WorldWideScience

Sample records for non-proliferation experiment recorded

  1. The Non-Proliferation Experiment recorded at the Pinedale

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carr, D.B.

    1994-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Experiment was recorded by five different seismic stations operated by Sandia National Laboratories at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility, approximately 7.60 from the Nevada Test Site. Two stations are different versions of the Deployable Seismic Verification System developed by the Department of Energy to provide seismic data to verify compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Vault and borehole versions of the Designated Seismic Stations also recorded the event. The final station is test instrumentation located at depths of 10, 40 and 1200 feet. Although the event is seen clearly at all the stations, there are variations in the raw data due to the different bandwidths and depths of deployment. One Deployable Seismic Verification System has been operating at Pinedale for over three years and in that time recorded 14 nuclear explosions and 4 earthquakes from the Nevada Test Site, along with numerous other western U.S. earthquakes. Several discriminants based on the work by Taylor et al. (1989) have been applied to this data. First the discriminants were tested by comparing the explosions only to the 4 earthquakes located on the Test Site. Only one discriminant, log(L g /P g ), did not show clear separation between the earthquakes and nuclear explosions. When other western U.S. events are included, only the m b vs. M s discriminant separated the events. In all cases where discrimination was possible, the Non-Proliferation Experiment was indistinguishable from a nuclear explosion

  2. Induced shock propagation on the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McKown, T.O.

    1994-01-01

    The Explosive Effects Physics Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments on the NPE (Non-Proliferation Experiment) as part of its effort to define source functions for seismic waves. Beyond the explosive chamber, the detonation induced shock propagated through the saturated tuff of the N-tunnel complex. The CORRTEX (COntinuous Reflectometry for Radius vsw Time EXperiment) system was used to investigate the shock propagation in two drill holes and the access drift. The CORRTEX experiments fielded will be described. The data obtained are reviewed and an apparent asymmetry in the radiating shock is discussed

  3. Explosive performance on the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKown, T.O.

    1994-03-01

    The non-proliferation experiment, originally called the chemical kiloton experiment, was planned and executed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to investigate the seismic yield relationship and distinguishing seismic signals between a nuclear event and a large mass conventional explosion. The Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments to further their studies of the source function for signals observed seismically. Since all investigations were contingent on the performance of the emplaced chemical explosive, an array of diagnostic measurements was fielded in the emplaced explosive. The CORRTEX system was used to investigate the explosive initiation and to determine the detonation velocities in multiple levels and in numerous directions. A description of the CORRTEX experiments fielded, a review of the data obtained and some interpretations of the data are reported.

  4. Experience in non-proliferation verification: The Treaty of Raratonga

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walker, R.A.

    1998-01-01

    The verification provisions of the Treaty of Raratonga are subdivided into two categories: those performed by IAEA and those performed by other entities. A final provision of the Treaty of Raratonga is relevant to IAEA safeguards according to support of the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. The non-IAEA verification process is described as well

  5. Experience of Republic of Macedonia in Providing WMD Non-Proliferation Policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mecinovic, S.

    2007-01-01

    The Republic of Macedonia as a country in transition and as a country which does not posses WMD, has accepted to developed and implemented non-proliferation policy of WMD. First of all, we accepted the definition of WMD as used in international agreements, conventions and protocol and WMD includes nuclear, biological and toxin weapons, agent and precursors. WMD in wide sense includes all toxic chemical substances if they are used as means of attack or if they are the target of attack, all microorganisms and their product, all industrial facilities that use toxic chemicals in their process of production, transport and stockpile if they are a target of military or terrorist attack. For WMD non-proliferation projects to be valid, they must be on the level and carry the weight of international policy and doctrine and involve a most comprehensive sphere of the scientific and professional communities. This is only way to implement the projects in country such is Republic of Macedonia where the public opinion is that WMD are not real security problem because we neither possess nor seek to posses these kinds of weapons. Our WMD non-proliferation policy is tied to control of weapons, agents, precursors, technology and their transfer, market and possibility of use. Because of that we try to control know terrorist organization, groups and individuals. Terrorism caused special concern and attention, particularly when we talk about terrorism with NBC weapons and radiological, chemical and biological warfare agents. Scientific and technological progress led to fact that the instruments for performing terrorism (including WMD) can be produced or procured much easier than before. Rising industry which uses toxic chemicals and microorganisms in the production process created a lot of potential targets for terrorism actions in which they can use be as a target and an executive instrument. The new goal of contemporary treats is safety of life environment, which today includes

  6. Proceedings of the symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE): Results and implications for test ban treaties

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Denny, M.D.; Stull, S.P. [eds.

    1994-12-31

    The large amounts of chemical explosives used worldwide in mining, quarrying, and civil engineering projects presents a challenge for policy makers molding a test ban, since their use could provide the necessary cover for a clandestine nuclear test. The Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) seeks to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical explosion in the same geology. Two chemical explosions were detonated at the Nevada Test Site to compare their signatures with previous nuclear tests. This conference presents results of these tests and discusses implications for test ban treaties. Conference papers are divided into the following sections: Background; Test preparations; EOS and code simulations; Rainier Mesa structure; Ground motion measurements; Non-seismic technologies; On-site inspection technologies; and a panel discussion. Selected papers are indexed separately for inclusion in the Energy Science and Technology Database.

  7. The joint verification experiments as a global non-proliferation exercise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shaner, J.W.

    1998-01-01

    This conference commemorates the 10th anniversary of the second of two Joint Verification Experiments conducted by the Soviet Union and the US. These two experiments, one at the Nevada test site in the US, and the second here at the Semipalatinsk test site were designed to test the verification of a nuclear testing treaty limiting the size underground explosions to 150 kilotons. By building trust and technical respect between the weapons scientists of the two most powerful adversaries, the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) had the unanticipated result of initiating a suite of cooperative projects and programs aimed at reducing the Cold War threats and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

  8. To make a national based historical survey of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Experiences from the example of Sweden

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, T.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: This project was initiated by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and approved by the Agency as a Support Programme Task to increase transparency and support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. A general model of how such a historical survey can be conducted has been worked out in order to serve as help for other countries evaluating their nuclear and nuclear related activities in the framework of the Additional Protocol. The model consists of the following parts: 1. A State's nuclear activities profile since the mid-forties. In this part the task is to analyse the State's civil and military nuclear plans in broad terms, as well as to investigate how these ambitions were carried out in practice. A central ingredient is to map-out how the nuclear energy projects were organised over time; i. e. to pin-point the government authorities, organisations, private companies, universities and research institutions who were involved in the activities and who had the authoritative power at different times since 1945. 2. A description and analysis of the State's role and interactions in the area of international non-proliferation. This part of the model includes a list of the national laws that have regulated the use of nuclear materials since 1945. Are there exceptions in the national jurisdictions that obstruct the international/national inspections to be carried out in practical terms? How have the import and export regulations been designed since 1945? Who are allowed to use sensitive nuclear materials and on what conditions? Another part of the analysis of the State's international policy of non-proliferation includes a description of the international and bilateral agreements that were signed and ratified over the span of the period under consideration. The experiences from the work with the survey of the Swedish nuclear activities show that not all co-operation necessarily went through bilateral (government controlled) agreements

  9. Discrimination between NTS explosions, earthquakes and the non-proliferation experiment at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carr, D.

    1994-09-01

    As the United States moves into an atmosphere of concern about the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries, the focus on monitoring nuclear explosions is changing from looking at specific test sites and yields to looking for tests of large and small yields from anywhere in the world. Discrimination of small events then becomes important and regional seismic monitoring the best method to detect and identify suspicious events. At the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility (PSRF) in Wyoming we have the opportunity to try different regional discriminants with nuclear tests from NTS, western US (W-US) earthquakes and the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). Four discriminants that gave the best results in a study by Taylor et al. were tried: m b :M s , M b :M s h , log(L g /P g ) and spectral ratios. The different discriminants were applied to the data (14 NTS explosions, the NPE, one Department of Defense (DOB) explosion and 34 NWS earthquakes) regardless of signal-to-noise. When the NTS explosions and NPE were only compared to four earthquakes located on or near the Test Site, all the discriminants except log(L g /P g ) worked fairly well at PSRF. When the other WUS earthquakes and DOD explosion are included, only m b :M s shows any promise. Because of frequent physical variations in the earth's crust, regional signals are complex and easily influenced by site and path characteristics. Looking at events from one specific area reduces the effects of the path, which is why three discriminants work well when the data set is restricted to events on or near NTS. The only discriminant not adversely affected from variations in path is m b :M s . This is probably because it is believed that source dimension, source time function and/or source mechanism is the cause for the differences between earthquakes and explosions with this discriminant, rather than any path effects

  10. The non-proliferation experiment and gas sampling as an on-site inspection activity: A progress report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carrigan, C.R.

    1994-03-01

    The Non-proliferation Experiment (NPE) is contributing to the development of gas sampling methods and models that may be incorporated into future on-site inspection (OSI) activities. Surface gas sampling and analysis, motivated by nuclear test containment studies, have already demonstrated the tendency for the gaseous products of an underground nuclear test to flow hundreds of meters to the surface over periods ranging from days to months. Even in the presence of a uniform sinusoidal pressure variation, there will be a net flow of cavity gas toward the surface. To test this barometric pumping effect at Rainier Mesa, gas bottles containing sulfur hexaflouride and 3 He were added to the pre-detonation cavity for the 1 kt chemical explosives test. Pre-detonation measurements of the background levels of both gases were obtained at selected sites on top of the mesa. The background levels of both tracers were found to be at or below mass spectrographic/gas chromatographic sensitivity thresholds in the parts-per-trillion range. Post-detonation, gas chromatographic analyses of samples taken during barometric pressure lows from the sampling sites on the mesa indicate the presence of significant levels (300--600 ppt) of sulfur hexaflouride. However, mass spectrographic analyses of gas samples taken to date do not show the presence of 3 He. To explain these observations, several possibilities are being explored through additional sampling/analysis and numerical modeling. For the NPE, the detonation point was approximately 400 m beneath the surface of Rainier Mesa and the event did not produce significant fracturing or subsidence on the surface of the mesa. Thus, the NPE may ultimately represent an extreme, but useful example for the application and tuning of cavity gas detection techniques

  11. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    DOE's nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities are defined by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). The Department's major responsibilities in this area are to: (1) provide technical assistance to the Department of State in negotiating agreements for civil cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other countries and international organizations; (2) join with other agencies to reach executive branch judgments with respect to the issuance of export licenses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (3) be responsible for processing subsequent arrangements with other agencies as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act; (4) control the distribution of special nuclear materials, components, equipment, and nuclear technology exports; (5) participate in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign governments and organizations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (6) act as a primary technical resource with respect to US participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency

  12. Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manley, I.T.

    1981-01-01

    Proliferation is a problem that can only be solved when the political problems which lead countries to contemplate, the possession of nuclear weapons are solved; in the meantime it can only be managed. Non-proliferation policy has to deal both with the political and the technical aspects of proliferation. It must seek to buy time by addressing the reasons why nations feel the political need to construct nuclear weapons, as well as delaying the moment when such nations feel capable of doing so. The subject is examined and proposals made. (author)

  13. Proceedings of the Symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment: Results and Implications for Test Ban Treaties, Rockville, Maryland, April 19-21, 1994

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Denny, Marvin D

    1994-01-01

    To address a critical verification issue for the current Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and for a possible future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Department of Energy sought to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical test in the same geology, so that other explosions could be identified. This was done in a field experiment code-named the NonProliferation Experiment (NPE).This comprehensive experiment was designed to determine the signatures of chemical explosions for a broad range of phenomena for comparison with those of previous nuclear tests. If significant differences can be measured, then these measures can be used to discriminate between the two types of explosions. In addition, when these differences are understood, large chemical explosions can be used to seismically calibrate regions to discriminate earthquakes from explosions. Toward this end, on-site and off-site measurements of transient phenomena were made, and on-site measurements of residual effects are in progress.Perhaps the most striking result was that the source function for the chemical explosion was identical to that of a nuclear one of about twice the yield. These proceedings provide more detailed results of the experiment.

  14. Non Proliferation of Nuclear

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bambang S Irawan

    2004-01-01

    Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons is the international community's efforts to maintain the security of the world, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear technology and the use of nuclear weapons, promoting cooperation for the use of nuclear peaceful purposes, build mutual trust (Confidence Building Measures) as well as to achieve the ultimate goal of disarmament overall (General and Complete Disarmament). Addressing the post-WTC tragedy, 11 September 2001, the Indonesian government should set up a National Measures (National Action Plan), among others formed the National Security Council and NBC Counter Proliferation Unit, or the National Authority for Nuclear Treaty, preparing national legislation, to prevent the abuse nuclear materials for terrorist acts, prevent Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear materials, developed a National Preparedness and Emergency Response Management in the event of a nuclear accident or attack by the use of nuclear terrorism. Importance of a National Action Plan meant the existence of a national commitment in the context of compliance with treaties and conventions which have been ratified relating to safety, security, safeguards towards a general and complete disarmament, to safeguard national security and maintain peace (safeguards) international

  15. Constructing a large-scale 3D Geologic Model for Analysis of the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Wagoner, J; Myers, S

    2008-04-09

    We have constructed a regional 3D geologic model of the southern Great Basin, in support of a seismic wave propagation investigation of the 1993 Nonproliferation Experiment (NPE) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The model is centered on the NPE and spans longitude -119.5{sup o} to -112.6{sup o} and latitude 34.5{sup o} to 39.8{sup o}; the depth ranges from the topographic surface to 150 km below sea level. The model includes the southern half of Nevada, as well as parts of eastern California, western Utah, and a portion of northwestern Arizona. The upper crust is constrained by both geologic and geophysical studies, while the lower crust and upper mantle are constrained by geophysical studies. The mapped upper crustal geologic units are Quaternary basin fill, Tertiary deposits, pre-Tertiary deposits, intrusive rocks of all ages, and calderas. The lower crust and upper mantle are parameterized with 5 layers, including the Moho. Detailed geologic data, including surface maps, borehole data, and geophysical surveys, were used to define the geology at the NTS. Digital geologic outcrop data were available for both Nevada and Arizona, whereas geologic maps for California and Utah were scanned and hand-digitized. Published gravity data (2km spacing) were used to determine the thickness of the Cenozoic deposits and thus estimate the depth of the basins. The free surface is based on a 10m lateral resolution DEM at the NTS and a 90m lateral resolution DEM elsewhere. Variations in crustal thickness are based on receiver function analysis and a framework compilation of reflection/refraction studies. We used Earthvision (Dynamic Graphics, Inc.) to integrate the geologic and geophysical information into a model of x,y,z,p nodes, where p is a unique integer index value representing the geologic unit. For seismic studies, the geologic units are mapped to specific seismic velocities. The gross geophysical structure of the crust and upper mantle is taken from regional surface

  16. Supporting non proliferation and global security efforts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pochon, E.

    2013-01-01

    CEA contributes as a major actor of France's action against nuclear proliferation and to the strengthening of nuclear security at national level as European and International levels, in particular through the support of the IAEA activities in nuclear non proliferation with the French Support Programme for the IAEA safeguards system and security with the contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and cooperation projects with the European Commission. The CEA is a French government funded technological research organization, organized around 5 branches: Nuclear Energy, Technological Researches, Defence (DAM), Material Sciences and Life Sciences. Within the scope of its activities, CEA covers most of the research areas and techniques in nuclear non-proliferation and security. The CEA is also the advisor of the French Government on nuclear policy. Treaty monitoring and the development and implementation of non proliferation and global security programs is an important mission of DAM which rely on nuclear weapons manufacture and past testing experience. The programmes on non proliferation and global security carried out to fulfil DAM's mission cover the following areas: development of monitoring and detection methods and equipments, country profiles and nuclear stockpiles assessment, arms control instruments, proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycle, monitoring of nuclear tests, operation and maintenance of national detection capabilities and contribution to CTBT verification systems. (A.C.)

  17. Nuclear non proliferation and disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    In the framework of the publication of a document on the ''weapons mastership, disarmament and non proliferation: the french action'', by the ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministry of Defense, the French Documentation organization presents a whole document. This document describes and details the following topics: the conference on the treaty of non proliferation of nuclear weapons, the France, Usa and Non Governmental Organizations position, the threats of the proliferation, the french actions towards the disarmament, the disarmament in the world, a chronology and some bibliographic resources. (A.L.B.)

  18. Future non-proliferation challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yelchenko, Volodymyr

    2008-01-01

    Having chaired the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee Mr. Volodymyr Yelchenko noted that the NPT States parties reaffirmed the important role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. They stressed that non-compliance with the Treaty provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation and placed emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. The universality aspect was brought to the front with the lack of progress in this area. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states, promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring non-proliferation. There is concern that non-States actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. One of the underlying themes at the Second Prepcom was the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation. Negative consequences to nuclear non-proliferation were also mentioned in the context of the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defense systems, with the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the urgent conclusion of such a treaty as a beneficial step towards non-proliferation was stressed. The NPT states parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for

  19. Non proliferation of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Le Guelte, Georges

    2015-10-01

    After having evoked the behaviour of nuclear countries regarding the development of nuclear weapons and uranium procurement, or nuclear programmes after the Second World War until nowadays, the author presents the non proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a construction at the service of super-powers. He comments and discusses the role of the IAEA control system and its evolutions: a control limited to declared installations, an export control with the spectre of plutonium, a control system thwarted by some technological innovations, information systems coming in, and an additional protocol related to the application of guarantees. He comments the evolution of the context from a bipolar world to a world without pole which raises the issue of how to have commitments respected: description of the role and practice of non proliferation during the Cold War, after the Cold War, and in a world without governance

  20. Romania non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biro, Lucian; Grama, Viviana

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Non-proliferation concept in Romania is based on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was ratified in 1970. According to the Article III of the Treaty, Romania ratified in 1972, the Agreement between Romania and IAEA for the application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 2000 Romania ratified the Additional Protocol to contribute through increased transparency, to confidence that no undeclared nuclear activities are concealed within the declared programme or make use of elements of that programme. Under the Additional Protocol Romania understands to increase the transparency of its nuclear activities lengthways fuel cycle. Romania has a strong legal framework to control nuclear material and nuclear activities. The Law 111/1996, republished is the Law on the safe deployment of nuclear activities. CNCAN issued National Regulations for Safeguards and Physical Protection. Prospecting for uranium in Romania was initiated in 1950. Between 1962 and 1978 all the uranium ore production was stockpiled at the mine sites. In 1978 the Feldioara Powder Plant was commissioned, since then both ore stockpiles and ore exploited have been processed to uranium chemical concentrates. The Powder Plant Feldioara was conceived and built following the necessity of milling and processing the uranium ore to UO 2 , in concordance with the national nuclear programme in order to produce electric energy from nuclear fuel. The Nuclear Fuel Plant has capability to manufacture CANDU-6 nuclear fuel. Nuclear Fuel Plant consists of two Production areas, the Quality Assurance and Engineering Departments. There are two Production Departments: Pelleting area including granulation, pressing, sintering, pellet grinding, uranium recycling and Assembling area including components fabrication, beryllium coating, brazing, graphite coating, fuel element and bundle assembly welding. Romania's Strategy for Energy Sector

  1. Non-proliferation and multinational enterprises

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-04-01

    The paper supplements CC/WG.2/9 in presenting the Japanese delegation's contribution in the areas of non-proliferation and multi-national enterprises. The paper questions whether multinational enrichment enterprises would constitute a significant non-proliferation factor, noting that the nature of the venture might create a potential for the dissemination of sensitive information. The paper also argues that a multi-national venture which was not economically competitive (with national facilities) would have questionable viability. The conclusion is that non-proliferation advantages, if any, would be a result, not an objective of such a venture

  2. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

  3. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-05-01

    Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

  4. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

  5. Nuclear arbitration: Interpreting non-proliferation agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tzeng, Peter

    2015-01-01

    At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements. These agreements include, inter alia, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements.1 States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, commentators have proposed various enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The inconvenient truth, however, is that states are generally unwilling to consent to enforcement mechanisms concerning issues as critical to national security as nuclear non-proliferation.3 This article suggests an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem: interpretation mechanisms. Although an interpretation mechanism does not have the teeth of an enforcement mechanism, it can induce compliance by providing an authoritative interpretation of a legal obligation. Interpretation mechanisms would help solve the non-compliance problem because, as this article shows, in many cases of alleged non-compliance with a non-proliferation agreement, the fundamental problem has been the lack of an authoritative interpretation of the agreement, not the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, this article proposes arbitration as the proper interpretation mechanism for non-proliferation agreements. It advocates the establishment of a 'Nuclear Arbitration Centre' as an independent branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommends the gradual introduction of arbitration clauses into the texts of non-proliferation agreements. Section I begins with a discussion of international agreements in general and the importance of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section II then discusses nuclear non-proliferation agreements and their lack of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section III examines seven case studies of alleged non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements in order to show that the main problem in many cases

  6. Israel's position on non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marom, R.

    1986-01-01

    Israel maintained that the complex international system and worldwide political tension created a situation in which comprehensive plans of disarmament could not produce any positive result. The deadlock in the field of general and complete disarmament has brought Israel to the realization that one possible way to alleviate the stalemate could be progress by stages through partial measures of disarmament. Israel's position on non-proliferation indicates that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ), as it relates to the Middle-East, could serve as a credible alternative to the unilateral adherence to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and an effective measure of non-proliferation in the region. (Author)

  7. United States non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1978-01-01

    U.S. non-proliferation policy is aimed at slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, managing the destabilizing effects of nuclear technology for energy purposes, and fostering international standards and institutions to deal responsibly with global nuclear development. These goals assume that nuclear technology has not already precluded social control and recognize the social benefits offered by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Non-proliferation policies recognize that the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is a more-difficult problem than technical ability and will concentrate on reducing those incentives through international agreements and safeguards and by maintaining the separation of commercial nuclear fuel cycles and military uses

  8. Developing a non-proliferation culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joly, J.

    2007-01-01

    Mr. J Joly, the President of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA), said that ESARDA has been actively involved in developing and promoting safeguards for more than 35 years and he is pleased to cooperate with the IAEA and the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management in the organization of this symposium. He proposes the development of a 'non-proliferation culture' as a key principle and defines a non-proliferation culture as the characteristics and attitudes of organizations and individuals that: (i) relate to the protection against the diversion and theft of nuclear material and the provision of information about research and development related to the nuclear fuel cycle; and (ii) receive the attention warranted by their significance. According to him the non-proliferation culture has three universal features: (i) policy commitments at the State level; (ii) the organizational framework and commitments; and (iii) the attitudes and behaviour of the staff members of these organizations. These aspects should be considered as a whole, and they should demonstrate transparency with respect to States' exclusively peaceful nuclear activities and contribute to establishing confidence among States and regions of the world. He concludes that a synergy should be developed between the cultures of nuclear non-proliferation, security and safety. Each of these cultures represents a key principle and, as such, can help to establish confidence among States and regions of the world. To the public, these cultures should represent professionalism, competence and responsibility by all parties involved

  9. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

  10. Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

    1997-01-01

    In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

  11. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2003-01-01

    Although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has enjoyed considerable success, today the regime has never been under greater threat. Three states have challenged the objectives of the NPT, and there is a technology challenge - the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology and know-how. A major issue confronting the international community is, how to deal with a determined proliferator? Despite this gloomy scenario, however, the non-proliferation regime has considerable strengths - many of which can be developed further. The regime comprises complex interacting and mutually reinforcing elements. At its centre is the NPT - with IAEA safeguards as the Treaty's verification mechanism. Important complementary elements include: restraint in the supply and the acquisition of sensitive technologies; multilateral regimes such as the CTBT and proposed FMCT; various regional and bilateral regimes; the range of security and arms control arrangements outside the nuclear area (including other WMD regimes); and the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. Especially important are political incentives and sanctions in support of non-proliferation objectives. This paper outlines some of the key issues facing the non-proliferation regime

  12. Sovereignty and non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimminich, O.

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty seems to violate the fundamental principle of the quality of the states. However, if interpreted in the light of the latest developments of the international law, it is possible to justify the discriminations which it imposes on the non-nuclear states. A crucial point is the implementation of article VI by the nuclear states. If the latter procrastinate in nuclear disarmament the whole NPT-regime will collapse. (orig.) [de

  13. Nuclear non-proliferation: failures and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, R.; Press, R.

    1980-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of combined political and technical attempts to achieve worldwide acceptance of a commitment to non-proliferation, to note failures to date, and to identify essential factors to be satisfied if greater and necessary success is to be achieved in the immediate future. For this it is necessary to separate the realism and unrealism so often involved in discussing the concept of non-proliferation, as defined above, particularly if treated as a moral principle rather than as part of a general security issue reflecting shifts in regional and global stability. The political nature of the non-proliferation problem is underlined by the fact that whereas five nuclear weapon states are currently accepted, any threatened increase in that number is discouraged by every possible peaceful means. This fact combines political acceptance of an existing international situation with a belief that any addition to the present number must lead to international instability. Success in preventing additions may be more readily achieved through political understanding and perhaps some compromises, in particular cases, rather than through seeking a universal solution to a generalized problem

  14. Strengthening the non proliferation regime: French views

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delaune, P.

    2013-01-01

    3 main issues can be identified in the French policy concerning the backing of non proliferation: 1) responding resolutely to proliferation crises, 2) reinforcing substantive efforts to prevent and impede proliferation, and 3) strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The first issue is very important because combating proliferation is vital to the security of all. Concerning the second issue, France attaches particular importance to strengthening specific measures to prevent and check proliferation. Let me mention a few proposals that we put forward: exports need to be controlled more effectively, proliferation activities have to be criminalized, or the development of proliferation-resistant technologies should be supported. Concerning the third issue it means the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, France proposes several means: -) aiming at the universalization of the additional protocol; -) ensuring that the Agency continues to have sufficient human, financial and technical resources to fulfill its verification mission effectively; -) encouraging the IAEA to make full use of the authority available to it; -) enhancing the use of information relevant to the delivery of the IAEA mandate; and -) sharing more accurate information concerning the breaches of commitments that happen. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  15. The Non-Proliferation Treaty increases security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kahiluoto, K.

    1995-01-01

    Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely was a historic decision. The Treaty is the most extensive international agreement on security policy to date; now its obligations have become a permanent part of international justice. Moreover, the NPT represents a political and moral obligation. Through the NPT, the international community has made a permanent commitment to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Increasing pressures will be applied to the few countries still outside the NPT, making it more likely that these countries will eventually change their views. The likelihood of regional bans on nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia, too, will increase. The Treaty promotes the establishment of new nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-free zone in Latin America - the countries covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty - is already very close to its full implementation. Finland is firmly committed to the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT Conference of 1995 was among the first international meetings in which Finland participated, and took an active role, as a Member State of the European Union. (orig.)

  16. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, F.; Hildenbrand, G.; Chari, P.R.; Imai, R.

    1978-01-01

    In a four-part discussion, United States non-proliferation policies are described, followed by responses and reactions from the Federal Republic of Germany, India, and Japan. The provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 are described as having both an internationalist ad a unilateralist approach. Criteria for agreements for cooperation and obtaining export licenses are outlined and the steps for implementation and negotiation are explained. The German author warns that the U.S. may be risking its chance to influence world nuclear trade and recommends more pragmatic and flexible policies to deal with proliferation. The Indian author criticizes the U.S. for not adopting an approach that differentiates between non-nuclear weapon states in terms of their technological capabilities and questions whether it is realistic to pursue inflexible trade policies. The Japanese author commends the U.S. for its moral stance, but criticizes its unilateral approach, which he finds lacking in realism and a sense of history

  17. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

  18. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

  19. The Federal Republic of Germany and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in retrospect and prospect

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haeckel, E.

    1989-01-01

    In view of the renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has to be renegotiated internationally within a few years, the Federal Republic is faced with a double challenge. On the one hand, the West German state is bound to assume a more prominent role in shaping the further development of the international nuclear order. On the other hand, the Federal Republic may find it increasingly difficult to define and uphold its own nuclear interests in a consistent manner both at home and abroad. Any attempt to direct Germany's nuclear outlook towards sustainable policy objectives must start from the fact that for the Federal Republic there is nothing to be gained from isolation but only from within the framework of its international links and obligations. This essay seeks to document the historical evolution of Germany's non-proliferation policy in the international context and to evaluate the record of its experience with the NPT in order to establish criteria for the understanding of future nuclear interests and objectives. It concludes with a plea for the Federal Republic to assume a more active and assertive role in the discharge of its international nuclear responsibilities. (orig./HSCH) [de

  20. Non-proliferation and international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.

    1992-01-01

    Full text: In my view, drastic nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon States could be coupled with universal commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear weapon States by 1995 when the extension of the NPT Will be discussed. The incentives and disincentives for making and stockpiling nuclear weapons are first of all in the political and security fields, (Global and regional detente reduce the incentive, With the cold war gone, the US and Russia are now agreeing on far-reaching cuts in their nuclear arsenals and at some point the other declared nuclear weapon States Will follow.In the regional fields, we have seen how Argentina and Brazil are about to commit themselves to exclusively peaceful uses of the atom through the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty. And we have seen how South Africa has joined the NPT. A new wave of States adhering to the NPT may be expected from countries in the former Soviet Union. Some have already come, others are on the way. Detente in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent would improve the outlook for non-proliferation in these areas. A second barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in export restrictions on sensitive nuclear material and equipment, Following the discoveries in Iraq, these restrictions are being strengthened in a large number of States. A third barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in the economic and political consequences that would follow for a State if IAEA safeguards inspection revealed activities aimed at the production of nuclear weapons. These must have a high degree of reliability. The case of Iraq showed that it was possible for a closed, highly militarized State to hide nuclear activities from the IAEA and the world We are now drawing the lessons from this case. It is not physically possible for inspectors to look into every building and basement in vast countries, They must have information about where to look, and the IAEA is significantly strengthening its information basis. The IAEA has also re

  1. Non-proliferation and safeguards in South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broodryk, Alta

    2001-01-01

    South Africa occupies a unique position in the history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in being the only country with a nuclear weapons capability that was voluntary terminated before acceding to the Treaty. The first nuclear device built was completed in December 1982, five more devices followed at an orderly pace of less than one per year and on 26 February 1990 cabinet officially implemented the termination of its nuclear deterrent capability. The events that flowed from the termination was that South Africa: Acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (10 July 1991); Signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/394, (16 September 1991); Submitted its initial inventory of nuclear material (30 September 1991); and Received first verification team from the Agency (November 1991). South Africa, being dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became a party to various non-proliferation treaties, regimes and groups. The National Non- Proliferation Policy, as published in a Cabinet memorandum, also clearly states this commitment. To comply with the requirements of the Treaty and Agreement the following two acts were published: The Nuclear Energy Act; The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The Minister of Minerals and Energy is the State Authority for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in South Africa, however, the Minister delegated this Authority to NECSA's Safeguards Division. To implement the requirements of the various acts, control regimes and treaties a State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard, was designed. This standard focuses on customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, the demonstration of commitment and the prevention of non-conformity. To comply with the requirements of the standard the following procedures were established and maintained: A Quality Manual; Customer focus; Control of documents; Control of quality records; Internal Audits

  2. Missile non-proliferation: an alternative approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delory, Stephane

    2011-01-01

    In this report, the author first proposes an overview of the notion of missile prohibition. He notices that the association between weapons of mass destruction and missiles is a prelude to the legitimacy of missile control, notably within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime or MTCR. He also comments the notion of total ban. In a second part, the author analyses and discusses the limitations of the control of technology diffusion. He discusses the role of the MTCR, comments the evolution of this regime with the taking of China and Russia into consideration, the impacts of national implementations of export regimes on the MTCR, and economic aspects of control implementation. In the next part, the author addresses other kinds of limitations, i.e. those related with capacity evolutions of proliferating States. The last part addresses the evolution towards a new definition of approach to missile non-proliferation, notably in terms of perception of missile roles and of technology transfer controls

  3. Flaws in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leventhal, P.

    1986-01-01

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nucler Weapons has the twin objectives of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons and ending the nuclear arms race on the one hand, and promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy on the other. In quantitative and symbolic terms the NPT is a huge success. More than two-thirds of the world's nations have signed on, making this the most popular arms control agreement on earth. Not a single nation has declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons state beyond the original five members of the ''nuclear club'' who qualified for weapons status under the terms of the Treaty itself: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. No party to the Treaty has exercised the permitted option to drop out, and none has been found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to have diverted nuclear material from civil to weapons purposes. Nor has any party been known to have violated NPT prohibitions on developing or assisting other nations to develop nuclear weapons

  4. Perspectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koungou, Leon

    2004-01-01

    To join traditional methods and new approaches of 'non-proliferation'. This is a technical method and the best way to fight against 'non-proliferation' which is facing few preoccupations: knowledge's disseminations; technologies; equipments and weapons that should be stopped. As it's important to note the return of nuclear danger as the end of confrontation between west-east which should be reduce. As the adaptation of mechanisms is necessary today, as it is important to react about states' incitations to violate international engagement of non-proliferation. Areas control allows finding out change and evolution, but more insufficient. Functional difficulties show that the IAEA (International Agency of Atomic Energy) does not work good. Safeguard system does not allow to respect 'non-proliferation' engagements; for instance 'junkies states' that they cannot dissuade traditional methods. The fight of 'non-proliferation' shows new progresses with fearing methods of prevention actions and heaviest international controls of exportation. The target of this is very ambitious. This new method is self-successful because it contributes to re-enforce international security when defeating acquisition of nuclear and mass destruction weapons by non-states factors. Therefore non-proliferation regime and especially 'non-proliferation treaty' remains delicate as long as some militaries state such USA will reject their 'non-proliferation' engagement. (author) [fr

  5. Non proliferation 1980 - INFCE and TnP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rainer, R.

    1981-01-01

    The TNP (non-proliferation agreement of nuclear weapons), its non proliferation policy and the peaceful use of fuel cycle are described, as well as the safeguards of IAEA. It is also mentioned the functions of INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation). (A.B.T.) [pt

  6. Twenty years of the Non-proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1990-01-01

    The report assesses the achievements of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and discusses ways in which the non-proliferation regime could be strenghtened. It recommends a series of measures to be taken by the parties of the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, with a view to reinforcing the Treaty and achieving its universality. 198 refs

  7. Non-proliferation aspects of long term assurance of supply

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The meetings in this section deal with the non-proliferation aspects of long-term assurance of supply of the nuclear fuel cycle. A list of 12 fundamental questions concerning the observation and application of the non-proliferation regulations is followed by the comments made by representatives of 10 countries

  8. Kazakhstan nuclear safety and non-proliferation issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhdanova, N.

    2002-01-01

    August 20, 1945. Moscow Kremlin. A meeting of the State Committee on Defense. Here, the decision was taken that the USSR would be a nuclear power. Washington had challenged the USSR by bombarding Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and Moscow accepted. Scientific research in the area of nuclear weapon development by the USA in the early 1940s, and the treat of the USA's monopoly on the possession of these weapons resulted in the creation of a similar weapon in the USSR. In order to test these weapons, the Semipalatinsk test site was created. A number of research experiment were conducted: ground-level, underground, atmospheric atomic explosions. In addition to nuclear weapon testing, other research was carried out, including: environmental impact analysis of radiation; the simulation of large-scale accidents affecting civilian industries; the geological monitoring of nuclear weapon tests in other countries. The activities at the Semipalatinsk test site not only shattered the USA's monopoly on the possession of atomic weapon. The global nuclear weapon balance of power preserved up until the dissolutions of the USSR, despite the entrance of England, France and China into the 'nuclear club'. And at the end of the 20th century, nuclear tests were conducted in India and Pakistan. Currently, Iran, Israel, Iraq and North Korea are close to being technically capable of producing nuclear weapons. The problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has many aspects: from the physical protection of nuclear-critical facilities and fissile materials from terrorist attacks, to the prohibition of the collection and resale of radioactive scrap metals. In connection with disintegration of the USSR, the problem of controlling transfers if fissile and radioactive materials in sovereign Kazakhstan has become particularly acute. Moreover, in the present day, one must give consideration to existence of international terrorism, which could take advantage to atomic weapons or so called 'dirty bombs

  9. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  10. The new US nuclear non-proliferation and export policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Welck, S. von.

    1981-01-01

    The future American nuclear non-proliferation and export policy will be determined chiefly by three elements: (1) Adherence to the former objective of nuclear non-proliferation. (2) A large and varied assortment of old and new tools for implementing this goal. (3) Much more differentiation in applying these tools in the light of the reliability, with respect to non-proliferation policy, of the respective partner. Consequently, it would make little sense for the new Administration to force upon allied industrialized countries, whose nuclear technologies are at the same level as that of the United States, restrictive rules on reprocessing and breeder technology. The new measures designed to curb proliferation are especially meant to destroy motivations that could cause states to own nuclear explosives. This also applies to the removal of economic motivations. (orig.) [de

  11. Non-proliferation and security: synergy and differences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joly, J.

    2013-01-01

    Operators of nuclear facilities put in place both physical and organisational means to meet in a comprehensive way the requirements associated with Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Safety and Security. The common aim is to protect man and the environment from ionising radiation. The approaches for meeting these requirements have real similarities, but also differences which need to be respected in order to develop an appropriate synergy for obtaining the best possible level of safety, security and non-proliferation. This article aims to show the provisions that have been taken with regard to non-proliferation, security and safety which complement and reinforce each other.The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  12. Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pomper, Miles A.

    2010-01-01

    Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

  13. The IAEA and non-proliferation: is quiescence progress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herron, L.W.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current status of more important non-proliferation aspects affecting or involving the IAEA. The questions dealt with cover in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Committee on Assurances of Supply established by the IAEA in 1980 and the International Plutonium Storage Study prepared by an IAEA expert group. The author concludes that in a number of areas involving this Agency, recent considerable activity at both political and technical levels has produced few tangible results althrough the situation is not static. (NEA) [fr

  14. Sustaining non-proliferation in the 1980s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nye, J.S.

    1984-01-01

    The subject is discussed as follows: introduction; the non-proliferation regime - 1950s to 1970s (IAEA safeguards; Non-proliferation Treaty; oil crisis; proposed sale of facilities for producing weapons-usable materials; USA position); the Carter Administration approach; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation); incentives (USA); export legislation (USA); domestic breeder policy (USA); maintaining the regime in the 1980s (safeguards; Pu and highly enriched uranium management; international spent fuel storage; fuel assurances); the problem of priority; rate vs. degree of proliferation; relations among regimes (international regimes); conclusion. (U.K.)

  15. Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Yong Soo

    2009-07-01

    KAERI has jointly worked with Sandia National Laboratories for Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia for the last five years. This project aims at support activities in this joint project between two states. The annual meetings were held during the project period, the 4th one in 2008 and the 5th one in 2009. In addition code comparison between KAERI and SNL's codes for assessing the back-end fuel cycle options was carried out. This project strongly enhances the close tie for the non-proliferation, transparency and safeguards among Korea Japan China Taiwan the United States Russia Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Thailand Vietnam and others for the project period

  16. Prospects of Iran's nuclear development and non-proliferation issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sakanashi, Sachi; Murakami, Tomoko

    2007-01-01

    Iran's nuclear issue might address how nuclear development could be compatible with international non-proliferation framework. This article presented the review on Iran's energy state and nuclear needs to free up oil and gas for export, Iran's interaction with international society, history of Iran's nuclear development and US and IAEA policy on Iran's nuclear issue. Finally future expected attitudes of international society and Iran were discussed in terms of the importance of Iran's resources on energy security in the world and also realization of effective non-proliferation framework. (T. Tanaka)

  17. United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    Science and technology transformed the world in the twentieth century. Living standards improved but warfare was rendered more deadly. Weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical and nuclear - and their means of delivery were developed, as ever more sophisticated conventional armaments were produced and disseminated. The horrors and destruction of armed conflict persist. The need for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training has never been greater. Indeed, changing concepts and perceptions of security and threat magnify the urgency for new thinking to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation goals. More than a decade after the end of the cold war and at the start of the twenty- first century, there is a pressing need to combat ignorance, complacency and a culture of violence. These can be countered through long-term programmes of education and training, especially those related to disarmament and non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with a view to their reduction and complete elimination. At the same time, concern has heightened over the global threat of the excessive and destabilizing proliferation of conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, rendering more acute the need to combat such proliferation in a sustained way through disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Additionally there is a need to raise awareness of new challenges to international security and the process of disarmament. Among them, terrorism, with the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction, is a source of particular concern. Other challenges, such as organized crime, poverty, human rights abuses and environmental concerns must also be taken into account. Education and training remain important but under utilized tools for promoting peace, disarmament and non-proliferation. The present report addresses that issue and proposes ideas for action

  18. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-01

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  19. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-15

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  20. Problems of non-proliferation and nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bueker, H.

    1982-01-01

    The non-nuclear weapons states are allowed to operate sensitive power plants only when they install systems for nuclear materials safeguarding. The Non-Proliferation Treaty in addition to the Atomic-Energy Control Treaty are the basis for this. IAEA and EURATOM have a control-function with inspectors who control the nuclear materials with a view to amount, type, and isotopic composition. (HP) [de

  1. Impasses and mistakes of the nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirst, M.

    1980-01-01

    It is analyzed the limitations for implementing the American Nuclear non-proliferation policy. It is shown the crisis of the North American international relations, with the economic and scientific development of the advanced capitalist nations and some countries of the third world, the penetration of these countries in the world trade commerce of the nuclear industry as sellers and cunsumers, and the Latin American's and Brazil's position in the international panorama of nuclear power. (M.C.K.) [pt

  2. Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshisaki, M.B.

    1993-01-01

    The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

  3. GALILEO NIMS EXPERIMENT DATA RECORDS: JUPITER OPERATIONS

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — NIMS Experiment Data Record (EDR) files contain raw data from the Galileo Orbiter Near-Infrared Mapping Spectrometer (CARLSONETAL1992). This raw data requires...

  4. Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

    2015-01-01

    The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

  5. U.S. - India nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yash Thomas, Mannully

    2008-01-01

    The agreement for cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (referred as 123 agreement) acknowledges a shift in international strategies and relations in both countries. As to India, it marks the end of nuclear isolation resulting from constraint, embargoes and controls and instead opens the path for nuclear commerce. With respect to the United States it entails a major geo strategic ally in the evolving South Asia region and promises large commercial benefits to the US nuclear sector. This is called 'nuclear deal' and constitutes one of the major political, economic and strategic relationship developing between the two countries since 2001. It will lead to the separation of military and civilian nuclear installations in India, the latter to be placed under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It thus, de facto accepts India in the club of nuclear weapon states within the meaning of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) although it is not party to this treaty, refuses adhering to it, officially possesses nuclear weapons and is not subject to a comprehensive system of safeguards. This article will examine the developments which led to the 123 agreement and its subsequent implementation in a wider context of international relations and non proliferation. First, the articles gives a brief introduction into the Indian nuclear programme, the legislative framework and the factors which necessitated nuclear cooperation between India and the United States. Secondly, it will address the implementation of the nuclear deal and subsequent developments. Finally, it will analyse the non proliferation issues related to the implementation of the agreement. (N.C.)

  6. The EU and non proliferation: need for a quantum leap?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kobia, R.

    2008-01-01

    This paper analyses the possibilities of a strategy and all-encompassing European policy that could constitute an efficient and structured system against proliferation. This paper concentrate on actions and developments at the level of the E.U. sensu stricto, i.e. where common actions under the E.U. umbrella are set up and contribute to the efforts in non-proliferation. It does not cover all measures and mechanisms under the 'non-proliferation regime', the integrated and evolving network of unilateral, bilateral, regional, multilateral treaties and other standing-setting arrangements, which collectively provide a framework guiding the behaviour of states, international organisations, enterprises, associations and all non state actors generally active in the nuclear sector. For the purposes of this paper, the 'utilitarian and teleological' prisms are used. The 'utilitarian perspective aims to maximizing the net expectable utility for all parties affected by a decision or action knowing the that traditional utilitarianism favours the options that bring about the best consequences and aims at the 'good'. The teleological approach lies in an interpretation that favours the ultimate goals of any provision and action as well as their spirit, rather than accepting to remain in a more narrow exegetic interpretation that favours the strict letter thereof. (N.C.)

  7. Open Source and Trade Data for Non-Proliferation: Challenges and Opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, I.; Gillard, N.

    2015-01-01

    This paper explores what more systematic exploitation of trade data can contribute to the state evaluation process. The paper begins by setting out a typology of trade data, which groups the data into five categories: · Government Declared Data, which is prepared and submitted by States to an international authority for non-proliferation purposes. · Government Recorded Data, which includes information collected by the state for its own purposes, and which is not routinely submitted to international authorities for non-proliferation purposes. It includes (some) export licencing data, customs data, and business registration information. · Business-held data, which includes information on a company's own products and customers, but also ''market intelligence''. · Intelligence and Enforcement Derived Information, which can include information on specific procurement attempts, networks, or procurement requirements. · Procurement Requirements Information, which can include information released by a programme for the purpose of seeking goods or services. Challenges and opportunities related to further exploitation of trade data sources in each category are then explored, as are factors related to accessibility (both in terms of mandates and more practical considerations), reliability (including presentation of a typology), completeness, and duplication in data. Next, the paper explores how the IAEA can systematically collect, integrate and analyze the various sources of trade data given the considerations outlined above. In particular, this section focuses on how data in variable structures can be integrated into the state evaluation process. In concluding, the paper will describe how the newly formed ''Collaboration on Open Source and Trade Analysis for Non-proliferation'' (COSTA-NP) is seeking to develop each of the categories of trade data. The paper links to research objectives 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 of the IAEA

  8. Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

  9. The future of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siddiqa, A.

    1997-01-01

    Nuclear proliferation in South Asia is currently one of the hot topics in world politics. The concern of the international community, and especially the USA, over this issue is coupled with the fear of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. As a result, Washington has been using its 'stick and carrot' policy to persuade the two countries involved not to develop their nuclear programs for military purposes. However both countries have not only continued to develop their nuclear ambitions, but seem to have achieved vertical nuclear proliferation. This paper examines the future non-proliferation in the South Asian region in the 1990s. This will be achieved by looking at the following: the development of the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan; how these programs have been developed; the reasons for acquiring the capability for non-conventional defence; the real fear in terms of nuclear proliferation in the region; the possible options for dealing with nuclear proliferation in South Asia

  10. Nuclear power and the non-proliferation issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    This leaflet, issued by the British Nuclear Forum on behalf of the industry, seeks first to place the problem of reconciling the need for nuclear power with its possible weapon uses in a historical perspective. Secondly, it describes the technical and political measures which are now taken, and others which could be introduced in order to ensure that nuclear power, which offers the cheapest and safest large-scale energy source for the future, can be made available without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Headings are: introduction; the early years; the IAEA; uranium enrichment; plutonium; secrecy has failed; the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the London Suppliers Group; the situation today; the British position; conclusions. (U.K.)

  11. Editorial: disarmament, non proliferation, confidence-building measures, armament control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soutou, Georges-Henri

    2015-01-01

    After having described the vicious circle existing between disarmament and security as it appeared before and during the first World War, the author deals with the specific case of nuclear disarmament as it was first addressed just after the Second World War, and was then not accepted by the Russians. He comments the political and strategical approach adopted by the Kennedy administration, notably within the context of severe crises (Berlin and Cuba). This resulted in the re-establishment of a relationship between war and policy as defined by Clausewitz, but based on a trilogy of three inseparable pairs: deterrence and armament control, armament control and non proliferation, armament control and confidence-building measures. The author shows that this trilogy has been somehow operating until the end of Cold War, and that nothing works anymore since the end of Cold War and of the bipolar world

  12. Carter faces new dilemmas over non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickson, D.

    1979-01-01

    Questions underlying the current domestic debate as to whether the US should revise its attitude towards the relationship between the spread of nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are considered. Problems arising from the provisional conclusions of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, set up at President Carter's suggestion in 1977, are evaluated. The thorny question of how to deal with the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for review in 1980 is discussed. Finally there is the issue, for which it is concluded nobody pretends to have all the answers, of whether a sufficient consensus - involving both developed and developing countries as partners in decision-making - can be forged to develop and apply an effective control regime, or whether increasing competition between both producers and consumers of nuclear power will be such as to limit the possibilities for multilateral action, shifting the focus back to bilateral actions. (UK)

  13. Future of US utilities under non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ladesich, J.N.

    1978-01-01

    The non-proliferation policy, a negative policy that closes the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, is only a small part of a chaotic energy environment characterized by inaction. The impact of this environment on California utilities has resulted in a virtual moratorium on new facilities at a time when the nuclear option can be shown to be vital. Utilities are experiencing uncertainties in future power generation because alternatives to nuclear energy may not be the best choices. Utilities feel frustrated by the inaction; not by the objectives of the accountability and security proposals. The utilities will continue to support nuclear power and the completion of the fuel cycle in spite of these uncertainties

  14. JAEA's actions and contributions to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Michiji, Toshiro

    2012-06-01

    Japan, a non-nuclear weapons state, has established a commercial nuclear fuel cycle including LWRs, and now is developing a fast neutron reactor fuel cycle as part of the next generation nuclear energy system, with commercial operation targeted for 2050. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is the independent administrative agency for conducting comprehensive nuclear R&D in Japan after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA and its predecessors have extensive experience in R&D, facility operations, and safeguards development and implementation for new types of nuclear facilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the operator of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities and numerous nuclear materials, JAEA makes international contributions to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. This paper provides an overview of JAEA's development of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards technologies, including remote monitoring of nuclear facilities, environmental sample analysis methods and new efforts since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

  15. Academic perspectives on the non-proliferation problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gummett, P.

    1984-01-01

    The USA has demonstrated a greater penchant for a technical focus aimed at denial than any other state, despite a brief interlude under President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger when it displayed a total lack of concern about proliferation. This terminated with the sudden reawakening of interest following the Indian explosion and the announcement that the USA was not prepared to accept additional requests for uranium-enrichment services. According to Brenner, this enrichment crisis was engineered as a deliberate act of policy: yet this act of policy was unrelated to non-proliferation objectives. Rather, the Nixon administration's interest in privatisation in general, and commercialisation of enriched-uranium supply in particular, had led to a bureaucratic battle between the domestic side of the White House, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). This battle was totally unrelated to foreign policy: a situation not without precedent in this area. Nixon's Republican administration deliberately provoked a supply bottleneck by changing the terms of AEC supply contracts, with the intention of forcing the Democrat-dominated JCAE to agree to the entry of private industry into the uranium-enrichment business. The outcome was more dramatic than had been intended

  16. The world's non-proliferation regime in time

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, George

    2005-01-01

    The idea for a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries was supported unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 1961. The NPT permits the P-5 to have nuclear weapons. All other NPT signatories are 'non-nuclear-weapon States' who are prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons. To gain their signatures, the NPT promises assistance to them in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and negotiations toward nuclear disarmament. Besides the P-5, the treaty now has 184 countries that have promised not to have nuclear weapons and that have agreed to accept inspections by the IAEA to verify that they are carrying out their promises. However, India, Pakistan, and Israel refused to join the treaty, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) withdrew from it. Of these four countries, only India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons. Israel and North Korea are assumed to have them. The non-proliferation regime today includes much more than the NPT. The IAEA standards for inspection were the next most important element. The IAEA inspection requirements negotiated in the early 1970s were shown to be inadequate by Iraq's success in hiding its nuclear-weapon efforts before and during the Gulf War of 1991. The Additional Protocol of 1997 is slowly replacing these requirements, but, as of December 2004, was in effect in only 62 NPT member countries. The regime includes the agreements creating nuclear-weapon free zones in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Mongolia. The countries that formed these zones are also members of the NPT. The regime includes suggestions for standards and financial assistance plus requirements for physical protection of nuclear material from theft by terrorists or others. These efforts range from the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, to the technical assistance provided by the IAEA and some countries, to the financial assistance offered by the G-8 and some other IAEA

  17. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Northeast Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han Yong-Sup

    1995-01-01

    This paper attempted to find out ways to facilitate bilateral and regional arms control regarding nuclear issues in Northeast Asia. This is done in order to reduce uncertainties regarding nuclear policy and capabilities of those countries, and thus to enhance transparency and confidence in the region. In order to bring them into the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process in an effective way, we revisited the issues that contributed to the acceleration of the arms race. The review provided insights into the future course of China, the two Koreas and Japan regarding their nuclear policy and capabilities. The findings of this study indicate a general likelihood of resistance to outside request for arms control and disarmament in the countries in Northeast Asia. Besides their continuation with the conventional arms race, countries in Northeast Asia are reluctant to go ahead with the programmes to enhance transparency, build confidence in the region, and to forgo intentions to go nuclear. China is slowly but steadily increasing its nuclear arsenals. Its nuclear arms control policy is not well integrated with nuclear policy and strategy, and it is subject to the overarching goal of nuclear policy and strategy to advance China's status and national security interests in the international community. Thus, it will be very difficult for other countries to bring China to the arms control process for the time being. North Korea has intended to develop nuclear weapons in order to hedge against uncertainties. This poses a threat to the NPT regime and the peace and security of Northeast Asia. Clearly, North Korea has shown its reluctance to disclose the entirety of its nuclear programme under the IAEA inspections. Although South Korea has taken a bold initiative to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, it has still not fully paid off. Japan adds the problem of plutonium surplus to the uncertain security environments surrounding Northeast Asia

  18. IAEA Director General calls for rededication to nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Speaking at the opening session of the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in New York on April 24, 2000, the Director General of the IAEA urged all nations to commit themselves unequivocally to the basic tenets of the non-proliferation regime

  19. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    Science.gov (United States)

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  20. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grand, C.

    2001-01-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  1. Humble Expectations (on Non-proliferation and Disarmament)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persbo, Andreas

    2014-04-01

    institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Disarmament cannot be verified without a strong safeguards system. The principal function of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Over its lifetime, the treaty has been fairly successful in dissuading further nations from acquiring arms. One can be cautiously optimistic about the future. While the situation in North Korea continues to be a headache, discussions with Iran look promising. It would be unrealistic to think that Iran will give up all its fuel cycle ambitions, but the present talks contains the embryo of a deal that may help make those ambitions less threatening to Iran's neighbours and strategic rivals, hence promoting regional stability. If nothing else, a carefully monitored nuclear programme in Iran - limited in its scope - will make it more costly and more time consuming for the country to develop weapons. The centre is holding. There are few indications at present that we will see many more new entrants in the nuclear weapons club. With continual improvements to safeguards - the continued uptake of the IAEA Additional Protocol in particular - we are likely to enter an era where cheating becomes more difficult, and more costly. (author)

  2. Statement at Inauguration Ceremony for Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 25 February 2011, Vienna, Austria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Y.

    2011-01-01

    I was a member of the Group of Governmental Experts which drafted the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non proliferation Education in 2002. In my new role at the IAEA, I continue to attach great importance to education. I believe it is vital that we educate the people of the world about how devastating nuclear weapons are and build awareness of the importance of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I have no doubt that the new Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation will make an important contribution in this area. The recent conclusion of the new START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States was a welcome development in the nuclear disarmament field. Reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons is a positive step towards a safe and peaceful world free of nuclear weapons which can impact positively on nuclear non-proliferation efforts. But, of course, further steps are needed. Disarmament and non-proliferation education have an essential role to play in maintaining and strengthening the momentum towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The IAEA has for decades been actively involved in promoting nuclear non-proliferation education. My colleagues and I speak about nuclear non-proliferation throughout the world. We organize briefings here in Vienna for members of parliament, government officials, think tanks, academics and other groups. We host educational seminars for NGOs, diplomats and journalists on the Agency's non-proliferation activities - the latest one was held this week. The IAEA also provides opportunities for on-the-job training and work experience to students and young professionals. Indeed, several Monterey Institute graduates are currently working with us. This is an excellent example of how disarmament and non-proliferation education can contribute to promoting international peace and security. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States took place during my time with Monterey in

  3. 2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

    1998-01-01

    On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session 'History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem' and three sections: 1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests'; 2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex'; 3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences'

  4. Non-Proliferation, the IAEA Safeguards System, and the importance of nuclear material measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stevens, Rebecca S. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-09-18

    The objective of this project is to explain the contribution of nuclear material measurements to the system of international verification of State declarations and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  5. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2004-01-01

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards

  6. The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biad, A.

    1996-01-01

    This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC)

  7. Composition and Recorders: A Motivating Experience

    Science.gov (United States)

    Birnie, Rebecca A.

    2014-01-01

    Composition with students on the elementary level sparks imagination and creativity while engaging students in an experience that can demonstrate personal musical growth. Traditionally, music educators have not been taught how to compose music, let alone lead their students in composing experiences. As music educators take the beginning steps of…

  8. Nuclear non-proliferation and security culture within EDF nuclear fleet

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Debes, M.

    2013-01-01

    This document describes the nuclear non-proliferation strategy and the safety culture of EDF. The author lists all the mandatory rules and regulations at international and national levels EDF has to comply with. All these requirements are applied in EDF nuclear facilities through adequate procedures that assure a nuclear material accountancy, a follow-up of any item containing nuclear material in the facility, and internal controls. External independent controls are also performed. The EDF security policy goal is to protect human, material and knowledge assets, and to preserve operational capacity, competitiveness and public confidence, within national regulatory framework and regulation on 'vital importance facilities'. The treatment of events or incident (detection, analysis, lessons drawn, experience feedback) is a tool to progress, along with reporting, internal control process and audits. The security requirements cover the different related domains important to EDF industrial assets: security of employees against assaults; security of data according to their sensibility level; security of the information system and telecom; awareness and training of employees; relations with external suppliers or contractors; business premises; security of staff and projects abroad. For industrial facilities and grids (facilities of 'vital importance'...), the defense in depth principles are applied against the different threat scenarios. Security measures are studied at the design stage in a consistent way with nuclear safety measures, while taking into account the protective means deployed by public authorities. These risk analysis are periodically reassessed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  9. Safeguards and non-proliferation: current challenges and the implications for Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leask, A.; Carlson, J.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: The expansion of nuclear programs raises the issue of how to ensure this does not increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. The non-proliferation regime - based on the NPT and its verification mechanism, the IAEA safeguards system - has been developed to provide assurance that nuclear programs are exclusively peaceful. Although to date the non-proliferation regime has been remarkably successful, in recent years it has come under serious challenge. Nuclear proliferation is emerging as one of the major issues facing the international community. Addressing technical and institutional aspects of the non-proliferation regime - especially safeguards, but also complementary measures such as export controls, proliferation-resistant technology, and an international framework on sensitive technology - is important. But proliferation is a political problem, and ultimately the success of the non-proliferation regime depends on political resolve to uphold compliance, using incentives and if necessary sanctions. These issues are vitally important to Australia's future. Being a major uranium supplier has strengthened Australia's influence in non-proliferation and safeguards developments

  10. The nuclear non-proliferation regime: What it is and how it has evolved

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Priest, J.

    1999-01-01

    The nuclear non-proliferation regime commonly denotes the legal norms, voluntary undertakings and policies which the international community has developed to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. The word 'regime' suggests a legally binding order. Some components of the non-proliferation regime are indeed legally binding. Others represent essentially political rather than legal commitments. This lecture describes the various independent but mutually reinforcing components of the non-proliferation regime. It thus touches on and highlights the particular importance of political incentives - or disincentives - to the acquisition of nuclear weapons; legal undertakings in which non-proliferation commitments are anchored; verification (specifically the IAEA Safeguards System); compliance and enforcement; export controls; physical protection measures; regional nuclear non-proliferation initiatives; and measures taken to curb proliferation in general and to strive for arms control and nuclear disarmament. The purpose of the lecture is to provide an over-arching, tour d'horizon for the more specific and detailed lectures which follow. (author)

  11. Nuclear fuel cycle industry. A responsible approach supporting non proliferation efforts in global perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jorant, Caroline

    2005-01-01

    This paper presents the reasons why and the manner in which nuclear industry is a stakeholder in non proliferation efforts. It then presents some recent proposals on multinational approaches to the fuel cycle industry and offers some comments and an industry view on these issues. A parallel is established with fundamental concepts in the field of radiation protection. Our industry, involved in 'nuclear technology development' (activities) qualified of 'sensitive' from a non proliferation standpoint, has major interests at stake in the evolution of the international non proliferation regime and is genuinely committed to the spreading of a non proliferation culture. The international community and in particular the nuclear community have been recently reflecting on ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in reaction to new threats or the perception thereof. Multilateral approaches regarding the nuclear fuel cycle are being discussed or proposed in this regard. Our approach as an industrial may be illustrated using the three basic principles developed in the field of radiation protection, namely limitation, justification and optimization. a) an overall limitation of sensitive facilities worldwide may be judicious, b) however no prohibition should be imposed if justified needs can be demonstrated on objective criteria, c) optimized used for existing facilities should be promoted through strengthened guarantees of supply where it may be necessary. (author)

  12. Conventionalization of nuclear energy and the change in non-proliferation politics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nerlich, U.

    1975-01-01

    A crisis in the non-proliferation politics. The author gives an outline of the configuration of the nuclear policies up to the sixties and of the transition from the non-proliferation treaty to the oil crisis, and portrays the new nuclear policies by illustrating the changed role of nuclear energy in the western industrial countries, the policies of exporting nuclear power plants (e.g. Iran and Egypt) and then introduces four new proliferation models: the economic (Egypt) and the diplomatic (Iran) model, the reprisal model (Israel and South Africa) and the political model (India, Brasil, Argentine). (HP/LN) [de

  13. Status and prospect of non-proliferation activities of ISTC and STCU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richard, M.; Daoust Maleval, D.; Louvet, P.

    2009-01-01

    This article examines the role of the International Science and Technology Centre of Moscow (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine in Kiev (STCU) in preventing proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expertise and know-how of scientists and engineers from the Former Soviet Union countries. The Centres were created in the first half of the nineties, in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This collapse raised very serious concerns: over the risk of former WMD scientists and engineers being recruited by States of concern or terrorist groups that wished to develop their own WMD capabilities and means of delivery; and the possibility that scientists and engineers would be driven to sell their knowledge, know-how or equipment in order to survive. Since the Centres' inception, the regional and international context has changed dramatically at both economic and strategic levels, in particular regarding non-proliferation and global security. Changes of a political and strategic nature in the former Soviet Union required the European Union to review its relationship with Russia, to reassess the importance of Central Asian Countries and the future of Ukraine as it is pulled between Russia and Europe. The Centres have had to adapt to these changes. The article draws from an evaluation of the Centres' non-proliferation activities, carried out by the authors between November 2006 and September 2007 at the request of the European Commission. Moreover, since completion of the mission, many events, important for the strategic relationships between E U, Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries occurred as the affirmation of Russia's regional leadership: its rearmament along with the stiffening of its relationships with western countries and some neighbours and closure to visitors; the Georgia-Russia conflict; and the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis. As CIS countries are more affected by the current economical crisis

  14. NIMS EXPERIMENT DATA RECORDS: SL-9 COMET IMPACT WITH JUPITER

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — NIMS Experiment Data Record (EDR) files contain raw data from the Galileo Orbiter Near-Infrared Mapping Spectrometer (CARLSONETAL1992). This raw data requires...

  15. NIMS EXPERIMENT DATA RECORDS: GASPRA/IDA ENCOUNTERS

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — NIMS Experiment Data Record (EDR) files contain raw data from the Galileo Orbiter Near-Infrared Mapping Spectrometer (CARLSONETAL1992). This raw data requires...

  16. Back-end of the fuel cycle and non-proliferation strategies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chebeskov, A.N.; Oussanov, V.I.; Iougai, S.V.; Pshakin, G.M.

    2001-01-01

    The paper focuses on the problem of fissile materials proliferation risk estimation. Some methodological approaches to the solution of this task and results of their application for comparison of different nuclear fuel cycle strategies are discussed. The results of comparative assessment of non-proliferation aspects of plutonium utilization alternatives in Russia using system analysis approach are presented. (author)

  17. New trends of activity on supporting of non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Issaeva, G.M.; Tyupkina, O.G.

    2002-01-01

    Taking into account the necessity of all possible strengthening of non-proliferation regimes Kazakhstan participates in a number of agreements and associations: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Supplier Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Conference on Disarmament, etc. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) greatly influenced on the development on non-proliferation regime in Kazakhstan. During initial stage of CTR activity (1993-1995) military projects prevailed. Later (1995-1997) the projects on liquidation of infrastructure for nuclear and bio- weapons were successfully realized. Last years, since 1999, the attention was shifted towards proliferation prevention of hazardous nuclear and biological materials. Recent terrorist acts and world community activity on global safety strengthening underline an urgency of quite new problems that entirely applied to Kazakhstan: monitoring of hazardous materials; enhancement of safety systems of 'risky' facilities and technologies; creation and/or upgrading of safety systems for industry infrastructure. The proposals of these new trends of non-proliferation have been developed. Development of physical protection system for oil and gas industry infrastructure of Kazakhstan based on safety concepts of nuclear facilities; Evaluation of radionuclide contamination and safety of oil and gas facilities of the Caspian region; Counteraction to nuclear materials proliferation; Cooperative approaches in preventing/reducing of illicit trafficking and use of WMD-related explosive materials. Implementation of the project would make of substantial contribution to successful solution of either regional or global safety problem

  18. The problem of the international balance of power and the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herrmann, R.S.W.

    1973-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty is a product of specific developments in the cold war; therefore, only if regarded from a very limited point of view, its problems are of an international or technical nature. The problem of the Non-Proliferation Treaty lies thus in the nature of antagonistic relations which determine the relationship between the USA and the UdSSR most specifically, the same as with the relationship between the states in a regional crisis. To the same extent to which the Non-Proliferation Treaty ought to limit the regulations of this strategic equilibrium (and the provision of these regulations) to the nuclear powers - and strictly speaking only to the two global antagonists - has this Treaty itself become the driving power for the proliferation of regulated deterrence mechanisms; in other words, the Non-Proliferation Treaty controls the political effectiveness of nuclearization potentials without interpreting this effectiveness itself. As a matter of fact, the problem of the regional status quo outside the alliance relations, seems to have become also a problem of nuclear deterrence. (orig./LN) [de

  19. The control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear development - present uncertainties

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Machado de Faria, N.G.; Amaral Barros, E.

    1983-01-01

    This report gives the views of Brazilian lawyers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It deals with the present situation and future prospects concerning the uses of nuclear energy. In particular, it proposes the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  20. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: speech of the president Obama at Prague

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, B.

    2009-01-01

    Introduced by the Prague speech of april 7 2009, the Obama President program towards the non proliferation and the nuclear disarmament was pointed out by its optimism ambition and determination. But a more detailed lecture shows concurrent positions. The author analyzes the political aspects of the President speech. (A.L.B.)

  1. The crisis bears the chance. The nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-01-01

    The contribution on the nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime covers the following topics: Iran and the verification of non-nuclear -weapon states, the system of nuclear safeguards, the application of new verification instruments, verification of possible military research and development activities, the limitation of proliferation relevant activities, delivery guarantees as mean for non-proliferation, Iran and the handling of contract violations, graded reactions, political issues, problems of harmonization, capacity and process deficiencies, before the ninth non-proliferation verification conference, approaches for strengthening the non-proliferation regime, recommendation to the German politics.

  2. Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirsaidov, U.M.

    2010-01-01

    This article is devoted to issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan. Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction arouse serious concern of world community. Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the weapons of mass destruction distributions become the subject of high concern. Besides, during the end of 'cold war', regional conflicts, collapse of Soviet Union, as well as access to sensitive technologies considerably increase the danger of weapons of mass destruction distribution. More than 10 countries have active programs, relating to weapons of mass destruction and, possibly, more than ten countries have potential to start implementing such kinds of programs. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution. After 11 September events, the risk of such weapons of mass destruction components use by such forces for Governments blackmail become real scene, which, despite of low possibility of this threat implementation, could have very serious and disastrous consequences. International community responded to these problems and challenges, basically through the following actions, which is detailed regime development of multilateral international treaties, directed to weapons of mass destruction distribution prevention. Non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, Convention on prohibition of chemical weapons and Convention on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons are some of them. As it is known, Tajikistan signed all these treaties. For different reasons these treaties were subject of serious tests. Nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 year, actual Israel status as state having nuclear weapon and North Korean

  3. The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Fifteen years after entry into force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    The need to halt a wider spread of nuclear weapons grew out of the realization that the increase in the number of countries possessing such weapons would increase the threat to world security. As the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons clearly states in its preamble, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty - also known as the non-proliferation Treaty - was concluded in 1968, at a time when there were already five nuclear-weapon Powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. This fact sheet is intended to provide background material on the Treaty, including the events that led to its conclusion, an overview of its provisions and the developments at the two previously held Review Conferences

  4. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [es

  5. The non-proliferation regime, vertical proliferation and the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, W.

    1988-12-01

    The disarmament orientation of the NPT, which stands beside the central aim of avoiding horizontal proliferation, raises a question: Does a compatibility exist between the non-proliferation policy of the Federal Republic and its security policy, which has its basic pillar in the nuclear deterrence strategy? Critics of this deterrence policy therefore, hinting to the disarmament determination of the NPT, demand that the Federal Republic should exercise its influence for the conclusion of a 'Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty' (CTBT), the establishment of a 'Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones' (NWFZ) in Europe, a 'No First Use'-Treaty (NFU) and finally the abolishment of all atomic weapons ('Zero Solution'). According to them such disarmament 'remedies' can reestablish or assure the waning or damaged international consensus for horizontal non-proliferation. This is a contribution for the establishment of a stable world order and will smooth the way for a prolongation of the NPT in the year 1995. An analysis of the history and the structure of interests shows that the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is deeply rooted in the NPT and that a prolongation of the treaty and its own membership is a substantial object of the foreign and security policy. Consequently the Federal Republic has to face the demands for an intensification of 'anti-nuclear measures' and has to examine their acceptability and their usefulness with respect to non-proliferation. The structure of the problem encloses the following aspects: The security conception of the Federal Republic with its military-strategic essence; the provisions in article VI NPT for negotiations with the object of a world free of atomic weapons; the derived disarmament 'remedies' for strengthening the consensus for horizontal non-proliferation and, finally, the real interface between horizontal and vertical proliferation. (orig./DG) [de

  6. The Non-Proliferation Treaty on the threshold to the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, W.

    1991-06-01

    The basic outlines of non-proliferation policy, its instruments, the position of the protagonists' interests and the fundamental fields of conflict are to the fore. The history and structure of international non-poliferation policy and, in particular, of the NPT, are described, the instruments for verifying the purely peaceful use of nuclear power (safeguards) are analysed, and important future technological and political challenges of the Treaty are listed. (orig./HP) [de

  7. Nuclear export policy and regulation for non-proliferation: Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boulanger, Werner.

    1978-01-01

    The nuclear export policy of the Federal Republic of Germany complies with the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Already in 1967 the Federal Government stated in a Peace Note that no export was authorised to countries (outside Euratom) which did not comply with the IAEA Safeguards. In the bilateral agreement the Federal Republic signed with Brasil in 1975, emphasis was put on international safeguards and the control exercised on exported materials to avoid any diversion for military purposes. (NEA) [fr

  8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-04-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  9. Briefing Book. Volume 1: The Evolution of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (Fourth Edition).

    Science.gov (United States)

    1998-01-01

    OPANAL) Spanish title: Organismo para la Proscription de las Armas Nucleares en la America Latina . Created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco ’to ensure... INTERNET DOCUMENT INFORMATION FORM A . Report Title: Briefing Book V1: The Evolution of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime(Fourth Edition) B...DATE Report Downloaded From the Internet 5/27/98 Report’s Point of Contact: (Name, Organization, Address, Office Symbol, & Ph #): Secretary of

  10. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: A status report. Vienna, 14 March 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    For more than half a century, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. Further meaningful progress towards a nuclear weapon free world will demand that we re-examine our fundamental concept of what security means and how it can best be achieved. The following specific areas where our attention should be focused are discussed briefly: the historical perspective, current strategies for non-proliferation and disarmament, and the future prospects

  11. Non-proliferation and security of nuclear supply (the viewpoint of a developing country)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alonso, G.; Tervino Botti, J.J.; Gonzalez Diaz, G.

    1981-10-01

    After discussing the economic, technical and political reasons underlying the slowdown in nuclear development, this paper describes the resulting problems encountered by the nuclear industry. To remedy the situation, the author suggests that in addition to measures to be adopted nationally to ensure more efficient and safer operation of nuclear installations, actions at international level should be implemented to remove obstacles to nuclear trade, bearing in mind the primary importance of non-proliferation. (NEA) [fr

  12. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [ru

  13. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  14. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-10-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  15. Nuclear non-proliferation: Revisiting the basics. Carnegie international non-proliferation conference 2002. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort - and despite recent challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But the international community has to move forward, it is essential that a number of the basic assumptions should be revisited, and a number of new approaches reconsidered. A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually disappear. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has overall been successful - but with some shortcomings. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force - and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the 'unequivocal undertaking' by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament - such as 'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further 'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,' 'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT - left without concrete follow-up actions and in

  16. Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chrzanowski, P.L.

    1993-01-01

    About 30 specialists in non-proliferation participated in a workshop to explore ideas for US Government preparatory steps leading to the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. To that end, workshop sessions were devoted to reviewing the lessons learned from previous Review Conferences, discussing the threats to the non-proliferation regime together with ways of preserving and strengthening it, and examining the management of international nuclear commerce. A fundamental premise shared by workshop participants was that extension of the NPT is immensely important to international security. The importance of stemming proliferation and, more specifically, extending the Treaty, is growing as a result of the significant changes in the world. If the conferees of the Extension Conference decide on no extension or extension for a short limited duration, some technically advanced states that have foregone development of nuclear weapons may begin to rethink their options. Also, other arms control measures, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could start to unravel. The US must provide strong international leadership to ensure that the Extension Conference is a success, resulting in Treaty extension, perhaps through successive terms, into the indefinite future. Workshop participants were struck by the urgent need for the US to take organizational steps so that it is highly effective in its advance preparations for the Extension Conference. Moreover, the Extension Conference provides both a challenge and an opportunity to mold a cohesive set of US policy actions to define the future role of nuclear weapons and combat their proliferation

  17. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

  18. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite; Wredberg, L.

    2000-06-01

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  19. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant Ltd., Vienna (Austria)

    2000-06-15

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  20. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Finland''s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  1. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Finland``s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  2. The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995); Le regime international de non-proliferation nucleaire a la veille de la conference de revision du TNP (1995)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Biad, A.

    1996-10-01

    This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC).

  3. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden``s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives. Refs.

  4. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden''s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives

  5. The non-proliferation policies of non-nuclear-weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marwah, Onkar

    1987-01-01

    Eight countries are considered to be capable of producing nuclear weapons and highly suspect in their intentions to actually produce them. These are Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The policies of these suspect Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) are considered in this paper. The first part assesses the non-proliferation (or proliferation) policies of the eight suspect NNWS, the second part evaluates their differences in approach from the policies urged upon them by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and the third and final part attempts to understand the future evolution of NNWS policies in the nuclear military field. (U.K.)

  6. Putting teeth in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 25 March 2006, Karlsruhe, Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2006-01-01

    The factors, contributing to the world's changes in respect to peace, security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are presented in the document. Five necessary and urgent measures are proposed in order to meet the current challenges: 1)tighten control for assess to nuclear fuel cycle technology; 2)accelerate global efforts tp protect nuclear material; 3)support effective nuclear verification; 4) reinvigorate disarmament efforts; 5) increase the effectiveness of the UN Security Council. The importance and necessity to place nuclear operations under multinational control is outlined

  7. A study on the development of nuclear policy to respond to international non-proliferation regimes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, K. B.; Yang, M. H.; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Jung, W. H.; Lim, C. Y

    2006-01-15

    This study analyzed the trends of the nonproliferation regimes in the following three aspects. First, this study analyzed the trends of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which includes the NPT, the IAEA safeguards system, the international nuclear export control regime and multilateral nuclear approach. Second, this study forecast the future trends of the nonproliferation systems with the reflection of current international situations. Third, this study also analyzed outstanding issues in nuclear control regimes and derived some factors to reflect national nuclear foreign policy.

  8. Nuclear Non-proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 - No 8 of 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Act aims at giving domestic legislative effect to Australia's international non-proliferation obligations and establishes controls over the possession and transport of nuclear materials and equipment by a system of permits. These obligations arise inter alia under the NPT Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Act provides that its provisions shall apply to nuclear material (as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute) and associated items which include associated material, equipment or technology. These are clearly defined in the Act. (NEA) [fr

  9. Statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-08-01

    The document reproduces the following statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, statements on behalf of the depository Governments and statements on behalf of other Governments (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Western Samoa and Nordic Countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)

  10. Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.; Mahy, Heidi A.

    2008-01-01

    The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, that provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.

  11. Nuclear non proliferation. Challenges after the NPT extension - CERI Studies Nr 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delpech, Therese

    1996-01-01

    After the decision of extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995, the author first discusses strengths and weaknesses of the non proliferation regime. On the one side, the five nuclear powers are tight by international commitments, the number of proliferating countries has not increased, some countries have willingly decided to give up their military nuclear programme, ex-USSR republics have joined the NPT, the Israel-PLO agreement of 1993 initiated a new era, potentially proliferating countries do not have very significant nuclear programmes, shortcomings of international controls have been identified, international cooperation has improved, and control techniques are available. On the other hand, some matters of concern remain: lessons from the Gulf War, an apparently easier access to nuclear weapons, new opportunities of regional domination, a weaker American guarantee, the North-Korean problem, new exporters of nuclear and ballistic goods and technologies. In the next part, the author discusses the conditions of the agreement for an undefined extension of the NPT, and notably outlines what made this success possible. Then, she addresses political issues related to the universal character of the NPT and to nuclear disarmament. She also discusses the responsibility of the Five nuclear powers, the role of nuclear weapons, and the implication of the extension of the Treaty for the European Union

  12. Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.; Mahy, Heidi A.

    2008-09-01

    The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, that provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.

  13. Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

    2013-01-01

    The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  14. Consideration on non-proliferation regime meeting in a changing world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, Hiroyoshi; Kikuchi, Masahiro

    1995-01-01

    This paper presents some proposals for improvement of non-proliferation regime including safeguards structures with historical changes of international regime. Current non-proliferation regime was established under the circumstances of Cold War, and it's structure and measures were influenced by the situation of these time. Although, a couple of years have passed from end of Cold War, new world order has not established yet. Therefore, it is expected that the current regime could be improved in accordance with new world order. Generally speaking, it could be welcomed that the current regime has got some successes from two points of views, namely no new nuclear weapon states have emerged and after the establishment of NPT and all nuclear weapon state is joined NPT finally. However, it is the authors' concern that some gray countries, such as India, Pakistan and Israel, have not joined the NPT yet and cases of Iraqi and DPRK have occurred. After reviewing of such new situation, some proposals will be presented in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime to meet current world conditions

  15. Report of the international forum on nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2013-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security - Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia-' on 12 and 13 December 2012, co-hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo. In the forum, keynote speakers from Japan, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S., France and Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. In two panel discussions, entitled 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle back end' and 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for nuclear energy use in the Asian region and a multilateral cooperative framework', active discussions were made among panelists from Japan, IAEA, the U.S., France, ROK, Russia and Kazakhstan. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report except presentation materials. (author)

  16. Environmental measurements and technology for non-proliferation objectives. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broadway, J.A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to identify multi-disciplinary and single focus laboratories from the environmental and public health communities that can serve as technical center of opportunity for nuclear, inorganic and organic analyses. The objectives of the Office of Research and Development effort are twofold: (1) to identify the technology shortcomings and technologies gaps (thus requirements) within these communities that could benefit from state-of-the-art infield analysis technologies currently under development and (2) to promote scientist-to-scientist dialog and technical exchange under such existing US government internship programs (eg SABIT/USDOC) to improve skills and work relationships. Although the data analysis will focus on environmentally sensitive signatures and materials, the office of Research and Development wishes to further its nuclear non-proliferation objectives by assessing the current technical skill and ingenious analytical tools in less-developed countries so as to broaden the base of capability for multi-species measurement technology development

  17. Anti-neutrino flux in a research reactor for non-proliferation application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Khakshournia, Samad; Foroughi, Shokoufeh [Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI), Tehran (Iran, Islamic Republic of). Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

    2017-11-15

    Owing to growing interest in the study of emitted antineutrinos from nuclear reactors to test the Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, antineutrino flux was studied in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) using ORIGEN code. According to our prediction, antineutrino rate was obtained 2.6 x 10{sup 17} (v{sub e}/sec) in the core No. 57F of the TRR. Calculations indicated that evolution of antineutrino flux was very slow with time and the performed refueling had not an observable effect on antineutrino flux curve for a 5 MW reactor with the conventional refueling program. It is seen that for non-proliferation applications the measurement of the contribution of {sup 239}Pu to the fission using an antineutrino detector is not viable in the TRR.

  18. SIGMA, the novel approach of a new non-proliferating uranium enrichment technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rivarola, M.; Florido, P.; Brasnarof, D.; Bergallo, J.

    2001-01-01

    The SIGMA concept, under development by Argentina, represents the evolution of the Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion technology, updated to face the challenge of the new economic-based and competitive world frame. The Enrichment technology has been historically considered as a highly proliferating activity in the nuclear field, and central countries have limited the access of the developing countries to this technology. The SIGMA concept incorporates innovative proliferation resistant criteria at the beginning of the design process, and inherits all the non-proliferation features of the Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs). The radical new proliferation resistant approach of the SIGMA technology, suggest a new kind of global control of the Uranium Enrichment Market, were some developing countries might access to an Enrichment plant without accessing to the technology itself. In this paper, we analyse the economy of the SIGMA plants, and the implications of this technology on the Uranium Global Market. (authors)

  19. SIGMA: the novel approach of a new non-proliferating uranium enrichment technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rivarola, M.; Florido, P.; Brasnarof, D.; Bergallo, E.

    2000-01-01

    The SIGMA concept, under development by Argentina, represents the evolution of the Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion technology, updated to face the challenge of the new economic-based and competitive world frame. The Enrichment technology has been historically considered as a highly proliferating activity in the nuclear field, and central countries limited the access of the developing countries to this technology. The SIGMA concept incorporates innovative proliferation resistant criteria at the beginning of the design process, and inherits all the non-proliferation features of the gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs). The radical new proliferation resistance approach of the SIGMA technology suggests a new kind of global control of the uranium enrichment market, where some developing countries might access an Enrichment plant without access to the technology itself. In this paper, we investigate the economy of the SIGMA plants, and the implications of this technology on the Uranium Global Market. (authors)

  20. Non proliferation and disarmament: nuclear disarmament and security policies in Sweden (1946-1975) - Historical note

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2007-06-01

    The author first outlines that Sweden appeared during the Cold War as committed against nuclear weapons, but in fact concentrated this commitment on the objective of nuclear disarmament of nuclear countries without having a very clear position on the objective of non proliferation as it was defined at the end of the 1950's, and also maintained a (secret for while) military nuclear programme which has been progressively given up from the middle of the 1960's. Then, the author discusses why Sweden adopted this double posture, its effects on the international scene, and achievements and setbacks of the Swedish diplomacy with respect to disarmament until the first NPT review conference of 1975

  1. Towards the fourth review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1990

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    This publication focuses on the background of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), its main provisions and some of the major issues discussed at the three conferences that have thus far been held to review the operation of the Treaty. A fourth conference to review the operation of the Treaty will be held at Geneva from 20 August to 14 September 1990. It will be the last regular review conference before the convening, in 1995, of a conference which will ''decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'' (article X, para.2). A Preparatory Committee (open to all parties) for the Fourth Review Conference has been established by the parties to the NPT, and 95 parties attended the first session, held in New York from 1 to 5 May 1989

  2. Non-Proliferation Community, Do We Really Speak the Same Language?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Michel, Q.; Viski, A.; Sevini, F.; Charatsis, C.; )

    2015-01-01

    The non-proliferation community, with its many different stakeholders, has issues with a number of terms and concepts which have different meanings, not only in different national languages but also for scientists, diplomats, engineers, law enforcement people, IAEA safeguards staff, and many others. The consequences are not only relevant for translators and seminar participants. This confusion of terms may create misunderstandings with legal, diplomatic and operational consequences. A number of terms, used because of their meaning in English are ''false friends'' in other languages, i.e., they are used because they sound close, but their meaning may be different. The nuances may be about the fact that they cover a narrower, broader, or slightly different concept in another national or professional language. The emblematic example is the English word control, written the same way in many languages but with different connotations. Other examples include terms which have a precise legal definition for some communities whereas other stakeholder see it as generic terms (e.g., technology, transit); terms that are not explicit but have different implicit contents related to the context like outreach or declaration; terms which are distinct in one language but translated into one word in others like specially and especially designed; terms which cover different realities for different work communities like counter-proliferation, analysis; terms which are widely used and hardly defined anywhere like dual-use; or terms which refer to a specific legal or moral reference framework which is not always explicated like illegal, legitimate. This paper will explore issues related to some of these terms used in Western languages, and argue the necessity to take into account these sometimes subtle language differences, realizing the difficulties they may create for practitioners of non-proliferation. Improvements might include revising official reference documents

  3. Role of non-governmental organizations in formation of non-proliferation culture in new independent countries (NIC)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevchik, M.

    2000-01-01

    Purpose of the report is demonstrate the non-governmental organizations (NGO) role in formation of non-proliferation culture in former Soviet Union. Activity of Center of Non-proliferation Problems Investigation (CNPI) of Monterey Institute of International Investigations and its collaboration with existing in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) non-governmental organizations is considered as example. Brief information about CNPI and reasons for it representatives opening of in Kazakhstan and in other CIS-countries, as well as cooperation of NGO in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine for creation on Central Asia zone free from nuclear weapon ia given. Some measures which could promote to formation of non-proliferation culture in region are suggested

  4. Record Management Audit: Nuclear Malaysia’s Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adnan, H.; Yusof, M. H.; Ngadiron, N.; Ismail, R.M.

    2016-01-01

    Full text: The Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear Malaysia) is heavily reliant on information in order to accomplish its strategic research and development, and commercialization (R&D&C) outcomes. Since its beginning in 1972, the activity of Information Management (IM) – Records Management (RM) is always integrated in the process of knowledge repository. The Division of Information Management (DIM) is the custodian for the agency’s knowledge repository and also responsible to ensure its compliance with the National Archive of Malaysian Act 2003 (Act 629), as well as to address the needs of 3s: Safety, Security and Safeguards outlined by IAEA. In 2013, Nuclear Malaysia has launched KM Nuclear Policy which includes KM audit committee, to oversee and provide checks and balances for KM initiative programmes. The first KM audit conducted was the Record Management Audit (RMA), started in 2014. The journey faced some challenges from people, process and technology and later completed in 2015 with accumulation of new knowledge derived for the KM improvement. RMA is a unique process which needs to be shared with others because it offers example and experience from the perspective of nuclear R&D agency. (author

  5. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; La conference d'examen 2000 du TNP et l'avenir du regime de non-proliferation nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grand, C. [Institut d' Etudes Politiques de Paris, 75 (France); Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr-Coetquidan (France)

    2001-07-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  6. Inter-relations between regional and global approaches to nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.

    1995-01-01

    It is now becoming evident that the end of the East-West conflict has had a significant effect upon both global and regional security structures. From a situation where regional arrangements were, in the main, determined and driven by pressures arising from the bipolar division which permeated all aspects of the global political system, they increasingly have an independent existence. This has enabled such arrangements to be tailored to local circumstances in a manner which is not possible with global agreements. In particular, it has become apparent that enhanced constraints on peaceful nuclear activities and much more intrusive inspection and monitoring procedures, can more easily be negotiated on a regional basis than a global one. It also appears that nuclear weapon states are prepared to make unconditional commitments about nuclear weapon use on a regional basis, whereas they may not be prepared to do so on a global one. In short, regional approaches enable fine-tuning of the international non-proliferation regime to occur, and for measures to be taken on a regional level that would be politically unacceptable on the global level, due to their discriminatory nature. In the years ahead additional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) agreements may be negotiated, covering more of the land area of the globe. In parallel, regional nuclear cooperation and safeguarding agreements might also be expected to develop along the lines of EURATOM and ABACC. This in turn may move the states which remain outside of the NPT to a similar position to Argentina and Brazil at the moment: to an acceptance that whatever their opposition in principle to the NPT and the system of supplier export guidelines, the commitments they have already accepted on a regional level are more intrusive and constraining than those they would incur if they were to have acceded to the Treaty. In these circumstances, accession to the NPT becomes a distinct possibility, and thus the regional approach to non-proliferation

  7. Detection of Materials of Interest to Non-Proliferation: A Novel Approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ze, F; Tittmann, B R; Lehahan, P M

    2002-04-11

    We propose the development of a novel detector that can locate and identify materials of interest to Nuclear Arms Non Proliferation. The device will combine nuclear acoustic resonance (NAR) with superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID) widely used in nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR), geophysics, nondestructive evaluations, and biomagnetism, to name only few. NAR works like NMR. Thus resonant absorption (of applied ultrasonic energy) by a nuclear spin system occurs when the ultrasonic frequency is equal to the appropriate frequency separations between the magnetic nuclear energy levels. Ultrasonic energy couples to the nuclear spin system via spin-phonon interaction. The resulting nuclear acoustic resonance can be detected via the changes in (a) ultrasonic attenuation, (b) ultrasonic velocity, (c) material magnetization, (d) or nuclear magnetic susceptibility, all of which carries ''intrinsic and unique signatures'' of the material under investigation. The device's sensitivity and penetration depth (into metals) will be enhanced by incorporating SQUID technology into the design. We will present the details of interaction physics and outline a plan of action needed to successfully transform the concepts into a practical detector.

  8. Implications of the Ukraine Crisis for Security, Non-Proliferation and Deterrence in North East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farghen, Morgane

    2014-01-01

    The Ukraine crisis has been a 'wake up' call for Europe but its implication in Asia should be also be considered. The Russian 'coup de force' in Ukraine has created a psychological trauma in Western countries not only amongst political and military leaders but also in the general population by its reminiscence of Cold war thinking and by pointing to the risk of a military conflict in Europe. Moreover the Russian attempt to change the borders by force could create a dangerous precedent and produce an undesirable 'butterfly effects' in the rest of the world. In North East Asia, the stability in a context of rising powers and proliferation risks, relies on a status quo based upon the partition of the Korean peninsula, a de facto autonomy of Taiwan and a Japanese administration over the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands. As the status quo is increasingly challenged by revisionist powers, the question is worth to be raised: what are the implications of the Ukraine crisis for security, non-proliferation, and deterrence in North East Asia?

  9. Abstracts of reports of the International conference on non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

    1997-01-01

    On August 21, 1947, the USSR Council of Ministers made a decision on creating Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (STS). The first Nuclear Test on the Test Site was conducted on August 29, 1949, the last one was made on October 19, 1989. In all during 40 years on Semipalatinsk Test Site 116 ground and air and 340 underground nuclear tests were conducted. They brought much damage to health and lives of thousands of people who involuntarily participated in those events. On August 29, 1991, by Kazakstan President's decree STS was closed but the problems of people's rehabilitation, natural landscapes recovering, test-site infrastructure conversion remained. These problems are being solved under direct state programs, intergovernmental agreements of Kazakstan with Russia and the USA, cooperation with different international and foreign organizations, enterprises, scientific-research centers. Kazakstan subsequently constantly pursues the policy of nonproliferation, takes measures on ellimination of nuclear tests consequences and relative infrastructure. The Republic is not involved into military nuclear programs. From its territory all the nuclear weapon was taken away. Kazakstan joined the Agreement on Non-proliferation, signed the Agreement on Safeguards to all Nuclear activity on Kazakh territory with the IAEA

  10. US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staats, E.B.

    1980-01-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm US reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonprofileration policies can influence export sales. Based on avavailable data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of US nuclear exports. However, US companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by US technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and complete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for US nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, US companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

  11. Inter-relations between regional and global approaches to non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jones, P.

    1995-01-01

    This paper has argued that regional and global approaches to non-proliferation are inextricably joined. Moreover, the significance of this connection is growing in the wake of the Cold War and will continue to do so. The model introduced to illustrate this relationship offers one way to understand its significance. Application of that model in different regional contexts will require subtlety, flexibility and perseverance if its components are to be properly and usefully adapted in each case. Each region is unique and has unique requirements. Unique solutions are required, and they must come from within each region. Dogmatism, both from those who preach the need for regional approaches and from those who preach adherence to global norms, will only lead to a dialogue of the deaf. The balance between the three different approaches discussed here will depend on the individual needs of each unique region as defined by the region itself. I am convinced, however, that the problems posed by proliferation global as well as regional. One cannot address these dimensions of the problem in isolation from each other and hope to succeed. And one cannot address either the global or the regional dimensions of proliferation, without also taking steps to enhance regional security through dialogue and confidence-building. Progress at all levels of the pyramid is ultimately necessary

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation and arms control: Are we making progress? 7 November 2005, Washington, DC, Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    ) establish a framework for multilateral management and control of the 'back end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. spent fuel reprocessing and waste disposal); and 4) create a similar framework for multilateral management and control of the 'front end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. enrichment and fuel production). Regarding the protection of nuclear material it is reported that multiple international and regional initiatives are underway to help countries to improve the physical protection of such material. The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2005. Many governments have also responded to UN Security Council resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004. Both the Convention and resolution 1540 call on countries to criminalize the illicit possession and use of radioactive material, and aim to enhance efforts to detect and combat illicit trafficking. And in July, parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material agreed on major changes that would make it legally binding for countries to protect nuclear facilities and material in domestic use, storage and transport. With strong support from the IAEA, Russia and the US, multiple countries are also taking steps to convert their research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel, and to return the HEU to the country of origin. For nuclear non-proliferation commitments to be effective, they must be backed by credible mechanisms to deal with cases of compliance. The potential for being referred to the UN Security Council has clearly acted as an inducement for compliance in some cases; however, we should recall that the referral of North Korea to the Council, in 1992 and again in 2003, resulted in little to no action. To be effective, the UN Security Council must be ready at all times to engage, in order to cope with emerging threats to international peace and security. On the nuclear disarmament front, no mechanism exists to monitor compliance with

  13. Electronic Medical Record Keeping: Eleven Years Experience at ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Aim: To rep ort the su ccess of a p ap erless med ical record system in a small clinic in a d evelop ing economy and to highlight the ad vantages and challenges of electronic med ical record keep ing, even with a small bu d get. Method: The concept of electronic med ical record (EMR) as a record keep ing method at Life Sup ...

  14. Abstracts of 3. International scientific-practical conference 'Semipalatinsk Test Site. Radiation Legacy and Non-proliferation Issues'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The Conference gathered representatives of more than 25 countries and international organizations. In the Conference among with actual problems of current environment conditions in Kazakhstan, perspective trends in the field of radiation protection, radio-ecological and radiobiological research and issues of international co-operation in support of non-proliferation regime, other advanced scientific projects were considered [ru

  15. How we think about peace and security. The ABCs of initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation education

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toki, Masako; Potter, William C.

    2005-01-01

    Education and training are among the most important but underutilized tools for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. Although few national governments or international organizations have invested significantly in such training programs, there is a growing recognition among States of the need to rectify this situation. This positive development is reflected in the broad support for recommendations of a UN study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and in related initiatives within the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the forthcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference, it is useful to take stock of the implementation of the UN study's recommendations. In particular, it is important to observe the progress that has been made within the context of the NPT review process, as well as the obstacles that must be overcome if the full potential for disarmament and non-proliferation education is to be realized. Resources on disarmament and non-proliferation education are increasingly available on the Internet. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs has launched new features on its web site that include links to academic institutes, governmental centers, NGOs and other bodies engaged in educational efforts. As part of its mission to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and raising global public awareness on WMD issues, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) has developed a series of tutorials for non-proliferation and disarmament education. Among these tutorials, the NPT Tutorial has been designed to educate and provide useful material about the treaty through interactive text and enriched multimedia segments, including timelines, maps, and numerous links to relevant resources. Among other resources are teaching guides developed by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies through its Critical Issues Forum (CIF). More

  16. Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to Prepare the Next Generation of Experts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens, W.A.M.; Peerani, P.; ); Gariazzo, C.; Ward, S.; Crete, J.-M.; Braunegger-Guelich, A.

    2015-01-01

    Although nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are a continuous concern of the international community and discussed frequently at international fora and conferences, the academic world is not really on board with these topics. What we mean by this is that nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is only very seldom part of a university curriculum. In the few cases where it does appear in the curriculum, whether in a nuclear engineering course or a political sciences master programme, it is typically covered only partially. Nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are multidisciplinary and embrace, inter alia, historical, legal, technical, and political aspects. This is perhaps the reason why it is challenging for a single professor or university to develop and implement a comprehensive academic course or programme in this area. Professional organizations in this field, like the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), have made first steps to address this issue by implementing specific educational activities. However, much more needs to be done. Therefore, ESARDA, INMM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are in the process of joining efforts to identify key elements and priorities to support universities in establishing appropriate and effective academic programmes in this area. This paper will share best practices, achievements and lessons learned by ESARDA, INMM and the IAEA in providing education and training to develop and maintain the expertise of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards professionals. In addition, it will suggest potential ways on how to assist universities to get prepared for building-up the next generation of experts able to meet any future challenges in the area of non-proliferation and safeguards. (author)

  17. Recording the PHILAE Touchdown using CASSE: Laboratory Experiments

    Science.gov (United States)

    Knapmeyer, Martin; Faber, Claudia; Tune, Jean-Baptiste; Arnold, Walter; Witte, Lars; Schröder, Silvio; Roll, Reinhard; Chares, Bernd; Fischer, Hans-Herbert; Möhlmann, Diedrich; Seidensticker, Klaus

    2014-05-01

    The landing of Philae on comet 67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko is scheduled for November 11, 2014. Its landing feet house the triaxial acceleration sensors of CASSE (Comet Acoustic Surface Sounding Experiment) which will thus be the first sensors to be in mechanical contact with the cometary surface. It is planned that CASSE will be in listening mode to record the deceleration of the lander by the collision with the comet. The analysis of this data will not only support an engineering analysis of the landing process itself but also yield information about the mechanical properties of the comet's surface. Here, we describe a series of controlled landings of a lander model. The tests were conducted in the Landing & Mobility Test Facility (LAMA) of the DLR Institute of Space Systems in Bremen, Germany, where an industrial robot can be programmed to move landers or rovers along predefined paths and under simulated low gravity. The qualification model of the Philae landing gear was used in the tests. It consists of three legs manufactured of carbon fiber and metal joints. Attached to each leg is a foot with two soles and a mechanically driven ice screw to secure the lander on the comet. The right one of these soles, if viewed from the outside towards the lander body, houses a Brüel & Kjaer DeltaTron 4506 triaxial piezoelectric accelerometer as used on the spacecraft. Orientation of the three axes was such that the X-axis of the accelerometer points downwards while the Y and Z axes are horizontal. This somewhat uncommon orientation was necessary due to the position of the electric connector on the 4506. Data was recorded at a sampling rate of 8.2 kHz for a duration of 2 s. Touchdown measurements were conducted on three types of ground with different landing velocities. Landings with low velocities were carried out on the concrete floor of the LAMA to determine the stiffness of the landing gear based on the deceleration data measured with the accelerometer. Landings on fine

  18. Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-06-01

    This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

  19. Tools for Trade Analysis and Open Source Information Monitoring for Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cojazzi, G.G.M.; Versino, C.; Wolfart, E.; Renda, G.; Janssens, W.A.M.; )

    2015-01-01

    The new state level approach being proposed by IAEA envisions an objective based and information driven safeguards approach utilizing all relevant information to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. To this goal the IAEA makes also use of open source information, here broadly defined as any information that is neither classified nor proprietary. It includes, but is not limited to: media sources, government and non-governmental reports and analyzes, commercial data, and scientific/technical literature, including trade data. Within the EC support programme to IAEA, JRC has surveyed and catalogued open sources on import-export customs trade data and developed tools for supporting the use of the related databases in safeguards. The JRC software The Big Table, (TBT), supports i.a.: a) the search through a collection of reference documents relevant to trade analysis (legal/regulatory documents, technical handbooks); b) the selection of items of interests to specific verifications and c) the mapping of these items to customs commodities searchable in trade databases. In the field of open source monitoring, JRC is developing and operating a ''Nuclear Security Media Monitor'' (NSMM), which is a web-based multilingual news aggregation system that automatically collects news articles from pre-defined web sites. NSMM is a domain specific version of the general JRC-Europe Media Monitor (EMM). NSMM has been established within the EC support programme with the aim, i.e., to streamline IAEA's process of open source information monitoring. In the first part, the paper will recall the trade data sources relevant for non-proliferation and will then illustrate the main features of TBT, recently coupled with the IAEA Physical Model, and new visualization techniques applied to trade data. In the second part it will present the main aspects of the NSMM also by illustrating some of uses done at JRC. (author)

  20. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Graham, Thomas Jr.

    2014-01-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be

  1. Clients experience of video recordings of their psychotherapy

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jacobsen, Claus Haugaard; Jensen, Karen Boelt; Madsen, Ninna Skov

    Background: Due to the development of technologies and the low costs video recording of psychotherapy sessions have gained ground in training and supervision. While some praise the advantages others decline to use this technological aid for ethical, theoretical or clinical reasons. Despite...... of having their psychotherapy sessions video recorded and presented in supervision. Methods: In all 25 clients receiving brief psychodynamic outpatient treatment in a university clinic setting filled out a questionnaire containing eight open ended questions concerning the influence of the video recordings...

  2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the insertion of the Brazilian State in its regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, Marcos Valle Machado da

    2010-01-01

    The issue of nuclear weapons continues to appear as a focal point of International Relations. The efforts and concrete actions on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control are still issues that generate recurring tensions between States. However, in Brazil, there is little analysis of an academic nature about these issues and, with respect to current and prospective position of the Brazilian State in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime, studies and analysis are even more scarce, or incipient. The present dissertation has as its object of study to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Regime arisen from NPT, and the Brazilian State insertion process in this Regime. Therefore our research work is structured in three areas: the first one is about the role of nuclear weapons in States security perception, the second is about NPT and its Regime, the third runs over the insertion of the Brazilian state in this regime. So, in summary, the research performed included the reasons that make a State to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT genesis and evolution of the perception of the meaning of that Treaty by the States, and the process and the degree of insertion of Brazil in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime. The inquiry sought to place this object of study in the broader debate on Foreign Relations, based on the approaches of the discipline devoted to the question of managing the security of States, id est, the two approaches that constitute the mainstream of the discipline: the perspective theoretical liberal (and neoliberal variants) and realistic thinking (and neo-realist). Thus, we have used different theoretical lenses, which we think necessary for understanding the specific parts and causal connections between these parts of a complex issue. (author)

  3. Assessment of nuclear fuel cycles with respect to assurance of energy supply; economic aspects; environmental aspects; non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    This paper, which was presented to all INFCE Working Groups gives a broad qualitative assessment in tabular form of the following five fuel cycles: LWR once-through, LWR with thermal recycle, HWR once-through, HTR with uranium recycle, fast breeder reactor. The assessment is given of the assurance of supply aspects, the macro- and micro-economic aspects, the environmental aspects, and the non-proliferation, including safeguards, aspects of each fuel cycle

  4. Extracts of proliferating and non-proliferating human cells display different base excision pathways and repair fidelity

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Akbari, Mansour; Pena Diaz, Javier; Andersen, Sonja

    2009-01-01

    Base excision repair (BER) of damaged or inappropriate bases in DNA has been reported to take place by single nucleotide insertion or through incorporation of several nucleotides, termed short-patch and long-patch repair, respectively. We found that extracts from proliferating and non-proliferati......Base excision repair (BER) of damaged or inappropriate bases in DNA has been reported to take place by single nucleotide insertion or through incorporation of several nucleotides, termed short-patch and long-patch repair, respectively. We found that extracts from proliferating and non......-proliferating cells both had capacity for single- and two-nucleotide insertion BER activity. However, patch size longer than two nucleotides was only detected in extracts from proliferating cells. Relative to extracts from proliferating cells, extracts from non-proliferating cells had approximately two-fold higher...... concentration of POLbeta, which contributed to most of two-nucleotide insertion BER. In contrast, two-nucleotide insertion in extracts from proliferating cells was not dependent on POLbeta. BER fidelity was two- to three-fold lower in extracts from the non-proliferating compared with extracts of proliferating...

  5. Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2014-01-01

    The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

  6. French network and acquired experience on record strong ground motion

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ferrieux, H.; Mohammadioun, G.

    1988-03-01

    The network intended to record strong ground motion in continental France is composed for the most part of instrument packages incorporated into nuclear installations, which are supplemented by a certain number of accelerometers placed in the most highly seismic areas. In a country where the level of seismicity is relatively modest, such a network is not conductive to the acquisition of new data, which, instead, is obtained through spot studies of limited duration using more sensitive instruments or through the recording of strong ground motion in neighbouring countries [fr

  7. Non proliferation regimes undertakings: Benefits and limits of synergies in verification technologies and procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richard, M.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Thirty years ago the NPT was entering into force. Therewith, when a State became party to the NPT, it had, in accordance with article III.1 of the Treaty, an undertaking to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards agreement with the IAEA and accept safeguards verification on source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territories in order to verify that such material is not diverted. This multilateral instrument was the foundation stone of the non-proliferation regime and marked the actual birth of internationally accepted measures to verily compliance with politically stringent agreements. Since that time several important multilateral or bilateral instruments on non-proliferation and disarmament have been negotiated and adopted to curb the development and the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) most of them since the middle of the eighties and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Amongst the multilateral instruments are the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapon and Toxin Weapons (1972), the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1993), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996), the Strengthening of the IAEA Safeguards and the Additional Protocol (1997), with some still in negotiation like the Protocol of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, and some on which negotiation is still a wish like the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Bilateral disarmament agreements between the United States of America and the Russian Federation such as the INF Treaty, START I and II, the agreements on the elimination of excess defence nuclear material as well as the Trilateral Initiative with the IAEA pave the way to nuclear disarmament with the reduction of both the number of nuclear weapons arsenal and the fissile material inventories. The politically stringent undertakings of States that have become parties to those agreements would not be possible without the

  8. Nuclear non-proliferation: The security context, 5 October 2007, University of Florence, Florence, Italy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2007-01-01

    Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, stated that nuclear threats have become more dangerous and more complex. We have witnessed the emergence of illicit trade in nuclear technology. Countries have managed to develop clandestine nuclear programmes. Sophisticated extremist groups have shown keen interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. n parallel, nuclear material and nuclear material production have become more difficult to control. Energy security concerns and fears of climate change are prompting many countries to revisit the nuclear power option. And to ensure a supply of reactor fuel, more countries have shown interest in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle - a step that brings them quite close to nuclear weapons capability. Add to this the 27 000 nuclear warheads that already exist in the arsenals of nine countries, and the hair trigger alert deployment level of some of these weapons. And as if these stockpiles and their deployment were not threat enough, most of these countries continue to repeat two inherently contradictory mantras: first, that it is important for them to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security; and second, that no one else should have them. 'Do as I say, not as I do'. Against this backdrop, there are four critical aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime that we must strengthen - addressing both symptoms and root causes - if we are to avoid a cascade of nuclear proliferation, and our ultimate self-destruction. First, we must develop a more effective approach for dealing with proliferation threats. Second, we must secure existing nuclear material stockpiles and tighten controls over the transfer and production of nuclear material. Third, we must strengthen the verification authority and capability of the IAEA. Fourth, we urgently need to find a way for disarmament to be given the prominence and priority it deserves. In conclusion, it is clear that a security strategy rooted in 'Us

  9. Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle; Nukleare Abruestung. Optionen fuer den kommenden Ueberpruefungszyklus des NVV

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mueller, Harald

    2011-07-01

    The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

  10. Supervised Occupational Experience Record Book for Agricultural Resource Conservation, Environmental Management and Forestry.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nickles, Tom

    The record book was designed to meet the occupational experience recordkeeping requirements of vocational agriculture students enrolled in forestry, environmental management, or agriculture resource conservation programs in Ohio. It provides guidelines and forms for recording on-the-job, in-the-school lab, and occupational experience project data.…

  11. Seven law concepts on nuclear non-proliferation suggested by the International Group of Legal Experts (ILG)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Steen, G. [Djursholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant LTD, Vienna (Austria)

    2001-03-01

    The ILG has worked as an independent group under the Swedish Support Programme on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The ILG's mission is concluded with this report. When developing the seven Law Concepts on national nuclear legislation that are presented in this report, the ILG has applied certain basic principles, which are firmly established in modern Western legislation. A summary of these principles is made here. They are essential cornerstones in laws and regulations that apply both to the nuclear industry and to other high technology areas, characterised by advanced safety and security requirements. Of essential importance is that the Operator alone is responsible for the fulfilment of requirements stipulated in laws and authority directives. The technical complexity of the nuclear industry and the far-reaching requirements on safety and security necessitate a qualified and complete national system of legislation and regulations. As all legislation in general, the nuclear legislation should be clear, easy to understand and give little room for misunderstandings and loopholes. It should also present the legally established requirements on safety and security in a form that facilitates the application and implementation by both state authorities, facility operators and individuals. The investigations of the causes of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents brought into focus the impact on nuclear safety from human failure. As a consequence, increased emphasis has since then been put on the development of an overall high safety culture in the nuclear field. It is recognised that a good safety culture also promotes the non-proliferation systems and safeguards measures and helps to reduce the risk of illicit trafficking. In a high safety culture environment, each individual facility employee has to be motivated and encouraged to carry out the assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with rules and

  12. Seven law concepts on nuclear non-proliferation suggested by the International Group of Legal Experts (ILG)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steen, G.; Wredberg, L.

    2001-03-01

    The ILG has worked as an independent group under the Swedish Support Programme on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The ILG's mission is concluded with this report. When developing the seven Law Concepts on national nuclear legislation that are presented in this report, the ILG has applied certain basic principles, which are firmly established in modern Western legislation. A summary of these principles is made here. They are essential cornerstones in laws and regulations that apply both to the nuclear industry and to other high technology areas, characterised by advanced safety and security requirements. Of essential importance is that the Operator alone is responsible for the fulfilment of requirements stipulated in laws and authority directives. The technical complexity of the nuclear industry and the far-reaching requirements on safety and security necessitate a qualified and complete national system of legislation and regulations. As all legislation in general, the nuclear legislation should be clear, easy to understand and give little room for misunderstandings and loopholes. It should also present the legally established requirements on safety and security in a form that facilitates the application and implementation by both state authorities, facility operators and individuals. The investigations of the causes of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents brought into focus the impact on nuclear safety from human failure. As a consequence, increased emphasis has since then been put on the development of an overall high safety culture in the nuclear field. It is recognised that a good safety culture also promotes the non-proliferation systems and safeguards measures and helps to reduce the risk of illicit trafficking. In a high safety culture environment, each individual facility employee has to be motivated and encouraged to carry out the assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with rules and regulations

  13. The University of Washington electronic medical record experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Welton, Nanette J

    2010-07-01

    The Health Sciences Library at the University of Washington initiated and continues to develop a role in the electronic medical record, starting with the development of the first integrated web-based interface, called MINDscape. An Integrated Academic Information Management System (IAIMS) grant in 1992 began the process, which also led to the development of a clinical medical librarian position. Over the years, the librarian's role in the clinical environment became more established, and with the advent of clinical online resources, it offered further opportunities for librarians to provide the expertise needed to incorporate the appropriate resources. The collaborative journey continues as librarians, now able to directly access the EMRs, provide information about what resources to use and where best to place them and design how best to provide notes or feedback to clinicians.

  14. Authentication of monitoring systems for non-proliferation and arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fuller, J.L.; Kouzes, R.T.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Radiation measurement and systems are central to the affirmation of compliance with nuclear material control agreements associated with a variety of arms control and non-proliferation regimes. A number of radiation measurement systems are under development for this purpose, and the correct functioning of these systems will be authenticated. Authentication is the process by which a monitoring party to an agreement is assured that measurement systems are assembled as designed, function as designed, and do not contain hidden features that allow the passing of material inconsistent with an accepted declaration. Attribute measurement systems are specific examples of radiation measurement systems that are being developed in the United States and the Russian Federation. Under one bilateral agreement, the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction (DoD DTRA/CTR) Program is constructing a Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) at Mayak to hold up to 50 tons of plutonium from the disassembly of Russian Federation nuclear weapons. Negotiations are being held between the U.S. and the Russian Federation for cooperative development of attribute measurement systems to provide confidence that the material is of weapons origin and other purposes. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is leading the authentication effort for U.S. interests at FMSF. There are two basic requirements for an attribute measurement system: protection of classified information, and assurance of credible performance of the system for the measurement. The technology used to protect classified information is referred to as an information barrier. An information barrier consists of technology and procedures that prevent the release of host-country classified information to a monitoring party during a joint inspection of a sensitive item. Information barriers are used on monitoring systems that are exposed to host-party classified materials

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  16. The text of the Agreement between Turkey and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    The full text of the agreement between Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  17. The New Face of EU Security Policies?:Analysing the Normative Patterns of EU Non-Proliferation Policies in the Southern Mediterranean

    OpenAIRE

    Kienzle, Benjamin

    2013-01-01

    In recent years, the European Union has substantially intensified its non-proliferation policies in the southern Mediterranean. Although the analysis of these policies shows that the Union comes close to what the literature suggests is an ideal type normative power, this interpretation in itself is at odds with other security policies in the southern Mediterranean and with non-proliferation policies outside the region, most notably in Iran. Therefore, this article examines the causes and impl...

  18. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented.

  19. A new nuclear triad: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, international verification and the International Atomic Energy Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Sanders, B.; Scheinman, L.; Bunn, G.

    1992-01-01

    The nuclear non-proliferation regime comprises a wide variety of unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements. All these agreements contain undertakings by the contracting states not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons and make provisions for means of verifying that the parties abide by these undertakings. The system of verification, the safeguards system, is fundamental to any effective nuclear non-proliferation policy. The purpose of this study is to show that IAEA safeguards, originally products of the political climate of the late 1960s and serving its ends, must be adapted to the political realities of the 1990s. The new aim of IAEA safeguards must be to deal with increased dangers of proliferation around the Asian crescent, and to derive full benefit from the end of the Cold War and from the dramatic progress that has been made since 1988 in devising and securing agreement on intrusive forms of verification that would have been unthinkable until very recently. Although much progress has been made since 1991, additional changes to reinforce the IAEA safeguards system are still required. The proposals contained in this study constitute a contribution to the debate over such changes and the necessary evolution of that system. (author)

  20. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented

  1. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, Lars van; Andersson, Sarmite; Bejarano, Gabriela; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Karlberg, Olof; Olsson, Kjell; Sandberg, Viviana; Stenberg, Tor; Turner, Roland; Zinger, Irene

    2010-06-01

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in a number of projects financed by the European Union. This report gives an overview of the cooperation projects in 2009 as well as the framework in which they are performed. Summaries of each project are given in an Appendix. The project managers in the Section for Cooperation and Development in the Department of International Affairs are responsible for the cooperation projects and the implementation of the bilateral programmes. But the positive outcome of the projects is also dependent on a large number of experts at SSM who work with the regulatory functions in the nuclear and radiation protection fields in a Swedish context as well as on external consultants. Together, their experience is invaluable for the implementation of the projects. But the projects also give experience of relevance for the SSM staff.

  2. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, Lars van; Andersson, Sarmite; Bejarano, Gabriela; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Karlberg, Olof; Olsson, Kjell; Sandberg, Viviana; Stenberg, Tor; Turner, Roland; Zinger, Irene

    2010-06-15

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in a number of projects financed by the European Union. This report gives an overview of the cooperation projects in 2009 as well as the framework in which they are performed. Summaries of each project are given in an Appendix. The project managers in the Section for Cooperation and Development in the Department of International Affairs are responsible for the cooperation projects and the implementation of the bilateral programmes. But the positive outcome of the projects is also dependent on a large number of experts at SSM who work with the regulatory functions in the nuclear and radiation protection fields in a Swedish context as well as on external consultants. Together, their experience is invaluable for the implementation of the projects. But the projects also give experience of relevance for the SSM staff.

  3. JUNO JUPITER UVS 2 EXPERIMENT DATA RECORD V1.0

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — The Juno Ultraviolet Spectrograph (UVS) CODMAC Level 2 Experiment Data Record is a collection of the far ultraviolet photon detections obtained by the UVS...

  4. LRO MOON LAMP 2 EXPERIMENT DATA RECORD V1.0

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) Lyman Alpha Mapping Project (LAMP) CODMAC Level 2 Experiment Data Record is a collection of the far ultraviolet photon...

  5. Supervised Occupational Experience Record Book for Agricultural Resources Conservation, Environmental Management and Forestry: Teacher's Guide.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nickles, Tom

    The guide is designed to aid the instructor in implementing the student guide entitled "Supervised Occupational Experience Record Book For Agricultural Resource Conservation, Environmental Management and Forestry". Intended for use in the secondary level vocational agriculture curriculum, general concepts, student record-keeping skills,…

  6. Experience of introducing a new database for an approved coordination and record keeping service

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Garratt, N. J.

    2011-01-01

    The Health Protection Agency (and its predecessors) has many years experience of running Approved Dosimetry Services, including coordination and record keeping. This paper describes the experiences gained whilst introducing a new web-based system for coordination and record keeping to replace the ageing mainframe database. This includes the planning of the project, the migration of the data between the two systems, parallel running of all the operational tasks and lessons learned during the process. (authors)

  7. Nuclear non-proliferation reality check: Role of research community in monitoring shaky

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wakefield, Julie

    Lop Nor in the western provence of Xin-jiang, China, felt a 6.1 seismic event last week. Like a shot heard round the world, the tremor was easily picked up by any seismic station that was listening (Figure 1). The seismic signals were not caused by an earthquake. Nor was the source a chemical explosion caused by an industrial mining collapse that occurred in the Urals on January 5 of this year. Instead, the shock waves propagated from an underground nuclear test—estimated to be China's 42nd nuclear test of record. The explosion, which occurred about a kilometer or so down in the Earth's crust, was on par with that of 40 to 150 kilotons of TNT (Figure 2).

  8. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-01

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in various projects financed by the European Union. The purpose of this project-oriented report is to provide the Swedish Government and other funding agencies as well as other interested audiences in Sweden and abroad with an encompassing understanding of our work and in particular the work performed during 2008. the activities are divided into four subfields: Nuclear waste management; Reactor safety; Radiation safety and emergency preparedness; and, Nuclear non-proliferation. SSM implements projects in the field of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management in Russia. The problems in this field also exist in other countries, yet the concentration of nuclear and radioactive materials are nowhere higher than in north-west Russia. And given the fact that most of these materials stem from the Cold War era and remain stored under conditions that vary from 'possibly acceptable' to 'wildly appalling' it is obvious that Sweden's first priority in the field of managing nuclear spent fuel and radioactive waste lies in this part of Russia. The prioritisation and selection of projects in reactor safety are established following thorough discussions with the partners in Russia and Ukraine. For specific guidance on safety and recommended safety improvements at RBMK and VVER reactors, SSM relies on analyses and handbooks established by the IAEA in the 1990s. In 2008, there were 16 projects in reactor safety. SSM implements a large number of projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. The activities are at a first glance at some distance from the activities covered and foreseen by for instance the

  9. Evaluation of selected features of US nuclear non-proliferation law and policy. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    Because other nations now have uranium enrichment facilities, no nation can use nuclear fuel services to dictate actions to others. The United States, therefore, should avoid undue reliance on its uranium enrichment capability as a tool to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1978 nuclear non-proliferation law requires the United States to ensure the availability of US enrichment services to meet foreign demand, but it is not apparent that a new enrichment plant authorized in 1975 is needed to meet this demand. The 1978 law has proven to be administratively workable as a means of exercising control over nuclear exports, but more needs to be done to make Government reviews of nuclear exports predictable and timely. A comprehensive interagency reassessment is needed of the controls the Department of Energy administers over foreign activities of US firms and individuals

  10. Nuclear non-proliferation: the U.S. obligation to accept spent fuel from foreign research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shapar, Howard K.; Egan, Joseph R.

    1995-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) had a 35-year program for the sale and receipt (for reprocessing) of high-enriched research reactor fuel for foreign research reactors, executed pursuant to bilateral agreements with nuclear trading partners. In 1988, DOE abruptly let this program lapse, citing environmental obstacles. DOE promised to renew the program upon completion of an environmental review which was to take approximately six months. After three and a half years, an environmental assessment was finally produced.Over a year and half elapsed since publication of the assessment before DOE finally took action to renew the program. The paper sets forth the nuclear non-proliferation and related foreign policy considerations which support renewal of the program. It also summarized the contractual and other commitments made to foreign research reactors and foreign governments and aspects of U.S. environmental law as they apply to continuation of the program. (author)

  11. The third review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was held in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty were being realized. The Conference ended with the adoption by consensus of a Final Declaration, by which the States parties, among other things, solemnly declared their conviction that the Treaty was essential to international peace and security and expressed their support for its objectives. This Fact Sheet provides information on the preparations for the Conference, developments at the Conference and the main features of the Final Declaration. Te text of the Treaty is reproduced in Disarmament Fact Sheet No. 33, and its historical background is contained in Fact Sheet No. 41

  12. THE ROLE AND RATIONALE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tom COPPEN

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available Much has been written about perceived weaknesses of the NPT and the challenges it has been facing over the last decades. Analysing the most important provisions of the NPT, this article demonstrates how the treaty has managed to maintain its central role in the non-proliferation regime since its conclusion, and how it retains enough flexibility within its review mechanism and its managerial approach to supervision to keep this position for the decades to come. The theoretical framework of the article is formed by theory of arms control law, relevant features of which are: a large influence of politics and national interests of states on the rule of law; its flexible yet treaty-based nature; and the distinctive role of supervision in order to ensure compliance with primary rules. The article analyses key NPT provisions. Based on Article VIII, the NPT Review Conferences have both an important political and legal function. They are the NPT’s mechanism for review, implementation and supervision; in legal terms, they enable the evolution of the NPT based on subsequent agreement and practice. The NPT articles on non-proliferation and disarmament illustrate how the NPT has evolved to close off loopholes (Articles I and II and retains its flexibility whilst providing a global platform for negotiations on nuclear disarmament (Article VI. Article III evolved and must be understood to oblige NPT states to sign an Additional Protocol (AP with the IAEA. Article IV sets the parameters for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but leaves room for negotiation and conflict. The supervision of the NPT, illustrated by the case of Iran, is a complicated process involving international organisations such as the IAEA and the UNSC; while these may play important roles, however, the enforcement of the NPT is ultimately left to the NPT states themselves.

  13. Do Years of Experience With Electronic Health Records Matter for Productivity in Community Health Centers?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Frogner, Bianca K; Wu, Xiaoli; Ku, Leighton; Pittman, Patricia; Masselink, Leah E

    This study investigated how years of experience with an electronic health record (EHR) related to productivity in community health centers (CHCs). Using data from the 2012 Uniform Data System, we regressed average annual medical visits, weighted for service intensity, as a function of full-time equivalent medical staff controlling for CHC size and location. Physician productivity significantly improved. Although the productivity of all other staff types was not significantly different by years of EHR experience, the trends showed lower productivity among nurses and other medical staff in CHCs with fewer years of EHR experience versus more years of experience.

  14. Update on the development and evaluation of a program of regional collaboration for non-proliferation and transparency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furaus, James P.; Hori, Masato; Glidewell, Don

    2003-01-01

    The purpose of the research is to develop and evaluate a Program of Regional Cooperation for Non-proliferation and transparency in the Pacific Rim arena. There has been interest in the development of regional collaboration in the Pacific Rim for over thirty years, but without the kind of results that have been observed in other areas of the world, such as Europe and South America. While there have been many discussions and many papers written on the topic, there has not been a concept or a program that has been proposed and successfully implemented. This research will identify attributes of existing successful regional collaborations in other parts of the world, research the open literature for past ideas and attempts for regional collaboration in the Pacific Rim, and propose a model for a sustainable regional collaboration in the Pacific Rim. One of the strategies for developing the program of collaboration is to create a Joint Program Plan for the Implementation of Technology Based Regional Cooperation. This plan will be developed jointly by Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), with input from the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration/National Nuclear Security Administration (USDOE/NNSA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other interested organizations. The plan will be a 'living plan,' that will be reviewed on a yearly basis to review status, and update as necessary. Another strategy is to implement technical objectives in parallel with the development of the program plan. This would include the completion of the implementation of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) system at JNC and sharing transparency data with SNL, USDOE/NNSA, IAEA, and other interested Pacific Rim entities. The availability of commercial off-the-shelf VPN systems, a technology that allows secure, inexpensive transfer of data across the Internet, will potentially be a key ingredient in the development

  15. The self-consistent energy system with an enhanced non-proliferated core concept for global nuclear energy utilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawashima, Masatoshi; Arie, Kazuo; Araki, Yoshio; Sato, Mitsuyoshi; Mori, Kenji; Nakayama, Yoshiyuki; Nakazono, Ryuichi; Kuroda, Yuji; Ishiguma, Kazuo; Fujii-e, Yoichi

    2008-01-01

    A sustainable nuclear energy system was developed based on the concept of Self-Consistent Nuclear Energy System (SCNES). Our study that trans-uranium (TRU) metallic fuel fast reactor cycle coupled with recycling of five long-lived fission products (LLFP) as well as actinides is the most promising system for the sustainable nuclear utilization. Efficient utilization of uranium-238 through the SCNES concept opens the doors to prolong the lifetime of nuclear energy systems towards several tens of thousand years. Recent evolution of the concept revealed compatibility of fuel sustainability, minor actinide (MA) minimization and non-proliferation aspects for peaceful use of nuclear energy systems through the discussion. As for those TRU compositions stabilized under fast neutron spectra, plutonium isotope fractions are remained in the range of reactor grade classification with high fraction of Pu240 isotope. Recent evolution of the SCNES concept has revealed that TRU recycling can cope with enhancing non-proliferation efforts in peaceful use with the 'no-blanket and multi-zoning core' concept. Therefore, the realization of SCNES is most important. In addition, along the process to the goals, a three-step approach is proposed to solve concurrent problems raised in the LWR systems. We discussed possible roles and contribution to the near future demand along worldwide expansion of LWR capacities by applying the 1st generation SCNES. MA fractions in TRU are more than 10% from LWR discharged fuels and even higher up to 20% in fuels from long interim storages. TRU recycling in the 1st generation SCNES system can reduce the MA fractions down to 4-5% in a few decades. This capability significantly releases 'MA' pressures in down-stream of LWR systems. Current efforts for enhancing capabilities for energy generation by LWR systems are efficient against the global warming crisis. In parallel to those movements, early realization of the SCNES concept can be the most viable decision

  16. The Impact on Non-proliferation with a Growing Number of BL-3 and BL-4 Labs in South America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Espona, M. J.

    2007-01-01

    After 2001 events (9/11 and anthrax letters) we witnessed the dramatic growth of the biodefense sector, and in within this framework, the increment of the number of high biosafety level laboratories (BSL3 and BSL4) both in central countries and peripheral ones. It is important to point out that not all the labs are devoted to activities related to biodefense but also to biological research from a traditional perspective. In this scenario, and as an unwanted consequence, we have noticed that the number of people -professionals with different level specialization- which have the information and skills that could be used to produce BW, grew vertiginously as well. So, considering the biodefense sector from a systemic perspective, we are being witnesses of how due to an intent to protect ourselves against the biological threat, our vulnerability to it gains an unexpected magnitude. Therefore, in this paper we will analyze the phenomenon of the growing number of high security level labs, first, in a global perspective and later, with focus in South America in order to determine if this evolving situation represents a security problem. In order to do that, we will approach the problem from different perspectives: health care, development, security/safety, defense and non proliferation.(author)

  17. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-15

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in various projects financed by the European Union. The purpose of this project-oriented report is to provide the Swedish Government and other funding agencies as well as other interested audiences in Sweden and abroad with an encompassing understanding of our work and in particular the work performed during 2008. the activities are divided into four subfields: Nuclear waste management; Reactor safety; Radiation safety and emergency preparedness; and, Nuclear non-proliferation. SSM implements projects in the field of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management in Russia. The problems in this field also exist in other countries, yet the concentration of nuclear and radioactive materials are nowhere higher than in north-west Russia. And given the fact that most of these materials stem from the Cold War era and remain stored under conditions that vary from 'possibly acceptable' to 'wildly appalling' it is obvious that Sweden's first priority in the field of managing nuclear spent fuel and radioactive waste lies in this part of Russia. The prioritisation and selection of projects in reactor safety are established following thorough discussions with the partners in Russia and Ukraine. For specific guidance on safety and recommended safety improvements at RBMK and VVER reactors, SSM relies on analyses and handbooks established by the IAEA in the 1990s. In 2008, there were 16 projects in reactor safety. SSM implements a large number of projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. The activities are at a first glance at some distance from the activities covered and

  18. The Use of Streamed Lecture Recordings: Patterns of Use, Student Experience and Effects on Learning Outcomes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Engstrand, Susan M.; Hall, Susanne

    2011-01-01

    We describe a study conducted during 2008-2009 that investigated three issues relating to the use of streamed video recordings of classes by students at the University of the Highlands and Islands. We investigated (i) the pattern of use of the resource, (ii) the student experience and (iii) the impact of watching the streamed classes on learning…

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for Romania on 1 May 2010 [es

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1972-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

  3. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1972-06-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  4. Non-proliferation through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear disarmament and international control of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, Ryukichi

    1993-01-01

    The role of nuclear factors in the international political situation has changed. The emphasis is now on the new circumstance of the post cold-war world. Non-proliferation is dealt with through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear weapons dismantling and international control of plutonium

  5. The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  6. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  7. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1971-05-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [es

  8. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-04-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [ru

  9. Neonatal Nurses Experience Unintended Consequences and Risks to Patient Safety With Electronic Health Records.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dudding, Katherine M; Gephart, Sheila M; Carrington, Jane M

    2018-04-01

    In this article, we examine the unintended consequences of nurses' use of electronic health records. We define these as unforeseen events, change in workflow, or an unanticipated result of implementation and use of electronic health records. Unintended consequences experienced by nurses while using electronic health records have been well researched. However, few studies have focused on neonatal nurses, and it is unclear to what extent unintended consequences threaten patient safety. A new instrument called the Carrington-Gephart Unintended Consequences of Electronic Health Record Questionnaire has been validated, and secondary analysis using the tool explored the phenomena among neonatal nurses (N = 40). The purposes of this study were to describe unintended consequences of use of electronic health records for neonatal nurses and to explore relationships between the phenomena and characteristics of the nurse and the electronic health record. The most frequent unintended consequences of electronic health record use were due to interruptions, followed by a heavier workload due to the electronic health record, changes to the workflow, and altered communication patterns. Neonatal nurses used workarounds most often with motivation to better assist patients. Teamwork was moderately related to higher unintended consequences including patient safety risks (r = 0.427, P = .007), system design (r = 0.419, P = .009), and technology barriers (r = 0.431, P = .007). Communication about patients was reduced when patient safety risks were high (r = -0.437, P = .003). By determining the frequency with which neonatal nurses experience unintended consequences of electronic health record use, future research can be targeted to improve electronic health record design through customization, integration, and refinement to support patient safety and better outcomes.

  10. Human radiation experiments: The Department of Energy roadmap to the story and the records

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1995-02-01

    The role of the US Government in conducting or sponsoring human radiation experiments has become the subject of public debate. Questions have been raised about the purpose, extent, and health consequences of these studies, and about how subjects were selected. The extent to which subjects provided informed consent is also under scrutiny. To respond to these questions, the Clinton administration has directed the US Department of Energy (DOE), along with other Federal agencies, to retrieve and inventory all records that document human radiation experiments. Many such records are now publicly available and will permit an open accounting and understanding of what took place. This report summarizes the Department`s ongoing search for records about human radiation experiments. It is also a roadmap to the large universe of pertinent DOE information. DOE is working to instill greater openness--consistent with national security and other appropriate considerations--throughout its operations. A key aspect of this effort is opening DOE`s historical records to independent research and analysis.

  11. Human radiation experiments: The Department of Energy roadmap to the story and the records

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    The role of the US Government in conducting or sponsoring human radiation experiments has become the subject of public debate. Questions have been raised about the purpose, extent, and health consequences of these studies, and about how subjects were selected. The extent to which subjects provided informed consent is also under scrutiny. To respond to these questions, the Clinton administration has directed the US Department of Energy (DOE), along with other Federal agencies, to retrieve and inventory all records that document human radiation experiments. Many such records are now publicly available and will permit an open accounting and understanding of what took place. This report summarizes the Department's ongoing search for records about human radiation experiments. It is also a roadmap to the large universe of pertinent DOE information. DOE is working to instill greater openness--consistent with national security and other appropriate considerations--throughout its operations. A key aspect of this effort is opening DOE's historical records to independent research and analysis

  12. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

  13. A computerised recording and monitoring system for extensive air shower experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naranan, S.; Rao, M.V.S.; Sivaprasad, K.; Subramaniam, P.B.

    1975-01-01

    A digital computer, TDC-12, with a memory capacity of 8 K 12-bit words and memory cycle time of 2 μs has been installed at the Cosmic Ray Laboratory at Kolar Gold Fields, India for real time operation with the KGF Air Shower Experiment. The computer system records the selected events and monitors and calibrates all the 90 detectors of various types in real time. (orig./WL) [de

  14. Patient experiences with full electronic access to health records and clinical notes through the My HealtheVet Personal Health Record Pilot: qualitative study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Woods, Susan S; Schwartz, Erin; Tuepker, Anais; Press, Nancy A; Nazi, Kim M; Turvey, Carolyn L; Nichol, W Paul

    2013-03-27

    Full sharing of the electronic health record with patients has been identified as an important opportunity to engage patients in their health and health care. The My HealtheVet Pilot, the initial personal health record of the US Department of Veterans Affairs, allowed patients and their delegates to view and download content in their electronic health record, including clinical notes, laboratory tests, and imaging reports. A qualitative study with purposeful sampling sought to examine patients' views and experiences with reading their health records, including their clinical notes, online. Five focus group sessions were conducted with patients and family members who enrolled in the My HealtheVet Pilot at the Portland Veterans Administration Medical Center, Oregon. A total of 30 patients enrolled in the My HealtheVet Pilot, and 6 family members who had accessed and viewed their electronic health records participated in the sessions. Four themes characterized patient experiences with reading the full complement of their health information. Patients felt that seeing their records positively affected communication with providers and the health system, enhanced knowledge of their health and improved self-care, and allowed for greater participation in the quality of their care such as follow-up of abnormal test results or decision-making on when to seek care. While some patients felt that seeing previously undisclosed information, derogatory language, or inconsistencies in their notes caused challenges, they overwhelmingly felt that having more, rather than less, of their health record information provided benefits. Patients and their delegates had predominantly positive experiences with health record transparency and the open sharing of notes and test results. Viewing their records appears to empower patients and enhance their contributions to care, calling into question common provider concerns about the effect of full record access on patient well-being. While shared

  15. The history of Finnish nuclear non-proliferation policy during the cold war. What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahosniemi, A.

    2004-03-01

    This article is a summary of the Finnish historical survey during the Cold War. In the article, I try to show how the Finnish Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy during the Cold War is linked to the broader context of the Finnish foreign and security policy. In the research report I have focused on several questions. One of the most important is the following: What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons during the Cold War? And in this context scientific knowledge is meant by knowing something about nuclear weapons. Basically, the Finnish national based survey of nuclear non-proliferation policy attempted to investigate issues like the kind of research concerning Nuclear Technology in general, Nuclear weapons, and Nuclear weapon policies of super powers in Finland during the Cold War era. (author)

  16. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okko, O. (ed.)

    2012-07-01

    The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

  17. University-level Non-proliferation and Safeguards Education and Human Capital Development Activities at Brookhaven National Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bachner K. M.; Pepper, S.; Gomera, J.; Einwechter, M.; Toler, L. T.

    2016-07-24

    BNL has offered Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century,? referred to as NNSS, every year since 2009 for graduate students in technical and policy fields related to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. The course focuses on relevant policy issues, in addition to technical components, and is part of a larger NGSI short course initiative that includes separate courses that are delivered at three other national laboratories and NNSA headquarters. [SCHOLZ and ROSENTHAL] The course includes lectures from esteemed nonproliferation experts, tours of various BNL facilities and laboratories, and in-field and table-top exercises on both technical and policy subjects. Topics include the history of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other relevant treaties, the history of and advances in international nuclear safeguards, current relevant political situations in countries such as Iran, Iraq, and the Democratic Peoples? Republic of Korea (DPRK), nuclear science and technology, instrumentation and techniques used for verification activities, and associated research and development. The students conduct a mock Design Information Verification (DIV) at BNL?s decommissioned Medical Research Reactor. The capstone of the course includes a series of student presentations in which students act as policy advisors and provide recommendations in response to scenarios involving a current nonproliferation related event that are prepared by the course organizers. ?The course is open to domestic and foreign students, and caters to students in, entering, or recently having completed graduate school. Interested students must complete an application and provide a resume and a statement describing their interest in the course. Eighteen to 22 students attend annually; 165 students have completed the course to date. A stipend helps to defray students? travel and subsistence expenses. In 2015, the course was shortened from three weeks to

  18. The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-07-01

    The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1971-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Fiji and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Fiji and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 March 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  2. IHEDN-FRS round table - Nuclear non proliferation in front of today's challenges, 10 November 2009 - Vallieres amphitheatre

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laborde, Richard; Grand, Camille; Tertrais, Bruno; Champchesnel, Tiphaine de; Hautecouverture, Benjamin; Briens, Martin

    2009-01-01

    This document first proposes a synthetic overview of contributions and then the texts of these contributions. After some introducing speeches, a first set of contributions addressed the present limitations of international instruments of struggle against proliferation (challenges of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the resolution 1540 of the UN Security Council and the new instruments of struggle against proliferation). The second set of contributions discussed the Iranian and Pakistani cases as examples of proliferation outside of and within the non proliferation regime

  3. Agreements Provided for in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Declarations Received from Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    The Director General has received from the Governments of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and Poland declarations in which they express their readiness, in conformity with the obligations they have assumed under Article III of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to begin negotiation of safeguards agreements with the Agency. The texts of these declarations are reproduced below for the information of all Members

  4. Building a national electronic medical record exchange system - experiences in Taiwan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Yu-Chuan Jack; Yen, Ju-Chuan; Chiu, Wen-Ta; Jian, Wen-Shan; Syed-Abdul, Shabbir; Hsu, Min-Huei

    2015-08-01

    Architecture (CDA) standards to generate clinical documents and Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise (IHE) Cross-enterprise Document Sharing (XDS) profile for the communication infrastructure. By December of 2014, the number of hospitals that provide an inter-institution EMR exchange service had reached 321. Hospitals that had not joined the service were all smaller ones with less than 100 beds. Inter-institution EMR exchange can make it much easier for people to access their own medical records, reduce the waste of medical resources, and improve the quality of medical care. The implementation of an inter-institution EMR exchange system faces many challenges. This article provides Taiwan's experiences as a reference. Copyright © 2015 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.

  5. 'For good and for bad': the relations between universal obligations and particular efforts in the field of nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen Van, L.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: The world has 'nuclear non-proliferation' on its lips. Presidents, politicians, journalists and others refer to it as the number one peril in our times. This may be right or wrong but irrespective of the real salience of 'nuclear dangers' it has a grip on our minds and wallets. A long range of states now make active investments in the improvement of nuclear security; not only at home as they used to do, but even abroad in other places and countries where there is concern with regard to how safe nuclear and materials are kept and stored. This development is surely an expression of a shared broadening of our sense of responsibility beyond the narrow confines of statehood and borders, and therefore this development should please us. On the other hand, the truly universal measures and instruments of the NPT and the regime round it are in trouble. It is being stated in some quarters that the NPT is inadequate in a new era with new threats from sub-state actors. Nevertheless, the NPT is the only legal instrument that is a framework that either by itself or as a starting-point can serve as a tool box for long-term storage of the proliferation risks. The reason for this is that the NPT is an expression of fairness in terms of rights and balances for all states committed to non-proliferation. And its foundations are those of international law. To the extent the NPT is being questioned will there also be a risk that non-proliferation efforts in the framework of cooperative threat reduction and for instance global partnership will lose legitimacy; simply for the reason that only a small number of the non-proliferation concerns are given attention. This relationship between cooperative threat reduction efforts on the one hand and universal legal instruments for non-proliferation on the other is a double-edged sword. While the two can reinvigorate and strengthen each other, there is also a risk that the one - cooperative threat reduction - when given preference over

  6. Sleep-monitoring, experiment M133. [electronic recording system for automatic analysis of human sleep patterns

    Science.gov (United States)

    Frost, J. D., Jr.; Salamy, J. G.

    1973-01-01

    The Skylab sleep-monitoring experiment simulated the timelines and environment expected during a 56-day Skylab mission. Two crewmembers utilized the data acquisition and analysis hardware, and their sleep characteristics were studied in an online fashion during a number of all night recording sessions. Comparison of the results of online automatic analysis with those of postmission visual data analysis was favorable, confirming the feasibility of obtaining reliable objective information concerning sleep characteristics during the Skylab missions. One crewmember exhibited definite changes in certain sleep characteristics (e.g., increased sleep latency, increased time Awake during first third of night, and decreased total sleep time) during the mission.

  7. Perampanel: An audit of clinical experience using the epilepsy electronic patient record.

    LENUS (Irish Health Repository)

    Ryan, E

    2016-07-01

    Perampanel is a non-competitive antagonist of AMPA glutamate receptors on post synaptic neurons. The aim of this study was to conduct an audit of the experience of perampanel treatment in Ireland based on the interrogation of the national epilepsy electronic patient record (EPR). A retrospective audit was compiled which reviewed the progress of patients who had been treated across two regional epilepsy centres. The EPR was used to identify patients and collect information relevant to their perampanel therapy. Collected data was entered into a statistical package for social sciences for analysis using descriptive statistics.\\r\

  8. Report of 'the 2014 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the new strategic energy plan'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamaga, Chikanobu; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Kobayashi, Naoki; Naoi, Yosuke; Oda, Tetsuzo; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2015-10-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the New Strategic Energy Plan -' on 3 December 2014, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, and International Nuclear Research Center, Tokyo Institute of Technology as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials and experts from Japan, the United States explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled 'Effective and efficient measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation based on domestic and foreign issues and the direction and role of technology development' and 'Roles of nuclear security COEs and future expectations'. In Panel Discussion 1, as the nuclear non-proliferation regime is facing various problems and challenges under current international circumstances, how to implement effective and efficient safeguards was discussed. In Panel Discussion 2, panelists discussed the following three points: 1. Current status of Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers and COEs, and Good Practice; 2. What these centers can do to enhance nuclear security (New role for COEs); 3. Regional cooperation in the Nuclear Security Training and Support Center (NSSC) and COEs in states, which the IAEA recommends establishing, and international cooperation and partnerships with international initiatives (New Role). Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the

  9. Experiences with electronic health records: early adopters in long-term care facilities.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cherry, Barbara J; Ford, Eric W; Peterson, Lori T

    2011-01-01

    : Electronic health records (EHRs) are becoming a required technology across the health care sector. Long-term care (LTC) facilities have lagged other settings in adopting health information technologies but represent an area where significant care coordination benefits might be realized. Nevertheless, managers face many of the same challenges implementing EHRs that exist in other environments when implementing enterprise-wide systems. : This study was conducted to provide a description of the early users' experiences with EHRs in LTC facilities. : Semistructured interviews were conducted. The 10 sites were all the "freestanding" LTC facilities using an EHR as of July 2008 in Texas. The interview respondents included administrators, nursing managers, nurses, certified nurse aides, and other system users. Semistructured interviews across multiple stakeholders were used to assess constructs critical to EHR adoption and implementation. : The LTC facility employees who work with EHR systems on a daily basis were positive about their experiences. In particular, operational improvements were achieved through increased access to resident information, cost avoidance, increased documentation accuracy, and implementation of evidence-based practices. : Overall, administrators believed that the systems improved care quality and employee satisfaction and were cost effective and that the EHR made a positive return on investment. Electronic documentation led to both increases in charge capture related to resource utilization group documentation, significant savings in pharmacy waste, and reductions in nursing overtime as medical record management became more automated. Quality improvement came from computer-aided monitoring of the certified nurse aide's attendance to residents' activities of daily living.

  10. Low-cost synchronization of high-speed audio and video recordings in bio-acoustic experiments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Laurijssen, Dennis; Verreycken, Erik; Geipel, Inga; Daems, Walter; Peremans, Herbert; Steckel, Jan

    2018-02-27

    In this paper, we present a method for synchronizing high-speed audio and video recordings of bio-acoustic experiments. By embedding a random signal into the recorded video and audio data, robust synchronization of a diverse set of sensor streams can be performed without the need to keep detailed records. The synchronization can be performed using recording devices without dedicated synchronization inputs. We demonstrate the efficacy of the approach in two sets of experiments: behavioral experiments on different species of echolocating bats and the recordings of field crickets. We present the general operating principle of the synchronization method, discuss its synchronization strength and provide insights into how to construct such a device using off-the-shelf components. © 2018. Published by The Company of Biologists Ltd.

  11. Closed Loop Experiment Manager (CLEM—An Open and Inexpensive Solution for Multichannel Electrophysiological Recordings and Closed Loop Experiments

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Hananel Hazan

    2017-10-01

    Full Text Available There is growing need for multichannel electrophysiological systems that record from and interact with neuronal systems in near real-time. Such systems are needed, for example, for closed loop, multichannel electrophysiological/optogenetic experimentation in vivo and in a variety of other neuronal preparations, or for developing and testing neuro-prosthetic devices, to name a few. Furthermore, there is a need for such systems to be inexpensive, reliable, user friendly, easy to set-up, open and expandable, and possess long life cycles in face of rapidly changing computing environments. Finally, they should provide powerful, yet reasonably easy to implement facilities for developing closed-loop protocols for interacting with neuronal systems. Here, we survey commercial and open source systems that address these needs to varying degrees. We then present our own solution, which we refer to as Closed Loop Experiments Manager (CLEM. CLEM is an open source, soft real-time, Microsoft Windows desktop application that is based on a single generic personal computer (PC and an inexpensive, general-purpose data acquisition board. CLEM provides a fully functional, user-friendly graphical interface, possesses facilities for recording, presenting and logging electrophysiological data from up to 64 analog channels, and facilities for controlling external devices, such as stimulators, through digital and analog interfaces. Importantly, it includes facilities for running closed-loop protocols written in any programming language that can generate dynamic link libraries (DLLs. We describe the application, its architecture and facilities. We then demonstrate, using networks of cortical neurons growing on multielectrode arrays (MEA that despite its reliance on generic hardware, its performance is appropriate for flexible, closed-loop experimentation at the neuronal network level.

  12. Technical cooperation of Tajikistan and IAEA in the field of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salomov, Dzh.A.; Mirsaidov, I.U.

    2010-01-01

    Full text: Republic of Tajikistan is a member of IAEA from 2001. Starting from that period the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) renders assistance to Tajikistan in rehabilitation of sites contaminated in result uranium extraction, strengthens the regulatory authority infrastructure, IAEA through national projects supported Tajikistan by new equipment for Scientific Centre of Oncology under Ministry of Health of the Republic of Tajikistan; new nuclear medicine department is established under Institute of Gastroenterology. Different equipment for identification of soil erosion, diagnosis of brucellosis decease among animals as well as for medical and industry diagnosis were received. Technical cooperation of Tajikistan with IAEA especially is successful on monitoring of uranium tailing dumps of Northern Tajikistan, which facilitates to weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation regime. During 2005-2008 two national and two regional projects were implemented with the following tasks: elaboration of regulatory basis and decision making process with the purpose of evaluation of residual radioactive substances influence on former sites on uranium extraction and reprocessing; assessment of carried out rehabilitation measures; ensuring the compliance international safety norms; action plan development on reducing the residual radioactive substances influence on population and rendering assistance to sustainable development. Seminars and practical training session and personnel training efficiently were carried out, resource base of State Enterprise Vostokredmet was strengthened by equipment, fellowship and scientific visits were organized and etc. In Dushanbe and Chkalovsk a number of seminars were organized. The participants attending those seminars were representatives of regulatory authority and industry. The program of seminars and practical training sessions were targeted for advance training of participants and better understanding of planning issues as

  13. Learning to work with electronic patient records and prescription charts: experiences and perceptions of hospital pharmacists.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burgin, Angela; O'Rourke, Rebecca; Tully, Mary P

    2014-01-01

    The use of electronic patient records (EPR) and electronic prescribing systems (such as electronic patient medication and administration records (EPMAR)) have many benefits. Changes and problems can result, however. Anecdotally, how pharmacists respond to system introduction varies greatly; there is very little information regarding pharmacists' experience in the literature. This study aimed to establish the changes that electronic systems afforded to hospital pharmacists' working practices and to investigate how and why they had responded to EPR and EPMAR. Four semi-structured focus groups were conducted with pharmacists with different levels of seniority, with 4-6 participants in each. The focus groups were held 8 months after implementation of EPR and EPMAR were complete, and each focus group met once. Transcripts were analyzed manually using thematic analysis and data interpreted through the application of Actor Network Theory (ANT) and human activity systems as described in Engestrom's Expansive Learning Theory (ELT). The three main overarching themes identified involved reduced patient contact, professional representation in the clinical environment and documentation in the EPR. Pharmacists felt less visible to, and had poorer relationships with, patients as they no longer saw them when they checked prescriptions. Interprofessional relationships changed as pharmacists provided informal EPMAR training for doctors and spoke more often with nurses to relay important information. Changes in whether, what and how pharmacists recorded information also were seen, particularly between pharmacists of different generations and years of working at the hospital. Analysis of the changes afforded by electronic systems using ANT and ELT suggest that pharmacists develop individual working practices in response to changes that electronic systems provide. For implementation success of EPR and EPMAR systems, pharmacists need to be taught not just the practicalities of system

  14. Surgeon-Manipulated Live Surgery Video Recording Apparatuses: Personal Experience and Review of Literature.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kapi, Emin

    2017-06-01

    Visual recording of surgical procedures is a method that is used quite frequently in practices of plastic surgery. While presentations containing photographs are quite common in education seminars and congresses, video-containing presentations find more favour. For this reason, the presentation of surgical procedures in the form of real-time video display has increased especially recently. Appropriate technical equipment for video recording is not available in most hospitals, so there is a need to set up external apparatus in the operating room. Among these apparatuses can be listed such options as head-mounted video cameras, chest-mounted cameras, and tripod-mountable cameras. The head-mounted video camera is an apparatus that is capable of capturing high-resolution and detailed close-up footage. The tripod-mountable camera enables video capturing from a fixed point. Certain user-specific modifications can be made to overcome some of these restrictions. Among these modifications, custom-made applications are one of the most effective solutions. The article makes an attempt to present the features and experiences concerning the use of a combination of a head- or chest-mounted action camera, a custom-made portable tripod apparatus of versatile features, and an underwater camera. The descriptions we used are quite easy-to-assembly, quickly installed, and inexpensive apparatuses that do not require specific technical knowledge and can be manipulated by the surgeon personally in all procedures. The author believes that video recording apparatuses will be integrated more to the operating room, become a standard practice, and become more enabling for self-manipulation by the surgeon in the near future. This journal requires that authors assign a level of evidence to each article. For a full description of these Evidence-Based Medicine ratings, please refer to the Table of Contents or the online Instructions to Authors www.springer.com/00266 .

  15. Undergraduate grade point average and graduate record examination scores: the experience of one graduate nursing program.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Newton, Sarah E; Moore, Gary

    2007-01-01

    Graduate nursing programs frequently use undergraduate grade point average (UGPA) and Graduate Record Examination (GRE) scores for admission decisions. The literature indicates that both UGPA and GRE scores are predictive of graduate school success, but that UGPA may be the better predictor. If that is so, one must ask if both are necessary for graduate nursing admission decisions. This article presents research on one graduate nursing program's experience with UGPA and GRE scores and offers a perspective regarding their continued usefulness for graduate admission decisions. Data from 120 graduate students were examined, and regression analysis indicated that UGPA significantly predicted GRE verbal and quantitative scores (p < .05). Regression analysis also determined a UGPA score above which the GRE provided little additional useful data for graduate nursing admission decisions.

  16. The text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-04-01

    The full text of the agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  17. [Electronic parent-child health records--potentials, aims and international experience].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Piso, B; Mathis-Edenhofer, S; Schramm, F; Wild, C

    2014-04-01

    Against the background of a planned re-orientation of the Austrian maternity and child programme, which might include an electronic instead of paper-based realisation, this article aims to give an overview of international pilot projects of electronic parent-child preventive care initiatives (ePCPI) as well as their aims, potentials and constraints. A literature search in databases and hand search for international (pilot) projects was undertaken. 9 of the 30 identified ePCPI can be treated as electronic parent and/or child health records, which have been realised within a comprehensive electronic health record, as an electronic version of a paper-based document or as a centre-based IT solution. Only a few ePCPI use the additional potential of health services planning and evaluation besides core components (e. g., administration of care) and facilitate systemic learning based on feedback and evaluation -cycles. Based on experiences from international ePCPIs some core components of successful planning and implementation, like the definition of aims and their monitoring, the constitution of teams responsible for planning and conception and the early involvement of end-users and stakeholders, should be considered to minimise avoidable mistakes. Consequent technology assessments, including those of IT-based interventions, are required to allow a reflected approach. © Georg Thieme Verlag KG Stuttgart · New York.

  18. Information report on the behalf of the foreign affairs, defence and armed forces Commission on France security, nuclear disarmament and non proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This report first gives an overview of nuclear disarmament and non proliferation twenty years after the end of Cold War: evolution and status of Russia's and United States' nuclear weapon arsenals, France's and United Kingdom's trend to reduce their nuclear armament, reinforcement of China's nuclear armament, effects and limitations of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It notices that the new international context gave birth to some expectations and may lead to a lower nuclear pressure, notably with the influence of START negotiations between Russia and the United States, provided that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is ratified by more countries, and that negotiations promote a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The report also outlines the importance of the promotion of better controlled peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It discusses the relationship between maintaining the world nuclear order and the reduction of international and regional tensions, and the importance of struggle against all forms of proliferation. It analyses the French nuclear posture in terms of security requirements, and in front of the zero nuclear option, in a context of ballistic missile proliferation, and in relationship with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

  19. IAEA safeguards: Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons. As the world's nuclear inspectorate, the IAEA performs an indispensable role in furthering nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Following the completion of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, the IAEA has become the instrument with which to verify that the peaceful use commitments made under the NPT or similar agreements are kept through performing what is known as its safeguards role. Under the NPT, governments around the world have committed to three common objectives: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; pursuing nuclear disarmament; and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT has made it obligatory for all its non-nuclear weapon State parties to submit all nuclear material in nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. With all but a handful of the world community as State parties, the NPT is by far the most widely adhered to legal agreement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The IAEA takes account of all source and special fissionable material in countries under safeguards. Monitoring and verification activities focus on those types of nuclear material that are the most crucial and relevant to nuclear weapons manufacturing. This includes plutonium-239, uranium-233 and -235 and any material containing one or more of these. Safeguards activities are applied routinely at over 900 facilities in 71 countries. In 2001 alone, more than 21,000 calendar days in the field were devoted to verifying hundreds of tons of special fissionable material by more than IAEA 250 inspectors

  20. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Annual report 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haemaelaeinen, M.; Karhu, P.

    2008-04-01

    Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2007 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two licence holders in 2007, setting required actions for them to correct their reporting and to update the descriptions of their procedures. Neither the IAEA nor the European Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards

  1. Cigarette smoking and tooth loss experience among young adults: a national record linkage study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tanaka Keiko

    2007-11-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Various factors affect tooth loss in older age including cigarette smoking; however, evidence regarding the association between smoking and tooth loss during young adulthood is limited. The present study examined the association between cigarette smoking and tooth loss experience among adults aged 20–39 years using linked data from two national databases in Japan. Methods Two databases of the National Nutrition Survey (NNS and the Survey of Dental Diseases (SDD, which were conducted in 1999, were obtained from the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare with permission for analytical use. In the NNS, participants received physical examinations and were interviewed regarding dietary intake and health practices including cigarette smoking, whereas in the SDD, participants were asked about their frequency of daily brushing, and received oral examinations by certified dentists. Among 6,805 records electronically linked via household identification code, 1314 records of individuals aged 20 to 39 years were analyzed. The prevalence of 1+ tooth loss was compared among non-, former, and current smokers. Multiple logistic regression models were constructed including confounders: frequency of tooth brushing, body mass index, alcohol consumption, and intake of vitamins C and E. Results Smoking rates differed greatly in men (53.3% and women (15.5%. The overall prevalence of tooth loss was 31.4% (31.8% men and 31.1% women. Tooth loss occurred more frequently among current smokers (40.6% than former (23.1% and non-smokers (27.9%. Current smoking showed a significant association with 1+ tooth loss in men (adjusted OR = 2.21 [1.40–3.50], P = 0.0007 and women (1.70 [1.13–2.55], P = 0.0111. A significant positive exposure-related relationship between cigarette smoking status and tooth loss was observed (P for trend Conclusion An association between cigarette smoking and tooth loss was evident among young adults throughout Japan. Due to

  2. Personal health records in the Netherlands: potential user preferences quantified by a discrete choice experiment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Determann, Domino; Lambooij, Mattijs S; Gyrd-Hansen, Dorte; de Bekker-Grob, Esther W; Steyerberg, Ewout W; Heldoorn, Marcel; Pedersen, Line Bjørnskov; de Wit, G Ardine

    2017-05-01

    To identify groups of potential users based on their preferences for characteristics of personal health records (PHRs) and to estimate potential PHR uptake. We performed a discrete choice experiment, which consisted of 12 choice scenarios, each comprising 2 hypothetical PHR alternatives and an opt-out. The alternatives differed based on 5 characteristics. The survey was administered to Internet panel members of the Dutch Federation of Patients and Consumer Organizations. We used latent class models to analyze the data. A total of 1,443 potential PHR users completed the discrete choice experiment. We identified 3 latent classes: "refusers" (class probability 43%), "eager adopters" (37%), and "reluctant adopters" (20%). The predicted uptake for the reluctant adopters ranged from 4% in the case of a PHR with the worst attribute levels to 68% in the best case. Those with 1 or more chronic diseases were significantly more likely to belong to the eager adopter class. The data storage provider was the most decisive aspect for the eager and reluctant adopters, while cost was most decisive for the refusers. Across all classes, health care providers and independent organizations were the most preferred data storage providers. We identified 3 groups, of which 1 group (more than one-third of potential PHR users) indicated great interest in a PHR irrespective of PHR characteristics. Policymakers who aim to expand the use of PHRs will be most successful when health care providers and health facilities or independent organizations store PHR data while refraining from including market parties. © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Medical Informatics Association. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com

  3. Introducing sexual orientation and gender identity into the electronic health record: one academic health center's experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Callahan, Edward J; Sitkin, Nicole; Ton, Hendry; Eidson-Ton, W Suzanne; Weckstein, Julie; Latimore, Darin

    2015-02-01

    Many U.S. populations experience significant health disparities. Increasing health care providers' awareness of and education about sexual orientation (SO) and gender identity (GI) diversity could help reduce health disparities among lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) patients. The authors share the University of California, Davis, Health System's (UCDHS's) experience as it became the first U.S. academic health center to formally introduce patient SO/GI demographic data into its electronic health record (EHR) as a step toward reducing LGBT health disparities. Adding these data to the EHR initially met with resistance. The authors, members of the UCDHS Task Force for Inclusion of SO/GI in the EHR, viewed this resistance as an invitation to educate leaders, providers, and staff about LGBT health disparities and to expose providers to techniques for discussing SO/GI with patients. They describe the strategies they employed to effect institutional culture change, including involvement of senior leadership, key informant interviews, educational outreach via grand rounds and resident workshops, and creation of a patient safety net through inviting providers to self-identify as welcoming LGBT patients. The ongoing cultural change process has inspired spin-off projects contributing to an improved climate for LGBT individuals at UCDHS, including an employee organization supporting SO/GI diversity, support for and among LGBT medical learners through events and listservs, development and implementation of an LGBT health curriculum, and creation of peer navigator programs for LGBT patients with cancer. The authors reflect on lessons learned and on institutional pride in and commitment to providing quality care for LGBT patients.

  4. Electronic Health Record (EHR) Organizational Change: Explaining Resistance Through Profession, Organizational Experience, and EHR Communication Quality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barrett, Ashley K

    2018-04-01

    The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act passed by the U.S. government in 2009 mandates that all healthcare organizations adopt a certified electronic health record (EHR) system by 2015. Failure to comply will result in Medicare reimbursement penalties, which steadily increase with each year of delinquency. There are several repercussions of this seemingly top-down, rule-bound organizational change-one of which is employee resistance. Given the penalties for violating EHR meaningful use standards are ongoing, resistance to this mandate presents a serious issue for healthcare organizations. This study surveyed 345 employees in one healthcare organization that recently implemented an EHR. Analysis of variance results offer theoretical and pragmatic contributions by demonstrating physicians, nurses, and employees with more experience in their organization are the most resistant to EHR change. The job characteristics model is used to explain these findings. Hierarchical regression analyses also demonstrate the quality of communication surrounding EHR implementation-from both formal and informal sources-is negatively associated with EHR resistance and positively associated with perceived EHR implementation success and EHR's perceived relative advantage.

  5. Development of a tool to measure user experience following electronic health record implementation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xiao, Yan; Montgomery, Donna Cook; Philpot, Lindsey M; Barnes, Sunni A; Compton, Jan; Kennerly, Donald

    2014-01-01

    The aim of this study was to develop a survey tool to assess electronic health record (EHR) implementation to guide improvement initiatives. Survey tools are needed for ongoing improvement and have not been developed for aspects of EHR implementation. The Baylor EHR User Experience (UX) survey was developed to capture 5 concept domains: training and competency, usability, infrastructure, usefulness, and end-user support. Validation efforts included content validity assessment, a pilot study, and analysis of 606 nurse respondents. The revised tool was sent to randomly sampled EHR nurse-users in 11 acute care facilities. A total of 1,301 nurses responded (37%). Internal consistency of the survey tool was excellent (Cronbach's α = .892). Survey responses including 1,819 open comments were used to identify and prioritize improvement efforts in areas such as education, support, optimization of EHR functions, and vendor change requests. The Baylor EHR UX survey was a valid tool that can be useful for prioritizing improvement efforts in relation to EHR implementation.

  6. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of Safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  7. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  8. Multiple dimensions of residential environments, neighborhood experiences, and jogging behavior in the RECORD Study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Karusisi, Noëlla; Bean, Kathy; Oppert, Jean-Michel; Pannier, Bruno; Chaix, Basile

    2012-07-01

    The purpose of this study was to examine the associations between a broad range of environmental characteristics and jogging behavior while taking into account different complementary outcomes to describe the behavior. Using the RECORD Cohort Study (7290 participants, 2007-2008, Paris region, France), multilevel models were used to investigate individual/neighborhood variables associated with the probability of jogging; the time spent jogging; and the location of the practice. The presence and quality of green and open spaces was associated both with a greater probability of jogging [risk ratio (RR) for the first vs. the fourth quartile=1.22, 95% credible interval (CrI): 1.03-1.44] and with the practice of jogging within rather than outside the neighborhood (RR=1.29; 95% CrI: 1.10-1.53). Moreover, a high social cohesion and the presence of enjoyable places were associated with a higher probability of jogging (RR=1.15; 95% CrI: 1.00-1.31; RR=1.22; 95% CrI: 1.03-1.44) while the presence of parks or a lake increased the probability of jogging inside rather than outside the neighborhood (RR=1.29; 95% CrI: 1.10-1.53; RR=1.14; 95% CrI: 1.03-1.26). Paying attention to physical and social environments, related neighborhood experiences, and attitudes toward health may be an effective approach to promote outdoor physical activity. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  9. Scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre - ARSRITP and arms control and nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avrorin, E.N.; Andrusenko, B.A.; Voznyuk, R.I.; Voloshin, N.P.

    1994-01-01

    The activity of scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre (RFNC) -ARSRITP in the field of nuclear disarmament control for the period of 1974 -1993 is discussed. RFNC - ARSRITP scientists in collaboration with american specialists have developed and employed in practice the techniques and equipment to control the bilateral Treaty on the limitation of Nuclear -Weapon Test. Experience of control over nuclear tests of threshold power and realization of new RFNC - ARSRITP scientific and technical projects have made a basis for development of measures and means of possible control methods to observe complete nuclear test ban

  10. The implications of South Asia's nuclear tests for non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. A report of the UNIDIR conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    On 7 and 8 September 1998, fifty experts, drawn from over twenty-five countries and from academia, non-governmental organizations and governments, met in their personal capacities in an off-the-record, 'track one a half' style meeting to discuss the implications of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998. The meeting was hosted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and sponsored by the governments of Australia, Denmark, Italy, Norway, New Zealand and the United States. The conference was divided into five sessions, each beginning with one or two short opening statements from selected experts followed by discussion amongst all the participants. The final session comprised a summary from two of the participants, which was circulated soon after the meeting. This report outlines the various discussions in the meeting and provides a list of possible policy directions that were suggested during the meeting. Not all policy suggestions received the full support of all participants, nor does their inclusion herein imply any endorsement by UNIDIR, the United Nations or any of the sponsoring governments

  11. Do Financial Incentives Increase the Use of Electronic Health Records? Findings from an Experiment

    OpenAIRE

    Lorenzo Moreno; Suzanne Felt-Lisk; Stacy Dale

    2013-01-01

    This working paper reviews impacts of the Electronic Health Records Demonstration implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, finding that moderate incentive payments did not lead to universal electronic health record (EHR) adoption and use in a two-year time frame. However, the demonstration showed that incentives can influence physician use of EHRs.

  12. 21 CFR 510.301 - Records and reports concerning experience with animal feeds bearing or containing new animal...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 21 Food and Drugs 6 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Records and reports concerning experience with... application is in effect. 510.301 Section 510.301 Food and Drugs FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF... or deterioration in the drug, or any failure of one or more distributed batches of the drug to meet...

  13. "But They Won't Come to Lectures..." The Impact of Audio Recorded Lectures on Student Experience and Attendance

    Science.gov (United States)

    Larkin, Helen E.

    2010-01-01

    The move to increasingly flexible platforms for student learning and experience through provision of online lecture recordings is often interpreted by educators as students viewing attendance at lectures as optional. The trend toward the use of this technology is often met with resistance from some academic staff who argue that student attendance…

  14. Two-wavelength holographic recording in photopolymer using four-energy-level system: experiments and modeling

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lin, Chun-Hua; Cho, Sheng-Lung; Lin, Shiuan-Huei; Chi, Sien; Hsu, Ken-Yuh

    2014-11-01

    We investigate a two-wavelength method for recording a persistent hologram in a doped photopolymer. The recording method is based on two separated optical excitations of the four-energy-level system of the doped element, one at λ=325 nm as the sensitizing wavelength and the other at λ=647 nm as the writing wavelength, allowing for an experimental demonstration of nondestructive readout in phenanthrenequinone-doped poly(methyl methacrylate). Further, a four-energy-level rate equations model is proposed for describing the dynamics of hologram recording. The model successfully explains our experimental finding and further provides a general method to investigate such a two-wavelength holographic recording in photopolymer.

  15. JUNO JUPITER MWR 2 EXPERIMENT DATA RECORDS V1.0

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — The Juno MWR EDR data sets will ultimately include all uncalibrated MWR science data records for the entire Juno mission. The set in this volume will contain only...

  16. A digital advocate? Reactions of rural people who experience homelessness to the idea of recording clinical encounters.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Grande, Stuart W; Castaldo, Mary Ganger; Carpenter-Song, Elizabeth; Griesemer, Ida; Elwyn, Glyn

    2017-08-01

    Are the benefits of recording clinical encounters shared across different groups, or do they vary based on social position? Studies show that educated patients record their clinical visits to enhance their experience, but very little is known about recording benefits among "hard-to-reach" populations. To examine the reactions of homeless people to the idea of using a smartphone to record their own clinical encounter, either covertly or with permission from their physician. We conducted semi-structured interviews with individuals at a temporary housing shelter in Northern New England. A thematic analysis identified themes that were iteratively refined into representative groups. Eighteen (18) interviews were conducted, 12 with women and six with men. Initial reactions to clinical recordings were positive (11 of 18). A majority (17 of 18) were willing to use recordings in future visits. A thematic analysis characterized data in two ways: (i) by providing reliable evidence for review, they functioned as an advocacy measure for patients; (ii) by promoting transparency and levelling social distance, this technology modified clinical relationships. Recordings permitted the sharing of data with others, providing tangible proof of behaviour and refuting misconceptions. Asking permission to record appeared to modify relationships and level perceived social distance with clinicians. We found that while many rural, disadvantaged individuals felt marginalized by the wide social distance between themselves and their clinicians, recording technology may serve as an advocate by holding both patients and doctors accountable and by permitting the burden of clinical proof to be shared. © 2016 The Authors Health Expectations Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  17. Chronic cortical and electromyographic recordings from a fully implantable device: preclinical experience in a nonhuman primate

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ryapolova-Webb, Elena; Afshar, Pedram; Stanslaski, Scott; Denison, Tim; de Hemptinne, Coralie; Bankiewicz, Krystof; Starr, Philip A.

    2014-02-01

    Objective. Analysis of intra- and perioperatively recorded cortical and basal ganglia local field potentials in human movement disorders has provided great insight into the pathophysiology of diseases such as Parkinson's, dystonia, and essential tremor. However, in order to better understand the network abnormalities and effects of chronic therapeutic stimulation in these disorders, long-term recording from a fully implantable data collection system is needed. Approach. A fully implantable investigational data collection system, the Activa® PC + S neurostimulator (Medtronic, Inc., Minneapolis, MN), has been developed for human use. Here, we tested its utility for extended intracranial recording in the motor system of a nonhuman primate. The system was attached to two quadripolar paddle arrays: one covering sensorimotor cortex, and one covering a proximal forelimb muscle, to study simultaneous cortical field potentials and electromyography during spontaneous transitions from rest to movement. Main results. Over 24 months of recording, movement-related changes in physiologically relevant frequency bands were readily detected, including beta and gamma signals at approximately 2.5 μV/\\sqrtHz and 0.7 μV/\\sqrt{Hz}, respectively. The system architecture allowed for flexible recording configurations and algorithm triggered data recording. In the course of physiological analyses, sensing artifacts were observed (˜1 μVrms stationary tones at fixed frequency), which were mitigated either with post-processing or algorithm design and did not impact the scientific conclusions. Histological examination revealed no underlying tissue damage; however, a fibrous capsule had developed around the paddles, demonstrating a potential mechanism for the observed signal amplitude reduction. Significance. This study establishes the usefulness of this system in measuring chronic brain and muscle signals. Use of this system may potentially be valuable in human trials of chronic brain

  18. Outlook on non-proliferation activities in the world and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy among Turkish speaking countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Birsen, N.

    2002-01-01

    Nuclear technology is being widely used in protecting the environment, manufacturing industry, medicine, agriculture, food industry and electricity production. In the world, 438 nuclear power plants are in operation, and 31 are under construction. Nuclear share of total electricity generation have reached to 17 percent. However, 2053 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1999 and 2 atom bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 have initiated nonproliferation activities aiming to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a climate where cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be fostered. In addition to international efforts for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, great efforts were made for disarmament and banning the nuclear tests which damage the environment. Following the first Geneva Conference in 1955 for expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Turkey was one of the first countries to start activities in the nuclear field. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) was established in 1956 and Turkey became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency established in 1957 by the United Nations for spreading the use of nuclear energy to contribute peace, health and prosperity throughout the world in same year. Turkey is a candidate state to join to European Union and has already signed Custom Union Agreement, also part of the Eurasian Region. So, there are significant developments in cultural, social, technical, economical and trade relations owning to our common historical and cultural values with the countries in the region and Central Asia. TAEK was established to support, co-ordinate and perform the activities in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and act as a regulatory body and establish cooperation with countries and international organizations. In the late 1990's TAEK, besides the cooperation with various countries, has involved to cooperating with nuclear institutes of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for

  19. Identifying Seismogenic Deposits in Cascadia Inland Lake Sediments: A Natural Experiment Recorded in the Sedimentary Records at Squaw Lakes, Oregon, USA

    Science.gov (United States)

    Morey, A. E.; Gavin, D. G.; Goldfinger, C.; Nelson, A. R.

    2013-12-01

    A natural experiment began after a landslide dammed Squaw Creek located ~100 km from the Oregon coast at the Oregon/California border (42.035804°N, 123.021973°W) separating the drainages at the confluence of Squaw and Slickear Creeks, resulting in the formation of Upper (Little) Squaw Lake and Lower (Big) Squaw Lake. Upper Squaw Lake is the smaller of the two lakes (7.2 ha) with a large drainage (40 sq km) and the sediments contain a 2000-y record of disturbance events. The thickest (~5 cm to ~35 cm) of the disturbance deposits correlate in timing and frequency as compared to the onshore/offshore record of seismogenic turbidites suggesting they were possibly triggered by strong shaking from great earthquakes. Both the drainage and the lake itself are situated within the Condrey Mountain Schist Terrane which consists of black graphitic quartz-mica schist ('blackschist'), with considerable amounts of chlorite-actinolite schist ('greenschist'), and is prone to failures. In contrast, Lower Squaw Lake is a larger, long lake (18.6 ha) with a small drainage (19 sq km). Lower Squaw Lake is also surrounded by the Condrey Mountain Schist, but approximately 95% of the drainage is located in the Western Hayfork Terrane, composed primarily of metavolcaniclastic andesitic agglomerate and tuff which is much more resistant to erosion and failure. These differences in geologic setting allow for the identification of deposits formed internally to the lake at Lower Squaw Lake, which can then be compared to the record from Upper Squaw Lake where the frequency of disturbance event deposits is much higher than reasonably expected from earthquakes. Because disturbance event deposits in Pacific Northwest lakes have been typically attributed to post-fire erosion or extreme hydrologic events, we take advantage of these differences in setting to differentiate between seismogenic and aseismic deposits in Cascadia lake sediments.

  20. Ultracentrifuge and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Voortman, A.J.

    1977-01-01

    The author states that there is no meaningful difference, from the point of view of proliferation between peaceful, civil, scientific application of nuclear fission, and the use of it in nuclear weapons. The proliferation of the nuclear technology for weapons appeared and appears to be closely connected with the spread of peaceful applications of nuclear technology. In connection with this, he discusses the Ultracentrifuge plant at Almelo (Netherlands) and the supply of nuclear technology by West-Germany especially to Brazil. Further the changed American policy and the possibility of an American/Russian deal to prevent the spread of the nuclear enrichment technology is discussed

  1. Safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.

    1985-01-01

    It deserves re-emphasizing that the first and most important obstacle to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of political judgement and determination. Safeguards cannot prevent a violation of obligations... any more than bank or company audits can prevent a misappropriation of funds. All they can do is expose infringements or arouse suspicions - in effect, sound the alarm. By submitting the whole of their nuclear energy sector to impartial international inspection, States can inspire great confidence on the part of the rest of the world in the exclusively peaceful nature of their programmes. Safeguards are today an essential precondition for imports of nuclear power technology, uranium fuel, and many different kinds of material for the nuclear energy sector. Without IAEA safeguards, the existing market in this sector would be unworkable. Potentially, the most important aspect of the acceptance of IAEA safeguards by nuclear-weapon States is that it shows their readiness to submit important installations within their territory to impartial inspection

  2. The Non-Proliferation Malaise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sur, Serge

    2013-01-01

    Issues pertaining to nuclear weapons no longer occupy more than a relatively modest position in the international security field, which is more significantly threatened by recent forms of conflict - particularly asymmetrical -, the contemporary challenges posed by terrorism, the collapse of States and ensuing civil violence, organised crime, massacres, regional destabilisation, and the emerging threats related to deleterious uses of the Internet. Analysing these challenges and threats, and defining and implementing effective responses constitutes the priorities of the international agenda and mobilizes the energy and capabilities of States, alliances and coalitions, and international organisations. The time when the nuclear arms race between the United States and the USSR and the arms control efforts that attempted to frame and control it dominated the international relations scene has passed. This duo has been succeeded by a relative lack of interest on the part of nuclear powers towards their own arms. (author)

  3. Guidelines for information about therapy experiments: a proposal on best practice for recording experimental data on cancer therapy

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    González-Beltrán Alejandra N

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Biology, biomedicine and healthcare have become data-driven enterprises, where scientists and clinicians need to generate, access, validate, interpret and integrate different kinds of experimental and patient-related data. Thus, recording and reporting of data in a systematic and unambiguous fashion is crucial to allow aggregation and re-use of data. This paper reviews the benefits of existing biomedical data standards and focuses on key elements to record experiments for therapy development. Specifically, we describe the experiments performed in molecular, cellular, animal and clinical models. We also provide an example set of elements for a therapy tested in a phase I clinical trial. Findings We introduce the Guidelines for Information About Therapy Experiments (GIATE, a minimum information checklist creating a consistent framework to transparently report the purpose, methods and results of the therapeutic experiments. A discussion on the scope, design and structure of the guidelines is presented, together with a description of the intended audience. We also present complementary resources such as a classification scheme, and two alternative ways of creating GIATE information: an electronic lab notebook and a simple spreadsheet-based format. Finally, we use GIATE to record the details of the phase I clinical trial of CHT-25 for patients with refractory lymphomas. The benefits of using GIATE for this experiment are discussed. Conclusions While data standards are being developed to facilitate data sharing and integration in various aspects of experimental medicine, such as genomics and clinical data, no previous work focused on therapy development. We propose a checklist for therapy experiments and demonstrate its use in the 131Iodine labeled CHT-25 chimeric antibody cancer therapy. As future work, we will expand the set of GIATE tools to continue to encourage its use by cancer researchers, and we will engineer an ontology to

  4. U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm U.S. reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonproliferation policies can influence export sales. Based on available data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of U.S. nuclear exports. However, U.S. companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by U.S. technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and compete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for U.S. nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, U.S. companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

  5. The Text of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force for the Slovak Republic on 1 December 2005 [es

  6. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Republic of Slovenia on 1 September 2006 [es

  7. Agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Czech Republic on 1 October 2009 [es

  8. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for the Republic of Estonia on 1 December 2005 [es

  9. Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    The document informs that the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

  10. Text of the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    The document informs that the Czech Republic succeeded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 1 January 1993 and to the agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the above treaty

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  12. The Text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 31 October 1975 between the Republic of Korea and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  13. The Text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977 between Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-03-01

    The text of the Agreement of 4 March 1977, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between Japan and the Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced for the information of all Members

  14. The text of the agreement of 5 December 1974 between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-04-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 5 December 1974, and the Protocol thereto, between Jordan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Agreement entered into force on 21 February 1978

  15. Responsibilities of supplier states and consumer states in accommodating supply arrangements to changing circumstances and to identify and evaluate alternative mechanisms for improving supply guarantees consistent with non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The papers by the USA and Australia deal with the responsibility of supplier states and consumer states in accommodating supply arrangements to changing circumstances and with the development of alternative supply guarantees consistent with non-proliferation treaties. A number of theses are evolved for the realisation of these goals; most of them refer to an improvement of bilateral contacts and agreements

  16. Statement issued on 28 February 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on accession of Argentina to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The statement was issued on 28 February 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on accession of Argentina to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Statement was received from the Resident Representative of France to the International Atomic Energy Agency and is being circulated for the information of all Member States

  17. Guidelines for the International Observation by the Agency of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes under the Provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or Analogous Provisions in Other International Agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    On 21 June 1972 the Board of Governors approved guidelines for the international observation by the Agency of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or analogous provisions in other international agreements. These guidelines are now reproduced herein for the information of all Members

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [fr

  19. The Text of the Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between the Holy See and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  1. The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  2. The Text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-11-01

    The text of the Agreement of 7 August 1978 between Portugal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 25, on 14 June 1979.

  3. The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ghana and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  4. The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  5. The Text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  6. Keratin Durability Has Implications for the Fossil Record: Results from a 10 Year Feather Degradation Experiment.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alison E Moyer

    Full Text Available Keratinous 'soft tissue' structures (i.e. epidermally derived and originally non-biomineralized, include feathers, skin, claws, beaks, and hair. Despite their relatively common occurrence in the fossil record (second only to bone and teeth, few studies have addressed natural degradation processes that must occur in all organic material, including those keratinous structures that are incorporated into the rock record as fossils. Because feathers have high preservation potential and strong phylogenetic signal, in the current study we examine feathers subjected to different burial environments for a duration of ~10 years, using transmission electron microscopy (TEM and in situ immunofluorescence (IF. We use morphology and persistence of specific immunoreactivity as indicators of preservation at the molecular and microstructural levels. We show that feather keratin is durable, demonstrates structural and microstructural integrity, and retains epitopes suitable for specific antibody recognition in even the harshest conditions. These data support the hypothesis that keratin antibody reactivity can be used to identify the nature and composition of epidermal structures in the rock record, and to address evolutionary questions by distinguishing between alpha- (widely distributed and beta- (limited to sauropsids keratin.

  7. Experience and Compliance With Scanning Vaccines' Two-Dimensional Barcodes to Record Data.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Evanson, Heather V; Rodgers, Loren; Reed, Jenica; Daily, Ashley; Gerlach, Kenneth; Greene, Michael; Koeppl, Patrick; Cox, Regina; Williams, Warren

    2018-01-01

    Automated population of data into health information system fields offers the potential to increase efficiencies and save time. Increasingly, as two-dimensional barcoded vaccine products and barcode scanning technology become more widely available, manual recording of vaccine data can be reduced. This evaluation explores how often two-dimensional barcodes on vaccine vials and syringes were scanned and the perceived benefits and challenges reported by vaccine providers. Eighty-two facilities that administer vaccines completed the evaluation. Twenty-seven of those facilities provided records from vaccines administered between July 2014 and January 2015. Among the 63 179 two-dimensional barcoded vaccine administrations recorded, 12 408 (19%) were scanned. We received 116 user surveys from 63 facilities; using content analysis, we identified perceived benefits of scanning, workflow challenges, scanning challenges, and other challenges. The findings of this evaluation can guide health information system developers, vaccine manufacturers, and vaccine providers on how to remove potential barriers to using two-dimensional barcode scanning.

  8. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session on S. 897 and S. 1432

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    On April 7, 1977, President Carter announced his nuclear power policy. The policy statement set forth seven specific objectives for the future use of nuclear energy in this country and the rest of the world. The two proposed instruments for implementing this policy are the revised fiscal year 1978 ERDA authorization draft bill and S. 1432, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. These legislative proposals are linked in that S. 1432 is designed to establish a non-proliferation framework with specific objectives established for the ERDA nuclear energy programs. The ERDA authorization bill is the budgetary vehicle to implement those objectives. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources obtained joint referral of certain portions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to insure that non-proliferation policy is implemented in a manner consistent with the policy of having sufficient energy for this country and foreign countries in the future. The Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development must examine the costs and the consequences of various initiatives before they are implemented. F or example, the proposal to guarantee uranium enrichment services for foreign nations poses specific requirements on ERDA to expand considerably our enrichment capacity by the year 2000. Without reprocessing, it is expected that spent fuel rods from abroad will be returned to this country for storage with attendant costs and siting decisions. Also, international fuel-cycle evaluation programs must be carefully examined to insure that all options, including regional fuel cycle centers with international controls and inspection, are considered in seeking international approaches to the non-proliferation objectives. At the June 10 hearing, the subcommittee received testimony on S. 1432, the bill prepared by the administration. The hearings on September 13 and 14 focused on S. 897. Statements by many witnesses are included

  9. Supporting information retrieval from electronic health records: A report of University of Michigan's nine-year experience in developing and using the Electronic Medical Record Search Engine (EMERSE).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hanauer, David A; Mei, Qiaozhu; Law, James; Khanna, Ritu; Zheng, Kai

    2015-06-01

    This paper describes the University of Michigan's nine-year experience in developing and using a full-text search engine designed to facilitate information retrieval (IR) from narrative documents stored in electronic health records (EHRs). The system, called the Electronic Medical Record Search Engine (EMERSE), functions similar to Google but is equipped with special functionalities for handling challenges unique to retrieving information from medical text. Key features that distinguish EMERSE from general-purpose search engines are discussed, with an emphasis on functions crucial to (1) improving medical IR performance and (2) assuring search quality and results consistency regardless of users' medical background, stage of training, or level of technical expertise. Since its initial deployment, EMERSE has been enthusiastically embraced by clinicians, administrators, and clinical and translational researchers. To date, the system has been used in supporting more than 750 research projects yielding 80 peer-reviewed publications. In several evaluation studies, EMERSE demonstrated very high levels of sensitivity and specificity in addition to greatly improved chart review efficiency. Increased availability of electronic data in healthcare does not automatically warrant increased availability of information. The success of EMERSE at our institution illustrates that free-text EHR search engines can be a valuable tool to help practitioners and researchers retrieve information from EHRs more effectively and efficiently, enabling critical tasks such as patient case synthesis and research data abstraction. EMERSE, available free of charge for academic use, represents a state-of-the-art medical IR tool with proven effectiveness and user acceptance. Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  10. Taking a quality assurance program from paper to electronic health records: one dental school's experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Filker, Phyllis J; Muckey, Erin Joy; Kelner, Steven M; Kodish-Stav, Jodi

    2009-09-01

    The Obama administration is seeking to increase access to and improve the efficiency of the health care system in the United States. One aspect of those efforts is a push towards the utilization of electronic health records (EHRs) by health care providers. Nova Southeastern University College of Dental Medicine (NSU-CDM) opened its doors in 1997 and began its evolution from paper charts to EHRs in 2006. AxiUm, a computer-run patient record and clinical management system, has become an integral part of the college's quality assurance program and its students' clinical education. Since the introduction of axiUm, the school has already noticed an increase in the quality of patient care due to improved oversight of patient management and the ability to more efficiently track treatment outcomes. Over time, the system will enable data collected by students providing care in the clinics to be quantified. Opposition to EHRs tends to stem primarily from the amount of time required for users to gain proficiency in the new technology, as well as from the initial cost to the provider. But there is no better place to begin this learning process regarding the importance and utilization of EHR systems than universities, where health professions students can acquire a comfort level with EHRs in an academic environment that they may then implement in their future practice.

  11. The SMART Platform: early experience enabling substitutable applications for electronic health records.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mandl, Kenneth D; Mandel, Joshua C; Murphy, Shawn N; Bernstam, Elmer Victor; Ramoni, Rachel L; Kreda, David A; McCoy, J Michael; Adida, Ben; Kohane, Isaac S

    2012-01-01

    The Substitutable Medical Applications, Reusable Technologies (SMART) Platforms project seeks to develop a health information technology platform with substitutable applications (apps) constructed around core services. The authors believe this is a promising approach to driving down healthcare costs, supporting standards evolution, accommodating differences in care workflow, fostering competition in the market, and accelerating innovation. The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, through the Strategic Health IT Advanced Research Projects (SHARP) Program, funds the project. The SMART team has focused on enabling the property of substitutability through an app programming interface leveraging web standards, presenting predictable data payloads, and abstracting away many details of enterprise health information technology systems. Containers--health information technology systems, such as electronic health records (EHR), personally controlled health records, and health information exchanges that use the SMART app programming interface or a portion of it--marshal data sources and present data simply, reliably, and consistently to apps. The SMART team has completed the first phase of the project (a) defining an app programming interface, (b) developing containers, and (c) producing a set of charter apps that showcase the system capabilities. A focal point of this phase was the SMART Apps Challenge, publicized by the White House, using http://www.challenge.gov website, and generating 15 app submissions with diverse functionality. Key strategic decisions must be made about the most effective market for further disseminating SMART: existing market-leading EHR vendors, new entrants into the EHR market, or other stakeholders such as health information exchanges.

  12. 21 CFR 514.80 - Records and reports concerning experience with approved new animal drugs.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... submitted, submission date and frequency, when is it to be submitted, how many copies?How do I petition to... experience report. What are the requirements for submission of advertisement and promotional labeling to FDA? 514.80(b)(5)(ii) Advertisements and promotional labeling. What are the requirements for adding a new...

  13. Using health care audit to improve quality of clinical records: the preliminary experience of an Italian Cancer Institute.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cadeddu, Chiara; Specchia, Maria Lucia; Cacciatore, Pasquale; Marchini, Raffaele; Ricciardi, Walter; Cavuto, Costanza

    2017-01-01

    Audit and feedback are recognized as part of a strategy for improving performance and supporting quality and safety in European health care systems. These considerations led the Clinical Management Staff of the "Regina Elena" Italian Cancer Institute to start a project of self-assessment of the quality of clinical records and organizational appropriateness through a retrospective review. The evaluation about appropriateness and congruity concerned both clinical records of 2013 and of 2015. At the end of the assessment of clinical records of each Care Unit, results were shared with medical staff in scheduled audit meetings. One hundred and thirteen clinical records (19%) did not meet congruity criteria, while 74 (12.6%) resulted as inappropriate. Considering the economic esteem calculated from the difference between Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) primarily identified as main diagnosis and main surgical intervention or procedure and those modified during the Local Health Unit (LHU) assessment, 2 surgical Care Units produced a high negative difference in terms of economic value with a consequent drop of hospital discharge form (named in Italian "scheda di dimissione ospedaliera", SDO) remuneration, 7 Care Units produced about the same medium difference with almost no change as SDO remuneration, and 2 Care Units had a positive difference with a profit in terms of SDO remuneration. Concerning the quality assessment of clinical records of 2015, the most critical areas were related to medical documents and hospital discharge form compilation. Our experience showed the effectiveness of clinical audit in assessing the quality of filling in medical records and the appropriateness of hospital admissions and the acceptability of this tool by clinicians.

  14. Experiments with the living dead: Plants as monitors and recorders of Biosphere Geosphere interactions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lomax, Barry; Fraser, Wesley

    2016-04-01

    Understanding variations in the Earth's climate history will enhance our understanding of and capacity to predict future climate change. Importantly this information can then be used to reduce uncertainty around future climate change predictions. However to achieve this, it is necessary to develop well constrained and robustly tested palaeo-proxies. Plants are innately coupled to the atmosphere requiring both sunlight and CO2 to drive photosynthesis and carbon assimilation. When combined with their resilience and persistence, the study of plant responses to climate change in concert with the analysis of fossil plants offer the opportunity to monitor past atmospheric conditions and infer palaeoclimate change. In this presentation we highlight how this approach is leading to the development of mechanistic palaeoproxies tested on palaeobotanically relevant extant species showing that plant fossils can be used as both monitors and geochemical recorders of atmospheric changes.

  15. Early Experiences with Mobile Electronic Health Records Application in a Tertiary Hospital in Korea

    Science.gov (United States)

    Park, Minah; Hong, Eunseok; Kim, Sunhyu; Ahn, Ryeok; Hong, Jungseok; Song, Seungyeol; Kim, Tak; Kim, Jeongkeun; Yeo, Seongwoon

    2015-01-01

    Objectives Recent advances in mobile technology have opened up possibilities to provide strongly integrated mobile-based services in healthcare and telemedicine. Although the number of mobile Electronic Health Record (EHR) applications is large and growing, there is a paucity of evidence demonstrating the usage patterns of these mobile applications by healthcare providers. This study aimed to illustrate the deployment process for an integrated mobile EHR application and to analyze usage patterns after provision of the mobile EHR service. Methods We developed an integrated mobile application that aimed to enhance the mobility of healthcare providers by improving access to patient- and hospital-related information during their daily medical activities. The study included mobile EHR users who accessed patient healthcare records between May 2013 and May 2014. We performed a data analysis using a web server log file analyzer from the integrated EHR system. Cluster analysis was applied to longitudinal user data based on their application usage pattern. Results The mobile EHR service named M-UMIS has been in service since May 2013. Every healthcare provider in the hospital could access the mobile EHR service and view the medical charts of their patients. The frequency of using services and network packet transmission on the M-UMIS increased gradually during the study period. The most frequently accessed service in the menu was the patient list. Conclusions A better understanding regarding the adoption of mobile EHR applications by healthcare providers in patient-centered care provides useful information to guide the design and implementation of future applications. PMID:26618036

  16. The SMART Platform: early experience enabling substitutable applications for electronic health records

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mandel, Joshua C; Murphy, Shawn N; Bernstam, Elmer Victor; Ramoni, Rachel L; Kreda, David A; McCoy, J Michael; Adida, Ben; Kohane, Isaac S

    2012-01-01

    Objective The Substitutable Medical Applications, Reusable Technologies (SMART) Platforms project seeks to develop a health information technology platform with substitutable applications (apps) constructed around core services. The authors believe this is a promising approach to driving down healthcare costs, supporting standards evolution, accommodating differences in care workflow, fostering competition in the market, and accelerating innovation. Materials and methods The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology, through the Strategic Health IT Advanced Research Projects (SHARP) Program, funds the project. The SMART team has focused on enabling the property of substitutability through an app programming interface leveraging web standards, presenting predictable data payloads, and abstracting away many details of enterprise health information technology systems. Containers—health information technology systems, such as electronic health records (EHR), personally controlled health records, and health information exchanges that use the SMART app programming interface or a portion of it—marshal data sources and present data simply, reliably, and consistently to apps. Results The SMART team has completed the first phase of the project (a) defining an app programming interface, (b) developing containers, and (c) producing a set of charter apps that showcase the system capabilities. A focal point of this phase was the SMART Apps Challenge, publicized by the White House, using http://www.challenge.gov website, and generating 15 app submissions with diverse functionality. Conclusion Key strategic decisions must be made about the most effective market for further disseminating SMART: existing market-leading EHR vendors, new entrants into the EHR market, or other stakeholders such as health information exchanges. PMID:22427539

  17. The Mice Drawer System (MDS) experiment and the space endurance record-breaking mice.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cancedda, Ranieri; Liu, Yi; Ruggiu, Alessandra; Tavella, Sara; Biticchi, Roberta; Santucci, Daniela; Schwartz, Silvia; Ciparelli, Paolo; Falcetti, Giancarlo; Tenconi, Chiara; Cotronei, Vittorio; Pignataro, Salvatore

    2012-01-01

    The Italian Space Agency, in line with its scientific strategies and the National Utilization Plan for the International Space Station (ISS), contracted Thales Alenia Space Italia to design and build a spaceflight payload for rodent research on ISS: the Mice Drawer System (MDS). The payload, to be integrated inside the Space Shuttle middeck during transportation and inside the Express Rack in the ISS during experiment execution, was designed to function autonomously for more than 3 months and to involve crew only for maintenance activities. In its first mission, three wild type (Wt) and three transgenic male mice over-expressing pleiotrophin under the control of a bone-specific promoter (PTN-Tg) were housed in the MDS. At the time of launch, animals were 2-months old. MDS reached the ISS on board of Shuttle Discovery Flight 17A/STS-128 on August 28(th), 2009. MDS returned to Earth on November 27(th), 2009 with Shuttle Atlantis Flight ULF3/STS-129 after 91 days, performing the longest permanence of mice in space. Unfortunately, during the MDS mission, one PTN-Tg and two Wt mice died due to health status or payload-related reasons. The remaining mice showed a normal behavior throughout the experiment and appeared in excellent health conditions at landing. During the experiment, the mice health conditions and their water and food consumption were daily checked. Upon landing mice were sacrificed, blood parameters measured and tissues dissected for subsequent analysis. To obtain as much information as possible on microgravity-induced tissue modifications, we organized a Tissue Sharing Program: 20 research groups from 6 countries participated. In order to distinguish between possible effects of the MDS housing conditions and effects due to the near-zero gravity environment, a ground replica of the flight experiment was performed at the University of Genova. Control tissues were collected also from mice maintained on Earth in standard vivarium cages.

  18. The Mice Drawer System (MDS experiment and the space endurance record-breaking mice.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ranieri Cancedda

    Full Text Available The Italian Space Agency, in line with its scientific strategies and the National Utilization Plan for the International Space Station (ISS, contracted Thales Alenia Space Italia to design and build a spaceflight payload for rodent research on ISS: the Mice Drawer System (MDS. The payload, to be integrated inside the Space Shuttle middeck during transportation and inside the Express Rack in the ISS during experiment execution, was designed to function autonomously for more than 3 months and to involve crew only for maintenance activities. In its first mission, three wild type (Wt and three transgenic male mice over-expressing pleiotrophin under the control of a bone-specific promoter (PTN-Tg were housed in the MDS. At the time of launch, animals were 2-months old. MDS reached the ISS on board of Shuttle Discovery Flight 17A/STS-128 on August 28(th, 2009. MDS returned to Earth on November 27(th, 2009 with Shuttle Atlantis Flight ULF3/STS-129 after 91 days, performing the longest permanence of mice in space. Unfortunately, during the MDS mission, one PTN-Tg and two Wt mice died due to health status or payload-related reasons. The remaining mice showed a normal behavior throughout the experiment and appeared in excellent health conditions at landing. During the experiment, the mice health conditions and their water and food consumption were daily checked. Upon landing mice were sacrificed, blood parameters measured and tissues dissected for subsequent analysis. To obtain as much information as possible on microgravity-induced tissue modifications, we organized a Tissue Sharing Program: 20 research groups from 6 countries participated. In order to distinguish between possible effects of the MDS housing conditions and effects due to the near-zero gravity environment, a ground replica of the flight experiment was performed at the University of Genova. Control tissues were collected also from mice maintained on Earth in standard vivarium cages.

  19. Medical students volunteering in hospital: a novel method of exploring and recording the patient experience

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Monica Lorraina Hytiris

    2017-05-01

    Full Text Available Background: Patient experience is increasingly recognised as an important feature of healthcare quality improvement. However, many of the methods implemented for its collection have significant limitations and reliability issues. This article describes how a UK healthcare organisation worked with medical student volunteers to build capacity for the collection of patient feedback in evidence-informed ways, and summarises student reflections on this process. Aims: To improve the quantity and quality of inpatient feedback, and in doing so provide new learning opportunities for medical students. Conclusions: Patient feedback gathered by volunteers is beneficial to the service and to medical student volunteers. As the feedback gathered is ward-specific, opportunities are created for practice improvements to be identified and acted on. It is feasible for medical students to be trained effectively as volunteers in gathering patient care experiences with adequate support mechanisms in place. Implications for practice: •\tHealthcare services should consider the use of personnel independent of the care team for the collection of patient feedback •\tPatient feedback needs to be shared with practitioners in a timely manner •\tMedical schools should consider this type of volunteering as a unique opportunity for medical students to improve understanding of patients’ experiences of healthcare, and of how care can be person-centred

  20. The IMISS-1 Experiment for Recording and Analysis of Accelerations in Orbital Flight

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sadovnichii, V. A.; Alexandrov, V. V.; Bugrov, D. I.; Lemak, S. S.; Pakhomov, V. B.; Panasyuk, M. I.; Petrov, V. L.; Yashin, I. V.

    2018-03-01

    The IMISS-1 experiment represents the second step in solving the problem of the creation of the gaze stabilization corrector. This device is designed to correct the effect of the gaze stabilization delay under microgravity. IMISS-1 continues research started by the Tat'yana-2 satellite. This research will be continued on board the International Space Station. At this stage we study the possibility of registration of angular and linear accelerations acting on the sensitive mass in terms of Low Earth Orbit flight, using MEMS sensors.

  1. Progress in the application of solid-state track recorders to reactor physics experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Besant, C.B.; Ipson, S.S.

    1969-03-01

    Heavily ionising particles passing through insulating materials cause tracks due to damage. These strain energy fields may be observed directly with an electron microscope or, after etching, the tracks may be seen with an optical microscope. The etching solution penetrates the damaged portion of the material and enlarges the hole if the etching is continued. This technique has been applied to detecting fission fragments from fissions taking place in a thin source of fissile material. The source, together with the insulating material is called a Solid-State Track Recorder and has been applied to the measurement of fission ratios in the fast critical assembly ZEBRA at Winfrith. The main disadvantage of the technique has been in counting tracks by eye which is laborious and subject to the human element. This has been overcome by counting tracks with a 'Quantimet' Computer Image Analyser. Absolute fission rate measurements are also discussed and it has been shown that measurements to an accuracy of better than ± 1% should be possible with this technique. (author)

  2. Electronic medical records in a sub-specialty practice: one asthma center's experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tolomeo, Concettina; Shiffman, Richard; Bazzy-Asaad, Alia

    2008-11-01

    There are numerous known benefits associated with the use of an electronic medical record (EMR). In October of 2004, a pediatric respiratory medicine practice at a major academic institution began the process of implementing an EMR system. Through this process, another benefit was realized, improved coordination between out-patient and in-patient care in relation to asthma education. The process began with the formation of an implementation team. The team consisted of technical as well as clinical experts from various disciplines. Together the team developed templates, decision support tools and standardized patient care letters. The team also determined workflow and provided training on the EMR system. A major benefit associated with EMR implementation was the increase in the number of children who were hospitalized with an asthma exacerbation and received an asthma action plan upon discharge. Prior to the EMR system, 4% received an asthma action plan upon discharge. After implementation of the EMR system, 58% received an asthma action plan upon discharge.

  3. Strong coupling effects during X-pulse CPMG experiments recorded on heteronuclear ABX spin systems: artifacts and a simple solution

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vallurupalli, Pramodh; Scott, Lincoln; Williamson, James R.; Kay, Lewis E.

    2007-01-01

    Simulation and experiment have been used to establish that significant artifacts can be generated in X-pulse CPMG relaxation dispersion experiments recorded on heteronuclear ABX spin-systems, such as 13 C i - 13 C j - 1 H, where 13 C i and 13 C j are strongly coupled. A qualitative explanation of the origin of these artifacts is presented along with a simple method to significantly reduce them. An application to the measurement of 1 H CPMG relaxation dispersion profiles in an HIV-2 TAR RNA molecule where all ribose sugars are protonated at the 2' position, deuterated at all other sugar positions and 13 C labeled at all sugar carbons is presented to illustrate the problems that strong 13 C- 13 C coupling introduces and a simple solution is proposed

  4. Adverse events of gastric electrical stimulators recorded in the Manufacturer and User Device Experience (MAUDE) Registry.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bielefeldt, Klaus

    2017-01-01

    The role of gastric electrical stimulation for patients with refractory symptoms of gastroparesis remains controversial. Open label studies suggest benefit while randomized controlled trials did not demonstrate differences between active and sham intervention. Using a voluntary reporting system of the Federal Drug Administration, we examined the type and frequency of adverse events. We conducted an electronic search of the Manufacturer and User Device Experience (MAUDE) databank using the keyword 'Enterra' for the time between January of 2001 and October of 2015. We abstracted information about the year of stimulator implantation, the year and type of adverse effect, the resulting intervention and outcome if available. A total of 1587 entries described adverse effects related the GES. Only 36 of the reports listed perioperative complications. The vast majority described problems that could be classified as patient concerns, local complications, or system failure. The most common problem related lack or loss of efficacy, followed by pain or complications affecting the pocket site. A subset of 801 reports provided information about the time between system implant and registration of concerns, which gradually declined over time. More than one third (35.7%) of the reported adverse events prompted surgical correction. The number of voluntarily reported adverse events and the high likelihood of repeated surgical interventions clearly demonstrate the potential downside of gastric electrical stimulation. Physicians considering this intervention will need to carefully weigh these risks and include this information when counseling or consenting patients. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  5. The text of the agreement of 11 June 1971 between Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons came into force for Finland on 1 October 1995. As a result of the coming into force of the aforesaid Agreement for Finland, the application of safeguards under the Agreement of 11 June 1971, which entered into force on 9 February 1972, between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been suspended

  6. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article 111(1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force, pursuant to the first sentence of Article 25(a) thereof, on 21 February 1977 [es

  7. The Text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 between Sudan and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 26 February 1975 and of the Protocol thereto, between Sudan and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 January 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  8. The Text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    The text of the Agreement of 30 January 1973, and of the Protocol thereto, between Morocco and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 18 February 1975, pursuant to Article 25. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mongolia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 September 2001. It was signed in Vienna on 5 December 2001

  10. Protocol between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the International Atomic Energy Agency Additional to the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Zaire and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)1 is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 9 April 2003

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Singapore and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 22 September 2005

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Mauritius and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 14 September 2004. It was signed on 9 December 2004 in Vienna

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/524) concluded between the Principality of Monaco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 6 July 2000

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Uruguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999 and signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999. The Protocol entered into force on 29 September 1999

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Amendment of Article 17

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the amendment to the Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The amendment was approved by the Board of Governors in June 1999, and entered into force on 10 September 1999

  4. Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

  5. Agreement of 30 September 1993 between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-09-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 September 1993 and signed in Vienna on 30 September 1993. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 5 May 1994

  6. Agreement of 21 December 1993 between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-03-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 2 December 1993 and signed in Vienna on 6 December 1993 and in Riga on 21 December 1993

  7. Agreement of 22 September 1994 between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-10-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Zambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 September 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 22 September 1994

  8. Agreement of 18 November 1993 between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Tonga and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 25 February 1975 and signed in Vienna on 31 October 1990 and in Nuku'Alofa on 18 November 1993

  9. Agreement of 26 July 1994 between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-04-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Almaty on 26 July 1994

  10. Agreement between the Republic of San Marino and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of San Marino and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Agreement was signed in Vienna on 3 March 1995 and in San Marino on 7 September 1998. It entered into force on 15 September 1998. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2010. It was signed on 7 October 2011 in Banjul, The Gambia, and on 18 October 2011 in Vienna, Austria

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [fr

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998 [fr

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [fr

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria [fr

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna [fr

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria [fr

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria [fr

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna [fr

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria [fr

  2. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010 [fr

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997 [fr

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna [fr

  5. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  6. The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-09-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna [es

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 10 March 2004 in Vienna [es

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998 [es

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 22 April 2010 in Berlin, Germany, and on 26 April 2010 in Vienna, Austria [es

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Malawi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed on 5 May 2007 in Lilongwe, Malawi, and on 26 July 2007 in Vienna, Austria [es

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria [es

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 September 1997. It was signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997 [es

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 24 September 2008. It was signed on 9 October 2008 in Vienna [es

  17. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria [es

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003 [es

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 4 March 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 23 July 2010 [es

  20. The Text of the Agreement of 6 September 1976 between The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-10-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol which is an integral part thereof, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency for the application of safeguards in the United Kingdom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  1. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 4 April 2000

  2. Text of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Succession by the Czech Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-07-01

    In a communication received on 24 March 1993, the Government of the Czech Republic informed the Director General, inter alia, that by virtue of succession to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, it was a Party, with effect from 1 January 1993, to the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [es

  3. IAEA safeguards related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons- T.N.P. and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America-Tlatelolco

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodrigues, M.D.F.

    1978-04-01

    The application of safeguards, focusing mainly the causes that gave origin to this type of control, is studied. The safeguard procedures used by the IAEA are also given, relative to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - Tlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons - T.N.P. and the Euratom safeguards. Some consideration is given to the organizations related to safeguards application such as IAEA, OPANAL and Euratom, their functions and aims. (F.E.) [pt

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria

  5. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998

  6. Protocol Additional the the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and entered into force on 6 July 2000

  7. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Poland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 30 September 1997, and entered into force on 5 May 2000

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between New Zealand and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/185) concluded between New Zealand and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and it entered into force on the same date

  9. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/187) concluded between the Holy See and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, and signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, when it entered into force

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-05-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was approved by the Board of Governors on 24 March 1999, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1999, and entered into force on 16 May 2000

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/508) concluded between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 22 September 1998, and applied provisionally as from the date of signature

  12. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-08-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/258) concluded between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 1998 and it entered into force on 28 july 1998

  13. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 8 December 1997, signed in Vienna on 11 March 1998, and entered into force on 5 July 2000

  14. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998, signed in Vienna on 26 November 1998, and entered into force on 22 August 2000

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the International Atomic Energy Agency in implementation of Article III.1 and 4 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998 and signed in Vienna on 4 December 1998. The Protocol entered into force on 16 December 1998

  16. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998, and entered into force on 10 October 2000

  17. Protocol additional to the agreement between Australia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement (INFCIRC/217) concluded between Australia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Conclusion of the Additional Protocol was authorized by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997 and signed in Vienna on the same date. The Additional Protocol entered into force on 12 December 1997

  18. Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards; Accountability e regime de nao proliferacao nuclear: uma avaliacao do modelo de vigilancia mutua brasileiro-argentina de salvaguardas nucleares

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2014-08-01

    The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

  19. Using a Patient Portal to Transmit Patient Reported Health Information into the Electronic Record: Workflow Implications and User Experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sorondo, Barbara; Allen, Amy; Bayleran, Janet; Doore, Stacy; Fathima, Samreen; Sabbagh, Iyad; Newcomb, Lori

    2016-01-01

    This project implemented an integrated patient self-reported screening tool in a patient portal and assessed clinical workflow and user experience in primary care practices. An electronic health risk assessment based on the CMS Annual Wellness Visit (AWV) was developed to integrate self-reported health information into the patient's electronic health record (EHR). Patients enrolled in care coordination tested the implementation. The evaluation plan included quantitative and qualitative measures of patient adoption, provider adoption, workflow impact, financial impact, and technology impact. Seventy-two patients completed the sample AWV, and 80% of the questionnaires had clinical findings that required provider follow-up. Patients expressed satisfaction with the portal, as it enabled them to view their health record and enter information. Implementation did not reduce office staff time. Providers and office staff agreed that an electronic system for adding information to their record would increase patient satisfaction, but they expressed concern with the need to promptly review the information and the time involved to accomplish this prior to an office visit. Despite satisfaction among patients, portal adoption is still low, due to technological limitations and to the lack of adaptability to primary care practice workflow. Notwithstanding those barriers, the use of the portal for completion of repetitive tasks, such as screening tools, should be encouraged. Patients can effectively use portals to complete the patient reported section of the CMS AWV. However, if the information is not completed during the same day of the office visit, the time required to address health findings outside of a regular office visit is uncompensated, and diminished the enthusiasm for this process among primary care practice staff.

  20. Towards plug-and-play integration of archetypes into legacy electronic health record systems: the ArchiMed experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Duftschmid, Georg; Chaloupka, Judith; Rinner, Christoph

    2013-01-22

    The dual model approach represents a promising solution for achieving semantically interoperable standardized electronic health record (EHR) exchange. Its acceptance, however, will depend on the effort required for integrating archetypes into legacy EHR systems. We propose a corresponding approach that: (a) automatically generates entry forms in legacy EHR systems from archetypes; and (b) allows the immediate export of EHR documents that are recorded via the generated forms and stored in the EHR systems' internal format as standardized and archetype-compliant EHR extracts. As a prerequisite for applying our approach, we define a set of basic requirements for the EHR systems. We tested our approach with an EHR system called ArchiMed and were able to successfully integrate 15 archetypes from a test set of 27. For 12 archetypes, the form generation failed owing to a particular type of complex structure (multiple repeating subnodes), which was prescribed by the archetypes but not supported by ArchiMed's data model. Our experiences show that archetypes should be customized based on the planned application scenario before their integration. This would allow problematic structures to be dissolved and irrelevant optional archetype nodes to be removed. For customization of archetypes, openEHR templates or specialized archetypes may be employed. Gaps in the data types or terminological features supported by an EHR system will often not preclude integration of the relevant archetypes. More work needs to be done on the usability of the generated forms.

  1. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992. It was signed on 21 May 1992 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  2. Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  3. Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Additional Protocol), the Additional Protocol, which had been applied provisionally from 17 February 2010, entered into force on 10 October 2012, the date upon which the Agency received written notification from Iraq that Iraq's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  5. H.R. 830: This Act may be cited as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Enforcement Act of 1991, introduced in the House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, February 5, 1991

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1991-01-01

    This bill would provide for the imposition of economic sanctions on any foreign person that engages in the trade of nuclear equipment and technology under certain circumstances that are prohibited under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The sanction is that the President shall prohibit, for at least two years, the entry into the customs territory of the US any article that is the product or manufacture of that foreign person so sanctioned. Any person may request an advisory opinion on a proposed activity from the President. Exceptions to the bill and petitions by interested persons are described

  6. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-08-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Exchange of Letters with the Commonwealth of Dominica in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean, which constitutes an agreement confirming that the Safeguards Agreement of 3 May 1996 (IAEA-INFCIRC-513) concluded between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica (Dominica) and the IAEA pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) satisfies the obligation of Dominica under Article 13 of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty) to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA

  7. Agreement between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Yemen and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 21 September 2000. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 August 2002. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Armenia and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was approved by the Board of Governors on 23 September 1997, signed in Vienna on 29 September 1997, and it will enter into force on the date the Agency receives written notification that Armenia's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. Pending entry into force, this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature, i.e., 29 September 1997

  9. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/226) concluded between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998, and signed in Vienna on 12 June 1998. Pending entry into force, the Protocol is being applied provisionally as from the date of signature, i.e. 12 June 1998

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 13 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of South Africa and the Agency, i.e. on 13 September 2002

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 5 March 2013. It was signed on 22 March 2013 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 22 March 2013, upon signature by the representatives of the Denmark and the Agency.

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Burundi and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 13 June 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 27 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 27 September 2007, upon signature by the representatives of Burundi and the Agency

  13. Agreement of 7 May 1996 between the Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and protocol thereof) between Saint Kitts and Nevis and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Basseterre on 7 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 7 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  14. Agreement of 14 April 1995 between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 22 November 1994 and in Minsk on 14 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 August 1995

  15. Agreement of 20 April 1995 between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Union of Myanmar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 20 April 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 20 April 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  16. Agreement of 26 June 1995 between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-08-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 29 March 1995 and signed in Vienna on 26 June 1995. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 26 June 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  17. Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Niger and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 20 March 2001. It was signed on 11 June 2002 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 16 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Niger written notification that Niger's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  18. Agreement of 3 May 1996 between the government of the commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-06-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereof) between the Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 12 September 1994 and signed in Vienna on 10 July 1995 and in Roseau, Dominica on 3 May 1996. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 3 May 1996. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  19. Agreement of 8 October 1994 between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1996-05-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994

  20. Agreement of 9 June 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-02-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 8 June 1994 and signed in Vienna on 9 June 1994. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 19 January 1995. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  2. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement 1 concluded between the Republic of Mali and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 September 2002. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2002. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Mali and the Agency, i.e. on 12 September 2002

  3. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [fr

  4. Protocol additional to the agreement between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement' concluded between the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 September 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 30 March 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Bangladesh and the Agency, i.e. on 30 March 2001

  5. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Madagascar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 June 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 18 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Madagascar and the Agency, i.e., on 18 September 2003

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Malta and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 28 November 2002. It was signed on 24 April 2003 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 12 July 2005, the date on which the Agency received from Malta written notification that Malta's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  7. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Palau and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 10 May 2005 in New York and 13 May 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 13 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Palau and the Agency

  8. Protocol between the government of the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency additional to the agreement for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Latvia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 12 July 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Latvia and the Agency, i.e. on 12 July 2001

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Botswana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 20 September 2005. It was signed on 21 July 2006 in Gaborone, Botswana, and on 24 August 2006 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 August 2006, upon signature by the representatives of Botswana and the Agency

  10. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 9 September 2003. It was signed in Vienna on 12 September 2003. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force upon signature by the representatives of Iceland and the Agency, i.e., on 12 September 2003

  11. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 19 July 2005 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 July 2005, upon signature by the representatives of Afghanistan and the Agency

  12. Agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 14 December 2004. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  13. Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 24 February 1992, It was signed on 28 July 1992 in Vienna and on 26 August 1992 in Geneva. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2005. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  14. Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 5 June 2012. It was signed on 6 June 2012 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 25 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 4 April 2013, the date on which the Agency received from Bosnia and Herzegovina written notification that Bosnia and Herzegovina's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 18 June 2003. It was signed on 6 February 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 9 May 2007, the date on which the Agency received from Kazakhstan written notification that Kazakhstan's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  16. The global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Challenges and prospects for the future. Interview with Mr. Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, November 26, 2009

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2009-01-01

    President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs since November 2007, Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala has had a long career as a Sri Lankan diplomat and leader in the field of international security. Among his numerous appointments, Mr. Dhanapala headed the Geneva-based UNIDIR. He chaired the widely acclaimed 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. He was Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs in the United Nations from 1998 to 2003. In this interview, Mr. Dhanapala gives us his thoughts about the nuclear non-proliferation regime, a few months before the 8. NPT Review Conference. (author)

  17. Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 1 March 2005. It was signed on 3 May 2005 in New York. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 3 May 2005, upon signature by the representatives of the Marshall Islands and the Agency

  18. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 15 August 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 24 January 2006, the date on which the Agency received from Ukraine written notification that Ukraine's constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  19. Development and daily use of an electronic oncological patient record for the total management of cancer patients: 7 years' experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Galligioni, E; Berloffa, F; Caffo, O; Tonazzolli, G; Ambrosini, G; Valduga, F; Eccher, C; Ferro, A; Forti, S

    2009-02-01

    We describe our experience with an electronic oncological patient record (EOPR) for the total management of cancer patients. The web-based EOPR was developed on the basis of a user-centred design including user education and training, followed by continuous assistance; user acceptance was monitored by means of three questionnaires administered after 2 weeks, 6 months and 6 years. The EOPR has been used daily for all in-ward, day hospital and ambulatory clinical activities since July 2000. The most widely appreciated functions are its rapid multipoint access, the self-updated summary of the patients' clinical course, the management of the entire therapeutic programme synchronised with working agendas and oncological teleconsultation. Security and privacy are assured by means of the separate storage of clinical and demographic data, with access protected by login and a password. The questionnaires highlighted appreciation of rapid data retrieval and exchange and the perception of improved quality of care, but also revealed a sense of additional work and a negative impact on doctor-patient relationships. Our EOPR has proved to be effective in the total management of cancer patients. Its user-centred design and flexible web technology have been key factors in its successful implementation and daily use.

  20. Strain localization during stress-loading and stress-relaxation cycles recorded in mylonitic peridotites from experiments and nature

    Science.gov (United States)

    Trepmann, Claudia; Matysiak, Agnes

    2017-04-01

    For the development of localized high-strain zones generally some "strain-weakening", i.e., a lower effective viscosity of shear zones compared to the host rocks, is assumed. A related question is, whether the strength of the lithosphere should be considered the strength of "weakened" shear zones or whether it should be considered as the strength of the intact rock. Based on our observations from mylonitic peridotites and experimental peridotite deformation, we find it useful to consider two stages for the development of localized high-strain zones: (1) stress-loading, where deformation at transient high stresses results not necessarily in a high amount of strain on sample scale, but in localized highly damaged zones enabling grain-size reduction during (2) stress-relaxation, where a high amount of strain can be accumulated. Mylonitic peridotites from the Finero complex, Southern Alps, record strain localization during stress-loading and stress-relaxation cycles within their prolonged geological history. We differentiate the heterogeneous olivine microstructure into host rock, mylonite, ultramylonite and protomylonite, by their amount and size of recrystallized grains as well as whether a foam structure is present or not. In host rocks and mylonites, a well-developed foam structure is preserved. Recrystallized grains have diameters on the order of mm in host rocks and on the order of a few hundred µm in mylonites. Mylonites represent an early stage of localized dynamic recrystallization with grain size reduction compared to the host rock. At quasi-static stress conditions, the strain energy was reduced such that a reduction in surface energy controlled grain boundary migration generating the foam structure in both rocks. During a second stage of deformation ultramylonites and protomylonites that both do not show a foam structure developed. Ultramylonites are characterized by a second generation of small recrystallized grains with diameter of a few tens of µm and

  1. Experience with Integrating Diagnostic Decision Support Software with Electronic Health Records: Benefits versus Risks of Information Sharing

    OpenAIRE

    Segal, Michael M.; Rahm, Alanna K.; Hulse, Nathan C.; Wood, Grant; Williams, Janet L.; Feldman, Lynn; Moore, Gregory J.; Gehrum, David; Yefko, Michelle; Mayernick, Steven; Gildersleeve, Roger; Sunderland, Margie C.; Bleyl, Steven B.; Haug, Peter; Williams, Marc S.

    2017-01-01

    Introduction: Reducing misdiagnosis has long been a goal of medical informatics. Current thinking has focused on achieving this goal by integrating diagnostic decision support into electronic health records.Methods: A diagnostic decision support system already in clinical use was integrated into electronic health record systems at two large health systems, after clinician input on desired capabilities. The decision support provided three outputs: editable text for use in a clinical note, a su...

  2. Agreement between the Government of Belize and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-03-01

    The Agreement between the Government of Belize and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 19 February 1986 and signed in Vienna on 8 July 1991 and in New York on 13 August 1992; the Protocol hereto was signed in New York on 13 August 1992 and in Vienna on 2 September 1992. The Agreement entered into, force on 21 January 1997. The present documents contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Belize to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of part one

  3. Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 19 July 2004, the date on which the Agency received from Seychelles written notification that Seychelles' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Chinese Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  5. Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 22 November 2007. It was signed on 23 June 2010 in Lisbon, Portugal, and on 8 July 2010 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 1 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Mozambique written notification that Mozambique's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  6. Protocol Additional to the agreement between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 June 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 24 September 1998. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Canada written notification that Canada's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 8 September 2000

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  8. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 7 June 2000. It was signed in Vienna on 5 July 2000. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from Azerbaijan written notification that Azerbaijan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 29 November 2000

  9. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Czech Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 28 September 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the date on which the Agency received from the Czech Republic written notification that the Czech Republic's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met, i.e. on 1 July 2002

  10. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Montenegro and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 13 June 2007. It was signed on 26 May 2008 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Montenegro written notification that Montenegro's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  11. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  12. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met.

  13. Agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Sultanate of Oman and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 20 September 1999. It was signed on 28 June 2001 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 5 September 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Oman written notification that Oman's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force the same date

  14. Agreement between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the International Atomic Energy agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It contains two parts: Part I stipulates the agreement of Azerbaijan to accept safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Part II specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on 14 September 1998, signed in Vienna on 6 November 1998, and entered into force on 29 April 1999. The Protocol entered into force on the same date

  15. Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between Morocco and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement of 30 January 1973 between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 22 September 2004 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 21 April 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Kingdom of Morocco written notification that Morocco's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  16. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Union of the Comoros and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 13 December 2005. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Union of the Comoros written notification that Comoros' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  17. Agreement between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Republic of Moldova and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Safeguards Agreement on 12 September 1995. It was signed on 27 September 1995 in Vienna and 14 June 1996 in Chisinau. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 17 May 2006, the date upon which the Agency received from Moldova written notification that Moldova's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  18. The text of the agreement of 29 February 1988 between Nigeria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-10-01

    The document reproduces the text of the Agreement of 29 February 1988 and of the Protocol thereto, between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It contains two parts. The first part stipulates the agreement of Nigeria to accept safeguards on all sources or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The second part specifies the procedures to be applied in the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I. The Agreement and the Protocol entered into force on 29 February 1988

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [fr

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (French Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. [fr

  1. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [fr

  2. Protocol additional to the agreement between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement concluded between the Republic of Tajikistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 12 June 2002. It was signed on 2 July 2003 in Vienna and on 7 July 2003 in Tashkent. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 14 December 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Tajikistan written notification that the Republic of Tajikistan's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  3. Protocol additional to the agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 16 June 2004. It was signed on 23 September 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 7 February 2005, the date on which the Agency received from the United Republic of Tanzania written notification that the United Republic of Tanzania's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  4. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 25 November 1998. It was signed in Vienna on 29 July 1999. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 February 2003, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Cyprus written notification that Cyprus' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  5. Agreement between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Bahrain and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 11 September 2007. It was signed in Vienna on 19 September 2007. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 10 May 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the Kingdom of Bahrain written notification that Bahrain's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  6. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Mozambique and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 22 November 2007. It was signed on 23 June 2010 in Lisbon, Portugal, and on 8 July 2010 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Mozambique written notification that Mozambique's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  7. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 6 March 2007. It was signed on 10 August 2007 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 17 September 2012, the date on which the Agency received from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam written notification that Vietnam's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  8. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Spanish Edition)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Principality of Andorra and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 December 2000. It was signed in Vienna, Austria on 9 January 2001. 2. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 19 December 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the Principality of Andorra written notification that its statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. [es

  9. Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2011-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 3 March 2009. It was signed in Vienna on 8 April 2009. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 20 December 2010, the date on which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met [es

  10. Agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 16 June 2005. It was signed in Vienna on 16 June 2005. 2. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 13 January 2009, the date upon which the Agency received from Saudi Arabia written notification that Saudi Arabia's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

  11. Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the United Arab Emirates and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Safeguards Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 28 November 2002. It was signed in Abu Dhabi on 15 December 2002. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 9 October 2003, the date upon which the Agency received from the United Arab Emirates written notification that the United Arab Emirates' statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  12. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 7 June 2000. It was signed on 16 June 2000 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 1 February 2005, the date upon which the Agency received from the Swiss Confederation written notification that the Swiss Confederation's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  13. Protocol Additional to the agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2004-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Seychelles and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Protocol Additional on 18 March 2003. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Windhoek and on 7 April 2004 in Vienna. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Protocol Additional, the Protocol entered into force on 13 October 2004, the date on which the Agency received from the Republic of Seychelles written notification that the Republic of Seychelles's statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

  14. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, June 10, September 13, 14, 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    Senator Frank Church presented the opening statement on the June 10, 1977 hearing concerning the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977, S.1432. S.1432 is designed to establish a nonproliferation framework with specific objectives established for the ERDA nuclear energy programs. The ERDA authorization bill is the budgetary vehicle to implement these objectives. The Committee on Energy and Natural Resources obtained joint referral of certain portions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to insure that nonproliferation policy is implemented in a manner consistent with the policy of having sufficent energy for this country and foreign countries in the future. Additionally, the Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development must examine the cost and the consequences of various initiatives before they are implemented. For example, the proposal to guarantee uranium enrichment services for foreign nations poses specific requirements on ERDA to expand considerably our enrichment capacity by the year 2000. Without reprocessing, it is expected that spent fuel rods from abroad will be returned to this country for storage with attendant costs and siting decisions. Also, international fuel cycle evaluation programs must be carefully examined to insure that all options, including regional fuel cycle centers with international controls and inspection, are considered in seeking international approaches to the nonproliferation objectives. It is these and related questions to which the subcommittee seeks answers. The hearings on September 13 and 14 focused on S.897, a bill to strengthen U.S. policies on nonproliferation and to reorganize certain export functions of the Federal government to promote more efficient administration of such functions. Statements were presented by experts in government, private firms, and industrial sectors

  15. Inter-rater Reliability of the Dysphagia Outcome and Severity Scale (DOSS): Effects of Clinical Experience, Audio-Recording and Training.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zarkada, Angeliki; Regan, Julie

    2017-10-19

    The Dysphagia Outcome and Severity Scale (DOSS) is widely used to measure dysphagia severity based on videofluoroscopy (VFSS). This study investigated inter-rater reliability (IRR) of the DOSS. It also determined the effect of clinical experience, VFSS audio-recording and training on DOSS IRR. A quantitative prospective research design was used. Seventeen speech and language pathologists (SLPs) were recruited from an acute teaching hospital, Dublin (> 3 years' VFSS experience, n = 10) and from a postgraduate dysphagia programme in a university setting (audio-recording). Each VFSS clip was independently rated using the DOSS scale. Four weeks later, the less experienced group attended a 1-h training session on DOSS rating after which DOSS IRR was re-tested. Cohen's kappa co-efficient was used to establish IRR. IRR of the DOSS presented only fair agreement (κ = 0.36, p audio-recording (κ = 0.287) compared to VFSS clips without audio-recording (κ = - 0.0395) (p < 0.05). IRR of the DOSS pre-training (κ = 0.328) was significantly better comparing to post-training (κ = 0.218) (p < 0.05). Findings raise concerns as the DOSS is frequently used in clinical practice to capture dysphagia severity and to monitor changes.

  16. The NUADU experiment on TC-2 and the first Energetic Neutral Atom (ENA images recorded by this instrument

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    S. McKenna-Lawlor

    2005-11-01

    Full Text Available The Earth’s ring current and how it responds to varying interplanetary conditions is described and an account provided of the production of Energetic Neutral Atoms (ENAs in the geo-corona. Also, the potential to remotely monitor, on a global scale, the temporal and spatial evolution of magnetospheric plasma populations through analysing ENA images recorded during magnetic storms/substorms is indicated. A technical account of the Energetic NeUtral Atom Detector Unit NUADU aboard China’s TC-2 mission (measurement range 45–>158 keV follows, together with an account of the scientific objectives of NUADU, both in stand-alone mode and in the context of multi-point imaging. Low altitude ENA emissions recorded by NUADU during south polar passages of TC-2 at the time of a moderate magnetic storm in September 2004, as well as bright ring current emissions recorded in November 2004 during a major geomagnetic storm, are presented and discussed in the context of various, accompanying, terrestrial disturbances. Also, ENA observations of the November 2004 ring current imaged simultaneously by TC-2/NUADU and by IMAGE/ HENA (viewing, respectively, from the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, are compared.

  17. Usage experience with the document archiving and communication system for the storage and retrieval of medical records.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Takeda, Toshihiro; Ueda, Kanayo; Manabe, Shiro; Teramoto, Kei; Mihara, Naoki; Matsumura, Yasushi

    2013-01-01

    Standard Japanese electronic medical record (EMR) systems are associated with major shortcomings. For example, they do not assure lifelong readability of records because each document requires its own viewing software program, a system that is difficult to maintain over long periods of time. It can also be difficult for users to comprehend a patient's clinical history because different classes of documents can only be accessed from their own window. To address these problems, we developed a document-based electronic medical record that aggregates all documents for a patient in a PDF or DocuWorks format. We call this system the Document Archiving and Communication System (DACS). There are two types of viewers in the DACS: the Matrix View, which provides a time line of a patient's history, and the Tree View, which stores the documents in hierarchical document classes. We placed 2,734 document classes into 11 categories. A total of 22,3972 documents were entered per month. The frequency of use of the DACS viewer was 268,644 instances per month. The DACS viewer was used to assess a patient's clinical history.

  18. Making a Historical Survey of a State's Nuclear Ambitions. Impact of Historical Developments of a State's National Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy on Additional Protocol Implementation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, Thomas

    2003-03-01

    In 1998, SKI initiated a project to conduct a historical survey of the Swedish nuclear weapons research for the period 1945-1972. IAEA became interested and accepted it in 2000 as a support program task to increase transparency and to support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. The main purpose of the Additional Protocol is to make the IAEA control system more efficient with regard to nuclear material, facilities and research. Other countries have now shown interest to follow the Swedish example and to make their own reviews of their past nuclear energy and nuclear weapons research. The most important aim is to produce basic information for IAEA on the nuclear activities of the past and to refine and strengthen the instruments of the Safeguard System within the Additional Protocol. The first objective of this report is to present a short summary of the Swedish historical survey, as well as similar projects in other countries dealing with nuclear-related and nuclear weapons research reviews. These tasks are dealt with in chapter 2. Secondly, the objective is to present a general model of how a national base survey can be designed. The model is based on the Swedish experiences and it has been designed to also serve as a guideline for other countries to strengthen their safeguards systems within the framework of the Additional Protocol. Since other States declared that they would make similar historical surveys, the SKI decided to work out a model that could be used by other countries intending to conduct such studies. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are participating in a co-operation project to carry out such nationally base surveys under the auspices of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate. Finland is also conducting such a survey, but it is done independently, albeit in close exchange of views between SKI and its Finnish counterpart, STUK. This is described in chapter 3. The third objective is to develop a pedagogic methodology for teaching

  19. Two years experience with a computer-assisted monitoring and recording system used in gynecological afterloading therapy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kaulich, T.W.; Boedi, R.; Nuesslin, F.; Hirnle, P.

    1990-01-01

    A computer program running on a simple desk-calculator has been developed for monitoring and recording gynecological high-dose afterloading therapy. For treatment monitoring the multiple-probe AM6-system (PTW-Freiburg) is used which allows for dose measurements in the urinary bladder and the rectum. The probe signals are processed on line in order to indicate the actual dose at the measuring points. After completing the irradiation the treatment is documented. Performing fractionated treatment the measuring data are stored in the computer memory for calculating total accumulated dose. The above-described monitoring- and protocolling system has proven its usefulness during two years of clinical work. (orig.) [de

  20. Sodium oxide and uranium oxide aerosol experiments: NSPP Tests 106-108 and Tests 204-207, data record report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Adams, R.E.; Kress, T.S.; Tobias, M.L.

    1981-03-01

    This data record report describes three sodium oxide aerosol tests and four uranium oxide aerosol tests conducted in the Nuclear Safety Pilot Plant project at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The goal of this project is to establish the validity (or level of conservatism) of the aerosol behavioral code, HAARM-3, and follow-on codes under development at the Battelle Columbus Laboratories for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Descriptions of the seven tests with tables and graphs summarizing the results are included. 92 figs.

  1. User experience analysis of e-TB Manager, a nationwide electronic tuberculosis recording and reporting system in Ukraine

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Niranjan Konduri

    2017-05-01

    Full Text Available Ukraine has successfully implemented e-TB Manager nationwide as its mandatory national tuberculosis registry after first introducing it in 2009. Our objective was to perform an end-of-programme evaluation after formal handover of the registry administration to Ukraine's Centre for Disease Control in 2015. We conducted a nationwide, cross-sectional, anonymous, 18-point user experience survey, and stratified the registry's transaction statistics to demonstrate usability. Contrary to initial implementation experience, older users (aged >50 years, often with limited or no computer proficiency prior to using the registry, had significantly better user experience scores for at least six of the 12 measures compared to younger users (aged 18–29 years. Using the registry for >3 years was associated with significantly higher scores for having capacity, adequacy of training received and satisfaction with the registry. Of the 5.9 million transactions over a 4-year period, nine out of 24 oblasts (regions and Kiev city accounted for 62.5% of all transactions, and corresponded to 59% of Ukraine's tuberculosis burden. There were 437 unique active users in 486 rayons (districts of Ukraine, demonstrating extensive reach. Our key findings complement the World Health Organization and European Respiratory Society's agenda for action on digital health to help implement the End TB Strategy.

  2. User experience analysis of e-TB Manager, a nationwide electronic tuberculosis recording and reporting system in Ukraine.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Konduri, Niranjan; Sawyer, Kelly; Nizova, Nataliya

    2017-04-01

    Ukraine has successfully implemented e-TB Manager nationwide as its mandatory national tuberculosis registry after first introducing it in 2009. Our objective was to perform an end-of-programme evaluation after formal handover of the registry administration to Ukraine's Centre for Disease Control in 2015. We conducted a nationwide, cross-sectional, anonymous, 18-point user experience survey, and stratified the registry's transaction statistics to demonstrate usability. Contrary to initial implementation experience, older users (aged >50 years), often with limited or no computer proficiency prior to using the registry, had significantly better user experience scores for at least six of the 12 measures compared to younger users (aged 18-29 years). Using the registry for >3 years was associated with significantly higher scores for having capacity, adequacy of training received and satisfaction with the registry. Of the 5.9 million transactions over a 4-year period, nine out of 24 oblasts (regions) and Kiev city accounted for 62.5% of all transactions, and corresponded to 59% of Ukraine's tuberculosis burden. There were 437 unique active users in 486 rayons (districts) of Ukraine, demonstrating extensive reach. Our key findings complement the World Health Organization and European Respiratory Society's agenda for action on digital health to help implement the End TB Strategy.

  3. Developing a point-of-care electronic medical record system for TB/HIV co-infected patients: experiences from Lighthouse Trust, Lilongwe, Malawi.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tweya, Hannock; Feldacker, Caryl; Gadabu, Oliver Jintha; Ng'ambi, Wingston; Mumba, Soyapi L; Phiri, Dave; Kamvazina, Luke; Mwakilama, Shawo; Kanyerere, Henry; Keiser, Olivia; Mwafilaso, Johnbosco; Kamba, Chancy; Egger, Matthias; Jahn, Andreas; Simwaka, Bertha; Phiri, Sam

    2016-03-05

    Implementation of user-friendly, real-time, electronic medical records for patient management may lead to improved adherence to clinical guidelines and improved quality of patient care. We detail the systematic, iterative process that implementation partners, Lighthouse clinic and Baobab Health Trust, employed to develop and implement a point-of-care electronic medical records system in an integrated, public clinic in Malawi that serves HIV-infected and tuberculosis (TB) patients. Baobab Health Trust, the system developers, conducted a series of technical and clinical meetings with Lighthouse and Ministry of Health to determine specifications. Multiple pre-testing sessions assessed patient flow, question clarity, information sequencing, and verified compliance to national guidelines. Final components of the TB/HIV electronic medical records system include: patient demographics; anthropometric measurements; laboratory samples and results; HIV testing; WHO clinical staging; TB diagnosis; family planning; clinical review; and drug dispensing. Our experience suggests that an electronic medical records system can improve patient management, enhance integration of TB/HIV services, and improve provider decision-making. However, despite sufficient funding and motivation, several challenges delayed system launch including: expansion of system components to include of HIV testing and counseling services; changes in the national antiretroviral treatment guidelines that required system revision; and low confidence to use the system among new healthcare workers. To ensure a more robust and agile system that met all stakeholder and user needs, our electronic medical records launch was delayed more than a year. Open communication with stakeholders, careful consideration of ongoing provider input, and a well-functioning, backup, paper-based TB registry helped ensure successful implementation and sustainability of the system. Additional, on-site, technical support provided

  4. Security Guarantees and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bruno Tertrais

    2011-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss the value of 'security guarantees', that is, positive security assurances that include a formal or informal defense commitment, in preventing nuclear proliferation. It demonstrates that such guarantees have proven to be a very effective instrument in preventing States from going nuclear. It would thus seem logical to reinforce or extend them. However, this path is fraught with obstacles and dilemmas

  5. Export policy and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.A.V.

    1978-01-01

    Developing countries with a nuclear programme are about a dozen according to information obtained by IAEA. They are a group hostile to any restriction imposed on nuclear technology export and consider that such restriction is contrary to the global concept of North/South co-operation which provides for transfer of advanced technology. In particular, they object to the fact that nuclear weapon states make use of Article 4 of the NPT. Industrialised countries are required to keep a balance between a regular and stable supply system and the assurance that exported nuclear installations and materials are placed under international control according to the IAEA Safeguards. (NEA) [fr

  6. Future technology challenges in non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richardson, J.H.

    2004-01-01

    Radiation detection technologies are an important tool in the prevention of proliferation. A variety of new developments have enabled enhanced performance in terms of energy resolution, spatial resolution, predictive modeling and simulation, active interrogation, and ease of operation and deployment in the field. For example, various gamma ray imaging approaches are being explored to combine spatial resolution with background suppression in order to enhance sensitivity at reasonable standoff distances and acquisition times. New materials and approaches are being developed in order to provide adequate energy resolution in field use without the necessity for liquid nitrogen. Finally, different detectors combined into distributed networks offer promise for detection and tracking of radioactive materials. As the world moves into the 21st century, the possibility of greater reliance on nuclear energy will impose additional technical requirements to prevent proliferation. In addition to proliferation resistant reactors, a careful examination of the various possible fuel cycles from cradle to grave will provide additional technical and nonproliferation challenges in the areas of conversion, enrichment, transportation, recycling and waste disposal. Radiation detection technology and information management have a prominent role in any future global regime for nonproliferation beyond the current Advanced Protocol. This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48. (author)

  7. New technologies in the Physical Education class. A positive experience with the digital video recording and vertical jump

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Daniel Rojano Ortega

    2010-01-01

    Full Text Available The objective of the Basic Competences is to highlight the essential learning of the Secondary School Curriculum. The fourth Basic Competence introduces in the Secondary School Program the use of the Information and Communication Technologies as an essential element to be informed, to learn and to communicate. To that effect, this article tries to bring the new technologies to the Physical Education Class, specifically to the analysis of the vertical jump. This jump has been traditionally evaluated with the Sargent’s test but this test has some errors which derive from the measuring process. Nowadays there are new very precise instruments often used in sports for the analysis of the vertical jump, but their high prices make it difficult to introduce them in the school. With this article we want to show that the digital video recording and the video edition programs constitute a very appropriate way to evaluate the vertical jump because it causes in the students great interest and implication.

  8. [The Chinese nuclear test and 'atoms for peace' as a measure for preventing nuclear armament of Japan: the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the United States and the introduction of light water reactors into Japan, 1964-1968].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yamazaki, Masakatsu

    2014-07-01

    Japan and the United States signed in 1968 a new atomic energy agreement through which US light-water nuclear reactors, including those of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of Tokyo Electric Power Company, were to be introduced into Japan. This paper studies the history of negotiations for the 1968 agreement using documents declassified in the 1990s in the US and Japan. After the success of the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, the United States became seriously concerned about nuclear armament of other countries in Asia including Japan. Expecting that Japan would not have its own nuclear weapons, the US offered to help the country to demonstrate its superiority in some fields of science including peaceful nuclear energy to counter the psychological effect of the Chinese nuclear armament. Driven by his own political agenda, the newly appointed Prime Minister Eisaku Sato responded to the US expectation favorably. When he met in January 1965 with President Johnson, Sato made it clear that Japan would not pursue nuclear weapons. Although the US continued its support after this visit, it nevertheless gave priority to the control of nuclear technology in Japan through the bilateral peaceful nuclear agreement. This paper argues that the 1968 agreement implicitly meant a strategic measure to prevent Japan from going nuclear and also a tactic to persuade Japan to join the Nuclear Non -Proliferation Treaty.

  9. Some major challenges: Nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear arms control and nuclear terrorism. Vienna, 29 October 2001. Statement to the symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    The main topics dealt with the ensuring of an effective, universal and adequately financed system for the verification of nuclear non-proliferation, namely as follows: Effectiveness of the system; Participation in the system ; Financing of the system; Making Progress in Nuclear Arms Control; Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism. In the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 2000, the Agency was able to conclude that for all 140 states with safeguards agreements in place the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. The Agency currently safeguards over 900 facilities in 70 countries on a regular safeguards budget of approximately US $80 million per year. Turning to the major recent challenge, protection against nuclear terrorism, the IAEA has long been active in encouraging States to make security an integral part of the management of their nuclear programmes. The recent attacks in the United States were, however, a wake-up call to all that more can and must be done. In the week immediately following the tragedy, the IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution which requested a thorough review of Agency activities and programmes relevant to preventing acts of nuclear terrorism

  10. The text of the amended Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the amended Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Swaziland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  11. The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  12. Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  13. The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  14. The Text of the Agreement between Iceland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Iceland to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  15. The text of the Agreement of 22 February 1978 between Paraguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-08-01

    The full text of the agreement between Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America is presented

  16. The Text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Senegal to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  17. The Text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Senegal to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  18. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [fr

  19. Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Iceland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Iceland to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between Iceland and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  1. The Text of the Agreement between the Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Kingdom of Lesotho to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  2. Agreement between the Holy See and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Holy See to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Holy See and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  3. The Text of the Agreement of 8 August 1978 between Gambia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of The Gambia to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of The Gambia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  4. The text of the Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-06-01

    The full text of the agreement between Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  5. The Role of Health Care Experience and Consumer Information Efficacy in Shaping Privacy and Security Perceptions of Medical Records: National Consumer Survey Results

    Science.gov (United States)

    Beckjord, Ellen; Moser, Richard P; Hughes, Penelope; Hesse, Bradford W

    2015-01-01

    Background Providers’ adoption of electronic health records (EHRs) is increasing and consumers have expressed concerns about the potential effects of EHRs on privacy and security. Yet, we lack a comprehensive understanding regarding factors that affect individuals’ perceptions regarding the privacy and security of their medical information. Objective The aim of this study was to describe national perceptions regarding the privacy and security of medical records and identify a comprehensive set of factors associated with these perceptions. Methods Using a nationally representative 2011-2012 survey, we reported on adults’ perceptions regarding privacy and security of medical records and sharing of health information between providers, and whether adults withheld information from a health care provider due to privacy or security concerns. We used multivariable models to examine the association between these outcomes and sociodemographic characteristics, health and health care experience, information efficacy, and technology-related variables. Results Approximately one-quarter of American adults (weighted n=235,217,323; unweighted n=3959) indicated they were very confident (n=989) and approximately half indicated they were somewhat confident (n=1597) in the privacy of their medical records; we found similar results regarding adults’ confidence in the security of medical records (very confident: n=828; somewhat confident: n=1742). In all, 12.33% (520/3904) withheld information from a health care provider and 59.06% (2100/3459) expressed concerns about the security of both faxed and electronic health information. Adjusting for other characteristics, adults who reported higher quality of care had significantly greater confidence in the privacy and security of their medical records and were less likely to withhold information from their health care provider due to privacy or security concerns. Adults with higher information efficacy had significantly greater

  6. Adopting electronic medical records in primary care: lessons learned from health information systems implementation experience in seven countries.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ludwick, D A; Doucette, John

    2009-01-01

    The adoption of health information systems is seen world wide as one method to mitigate the widening health care demand and supply gap. The purpose of this review was to identify the current state of knowledge about health information systems adoption in primary care. The goal was to understand factors and influencers affecting implementation outcomes from previous health information systems implementations experiences. A comprehensive systematic literature review of peer reviewed and grey literature was undertaken to identify the current state of knowledge regarding the implementation of health information systems. A total of 6 databases, 27 journal websites, 20 websites from grey sources, 9 websites from medical colleges and professional associations as well as 22 government/commission websites were searched. The searches returned almost 3700 article titles. Eighty-six articles met our inclusion and exclusion criteria. Articles show that systems' graphical user interface design quality, feature functionality, project management, procurement and users' previous experience affect implementation outcomes. Implementers had concerns about factors such as privacy, patient safety, provider/patient relations, staff anxiety, time factors, quality of care, finances, efficiency, and liability. The review showed that implementers can insulate the project from such concerns by establishing strong leadership, using project management techniques, establishing standards and training their staff to ensure such risks do not compromise implementation success. The review revealed the concept of socio-technical factors, or "fit" factors, that complicate health information systems deployment. The socio-technical perspective considers how the technical features of a health information system interact with the social features of a health care work environment. The review showed that quality of care, patient safety and provider/patient relations were not, positively or negatively

  7. Notes on some experiments on the application of subtractive compensation to USGS seismic magnetic tape recording and playback systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Eaton, Jerry P.

    1975-01-01

    The purpose of these experiments is to lay the groundwork for the implementation of subtractive compensation of the USGS seismic network tape playbacks utilizing the Develco model 6203 discriminators at a x1 playback speed. Although the Develco discriminators were designed for this application and a matching Develco compensation discriminator was purchased, effective use of this system for subtractive compensation has been blocked by the inadequate (frequency dependent) matching of the phase of the compensation signal to that of the data signal at the point compensation is carried out in the data discriminators. John Van Schaack has ameliorated the phase mismatch problem by an empirical alteration of the compensation discriminator input bandpass filter. We have selected a set (of eight) Develco discriminators and adjusted their compensation signal input levels to minimize spurious signals (noise) originating from tape speed irregularities. The sensitivity of the data discriminators was adjusted so that deviations of +125 Hz and -125 Hz produced output signals of +2.00 volts and -2.00 volts, respectively. The eight data discriminators are driven by a multiplex signal on a single tape track (subcarriers 680, 1020, 1360, 1700, 2040, 2380, 2720, and 3060 Hz). The Develco-supplied compensation discriminator requires an unmodulated 3125 Hz signal on a separate tape track.

  8. Records Management

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ray, Charles M.

    1977-01-01

    This discussion of evaluating a records management course includes comments on management orientation, creation of records, maintenance of records, selection and use of equipment, storage and destruction of records, micrographics, and a course outline. (TA)

  9. [Experience with the use of an implantable loop recorder in a series of older people with falls and suspected arrhythmic syncopes].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Martínez, Paula; Pilar Sáez, María; Rubio, José Amador; Cánovas, Ester; Esteban, Elena; Botas, Javier

    2014-01-01

    To review our experience on using an implantable loop recorder (ILR) in patients with recurrent falls, when an arrhythmogenic cause is suspected. This is a retrospective, observational study of patients with repetitive unexplained falls, suspected syncope, or electrocardiographic abnormalities. All of them had been evaluated by a cardiologist, who decided to implant a loop recorder (ILR) for an accurate diagnosis. A total of 13 patients received an ILR. The average falls rate for the sample was 3.3. The mean age was 78 years, and 46% were female, with a mean follow-up period of 24 months. During this time, three patients did not suffer from a new fall. An arrhythmogenic diagnosis was obtained in 5 patients: bradycardia was identified in 4 cases, and tachycardia in one of them. The symptoms did not coincide with a documented arrhythmia in the rest of the patients. ILR is a helpful tool to establish an arrhythmogenic cause of unexplained and recurrent falls, in this selected sample of older adults. Copyright © 2013 SEGG. Published by Elsevier Espana. All rights reserved.

  10. MOLA PRECISION EXPERIMENT DATA RECORD

    Data.gov (United States)

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration — The Mars Global Surveyor spacecraft included a laser altimeter instrument. The primary objective of the Mars Orbiter Laser Altimeter (MOLA) is to determine globally...

  11. Records Management

    Data.gov (United States)

    U.S. Environmental Protection Agency — All Federal Agencies are required to prescribe an appropriate records maintenance program so that complete records are filed or otherwise preserved, records can be...

  12. The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  13. Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Dominican Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  14. Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Jamaica to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  15. Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  16. The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Ghana to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

  17. Agreement between the Commonwealth of The Bahamas and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with The Bahamas to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Commonwealth of The Bahamas and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  18. The Text of the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between Ghana and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Ghana to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2012-01-01

    The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement of 23 August 1973 between the Government of the Republic of Ghana and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

  19. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

  20. Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in Guatemala City on 14 December 2001