A.; Janssens, Willem; Dickman, Deborah A.

    2010-01-01

    The renaissance of efforts to expand the use of nuclear energy requires the parallel development of a renewed and more sophisticated work force. Growth in the nuclear sector with high standard of safety, safeguards and security requires skilled staff for design, operations, inspections etc. High-quality nuclear technology educational programs are diminished from past years, and the ability of universities to attract students and to meet future staffing requirements of the nuclear industry is becoming seriously compromised. Thus, education and training in nuclear engineering and sciences is one of the cornerstones for the nuclear sector. Teaching in the nuclear field still seems strongly influenced by national history but it is time to strengthen resources and collaborate. Moreover with the current nuclear security threats it becomes critical that nuclear technology experts master the basic principles not only of safety, but also of nuclear safeguards, nonproliferation and nuclear security. In Europe the European Nuclear Education Network (ENEN) Association has established the certificate 'European Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering (EMSNE)' as the classic nuclear engineering program covering reactor operation and nuclear safety. However, it does not include courses on nonproliferation, safeguards, or dual-use technologies. The lack of education in nuclear safeguards was tackled by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), through development and implementation of safeguards course modules. Since 2005 the ESARDA Working Group, called the Training and Knowledge Management Working Group, (TKMWG) has worked with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Ispra, Italy to organize a Nuclear Safeguards and Nonproliferation course. This five-day course is held each spring at the JRC, and continues to show increasing interest as evidenced by the positive responses of international lecturers and students. The standard set of lectures covers a broad

  15. Towards the fourth review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1990

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    This publication focuses on the background of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), its main provisions and some of the major issues discussed at the three conferences that have thus far been held to review the operation of the Treaty. A fourth conference to review the operation of the Treaty will be held at Geneva from 20 August to 14 September 1990. It will be the last regular review conference before the convening, in 1995, of a conference which will ''decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'' (article X, para.2). A Preparatory Committee (open to all parties) for the Fourth Review Conference has been established by the parties to the NPT, and 95 parties attended the first session, held in New York from 1 to 5 May 1989

  16. SIGMA: the novel approach of a new non-proliferating uranium enrichment technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rivarola, M.; Florido, P.; Brasnarof, D.; Bergallo, E.

    2000-01-01

    The SIGMA concept, under development by Argentina, represents the evolution of the Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion technology, updated to face the challenge of the new economic-based and competitive world frame. The Enrichment technology has been historically considered as a highly proliferating activity in the nuclear field, and central countries limited the access of the developing countries to this technology. The SIGMA concept incorporates innovative proliferation resistant criteria at the beginning of the design process, and inherits all the non-proliferation features of the gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs). The radical new proliferation resistance approach of the SIGMA technology suggests a new kind of global control of the uranium enrichment market, where some developing countries might access an Enrichment plant without access to the technology itself. In this paper, we investigate the economy of the SIGMA plants, and the implications of this technology on the Uranium Global Market. (authors)

  17. Environmental measurements and technology for non-proliferation objectives. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broadway, J.A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to identify multi-disciplinary and single focus laboratories from the environmental and public health communities that can serve as technical center of opportunity for nuclear, inorganic and organic analyses. The objectives of the Office of Research and Development effort are twofold: (1) to identify the technology shortcomings and technologies gaps (thus requirements) within these communities that could benefit from state-of-the-art infield analysis technologies currently under development and (2) to promote scientist-to-scientist dialog and technical exchange under such existing US government internship programs (eg SABIT/USDOC) to improve skills and work relationships. Although the data analysis will focus on environmentally sensitive signatures and materials, the office of Research and Development wishes to further its nuclear non-proliferation objectives by assessing the current technical skill and ingenious analytical tools in less-developed countries so as to broaden the base of capability for multi-species measurement technology development

  18. Fuel cycle of nuclear power plants and safeguards system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Malek, Z.

    1980-10-01

    The international safeguard system of nuclear weapon nonproliferation and the IAEA safeguard system are briefly described. In Czechoslovakia, a decree was issued in 1977 governing the accounting for and control of nuclear materials. The contents of the decree are presented. Described are computer processing of accounting data, technical criteria for the safeguard system application, containment and inspection in the IAEA safeguard system. The method is shown of the control of and accounting for nuclear materials in nuclear power plants and in fuel manufacturing, reprocessing and enrichment plants. Nondestructive and destructive methods of nuclear materials analysis are discussed. Nondestructive methods used include gamma spectrometry, neutron techniques, X-ray fluores--cence techniques. (J.P.)

  19. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime: An international priority. Tokyo, 10 December 2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons has witnessed steady progress and a number of important milestones. Progress, however, is still required on this and many other fronts, including: the need to work energetically to ensure the universal adherence to safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements; the need for reducing existing nuclear weapon arsenals and adopting concrete steps that move us further towards nuclear disarmament; the need to draw in those States that remain outside the NPT regime; and the need to develop alternative approaches to regional and international security that are functional and inclusive, and that do not incorporate nuclear deterrence as a feature

  20. National Nuclear Security Administration Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program Annual Report in Brief: October 2007 - May 2008

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Berkman, Clarissa O.; Fankhauser, Jana G.; Sandusky, Jessica A.

    2009-05-01

    This abbreviated Annual Report covers program activities of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nonproliferation Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP) from October 2007 through May 2008--the timeframe between the last Annual Report (which covered activities through September 2007) and the next report (which will begin with June 2008 activities). In that timeframe, the NGFP continued building a solid foundation as the program began reaping the benefits of recently implemented changes. This report is organized by Fellowship class and the pertinent program activities for each, including: October 2007 Recruiting events and final applications (Class of 2008) Winter 2007 Selection and hiring (Class of 2008) Spring 2008 Career development roundtables (Class of 2007) Orientation planning (Class of 2008) Recruitment planning and university outreach (Class of 2009) May 2008 Closing ceremony (Class of 2007)

  1. Stabilization and immobilization of military plutonium: A non-proliferation perspective

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Leventhal, P. [Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Nuclear Control Institute welcomes this DOE-sponsored technical workshop on stabilization and immobilization of weapons plutonium (W Pu) because of the significant contribution it can make toward the ultimate non-proliferation objective of eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), from world commerce. The risk of theft or diversion of these materials warrants concern, as only a few kilograms in the hands of terrorists or threshold states would give them the capability to build nuclear weapons. Military plutonium disposition questions cannot be addressed in isolation from civilian plutonium issues. The National Academy of Sciences has urged that {open_quotes}further steps should be taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the world`s plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated...{close_quotes}. This report discusses vitrification and a mixed oxide fuels option, and the effects of disposition choices on civilian plutonium fuel cycles.

  2. Non-proliferation, safeguards, and security for the fissile materials disposition program immobilization alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Tolk, K.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Moore, L.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Department of Energy is analyzing long-term storage and disposition alternatives for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered. These include facilities for storage, conversion and stabilization of fissile materials, immobilization in glass or ceramic material, fabrication of fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use of reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and disposal of fissile material using geologic alternatives. This paper will focus on how the objectives of reducing security and proliferation risks are being considered, and the possible facility impacts. Some of the areas discussed in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threats, and (4) potential proliferation, safeguards, and security issues and impacts on the facilities. Issues applicable to all of the possible disposition alternatives will be discussed in this paper. However, particular attention is given to the plutonium immobilization alternatives.

  3. Present status of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Netchaev, B.

    1976-01-01

    The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons plays an important role in enhancing the security of all States. It is essential to maintain in the implementation of the Treaty an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of all the countries Party to the Treaty wether or not nuclear weapon States. These questions were discussed during the Conference on the operation of the Treaty held in Geneva in May 1975. It was emphasized at the Conference that the first five years of application of the Treaty had shown a consistent increase in the number of ratifications and in the safeguards agreements concluded on the basis of the Agreement. (N.E.A.) [fr

  4. Anti-neutrino flux in a research reactor for non-proliferation application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Khakshournia, Samad; Foroughi, Shokoufeh [Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI), Tehran (Iran, Islamic Republic of). Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

    2017-11-15

    Owing to growing interest in the study of emitted antineutrinos from nuclear reactors to test the Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, antineutrino flux was studied in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) using ORIGEN code. According to our prediction, antineutrino rate was obtained 2.6 x 10{sup 17} (v{sub e}/sec) in the core No. 57F of the TRR. Calculations indicated that evolution of antineutrino flux was very slow with time and the performed refueling had not an observable effect on antineutrino flux curve for a 5 MW reactor with the conventional refueling program. It is seen that for non-proliferation applications the measurement of the contribution of {sup 239}Pu to the fission using an antineutrino detector is not viable in the TRR.

  5. Airborne Multisensor Pod System, Arms control and nonproliferation technologies: Second quarter 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alonzo, G M; Sanford, N M [eds.

    1995-01-01

    This issue focuses on the Airborne Multisensor Pod System (AMPS) which is a collaboration of many of the DOE national laboratories to provide a scientific environment to research multiple sensors and the new information that can be derived from them. The bulk of the research has been directed at nonproliferation applications, but it has also proven useful in environmental monitoring and assessment, and land/water management. The contents of this issue are: using AMPS technology to detect proliferation and monitor resources; combining multisensor data to monitor facilities and natural resources; planning a AMPS mission; SAR pod produces images day or night, rain or shine; MSI pod combines data from multiple sensors; ESI pod will analyze emissions and effluents; and accessing AMPS information on the Internet.

  6. The Asia-Pacific region: non-proliferation and other disarmament issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    In the past few years, the United States and the former Soviet Union began to adjust their force structures in Asia-Pacific region. In this respect, a large range of issues have been raised in discussions on the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Apart from the issues and trends related to proliferation, military expenditure, arms transfer and other disarmament matters, the specific situations in the respective subregions of South-East Asia, South Asia and North-East Asia were discussed. Comprehensive and verified commitments not to possess any such weapons is stressed as the main goal of the meeting. It is vitally important that opportunities that were opened should be seized to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological as well as highly destabilizing conventional weapons

  7. SIGMA, the novel approach of a new non-proliferating uranium enrichment technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rivarola, M.; Florido, P.; Brasnarof, D.; Bergallo, J.

    2001-01-01

    The SIGMA concept, under development by Argentina, represents the evolution of the Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion technology, updated to face the challenge of the new economic-based and competitive world frame. The Enrichment technology has been historically considered as a highly proliferating activity in the nuclear field, and central countries have limited the access of the developing countries to this technology. The SIGMA concept incorporates innovative proliferation resistant criteria at the beginning of the design process, and inherits all the non-proliferation features of the Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs). The radical new proliferation resistant approach of the SIGMA technology, suggest a new kind of global control of the Uranium Enrichment Market, were some developing countries might access to an Enrichment plant without accessing to the technology itself. In this paper, we analyse the economy of the SIGMA plants, and the implications of this technology on the Uranium Global Market. (authors)

  8. 78 FR 48151 - Defense Health Board; Notice of Federal Advisory Committee Meeting

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-08-07

    ... implications of trends in overweight and obesity in America for the DoD and the report on the Deployment Health... by the subcommittees on the sustainment and advancement of amputee care, deployment pulmonary health... DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary Defense Health Board; Notice of Federal Advisory...

  9. Problems and Mitigation Strategies for Developing and Validating Statistical Cyber Defenses

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-04-01

    such as Firewalls , HTTP proxies, and application-level Attribute Based Ac- cess Control [1] to provide a layered defense in depth. The spe- cific...research and technology develop- ment in several areas including: cyber defense, synthetic biology, advanced design tools, AI learning, and quantum

  10. Economic and Nonproliferation Analysis Framework for Assessing Reliable Nuclear Fuel Service Arrangements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Phillips, Jon R.; Kreyling, Sean J.; Short, Steven M.; Weimar, Mark R.

    2010-01-01

    Nuclear power is now broadly recognized as an essential technology in national strategies to provide energy security while meeting carbon management goals. Yet a long standing conundrum remains: how to enable rapid growth in the global nuclear power infrastructure while controlling the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies that lie at the heart of nuclear fuel supply and nuclear weapons programs. Reducing the latent proliferation risk posed by a broader horizontal spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology has been a primary goal of national nuclear supplier policies since the beginning of the nuclear power age. Attempts to control the spread of sensitive nuclear technology have been the subject of numerous initiatives in the intervening decades sometimes taking the form of calls to develop fuel supply and service assurances to reduce market pull to increase the number of states with fuel cycle capabilities. A clear understanding of what characteristics of specific reliable nuclear fuel service (RNFS) and supply arrangements qualify them as 'attractive offers' is critical to the success of current and future efforts. At a minimum, RNFS arrangements should provide economic value to all participants and help reduce latent proliferation risks posed by the global expansion of nuclear power. In order to inform the technical debate and the development of policy, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has been developing an analytical framework to evaluate the economics and nonproliferation merits of alternative approaches to RNFS arrangements. This paper provides a brief overview of the economic analysis framework developed and applied to a model problem of current interest: full-service nuclear fuel leasing arrangements. Furthermore, this paper presents an extended outline of a proposed analysis approach to evaluate the non-proliferation merits of various RNFS alternatives.

  11. Non-Proliferation Community, Do We Really Speak the Same Language?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Michel, Q.; Viski, A.; Sevini, F.; Charatsis, C.; )

    2015-01-01

    The non-proliferation community, with its many different stakeholders, has issues with a number of terms and concepts which have different meanings, not only in different national languages but also for scientists, diplomats, engineers, law enforcement people, IAEA safeguards staff, and many others. The consequences are not only relevant for translators and seminar participants. This confusion of terms may create misunderstandings with legal, diplomatic and operational consequences. A number of terms, used because of their meaning in English are ''false friends'' in other languages, i.e., they are used because they sound close, but their meaning may be different. The nuances may be about the fact that they cover a narrower, broader, or slightly different concept in another national or professional language. The emblematic example is the English word control, written the same way in many languages but with different connotations. Other examples include terms which have a precise legal definition for some communities whereas other stakeholder see it as generic terms (e.g., technology, transit); terms that are not explicit but have different implicit contents related to the context like outreach or declaration; terms which are distinct in one language but translated into one word in others like specially and especially designed; terms which cover different realities for different work communities like counter-proliferation, analysis; terms which are widely used and hardly defined anywhere like dual-use; or terms which refer to a specific legal or moral reference framework which is not always explicated like illegal, legitimate. This paper will explore issues related to some of these terms used in Western languages, and argue the necessity to take into account these sometimes subtle language differences, realizing the difficulties they may create for practitioners of non-proliferation. Improvements might include revising official reference documents

  12. Open Source and Trade Data for Non-Proliferation: Challenges and Opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, I.; Gillard, N.

    2015-01-01

    This paper explores what more systematic exploitation of trade data can contribute to the state evaluation process. The paper begins by setting out a typology of trade data, which groups the data into five categories: · Government Declared Data, which is prepared and submitted by States to an international authority for non-proliferation purposes. · Government Recorded Data, which includes information collected by the state for its own purposes, and which is not routinely submitted to international authorities for non-proliferation purposes. It includes (some) export licencing data, customs data, and business registration information. · Business-held data, which includes information on a company's own products and customers, but also ''market intelligence''. · Intelligence and Enforcement Derived Information, which can include information on specific procurement attempts, networks, or procurement requirements. · Procurement Requirements Information, which can include information released by a programme for the purpose of seeking goods or services. Challenges and opportunities related to further exploitation of trade data sources in each category are then explored, as are factors related to accessibility (both in terms of mandates and more practical considerations), reliability (including presentation of a typology), completeness, and duplication in data. Next, the paper explores how the IAEA can systematically collect, integrate and analyze the various sources of trade data given the considerations outlined above. In particular, this section focuses on how data in variable structures can be integrated into the state evaluation process. In concluding, the paper will describe how the newly formed ''Collaboration on Open Source and Trade Analysis for Non-proliferation'' (COSTA-NP) is seeking to develop each of the categories of trade data. The paper links to research objectives 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 of the IAEA

  13. The Non-Proliferation Experiment recorded at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carr, D.B. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Non-Proliferation Experiment was recorded by five different seismic stations operated by Sandia National Laboratories at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility, approximately 7.6{degrees} from the Nevada Test Site. Two stations are different versions of the Deployable Seismic Verification System developed by the Department of Energy to provide seismic data to verify compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Vault and borehole versions of the Designated Seismic Stations also recorded the event. The final station is test instrumentation located at depths of 10, 40 and 1200 feet. Although the event is seen clearly at all the stations, there are variations in the raw data due to the different bandwidths and depths of deployment. One Deployable Seismic Verification System has been operating at Pinedale for over three years and in that time recorded 14 nuclear explosions and 4 earthquakes from the Nevada Test Site, along with numerous other western U.S. earthquakes. Several discriminants based on the work by Taylor et al. (1989) have been applied to this data. First the discriminants were tested by comparing the explosions only to the 4 earthquakes located on the Test Site. Only one discriminant, log(L{sub g}/P{sub g}), did not show clear separation between the earthquakes and nuclear explosions. When other western U.S. events are included, only the M{sub b} vs. M{sub s} discriminant separated the event. In all cases where discrimination was possible, the Non-Proliferation Experiment was indistinguishable from a nuclear explosion.

  14. Key Issues on Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Yong Soo; Whang, Joo Ho; Lee, Un Chul

    2005-01-01

    Energy demand in East Asia casts a significant challenge to sustainable economy development and socio-political stability in the region which has experienced tensions throughout the history. The energy demand in this region has been dramatically increased since the start of reform in PRC. DPRK is another challenge. The current electricity consumption in DPRK is around 10% of that in ROK. If the economy of PRC continuously grows to the level of neighboring states and if the living standard of DPRK reaches that of ROK, the energy and electricity demand in the region will certainly be out of control unless the proper measures are taken into actions from today. The only feasible energy option is the nuclear one. PRC already proclaimed its ambitious plan to deploy more than 30 reactors in the near future. In addition, a couple of the South Eastern Asian states expressed their willingness to introduce nuclear power plants in the future. The increase in the use of nuclear energy is expected to bring up the nuclear renaissance in the region. However, without the proper mechanisms to supply fresh fuels and to manage spent nuclear fuels with full compliance of nuclear energy nonproliferation, the new development will inevitably cause the instability in the region. So far many interesting proposals on nuclear cooperation in East Asia were announced. Unfortunately, none of them works out properly yet, partly because the old proposals were too political. To restart the engine of the nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation in the region, it is necessary to find out what would be the common interests of the region not so much related to politics. In this paper, some key technical issues are addressed for future regional joint studies

  15. Proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. Summary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-03-01

    The United States Department of Energy and United States Department of State are jointly proposing to adopt a policy to manage spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. Only spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States would be covered by the proposed policy. The purpose of the proposed policy is to promote U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives, specifically by seeking to reduce highly-enriched uranium from civilian commerce. This is a summary of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement. Environmental effects and policy considerations of three Management Alternative approaches for implementation of the proposed policy are assessed. The three Management Alternatives analyzed are: (1) acceptance and management of the spent nuclear fuel by the Department of Energy in the United States, (2) management of the spent nuclear fuel at one or more foreign facilities (under conditions that satisfy United States nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives), and (3) a combination of components of Management Alternatives 1 and 2 (Hybrid Alternative). A No Action Alternative is also analyzed. For each Management Alternative, there are a number of alternatives for its implementation. For Management Alternative 1, this document addresses the environmental effects of various implementation alternatives such as varied policy durations, management of various quantities of spent nuclear fuel, and differing financing arrangements. Environmental impacts at various potential ports of entry, along truck and rail transportation routes, at candidate management sites, and for alternate storage technologies are also examined. For Management Alternative 2, this document addresses two subalternatives: (1) assisting foreign nations with storage; and (2) assisting foreign nations with reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel

  16. 77 FR 43083 - Federal Acquisition Regulation; Information Collection; Advance Payments

    Science.gov (United States)

    2012-07-23

    ...; Information Collection; Advance Payments AGENCIES: Department of Defense (DOD), General Services... requirement concerning advance payments. Public comments are particularly invited on: Whether this collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of functions of the Federal Acquisition...

  17. Sandia and General Motors: Advancing Clean Combustion Engines with

    Science.gov (United States)

    , storage, and disposal. Defense Waste Management Programs Advanced Nuclear Energy Nuclear Energy Safety Components and Systems Improving battery performance, economics, and safety for transportation. Batteries Sciences and Engineering Chemical Sciences Geosciences Fusion Energy Sciences Advanced Scientific Computing

  18. Nanomaterials for Defense Applications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Turaga, Uday; Singh, Vinitkumar; Lalagiri, Muralidhar; Kiekens, Paul; Ramkumar, Seshadri S.

    Nanotechnology has found a number of applications in electronics and healthcare. Within the textile field, applications of nanotechnology have been limited to filters, protective liners for chemical and biological clothing and nanocoatings. This chapter presents an overview of the applications of nanomaterials such as nanofibers and nanoparticles that are of use to military and industrial sectors. An effort has been made to categorize nanofibers based on the method of production. This chapter particularly focuses on a few latest developments that have taken place with regard to the application of nanomaterials such as metal oxides in the defense arena.

  19. Phenomenon of Psychological Defense

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Elena T. Sokolova

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available The author discusses the controversial issues of formation and functioning of psy¬chological defense mechanisms in ontogenesis and in personality disorders as they are represented in classical and contemporary psychoanalysis, in cognitivism and communication theory. The paper emphasizes the role of cognitive organi¬zation (style, sign-symbolic mediation, representative system of object relations and attachments in individual typological variability of the level organization of ciency of personal and social adaptation, in maturity and mental health of personality

  20. Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cronin, J.J.; Kohen, M.D.; Rivers, J.D.

    1996-01-01

    The Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP) was established by the Department of Defense in 1990 to assist defense facilities in preparing for treaty verification activities. Led by the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), an element of the Department of Defense, DTIRP''s membership includes representatives from other Department of Defense agencies, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Commerce, and others. The Office of Safeguards and Security has a significant interest in this program, due to the number of national defense facilities within its purview that are candidates for future inspections. As a result, the Office of Safeguards and Security has taken a very active role in DTIRP. This paper discusses the Office of Safeguards and Security''s increasing involvement in various elements of the DTIRP, ranging from facility assessments to training development and implementation

  1. Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe

    OpenAIRE

    Sarihan, Ali; Bush, Amy; Summers, Lawrence; Thompson, Brent; Tomasszewski, Steven

    2009-01-01

    This paper will build on ballistic missile defense in Europe. In the first part, a brief historical overview will place the current public management issue into light. This is followed by a discussion of the main actors in the international debate, the problems that arise and the available options and recommendations to address missile defense. In the second part, differences between George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama will analyze under the title “Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe: Evolving...

  2. Defense Programs and Budget Risk

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Troutman, Mark D

    2006-01-01

    .... Therefore the Defense Department has set before itself a requirement to modernize a large conventional force structure engaged in ongoing combat operations while simultaneously developing deeper...

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  4. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  5. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-12-13

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  6. The Text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-04-17

    The text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  7. The Text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-04-13

    The text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-04-19

    The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-02-22

    The text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  10. The text of the Agreement between Turkey and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    The full text of the agreement between Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Bulgaria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Poland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  14. Information Warfare: Issues Associated with the Defense of DOD Computers and Computer Networks

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Franklin, Derek

    2002-01-01

    The threat to the Defense Information Infrastructure is growing Hackers have advanced in sophistication and the potential exists for an alliance of independent hackers and terrorist/criminal groups...

  15. Formal Specification and Run-time Monitoring Within the Ballistic Missile Defense Project

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Caffall, Dale S; Cook, Thomas; Drusinsky, Doron; Michael, James B; Shing, Man-Tak; Sklavounos, Nicholas

    2005-01-01

    .... Ballistic Missile Defense Advanced Battle Manager (ABM) project in an effort that is amongst the most comprehensive application of formal methods to a large-scale safety-critical software application ever reported...

  16. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IX. Reactor and fuel cycle descriptions

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1979-12-01

    The Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) has characterized and assessed various reactor/fuel-cycle systems. Volume IX provides, in summary form, the technical descriptions of the reactor/fuel-cycle systems studied. This includes the status of the system technology, as well as a discussion of the safety, environmental, and licensing needs from a technical perspective. This information was then used in developing the research, development, and demonstration (RD and D) program, including its cost and time frame, to advance the existing technology to the level needed for commercial use. Wherever possible, the cost data are given as ranges to reflect the uncertainties in the estimates. Volume IX is divided into three sections: Chapter 1, Reactor Systems; Chapter 2, Fuel-Cycle Systems; and the Appendixes. Chapter 1 contains the characterizations of the following 12 reactor types: light-water reactor; heavy-water reactor; water-cooled breeder reactor; high-temperature gas-cooled reactor; gas-cooled fast reactor; liquid-metal fast breeder reactor; spectral-shift-controlled reactor; accelerator-driven reactor; molten-salt reactor; gaseous-core reactor; tokamak fusion-fisson hybrid reactor; and fast mixed-spectrum reactor. Chapter 2 contains similar information developed for fuel-cycle facilities in the following categories: mining and milling; conversion and enrichment; fuel fabrication; spent fuel reprocessing; waste handling and disposal; and transportation of nuclear materials.

  17. Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power: report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume IX. Reactor and fuel cycle descriptions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-12-01

    The Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) has characterized and assessed various reactor/fuel-cycle systems. Volume IX provides, in summary form, the technical descriptions of the reactor/fuel-cycle systems studied. This includes the status of the system technology, as well as a discussion of the safety, environmental, and licensing needs from a technical perspective. This information was then used in developing the research, development, and demonstration (RD and D) program, including its cost and time frame, to advance the existing technology to the level needed for commercial use. Wherever possible, the cost data are given as ranges to reflect the uncertainties in the estimates. Volume IX is divided into three sections: Chapter 1, Reactor Systems; Chapter 2, Fuel-Cycle Systems; and the Appendixes. Chapter 1 contains the characterizations of the following 12 reactor types: light-water reactor; heavy-water reactor; water-cooled breeder reactor; high-temperature gas-cooled reactor; gas-cooled fast reactor; liquid-metal fast breeder reactor; spectral-shift-controlled reactor; accelerator-driven reactor; molten-salt reactor; gaseous-core reactor; tokamak fusion-fisson hybrid reactor; and fast mixed-spectrum reactor. Chapter 2 contains similar information developed for fuel-cycle facilities in the following categories: mining and milling; conversion and enrichment; fuel fabrication; spent fuel reprocessing; waste handling and disposal; and transportation of nuclear materials

  18. Rock mechanics contributions from defense programs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heuze, F.E.

    1992-02-01

    An attempt is made at illustrating the many contributions to rock mechanics from US defense programs, over the past 30-plus years. Large advances have been achieved in the technology-base area covering instrumentation, material properties, physical modeling, constitutive relations and numerical simulations. In the applications field, much progress has been made in understanding and being able to predict rock mass behavior related to underground explosions, cratering, projectile penetration, and defense nuclear waste storage. All these activities stand on their own merit as benefits to national security. But their impact is even broader, because they have found widespread applications in the non-defense sector; to name a few: the prediction of the response of underground structures to major earthquakes, the physics of the earth's interior at great depths, instrumentation for monitoring mine blasting, thermo-mechanical instrumentation useful for civilian nuclear waste repositories, dynamic properties of earthquake faults, and transient large-strain numerical modeling of geological processes, such as diapirism. There is not pretense that this summary is exhaustive. It is meant to highlight success stories representative of DOE and DOD geotechnical activities, and to point to remaining challenges

  19. Defense.gov Special Report: Defense Officials Release Operational Energy

    Science.gov (United States)

    , DOD Operational Energy Strategy DOD's Operational Energy Strategy will guide the Defense Department to operations are among the goals of the Defense Department's operational energy strategy, a senior Pentagon operational energy footprint, experts in solar power, microgrids and "smart" generators recently

  20. Induction of defensive enzymes (isozymes) during defense against ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    user

    2012-09-06

    Sep 6, 2012 ... defense against two different fungal pathogens in pear calli ... study the biochemical changes in relation to plant defense ... relatively easy to manipulate by empirical means, allowing for a ... earlier phase, and the degree of rot was significantly ..... resistance of fruit, and they play an important role in the.