WorldWideScience

Sample records for non-proliferation experiment recorded

  1. The Non-Proliferation Experiment recorded at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carr, D.B. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Non-Proliferation Experiment was recorded by five different seismic stations operated by Sandia National Laboratories at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility, approximately 7.6{degrees} from the Nevada Test Site. Two stations are different versions of the Deployable Seismic Verification System developed by the Department of Energy to provide seismic data to verify compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Vault and borehole versions of the Designated Seismic Stations also recorded the event. The final station is test instrumentation located at depths of 10, 40 and 1200 feet. Although the event is seen clearly at all the stations, there are variations in the raw data due to the different bandwidths and depths of deployment. One Deployable Seismic Verification System has been operating at Pinedale for over three years and in that time recorded 14 nuclear explosions and 4 earthquakes from the Nevada Test Site, along with numerous other western U.S. earthquakes. Several discriminants based on the work by Taylor et al. (1989) have been applied to this data. First the discriminants were tested by comparing the explosions only to the 4 earthquakes located on the Test Site. Only one discriminant, log(L{sub g}/P{sub g}), did not show clear separation between the earthquakes and nuclear explosions. When other western U.S. events are included, only the M{sub b} vs. M{sub s} discriminant separated the event. In all cases where discrimination was possible, the Non-Proliferation Experiment was indistinguishable from a nuclear explosion.

  2. The non-proliferation experiment

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    Hannon, W.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    On September 22, 1993, the Department of Energy detonated more than 1.2 million kg of blasting agent in a tunnel in Rainier Mesa at the Nevada Test Site. The resulting explosion generated seismic, electromagnetic, and air pressure signals that were recorded on instruments deployed at distances ranging from a few meters to hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of kilometers. More than 12 organizations made measurements before, during, and after the explosions. The explosion and its associated experiments are known as the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). Analyses of the measurements made during the NPE and comparisons with similar measurements made on previous nearly nuclear explosions and on a co-located smaller explosion detonated at the same site are providing basic phenomenological insights into what is potentially one of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)-distinguishing between nuclear explosions and some of the many conventional explosions that occur each year. The NPE is also providing information on the use of chemical explosions to develop empirical discriminants in regions where no nuclear explosions have been recorded. In another verification application, several NPE projects are examining the utility of on-site, pre-shot, shot-time, and post-shot measurements of gas seepage, seismic activity, and other observables as a means of identifying the source of signals that appear like nuclear explosions at regional distances. Two related activities are being considered. First, challenge on-site inspections, conducted after an event has occurred, may be able to use the characteristics of phenomena that persist after the explosion to detect and identify the source of the signals that appeared ambiguous or explosion-like to remote sensors. Second, cooperative, on-site measurements made at the time of a pre-nounced conventional explosion may provide assurance that a nuclear explosion did not occur as part of or in place of the pre-announced explosion.

  3. EMP at the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bell, J. [AWE, Aldermaston (United Kingdom)

    1994-12-31

    This experiment presented an opportunity to field customized equipment designed to detect and record electromagnetic pulse (EMP) emanations from an explosion over a wide frequency range. Any data recorded could be used in conjunction with the seismic methods to further non-proliferation studies. No EMP emanations were detectable from the four sensors deployed outside the tunnel confines.

  4. Investigations of the low frequency seismic waves recorded at near-regional distances from the Non-Proliferation Experiment

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    Patton, H.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    Seismic waves recorded at near-regional distances are used to characterize the source of the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) and three selected nuclear explosions detonated in N-tunnel on Rainier Mesa. For periods longer than 5 sec, the signal-to-noise ratio is poor on most recordings of the NPE. A seismogram-stacking method is used in order to reduce background noise in coherent arrivals of Rayleigh waves. This method requires equalization of path dispersion and attenuation, which is accomplished in this study with empirical Green`s functions. The stacked, equalized Rayleigh-wave spectra are inverted, along with the spectral amplitudes of Lg waves with periods of 2-5 sec, for estimates of the seismic moment tensor. The NPE isotropic moment is 1.6 x 10{sup 14} Nt-m. The inferred static level of the reduced displacement potential is 825 m{sup 3}, which is about two times smaller than the estimate from free-field data recorded within 1 km of the NPE. Moment tensors of the NPE and nuclear explosions are asymmetric, describing prolate ellipsoids of rotation with the long axis in the vertical direction. The asymmetries are among the largest for explosions on Pahute and Rainier Mesa. The non-isotropic component is a compensated linear vector dipole (CLVD), which may represent driven block motions occurring within a conical volume of material extending from the shot point (apex) to the free surface. The CLVD source can help explain some observations of scalloping in the spectra of Lg waves and Lg spectral ratios. Seismic radiation from the NPE is virtually indistinguishable from that of nearby nuclear explosions for frequencies below 1 Hz.

  5. Infrasonic measurements of the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Whitaker, R.W.; Noel, S.; Meadows, W. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    Two infrasonic arrays were operated for the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). The arrays were located at the Nevada Test Site and at St. George, UT. The results were consistent with experience on underground tests, and therefore close to underground nuclear tests of similar size.

  6. Lessons learned from the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McWilliam, C.; Curtis, S. [DOE, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Department of Energy sponsored Non-Proliferation Experiment (formerly known as the Chemical Kiloton) involved the detonation of blasting agent approximately equivalent to one kiloton of energy release on the Nevada Test Site in an effort to determine if (and if so, which) discriminators exist between conventional and nuclear detonations of similar yield. Coordination among hundreds of scientists from at least fifteen different organizations were required to design the experiments necessary to collect and interpret data from this unique and complex event. Stakeholders and members of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament observed the progress of the experiment first hand. The experiment was a success in that a vast majority of the expected data was collected and shared quickly and efficiently throughout the international scientific community. The management of the project was discussed among the major co-sponsoring organizations and the significant {open_quotes}lessons learned{close_quotes} are presented.

  7. Explosive performance on the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKown, T.O. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Explosive Effects Physics Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments on the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) as part of its effort to define source functions for seismic waves. Since all investigations were contingent on the performance of the emplaced chemical explosive, an array of diagnostic measurements was fielded in the emplaced explosive. The CORRTEX (COntinuous Reflectometry for Radius vs Time EXperiment) system was used to investigate the explosive initiation and to determine the detonation velocities on three levels and in a number of radial directions. The CORRTEX experiments fielded in the explosive chamber will be described, including a description of the explosive emplacement from the perspective of its impact on the CORRTEX results. The data obtained are reviewed and the resulting detonation velocities are reported. A variation of detonation velocity with depth in the explosive and the apparent underdetonation and overdetonation of the explosive in different radial directions is reported.

  8. Explosive performance on the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKown, T.O.

    1994-03-01

    The non-proliferation experiment, originally called the chemical kiloton experiment, was planned and executed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to investigate the seismic yield relationship and distinguishing seismic signals between a nuclear event and a large mass conventional explosion. The Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments to further their studies of the source function for signals observed seismically. Since all investigations were contingent on the performance of the emplaced chemical explosive, an array of diagnostic measurements was fielded in the emplaced explosive. The CORRTEX system was used to investigate the explosive initiation and to determine the detonation velocities in multiple levels and in numerous directions. A description of the CORRTEX experiments fielded, a review of the data obtained and some interpretations of the data are reported.

  9. Experience in non-proliferation verification: The Treaty of Raratonga

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walker, R.A.

    1998-01-01

    The verification provisions of the Treaty of Raratonga are subdivided into two categories: those performed by IAEA and those performed by other entities. A final provision of the Treaty of Raratonga is relevant to IAEA safeguards according to support of the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. The non-IAEA verification process is described as well

  10. Ionospheric measurements for the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fitzgerald, T.J.

    1994-01-01

    The detection of explosions using ionospheric techniques relies on measuring perturbations induced in radio propagation by acoustics waves which disturb the electron density of the ionosphere. Such techniques have been applied to the detection of atmospheric explosions, underground nuclear tests, earthquakes, and surface mining explosions. The nighttime ionosphere presents a difficulty for the detection of explosions because in the absence of solar ionization radiation the electron density in the altitude range of 90 to 200 km decays after sunset and perturbation effects are correspondingly reduced. On the other hand, acoustic waves produced by weak sources reach a maximum amplitude in the altitude range of 100 to 150 km and are highly attenuated at altitudes above 200 km. For safety reasons, most planned explosions are conducted during daylight which has limited the experimental measurements during nighttime. However a recent opportunity for a nighttime measurement occurred in connection with the Non-Proliferation Experiment which consisted of the detonation of a large chemical charge underground at the Nevada Test Site near midnight local time. the results, based on a new technique of using medium frequency radio transmissions provided by commercial broadcasts to detect explosion effects, were negative. The most likely explanation for the negative result is that the radio transmissions did not reflect at a low enough altitude to sense the perturbations produced by the acoustic waves

  11. Cavity pressure/residual stress measurements from the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heinle, R.A.; Hudson, B.C. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Hatch, M.A. Jr.

    1994-12-31

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments on the Non-Proliferation Experiment to determine post-detonation gas pressure inside the explosive cavity and the residual rock stress in the region immediately outside the cavity. Before detonation there was significant concern that steam and detonation products would create very high temperatures and pressure in the blast cavity that would exist for weeks and months after firing. This could constitute a safety hazard to personnel re-entering the tunnel. Consequently the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was asked to field its Cavity Pressure/Residual stress monitor system on the Non-Proliferation Experiment. We obtained experimental data for the first 600 ms after the explosion and again several weeks after detonation upon tunnel re-entry. We recorded early-time cavity pressure of about 8.3 MPa. In addition we believe that the ends of our sensor hoses were subjected to an ambient driving pressure of about 0.5 MPa (absolute) that persisted until at least three weeks after zero time.

  12. Reactor Neutrino Detection for Non Proliferation with the NUCIFER Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bouvet, L. [CEA, Centre de Saclay, IRFU, Gif-sur-Yvette, (France); Bouvier, S.; Bui, V. M. [Laboratoire Subatech, Ecole des Mines, Nantes Cedex 3 (France); others, and

    2012-06-15

    Neutrinos are the most abundant matter particles in the Universe. Thoroughly investigated in basic science, the neutrino field is now delivering first applications to the monitoring of nuclear reactors. The neutrinos are emitted in the decay chain of the fission products; therefore measuring their flux provides real-time information, directly related to the fission process occurring in the reactor core. Because of the very weak interaction of neutrinos with matter a neutrino detector can stand outside the core containment vessel and provide a non-intrusive and inherently tamper resistant measurement. After a brief review of the existing data and worldwide projects, we present the NUCIFER experiment. The active part of the detector is a tank filled up with one ton of Gadolinium-doped liquid scintillator. Sixteen photomultiplier tubes, isolated from the liquid by an acrylic buffer, read out the light produced by the interaction of a neutrino with the protons of the liquid. The tank is surrounded by plastic scintillator plates to veto the cosmic rays. Then polyethylene and lead shielding suppress the background coming from external neutrons and gamma rays respectively. The NUCIFER detector has been designed for an optimal compromise between the detection performances and the specifications of operation in a safeguards regime. Its global footprint is 2.8 m x 2.8 m and it can monitor remotely the nuclear power plant thermal power and Plutonium content with very little maintenance on years scale. The experiment is currently installed near the OSIRIS research reactor (70 MWth) at CEA, in Saclay, France. First data are expected by May 2012. This work is done in contact with the IAEA/SGTN division that is currently investigating the potentiality of neutrinos as a novel safeguards tool. A dedicated working group has been created in 2010 to coordinate the simulation effort of various reactor types as well as the development of dedicated detectors and define and eventually

  13. Regional seismic observations of the Non-Proliferation Experiment at the Livermore NTS Network

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Walter, W.R.; Mayeda, K.; Patton, H.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)] [and others

    1994-12-31

    The Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), a 1-kiloton chemical explosion in N-tunnel at Rainier Mesa on the Nevada Test Site (NTS), was recorded by the four station, regional seismic Livermore NTS Network, (LNN). In this study we compare the NPE`s seismic yield, frequency content, and discrimination performance with other NTS events recorded at LNN. Preliminary findings include: The NPE LNN average magnitudes are 4.16 for m{sub b}(P{sub n}) and 4.59 for m{sub b}(L{sub g}). Using published magnitude-yield relations gives nuclear equivalent yields of 2.3 and 2.2 kilotons respectively, implying enhanced coupling of chemical relative to nuclear explosions. A comparison of the NPE seismograms with those with similar magnitude N-tunnel nuclear explosions shows remarkable similarity over the frequency band 0.5 to 5.0 Hz. Outside this band the explosions show more variability, with the NPE having the least relative energy below 0.5 Hz and the most energy above 5 Hz when scaled by magnitude. Considering the variability within the N-tunnel nuclear explosions, these low- and high-frequency NPE-nuclear differences may not reflect chemical-nuclear source differences. The NPE was compared to a large number of NTS nuclear explosions and earthquakes as part of an ongoing short-period discrimination study of P{sub N}/L{sub g},P{sub g}/L{sub g}, and spectral ratios in the P{sub n}, P{sub g},L{sub g}, and coda phases. For these discriminants, the NPE looks very similar to N-tunnel nuclear explosions and other NTS nuclear explosions, implying seismic identification of contained, non-ripple-fired, chemical explosions as non-nuclear may not be possible. However, such blasts might serve as surrogate nuclear explosions when calibrating seismic discriminants in regions where nuclear testing has not occurred.

  14. Geology, geophysics, and physical properties of the U12n.25 non-proliferation experiment site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baldwin, M.J.; Bradford, R.P.; Hopkins, S.P. [Raytheon Services Nevada, Mercury, NV (United States)] [and others

    1994-12-31

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Experiment was conducted in the U12n.25 drift in N-Tunnel at the Nevada Test Site. The geologic characterization of the site was performed by Raytheon Services Nevada geologists in the standard manner used for all underground nuclear weapons-effects tests executed by the Defense Nuclear Agency. The U12n.25 test bed was constructed in zeolitized ash-fall tuff of the Tunnel Beds Tuff, Subunit 4K, 389.0 m below the surface of Rainier Mesa. The structural geology of the site was simple, with the nearest fault plane projected to be 12 m below the mined cavity at closest approach, and an average bedding dip of seven degrees to the northwest. The cavity excavation revealed several small fractures, including one which produced minor amounts of free water during construction. The physical properties of the site were well within the range of experience for the zeolitized tuff of N-Tunnel and no geology-related problems were encountered during construction. The zeolitized tuff of N-Tunnel has been the site of twenty nuclear tests conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. The similarities of geologic setting, site geometry, and physical properties allow many comparisons of Non-Proliferation Experiment results with the large nuclear-test data base.

  15. Preshot predictions for the near-source region in the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patch, D.F.; Welch, J.E.; Zerkle, J. [SAIC/Simulation Technology Operation, San Diego, CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    This paper summarizes a number of one and two-dimensional, ground motion calculations made in support of the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), a 1KT high explosive shot fired on 22 September 1993 at the Nevada Test Site. These calculations were sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency`s late-time containment program, and were completed well before the test was executed. They addressed a variety of test design, analysis and construction issues, and sought to identify any potential safety concerns. The test site model used in these calculations was based in large part on earlier work performed at SAIC and by other Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) contractors for the nearby underground nuclear test, code named MISTY ECHO. In particular, to obtain physical property and quasi-static material response data for the site, a number of core samples recovered near the MISTY ECHO working point (WP) were tested by TerraTek. We then used these data to develop a numerical response model for the site.

  16. An overview of the on-site inspection measurements from the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zucca, J.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    An on-site inspection (OSI) is an in-person visit to site to collect data and examine evidence in order to determine the source of an ambiguous event detected via remote monitoring systems or other measures. Its purpose is to determine whether the treaty has been violated, to deter violations, and to build confidence. At the time of this writing, it is anticipated that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) being developed in the Conference on Disarmament will contain OSI provisions. In an era of testing moratoria, the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) provided a unique opportunity to investigate candidate OSI techniques. On site inspections could occur in three different contexts: after-the-fact inspections based on information from remote monitoring systems; inspections prior to, during, and after large declared chemical explosions (e.g., a large mining explosion); continuous monitoring inspections with unattended sensors at certain agreed-upon sites (e.g., previous test sites). OSI monitoring techniques need to be designed to detect the phenomena and residual effects of nuclear explosions. In the underground case, the primary effects of interest for OSI are the electromagnetic pulse, shock waves, aftershocks, radioactive gas, rubble zone, and apical void. These effects are well known and the basic techniques for their detection well established. We designed our measurement program for the NPE to answer specific issues about these detection technologies. Our measurement program includes the following: zerotime electromagnetic measurements; seismic aftershock survey; before and after electrical soundings; gas tracers introduced into the explosive; before and after multispectral overhead imagery from low-flying aircraft; before and after geological surveys.

  17. Experience of Republic of Macedonia in Providing WMD Non-Proliferation Policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mecinovic, S.

    2007-01-01

    The Republic of Macedonia as a country in transition and as a country which does not posses WMD, has accepted to developed and implemented non-proliferation policy of WMD. First of all, we accepted the definition of WMD as used in international agreements, conventions and protocol and WMD includes nuclear, biological and toxin weapons, agent and precursors. WMD in wide sense includes all toxic chemical substances if they are used as means of attack or if they are the target of attack, all microorganisms and their product, all industrial facilities that use toxic chemicals in their process of production, transport and stockpile if they are a target of military or terrorist attack. For WMD non-proliferation projects to be valid, they must be on the level and carry the weight of international policy and doctrine and involve a most comprehensive sphere of the scientific and professional communities. This is only way to implement the projects in country such is Republic of Macedonia where the public opinion is that WMD are not real security problem because we neither possess nor seek to posses these kinds of weapons. Our WMD non-proliferation policy is tied to control of weapons, agents, precursors, technology and their transfer, market and possibility of use. Because of that we try to control know terrorist organization, groups and individuals. Terrorism caused special concern and attention, particularly when we talk about terrorism with NBC weapons and radiological, chemical and biological warfare agents. Scientific and technological progress led to fact that the instruments for performing terrorism (including WMD) can be produced or procured much easier than before. Rising industry which uses toxic chemicals and microorganisms in the production process created a lot of potential targets for terrorism actions in which they can use be as a target and an executive instrument. The new goal of contemporary treats is safety of life environment, which today includes

  18. Post-test geologic observations made at the non-proliferation experiment site, N-tunnel, Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Townsend, D.R.; Bradford, R.P.; Hopkins, S.P. [Raytheon Services Nevada, Mercury, NV (United States)] [and others

    1994-12-31

    Qualitative evaluations of damage resulting from an underground explosion can provide valuable information concerning the size of the charge, as well as the location of a clandestine detonation. However, caution must be exercised during the appraisal because the effects of an explosion are a function of many factors in addition to yield. Construction techniques, the physical properties of the surrounding rock, and the depth of burial are all important considerations when evaluating the effects of an underground detonation. Raytheon Services Nevada geologists documented underground and surface effects of the Non-Proliferation Experiment, as they have for all recent underground weapons-effects tests conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. Underground, the extent of the visible damage decreased rapidly from severe at the closest inspection point 100 m from the Working Point, to insignificant 300 m from the Working Point. The severity of damage correlates in some instances with the orientation of the drift with respect to the shock-wave propagation direction. No evidence of the Non-Proliferation explosion was visible on the mesa surface 389 m above the Working Point the day after the explosion.

  19. Proceedings of the symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE): Results and implications for test ban treaties

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Denny, M.D.; Stull, S.P. [eds.

    1994-12-31

    The large amounts of chemical explosives used worldwide in mining, quarrying, and civil engineering projects presents a challenge for policy makers molding a test ban, since their use could provide the necessary cover for a clandestine nuclear test. The Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) seeks to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical explosion in the same geology. Two chemical explosions were detonated at the Nevada Test Site to compare their signatures with previous nuclear tests. This conference presents results of these tests and discusses implications for test ban treaties. Conference papers are divided into the following sections: Background; Test preparations; EOS and code simulations; Rainier Mesa structure; Ground motion measurements; Non-seismic technologies; On-site inspection technologies; and a panel discussion. Selected papers are indexed separately for inclusion in the Energy Science and Technology Database.

  20. The international nuclear non-proliferation system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, T.

    1985-01-01

    This volume focuses upon the issues raised at this Conference, and attempts to address the international diplomatic, political and trading, rather than technical, questions which surround nuclear non-proliferation policies. It does so by bringing together chapters contributed by participants in non-proliferation diplomacy, those with experience in shaping International Atomic Energy Agency and national policies and academic observers of non-proliferation activities and the international nuclear industry. An analysis is provided of past non-proliferation policies and activities and current issues, and an attempt is made to offer ideas for new initiatives which may sustain the non-proliferation system in the future

  1. The joint verification experiments as a global non-proliferation exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shaner, J.W.

    1998-01-01

    This conference commemorates the 10th anniversary of the second of two Joint Verification Experiments conducted by the Soviet Union and the US. These two experiments, one at the Nevada test site in the US, and the second here at the Semipalatinsk test site were designed to test the verification of a nuclear testing treaty limiting the size underground explosions to 150 kilotons. By building trust and technical respect between the weapons scientists of the two most powerful adversaries, the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) had the unanticipated result of initiating a suite of cooperative projects and programs aimed at reducing the Cold War threats and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

  2. Background on the commercial explosive chosen for the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mammele, M.E.

    1994-12-31

    The requirements of the Chemical Kiloton Experiment as outlined in the original explosives bid package provided DYNO NOBEL/Alpha-Ireco, Inc. with a unique challenge. The size of the chamber, the total volume of explosives required, the chemical energy equivalent of one kiloton, the time-frame of loading the chamber, transportation, safety, were all necessary considerations in choosing this particular explosive. The rationale for choosing this particular emulsion/ANFO blend of blasting agent explosive will be presented. DYNO NOBEL INC in-house theoretical predictions as to the explosive performance potential of the blasting agent will be compared to some of the actual data acquired upon detonation. The results of this type of experiment may provide new insight as to the efficiency of the energy release of typical commercial explosives.

  3. To make a national based historical survey of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Experiences from the example of Sweden

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, T.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: This project was initiated by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and approved by the Agency as a Support Programme Task to increase transparency and support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. A general model of how such a historical survey can be conducted has been worked out in order to serve as help for other countries evaluating their nuclear and nuclear related activities in the framework of the Additional Protocol. The model consists of the following parts: 1. A State's nuclear activities profile since the mid-forties. In this part the task is to analyse the State's civil and military nuclear plans in broad terms, as well as to investigate how these ambitions were carried out in practice. A central ingredient is to map-out how the nuclear energy projects were organised over time; i. e. to pin-point the government authorities, organisations, private companies, universities and research institutions who were involved in the activities and who had the authoritative power at different times since 1945. 2. A description and analysis of the State's role and interactions in the area of international non-proliferation. This part of the model includes a list of the national laws that have regulated the use of nuclear materials since 1945. Are there exceptions in the national jurisdictions that obstruct the international/national inspections to be carried out in practical terms? How have the import and export regulations been designed since 1945? Who are allowed to use sensitive nuclear materials and on what conditions? Another part of the analysis of the State's international policy of non-proliferation includes a description of the international and bilateral agreements that were signed and ratified over the span of the period under consideration. The experiences from the work with the survey of the Swedish nuclear activities show that not all co-operation necessarily went through bilateral (government controlled) agreements

  4. The non-proliferation experiment and gas sampling as an on-site inspection activity: A progress report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carrigan, C.R.

    1994-03-01

    The Non-proliferation Experiment (NPE) is contributing to the development of gas sampling methods and models that may be incorporated into future on-site inspection (OSI) activities. Surface gas sampling and analysis, motivated by nuclear test containment studies, have already demonstrated the tendency for the gaseous products of an underground nuclear test to flow hundreds of meters to the surface over periods ranging from days to months. Even in the presence of a uniform sinusoidal pressure variation, there will be a net flow of cavity gas toward the surface. To test this barometric pumping effect at Rainier Mesa, gas bottles containing sulfur hexaflouride and 3 He were added to the pre-detonation cavity for the 1 kt chemical explosives test. Pre-detonation measurements of the background levels of both gases were obtained at selected sites on top of the mesa. The background levels of both tracers were found to be at or below mass spectrographic/gas chromatographic sensitivity thresholds in the parts-per-trillion range. Post-detonation, gas chromatographic analyses of samples taken during barometric pressure lows from the sampling sites on the mesa indicate the presence of significant levels (300--600 ppt) of sulfur hexaflouride. However, mass spectrographic analyses of gas samples taken to date do not show the presence of 3 He. To explain these observations, several possibilities are being explored through additional sampling/analysis and numerical modeling. For the NPE, the detonation point was approximately 400 m beneath the surface of Rainier Mesa and the event did not produce significant fracturing or subsidence on the surface of the mesa. Thus, the NPE may ultimately represent an extreme, but useful example for the application and tuning of cavity gas detection techniques

  5. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    DOE's nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities are defined by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). The Department's major responsibilities in this area are to: (1) provide technical assistance to the Department of State in negotiating agreements for civil cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other countries and international organizations; (2) join with other agencies to reach executive branch judgments with respect to the issuance of export licenses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (3) be responsible for processing subsequent arrangements with other agencies as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act; (4) control the distribution of special nuclear materials, components, equipment, and nuclear technology exports; (5) participate in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign governments and organizations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (6) act as a primary technical resource with respect to US participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency

  6. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

  7. Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manley, I.T.

    1981-01-01

    Proliferation is a problem that can only be solved when the political problems which lead countries to contemplate, the possession of nuclear weapons are solved; in the meantime it can only be managed. Non-proliferation policy has to deal both with the political and the technical aspects of proliferation. It must seek to buy time by addressing the reasons why nations feel the political need to construct nuclear weapons, as well as delaying the moment when such nations feel capable of doing so. The subject is examined and proposals made. (author)

  8. Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deiseroth, D.; Gustafsson, S.

    1993-01-01

    The issue of Nuclear Non Proliferation has been moved to a leading place on the contemporary international security agenda. What about the situation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belorussia? Why did the IAEA-inspectors totally failed to discover any sign of Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapon programme before the Gulf War? Do the NATO and their nuclear power states violate Art. VI of the Non-Proliferation-Treaty (NPT), because they are - despite the end of the cold war - not willing to renounce of the ''option of the first use of nuclear weapons''? Does the NPT establish a form of nuclear apartheid? What will be the situation if the NPT-Extension-Conference in 1995 will be unable to obtain a majority of the parties for any one extension proposal? Do we need a new international nuclear control agency with severe powers, a sort of nuclear Interpol? The Colloquium ''Saving NPT and abolishing Nuclear Weapons'', held in Stockholm in September 1992, organized by the Swedish and the German Sections of IALANA, tried to analyse some of the raised issues. (orig.) [de

  9. Proceedings of the Symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment: Results and Implications for Test Ban Treaties, Rockville, Maryland, April 19-21, 1994

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Denny, Marvin D

    1994-01-01

    To address a critical verification issue for the current Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and for a possible future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Department of Energy sought to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical test in the same geology, so that other explosions could be identified. This was done in a field experiment code-named the NonProliferation Experiment (NPE).This comprehensive experiment was designed to determine the signatures of chemical explosions for a broad range of phenomena for comparison with those of previous nuclear tests. If significant differences can be measured, then these measures can be used to discriminate between the two types of explosions. In addition, when these differences are understood, large chemical explosions can be used to seismically calibrate regions to discriminate earthquakes from explosions. Toward this end, on-site and off-site measurements of transient phenomena were made, and on-site measurements of residual effects are in progress.Perhaps the most striking result was that the source function for the chemical explosion was identical to that of a nuclear one of about twice the yield. These proceedings provide more detailed results of the experiment.

  10. Non Proliferation of Nuclear

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bambang S Irawan

    2004-01-01

    Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons is the international community's efforts to maintain the security of the world, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear technology and the use of nuclear weapons, promoting cooperation for the use of nuclear peaceful purposes, build mutual trust (Confidence Building Measures) as well as to achieve the ultimate goal of disarmament overall (General and Complete Disarmament). Addressing the post-WTC tragedy, 11 September 2001, the Indonesian government should set up a National Measures (National Action Plan), among others formed the National Security Council and NBC Counter Proliferation Unit, or the National Authority for Nuclear Treaty, preparing national legislation, to prevent the abuse nuclear materials for terrorist acts, prevent Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear materials, developed a National Preparedness and Emergency Response Management in the event of a nuclear accident or attack by the use of nuclear terrorism. Importance of a National Action Plan meant the existence of a national commitment in the context of compliance with treaties and conventions which have been ratified relating to safety, security, safeguards towards a general and complete disarmament, to safeguard national security and maintain peace (safeguards) international

  11. Constructing a large-scale 3D Geologic Model for Analysis of the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wagoner, J; Myers, S

    2008-04-09

    We have constructed a regional 3D geologic model of the southern Great Basin, in support of a seismic wave propagation investigation of the 1993 Nonproliferation Experiment (NPE) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The model is centered on the NPE and spans longitude -119.5{sup o} to -112.6{sup o} and latitude 34.5{sup o} to 39.8{sup o}; the depth ranges from the topographic surface to 150 km below sea level. The model includes the southern half of Nevada, as well as parts of eastern California, western Utah, and a portion of northwestern Arizona. The upper crust is constrained by both geologic and geophysical studies, while the lower crust and upper mantle are constrained by geophysical studies. The mapped upper crustal geologic units are Quaternary basin fill, Tertiary deposits, pre-Tertiary deposits, intrusive rocks of all ages, and calderas. The lower crust and upper mantle are parameterized with 5 layers, including the Moho. Detailed geologic data, including surface maps, borehole data, and geophysical surveys, were used to define the geology at the NTS. Digital geologic outcrop data were available for both Nevada and Arizona, whereas geologic maps for California and Utah were scanned and hand-digitized. Published gravity data (2km spacing) were used to determine the thickness of the Cenozoic deposits and thus estimate the depth of the basins. The free surface is based on a 10m lateral resolution DEM at the NTS and a 90m lateral resolution DEM elsewhere. Variations in crustal thickness are based on receiver function analysis and a framework compilation of reflection/refraction studies. We used Earthvision (Dynamic Graphics, Inc.) to integrate the geologic and geophysical information into a model of x,y,z,p nodes, where p is a unique integer index value representing the geologic unit. For seismic studies, the geologic units are mapped to specific seismic velocities. The gross geophysical structure of the crust and upper mantle is taken from regional surface

  12. Supporting non proliferation and global security efforts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pochon, E.

    2013-01-01

    CEA contributes as a major actor of France's action against nuclear proliferation and to the strengthening of nuclear security at national level as European and International levels, in particular through the support of the IAEA activities in nuclear non proliferation with the French Support Programme for the IAEA safeguards system and security with the contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and cooperation projects with the European Commission. The CEA is a French government funded technological research organization, organized around 5 branches: Nuclear Energy, Technological Researches, Defence (DAM), Material Sciences and Life Sciences. Within the scope of its activities, CEA covers most of the research areas and techniques in nuclear non-proliferation and security. The CEA is also the advisor of the French Government on nuclear policy. Treaty monitoring and the development and implementation of non proliferation and global security programs is an important mission of DAM which rely on nuclear weapons manufacture and past testing experience. The programmes on non proliferation and global security carried out to fulfil DAM's mission cover the following areas: development of monitoring and detection methods and equipments, country profiles and nuclear stockpiles assessment, arms control instruments, proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycle, monitoring of nuclear tests, operation and maintenance of national detection capabilities and contribution to CTBT verification systems. (A.C.)

  13. Nuclear non proliferation and disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    In the framework of the publication of a document on the ''weapons mastership, disarmament and non proliferation: the french action'', by the ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministry of Defense, the French Documentation organization presents a whole document. This document describes and details the following topics: the conference on the treaty of non proliferation of nuclear weapons, the France, Usa and Non Governmental Organizations position, the threats of the proliferation, the french actions towards the disarmament, the disarmament in the world, a chronology and some bibliographic resources. (A.L.B.)

  14. Future non-proliferation challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yelchenko, Volodymyr

    2008-01-01

    Having chaired the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee Mr. Volodymyr Yelchenko noted that the NPT States parties reaffirmed the important role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. They stressed that non-compliance with the Treaty provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation and placed emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. The universality aspect was brought to the front with the lack of progress in this area. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states, promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring non-proliferation. There is concern that non-States actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. One of the underlying themes at the Second Prepcom was the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation. Negative consequences to nuclear non-proliferation were also mentioned in the context of the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defense systems, with the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the urgent conclusion of such a treaty as a beneficial step towards non-proliferation was stressed. The NPT states parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for

  15. Non proliferation of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Le Guelte, Georges

    2015-10-01

    After having evoked the behaviour of nuclear countries regarding the development of nuclear weapons and uranium procurement, or nuclear programmes after the Second World War until nowadays, the author presents the non proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a construction at the service of super-powers. He comments and discusses the role of the IAEA control system and its evolutions: a control limited to declared installations, an export control with the spectre of plutonium, a control system thwarted by some technological innovations, information systems coming in, and an additional protocol related to the application of guarantees. He comments the evolution of the context from a bipolar world to a world without pole which raises the issue of how to have commitments respected: description of the role and practice of non proliferation during the Cold War, after the Cold War, and in a world without governance

  16. Non-proliferation and disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ritter von Wagner, A.

    1993-01-01

    In 1995 the Conference on the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will take place. Will it be extended for a long term, indefinitely or only for a fixed period? The Federal Government of Germany advocates an unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others have different ideas alleging that the Treaty is imperfect and discriminating. It is a thorn in the side of many States, in particular of the Third World, which no longer want to put up with being treated as second-class states. One argument which is considered especially embarrassing by developing countries as a visible expression of such discrimination, are the nuclear tests which are still carried out by nuclear weapon states. Is the political situation still such that one needs those weapons? Strategists gradually find it difficult to argument; over and over again they claim that an abandonment of nuclear weapons would make the world unsafer. But development has gradually passed over them. Nevertheless, one finds it hard to throw overboard considerations which for years have determined one's thinking. (orig./HSCH) [de

  17. Romania non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biro, Lucian; Grama, Viviana

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Non-proliferation concept in Romania is based on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was ratified in 1970. According to the Article III of the Treaty, Romania ratified in 1972, the Agreement between Romania and IAEA for the application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 2000 Romania ratified the Additional Protocol to contribute through increased transparency, to confidence that no undeclared nuclear activities are concealed within the declared programme or make use of elements of that programme. Under the Additional Protocol Romania understands to increase the transparency of its nuclear activities lengthways fuel cycle. Romania has a strong legal framework to control nuclear material and nuclear activities. The Law 111/1996, republished is the Law on the safe deployment of nuclear activities. CNCAN issued National Regulations for Safeguards and Physical Protection. Prospecting for uranium in Romania was initiated in 1950. Between 1962 and 1978 all the uranium ore production was stockpiled at the mine sites. In 1978 the Feldioara Powder Plant was commissioned, since then both ore stockpiles and ore exploited have been processed to uranium chemical concentrates. The Powder Plant Feldioara was conceived and built following the necessity of milling and processing the uranium ore to UO 2 , in concordance with the national nuclear programme in order to produce electric energy from nuclear fuel. The Nuclear Fuel Plant has capability to manufacture CANDU-6 nuclear fuel. Nuclear Fuel Plant consists of two Production areas, the Quality Assurance and Engineering Departments. There are two Production Departments: Pelleting area including granulation, pressing, sintering, pellet grinding, uranium recycling and Assembling area including components fabrication, beryllium coating, brazing, graphite coating, fuel element and bundle assembly welding. Romania's Strategy for Energy Sector

  18. The handbook of nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, M. H.; Lee, B. W.; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Lee, K. S.

    2003-07-01

    This report analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This report took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and current status. It is here divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this report dealt four multilateral treaties concluded for international non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. And international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are also analyzed focused on UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, regional safeguards system and international conferences. In addition, this report reviewed the nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is a important tool for bilateral regime

  19. Non-proliferation and multinational enterprises

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-04-01

    The paper supplements CC/WG.2/9 in presenting the Japanese delegation's contribution in the areas of non-proliferation and multi-national enterprises. The paper questions whether multinational enrichment enterprises would constitute a significant non-proliferation factor, noting that the nature of the venture might create a potential for the dissemination of sensitive information. The paper also argues that a multi-national venture which was not economically competitive (with national facilities) would have questionable viability. The conclusion is that non-proliferation advantages, if any, would be a result, not an objective of such a venture

  20. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-05-01

    Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

  1. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

  2. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

  3. The future of non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gere, F.

    2000-01-01

    This paper comprises two parts. The first part makes a status of the non-proliferation policy: problems of ratification of Start 2 and CTBT treaties, nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in May 1998 etc. The second part makes a prospective reflexion on the evolution of the position of nuclearized countries at the 2015-2030 vista: role of Asia, nuclear perception, evolution of the US perception of non-proliferation, military strategy and European unification. (J.S.)

  4. China's position on nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Qian Jiadong.

    1986-01-01

    The paper discusses China's position on nuclear non-proliferation, in view of the fact that China does not subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China refuses to accede to the NPT because it considers the treaty to be discriminatory, and reasons are given for this point of view. However its stand for nuclear disarmament and disapproval of nuclear proliferation are declared. Nuclear arms race, prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament are also considered. (UK)

  5. Nuclear arbitration: Interpreting non-proliferation agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tzeng, Peter

    2015-01-01

    At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements. These agreements include, inter alia, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements.1 States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, commentators have proposed various enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The inconvenient truth, however, is that states are generally unwilling to consent to enforcement mechanisms concerning issues as critical to national security as nuclear non-proliferation.3 This article suggests an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem: interpretation mechanisms. Although an interpretation mechanism does not have the teeth of an enforcement mechanism, it can induce compliance by providing an authoritative interpretation of a legal obligation. Interpretation mechanisms would help solve the non-compliance problem because, as this article shows, in many cases of alleged non-compliance with a non-proliferation agreement, the fundamental problem has been the lack of an authoritative interpretation of the agreement, not the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, this article proposes arbitration as the proper interpretation mechanism for non-proliferation agreements. It advocates the establishment of a 'Nuclear Arbitration Centre' as an independent branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommends the gradual introduction of arbitration clauses into the texts of non-proliferation agreements. Section I begins with a discussion of international agreements in general and the importance of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section II then discusses nuclear non-proliferation agreements and their lack of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section III examines seven case studies of alleged non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements in order to show that the main problem in many cases

  6. Israel's position on non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marom, R.

    1986-01-01

    Israel maintained that the complex international system and worldwide political tension created a situation in which comprehensive plans of disarmament could not produce any positive result. The deadlock in the field of general and complete disarmament has brought Israel to the realization that one possible way to alleviate the stalemate could be progress by stages through partial measures of disarmament. Israel's position on non-proliferation indicates that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ), as it relates to the Middle-East, could serve as a credible alternative to the unilateral adherence to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and an effective measure of non-proliferation in the region. (Author)

  7. The European dimension in non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krause, J.

    1996-01-01

    Europe was for decades the focal point of efforts to prevent or constrain nuclear proliferation and the first region in which non-proliferation efforts failed. Paper deals with current proliferation problems in Europe, namely, diversion of weapons, diversion from dismantling, production over-capacity, security concerns. Legal instruments against proliferation in Europe described here include development of international norms; instruments of security assurance and cooperation; disarmament assistance; fissile material management; assistance in creating export control systems; improving and harmonizing export controls for dual-purpose items. Problems in implementing non-proliferation instruments are described separately

  8. United States non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1978-01-01

    U.S. non-proliferation policy is aimed at slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, managing the destabilizing effects of nuclear technology for energy purposes, and fostering international standards and institutions to deal responsibly with global nuclear development. These goals assume that nuclear technology has not already precluded social control and recognize the social benefits offered by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Non-proliferation policies recognize that the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is a more-difficult problem than technical ability and will concentrate on reducing those incentives through international agreements and safeguards and by maintaining the separation of commercial nuclear fuel cycles and military uses

  9. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

  10. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2003-01-01

    Although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has enjoyed considerable success, today the regime has never been under greater threat. Three states have challenged the objectives of the NPT, and there is a technology challenge - the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology and know-how. A major issue confronting the international community is, how to deal with a determined proliferator? Despite this gloomy scenario, however, the non-proliferation regime has considerable strengths - many of which can be developed further. The regime comprises complex interacting and mutually reinforcing elements. At its centre is the NPT - with IAEA safeguards as the Treaty's verification mechanism. Important complementary elements include: restraint in the supply and the acquisition of sensitive technologies; multilateral regimes such as the CTBT and proposed FMCT; various regional and bilateral regimes; the range of security and arms control arrangements outside the nuclear area (including other WMD regimes); and the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. Especially important are political incentives and sanctions in support of non-proliferation objectives. This paper outlines some of the key issues facing the non-proliferation regime

  11. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shea, M.

    2000-01-01

    Fissionable materials are common to all nuclear weapons and controls on the production, storage, processing and use of fissionable materials provides one means to address non-proliferation and disarmament. In this article, the relevance of such controls is examined and the current situation and future prospects are assessed. (authors)

  12. Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

    1997-01-01

    In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

  13. Nuclear exports and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courteix, Simone.

    1978-01-01

    Increased preoccupation in present times with the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the multiplication of international agreements such as the Non-proliferation Treaty and in the strengthening of consultations between industrialised countries (London Club). After analysing the IAEA safeguards system under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its shortcomings both technically and otherwise, the author considers how this situation can be remedied in the light of the London Agreements and in view of the position of the main countries concerned. The annex to the book contains the texts of many international agreements and relevant national regulations as well as nuclear policy statements. It also includes a detailed bibliograaphy. (NEA) [fr

  14. Non-proliferation efforts in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chellaney, B.

    1994-01-01

    Southern Asia is one of the most volatile regions in the world because of inter-State and intra-State conflicts. Security in the region highly depends on the rival capabilities of the involved states, Pakistan, India, China. Increased Confidence building and nuclear transparency are becoming more significant issues in attaining stability in the region, although non-proliferation efforts in this region have attained little headway

  15. Sovereignty and non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimminich, O.

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty seems to violate the fundamental principle of the quality of the states. However, if interpreted in the light of the latest developments of the international law, it is possible to justify the discriminations which it imposes on the non-nuclear states. A crucial point is the implementation of article VI by the nuclear states. If the latter procrastinate in nuclear disarmament the whole NPT-regime will collapse. (orig.) [de

  16. INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Donnelly, W H [Library of Congress, Washington, DC (USA)

    1980-12-01

    The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. This article outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US non-proliferation policy.

  17. Elements of safety and non proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jalouneix, Jean; Aurelle, Jacques; Funk, Pierre; Ladsous, David; Bon Nguyen, Romuald; Goue, Georges; Lefevre, Odile

    2015-01-01

    This book on nuclear safety and non proliferation is based on knowledge and expertise of the IRSN. The first chapter addresses the safety of nuclear materials, of their installations and of their transportations. It proposes some contextual elements, presents the general guidelines of the French nuclear safety arrangement, the approach to take risks into account, the involved governmental and public bodies, the legal framework, and the protection and control arrangement (in terms of planning of safety-related activities, in terms of operator obligations, in terms of exercises and management crisis). The second part addresses the safety of radioactive sources: context (peculiarity, losses and thefts), international framework (source categories, Euratom directive), and the French organisation. The third chapter addresses nuclear non proliferation: historical background (creation and role of the IAEA and of the EAEC, definitions), principle of statements, inspection process, and French organisation (legal framework, governmental bodies, the IRSN). The last chapter addresses the issue of chemical non proliferation: historical background, international context (Convention on chemical weapons, organisation for their ban), and the French organisation

  18. Strengthening the non proliferation regime: French views

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delaune, P.

    2013-01-01

    3 main issues can be identified in the French policy concerning the backing of non proliferation: 1) responding resolutely to proliferation crises, 2) reinforcing substantive efforts to prevent and impede proliferation, and 3) strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The first issue is very important because combating proliferation is vital to the security of all. Concerning the second issue, France attaches particular importance to strengthening specific measures to prevent and check proliferation. Let me mention a few proposals that we put forward: exports need to be controlled more effectively, proliferation activities have to be criminalized, or the development of proliferation-resistant technologies should be supported. Concerning the third issue it means the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, France proposes several means: -) aiming at the universalization of the additional protocol; -) ensuring that the Agency continues to have sufficient human, financial and technical resources to fulfill its verification mission effectively; -) encouraging the IAEA to make full use of the authority available to it; -) enhancing the use of information relevant to the delivery of the IAEA mandate; and -) sharing more accurate information concerning the breaches of commitments that happen. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  19. Nuclear non-proliferation: failures and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, R.; Press, R.

    1980-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of combined political and technical attempts to achieve worldwide acceptance of a commitment to non-proliferation, to note failures to date, and to identify essential factors to be satisfied if greater and necessary success is to be achieved in the immediate future. For this it is necessary to separate the realism and unrealism so often involved in discussing the concept of non-proliferation, as defined above, particularly if treated as a moral principle rather than as part of a general security issue reflecting shifts in regional and global stability. The political nature of the non-proliferation problem is underlined by the fact that whereas five nuclear weapon states are currently accepted, any threatened increase in that number is discouraged by every possible peaceful means. This fact combines political acceptance of an existing international situation with a belief that any addition to the present number must lead to international instability. Success in preventing additions may be more readily achieved through political understanding and perhaps some compromises, in particular cases, rather than through seeking a universal solution to a generalized problem

  20. The Asian countries and the non-proliferation treaty prorogation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffmann, N.

    1995-01-01

    This work deals with the non-proliferation treaty prorogation of Asia. The position of the asian countries under the old non-proliferation treaty is given. It includes the 1968 non-proliferation treaty signatories, the calling in question again and the criticisms revealed by the asian countries. The positions and the open forecasts expressed on the non-proliferation treaty prorogation and the article on the elimination of the nuclear weapons are also given. (O.L.)

  1. Nuclear non proliferation and disarmament; Non-proliferation nucleaire et desarmement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-07-01

    In the framework of the publication of a document on the ''weapons mastership, disarmament and non proliferation: the french action'', by the ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministry of Defense, the French Documentation organization presents a whole document. This document describes and details the following topics: the conference on the treaty of non proliferation of nuclear weapons, the France, Usa and Non Governmental Organizations position, the threats of the proliferation, the french actions towards the disarmament, the disarmament in the world, a chronology and some bibliographic resources. (A.L.B.)

  2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty increases security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kahiluoto, K.

    1995-01-01

    Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely was a historic decision. The Treaty is the most extensive international agreement on security policy to date; now its obligations have become a permanent part of international justice. Moreover, the NPT represents a political and moral obligation. Through the NPT, the international community has made a permanent commitment to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Increasing pressures will be applied to the few countries still outside the NPT, making it more likely that these countries will eventually change their views. The likelihood of regional bans on nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia, too, will increase. The Treaty promotes the establishment of new nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-free zone in Latin America - the countries covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty - is already very close to its full implementation. Finland is firmly committed to the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT Conference of 1995 was among the first international meetings in which Finland participated, and took an active role, as a Member State of the European Union. (orig.)

  3. Positive steps toward non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Greenhalgh, G.

    1979-08-30

    Russel W. Fox and Mason Willrich in their paper, International Custody of Plutonium Stocks: A First Step Toward an International Regime for Sensitive Nuclear Energy Activities, advocate placing excess plutonium in an international custodial facility; critical criteria governing releases are outlined so that, on one hand the owners can have high confidence that their plutonium will be returned promptly, under appropriate circumstances, and on the other hand, all the other participating and concerned countries can have confidence in the assurance that plutonium will be released only for immediate use in a defined and approved civil purpose. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the 1978 issue of its Year Book, recognizes a move towards a more positive approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation. It is noted that the non-proliferation strategies of the main supply countries have largely concentrated on a two-pronged approach of technology denials with tightening of safeguards. But already, enrichment, reprocessing, and breeder reactor programs extend far beyond the five nuclear weapon states. History testifies to the limitations of a policy of technical denials. SIPRI recognizes that another way to dissuade non-nuclear weapon states from creating their own enrichment or reprocessing plants would be to establish an open market for these services, a market characterized by diversity and competition. So far, there has been no case where a country has developed nuclear explosives by diverting material from a civil power station. Development of nuclear weapons by various countries is briefly noted and areas where strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is needed are noted. (MCW)

  4. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

  5. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

  6. Non-proliferation and international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.

    1992-01-01

    Full text: In my view, drastic nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon States could be coupled with universal commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear weapon States by 1995 when the extension of the NPT Will be discussed. The incentives and disincentives for making and stockpiling nuclear weapons are first of all in the political and security fields, (Global and regional detente reduce the incentive, With the cold war gone, the US and Russia are now agreeing on far-reaching cuts in their nuclear arsenals and at some point the other declared nuclear weapon States Will follow.In the regional fields, we have seen how Argentina and Brazil are about to commit themselves to exclusively peaceful uses of the atom through the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty. And we have seen how South Africa has joined the NPT. A new wave of States adhering to the NPT may be expected from countries in the former Soviet Union. Some have already come, others are on the way. Detente in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent would improve the outlook for non-proliferation in these areas. A second barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in export restrictions on sensitive nuclear material and equipment, Following the discoveries in Iraq, these restrictions are being strengthened in a large number of States. A third barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in the economic and political consequences that would follow for a State if IAEA safeguards inspection revealed activities aimed at the production of nuclear weapons. These must have a high degree of reliability. The case of Iraq showed that it was possible for a closed, highly militarized State to hide nuclear activities from the IAEA and the world We are now drawing the lessons from this case. It is not physically possible for inspectors to look into every building and basement in vast countries, They must have information about where to look, and the IAEA is significantly strengthening its information basis. The IAEA has also re

  7. Non-proliferation and safeguards in South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broodryk, Alta

    2001-01-01

    South Africa occupies a unique position in the history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in being the only country with a nuclear weapons capability that was voluntary terminated before acceding to the Treaty. The first nuclear device built was completed in December 1982, five more devices followed at an orderly pace of less than one per year and on 26 February 1990 cabinet officially implemented the termination of its nuclear deterrent capability. The events that flowed from the termination was that South Africa: Acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (10 July 1991); Signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/394, (16 September 1991); Submitted its initial inventory of nuclear material (30 September 1991); and Received first verification team from the Agency (November 1991). South Africa, being dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became a party to various non-proliferation treaties, regimes and groups. The National Non- Proliferation Policy, as published in a Cabinet memorandum, also clearly states this commitment. To comply with the requirements of the Treaty and Agreement the following two acts were published: The Nuclear Energy Act; The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The Minister of Minerals and Energy is the State Authority for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in South Africa, however, the Minister delegated this Authority to NECSA's Safeguards Division. To implement the requirements of the various acts, control regimes and treaties a State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard, was designed. This standard focuses on customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, the demonstration of commitment and the prevention of non-conformity. To comply with the requirements of the standard the following procedures were established and maintained: A Quality Manual; Customer focus; Control of documents; Control of quality records; Internal Audits

  8. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Haeckel, E.; Haefele, W.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Ungerer, W.

    1991-01-01

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP) [de

  9. International aspects of non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aucoin, P.A.

    1978-01-01

    There are currently two areas on the national scene and one on the international scene that require immediate attention. The first is relief under contracts for enrichment services, an area in which the US can still demonstrate its desire to become a stable and continuous source of supply. The second national area is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. The United States must proceed very cautiously, however, for if discretion and very careful judgment are not used, the Act will immediately be branded as a blatant effort on the part of the US to control the energy options of other sovereign states. The international area is that of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation program. This medium exists for wise and deliberate growth of a commercial nuclear power program which can serve the global community. The next three years probably allow one remaining chance for successful containment of weapons proliferation. If we do not recognize the rights of every sovereign state to voluntarily participate and agree, we, as members of the global community, will have failed

  10. Missile non-proliferation: an alternative approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delory, Stephane

    2011-01-01

    In this report, the author first proposes an overview of the notion of missile prohibition. He notices that the association between weapons of mass destruction and missiles is a prelude to the legitimacy of missile control, notably within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime or MTCR. He also comments the notion of total ban. In a second part, the author analyses and discusses the limitations of the control of technology diffusion. He discusses the role of the MTCR, comments the evolution of this regime with the taking of China and Russia into consideration, the impacts of national implementations of export regimes on the MTCR, and economic aspects of control implementation. In the next part, the author addresses other kinds of limitations, i.e. those related with capacity evolutions of proliferating States. The last part addresses the evolution towards a new definition of approach to missile non-proliferation, notably in terms of perception of missile roles and of technology transfer controls

  11. Flaws in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leventhal, P.

    1986-01-01

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nucler Weapons has the twin objectives of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons and ending the nuclear arms race on the one hand, and promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy on the other. In quantitative and symbolic terms the NPT is a huge success. More than two-thirds of the world's nations have signed on, making this the most popular arms control agreement on earth. Not a single nation has declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons state beyond the original five members of the ''nuclear club'' who qualified for weapons status under the terms of the Treaty itself: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. No party to the Treaty has exercised the permitted option to drop out, and none has been found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to have diverted nuclear material from civil to weapons purposes. Nor has any party been known to have violated NPT prohibitions on developing or assisting other nations to develop nuclear weapons

  12. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - crisis of a concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eisenbart, C.; Ehrenstein, D. von

    1990-01-01

    The Working Group of FEST (Protestant Study Community) and VDW (Association of German Scientists) presents twelve theses on the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and deduces recommendations, in particular for the Federal Government. The WG thinks that scope and significance of international nuclear policy has not been sufficiently perceived neither by the German public nor by politicians. The theses are supplemented and explained in more detail by special contributions of the WG's members. The contributions deal with the historical background, with the instruments of NP policy, with international law, with risks and limiting these risks, with economic aspects, with nuclear policy in the Third World, with the chances of nuclear disarmament, and with Federal NP policy. The 'twelve theses' as well as the 22 contributions are individual records. (HSCH) [de

  13. Twenty years of the Non-proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1990-01-01

    The report assesses the achievements of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and discusses ways in which the non-proliferation regime could be strenghtened. It recommends a series of measures to be taken by the parties of the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, with a view to reinforcing the Treaty and achieving its universality. 198 refs

  14. Non proliferation 1980 - INFCE and TnP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rainer, R.

    1981-01-01

    The TNP (non-proliferation agreement of nuclear weapons), its non proliferation policy and the peaceful use of fuel cycle are described, as well as the safeguards of IAEA. It is also mentioned the functions of INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation). (A.B.T.) [pt

  15. Non-proliferation aspects of long term assurance of supply

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The meetings in this section deal with the non-proliferation aspects of long-term assurance of supply of the nuclear fuel cycle. A list of 12 fundamental questions concerning the observation and application of the non-proliferation regulations is followed by the comments made by representatives of 10 countries

  16. Perspectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koungou, Leon

    2004-01-01

    To join traditional methods and new approaches of 'non-proliferation'. This is a technical method and the best way to fight against 'non-proliferation' which is facing few preoccupations: knowledge's disseminations; technologies; equipments and weapons that should be stopped. As it's important to note the return of nuclear danger as the end of confrontation between west-east which should be reduce. As the adaptation of mechanisms is necessary today, as it is important to react about states' incitations to violate international engagement of non-proliferation. Areas control allows finding out change and evolution, but more insufficient. Functional difficulties show that the IAEA (International Agency of Atomic Energy) does not work good. Safeguard system does not allow to respect 'non-proliferation' engagements; for instance 'junkies states' that they cannot dissuade traditional methods. The fight of 'non-proliferation' shows new progresses with fearing methods of prevention actions and heaviest international controls of exportation. The target of this is very ambitious. This new method is self-successful because it contributes to re-enforce international security when defeating acquisition of nuclear and mass destruction weapons by non-states factors. Therefore non-proliferation regime and especially 'non-proliferation treaty' remains delicate as long as some militaries state such USA will reject their 'non-proliferation' engagement. (author) [fr

  17. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the Obama Administration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baek, Jin Hyun; Hwang, Ji Hwan

    2009-12-01

    The objective of this study is to analyze and foresee trends of international nuclear non-proliferation regimes focused on the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the Obama administration, and suggest national policy directions which promote utilization and development of nuclear energy in Korea. For the effective and efficient implementation of the national nuclear use and development program in current international nuclear environment, many efforts should be made: to actively and positively participate in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; to strengthen nuclear diplomacy in a more systematic manner; and to strengthen the international nuclear cooperation

  18. Non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation - accomplishments and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, H.R. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to assess the accomplishments in non-proliferation and nuclear co-operation since the beginning of President Reagan's administration, and the challenges remaining to be met in those fields. (NEA) [fr

  19. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  20. Perspectives and benefits of the non-proliferating fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parker, F.

    2012-01-01

    The world community has faced the issues of nuclear non-proliferation for decades. Frank Parker, Emeritus Distinguished Professor at Vanderbilt University, has proposed a non-proliferating fuel cycle, which greatly reduces the risk of use of nuclear materials for military purpose. A simplified fuel cycle with reduced opportunities for proliferation of nuclear weapons and permanent disposal of radioactive wastes as well as a reference sub-seabed HLW disposal system are described [ru

  1. Non-proliferation and security: synergy and differences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joly, J.

    2013-01-01

    Operators of nuclear facilities put in place both physical and organisational means to meet in a comprehensive way the requirements associated with Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Safety and Security. The common aim is to protect man and the environment from ionising radiation. The approaches for meeting these requirements have real similarities, but also differences which need to be respected in order to develop an appropriate synergy for obtaining the best possible level of safety, security and non-proliferation. This article aims to show the provisions that have been taken with regard to non-proliferation, security and safety which complement and reinforce each other.The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  2. The new US nuclear non-proliferation and export policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Welck, S. von.

    1981-01-01

    The future American nuclear non-proliferation and export policy will be determined chiefly by three elements: (1) Adherence to the former objective of nuclear non-proliferation. (2) A large and varied assortment of old and new tools for implementing this goal. (3) Much more differentiation in applying these tools in the light of the reliability, with respect to non-proliferation policy, of the respective partner. Consequently, it would make little sense for the new Administration to force upon allied industrialized countries, whose nuclear technologies are at the same level as that of the United States, restrictive rules on reprocessing and breeder technology. The new measures designed to curb proliferation are especially meant to destroy motivations that could cause states to own nuclear explosives. This also applies to the removal of economic motivations. (orig.) [de

  3. Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pomper, Miles A.

    2010-01-01

    Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

  4. Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Yong Soo

    2009-07-01

    KAERI has jointly worked with Sandia National Laboratories for Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia for the last five years. This project aims at support activities in this joint project between two states. The annual meetings were held during the project period, the 4th one in 2008 and the 5th one in 2009. In addition code comparison between KAERI and SNL's codes for assessing the back-end fuel cycle options was carried out. This project strongly enhances the close tie for the non-proliferation, transparency and safeguards among Korea Japan China Taiwan the United States Russia Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Thailand Vietnam and others for the project period

  5. Sustaining non-proliferation in the 1980s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nye, J.S.

    1984-01-01

    The subject is discussed as follows: introduction; the non-proliferation regime - 1950s to 1970s (IAEA safeguards; Non-proliferation Treaty; oil crisis; proposed sale of facilities for producing weapons-usable materials; USA position); the Carter Administration approach; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation); incentives (USA); export legislation (USA); domestic breeder policy (USA); maintaining the regime in the 1980s (safeguards; Pu and highly enriched uranium management; international spent fuel storage; fuel assurances); the problem of priority; rate vs. degree of proliferation; relations among regimes (international regimes); conclusion. (U.K.)

  6. The IAEA and non-proliferation: is quiescence progress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herron, L.W.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current status of more important non-proliferation aspects affecting or involving the IAEA. The questions dealt with cover in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Committee on Assurances of Supply established by the IAEA in 1980 and the International Plutonium Storage Study prepared by an IAEA expert group. The author concludes that in a number of areas involving this Agency, recent considerable activity at both political and technical levels has produced few tangible results althrough the situation is not static. (NEA) [fr

  7. British nuclear non-proliferation policy and the trident purchase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keohane, D.

    1984-01-01

    Since the mid-1950s, the UK has had a policy of making significant and sustained efforts to minimise the spread of nuclear arms. Unlike the global focus of its non-proliferation policy, the decision on Trident in centred upon national and perhaps regional requirements. At a time when non-nuclear countries are charging nuclear-weapon states with a grave failure to meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, Britain is making plans that would further increase the gap between the nuclear 'haves' and have-nots' and that indicate it expects to require nuclear arms in the next century. It would of course be unrealistic to expect a government to fully harmonise its manifold policies and unreasonable to suggest it should give absolute priority to one of its policy concerns, such as non-proliferation. But Britain is emphasising the high value it places upon the independent possession of strategic nuclear arms through its decision to purchase Trident, thus implicitly contradicting the logic underlying its non-proliferation policy. Compared to other factors, the influence of the Trident decision upon the non-proliferation regime appears very marginal, yet it is unlikely to strengthen that regime

  8. United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    Science and technology transformed the world in the twentieth century. Living standards improved but warfare was rendered more deadly. Weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical and nuclear - and their means of delivery were developed, as ever more sophisticated conventional armaments were produced and disseminated. The horrors and destruction of armed conflict persist. The need for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training has never been greater. Indeed, changing concepts and perceptions of security and threat magnify the urgency for new thinking to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation goals. More than a decade after the end of the cold war and at the start of the twenty- first century, there is a pressing need to combat ignorance, complacency and a culture of violence. These can be countered through long-term programmes of education and training, especially those related to disarmament and non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with a view to their reduction and complete elimination. At the same time, concern has heightened over the global threat of the excessive and destabilizing proliferation of conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, rendering more acute the need to combat such proliferation in a sustained way through disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Additionally there is a need to raise awareness of new challenges to international security and the process of disarmament. Among them, terrorism, with the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction, is a source of particular concern. Other challenges, such as organized crime, poverty, human rights abuses and environmental concerns must also be taken into account. Education and training remain important but under utilized tools for promoting peace, disarmament and non-proliferation. The present report addresses that issue and proposes ideas for action

  9. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-01

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  10. Nuclear non-proliferation: a guide to the debate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1985-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of 15 countries have been studied and summarized for use by participants of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation (NPT) of Nuclear weapons held in September 1985. The main purpose of the guide is to examine what action must be taken to ensure the Treaty's survival. There are four chapters following an introduction, covering the implementation of the essential provisions of the NPT, the motivations of the countries which have not joined the NPT, together with the motivations of those which have formally renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, even though they possess the technical and economic potential necessary to manufacture them. The last chapter summarises measures which might be taken to strengthen the NPT including ideas put forward at a workshop held in 1984. (author)

  11. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-15

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  12. Reforming the non-proliferation system in the 1980s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1984-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of the 1970s were based largely on the misconception that the main danger lay in the possible misuse of civil nuclear-power plants for the production of weapon materials. In consequence their aim, whether by means of denial or control, was to ensure that such misuse was made more difficult in all countries with nuclear-power industries. Less attention was paid to the potential for misuse of the nuclear-research plants in the handful of countries outside the non-proliferation system. The resulting difficulties placed in the way of countries developing their nuclear-power industries damaged relations between the supplier and the consumer states, and discredited any new efforts aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation system. By contrast, the 1980s began, first in INFCE and then in the Committee on Assurances of Supply, with a concerted attempt to re-establish a dialogue based on a relationship of trust between the supplier and the customer states. But a restored consensus will not, on its own, deal with the problem of those states that are outside the non-proliferation system and that have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The outcome of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply may help to attract some of those states into the system, but more needs to be done either by adapting the NPT, making adherence to it appear more attractive, or by devising some alternative code of behaviour for states not party to the Treaty and by seeking to remove the political obstacles that lie in the way of at least some of the potential weapon states adhering to the Treaty

  13. Non-proliferation policies and demand for uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warnecke, S.J.

    1978-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of USA, Canada and Australia are outlined, and the effects on nuclear policy in the consumer countries, particularly the member states of the European Community and Japan are considered. Supply and demand in relation to uranium, security and economic aspects are covered. Reprocessing, the use of plutonium in breeder reactors, and the wider issues of international confidence and trade are discussed. (U.K.)

  14. URENCO: A Multinational Contribution to Non-Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korbmacher, T.

    2015-01-01

    URENCO was founded in 1970 following the signing of the Treaty of Almelo by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The fundamental principles for effective supervision of URENCO's technology and enrichment operations with respect to non-proliferation issues have been laid down in this treaty. In order to enable the construction of a URENCO enrichment facility in the USA and to permit the transfer of classified information into the USA, another treaty has been concluded in 1992. The US government entered into the Treaty of Washington together with the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to ensure that the same conditions that had been agreed in the Treaty of Almelo would also apply to the US. To allow for the completion of the joint venture with Areva regarding the URENCO Group's technology business ETC, the Treaty of Cardiff has been signed on 12 July 2005 by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France. Through this treaty, France is obliged to adhere to the principles of the Treaty of Almelo. For each treaty, control bodies have been formed with representatives of the governments of the signatory countries. These committees exercise the role of effective supervision of the technology and operations with respect to non-proliferation issues. They also consider all questions concerning the safeguards system (as established by IAEA/Euratom), classification arrangements and security procedures, exports of the technology and enriched uranium, as well as other non-proliferation issues. The presentation describes how the multinational structure of URENCO contributes to Non-Proliferation on the basis of the above mentioned treaties. Beyond that, the international cross linking of operational working groups and committees within the URENCO Group structure is explained. This structure implies an additional assurance to achieve the safeguards goals set. (author)

  15. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations

  16. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations.

  17. Impasses and mistakes of the nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirst, M.

    1980-01-01

    It is analyzed the limitations for implementing the American Nuclear non-proliferation policy. It is shown the crisis of the North American international relations, with the economic and scientific development of the advanced capitalist nations and some countries of the third world, the penetration of these countries in the world trade commerce of the nuclear industry as sellers and cunsumers, and the Latin American's and Brazil's position in the international panorama of nuclear power. (M.C.K.) [pt

  18. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

  19. Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1978-01-01

    This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

  20. Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshisaki, M.B.

    1993-01-01

    The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

  1. Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

    2015-01-01

    The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

  2. Non-proliferation and the control of atomic energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1977-01-01

    The non-proliferation problem has never ceased to haunt and to influence those responsible for the development of atomic energy. During and after the Second World War, Anglo-American co-operation was reflected in restrictions on the exchange of enrichment and reprocessing know-how. Between 1945 and 1955, the Anglo-Saxon powers continued with the policy of secrecy and uranium monopoly decided on in 1943 at the Quebec summit conference. Starting in 1955, the failure of this policy led - at the suggestion of the United States of America - to a freer flow of information and to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with its safeguards, which permitted widespread application of the policy of technical assistance subject to controls and widespread commerce in research and power reactors - mainly fuelled with enriched uranium and manufactured in the USA. There followed periods characterized by general legal blocks, with two unilateral renunciation treaties - the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, covering non-underground tests, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1968, covering nuclear explosive devices and the entire fuel cycle. The Indian atomic explosion and the acceleration of nuclear programmes owing to the oil crisis prompted - in 1974 - efforts by supplier countries to limit the transfer of sensitive technology and the possession of plants capable of producing substances which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; the USA has even proposed the curtailment of plutonium extraction and of breeder construction, although these are considered by many countries to be essential to the independence of their energy development programmes. This policy of reserving the sensitive stages of the fuel cycles to a few advanced countries and the questioning of existing nuclear agreements have created, in the relations between supplier and recipient countries, a regrettable intensification of the distrust which must be dispelled

  3. U.S. - India nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yash Thomas, Mannully

    2008-01-01

    The agreement for cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (referred as 123 agreement) acknowledges a shift in international strategies and relations in both countries. As to India, it marks the end of nuclear isolation resulting from constraint, embargoes and controls and instead opens the path for nuclear commerce. With respect to the United States it entails a major geo strategic ally in the evolving South Asia region and promises large commercial benefits to the US nuclear sector. This is called 'nuclear deal' and constitutes one of the major political, economic and strategic relationship developing between the two countries since 2001. It will lead to the separation of military and civilian nuclear installations in India, the latter to be placed under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It thus, de facto accepts India in the club of nuclear weapon states within the meaning of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) although it is not party to this treaty, refuses adhering to it, officially possesses nuclear weapons and is not subject to a comprehensive system of safeguards. This article will examine the developments which led to the 123 agreement and its subsequent implementation in a wider context of international relations and non proliferation. First, the articles gives a brief introduction into the Indian nuclear programme, the legislative framework and the factors which necessitated nuclear cooperation between India and the United States. Secondly, it will address the implementation of the nuclear deal and subsequent developments. Finally, it will analyse the non proliferation issues related to the implementation of the agreement. (N.C.)

  4. Approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subrahmanyam, K.

    1981-01-01

    The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)

  5. Indonesia ratifies the treaty on non proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moendi Poernomo

    1979-01-01

    By Act no. 8 of 1978 Indonesia ratified the treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons. This means that Indonesia became a party to the treaty. Ratification does not guarantee that Indonesia will automatically obtain assistance in developing its nuclear technology capability, but in this way at least Indonesia demonstrates its intention to promote world peace as clearly stated in the Main Guide Lines of State Policy. Development of nuclear technology can be achieved through international cooperation with advanced countries without being suspected of having intention other than peace. (author)

  6. The EU and non proliferation: need for a quantum leap?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kobia, R.

    2008-01-01

    This paper analyses the possibilities of a strategy and all-encompassing European policy that could constitute an efficient and structured system against proliferation. This paper concentrate on actions and developments at the level of the E.U. sensu stricto, i.e. where common actions under the E.U. umbrella are set up and contribute to the efforts in non-proliferation. It does not cover all measures and mechanisms under the 'non-proliferation regime', the integrated and evolving network of unilateral, bilateral, regional, multilateral treaties and other standing-setting arrangements, which collectively provide a framework guiding the behaviour of states, international organisations, enterprises, associations and all non state actors generally active in the nuclear sector. For the purposes of this paper, the 'utilitarian and teleological' prisms are used. The 'utilitarian perspective aims to maximizing the net expectable utility for all parties affected by a decision or action knowing the that traditional utilitarianism favours the options that bring about the best consequences and aims at the 'good'. The teleological approach lies in an interpretation that favours the ultimate goals of any provision and action as well as their spirit, rather than accepting to remain in a more narrow exegetic interpretation that favours the strict letter thereof. (N.C.)

  7. New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

    1999-01-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

  8. Current nuclear non-proliferation policies in the world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru

    1997-01-01

    Although a global nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has disappeared, many challenges to nuclear non-proliferation have emerged. Sources of concern, like a nuclear weapon program by Iraq and suspicions of North Korea have caused the adoption of a variety of political and technical measures in order to meet these challenges in the post-Cold War era. This paper describes the following ten policies for non-proliferation: 1) Strengthening the NPT; 2) Nuclear reduction; 3) CTBT and cut-off treaty; 4) Establishment of NWFZs; 5) Counterproliferation; 6) Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards; 7) Control and disposal of nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons; 8) Export control; 9) Registration of plutonium; and 10) Actions against nuclear smuggling. The first four measures can be said to be mainly political policies, the fifth measure (counterproliferation), can be categorized as basically a military policy, and the last five measures can be said to be technical. (J.P.N.)

  9. Open Source and Trade Data for Non-Proliferation: Challenges and Opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, I.; Gillard, N.

    2015-01-01

    This paper explores what more systematic exploitation of trade data can contribute to the state evaluation process. The paper begins by setting out a typology of trade data, which groups the data into five categories: · Government Declared Data, which is prepared and submitted by States to an international authority for non-proliferation purposes. · Government Recorded Data, which includes information collected by the state for its own purposes, and which is not routinely submitted to international authorities for non-proliferation purposes. It includes (some) export licencing data, customs data, and business registration information. · Business-held data, which includes information on a company's own products and customers, but also ''market intelligence''. · Intelligence and Enforcement Derived Information, which can include information on specific procurement attempts, networks, or procurement requirements. · Procurement Requirements Information, which can include information released by a programme for the purpose of seeking goods or services. Challenges and opportunities related to further exploitation of trade data sources in each category are then explored, as are factors related to accessibility (both in terms of mandates and more practical considerations), reliability (including presentation of a typology), completeness, and duplication in data. Next, the paper explores how the IAEA can systematically collect, integrate and analyze the various sources of trade data given the considerations outlined above. In particular, this section focuses on how data in variable structures can be integrated into the state evaluation process. In concluding, the paper will describe how the newly formed ''Collaboration on Open Source and Trade Analysis for Non-proliferation'' (COSTA-NP) is seeking to develop each of the categories of trade data. The paper links to research objectives 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 of the IAEA

  10. Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

  11. Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

  12. Carter faces new dilemmas over non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickson, D.

    1979-01-01

    Questions underlying the current domestic debate as to whether the US should revise its attitude towards the relationship between the spread of nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are considered. Problems arising from the provisional conclusions of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, set up at President Carter's suggestion in 1977, are evaluated. The thorny question of how to deal with the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for review in 1980 is discussed. Finally there is the issue, for which it is concluded nobody pretends to have all the answers, of whether a sufficient consensus - involving both developed and developing countries as partners in decision-making - can be forged to develop and apply an effective control regime, or whether increasing competition between both producers and consumers of nuclear power will be such as to limit the possibilities for multilateral action, shifting the focus back to bilateral actions. (UK)

  13. Editorial: disarmament, non proliferation, confidence-building measures, armament control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soutou, Georges-Henri

    2015-01-01

    After having described the vicious circle existing between disarmament and security as it appeared before and during the first World War, the author deals with the specific case of nuclear disarmament as it was first addressed just after the Second World War, and was then not accepted by the Russians. He comments the political and strategical approach adopted by the Kennedy administration, notably within the context of severe crises (Berlin and Cuba). This resulted in the re-establishment of a relationship between war and policy as defined by Clausewitz, but based on a trilogy of three inseparable pairs: deterrence and armament control, armament control and non proliferation, armament control and confidence-building measures. The author shows that this trilogy has been somehow operating until the end of Cold War, and that nothing works anymore since the end of Cold War and of the bipolar world

  14. Nuclear power and the non-proliferation issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    This leaflet, issued by the British Nuclear Forum on behalf of the industry, seeks first to place the problem of reconciling the need for nuclear power with its possible weapon uses in a historical perspective. Secondly, it describes the technical and political measures which are now taken, and others which could be introduced in order to ensure that nuclear power, which offers the cheapest and safest large-scale energy source for the future, can be made available without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Headings are: introduction; the early years; the IAEA; uranium enrichment; plutonium; secrecy has failed; the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the London Suppliers Group; the situation today; the British position; conclusions. (U.K.)

  15. Future of US utilities under non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ladesich, J.N.

    1978-01-01

    The non-proliferation policy, a negative policy that closes the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, is only a small part of a chaotic energy environment characterized by inaction. The impact of this environment on California utilities has resulted in a virtual moratorium on new facilities at a time when the nuclear option can be shown to be vital. Utilities are experiencing uncertainties in future power generation because alternatives to nuclear energy may not be the best choices. Utilities feel frustrated by the inaction; not by the objectives of the accountability and security proposals. The utilities will continue to support nuclear power and the completion of the fuel cycle in spite of these uncertainties

  16. The future of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siddiqa, A.

    1997-01-01

    Nuclear proliferation in South Asia is currently one of the hot topics in world politics. The concern of the international community, and especially the USA, over this issue is coupled with the fear of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. As a result, Washington has been using its 'stick and carrot' policy to persuade the two countries involved not to develop their nuclear programs for military purposes. However both countries have not only continued to develop their nuclear ambitions, but seem to have achieved vertical nuclear proliferation. This paper examines the future non-proliferation in the South Asian region in the 1990s. This will be achieved by looking at the following: the development of the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan; how these programs have been developed; the reasons for acquiring the capability for non-conventional defence; the real fear in terms of nuclear proliferation in the region; the possible options for dealing with nuclear proliferation in South Asia

  17. Nuclear non proliferation. To declare, to support, and to analyse

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2016-01-01

    While proposing a brief presentation of the three main stages of an inspection (from the notification and preparation to the implementation of corrective actions), and a brief interview of a member of the French Euratom technical Committee (CTE) who presents this body and its role, this article proposes an overview of the commitment and practices of the IRSN regarding nuclear non-proliferation. It recalls that the control of nuclear materials is required by the Euratom Treaty, describes how the IRSN supports industrials to facilitate inspections made by the European Commission, and helps them in answering the post-inspection letter and in implementing corrective actions. It also evokes the role of the IRSN in nuclear material accounting

  18. Non-proliferation and advances in nuclear science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iyengar, P.K.

    1995-01-01

    So far, the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has concentrated on safeguard regimes based on technologies relating to the production of uranium and plutonium in nuclear reactors, and on their potential diversion for use in nuclear weapons. As nuclear science advances, however, nuclear technology both peaceful and for weapons will change, and for the NPT to remain relevant, it must reflect these changes. At this juncture, when the NPT is coming up for review in a year's time, it is important for physicists to take a fresh look at recent advances in nuclear science, and inform the policy-makers and the public at large about their potential for impacting nuclear technology in the future. In this article a few such advances are highlighted and their implications for the NPT are considered. (author). 4 refs

  19. JAEA's actions and contributions to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Michiji, Toshiro

    2012-06-01

    Japan, a non-nuclear weapons state, has established a commercial nuclear fuel cycle including LWRs, and now is developing a fast neutron reactor fuel cycle as part of the next generation nuclear energy system, with commercial operation targeted for 2050. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is the independent administrative agency for conducting comprehensive nuclear R&D in Japan after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA and its predecessors have extensive experience in R&D, facility operations, and safeguards development and implementation for new types of nuclear facilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the operator of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities and numerous nuclear materials, JAEA makes international contributions to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. This paper provides an overview of JAEA's development of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards technologies, including remote monitoring of nuclear facilities, environmental sample analysis methods and new efforts since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

  20. The Nuclear Progress And The Non-Proliferation Policies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Popa-Simil, Liviu [Los Alamos, NM 87544 (United States)

    2009-06-15

    The 2008 fall crisis showed the limits of globalization under the actual rules and de-regulations promoted by few developed countries. It also showed the weakness of the planetary economy induced by strong economic connections that makes the propagation of crises faster than the spread of welfare. The increase in severe weather and natural disasters showed how fast the civilization can be spoiled while the competition for oil resources made the interstate tensions grow. For almost all states, the development of the nuclear power becomes a prime option, even oil producers started to show interest in nuclear technology and also, policies that in particular are clearly oriented towards national development policies. The fact that anybody mastering nuclear technologies and uses for power production is capable in a reasonable time to produce weapons is a well-known fact. Therefore, in order to reduce the proliferation risk it is necessary to contain the nuclear science development. An alternative is to shift the weight in promoting renewable energies, as potential future energy alternative. Considering rigorously the future climate change effects, it becomes obvious that any delay in nuclear development will turn very costly for any nation ignoring all these facts and, the complexity of the real nonproliferation is growing. This new trend raises serious challenges in front of all states regarding the non-proliferation and, in order to keep control and stimulate a sound nuclear development, some of the actual non-proliferation concepts and policies have to be reformulated and enhanced. This has to be done in parallel with a more intensive implication of the international organisms in the real development of the nuclear power at national level. The large diversity of nuclear applications with huge collateral implication in every national economy makes the role of the international organisms orders of magnitude more important. The new challenges posed in front of the

  1. Academic perspectives on the non-proliferation problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gummett, P.

    1984-01-01

    The USA has demonstrated a greater penchant for a technical focus aimed at denial than any other state, despite a brief interlude under President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger when it displayed a total lack of concern about proliferation. This terminated with the sudden reawakening of interest following the Indian explosion and the announcement that the USA was not prepared to accept additional requests for uranium-enrichment services. According to Brenner, this enrichment crisis was engineered as a deliberate act of policy: yet this act of policy was unrelated to non-proliferation objectives. Rather, the Nixon administration's interest in privatisation in general, and commercialisation of enriched-uranium supply in particular, had led to a bureaucratic battle between the domestic side of the White House, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). This battle was totally unrelated to foreign policy: a situation not without precedent in this area. Nixon's Republican administration deliberately provoked a supply bottleneck by changing the terms of AEC supply contracts, with the intention of forcing the Democrat-dominated JCAE to agree to the entry of private industry into the uranium-enrichment business. The outcome was more dramatic than had been intended

  2. The world's non-proliferation regime in time

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, George

    2005-01-01

    The idea for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries was supported unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 1961. The NPT permits the P-5 to have nuclear weapons. All other NPT signatories are 'non-nuclear-weapon States' who are prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons. To gain their signatures, the NPT promises assistance to them in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and negotiations toward nuclear disarmament. Besides the P-5, the treaty now has 184 countries that have promised not to have nuclear weapons and that have agreed to accept inspections by the IAEA to verify that they are carrying out their promises. However, India, Pakistan, and Israel refused to join the treaty, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) withdrew from it. Of these four countries, only India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons. Israel and North Korea are assumed to have them. The non-proliferation regime today includes much more than the NPT. The IAEA standards for inspection were the next most important element. The IAEA inspection requirements negotiated in the early 1970s were shown to be inadequate by Iraq's success in hiding its nuclear-weapon efforts before and during the Gulf War of 1991. The Additional Protocol of 1997 is slowly replacing these requirements, but, as of December 2004, was in effect in only 62 NPT member countries. The regime includes the agreements creating nuclear-weapon free zones in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Mongolia. The countries that formed these zones are also members of the NPT. The regime includes suggestions for standards and financial assistance plus requirements for physical protection of nuclear material from theft by terrorists or others. These efforts range from the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to the technical assistance provided by the IAEA and some countries, to the financial assistance offered by the G-8 and some other IAEA

  3. The SSAC in international safeguards and non-proliferation aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bett, F.L.; Humphreys, J.J.

    1989-01-01

    The history of international efforts against horizontal proliferation, including the Baruch Plan, bilateral safeguards agreement, IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines and the Physical Protection Convention, is reviewed. The role of IAEA NPT safeguards in verifying nondiversion and ensuring no misuse of supplied nuclear items is discussed. The vital importance of successful performance of this role to peaceful nuclear commerce is stressed. The application of NPT safeguards by the IAEA is described, particularly the IAEA's requirement that a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material be established. Such a State System has two different but complementary areas of responsibility - ensuring that the use of nuclear material is controlled effectively and can be readily accounted for (this includes the area of physical protection), and providing accounts of nuclear material to responsible bodies such as the State's government and equally importantly to the IAEA for safeguards purpose, as the IAEA bases its conclusions about diversion on its verification of the data provided by the State System

  4. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Where Next?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, G.

    2013-01-01

    Let me come straight to the point: We are still at a real watershed with respect to the whole nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament project, about which hopes have been so high for most of the last two years, especially following the political breakthrough of the election of a US president totally committed to the ultimate achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world. Unless the key players in the international community, and there are many that matter in this context, not just the United States of America and the Russian Federation, get really serious about moving forward on the multiple critical agenda issues that face us - not just safeguards, the subject of this symposium, but right across the whole spectrum of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful-uses challenges - there is a very real danger that such remaining momentum for change as there is will stall, that the whole project will fall apart, and that we will be condemned to live for the indefinitely foreseeable future in a nuclear world that is very dangerous indeed. The prevailing sentiment after the May Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was one of relief - that the conference had not broken down as it did in 2005 and that catastrophe had been avoided; in effect, that this particular watershed point had been passed. But the positive gains from that conference, when objectively assessed, were negligible on crucial NPT regime strengthening issues, and, with the possible exception of the agreement to hold a Middle East conference in 2012, very slight indeed elsewhere. And, weighing in the negative balance, there have been some serious disappointments on other key benchmark issues spelled out in US President Obama's April 2009 Prague Speech and on which real movement had been hoped for this year. Nothing has moved on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification by the USA or any other major nuclear power; negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) remain

  5. Non-proliferation policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shkol'nik, V.S.; Zhantikin, T.M.

    1997-01-01

    The present abstract reveals the aspects of Kazakstan's non-proliferation policy. After acquiring independence in Kazakstan there remained a huge nuclear inheritance of the USSR. Kazakstan had to determine its policy regarding nuclear stuff. One of the most important test sites of the former USSR - Semipalatinsk test site - was closed. The Republic signed the Lisbon Protocols to the Treaty between the USSR and USA on the reduction and limitation of strategic and offensive arms. On December 13, 1993, Kazakstan and the IAEA concluded the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. All nuclear weapons were removed from Kazakstan territory, work resulting in military nuclear power use was terminated. A wide program on conversion of the former military research infrastructure is being performed with the support of some foreign countries. For instance Kazakstan / USA jointly work on withdrawing highly enriched nuclear materials from Ulba Metallurgical Plant to the USA enterprises for processing ('Sapphere'). Another conversion activity is liquidation of the former testing holes at Semipalatinsk test site. In relation to this there appeared an agreement between U.S. Department of defence and Ministry of Sciences and New Technologies of the Republic of Kazakstan (October, 3, 1995). A sensitive information is present at the area of the former test site. The traditional IAEA safeguards are used to nuclear facilities and nuclear materials

  6. 1995 - a pivotal year for nuclear nonproliferation. German nonproliferation policy in the runup to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Preisinger, J.

    1994-01-01

    The paper describes the non-proliferation as a task of preventive security policy, the non-proliferation instruments, the content of an extended non-proliferation system, and tasks of German non-proliferation policy. (DG)

  7. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Northeast Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han Yong-Sup

    1995-01-01

    This paper attempted to find out ways to facilitate bilateral and regional arms control regarding nuclear issues in Northeast Asia. This is done in order to reduce uncertainties regarding nuclear policy and capabilities of those countries, and thus to enhance transparency and confidence in the region. In order to bring them into the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process in an effective way, we revisited the issues that contributed to the acceleration of the arms race. The review provided insights into the future course of China, the two Koreas and Japan regarding their nuclear policy and capabilities. The findings of this study indicate a general likelihood of resistance to outside request for arms control and disarmament in the countries in Northeast Asia. Besides their continuation with the conventional arms race, countries in Northeast Asia are reluctant to go ahead with the programmes to enhance transparency, build confidence in the region, and to forgo intentions to go nuclear. China is slowly but steadily increasing its nuclear arsenals. Its nuclear arms control policy is not well integrated with nuclear policy and strategy, and it is subject to the overarching goal of nuclear policy and strategy to advance China's status and national security interests in the international community. Thus, it will be very difficult for other countries to bring China to the arms control process for the time being. North Korea has intended to develop nuclear weapons in order to hedge against uncertainties. This poses a threat to the NPT regime and the peace and security of Northeast Asia. Clearly, North Korea has shown its reluctance to disclose the entirety of its nuclear programme under the IAEA inspections. Although South Korea has taken a bold initiative to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, it has still not fully paid off. Japan adds the problem of plutonium surplus to the uncertain security environments surrounding Northeast Asia

  8. Nuclear power generation and nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rathjens, G.

    1979-01-01

    The main points existing between nuclear energy development and nuclear non-proliferation policy are reviewed. The solar energy and other energy will replace for nuclear fission energy in the twenty first century, but it may not occur in the first half, and the structure has to be established to continue the development of nuclear fission technology, including breeder reactor technology. In the near future, it should be encouraged to use advanced thermal reactors if they are economic and operated with safety. Miserable results may be created in the worldwide scale, if a serious accident occurs anywhere or nuclear power reactors are utilized for military object. It is estimated to be possible to develop the ability of manufacturing nuclear weapons within two or three years in the countries where the industry is highly developed so as to generate nuclear power. It is also difficult to take measures so that nuclear power generation does not increase nuclear proliferation problems, and it is necessary to mitigate the motive and to establish the international organization. Concensus exists that as the minimum security action, the storage and transportation of materials, which can be directly utilized for nuclear weapons, should be decided by the international system. The most portions of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle should be put under the international management, as far as possible. This problem is discussed in INFCE. Related to the nuclear nonproliferation, the difference of policy in fuel cycle problems between USA and the other countries, the enrichment of nuclear fuel material, especially the reasons to inhibit the construction of additional enrichment facilities, nuclear fuel reprocessing problems, radioactive waste disposal, plutonium stock and plutonium recycle problems are reviewed. (Nakai, Y.)

  9. IAEA Director General calls for rededication to nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Speaking at the opening session of the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in New York on April 24, 2000, the Director General of the IAEA urged all nations to commit themselves unequivocally to the basic tenets of the non-proliferation regime

  10. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    Science.gov (United States)

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  11. From nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament: a need to refocus NPT priorities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sethi, Manpreet

    1998-01-01

    This paper seeks to suggest that attempts at general and complete nuclear disarmament have largely failed because of an over emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly horizontal, while disarmament has attracted only lip service from the perpetrators of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that is deemed to be the core of the global non-proliferation regime is no less to blame for having indulged in a skewed pursuit of its twin objectives - nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The paper argues that nuclear non-proliferation can be sustainable only if complemented by nuclear disarmament. In the absence of the latter, proliferation of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the NPT and its safeguards regime, would always pose a potential risk

  12. Humble Expectations (on Non-proliferation and Disarmament)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persbo, Andreas

    2014-04-01

    institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Disarmament cannot be verified without a strong safeguards system. The principal function of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Over its lifetime, the treaty has been fairly successful in dissuading further nations from acquiring arms. One can be cautiously optimistic about the future. While the situation in North Korea continues to be a headache, discussions with Iran look promising. It would be unrealistic to think that Iran will give up all its fuel cycle ambitions, but the present talks contains the embryo of a deal that may help make those ambitions less threatening to Iran's neighbours and strategic rivals, hence promoting regional stability. If nothing else, a carefully monitored nuclear programme in Iran - limited in its scope - will make it more costly and more time consuming for the country to develop weapons. The centre is holding. There are few indications at present that we will see many more new entrants in the nuclear weapons club. With continual improvements to safeguards - the continued uptake of the IAEA Additional Protocol in particular - we are likely to enter an era where cheating becomes more difficult, and more costly. (author)

  13. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grand, C.

    2001-01-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  14. Statement at Inauguration Ceremony for Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 25 February 2011, Vienna, Austria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Y.

    2011-01-01

    I was a member of the Group of Governmental Experts which drafted the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non proliferation Education in 2002. In my new role at the IAEA, I continue to attach great importance to education. I believe it is vital that we educate the people of the world about how devastating nuclear weapons are and build awareness of the importance of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I have no doubt that the new Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation will make an important contribution in this area. The recent conclusion of the new START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States was a welcome development in the nuclear disarmament field. Reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons is a positive step towards a safe and peaceful world free of nuclear weapons which can impact positively on nuclear non-proliferation efforts. But, of course, further steps are needed. Disarmament and non-proliferation education have an essential role to play in maintaining and strengthening the momentum towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The IAEA has for decades been actively involved in promoting nuclear non-proliferation education. My colleagues and I speak about nuclear non-proliferation throughout the world. We organize briefings here in Vienna for members of parliament, government officials, think tanks, academics and other groups. We host educational seminars for NGOs, diplomats and journalists on the Agency's non-proliferation activities - the latest one was held this week. The IAEA also provides opportunities for on-the-job training and work experience to students and young professionals. Indeed, several Monterey Institute graduates are currently working with us. This is an excellent example of how disarmament and non-proliferation education can contribute to promoting international peace and security. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States took place during my time with Monterey in

  15. The Rarotonga treaty: regional approach to non-proliferation in the South Pacific

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Papadimitropulos, P.

    1988-01-01

    The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation in the South-Pacific-the Rarotonga treaty - is discussed. The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation is aimed in a wide sense at the assistance to detante in a certain region and the propagation of measures strengthening confidence there. On December 11, 1975 at the initiative of New Zealand and Fiji the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the nuclear-free zone in the South-Pacific. In compliance with the Rarotonga treaty a large nuclear-free zone is created. The participants of the Rarotonga Treaty assess the values of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

  16. Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, Harald

    2011-01-01

    The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

  17. First annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to annual report to Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) requires that DOE's Annual Report include views and recommendations regarding non-proliferation policies and actions for which the Department is responsible. The Act also requires a detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative fuel cycles, including an unclassified summary and a comprehensive version containing relevant classified information. The goals of United States non-proliferation policy are to minimize the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a stable international environment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy

  18. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

  19. 2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koltysheva, G I; Perepelkin, I G [eds.

    1999-12-31

    On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session `History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem` and three sections: (1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests`; (2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex`; (3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences`

  20. Non-Proliferation, the IAEA Safeguards System, and the importance of nuclear material measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stevens, Rebecca S. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-09-18

    The objective of this project is to explain the contribution of nuclear material measurements to the system of international verification of State declarations and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  1. 2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

    1998-01-01

    On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session 'History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem' and three sections: 1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests'; 2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex'; 3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences'

  2. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2004-01-01

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards

  3. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ElBaradei, M

    2004-06-21

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards.

  4. The role of strategic missile defence in the global architecture de ballistic non proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2007-01-01

    Whereas some think that missile defence is a proliferation agent by nature and therefore undermines the already fragile regime of ballistic non proliferation, some others think that missile defence could underpin the non proliferation regime. The author thus discusses these issues and both points of view by commenting the ambiguous discursive relationships between missile defence and arms control, and by highlighting the various roles and missions given to missile defence, notably in treaties (like the ABM treaty) and postures adopted by concerned countries

  5. The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biad, A.

    1996-01-01

    This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC)

  6. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    OpenAIRE

    Sandra Colombo; Cristian Guglielminotti; María Nevia Vera

    2017-01-01

    The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu). The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous develop...

  7. On the non-proliferation framework of Japan's peaceful nuclear utilization program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kano, Takashi

    1996-01-01

    The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the NPT) convened in New York, from April 17 to May 12, 1995 and decided that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely, after reviewing the operation and affirming some aspects of the NPT, while emphasizing the ''Decision on Strengthening the Review Process'' for the NPT and the ''Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,'' also adopted by the Conference. In parallel, Japan made its basic non-proliferation policy clear in the ''Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy'' which was decided by the Atomic Energy Commission (chaired by Mikio Oomi, then Minister of the Science and Technology Agency of Japan) in June 1994. The Long-Term Program discusses various problems facing post-Cold-War international society and describes Japan's policy for establishing international confidence concerning non-proliferation. This paper summarizes Japan's non-proliferation policy as articulated in the Long-Term Program, and describes some results of an analysis comparing the Long-Term Program with the resolutions on the international non-proliferation frameworks adopted by the NPT conference

  8. Nuclear non-proliferation and security culture within EDF nuclear fleet

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Debes, M.

    2013-01-01

    This document describes the nuclear non-proliferation strategy and the safety culture of EDF. The author lists all the mandatory rules and regulations at international and national levels EDF has to comply with. All these requirements are applied in EDF nuclear facilities through adequate procedures that assure a nuclear material accountancy, a follow-up of any item containing nuclear material in the facility, and internal controls. External independent controls are also performed. The EDF security policy goal is to protect human, material and knowledge assets, and to preserve operational capacity, competitiveness and public confidence, within national regulatory framework and regulation on 'vital importance facilities'. The treatment of events or incident (detection, analysis, lessons drawn, experience feedback) is a tool to progress, along with reporting, internal control process and audits. The security requirements cover the different related domains important to EDF industrial assets: security of employees against assaults; security of data according to their sensibility level; security of the information system and telecom; awareness and training of employees; relations with external suppliers or contractors; business premises; security of staff and projects abroad. For industrial facilities and grids (facilities of 'vital importance'...), the defense in depth principles are applied against the different threat scenarios. Security measures are studied at the design stage in a consistent way with nuclear safety measures, while taking into account the protective means deployed by public authorities. These risk analysis are periodically reassessed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  9. Safeguards and non-proliferation: current challenges and the implications for Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leask, A.; Carlson, J.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: The expansion of nuclear programs raises the issue of how to ensure this does not increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. The non-proliferation regime - based on the NPT and its verification mechanism, the IAEA safeguards system - has been developed to provide assurance that nuclear programs are exclusively peaceful. Although to date the non-proliferation regime has been remarkably successful, in recent years it has come under serious challenge. Nuclear proliferation is emerging as one of the major issues facing the international community. Addressing technical and institutional aspects of the non-proliferation regime - especially safeguards, but also complementary measures such as export controls, proliferation-resistant technology, and an international framework on sensitive technology - is important. But proliferation is a political problem, and ultimately the success of the non-proliferation regime depends on political resolve to uphold compliance, using incentives and if necessary sanctions. These issues are vitally important to Australia's future. Being a major uranium supplier has strengthened Australia's influence in non-proliferation and safeguards developments

  10. The nuclear non-proliferation regime: What it is and how it has evolved

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Priest, J.

    1999-01-01

    The nuclear non-proliferation regime commonly denotes the legal norms, voluntary undertakings and policies which the international community has developed to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. The word 'regime' suggests a legally binding order. Some components of the non-proliferation regime are indeed legally binding. Others represent essentially political rather than legal commitments. This lecture describes the various independent but mutually reinforcing components of the non-proliferation regime. It thus touches on and highlights the particular importance of political incentives - or disincentives - to the acquisition of nuclear weapons; legal undertakings in which non-proliferation commitments are anchored; verification (specifically the IAEA Safeguards System); compliance and enforcement; export controls; physical protection measures; regional nuclear non-proliferation initiatives; and measures taken to curb proliferation in general and to strive for arms control and nuclear disarmament. The purpose of the lecture is to provide an over-arching, tour d'horizon for the more specific and detailed lectures which follow. (author)

  11. Nuclear fuel cycle industry. A responsible approach supporting non proliferation efforts in global perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jorant, Caroline

    2005-01-01

    This paper presents the reasons why and the manner in which nuclear industry is a stakeholder in non proliferation efforts. It then presents some recent proposals on multinational approaches to the fuel cycle industry and offers some comments and an industry view on these issues. A parallel is established with fundamental concepts in the field of radiation protection. Our industry, involved in 'nuclear technology development' (activities) qualified of 'sensitive' from a non proliferation standpoint, has major interests at stake in the evolution of the international non proliferation regime and is genuinely committed to the spreading of a non proliferation culture. The international community and in particular the nuclear community have been recently reflecting on ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in reaction to new threats or the perception thereof. Multilateral approaches regarding the nuclear fuel cycle are being discussed or proposed in this regard. Our approach as an industrial may be illustrated using the three basic principles developed in the field of radiation protection, namely limitation, justification and optimization. a) an overall limitation of sensitive facilities worldwide may be judicious, b) however no prohibition should be imposed if justified needs can be demonstrated on objective criteria, c) optimized used for existing facilities should be promoted through strengthened guarantees of supply where it may be necessary. (author)

  12. Alternative fuel cycles and non-proliferation aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kessler, G.

    1980-10-01

    The most important physical characteristics of the U/Pu and the Th/U fuel cycles and the technical data of the most significant converter reactors operating with Th/U fuel are outlined in the report. Near breeders as well as breeders with a thermal neutron spectrum are briefly discussed, and the potential of breeders with fast neutron spectra in the Th/U fuel is outlined. The essential criteria for the comparison of the alternative fuel cycles with the reference Pu/U cycle are the consumption of natural uranium, the numbers of U-233 producing and U-233 consuming converter reactors and the amounts of fission material transported and handled within the fuel cycle (reprocessing, refabrication). Although the alternative U/Th fuel cycles are feasible with some advantages and some disadvantages as compared to the reference U/Pu cycle, not much experience has so far been gathered with pilot plants of the fuel cycle. The respective status in reprocessing, refabrication and waste disposal is briefly discussed. Finally, a comparison of the risk potential inherent in secular storage is presented and questions of resistance to proliferation and of safeguards of the U/Th cycle are discussed

  13. Non-proliferation through effective international control. Report of working group I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, S.E.

    1993-01-01

    Working Group I focused on two issues: the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Missile Technology Regime (MTCR). There was wide agreement within the Group on a number of factors that will strongly influence the prospects for the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension Conference. Two points stood out as particularly important: first, emphasis on the obligations for nuclear Powers to move in good faith in direction of nuclear disarmament; and second, inadequacy of security guarantees to non-nuclear States associated with the NPT

  14. Environmental effects of additional uranium development required by a non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baca, T.E.; Scudella, G.

    1978-01-01

    New Mexico can expect to see an accelerated development of its uranium resources. The President's policy on non-proliferation will impact the degree and quantity of uranium ore mined. Environmental impacts are significant and are affected by the mining and milling phase more than any other aspect of the uranium fuel cycle. The state has begun evaluating the resource-associated impacts of uranium mining and milling, although very little reliable data are available. The information gathered, however, shows a need for state and Federal evaluation of both the impacts and the non-proliferation policy. 4 references

  15. Nuclear energy and non proliferation. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooley, J.; Rauf, T.

    2008-01-01

    This article discusses the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. The IAEA verifies States compliance with their non-proliferation commitments through the application of safeguards on their civilian nuclear programmes to ensure that they are being used solely for peaceful purposes. The IAEA safeguards have evolved in the course of five decades and have become an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime and the global security system. To continue to serve the international community, they need to continue to move with the times, especially in light of the renewed interest in nuclear energy. (Author)

  16. The G1/S Specific Cyclin D2 Is a Regulator of HIV-1 Restriction in Non-proliferating Cells

    Science.gov (United States)

    Badia, Roger; Pujantell, Maria; Riveira-Muñoz, Eva; Puig, Teresa; Torres-Torronteras, Javier; Martí, Ramón; Clotet, Bonaventura; Ampudia, Rosa M.; Ballana, Ester

    2016-01-01

    Macrophages are a heterogeneous cell population strongly influenced by differentiation stimuli that become susceptible to HIV-1 infection after inactivation of the restriction factor SAMHD1 by cyclin-dependent kinases (CDK). Here, we have used primary human monocyte-derived macrophages differentiated through different stimuli to evaluate macrophage heterogeneity on cell activation and proliferation and susceptibility to HIV-1 infection. Stimulation of monocytes with GM-CSF induces a non-proliferating macrophage population highly restrictive to HIV-1 infection, characterized by the upregulation of the G1/S-specific cyclin D2, known to control early steps of cell cycle progression. Knockdown of cyclin D2, enhances HIV-1 replication in GM-CSF macrophages through inactivation of SAMHD1 restriction factor by phosphorylation. Co-immunoprecipitation experiments show that cyclin D2 forms a complex with CDK4 and p21, a factor known to restrict HIV-1 replication by affecting the function of the downstream cascade that leads to SAMHD1 deactivation. Thus, we demonstrate that cyclin D2 acts as regulator of cell cycle proteins affecting SAMHD1-mediated HIV-1 restriction in non-proliferating macrophages. PMID:27541004

  17. Status and prospect of non-proliferation activities of ISTC and STCU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richard, M.; Daoust Maleval, D.; Louvet, P.

    2009-01-01

    This article examines the role of the International Science and Technology Centre of Moscow (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine in Kiev (STCU) in preventing proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expertise and know-how of scientists and engineers from the Former Soviet Union countries. The Centres were created in the first half of the nineties, in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This collapse raised very serious concerns: over the risk of former WMD scientists and engineers being recruited by States of concern or terrorist groups that wished to develop their own WMD capabilities and means of delivery; and the possibility that scientists and engineers would be driven to sell their knowledge, know-how or equipment in order to survive. Since the Centres' inception, the regional and international context has changed dramatically at both economic and strategic levels, in particular regarding non-proliferation and global security. Changes of a political and strategic nature in the former Soviet Union required the European Union to review its relationship with Russia, to reassess the importance of Central Asian Countries and the future of Ukraine as it is pulled between Russia and Europe. The Centres have had to adapt to these changes. The article draws from an evaluation of the Centres' non-proliferation activities, carried out by the authors between November 2006 and September 2007 at the request of the European Commission. Moreover, since completion of the mission, many events, important for the strategic relationships between E U, Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries occurred as the affirmation of Russia's regional leadership: its rearmament along with the stiffening of its relationships with western countries and some neighbours and closure to visitors; the Georgia-Russia conflict; and the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis. As CIS countries are more affected by the current economical crisis

  18. The control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear development - present uncertainties

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Machado de Faria, N.G.; Amaral Barros, E.

    1983-01-01

    This report gives the views of Brazilian lawyers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It deals with the present situation and future prospects concerning the uses of nuclear energy. In particular, it proposes the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  19. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Control in the Republic of Croatia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valcic, I.; Prah, M.; Mikec, N.

    2006-01-01

    In accordance with its internationally accepted obligations, the Republic of Croatia is actively implementing principles of non-proliferation and export control of nuclear materials and/or equipment. The article deals with treaties, conventions, agreements and other international arrangements that are creating certain obligation for Republic of Croatia related to nuclear non-proliferation. The most important are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Protocol, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the NSG Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. In addition the article describes a national regulative framework, the basis for conducting activities in nuclear material control, export control of dual-use items as well as non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Details are given about the Nuclear Safety Act, the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Act on Export of Dual-Use Items, the Decree on the List of Dual-Use Items, the Law on Production, Repair and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment and the Decree specifying goods subject to export and import licenses. (author)

  20. New trends of activity on supporting of non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Issaeva, G.M.; Tyupkina, O.G.

    2002-01-01

    Taking into account the necessity of all possible strengthening of non-proliferation regimes Kazakhstan participates in a number of agreements and associations: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Supplier Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Conference on Disarmament, etc. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) greatly influenced on the development on non-proliferation regime in Kazakhstan. During initial stage of CTR activity (1993-1995) military projects prevailed. Later (1995-1997) the projects on liquidation of infrastructure for nuclear and bio- weapons were successfully realized. Last years, since 1999, the attention was shifted towards proliferation prevention of hazardous nuclear and biological materials. Recent terrorist acts and world community activity on global safety strengthening underline an urgency of quite new problems that entirely applied to Kazakhstan: monitoring of hazardous materials; enhancement of safety systems of 'risky' facilities and technologies; creation and/or upgrading of safety systems for industry infrastructure. The proposals of these new trends of non-proliferation have been developed. Development of physical protection system for oil and gas industry infrastructure of Kazakhstan based on safety concepts of nuclear facilities; Evaluation of radionuclide contamination and safety of oil and gas facilities of the Caspian region; Counteraction to nuclear materials proliferation; Cooperative approaches in preventing/reducing of illicit trafficking and use of WMD-related explosive materials. Implementation of the project would make of substantial contribution to successful solution of either regional or global safety problem

  1. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: speech of the president Obama at Prague

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, B.

    2009-01-01

    Introduced by the Prague speech of april 7 2009, the Obama President program towards the non proliferation and the nuclear disarmament was pointed out by its optimism ambition and determination. But a more detailed lecture shows concurrent positions. The author analyzes the political aspects of the President speech. (A.L.B.)

  2. Back-end of the fuel cycle and non-proliferation strategies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chebeskov, A.N.; Oussanov, V.I.; Iougai, S.V.; Pshakin, G.M. [Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, State Scientific Center of Russian Federation, Obninsk (Russian Federation)

    2001-07-01

    The paper focuses on the problem of fissile materials proliferation risk estimation. Some methodological approaches to the solution of this task and results of their application for comparison of different nuclear fuel cycle strategies are discussed. The results of comparative assessment of non-proliferation aspects of plutonium utilization alternatives in Russia using system analysis approach are presented. (author)

  3. Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shinohara, Nobuo; Kokaji, Lisa; Ichimasa, Sukeyuki

    2010-01-01

    In Global Center of Excellence Program of The University of Tokyo, Non- Proliferation Study Committee by the members of nuclear industries, electricity utilities, nuclear energy institutes and universities has initiated on October 2008 from the viewpoints of investigating a package of measures for nuclear non-proliferation and bringing up young people who will support the near-future nuclear energy system. One of the non-proliferation issues in the Committee is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Objective of this treaty is to cease all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosion. This purpose should be contributed effectively to the political stability of the Asian region by continuous efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons. In the Committee, by extracting several issues related to the CTBT, conception of 'Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation' has been discussed with the aim of the nuclear-weapon security in Asian region, where environmental nuclear-test monitoring data is mainly treated and utilized. In this paper, the conception of the 'network' is presented in detail. (author)

  4. Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects. Key issue paper no. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-06-01

    This paper examines the current nuclear non-proliferation regime (Section 2) and the issues most likely to arise as the civil nuclear fuel cycle develops over the next 50 years (Section 3). Section 4 deals with fuel cycles and nuclear material inventories. 14 refs.

  5. A Study on Introduction of Nuclear Power Plants in India and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Seung Hyo; Lim, Dong Hyuk

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which was formed to build nuclear export control has been accepting the nuclear cooperation for the member nation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Korea exported nuclear power plants to United Arab Emirates in 2009 and research and training reactor to Jordan in 2010 based on the forcible non-proliferation regime as a member nation of NSG, so it is strengthening its position in the atomic energy industry. In addition, Korea concluded an agreement with India which is planning the construction of 25.based or more nuclear power plants for the next 20 years in last July, 25, so it will enter the atomic energy market in India. But India has been accepted the exceptionally civilian nuclear cooperation as a de facto Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) and non-member state of NPT, so concerns about nuclear proliferation has been raised. This study aims to introduce the allowance of exceptions background in India, to analyze its effect on the non-proliferation regime and to find nuclear non-proliferation conditions

  6. Nuclear energy and non-proliferation in Latin America: the constitution of Tlatelolco system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armanet, P.

    1982-01-01

    The nuclear energy as alternative energy resource and its military use are analysed. Then the main characteristics of the Tratelolco treaty and non-proliferation in Latin America are discussed. Finally the importance of the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America is shown. (A.B.T.) [pt

  7. Back-end of the fuel cycle and non-proliferation strategies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chebeskov, A.N.; Oussanov, V.I.; Iougai, S.V.; Pshakin, G.M.

    2001-01-01

    The paper focuses on the problem of fissile materials proliferation risk estimation. Some methodological approaches to the solution of this task and results of their application for comparison of different nuclear fuel cycle strategies are discussed. The results of comparative assessment of non-proliferation aspects of plutonium utilization alternatives in Russia using system analysis approach are presented. (author)

  8. NIMS EXPERIMENT DATA RECORDS: SL-9 COMET IMPACT WITH JUPITER

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — NIMS Experiment Data Record (EDR) files contain raw data from the Galileo Orbiter Near-Infrared Mapping Spectrometer (CARLSONETAL1992). This raw data requires...

  9. NIMS EXPERIMENT DATA RECORDS: GASPRA/IDA ENCOUNTERS

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — NIMS Experiment Data Record (EDR) files contain raw data from the Galileo Orbiter Near-Infrared Mapping Spectrometer (CARLSONETAL1992). This raw data requires...

  10. Dedicated data recording video system for Spacelab experiments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fukuda, Toshiyuki; Tanaka, Shoji; Fujiwara, Shinji; Onozuka, Kuniharu

    1984-04-01

    A feasibility study of video tape recorder (VTR) modification to add the capability of data recording etc. was conducted. This system is an on-broad system to support Spacelab experiments as a dedicated video system and a dedicated data recording system to operate independently of the normal operation of the Orbiter, Spacelab and the other experiments. It continuously records the video image signals with the acquired data, status and operator's voice at the same time on one cassette video tape. Such things, the crews' actions, animals' behavior, microscopic views and melting materials in furnace, etc. are recorded. So, it is expected that experimenters can make a very easy and convenient analysis of the synchronized video, voice and data signals in their post flight analysis.

  11. The legal points at issue concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty and the verification agreement of EURATOM with the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zieger, G.

    1975-01-01

    An excellent and comprehensive but very juridicial contribution on: Development and content of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the problems which this Treaty poses for EURATOM (a common market, common supply, joint enterprises, Non-proliferation Treaty and France), the compatibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty with the EURATOM Treaty, verification agreement EURATOM - IAEA (the IAEA as the supervisory authority, the control system of the IAEA, guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements, national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material IAEA supervision as a secondary control, principles of IAEA supervision, secrecy, conflict management), conclusion of the verification agreement, deviations from the guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements legal reflexions (verification agreement and Non-proliferation Treaty, reservations concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty, questions of competence between EURATOM and member states without nuclear weapons, problems of equal treatment). (HP/LN) [de

  12. The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Fifteen years after entry into force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    The need to halt a wider spread of nuclear weapons grew out of the realization that the increase in the number of countries possessing such weapons would increase the threat to world security. As the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons clearly states in its preamble, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty - also known as the non-proliferation Treaty - was concluded in 1968, at a time when there were already five nuclear-weapon Powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. This fact sheet is intended to provide background material on the Treaty, including the events that led to its conclusion, an overview of its provisions and the developments at the two previously held Review Conferences

  13. The impact of non-proliferation policies on the uranium market - an industry view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stephany, M.

    1977-01-01

    It is concluded that from an economic point of view, the impact of the present political discussions on non-proliferation (referring particularly to U.S. and Canadian initiatives) on the uranium market (through the choice of reactor programmes in different countries, and other parts of the fuel cycle, such an enrichment, reprocessing, the use of plutonium and the disposal of radioactive waste) cannot be assessed quantitatively. It is believed, however, that in general terms the non-proliferation issue will lead to an increase in the cost of nuclear energy and of all energy. It is also considered that it will tend to strengthen nationalism and thereby to restrict international trade. (U.K.)

  14. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1983-01-01

    The author discusses the reasons of criticism and even rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, dealing in particular with the alledged discriminating nature of the Treaty and with the statement that the Treaty is not apt to prevent proliferation on a vertical plane. He further discusses the motives behind the efforts of potential nuclear weapons states to get nuclear weapons. The system of worldwide and bilateral safeguards and controls covering the transfer of nuclear technologies is explained. In conclusion the author suggests to pay more attention to article IV, sub-section (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as this might offer a suitable approach to restricting the dissemination of nuclear explosives. (HP) [de

  15. Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirsaidov, U.M.

    2010-01-01

    This article is devoted to issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan. Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction arouse serious concern of world community. Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the weapons of mass destruction distributions become the subject of high concern. Besides, during the end of 'cold war', regional conflicts, collapse of Soviet Union, as well as access to sensitive technologies considerably increase the danger of weapons of mass destruction distribution. More than 10 countries have active programs, relating to weapons of mass destruction and, possibly, more than ten countries have potential to start implementing such kinds of programs. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution. After 11 September events, the risk of such weapons of mass destruction components use by such forces for Governments blackmail become real scene, which, despite of low possibility of this threat implementation, could have very serious and disastrous consequences. International community responded to these problems and challenges, basically through the following actions, which is detailed regime development of multilateral international treaties, directed to weapons of mass destruction distribution prevention. Non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, Convention on prohibition of chemical weapons and Convention on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons are some of them. As it is known, Tajikistan signed all these treaties. For different reasons these treaties were subject of serious tests. Nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 year, actual Israel status as state having nuclear weapon and North Korean program on

  16. Review of international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shimizu, Ryo; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Sakurai, Satoshi; Tamai, Hiroshi; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Kuno, Yusuke

    2012-02-01

    International forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation was held at Gakushi-kaikan, Tokyo on February 2-3, 2011 in cooperation with The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and The University of Tokyo Global COE. In our International Forum, we would like to encourage active discussion of international challenges to and solutions for compatibility between peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, and international cooperation for emerging nuclear energy states. It was successfully carried out with as many as 310 participants and a lot of discussions. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. (author)

  17. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sandra Colombo

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu. The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous development of this technology in emerging countries. Against this, the article investigates the existence of margins to maneuver in the international system from the case of study of Argentina, one of the few developing countries that have managed to export nuclear technology, and has declared the development of independent nuclear activity as a State policy

  18. The non-proliferation regime, vertical proliferation and the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, W.

    1988-12-01

    The disarmament orientation of the NPT, which stands beside the central aim of avoiding horizontal proliferation, raises a question: Does a compatibility exist between the non-proliferation policy of the Federal Republic and its security policy, which has its basic pillar in the nuclear deterrence strategy? Critics of this deterrence policy therefore, hinting to the disarmament determination of the NPT, demand that the Federal Republic should exercise its influence for the conclusion of a 'Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty' (CTBT), the establishment of a 'Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones' (NWFZ) in Europe, a 'No First Use'-Treaty (NFU) and finally the abolishment of all atomic weapons ('Zero Solution'). According to them such disarmament 'remedies' can reestablish or assure the waning or damaged international consensus for horizontal non-proliferation. This is a contribution for the establishment of a stable world order and will smooth the way for a prolongation of the NPT in the year 1995. An analysis of the history and the structure of interests shows that the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is deeply rooted in the NPT and that a prolongation of the treaty and its own membership is a substantial object of the foreign and security policy. Consequently the Federal Republic has to face the demands for an intensification of 'anti-nuclear measures' and has to examine their acceptability and their usefulness with respect to non-proliferation. The structure of the problem encloses the following aspects: The security conception of the Federal Republic with its military-strategic essence; the provisions in article VI NPT for negotiations with the object of a world free of atomic weapons; the derived disarmament 'remedies' for strengthening the consensus for horizontal non-proliferation and, finally, the real interface between horizontal and vertical proliferation. (orig./DG) [de

  19. Assuring the success of the non-proliferation treaty extension conference. Excerpts from the panel discussions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This publication presents excerpts from a conference organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament Inc., in cooperation with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, and covers the following issues: status of the comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations, fissile cut-off and ending production of nuclear weapons, how should nuclear weapons states pursue disarmament under Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NPT extension: problems and prospects

  20. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1970-04-22

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

  1. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: A status report. Vienna, 14 March 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    For more than half a century, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. Further meaningful progress towards a nuclear weapon free world will demand that we re-examine our fundamental concept of what security means and how it can best be achieved. The following specific areas where our attention should be focused are discussed briefly: the historical perspective, current strategies for non-proliferation and disarmament, and the future prospects

  2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  3. Export of nuclear equipment and materials and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courteix, Simone.

    1977-01-01

    The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of great concern today despite the entry into force in the early '70s of the NPT. To master civilian nuclear technology implies the ability to develop nuclear explosive devices; therefore in recent years contacts have strengthened between countries exporting nuclear equipment, specially in the frame of the 'London Club' so as to ensure that their exports will not result in disseminating nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  4. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [fr

  5. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [ru

  6. The Non-Proliferation Treaty on the threshold to the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, W.

    1991-06-01

    The basic outlines of non-proliferation policy, its instruments, the position of the protagonists' interests and the fundamental fields of conflict are to the fore. The history and structure of international non-poliferation policy and, in particular, of the NPT, are described, the instruments for verifying the purely peaceful use of nuclear power (safeguards) are analysed, and important future technological and political challenges of the Treaty are listed. (orig./HP) [de

  7. Nuclear export policy and regulation for non-proliferation: Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boulanger, Werner.

    1978-01-01

    The nuclear export policy of the Federal Republic of Germany complies with the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Already in 1967 the Federal Government stated in a Peace Note that no export was authorised to countries (outside Euratom) which did not comply with the IAEA Safeguards. In the bilateral agreement the Federal Republic signed with Brasil in 1975, emphasis was put on international safeguards and the control exercised on exported materials to avoid any diversion for military purposes. (NEA) [fr

  8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-10-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  9. Scientists for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transactions of international seminar

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the Second International Seminar 'Scientists for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. The Seminar took place from 11 to 14 October 1994 in Nakhabino Country Club near Moscow. More than 60 specialists from Russia, USA, France, Belgium as well as IAEA and CEU took part in the seminar. Problems of cooperation in the field of nuclear materials accounting, control and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear export regulations and disarmament control are discussed at the seminar

  10. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [es

  11. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-04-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation: Revisiting the basics. Carnegie international non-proliferation conference 2002. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort - and despite recent challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But the international community has to move forward, it is essential that a number of the basic assumptions should be revisited, and a number of new approaches reconsidered. A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually disappear. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has overall been successful - but with some shortcomings. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force - and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the 'unequivocal undertaking' by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament - such as 'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further 'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,' 'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT - left without concrete follow-up actions and in

  13. Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chrzanowski, P.L.

    1993-01-01

    About 30 specialists in non-proliferation participated in a workshop to explore ideas for US Government preparatory steps leading to the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. To that end, workshop sessions were devoted to reviewing the lessons learned from previous Review Conferences, discussing the threats to the non-proliferation regime together with ways of preserving and strengthening it, and examining the management of international nuclear commerce. A fundamental premise shared by workshop participants was that extension of the NPT is immensely important to international security. The importance of stemming proliferation and, more specifically, extending the Treaty, is growing as a result of the significant changes in the world. If the conferees of the Extension Conference decide on no extension or extension for a short limited duration, some technically advanced states that have foregone development of nuclear weapons may begin to rethink their options. Also, other arms control measures, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could start to unravel. The US must provide strong international leadership to ensure that the Extension Conference is a success, resulting in Treaty extension, perhaps through successive terms, into the indefinite future. Workshop participants were struck by the urgent need for the US to take organizational steps so that it is highly effective in its advance preparations for the Extension Conference. Moreover, the Extension Conference provides both a challenge and an opportunity to mold a cohesive set of US policy actions to define the future role of nuclear weapons and combat their proliferation

  14. Nuclear disarmament and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

    1999-01-01

    The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference reaffirmed 'the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control' and endorsed 'universal application of safeguards once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved'. Hence strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and incremental broadening of its coverage towards the universal application of international safeguards in all States is a high priority albeit for the medium to long term. A tentative attempt is made in this paper to anticipate how the elements of verification under the NPT, FMCT and other conventions and arrangements related to nuclear non-proliferation will evolve against the background of the disarmament process, with the goal of achieving at some future stage an ultimate convergence of verification regimes under a complete nuclear disarmament. We think, however, that most of the new initiatives in the area of disarmament/non-proliferation should be realised during the current disarmament phase. We do not wish our model to be perceived as a rigid time-bound scheme. New initiatives should be implemented in parallel and as soon as practicable. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and should not be taken to represent Australian Government policy. (author)

  15. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

  16. Clients experience of video recordings of their psychotherapy

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jacobsen, Claus Haugaard; Jensen, Karen Boelt; Madsen, Ninna Skov

    the current relatively widespread use video one finds only a very limited numbers empirical study of how these recordings is experienced by the clients. Aim: After a brief discussion of the pro and cons of the use of video recordings this paper presents a qualitative, explorative study of clients’ experiences......Background: Due to the development of technologies and the low costs video recording of psychotherapy sessions have gained ground in training and supervision. While some praise the advantages others decline to use this technological aid for ethical, theoretical or clinical reasons. Despite...

  17. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Finland``s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  18. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant Ltd., Vienna (Austria)

    2000-06-15

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  19. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite; Wredberg, L.

    2000-06-01

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  20. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Finland''s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  1. Activities of the study group of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation policy. FY Heisei 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Oi, Noboru

    2000-01-01

    The Study Group on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Policy (Chairman: Prof. Kurosawa) was established in FY1999 with the funding from the Science and Technology Agency. The aim of the Study Group is to clearly understand nuclear proliferation issues and to lead international opinion. Nuclear non-proliferation is a matter of rather scanty interest compared to nuclear safety while both of them are important in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Japan. In FY2000, the Study Group held International Symposium 'Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: A Challenge of 21st Century' and in conjunction with this Symposium, dispatched 'The Statement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Action Plan towards 21st Century'. The Statement consists of five propositions: 1) Strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and making it universally applicable, 2) Negative legacy of cold war: rapid solution of problems, 3) Civil (non-military) plutonium, 4) Development of technology to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime internationally, and 5) Strengthening Japanese initiative on nuclear non-proliferation policy. In this report, these activities will be explained in detail. (author)

  2. The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

    2015-01-01

    Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

  3. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

  4. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden''s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives

  5. IAEA Director General welcomes Cuba's intention to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed Cuba's announcement to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. He expressed the hope that Cuba will conclude soon a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required under Article III of the NPT. 'With Cuba's intention to become party to the NPT, we have come a step closer to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime,' Mr. ElBaradei said. Only three countries worldwide with significant nuclear activities now remain outside the NPT. With 188 countries party to the Treaty, the NPT is the most adhered to international agreement after the United Nations Charter and the most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty. The NPT makes it mandatory that all non-nuclear-weapon States conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. The Director General also welcomed Cuba's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which completes the process of having all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as members of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Mr. ElBaradei said that, 'the Tlatelolco Treaty provides a good model for other regional nuclear-weapon-free zones to follow'. He added that 'universal adherence of all countries in regions having nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements is important to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime'. (IAEA)

  6. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage imposition options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to burn the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the non-proliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

  7. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden``s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives. Refs.

  8. Statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-08-01

    The document reproduces the following statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, statements on behalf of the depository Governments and statements on behalf of other Governments (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Western Samoa and Nordic Countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)

  9. Putting teeth in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 25 March 2006, Karlsruhe, Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2006-01-01

    The factors, contributing to the world's changes in respect to peace, security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are presented in the document. Five necessary and urgent measures are proposed in order to meet the current challenges: 1)tighten control for assess to nuclear fuel cycle technology; 2)accelerate global efforts tp protect nuclear material; 3)support effective nuclear verification; 4) reinvigorate disarmament efforts; 5) increase the effectiveness of the UN Security Council. The importance and necessity to place nuclear operations under multinational control is outlined

  10. Non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    In the face of improved international relations, regional and subregional issues have acquired additional urgency and importance in the field of disarmament and international security. The pursuit of regional solutions to regional problems is thus being actively encouraged by the international community. Towards this end, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is seeking to promote regional approaches to disarmament either through the united nations regional centres for peace and Disarmament or cooperation with individual Governments. Within this framework this conference was dealing with non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific region

  11. Nuclear Non-proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 - No 8 of 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Act aims at giving domestic legislative effect to Australia's international non-proliferation obligations and establishes controls over the possession and transport of nuclear materials and equipment by a system of permits. These obligations arise inter alia under the NPT Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Act provides that its provisions shall apply to nuclear material (as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute) and associated items which include associated material, equipment or technology. These are clearly defined in the Act. (NEA) [fr

  12. Non proliferation and disarmament: nuclear disarmament and security policies in Sweden (1946-1975) - Historical note

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2007-06-01

    The author first outlines that Sweden appeared during the Cold War as committed against nuclear weapons, but in fact concentrated this commitment on the objective of nuclear disarmament of nuclear countries without having a very clear position on the objective of non proliferation as it was defined at the end of the 1950's, and also maintained a (secret for while) military nuclear programme which has been progressively given up from the middle of the 1960's. Then, the author discusses why Sweden adopted this double posture, its effects on the international scene, and achievements and setbacks of the Swedish diplomacy with respect to disarmament until the first NPT review conference of 1975

  13. The non-proliferation policies of non-nuclear-weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marwah, Onkar

    1987-01-01

    Eight countries are considered to be capable of producing nuclear weapons and highly suspect in their intentions to actually produce them. These are Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The policies of these suspect Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) are considered in this paper. The first part assesses the non-proliferation (or proliferation) policies of the eight suspect NNWS, the second part evaluates their differences in approach from the policies urged upon them by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and the third and final part attempts to understand the future evolution of NNWS policies in the nuclear military field. (U.K.)

  14. Nuclear weapon-free zone, non-proliferation treaty and South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jayaramu, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    Emergence of and the motivations behind the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, the conceptual linkage between the nuclear weapon free zone and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the problems involved in the implementation of nuclear weapon free zone proposals put forward from time to time are discussed. Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, motivations behind the proposal, and India's response to it are examined. It is pointed out that both the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone indirectly grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the use of nuclear weapons. (M.G.B.)

  15. Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.; Mahy, Heidi A.

    2008-01-01

    The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, that provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.

  16. Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

    2013-01-01

    The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  17. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: A long-term perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haeckel, E.

    1990-01-01

    International nuclear policy has been determined for a long time by the exigencies of the status quo. The non-proliferation regime draws its legitimacy from the continuation of extant patterns of power in world politics. Such a static policy cannot succeed forever. Overcoming the threat of nuclear proliferation will require innovative strategy that reaches beyond the status quo. It calls for structural change in the international system to be accomodated instead of resisted. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to hold, nuclear weapon states will finally have to forgo their privileged status. This cannot, however, be accomplished simply through the abolition or renunciation of nuclear weapons since nuclear weapons themselves continue to be instrumental for war prevention and international stability. Rather, what is needed is a new approach to the management of the nuclear world system under international responsibility. Nonproliferation and disarmament objectives together call for a concept of global security in which multilateral institutions assume an increasingly important role of nuclear diplomacy. (orig.) [de

  18. Consideration on non-proliferation regime meeting in a changing world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, Hiroyoshi; Kikuchi, Masahiro

    1995-01-01

    This paper presents some proposals for improvement of non-proliferation regime including safeguards structures with historical changes of international regime. Current non-proliferation regime was established under the circumstances of Cold War, and it's structure and measures were influenced by the situation of these time. Although, a couple of years have passed from end of Cold War, new world order has not established yet. Therefore, it is expected that the current regime could be improved in accordance with new world order. Generally speaking, it could be welcomed that the current regime has got some successes from two points of views, namely no new nuclear weapon states have emerged and after the establishment of NPT and all nuclear weapon state is joined NPT finally. However, it is the authors' concern that some gray countries, such as India, Pakistan and Israel, have not joined the NPT yet and cases of Iraqi and DPRK have occurred. After reviewing of such new situation, some proposals will be presented in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime to meet current world conditions

  19. Nuclear non proliferation. Challenges after the NPT extension - CERI Studies Nr 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delpech, Therese

    1996-01-01

    After the decision of extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995, the author first discusses strengths and weaknesses of the non proliferation regime. On the one side, the five nuclear powers are tight by international commitments, the number of proliferating countries has not increased, some countries have willingly decided to give up their military nuclear programme, ex-USSR republics have joined the NPT, the Israel-PLO agreement of 1993 initiated a new era, potentially proliferating countries do not have very significant nuclear programmes, shortcomings of international controls have been identified, international cooperation has improved, and control techniques are available. On the other hand, some matters of concern remain: lessons from the Gulf War, an apparently easier access to nuclear weapons, new opportunities of regional domination, a weaker American guarantee, the North-Korean problem, new exporters of nuclear and ballistic goods and technologies. In the next part, the author discusses the conditions of the agreement for an undefined extension of the NPT, and notably outlines what made this success possible. Then, she addresses political issues related to the universal character of the NPT and to nuclear disarmament. She also discusses the responsibility of the Five nuclear powers, the role of nuclear weapons, and the implication of the extension of the Treaty for the European Union

  20. Evaluation of the Administration's proposed nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Dwindling supplies of fossil fuels are causing countries to turn increasingly to nuclear power as a major source of energy. Although nuclear power holds out the promise of energy independence, it has a formidable drawback--it can also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In April, the President announced a new policy designed to curb nuclear proliferation and the executive branch proposed legislation entitled 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977.' The strategy outlined in these documents calls for stricter export controls and safeguards as well as actions affecting uranium enrichment services, reprocessing, storing of spent fuel, and disposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. GAO analyzed this non-proliferation strategy as it relates to: Improving nuclear export controls; Strengthening international nuclear safeguards; Maintaining U.S. reliability as a supplier of uranium enrichment services; Deferring U.S. reprocessing of spent fuel as an example for others; Reducing risk of proliferation by controlling spent reactor fuel. In general, GAO concluded that the administration's strategy is constructive but noted some weaknesses which should be addressed. Some of the problems noted in this report may already have been addressed by congressional committees in their markup of the legislation

  1. Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.; Mahy, Heidi A.

    2008-09-01

    The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, that provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.

  2. A Non-Proliferating Fuel Cycle: No Enrichment, Reprocessing or Accessible Spent Fuel - 12375

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, Frank L. [Vanderbilt University (United States)

    2012-07-01

    Current fuel cycles offer a number of opportunities for access to plutonium, opportunities to create highly enriched uranium and access highly radioactive wastes to create nuclear weapons and 'dirty' bombs. The non-proliferating fuel cycle however eliminates or reduces such opportunities and access by eliminating the mining, milling and enrichment of uranium. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces the production of plutonium per unit of energy created, eliminates reprocessing and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel and the creation of a stream of high-level waste. It further simplifies the search for land based deep geologic repositories and interim storage sites for spent fuel in the USA by disposing of the spent fuel in deep sub-seabed sediments after storing the spent fuel at U.S. Navy Nuclear Shipyards that have the space and all of the necessary equipment and security already in place. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces transportation risks by utilizing barges for the collection of spent fuel and transport to the Navy shipyards and specially designed ships to take the spent fuel to designated disposal sites at sea and to dispose of them there in deep sub-seabed sediments. Disposal in the sub-seabed sediments practically eliminates human intrusion. Potential disposal sites include Great Meteor East and Southern Nares Abyssal Plain. Such sites then could easily become international disposal sites since they occur in the open ocean. It also reduces the level of human exposure in case of failure because of the large physical and chemical dilution and the elimination of a major pathway to man-seawater is not potable. Of course, the recovery of uranium from sea water and the disposal of spent fuel in sub-seabed sediments must be proven on an industrial scale. All other technologies are already operating on an industrial scale. If externalities, such as reduced terrorist threats, environmental damage (including embedded

  3. Report of the international forum on nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2013-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security - Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia-' on 12 and 13 December 2012, co-hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo. In the forum, keynote speakers from Japan, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S., France and Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. In two panel discussions, entitled 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle back end' and 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for nuclear energy use in the Asian region and a multilateral cooperative framework', active discussions were made among panelists from Japan, IAEA, the U.S., France, ROK, Russia and Kazakhstan. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report except presentation materials. (author)

  4. Towards the fourth review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1990

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    This publication focuses on the background of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), its main provisions and some of the major issues discussed at the three conferences that have thus far been held to review the operation of the Treaty. A fourth conference to review the operation of the Treaty will be held at Geneva from 20 August to 14 September 1990. It will be the last regular review conference before the convening, in 1995, of a conference which will ''decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'' (article X, para.2). A Preparatory Committee (open to all parties) for the Fourth Review Conference has been established by the parties to the NPT, and 95 parties attended the first session, held in New York from 1 to 5 May 1989

  5. SIGMA: the novel approach of a new non-proliferating uranium enrichment technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rivarola, M.; Florido, P.; Brasnarof, D.; Bergallo, E.

    2000-01-01

    The SIGMA concept, under development by Argentina, represents the evolution of the Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion technology, updated to face the challenge of the new economic-based and competitive world frame. The Enrichment technology has been historically considered as a highly proliferating activity in the nuclear field, and central countries limited the access of the developing countries to this technology. The SIGMA concept incorporates innovative proliferation resistant criteria at the beginning of the design process, and inherits all the non-proliferation features of the gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs). The radical new proliferation resistance approach of the SIGMA technology suggests a new kind of global control of the uranium enrichment market, where some developing countries might access an Enrichment plant without access to the technology itself. In this paper, we investigate the economy of the SIGMA plants, and the implications of this technology on the Uranium Global Market. (authors)

  6. Environmental measurements and technology for non-proliferation objectives. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broadway, J.A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to identify multi-disciplinary and single focus laboratories from the environmental and public health communities that can serve as technical center of opportunity for nuclear, inorganic and organic analyses. The objectives of the Office of Research and Development effort are twofold: (1) to identify the technology shortcomings and technologies gaps (thus requirements) within these communities that could benefit from state-of-the-art infield analysis technologies currently under development and (2) to promote scientist-to-scientist dialog and technical exchange under such existing US government internship programs (eg SABIT/USDOC) to improve skills and work relationships. Although the data analysis will focus on environmentally sensitive signatures and materials, the office of Research and Development wishes to further its nuclear non-proliferation objectives by assessing the current technical skill and ingenious analytical tools in less-developed countries so as to broaden the base of capability for multi-species measurement technology development

  7. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime: An international priority. Tokyo, 10 December 2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons has witnessed steady progress and a number of important milestones. Progress, however, is still required on this and many other fronts, including: the need to work energetically to ensure the universal adherence to safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements; the need for reducing existing nuclear weapon arsenals and adopting concrete steps that move us further towards nuclear disarmament; the need to draw in those States that remain outside the NPT regime; and the need to develop alternative approaches to regional and international security that are functional and inclusive, and that do not incorporate nuclear deterrence as a feature

  8. Stabilization and immobilization of military plutonium: A non-proliferation perspective

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Leventhal, P. [Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Nuclear Control Institute welcomes this DOE-sponsored technical workshop on stabilization and immobilization of weapons plutonium (W Pu) because of the significant contribution it can make toward the ultimate non-proliferation objective of eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), from world commerce. The risk of theft or diversion of these materials warrants concern, as only a few kilograms in the hands of terrorists or threshold states would give them the capability to build nuclear weapons. Military plutonium disposition questions cannot be addressed in isolation from civilian plutonium issues. The National Academy of Sciences has urged that {open_quotes}further steps should be taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the world`s plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated...{close_quotes}. This report discusses vitrification and a mixed oxide fuels option, and the effects of disposition choices on civilian plutonium fuel cycles.

  9. Non-proliferation, safeguards, and security for the fissile materials disposition program immobilization alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Tolk, K.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Moore, L.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Department of Energy is analyzing long-term storage and disposition alternatives for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered. These include facilities for storage, conversion and stabilization of fissile materials, immobilization in glass or ceramic material, fabrication of fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use of reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and disposal of fissile material using geologic alternatives. This paper will focus on how the objectives of reducing security and proliferation risks are being considered, and the possible facility impacts. Some of the areas discussed in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threats, and (4) potential proliferation, safeguards, and security issues and impacts on the facilities. Issues applicable to all of the possible disposition alternatives will be discussed in this paper. However, particular attention is given to the plutonium immobilization alternatives.

  10. Present status of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Netchaev, B.

    1976-01-01

    The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons plays an important role in enhancing the security of all States. It is essential to maintain in the implementation of the Treaty an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of all the countries Party to the Treaty wether or not nuclear weapon States. These questions were discussed during the Conference on the operation of the Treaty held in Geneva in May 1975. It was emphasized at the Conference that the first five years of application of the Treaty had shown a consistent increase in the number of ratifications and in the safeguards agreements concluded on the basis of the Agreement. (N.E.A.) [fr

  11. Anti-neutrino flux in a research reactor for non-proliferation application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Khakshournia, Samad; Foroughi, Shokoufeh [Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI), Tehran (Iran, Islamic Republic of). Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

    2017-11-15

    Owing to growing interest in the study of emitted antineutrinos from nuclear reactors to test the Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, antineutrino flux was studied in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) using ORIGEN code. According to our prediction, antineutrino rate was obtained 2.6 x 10{sup 17} (v{sub e}/sec) in the core No. 57F of the TRR. Calculations indicated that evolution of antineutrino flux was very slow with time and the performed refueling had not an observable effect on antineutrino flux curve for a 5 MW reactor with the conventional refueling program. It is seen that for non-proliferation applications the measurement of the contribution of {sup 239}Pu to the fission using an antineutrino detector is not viable in the TRR.

  12. The structure of German non-proliferation policy - past and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1990-01-01

    West German nonproliferation policy has evolved through four phases: First German policy strived to regain the right to nuclear research and industrial development. Then West Germany struggled for participation in NATO nuclear decision-making. Following the conclusion of the NPT, the full development of a mature nuclear industry, including activities in the full fuel cycle, and the promotion of nuclear exports were the focus of national nuclear policy. Starting in the early eighties, political aspects became more important. International security, arms control and disarmament, and foreign reputation had a more prominent role than pure economic interests. In the future, the united Germany must take care not to repeat the sad scandals of the eighties. Its renunciation of nuclear weapons remains a pillar of European stability and a prerequisite for a European peace system. Together with its European partners, Germany can be expected to take a more active, supportive and effective role in international non-proliferation policy. (orig./HSCH) [de

  13. The Asia-Pacific region: non-proliferation and other disarmament issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    In the past few years, the United States and the former Soviet Union began to adjust their force structures in Asia-Pacific region. In this respect, a large range of issues have been raised in discussions on the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Apart from the issues and trends related to proliferation, military expenditure, arms transfer and other disarmament matters, the specific situations in the respective subregions of South-East Asia, South Asia and North-East Asia were discussed. Comprehensive and verified commitments not to possess any such weapons is stressed as the main goal of the meeting. It is vitally important that opportunities that were opened should be seized to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological as well as highly destabilizing conventional weapons

  14. SIGMA, the novel approach of a new non-proliferating uranium enrichment technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rivarola, M.; Florido, P.; Brasnarof, D.; Bergallo, J.

    2001-01-01

    The SIGMA concept, under development by Argentina, represents the evolution of the Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion technology, updated to face the challenge of the new economic-based and competitive world frame. The Enrichment technology has been historically considered as a highly proliferating activity in the nuclear field, and central countries have limited the access of the developing countries to this technology. The SIGMA concept incorporates innovative proliferation resistant criteria at the beginning of the design process, and inherits all the non-proliferation features of the Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs). The radical new proliferation resistant approach of the SIGMA technology, suggest a new kind of global control of the Uranium Enrichment Market, were some developing countries might access to an Enrichment plant without accessing to the technology itself. In this paper, we analyse the economy of the SIGMA plants, and the implications of this technology on the Uranium Global Market. (authors)

  15. Non-Proliferation Community, Do We Really Speak the Same Language?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Michel, Q.; Viski, A.; Sevini, F.; Charatsis, C.; )

    2015-01-01

    The non-proliferation community, with its many different stakeholders, has issues with a number of terms and concepts which have different meanings, not only in different national languages but also for scientists, diplomats, engineers, law enforcement people, IAEA safeguards staff, and many others. The consequences are not only relevant for translators and seminar participants. This confusion of terms may create misunderstandings with legal, diplomatic and operational consequences. A number of terms, used because of their meaning in English are ''false friends'' in other languages, i.e., they are used because they sound close, but their meaning may be different. The nuances may be about the fact that they cover a narrower, broader, or slightly different concept in another national or professional language. The emblematic example is the English word control, written the same way in many languages but with different connotations. Other examples include terms which have a precise legal definition for some communities whereas other stakeholder see it as generic terms (e.g., technology, transit); terms that are not explicit but have different implicit contents related to the context like outreach or declaration; terms which are distinct in one language but translated into one word in others like specially and especially designed; terms which cover different realities for different work communities like counter-proliferation, analysis; terms which are widely used and hardly defined anywhere like dual-use; or terms which refer to a specific legal or moral reference framework which is not always explicated like illegal, legitimate. This paper will explore issues related to some of these terms used in Western languages, and argue the necessity to take into account these sometimes subtle language differences, realizing the difficulties they may create for practitioners of non-proliferation. Improvements might include revising official reference documents

  16. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage on options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to bum the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the nonproliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

  17. Role of non-governmental organizations in formation of non-proliferation culture in new independent countries (NIC)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevchik, M.

    2000-01-01

    Purpose of the report is demonstrate the non-governmental organizations (NGO) role in formation of non-proliferation culture in former Soviet Union. Activity of Center of Non-proliferation Problems Investigation (CNPI) of Monterey Institute of International Investigations and its collaboration with existing in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) non-governmental organizations is considered as example. Brief information about CNPI and reasons for it representatives opening of in Kazakhstan and in other CIS-countries, as well as cooperation of NGO in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine for creation on Central Asia zone free from nuclear weapon ia given. Some measures which could promote to formation of non-proliferation culture in region are suggested

  18. Electronic medical record in cardiology: a 10-year Italian experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Carpeggiani, Clara; Macerata, Alberto; Morales, Maria Aurora

    2015-08-01

    the aim of this study was to report a ten years experience in the electronic medical record (EMR) use. An estimated 80% of healthcare transactions are still paper-based. an EMR system was built at the end of 1998 in an Italian tertiary care center to achieve total integration among different human and instrumental sources, eliminating paper-based medical records. Physicians and nurses who used EMR system reported their opinions. In particular the hospital activity supported electronically, regarding 4,911 adult patients hospitalized in the 2004- 2008 period, was examined. the final EMR product integrated multimedia document (text, images, signals). EMR presented for the most part advantages and was well adopted by the personnel. Appropriateness evaluation was also possible for some procedures. Some disadvantages were encountered, such as start-up costs, long time required to learn how to use the tool, little to no standardization between systems and the EMR technology. the EMR is a strategic goal for clinical system integration to allow a better health care quality. The advantages of the EMR overcome the disadvantages, yielding a positive return on investment to health care organization.

  19. Record Management Audit: Nuclear Malaysia’s Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adnan, H.; Yusof, M. H.; Ngadiron, N.; Ismail, R.M.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: The Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear Malaysia) is heavily reliant on information in order to accomplish its strategic research and development, and commercialization (R&D&C) outcomes. Since its beginning in 1972, the activity of Information Management (IM) – Records Management (RM) is always integrated in the process of knowledge repository. The Division of Information Management (DIM) is the custodian for the agency’s knowledge repository and also responsible to ensure its compliance with the National Archive of Malaysian Act 2003 (Act 629), as well as to address the needs of 3s: Safety, Security and Safeguards outlined by IAEA. In 2013, Nuclear Malaysia has launched KM Nuclear Policy which includes KM audit committee, to oversee and provide checks and balances for KM initiative programmes. The first KM audit conducted was the Record Management Audit (RMA), started in 2014. The journey faced some challenges from people, process and technology and later completed in 2015 with accumulation of new knowledge derived for the KM improvement. RMA is a unique process which needs to be shared with others because it offers example and experience from the perspective of nuclear R&D agency. (author

  20. Electronic medical record in cardiology: a 10-year Italian experience

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Clara Carpeggiani

    2015-08-01

    Full Text Available SummaryObjectives:the aim of this study was to report a ten years experience in the electronic medical record (EMR use. An estimated 80% of healthcare transactions are still paper-based.Methods:an EMR system was built at the end of 1998 in an Italian tertiary care center to achieve total integration among different human and instrumental sources, eliminating paper-based medical records. Physicians and nurses who used EMR system reported their opinions. In particular the hospital activity supported electronically, regarding 4,911 adult patients hospitalized in the 2004- 2008 period, was examined.Results:the final EMR product integrated multimedia document (text, images, signals. EMR presented for the most part advantages and was well adopted by the personnel. Appropriateness evaluation was also possible for some procedures. Some disadvantages were encountered, such as start-up costs, long time required to learn how to use the tool, little to no standardization between systems and the EMR technology.Conclusion:the EMR is a strategic goal for clinical system integration to allow a better health care quality. The advantages of the EMR overcome the disadvantages, yielding a positive return on investment to health care organization.

  1. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; La conference d'examen 2000 du TNP et l'avenir du regime de non-proliferation nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grand, C. [Institut d' Etudes Politiques de Paris, 75 (France); Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr-Coetquidan (France)

    2001-07-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  2. Inter-relations between regional and global approaches to nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.

    1995-01-01

    It is now becoming evident that the end of the East-West conflict has had a significant effect upon both global and regional security structures. From a situation where regional arrangements were, in the main, determined and driven by pressures arising from the bipolar division which permeated all aspects of the global political system, they increasingly have an independent existence. This has enabled such arrangements to be tailored to local circumstances in a manner which is not possible with global agreements. In particular, it has become apparent that enhanced constraints on peaceful nuclear activities and much more intrusive inspection and monitoring procedures, can more easily be negotiated on a regional basis than a global one. It also appears that nuclear weapon states are prepared to make unconditional commitments about nuclear weapon use on a regional basis, whereas they may not be prepared to do so on a global one. In short, regional approaches enable fine-tuning of the international non-proliferation regime to occur, and for measures to be taken on a regional level that would be politically unacceptable on the global level, due to their discriminatory nature. In the years ahead additional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) agreements may be negotiated, covering more of the land area of the globe. In parallel, regional nuclear cooperation and safeguarding agreements might also be expected to develop along the lines of EURATOM and ABACC. This in turn may move the states which remain outside of the NPT to a similar position to Argentina and Brazil at the moment: to an acceptance that whatever their opposition in principle to the NPT and the system of supplier export guidelines, the commitments they have already accepted on a regional level are more intrusive and constraining than those they would incur if they were to have acceded to the Treaty. In these circumstances, accession to the NPT becomes a distinct possibility, and thus the regional approach to non-proliferation

  3. US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staats, E.B.

    1980-01-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm US reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonprofileration policies can influence export sales. Based on avavailable data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of US nuclear exports. However, US companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by US technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and complete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for US nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, US companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

  4. The roles of Euratom and the IAEA in nuclear non-proliferation - a Euratom view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szymanski, P.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State is based on the finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The state-level concept that has been introduced by the IAEA in this respect allows and obliges the IAEA to take into account state specific factors to determine the set of safeguards activities to be applied in a State. The effectiveness of the EURATOM regional safeguards systems, its cooperation with the IAEA and its independence from States and operators are among the factors which the IAEA needs to consider in order to apply safeguards in an effective and efficient way. Socio-economic and political factors like the support to international non-proliferation should also be factors in this concept. The intended evolution of the state-level concept by the IAEA then should result in making better use of the activities of EURATOM safeguards. This is possible by the IAEA relying more on the EURATOM activities for the verification of declared nuclear material and the IAEA concentrating on getting assurance on the absence of undeclared materials and activities. Developing a regional-level concept that supplements the state-level concept can contribute to determine the extent to which the IAEA can make better use of EURATOM safeguards in the future. (author)

  5. Implications of the Ukraine Crisis for Security, Non-Proliferation and Deterrence in North East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farghen, Morgane

    2014-01-01

    The Ukraine crisis has been a 'wake up' call for Europe but its implication in Asia should be also be considered. The Russian 'coup de force' in Ukraine has created a psychological trauma in Western countries not only amongst political and military leaders but also in the general population by its reminiscence of Cold war thinking and by pointing to the risk of a military conflict in Europe. Moreover the Russian attempt to change the borders by force could create a dangerous precedent and produce an undesirable 'butterfly effects' in the rest of the world. In North East Asia, the stability in a context of rising powers and proliferation risks, relies on a status quo based upon the partition of the Korean peninsula, a de facto autonomy of Taiwan and a Japanese administration over the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands. As the status quo is increasingly challenged by revisionist powers, the question is worth to be raised: what are the implications of the Ukraine crisis for security, non-proliferation, and deterrence in North East Asia?

  6. Abstracts of reports of the International conference on non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

    1997-01-01

    On August 21, 1947, the USSR Council of Ministers made a decision on creating Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (STS). The first Nuclear Test on the Test Site was conducted on August 29, 1949, the last one was made on October 19, 1989. In all during 40 years on Semipalatinsk Test Site 116 ground and air and 340 underground nuclear tests were conducted. They brought much damage to health and lives of thousands of people who involuntarily participated in those events. On August 29, 1991, by Kazakstan President's decree STS was closed but the problems of people's rehabilitation, natural landscapes recovering, test-site infrastructure conversion remained. These problems are being solved under direct state programs, intergovernmental agreements of Kazakstan with Russia and the USA, cooperation with different international and foreign organizations, enterprises, scientific-research centers. Kazakstan subsequently constantly pursues the policy of nonproliferation, takes measures on ellimination of nuclear tests consequences and relative infrastructure. The Republic is not involved into military nuclear programs. From its territory all the nuclear weapon was taken away. Kazakstan joined the Agreement on Non-proliferation, signed the Agreement on Safeguards to all Nuclear activity on Kazakh territory with the IAEA

  7. Nuclear non-proliferation and arms control: Are we making progress? 7 November 2005, Washington, DC, Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    ) establish a framework for multilateral management and control of the 'back end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. spent fuel reprocessing and waste disposal); and 4) create a similar framework for multilateral management and control of the 'front end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. enrichment and fuel production). Regarding the protection of nuclear material it is reported that multiple international and regional initiatives are underway to help countries to improve the physical protection of such material. The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2005. Many governments have also responded to UN Security Council resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004. Both the Convention and resolution 1540 call on countries to criminalize the illicit possession and use of radioactive material, and aim to enhance efforts to detect and combat illicit trafficking. And in July, parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material agreed on major changes that would make it legally binding for countries to protect nuclear facilities and material in domestic use, storage and transport. With strong support from the IAEA, Russia and the US, multiple countries are also taking steps to convert their research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel, and to return the HEU to the country of origin. For nuclear non-proliferation commitments to be effective, they must be backed by credible mechanisms to deal with cases of compliance. The potential for being referred to the UN Security Council has clearly acted as an inducement for compliance in some cases; however, we should recall that the referral of North Korea to the Council, in 1992 and again in 2003, resulted in little to no action. To be effective, the UN Security Council must be ready at all times to engage, in order to cope with emerging threats to international peace and security. On the nuclear disarmament front, no mechanism exists to monitor compliance with

  8. 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    On 19 July 1995, the Director General received a letter, addressed to him by the Alternate Resident Representative of Canada to the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

  9. Abstracts of 3. International scientific-practical conference 'Semipalatinsk Test Site. Radiation Legacy and Non-proliferation Issues'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The Conference gathered representatives of more than 25 countries and international organizations. In the Conference among with actual problems of current environment conditions in Kazakhstan, perspective trends in the field of radiation protection, radio-ecological and radiobiological research and issues of international co-operation in support of non-proliferation regime, other advanced scientific projects were considered [ru

  10. How we think about peace and security. The ABCs of initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation education

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toki, Masako; Potter, William C.

    2005-01-01

    Education and training are among the most important but underutilized tools for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. Although few national governments or international organizations have invested significantly in such training programs, there is a growing recognition among States of the need to rectify this situation. This positive development is reflected in the broad support for recommendations of a UN study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and in related initiatives within the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the forthcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference, it is useful to take stock of the implementation of the UN study's recommendations. In particular, it is important to observe the progress that has been made within the context of the NPT review process, as well as the obstacles that must be overcome if the full potential for disarmament and non-proliferation education is to be realized. Resources on disarmament and non-proliferation education are increasingly available on the Internet. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs has launched new features on its web site that include links to academic institutes, governmental centers, NGOs and other bodies engaged in educational efforts. As part of its mission to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and raising global public awareness on WMD issues, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) has developed a series of tutorials for non-proliferation and disarmament education. Among these tutorials, the NPT Tutorial has been designed to educate and provide useful material about the treaty through interactive text and enriched multimedia segments, including timelines, maps, and numerous links to relevant resources. Among other resources are teaching guides developed by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies through its Critical Issues Forum (CIF). More

  11. Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to Prepare the Next Generation of Experts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens, W.A.M.; Peerani, P.; ); Gariazzo, C.; Ward, S.; Crete, J.-M.; Braunegger-Guelich, A.

    2015-01-01

    Although nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are a continuous concern of the international community and discussed frequently at international fora and conferences, the academic world is not really on board with these topics. What we mean by this is that nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is only very seldom part of a university curriculum. In the few cases where it does appear in the curriculum, whether in a nuclear engineering course or a political sciences master programme, it is typically covered only partially. Nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are multidisciplinary and embrace, inter alia, historical, legal, technical, and political aspects. This is perhaps the reason why it is challenging for a single professor or university to develop and implement a comprehensive academic course or programme in this area. Professional organizations in this field, like the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), have made first steps to address this issue by implementing specific educational activities. However, much more needs to be done. Therefore, ESARDA, INMM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are in the process of joining efforts to identify key elements and priorities to support universities in establishing appropriate and effective academic programmes in this area. This paper will share best practices, achievements and lessons learned by ESARDA, INMM and the IAEA in providing education and training to develop and maintain the expertise of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards professionals. In addition, it will suggest potential ways on how to assist universities to get prepared for building-up the next generation of experts able to meet any future challenges in the area of non-proliferation and safeguards. (author)

  12. Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-06-01

    This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

  13. Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-04-01

    This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

  14. Recording the PHILAE Touchdown using CASSE: Laboratory Experiments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Knapmeyer, Martin; Faber, Claudia; Tune, Jean-Baptiste; Arnold, Walter; Witte, Lars; Schröder, Silvio; Roll, Reinhard; Chares, Bernd; Fischer, Hans-Herbert; Möhlmann, Diedrich; Seidensticker, Klaus

    2014-05-01

    The landing of Philae on comet 67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko is scheduled for November 11, 2014. Its landing feet house the triaxial acceleration sensors of CASSE (Comet Acoustic Surface Sounding Experiment) which will thus be the first sensors to be in mechanical contact with the cometary surface. It is planned that CASSE will be in listening mode to record the deceleration of the lander by the collision with the comet. The analysis of this data will not only support an engineering analysis of the landing process itself but also yield information about the mechanical properties of the comet's surface. Here, we describe a series of controlled landings of a lander model. The tests were conducted in the Landing & Mobility Test Facility (LAMA) of the DLR Institute of Space Systems in Bremen, Germany, where an industrial robot can be programmed to move landers or rovers along predefined paths and under simulated low gravity. The qualification model of the Philae landing gear was used in the tests. It consists of three legs manufactured of carbon fiber and metal joints. Attached to each leg is a foot with two soles and a mechanically driven ice screw to secure the lander on the comet. The right one of these soles, if viewed from the outside towards the lander body, houses a Brüel & Kjaer DeltaTron 4506 triaxial piezoelectric accelerometer as used on the spacecraft. Orientation of the three axes was such that the X-axis of the accelerometer points downwards while the Y and Z axes are horizontal. This somewhat uncommon orientation was necessary due to the position of the electric connector on the 4506. Data was recorded at a sampling rate of 8.2 kHz for a duration of 2 s. Touchdown measurements were conducted on three types of ground with different landing velocities. Landings with low velocities were carried out on the concrete floor of the LAMA to determine the stiffness of the landing gear based on the deceleration data measured with the accelerometer. Landings on fine

  15. Tools for Trade Analysis and Open Source Information Monitoring for Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cojazzi, G.G.M.; Versino, C.; Wolfart, E.; Renda, G.; Janssens, W.A.M.; )

    2015-01-01

    The new state level approach being proposed by IAEA envisions an objective based and information driven safeguards approach utilizing all relevant information to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. To this goal the IAEA makes also use of open source information, here broadly defined as any information that is neither classified nor proprietary. It includes, but is not limited to: media sources, government and non-governmental reports and analyzes, commercial data, and scientific/technical literature, including trade data. Within the EC support programme to IAEA, JRC has surveyed and catalogued open sources on import-export customs trade data and developed tools for supporting the use of the related databases in safeguards. The JRC software The Big Table, (TBT), supports i.a.: a) the search through a collection of reference documents relevant to trade analysis (legal/regulatory documents, technical handbooks); b) the selection of items of interests to specific verifications and c) the mapping of these items to customs commodities searchable in trade databases. In the field of open source monitoring, JRC is developing and operating a ''Nuclear Security Media Monitor'' (NSMM), which is a web-based multilingual news aggregation system that automatically collects news articles from pre-defined web sites. NSMM is a domain specific version of the general JRC-Europe Media Monitor (EMM). NSMM has been established within the EC support programme with the aim, i.e., to streamline IAEA's process of open source information monitoring. In the first part, the paper will recall the trade data sources relevant for non-proliferation and will then illustrate the main features of TBT, recently coupled with the IAEA Physical Model, and new visualization techniques applied to trade data. In the second part it will present the main aspects of the NSMM also by illustrating some of uses done at JRC. (author)

  16. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Graham, Thomas Jr. [7609 Glenbrook Rd., Bethesda, MD 20814 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

  17. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Review conference of the States Parties Geneva 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1985 with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. The Treaty, commonly referred to as the non-proliferation Treaty, is the fundamental instrument to avert the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons and is, perhaps, the most important multilateral arms regulation agreement of our time. It was negotiated in the 1960s in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and in the United Nations General Assembly. The Treaty was opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on July 1, 1968. On that date, it was signed by the three Depositary Governments - the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States - and by 58 other States. As of December 31, 1983 the number of States parties to the Treaty had risen to 119

  18. Assessment of nuclear fuel cycles with respect to assurance of energy supply; economic aspects; environmental aspects; non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    This paper, which was presented to all INFCE Working Groups gives a broad qualitative assessment in tabular form of the following five fuel cycles: LWR once-through, LWR with thermal recycle, HWR once-through, HTR with uranium recycle, fast breeder reactor. The assessment is given of the assurance of supply aspects, the macro- and micro-economic aspects, the environmental aspects, and the non-proliferation, including safeguards, aspects of each fuel cycle

  19. The new generation of nuclear submarines: in violation of the non proliferation treaty - Booklet No. 3, June 2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-06-01

    The Observatory of French nuclear weapons looks forwards to the elimination of nuclear weapons in conformity with the aims of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. The object of this booklet of the Observatory of French nuclear weapons about the program of new generation missile-launching nuclear submarines is to show the amplitude of this program that is going to mobilize considerable industrial resources and energies to the detriment of other security alternatives

  20. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the insertion of the Brazilian State in its regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, Marcos Valle Machado da

    2010-01-01

    The issue of nuclear weapons continues to appear as a focal point of International Relations. The efforts and concrete actions on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control are still issues that generate recurring tensions between States. However, in Brazil, there is little analysis of an academic nature about these issues and, with respect to current and prospective position of the Brazilian State in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime, studies and analysis are even more scarce, or incipient. The present dissertation has as its object of study to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Regime arisen from NPT, and the Brazilian State insertion process in this Regime. Therefore our research work is structured in three areas: the first one is about the role of nuclear weapons in States security perception, the second is about NPT and its Regime, the third runs over the insertion of the Brazilian state in this regime. So, in summary, the research performed included the reasons that make a State to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT genesis and evolution of the perception of the meaning of that Treaty by the States, and the process and the degree of insertion of Brazil in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime. The inquiry sought to place this object of study in the broader debate on Foreign Relations, based on the approaches of the discipline devoted to the question of managing the security of States, id est, the two approaches that constitute the mainstream of the discipline: the perspective theoretical liberal (and neoliberal variants) and realistic thinking (and neo-realist). Thus, we have used different theoretical lenses, which we think necessary for understanding the specific parts and causal connections between these parts of a complex issue. (author)

  1. IHEDN-FRS round table - Nuclear non proliferation in front of today's challenges, 10 November 2009 - Vallieres amphitheatre

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laborde, Richard; Grand, Camille; Tertrais, Bruno; Champchesnel, Tiphaine de; Hautecouverture, Benjamin; Briens, Martin

    2009-01-01

    This document first proposes a synthetic overview of contributions and then the texts of these contributions. After some introducing speeches, a first set of contributions addressed the present limitations of international instruments of struggle against proliferation (challenges of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the resolution 1540 of the UN Security Council and the new instruments of struggle against proliferation). The second set of contributions discussed the Iranian and Pakistani cases as examples of proliferation outside of and within the non proliferation regime

  2. Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2014-01-01

    The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

  3. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-01-01

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  4. Germany and the nuclear non-proliferation; Current situation and prospects; Deutschland und die nukleare Nichtverbreitung; Zwischenbilanz und Ausblick

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Preisinger, J.

    1993-07-01

    A summary is given of the consequences, both positive and negative, of international non-proliferation policy. The numerous, complex branches and connections of national measures and inter-stake agreements for the peaceful, controlled uses of nuclear technology and related military technologies are expertly described, and assessed on their effectiveness. Weak aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime are pointed out and past reforms are illustrated and assessed in the light of recent developments. The interests of the German Federal Republic from the centre of this analysis. The author shows that, after a certain hesitary, German diplomacy has now become active in the establishment of an international non-proliferation regime. He concludes that Germany should take a strong initiative role in maintaining a peaceful international nuclear order. (orig.) [Deutsch] Es wird ein Resuemee der bisherigen Erfolge und Misserfolge internationaler Nichtverbreitungspolitik gezogen. Die komplexen, vielfach veraestelten und verschachtelten nationalen Massnahmen und zwischenstaatlichen Vereinbarungen zur Ueberwachung und friedlichen Zweckbindung von Nukleartechnologie und militaerisch relevanten Anschlusstechnologien werden sachkundig erlaeutert und auf ihre Wirksamkeit ueberprueft. Schwachstellen des nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregimes werden offengelegt, Reformschritte der vergangenen Jahre werden dargestellt und im Lichte der juengsten Entwicklungen bewertet. Dabei steht die Interessenlage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Zentrum der Analyse. Der Autor zeigt, dass die deutsche Diplomatie sich nach einer gewissen Zurueckhaltung schliesslich aktiv in die Gestaltung des internationalen Nichtverbreitungsregimes eingeschaltet hat. Er plaediert fuer eine kraftvolle Initiativrolle Deutschlands zur Erhaltung einer friedlichen internationalen Nuklearordnung. (orig.)

  5. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING RELIABLE NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICE APPROACHES: ECONOMIC AND NON-PROLIFERATION MERITS OF NUCLEAR FUEL LEASING

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kreyling, Sean J.; Brothers, Alan J.; Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.

    2010-01-01

    The goal of international nuclear policy since the dawn of nuclear power has been the peaceful expansion of nuclear energy while controlling the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Numerous initiatives undertaken in the intervening decades to develop international agreements on providing nuclear fuel supply assurances, or reliable nuclear fuel services (RNFS) attempted to control the spread of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. In order to inform the international debate and the development of government policy, PNNL has been developing an analytical framework to holistically evaluate the economics and non-proliferation merits of alternative approaches to managing the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., cradle-to-grave). This paper provides an overview of the analytical framework and discusses preliminary results of an economic assessment of one RNFS approach: full-service nuclear fuel leasing. The specific focus of this paper is the metrics under development to systematically evaluate the non-proliferation merits of fuel-cycle management alternatives. Also discussed is the utility of an integrated assessment of the economics and non-proliferation merits of nuclear fuel leasing.

  6. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-11-15

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  7. Non proliferation regimes undertakings: Benefits and limits of synergies in verification technologies and procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richard, M.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Thirty years ago the NPT was entering into force. Therewith, when a State became party to the NPT, it had, in accordance with article III.1 of the Treaty, an undertaking to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards agreement with the IAEA and accept safeguards verification on source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territories in order to verify that such material is not diverted. This multilateral instrument was the foundation stone of the non-proliferation regime and marked the actual birth of internationally accepted measures to verily compliance with politically stringent agreements. Since that time several important multilateral or bilateral instruments on non-proliferation and disarmament have been negotiated and adopted to curb the development and the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) most of them since the middle of the eighties and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Amongst the multilateral instruments are the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapon and Toxin Weapons (1972), the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1993), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996), the Strengthening of the IAEA Safeguards and the Additional Protocol (1997), with some still in negotiation like the Protocol of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, and some on which negotiation is still a wish like the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Bilateral disarmament agreements between the United States of America and the Russian Federation such as the INF Treaty, START I and II, the agreements on the elimination of excess defence nuclear material as well as the Trilateral Initiative with the IAEA pave the way to nuclear disarmament with the reduction of both the number of nuclear weapons arsenal and the fissile material inventories. The politically stringent undertakings of States that have become parties to those agreements would not be possible without the

  8. French network and acquired experience on record strong ground motion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferrieux, H.; Mohammadioun, G.

    1988-03-01

    The network intended to record strong ground motion in continental France is composed for the most part of instrument packages incorporated into nuclear installations, which are supplemented by a certain number of accelerometers placed in the most highly seismic areas. In a country where the level of seismicity is relatively modest, such a network is not conductive to the acquisition of new data, which, instead, is obtained through spot studies of limited duration using more sensitive instruments or through the recording of strong ground motion in neighbouring countries [fr

  9. Keeping Up the Live: Recorded Television as Live Experience

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Es, Karin; Keilbach, Judith

    2018-01-01

    textabstractIncreasingly new media platforms are making claims to liveness. Looking back in television history we also find programmes that were recorded, but kept up the claims of being live. This raises the question as to what accounts for the attraction of the live? Focusing on Ein Platz für

  10. Nuclear non-proliferation: The security context, 5 October 2007, University of Florence, Florence, Italy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2007-01-01

    Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, stated that nuclear threats have become more dangerous and more complex. We have witnessed the emergence of illicit trade in nuclear technology. Countries have managed to develop clandestine nuclear programmes. Sophisticated extremist groups have shown keen interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. n parallel, nuclear material and nuclear material production have become more difficult to control. Energy security concerns and fears of climate change are prompting many countries to revisit the nuclear power option. And to ensure a supply of reactor fuel, more countries have shown interest in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle - a step that brings them quite close to nuclear weapons capability. Add to this the 27 000 nuclear warheads that already exist in the arsenals of nine countries, and the hair trigger alert deployment level of some of these weapons. And as if these stockpiles and their deployment were not threat enough, most of these countries continue to repeat two inherently contradictory mantras: first, that it is important for them to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security; and second, that no one else should have them. 'Do as I say, not as I do'. Against this backdrop, there are four critical aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime that we must strengthen - addressing both symptoms and root causes - if we are to avoid a cascade of nuclear proliferation, and our ultimate self-destruction. First, we must develop a more effective approach for dealing with proliferation threats. Second, we must secure existing nuclear material stockpiles and tighten controls over the transfer and production of nuclear material. Third, we must strengthen the verification authority and capability of the IAEA. Fourth, we urgently need to find a way for disarmament to be given the prominence and priority it deserves. In conclusion, it is clear that a security strategy rooted in 'Us

  11. Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle; Nukleare Abruestung. Optionen fuer den kommenden Ueberpruefungszyklus des NVV

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mueller, Harald

    2011-07-01

    The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

  12. Seven law concepts on nuclear non-proliferation suggested by the International Group of Legal Experts (ILG)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Steen, G. [Djursholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant LTD, Vienna (Austria)

    2001-03-01

    The ILG has worked as an independent group under the Swedish Support Programme on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The ILG's mission is concluded with this report. When developing the seven Law Concepts on national nuclear legislation that are presented in this report, the ILG has applied certain basic principles, which are firmly established in modern Western legislation. A summary of these principles is made here. They are essential cornerstones in laws and regulations that apply both to the nuclear industry and to other high technology areas, characterised by advanced safety and security requirements. Of essential importance is that the Operator alone is responsible for the fulfilment of requirements stipulated in laws and authority directives. The technical complexity of the nuclear industry and the far-reaching requirements on safety and security necessitate a qualified and complete national system of legislation and regulations. As all legislation in general, the nuclear legislation should be clear, easy to understand and give little room for misunderstandings and loopholes. It should also present the legally established requirements on safety and security in a form that facilitates the application and implementation by both state authorities, facility operators and individuals. The investigations of the causes of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents brought into focus the impact on nuclear safety from human failure. As a consequence, increased emphasis has since then been put on the development of an overall high safety culture in the nuclear field. It is recognised that a good safety culture also promotes the non-proliferation systems and safeguards measures and helps to reduce the risk of illicit trafficking. In a high safety culture environment, each individual facility employee has to be motivated and encouraged to carry out the assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with rules and

  13. Seven law concepts on nuclear non-proliferation suggested by the International Group of Legal Experts (ILG)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steen, G.; Wredberg, L.

    2001-03-01

    The ILG has worked as an independent group under the Swedish Support Programme on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The ILG's mission is concluded with this report. When developing the seven Law Concepts on national nuclear legislation that are presented in this report, the ILG has applied certain basic principles, which are firmly established in modern Western legislation. A summary of these principles is made here. They are essential cornerstones in laws and regulations that apply both to the nuclear industry and to other high technology areas, characterised by advanced safety and security requirements. Of essential importance is that the Operator alone is responsible for the fulfilment of requirements stipulated in laws and authority directives. The technical complexity of the nuclear industry and the far-reaching requirements on safety and security necessitate a qualified and complete national system of legislation and regulations. As all legislation in general, the nuclear legislation should be clear, easy to understand and give little room for misunderstandings and loopholes. It should also present the legally established requirements on safety and security in a form that facilitates the application and implementation by both state authorities, facility operators and individuals. The investigations of the causes of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents brought into focus the impact on nuclear safety from human failure. As a consequence, increased emphasis has since then been put on the development of an overall high safety culture in the nuclear field. It is recognised that a good safety culture also promotes the non-proliferation systems and safeguards measures and helps to reduce the risk of illicit trafficking. In a high safety culture environment, each individual facility employee has to be motivated and encouraged to carry out the assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with rules and regulations

  14. Authentication of monitoring systems for non-proliferation and arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fuller, J.L.; Kouzes, R.T.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Radiation measurement and systems are central to the affirmation of compliance with nuclear material control agreements associated with a variety of arms control and non-proliferation regimes. A number of radiation measurement systems are under development for this purpose, and the correct functioning of these systems will be authenticated. Authentication is the process by which a monitoring party to an agreement is assured that measurement systems are assembled as designed, function as designed, and do not contain hidden features that allow the passing of material inconsistent with an accepted declaration. Attribute measurement systems are specific examples of radiation measurement systems that are being developed in the United States and the Russian Federation. Under one bilateral agreement, the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction (DoD DTRA/CTR) Program is constructing a Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) at Mayak to hold up to 50 tons of plutonium from the disassembly of Russian Federation nuclear weapons. Negotiations are being held between the U.S. and the Russian Federation for cooperative development of attribute measurement systems to provide confidence that the material is of weapons origin and other purposes. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is leading the authentication effort for U.S. interests at FMSF. There are two basic requirements for an attribute measurement system: protection of classified information, and assurance of credible performance of the system for the measurement. The technology used to protect classified information is referred to as an information barrier. An information barrier consists of technology and procedures that prevent the release of host-country classified information to a monitoring party during a joint inspection of a sensitive item. Information barriers are used on monitoring systems that are exposed to host-party classified materials

  15. The Iranian Atomic program - Energy- versus Safety policy? On the problem of international non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klimas, Mirko

    2007-01-01

    The Iranian atomic program: An important part of national energy policy or military way out of the international safety dilemma? In detail the author investigates - against background of Neorealism Theory - the coherences between international non-proliferation regimes - from Atoms for Peace program of the 1950 years up to actual measures of the IAEA - and the development of the Iranian atomic program. Off from superficial discussions on intentions of the Iranian government the book lightens the background of an international policy, which not only favours Iran during production of nuclear weapons as also invites the country to a military utilization of its atomic program. (orig./GL)

  16. Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abdelwahab, Biad

    2010-01-01

    The NPT was negotiated during the Cold War period to prevent the emergence of new nuclear players by distinguishing between 'nuclear-weapon states' (NWS) which had carried out nuclear testing before 1 January 1967, that is the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China, and 'non-nuclear-weapon states' (NNWS). Under the NPT, the two groups of states commit to comply with a series of commitments formulated around 'three pillars': 1 - Non-proliferation: the NWSs undertake under Article I not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any NNWS to acquire them, while the NNWSs are bound under Article II to neither develop or acquire nuclear weapons or 'other nuclear explosive devices' nor to receive any assistance in that connection. 2 - Peaceful use of nuclear energy: Article IV guarantees the 'inalienable right' to 'develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination'. 3 - Nuclear disarmament: each state party to the treaty undertakes under Article VI 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'. The treaty entered in force in March 1970 and has since become universal, with 189 states parties in May 2010. At five-year intervals, parties to the treaty convene review conferences in order to review the operation of the treaty, Article VIII(3). The 1975, 1985 and 2000 review conferences culminated in the adoption of a final declaration and the 1995 review conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The preparatory committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 review conference, which met from April 2007 to May 2009, did not adopt any recommendations, in absence of a consensus on essential issues concerning the operation of the treaty. Hence the importance of this 8. review conference of the parties held in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010 in a

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-12-13

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-04-19

    The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-02-22

    The text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  2. The text of the Agreement between Turkey and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    The full text of the agreement between Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  4. Remarks on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, United Nations Security Council, 24 September 2009, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2009-01-01

    IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) limited his speech to a few key issues. First he stated that the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is fragile and has many shortcomings because the IAEA's legal authority is severely limited in some countries and the IAEA verification mandate is centred on nuclear material and not on weaponization activities. Secondly there is a growing number of states that have mastered uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. Any one of these states could develop nuclear weapons in a short span of time, if, for example, it decided to withdraw from the NPT. There is a need to move from national to multinational control of the nuclear fuel cycle. Thirdly the highest level of protection for nuclear and radioactive material has to be provided. A fourth issue is the need to strengthen the IAEA. A fifth issue is that the IAEA cannot do its work in isolation but depends on a supportive political process, with the Security Council at its core. A sixth issue is that the Security Council must put more emphasis on addressing the insecurities that lie behind many cases of proliferation, such as endemic conflicts, security imbalances and lack of trust. Finally, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is gratified to see nuclear disarmament back at the top of the international agenda, as well as recognition of the intrinsic link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

  5. Cell kinetics of irradiated experimental tumors: cell transition from the non-proliferating to the proliferating pool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potmesil, M.; Goldfeder, A.

    1980-01-01

    In murine mammary carcinomas, parenchymal tumor cells with dense nucleoli traverse the cell cycle and divide, thus constituting the proliferating pool. Cells with trabeculate or ring-shaped nucleoli either proceed slowly through G 1 phase or are arrested in it. The role of these non-proliferating, G 1 phase-confined cells in tumor regeneration was studied in vivo after a subcurative dose of X-irradiation in two transplantable tumor lines. Tumor-bearing mice were continuously injected with methyl[ 3 H]thymidine before and after irradiation. Finally, the labeling was discontinued, mice injected with vincristine sulfate and cells arrested in metaphase were accumulated over 10-hrs. Two clearly delineated groups of vincristine-arrested mitoses emerged in autoradiograms prepared from tumor tissue at the time of starting tumor regrowth: one group with the silver-grain counts corresponding to the background level, the other with heavily labeled mitoses. As the only source of unlabeled mitoses was unlabeled G 1 phase-confined cells persisting in the tumor, this indicated cell transition from the non-proliferating to the proliferating pool, which took place in the initial phase of the tumor regrowth. Unlabeled progenitors have apparently remained in G 1 phase for at least 5-12 days after irradiation. (author)

  6. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented

  7. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented.

  8. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, Lars van; Andersson, Sarmite; Bejarano, Gabriela; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Karlberg, Olof; Olsson, Kjell; Sandberg, Viviana; Stenberg, Tor; Turner, Roland; Zinger, Irene

    2010-06-01

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in a number of projects financed by the European Union. This report gives an overview of the cooperation projects in 2009 as well as the framework in which they are performed. Summaries of each project are given in an Appendix. The project managers in the Section for Cooperation and Development in the Department of International Affairs are responsible for the cooperation projects and the implementation of the bilateral programmes. But the positive outcome of the projects is also dependent on a large number of experts at SSM who work with the regulatory functions in the nuclear and radiation protection fields in a Swedish context as well as on external consultants. Together, their experience is invaluable for the implementation of the projects. But the projects also give experience of relevance for the SSM staff.

  9. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, Lars van; Andersson, Sarmite; Bejarano, Gabriela; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Karlberg, Olof; Olsson, Kjell; Sandberg, Viviana; Stenberg, Tor; Turner, Roland; Zinger, Irene

    2010-06-15

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in a number of projects financed by the European Union. This report gives an overview of the cooperation projects in 2009 as well as the framework in which they are performed. Summaries of each project are given in an Appendix. The project managers in the Section for Cooperation and Development in the Department of International Affairs are responsible for the cooperation projects and the implementation of the bilateral programmes. But the positive outcome of the projects is also dependent on a large number of experts at SSM who work with the regulatory functions in the nuclear and radiation protection fields in a Swedish context as well as on external consultants. Together, their experience is invaluable for the implementation of the projects. But the projects also give experience of relevance for the SSM staff.

  10. Experience of introducing a new database for an approved coordination and record keeping service

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garratt, N. J.

    2011-01-01

    The Health Protection Agency (and its predecessors) has many years experience of running Approved Dosimetry Services, including coordination and record keeping. This paper describes the experiences gained whilst introducing a new web-based system for coordination and record keeping to replace the ageing mainframe database. This includes the planning of the project, the migration of the data between the two systems, parallel running of all the operational tasks and lessons learned during the process. (authors)

  11. Non-proliferation issues within the framework of CIS: Case of Ukraine

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matseiko, Y.M.

    1993-01-01

    The end of cold war has created quantitatively new perspectives for the formation of a system of international security. Experience suggests that nuclear disarmament, in order to be successful, has to take into account the security of States. Nuclear disarmament should proceed within a broad political context of international, regional and national security. The Ukrainian experience proves that if disarmament did not contribute to security, then it could hardly be accepted as desirable. The presence of nuclear weapons and means of delivery on the territory of Ukraine is temporary. Ukraine is determined to free itself of nuclear weapons both by unilateral actions and by acceding to international agreements. Ukraine has eliminated tactical nuclear weapons by simply transferring them to Russia. Ukraine has never viewed the acquisition of nuclear weapons as either necessary or desirable but needs political guarantee that its national security will not be jeopardized

  12. A study on strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime through the export control system of sensitive materials, equipment and technology related to nuclear activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro; Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Komizo, Yasuyoshi

    2004-01-01

    The strengthened safeguards caused from safeguards experiences to Iraq and DPRK leads to the expansion of the IAEA's activities for verification of all nuclear activities as well as verification of nuclear material in the States. The purpose of the activities, of course, includes detection of undeclared exports and imports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material. The Additional Protocol to the agreements between States and the IAEA for the application of safeguards requires to the States to declare the exports and imports information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material corresponding to the export control list that is established by the nuclear suppliers group. The Additional Protocol also insists the IAEA's right to access to the location identified by the State to resolve a question related to the declarations. Recently, the IAEA detected the black market group of the sensitive materials, equipment and technologies relevant to the nuclear proliferation through the safeguards activities to Iran and Libya. International community stated deeply concerns to the indecent facts. This paper would discuss and propose the supplemental strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime by effective combination of the safeguards activities under additional protocol and the export control regime. (author)

  13. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-01

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in various projects financed by the European Union. The purpose of this project-oriented report is to provide the Swedish Government and other funding agencies as well as other interested audiences in Sweden and abroad with an encompassing understanding of our work and in particular the work performed during 2008. the activities are divided into four subfields: Nuclear waste management; Reactor safety; Radiation safety and emergency preparedness; and, Nuclear non-proliferation. SSM implements projects in the field of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management in Russia. The problems in this field also exist in other countries, yet the concentration of nuclear and radioactive materials are nowhere higher than in north-west Russia. And given the fact that most of these materials stem from the Cold War era and remain stored under conditions that vary from 'possibly acceptable' to 'wildly appalling' it is obvious that Sweden's first priority in the field of managing nuclear spent fuel and radioactive waste lies in this part of Russia. The prioritisation and selection of projects in reactor safety are established following thorough discussions with the partners in Russia and Ukraine. For specific guidance on safety and recommended safety improvements at RBMK and VVER reactors, SSM relies on analyses and handbooks established by the IAEA in the 1990s. In 2008, there were 16 projects in reactor safety. SSM implements a large number of projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. The activities are at a first glance at some distance from the activities covered and foreseen by for instance the

  14. Non proliferation and disarmament: the 'golden age' of the Irish diplomacy (1957-1961) - Historical note

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2007-06-01

    The author proposes an analysis of the Irish diplomatic actions and policy with respect to non proliferation and disarmament at the end of the 1950's. Inspired by the Swedish international posture, this policy notably produced the so-called 'Irish resolution'. The author first comments the origin of this resolution, and then describes the negotiation process which lasted about two years to finally produce this resolution which was voted by the United Nations General Assembly. The last part of the article comments the content of the resolution which stated that the NPT had to be considered as a first step on the way to disarmament. While evoking the evolution of the Irish diplomatic action during the following years, the author comments the implications and influence of this Irish resolution

  15. Evaluation of selected features of US nuclear non-proliferation law and policy. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    Because other nations now have uranium enrichment facilities, no nation can use nuclear fuel services to dictate actions to others. The United States, therefore, should avoid undue reliance on its uranium enrichment capability as a tool to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1978 nuclear non-proliferation law requires the United States to ensure the availability of US enrichment services to meet foreign demand, but it is not apparent that a new enrichment plant authorized in 1975 is needed to meet this demand. The 1978 law has proven to be administratively workable as a means of exercising control over nuclear exports, but more needs to be done to make Government reviews of nuclear exports predictable and timely. A comprehensive interagency reassessment is needed of the controls the Department of Energy administers over foreign activities of US firms and individuals

  16. The third review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was held in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty were being realized. The Conference ended with the adoption by consensus of a Final Declaration, by which the States parties, among other things, solemnly declared their conviction that the Treaty was essential to international peace and security and expressed their support for its objectives. This Fact Sheet provides information on the preparations for the Conference, developments at the Conference and the main features of the Final Declaration. Te text of the Treaty is reproduced in Disarmament Fact Sheet No. 33, and its historical background is contained in Fact Sheet No. 41

  17. International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-proliferation : 60 Years of IAEA and EURATOM

    CERN Document Server

    Abousahl, Said; Plastino, Wolfango

    2018-01-01

    This open access book examines key aspects of international cooperation to enhance nuclear safety, security, safeguards, and non-proliferation, thereby assisting in development and maintenance of the verification regime and fostering progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world. The book opens by addressing important political, institutional, and legal dimensions. Current challenges are discussed and attempts made to identify possible solutions and future improvements. Subsequent sections consider scientific developments that have the potential to increase the effectiveness of implementation of international regimes, particularly in critical areas, technology foresight, and the ongoing evaluation of current capabilities. The closing sections examine scientific and technical challenges and discuss the role of international cooperation and actions of the scientific community in leading the world toward peace and security. The book – which celebrates 60 years of IAEA Atoms for Peace and Development and the EURA...

  18. Nuclear non-proliferation: the U.S. obligation to accept spent fuel from foreign research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shapar, Howard K.; Egan, Joseph R.

    1995-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) had a 35-year program for the sale and receipt (for reprocessing) of high-enriched research reactor fuel for foreign research reactors, executed pursuant to bilateral agreements with nuclear trading partners. In 1988, DOE abruptly let this program lapse, citing environmental obstacles. DOE promised to renew the program upon completion of an environmental review which was to take approximately six months. After three and a half years, an environmental assessment was finally produced.Over a year and half elapsed since publication of the assessment before DOE finally took action to renew the program. The paper sets forth the nuclear non-proliferation and related foreign policy considerations which support renewal of the program. It also summarized the contractual and other commitments made to foreign research reactors and foreign governments and aspects of U.S. environmental law as they apply to continuation of the program. (author)

  19. TOWARDS FULFILLMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    s. Bagheri

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT is an international treaty that should be implemented during both peace and wartime. However, the obligations included in the treaty are dependent upon states' attitudes regarding other issues. Non-use of nuclear weapons is directly related to negotiations done for the purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, non-production or accumulation by other means and disarmament. In our day, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the issues of international law.The present study is of crucial significance due to its endeavor to clarify the general principles of Humanitarian Law in a relationship to the threat of nuclear weapons' up to now, a special norm; significantly limiting or completely prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, has not been accepted in international law. However, customary international humanitarian law regarding the use of nuclear weapons holds great value because of its purpose in eliminating nuclear weapons as a means of war through ascertaining their non-use and also appeasing the importance of nuclear ascendancy. In this respect, the NPT regime and its relationship with international humanitarian law will be discussed. Firstly, the NPT background, formation, main objectives and principles will be analyzed. In order to evaluate the relationship between the NPT and humanitarian law, the humanitarian obligations in general, humanitarian obligations in the context of the NPT and fulfillmen t of these obligations under the NPT should be studied. One of the main parts of the study is nuclear disarmament obligation included in the NPT. In this section, nuclear disarmament obligation in the context of the NPT and the legal framework of possible, general and comprehensive disarmament will be examined.

  20. THE ROLE AND RATIONALE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tom COPPEN

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available Much has been written about perceived weaknesses of the NPT and the challenges it has been facing over the last decades. Analysing the most important provisions of the NPT, this article demonstrates how the treaty has managed to maintain its central role in the non-proliferation regime since its conclusion, and how it retains enough flexibility within its review mechanism and its managerial approach to supervision to keep this position for the decades to come. The theoretical framework of the article is formed by theory of arms control law, relevant features of which are: a large influence of politics and national interests of states on the rule of law; its flexible yet treaty-based nature; and the distinctive role of supervision in order to ensure compliance with primary rules. The article analyses key NPT provisions. Based on Article VIII, the NPT Review Conferences have both an important political and legal function. They are the NPT’s mechanism for review, implementation and supervision; in legal terms, they enable the evolution of the NPT based on subsequent agreement and practice. The NPT articles on non-proliferation and disarmament illustrate how the NPT has evolved to close off loopholes (Articles I and II and retains its flexibility whilst providing a global platform for negotiations on nuclear disarmament (Article VI. Article III evolved and must be understood to oblige NPT states to sign an Additional Protocol (AP with the IAEA. Article IV sets the parameters for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but leaves room for negotiation and conflict. The supervision of the NPT, illustrated by the case of Iran, is a complicated process involving international organisations such as the IAEA and the UNSC; while these may play important roles, however, the enforcement of the NPT is ultimately left to the NPT states themselves.

  1. The third review conference of the parties of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recent developments concerning international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canty, M.J.; Richter, B.; Schlupp, C.; Stein, G.

    1986-11-01

    The non-proliferation activities and instruments are listed in a table. The two main instruments are the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Safeguards, which are supplemented by treaties of regional restricted effects, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the EURATOM treaty. The two-tier structure of the treaties, i.e. to provide for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and at the same time foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, has proven to have a particularly stabilizing effect, which was confirmed by the last Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. The conference members were particularly satisfied with the results of the IAEA Safeguards. Future developments towards improving international safeguards will concentrate on operator-friendly and financially reasonable safeguards measures, such as safeguards effectiveness evaluations and near-real-time accountancy. The results of the CAS discussions on the definition of principles and goals of co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are of importance also to the PUNE conference. The PUNE conference will be held in 1987 and is expected to yield points of orientation for further embedding the non-proliferation principle in the international co-operative activities and the nuclear business in the 1980s. (orig./HP) [de

  2. Monitoring non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Can regional CBMs play a role?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sood, R.

    1994-01-01

    The experience of regional Confidence Building Measures (CBM), has only limited applicability for tackling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Where the international norm has developed as in the case of biological and chemical weapons, through international disarmament treaties, regional initiatives can strengthen this norm. Where a norm is less well-founded, regional initiatives are not likely to succeed. Specifically, with regard to nuclear weapons, consensus on negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty and a convention for prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes and explosive devices is a positive development. Successful conclusion of these universal and verifiable treaties will go a long way to strengthening the international norm against proliferation. Two other measures are critical - a development of a non-use assurance and commencement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations among all five nuclear weapon States. If the international community witnesses improvement in these areas, regional negotiations will be stimulated. Therefore, the primary focus should be on developing an international norm to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Regional efforts will take their cue from these international norms and would result in CBMs that are consistent with the international norm

  3. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okko, O [ed.

    2012-07-01

    The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

  4. Update on the development and evaluation of a program of regional collaboration for non-proliferation and transparency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furaus, James P.; Hori, Masato; Glidewell, Don

    2003-01-01

    The purpose of the research is to develop and evaluate a Program of Regional Cooperation for Non-proliferation and transparency in the Pacific Rim arena. There has been interest in the development of regional collaboration in the Pacific Rim for over thirty years, but without the kind of results that have been observed in other areas of the world, such as Europe and South America. While there have been many discussions and many papers written on the topic, there has not been a concept or a program that has been proposed and successfully implemented. This research will identify attributes of existing successful regional collaborations in other parts of the world, research the open literature for past ideas and attempts for regional collaboration in the Pacific Rim, and propose a model for a sustainable regional collaboration in the Pacific Rim. One of the strategies for developing the program of collaboration is to create a Joint Program Plan for the Implementation of Technology Based Regional Cooperation. This plan will be developed jointly by Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), with input from the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration/National Nuclear Security Administration (USDOE/NNSA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other interested organizations. The plan will be a 'living plan,' that will be reviewed on a yearly basis to review status, and update as necessary. Another strategy is to implement technical objectives in parallel with the development of the program plan. This would include the completion of the implementation of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) system at JNC and sharing transparency data with SNL, USDOE/NNSA, IAEA, and other interested Pacific Rim entities. The availability of commercial off-the-shelf VPN systems, a technology that allows secure, inexpensive transfer of data across the Internet, will potentially be a key ingredient in the development

  5. The self-consistent energy system with an enhanced non-proliferated core concept for global nuclear energy utilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawashima, Masatoshi; Arie, Kazuo; Araki, Yoshio; Sato, Mitsuyoshi; Mori, Kenji; Nakayama, Yoshiyuki; Nakazono, Ryuichi; Kuroda, Yuji; Ishiguma, Kazuo; Fujii-e, Yoichi

    2008-01-01

    A sustainable nuclear energy system was developed based on the concept of Self-Consistent Nuclear Energy System (SCNES). Our study that trans-uranium (TRU) metallic fuel fast reactor cycle coupled with recycling of five long-lived fission products (LLFP) as well as actinides is the most promising system for the sustainable nuclear utilization. Efficient utilization of uranium-238 through the SCNES concept opens the doors to prolong the lifetime of nuclear energy systems towards several tens of thousand years. Recent evolution of the concept revealed compatibility of fuel sustainability, minor actinide (MA) minimization and non-proliferation aspects for peaceful use of nuclear energy systems through the discussion. As for those TRU compositions stabilized under fast neutron spectra, plutonium isotope fractions are remained in the range of reactor grade classification with high fraction of Pu240 isotope. Recent evolution of the SCNES concept has revealed that TRU recycling can cope with enhancing non-proliferation efforts in peaceful use with the 'no-blanket and multi-zoning core' concept. Therefore, the realization of SCNES is most important. In addition, along the process to the goals, a three-step approach is proposed to solve concurrent problems raised in the LWR systems. We discussed possible roles and contribution to the near future demand along worldwide expansion of LWR capacities by applying the 1st generation SCNES. MA fractions in TRU are more than 10% from LWR discharged fuels and even higher up to 20% in fuels from long interim storages. TRU recycling in the 1st generation SCNES system can reduce the MA fractions down to 4-5% in a few decades. This capability significantly releases 'MA' pressures in down-stream of LWR systems. Current efforts for enhancing capabilities for energy generation by LWR systems are efficient against the global warming crisis. In parallel to those movements, early realization of the SCNES concept can be the most viable decision

  6. Cancer patients' attitudes and experiences of online access to their electronic medical records: A qualitative study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rexhepi, Hanife; Åhlfeldt, Rose-Mharie; Cajander, Åsa; Huvila, Isto

    2018-06-01

    Patients' access to their online medical records serves as one of the cornerstones in the efforts to increase patient engagement and improve healthcare outcomes. The aim of this article is to provide in-depth understanding of cancer patients' attitudes and experiences of online medical records, as well as an increased understanding of the complexities of developing and launching e-Health services. The study result confirms that online access can help patients prepare for doctor visits and to understand their medical issues. In contrast to the fears of many physicians, the study shows that online access to medical records did not generate substantial anxiety, concerns or increased phone calls to the hospital.

  7. Record keeping for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities: Guidelines and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    This report covers record keeping for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities. Nuclear facilities include large commercial facilities such as nuclear power plants or chemical nuclear facilities (e.g. for fabrication and reprocessing), but also include smaller facilities such as research reactors and medical, industrial and other research facilities. Special attention may be needed for these small facilities owing to factors such as the low priority given to decommissioning by research teams and the possibility of poorly recorded structural and operational changes. A focus on research reactors is also important because of their widespread distribution. Two IAEA TECDOCs address record keeping for radioactive waste management and disposal facilities, and therefore these areas are not covered in this report. The objective of this report is to provide information, experience and assistance on how to identify, update as needed and maintain records to assist in the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, including for the decommissioning plan. This report is intended to be useful to policy makers, regulators, owners, operators, decommissioning contractors and other interested parties. Record keeping is an integral part of overall QA or quality management programmes, and this is emphasized in this report. This report also indicates the possible consequences of not maintaining adequate records. This report describes the needs and the sources of the records for decommissioning (Section 3) and the process of identifying and selecting these records (Section 4). Section 5 considers the records from the decommissioning process itself and their retention, while Section 6 deals with QA, organization and responsibilities. The Records Management System (RMS) is dealt with in Section 7 and the management of new records in Section 8. A summary of observations is included in Section 9. The report is complemented by an appendix and annexes that describe case histories

  8. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-15

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in various projects financed by the European Union. The purpose of this project-oriented report is to provide the Swedish Government and other funding agencies as well as other interested audiences in Sweden and abroad with an encompassing understanding of our work and in particular the work performed during 2008. the activities are divided into four subfields: Nuclear waste management; Reactor safety; Radiation safety and emergency preparedness; and, Nuclear non-proliferation. SSM implements projects in the field of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management in Russia. The problems in this field also exist in other countries, yet the concentration of nuclear and radioactive materials are nowhere higher than in north-west Russia. And given the fact that most of these materials stem from the Cold War era and remain stored under conditions that vary from 'possibly acceptable' to 'wildly appalling' it is obvious that Sweden's first priority in the field of managing nuclear spent fuel and radioactive waste lies in this part of Russia. The prioritisation and selection of projects in reactor safety are established following thorough discussions with the partners in Russia and Ukraine. For specific guidance on safety and recommended safety improvements at RBMK and VVER reactors, SSM relies on analyses and handbooks established by the IAEA in the 1990s. In 2008, there were 16 projects in reactor safety. SSM implements a large number of projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. The activities are at a first glance at some distance from the activities covered and

  9. The Impact on Non-proliferation with a Growing Number of BL-3 and BL-4 Labs in South America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Espona, M. J.

    2007-01-01

    After 2001 events (9/11 and anthrax letters) we witnessed the dramatic growth of the biodefense sector, and in within this framework, the increment of the number of high biosafety level laboratories (BSL3 and BSL4) both in central countries and peripheral ones. It is important to point out that not all the labs are devoted to activities related to biodefense but also to biological research from a traditional perspective. In this scenario, and as an unwanted consequence, we have noticed that the number of people -professionals with different level specialization- which have the information and skills that could be used to produce BW, grew vertiginously as well. So, considering the biodefense sector from a systemic perspective, we are being witnesses of how due to an intent to protect ourselves against the biological threat, our vulnerability to it gains an unexpected magnitude. Therefore, in this paper we will analyze the phenomenon of the growing number of high security level labs, first, in a global perspective and later, with focus in South America in order to determine if this evolving situation represents a security problem. In order to do that, we will approach the problem from different perspectives: health care, development, security/safety, defense and non proliferation.(author)

  10. Accelerator-driven subcritical systems - An analysis with a focus on non-proliferation and export control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, Per; Nielsen, Fredrik; Sunhede, Daniel

    2013-01-01

    The Department of Nuclear Weapons Related Issues at The Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, as commissioned by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, SSM, conducted a study concerning Accelerator Driven Subcritical Systems, ADS, with emphasis on non-proliferation and export control. An ADS looks at first glance like a traditional nuclear reactor, but the nuclear core is designed to always remain subcritical, both during normal and off-normal conditions. Neutrons are instead supplied by an external source in the form of an proton accelerator and a spallation target. This report gives a short walk-through to the physical processes that governs the neutron flux and reactivity in the core and how they are affected by the design of the core including the accelerator and spallation target. Furthermore is the results from reactor core simulations presented, where the isotopic nuclear fuel inventory has been studied as a function of burn up and initial configuration. Finally the report contains an analysis of the potential risks involved from the perspective of nuclear proliferation and exports. This study shows that ADS in the future could constitute a proliferation concern. The subsystems and components in question share design and materials with the equivalent components in traditional reactors with the exception of the proton accelerator and spallation target, which is unique for accelerator driven systems

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1972-11-17

    The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  12. Non-proliferation through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear disarmament and international control of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, Ryukichi

    1993-01-01

    The role of nuclear factors in the international political situation has changed. The emphasis is now on the new circumstance of the post cold-war world. Non-proliferation is dealt with through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear weapons dismantling and international control of plutonium

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1972-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  14. The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1972-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for Romania on 1 May 2010 [es

  16. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1972-06-15

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-05-18

    The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-06-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-06-10

    The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-12-13

    The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1972-03-24

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-07-10

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

  4. The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

  5. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1972-06-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  6. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1971-05-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [es

  7. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-04-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [ru

  8. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  10. The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  12. The crisis bears the chance. The nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime; In der Krise liegt die Chance. Der Atomkonflikt mit Iran und seine Auswirkungen auf das nukleare Nichtverbreitungsregime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-10-15

    The contribution on the nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime covers the following topics: Iran and the verification of non-nuclear -weapon states, the system of nuclear safeguards, the application of new verification instruments, verification of possible military research and development activities, the limitation of proliferation relevant activities, delivery guarantees as mean for non-proliferation, Iran and the handling of contract violations, graded reactions, political issues, problems of harmonization, capacity and process deficiencies, before the ninth non-proliferation verification conference, approaches for strengthening the non-proliferation regime, recommendation to the German politics.

  13. Neonatal Nurses Experience Unintended Consequences and Risks to Patient Safety With Electronic Health Records.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dudding, Katherine M; Gephart, Sheila M; Carrington, Jane M

    2018-04-01

    In this article, we examine the unintended consequences of nurses' use of electronic health records. We define these as unforeseen events, change in workflow, or an unanticipated result of implementation and use of electronic health records. Unintended consequences experienced by nurses while using electronic health records have been well researched. However, few studies have focused on neonatal nurses, and it is unclear to what extent unintended consequences threaten patient safety. A new instrument called the Carrington-Gephart Unintended Consequences of Electronic Health Record Questionnaire has been validated, and secondary analysis using the tool explored the phenomena among neonatal nurses (N = 40). The purposes of this study were to describe unintended consequences of use of electronic health records for neonatal nurses and to explore relationships between the phenomena and characteristics of the nurse and the electronic health record. The most frequent unintended consequences of electronic health record use were due to interruptions, followed by a heavier workload due to the electronic health record, changes to the workflow, and altered communication patterns. Neonatal nurses used workarounds most often with motivation to better assist patients. Teamwork was moderately related to higher unintended consequences including patient safety risks (r = 0.427, P = .007), system design (r = 0.419, P = .009), and technology barriers (r = 0.431, P = .007). Communication about patients was reduced when patient safety risks were high (r = -0.437, P = .003). By determining the frequency with which neonatal nurses experience unintended consequences of electronic health record use, future research can be targeted to improve electronic health record design through customization, integration, and refinement to support patient safety and better outcomes.

  14. Report of “the 2013 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suda, Kazunori; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2014-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held “International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Ensuring Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station –” on 3 and 4 December 2013, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials from Japan, the United States, France and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled “Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security measures of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” and “Roles of safeguards and technical measures for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation for nuclear fuel cycle options”. In the first panel based on the implications of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on the domestic and global nuclear energy use and increased interest in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle, discussion was made on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security challenges on both fuel cycle options from the policy and institutional viewpoints whereas in the second panel the roles of safeguards and proliferation resistant nuclear technology including plutonium burning technology in ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle were discussed. Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France and Republic of Korea participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording

  15. Human radiation experiments: The Department of Energy roadmap to the story and the records

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    The role of the US Government in conducting or sponsoring human radiation experiments has become the subject of public debate. Questions have been raised about the purpose, extent, and health consequences of these studies, and about how subjects were selected. The extent to which subjects provided informed consent is also under scrutiny. To respond to these questions, the Clinton administration has directed the US Department of Energy (DOE), along with other Federal agencies, to retrieve and inventory all records that document human radiation experiments. Many such records are now publicly available and will permit an open accounting and understanding of what took place. This report summarizes the Department's ongoing search for records about human radiation experiments. It is also a roadmap to the large universe of pertinent DOE information. DOE is working to instill greater openness--consistent with national security and other appropriate considerations--throughout its operations. A key aspect of this effort is opening DOE's historical records to independent research and analysis

  16. Human radiation experiments: The Department of Energy roadmap to the story and the records

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1995-02-01

    The role of the US Government in conducting or sponsoring human radiation experiments has become the subject of public debate. Questions have been raised about the purpose, extent, and health consequences of these studies, and about how subjects were selected. The extent to which subjects provided informed consent is also under scrutiny. To respond to these questions, the Clinton administration has directed the US Department of Energy (DOE), along with other Federal agencies, to retrieve and inventory all records that document human radiation experiments. Many such records are now publicly available and will permit an open accounting and understanding of what took place. This report summarizes the Department`s ongoing search for records about human radiation experiments. It is also a roadmap to the large universe of pertinent DOE information. DOE is working to instill greater openness--consistent with national security and other appropriate considerations--throughout its operations. A key aspect of this effort is opening DOE`s historical records to independent research and analysis.

  17. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

  18. Fast reconstruction of trajectories of charged muons recorded by the MUCH detector in the CBM experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ablyazimov, T.O.; Ivanov, V.V.

    2017-01-01

    The CBM experiment is currently being developed in GSI (Darmstadt, Germany) at the FAIR accelerator complex by an international collaboration including JINR. One of the main goals of the experiment is a research of charmonium production process in nucleus-nucleus collisions at high energies. The registration of such decays as J/ψ → μ"+μ"− is planned to be carried out in real time. The current paper presents an algorithm suitable for fast reconstruction of trajectories of charged muons from J/ψ decays recorded by the MUCH detector. [ru

  19. A computerised recording and monitoring system for extensive air shower experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naranan, S.; Rao, M.V.S.; Sivaprasad, K.; Subramaniam, P.B.

    1975-01-01

    A digital computer, TDC-12, with a memory capacity of 8 K 12-bit words and memory cycle time of 2 μs has been installed at the Cosmic Ray Laboratory at Kolar Gold Fields, India for real time operation with the KGF Air Shower Experiment. The computer system records the selected events and monitors and calibrates all the 90 detectors of various types in real time. (orig./WL) [de

  20. Patient experiences with full electronic access to health records and clinical notes through the My HealtheVet Personal Health Record Pilot: qualitative study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Woods, Susan S; Schwartz, Erin; Tuepker, Anais; Press, Nancy A; Nazi, Kim M; Turvey, Carolyn L; Nichol, W Paul

    2013-03-27

    Full sharing of the electronic health record with patients has been identified as an important opportunity to engage patients in their health and health care. The My HealtheVet Pilot, the initial personal health record of the US Department of Veterans Affairs, allowed patients and their delegates to view and download content in their electronic health record, including clinical notes, laboratory tests, and imaging reports. A qualitative study with purposeful sampling sought to examine patients' views and experiences with reading their health records, including their clinical notes, online. Five focus group sessions were conducted with patients and family members who enrolled in the My HealtheVet Pilot at the Portland Veterans Administration Medical Center, Oregon. A total of 30 patients enrolled in the My HealtheVet Pilot, and 6 family members who had accessed and viewed their electronic health records participated in the sessions. Four themes characterized patient experiences with reading the full complement of their health information. Patients felt that seeing their records positively affected communication with providers and the health system, enhanced knowledge of their health and improved self-care, and allowed for greater participation in the quality of their care such as follow-up of abnormal test results or decision-making on when to seek care. While some patients felt that seeing previously undisclosed information, derogatory language, or inconsistencies in their notes caused challenges, they overwhelmingly felt that having more, rather than less, of their health record information provided benefits. Patients and their delegates had predominantly positive experiences with health record transparency and the open sharing of notes and test results. Viewing their records appears to empower patients and enhance their contributions to care, calling into question common provider concerns about the effect of full record access on patient well-being. While shared

  1. The history of Finnish nuclear non-proliferation policy during the cold war. What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahosniemi, A.

    2004-03-01

    This article is a summary of the Finnish historical survey during the Cold War. In the article, I try to show how the Finnish Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy during the Cold War is linked to the broader context of the Finnish foreign and security policy. In the research report I have focused on several questions. One of the most important is the following: What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons during the Cold War? And in this context scientific knowledge is meant by knowing something about nuclear weapons. Basically, the Finnish national based survey of nuclear non-proliferation policy attempted to investigate issues like the kind of research concerning Nuclear Technology in general, Nuclear weapons, and Nuclear weapon policies of super powers in Finland during the Cold War era. (author)

  2. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the process for its enhanced review on the eve of the 2000 review conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinel, C.

    2000-01-01

    This article sets out the principle and essentials of the process for reviewing the operation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970. In 1995 the NPT was extended. The 2000 review conference is of considerable importance for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly in the light of the fact that after the indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states urged the nuclear-weapon states to take new steps towards nuclear disarmament. This article presents a review of the 30 year period of the application of NPT

  3. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okko, O. (ed.)

    2012-07-01

    The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

  4. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO), combines the statutory office of Director of Safeguards with that of Director, Chemical Weapons Convention Office (CWCO). The Director General also performs the functions of the Director, Australian Comprehensive Test-Ban Office (ACTBO) on an informal basis, as the relevant legislation has not yet come into effect. Throughout the year, ASNO made a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Additional Protocol enters general application, as well as the specific arrangements which will apply in Australia. In the latter context, ASNO offers the IAEA a safeguards-friendly environment, together with constructive critique, to assist in the development and testing of new techniques. This work is important in ensuring the effective implementation of strengthened safeguards elsewhere. Substantial progress were made on several new bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements. An agreement with the US covering transfer of the Silex laser enrichment technology came into force, and ASNO is now working with US authorities to develop the detailed administrative arrangements required to give effect to this agreement. Also concluded during the year was an agreement with New Zealand covering transfers of uranium for non-nuclear use (as a colouring agent in glass manufacture). ASNO was also working closely with ANSTO to ensure that nuclear material accountancy and control at Lucas Heights accords with best international practice, particularly having regard to the requirements of the IAEA under integrated safeguards. Excellent professional relationship were maintained with the OPCW and counterpart national authorities

  5. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) primary focus is national security-verification and treaty compliance across several regimes addressing weapons of mass destruction-linked to a major facilitation role in regard to industry compliance. The key aspect here is ensuring Australia's treaty commitments are met. Additionally, ASNO's activities are central to Government policy on the mining and export of uranium. Throughout the past year, ASNO continued to make a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. Australia played a key role in the negotiations leading to the adoption by the IAEA in 1997 of the Model Protocol, which provides the IAEA Secretariat with the authority to implement strengthened safeguards measures. In December 1997, Australia was the first country to bring into effect a Protocol with the IAEA based on this model. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Protocol enters general application. ASNO's As mentioned above, ASNO has developed and implemented new safeguards arrangements in Australia under the Protocol for strengthened safeguards, including facilitation of IAEA verification activities at the Ranger uranium mine-this is the first time the IAEA (under the Protocol) has visited a uranium mine and the lessons learned will help the IAEA develop its procedures. One major activity for ASNO is monitoring the progress of the Silex project to ensure that, as soon as appropriate, the technology is declared 'associated technology' and controlled in accordance with relevant legislative and Treaty requirements. In anticipation of this, ASNO has taken steps to protect the Silex technology against unauthorised access. Over the past 12 months, ASNO has established itself as the provisional

  6. University-level Non-proliferation and Safeguards Education and Human Capital Development Activities at Brookhaven National Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bachner K. M.; Pepper, S.; Gomera, J.; Einwechter, M.; Toler, L. T.

    2016-07-24

    BNL has offered Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century,? referred to as NNSS, every year since 2009 for graduate students in technical and policy fields related to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. The course focuses on relevant policy issues, in addition to technical components, and is part of a larger NGSI short course initiative that includes separate courses that are delivered at three other national laboratories and NNSA headquarters. [SCHOLZ and ROSENTHAL] The course includes lectures from esteemed nonproliferation experts, tours of various BNL facilities and laboratories, and in-field and table-top exercises on both technical and policy subjects. Topics include the history of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other relevant treaties, the history of and advances in international nuclear safeguards, current relevant political situations in countries such as Iran, Iraq, and the Democratic Peoples? Republic of Korea (DPRK), nuclear science and technology, instrumentation and techniques used for verification activities, and associated research and development. The students conduct a mock Design Information Verification (DIV) at BNL?s decommissioned Medical Research Reactor. The capstone of the course includes a series of student presentations in which students act as policy advisors and provide recommendations in response to scenarios involving a current nonproliferation related event that are prepared by the course organizers. ?The course is open to domestic and foreign students, and caters to students in, entering, or recently having completed graduate school. Interested students must complete an application and provide a resume and a statement describing their interest in the course. Eighteen to 22 students attend annually; 165 students have completed the course to date. A stipend helps to defray students? travel and subsistence expenses. In 2015, the course was shortened from three weeks to

  7. The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-07-01

    The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Fiji and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Fiji and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 March 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  10. The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-06-12

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Fiji and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-07-10

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Fiji and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 March 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-02-19

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  14. The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1978-07-15

    The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-02-15

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Lesotho and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 12 June 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1971-10-27

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

  17. Proceedings of the review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Geneva, 5-30 May 1975

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1976-01-01

    The proceedings of the 1975 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons review the different Articles of the Treaty and their implementation following a report on the preparations for the Conference. The Annexes contain the text of the Treaty, as well as addresses by various Delegates concerning their countries' positions together with the final declaration and a series of draft resolutions. (NEA) [fr

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1971-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1971-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1971-11-19

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

  1. Agreements Provided for in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Declarations Received from Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    The Director General has received from the Governments of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and Poland declarations in which they express their readiness, in conformity with the obligations they have assumed under Article III of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to begin negotiation of safeguards agreements with the Agency. The texts of these declarations are reproduced below for the information of all Members

  2. Agreements Provided for in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Declarations Received from Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and Poland

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1970-06-11

    The Director General has received from the Governments of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and Poland declarations in which they express their readiness, in conformity with the obligations they have assumed under Article III of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to begin negotiation of safeguards agreements with the Agency. The texts of these declarations are reproduced below for the information of all Members.

  3. The Text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 between Ethiopia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-07-01

    The text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 and of the Protocol thereto between Ethiopia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 December 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  4. Persistence of exponential bed thickness distributions in the stratigraphic record: Experiments and theory

    Science.gov (United States)

    Straub, K. M.; Ganti, V. K.; Paola, C.; Foufoula-Georgiou, E.

    2010-12-01

    Stratigraphy preserved in alluvial basins houses the most complete record of information necessary to reconstruct past environmental conditions. Indeed, the character of the sedimentary record is inextricably related to the surface processes that formed it. In this presentation we explore how the signals of surface processes are recorded in stratigraphy through the use of physical and numerical experiments. We focus on linking surface processes to stratigraphy in 1D by quantifying the probability distributions of processes that govern the evolution of depositional systems to the probability distribution of preserved bed thicknesses. In this study we define a bed as a package of sediment bounded above and below by erosional surfaces. In a companion presentation we document heavy-tailed statistics of erosion and deposition from high-resolution temporal elevation data recorded during a controlled physical experiment. However, the heavy tails in the magnitudes of erosional and depositional events are not preserved in the experimental stratigraphy. Similar to many bed thickness distributions reported in field studies we find that an exponential distribution adequately describes the thicknesses of beds preserved in our experiment. We explore the generation of exponential bed thickness distributions from heavy-tailed surface statistics using 1D numerical models. These models indicate that when the full distribution of elevation fluctuations (both erosional and depositional events) is symmetrical, the resulting distribution of bed thicknesses is exponential in form. Finally, we illustrate that a predictable relationship exists between the coefficient of variation of surface elevation fluctuations and the scale-parameter of the resulting exponential distribution of bed thicknesses.

  5. 'For good and for bad': the relations between universal obligations and particular efforts in the field of nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen Van, L.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: The world has 'nuclear non-proliferation' on its lips. Presidents, politicians, journalists and others refer to it as the number one peril in our times. This may be right or wrong but irrespective of the real salience of 'nuclear dangers' it has a grip on our minds and wallets. A long range of states now make active investments in the improvement of nuclear security; not only at home as they used to do, but even abroad in other places and countries where there is concern with regard to how safe nuclear and materials are kept and stored. This development is surely an expression of a shared broadening of our sense of responsibility beyond the narrow confines of statehood and borders, and therefore this development should please us. On the other hand, the truly universal measures and instruments of the NPT and the regime round it are in trouble. It is being stated in some quarters that the NPT is inadequate in a new era with new threats from sub-state actors. Nevertheless, the NPT is the only legal instrument that is a framework that either by itself or as a starting-point can serve as a tool box for long-term storage of the proliferation risks. The reason for this is that the NPT is an expression of fairness in terms of rights and balances for all states committed to non-proliferation. And its foundations are those of international law. To the extent the NPT is being questioned will there also be a risk that non-proliferation efforts in the framework of cooperative threat reduction and for instance global partnership will lose legitimacy; simply for the reason that only a small number of the non-proliferation concerns are given attention. This relationship between cooperative threat reduction efforts on the one hand and universal legal instruments for non-proliferation on the other is a double-edged sword. While the two can reinvigorate and strengthen each other, there is also a risk that the one - cooperative threat reduction - when given preference over

  6. Building a national electronic medical record exchange system - experiences in Taiwan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Yu-Chuan Jack; Yen, Ju-Chuan; Chiu, Wen-Ta; Jian, Wen-Shan; Syed-Abdul, Shabbir; Hsu, Min-Huei

    2015-08-01

    Architecture (CDA) standards to generate clinical documents and Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) Cross-enterprise Document Sharing (XDS) profile for the communication infrastructure. By December of 2014, the number of hospitals that provide an inter-institution EMR exchange service had reached 321. Hospitals that had not joined the service were all smaller ones with less than 100 beds. Inter-institution EMR exchange can make it much easier for people to access their own medical records, reduce the waste of medical resources, and improve the quality of medical care. The implementation of an inter-institution EMR exchange system faces many challenges. This article provides Taiwan's experiences as a reference. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  7. A study for collaborative management for nuclear spent fuel control. Seeking for nuclear non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-03-01

    Because of the rapid increase of power generation with nuclear fuel in East Asia area, the management and control of nuclear spent fuel from nuclear reactors has become an essential and urgent issue in this area. This study focused on the possibility of forming an intergovernmental collaborative management system for nuclear spent fuel with an emphasize on nuclear non-proliferation among East Asian countries, i.e. China, Korea, Taiwan and Japan who own and operate nuclear power plants. First, we studied the present situation for nuclear spent fuel, including the storage measures, the future fore- cast on the accumulation and the government measures to deal with these spent fuel. Then, based upon first step studies, we examined the pros and cons when the collaborative management is realized particularly from the viewpoint of prevention of nuclear proliferation. Further, we estimated possible means for management and control of nuclear spent fuel, including its system size and cost. Finally, we extracted some technological tasks to be solved and political issues to be discussed. Our findings are as follows. 1. The total amount of the power generation in three East Asian counties (China, Korea and Taiwan) is about 17 million KW presently. This will be tripled to 51 million KW by the year 2010. When Japan's ability is added it is 62 million KW currently and 121 million by 2010. 2. The nuclear spent fuel in Taiwan and Korea will be saturated for their storage capacity. On the other hand, Japan will start to operate her reprocessing plant in Aomori prefecture in 2003 and her new storage capability is completed in 1999. Also in China, a reprocessing pilot plant is under construction and its operation is scheduled in 2001. 3. As their national policy, China and Japan does reprocess from spent fuel but Korea and Taiwan don't. Instead, they take non-reprocessing and direct geological disposal. 4. If the collaborative management of nuclear wastes is realized Multi

  8. Perampanel: An audit of clinical experience using the epilepsy electronic patient record.

    LENUS (Irish Health Repository)

    Ryan, E

    2016-07-01

    Perampanel is a non-competitive antagonist of AMPA glutamate receptors on post synaptic neurons. The aim of this study was to conduct an audit of the experience of perampanel treatment in Ireland based on the interrogation of the national epilepsy electronic patient record (EPR). A retrospective audit was compiled which reviewed the progress of patients who had been treated across two regional epilepsy centres. The EPR was used to identify patients and collect information relevant to their perampanel therapy. Collected data was entered into a statistical package for social sciences for analysis using descriptive statistics.\\r\

  9. Sleep-monitoring, experiment M133. [electronic recording system for automatic analysis of human sleep patterns

    Science.gov (United States)

    Frost, J. D., Jr.; Salamy, J. G.

    1973-01-01

    The Skylab sleep-monitoring experiment simulated the timelines and environment expected during a 56-day Skylab mission. Two crewmembers utilized the data acquisition and analysis hardware, and their sleep characteristics were studied in an online fashion during a number of all night recording sessions. Comparison of the results of online automatic analysis with those of postmission visual data analysis was favorable, confirming the feasibility of obtaining reliable objective information concerning sleep characteristics during the Skylab missions. One crewmember exhibited definite changes in certain sleep characteristics (e.g., increased sleep latency, increased time Awake during first third of night, and decreased total sleep time) during the mission.

  10. Report of 'the 2014 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the new strategic energy plan'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamaga, Chikanobu; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Kobayashi, Naoki; Naoi, Yosuke; Oda, Tetsuzo; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2015-10-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the New Strategic Energy Plan -' on 3 December 2014, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, and International Nuclear Research Center, Tokyo Institute of Technology as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials and experts from Japan, the United States explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled 'Effective and efficient measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation based on domestic and foreign issues and the direction and role of technology development' and 'Roles of nuclear security COEs and future expectations'. In Panel Discussion 1, as the nuclear non-proliferation regime is facing various problems and challenges under current international circumstances, how to implement effective and efficient safeguards was discussed. In Panel Discussion 2, panelists discussed the following three points: 1. Current status of Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers and COEs, and Good Practice; 2. What these centers can do to enhance nuclear security (New role for COEs); 3. Regional cooperation in the Nuclear Security Training and Support Center (NSSC) and COEs in states, which the IAEA recommends establishing, and international cooperation and partnerships with international initiatives (New Role). Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the

  11. Event Recording Data Acquisition System and Experiment Data Management System for Neutron Experiments at MLF, J-PARC

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nakatani, T.; Inamura, Y.; Moriyama, K.; Ito, T.; Muto, S.; Otomo, T.

    Neutron scattering can be a powerful probe in the investigation of many phenomena in the materials and life sciences. The Materials and Life Science Experimental Facility (MLF) at the Japan Proton Accelerator Research Complex (J-PARC) is a leading center of experimental neutron science and boasts one of the most intense pulsed neutron sources in the world. The MLF currently has 18 experimental instruments in operation that support a wide variety of users from across a range of research fields. The instruments include optical elements, sample environment apparatus and detector systems that are controlled and monitored electronically throughout an experiment. Signals from these components and those from the neutron source are converted into a digital format by the data acquisition (DAQ) electronics and recorded as time-tagged event data in the DAQ computers using "DAQ-Middleware". Operating in event mode, the DAQ system produces extremely large data files (˜GB) under various measurement conditions. Simultaneously, the measurement meta-data indicating each measurement condition is recorded in XML format by the MLF control software framework "IROHA". These measurement event data and meta-data are collected in the MLF common storage and cataloged by the MLF Experimental Database (MLF EXP-DB) based on a commercial XML database. The system provides a web interface for users to manage and remotely analyze experimental data.

  12. Technical cooperation of Tajikistan and IAEA in the field of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salomov, Dzh.A.; Mirsaidov, I.U.

    2010-01-01

    Full text: Republic of Tajikistan is a member of IAEA from 2001. Starting from that period the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) renders assistance to Tajikistan in rehabilitation of sites contaminated in result uranium extraction, strengthens the regulatory authority infrastructure, IAEA through national projects supported Tajikistan by new equipment for Scientific Centre of Oncology under Ministry of Health of the Republic of Tajikistan; new nuclear medicine department is established under Institute of Gastroenterology. Different equipment for identification of soil erosion, diagnosis of brucellosis decease among animals as well as for medical and industry diagnosis were received. Technical cooperation of Tajikistan with IAEA especially is successful on monitoring of uranium tailing dumps of Northern Tajikistan, which facilitates to weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation regime. During 2005-2008 two national and two regional projects were implemented with the following tasks: elaboration of regulatory basis and decision making process with the purpose of evaluation of residual radioactive substances influence on former sites on uranium extraction and reprocessing; assessment of carried out rehabilitation measures; ensuring the compliance international safety norms; action plan development on reducing the residual radioactive substances influence on population and rendering assistance to sustainable development. Seminars and practical training session and personnel training efficiently were carried out, resource base of State Enterprise Vostokredmet was strengthened by equipment, fellowship and scientific visits were organized and etc. In Dushanbe and Chkalovsk a number of seminars were organized. The participants attending those seminars were representatives of regulatory authority and industry. The program of seminars and practical training sessions were targeted for advance training of participants and better understanding of planning issues as

  13. Low-cost synchronization of high-speed audio and video recordings in bio-acoustic experiments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Laurijssen, Dennis; Verreycken, Erik; Geipel, Inga; Daems, Walter; Peremans, Herbert; Steckel, Jan

    2018-02-27

    In this paper, we present a method for synchronizing high-speed audio and video recordings of bio-acoustic experiments. By embedding a random signal into the recorded video and audio data, robust synchronization of a diverse set of sensor streams can be performed without the need to keep detailed records. The synchronization can be performed using recording devices without dedicated synchronization inputs. We demonstrate the efficacy of the approach in two sets of experiments: behavioral experiments on different species of echolocating bats and the recordings of field crickets. We present the general operating principle of the synchronization method, discuss its synchronization strength and provide insights into how to construct such a device using off-the-shelf components. © 2018. Published by The Company of Biologists Ltd.

  14. Legislation to amend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. Hearings and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs, and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318, August 3, 10; September 8, 15; and December 14, 1982

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1983-01-01

    Witnesses evaluated the effectiveness of non-proliferation policies during five days of hearings on H.R. 6032 and H.R. 6318 amending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978. The objective is to retain US leadership in nuclear trade while strengthening restrictions that retard the proliferation of weapons-grade material. They examined the economic benefits of new policy initiatives which permit foreign countries to reprocess and recycle US-supplied fuel and permit US companies to export reprocessing technology. The 19 witnesses spoke for the nuclear industry, organizations involved in arms control, and the administration. The 30 appendices include the texts of H.R. 6032, H.R. 6318, and H.R. 7430 and other comments and materials submitted for the record

  15. Closed Loop Experiment Manager (CLEM—An Open and Inexpensive Solution for Multichannel Electrophysiological Recordings and Closed Loop Experiments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hananel Hazan

    2017-10-01

    Full Text Available There is growing need for multichannel electrophysiological systems that record from and interact with neuronal systems in near real-time. Such systems are needed, for example, for closed loop, multichannel electrophysiological/optogenetic experimentation in vivo and in a variety of other neuronal preparations, or for developing and testing neuro-prosthetic devices, to name a few. Furthermore, there is a need for such systems to be inexpensive, reliable, user friendly, easy to set-up, open and expandable, and possess long life cycles in face of rapidly changing computing environments. Finally, they should provide powerful, yet reasonably easy to implement facilities for developing closed-loop protocols for interacting with neuronal systems. Here, we survey commercial and open source systems that address these needs to varying degrees. We then present our own solution, which we refer to as Closed Loop Experiments Manager (CLEM. CLEM is an open source, soft real-time, Microsoft Windows desktop application that is based on a single generic personal computer (PC and an inexpensive, general-purpose data acquisition board. CLEM provides a fully functional, user-friendly graphical interface, possesses facilities for recording, presenting and logging electrophysiological data from up to 64 analog channels, and facilities for controlling external devices, such as stimulators, through digital and analog interfaces. Importantly, it includes facilities for running closed-loop protocols written in any programming language that can generate dynamic link libraries (DLLs. We describe the application, its architecture and facilities. We then demonstrate, using networks of cortical neurons growing on multielectrode arrays (MEA that despite its reliance on generic hardware, its performance is appropriate for flexible, closed-loop experimentation at the neuronal network level.

  16. The text of the Agreement of 14 July 1980 between Indonesia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-09-01

    The full text of the agreement between Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  17. The text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-04-01

    The full text of the agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  18. Surgeon-Manipulated Live Surgery Video Recording Apparatuses: Personal Experience and Review of Literature.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kapi, Emin

    2017-06-01

    Visual recording of surgical procedures is a method that is used quite frequently in practices of plastic surgery. While presentations containing photographs are quite common in education seminars and congresses, video-containing presentations find more favour. For this reason, the presentation of surgical procedures in the form of real-time video display has increased especially recently. Appropriate technical equipment for video recording is not available in most hospitals, so there is a need to set up external apparatus in the operating room. Among these apparatuses can be listed such options as head-mounted video cameras, chest-mounted cameras, and tripod-mountable cameras. The head-mounted video camera is an apparatus that is capable of capturing high-resolution and detailed close-up footage. The tripod-mountable camera enables video capturing from a fixed point. Certain user-specific modifications can be made to overcome some of these restrictions. Among these modifications, custom-made applications are one of the most effective solutions. The article makes an attempt to present the features and experiences concerning the use of a combination of a head- or chest-mounted action camera, a custom-made portable tripod apparatus of versatile features, and an underwater camera. The descriptions we used are quite easy-to-assembly, quickly installed, and inexpensive apparatuses that do not require specific technical knowledge and can be manipulated by the surgeon personally in all procedures. The author believes that video recording apparatuses will be integrated more to the operating room, become a standard practice, and become more enabling for self-manipulation by the surgeon in the near future. This journal requires that authors assign a level of evidence to each article. For a full description of these Evidence-Based Medicine ratings, please refer to the Table of Contents or the online Instructions to Authors www.springer.com/00266 .

  19. Undergraduate grade point average and graduate record examination scores: the experience of one graduate nursing program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Newton, Sarah E; Moore, Gary

    2007-01-01

    Graduate nursing programs frequently use undergraduate grade point average (UGPA) and Graduate Record Examination (GRE) scores for admission decisions. The literature indicates that both UGPA and GRE scores are predictive of graduate school success, but that UGPA may be the better predictor. If that is so, one must ask if both are necessary for graduate nursing admission decisions. This article presents research on one graduate nursing program's experience with UGPA and GRE scores and offers a perspective regarding their continued usefulness for graduate admission decisions. Data from 120 graduate students were examined, and regression analysis indicated that UGPA significantly predicted GRE verbal and quantitative scores (p < .05). Regression analysis also determined a UGPA score above which the GRE provided little additional useful data for graduate nursing admission decisions.

  20. IAEA safeguards: Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons. As the world's nuclear inspectorate, the IAEA performs an indispensable role in furthering nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Following the completion of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, the IAEA has become the instrument with which to verify that the peaceful use commitments made under the NPT or similar agreements are kept through performing what is known as its safeguards role. Under the NPT, governments around the world have committed to three common objectives: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; pursuing nuclear disarmament; and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT has made it obligatory for all its non-nuclear weapon State parties to submit all nuclear material in nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. With all but a handful of the world community as State parties, the NPT is by far the most widely adhered to legal agreement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The IAEA takes account of all source and special fissionable material in countries under safeguards. Monitoring and verification activities focus on those types of nuclear material that are the most crucial and relevant to nuclear weapons manufacturing. This includes plutonium-239, uranium-233 and -235 and any material containing one or more of these. Safeguards activities are applied routinely at over 900 facilities in 71 countries. In 2001 alone, more than 21,000 calendar days in the field were devoted to verifying hundreds of tons of special fissionable material by more than IAEA 250 inspectors

  1. Institutional effectiveness in international regimes. An analysis of the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime coping with the political malignity in the case of Iran

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oezden, Tugba

    2015-07-01

    Among the international security regimes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has a prominent ranking due to the destructive power of the nuclear weapons over regional and global peace and stability. The NPT Regime has come across with two major challenges in the recent decade: North Korea and Iran. Contrary to North Korea, Iran is determined to stay as a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Regime still did not confirm the character and extent of Iranian nuclear program. The question of this study is ''why the processes of the NPT Regime cannot specify the nature and scope of Irans nuclear program?'' The three main the processes of the regime, which are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the multilateral negotiations, are examined to determine the weaknesses of the regime. This study argues that the regime is modulated to cope with operational challenges and it remains relatively incompetent when a political challenge arises.

  2. Information report on the behalf of the foreign affairs, defence and armed forces Commission on France security, nuclear disarmament and non proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This report first gives an overview of nuclear disarmament and non proliferation twenty years after the end of Cold War: evolution and status of Russia's and United States' nuclear weapon arsenals, France's and United Kingdom's trend to reduce their nuclear armament, reinforcement of China's nuclear armament, effects and limitations of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It notices that the new international context gave birth to some expectations and may lead to a lower nuclear pressure, notably with the influence of START negotiations between Russia and the United States, provided that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is ratified by more countries, and that negotiations promote a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The report also outlines the importance of the promotion of better controlled peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It discusses the relationship between maintaining the world nuclear order and the reduction of international and regional tensions, and the importance of struggle against all forms of proliferation. It analyses the French nuclear posture in terms of security requirements, and in front of the zero nuclear option, in a context of ballistic missile proliferation, and in relationship with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

  3. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Annual report 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haemaelaeinen, M.; Karhu, P.

    2008-04-01

    Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2007 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two licence holders in 2007, setting required actions for them to correct their reporting and to update the descriptions of their procedures. Neither the IAEA nor the European Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards

  4. Cigarette smoking and tooth loss experience among young adults: a national record linkage study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tanaka Keiko

    2007-11-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Various factors affect tooth loss in older age including cigarette smoking; however, evidence regarding the association between smoking and tooth loss during young adulthood is limited. The present study examined the association between cigarette smoking and tooth loss experience among adults aged 20–39 years using linked data from two national databases in Japan. Methods Two databases of the National Nutrition Survey (NNS and the Survey of Dental Diseases (SDD, which were conducted in 1999, were obtained from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare with permission for analytical use. In the NNS, participants received physical examinations and were interviewed regarding dietary intake and health practices including cigarette smoking, whereas in the SDD, participants were asked about their frequency of daily brushing, and received oral examinations by certified dentists. Among 6,805 records electronically linked via household identification code, 1314 records of individuals aged 20 to 39 years were analyzed. The prevalence of 1+ tooth loss was compared among non-, former, and current smokers. Multiple logistic regression models were constructed including confounders: frequency of tooth brushing, body mass index, alcohol consumption, and intake of vitamins C and E. Results Smoking rates differed greatly in men (53.3% and women (15.5%. The overall prevalence of tooth loss was 31.4% (31.8% men and 31.1% women. Tooth loss occurred more frequently among current smokers (40.6% than former (23.1% and non-smokers (27.9%. Current smoking showed a significant association with 1+ tooth loss in men (adjusted OR = 2.21 [1.40–3.50], P = 0.0007 and women (1.70 [1.13–2.55], P = 0.0111. A significant positive exposure-related relationship between cigarette smoking status and tooth loss was observed (P for trend Conclusion An association between cigarette smoking and tooth loss was evident among young adults throughout Japan. Due to

  5. Educational Policy and Children's Experience: Running Records in the Lower Primary Singaporean English Language Classroom

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jones, Sally Ann

    2011-01-01

    In this article, I report on a small project involving the use of guided reading groups, levelled texts and running records in a multilingual primary school in Singapore. I focus on running records and ask whether their use is suitable pedagogically and practically for the Singaporean context. The analysis of 22 records of primary one and primary…

  6. Patients Reading Their Medical Records: Differences in Experiences and Attitudes between Regular and Inexperienced Readers

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huvila, Isto; Daniels, Mats; Cajander, Åsa; Åhlfeldt, Rose-Mharie

    2016-01-01

    Introduction: We report results of a study of how ordering and reading of printouts of medical records by regular and inexperienced readers relate to how the records are used, to the health information practices of patients, and to their expectations of the usefulness of new e-Health services and online access to medical records. Method: The study…

  7. Introducing sexual orientation and gender identity into the electronic health record: one academic health center's experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Callahan, Edward J; Sitkin, Nicole; Ton, Hendry; Eidson-Ton, W Suzanne; Weckstein, Julie; Latimore, Darin

    2015-02-01

    Many U.S. populations experience significant health disparities. Increasing health care providers' awareness of and education about sexual orientation (SO) and gender identity (GI) diversity could help reduce health disparities among lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) patients. The authors share the University of California, Davis, Health System's (UCDHS's) experience as it became the first U.S. academic health center to formally introduce patient SO/GI demographic data into its electronic health record (EHR) as a step toward reducing LGBT health disparities. Adding these data to the EHR initially met with resistance. The authors, members of the UCDHS Task Force for Inclusion of SO/GI in the EHR, viewed this resistance as an invitation to educate leaders, providers, and staff about LGBT health disparities and to expose providers to techniques for discussing SO/GI with patients. They describe the strategies they employed to effect institutional culture change, including involvement of senior leadership, key informant interviews, educational outreach via grand rounds and resident workshops, and creation of a patient safety net through inviting providers to self-identify as welcoming LGBT patients. The ongoing cultural change process has inspired spin-off projects contributing to an improved climate for LGBT individuals at UCDHS, including an employee organization supporting SO/GI diversity, support for and among LGBT medical learners through events and listservs, development and implementation of an LGBT health curriculum, and creation of peer navigator programs for LGBT patients with cancer. The authors reflect on lessons learned and on institutional pride in and commitment to providing quality care for LGBT patients.

  8. Personal health records in the Netherlands: potential user preferences quantified by a discrete choice experiment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Determann, Domino; Lambooij, Mattijs S; Gyrd-Hansen, Dorte; de Bekker-Grob, Esther W; Steyerberg, Ewout W; Heldoorn, Marcel; Pedersen, Line Bjørnskov; de Wit, G Ardine

    2017-05-01

    To identify groups of potential users based on their preferences for characteristics of personal health records (PHRs) and to estimate potential PHR uptake. We performed a discrete choice experiment, which consisted of 12 choice scenarios, each comprising 2 hypothetical PHR alternatives and an opt-out. The alternatives differed based on 5 characteristics. The survey was administered to Internet panel members of the Dutch Federation of Patients and Consumer Organizations. We used latent class models to analyze the data. A total of 1,443 potential PHR users completed the discrete choice experiment. We identified 3 latent classes: "refusers" (class probability 43%), "eager adopters" (37%), and "reluctant adopters" (20%). The predicted uptake for the reluctant adopters ranged from 4% in the case of a PHR with the worst attribute levels to 68% in the best case. Those with 1 or more chronic diseases were significantly more likely to belong to the eager adopter class. The data storage provider was the most decisive aspect for the eager and reluctant adopters, while cost was most decisive for the refusers. Across all classes, health care providers and independent organizations were the most preferred data storage providers. We identified 3 groups, of which 1 group (more than one-third of potential PHR users) indicated great interest in a PHR irrespective of PHR characteristics. Policymakers who aim to expand the use of PHRs will be most successful when health care providers and health facilities or independent organizations store PHR data while refraining from including market parties. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Medical Informatics Association. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com

  9. Meaningful Use of Electronic Health Records: Experiences From the Field and Future Opportunities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Slight, Sarah Patricia; Berner, Eta S; Galanter, William; Huff, Stanley; Lambert, Bruce L; Lannon, Carole; Lehmann, Christoph U; McCourt, Brian J; McNamara, Michael; Menachemi, Nir; Payne, Thomas H; Spooner, S Andrew; Schiff, Gordon D; Wang, Tracy Y; Akincigil, Ayse; Crystal, Stephen; Fortmann, Stephen P; Bates, David W

    2015-09-18

    With the aim of improving health care processes through health information technology (HIT), the US government has promulgated requirements for "meaningful use" (MU) of electronic health records (EHRs) as a condition for providers receiving financial incentives for the adoption and use of these systems. Considerable uncertainty remains about the impact of these requirements on the effective application of EHR systems. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)-sponsored Centers for Education and Research in Therapeutics (CERTs) critically examined the impact of the MU policy relating to the use of medications and jointly developed recommendations to help inform future HIT policy. We gathered perspectives from a wide range of stakeholders (N=35) who had experience with MU requirements, including academicians, practitioners, and policy makers from different health care organizations including and beyond the CERTs. Specific issues and recommendations were discussed and agreed on as a group. Stakeholders' knowledge and experiences from implementing MU requirements fell into 6 domains: (1) accuracy of medication lists and medication reconciliation, (2) problem list accuracy and the shift in HIT priorities, (3) accuracy of allergy lists and allergy-related standards development, (4) support of safer and effective prescribing for children, (5) considerations for rural communities, and (6) general issues with achieving MU. Standards are needed to better facilitate the exchange of data elements between health care settings. Several organizations felt that their preoccupation with fulfilling MU requirements stifled innovation. Greater emphasis should be placed on local HIT configurations that better address population health care needs. Although MU has stimulated adoption of EHRs, its effects on quality and safety remain uncertain. Stakeholders felt that MU requirements should be more flexible and recognize that integrated models may achieve information

  10. Electronic Health Record (EHR) Organizational Change: Explaining Resistance Through Profession, Organizational Experience, and EHR Communication Quality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barrett, Ashley K

    2018-04-01

    The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act passed by the U.S. government in 2009 mandates that all healthcare organizations adopt a certified electronic health record (EHR) system by 2015. Failure to comply will result in Medicare reimbursement penalties, which steadily increase with each year of delinquency. There are several repercussions of this seemingly top-down, rule-bound organizational change-one of which is employee resistance. Given the penalties for violating EHR meaningful use standards are ongoing, resistance to this mandate presents a serious issue for healthcare organizations. This study surveyed 345 employees in one healthcare organization that recently implemented an EHR. Analysis of variance results offer theoretical and pragmatic contributions by demonstrating physicians, nurses, and employees with more experience in their organization are the most resistant to EHR change. The job characteristics model is used to explain these findings. Hierarchical regression analyses also demonstrate the quality of communication surrounding EHR implementation-from both formal and informal sources-is negatively associated with EHR resistance and positively associated with perceived EHR implementation success and EHR's perceived relative advantage.

  11. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  12. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of Safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  13. Scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre - ARSRITP and arms control and nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avrorin, E.N.; Andrusenko, B.A.; Voznyuk, R.I.; Voloshin, N.P.

    1994-01-01

    The activity of scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre (RFNC) -ARSRITP in the field of nuclear disarmament control for the period of 1974 -1993 is discussed. RFNC - ARSRITP scientists in collaboration with american specialists have developed and employed in practice the techniques and equipment to control the bilateral Treaty on the limitation of Nuclear -Weapon Test. Experience of control over nuclear tests of threshold power and realization of new RFNC - ARSRITP scientific and technical projects have made a basis for development of measures and means of possible control methods to observe complete nuclear test ban

  14. The implications of South Asia's nuclear tests for non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. A report of the UNIDIR conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    On 7 and 8 September 1998, fifty experts, drawn from over twenty-five countries and from academia, non-governmental organizations and governments, met in their personal capacities in an off-the-record, 'track one a half' style meeting to discuss the implications of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998. The meeting was hosted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and sponsored by the governments of Australia, Denmark, Italy, Norway, New Zealand and the United States. The conference was divided into five sessions, each beginning with one or two short opening statements from selected experts followed by discussion amongst all the participants. The final session comprised a summary from two of the participants, which was circulated soon after the meeting. This report outlines the various discussions in the meeting and provides a list of possible policy directions that were suggested during the meeting. Not all policy suggestions received the full support of all participants, nor does their inclusion herein imply any endorsement by UNIDIR, the United Nations or any of the sponsoring governments

  15. Nurses' Experiences of an Initial and Reimplemented Electronic Health Record Use.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chang, Chi-Ping; Lee, Ting-Ting; Liu, Chia-Hui; Mills, Mary Etta

    2016-04-01

    The electronic health record is a key component of healthcare information systems. Currently, numerous hospitals have adopted electronic health records to replace paper-based records to document care processes and improve care quality. Integrating healthcare information system into traditional nursing daily operations requires time and effort for nurses to become familiarized with this new technology. In the stages of electronic health record implementation, smooth adoption can streamline clinical nursing activities. In order to explore the adoption process, a descriptive qualitative study design and focus group interviews were conducted 3 months after and 2 years after electronic health record system implementation (system aborted 1 year in between) in one hospital located in southern Taiwan. Content analysis was performed to analyze the interview data, and six main themes were derived, in the first stage: (1) liability, work stress, and anticipation for electronic health record; (2) slow network speed, user-unfriendly design for learning process; (3) insufficient information technology/organization support; on the second stage: (4) getting used to electronic health record and further system requirements, (5) benefits of electronic health record in time saving and documentation, (6) unrealistic information technology competence expectation and future use. It concluded that user-friendly design and support by informatics technology and manpower backup would facilitate this adoption process as well.

  16. 21 CFR 510.301 - Records and reports concerning experience with animal feeds bearing or containing new animal...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 6 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Records and reports concerning experience with... application is in effect. 510.301 Section 510.301 Food and Drugs FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF... or deterioration in the drug, or any failure of one or more distributed batches of the drug to meet...

  17. "But They Won't Come to Lectures..." The Impact of Audio Recorded Lectures on Student Experience and Attendance

    Science.gov (United States)

    Larkin, Helen E.

    2010-01-01

    The move to increasingly flexible platforms for student learning and experience through provision of online lecture recordings is often interpreted by educators as students viewing attendance at lectures as optional. The trend toward the use of this technology is often met with resistance from some academic staff who argue that student attendance…

  18. JUNO JUPITER MWR 2 EXPERIMENT DATA RECORDS V1.0

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — The Juno MWR EDR data sets will ultimately include all uncalibrated MWR science data records for the entire Juno mission. The set in this volume will contain only...

  19. Outlook on non-proliferation activities in the world and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy among Turkish speaking countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Birsen, N.

    2002-01-01

    Nuclear technology is being widely used in protecting the environment, manufacturing industry, medicine, agriculture, food industry and electricity production. In the world, 438 nuclear power plants are in operation, and 31 are under construction. Nuclear share of total electricity generation have reached to 17 percent. However, 2053 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1999 and 2 atom bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 have initiated nonproliferation activities aiming to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a climate where cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be fostered. In addition to international efforts for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, great efforts were made for disarmament and banning the nuclear tests which damage the environment. Following the first Geneva Conference in 1955 for expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Turkey was one of the first countries to start activities in the nuclear field. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) was established in 1956 and Turkey became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency established in 1957 by the United Nations for spreading the use of nuclear energy to contribute peace, health and prosperity throughout the world in same year. Turkey is a candidate state to join to European Union and has already signed Custom Union Agreement, also part of the Eurasian Region. So, there are significant developments in cultural, social, technical, economical and trade relations owning to our common historical and cultural values with the countries in the region and Central Asia. TAEK was established to support, co-ordinate and perform the activities in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and act as a regulatory body and establish cooperation with countries and international organizations. In the late 1990's TAEK, besides the cooperation with various countries, has involved to cooperating with nuclear institutes of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for

  20. Chronic cortical and electromyographic recordings from a fully implantable device: preclinical experience in a nonhuman primate

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ryapolova-Webb, Elena; Afshar, Pedram; Stanslaski, Scott; Denison, Tim; de Hemptinne, Coralie; Bankiewicz, Krystof; Starr, Philip A.

    2014-02-01

    Objective. Analysis of intra- and perioperatively recorded cortical and basal ganglia local field potentials in human movement disorders has provided great insight into the pathophysiology of diseases such as Parkinson's, dystonia, and essential tremor. However, in order to better understand the network abnormalities and effects of chronic therapeutic stimulation in these disorders, long-term recording from a fully implantable data collection system is needed. Approach. A fully implantable investigational data collection system, the Activa® PC + S neurostimulator (Medtronic, Inc., Minneapolis, MN), has been developed for human use. Here, we tested its utility for extended intracranial recording in the motor system of a nonhuman primate. The system was attached to two quadripolar paddle arrays: one covering sensorimotor cortex, and one covering a proximal forelimb muscle, to study simultaneous cortical field potentials and electromyography during spontaneous transitions from rest to movement. Main results. Over 24 months of recording, movement-related changes in physiologically relevant frequency bands were readily detected, including beta and gamma signals at approximately 2.5 μV/\\sqrtHz and 0.7 μV/\\sqrt{Hz}, respectively. The system architecture allowed for flexible recording configurations and algorithm triggered data recording. In the course of physiological analyses, sensing artifacts were observed (˜1 μVrms stationary tones at fixed frequency), which were mitigated either with post-processing or algorithm design and did not impact the scientific conclusions. Histological examination revealed no underlying tissue damage; however, a fibrous capsule had developed around the paddles, demonstrating a potential mechanism for the observed signal amplitude reduction. Significance. This study establishes the usefulness of this system in measuring chronic brain and muscle signals. Use of this system may potentially be valuable in human trials of chronic brain

  1. Information report on the behalf of the foreign affairs, defence and armed forces Commission on France security, nuclear disarmament and non proliferation; Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires etrangeres, de la defense et des forces armees (1) sur le desarmement, la non-proliferation nucleaires et la securite de la France

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-07-01

    This report first gives an overview of nuclear disarmament and non proliferation twenty years after the end of Cold War: evolution and status of Russia's and United States' nuclear weapon arsenals, France's and United Kingdom's trend to reduce their nuclear armament, reinforcement of China's nuclear armament, effects and limitations of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It notices that the new international context gave birth to some expectations and may lead to a lower nuclear pressure, notably with the influence of START negotiations between Russia and the United States, provided that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is ratified by more countries, and that negotiations promote a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The report also outlines the importance of the promotion of better controlled peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It discusses the relationship between maintaining the world nuclear order and the reduction of international and regional tensions, and the importance of struggle against all forms of proliferation. It analyses the French nuclear posture in terms of security requirements, and in front of the zero nuclear option, in a context of ballistic missile proliferation, and in relationship with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

  2. Nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1969-01-01

    Taking into account the devastation that a nuclear war would inflict upon mankind, and the resulting need to do all that is in our power to keep such a tragedy from occuring, as well as to implement measures to safeguard all the peoples' safety, each State that owns nuclear weapons and that is a part of the Treaty pledges not to trade nuclear weapons, other explosive devices nor the control over such instruments to any other entity whatsoever, wether directly or indirectly. Likewise, all States that does not posses any nuclear weaponry and that are part of the Treaty, in turn pledge not to receive from any other entity nuclear weaponry or other explosive devices in trade, wether directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire this fashion of weaponry and not to request or accept any help whatsoever in the manufacturing of nuclear weaponry or related devices. The present Treaty remains open to the subscription of other countries, on July 26, 1968, with Mexico as one of the signatory countries

  3. Ultracentrifuge and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Voortman, A.J.

    1977-01-01

    The author states that there is no meaningful difference, from the point of view of proliferation between peaceful, civil, scientific application of nuclear fission, and the use of it in nuclear weapons. The proliferation of the nuclear technology for weapons appeared and appears to be closely connected with the spread of peaceful applications of nuclear technology. In connection with this, he discusses the Ultracentrifuge plant at Almelo (Netherlands) and the supply of nuclear technology by West-Germany especially to Brazil. Further the changed American policy and the possibility of an American/Russian deal to prevent the spread of the nuclear enrichment technology is discussed

  4. The Non-Proliferation Malaise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sur, Serge

    2013-01-01

    Issues pertaining to nuclear weapons no longer occupy more than a relatively modest position in the international security field, which is more significantly threatened by recent forms of conflict - particularly asymmetrical -, the contemporary challenges posed by terrorism, the collapse of States and ensuing civil violence, organised crime, massacres, regional destabilisation, and the emerging threats related to deleterious uses of the Internet. Analysing these challenges and threats, and defining and implementing effective responses constitutes the priorities of the international agenda and mobilizes the energy and capabilities of States, alliances and coalitions, and international organisations. The time when the nuclear arms race between the United States and the USSR and the arms control efforts that attempted to frame and control it dominated the international relations scene has passed. This duo has been succeeded by a relative lack of interest on the part of nuclear powers towards their own arms. (author)

  5. Chronic multisite brain recordings from a totally implantable bidirectional neural interface: experience in 5 patients with Parkinson's disease.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Swann, Nicole C; de Hemptinne, Coralie; Miocinovic, Svjetlana; Qasim, Salman; Ostrem, Jill L; Galifianakis, Nicholas B; Luciano, Marta San; Wang, Sarah S; Ziman, Nathan; Taylor, Robin; Starr, Philip A

    2018-02-01

    OBJECTIVE Dysfunction of distributed neural networks underlies many brain disorders. The development of neuromodulation therapies depends on a better understanding of these networks. Invasive human brain recordings have a favorable temporal and spatial resolution for the analysis of network phenomena but have generally been limited to acute intraoperative recording or short-term recording through temporarily externalized leads. Here, the authors describe their initial experience with an investigational, first-generation, totally implantable, bidirectional neural interface that allows both continuous therapeutic stimulation and recording of field potentials at multiple sites in a neural network. METHODS Under a physician-sponsored US Food and Drug Administration investigational device exemption, 5 patients with Parkinson's disease were implanted with the Activa PC+S system (Medtronic Inc.). The device was attached to a quadripolar lead placed in the subdural space over motor cortex, for electrocorticography potential recordings, and to a quadripolar lead in the subthalamic nucleus (STN), for both therapeutic stimulation and recording of local field potentials. Recordings from the brain of each patient were performed at multiple time points over a 1-year period. RESULTS There were no serious surgical complications or interruptions in deep brain stimulation therapy. Signals in both the cortex and the STN were relatively stable over time, despite a gradual increase in electrode impedance. Canonical movement-related changes in specific frequency bands in the motor cortex were identified in most but not all recordings. CONCLUSIONS The acquisition of chronic multisite field potentials in humans is feasible. The device performance characteristics described here may inform the design of the next generation of totally implantable neural interfaces. This research tool provides a platform for translating discoveries in brain network dynamics to improved neurostimulation

  6. Embedding online patient record access in UK primary care: a survey of stakeholder experiences.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pagliari, Claudia; Shand, Tim; Fisher, Brian

    2012-05-01

    To explore the integration of online patient Record Access within UK Primary Care, its perceived impacts on workload and service quality, and barriers to implementation. Mixed format survey of clinicians, administrators and patients. Telephone interviews with non-users. Primary care centres within NHS England that had offered online record access for the preceding year. Of the 57 practices initially agreeing to pilot the system, 32 had adopted it and 16 of these returned questionnaires. The 42 individual respondents included 14 practice managers, 15 clinicians and 13 patients. Follow-up interviews were conducted with one participant from 15 of the 25 non-adopter practices. Most professionals believed that the system is easy to integrate within primary care; while most patients found it easy to integrate within their daily lives. Professionals perceived no increase in the volume of patient queries or clinical consultations as a result of Record Access; indeed some believed that these had decreased. Most clinicians and patients believed that the service had improved mutual trust, communication, patients' health knowledge and health behaviour. Inhibiting factors included concerns about security, liability and resource requirements. Non-adoption was most frequently attributed to competing priorities, rather than negative beliefs about the service. Record access has an important role to play in supporting patient-focused healthcare policies in the UK and may be easily accommodated within existing services. Additional materials to facilitate patient recruitment, inform system set-up processes, and assure clinicians of their legal position are likely to encourage more widespread adoption.

  7. Statement to 2010 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 3 May 2010, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Y.

    2010-01-01

    The IAEA works to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technical cooperation. The IAEA also has a role to play in verifying nuclear disarmament. As all of these activities are relevant to the work of the NPT Review Conference, I would like to provide you with a brief overview of recent developments. As you know, reliable supplies of energy are vital to ensure continued prosperity and sustained development. Nuclear power is enjoying growing acceptance as a stable and clean source of energy that can help to mitigate the impact of climate change. More than 60 countries are considering introducing nuclear power to generate electricity. It is expected that between 10 and 25 new countries will bring their first nuclear power plants online by 2030. Certainly, it is for each sovereign State to decide whether or not to use nuclear power, but the IAEA assists interested countries in establishing a reliable nuclear infrastructure. Nuclear power must be accessible not only for developed countries but also for developing countries. Nuclear power needs to be efficient, sustainable and profitable. Any expansion in its use must be done safely and securely, and without increasing the proliferation risk.A successful NPT Review Conference is indispensable because it will enhance confidence in the non-proliferation regime, which in turn will provide the Agency with a stronger basis for our work in all areas

  8. U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm U.S. reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonproliferation policies can influence export sales. Based on available data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of U.S. nuclear exports. However, U.S. companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by U.S. technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and compete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for U.S. nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, U.S. companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

  9. The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  10. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Republic of Slovenia on 1 September 2006 [es

  11. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for the Republic of Estonia on 1 December 2005 [es

  12. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Czech Republic on 1 October 2009 [es

  13. The Text of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force for the Slovak Republic on 1 December 2005 [es

  14. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  15. The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-12-13

    The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  16. The Text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1976-11-19

    The text of the Agreement of 16 May 1974 between Thailand and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 May 1974, pursuant to Article 25 thereof.

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-12-13

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Viet-Nam and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1975-01-24

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 9 January 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  19. The Text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1976-06-16

    The text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  20. The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-06-06

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  1. The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-05-14

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  2. The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1975-12-16

    The text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ghana and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  3. Responsibilities of supplier states and consumer states in accommodating supply arrangements to changing circumstances and to identify and evaluate alternative mechanisms for improving supply guarantees consistent with non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The papers by the USA and Australia deal with the responsibility of supplier states and consumer states in accommodating supply arrangements to changing circumstances and with the development of alternative supply guarantees consistent with non-proliferation treaties. A number of theses are evolved for the realisation of these goals; most of them refer to an improvement of bilateral contacts and agreements

  4. The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1978-03-15

    The text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between Japan and the Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced for the information of all Members.

  5. Statement issued on 30 January 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union in connection with the accession of Algeria to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The statement was issued on 30 January 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union in connection with Algeria's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Statement was received from the Resident Representative of France to the International Atomic Energy Agency and is being circulated for the information of all Member States

  6. The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  7. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  8. The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-03-01

    The text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between Japan and the Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced for the information of all Members

  9. Statement issued on 28 February 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on accession of Argentina to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The statement was issued on 28 February 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on accession of Argentina to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Statement was received from the Resident Representative of France to the International Atomic Energy Agency and is being circulated for the information of all Member States

  10. Guidelines for the International Observation by the Agency of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes under the Provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Analogous Provisions in Other International Agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    On 21 June 1972 the Board of Governors approved guidelines for the international observation by the Agency of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or analogous provisions in other international agreements. These guidelines are now reproduced herein for the information of all Members

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  12. The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  13. Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    The document informs that the Czech Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

  14. Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    The document informs that the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

  15. The text of the agreement of 5 December 1974 between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1978-04-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 5 December 1974, and the Protocol thereto, between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agreement entered into force on 21 February 1978

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Viet-Nam and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Viet-Nam and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 9 January 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

  18. The Text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  19. The Text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-11-01

    The text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 14 June 1979.

  20. Communication received from the Resident Representatives of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to the Agency concerning multilateral cooperation on energy security in support of Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Director General has received a letter dated 13 September 2007 from the Resident Representatives of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, attaching a declaration concerning multilateral cooperation on energy security in support of Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The letter and, as requested therein, the declaration, are herewith circulated for information

  1. The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ghana and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  2. Guidelines for information about therapy experiments: a proposal on best practice for recording experimental data on cancer therapy.

    Science.gov (United States)

    González-Beltrán, Alejandra N; Yong, May Y; Dancey, Gairin; Begent, Richard

    2012-01-06

    Biology, biomedicine and healthcare have become data-driven enterprises, where scientists and clinicians need to generate, access, validate, interpret and integrate different kinds of experimental and patient-related data. Thus, recording and reporting of data in a systematic and unambiguous fashion is crucial to allow aggregation and re-use of data. This paper reviews the benefits of existing biomedical data standards and focuses on key elements to record experiments for therapy development. Specifically, we describe the experiments performed in molecular, cellular, animal and clinical models. We also provide an example set of elements for a therapy tested in a phase I clinical trial. We introduce the Guidelines for Information About Therapy Experiments (GIATE), a minimum information checklist creating a consistent framework to transparently report the purpose, methods and results of the therapeutic experiments. A discussion on the scope, design and structure of the guidelines is presented, together with a description of the intended audience. We also present complementary resources such as a classification scheme, and two alternative ways of creating GIATE information: an electronic lab notebook and a simple spreadsheet-based format. Finally, we use GIATE to record the details of the phase I clinical trial of CHT-25 for patients with refractory lymphomas. The benefits of using GIATE for this experiment are discussed. While data standards are being developed to facilitate data sharing and integration in various aspects of experimental medicine, such as genomics and clinical data, no previous work focused on therapy development. We propose a checklist for therapy experiments and demonstrate its use in the 131Iodine labeled CHT-25 chimeric antibody cancer therapy. As future work, we will expand the set of GIATE tools to continue to encourage its use by cancer researchers, and we will engineer an ontology to annotate GIATE elements and facilitate unambiguous

  3. Guidelines for information about therapy experiments: a proposal on best practice for recording experimental data on cancer therapy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    González-Beltrán Alejandra N

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Biology, biomedicine and healthcare have become data-driven enterprises, where scientists and clinicians need to generate, access, validate, interpret and integrate different kinds of experimental and patient-related data. Thus, recording and reporting of data in a systematic and unambiguous fashion is crucial to allow aggregation and re-use of data. This paper reviews the benefits of existing biomedical data standards and focuses on key elements to record experiments for therapy development. Specifically, we describe the experiments performed in molecular, cellular, animal and clinical models. We also provide an example set of elements for a therapy tested in a phase I clinical trial. Findings We introduce the Guidelines for Information About Therapy Experiments (GIATE, a minimum information checklist creating a consistent framework to transparently report the purpose, methods and results of the therapeutic experiments. A discussion on the scope, design and structure of the guidelines is presented, together with a description of the intended audience. We also present complementary resources such as a classification scheme, and two alternative ways of creating GIATE information: an electronic lab notebook and a simple spreadsheet-based format. Finally, we use GIATE to record the details of the phase I clinical trial of CHT-25 for patients with refractory lymphomas. The benefits of using GIATE for this experiment are discussed. Conclusions While data standards are being developed to facilitate data sharing and integration in various aspects of experimental medicine, such as genomics and clinical data, no previous work focused on therapy development. We propose a checklist for therapy experiments and demonstrate its use in the 131Iodine labeled CHT-25 chimeric antibody cancer therapy. As future work, we will expand the set of GIATE tools to continue to encourage its use by cancer researchers, and we will engineer an ontology to

  4. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session on S. 897 and S. 1432

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    On April 7, 1977, President Carter announced his nuclear power policy. The policy statement set forth seven specific objectives for the future use of nuclear energy in this country and the rest of the world. The two proposed instruments for implementing this policy are the revised fiscal year 1978 ERDA authorization draft bill and S. 1432, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. These legislative proposals are linked in that S. 1432 is designed to establish a non-proliferation framework with specific objectives established for the ERDA nuclear energy programs. The ERDA authorization bill is the budgetary vehicle to implement those objectives. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources obtained joint referral of certain portions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to insure that non-proliferation policy is implemented in a manner consistent with the policy of having sufficient energy for this country and foreign countries in the future. The Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development must examine the costs and the consequences of various initiatives before they are implemented. F or example, the proposal to guarantee uranium enrichment services for foreign nations poses specific requirements on ERDA to expand considerably our enrichment capacity by the year 2000. Without reprocessing, it is expected that spent fuel rods from abroad will be returned to this country for storage with attendant costs and siting decisions. Also, international fuel-cycle evaluation programs must be carefully examined to insure that all options, including regional fuel cycle centers with international controls and inspection, are considered in seeking international approaches to the non-proliferation objectives. At the June 10 hearing, the subcommittee received testimony on S. 1432, the bill prepared by the administration. The hearings on September 13 and 14 focused on S. 897. Statements by many witnesses are included

  5. Supporting information retrieval from electronic health records: A report of University of Michigan's nine-year experience in developing and using the Electronic Medical Record Search Engine (EMERSE).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hanauer, David A; Mei, Qiaozhu; Law, James; Khanna, Ritu; Zheng, Kai

    2015-06-01

    This paper describes the University of Michigan's nine-year experience in developing and using a full-text search engine designed to facilitate information retrieval (IR) from narrative documents stored in electronic health records (EHRs). The system, called the Electronic Medical Record Search Engine (EMERSE), functions similar to Google but is equipped with special functionalities for handling challenges unique to retrieving information from medical text. Key features that distinguish EMERSE from general-purpose search engines are discussed, with an emphasis on functions crucial to (1) improving medical IR performance and (2) assuring search quality and results consistency regardless of users' medical background, stage of training, or level of technical expertise. Since its initial deployment, EMERSE has been enthusiastically embraced by clinicians, administrators, and clinical and translational researchers. To date, the system has been used in supporting more than 750 research projects yielding 80 peer-reviewed publications. In several evaluation studies, EMERSE demonstrated very high levels of sensitivity and specificity in addition to greatly improved chart review efficiency. Increased availability of electronic data in healthcare does not automatically warrant increased availability of information. The success of EMERSE at our institution illustrates that free-text EHR search engines can be a valuable tool to help practitioners and researchers retrieve information from EHRs more effectively and efficiently, enabling critical tasks such as patient case synthesis and research data abstraction. EMERSE, available free of charge for academic use, represents a state-of-the-art medical IR tool with proven effectiveness and user acceptance. Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  6. Agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by exchange of letters with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 September 2000. It was effected by an exchange of letters of 4 and 10 October 2000. The Agreement and the Protocol thereto entered into force on the date upon which the Agency received written confirmation on behalf of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that the constitutional requirements for the entry into force have been met, i.e. on 16 April 2002

  7. [History and paradigms in Collective Health: record of a teaching experience].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nunes, Everardo Duarte

    2011-04-01

    The paper describes a pedagogical experience at graduate level on the topic of History and Paradigms of Knowledge in Health. The experience originated in the first two courses at the Sergio Arouca National School of Public Health, at Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) (19921993) and later at the School of Medical Sciences, State University of Campinas (Unicamp) (19942006). The article highlights the contents of the two courses and presents some considerations about the relevance of the subjects that deal with the historical character of the areas of knowledge and provides feedback for reflection on the field of knowledge as a whole and its specific aspects.

  8. Using health care audit to improve quality of clinical records: the preliminary experience of an Italian Cancer Institute.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cadeddu, Chiara; Specchia, Maria Lucia; Cacciatore, Pasquale; Marchini, Raffaele; Ricciardi, Walter; Cavuto, Costanza

    2017-01-01

    Audit and feedback are recognized as part of a strategy for improving performance and supporting quality and safety in European health care systems. These considerations led the Clinical Management Staff of the "Regina Elena" Italian Cancer Institute to start a project of self-assessment of the quality of clinical records and organizational appropriateness through a retrospective review. The evaluation about appropriateness and congruity concerned both clinical records of 2013 and of 2015. At the end of the assessment of clinical records of each Care Unit, results were shared with medical staff in scheduled audit meetings. One hundred and thirteen clinical records (19%) did not meet congruity criteria, while 74 (12.6%) resulted as inappropriate. Considering the economic esteem calculated from the difference between Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) primarily identified as main diagnosis and main surgical intervention or procedure and those modified during the Local Health Unit (LHU) assessment, 2 surgical Care Units produced a high negative difference in terms of economic value with a consequent drop of hospital discharge form (named in Italian "scheda di dimissione ospedaliera", SDO) remuneration, 7 Care Units produced about the same medium difference with almost no change as SDO remuneration, and 2 Care Units had a positive difference with a profit in terms of SDO remuneration. Concerning the quality assessment of clinical records of 2015, the most critical areas were related to medical documents and hospital discharge form compilation. Our experience showed the effectiveness of clinical audit in assessing the quality of filling in medical records and the appropriateness of hospital admissions and the acceptability of this tool by clinicians.

  9. 21 CFR 514.80 - Records and reports concerning experience with approved new animal drugs.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... good manufacturing practices? 514.80(a)(5). 514.80(b) Reporting requirements. What are the requirements... experience report. What are the requirements for submission of advertisement and promotional labeling to FDA? 514.80(b)(5)(ii) Advertisements and promotional labeling. What are the requirements for adding a new...

  10. Involving People with Lived Experience of Homelessness in Electronic Health Records Research

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Serena Luchenski

    2017-04-01

    Using a participatory and dynamic approach to involve people with lived experience of homelessness and exclusion is an effective public engagement methodology for complex topics such as EHR research and data linkage. Information provided in the workshop was useful for interpreting findings, identifying strengths and gaps in health and social services, and developing research and practice recommendations.

  11. Experiments with the living dead: Plants as monitors and recorders of Biosphere Geosphere interactions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lomax, Barry; Fraser, Wesley

    2016-04-01

    Understanding variations in the Earth's climate history will enhance our understanding of and capacity to predict future climate change. Importantly this information can then be used to reduce uncertainty around future climate change predictions. However to achieve this, it is necessary to develop well constrained and robustly tested palaeo-proxies. Plants are innately coupled to the atmosphere requiring both sunlight and CO2 to drive photosynthesis and carbon assimilation. When combined with their resilience and persistence, the study of plant responses to climate change in concert with the analysis of fossil plants offer the opportunity to monitor past atmospheric conditions and infer palaeoclimate change. In this presentation we highlight how this approach is leading to the development of mechanistic palaeoproxies tested on palaeobotanically relevant extant species showing that plant fossils can be used as both monitors and geochemical recorders of atmospheric changes.

  12. Experiments of Multi-Level Read-Only Recording Using Readout Signal Wave-Shape Modulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yi, Tang; Jing, Pei; Long-Fa, Pan; Yi, Ni; Hua, Hu; Bu-Qing, Zhang

    2008-01-01

    An innovative multilevel read-only recording method is proposed. In this method, a short pit/land is deliberately inserted to the original land/pit. This modifies the wave-shape of readout signal. Taking the wave-shape as the symbol of level detection, a signal wave-shape modulation (SWSM) multilevel method is realized. This method is carried out and validated on the DVD read-only manufacture and readout system. A capacity of 15 GB can be expected, and a bit error rate of 10 −4 is achieved. The capacity can meet the demand of high definition movie publication. This method also provides a potential multi-level solution for other storage formats and systems. (fundamental areas of phenomenology (including applications))

  13. Comparison of optical spectra recorded during DPF-1000U plasma experiments with gas-puffing

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zaloga Dobromil R.

    2015-06-01

    Full Text Available The results are presented of the optical spectra measurements for free plasma streams generated with the use of the modified DPF-1000U machine. This facility was recently equipped with a gas injection system (the so-called gas-puff placed on the symmetry axis behind the central opening in the inner electrode. The DPF-1000U experimental chamber was filled up with pure deuterium at the initial pressure of 1.6 or 2.4 mbar. Additionally, when the use was made of the gas-puff system about 1 cm3 of pure deuterium was injected at the pressure of 2 bars. The gas injection was initiated 1.5 or 2 ms before the triggering of the main discharge. The investigated plasma discharges were powered from a condenser bank charged initially to 23 kV (corresponding to the energy of 352 kJ, and the maximum discharge current amounted to about 1.8 MA. In order to investigate properties of a dense plasma column formed during DPF-1000U discharges the use was made of the optical emission spectroscopy. The optical spectra were recorded along the line of sight perpendicular to the vacuum chamber, using a Mechelle®900 spectrometer. The recent analysis of all the recorded spectra made it possible to compare the temporal changes in the electron density of a freely propagating plasma stream for discharges without and with the gas-puffing. Using this data an appropriate mode of operation of the DPF-1000U facility could be determined.

  14. The SMART Platform: early experience enabling substitutable applications for electronic health records

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mandel, Joshua C; Murphy, Shawn N; Bernstam, Elmer Victor; Ramoni, Rachel L; Kreda, David A; McCoy, J Michael; Adida, Ben; Kohane, Isaac S

    2012-01-01

    Objective The Substitutable Medical Applications, Reusable Technologies (SMART) Platforms project seeks to develop a health information technology platform with substitutable applications (apps) constructed around core services. The authors believe this is a promising approach to driving down healthcare costs, supporting standards evolution, accommodating differences in care workflow, fostering competition in the market, and accelerating innovation. Materials and methods The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, through the Strategic Health IT Advanced Research Projects (SHARP) Program, funds the project. The SMART team has focused on enabling the property of substitutability through an app programming interface leveraging web standards, presenting predictable data payloads, and abstracting away many details of enterprise health information technology systems. Containers—health information technology systems, such as electronic health records (EHR), personally controlled health records, and health information exchanges that use the SMART app programming interface or a portion of it—marshal data sources and present data simply, reliably, and consistently to apps. Results The SMART team has completed the first phase of the project (a) defining an app programming interface, (b) developing containers, and (c) producing a set of charter apps that showcase the system capabilities. A focal point of this phase was the SMART Apps Challenge, publicized by the White House, using http://www.challenge.gov website, and generating 15 app submissions with diverse functionality. Conclusion Key strategic decisions must be made about the most effective market for further disseminating SMART: existing market-leading EHR vendors, new entrants into the EHR market, or other stakeholders such as health information exchanges. PMID:22427539

  15. The Mice Drawer System (MDS experiment and the space endurance record-breaking mice.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ranieri Cancedda

    Full Text Available The Italian Space Agency, in line with its scientific strategies and the National Utilization Plan for the International Space Station (ISS, contracted Thales Alenia Space Italia to design and build a spaceflight payload for rodent research on ISS: the Mice Drawer System (MDS. The payload, to be integrated inside the Space Shuttle middeck during transportation and inside the Express Rack in the ISS during experiment execution, was designed to function autonomously for more than 3 months and to involve crew only for maintenance activities. In its first mission, three wild type (Wt and three transgenic male mice over-expressing pleiotrophin under the control of a bone-specific promoter (PTN-Tg were housed in the MDS. At the time of launch, animals were 2-months old. MDS reached the ISS on board of Shuttle Discovery Flight 17A/STS-128 on August 28(th, 2009. MDS returned to Earth on November 27(th, 2009 with Shuttle Atlantis Flight ULF3/STS-129 after 91 days, performing the longest permanence of mice in space. Unfortunately, during the MDS mission, one PTN-Tg and two Wt mice died due to health status or payload-related reasons. The remaining mice showed a normal behavior throughout the experiment and appeared in excellent health conditions at landing. During the experiment, the mice health conditions and their water and food consumption were daily checked. Upon landing mice were sacrificed, blood parameters measured and tissues dissected for subsequent analysis. To obtain as much information as possible on microgravity-induced tissue modifications, we organized a Tissue Sharing Program: 20 research groups from 6 countries participated. In order to distinguish between possible effects of the MDS housing conditions and effects due to the near-zero gravity environment, a ground replica of the flight experiment was performed at the University of Genova. Control tissues were collected also from mice maintained on Earth in standard vivarium cages.

  16. Signal from Cyg X-3, as recorded in some underground experiments, real?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chudakov, A.E.

    1986-01-01

    Most of the excitement concerning the underground detection of signals from Cyg X-3 comes not from astrophysical grounds, but from the contradiction with surface experimental data. Believing in the Cyg X-3 signal underground and also that the main processes of muon production are well knownm the conclusion was drawn that the signal in EAS Cherenkov or counter experiments could be remarkably high, which is not the case. Possible solutions to this discrepancy are discussed

  17. The Mice Drawer System (MDS) experiment and the space endurance record-breaking mice.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cancedda, Ranieri; Liu, Yi; Ruggiu, Alessandra; Tavella, Sara; Biticchi, Roberta; Santucci, Daniela; Schwartz, Silvia; Ciparelli, Paolo; Falcetti, Giancarlo; Tenconi, Chiara; Cotronei, Vittorio; Pignataro, Salvatore

    2012-01-01

    The Italian Space Agency, in line with its scientific strategies and the National Utilization Plan for the International Space Station (ISS), contracted Thales Alenia Space Italia to design and build a spaceflight payload for rodent research on ISS: the Mice Drawer System (MDS). The payload, to be integrated inside the Space Shuttle middeck during transportation and inside the Express Rack in the ISS during experiment execution, was designed to function autonomously for more than 3 months and to involve crew only for maintenance activities. In its first mission, three wild type (Wt) and three transgenic male mice over-expressing pleiotrophin under the control of a bone-specific promoter (PTN-Tg) were housed in the MDS. At the time of launch, animals were 2-months old. MDS reached the ISS on board of Shuttle Discovery Flight 17A/STS-128 on August 28(th), 2009. MDS returned to Earth on November 27(th), 2009 with Shuttle Atlantis Flight ULF3/STS-129 after 91 days, performing the longest permanence of mice in space. Unfortunately, during the MDS mission, one PTN-Tg and two Wt mice died due to health status or payload-related reasons. The remaining mice showed a normal behavior throughout the experiment and appeared in excellent health conditions at landing. During the experiment, the mice health conditions and their water and food consumption were daily checked. Upon landing mice were sacrificed, blood parameters measured and tissues dissected for subsequent analysis. To obtain as much information as possible on microgravity-induced tissue modifications, we organized a Tissue Sharing Program: 20 research groups from 6 countries participated. In order to distinguish between possible effects of the MDS housing conditions and effects due to the near-zero gravity environment, a ground replica of the flight experiment was performed at the University of Genova. Control tissues were collected also from mice maintained on Earth in standard vivarium cages.

  18. Medical students volunteering in hospital: a novel method of exploring and recording the patient experience

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Monica Lorraina Hytiris

    2017-05-01

    Full Text Available Background: Patient experience is increasingly recognised as an important feature of healthcare quality improvement. However, many of the methods implemented for its collection have significant limitations and reliability issues. This article describes how a UK healthcare organisation worked with medical student volunteers to build capacity for the collection of patient feedback in evidence-informed ways, and summarises student reflections on this process. Aims: To improve the quantity and quality of inpatient feedback, and in doing so provide new learning opportunities for medical students. Conclusions: Patient feedback gathered by volunteers is beneficial to the service and to medical student volunteers. As the feedback gathered is ward-specific, opportunities are created for practice improvements to be identified and acted on. It is feasible for medical students to be trained effectively as volunteers in gathering patient care experiences with adequate support mechanisms in place. Implications for practice: •\tHealthcare services should consider the use of personnel independent of the care team for the collection of patient feedback •\tPatient feedback needs to be shared with practitioners in a timely manner •\tMedical schools should consider this type of volunteering as a unique opportunity for medical students to improve understanding of patients’ experiences of healthcare, and of how care can be person-centred

  19. Extraction of Pn seismic signals from air-gun shots recorded by the Cascadia Amphibious seismic experiment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rathnayaka, S.; Gao, H.

    2017-12-01

    The goal of this study is to extract Pn (head wave) seismic waveforms recorded by both offshore and onshore (broadband and short period) seismic stations and evaluate the data quality. Two offshore active-source seismic experiments, MGL 1211 and MGL 1212, were conducted from 13th June to 24th July 2012, during the first year deployment of the Cascadia Initiative Amphibious Array. In total, we choose 110 ocean bottom seismometers and 209 inland stations that are located along the entire Cascadia subduction zone. We first remove the instrument response, and then explore the potential frequency ranges and the diurnal effect. We make the common receiver gathering for each seismic station and filter the seismic waveforms at multiple frequency bands, ranging from 3-5 Hz, 5-10 Hz, 10-20 Hz, to 20-40 Hz, respectively. To quantitatively evaluate the data quality, we calculate the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the waveforms for usable stations that record clear Pn arrivals at multiple frequency bands. Our results show that most offshore stations located at deep water (>1.5 km) record clear air-gun shot signals at frequencies higher than 3 Hz and up to 550 km away from the source. For most stations located on the shallow continental shelf, the seismic recordings appear much noisier at all the frequencies compared to stations at deep water. Three general trends are observed for the SNR distribution; First, the SNR ratio increases from lower to higher frequency bands; Second, the ratio decreases with the increasing source-to-receiver distance; And third, the ratio increases from shallow to deep water. We also observe a rough negative relationship of the signal-to-noise ratio with the thickness of the marine sediment. Only 5 inland stations record clear air-gun shot arrivals up to 200 km away from the source. More detailed data quality analysis with more results will also be present.

  20. Progress in the application of solid-state track recorders to reactor physics experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Besant, C.B.; Ipson, S.S.

    1969-03-01

    Heavily ionising particles passing through insulating materials cause tracks due to damage. These strain energy fields may be observed directly with an electron microscope or, after etching, the tracks may be seen with an optical microscope. The etching solution penetrates the damaged portion of the material and enlarges the hole if the etching is continued. This technique has been applied to detecting fission fragments from fissions taking place in a thin source of fissile material. The source, together with the insulating material is called a Solid-State Track Recorder and has been applied to the measurement of fission ratios in the fast critical assembly ZEBRA at Winfrith. The main disadvantage of the technique has been in counting tracks by eye which is laborious and subject to the human element. This has been overcome by counting tracks with a 'Quantimet' Computer Image Analyser. Absolute fission rate measurements are also discussed and it has been shown that measurements to an accuracy of better than ± 1% should be possible with this technique. (author)

  1. Reconciling "Whiffs" of O2 with the Archean MIF S Record: Insights from Sulfide Oxidation Experiments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johnson, A.; Reinhard, C. T.; Romaniello, S. J.; Greaney, A. T.; Garcia-Robledo, E.; Revsbech, N. P.; Canfield, D. E.; Lyons, T. W.; Anbar, A. D.

    2016-12-01

    The Archean-Proterozoic transition is marked by the first appreciable accumulation of O2 in Earth's oceans and atmosphere at 2.4 billion years ago (Ga). However, this Great Oxidation Event (GOE) is not the first evidence for O2 in Earth's surface environment. Paleoredox proxies preserved in ancient marine shales (Mo, Cr, Re, U) suggest transient episodes of oxidative weathering before the GOE, perhaps as early as 3.0 Ga. One marine shale in particular, the 2.5 Ga Mount McRae Shale of Western Australia, contains a euxinic interval with Mo enrichments up to 50 ppm. This enrichment is classically interpreted as the result of oxidative weathering of sulfides on the continental surface. However, prior weathering models based on experiments suggested that sulfides require large amounts of O2 [>10-4 present atmospheric level (PAL) pO2] to produce this weathering signature, in conflict with estimates of Archean pO2 from non-mass-dependent (NMD) sulfur isotope anomalies (molybdenite from 3 - 700 nM O2 (equivalent at equilibrium to 10-5 - 10-3 PAL) to measure oxidation kinetics as a function of the concentration of dissolved O2. We measured rates by injecting oxygenated water at a steady flow rate and monitoring dissolved O2 concentrations with LUMOS sensors. Our data extend the O2 range explored in pyrite oxidation experiments by three orders of magnitude and provide the first rates for molybdenite oxidation at O2 concentrations potentially analogous to those characteristic of the Archean atmosphere. Our results show that pyrite and molybdenite oxidize significantly more rapidly at lower O2 levels than previously thought. As a result, our revised weathering model demonstrates that the Mo enrichments observed in late Archean marine shales are potentially attainable at extremely low atmospheric pO2 values (e.g., <10-5 PAL), reconciling large sedimentary Mo enrichments with co-occurring NMD sulfur isotope anomalies.

  2. Review of GAO report on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Seventh Congress, First Session, May 21, 1981

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1981-01-01

    Three witnesses from the General Accounting Office (GAO) testified at a May 21, 1981 hearing on the results of a three-year review of the impact and implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978. A total of 115 countries have ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), and some have urged a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America. The GAO proposed recommendations for improving NNPA administration and developing a more coherent long-term policy. The GAO questions the need for additional enrichment capacity, and suggests a closer look at the need to complete the centrifuge facility. It notes only limited progress in multinational fuel-supply assurances and the establishment of international spent-fuel repositories. It urges the US to take a more-active role in these areas and in the international control system. A listing of US exports of highly enriched uranium from 1954 to 1981 follows the testimony

  3. The text of the agreement of 11 June 1971 between Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for Finland on 1 October 1995. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Finland, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 11 June 1971, which entered into force on 9 February 1972, between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been suspended

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [fr

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998 [fr

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [fr

  7. The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977 between Maldives and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Maldives and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  8. Text of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Succession by the Czech Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    In a communication received on 24 March 1993, the Government of the Czech Republic informed the Director General, inter alia, that by virtue of succession to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, it was a Party, with effect from 1 January 1993, to the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [es

  9. The Text of the Agreement of 24 April 1977 between Afghanistan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-04-01

    The text of the Agreement of 24 April 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Afghanistan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 February 1978. The Protocol entered into force on the same date pursuant to Article II thereof.

  10. The Text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Morocco and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 18 February 1975, pursuant to Article 25. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria [es

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [es

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria [es

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997 [es

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria [es

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-09-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 6 July 2000

  18. The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977 between Maldives and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1977-11-29

    The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Maldives and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  19. The Text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 between Sudan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1977-06-10

    The text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 and of the Protocol thereto, between Sudan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 January 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  20. The Text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975 between Swaziland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1975-12-18

    The text of the Agreement of 28 July 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Swaziland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 July 1975, pursuant to Article 24 thereof. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

  2. Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

  3. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [es

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

  6. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

  7. The Text of the Agreement of 6 September 1976 between The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1978-10-15

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  9. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-05-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000.

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-10-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000.

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-10-29

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999.

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-10-29

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date.

  13. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-07-28

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000.

  14. Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

  15. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-09-14

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000.

  17. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-06-20

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000.

  18. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-04-18

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000.

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-10-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000.

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-25

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature