WorldWideScience

Sample records for non-proliferation event aftershocks

  1. Aftershocks and triggered events of the Great 1906 California earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meltzner, A.J.; Wald, D.J.

    2003-01-01

    The San Andreas fault is the longest fault in California and one of the longest strike-slip faults in the world, yet little is known about the aftershocks following the most recent great event on the San Andreas, the Mw 7.8 San Francisco earthquake on 18 April 1906. We conducted a study to locate and to estimate magnitudes for the largest aftershocks and triggered events of this earthquake. We examined existing catalogs and historical documents for the period April 1906 to December 1907, compiling data on the first 20 months of the aftershock sequence. We grouped felt reports temporally and assigned modified Mercalli intensities for the larger events based on the descriptions judged to be the most reliable. For onshore and near-shore events, a grid-search algorithm (derived from empirical analysis of modern earthquakes) was used to find the epicentral location and magnitude most consistent with the assigned intensities. For one event identified as far offshore, the event's intensity distribution was compared with those of modern events, in order to contrain the event's location and magnitude. The largest aftershock within the study period, an M ???6.7 event, occurred ???100 km west of Eureka on 23 April 1906. Although not within our study period, another M ???6.7 aftershock occurred near Cape Mendocino on 28 October 1909. Other significant aftershocks included an M ???5.6 event near San Juan Bautista on 17 May 1906 and an M ???6.3 event near Shelter Cove on 11 August 1907. An M ???4.9 aftershock occurred on the creeping segment of the San Andreas fault (southeast of the mainshock rupture) on 6 July 1906. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake also triggered events in southern California (including separate events in or near the Imperial Valley, the Pomona Valley, and Santa Monica Bay), in western Nevada, in southern central Oregon, and in western Arizona, all within 2 days of the mainshock. Of these trigerred events, the largest were an M ???6.1 earthquake near Brawley

  2. Constraining the magnitude of the largest event in a foreshock-main shock-aftershock sequence

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shcherbakov, Robert; Zhuang, Jiancang; Ogata, Yosihiko

    2018-01-01

    Extreme value statistics and Bayesian methods are used to constrain the magnitudes of the largest expected earthquakes in a sequence governed by the parametric time-dependent occurrence rate and frequency-magnitude statistics. The Bayesian predictive distribution for the magnitude of the largest event in a sequence is derived. Two types of sequences are considered, that is, the classical aftershock sequences generated by large main shocks and the aftershocks generated by large foreshocks preceding a main shock. For the former sequences, the early aftershocks during a training time interval are used to constrain the magnitude of the future extreme event during the forecasting time interval. For the latter sequences, the earthquakes preceding the main shock are used to constrain the magnitudes of the subsequent extreme events including the main shock. The analysis is applied retrospectively to past prominent earthquake sequences.

  3. The Mw=8.8 Maule earthquake aftershock sequence, event catalog and locations

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meltzer, A.; Benz, H.; Brown, L.; Russo, R. M.; Beck, S. L.; Roecker, S. W.

    2011-12-01

    The aftershock sequence of the Mw=8.8 Maule earthquake off the coast of Chile in February 2010 is one of the most well-recorded aftershock sequences from a great megathrust earthquake. Immediately following the Maule earthquake, teams of geophysicists from Chile, France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States coordinated resources to capture aftershocks and other seismic signals associated with this significant earthquake. In total, 91 broadband, 48 short period, and 25 accelerometers stations were deployed above the rupture zone of the main shock from 33-38.5°S and from the coast to the Andean range front. In order to integrate these data into a unified catalog, the USGS National Earthquake Information Center develop procedures to use their real-time seismic monitoring system (Bulletin Hydra) to detect, associate, location and compute earthquake source parameters from these stations. As a first step in the process, the USGS has built a seismic catalog of all M3.5 or larger earthquakes for the time period of the main aftershock deployment from March 2010-October 2010. The catalog includes earthquake locations, magnitudes (Ml, Mb, Mb_BB, Ms, Ms_BB, Ms_VX, Mc), associated phase readings and regional moment tensor solutions for most of the M4 or larger events. Also included in the catalog are teleseismic phases and amplitude measures and body-wave MT and CMT solutions for the larger events, typically M5.5 and larger. Tuning of automated detection and association parameters should allow a complete catalog of events to approximately M2.5 or larger for that dataset of more than 164 stations. We characterize the aftershock sequence in terms of magnitude, frequency, and location over time. Using the catalog locations and travel times as a starting point we use double difference techniques to investigate relative locations and earthquake clustering. In addition, phase data from candidate ground truth events and modeling of surface waves can be used to calibrate the

  4. An Autonomous System for Grouping Events in a Developing Aftershock Sequence

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harris, D. B. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Dodge, D. A. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2011-03-22

    We describe a prototype detection framework that automatically clusters events in real time from a rapidly unfolding aftershock sequence. We use the fact that many aftershocks are repetitive, producing similar waveforms. By clustering events based on correlation measures of waveform similarity, the number of independent event instances that must be examined in detail by analysts may be reduced. Our system processes array data and acquires waveform templates with a short-term average (STA)/long-term average (LTA) detector operating on a beam directed at the P phases of the aftershock sequence. The templates are used to create correlation-type (subspace) detectors that sweep the subsequent data stream for occurrences of the same waveform pattern. Events are clustered by association with a particular detector. Hundreds of subspace detectors can run in this framework a hundred times faster than in real time. Nonetheless, to check the growth in the number of detectors, the framework pauses periodically and reclusters detections to reduce the number of event groups. These groups define new subspace detectors that replace the older generation of detectors. Because low-magnitude occurrences of a particular signal template may be missed by the STA/LTA detector, we advocate restarting the framework from the beginning of the sequence periodically to reprocess the entire data stream with the existing detectors. We tested the framework on 10 days of data from the Nevada Seismic Array (NVAR) covering the 2003 San Simeon earthquake. One hundred eighty-four automatically generated detectors produced 676 detections resulting in a potential reduction in analyst workload of up to 73%.

  5. Non Proliferation of Nuclear

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bambang S Irawan

    2004-01-01

    Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons is the international community's efforts to maintain the security of the world, in order to prevent the spread of nuclear technology and the use of nuclear weapons, promoting cooperation for the use of nuclear peaceful purposes, build mutual trust (Confidence Building Measures) as well as to achieve the ultimate goal of disarmament overall (General and Complete Disarmament). Addressing the post-WTC tragedy, 11 September 2001, the Indonesian government should set up a National Measures (National Action Plan), among others formed the National Security Council and NBC Counter Proliferation Unit, or the National Authority for Nuclear Treaty, preparing national legislation, to prevent the abuse nuclear materials for terrorist acts, prevent Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear materials, developed a National Preparedness and Emergency Response Management in the event of a nuclear accident or attack by the use of nuclear terrorism. Importance of a National Action Plan meant the existence of a national commitment in the context of compliance with treaties and conventions which have been ratified relating to safety, security, safeguards towards a general and complete disarmament, to safeguard national security and maintain peace (safeguards) international

  6. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1984-01-01

    DOE's nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities are defined by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). The Department's major responsibilities in this area are to: (1) provide technical assistance to the Department of State in negotiating agreements for civil cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other countries and international organizations; (2) join with other agencies to reach executive branch judgments with respect to the issuance of export licenses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; (3) be responsible for processing subsequent arrangements with other agencies as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act; (4) control the distribution of special nuclear materials, components, equipment, and nuclear technology exports; (5) participate in bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign governments and organizations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (6) act as a primary technical resource with respect to US participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency

  7. Aftershock Sequences and Seismic-Like Organization of Acoustic Events Produced by a Single Propagating Crack

    Science.gov (United States)

    Alizee, D.; Bonamy, D.

    2017-12-01

    In inhomogeneous brittle solids like rocks, concrete or ceramics, one usually distinguish nominally brittle fracture, driven by the propagation of a single crack from quasibrittle one, resulting from the accumulation of many microcracks. The latter goes along with intermittent sharp noise, as e.g. revealed by the acoustic emission observed in lab scale compressive fracture experiments or at geophysical scale in the seismic activity. In both cases, statistical analyses have revealed a complex time-energy organization into aftershock sequences obeying a range of robust empirical scaling laws (the Omori-Utsu, productivity and Bath's law) that help carry out seismic hazard analysis and damage mitigation. These laws are usually conjectured to emerge from the collective dynamics of microcrack nucleation. In the experiments presented at AGU, we will show that such a statistical organization is not specific to the quasi-brittle multicracking situations, but also rules the acoustic events produced by a single crack slowly driven in an artificial rock made of sintered polymer beads. This simpler situation has advantageous properties (statistical stationarity in particular) permitting us to uncover the origins of these seismic laws: Both productivity law and Bath's law result from the scale free statistics for event energy and Omori-Utsu law results from the scale-free statistics of inter-event time. This yields predictions on how the associated parameters are related, which were analytically derived. Surprisingly, the so-obtained relations are also compatible with observations on lab scale compressive fracture experiments, suggesting that, in these complex multicracking situations also, the organization into aftershock sequences and associated seismic laws are also ruled by the propagation of individual microcrack fronts, and not by the collective, stress-mediated, microcrack nucleation. Conversely, the relations are not fulfilled in seismology signals, suggesting that

  8. Nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1990-01-01

    This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

  9. Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Manley, I.T.

    1981-01-01

    Proliferation is a problem that can only be solved when the political problems which lead countries to contemplate, the possession of nuclear weapons are solved; in the meantime it can only be managed. Non-proliferation policy has to deal both with the political and the technical aspects of proliferation. It must seek to buy time by addressing the reasons why nations feel the political need to construct nuclear weapons, as well as delaying the moment when such nations feel capable of doing so. The subject is examined and proposals made. (author)

  10. Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Deiseroth, D.; Gustafsson, S.

    1993-01-01

    The issue of Nuclear Non Proliferation has been moved to a leading place on the contemporary international security agenda. What about the situation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belorussia? Why did the IAEA-inspectors totally failed to discover any sign of Iraq's clandestine nuclear-weapon programme before the Gulf War? Do the NATO and their nuclear power states violate Art. VI of the Non-Proliferation-Treaty (NPT), because they are - despite the end of the cold war - not willing to renounce of the ''option of the first use of nuclear weapons''? Does the NPT establish a form of nuclear apartheid? What will be the situation if the NPT-Extension-Conference in 1995 will be unable to obtain a majority of the parties for any one extension proposal? Do we need a new international nuclear control agency with severe powers, a sort of nuclear Interpol? The Colloquium ''Saving NPT and abolishing Nuclear Weapons'', held in Stockholm in September 1992, organized by the Swedish and the German Sections of IALANA, tried to analyse some of the raised issues. (orig.) [de

  11. Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

    1997-01-01

    In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

  12. The non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hannon, W.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    On September 22, 1993, the Department of Energy detonated more than 1.2 million kg of blasting agent in a tunnel in Rainier Mesa at the Nevada Test Site. The resulting explosion generated seismic, electromagnetic, and air pressure signals that were recorded on instruments deployed at distances ranging from a few meters to hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of kilometers. More than 12 organizations made measurements before, during, and after the explosions. The explosion and its associated experiments are known as the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). Analyses of the measurements made during the NPE and comparisons with similar measurements made on previous nearly nuclear explosions and on a co-located smaller explosion detonated at the same site are providing basic phenomenological insights into what is potentially one of the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)-distinguishing between nuclear explosions and some of the many conventional explosions that occur each year. The NPE is also providing information on the use of chemical explosions to develop empirical discriminants in regions where no nuclear explosions have been recorded. In another verification application, several NPE projects are examining the utility of on-site, pre-shot, shot-time, and post-shot measurements of gas seepage, seismic activity, and other observables as a means of identifying the source of signals that appear like nuclear explosions at regional distances. Two related activities are being considered. First, challenge on-site inspections, conducted after an event has occurred, may be able to use the characteristics of phenomena that persist after the explosion to detect and identify the source of the signals that appeared ambiguous or explosion-like to remote sensors. Second, cooperative, on-site measurements made at the time of a pre-nounced conventional explosion may provide assurance that a nuclear explosion did not occur as part of or in place of the pre-announced explosion.

  13. Nuclear non proliferation and disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    In the framework of the publication of a document on the ''weapons mastership, disarmament and non proliferation: the french action'', by the ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministry of Defense, the French Documentation organization presents a whole document. This document describes and details the following topics: the conference on the treaty of non proliferation of nuclear weapons, the France, Usa and Non Governmental Organizations position, the threats of the proliferation, the french actions towards the disarmament, the disarmament in the world, a chronology and some bibliographic resources. (A.L.B.)

  14. Future non-proliferation challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yelchenko, Volodymyr

    2008-01-01

    Having chaired the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee Mr. Volodymyr Yelchenko noted that the NPT States parties reaffirmed the important role of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. They stressed that non-compliance with the Treaty provisions by States parties undermined non-proliferation and placed emphasis on the mutually reinforcing nature of disarmament and non-proliferation, and due respect for the right of States parties to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with the treaty. They reaffirmed the importance of promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes in ways consistent with the non-proliferation goal of the Treaty. The universality aspect was brought to the front with the lack of progress in this area. States parties called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapons states, promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with Additional Protocols, for ensuring non-proliferation. There is concern that non-States actors could gain access to weapons of mass destruction. One of the underlying themes at the Second Prepcom was the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against their proliferation. Negative consequences to nuclear non-proliferation were also mentioned in the context of the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the development of missile defense systems, with the risk of a new arms race on Earth and in outer space. The importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Conference of Disarmament on a treaty concerning fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the urgent conclusion of such a treaty as a beneficial step towards non-proliferation was stressed. The NPT states parties reaffirmed the role of the IAEA as the sole competent authority responsible for

  15. Non proliferation of nuclear weapons?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Le Guelte, Georges

    2015-10-01

    After having evoked the behaviour of nuclear countries regarding the development of nuclear weapons and uranium procurement, or nuclear programmes after the Second World War until nowadays, the author presents the non proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a construction at the service of super-powers. He comments and discusses the role of the IAEA control system and its evolutions: a control limited to declared installations, an export control with the spectre of plutonium, a control system thwarted by some technological innovations, information systems coming in, and an additional protocol related to the application of guarantees. He comments the evolution of the context from a bipolar world to a world without pole which raises the issue of how to have commitments respected: description of the role and practice of non proliferation during the Cold War, after the Cold War, and in a world without governance

  16. Larger aftershocks happen farther away: nonseparability of magnitude and spatial distributions of aftershocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Van Der Elst, Nicholas; Shaw, Bruce E.

    2015-01-01

    Aftershocks may be driven by stress concentrations left by the main shock rupture or by elastic stress transfer to adjacent fault sections or strands. Aftershocks that occur within the initial rupture may be limited in size, because the scale of the stress concentrations should be smaller than the primary rupture itself. On the other hand, aftershocks that occur on adjacent fault segments outside the primary rupture may have no such size limitation. Here we use high-precision double-difference relocated earthquake catalogs to demonstrate that larger aftershocks occur farther away than smaller aftershocks, when measured from the centroid of early aftershock activity—a proxy for the initial rupture. Aftershocks as large as or larger than the initiating event nucleate almost exclusively in the outer regions of the aftershock zone. This observation is interpreted as a signature of elastic rebound in the earthquake catalog and can be used to improve forecasting of large aftershocks.

  17. Non-proliferation and disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ritter von Wagner, A.

    1993-01-01

    In 1995 the Conference on the prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will take place. Will it be extended for a long term, indefinitely or only for a fixed period? The Federal Government of Germany advocates an unlimited extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Others have different ideas alleging that the Treaty is imperfect and discriminating. It is a thorn in the side of many States, in particular of the Third World, which no longer want to put up with being treated as second-class states. One argument which is considered especially embarrassing by developing countries as a visible expression of such discrimination, are the nuclear tests which are still carried out by nuclear weapon states. Is the political situation still such that one needs those weapons? Strategists gradually find it difficult to argument; over and over again they claim that an abandonment of nuclear weapons would make the world unsafer. But development has gradually passed over them. Nevertheless, one finds it hard to throw overboard considerations which for years have determined one's thinking. (orig./HSCH) [de

  18. The international nuclear non-proliferation system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, T.

    1985-01-01

    This volume focuses upon the issues raised at this Conference, and attempts to address the international diplomatic, political and trading, rather than technical, questions which surround nuclear non-proliferation policies. It does so by bringing together chapters contributed by participants in non-proliferation diplomacy, those with experience in shaping International Atomic Energy Agency and national policies and academic observers of non-proliferation activities and the international nuclear industry. An analysis is provided of past non-proliferation policies and activities and current issues, and an attempt is made to offer ideas for new initiatives which may sustain the non-proliferation system in the future

  19. Romania non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biro, Lucian; Grama, Viviana

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Non-proliferation concept in Romania is based on the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was ratified in 1970. According to the Article III of the Treaty, Romania ratified in 1972, the Agreement between Romania and IAEA for the application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In 2000 Romania ratified the Additional Protocol to contribute through increased transparency, to confidence that no undeclared nuclear activities are concealed within the declared programme or make use of elements of that programme. Under the Additional Protocol Romania understands to increase the transparency of its nuclear activities lengthways fuel cycle. Romania has a strong legal framework to control nuclear material and nuclear activities. The Law 111/1996, republished is the Law on the safe deployment of nuclear activities. CNCAN issued National Regulations for Safeguards and Physical Protection. Prospecting for uranium in Romania was initiated in 1950. Between 1962 and 1978 all the uranium ore production was stockpiled at the mine sites. In 1978 the Feldioara Powder Plant was commissioned, since then both ore stockpiles and ore exploited have been processed to uranium chemical concentrates. The Powder Plant Feldioara was conceived and built following the necessity of milling and processing the uranium ore to UO 2 , in concordance with the national nuclear programme in order to produce electric energy from nuclear fuel. The Nuclear Fuel Plant has capability to manufacture CANDU-6 nuclear fuel. Nuclear Fuel Plant consists of two Production areas, the Quality Assurance and Engineering Departments. There are two Production Departments: Pelleting area including granulation, pressing, sintering, pellet grinding, uranium recycling and Assembling area including components fabrication, beryllium coating, brazing, graphite coating, fuel element and bundle assembly welding. Romania's Strategy for Energy Sector

  20. Foreshocks and Aftershocks Detected from Stick-slip Events on a 3 m Biaxial Apparatus and their Relationship to Quasistatic Nucleation and Wear Processes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wu, S.; Mclaskey, G.

    2017-12-01

    We investigate foreshocks and aftershocks of dynamic stick-slip events generated on a newly constructed 3 m biaxial friction apparatus at Cornell University (attached figure). In a typical experiment, two rectangular granite blocks are squeezed together under 4 or 7 MPa of normal pressure ( 4 or 7 million N on a 1 m2 fault surface), and then shear stress is increased until the fault slips 10 - 400 microns in a dynamic rupture event similar to a M -2 to M -3 earthquake. Some ruptures nucleate near the north end of the fault, where the shear force is applied, other ruptures nucleate 2 m from the north end of the fault. The samples are instrumented with 16 piezoelectric sensors, 16 eddy current sensors, and 8 strain gage rosettes, evenly placed along the fault to measure vertical ground motion, local slip, and local stress, respectively. We studied sequences of tens of slip events and identified a total of 194 foreshocks and 66 aftershocks located within 6 s time windows around the stick-slip events and analyzed their timing and locations relative to the quasistatic nucleation process. We found that the locations of the foreshocks and aftershocks were distributed all along the length of the fault, with the majority located at the ends of the fault where local normal and shear stress is highest (caused by both edge effects and the finite stiffness of the steel frame surrounding the granite blocks). We also opened the laboratory fault and inspected the fault surface and found increased wear at the sample ends. To explore the foreshocks' and aftershocks' relationship to the nucleation and afterslip, we compared the occurrence of foreshocks to the local slip rate on the laboratory fault closest to each foreshock in space and time. We found that that majority of foreshocks were generated from local slip rates between 1 and 100 microns/s, though we were not able to resolve slip rate lower than about 1 micron/s. Our experiments provide insight into how foreshocks and

  1. The handbook of nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, M. H.; Lee, B. W.; Oh, K. B.; Lee, H. M.; Ko, H. S.; Ryu, J. S.; Lee, K. S.

    2003-07-01

    This report analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This report took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and current status. It is here divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this report dealt four multilateral treaties concluded for international non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. And international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are also analyzed focused on UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, regional safeguards system and international conferences. In addition, this report reviewed the nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is a important tool for bilateral regime

  2. An overview of the on-site inspection measurements from the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zucca, J.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    An on-site inspection (OSI) is an in-person visit to site to collect data and examine evidence in order to determine the source of an ambiguous event detected via remote monitoring systems or other measures. Its purpose is to determine whether the treaty has been violated, to deter violations, and to build confidence. At the time of this writing, it is anticipated that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) being developed in the Conference on Disarmament will contain OSI provisions. In an era of testing moratoria, the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) provided a unique opportunity to investigate candidate OSI techniques. On site inspections could occur in three different contexts: after-the-fact inspections based on information from remote monitoring systems; inspections prior to, during, and after large declared chemical explosions (e.g., a large mining explosion); continuous monitoring inspections with unattended sensors at certain agreed-upon sites (e.g., previous test sites). OSI monitoring techniques need to be designed to detect the phenomena and residual effects of nuclear explosions. In the underground case, the primary effects of interest for OSI are the electromagnetic pulse, shock waves, aftershocks, radioactive gas, rubble zone, and apical void. These effects are well known and the basic techniques for their detection well established. We designed our measurement program for the NPE to answer specific issues about these detection technologies. Our measurement program includes the following: zerotime electromagnetic measurements; seismic aftershock survey; before and after electrical soundings; gas tracers introduced into the explosive; before and after multispectral overhead imagery from low-flying aircraft; before and after geological surveys.

  3. Non-proliferation and multinational enterprises

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-04-01

    The paper supplements CC/WG.2/9 in presenting the Japanese delegation's contribution in the areas of non-proliferation and multi-national enterprises. The paper questions whether multinational enrichment enterprises would constitute a significant non-proliferation factor, noting that the nature of the venture might create a potential for the dissemination of sensitive information. The paper also argues that a multi-national venture which was not economically competitive (with national facilities) would have questionable viability. The conclusion is that non-proliferation advantages, if any, would be a result, not an objective of such a venture

  4. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-05-01

    Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

  5. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok.

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs

  6. Handbook for nuclear non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Byung Wook; Oh, Keun Bae; Lee, Kwang Seok; Lee, Dong Jin; Ko, Han Seok

    1997-05-01

    This book analyzed international non-proliferation regime preventing from spread of nuclear weapon. This book took review from the historical background of non-proliferation regime to the recent changes and status. The regime, here, is divided into multilateral and bilateral regime. First of all, this book reports four multilateral treaties concluded for non-proliferation such as NPT, NWFZ, CTBT and others. Secondly, international organization and regimes concerned with non-proliferation are analyzed with emphasis of UN, IAEA, ZC and NSG, Regional Safeguards System and international conference. Finally, this book report the current circumstances of nuclear cooperation agreement related with Korea which is an important means for bilateral regime. (author). 13 tabs., 2 figs.

  7. The future of non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gere, F.

    2000-01-01

    This paper comprises two parts. The first part makes a status of the non-proliferation policy: problems of ratification of Start 2 and CTBT treaties, nuclear tests in India and Pakistan in May 1998 etc. The second part makes a prospective reflexion on the evolution of the position of nuclearized countries at the 2015-2030 vista: role of Asia, nuclear perception, evolution of the US perception of non-proliferation, military strategy and European unification. (J.S.)

  8. China's position on nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Qian Jiadong.

    1986-01-01

    The paper discusses China's position on nuclear non-proliferation, in view of the fact that China does not subscribe to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China refuses to accede to the NPT because it considers the treaty to be discriminatory, and reasons are given for this point of view. However its stand for nuclear disarmament and disapproval of nuclear proliferation are declared. Nuclear arms race, prevention of nuclear war, and nuclear disarmament are also considered. (UK)

  9. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Haeckel, E.; Haefele, W.; Lauppe, W.D.; Mueller, H.; Ungerer, W.

    1991-01-01

    During the turbulant transitional events in world politics in the nineties, the control of nuclear weapons plays a major role. While the superpowers are reducing their nuclear arsenal, the danger of nuclear anarchy in the world remains virulent. The NPT of 1968 is up for review soon. The falling apart of the former communist sphere of power, and the regions of conflict in the Third World present new risks for the proliferation of nuclear arms. For unified Germany, which explicitly renounced nuclear weapons, this situation presents difficult questions concerning national safety policies and international responsibility. This volume presents contributions which take a new look at topical and long-term problems of nuclear NP politics. The authors evaluate the conditions under which the NP regime came into being, and assess short- and long-term possibilities and risks. The following papers are included: 1.) Basic controversies during the negotiations concerning the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Ungerer); 2.) Prologation of the NPT 1995 and appropriate problems concerning safety and control (Haefele/Lauppe); 3.) Consequences of the Iraq case for NP policy (Ficher); 4.) Problems of nuclear technology control (Mueller); 5.) Framework conditions of a nuclear world system (Haeckel). (orig./HP) [de

  10. Nuclear arbitration: Interpreting non-proliferation agreements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tzeng, Peter

    2015-01-01

    At the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime lie international agreements. These agreements include, inter alia, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, nuclear co-operation agreements and nuclear export control agreements.1 States, however, do not always comply with their obligations under these agreements. In response, commentators have proposed various enforcement mechanisms to promote compliance. The inconvenient truth, however, is that states are generally unwilling to consent to enforcement mechanisms concerning issues as critical to national security as nuclear non-proliferation.3 This article suggests an alternative solution to the non-compliance problem: interpretation mechanisms. Although an interpretation mechanism does not have the teeth of an enforcement mechanism, it can induce compliance by providing an authoritative interpretation of a legal obligation. Interpretation mechanisms would help solve the non-compliance problem because, as this article shows, in many cases of alleged non-compliance with a non-proliferation agreement, the fundamental problem has been the lack of an authoritative interpretation of the agreement, not the lack of an enforcement mechanism. Specifically, this article proposes arbitration as the proper interpretation mechanism for non-proliferation agreements. It advocates the establishment of a 'Nuclear Arbitration Centre' as an independent branch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and recommends the gradual introduction of arbitration clauses into the texts of non-proliferation agreements. Section I begins with a discussion of international agreements in general and the importance of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section II then discusses nuclear non-proliferation agreements and their lack of interpretation and enforcement mechanisms. Section III examines seven case studies of alleged non-compliance with non-proliferation agreements in order to show that the main problem in many cases

  11. Temporal characteristics of some aftershock sequences in Bulgaria

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    D. Solakov

    1999-06-01

    Full Text Available We apply statistical analysis to study the temporal distribution of aftershocks in aftershock sequences of five earthquakes which occurred in Bulgaria. We use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the parameters of the modified Omori formula for aftershock sequences which is directly based on a time series. We find that: the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter p show a regional variation, with lower values of the decay rate in North Bulgaria; the modified Omori formula provides an appropriate representation of temporal variation of the aftershock activity in North Bulgaria; the aftershock sequences in South Bulgaria are best modeled by the combination of an ordinary aftershock sequence with secondary aftershock activity. A plot of the cumulative number of events versus the frequency-linearized time t clearly demonstrates a transition from aftershock to foreshock activity prior to the second 1986 Strazhitsa (North Bulgaria earthquake.

  12. Israel's position on non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marom, R.

    1986-01-01

    Israel maintained that the complex international system and worldwide political tension created a situation in which comprehensive plans of disarmament could not produce any positive result. The deadlock in the field of general and complete disarmament has brought Israel to the realization that one possible way to alleviate the stalemate could be progress by stages through partial measures of disarmament. Israel's position on non-proliferation indicates that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ), as it relates to the Middle-East, could serve as a credible alternative to the unilateral adherence to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon (NPT) and an effective measure of non-proliferation in the region. (Author)

  13. The European dimension in non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krause, J.

    1996-01-01

    Europe was for decades the focal point of efforts to prevent or constrain nuclear proliferation and the first region in which non-proliferation efforts failed. Paper deals with current proliferation problems in Europe, namely, diversion of weapons, diversion from dismantling, production over-capacity, security concerns. Legal instruments against proliferation in Europe described here include development of international norms; instruments of security assurance and cooperation; disarmament assistance; fissile material management; assistance in creating export control systems; improving and harmonizing export controls for dual-purpose items. Problems in implementing non-proliferation instruments are described separately

  14. United States non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1978-01-01

    U.S. non-proliferation policy is aimed at slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, managing the destabilizing effects of nuclear technology for energy purposes, and fostering international standards and institutions to deal responsibly with global nuclear development. These goals assume that nuclear technology has not already precluded social control and recognize the social benefits offered by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Non-proliferation policies recognize that the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is a more-difficult problem than technical ability and will concentrate on reducing those incentives through international agreements and safeguards and by maintaining the separation of commercial nuclear fuel cycles and military uses

  15. Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

  16. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    2003-01-01

    Although the nuclear non-proliferation regime has enjoyed considerable success, today the regime has never been under greater threat. Three states have challenged the objectives of the NPT, and there is a technology challenge - the spread of centrifuge enrichment technology and know-how. A major issue confronting the international community is, how to deal with a determined proliferator? Despite this gloomy scenario, however, the non-proliferation regime has considerable strengths - many of which can be developed further. The regime comprises complex interacting and mutually reinforcing elements. At its centre is the NPT - with IAEA safeguards as the Treaty's verification mechanism. Important complementary elements include: restraint in the supply and the acquisition of sensitive technologies; multilateral regimes such as the CTBT and proposed FMCT; various regional and bilateral regimes; the range of security and arms control arrangements outside the nuclear area (including other WMD regimes); and the development of proliferation-resistant technologies. Especially important are political incentives and sanctions in support of non-proliferation objectives. This paper outlines some of the key issues facing the non-proliferation regime

  17. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shea, M.

    2000-01-01

    Fissionable materials are common to all nuclear weapons and controls on the production, storage, processing and use of fissionable materials provides one means to address non-proliferation and disarmament. In this article, the relevance of such controls is examined and the current situation and future prospects are assessed. (authors)

  18. EMP at the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bell, J. [AWE, Aldermaston (United Kingdom)

    1994-12-31

    This experiment presented an opportunity to field customized equipment designed to detect and record electromagnetic pulse (EMP) emanations from an explosion over a wide frequency range. Any data recorded could be used in conjunction with the seismic methods to further non-proliferation studies. No EMP emanations were detectable from the four sensors deployed outside the tunnel confines.

  19. Supporting non proliferation and global security efforts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pochon, E.

    2013-01-01

    CEA contributes as a major actor of France's action against nuclear proliferation and to the strengthening of nuclear security at national level as European and International levels, in particular through the support of the IAEA activities in nuclear non proliferation with the French Support Programme for the IAEA safeguards system and security with the contribution to the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan and cooperation projects with the European Commission. The CEA is a French government funded technological research organization, organized around 5 branches: Nuclear Energy, Technological Researches, Defence (DAM), Material Sciences and Life Sciences. Within the scope of its activities, CEA covers most of the research areas and techniques in nuclear non-proliferation and security. The CEA is also the advisor of the French Government on nuclear policy. Treaty monitoring and the development and implementation of non proliferation and global security programs is an important mission of DAM which rely on nuclear weapons manufacture and past testing experience. The programmes on non proliferation and global security carried out to fulfil DAM's mission cover the following areas: development of monitoring and detection methods and equipments, country profiles and nuclear stockpiles assessment, arms control instruments, proliferation resistance of nuclear fuel cycle, monitoring of nuclear tests, operation and maintenance of national detection capabilities and contribution to CTBT verification systems. (A.C.)

  20. Nuclear exports and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courteix, Simone.

    1978-01-01

    Increased preoccupation in present times with the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in the multiplication of international agreements such as the Non-proliferation Treaty and in the strengthening of consultations between industrialised countries (London Club). After analysing the IAEA safeguards system under the Non-proliferation Treaty and its shortcomings both technically and otherwise, the author considers how this situation can be remedied in the light of the London Agreements and in view of the position of the main countries concerned. The annex to the book contains the texts of many international agreements and relevant national regulations as well as nuclear policy statements. It also includes a detailed bibliograaphy. (NEA) [fr

  1. Non-proliferation efforts in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chellaney, B.

    1994-01-01

    Southern Asia is one of the most volatile regions in the world because of inter-State and intra-State conflicts. Security in the region highly depends on the rival capabilities of the involved states, Pakistan, India, China. Increased Confidence building and nuclear transparency are becoming more significant issues in attaining stability in the region, although non-proliferation efforts in this region have attained little headway

  2. Sovereignty and non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kimminich, O.

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty seems to violate the fundamental principle of the quality of the states. However, if interpreted in the light of the latest developments of the international law, it is possible to justify the discriminations which it imposes on the non-nuclear states. A crucial point is the implementation of article VI by the nuclear states. If the latter procrastinate in nuclear disarmament the whole NPT-regime will collapse. (orig.) [de

  3. INFCE and US non-proliferation policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Donnelly, W H [Library of Congress, Washington, DC (USA)

    1980-12-01

    The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), which published its final reports in February 1980 produced a massive international effort of a kind never before seen. Over a period of two years its eight working groups held 61 meetings involving 519 experts from 46 countries and five international organizations. This article outlines the background and structure of INFCE and discusses how its recommendations diverge from US non-proliferation policy.

  4. Elements of safety and non proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jalouneix, Jean; Aurelle, Jacques; Funk, Pierre; Ladsous, David; Bon Nguyen, Romuald; Goue, Georges; Lefevre, Odile

    2015-01-01

    This book on nuclear safety and non proliferation is based on knowledge and expertise of the IRSN. The first chapter addresses the safety of nuclear materials, of their installations and of their transportations. It proposes some contextual elements, presents the general guidelines of the French nuclear safety arrangement, the approach to take risks into account, the involved governmental and public bodies, the legal framework, and the protection and control arrangement (in terms of planning of safety-related activities, in terms of operator obligations, in terms of exercises and management crisis). The second part addresses the safety of radioactive sources: context (peculiarity, losses and thefts), international framework (source categories, Euratom directive), and the French organisation. The third chapter addresses nuclear non proliferation: historical background (creation and role of the IAEA and of the EAEC, definitions), principle of statements, inspection process, and French organisation (legal framework, governmental bodies, the IRSN). The last chapter addresses the issue of chemical non proliferation: historical background, international context (Convention on chemical weapons, organisation for their ban), and the French organisation

  5. Strengthening the non proliferation regime: French views

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delaune, P.

    2013-01-01

    3 main issues can be identified in the French policy concerning the backing of non proliferation: 1) responding resolutely to proliferation crises, 2) reinforcing substantive efforts to prevent and impede proliferation, and 3) strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The first issue is very important because combating proliferation is vital to the security of all. Concerning the second issue, France attaches particular importance to strengthening specific measures to prevent and check proliferation. Let me mention a few proposals that we put forward: exports need to be controlled more effectively, proliferation activities have to be criminalized, or the development of proliferation-resistant technologies should be supported. Concerning the third issue it means the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, France proposes several means: -) aiming at the universalization of the additional protocol; -) ensuring that the Agency continues to have sufficient human, financial and technical resources to fulfill its verification mission effectively; -) encouraging the IAEA to make full use of the authority available to it; -) enhancing the use of information relevant to the delivery of the IAEA mandate; and -) sharing more accurate information concerning the breaches of commitments that happen. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  6. Nuclear non-proliferation: failures and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, R.; Press, R.

    1980-01-01

    The objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of combined political and technical attempts to achieve worldwide acceptance of a commitment to non-proliferation, to note failures to date, and to identify essential factors to be satisfied if greater and necessary success is to be achieved in the immediate future. For this it is necessary to separate the realism and unrealism so often involved in discussing the concept of non-proliferation, as defined above, particularly if treated as a moral principle rather than as part of a general security issue reflecting shifts in regional and global stability. The political nature of the non-proliferation problem is underlined by the fact that whereas five nuclear weapon states are currently accepted, any threatened increase in that number is discouraged by every possible peaceful means. This fact combines political acceptance of an existing international situation with a belief that any addition to the present number must lead to international instability. Success in preventing additions may be more readily achieved through political understanding and perhaps some compromises, in particular cases, rather than through seeking a universal solution to a generalized problem

  7. The Asian countries and the non-proliferation treaty prorogation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffmann, N.

    1995-01-01

    This work deals with the non-proliferation treaty prorogation of Asia. The position of the asian countries under the old non-proliferation treaty is given. It includes the 1968 non-proliferation treaty signatories, the calling in question again and the criticisms revealed by the asian countries. The positions and the open forecasts expressed on the non-proliferation treaty prorogation and the article on the elimination of the nuclear weapons are also given. (O.L.)

  8. Nuclear non proliferation and disarmament; Non-proliferation nucleaire et desarmement

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-07-01

    In the framework of the publication of a document on the ''weapons mastership, disarmament and non proliferation: the french action'', by the ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministry of Defense, the French Documentation organization presents a whole document. This document describes and details the following topics: the conference on the treaty of non proliferation of nuclear weapons, the France, Usa and Non Governmental Organizations position, the threats of the proliferation, the french actions towards the disarmament, the disarmament in the world, a chronology and some bibliographic resources. (A.L.B.)

  9. The Non-Proliferation Treaty increases security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kahiluoto, K.

    1995-01-01

    Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely was a historic decision. The Treaty is the most extensive international agreement on security policy to date; now its obligations have become a permanent part of international justice. Moreover, the NPT represents a political and moral obligation. Through the NPT, the international community has made a permanent commitment to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Increasing pressures will be applied to the few countries still outside the NPT, making it more likely that these countries will eventually change their views. The likelihood of regional bans on nuclear weapons in the Middle East and in Asia, too, will increase. The Treaty promotes the establishment of new nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-free zone in Latin America - the countries covered by the Tlatelolco Treaty - is already very close to its full implementation. Finland is firmly committed to the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT Conference of 1995 was among the first international meetings in which Finland participated, and took an active role, as a Member State of the European Union. (orig.)

  10. Scale-free networks of earthquakes and aftershocks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baiesi, Marco; Paczuski, Maya

    2004-01-01

    We propose a metric to quantify correlations between earthquakes. The metric consists of a product involving the time interval and spatial distance between two events, as well as the magnitude of the first one. According to this metric, events typically are strongly correlated to only one or a few preceding ones. Thus a classification of events as foreshocks, main shocks, or aftershocks emerges automatically without imposing predetermined space-time windows. In the simplest network construction, each earthquake receives an incoming link from its most correlated predecessor. The number of aftershocks for any event, identified by its outgoing links, is found to be scale free with exponent γ=2.0(1). The original Omori law with p=1 emerges as a robust feature of seismicity, holding up to years even for aftershock sequences initiated by intermediate magnitude events. The broad distribution of distances between earthquakes and their linked aftershocks suggests that aftershock collection with fixed space windows is not appropriate

  11. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grand, C.

    2001-01-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  12. Positive steps toward non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Greenhalgh, G.

    1979-08-30

    Russel W. Fox and Mason Willrich in their paper, International Custody of Plutonium Stocks: A First Step Toward an International Regime for Sensitive Nuclear Energy Activities, advocate placing excess plutonium in an international custodial facility; critical criteria governing releases are outlined so that, on one hand the owners can have high confidence that their plutonium will be returned promptly, under appropriate circumstances, and on the other hand, all the other participating and concerned countries can have confidence in the assurance that plutonium will be released only for immediate use in a defined and approved civil purpose. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the 1978 issue of its Year Book, recognizes a move towards a more positive approach to the problem of nuclear proliferation. It is noted that the non-proliferation strategies of the main supply countries have largely concentrated on a two-pronged approach of technology denials with tightening of safeguards. But already, enrichment, reprocessing, and breeder reactor programs extend far beyond the five nuclear weapon states. History testifies to the limitations of a policy of technical denials. SIPRI recognizes that another way to dissuade non-nuclear weapon states from creating their own enrichment or reprocessing plants would be to establish an open market for these services, a market characterized by diversity and competition. So far, there has been no case where a country has developed nuclear explosives by diverting material from a civil power station. Development of nuclear weapons by various countries is briefly noted and areas where strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is needed are noted. (MCW)

  13. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Harry, R J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

  14. IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, R.J.S.

    1995-02-01

    An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

  15. Non-proliferation and international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blix, H.

    1992-01-01

    Full text: In my view, drastic nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon States could be coupled with universal commitment to non-proliferation by non-nuclear weapon States by 1995 when the extension of the NPT Will be discussed. The incentives and disincentives for making and stockpiling nuclear weapons are first of all in the political and security fields, (Global and regional detente reduce the incentive, With the cold war gone, the US and Russia are now agreeing on far-reaching cuts in their nuclear arsenals and at some point the other declared nuclear weapon States Will follow.In the regional fields, we have seen how Argentina and Brazil are about to commit themselves to exclusively peaceful uses of the atom through the Latin American Tlatelolco Treaty. And we have seen how South Africa has joined the NPT. A new wave of States adhering to the NPT may be expected from countries in the former Soviet Union. Some have already come, others are on the way. Detente in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent would improve the outlook for non-proliferation in these areas. A second barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in export restrictions on sensitive nuclear material and equipment, Following the discoveries in Iraq, these restrictions are being strengthened in a large number of States. A third barrier to nuclear proliferation lies in the economic and political consequences that would follow for a State if IAEA safeguards inspection revealed activities aimed at the production of nuclear weapons. These must have a high degree of reliability. The case of Iraq showed that it was possible for a closed, highly militarized State to hide nuclear activities from the IAEA and the world We are now drawing the lessons from this case. It is not physically possible for inspectors to look into every building and basement in vast countries, They must have information about where to look, and the IAEA is significantly strengthening its information basis. The IAEA has also re

  16. Non-proliferation and safeguards in South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broodryk, Alta

    2001-01-01

    South Africa occupies a unique position in the history of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in being the only country with a nuclear weapons capability that was voluntary terminated before acceding to the Treaty. The first nuclear device built was completed in December 1982, five more devices followed at an orderly pace of less than one per year and on 26 February 1990 cabinet officially implemented the termination of its nuclear deterrent capability. The events that flowed from the termination was that South Africa: Acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (10 July 1991); Signed Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, INFCIRC/394, (16 September 1991); Submitted its initial inventory of nuclear material (30 September 1991); and Received first verification team from the Agency (November 1991). South Africa, being dedicated to the prevention of the proliferation of Nuclear Weapons became a party to various non-proliferation treaties, regimes and groups. The National Non- Proliferation Policy, as published in a Cabinet memorandum, also clearly states this commitment. To comply with the requirements of the Treaty and Agreement the following two acts were published: The Nuclear Energy Act; The Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The Minister of Minerals and Energy is the State Authority for the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement in South Africa, however, the Minister delegated this Authority to NECSA's Safeguards Division. To implement the requirements of the various acts, control regimes and treaties a State System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, based on the ISO 9001:2000 standard, was designed. This standard focuses on customer satisfaction, continuous improvement, the demonstration of commitment and the prevention of non-conformity. To comply with the requirements of the standard the following procedures were established and maintained: A Quality Manual; Customer focus; Control of documents; Control of quality records; Internal Audits

  17. Lessons learned from the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McWilliam, C.; Curtis, S. [DOE, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Department of Energy sponsored Non-Proliferation Experiment (formerly known as the Chemical Kiloton) involved the detonation of blasting agent approximately equivalent to one kiloton of energy release on the Nevada Test Site in an effort to determine if (and if so, which) discriminators exist between conventional and nuclear detonations of similar yield. Coordination among hundreds of scientists from at least fifteen different organizations were required to design the experiments necessary to collect and interpret data from this unique and complex event. Stakeholders and members of the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament observed the progress of the experiment first hand. The experiment was a success in that a vast majority of the expected data was collected and shared quickly and efficiently throughout the international scientific community. The management of the project was discussed among the major co-sponsoring organizations and the significant {open_quotes}lessons learned{close_quotes} are presented.

  18. Explosive performance on the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKown, T.O.

    1994-03-01

    The non-proliferation experiment, originally called the chemical kiloton experiment, was planned and executed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to investigate the seismic yield relationship and distinguishing seismic signals between a nuclear event and a large mass conventional explosion. The Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments to further their studies of the source function for signals observed seismically. Since all investigations were contingent on the performance of the emplaced chemical explosive, an array of diagnostic measurements was fielded in the emplaced explosive. The CORRTEX system was used to investigate the explosive initiation and to determine the detonation velocities in multiple levels and in numerous directions. A description of the CORRTEX experiments fielded, a review of the data obtained and some interpretations of the data are reported.

  19. International aspects of non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aucoin, P.A.

    1978-01-01

    There are currently two areas on the national scene and one on the international scene that require immediate attention. The first is relief under contracts for enrichment services, an area in which the US can still demonstrate its desire to become a stable and continuous source of supply. The second national area is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977. The United States must proceed very cautiously, however, for if discretion and very careful judgment are not used, the Act will immediately be branded as a blatant effort on the part of the US to control the energy options of other sovereign states. The international area is that of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation program. This medium exists for wise and deliberate growth of a commercial nuclear power program which can serve the global community. The next three years probably allow one remaining chance for successful containment of weapons proliferation. If we do not recognize the rights of every sovereign state to voluntarily participate and agree, we, as members of the global community, will have failed

  20. Missile non-proliferation: an alternative approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delory, Stephane

    2011-01-01

    In this report, the author first proposes an overview of the notion of missile prohibition. He notices that the association between weapons of mass destruction and missiles is a prelude to the legitimacy of missile control, notably within the framework of the Missile Technology Control Regime or MTCR. He also comments the notion of total ban. In a second part, the author analyses and discusses the limitations of the control of technology diffusion. He discusses the role of the MTCR, comments the evolution of this regime with the taking of China and Russia into consideration, the impacts of national implementations of export regimes on the MTCR, and economic aspects of control implementation. In the next part, the author addresses other kinds of limitations, i.e. those related with capacity evolutions of proliferating States. The last part addresses the evolution towards a new definition of approach to missile non-proliferation, notably in terms of perception of missile roles and of technology transfer controls

  1. Flaws in the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leventhal, P.

    1986-01-01

    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nucler Weapons has the twin objectives of stopping the further spread of nuclear weapons and ending the nuclear arms race on the one hand, and promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy on the other. In quantitative and symbolic terms the NPT is a huge success. More than two-thirds of the world's nations have signed on, making this the most popular arms control agreement on earth. Not a single nation has declared itself to be a nuclear-weapons state beyond the original five members of the ''nuclear club'' who qualified for weapons status under the terms of the Treaty itself: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. No party to the Treaty has exercised the permitted option to drop out, and none has been found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to have diverted nuclear material from civil to weapons purposes. Nor has any party been known to have violated NPT prohibitions on developing or assisting other nations to develop nuclear weapons

  2. Towards a Logical Distinction Between Swarms and Aftershock Sequences

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gardine, M.; Burris, L.; McNutt, S.

    2007-12-01

    The distinction between swarms and aftershock sequences has, up to this point, been fairly arbitrary and non- uniform. Typically 0.5 to 1 order of magnitude difference between the mainshock and largest aftershock has been a traditional choice, but there are many exceptions. Seismologists have generally assumed that the mainshock carries most of the energy, but this is only true if it is sufficiently large compared to the size and numbers of aftershocks. Here we present a systematic division based on energy of the aftershock sequence compared to the energy of the largest event of the sequence. It is possible to calculate the amount of aftershock energy assumed to be in the sequence using the b-value of the frequency-magnitude relation with a fixed choice of magnitude separation (M-mainshock minus M-largest aftershock). Assuming that the energy of an aftershock sequence is less than the energy of the mainshock, the b-value at which the aftershock energy exceeds that of the mainshock energy determines the boundary between aftershock sequences and swarms. The amount of energy for various choices of b-value is also calculated using different values of magnitude separation. When the minimum b-value at which the sequence energy exceeds that of the largest event/mainshock is plotted against the magnitude separation, a linear trend emerges. Values plotting above this line represent swarms and values plotting below it represent aftershock sequences. This scheme has the advantage that it represents a physical quantity - energy - rather than only statistical features of earthquake distributions. As such it may be useful to help distinguish swarms from mainshock/aftershock sequences and to better determine the underlying causes of earthquake swarms.

  3. Loading rates in California inferred from aftershocks

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    C. Narteau

    2008-03-01

    Full Text Available We estimate the loading rate in southern California and the change in stress induced by a transient slip event across the San Andreas fault (SAF system in central California, using a model of static fatigue. We analyze temporal properties of aftershocks in order to determine the time delay before the onset of the power law aftershock decay rate. In creep-slip and stick-slip zones, we show that the rate of change of this delay is related to seismic and aseismic deformation across the SAF system. Furthermore, we show that this rate of change is proportional to the deficit of slip rate along the SAF. This new relationship between geodetic and seismological data is in good agreement with predictions from a Limited Power Law model in which the evolution of the duration of a linear aftershock decay rate over short time results from variations in the load of the brittle upper crust.

  4. Twenty years of the Non-proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1990-01-01

    The report assesses the achievements of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and discusses ways in which the non-proliferation regime could be strenghtened. It recommends a series of measures to be taken by the parties of the Treaty, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, with a view to reinforcing the Treaty and achieving its universality. 198 refs

  5. Non proliferation 1980 - INFCE and TnP

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rainer, R.

    1981-01-01

    The TNP (non-proliferation agreement of nuclear weapons), its non proliferation policy and the peaceful use of fuel cycle are described, as well as the safeguards of IAEA. It is also mentioned the functions of INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation). (A.B.T.) [pt

  6. Non-proliferation aspects of long term assurance of supply

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-01-01

    The meetings in this section deal with the non-proliferation aspects of long-term assurance of supply of the nuclear fuel cycle. A list of 12 fundamental questions concerning the observation and application of the non-proliferation regulations is followed by the comments made by representatives of 10 countries

  7. Perspectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koungou, Leon

    2004-01-01

    To join traditional methods and new approaches of 'non-proliferation'. This is a technical method and the best way to fight against 'non-proliferation' which is facing few preoccupations: knowledge's disseminations; technologies; equipments and weapons that should be stopped. As it's important to note the return of nuclear danger as the end of confrontation between west-east which should be reduce. As the adaptation of mechanisms is necessary today, as it is important to react about states' incitations to violate international engagement of non-proliferation. Areas control allows finding out change and evolution, but more insufficient. Functional difficulties show that the IAEA (International Agency of Atomic Energy) does not work good. Safeguard system does not allow to respect 'non-proliferation' engagements; for instance 'junkies states' that they cannot dissuade traditional methods. The fight of 'non-proliferation' shows new progresses with fearing methods of prevention actions and heaviest international controls of exportation. The target of this is very ambitious. This new method is self-successful because it contributes to re-enforce international security when defeating acquisition of nuclear and mass destruction weapons by non-states factors. Therefore non-proliferation regime and especially 'non-proliferation treaty' remains delicate as long as some militaries state such USA will reject their 'non-proliferation' engagement. (author) [fr

  8. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy of the Obama Administration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baek, Jin Hyun; Hwang, Ji Hwan

    2009-12-01

    The objective of this study is to analyze and foresee trends of international nuclear non-proliferation regimes focused on the nuclear non-proliferation policy of the Obama administration, and suggest national policy directions which promote utilization and development of nuclear energy in Korea. For the effective and efficient implementation of the national nuclear use and development program in current international nuclear environment, many efforts should be made: to actively and positively participate in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime; to strengthen nuclear diplomacy in a more systematic manner; and to strengthen the international nuclear cooperation

  9. Non-proliferation and nuclear cooperation - accomplishments and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, H.R. Jr.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to assess the accomplishments in non-proliferation and nuclear co-operation since the beginning of President Reagan's administration, and the challenges remaining to be met in those fields. (NEA) [fr

  10. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result

  11. Perspectives and benefits of the non-proliferating fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parker, F.

    2012-01-01

    The world community has faced the issues of nuclear non-proliferation for decades. Frank Parker, Emeritus Distinguished Professor at Vanderbilt University, has proposed a non-proliferating fuel cycle, which greatly reduces the risk of use of nuclear materials for military purpose. A simplified fuel cycle with reduced opportunities for proliferation of nuclear weapons and permanent disposal of radioactive wastes as well as a reference sub-seabed HLW disposal system are described [ru

  12. Experience in non-proliferation verification: The Treaty of Raratonga

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walker, R.A.

    1998-01-01

    The verification provisions of the Treaty of Raratonga are subdivided into two categories: those performed by IAEA and those performed by other entities. A final provision of the Treaty of Raratonga is relevant to IAEA safeguards according to support of the continued effectiveness of the international non-proliferation system based on the Non-proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system. The non-IAEA verification process is described as well

  13. The world's non-proliferation regime in time

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bunn, George

    2005-01-01

    members to countries that need assistance in order to provide better security for nuclear material in their possession, to an April 2004 Security Council resolution that requires countries having nuclear materials to protect them in various ways from being acquired by 'non-State actors' such as terrorists. The regime includes prohibitions on testing such as the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The first prohibits nuclear weapons tests everywhere but underground, and the second will prohibit them even underground if it goes into force. For the large majority of NPT members not having nuclear weapons, these treaties contribute to non-proliferation not just by inhibiting testing but by reducing the discrimination inherent in the NPT between those permitted to have nuclear weapons and those not so permitted. These members see an agreement to stop testing by the P-5 as a step of compliance by the P-5 with their NPT promise to cease the nuclear arms race, reduce their nuclear weapons and move toward nuclear disarmament. The regime includes 'no-first-use promises' by the P-5 to other NPT members, usually called 'negative security assurances.' All of the P-5 but China have stated some exceptions to these promises. (The US exception permits use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon NPT member if it attacks another non-weapon NPT member while the attacker is in alliance with a State having nuclear weapons. Recently, the United States asserted another exception by saying it might use nuclear weapons to counter a biological or chemical attack.) The regime includes promises by the P-5 that some protection will be provided to other NPT members in the event of a threat of attack, promises called 'positive security assurances.' The P-5 have promised to seek immediate UN Security Council orders providing security assistance to any NPT member not having nuclear weapons if it is threatened with attack by another nation's nuclear weapons. For

  14. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Where Next?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Evans, G.

    2013-01-01

    Let me come straight to the point: We are still at a real watershed with respect to the whole nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament project, about which hopes have been so high for most of the last two years, especially following the political breakthrough of the election of a US president totally committed to the ultimate achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world. Unless the key players in the international community, and there are many that matter in this context, not just the United States of America and the Russian Federation, get really serious about moving forward on the multiple critical agenda issues that face us - not just safeguards, the subject of this symposium, but right across the whole spectrum of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful-uses challenges - there is a very real danger that such remaining momentum for change as there is will stall, that the whole project will fall apart, and that we will be condemned to live for the indefinitely foreseeable future in a nuclear world that is very dangerous indeed. The prevailing sentiment after the May Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was one of relief - that the conference had not broken down as it did in 2005 and that catastrophe had been avoided; in effect, that this particular watershed point had been passed. But the positive gains from that conference, when objectively assessed, were negligible on crucial NPT regime strengthening issues, and, with the possible exception of the agreement to hold a Middle East conference in 2012, very slight indeed elsewhere. And, weighing in the negative balance, there have been some serious disappointments on other key benchmark issues spelled out in US President Obama's April 2009 Prague Speech and on which real movement had been hoped for this year. Nothing has moved on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratification by the USA or any other major nuclear power; negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) remain

  15. Non-proliferation and security: synergy and differences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Joly, J.

    2013-01-01

    Operators of nuclear facilities put in place both physical and organisational means to meet in a comprehensive way the requirements associated with Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Safety and Security. The common aim is to protect man and the environment from ionising radiation. The approaches for meeting these requirements have real similarities, but also differences which need to be respected in order to develop an appropriate synergy for obtaining the best possible level of safety, security and non-proliferation. This article aims to show the provisions that have been taken with regard to non-proliferation, security and safety which complement and reinforce each other.The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

  16. The new US nuclear non-proliferation and export policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Welck, S. von.

    1981-01-01

    The future American nuclear non-proliferation and export policy will be determined chiefly by three elements: (1) Adherence to the former objective of nuclear non-proliferation. (2) A large and varied assortment of old and new tools for implementing this goal. (3) Much more differentiation in applying these tools in the light of the reliability, with respect to non-proliferation policy, of the respective partner. Consequently, it would make little sense for the new Administration to force upon allied industrialized countries, whose nuclear technologies are at the same level as that of the United States, restrictive rules on reprocessing and breeder technology. The new measures designed to curb proliferation are especially meant to destroy motivations that could cause states to own nuclear explosives. This also applies to the removal of economic motivations. (orig.) [de

  17. Foreshocks, aftershocks, and earthquake probabilities: Accounting for the landers earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jones, Lucile M.

    1994-01-01

    The equation to determine the probability that an earthquake occurring near a major fault will be a foreshock to a mainshock on that fault is modified to include the case of aftershocks to a previous earthquake occurring near the fault. The addition of aftershocks to the background seismicity makes its less probable that an earthquake will be a foreshock, because nonforeshocks have become more common. As the aftershocks decay with time, the probability that an earthquake will be a foreshock increases. However, fault interactions between the first mainshock and the major fault can increase the long-term probability of a characteristic earthquake on that fault, which will, in turn, increase the probability that an event is a foreshock, compensating for the decrease caused by the aftershocks.

  18. Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pomper, Miles A.

    2010-01-01

    Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

  19. Promotion of Nuclear Non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hwang, Yong Soo

    2009-07-01

    KAERI has jointly worked with Sandia National Laboratories for Nuclear Energy Non-proliferation in East Asia for the last five years. This project aims at support activities in this joint project between two states. The annual meetings were held during the project period, the 4th one in 2008 and the 5th one in 2009. In addition code comparison between KAERI and SNL's codes for assessing the back-end fuel cycle options was carried out. This project strongly enhances the close tie for the non-proliferation, transparency and safeguards among Korea Japan China Taiwan the United States Russia Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Thailand Vietnam and others for the project period

  20. Sustaining non-proliferation in the 1980s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nye, J.S.

    1984-01-01

    The subject is discussed as follows: introduction; the non-proliferation regime - 1950s to 1970s (IAEA safeguards; Non-proliferation Treaty; oil crisis; proposed sale of facilities for producing weapons-usable materials; USA position); the Carter Administration approach; INFCE (International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation); incentives (USA); export legislation (USA); domestic breeder policy (USA); maintaining the regime in the 1980s (safeguards; Pu and highly enriched uranium management; international spent fuel storage; fuel assurances); the problem of priority; rate vs. degree of proliferation; relations among regimes (international regimes); conclusion. (U.K.)

  1. The IAEA and non-proliferation: is quiescence progress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Herron, L.W.

    1983-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the current status of more important non-proliferation aspects affecting or involving the IAEA. The questions dealt with cover in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Committee on Assurances of Supply established by the IAEA in 1980 and the International Plutonium Storage Study prepared by an IAEA expert group. The author concludes that in a number of areas involving this Agency, recent considerable activity at both political and technical levels has produced few tangible results althrough the situation is not static. (NEA) [fr

  2. The Non-Proliferation Treaty: Fifteen years after entry into force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    The need to halt a wider spread of nuclear weapons grew out of the realization that the increase in the number of countries possessing such weapons would increase the threat to world security. As the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons clearly states in its preamble, the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war. The Treaty - also known as the non-proliferation Treaty - was concluded in 1968, at a time when there were already five nuclear-weapon Powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China. This fact sheet is intended to provide background material on the Treaty, including the events that led to its conclusion, an overview of its provisions and the developments at the two previously held Review Conferences

  3. Foreshocks and aftershocks of the Great 1857 California earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meltzner, A.J.; Wald, D.J.

    1999-01-01

    The San Andreas fault is the longest fault in California and one of the longest strike-slip faults anywhere in the world, yet we know little about many aspects of its behavior before, during, and after large earthquakes. We conducted a study to locate and to estimate magnitudes for the largest foreshocks and aftershocks of the 1857 M 7.9 Fort Tejon earthquake on the central and southern segments of the fault. We began by searching archived first-hand accounts from 1857 through 1862, by grouping felt reports temporally, and by assigning modified Mercalli intensities to each site. We then used a modified form of the grid-search algorithm of Bakum and Wentworth, derived from empirical analysis of modern earthquakes, to find the location and magnitude most consistent with the assigned intensities for each of the largest events. The result confirms a conclusion of Sieh that at least two foreshocks ('dawn' and 'sunrise') located on or near the Parkfield segment of the San Andreas fault preceded the mainshock. We estimate their magnitudes to be M ~ 6.1 and M ~ 5.6, respectively. The aftershock rate was below average but within one standard deviation of the number of aftershocks expected based on statistics of modern southern California mainshock-aftershock sequences. The aftershocks included two significant events during the first eight days of the sequence, with magnitudes M ~ 6.25 and M ~ 6.7, near the southern half of the rupture; later aftershocks included a M ~ 6 event near San Bernardino in December 1858 and a M ~ 6.3 event near the Parkfield segment in April 1860. From earthquake logs at Fort Tejon, we conclude that the aftershock sequence lasted a minimum of 3.75 years.

  4. British nuclear non-proliferation policy and the trident purchase

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keohane, D.

    1984-01-01

    Since the mid-1950s, the UK has had a policy of making significant and sustained efforts to minimise the spread of nuclear arms. Unlike the global focus of its non-proliferation policy, the decision on Trident in centred upon national and perhaps regional requirements. At a time when non-nuclear countries are charging nuclear-weapon states with a grave failure to meet their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, Britain is making plans that would further increase the gap between the nuclear 'haves' and have-nots' and that indicate it expects to require nuclear arms in the next century. It would of course be unrealistic to expect a government to fully harmonise its manifold policies and unreasonable to suggest it should give absolute priority to one of its policy concerns, such as non-proliferation. But Britain is emphasising the high value it places upon the independent possession of strategic nuclear arms through its decision to purchase Trident, thus implicitly contradicting the logic underlying its non-proliferation policy. Compared to other factors, the influence of the Trident decision upon the non-proliferation regime appears very marginal, yet it is unlikely to strengthen that regime

  5. Infrasonic measurements of the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Whitaker, R.W.; Noel, S.; Meadows, W. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    Two infrasonic arrays were operated for the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE). The arrays were located at the Nevada Test Site and at St. George, UT. The results were consistent with experience on underground tests, and therefore close to underground nuclear tests of similar size.

  6. United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    Science and technology transformed the world in the twentieth century. Living standards improved but warfare was rendered more deadly. Weapons of mass destruction - biological, chemical and nuclear - and their means of delivery were developed, as ever more sophisticated conventional armaments were produced and disseminated. The horrors and destruction of armed conflict persist. The need for disarmament and non-proliferation education and training has never been greater. Indeed, changing concepts and perceptions of security and threat magnify the urgency for new thinking to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation goals. More than a decade after the end of the cold war and at the start of the twenty- first century, there is a pressing need to combat ignorance, complacency and a culture of violence. These can be countered through long-term programmes of education and training, especially those related to disarmament and non- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with a view to their reduction and complete elimination. At the same time, concern has heightened over the global threat of the excessive and destabilizing proliferation of conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, rendering more acute the need to combat such proliferation in a sustained way through disarmament and non-proliferation education and training. Additionally there is a need to raise awareness of new challenges to international security and the process of disarmament. Among them, terrorism, with the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction, is a source of particular concern. Other challenges, such as organized crime, poverty, human rights abuses and environmental concerns must also be taken into account. Education and training remain important but under utilized tools for promoting peace, disarmament and non-proliferation. The present report addresses that issue and proposes ideas for action

  7. Extreme value statistics and thermodynamics of earthquakes: aftershock sequences

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    B. H. Lavenda

    2000-06-01

    Full Text Available The Gutenberg-Richter magnitude-frequency law takes into account the minimum detectable magnitude, and treats aftershocks as if they were independent and identically distributed random events. A new magnitude-frequency relation is proposed which takes into account the magnitude of the main shock, and the degree to which aftershocks depend on the main shock makes them appear clustered. In certain cases, there can be two branches in the order-statistics of aftershock sequences: for energies below threshold, the Pareto law applies and the asymptotic distribution of magnitude is the double-exponential distribution, while energies above threshold follow a one-parameter beta distribution, whose exponent is the cluster dimension, and the asymptotic Gompertz distribution predicts a maximum magnitude. The 1957 Aleutian Islands aftershock sequence exemplifies such dual behavior. A thermodynamics of aftershocks is constructed on the analogy between the non-conservation of the number of aftershocks and that of the particle number in degenerate gases.

  8. Rapid Estimates of Rupture Extent for Large Earthquakes Using Aftershocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Polet, J.; Thio, H. K.; Kremer, M.

    2009-12-01

    The spatial distribution of aftershocks is closely linked to the rupture extent of the mainshock that preceded them and a rapid analysis of aftershock patterns therefore has potential for use in near real-time estimates of earthquake impact. The correlation between aftershocks and slip distribution has frequently been used to estimate the fault dimensions of large historic earthquakes for which no, or insufficient, waveform data is available. With the advent of earthquake inversions that use seismic waveforms and geodetic data to constrain the slip distribution, the study of aftershocks has recently been largely focused on enhancing our understanding of the underlying mechanisms in a broader earthquake mechanics/dynamics framework. However, in a near real-time earthquake monitoring environment, in which aftershocks of large earthquakes are routinely detected and located, these data may also be effective in determining a fast estimate of the mainshock rupture area, which would aid in the rapid assessment of the impact of the earthquake. We have analyzed a considerable number of large recent earthquakes and their aftershock sequences and have developed an effective algorithm that determines the rupture extent of a mainshock from its aftershock distribution, in a fully automatic manner. The algorithm automatically removes outliers by spatial binning, and subsequently determines the best fitting “strike” of the rupture and its length by projecting the aftershock epicenters onto a set of lines that cross the mainshock epicenter with incremental azimuths. For strike-slip or large dip-slip events, for which the surface projection of the rupture is recti-linear, the calculated strike correlates well with the strike of the fault and the corresponding length, determined from the distribution of aftershocks projected onto the line, agrees well with the rupture length. In the case of a smaller dip-slip rupture with an aspect ratio closer to 1, the procedure gives a measure

  9. Long Aftershock Sequences within Continents and Implications for Earthquake Hazard Assessment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stein, S. A.; Liu, M.

    2014-12-01

    Recent seismicity in the Tangshan region in North China has prompted concern about a repetition of the 1976 M7.8 earthquake that destroyed the city, killing more than 242,000 people. However, the decay of seismicity there implies that the recent earthquakes are probably aftershocks of the 1976 event. This 37-year sequence is an example of the phenomenon that aftershock sequences within continents are often significantly longer than the typical 10 years at plate boundaries. The long sequence of aftershocks in continents is consistent with a simple friction-based model predicting that the length of aftershock sequences varies inversely with the rate at which faults are loaded. Hence the slowly-deforming continents tend to have aftershock sequences significantly longer than at rapidly-loaded plate boundaries. This effect has two consequences for hazard assessment. First, within the heavily populated continents that are typically within plate interiors, assessments of earthquake hazards rely significantly on the assumption that the locations of small earthquakes shown by the short historical record reflect continuing deformation that will cause future large earthquakes. This assumption would lead to overestimation of the hazard in presently active areas and underestimation elsewhere, if some of these small events are aftershocks. Second, successful attempts to remove aftershocks from catalogs used for hazard assessment would underestimate the hazard, because much of the hazard is due to the aftershocks, and the declustering algorithms implicitly assume short aftershock sequences and thus do not remove long-duration ones.

  10. Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mirsaidov, U.M.

    2010-01-01

    This article is devoted to issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan. Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction arouse serious concern of world community. Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the weapons of mass destruction distributions become the subject of high concern. Besides, during the end of 'cold war', regional conflicts, collapse of Soviet Union, as well as access to sensitive technologies considerably increase the danger of weapons of mass destruction distribution. More than 10 countries have active programs, relating to weapons of mass destruction and, possibly, more than ten countries have potential to start implementing such kinds of programs. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution. After 11 September events, the risk of such weapons of mass destruction components use by such forces for Governments blackmail become real scene, which, despite of low possibility of this threat implementation, could have very serious and disastrous consequences. International community responded to these problems and challenges, basically through the following actions, which is detailed regime development of multilateral international treaties, directed to weapons of mass destruction distribution prevention. Non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, Convention on prohibition of chemical weapons and Convention on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons are some of them. As it is known, Tajikistan signed all these treaties. For different reasons these treaties were subject of serious tests. Nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 year, actual Israel status as state having nuclear weapon and North Korean program on

  11. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-01

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation: a guide to the debate

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldblat, Jozef.

    1985-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of 15 countries have been studied and summarized for use by participants of the third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation (NPT) of Nuclear weapons held in September 1985. The main purpose of the guide is to examine what action must be taken to ensure the Treaty's survival. There are four chapters following an introduction, covering the implementation of the essential provisions of the NPT, the motivations of the countries which have not joined the NPT, together with the motivations of those which have formally renounced the possession of nuclear weapons, even though they possess the technical and economic potential necessary to manufacture them. The last chapter summarises measures which might be taken to strengthen the NPT including ideas put forward at a workshop held in 1984. (author)

  13. An Introduction to Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Haakansson, Ane; Jonter, Thomas

    2007-06-15

    The purpose of this project was to compile a course material that covers how the nuclear safeguards system has emerged and how it works today. The produced compendium is directed to both university students and people concerned by safeguards from the industry. The primary aim of the first part of this paper is to describe the historical development of this global non-proliferation system and its central tasks. A second purpose is to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of its current design in order to answer the following question: Can we today say that we have a functioning global non-proliferation system? Does it require further strengthening, and, if so, how can this be achieved? In the second section we review the verification regime within nuclear safeguards, i. e. describe the methods and techniques that are available to reassure the world community that concluded treaties are adhered to

  14. Reforming the non-proliferation system in the 1980s

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1984-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of the 1970s were based largely on the misconception that the main danger lay in the possible misuse of civil nuclear-power plants for the production of weapon materials. In consequence their aim, whether by means of denial or control, was to ensure that such misuse was made more difficult in all countries with nuclear-power industries. Less attention was paid to the potential for misuse of the nuclear-research plants in the handful of countries outside the non-proliferation system. The resulting difficulties placed in the way of countries developing their nuclear-power industries damaged relations between the supplier and the consumer states, and discredited any new efforts aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation system. By contrast, the 1980s began, first in INFCE and then in the Committee on Assurances of Supply, with a concerted attempt to re-establish a dialogue based on a relationship of trust between the supplier and the customer states. But a restored consensus will not, on its own, deal with the problem of those states that are outside the non-proliferation system and that have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. The outcome of the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply may help to attract some of those states into the system, but more needs to be done either by adapting the NPT, making adherence to it appear more attractive, or by devising some alternative code of behaviour for states not party to the Treaty and by seeking to remove the political obstacles that lie in the way of at least some of the potential weapon states adhering to the Treaty

  15. Non-proliferation policies and demand for uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warnecke, S.J.

    1978-01-01

    The non-proliferation policies of USA, Canada and Australia are outlined, and the effects on nuclear policy in the consumer countries, particularly the member states of the European Community and Japan are considered. Supply and demand in relation to uranium, security and economic aspects are covered. Reprocessing, the use of plutonium in breeder reactors, and the wider issues of international confidence and trade are discussed. (U.K.)

  16. URENCO: A Multinational Contribution to Non-Proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korbmacher, T.

    2015-01-01

    URENCO was founded in 1970 following the signing of the Treaty of Almelo by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The fundamental principles for effective supervision of URENCO's technology and enrichment operations with respect to non-proliferation issues have been laid down in this treaty. In order to enable the construction of a URENCO enrichment facility in the USA and to permit the transfer of classified information into the USA, another treaty has been concluded in 1992. The US government entered into the Treaty of Washington together with the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to ensure that the same conditions that had been agreed in the Treaty of Almelo would also apply to the US. To allow for the completion of the joint venture with Areva regarding the URENCO Group's technology business ETC, the Treaty of Cardiff has been signed on 12 July 2005 by the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France. Through this treaty, France is obliged to adhere to the principles of the Treaty of Almelo. For each treaty, control bodies have been formed with representatives of the governments of the signatory countries. These committees exercise the role of effective supervision of the technology and operations with respect to non-proliferation issues. They also consider all questions concerning the safeguards system (as established by IAEA/Euratom), classification arrangements and security procedures, exports of the technology and enriched uranium, as well as other non-proliferation issues. The presentation describes how the multinational structure of URENCO contributes to Non-Proliferation on the basis of the above mentioned treaties. Beyond that, the international cross linking of operational working groups and committees within the URENCO Group structure is explained. This structure implies an additional assurance to achieve the safeguards goals set. (author)

  17. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations

  18. The international nuclear non-proliferation system: Challenges and choices

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Simpson, J.; McGrew, A.G.

    1984-01-01

    When a topic has been under discussion for almost 40 years there is a danger that the literature will become excessively esoteric and that, as Philip Grummett suggests, '...a new scholasticism will arise' (p.79). Originating in a November l982 seminar co-sponsored by the British International Studies Association and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this volume is a refreshing, well conceived, and well written antidote to that trend. It is also well timed for the 1985 NPT Review Conference. The eight chapters of the volume are divided into three sections. Following an introduction by Anthony McGrew that touches on all the major themes of the volume, the first section deals with the existing non-proliferation system. In three chapters the historical, institutional and policy-making elements of the present system are outlined. There is a vignette on the Nuclear Suppliers Group in Wilmshurst's chapter one (pp. 28-33). Fischer's informative chapter on the IAEA is followed by Gummett's examination of policy options, including, for example, the linking of conventional weapons transfer to non-proliferation policies. The second section, also of three chapters, examines current issues: the state of the international nuclear industry, and the non-proliferation policies of the United States and Britain. Walker's chapter focuses chiefly on change in the industry-from monopoly to pluralism in suppliers, the effect of the economic recession, and the combined effect of these two factors on international politics. Devine's American non-proliferation chapter is a statement of the State Department view, whilst Keohane's chapter on Britain attempts to put the Trident procurement into a proliferation context. The British chapter is present because of ethnocentric considerations.

  19. Impasses and mistakes of the nuclear non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hirst, M.

    1980-01-01

    It is analyzed the limitations for implementing the American Nuclear non-proliferation policy. It is shown the crisis of the North American international relations, with the economic and scientific development of the advanced capitalist nations and some countries of the third world, the penetration of these countries in the world trade commerce of the nuclear industry as sellers and cunsumers, and the Latin American's and Brazil's position in the international panorama of nuclear power. (M.C.K.) [pt

  20. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2000-01-01

    The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

  1. The year 2000 examination conference of the non-proliferation treaty and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; La conference d'examen 2000 du TNP et l'avenir du regime de non-proliferation nucleaire

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Grand, C. [Institut d' Etudes Politiques de Paris, 75 (France); Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr-Coetquidan (France)

    2001-07-01

    The nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty (NPT), signed on July 1, 1968 and enforced on March 5, 1970, has been progressively considered as the headstone of the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The sixth NPT examination conference took place at New York (USA) in the year 2000, 5 years after the previous conference but also after the first nuclear weapon tests of India and Pakistan. This article recalls up the main non-proliferation events that took place between the 1995 and 2000 conferences and presents the progresses and results of the New York conference. Finally, it wonders about the ambiguities in the conclusions of this last conference. (J.S.)

  2. Non-proliferation and international safeguards. [Booklet by IAEA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1978-01-01

    This booklet consists of 13 separate, brief analyses related to the subject title, namely: The International Scope of IAEA Safeguards; Application of Safeguards Procedures; Computer-Based Safeguards Information and Accounting System; IAEA Training Activities Related to State Systems of Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Control; Surveillance and Containment Measures to Support IAEA Safeguards; International Plutonium Management; Safeguards for Reprocessing and Enrichment Plants; Non-Destructive Assay: Instruments and Techniques for Agency Safeguards; The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory: Its Functions and Analytical Facilities; Resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 12 June 1968; The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 1975; Resolutions on the IAEA's Work in the Field of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 8 and 12 December, 1977; and a Map on the NPT situation in the world (with explanations).

  3. Engineering Applications Using Probabilistic Aftershock Hazard Analyses: Aftershock Hazard Map and Load Combination of Aftershocks and Tsunamis

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Byunghyun Choi

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available After the Tohoku earthquake in 2011, we observed that aftershocks tended to occur in a wide region after such a large earthquake. These aftershocks resulted in secondary damage or delayed rescue and recovery activities. In addition, it has been reported that there are regions where the intensity of the vibrations owing to the aftershocks was much stronger than those associated with the main shock. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the seismic risk associated with aftershocks. We used the data regarding aftershocks that was obtained from the Tohoku earthquake and various other historically large earthquakes. We investigated the spatial and temporal distribution of the aftershocks using the Gutenberg–Richter law and the modified Omori law. Subsequently, we previously proposed a probabilistic aftershock occurrence model that is expected to be useful to develop plans for recovery activities after future large earthquakes. In this study, the probabilistic aftershock hazard analysis is used to create aftershock hazard maps. We propose a hazard map focusing on the probability of aftershocks on the scale of the main shock for use with a recovery activity plan. Following the lessons learned from the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, we focus on the simultaneous occurrence of tsunamis and aftershocks just after a great subduction earthquake. The probabilistic aftershock hazard analysis is used to derive load combination equations of the load and resistance factor design. This design is intended to simultaneously consider tsunamis and aftershocks for tsunami-resistant designs of tsunami evacuation buildings.

  4. Long-Delayed Aftershocks in New Zealand and the 2016 M7.8 Kaikoura Earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shebalin, P.; Baranov, S.

    2017-10-01

    We study aftershock sequences of six major earthquakes in New Zealand, including the 2016 M7.8 Kaikaoura and 2016 M7.1 North Island earthquakes. For Kaikaoura earthquake, we assess the expected number of long-delayed large aftershocks of M5+ and M5.5+ in two periods, 0.5 and 3 years after the main shocks, using 75 days of available data. We compare results with obtained for other sequences using same 75-days period. We estimate the errors by considering a set of magnitude thresholds and corresponding periods of data completeness and consistency. To avoid overestimation of the expected rates of large aftershocks, we presume a break of slope of the magnitude-frequency relation in the aftershock sequences, and compare two models, with and without the break of slope. Comparing estimations to the actual number of long-delayed large aftershocks, we observe, in general, a significant underestimation of their expected number. We can suppose that the long-delayed aftershocks may reflect larger-scale processes, including interaction of faults, that complement an isolated relaxation process. In the spirit of this hypothesis, we search for symptoms of the capacity of the aftershock zone to generate large events months after the major earthquake. We adapt an algorithm EAST, studying statistics of early aftershocks, to the case of secondary aftershocks within aftershock sequences of major earthquakes. In retrospective application to the considered cases, the algorithm demonstrates an ability to detect in advance long-delayed aftershocks both in time and space domains. Application of the EAST algorithm to the 2016 M7.8 Kaikoura earthquake zone indicates that the most likely area for a delayed aftershock of M5.5+ or M6+ is at the northern end of the zone in Cook Strait.

  5. Aftershocks of the 13 May 1993 Shumagin Alaska earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lu, Zhong; Wyss, Max; Tytgat, Guy; McNutt, Steve; Stihler, Scott

    1994-01-01

    The 13 May 1993 Ms 6.9 Shumagin earthquake had an aftershock sequence of 247 earthquakes with magnitudes greater than or equal to 1.5 by 1 June 1993. Of these aftershocks, 79 were located by using S-P travel times at the only two stations within 570 km of the mainshock epicenter. The rupture area inferred from the aftershocks is about 600 km2 and we estimate for the mainshock a mean fault displacement of 1.0 m and a 28 bar stress drop. The magnitude-frequency plots give a b-value for the aftershock sequence of about 0.4, which is low compared to the background value of approximately 0.8. The decay of the aftershock sequence followed the modified Omori law with a p-value of 0.79, which is also lower than the typical values of about 1.1 observed in Alaska. Both of these facts can be interpreted as indicating relatively high ambient stress in the Shumagin seismic gap and the possibility that the 13 May earthquake was a foreshock to a larger gap-filling event to occur within the next few years.

  6. Non-proliferation and the control of atomic energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, B.

    1977-01-01

    The non-proliferation problem has never ceased to haunt and to influence those responsible for the development of atomic energy. During and after the Second World War, Anglo-American co-operation was reflected in restrictions on the exchange of enrichment and reprocessing know-how. Between 1945 and 1955, the Anglo-Saxon powers continued with the policy of secrecy and uranium monopoly decided on in 1943 at the Quebec summit conference. Starting in 1955, the failure of this policy led - at the suggestion of the United States of America - to a freer flow of information and to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with its safeguards, which permitted widespread application of the policy of technical assistance subject to controls and widespread commerce in research and power reactors - mainly fuelled with enriched uranium and manufactured in the USA. There followed periods characterized by general legal blocks, with two unilateral renunciation treaties - the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, covering non-underground tests, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1968, covering nuclear explosive devices and the entire fuel cycle. The Indian atomic explosion and the acceleration of nuclear programmes owing to the oil crisis prompted - in 1974 - efforts by supplier countries to limit the transfer of sensitive technology and the possession of plants capable of producing substances which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons; the USA has even proposed the curtailment of plutonium extraction and of breeder construction, although these are considered by many countries to be essential to the independence of their energy development programmes. This policy of reserving the sensitive stages of the fuel cycles to a few advanced countries and the questioning of existing nuclear agreements have created, in the relations between supplier and recipient countries, a regrettable intensification of the distrust which must be dispelled

  7. U.S. - India nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yash Thomas, Mannully

    2008-01-01

    The agreement for cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (referred as 123 agreement) acknowledges a shift in international strategies and relations in both countries. As to India, it marks the end of nuclear isolation resulting from constraint, embargoes and controls and instead opens the path for nuclear commerce. With respect to the United States it entails a major geo strategic ally in the evolving South Asia region and promises large commercial benefits to the US nuclear sector. This is called 'nuclear deal' and constitutes one of the major political, economic and strategic relationship developing between the two countries since 2001. It will lead to the separation of military and civilian nuclear installations in India, the latter to be placed under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It thus, de facto accepts India in the club of nuclear weapon states within the meaning of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) although it is not party to this treaty, refuses adhering to it, officially possesses nuclear weapons and is not subject to a comprehensive system of safeguards. This article will examine the developments which led to the 123 agreement and its subsequent implementation in a wider context of international relations and non proliferation. First, the articles gives a brief introduction into the Indian nuclear programme, the legislative framework and the factors which necessitated nuclear cooperation between India and the United States. Secondly, it will address the implementation of the nuclear deal and subsequent developments. Finally, it will analyse the non proliferation issues related to the implementation of the agreement. (N.C.)

  8. Approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Subrahmanyam, K.

    1981-01-01

    The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)

  9. Indonesia ratifies the treaty on non proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moendi Poernomo

    1979-01-01

    By Act no. 8 of 1978 Indonesia ratified the treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons. This means that Indonesia became a party to the treaty. Ratification does not guarantee that Indonesia will automatically obtain assistance in developing its nuclear technology capability, but in this way at least Indonesia demonstrates its intention to promote world peace as clearly stated in the Main Guide Lines of State Policy. Development of nuclear technology can be achieved through international cooperation with advanced countries without being suspected of having intention other than peace. (author)

  10. Spatio-temporal evolution of the 2011 Prague, Oklahoma aftershock sequence revealed using subspace detection and relocation

    Science.gov (United States)

    McMahon, Nicole D; Aster, Richard C.; Yeck, William; McNamara, Daniel E.; Benz, Harley M.

    2017-01-01

    The 6 November 2011 Mw 5.7 earthquake near Prague, Oklahoma is the second largest earthquake ever recorded in the state. A Mw 4.8 foreshock and the Mw 5.7 mainshock triggered a prolific aftershock sequence. Utilizing a subspace detection method, we increase by fivefold the number of precisely located events between 4 November and 5 December 2011. We find that while most aftershock energy is released in the crystalline basement, a significant number of the events occur in the overlying Arbuckle Group, indicating that active Meeker-Prague faulting extends into the sedimentary zone of wastewater disposal. Although the number of aftershocks in the Arbuckle Group is large, comprising ~40% of the aftershock catalog, the moment contribution of Arbuckle Group earthquakes is much less than 1% of the total aftershock moment budget. Aftershock locations are sparse in patches that experienced large slip during the mainshock.

  11. The EU and non proliferation: need for a quantum leap?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kobia, R.

    2008-01-01

    This paper analyses the possibilities of a strategy and all-encompassing European policy that could constitute an efficient and structured system against proliferation. This paper concentrate on actions and developments at the level of the E.U. sensu stricto, i.e. where common actions under the E.U. umbrella are set up and contribute to the efforts in non-proliferation. It does not cover all measures and mechanisms under the 'non-proliferation regime', the integrated and evolving network of unilateral, bilateral, regional, multilateral treaties and other standing-setting arrangements, which collectively provide a framework guiding the behaviour of states, international organisations, enterprises, associations and all non state actors generally active in the nuclear sector. For the purposes of this paper, the 'utilitarian and teleological' prisms are used. The 'utilitarian perspective aims to maximizing the net expectable utility for all parties affected by a decision or action knowing the that traditional utilitarianism favours the options that bring about the best consequences and aims at the 'good'. The teleological approach lies in an interpretation that favours the ultimate goals of any provision and action as well as their spirit, rather than accepting to remain in a more narrow exegetic interpretation that favours the strict letter thereof. (N.C.)

  12. New evolution of safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seyama, K.; Kurihara, H.

    1999-01-01

    Since the end of the Cold War, circumstances concerning international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation have changed drastically. At this stage, early introduction of a strengthened and streamlined new safeguards system and broad implementation of the verification activities regarding nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons are expected, and in the near future, the international community is expected to establish a verification regime under the Cut Off Treaty. From now on, the roles of the IAEA will become more important in these new areas. At the same time the efficiency of the activities is essential from a financial and human resources aspect in order to introduce those measures smoothly. On the other hand, the Member States should cooperate with the IAEA to improve the transparency of its nuclear policy and activities. Taking account of such circumstances, first, the authors will explain the non-proliferation policy of Japan. Second, the authors will introduce the present status of Japan's safeguards system and activities. Finally, the authors will present several tasks which are important for the IAEA and Japanese safeguards for coming several years. (author)

  13. Current nuclear non-proliferation policies in the world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru

    1997-01-01

    Although a global nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union has disappeared, many challenges to nuclear non-proliferation have emerged. Sources of concern, like a nuclear weapon program by Iraq and suspicions of North Korea have caused the adoption of a variety of political and technical measures in order to meet these challenges in the post-Cold War era. This paper describes the following ten policies for non-proliferation: 1) Strengthening the NPT; 2) Nuclear reduction; 3) CTBT and cut-off treaty; 4) Establishment of NWFZs; 5) Counterproliferation; 6) Strengthening the IAEA Safeguards; 7) Control and disposal of nuclear material from dismantled nuclear weapons; 8) Export control; 9) Registration of plutonium; and 10) Actions against nuclear smuggling. The first four measures can be said to be mainly political policies, the fifth measure (counterproliferation), can be categorized as basically a military policy, and the last five measures can be said to be technical. (J.P.N.)

  14. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, Annual Report 2001-2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    During the year Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) continued our substantial contribution to the development and strengthening of international verification regimes concerned with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Domestically, ASNO conducted, or contributed to, review of WMD- related legislation and administration, amending permits to enhance security arrangements, and beginning development of supporting legislative changes. Another major area of work is the replacement research reactor project, where ASNO has been closely involved through safeguards and security aspects. This year has been dominated by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States, and ongoing consequences. These events, and the concern that terrorists would use WMD if they were able to acquire them, have served to emphasise the importance of effective counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism measures to complement the non-proliferation regimes. They have also focused attention on the need to deal with non- compliance with WMD treaty commitments. The key achivements reported for the year under review include: 1. All treaty and statutory requirements met in respect of: nuclear material and nuclear items in Australia, Australian uranium exports (Australian Obligated Nuclear Material), chemicals covered by the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) and establishment of CTBT(Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) monitoring stations; 2. Effective contribution to strengthening non-proliferation verification regimes and counter terrorism initiatives: ongoing support for IAEA safeguards development, regional outreach on IAEA safeguards, CWC implementation and encouraging CTBT ratification, ANSTO security upgraded; security plan approved for construction of replacement research reactor, review, with other responsible authorities, of security of CWC related chemicals, and radiation sources

  15. Aftershocks and triggering processes in rock fracture

    Science.gov (United States)

    Davidsen, J.; Kwiatek, G.; Goebel, T.; Stanchits, S. A.; Dresen, G.

    2017-12-01

    One of the hallmarks of our understanding of seismicity in nature is the importance of triggering processes, which makes the forecasting of seismic activity feasible. These triggering processes by which one earthquake induces (dynamic or static) stress changes leading to potentially multiple other earthquakes are at the core relaxation processes. A specic example of triggering are aftershocks following a large earthquake, which have been observed to follow certain empirical relationships such as the Omori-Utsu relation. Such an empirical relation should arise from the underlying microscopic dynamics of the involved physical processes but the exact connection remains to be established. Simple explanations have been proposed but their general applicability is unclear. Many explanations involve the picture of an earthquake as a purely frictional sliding event. Here, we present experimental evidence that these empirical relationships are not limited to frictional processes but also arise in fracture zone formation and are mostly related to compaction-type events. Our analysis is based on tri-axial compression experiments under constant displacement rate on sandstone and granite samples using spatially located acoustic emission events and their focal mechanisms. More importantly, we show that event-event triggering plays an important role in the presence of large-scale or macrocopic imperfections while such triggering is basically absent if no signicant imperfections are present. We also show that spatial localization and an increase in activity rates close to failure do not necessarily imply triggering behavior associated with aftershocks. Only if a macroscopic crack is formed and its propagation remains subcritical do we observe significant triggering.

  16. Course modules on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bril, L.-V.; Janssens-Maenhout, G.

    2004-01-01

    Full text: One of major current concern in the nuclear field is the conservation of developed knowledge and expertise. The relevance of this subject is steadily increasing for several reasons: retirement of the generation of first industrial development of nuclear energy, only one new reactor under construction in Europe while several in Eastern and Asian countries, the public's concern on safety, radioactive waste and safeguards aspects, and some lack of interest common to many activities in engineering and physics. Moreover nuclear safeguards is nowadays characterised with an enlarged scope and no longer strictly limited to the accountancy of nuclear material; today it encompasses non proliferation of nuclear material, and deals with the control of dual use equipment and technologies, illicit trafficking and External Security. Some higher education networks, such as the European Nuclear Engineering Network (ENEN), have been established to make better use of dwindling teaching capacity, scientific equipment and research infrastructure, through co-operation amongst universities and research centres. The European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) initiated the set-up of course modules under an e-learning medium, to preserve knowledge in nuclear safeguards. These course modules should be considered as basic pedagogical documentation, which will be accessible via the Internet. Monitoring or controlling of the accesses will be ensured. The modules are structured with an increasing level of detail, in function of the audience. On one hand the course modules should be attractive to University students in nuclear, chemical or mechanical engineering, in radiochemistry, statistics, law, political science etc. at universities or specialised institutes. On the other hand the course modules aim to give professionals, working on specific safeguards or non-proliferation issues an overview and detailed technical information on the wide variety of nuclear

  17. Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.

    1999-01-01

    Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

  18. International Aftershock Forecasting: Lessons from the Gorkha Earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Michael, A. J.; Blanpied, M. L.; Brady, S. R.; van der Elst, N.; Hardebeck, J.; Mayberry, G. C.; Page, M. T.; Smoczyk, G. M.; Wein, A. M.

    2015-12-01

    Following the M7.8 Gorhka, Nepal, earthquake of April 25, 2015 the USGS issued a series of aftershock forecasts. The initial impetus for these forecasts was a request from the USAID Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance to support their Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) which coordinated US Government disaster response, including search and rescue, with the Government of Nepal. Because of the possible utility of the forecasts to people in the region and other response teams, the USGS released these forecasts publicly through the USGS Earthquake Program web site. The initial forecast used the Reasenberg and Jones (Science, 1989) model with generic parameters developed for active deep continental regions based on the Garcia et al. (BSSA, 2012) tectonic regionalization. These were then updated to reflect a lower productivity and higher decay rate based on the observed aftershocks, although relying on teleseismic observations, with a high magnitude-of-completeness, limited the amount of data. After the 12 May M7.3 aftershock, the forecasts used an Epidemic Type Aftershock Sequence model to better characterize the multiple sources of earthquake clustering. This model provided better estimates of aftershock uncertainty. These forecast messages were crafted based on lessons learned from the Christchurch earthquake along with input from the U.S. Embassy staff in Kathmandu. Challenges included how to balance simple messaging with forecasts over a variety of time periods (week, month, and year), whether to characterize probabilities with words such as those suggested by the IPCC (IPCC, 2010), how to word the messages in a way that would translate accurately into Nepali and not alarm the public, and how to present the probabilities of unlikely but possible large and potentially damaging aftershocks, such as the M7.3 event, which had an estimated probability of only 1-in-200 for the week in which it occurred.

  19. Carter faces new dilemmas over non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickson, D.

    1979-01-01

    Questions underlying the current domestic debate as to whether the US should revise its attitude towards the relationship between the spread of nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are considered. Problems arising from the provisional conclusions of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, set up at President Carter's suggestion in 1977, are evaluated. The thorny question of how to deal with the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for review in 1980 is discussed. Finally there is the issue, for which it is concluded nobody pretends to have all the answers, of whether a sufficient consensus - involving both developed and developing countries as partners in decision-making - can be forged to develop and apply an effective control regime, or whether increasing competition between both producers and consumers of nuclear power will be such as to limit the possibilities for multilateral action, shifting the focus back to bilateral actions. (UK)

  20. Editorial: disarmament, non proliferation, confidence-building measures, armament control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soutou, Georges-Henri

    2015-01-01

    After having described the vicious circle existing between disarmament and security as it appeared before and during the first World War, the author deals with the specific case of nuclear disarmament as it was first addressed just after the Second World War, and was then not accepted by the Russians. He comments the political and strategical approach adopted by the Kennedy administration, notably within the context of severe crises (Berlin and Cuba). This resulted in the re-establishment of a relationship between war and policy as defined by Clausewitz, but based on a trilogy of three inseparable pairs: deterrence and armament control, armament control and non proliferation, armament control and confidence-building measures. The author shows that this trilogy has been somehow operating until the end of Cold War, and that nothing works anymore since the end of Cold War and of the bipolar world

  1. Nuclear power and the non-proliferation issue

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-12-01

    This leaflet, issued by the British Nuclear Forum on behalf of the industry, seeks first to place the problem of reconciling the need for nuclear power with its possible weapon uses in a historical perspective. Secondly, it describes the technical and political measures which are now taken, and others which could be introduced in order to ensure that nuclear power, which offers the cheapest and safest large-scale energy source for the future, can be made available without contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Headings are: introduction; the early years; the IAEA; uranium enrichment; plutonium; secrecy has failed; the Non-Proliferation Treaty; the London Suppliers Group; the situation today; the British position; conclusions. (U.K.)

  2. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - crisis of a concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Eisenbart, C.; Ehrenstein, D. von

    1990-01-01

    The Working Group of FEST (Protestant Study Community) and VDW (Association of German Scientists) presents twelve theses on the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and deduces recommendations, in particular for the Federal Government. The WG thinks that scope and significance of international nuclear policy has not been sufficiently perceived neither by the German public nor by politicians. The theses are supplemented and explained in more detail by special contributions of the WG's members. The contributions deal with the historical background, with the instruments of NP policy, with international law, with risks and limiting these risks, with economic aspects, with nuclear policy in the Third World, with the chances of nuclear disarmament, and with Federal NP policy. The 'twelve theses' as well as the 22 contributions are individual records. (HSCH) [de

  3. Future of US utilities under non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ladesich, J.N.

    1978-01-01

    The non-proliferation policy, a negative policy that closes the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle, is only a small part of a chaotic energy environment characterized by inaction. The impact of this environment on California utilities has resulted in a virtual moratorium on new facilities at a time when the nuclear option can be shown to be vital. Utilities are experiencing uncertainties in future power generation because alternatives to nuclear energy may not be the best choices. Utilities feel frustrated by the inaction; not by the objectives of the accountability and security proposals. The utilities will continue to support nuclear power and the completion of the fuel cycle in spite of these uncertainties

  4. The future of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Siddiqa, A.

    1997-01-01

    Nuclear proliferation in South Asia is currently one of the hot topics in world politics. The concern of the international community, and especially the USA, over this issue is coupled with the fear of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. As a result, Washington has been using its 'stick and carrot' policy to persuade the two countries involved not to develop their nuclear programs for military purposes. However both countries have not only continued to develop their nuclear ambitions, but seem to have achieved vertical nuclear proliferation. This paper examines the future non-proliferation in the South Asian region in the 1990s. This will be achieved by looking at the following: the development of the nuclear capabilities of both India and Pakistan; how these programs have been developed; the reasons for acquiring the capability for non-conventional defence; the real fear in terms of nuclear proliferation in the region; the possible options for dealing with nuclear proliferation in South Asia

  5. Nuclear non proliferation. To declare, to support, and to analyse

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    2016-01-01

    While proposing a brief presentation of the three main stages of an inspection (from the notification and preparation to the implementation of corrective actions), and a brief interview of a member of the French Euratom technical Committee (CTE) who presents this body and its role, this article proposes an overview of the commitment and practices of the IRSN regarding nuclear non-proliferation. It recalls that the control of nuclear materials is required by the Euratom Treaty, describes how the IRSN supports industrials to facilitate inspections made by the European Commission, and helps them in answering the post-inspection letter and in implementing corrective actions. It also evokes the role of the IRSN in nuclear material accounting

  6. Explosive performance on the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McKown, T.O. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Explosive Effects Physics Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments on the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) as part of its effort to define source functions for seismic waves. Since all investigations were contingent on the performance of the emplaced chemical explosive, an array of diagnostic measurements was fielded in the emplaced explosive. The CORRTEX (COntinuous Reflectometry for Radius vs Time EXperiment) system was used to investigate the explosive initiation and to determine the detonation velocities on three levels and in a number of radial directions. The CORRTEX experiments fielded in the explosive chamber will be described, including a description of the explosive emplacement from the perspective of its impact on the CORRTEX results. The data obtained are reviewed and the resulting detonation velocities are reported. A variation of detonation velocity with depth in the explosive and the apparent underdetonation and overdetonation of the explosive in different radial directions is reported.

  7. Non-proliferation and advances in nuclear science

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iyengar, P.K.

    1995-01-01

    So far, the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) has concentrated on safeguard regimes based on technologies relating to the production of uranium and plutonium in nuclear reactors, and on their potential diversion for use in nuclear weapons. As nuclear science advances, however, nuclear technology both peaceful and for weapons will change, and for the NPT to remain relevant, it must reflect these changes. At this juncture, when the NPT is coming up for review in a year's time, it is important for physicists to take a fresh look at recent advances in nuclear science, and inform the policy-makers and the public at large about their potential for impacting nuclear technology in the future. In this article a few such advances are highlighted and their implications for the NPT are considered. (author). 4 refs

  8. The Non-Proliferation Experiment recorded at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carr, D.B. [Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    1994-12-31

    The Non-Proliferation Experiment was recorded by five different seismic stations operated by Sandia National Laboratories at the Pinedale Seismic Research Facility, approximately 7.6{degrees} from the Nevada Test Site. Two stations are different versions of the Deployable Seismic Verification System developed by the Department of Energy to provide seismic data to verify compliance with a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Vault and borehole versions of the Designated Seismic Stations also recorded the event. The final station is test instrumentation located at depths of 10, 40 and 1200 feet. Although the event is seen clearly at all the stations, there are variations in the raw data due to the different bandwidths and depths of deployment. One Deployable Seismic Verification System has been operating at Pinedale for over three years and in that time recorded 14 nuclear explosions and 4 earthquakes from the Nevada Test Site, along with numerous other western U.S. earthquakes. Several discriminants based on the work by Taylor et al. (1989) have been applied to this data. First the discriminants were tested by comparing the explosions only to the 4 earthquakes located on the Test Site. Only one discriminant, log(L{sub g}/P{sub g}), did not show clear separation between the earthquakes and nuclear explosions. When other western U.S. events are included, only the M{sub b} vs. M{sub s} discriminant separated the event. In all cases where discrimination was possible, the Non-Proliferation Experiment was indistinguishable from a nuclear explosion.

  9. The Nuclear Progress And The Non-Proliferation Policies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Popa-Simil, Liviu [Los Alamos, NM 87544 (United States)

    2009-06-15

    The 2008 fall crisis showed the limits of globalization under the actual rules and de-regulations promoted by few developed countries. It also showed the weakness of the planetary economy induced by strong economic connections that makes the propagation of crises faster than the spread of welfare. The increase in severe weather and natural disasters showed how fast the civilization can be spoiled while the competition for oil resources made the interstate tensions grow. For almost all states, the development of the nuclear power becomes a prime option, even oil producers started to show interest in nuclear technology and also, policies that in particular are clearly oriented towards national development policies. The fact that anybody mastering nuclear technologies and uses for power production is capable in a reasonable time to produce weapons is a well-known fact. Therefore, in order to reduce the proliferation risk it is necessary to contain the nuclear science development. An alternative is to shift the weight in promoting renewable energies, as potential future energy alternative. Considering rigorously the future climate change effects, it becomes obvious that any delay in nuclear development will turn very costly for any nation ignoring all these facts and, the complexity of the real nonproliferation is growing. This new trend raises serious challenges in front of all states regarding the non-proliferation and, in order to keep control and stimulate a sound nuclear development, some of the actual non-proliferation concepts and policies have to be reformulated and enhanced. This has to be done in parallel with a more intensive implication of the international organisms in the real development of the nuclear power at national level. The large diversity of nuclear applications with huge collateral implication in every national economy makes the role of the international organisms orders of magnitude more important. The new challenges posed in front of the

  10. Academic perspectives on the non-proliferation problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gummett, P.

    1984-01-01

    The USA has demonstrated a greater penchant for a technical focus aimed at denial than any other state, despite a brief interlude under President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger when it displayed a total lack of concern about proliferation. This terminated with the sudden reawakening of interest following the Indian explosion and the announcement that the USA was not prepared to accept additional requests for uranium-enrichment services. According to Brenner, this enrichment crisis was engineered as a deliberate act of policy: yet this act of policy was unrelated to non-proliferation objectives. Rather, the Nixon administration's interest in privatisation in general, and commercialisation of enriched-uranium supply in particular, had led to a bureaucratic battle between the domestic side of the White House, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE). This battle was totally unrelated to foreign policy: a situation not without precedent in this area. Nixon's Republican administration deliberately provoked a supply bottleneck by changing the terms of AEC supply contracts, with the intention of forcing the Democrat-dominated JCAE to agree to the entry of private industry into the uranium-enrichment business. The outcome was more dramatic than had been intended

  11. The SSAC in international safeguards and non-proliferation aspects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bett, F.L.; Humphreys, J.J.

    1989-01-01

    The history of international efforts against horizontal proliferation, including the Baruch Plan, bilateral safeguards agreement, IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines and the Physical Protection Convention, is reviewed. The role of IAEA NPT safeguards in verifying nondiversion and ensuring no misuse of supplied nuclear items is discussed. The vital importance of successful performance of this role to peaceful nuclear commerce is stressed. The application of NPT safeguards by the IAEA is described, particularly the IAEA's requirement that a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material be established. Such a State System has two different but complementary areas of responsibility - ensuring that the use of nuclear material is controlled effectively and can be readily accounted for (this includes the area of physical protection), and providing accounts of nuclear material to responsible bodies such as the State's government and equally importantly to the IAEA for safeguards purpose, as the IAEA bases its conclusions about diversion on its verification of the data provided by the State System

  12. Non-proliferation policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shkol'nik, V.S.; Zhantikin, T.M.

    1997-01-01

    The present abstract reveals the aspects of Kazakstan's non-proliferation policy. After acquiring independence in Kazakstan there remained a huge nuclear inheritance of the USSR. Kazakstan had to determine its policy regarding nuclear stuff. One of the most important test sites of the former USSR - Semipalatinsk test site - was closed. The Republic signed the Lisbon Protocols to the Treaty between the USSR and USA on the reduction and limitation of strategic and offensive arms. On December 13, 1993, Kazakstan and the IAEA concluded the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. All nuclear weapons were removed from Kazakstan territory, work resulting in military nuclear power use was terminated. A wide program on conversion of the former military research infrastructure is being performed with the support of some foreign countries. For instance Kazakstan / USA jointly work on withdrawing highly enriched nuclear materials from Ulba Metallurgical Plant to the USA enterprises for processing ('Sapphere'). Another conversion activity is liquidation of the former testing holes at Semipalatinsk test site. In relation to this there appeared an agreement between U.S. Department of defence and Ministry of Sciences and New Technologies of the Republic of Kazakstan (October, 3, 1995). A sensitive information is present at the area of the former test site. The traditional IAEA safeguards are used to nuclear facilities and nuclear materials

  13. Ionospheric measurements for the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fitzgerald, T.J.

    1994-01-01

    The detection of explosions using ionospheric techniques relies on measuring perturbations induced in radio propagation by acoustics waves which disturb the electron density of the ionosphere. Such techniques have been applied to the detection of atmospheric explosions, underground nuclear tests, earthquakes, and surface mining explosions. The nighttime ionosphere presents a difficulty for the detection of explosions because in the absence of solar ionization radiation the electron density in the altitude range of 90 to 200 km decays after sunset and perturbation effects are correspondingly reduced. On the other hand, acoustic waves produced by weak sources reach a maximum amplitude in the altitude range of 100 to 150 km and are highly attenuated at altitudes above 200 km. For safety reasons, most planned explosions are conducted during daylight which has limited the experimental measurements during nighttime. However a recent opportunity for a nighttime measurement occurred in connection with the Non-Proliferation Experiment which consisted of the detonation of a large chemical charge underground at the Nevada Test Site near midnight local time. the results, based on a new technique of using medium frequency radio transmissions provided by commercial broadcasts to detect explosion effects, were negative. The most likely explanation for the negative result is that the radio transmissions did not reflect at a low enough altitude to sense the perturbations produced by the acoustic waves

  14. Aftershock communication during the Canterbury Earthquakes, New Zealand: implications for response and recovery in the built environment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Julia Becker,; Wein, Anne; Sally Potter,; Emma Doyle,; Ratliff, Jamie L.

    2015-01-01

    On 4 September 2010, a Mw7.1 earthquake occurred in Canterbury, New Zealand. Following the initial earthquake, an aftershock sequence was initiated, with the most significant aftershock being a Mw6.3 earthquake occurring on 22 February 2011. This aftershock caused severe damage to the city of Christchurch and building failures that killed 185 people. During the aftershock sequence it became evident that effective communication of aftershock information (e.g., history and forecasts) was imperative to assist with decision making during the response and recovery phases of the disaster, as well as preparedness for future aftershock events. As a consequence, a joint JCDR-USGS research project was initiated to investigate: • How aftershock information was communicated to organisations and to the public; • How people interpreted that information; • What people did in response to receiving that information; • What information people did and did not need; and • What decision-making challenges were encountered relating to aftershocks. Research was conducted by undertaking focus group meetings and interviews with a range of information providers and users, including scientists and science advisors, emergency managers and responders, engineers, communication officers, businesses, critical infrastructure operators, elected officials, and the public. The interviews and focus group meetings were recorded and transcribed, and key themes were identified. This paper focuses on the aftershock information needs for decision-making about the built environment post-earthquake, including those involved in response (e.g., for building assessment and management), recovery/reduction (e.g., the development of new building standards), and readiness (e.g. between aftershocks). The research has found that the communication of aftershock information varies with time, is contextual, and is affected by interactions among roles, by other information, and by decision objectives. A number

  15. 1995 - a pivotal year for nuclear nonproliferation. German nonproliferation policy in the runup to the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Preisinger, J.

    1994-01-01

    The paper describes the non-proliferation as a task of preventive security policy, the non-proliferation instruments, the content of an extended non-proliferation system, and tasks of German non-proliferation policy. (DG)

  16. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Northeast Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Han Yong-Sup

    1995-01-01

    This paper attempted to find out ways to facilitate bilateral and regional arms control regarding nuclear issues in Northeast Asia. This is done in order to reduce uncertainties regarding nuclear policy and capabilities of those countries, and thus to enhance transparency and confidence in the region. In order to bring them into the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation process in an effective way, we revisited the issues that contributed to the acceleration of the arms race. The review provided insights into the future course of China, the two Koreas and Japan regarding their nuclear policy and capabilities. The findings of this study indicate a general likelihood of resistance to outside request for arms control and disarmament in the countries in Northeast Asia. Besides their continuation with the conventional arms race, countries in Northeast Asia are reluctant to go ahead with the programmes to enhance transparency, build confidence in the region, and to forgo intentions to go nuclear. China is slowly but steadily increasing its nuclear arsenals. Its nuclear arms control policy is not well integrated with nuclear policy and strategy, and it is subject to the overarching goal of nuclear policy and strategy to advance China's status and national security interests in the international community. Thus, it will be very difficult for other countries to bring China to the arms control process for the time being. North Korea has intended to develop nuclear weapons in order to hedge against uncertainties. This poses a threat to the NPT regime and the peace and security of Northeast Asia. Clearly, North Korea has shown its reluctance to disclose the entirety of its nuclear programme under the IAEA inspections. Although South Korea has taken a bold initiative to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, it has still not fully paid off. Japan adds the problem of plutonium surplus to the uncertain security environments surrounding Northeast Asia

  17. Nuclear power generation and nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rathjens, G.

    1979-01-01

    The main points existing between nuclear energy development and nuclear non-proliferation policy are reviewed. The solar energy and other energy will replace for nuclear fission energy in the twenty first century, but it may not occur in the first half, and the structure has to be established to continue the development of nuclear fission technology, including breeder reactor technology. In the near future, it should be encouraged to use advanced thermal reactors if they are economic and operated with safety. Miserable results may be created in the worldwide scale, if a serious accident occurs anywhere or nuclear power reactors are utilized for military object. It is estimated to be possible to develop the ability of manufacturing nuclear weapons within two or three years in the countries where the industry is highly developed so as to generate nuclear power. It is also difficult to take measures so that nuclear power generation does not increase nuclear proliferation problems, and it is necessary to mitigate the motive and to establish the international organization. Concensus exists that as the minimum security action, the storage and transportation of materials, which can be directly utilized for nuclear weapons, should be decided by the international system. The most portions of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle should be put under the international management, as far as possible. This problem is discussed in INFCE. Related to the nuclear nonproliferation, the difference of policy in fuel cycle problems between USA and the other countries, the enrichment of nuclear fuel material, especially the reasons to inhibit the construction of additional enrichment facilities, nuclear fuel reprocessing problems, radioactive waste disposal, plutonium stock and plutonium recycle problems are reviewed. (Nakai, Y.)

  18. Statistical properties of mine tremor aftershocks

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Kgarume, TE

    2010-02-01

    Full Text Available Mine tremors and their aftershocks pose a risk to mine workers in the deep gold mines of South Africa. The statistical properties of mine-tremor aftershocks were investigated as part of an endeavour to assess the hazard and manage the risk. Data...

  19. Characteristics of Gyeongju earthquake, moment magnitude 5.5 and relative relocations of aftershocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cho, ChangSoo; Son, Minkyung

    2017-04-01

    There is low seismicity in the korea peninsula. According historical record in the historic book, There were several strong earthquake in the korea peninsula. Especially in Gyeongju of capital city of the Silla dynasty, few strong earthquakes caused the fatalities of several hundreds people 1,300 years ago and damaged the houses and make the wall of castles collapsed. Moderate strong earthquake of moment magnitude 5.5 hit the city in September 12, 2016. Over 1000 aftershocks were detected. The numbers of occurrences of aftershock over time follows omori's law well. The distribution of relative locations of 561 events using clustering aftershocks by cross-correlation between P and S waveform of the events showed the strike NNE 25 30 o and dip 68 74o of fault plane to cause the earthquake matched with the fault plane solution of moment tensor inversion well. The depth of range of the events is from 11km to 16km. The width of distribution of event locations is about 5km length. The direction of maximum horizontal stress by inversion of stress for the moment solutions of main event and large aftershocks is similar to the known maximum horizontal stress direction of the korea peninsula. The relation curves between moment magnitude and local magnitude of aftershocks shows that the moment magnitude increases slightly more for events of size less than 2.0

  20. IAEA Director General calls for rededication to nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    Speaking at the opening session of the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in New York on April 24, 2000, the Director General of the IAEA urged all nations to commit themselves unequivocally to the basic tenets of the non-proliferation regime

  1. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Regulating Nuclear Weapons around the World

    Science.gov (United States)

    Middleton, Tiffany Willey

    2010-01-01

    In May 2010, scientists, national security experts, and state delegates from nations around the world will convene in New York for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. They will review current guidelines for nuclear testing and possession of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968,…

  2. Aftershock

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Bennike, Rune Bolding

    2017-01-01

    ’ as a political environment rife with opportunity, bias, and unintended consequences. As scholars and interested observers of Nepal and the Himalaya, we need to pay close attention to this environment and its potentially unequal outcomes that reverberate past this present moment of taking stock....

  3. An Explosion Aftershock Model with Application to On-Site Inspection

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ford, Sean R.; Labak, Peter

    2016-01-01

    An estimate of aftershock activity due to a theoretical underground nuclear explosion is produced using an aftershock rate model. The model is developed with data from the Nevada National Security Site, formerly known as the Nevada Test Site, and the Semipalatinsk Test Site, which we take to represent soft-rock and hard-rock testing environments, respectively. Estimates of expected magnitude and number of aftershocks are calculated using the models for different testing and inspection scenarios. These estimates can help inform the Seismic Aftershock Monitoring System (SAMS) deployment in a potential Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection (OSI), by giving the OSI team a probabilistic assessment of potential aftershocks in the Inspection Area (IA). The aftershock assessment, combined with an estimate of the background seismicity in the IA and an empirically derived map of threshold magnitude for the SAMS network, could aid the OSI team in reporting. We apply the hard-rock model to a M5 event and combine it with the very sensitive detection threshold for OSI sensors to show that tens of events per day are expected up to a month after an explosion measured several kilometers away.

  4. From nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament: a need to refocus NPT priorities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sethi, Manpreet

    1998-01-01

    This paper seeks to suggest that attempts at general and complete nuclear disarmament have largely failed because of an over emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly horizontal, while disarmament has attracted only lip service from the perpetrators of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that is deemed to be the core of the global non-proliferation regime is no less to blame for having indulged in a skewed pursuit of its twin objectives - nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The paper argues that nuclear non-proliferation can be sustainable only if complemented by nuclear disarmament. In the absence of the latter, proliferation of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the NPT and its safeguards regime, would always pose a potential risk

  5. Utility of temporary aftershock warning system in the immediate aftermath of large damaging earthquakes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harben, P.E.; Jarpe, S.P.; Hunter, S.; Johnston, C.A.

    1993-01-01

    An aftershock warning system (AWS) is a real-time warning system that is deployed immediately after a large damaging earthquake in the epicentral region of the main shock. The primary purpose of such a system is to warn rescue teams and workers within damaged structures of imminent destructive shaking. The authors have examined the utility of such a system (1) by evaluating historical data, and (2) by developing and testing a prototype system during the 1992 Landers, California, aftershock sequence. Analyzing historical data is important in determining when and where damaging aftershocks are likely to occur and the probable usefulness of an AWS in a particular region. As part of this study, they analyzed the spatial and temporal distribution of large (magnitude >5.0) aftershocks from earthquakes with magnitudes >6.0 that took place between 1942 and 1991 in California and Nevada. They found that one-quarter of these large aftershocks occurred from 2 days-2 months after the main event, nearly one-half occurred within the first two days of the main event, and greater than one-half occurred within 20 km of the main shock's epicenter. They also reviewed a case study of the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, which showed that an AWS could have given Mexico City a warning of ∼60 sec before the magnitude 7.6 aftershock that occurred 36 hr. after the main event. They deployed a four-station prototype AWS near Landers after a magnitude 7.4 earthquake occurred on June 28, 1992. The aftershock data, collected from July 3-10, showed that the aftershocks in the vicinity of the four stations varied in magnitude from 3.0-4.4. Using a two-station detection criterion to minimize false alarms, this AWS reliably discriminated between smaller and larger aftershocks within 3 sec of the origin time of the events. This prototype could have provided 6 sec of warning to Palm Springs and 20 sec of warning to San Bernardino of aftershocks occurring in the main-shock epicentral region

  6. IDENTIFICATION OF EARTHQUAKE AFTERSHOCK AND SWARM SEQUENCES IN THE BAIKAL RIFT ZONE

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    N. A. Radziminovich

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available The catalog of earthquakes (КR³6.6 which occurred in the Baikal rift zone (BRZ was declastered, and the results are presented in the article. Aftershocks of seismic events (КR³12.5 were determined by the software developed by V.B. Smirnov (Lomonosov Moscow State University with application of the algorithm co-authored by G.M. Molchan and O.E. Dmitrieva. To ensure proper control of the software application, aftershocks were also selected manually. The results of declustering show that aftershocks of the earthquakes (КR³12.5 account for about 25 per cent of all seismic events in the regional catalog. Aftershocks accompanied 90 per cent of all the earthquakes considered as main shocks. Besides, earthquake swarms, including events with КR³11, were identified. The results of this study show that, in the BRZ, the swarms and strong events with aftershocks are not spatially separated, and this conclusion differs from the views of the previous studies that reviewed data from a shorter observation period. Moreover, it is noted that the swarms may consist of several main shocks accompanied by aftershocks. The data accumulated over the last fifty years of instrumental observations support the conclusion made earlier that the swarms in BRZ occur mainly in the north-eastward direction from Lake Baikal and also confirm the trend of a small number of aftershocks accompanying earthquakes in the south-western part of the Baikal rift zone.

  7. Humble Expectations (on Non-proliferation and Disarmament)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persbo, Andreas

    2014-04-01

    institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Disarmament cannot be verified without a strong safeguards system. The principal function of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. Over its lifetime, the treaty has been fairly successful in dissuading further nations from acquiring arms. One can be cautiously optimistic about the future. While the situation in North Korea continues to be a headache, discussions with Iran look promising. It would be unrealistic to think that Iran will give up all its fuel cycle ambitions, but the present talks contains the embryo of a deal that may help make those ambitions less threatening to Iran's neighbours and strategic rivals, hence promoting regional stability. If nothing else, a carefully monitored nuclear programme in Iran - limited in its scope - will make it more costly and more time consuming for the country to develop weapons. The centre is holding. There are few indications at present that we will see many more new entrants in the nuclear weapons club. With continual improvements to safeguards - the continued uptake of the IAEA Additional Protocol in particular - we are likely to enter an era where cheating becomes more difficult, and more costly. (author)

  8. The Use of Explosion Aftershock Probabilities for Planning and Deployment of Seismic Aftershock Monitoring System for an On-site Inspection

    Science.gov (United States)

    Labak, P.; Ford, S. R.; Sweeney, J. J.; Smith, A. T.; Spivak, A.

    2011-12-01

    One of four elements of CTBT verification regime is On-site inspection (OSI). Since the sole purpose of an OSI shall be to clarify whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out, inspection activities can be conducted and techniques used in order to collect facts to support findings provided in inspection reports. Passive seismological monitoring, realized by the seismic aftershock monitoring (SAMS) is one of the treaty allowed techniques during an OSI. Effective planning and deployment of SAMS during the early stages of an OSI is required due to the nature of possible events recorded and due to the treaty related constrains on size of inspection area, size of inspection team and length of an inspection. A method, which may help in planning the SAMS deployment is presented. An estimate of aftershock activity due to a theoretical underground nuclear explosion is produced using a simple aftershock rate model (Ford and Walter, 2010). The model is developed with data from the Nevada Test Site and Semipalatinsk Test Site, which we take to represent soft- and hard-rock testing environments, respectively. Estimates of expected magnitude and number of aftershocks are calculated using the models for different testing and inspection scenarios. These estimates can help to plan the SAMS deployment for an OSI by giving a probabilistic assessment of potential aftershocks in the Inspection Area (IA). The aftershock assessment combined with an estimate of the background seismicity in the IA and an empirically-derived map of threshold magnitude for the SAMS network could aid the OSI team in reporting. We tested the hard-rock model to a scenario similar to the 2008 Integrated Field Exercise 2008 deployment in Kazakhstan and produce an estimate of possible recorded aftershock activity.

  9. Characterization of Aftershock Sequences from Large Strike-Slip Earthquakes Along Geometrically Complex Faults

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sexton, E.; Thomas, A.; Delbridge, B. G.

    2017-12-01

    Large earthquakes often exhibit complex slip distributions and occur along non-planar fault geometries, resulting in variable stress changes throughout the region of the fault hosting aftershocks. To better discern the role of geometric discontinuities on aftershock sequences, we compare areas of enhanced and reduced Coulomb failure stress and mean stress for systematic differences in the time dependence and productivity of these aftershock sequences. In strike-slip faults, releasing structures, including stepovers and bends, experience an increase in both Coulomb failure stress and mean stress during an earthquake, promoting fluid diffusion into the region and further failure. Conversely, Coulomb failure stress and mean stress decrease in restraining bends and stepovers in strike-slip faults, and fluids diffuse away from these areas, discouraging failure. We examine spatial differences in seismicity patterns along structurally complex strike-slip faults which have hosted large earthquakes, such as the 1992 Mw 7.3 Landers, the 2010 Mw 7.2 El-Mayor Cucapah, the 2014 Mw 6.0 South Napa, and the 2016 Mw 7.0 Kumamoto events. We characterize the behavior of these aftershock sequences with the Epidemic Type Aftershock-Sequence Model (ETAS). In this statistical model, the total occurrence rate of aftershocks induced by an earthquake is λ(t) = λ_0 + \\sum_{i:t_i

  10. The Rarotonga treaty: regional approach to non-proliferation in the South Pacific

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Papadimitropulos, P.

    1988-01-01

    The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation in the South-Pacific-the Rarotonga treaty - is discussed. The regional approach to the problem of non-proliferation is aimed in a wide sense at the assistance to detante in a certain region and the propagation of measures strengthening confidence there. On December 11, 1975 at the initiative of New Zealand and Fiji the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the nuclear-free zone in the South-Pacific. In compliance with the Rarotonga treaty a large nuclear-free zone is created. The participants of the Rarotonga Treaty assess the values of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

  11. Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, Harald

    2011-01-01

    The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

  12. First annual report on nuclear non-proliferation: supplement to annual report to Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    Section 602 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) requires that DOE's Annual Report include views and recommendations regarding non-proliferation policies and actions for which the Department is responsible. The Act also requires a detailed analysis of the proliferation implications of advanced enrichment and reprocessing techniques, advanced reactors, and alternative fuel cycles, including an unclassified summary and a comprehensive version containing relevant classified information. The goals of United States non-proliferation policy are to minimize the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a stable international environment for the peaceful use of nuclear energy

  13. Aftershock Energy Distribution by Statistical Mechanics Approach

    Science.gov (United States)

    Daminelli, R.; Marcellini, A.

    2015-12-01

    The aim of our work is to research the most probable distribution of the energy of aftershocks. We started by applying one of the fundamental principles of statistical mechanics that, in case of aftershock sequences, it could be expressed as: the greater the number of different ways in which the energy of aftershocks can be arranged among the energy cells in phase space the more probable the distribution. We assume that each cell in phase space has the same possibility to be occupied, and that more than one cell in the phase space can have the same energy. Seeing that seismic energy is proportional to products of different parameters, a number of different combinations of parameters can produce different energies (e.g., different combination of stress drop and fault area can release the same seismic energy). Let us assume that there are gi cells in the aftershock phase space characterised by the same energy released ɛi. Therefore we can assume that the Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics can be applied to aftershock sequences with the proviso that the judgment on the validity of this hypothesis is the agreement with the data. The aftershock energy distribution can therefore be written as follow: n(ɛ)=Ag(ɛ)exp(-βɛ)where n(ɛ) is the number of aftershocks with energy, ɛ, A and β are constants. Considering the above hypothesis, we can assume g(ɛ) is proportional to ɛ. We selected and analysed different aftershock sequences (data extracted from Earthquake Catalogs of SCEC, of INGV-CNT and other institutions) with a minimum magnitude retained ML=2 (in some cases ML=2.6) and a time window of 35 days. The results of our model are in agreement with the data, except in the very low energy band, where our model resulted in a moderate overestimation.

  14. Canada and international safeguards. Verifying nuclear non-proliferation. Verification brochure no. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1990-01-01

    The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970 and now has about 140 signatory nations. By creating legal barriers against proliferation and by promoting an international non-proliferation ethic, the NPT has promoted international peace and security. A key ingredient has been the confidence generated through verification by IAEA safeguards. By the end of 1988 IAEA safeguards agreements had been concluded with about 100 countries, including Canada. Over 500 nuclear facilities worldwide are under safeguards or contain safeguarded nuclear material. The existence of this credible and effective safeguards system makes international trade in nuclear equipment and materials possible, monitoring the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries as well as between industrial countries. Canada is committed to non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards. Canadian non-proliferation policy is among the strictest in the world, even though opportunities have been lost to sell Canadian technology abroad as a result.

  15. 2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Koltysheva, G I; Perepelkin, I G [eds.

    1999-12-31

    On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session `History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem` and three sections: (1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests`; (2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex`; (3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences`

  16. Non-Proliferation, the IAEA Safeguards System, and the importance of nuclear material measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Stevens, Rebecca S. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2017-09-18

    The objective of this project is to explain the contribution of nuclear material measurements to the system of international verification of State declarations and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

  17. 2. International conference on non-proliferation problems. Abstracts of reports

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

    1998-01-01

    On 14-17 September 1998, in Kurchatov (Kazakstan), II. International Conference on Non-proliferation Problems was held. Representatives from different international organizations (IAEA, UNO, CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, Austria), from organizations of Kazakstan, Russia, USA, Japan took part in the Conference. At the conference there were 220 participants. Different issues relating to non-proliferation were discussed at the conference sections. The Conference included Plenary Session 'History and Current State of Non-proliferation Problem' and three sections: 1) Practical measures to support non-proliferation regime and Control for Nuclear Tests'; 2) Problems on Eliminating Nuclear tests Consequences and Conversion of Nuclear and Industrial Complex'; 3) Medical and ecological problems of Nuclear Tests Consequences'

  18. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2004-01-01

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards

  19. Nuclear non-proliferation: Global security in a rapidly changing world. Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, 21 June 2004, Washington, DC, USA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    ElBaradei, M

    2004-06-21

    This statement outlines what the IAEA and the international community has learned, what are the problems faced and the nature of the required reforms in the field of non-proliferation, security, safeguards inspection. The proposals are mostly fucued on international/collective cooperation in arms control, improvements of security and effectiveness of safeguards.

  20. Foreshock and aftershocks in simple earthquake models.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kazemian, J; Tiampo, K F; Klein, W; Dominguez, R

    2015-02-27

    Many models of earthquake faults have been introduced that connect Gutenberg-Richter (GR) scaling to triggering processes. However, natural earthquake fault systems are composed of a variety of different geometries and materials and the associated heterogeneity in physical properties can cause a variety of spatial and temporal behaviors. This raises the question of how the triggering process and the structure interact to produce the observed phenomena. Here we present a simple earthquake fault model based on the Olami-Feder-Christensen and Rundle-Jackson-Brown cellular automata models with long-range interactions that incorporates a fixed percentage of stronger sites, or asperity cells, into the lattice. These asperity cells are significantly stronger than the surrounding lattice sites but eventually rupture when the applied stress reaches their higher threshold stress. The introduction of these spatial heterogeneities results in temporal clustering in the model that mimics that seen in natural fault systems along with GR scaling. In addition, we observe sequences of activity that start with a gradually accelerating number of larger events (foreshocks) prior to a main shock that is followed by a tail of decreasing activity (aftershocks). This work provides further evidence that the spatial and temporal patterns observed in natural seismicity are strongly influenced by the underlying physical properties and are not solely the result of a simple cascade mechanism.

  1. Automatic analysis of the 2015 Gorkha earthquake aftershock sequence.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baillard, C.; Lyon-Caen, H.; Bollinger, L.; Rietbrock, A.; Letort, J.; Adhikari, L. B.

    2016-12-01

    The Mw 7.8 Gorkha earthquake, that partially ruptured the Main Himalayan Thrust North of Kathmandu on the 25th April 2015, was the largest and most catastrophic earthquake striking Nepal since the great M8.4 1934 earthquake. This mainshock was followed by multiple aftershocks, among them, two notable events that occurred on the 12th May with magnitudes of 7.3 Mw and 6.3 Mw. Due to these recent events it became essential for the authorities and for the scientific community to better evaluate the seismic risk in the region through a detailed analysis of the earthquake catalog, amongst others, the spatio-temporal distribution of the Gorkha aftershock sequence. Here we complement this first study by doing a microseismic study using seismic data coming from the eastern part of the Nepalese Seismological Center network associated to one broadband station in Everest. Our primary goal is to deliver an accurate catalog of the aftershock sequence. Due to the exceptional number of events detected we performed an automatic picking/locating procedure which can be splitted in 4 steps: 1) Coarse picking of the onsets using a classical STA/LTA picker, 2) phase association of picked onsets to detect and declare seismic events, 3) Kurtosis pick refinement around theoretical arrival times to increase picking and location accuracy and, 4) local magnitude calculation based amplitude of waveforms. This procedure is time efficient ( 1 sec/event), reduces considerably the location uncertainties ( 2 to 5 km errors) and increases the number of events detected compared to manual processing. Indeed, the automatic detection rate is 10 times higher than the manual detection rate. By comparing to the USGS catalog we were able to give a new attenuation law to compute local magnitudes in the region. A detailed analysis of the seismicity shows a clear migration toward the east of the region and a sudden decrease of seismicity 100 km east of Kathmandu which may reveal the presence of a tectonic

  2. The role of strategic missile defence in the global architecture de ballistic non proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2007-01-01

    Whereas some think that missile defence is a proliferation agent by nature and therefore undermines the already fragile regime of ballistic non proliferation, some others think that missile defence could underpin the non proliferation regime. The author thus discusses these issues and both points of view by commenting the ambiguous discursive relationships between missile defence and arms control, and by highlighting the various roles and missions given to missile defence, notably in treaties (like the ABM treaty) and postures adopted by concerned countries

  3. The nuclear non-proliferation international system before the TNP revision conference (1995)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biad, A.

    1996-01-01

    This document described the international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation. It consists of different agreements which aim at a pacific use of nuclear energy. However it is shown that many difficulties occurred during the non-proliferation treaty. Questions on equilibrium between control and cooperation, on the link between nuclear weapons reduction and countries equipped with the weapon, on the security for non-equipped countries are separately discussed. (TEC)

  4. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    OpenAIRE

    Sandra Colombo; Cristian Guglielminotti; María Nevia Vera

    2017-01-01

    The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu). The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous develop...

  5. Spectral scaling of the aftershocks of the Tocopilla 2007 earthquake in northern Chile

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lancieri, M.; Madariaga, R.; Bonilla, F.

    2012-04-01

    We study the scaling of spectral properties of a set of 68 aftershocks of the 2007 November 14 Tocopilla (M 7.8) earthquake in northern Chile. These are all subduction events with similar reverse faulting focal mechanism that were recorded by a homogenous network of continuously recording strong motion instruments. The seismic moment and the corner frequency are obtained assuming that the aftershocks satisfy an inverse omega-square spectral decay; radiated energy is computed integrating the square velocity spectrum corrected for attenuation at high frequencies and for the finite bandwidth effect. Using a graphical approach, we test the scaling of seismic spectrum, and the scale invariance of the apparent stress drop with the earthquake size. To test whether the Tocopilla aftershocks scale with a single parameter, we introduce a non-dimensional number, ?, that should be constant if earthquakes are self-similar. For the Tocopilla aftershocks, Cr varies by a factor of 2. More interestingly, Cr for the aftershocks is close to 2, the value that is expected for events that are approximately modelled by a circular crack. Thus, in spite of obvious differences in waveforms, the aftershocks of the Tocopilla earthquake are self-similar. The main shock is different because its records contain large near-field waves. Finally, we investigate the scaling of energy release rate, Gc, with the slip. We estimated Gc from our previous estimates of the source parameters, assuming a simple circular crack model. We find that Gc values scale with the slip, and are in good agreement with those found by Abercrombie and Rice for the Northridge aftershocks.

  6. On the non-proliferation framework of Japan's peaceful nuclear utilization program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kano, Takashi

    1996-01-01

    The Conference of the States Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the NPT) convened in New York, from April 17 to May 12, 1995 and decided that the NPT shall continue in force indefinitely, after reviewing the operation and affirming some aspects of the NPT, while emphasizing the ''Decision on Strengthening the Review Process'' for the NPT and the ''Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament,'' also adopted by the Conference. In parallel, Japan made its basic non-proliferation policy clear in the ''Long-Term Program for Research, Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy'' which was decided by the Atomic Energy Commission (chaired by Mikio Oomi, then Minister of the Science and Technology Agency of Japan) in June 1994. The Long-Term Program discusses various problems facing post-Cold-War international society and describes Japan's policy for establishing international confidence concerning non-proliferation. This paper summarizes Japan's non-proliferation policy as articulated in the Long-Term Program, and describes some results of an analysis comparing the Long-Term Program with the resolutions on the international non-proliferation frameworks adopted by the NPT conference

  7. Abstracts of reports of the International conference on non-proliferation problems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Koltysheva, G.I.; Perepelkin, I.G.

    1997-01-01

    On August 21, 1947, the USSR Council of Ministers made a decision on creating Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site (STS). The first Nuclear Test on the Test Site was conducted on August 29, 1949, the last one was made on October 19, 1989. In all during 40 years on Semipalatinsk Test Site 116 ground and air and 340 underground nuclear tests were conducted. They brought much damage to health and lives of thousands of people who involuntarily participated in those events. On August 29, 1991, by Kazakstan President's decree STS was closed but the problems of people's rehabilitation, natural landscapes recovering, test-site infrastructure conversion remained. These problems are being solved under direct state programs, intergovernmental agreements of Kazakstan with Russia and the USA, cooperation with different international and foreign organizations, enterprises, scientific-research centers. Kazakstan subsequently constantly pursues the policy of nonproliferation, takes measures on ellimination of nuclear tests consequences and relative infrastructure. The Republic is not involved into military nuclear programs. From its territory all the nuclear weapon was taken away. Kazakstan joined the Agreement on Non-proliferation, signed the Agreement on Safeguards to all Nuclear activity on Kazakh territory with the IAEA

  8. Nuclear non-proliferation and security culture within EDF nuclear fleet

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Debes, M.

    2013-01-01

    This document describes the nuclear non-proliferation strategy and the safety culture of EDF. The author lists all the mandatory rules and regulations at international and national levels EDF has to comply with. All these requirements are applied in EDF nuclear facilities through adequate procedures that assure a nuclear material accountancy, a follow-up of any item containing nuclear material in the facility, and internal controls. External independent controls are also performed. The EDF security policy goal is to protect human, material and knowledge assets, and to preserve operational capacity, competitiveness and public confidence, within national regulatory framework and regulation on 'vital importance facilities'. The treatment of events or incident (detection, analysis, lessons drawn, experience feedback) is a tool to progress, along with reporting, internal control process and audits. The security requirements cover the different related domains important to EDF industrial assets: security of employees against assaults; security of data according to their sensibility level; security of the information system and telecom; awareness and training of employees; relations with external suppliers or contractors; business premises; security of staff and projects abroad. For industrial facilities and grids (facilities of 'vital importance'...), the defense in depth principles are applied against the different threat scenarios. Security measures are studied at the design stage in a consistent way with nuclear safety measures, while taking into account the protective means deployed by public authorities. These risk analysis are periodically reassessed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (A.C.)

  9. Safeguards and non-proliferation: current challenges and the implications for Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leask, A.; Carlson, J.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: The expansion of nuclear programs raises the issue of how to ensure this does not increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. The non-proliferation regime - based on the NPT and its verification mechanism, the IAEA safeguards system - has been developed to provide assurance that nuclear programs are exclusively peaceful. Although to date the non-proliferation regime has been remarkably successful, in recent years it has come under serious challenge. Nuclear proliferation is emerging as one of the major issues facing the international community. Addressing technical and institutional aspects of the non-proliferation regime - especially safeguards, but also complementary measures such as export controls, proliferation-resistant technology, and an international framework on sensitive technology - is important. But proliferation is a political problem, and ultimately the success of the non-proliferation regime depends on political resolve to uphold compliance, using incentives and if necessary sanctions. These issues are vitally important to Australia's future. Being a major uranium supplier has strengthened Australia's influence in non-proliferation and safeguards developments

  10. The nuclear non-proliferation regime: What it is and how it has evolved

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Priest, J.

    1999-01-01

    The nuclear non-proliferation regime commonly denotes the legal norms, voluntary undertakings and policies which the international community has developed to deal with the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. The word 'regime' suggests a legally binding order. Some components of the non-proliferation regime are indeed legally binding. Others represent essentially political rather than legal commitments. This lecture describes the various independent but mutually reinforcing components of the non-proliferation regime. It thus touches on and highlights the particular importance of political incentives - or disincentives - to the acquisition of nuclear weapons; legal undertakings in which non-proliferation commitments are anchored; verification (specifically the IAEA Safeguards System); compliance and enforcement; export controls; physical protection measures; regional nuclear non-proliferation initiatives; and measures taken to curb proliferation in general and to strive for arms control and nuclear disarmament. The purpose of the lecture is to provide an over-arching, tour d'horizon for the more specific and detailed lectures which follow. (author)

  11. Nuclear fuel cycle industry. A responsible approach supporting non proliferation efforts in global perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jorant, Caroline

    2005-01-01

    This paper presents the reasons why and the manner in which nuclear industry is a stakeholder in non proliferation efforts. It then presents some recent proposals on multinational approaches to the fuel cycle industry and offers some comments and an industry view on these issues. A parallel is established with fundamental concepts in the field of radiation protection. Our industry, involved in 'nuclear technology development' (activities) qualified of 'sensitive' from a non proliferation standpoint, has major interests at stake in the evolution of the international non proliferation regime and is genuinely committed to the spreading of a non proliferation culture. The international community and in particular the nuclear community have been recently reflecting on ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in reaction to new threats or the perception thereof. Multilateral approaches regarding the nuclear fuel cycle are being discussed or proposed in this regard. Our approach as an industrial may be illustrated using the three basic principles developed in the field of radiation protection, namely limitation, justification and optimization. a) an overall limitation of sensitive facilities worldwide may be judicious, b) however no prohibition should be imposed if justified needs can be demonstrated on objective criteria, c) optimized used for existing facilities should be promoted through strengthened guarantees of supply where it may be necessary. (author)

  12. Deterministic properties of mine tremor aftershocks

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Kgarume, TE

    2010-10-01

    Full Text Available -values with n-2 degrees of freedom 5th International Seminar on Deep and High Stress Mining, 6-8 October 2010, Santiago CHILE Comparison of aftershock productivity, CLR 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 Log(time), s N....0 ≤ MM ≤ 4.0 Proportion of aftershocks (%) Proportion of aftershocks (%) 3 × BG 52.1 46.2 10 × BG 41.5 41.6 5th International Seminar on Deep and High Stress Mining, 6-8 October 2010, Santiago CHILE 5 Conclusions Previous studies have indicated...

  13. Remote detection of weak aftershocks of the DPRK underground explosions using waveform cross correlation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Le Bras, R.; Rozhkov, M.; Bobrov, D.; Kitov, I. O.; Sanina, I.

    2017-12-01

    Association of weak seismic signals generated by low-magnitude aftershocks of the DPRK underground tests into event hypotheses represent a challenge for routine automatic and interactive processing at the International Data Centre (IDC) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, due to the relatively low station density of the International Monitoring System (IMS) seismic network. Since 2011, as an alternative, the IDC has been testing various prototype techniques of signal detection and event creation based on waveform cross correlation. Using signals measured by seismic stations of the IMS from DPRK explosions as waveform templates, the IDC detected several small (estimated mb between 2.2 and 3.6) seismic events after two DPRK tests conducted on September 9, 2016 and September 3, 2017. The obtained detections were associated with reliable event hypothesis and then used to locate these events relative to the epicenters of the DPRK explosions. We observe high similarity of the detected signals with the corresponding waveform templates. The newly found signals also correlate well between themselves. In addition, the values of the signal-to-noise ratios (SNR) estimated using the traces of cross correlation coefficients, increase with template length (from 5 s to 150 s), providing strong evidence in favour of their spatial closeness, which allows interpreting them as explosion aftershocks. We estimated the relative magnitudes of all aftershocks using the ratio of RMS amplitudes of the master and slave signal in the cross correlation windows characterized by the highest SNR. Additional waveform data from regional non-IMS stations MDJ and SEHB provide independent validation of these aftershock hypotheses. Since waveform templates from any single master event may be sub-efficient at some stations, we have also developed a method of joint usage of the DPRK and the biggest aftershocks templates to build more robust event hypotheses.

  14. Mine aftershocks and implications for seismic hazard assessment

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Kgarume, T

    2010-11-01

    Full Text Available A methodology of assessing the seismic hazard associated with aftershocks is developed by performing statistical and deterministic analysis of seismic data from two South African deep-level gold mines. A method employing stacking of aftershocks...

  15. Abundant aftershock sequence of the 2015 Mw7.5 Hindu Kush intermediate-depth earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Li, Chenyu; Peng, Zhigang; Yao, Dongdong; Guo, Hao; Zhan, Zhongwen; Zhang, Haijiang

    2018-05-01

    The 2015 Mw7.5 Hindu Kush earthquake occurred at a depth of 213 km beneath the Hindu Kush region of Afghanistan. While many early aftershocks were missing from the global earthquake catalogues, this sequence was recorded continuously by eight broad-band stations within 500 km. Here we use a waveform matching technique to systematically detect earthquakes around the main shock. More than 3000 events are detected within 35 d after the main shock, as compared with 42 listed in the Advanced National Seismic System catalogue (or 196 in the International Seismological Centre catalogue). The aftershock sequence generally follows the Omori's law with a decay constant p = 0.92. We also apply the recently developed double-pair double-difference technique to relocate all detected aftershocks. Most of them are located to the west of the hypocentre of the main shock, consistent with the westward propagation of the main-shock rupture. The aftershocks outline a nearly vertical southward dipping plane, which matches well with one of the nodal planes of the main shock. We conclude that the aftershock sequence of this intermediate-depth earthquake shares many similarities with those for shallow earthquakes and infer that there are some common mechanisms responsible for shallow and intermediate-depth earthquakes.

  16. Aftershocks: an attempted analysis of their frequency and severity in view of risk assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mohammadioun, G.

    1985-08-01

    A catalogue comprising some 30.000 strong and moderate-sized earthquakes with their associated aftershocks, collected worldwide, has been established for the purpose of studying time and magnitude distributions with engineering applications in mind. An attempt is made to model this data base using, notably, Poisson and Weibull relations. Preliminary results include regional variations in a coefficient evaluated by means of the magnitude law and the computed probability of occurrence of an aftershock of given magnitude within a given time after the main shock. A relationship is likewise shown to exist between maximum-density magnitudes and the maximum-density time intervals separating individual events. 13 refs., 3 figs

  17. Aftershocks of 26th January 2001 Bhuj earthquake and ...

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    R. Narasimhan (Krishtel eMaging) 1461 1996 Oct 15 13:05:22

    Aftershocks of 26th January 2001 Bhuj earthquake and seismotectonics of the Kutch region. K S Misra∗, R Bhutani and R Sonp. Geological Survey of India, Alandi Road, Pune - 6, India. ∗email: gsi−pune@vsnl.com. The 26th January 2001 Bhuj earthquake was followed by intense aftershock activity. Aftershock data from ...

  18. Regional seismic observations of the Non-Proliferation Experiment at the Livermore NTS Network

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Walter, W.R.; Mayeda, K.; Patton, H.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)] [and others

    1994-12-31

    The Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), a 1-kiloton chemical explosion in N-tunnel at Rainier Mesa on the Nevada Test Site (NTS), was recorded by the four station, regional seismic Livermore NTS Network, (LNN). In this study we compare the NPE`s seismic yield, frequency content, and discrimination performance with other NTS events recorded at LNN. Preliminary findings include: The NPE LNN average magnitudes are 4.16 for m{sub b}(P{sub n}) and 4.59 for m{sub b}(L{sub g}). Using published magnitude-yield relations gives nuclear equivalent yields of 2.3 and 2.2 kilotons respectively, implying enhanced coupling of chemical relative to nuclear explosions. A comparison of the NPE seismograms with those with similar magnitude N-tunnel nuclear explosions shows remarkable similarity over the frequency band 0.5 to 5.0 Hz. Outside this band the explosions show more variability, with the NPE having the least relative energy below 0.5 Hz and the most energy above 5 Hz when scaled by magnitude. Considering the variability within the N-tunnel nuclear explosions, these low- and high-frequency NPE-nuclear differences may not reflect chemical-nuclear source differences. The NPE was compared to a large number of NTS nuclear explosions and earthquakes as part of an ongoing short-period discrimination study of P{sub N}/L{sub g},P{sub g}/L{sub g}, and spectral ratios in the P{sub n}, P{sub g},L{sub g}, and coda phases. For these discriminants, the NPE looks very similar to N-tunnel nuclear explosions and other NTS nuclear explosions, implying seismic identification of contained, non-ripple-fired, chemical explosions as non-nuclear may not be possible. However, such blasts might serve as surrogate nuclear explosions when calibrating seismic discriminants in regions where nuclear testing has not occurred.

  19. Near real-time aftershock hazard maps for earthquakes

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCloskey, J.; Nalbant, S. S.

    2009-04-01

    Stress interaction modelling is routinely used to explain the spatial relationships between earthquakes and their aftershocks. On 28 October 2008 a M6.4 earthquake occurred near the Pakistan-Afghanistan border killing several hundred and causing widespread devastation. A second M6.4 event occurred 12 hours later 20km to the south east. By making some well supported assumptions concerning the source event and the geometry of any likely triggered event it was possible to map those areas most likely to experience further activity. Using Google earth, it would further have been possible to identify particular settlements in the source area which were particularly at risk and to publish their locations globally within about 3 hours of the first earthquake. Such actions could have significantly focused the initial emergency response management. We argue for routine prospective testing of such forecasts and dialogue between social and physical scientists and emergency response professionals around the practical application of these techniques.

  20. Non-proliferation through effective international control. Report of working group I

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, S.E.

    1993-01-01

    Working Group I focused on two issues: the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the Missile Technology Regime (MTCR). There was wide agreement within the Group on a number of factors that will strongly influence the prospects for the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension Conference. Two points stood out as particularly important: first, emphasis on the obligations for nuclear Powers to move in good faith in direction of nuclear disarmament; and second, inadequacy of security guarantees to non-nuclear States associated with the NPT

  1. Environmental effects of additional uranium development required by a non-proliferation policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baca, T.E.; Scudella, G.

    1978-01-01

    New Mexico can expect to see an accelerated development of its uranium resources. The President's policy on non-proliferation will impact the degree and quantity of uranium ore mined. Environmental impacts are significant and are affected by the mining and milling phase more than any other aspect of the uranium fuel cycle. The state has begun evaluating the resource-associated impacts of uranium mining and milling, although very little reliable data are available. The information gathered, however, shows a need for state and Federal evaluation of both the impacts and the non-proliferation policy. 4 references

  2. Nuclear energy and non proliferation. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cooley, J.; Rauf, T.

    2008-01-01

    This article discusses the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. The IAEA verifies States compliance with their non-proliferation commitments through the application of safeguards on their civilian nuclear programmes to ensure that they are being used solely for peaceful purposes. The IAEA safeguards have evolved in the course of five decades and have become an integral part of the international non-proliferation regime and the global security system. To continue to serve the international community, they need to continue to move with the times, especially in light of the renewed interest in nuclear energy. (Author)

  3. Aftershocks : Economic Crisis and Institutional Choice

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Hemerijck, Anton; Knapen, Ben; Doorne, van Ellen

    2009-01-01

    Aftershocks werd geschreven op het hoogtepunt van de grootste economische crisis sinds de grote depressie. Hoewel het voorbarig zou zijn aan te nemen dat de gevolgen van de crisis al in volle omvang duidelijk zijn, is het overduidelijk dat zij ingrijpende effecten zal hebben op politiek, economisch

  4. Status and prospect of non-proliferation activities of ISTC and STCU

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richard, M.; Daoust Maleval, D.; Louvet, P.

    2009-01-01

    This article examines the role of the International Science and Technology Centre of Moscow (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Centre of Ukraine in Kiev (STCU) in preventing proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) expertise and know-how of scientists and engineers from the Former Soviet Union countries. The Centres were created in the first half of the nineties, in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This collapse raised very serious concerns: over the risk of former WMD scientists and engineers being recruited by States of concern or terrorist groups that wished to develop their own WMD capabilities and means of delivery; and the possibility that scientists and engineers would be driven to sell their knowledge, know-how or equipment in order to survive. Since the Centres' inception, the regional and international context has changed dramatically at both economic and strategic levels, in particular regarding non-proliferation and global security. Changes of a political and strategic nature in the former Soviet Union required the European Union to review its relationship with Russia, to reassess the importance of Central Asian Countries and the future of Ukraine as it is pulled between Russia and Europe. The Centres have had to adapt to these changes. The article draws from an evaluation of the Centres' non-proliferation activities, carried out by the authors between November 2006 and September 2007 at the request of the European Commission. Moreover, since completion of the mission, many events, important for the strategic relationships between E U, Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries occurred as the affirmation of Russia's regional leadership: its rearmament along with the stiffening of its relationships with western countries and some neighbours and closure to visitors; the Georgia-Russia conflict; and the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis. As CIS countries are more affected by the current economical crisis

  5. The control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear development - present uncertainties

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Machado de Faria, N.G.; Amaral Barros, E.

    1983-01-01

    This report gives the views of Brazilian lawyers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It deals with the present situation and future prospects concerning the uses of nuclear energy. In particular, it proposes the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  6. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Export Control in the Republic of Croatia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Valcic, I.; Prah, M.; Mikec, N.

    2006-01-01

    In accordance with its internationally accepted obligations, the Republic of Croatia is actively implementing principles of non-proliferation and export control of nuclear materials and/or equipment. The article deals with treaties, conventions, agreements and other international arrangements that are creating certain obligation for Republic of Croatia related to nuclear non-proliferation. The most important are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards with Protocol, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the Republic of Croatia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the NSG Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology and NSG Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. In addition the article describes a national regulative framework, the basis for conducting activities in nuclear material control, export control of dual-use items as well as non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. Details are given about the Nuclear Safety Act, the Act on Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Act on Export of Dual-Use Items, the Decree on the List of Dual-Use Items, the Law on Production, Repair and Trade in Arms and Military Equipment and the Decree specifying goods subject to export and import licenses. (author)

  7. New trends of activity on supporting of non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Issaeva, G.M.; Tyupkina, O.G.

    2002-01-01

    Taking into account the necessity of all possible strengthening of non-proliferation regimes Kazakhstan participates in a number of agreements and associations: Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Supplier Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Conference on Disarmament, etc. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) greatly influenced on the development on non-proliferation regime in Kazakhstan. During initial stage of CTR activity (1993-1995) military projects prevailed. Later (1995-1997) the projects on liquidation of infrastructure for nuclear and bio- weapons were successfully realized. Last years, since 1999, the attention was shifted towards proliferation prevention of hazardous nuclear and biological materials. Recent terrorist acts and world community activity on global safety strengthening underline an urgency of quite new problems that entirely applied to Kazakhstan: monitoring of hazardous materials; enhancement of safety systems of 'risky' facilities and technologies; creation and/or upgrading of safety systems for industry infrastructure. The proposals of these new trends of non-proliferation have been developed. Development of physical protection system for oil and gas industry infrastructure of Kazakhstan based on safety concepts of nuclear facilities; Evaluation of radionuclide contamination and safety of oil and gas facilities of the Caspian region; Counteraction to nuclear materials proliferation; Cooperative approaches in preventing/reducing of illicit trafficking and use of WMD-related explosive materials. Implementation of the project would make of substantial contribution to successful solution of either regional or global safety problem

  8. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: speech of the president Obama at Prague

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, B.

    2009-01-01

    Introduced by the Prague speech of april 7 2009, the Obama President program towards the non proliferation and the nuclear disarmament was pointed out by its optimism ambition and determination. But a more detailed lecture shows concurrent positions. The author analyzes the political aspects of the President speech. (A.L.B.)

  9. Back-end of the fuel cycle and non-proliferation strategies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chebeskov, A.N.; Oussanov, V.I.; Iougai, S.V.; Pshakin, G.M. [Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, State Scientific Center of Russian Federation, Obninsk (Russian Federation)

    2001-07-01

    The paper focuses on the problem of fissile materials proliferation risk estimation. Some methodological approaches to the solution of this task and results of their application for comparison of different nuclear fuel cycle strategies are discussed. The results of comparative assessment of non-proliferation aspects of plutonium utilization alternatives in Russia using system analysis approach are presented. (author)

  10. Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shinohara, Nobuo; Kokaji, Lisa; Ichimasa, Sukeyuki

    2010-01-01

    In Global Center of Excellence Program of The University of Tokyo, Non- Proliferation Study Committee by the members of nuclear industries, electricity utilities, nuclear energy institutes and universities has initiated on October 2008 from the viewpoints of investigating a package of measures for nuclear non-proliferation and bringing up young people who will support the near-future nuclear energy system. One of the non-proliferation issues in the Committee is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Objective of this treaty is to cease all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosion. This purpose should be contributed effectively to the political stability of the Asian region by continuous efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons. In the Committee, by extracting several issues related to the CTBT, conception of 'Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation' has been discussed with the aim of the nuclear-weapon security in Asian region, where environmental nuclear-test monitoring data is mainly treated and utilized. In this paper, the conception of the 'network' is presented in detail. (author)

  11. Non-proliferation and safeguards aspects. Key issue paper no. 5

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-06-01

    This paper examines the current nuclear non-proliferation regime (Section 2) and the issues most likely to arise as the civil nuclear fuel cycle develops over the next 50 years (Section 3). Section 4 deals with fuel cycles and nuclear material inventories. 14 refs.

  12. A Study on Introduction of Nuclear Power Plants in India and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Conditions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang, Seung Hyo; Lim, Dong Hyuk

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which was formed to build nuclear export control has been accepting the nuclear cooperation for the member nation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Korea exported nuclear power plants to United Arab Emirates in 2009 and research and training reactor to Jordan in 2010 based on the forcible non-proliferation regime as a member nation of NSG, so it is strengthening its position in the atomic energy industry. In addition, Korea concluded an agreement with India which is planning the construction of 25.based or more nuclear power plants for the next 20 years in last July, 25, so it will enter the atomic energy market in India. But India has been accepted the exceptionally civilian nuclear cooperation as a de facto Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) and non-member state of NPT, so concerns about nuclear proliferation has been raised. This study aims to introduce the allowance of exceptions background in India, to analyze its effect on the non-proliferation regime and to find nuclear non-proliferation conditions

  13. Nuclear energy and non-proliferation in Latin America: the constitution of Tlatelolco system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armanet, P.

    1982-01-01

    The nuclear energy as alternative energy resource and its military use are analysed. Then the main characteristics of the Tratelolco treaty and non-proliferation in Latin America are discussed. Finally the importance of the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin America is shown. (A.B.T.) [pt

  14. Back-end of the fuel cycle and non-proliferation strategies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chebeskov, A.N.; Oussanov, V.I.; Iougai, S.V.; Pshakin, G.M.

    2001-01-01

    The paper focuses on the problem of fissile materials proliferation risk estimation. Some methodological approaches to the solution of this task and results of their application for comparison of different nuclear fuel cycle strategies are discussed. The results of comparative assessment of non-proliferation aspects of plutonium utilization alternatives in Russia using system analysis approach are presented. (author)

  15. Aftershock Characteristics as a Means of Discriminating Explosions from Earthquakes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ford, S R; Walter, W R

    2009-05-20

    The behavior of aftershock sequences around the Nevada Test Site in the southern Great Basin is characterized as a potential discriminant between explosions and earthquakes. The aftershock model designed by Reasenberg and Jones (1989, 1994) allows for a probabilistic statement of earthquake-like aftershock behavior at any time after the mainshock. We use this model to define two types of aftershock discriminants. The first defines M{sub X}, or the minimum magnitude of an aftershock expected within a given duration after the mainshock with probability X. Of the 67 earthquakes with M > 4 in the study region, 63 of them produce an aftershock greater than M{sub 99} within the first seven days after a mainshock. This is contrasted with only six of 93 explosions with M > 4 that produce an aftershock greater than M{sub 99} for the same period. If the aftershock magnitude threshold is lowered and the M{sub 90} criteria is used, then no explosions produce an aftershock greater than M{sub 90} for durations that end more than 17 days after the mainshock. The other discriminant defines N{sub X}, or the minimum cumulative number of aftershocks expected for given time after the mainshock with probability X. Similar to the aftershock magnitude discriminant, five earthquakes do not produce more aftershocks than N{sub 99} within 7 days after the mainshock. However, within the same period all but one explosion produce less aftershocks then N{sub 99}. One explosion is added if the duration is shortened to two days after than mainshock. The cumulative number aftershock discriminant is more reliable, especially at short durations, but requires a low magnitude of completeness for the given earthquake catalog. These results at NTS are quite promising and should be evaluated at other nuclear test sites to understand the effects of differences in the geologic setting and nuclear testing practices on its performance.

  16. Imaging 2015 Mw 7.8 Gorkha Earthquake and Its Aftershock Sequence Combining Multiple Calibrated Global Seismic Arrays

    Science.gov (United States)

    LI, B.; Ghosh, A.

    2016-12-01

    The 2015 Mw 7.8 Gorkha earthquake provides a good opportunity to study the tectonics and earthquake hazards in the Himalayas, one of the most seismically active plate boundaries. Details of the seismicity patterns and associated structures in the Himalayas are poorly understood mainly due to limited instrumentation. Here, we apply a back-projection method to study the mainshock rupture and the following aftershock sequence using four large aperture global seismic arrays. All the arrays show eastward rupture propagation of about 130 km and reveal similar evolution of seismic energy radiation, with strong high-frequency energy burst about 50 km north of Kathmandu. Each single array, however, is typically limited by large azimuthal gap, low resolution, and artifacts due to unmodeled velocity structures. Therefore, we use a self-consistent empirical calibration method to combine four different arrays to image the Gorkha event. It greatly improves the resolution, can better track rupture and reveal details that cannot be resolved by any individual array. In addition, we also use the same arrays at teleseismic distances and apply a back-projection technique to detect and locate the aftershocks immediately following the Gorkha earthquake. We detect about 2.5 times the aftershocks recorded by the Advance National Seismic System comprehensive earthquake catalog during the 19 days following the mainshock. The aftershocks detected by the arrays show an east-west trend in general, with majority of the aftershocks located at the eastern part of the rupture patch and surrounding the rupture zone of the largest Mw 7.3 aftershock. Overall spatiotemporal aftershock pattern agrees well with global catalog, with our catalog showing more details relative to the standard global catalog. The improved aftershock catalog enables us to better study the aftershock dynamics, stress evolution in this region. Moreover, rapid and better imaging of aftershock distribution may aid rapid response

  17. Experience of Republic of Macedonia in Providing WMD Non-Proliferation Policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mecinovic, S.

    2007-01-01

    The Republic of Macedonia as a country in transition and as a country which does not posses WMD, has accepted to developed and implemented non-proliferation policy of WMD. First of all, we accepted the definition of WMD as used in international agreements, conventions and protocol and WMD includes nuclear, biological and toxin weapons, agent and precursors. WMD in wide sense includes all toxic chemical substances if they are used as means of attack or if they are the target of attack, all microorganisms and their product, all industrial facilities that use toxic chemicals in their process of production, transport and stockpile if they are a target of military or terrorist attack. For WMD non-proliferation projects to be valid, they must be on the level and carry the weight of international policy and doctrine and involve a most comprehensive sphere of the scientific and professional communities. This is only way to implement the projects in country such is Republic of Macedonia where the public opinion is that WMD are not real security problem because we neither possess nor seek to posses these kinds of weapons. Our WMD non-proliferation policy is tied to control of weapons, agents, precursors, technology and their transfer, market and possibility of use. Because of that we try to control know terrorist organization, groups and individuals. Terrorism caused special concern and attention, particularly when we talk about terrorism with NBC weapons and radiological, chemical and biological warfare agents. Scientific and technological progress led to fact that the instruments for performing terrorism (including WMD) can be produced or procured much easier than before. Rising industry which uses toxic chemicals and microorganisms in the production process created a lot of potential targets for terrorism actions in which they can use be as a target and an executive instrument. The new goal of contemporary treats is safety of life environment, which today includes

  18. Quantitative Mapping of Precursory Seismic Quiescence Before Large Aftershocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Neukomm, S.; Wiemer, S.; Giardini, D.

    2002-12-01

    A relative decrease of aftershock activity before the occurrence of large aftershocks to M6+ mainshocks is one of only few earthquake precursors accepted for the IASPEI preliminary list of significant earthquake precursors. If one considers earthquake rate to be dependent on stressing rate, aftershocks sequences offer in fact an ideal environment to detect precursory quiescence before large earthquakes: The numerous aftershocks allow a much higher spatial and temporal resolution of transients in seismicity than possible with the average background rate of micro-earthquakes. Past studies of precursory quiescence before larger aftershocks, however, have largely been based on bulk value. The aim of this study is to map the temporal and spatial variability of activity rate within several rich aftershock sequences, and, possibly, exploit the results for improving real time probabilistic aftershock hazard assessment. We introduce a new algorithm based on fitting the modified Omori law to the aftershock sequences. At arbitrarily chosen grid points, the Omori parameters of the sub-samples containing all aftershock within 5 or 10 km of the node are estimated at time t. We calculate the number of aftershocks N +/- dN in the time interval t + dt using the relevant four Omori parameters (p, c and k) parameters and their corresponding standard deviations estimated using a bootstrap analysis. The difference between the forecasted and the observed number of aftershocks, normalized by the standard deviation of the forecast, is our estimator of rate change. The algorithm is tested on synthetic aftershock sequences containing artificial quiescences in order to calibrate the free parameters for optimal detection of precursory quiescence. We then perform our spatial and temporal mapping for several prominent Californian and Japanese aftershock sequences (Landers, Hector Mine, Northridge, Loma Prieta, Kobe, Western Tottori and Hokkaido). Preliminary results suggest that we cannot

  19. Accounting for orphaned aftershocks in the earthquake background rate

    Science.gov (United States)

    Van Der Elst, Nicholas

    2017-01-01

    Aftershocks often occur within cascades of triggered seismicity in which each generation of aftershocks triggers an additional generation, and so on. The rate of earthquakes in any particular generation follows Omori's law, going approximately as 1/t. This function decays rapidly, but is heavy-tailed, and aftershock sequences may persist for long times at a rate that is difficult to discriminate from background. It is likely that some apparently spontaneous earthquakes in the observational catalogue are orphaned aftershocks of long-past main shocks. To assess the relative proportion of orphaned aftershocks in the apparent background rate, I develop an extension of the ETAS model that explicitly includes the expected contribution of orphaned aftershocks to the apparent background rate. Applying this model to California, I find that the apparent background rate can be almost entirely attributed to orphaned aftershocks, depending on the assumed duration of an aftershock sequence. This implies an earthquake cascade with a branching ratio (the average number of directly triggered aftershocks per main shock) of nearly unity. In physical terms, this implies that very few earthquakes are completely isolated from the perturbing effects of other earthquakes within the fault system. Accounting for orphaned aftershocks in the ETAS model gives more accurate estimates of the true background rate, and more realistic expectations for long-term seismicity patterns.

  20. Depth dependent stress revealed by aftershocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Narteau, C.; Shebalin, P.

    2017-12-01

    Aftershocks occur in response to perturbations of the state of stress induced either by earthquakes or human activities. Along major strike-slip fault segments of the San Andreas fault system, the time-delay before the onset of the power-law aftershock decay rate (the c-value) varies by three orders of magnitude in the first twenty kilometers below the surface. Despite the influence of the lithostatic stress, there is no continuous change in c-value with respect to depth. Instead, two decay phases are separated by an abrupt increase at an intermediate depth range of 2 to 5 km. This transitional regime is the only one observed in fluid-injection-induced seismic areas. This provides strong evidence for the role of fluid and a porosity reduction mechanism at depth of few kilometers in active fault zones. Aftershock statistics can then be used to predict the evolution the differential shear stress with depth until the brittle-ductile transition is reached.

  1. The legal points at issue concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty and the verification agreement of EURATOM with the IAEA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zieger, G.

    1975-01-01

    An excellent and comprehensive but very juridicial contribution on: Development and content of the Non-proliferation Treaty, the problems which this Treaty poses for EURATOM (a common market, common supply, joint enterprises, Non-proliferation Treaty and France), the compatibility of the Non-proliferation Treaty with the EURATOM Treaty, verification agreement EURATOM - IAEA (the IAEA as the supervisory authority, the control system of the IAEA, guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements, national systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material IAEA supervision as a secondary control, principles of IAEA supervision, secrecy, conflict management), conclusion of the verification agreement, deviations from the guidelines elaborated by the IAEA to be used as the basis for negotiating safeguard agreements legal reflexions (verification agreement and Non-proliferation Treaty, reservations concerning the Non-proliferation Treaty, questions of competence between EURATOM and member states without nuclear weapons, problems of equal treatment). (HP/LN) [de

  2. The impact of non-proliferation policies on the uranium market - an industry view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stephany, M.

    1977-01-01

    It is concluded that from an economic point of view, the impact of the present political discussions on non-proliferation (referring particularly to U.S. and Canadian initiatives) on the uranium market (through the choice of reactor programmes in different countries, and other parts of the fuel cycle, such an enrichment, reprocessing, the use of plutonium and the disposal of radioactive waste) cannot be assessed quantitatively. It is believed, however, that in general terms the non-proliferation issue will lead to an increase in the cost of nuclear energy and of all energy. It is also considered that it will tend to strengthen nationalism and thereby to restrict international trade. (U.K.)

  3. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilmshurst, M.J.

    1983-01-01

    The author discusses the reasons of criticism and even rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, dealing in particular with the alledged discriminating nature of the Treaty and with the statement that the Treaty is not apt to prevent proliferation on a vertical plane. He further discusses the motives behind the efforts of potential nuclear weapons states to get nuclear weapons. The system of worldwide and bilateral safeguards and controls covering the transfer of nuclear technologies is explained. In conclusion the author suggests to pay more attention to article IV, sub-section (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as this might offer a suitable approach to restricting the dissemination of nuclear explosives. (HP) [de

  4. Review of international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shimizu, Ryo; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Sakurai, Satoshi; Tamai, Hiroshi; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Kuno, Yusuke

    2012-02-01

    International forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation was held at Gakushi-kaikan, Tokyo on February 2-3, 2011 in cooperation with The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and The University of Tokyo Global COE. In our International Forum, we would like to encourage active discussion of international challenges to and solutions for compatibility between peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation, and international cooperation for emerging nuclear energy states. It was successfully carried out with as many as 310 participants and a lot of discussions. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summary of panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. (author)

  5. Argentina’s nuclear development and the non-proliferation regime

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Sandra Colombo

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The development and transfer of nuclear technology have been put under strict control due to its possible military use, leading to the creation of international non-proliferation regimes. One of the latest proposals was the creation of multilateral banks of low enriched uranium (leu. The article states that, under the goal of non-proliferation, this initiative can contribute to accentuate the asymmetry in the distribution of world economic and political power, damaging the endogenous development of this technology in emerging countries. Against this, the article investigates the existence of margins to maneuver in the international system from the case of study of Argentina, one of the few developing countries that have managed to export nuclear technology, and has declared the development of independent nuclear activity as a State policy

  6. The non-proliferation regime, vertical proliferation and the interests of the Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, W.

    1988-12-01

    The disarmament orientation of the NPT, which stands beside the central aim of avoiding horizontal proliferation, raises a question: Does a compatibility exist between the non-proliferation policy of the Federal Republic and its security policy, which has its basic pillar in the nuclear deterrence strategy? Critics of this deterrence policy therefore, hinting to the disarmament determination of the NPT, demand that the Federal Republic should exercise its influence for the conclusion of a 'Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty' (CTBT), the establishment of a 'Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones' (NWFZ) in Europe, a 'No First Use'-Treaty (NFU) and finally the abolishment of all atomic weapons ('Zero Solution'). According to them such disarmament 'remedies' can reestablish or assure the waning or damaged international consensus for horizontal non-proliferation. This is a contribution for the establishment of a stable world order and will smooth the way for a prolongation of the NPT in the year 1995. An analysis of the history and the structure of interests shows that the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is deeply rooted in the NPT and that a prolongation of the treaty and its own membership is a substantial object of the foreign and security policy. Consequently the Federal Republic has to face the demands for an intensification of 'anti-nuclear measures' and has to examine their acceptability and their usefulness with respect to non-proliferation. The structure of the problem encloses the following aspects: The security conception of the Federal Republic with its military-strategic essence; the provisions in article VI NPT for negotiations with the object of a world free of atomic weapons; the derived disarmament 'remedies' for strengthening the consensus for horizontal non-proliferation and, finally, the real interface between horizontal and vertical proliferation. (orig./DG) [de

  7. Assuring the success of the non-proliferation treaty extension conference. Excerpts from the panel discussions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This publication presents excerpts from a conference organized by the NGO Committee on Disarmament Inc., in cooperation with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, and covers the following issues: status of the comprehensive test ban treaty negotiations, fissile cut-off and ending production of nuclear weapons, how should nuclear weapons states pursue disarmament under Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), NPT extension: problems and prospects

  8. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1970-04-22

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

  9. Non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament: A status report. Vienna, 14 March 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    For more than half a century, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. Further meaningful progress towards a nuclear weapon free world will demand that we re-examine our fundamental concept of what security means and how it can best be achieved. The following specific areas where our attention should be focused are discussed briefly: the historical perspective, current strategies for non-proliferation and disarmament, and the future prospects

  10. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  11. Export of nuclear equipment and materials and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courteix, Simone.

    1977-01-01

    The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of great concern today despite the entry into force in the early '70s of the NPT. To master civilian nuclear technology implies the ability to develop nuclear explosive devices; therefore in recent years contacts have strengthened between countries exporting nuclear equipment, specially in the frame of the 'London Club' so as to ensure that their exports will not result in disseminating nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

  12. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [fr

  13. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [ru

  14. The Non-Proliferation Treaty on the threshold to the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, W.

    1991-06-01

    The basic outlines of non-proliferation policy, its instruments, the position of the protagonists' interests and the fundamental fields of conflict are to the fore. The history and structure of international non-poliferation policy and, in particular, of the NPT, are described, the instruments for verifying the purely peaceful use of nuclear power (safeguards) are analysed, and important future technological and political challenges of the Treaty are listed. (orig./HP) [de

  15. Nuclear export policy and regulation for non-proliferation: Federal Republic of Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Boulanger, Werner.

    1978-01-01

    The nuclear export policy of the Federal Republic of Germany complies with the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Already in 1967 the Federal Government stated in a Peace Note that no export was authorised to countries (outside Euratom) which did not comply with the IAEA Safeguards. In the bilateral agreement the Federal Republic signed with Brasil in 1975, emphasis was put on international safeguards and the control exercised on exported materials to avoid any diversion for military purposes. (NEA) [fr

  16. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1986-10-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  17. Scientists for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transactions of international seminar

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1994-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the Second International Seminar 'Scientists for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. The Seminar took place from 11 to 14 October 1994 in Nakhabino Country Club near Moscow. More than 60 specialists from Russia, USA, France, Belgium as well as IAEA and CEU took part in the seminar. Problems of cooperation in the field of nuclear materials accounting, control and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear export regulations and disarmament control are discussed at the seminar

  18. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [es

  19. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-04-01

    By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

  20. Nuclear non-proliferation: Revisiting the basics. Carnegie international non-proliferation conference 2002. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort - and despite recent challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But the international community has to move forward, it is essential that a number of the basic assumptions should be revisited, and a number of new approaches reconsidered. A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually disappear. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has overall been successful - but with some shortcomings. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force - and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the 'unequivocal undertaking' by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament - such as 'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further 'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,' 'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT - left without concrete follow-up actions and in

  1. Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chrzanowski, P.L.

    1993-01-01

    About 30 specialists in non-proliferation participated in a workshop to explore ideas for US Government preparatory steps leading to the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Extension Conference. To that end, workshop sessions were devoted to reviewing the lessons learned from previous Review Conferences, discussing the threats to the non-proliferation regime together with ways of preserving and strengthening it, and examining the management of international nuclear commerce. A fundamental premise shared by workshop participants was that extension of the NPT is immensely important to international security. The importance of stemming proliferation and, more specifically, extending the Treaty, is growing as a result of the significant changes in the world. If the conferees of the Extension Conference decide on no extension or extension for a short limited duration, some technically advanced states that have foregone development of nuclear weapons may begin to rethink their options. Also, other arms control measures, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, could start to unravel. The US must provide strong international leadership to ensure that the Extension Conference is a success, resulting in Treaty extension, perhaps through successive terms, into the indefinite future. Workshop participants were struck by the urgent need for the US to take organizational steps so that it is highly effective in its advance preparations for the Extension Conference. Moreover, the Extension Conference provides both a challenge and an opportunity to mold a cohesive set of US policy actions to define the future role of nuclear weapons and combat their proliferation

  2. Nuclear disarmament and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

    1999-01-01

    The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference reaffirmed 'the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control' and endorsed 'universal application of safeguards once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved'. Hence strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and incremental broadening of its coverage towards the universal application of international safeguards in all States is a high priority albeit for the medium to long term. A tentative attempt is made in this paper to anticipate how the elements of verification under the NPT, FMCT and other conventions and arrangements related to nuclear non-proliferation will evolve against the background of the disarmament process, with the goal of achieving at some future stage an ultimate convergence of verification regimes under a complete nuclear disarmament. We think, however, that most of the new initiatives in the area of disarmament/non-proliferation should be realised during the current disarmament phase. We do not wish our model to be perceived as a rigid time-bound scheme. New initiatives should be implemented in parallel and as soon as practicable. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and should not be taken to represent Australian Government policy. (author)

  3. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2001-01-01

    The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

  4. Plutonium: key issue in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yoshisaki, M.B.

    1993-01-01

    The technical report is a 1993 update on weapons-grade plutonium, a key issue in nuclear disarmament. Its vital significance would again be discussed during the fifth and the last Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Nuclear Weapons which would end in 1995. Member States shall decide whether an indefinite or conditional extension of NPT is necessary for world peace and international security. Two Non-NPT States, Russia and U.S.A. are in the forefront working for the reduction of nuclear weapons through nuclear disarmament. Their major effort is focused on the implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II or START I and II for world peace. The eventual implementation of START I and II would lead to the dismantling of plutonium from nuclear warheads proposed to be eliminated by both countries. This report gives three technical options to be derived from nuclear disarmament issues for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: (a) indefinite storage - there is no guarantee that these will not be used in the future (b) disposal as wastes - possible only in principle, because of lack of experience in mixing plutonium with high level wastes, and (c) source of energy - best option in managing stored weapons materials, because it satisfies non-proliferation objectives. It means fuel for energy in Light Water Reactors (LWR) or Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). (author). 8 refs

  5. A Bayesian theory for seismic foreshocks and aftershocks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Apostol, B.-F.

    2006-01-01

    Statistical distributions in time, magnitude and energy are derived for seismic foreshocks and aftershocks accompanying a main seismic shock, as based on the Bayesian theory of probabilities and on a model introduced recently for the accumulation of energy in a seismic focus. Omori's law is obtained as a self-replication of a generating distribution, the self-consistency of the process requiring an exponential law for this generating distribution. The two distributions are interrelated by Euler's transform, which provides also a generalized form of Omori's law. The regime of the accompanying seismic events is characterized as fully as possible, including the time dependence of the magnitude and the rate of released energy. (author)

  6. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Finland``s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  7. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite [Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Stockholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant Ltd., Vienna (Austria)

    2000-06-15

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  8. Swedish support programme on nuclear non-proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ek, P.; Andersson, Sarmite; Wredberg, L.

    2000-06-01

    At the request of the Swedish Government, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate has established a support and co-operation programme in the area of nuclear non-proliferation with Russia and several of the republics of the former Soviet Union. The Programme was initiated in 1991 and an overall goal is to accomplish national means and measures for control and protection of nuclear material and facilities, in order to minimise the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons and illicit trafficking of nuclear material and equipment. The objective of the Swedish Support Programme is to help each, so called, recipient State to be able to, independently and without help from outside, take the full responsibility for operating a national non-proliferation system and thereby fulfil the requirements imposed through the international legal instruments. This would include both the development and implementation of a modern nuclear legislation system, and the establishment of the components making up a national system for combating illicit trafficking. The support and co-operation projects are organised in five Project Groups (i.e. nuclear legislation, nuclear material control, physical protection, export/import control, and combating of illicit trafficking), which together cover the entire non-proliferation area. Up till June 2000, support and co-operation projects, completed and on-going, have been carried out in ten States, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, programmes have been initiated during the first part of 2000 with Estonia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition, assistance has been given to Poland on a specific nuclear material accountancy topic. All projects are done on request by and in co-operation with these States. The total number of projects initiated during the period 1991 to June 2000 is 109, thereof 77 have been completed and 32 are currently on-going. It is the

  9. Finland and nuclear non-proliferation: The evolution and cultivation of a norm

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Finland''s entrance on the non-proliferation scene was in 1963 when President Kekkonen suggested a Nordic nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This started a debate in and among the Nordic countries and it created a Finnish profile towards the Soviet Union. In most cases, the Soviets tried to bring Finland into a much closer relationship with the USSR. The mere prospect and debate on a Nordic NWFZ reduced the incentive for the Soviets to undermine Finnish neutrality or their desire to suggest consultations according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on military assistance in the case of a threat to Soviet and/or Finnish security. During the negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1965-1968, Finland played a very active role as a bridge-builder, first between the superpowers and later between the developed and the developing world. This activity gave Finland a name in the UN, strengthened its neutrality and established good relations with the West as well. In 1978, Kekkonen brought up the Nordic NWFZ once more, this time under influence of certain strategic challenges to Finland and general East-West developments. In this Kekkonen had much backing by the public in Finland whereas other states reacted very reluctantly. Politics in Finland has to a large extent been marked by the relations with Russia and later the Soviet Union. However, nuclear non-proliferation was used to ease the weight of this imposing neighbour; a strategy that certainly must be regarded as successful. While achieving this, it was also possible to increase contacts with western states and remain accepted as a neutral state. For Finland, non-proliferation policy was initially a suitable issue to solve other problems than those related exclusively to proliferation. But it was also a policy with a high degree of persistence, pragmatism and willingness to work with concrete issues that maybe do not reach the international limelight in the short run but that work in

  10. Seismic Parameters of Mining-Induced Aftershock Sequences for Re-entry Protocol Development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Vallejos, Javier A.; Estay, Rodrigo A.

    2018-03-01

    A common characteristic of deep mines in hard rock is induced seismicity. This results from stress changes and rock failure around mining excavations. Following large seismic events, there is an increase in the levels of seismicity, which gradually decay with time. Restricting access to areas of a mine for enough time to allow this decay of seismic events is the main approach in re-entry strategies. The statistical properties of aftershock sequences can be studied with three scaling relations: (1) Gutenberg-Richter frequency magnitude, (2) the modified Omori's law (MOL) for the temporal decay, and (3) Båth's law for the magnitude of the largest aftershock. In this paper, these three scaling relations, in addition to the stochastic Reasenberg-Jones model are applied to study the characteristic parameters of 11 large magnitude mining-induced aftershock sequences in four mines in Ontario, Canada. To provide guidelines for re-entry protocol development, the dependence of the scaling relation parameters on the magnitude of the main event are studied. Some relations between the parameters and the magnitude of the main event are found. Using these relationships and the scaling relations, a space-time-magnitude re-entry protocol is developed. These findings provide a first approximation to concise and well-justified guidelines for re-entry protocol development applicable to the range of mining conditions found in Ontario, Canada.

  11. Aftershock Duration of the 1976 Ms 7.8 Tangshan Earthquake: Implication for the Seismic Hazard Model with a Sensitivity Analysis

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhong, Q.; Shi, B.

    2011-12-01

    The disaster of the Ms 7.8 earthquake occurred in Tangshan, China, on July 28th 1976 caused at least 240,000 deaths. The mainshock was followed by two largest aftershocks, the Ms 7.1 occurred after 15 hr later of the mainshock, and the Ms 6.9 occurred on 15 November. The aftershock sequence is lasting to date, making the regional seismic activity rate around the Tangshan main fault much higher than that of before the main event. If these aftershocks are involved in the local main event catalog for the PSHA calculation purpose, the resultant seismic hazard calculation will be overestimated in this region and underestimated in other place. However, it is always difficult to accurately determine the time duration of aftershock sequences and identifies the aftershocks from main event catalog for seismologist. In this study, by using theoretical inference and empirical relation given by Dieterich, we intended to derive the plausible time length of aftershock sequences of the Ms 7.8 Tangshan earthquake. The aftershock duration from log-log regression approach gives us about 120 years according to the empirical Omori's relation. Based on Dietrich approach, it has been claimed that the aftershock duration is a function of remote shear stressing rate, normal stress acting on the fault plane, and fault frictional constitutive parameters. In general, shear stressing rate could be estimated in three ways: 1. Shear stressing rate could be written as a function of static stress drop and a mean earthquake recurrence time. In this case, the time length of aftershock sequences is about 70-100 years. However, since the recurrence time inherits a great deal of uncertainty. 2. Ziv and Rubin derived a general function between shear stressing rate, fault slip speed and fault width with a consideration that aftershock duration does not scale with mainshock magnitude. Therefore, from Ziv's consideration, the aftershock duration is about 80 years. 3. Shear stressing rate is also can be

  12. Activities of the study group of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation policy. FY Heisei 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Oi, Noboru

    2000-01-01

    The Study Group on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation Policy (Chairman: Prof. Kurosawa) was established in FY1999 with the funding from the Science and Technology Agency. The aim of the Study Group is to clearly understand nuclear proliferation issues and to lead international opinion. Nuclear non-proliferation is a matter of rather scanty interest compared to nuclear safety while both of them are important in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Japan. In FY2000, the Study Group held International Symposium 'Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: A Challenge of 21st Century' and in conjunction with this Symposium, dispatched 'The Statement on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation, Action Plan towards 21st Century'. The Statement consists of five propositions: 1) Strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and making it universally applicable, 2) Negative legacy of cold war: rapid solution of problems, 3) Civil (non-military) plutonium, 4) Development of technology to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime internationally, and 5) Strengthening Japanese initiative on nuclear non-proliferation policy. In this report, these activities will be explained in detail. (author)

  13. Aftershocks following crash of currency exchange rate: The case of RUB/USD in 2014

    Science.gov (United States)

    Usmanova, Vasilya; Lysogorskiy, Yury V.; Abe, Sumiyoshi

    2018-02-01

    The dynamical behavior of the currency exchange rate after its large-scale catastrophe is discussed through a case study of the rate of Russian rubles to US dollars after its crash in 2014. It is shown that, similarly to the case of the stock market crash, the relaxation is characterized by a power law, which is in analogy with the Omori-Utsu law for earthquake aftershocks. The waiting-time distribution is found to also obey a power law. Furthermore, the event-event correlation is discussed, and the aging phenomenon and scaling property are observed. Comments are made on (non-)Markovianity of the aftershock process and on a possible relevance of glassy dynamics to the market system after the crash.

  14. Statistical Features of the 2010 Beni-Ilmane, Algeria, Aftershock Sequence

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hamdache, M.; Peláez, J. A.; Gospodinov, D.; Henares, J.

    2018-03-01

    The aftershock sequence of the 2010 Beni-Ilmane ( M W 5.5) earthquake is studied in depth to analyze the spatial and temporal variability of seismicity parameters of the relationships modeling the sequence. The b value of the frequency-magnitude distribution is examined rigorously. A threshold magnitude of completeness equal to 2.1, using the maximum curvature procedure or the changing point algorithm, and a b value equal to 0.96 ± 0.03 have been obtained for the entire sequence. Two clusters have been identified and characterized by their faulting type, exhibiting b values equal to 0.99 ± 0.05 and 1.04 ± 0.05. Additionally, the temporal decay of the aftershock sequence was examined using a stochastic point process. The analysis was done through the restricted epidemic-type aftershock sequence (RETAS) stochastic model, which allows the possibility to recognize the prevailing clustering pattern of the relaxation process in the examined area. The analysis selected the epidemic-type aftershock sequence (ETAS) model to offer the most appropriate description of the temporal distribution, which presumes that all events in the sequence can cause secondary aftershocks. Finally, the fractal dimensions are estimated using the integral correlation. The obtained D 2 values are 2.15 ± 0.01, 2.23 ± 0.01 and 2.17 ± 0.02 for the entire sequence, and for the first and second cluster, respectively. An analysis of the temporal evolution of the fractal dimensions D -2, D 0, D 2 and the spectral slope has been also performed to derive and characterize the different clusters included in the sequence.

  15. Aftershocks of the India Republic Day Earthquake: the MAEC/ISTAR Temporary Seismograph Network

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bodin, P.; Horton, S.; Johnston, A.; Patterson, G.; Bollwerk, J.; Rydelek, P.; Steiner, G.; McGoldrick, C.; Budhbhatti, K. P.; Shah, R.; Macwan, N.

    2001-05-01

    The MW=7.7 Republic Day (26 January, 2001) earthquake on the Kachchh in western India initiated a strong sequence of small aftershocks. Seventeen days following the mainshock, we deployed a network of portable digital event recorders as a cooperative project of the Mid America Earthquake Center in the US and the Institute for Scientific and Technological Advanced Research. Our network consisted of 8 event-triggered Kinemetrics K2 seismographs with 6 data channels (3 accelerometer, 3 Mark L-28/3d seismometer) sampled at 200 Hz, and one continuously-recording Guralp CMG40TD broad-band seismometer sampled at 220 Hz. This network was in place for 18 days. Underlying our network deployment was the notion that because of its tectonic and geologic setting the Republic Day earthquake and its aftershocks might have source and/or propagation characteristics common to earthquakes in stable continental plate-interiors rather than those on plate boundaries or within continental mobile belts. Thus, our goals were to provide data that could be used to compare the Republic Day earthquake with other earthquakes. In particular, the objectives of our network deployment were: (1) to characterize the spatial distribution and occurrence rates of aftershocks, (2) to examine source characteristics of the aftershocks (stress-drops, focal mechanisms), (3) to study the effect of deep unconsolidated sediment on wave propagation, and (4) to determine if other faults (notably the Allah Bundh) were simultaneously active. Most of our sites were on Jurassic bedrock, and all were either free-field, or on the floor of light structures built on rock or with a thin soil cover. However, one of our stations was on a section of unconsolidated sediments hundreds of meters thick adjacent to a site that was subjected to shaking-induced sediment liquefaction during the mainshock. The largest aftershock reported by global networks was an MW=5.9 event on January 28, prior to our deployment. The largest

  16. The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

    2015-01-01

    Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

  17. Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Education at Texas A&M University

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gariazzo, C.; Charlton, W.

    2015-01-01

    The MS degree in Nuclear Engineering - Non-proliferation at Texas A&M University is administered by the Nuclear Security Science and Policy Institute (NSSPI). The oldest and largest of its kind in the US, 45 M.S. and 15 Ph.D. students conducted technical research in relevant areas: safeguards, nuclear security, non-proliferation, and arms control. In addition to focusing on graduate education with a wide combination of internationally-recognized talent, NSSPI faculty lead research and service activities in safeguarding of nuclear materials and reducing nuclear threats. Texas A&M Nuclear Engineering students take relevant nonproliferation and safeguards courses (within the College of Engineering and the Texas A&M Bush School of Government) as well as conduct their research under competent experts. The complete educational experience here is unique because of the strong research and educational support NSSPI provides. This paper will detail these endeavors and convey contributions from NSSPI for developing next-generation safeguards experts via practical experiences and strong affiliations with real-world practitioners. The safeguards and non-proliferation education programme blends historical, legal, technical and policy aspects that is unique for a technical university such as Texas A&M. Beyond classroom lectures, NSSPI provides opportunities for students ranging from asynchronous learning modules to practical experiences. Publicly-available self-paced, online course modules in basic and advanced safeguards education have been developed by NSSPI as supplemental nuclear education for students and professionals. By leveraging NSSPI's contacts, students participate in exchange programmes with international institutions as well as partake in experiences like engaging safeguards practitioners at nuclear fuel cycle facilities around the world, conducting experiments at internationally-renowned laboratories, and representing their communities at workshops worldwide

  18. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, L. van

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden''s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives

  19. Open Source and Trade Data for Non-Proliferation: Challenges and Opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stewart, I.; Gillard, N.

    2015-01-01

    This paper explores what more systematic exploitation of trade data can contribute to the state evaluation process. The paper begins by setting out a typology of trade data, which groups the data into five categories: · Government Declared Data, which is prepared and submitted by States to an international authority for non-proliferation purposes. · Government Recorded Data, which includes information collected by the state for its own purposes, and which is not routinely submitted to international authorities for non-proliferation purposes. It includes (some) export licencing data, customs data, and business registration information. · Business-held data, which includes information on a company's own products and customers, but also ''market intelligence''. · Intelligence and Enforcement Derived Information, which can include information on specific procurement attempts, networks, or procurement requirements. · Procurement Requirements Information, which can include information released by a programme for the purpose of seeking goods or services. Challenges and opportunities related to further exploitation of trade data sources in each category are then explored, as are factors related to accessibility (both in terms of mandates and more practical considerations), reliability (including presentation of a typology), completeness, and duplication in data. Next, the paper explores how the IAEA can systematically collect, integrate and analyze the various sources of trade data given the considerations outlined above. In particular, this section focuses on how data in variable structures can be integrated into the state evaluation process. In concluding, the paper will describe how the newly formed ''Collaboration on Open Source and Trade Analysis for Non-proliferation'' (COSTA-NP) is seeking to develop each of the categories of trade data. The paper links to research objectives 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.3, and 2.4 of the IAEA

  20. IAEA Director General welcomes Cuba's intention to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed Cuba's announcement to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. He expressed the hope that Cuba will conclude soon a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required under Article III of the NPT. 'With Cuba's intention to become party to the NPT, we have come a step closer to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime,' Mr. ElBaradei said. Only three countries worldwide with significant nuclear activities now remain outside the NPT. With 188 countries party to the Treaty, the NPT is the most adhered to international agreement after the United Nations Charter and the most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty. The NPT makes it mandatory that all non-nuclear-weapon States conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. The Director General also welcomed Cuba's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which completes the process of having all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as members of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Mr. ElBaradei said that, 'the Tlatelolco Treaty provides a good model for other regional nuclear-weapon-free zones to follow'. He added that 'universal adherence of all countries in regions having nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements is important to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime'. (IAEA)

  1. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage imposition options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to burn the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the non-proliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

  2. Sweden and the making of nuclear non-proliferation: from indecision to assertiveness

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, L. van [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research

    1998-03-01

    Swedish research on nuclear weapons started at a modest scale in 1945 but was soon expanded. By the early 1950s the research programme started to face some of the problems that were going to accompany it for the rest of its life: different priorities and cost-estimates were made by the sectors that wanted to develop nuclear energy and those working on the bomb. Moreover, an introduction of nuclear weapons would lead to a major redistribution of resources to the disadvantage of the navy and army. The public and political debates intensified during the 1950s and culminated in 1960. At first, pro-nuclear voices had been strongest but were soon challenged by interest groups, unions and peace movements. 1960, a committee within the government had established a compromise: Nuclear weapons research for production of weapons would be terminated, while research on the consequences of nuclear weapons would continue. It was a cosmetic decision that could cover for a continued research on weapons design. Nevertheless, there are some general qualities from the debates that indicate why the outcome was that Sweden signed the NPT in 1968. First, the number of interested persons, groups movements and party politicians engaged in the issue increased every time the issue came up. Secondly, the segments of society that supported the nuclear option remained roughly the same. No strong movements rallied to the defence of this position. On the other hand, the anti-nuclear wing received more and more followers. Third, there was a marked tendency by virtually all actors (except the military) to include every sign of progress in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts as arguments against Swedish proliferation. Since 1968, the non-proliferation choice has ben manifested through Sweden``s adherence to the NPT and this has been accompanied by a strong commitment to other non-proliferation initiatives. Refs.

  3. Statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1988-08-01

    The document reproduces the following statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, statements on behalf of the depository Governments and statements on behalf of other Governments (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Western Samoa and Nordic Countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)

  4. Putting teeth in the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 25 March 2006, Karlsruhe, Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2006-01-01

    The factors, contributing to the world's changes in respect to peace, security and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are presented in the document. Five necessary and urgent measures are proposed in order to meet the current challenges: 1)tighten control for assess to nuclear fuel cycle technology; 2)accelerate global efforts tp protect nuclear material; 3)support effective nuclear verification; 4) reinvigorate disarmament efforts; 5) increase the effectiveness of the UN Security Council. The importance and necessity to place nuclear operations under multinational control is outlined

  5. Non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    In the face of improved international relations, regional and subregional issues have acquired additional urgency and importance in the field of disarmament and international security. The pursuit of regional solutions to regional problems is thus being actively encouraged by the international community. Towards this end, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs is seeking to promote regional approaches to disarmament either through the united nations regional centres for peace and Disarmament or cooperation with individual Governments. Within this framework this conference was dealing with non-proliferation and confidence-building measures in Asia and the Pacific region

  6. Nuclear Non-proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987 - No 8 of 1987

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This Act aims at giving domestic legislative effect to Australia's international non-proliferation obligations and establishes controls over the possession and transport of nuclear materials and equipment by a system of permits. These obligations arise inter alia under the NPT Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Act provides that its provisions shall apply to nuclear material (as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute) and associated items which include associated material, equipment or technology. These are clearly defined in the Act. (NEA) [fr

  7. Non proliferation and disarmament: nuclear disarmament and security policies in Sweden (1946-1975) - Historical note

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2007-06-01

    The author first outlines that Sweden appeared during the Cold War as committed against nuclear weapons, but in fact concentrated this commitment on the objective of nuclear disarmament of nuclear countries without having a very clear position on the objective of non proliferation as it was defined at the end of the 1950's, and also maintained a (secret for while) military nuclear programme which has been progressively given up from the middle of the 1960's. Then, the author discusses why Sweden adopted this double posture, its effects on the international scene, and achievements and setbacks of the Swedish diplomacy with respect to disarmament until the first NPT review conference of 1975

  8. The non-proliferation policies of non-nuclear-weapon states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marwah, Onkar

    1987-01-01

    Eight countries are considered to be capable of producing nuclear weapons and highly suspect in their intentions to actually produce them. These are Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The policies of these suspect Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) are considered in this paper. The first part assesses the non-proliferation (or proliferation) policies of the eight suspect NNWS, the second part evaluates their differences in approach from the policies urged upon them by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and the third and final part attempts to understand the future evolution of NNWS policies in the nuclear military field. (U.K.)

  9. Nuclear weapon-free zone, non-proliferation treaty and South Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jayaramu, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    Emergence of and the motivations behind the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, the conceptual linkage between the nuclear weapon free zone and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the problems involved in the implementation of nuclear weapon free zone proposals put forward from time to time are discussed. Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, motivations behind the proposal, and India's response to it are examined. It is pointed out that both the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone indirectly grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the use of nuclear weapons. (M.G.B.)

  10. Variation of b and p values from aftershocks sequences along the Mexican subduction zone and their relation to plate characteristics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ávila-Barrientos, L.; Zúñiga, F. R.; Rodríguez-Pérez, Q.; Guzmán-Speziale, M.

    2015-11-01

    Aftershock sequences along the Mexican subduction margin (between coordinates 110ºW and 91ºW) were analyzed by means of the p value from the Omori-Utsu relation and the b value from the Gutenberg-Richter relation. We focused on recent medium to large (Mw > 5.6) events considered susceptible of generating aftershock sequences suitable for analysis. The main goal was to try to find a possible correlation between aftershock parameters and plate characteristics, such as displacement rate, age and segmentation. The subduction regime of Mexico is one of the most active regions of the world with a high frequency of occurrence of medium to large events and plate characteristics change along the subduction margin. Previous studies have observed differences in seismic source characteristics at the subduction regime, which may indicate a difference in rheology and possible segmentation. The results of the analysis of the aftershock sequences indicate a slight tendency for p values to decrease from west to east with increasing of plate age although a statistical significance is undermined by the small number of aftershocks in the sequences, a particular feature distinctive of the region as compared to other world subduction regimes. The b values show an opposite, increasing trend towards the east even though the statistical significance is not enough to warrant the validation of such a trend. A linear regression between both parameters provides additional support for the inverse relation. Moreover, we calculated the seismic coupling coefficient, showing a direct relation with the p and b values. While we cannot undoubtedly confirm the hypothesis that aftershock generation depends on certain tectonic characteristics (age, thickness, temperature), our results do not reject it thus encouraging further study into this question.

  11. The Impact on Non-proliferation with a Growing Number of BL-3 and BL-4 Labs in South America

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Espona, M. J.

    2007-01-01

    After 2001 events (9/11 and anthrax letters) we witnessed the dramatic growth of the biodefense sector, and in within this framework, the increment of the number of high biosafety level laboratories (BSL3 and BSL4) both in central countries and peripheral ones. It is important to point out that not all the labs are devoted to activities related to biodefense but also to biological research from a traditional perspective. In this scenario, and as an unwanted consequence, we have noticed that the number of people -professionals with different level specialization- which have the information and skills that could be used to produce BW, grew vertiginously as well. So, considering the biodefense sector from a systemic perspective, we are being witnesses of how due to an intent to protect ourselves against the biological threat, our vulnerability to it gains an unexpected magnitude. Therefore, in this paper we will analyze the phenomenon of the growing number of high security level labs, first, in a global perspective and later, with focus in South America in order to determine if this evolving situation represents a security problem. In order to do that, we will approach the problem from different perspectives: health care, development, security/safety, defense and non proliferation.(author)

  12. Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.; Mahy, Heidi A.

    2008-01-01

    The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, that provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.

  13. JAEA's actions and contributions to the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Suda, Kazunori; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Michiji, Toshiro

    2012-06-01

    Japan, a non-nuclear weapons state, has established a commercial nuclear fuel cycle including LWRs, and now is developing a fast neutron reactor fuel cycle as part of the next generation nuclear energy system, with commercial operation targeted for 2050. Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) is the independent administrative agency for conducting comprehensive nuclear R&D in Japan after the merger of Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC). JAEA and its predecessors have extensive experience in R&D, facility operations, and safeguards development and implementation for new types of nuclear facilities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As the operator of various nuclear fuel cycle facilities and numerous nuclear materials, JAEA makes international contributions to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation. This paper provides an overview of JAEA's development of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards technologies, including remote monitoring of nuclear facilities, environmental sample analysis methods and new efforts since the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.

  14. Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

    2013-01-01

    The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  15. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: A long-term perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haeckel, E.

    1990-01-01

    International nuclear policy has been determined for a long time by the exigencies of the status quo. The non-proliferation regime draws its legitimacy from the continuation of extant patterns of power in world politics. Such a static policy cannot succeed forever. Overcoming the threat of nuclear proliferation will require innovative strategy that reaches beyond the status quo. It calls for structural change in the international system to be accomodated instead of resisted. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to hold, nuclear weapon states will finally have to forgo their privileged status. This cannot, however, be accomplished simply through the abolition or renunciation of nuclear weapons since nuclear weapons themselves continue to be instrumental for war prevention and international stability. Rather, what is needed is a new approach to the management of the nuclear world system under international responsibility. Nonproliferation and disarmament objectives together call for a concept of global security in which multilateral institutions assume an increasingly important role of nuclear diplomacy. (orig.) [de

  16. Consideration on non-proliferation regime meeting in a changing world

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, Hiroyoshi; Kikuchi, Masahiro

    1995-01-01

    This paper presents some proposals for improvement of non-proliferation regime including safeguards structures with historical changes of international regime. Current non-proliferation regime was established under the circumstances of Cold War, and it's structure and measures were influenced by the situation of these time. Although, a couple of years have passed from end of Cold War, new world order has not established yet. Therefore, it is expected that the current regime could be improved in accordance with new world order. Generally speaking, it could be welcomed that the current regime has got some successes from two points of views, namely no new nuclear weapon states have emerged and after the establishment of NPT and all nuclear weapon state is joined NPT finally. However, it is the authors' concern that some gray countries, such as India, Pakistan and Israel, have not joined the NPT yet and cases of Iraqi and DPRK have occurred. After reviewing of such new situation, some proposals will be presented in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime to meet current world conditions

  17. Nuclear non proliferation. Challenges after the NPT extension - CERI Studies Nr 11

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Delpech, Therese

    1996-01-01

    After the decision of extension of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 1995, the author first discusses strengths and weaknesses of the non proliferation regime. On the one side, the five nuclear powers are tight by international commitments, the number of proliferating countries has not increased, some countries have willingly decided to give up their military nuclear programme, ex-USSR republics have joined the NPT, the Israel-PLO agreement of 1993 initiated a new era, potentially proliferating countries do not have very significant nuclear programmes, shortcomings of international controls have been identified, international cooperation has improved, and control techniques are available. On the other hand, some matters of concern remain: lessons from the Gulf War, an apparently easier access to nuclear weapons, new opportunities of regional domination, a weaker American guarantee, the North-Korean problem, new exporters of nuclear and ballistic goods and technologies. In the next part, the author discusses the conditions of the agreement for an undefined extension of the NPT, and notably outlines what made this success possible. Then, she addresses political issues related to the universal character of the NPT and to nuclear disarmament. She also discusses the responsibility of the Five nuclear powers, the role of nuclear weapons, and the implication of the extension of the Treaty for the European Union

  18. Evaluation of the Administration's proposed nuclear non-proliferation strategy. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    Dwindling supplies of fossil fuels are causing countries to turn increasingly to nuclear power as a major source of energy. Although nuclear power holds out the promise of energy independence, it has a formidable drawback--it can also lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In April, the President announced a new policy designed to curb nuclear proliferation and the executive branch proposed legislation entitled 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977.' The strategy outlined in these documents calls for stricter export controls and safeguards as well as actions affecting uranium enrichment services, reprocessing, storing of spent fuel, and disposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. GAO analyzed this non-proliferation strategy as it relates to: Improving nuclear export controls; Strengthening international nuclear safeguards; Maintaining U.S. reliability as a supplier of uranium enrichment services; Deferring U.S. reprocessing of spent fuel as an example for others; Reducing risk of proliferation by controlling spent reactor fuel. In general, GAO concluded that the administration's strategy is constructive but noted some weaknesses which should be addressed. Some of the problems noted in this report may already have been addressed by congressional committees in their markup of the legislation

  19. Economic and Non-proliferation Policy Considerations of Uranium Enrichment in Brazil and Argentina

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.; Mahy, Heidi A.

    2008-09-01

    The nuclear development programs of both Argentina and Brazil have, since the 1970s, been premised on the desire for self-sufficiency and assurance of nuclear fuel supply. While military rivalry and mutual distrust led to nuclear weapons related development programs in the 1970s and 1980s, both countries have since terminated these programs. Furthermore, the governments of both countries have pledged their commitment to exclusively non-explosive use of nuclear energy and have signed the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Utilizing rights provided for under the NPT, both Argentina and Brazil have nuclear fuel production facilities, with the notable exception of enrichment plants, that provide much of the current indigenous fuel requirements for their nuclear power plants. However, both countries are actively developing enrichment capability to fill this gap. The purpose of this report is to assess the economic basis and non-proliferation policy considerations for indigenous enrichment capability within the context of their desired self-sufficiency and to evaluate possible United States Government policy options.

  20. Geology, geophysics, and physical properties of the U12n.25 non-proliferation experiment site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Baldwin, M.J.; Bradford, R.P.; Hopkins, S.P. [Raytheon Services Nevada, Mercury, NV (United States)] [and others

    1994-12-31

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Experiment was conducted in the U12n.25 drift in N-Tunnel at the Nevada Test Site. The geologic characterization of the site was performed by Raytheon Services Nevada geologists in the standard manner used for all underground nuclear weapons-effects tests executed by the Defense Nuclear Agency. The U12n.25 test bed was constructed in zeolitized ash-fall tuff of the Tunnel Beds Tuff, Subunit 4K, 389.0 m below the surface of Rainier Mesa. The structural geology of the site was simple, with the nearest fault plane projected to be 12 m below the mined cavity at closest approach, and an average bedding dip of seven degrees to the northwest. The cavity excavation revealed several small fractures, including one which produced minor amounts of free water during construction. The physical properties of the site were well within the range of experience for the zeolitized tuff of N-Tunnel and no geology-related problems were encountered during construction. The zeolitized tuff of N-Tunnel has been the site of twenty nuclear tests conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. The similarities of geologic setting, site geometry, and physical properties allow many comparisons of Non-Proliferation Experiment results with the large nuclear-test data base.

  1. Cavity pressure/residual stress measurements from the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Heinle, R.A.; Hudson, B.C. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States); Hatch, M.A. Jr.

    1994-12-31

    The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory planned and conducted experiments on the Non-Proliferation Experiment to determine post-detonation gas pressure inside the explosive cavity and the residual rock stress in the region immediately outside the cavity. Before detonation there was significant concern that steam and detonation products would create very high temperatures and pressure in the blast cavity that would exist for weeks and months after firing. This could constitute a safety hazard to personnel re-entering the tunnel. Consequently the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was asked to field its Cavity Pressure/Residual stress monitor system on the Non-Proliferation Experiment. We obtained experimental data for the first 600 ms after the explosion and again several weeks after detonation upon tunnel re-entry. We recorded early-time cavity pressure of about 8.3 MPa. In addition we believe that the ends of our sensor hoses were subjected to an ambient driving pressure of about 0.5 MPa (absolute) that persisted until at least three weeks after zero time.

  2. Characterizing Aftershock Sequences of the Recent Strong Earthquakes in Central Italy

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kossobokov, Vladimir G.; Nekrasova, Anastasia K.

    2017-10-01

    The recent strong earthquakes in Central Italy allow for a comparative analysis of their aftershocks from the viewpoint of the Unified Scaling Law for Earthquakes, USLE, which generalizes the Gutenberg-Richter relationship making use of naturally fractal distribution of earthquake sources of different size in a seismic region. In particular, we consider aftershocks as a sequence of avalanches in self-organized system of blocks-and-faults of the Earth lithosphere, each aftershock series characterized with the distribution of the USLE control parameter, η. We found the existence, in a long-term, of different, intermittent levels of rather steady seismic activity characterized with a near constant value of η, which switch, in mid-term, at times of transition associated with catastrophic events. On such a transition, seismic activity may follow different scenarios with inter-event time scaling of different kind, including constant, logarithmic, power law, exponential rise/decay or a mixture of those as observed in the case of the ongoing one associated with the three strong earthquakes in 2016. Evidently, our results do not support the presence of universality of seismic energy release, while providing constraints on modelling seismic sequences for earthquake physicists and supplying decision makers with information for improving local seismic hazard assessments.

  3. Long aftershock sequences in North China and Central US: implications for hazard assessment in mid-continents

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, Mian; Luo, Gang; Wang, Hui; Stein, Seth

    2014-02-01

    Because seismic activity within mid-continents is usually much lower than that along plate boundary zones, even small earthquakes can cause widespread concerns, especially when these events occur in the source regions of previous large earthquakes. However, these small earthquakes may be just aftershocks that continue for decades or even longer. The recent seismicity in the Tangshan region in North China is likely aftershocks of the 1976 Great Tangshan earthquake. The current earthquake sequence in the New Madrid seismic zone in central United States, which includes a cluster of M ~ 7.0 events in 1811-1812 and a number of similar events in the past millennium, is believed to result from recent fault reactivation that releases pre-stored strain energy in the crust. If so, this earthquake sequence is similar to aftershocks in that the rates of energy release should decay with time and the sequence of earthquakes will eventually end. We use simple physical analysis and numerical simulations to show that the current sequence of large earthquakes in the New Madrid fault zone is likely ending or has ended. Recognizing that mid-continental earthquakes have long aftershock sequences and complex spatiotemporal occurrences are critical to improve hazard assessments.

  4. Constraints on Dynamic Triggering from very Short term Microearthquake Aftershocks at Parkfield

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ampuero, J.; Rubin, A.

    2004-12-01

    The study of microearthquakes helps bridge the gap between laboratory experiments and data from large earthquakes, the two disparate scales that have contributed so far to our understanding of earthquake physics. Although they are frequent, microearthquakes are difficult to analyse. Applying high precision relocation techniques, Rubin and Gillard (2000) observed a pronounced asymmetry in the spatial distribution of the earliest and nearest aftershocks of microearthquakes along the San Andreas fault (they occur more often to the NW of the mainshock). It was suggested that this could be related to the velocity contrast across the fault. Preferred directivity of dynamic rupture pulses running along a bimaterial interface (to the SE in the case of the SAF) is expected on theoretical grounds. Our numerical simulations of crack-like rupture on such interfaces show a pronounced asymmetry of the stress histories beyond the rupture ends, and suggest two possible mechanisms for the observed asymmetry: First, that it results from an asymmmetry in the static stress field following arrest of the mainshock (closer to failure to the NW), or second, that it is due to a short-duration tensile pulse that propagates to the SE, which could reduce the number of aftershocks to the SE by dynamic triggering of any nucleation site close enough to failure to have otherwise produced an aftershock. To distinguish betwen these mechanisms we need observations of dynamic triggering in microseismicity. For small events triggered at a distance of some mainshock radii, triggering time scales are so short that seismograms of both events overlap. To detect the occurrence of compound events and very short term aftershocks in the HRSN Parkfield archived waveforms we have developed an automated search algorithm based on empirical Green's function (EGF) deconvolution. Optimal EGFs are first selected by the coherency of the cross-component convolution with respect to the target event. Then Landweber

  5. Mainshock-Aftershocks Clustering Detection in Volcanic Regions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Garza Giron, R.; Brodsky, E. E.; Prejean, S. G.

    2017-12-01

    Crustal earthquakes tend to break their general Poissonean process behavior by gathering into two main kinds of seismic bursts: swarms and mainshock-aftershocks sequences. The former is commonly related to volcanic or geothermal processes whereas the latter is a characteristic feature of tectonically driven seismicity. We explore the mainshock-aftershock clustering behavior of different active volcanic regions in Japan and its comparison to non-volcanic regions. We find that aftershock production in volcanoes shows mainshock-aftershocks clustering similar to what is observed in non-volcanic areas. The ratio of volanic areas that cluster in mainshock-aftershocks sequences vs the areas that do not is comparable to the ratio of non-volcanic regions that show clustering vs the ones that do not. Furthermore, the level of production of aftershocks for most volcanic areas where clustering is present seems to be of the same order of magnitude, or slightly higher, as the median of the non-volcanic regions. An interesting example of highly aftershock-productive volcanoes emerges from the 2000 Miyakejima dike intrusion. A big seismic cluster started to build up rapidly in the south-west flank of Miyakejima to later propagate to the north-west towards the Kozushima and Niijima volcanoes. In Miyakejima the seismicity showed a swarm-like signature with a constant earthquake rate, whereas Kozushima and Niijima both had expressions of highly productive mainshock-aftershocks sequences. These findings are surprising given the alternative mechanisms available in volcanic systems for releasing deviatoric strain. We speculate that aftershock behavior might hold a relationship with the rheological properties of the rocks of each system and with the capacity of a system to accumulate or release the internal pressures caused by magmatic or hydrothermal systems.

  6. How informative are slip models for aftershock forecasting?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bach, Christoph; Hainzl, Sebastian

    2013-04-01

    Coulomb stress changes (ΔCFS) have been recognized as a major trigger mechanism for earthquakes, in particular aftershock distributions and the spatial patterns of ΔCFS are often found to be correlated. However, the Coulomb stress calculations are based on slip inversions and the receiver fault mechanisms which both contain large uncertainties. In particular, slip inversions are usually non-unique and often differ strongly for the same earthquakes. Here we want to address the information content of those inversions with respect to aftershock forecasting. Therefore we compare the slip models to randomized fractal slip models which are only constrained by fault information and moment magnitude. The uncertainty of the aftershock mechanisms is considered by using many receiver fault orientations, and by calculating ΔCFS at several depth layers. The stress change is then converted into an aftershock probability map utilizing a clock advance model. To estimate the information content of the slip models, we use an Epidemic Type Aftershock Sequence (ETAS) model approach introduced by Bach and Hainzl (2012), where the spatial probability density of direct aftershocks is related to the ΔCFS calculations. Besides the directly triggered aftershocks, this approach also takes secondary aftershock triggering into account. We quantify our results by calculating the information gain of the randomized slip models relative to the corresponding published slip model. As case studies, we investigate the aftershock sequences of several well-known main shocks such as 1992 Landers, 1999 Hector Mine, 2004 Parkfield, 2002 Denali. First results show a huge difference in the information content of slip models. For some of the cases up to 90% of the random slip models are found to perform better than the originally published model, for some other cases only few random models are found performing better than the published slip model.

  7. Tsunami waves generated by dynamically triggered aftershocks of the 2010 Haiti earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ten Brink, U. S.; Wei, Y.; Fan, W.; Miller, N. C.; Granja, J. L.

    2017-12-01

    Dynamically-triggered aftershocks, thought to be set off by the passage of surface waves, are currently not considered in tsunami warnings, yet may produce enough seafloor deformation to generate tsunamis on their own, as judged from new findings about the January 12, 2010 Haiti earthquake tsunami in the Caribbean Sea. This tsunami followed the Mw7.0 Haiti mainshock, which resulted from a complex rupture along the north shore of Tiburon Peninsula, not beneath the Caribbean Sea. The mainshock, moreover, had a mixed strike-slip and thrust focal mechanism. There were no recorded aftershocks in the Caribbean Sea, only small coastal landslides and rock falls on the south shore of Tiburon Peninsula. Nevertheless, a tsunami was recorded on deep-sea DART buoy 42407 south of the Dominican Republic and on the Santo Domingo tide gauge, and run-ups of ≤3 m were observed along a 90-km-long stretch of the SE Haiti coast. Three dynamically-triggered aftershocks south of Haiti have been recently identified within the coda of the mainshock (stacks, and back-projecting the arrivals to the vicinity of the main shock (50-300 km). Two of the aftershocks, coming 20-40 s and 40-60 s after the mainshock, plot along NW-SE-trending submarine ridges in the Caribbean Sea south of Haiti. The third event, 120-140 s was located along the steep eastern slope of Bahoruco Peninsula, which is delineated by a normal fault. Forward tsunami models show that the arrival times of the DART buoy and tide gauge times are best fit by the earliest of the three aftershocks, with a Caribbean source 60 km SW of the mainshock rupture zone. Preliminary inversion of the DART buoy time series for fault locations and orientations confirms the location of the first source, but requires an additional unidentified source closer to shore 40 km SW of the mainshock rupture zone. This overall agreement between earthquake and tsunami analyses suggests that land-based earthquake ruptures and/or non-thrust main shocks can

  8. A Non-Proliferating Fuel Cycle: No Enrichment, Reprocessing or Accessible Spent Fuel - 12375

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, Frank L. [Vanderbilt University (United States)

    2012-07-01

    Current fuel cycles offer a number of opportunities for access to plutonium, opportunities to create highly enriched uranium and access highly radioactive wastes to create nuclear weapons and 'dirty' bombs. The non-proliferating fuel cycle however eliminates or reduces such opportunities and access by eliminating the mining, milling and enrichment of uranium. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces the production of plutonium per unit of energy created, eliminates reprocessing and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel and the creation of a stream of high-level waste. It further simplifies the search for land based deep geologic repositories and interim storage sites for spent fuel in the USA by disposing of the spent fuel in deep sub-seabed sediments after storing the spent fuel at U.S. Navy Nuclear Shipyards that have the space and all of the necessary equipment and security already in place. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces transportation risks by utilizing barges for the collection of spent fuel and transport to the Navy shipyards and specially designed ships to take the spent fuel to designated disposal sites at sea and to dispose of them there in deep sub-seabed sediments. Disposal in the sub-seabed sediments practically eliminates human intrusion. Potential disposal sites include Great Meteor East and Southern Nares Abyssal Plain. Such sites then could easily become international disposal sites since they occur in the open ocean. It also reduces the level of human exposure in case of failure because of the large physical and chemical dilution and the elimination of a major pathway to man-seawater is not potable. Of course, the recovery of uranium from sea water and the disposal of spent fuel in sub-seabed sediments must be proven on an industrial scale. All other technologies are already operating on an industrial scale. If externalities, such as reduced terrorist threats, environmental damage (including embedded

  9. Report of the international forum on nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tazaki, Makiko; Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2013-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security - Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for the back end of nuclear fuel cycle and regional cooperation in Asia-' on 12 and 13 December 2012, co-hosted by the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo. In the forum, keynote speakers from Japan, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S., France and Republic of Korea (ROK), respectively explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. In two panel discussions, entitled 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle back end' and 'Measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security for nuclear energy use in the Asian region and a multilateral cooperative framework', active discussions were made among panelists from Japan, IAEA, the U.S., France, ROK, Russia and Kazakhstan. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording and content of this report except presentation materials. (author)

  10. Towards the fourth review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1990

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-01-01

    This publication focuses on the background of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), its main provisions and some of the major issues discussed at the three conferences that have thus far been held to review the operation of the Treaty. A fourth conference to review the operation of the Treaty will be held at Geneva from 20 August to 14 September 1990. It will be the last regular review conference before the convening, in 1995, of a conference which will ''decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'' (article X, para.2). A Preparatory Committee (open to all parties) for the Fourth Review Conference has been established by the parties to the NPT, and 95 parties attended the first session, held in New York from 1 to 5 May 1989

  11. SIGMA: the novel approach of a new non-proliferating uranium enrichment technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rivarola, M.; Florido, P.; Brasnarof, D.; Bergallo, E.

    2000-01-01

    The SIGMA concept, under development by Argentina, represents the evolution of the Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion technology, updated to face the challenge of the new economic-based and competitive world frame. The Enrichment technology has been historically considered as a highly proliferating activity in the nuclear field, and central countries limited the access of the developing countries to this technology. The SIGMA concept incorporates innovative proliferation resistant criteria at the beginning of the design process, and inherits all the non-proliferation features of the gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs). The radical new proliferation resistance approach of the SIGMA technology suggests a new kind of global control of the uranium enrichment market, where some developing countries might access an Enrichment plant without access to the technology itself. In this paper, we investigate the economy of the SIGMA plants, and the implications of this technology on the Uranium Global Market. (authors)

  12. Environmental measurements and technology for non-proliferation objectives. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Broadway, J.A.

    1998-01-01

    The purpose of this study is to identify multi-disciplinary and single focus laboratories from the environmental and public health communities that can serve as technical center of opportunity for nuclear, inorganic and organic analyses. The objectives of the Office of Research and Development effort are twofold: (1) to identify the technology shortcomings and technologies gaps (thus requirements) within these communities that could benefit from state-of-the-art infield analysis technologies currently under development and (2) to promote scientist-to-scientist dialog and technical exchange under such existing US government internship programs (eg SABIT/USDOC) to improve skills and work relationships. Although the data analysis will focus on environmentally sensitive signatures and materials, the office of Research and Development wishes to further its nuclear non-proliferation objectives by assessing the current technical skill and ingenious analytical tools in less-developed countries so as to broaden the base of capability for multi-species measurement technology development

  13. Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime: An international priority. Tokyo, 10 December 2002

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2002-01-01

    The efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons has witnessed steady progress and a number of important milestones. Progress, however, is still required on this and many other fronts, including: the need to work energetically to ensure the universal adherence to safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements; the need for reducing existing nuclear weapon arsenals and adopting concrete steps that move us further towards nuclear disarmament; the need to draw in those States that remain outside the NPT regime; and the need to develop alternative approaches to regional and international security that are functional and inclusive, and that do not incorporate nuclear deterrence as a feature

  14. Stabilization and immobilization of military plutonium: A non-proliferation perspective

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Leventhal, P. [Nuclear Control Institute, Washington, DC (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Nuclear Control Institute welcomes this DOE-sponsored technical workshop on stabilization and immobilization of weapons plutonium (W Pu) because of the significant contribution it can make toward the ultimate non-proliferation objective of eliminating weapons-usable nuclear material, plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), from world commerce. The risk of theft or diversion of these materials warrants concern, as only a few kilograms in the hands of terrorists or threshold states would give them the capability to build nuclear weapons. Military plutonium disposition questions cannot be addressed in isolation from civilian plutonium issues. The National Academy of Sciences has urged that {open_quotes}further steps should be taken to reduce the proliferation risks posed by all of the world`s plutonium stocks, military and civilian, separated and unseparated...{close_quotes}. This report discusses vitrification and a mixed oxide fuels option, and the effects of disposition choices on civilian plutonium fuel cycles.

  15. Non-proliferation, safeguards, and security for the fissile materials disposition program immobilization alternatives

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duggan, R.A.; Jaeger, C.D.; Tolk, K.M. [Sandia National Labs., Albuquerque, NM (United States); Moore, L.R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1996-05-01

    The Department of Energy is analyzing long-term storage and disposition alternatives for surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of different disposition alternatives are being considered. These include facilities for storage, conversion and stabilization of fissile materials, immobilization in glass or ceramic material, fabrication of fissile material into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for reactors, use of reactor based technologies to convert material into spent fuel, and disposal of fissile material using geologic alternatives. This paper will focus on how the objectives of reducing security and proliferation risks are being considered, and the possible facility impacts. Some of the areas discussed in this paper include: (1) domestic and international safeguards requirements, (2) non-proliferation criteria and measures, (3) the threats, and (4) potential proliferation, safeguards, and security issues and impacts on the facilities. Issues applicable to all of the possible disposition alternatives will be discussed in this paper. However, particular attention is given to the plutonium immobilization alternatives.

  16. Present status of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Netchaev, B.

    1976-01-01

    The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons plays an important role in enhancing the security of all States. It is essential to maintain in the implementation of the Treaty an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of all the countries Party to the Treaty wether or not nuclear weapon States. These questions were discussed during the Conference on the operation of the Treaty held in Geneva in May 1975. It was emphasized at the Conference that the first five years of application of the Treaty had shown a consistent increase in the number of ratifications and in the safeguards agreements concluded on the basis of the Agreement. (N.E.A.) [fr

  17. Anti-neutrino flux in a research reactor for non-proliferation application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Khakshournia, Samad; Foroughi, Shokoufeh [Nuclear Science and Technology Research Institute (NSTRI), Tehran (Iran, Islamic Republic of). Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)

    2017-11-15

    Owing to growing interest in the study of emitted antineutrinos from nuclear reactors to test the Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, antineutrino flux was studied in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) using ORIGEN code. According to our prediction, antineutrino rate was obtained 2.6 x 10{sup 17} (v{sub e}/sec) in the core No. 57F of the TRR. Calculations indicated that evolution of antineutrino flux was very slow with time and the performed refueling had not an observable effect on antineutrino flux curve for a 5 MW reactor with the conventional refueling program. It is seen that for non-proliferation applications the measurement of the contribution of {sup 239}Pu to the fission using an antineutrino detector is not viable in the TRR.

  18. The structure of German non-proliferation policy - past and future

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, H.

    1990-01-01

    West German nonproliferation policy has evolved through four phases: First German policy strived to regain the right to nuclear research and industrial development. Then West Germany struggled for participation in NATO nuclear decision-making. Following the conclusion of the NPT, the full development of a mature nuclear industry, including activities in the full fuel cycle, and the promotion of nuclear exports were the focus of national nuclear policy. Starting in the early eighties, political aspects became more important. International security, arms control and disarmament, and foreign reputation had a more prominent role than pure economic interests. In the future, the united Germany must take care not to repeat the sad scandals of the eighties. Its renunciation of nuclear weapons remains a pillar of European stability and a prerequisite for a European peace system. Together with its European partners, Germany can be expected to take a more active, supportive and effective role in international non-proliferation policy. (orig./HSCH) [de

  19. The Asia-Pacific region: non-proliferation and other disarmament issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1992-01-01

    In the past few years, the United States and the former Soviet Union began to adjust their force structures in Asia-Pacific region. In this respect, a large range of issues have been raised in discussions on the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Apart from the issues and trends related to proliferation, military expenditure, arms transfer and other disarmament matters, the specific situations in the respective subregions of South-East Asia, South Asia and North-East Asia were discussed. Comprehensive and verified commitments not to possess any such weapons is stressed as the main goal of the meeting. It is vitally important that opportunities that were opened should be seized to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological as well as highly destabilizing conventional weapons

  20. SIGMA, the novel approach of a new non-proliferating uranium enrichment technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rivarola, M.; Florido, P.; Brasnarof, D.; Bergallo, J.

    2001-01-01

    The SIGMA concept, under development by Argentina, represents the evolution of the Uranium Enrichment Gaseous Diffusion technology, updated to face the challenge of the new economic-based and competitive world frame. The Enrichment technology has been historically considered as a highly proliferating activity in the nuclear field, and central countries have limited the access of the developing countries to this technology. The SIGMA concept incorporates innovative proliferation resistant criteria at the beginning of the design process, and inherits all the non-proliferation features of the Gaseous Diffusion Plants (GDPs). The radical new proliferation resistant approach of the SIGMA technology, suggest a new kind of global control of the Uranium Enrichment Market, were some developing countries might access to an Enrichment plant without accessing to the technology itself. In this paper, we analyse the economy of the SIGMA plants, and the implications of this technology on the Uranium Global Market. (authors)

  1. Non-Proliferation Community, Do We Really Speak the Same Language?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; Janssens, W.A.M.; Michel, Q.; Viski, A.; Sevini, F.; Charatsis, C.; )

    2015-01-01

    The non-proliferation community, with its many different stakeholders, has issues with a number of terms and concepts which have different meanings, not only in different national languages but also for scientists, diplomats, engineers, law enforcement people, IAEA safeguards staff, and many others. The consequences are not only relevant for translators and seminar participants. This confusion of terms may create misunderstandings with legal, diplomatic and operational consequences. A number of terms, used because of their meaning in English are ''false friends'' in other languages, i.e., they are used because they sound close, but their meaning may be different. The nuances may be about the fact that they cover a narrower, broader, or slightly different concept in another national or professional language. The emblematic example is the English word control, written the same way in many languages but with different connotations. Other examples include terms which have a precise legal definition for some communities whereas other stakeholder see it as generic terms (e.g., technology, transit); terms that are not explicit but have different implicit contents related to the context like outreach or declaration; terms which are distinct in one language but translated into one word in others like specially and especially designed; terms which cover different realities for different work communities like counter-proliferation, analysis; terms which are widely used and hardly defined anywhere like dual-use; or terms which refer to a specific legal or moral reference framework which is not always explicated like illegal, legitimate. This paper will explore issues related to some of these terms used in Western languages, and argue the necessity to take into account these sometimes subtle language differences, realizing the difficulties they may create for practitioners of non-proliferation. Improvements might include revising official reference documents

  2. Non-proliferation issues for the disposition of fissile materials using reactor alternatives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jaeger, C.D.; Duggan, R.A.; Tolk, K.M.

    1996-01-01

    The Department of Energy (DOE) is analyzing long-term storage on options for excess weapons-usable fissile materials. A number of the disposition alternatives are being considered which involve the use of reactors. The various reactor alternatives are all very similar and include front-end processes that could convert plutonium to a usable form for fuel fabrication, a MOX fuel fab facility, reactors to bum the MOX fuel and ultimate disposal of spent fuel in some geologic repository. They include existing, partially completed, advanced or evolutionary light water reactors and Canadian deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors. In addition to the differences in the type of reactors, other variants on these alternatives are being evaluated to include the location and number of the reactors, the location of the mixed oxide (MOX) fabrication facility, the ownership of the facilities (private or government) and the colocation and/or separation of these facilities. All of these alternatives and their variants must be evaluated with respect to non-proliferation resistance. Both domestic and international safeguards support are being provided to DOE's Fissile Materials Disposition Program (FMDP) and includes such areas as physical protection, nuclear materials accountability and material containment and surveillance. This paper will focus on how the non-proliferation objective of reducing security risks and strengthening arms reduction will be accomplished and what some of the nonproliferation issues are for the reactor alternatives. Proliferation risk has been defined in terms of material form, physical environment, and the level of security and safeguards that is applied to the material. Metrics have been developed for each of these factors. The reactor alternatives will be evaluated with respect to these proliferation risk factors at each of the unit process locations in the alternative

  3. Aftershock Forecasting: Recent Developments and Lessons from the 2016 M5.8 Pawnee, Oklahoma, Earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Michael, A. J.; Field, E. H.; Hardebeck, J.; Llenos, A. L.; Milner, K. R.; Page, M. T.; Perry, S. C.; van der Elst, N.; Wein, A. M.

    2016-12-01

    After the Mw 5.8 Pawnee, Oklahoma, earthquake of September 3, 2016 the USGS issued a series of aftershock forecasts for the next month and year. These forecasts were aimed at the emergency response community, those making decisions about well operations in the affected region, and the general public. The forecasts were generated manually using methods planned for automatically released Operational Aftershock Forecasts. The underlying method is from Reasenberg and Jones (Science, 1989) with improvements recently published in Page et al. (BSSA, 2016), implemented in a JAVA Graphical User Interface and presented in a template that is under development. The methodological improvements include initial models based on the tectonic regime as defined by Garcia et al. (BSSA, 2012) and the inclusion of both uncertainty in the clustering parameters and natural random variability. We did not utilize the time-dependent magnitude of completeness model from Page et al. because it applies only to teleseismic events recorded by NEIC. The parameters for Garcia's Generic Active Continental Region underestimated the modified-Omori decay parameter and underestimated the aftershock rate by a factor of 2. And the sequence following the Mw 5.7 Prague, Oklahoma, earthquake of November 6, 2011 was about 3 to 4 times more productive than the Pawnee sequence. The high productivity for these potentially induced sequences is consistent with an increase in productivity in Oklahoma since 2009 (Llenos and Michael, BSSA, 2013) and makes a general tectonic model inapplicable to sequences in this region. Soon after the mainshock occurred, the forecasts relied on the sequence specific parameters. After one month, the Omori decay parameter p is less than one, implying a very long-lived sequence. However, the decay parameter is known to be biased low at early times due to secondary aftershock triggering, and the p-value determined early in the sequence may be inaccurate for long-term forecasting.

  4. How variable is the number of triggered aftershocks?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marsan, D.; Helmstetter, A.

    2017-07-01

    Aftershock activity depends at first order on the main shock magnitude but also shows important fluctuations between shocks of equal magnitude. We here investigate these fluctuations, by quantifying them and by relating them to the main shock stress drop and other variables, for southern California earthquakes. A method is proposed in order to only count directly triggered aftershocks, rather than secondary aftershocks (i.e., triggered by previous aftershocks), and to only quantify fluctuations going beyond the natural Poisson variability. Testing of the method subjected to various model errors allows to quantify its robustness. It is found that these fluctuations follow a distribution that is well fitted by a lognormal distribution, with a coefficient of variation of about 1.0 to 1.1. A simple model is proposed to relate this observed dependence to main shock stress drop variability.

  5. Foreshocks and aftershocks in the Olami-Feder-Christensen model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hergarten, Stefan; Neugebauer, Horst J.

    2002-01-01

    With the help of numerical simulations we show that the established Olami-Feder-Christensen earthquake model exhibits sequences of foreshocks and aftershocks; this behavior has not been recognized in previous studies. Our results are consistent with Omori's empirical law, but the exponents predicted by the model are lower than observed in nature. The occurrence of foreshocks and aftershocks can be attributed to the nonconservative character of the Olami-Feder-Christensen model

  6. Role of non-governmental organizations in formation of non-proliferation culture in new independent countries (NIC)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sevchik, M.

    2000-01-01

    Purpose of the report is demonstrate the non-governmental organizations (NGO) role in formation of non-proliferation culture in former Soviet Union. Activity of Center of Non-proliferation Problems Investigation (CNPI) of Monterey Institute of International Investigations and its collaboration with existing in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) non-governmental organizations is considered as example. Brief information about CNPI and reasons for it representatives opening of in Kazakhstan and in other CIS-countries, as well as cooperation of NGO in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine for creation on Central Asia zone free from nuclear weapon ia given. Some measures which could promote to formation of non-proliferation culture in region are suggested

  7. The non-proliferation experiment and gas sampling as an on-site inspection activity: A progress report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carrigan, C.R.

    1994-03-01

    The Non-proliferation Experiment (NPE) is contributing to the development of gas sampling methods and models that may be incorporated into future on-site inspection (OSI) activities. Surface gas sampling and analysis, motivated by nuclear test containment studies, have already demonstrated the tendency for the gaseous products of an underground nuclear test to flow hundreds of meters to the surface over periods ranging from days to months. Even in the presence of a uniform sinusoidal pressure variation, there will be a net flow of cavity gas toward the surface. To test this barometric pumping effect at Rainier Mesa, gas bottles containing sulfur hexaflouride and 3 He were added to the pre-detonation cavity for the 1 kt chemical explosives test. Pre-detonation measurements of the background levels of both gases were obtained at selected sites on top of the mesa. The background levels of both tracers were found to be at or below mass spectrographic/gas chromatographic sensitivity thresholds in the parts-per-trillion range. Post-detonation, gas chromatographic analyses of samples taken during barometric pressure lows from the sampling sites on the mesa indicate the presence of significant levels (300--600 ppt) of sulfur hexaflouride. However, mass spectrographic analyses of gas samples taken to date do not show the presence of 3 He. To explain these observations, several possibilities are being explored through additional sampling/analysis and numerical modeling. For the NPE, the detonation point was approximately 400 m beneath the surface of Rainier Mesa and the event did not produce significant fracturing or subsidence on the surface of the mesa. Thus, the NPE may ultimately represent an extreme, but useful example for the application and tuning of cavity gas detection techniques

  8. Inter-relations between regional and global approaches to nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Simpson, J.

    1995-01-01

    It is now becoming evident that the end of the East-West conflict has had a significant effect upon both global and regional security structures. From a situation where regional arrangements were, in the main, determined and driven by pressures arising from the bipolar division which permeated all aspects of the global political system, they increasingly have an independent existence. This has enabled such arrangements to be tailored to local circumstances in a manner which is not possible with global agreements. In particular, it has become apparent that enhanced constraints on peaceful nuclear activities and much more intrusive inspection and monitoring procedures, can more easily be negotiated on a regional basis than a global one. It also appears that nuclear weapon states are prepared to make unconditional commitments about nuclear weapon use on a regional basis, whereas they may not be prepared to do so on a global one. In short, regional approaches enable fine-tuning of the international non-proliferation regime to occur, and for measures to be taken on a regional level that would be politically unacceptable on the global level, due to their discriminatory nature. In the years ahead additional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) agreements may be negotiated, covering more of the land area of the globe. In parallel, regional nuclear cooperation and safeguarding agreements might also be expected to develop along the lines of EURATOM and ABACC. This in turn may move the states which remain outside of the NPT to a similar position to Argentina and Brazil at the moment: to an acceptance that whatever their opposition in principle to the NPT and the system of supplier export guidelines, the commitments they have already accepted on a regional level are more intrusive and constraining than those they would incur if they were to have acceded to the Treaty. In these circumstances, accession to the NPT becomes a distinct possibility, and thus the regional approach to non-proliferation

  9. Aftershock stress analysis of the April 2015 Mw 7.8 Gorkha earthquake from the NAMASTE project

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pant, M.; Velasco, A. A.; Karplus, M. S.; Patlan, E.; Ghosh, A.; Nabelek, J.; Kuna, V. M.; Sapkota, S. N.; Adhikari, L. B.; Klemperer, S. L.

    2016-12-01

    Continental collision between the Indian plate and the Eurasian plate, converging at 45 mm/yr, has uplifted the northern part of Nepal forming the Himalaya. Because of this convergence, the region has experienced large, devastating earthquakes, including the 1934 Mw 8.4 Nepal-Bihar earthquake and two recent earthquakes on April 25, 2015 Mw 7.8 (Gorkha earthquake) and May 12, 2015 Mw 7.2. These quakes killed thousands of people and caused billion dollars of property loss. Despite some recent geologic and geophysical studies of this area, many tectonic questions remain unanswered. Shortly after the Gorkha earthquake, we deployed a seismic network, NAMASTE (Nepal Array Measuring Aftershock Seismicity Trailing Earthquake), to study the aftershocks of these two large events. Our network included 45 different seismic stations (16 short period, 25 broadband, and 4 strong motion sensors) that spanned the Gorkha rupture area. The deployment extends from south of the Main Frontal Thrust (MFT) to the Main Central Thrust region (MCT), and it to recorded aftershocks for more than ten months from June 2015 to May 2016. We are leveraging high-precision earthquake locations by measuring and picking P-wave first-motion arrival polarity to develop a catalog of focal mechanisms for the larger aftershocks. We will use this catalog to correlate the seismicity and stress related of the Indo-Eurasian plate margin, hoping to address questions regarding the complex fault geometries and future earthquake hazards at this plate margin.

  10. Robust seismicity forecasting based on Bayesian parameter estimation for epidemiological spatio-temporal aftershock clustering models.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ebrahimian, Hossein; Jalayer, Fatemeh

    2017-08-29

    In the immediate aftermath of a strong earthquake and in the presence of an ongoing aftershock sequence, scientific advisories in terms of seismicity forecasts play quite a crucial role in emergency decision-making and risk mitigation. Epidemic Type Aftershock Sequence (ETAS) models are frequently used for forecasting the spatio-temporal evolution of seismicity in the short-term. We propose robust forecasting of seismicity based on ETAS model, by exploiting the link between Bayesian inference and Markov Chain Monte Carlo Simulation. The methodology considers the uncertainty not only in the model parameters, conditioned on the available catalogue of events occurred before the forecasting interval, but also the uncertainty in the sequence of events that are going to happen during the forecasting interval. We demonstrate the methodology by retrospective early forecasting of seismicity associated with the 2016 Amatrice seismic sequence activities in central Italy. We provide robust spatio-temporal short-term seismicity forecasts with various time intervals in the first few days elapsed after each of the three main events within the sequence, which can predict the seismicity within plus/minus two standard deviations from the mean estimate within the few hours elapsed after the main event.

  11. US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Staats, E.B.

    1980-01-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm US reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonprofileration policies can influence export sales. Based on avavailable data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of US nuclear exports. However, US companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by US technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and complete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for US nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, US companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

  12. The roles of Euratom and the IAEA in nuclear non-proliferation - a Euratom view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szymanski, P.

    2013-01-01

    The IAEA safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State is based on the finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The state-level concept that has been introduced by the IAEA in this respect allows and obliges the IAEA to take into account state specific factors to determine the set of safeguards activities to be applied in a State. The effectiveness of the EURATOM regional safeguards systems, its cooperation with the IAEA and its independence from States and operators are among the factors which the IAEA needs to consider in order to apply safeguards in an effective and efficient way. Socio-economic and political factors like the support to international non-proliferation should also be factors in this concept. The intended evolution of the state-level concept by the IAEA then should result in making better use of the activities of EURATOM safeguards. This is possible by the IAEA relying more on the EURATOM activities for the verification of declared nuclear material and the IAEA concentrating on getting assurance on the absence of undeclared materials and activities. Developing a regional-level concept that supplements the state-level concept can contribute to determine the extent to which the IAEA can make better use of EURATOM safeguards in the future. (author)

  13. Implications of the Ukraine Crisis for Security, Non-Proliferation and Deterrence in North East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farghen, Morgane

    2014-01-01

    The Ukraine crisis has been a 'wake up' call for Europe but its implication in Asia should be also be considered. The Russian 'coup de force' in Ukraine has created a psychological trauma in Western countries not only amongst political and military leaders but also in the general population by its reminiscence of Cold war thinking and by pointing to the risk of a military conflict in Europe. Moreover the Russian attempt to change the borders by force could create a dangerous precedent and produce an undesirable 'butterfly effects' in the rest of the world. In North East Asia, the stability in a context of rising powers and proliferation risks, relies on a status quo based upon the partition of the Korean peninsula, a de facto autonomy of Taiwan and a Japanese administration over the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands. As the status quo is increasingly challenged by revisionist powers, the question is worth to be raised: what are the implications of the Ukraine crisis for security, non-proliferation, and deterrence in North East Asia?

  14. Preshot predictions for the near-source region in the non-proliferation experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patch, D.F.; Welch, J.E.; Zerkle, J. [SAIC/Simulation Technology Operation, San Diego, CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    This paper summarizes a number of one and two-dimensional, ground motion calculations made in support of the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE), a 1KT high explosive shot fired on 22 September 1993 at the Nevada Test Site. These calculations were sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency`s late-time containment program, and were completed well before the test was executed. They addressed a variety of test design, analysis and construction issues, and sought to identify any potential safety concerns. The test site model used in these calculations was based in large part on earlier work performed at SAIC and by other Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) contractors for the nearby underground nuclear test, code named MISTY ECHO. In particular, to obtain physical property and quasi-static material response data for the site, a number of core samples recovered near the MISTY ECHO working point (WP) were tested by TerraTek. We then used these data to develop a numerical response model for the site.

  15. Study On Aftershock Triggering In Consideration Of Tectonic Stress Field

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hu, C.; Cai, Y.

    2007-12-01

    : The occurrence of earthquake is related to the strength of rock and tectonic stress field. The seismic risk factor (SRF),D=\\left|{τn }\\right|/(μσn ) is proposed to describe the dangerous status of aftershock triggering in this paper. Dearthquakes, velocity field from GPS as well as geological survey. As one order of approximation, the magnitudes of the regional tectonic stress field can be estimated by the Coulomb failure criterion. Finite element method (FEM) and the concept of the factor D are used to study the aftershock triggering of the 1976 Tangshan Ms=7.8 earthquake. The results show that: (1) Most of the aftershocks triggered by the Tangshan earthquake occurred in the two-leaf-shaped regions of D≥ 1 near the north-east end of the main-shock fault. The largest leaf is about 100km long and 40km wide. (2) The areas of aftershock triggering predicted by the seismic risk factorD and Δ CFS (the changes in the Coulomb failure stress) are almost the same near the fault. The difference between them is that the aftershock area predicted by Δ CFS≥ 0 is too large and the area predicted by the factor D≥ 1 is limited. The areas of aftershock triggering predicted by Δ CFS≥ 0.04 MPa are nearly the same as those of D≥ 1 obtained by the study. (3) Sometimes Δ CFS =0.01MPa is taken as a low threshold of aftershock triggering. However, Δ CFS≥ 0 only means the probability increase of the earthquake triggering, not means the earthquake will occur. The earthquake occurrence is not only related to Δ CFS, but also to the tectonic stress field before the main-shock.

  16. Nuclear non-proliferation and arms control: Are we making progress? 7 November 2005, Washington, DC, Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    ) establish a framework for multilateral management and control of the 'back end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. spent fuel reprocessing and waste disposal); and 4) create a similar framework for multilateral management and control of the 'front end' of the fuel cycle (i.e. enrichment and fuel production). Regarding the protection of nuclear material it is reported that multiple international and regional initiatives are underway to help countries to improve the physical protection of such material. The International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 2005. Many governments have also responded to UN Security Council resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004. Both the Convention and resolution 1540 call on countries to criminalize the illicit possession and use of radioactive material, and aim to enhance efforts to detect and combat illicit trafficking. And in July, parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material agreed on major changes that would make it legally binding for countries to protect nuclear facilities and material in domestic use, storage and transport. With strong support from the IAEA, Russia and the US, multiple countries are also taking steps to convert their research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel, and to return the HEU to the country of origin. For nuclear non-proliferation commitments to be effective, they must be backed by credible mechanisms to deal with cases of compliance. The potential for being referred to the UN Security Council has clearly acted as an inducement for compliance in some cases; however, we should recall that the referral of North Korea to the Council, in 1992 and again in 2003, resulted in little to no action. To be effective, the UN Security Council must be ready at all times to engage, in order to cope with emerging threats to international peace and security. On the nuclear disarmament front, no mechanism exists to monitor compliance with

  17. 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    On 19 July 1995, the Director General received a letter, addressed to him by the Alternate Resident Representative of Canada to the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

  18. Abstracts of 3. International scientific-practical conference 'Semipalatinsk Test Site. Radiation Legacy and Non-proliferation Issues'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-01-01

    The Conference gathered representatives of more than 25 countries and international organizations. In the Conference among with actual problems of current environment conditions in Kazakhstan, perspective trends in the field of radiation protection, radio-ecological and radiobiological research and issues of international co-operation in support of non-proliferation regime, other advanced scientific projects were considered [ru

  19. How we think about peace and security. The ABCs of initiatives for disarmament and non-proliferation education

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Toki, Masako; Potter, William C.

    2005-01-01

    Education and training are among the most important but underutilized tools for promoting disarmament and non-proliferation. Although few national governments or international organizations have invested significantly in such training programs, there is a growing recognition among States of the need to rectify this situation. This positive development is reflected in the broad support for recommendations of a UN study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and in related initiatives within the review process of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of the forthcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference, it is useful to take stock of the implementation of the UN study's recommendations. In particular, it is important to observe the progress that has been made within the context of the NPT review process, as well as the obstacles that must be overcome if the full potential for disarmament and non-proliferation education is to be realized. Resources on disarmament and non-proliferation education are increasingly available on the Internet. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs has launched new features on its web site that include links to academic institutes, governmental centers, NGOs and other bodies engaged in educational efforts. As part of its mission to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by training the next generation of nonproliferation specialists and raising global public awareness on WMD issues, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) has developed a series of tutorials for non-proliferation and disarmament education. Among these tutorials, the NPT Tutorial has been designed to educate and provide useful material about the treaty through interactive text and enriched multimedia segments, including timelines, maps, and numerous links to relevant resources. Among other resources are teaching guides developed by the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies through its Critical Issues Forum (CIF). More

  20. Seismic amplitude measurements suggest foreshocks have different focal mechanisms than aftershocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lindh, A.; Fuis, G.; Mantis, C.

    1978-01-01

    The ratio of the amplitudes of P and S waves from the foreshocks and aftershocks to three recent California earthquakes show a characteristic change at the time of the main events. As this ratio is extremely sensitive to small changes in the orientation of the fault plane, a small systematic change in stress or fault configuration in the source region may be inferred. These results suggest an approach to the recognition of foreshocks based on simple measurements of the amplitudes of seismic waves. Copyright ?? 1978 AAAS.

  1. The Hellenic Seismological Network Of Crete (HSNC): Validation and results of the 2013 aftershock sequences

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chatzopoulos, Georgios; Papadopoulos, Ilias; Vallianatos, Filippos

    2015-04-01

    The number and quality of seismological networks in Europe has increased in the past decades. Nevertheless, the need for localized networks monitoring areas of great seismic and scientific interest is constant. Hellenic Seismological Network of Crete (HSNC) covers this need for the vicinity of the South Aegean Sea and Crete Island. In the present work with the use of Z-map software (www.seismo.ethz.ch) the spatial variability of Magnitude of Completeness (Mc) is calculated from HSNC's manual analysis catalogue of events for the period 2011 until today, proving the good coverage of HSNC in the areas. Furthermore the 2013, South Aegean seismicity where two large shallow earthquakes occurred in the vicinity of Crete Island, is discussed. The first event takes place on 15th June 2013 in the front of the Hellenic Arc, south from central Crete, while the second one on 12th October, 2013 on the western part of Crete. The two main shocks and their aftershock sequences have been relocated with the use of hypoinverse earthquake location software and an appropriate crust model. The HSNC identified more than 500 and 300 aftershocks respectively followed after the main events. The detailed construction of aftershocks catalogue permits the applicability of modern theories based on complexity sciences as described recently in the frame of non extensive statistical physics. In addition site effects in the stations locations are presented using event and noise recordings. This work was implemented through the project IMPACT-ARC in the framework of action "ARCHIMEDES III-Support of Research Teams at TEI of Crete" (MIS380353) of the Operational Program "Education and Lifelong Learning" and is co-financed by the European Union (European Social Fund) and Greek national funds References A. Tzanis and F. Vallianatos, "Distributed power-law seismicity changes and crustal deformation in the EW Hellenic Arc", Natural Hazards and Earth Systems Sciences, 3, 179-195, 2003 F. Vallianatos, G

  2. Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to Prepare the Next Generation of Experts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Janssens, W.A.M.; Peerani, P.; ); Gariazzo, C.; Ward, S.; Crete, J.-M.; Braunegger-Guelich, A.

    2015-01-01

    Although nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are a continuous concern of the international community and discussed frequently at international fora and conferences, the academic world is not really on board with these topics. What we mean by this is that nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards is only very seldom part of a university curriculum. In the few cases where it does appear in the curriculum, whether in a nuclear engineering course or a political sciences master programme, it is typically covered only partially. Nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards are multidisciplinary and embrace, inter alia, historical, legal, technical, and political aspects. This is perhaps the reason why it is challenging for a single professor or university to develop and implement a comprehensive academic course or programme in this area. Professional organizations in this field, like the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) and the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM), have made first steps to address this issue by implementing specific educational activities. However, much more needs to be done. Therefore, ESARDA, INMM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are in the process of joining efforts to identify key elements and priorities to support universities in establishing appropriate and effective academic programmes in this area. This paper will share best practices, achievements and lessons learned by ESARDA, INMM and the IAEA in providing education and training to develop and maintain the expertise of nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards professionals. In addition, it will suggest potential ways on how to assist universities to get prepared for building-up the next generation of experts able to meet any future challenges in the area of non-proliferation and safeguards. (author)

  3. Including foreshocks and aftershocks in time-independent probabilistic seismic hazard analyses

    Science.gov (United States)

    Boyd, Oliver S.

    2012-01-01

    Time‐independent probabilistic seismic‐hazard analysis treats each source as being temporally and spatially independent; hence foreshocks and aftershocks, which are both spatially and temporally dependent on the mainshock, are removed from earthquake catalogs. Yet, intuitively, these earthquakes should be considered part of the seismic hazard, capable of producing damaging ground motions. In this study, I consider the mainshock and its dependents as a time‐independent cluster, each cluster being temporally and spatially independent from any other. The cluster has a recurrence time of the mainshock; and, by considering the earthquakes in the cluster as a union of events, dependent events have an opportunity to contribute to seismic ground motions and hazard. Based on the methods of the U.S. Geological Survey for a high‐hazard site, the inclusion of dependent events causes ground motions that are exceeded at probability levels of engineering interest to increase by about 10% but could be as high as 20% if variations in aftershock productivity can be accounted for reliably.

  4. Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-06-01

    This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

  5. Verifying compliance with nuclear non-proliferation undertakings: IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2008-04-01

    This report provides background information on safeguards and explains procedures for States to conclude Additional Protocols to comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Since the IAEA was founded in 1957, its safeguards system has been an indispensable component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation. In recognition of this, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) makes it mandatory for all non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) party to the Treaty to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus allow for the application of safeguards to all their nuclear material. Under Article III of the NPT, all NNWS undertake to accept safeguards, as set forth in agreements to be negotiated and concluded with the IAEA, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the States' obligations under the NPT. In May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements (reproduced in INFCIRC/540(Corr.)) which provided for an additional legal authority. In States that have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the IAEA is able to optimize the implementation of all safeguards measures available. In order to simplify certain procedures under comprehensive safeguards agreements for States with little or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a facility, the IAEA began making available, in 1971, a 'small quantities protocol' (SQP), which held in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions of comprehensive safeguards agreements for so long as the State concerned satisfied these criteria. The safeguards system aims at detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear material. Such material includes enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium-233, which could be used directly in nuclear weapons. It also includes natural uranium and depleted uranium, the latter of which is

  6. Tools for Trade Analysis and Open Source Information Monitoring for Non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cojazzi, G.G.M.; Versino, C.; Wolfart, E.; Renda, G.; Janssens, W.A.M.; )

    2015-01-01

    The new state level approach being proposed by IAEA envisions an objective based and information driven safeguards approach utilizing all relevant information to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards. To this goal the IAEA makes also use of open source information, here broadly defined as any information that is neither classified nor proprietary. It includes, but is not limited to: media sources, government and non-governmental reports and analyzes, commercial data, and scientific/technical literature, including trade data. Within the EC support programme to IAEA, JRC has surveyed and catalogued open sources on import-export customs trade data and developed tools for supporting the use of the related databases in safeguards. The JRC software The Big Table, (TBT), supports i.a.: a) the search through a collection of reference documents relevant to trade analysis (legal/regulatory documents, technical handbooks); b) the selection of items of interests to specific verifications and c) the mapping of these items to customs commodities searchable in trade databases. In the field of open source monitoring, JRC is developing and operating a ''Nuclear Security Media Monitor'' (NSMM), which is a web-based multilingual news aggregation system that automatically collects news articles from pre-defined web sites. NSMM is a domain specific version of the general JRC-Europe Media Monitor (EMM). NSMM has been established within the EC support programme with the aim, i.e., to streamline IAEA's process of open source information monitoring. In the first part, the paper will recall the trade data sources relevant for non-proliferation and will then illustrate the main features of TBT, recently coupled with the IAEA Physical Model, and new visualization techniques applied to trade data. In the second part it will present the main aspects of the NSMM also by illustrating some of uses done at JRC. (author)

  7. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Graham, Thomas Jr. [7609 Glenbrook Rd., Bethesda, MD 20814 (United States)

    2014-05-09

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

  8. Aftershocks to Philippine quake found within nearby megathrust fault

    Science.gov (United States)

    Schultz, Colin

    2013-02-01

    On 31 August 2012 a magnitude 7.6 earthquake ruptured deep beneath the sea floor of the Philippine Trench, a powerful intraplate earthquake centered seaward of the plate boundary. In the wake of the main shock, sensors detected a flurry of aftershocks, counting 110 in total. Drawing on seismic wave observations and rupture mechanisms calculated for the aftershocks, Ye et al. found that many were located near the epicenter of the main intraplate quake but at shallower depth; all involved normal faulting. Some shallow thrusting aftershocks were located farther to the west, centered within the potentially dangerous megathrust fault formed by the subduction of the Philippine Sea plate beneath the Philippine microplate, the piece of crust housing the Philippine Islands.

  9. Nonlinear Viscoelastic Mechanism for Aftershock Triggering and Decay

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shcherbakov, R.; Zhang, X.

    2016-12-01

    Aftershocks are ubiquitous in nature. They are the manifestation of relaxation phenomena observed in various physical systems. In one prominent example, they typically occur after large earthquakes. They also occur in other natural or experimental systems, for example, in solar flares, in fracture experiments on porous materials and acoustic emissions, after stock market crashes, in the volatility of stock prices returns, in internet traffic variability and e-mail spamming, to mention a few. The observed aftershock sequences usually obey several well defined non-trivial empirical laws in magnitude, temporal, and spatial domains. In many cases their characteristics follow scale-invariant distributions. The occurrence of aftershocks displays a prominent temporal behavior due to time-dependent mechanisms of stress and/or energy transfer. In this work, we consider a slider-block model to mimic the behavior of a seismogenic fault. In the model, we introduce a nonlinear viscoelastic coupling mechanism to capture the essential characteristics of crustal rheology and stress interaction between the blocks and the medium. For this purpose we employ nonlinear Kelvin-Voigt elements consisting of an elastic spring and a dashpot assembled in parallel to introduce viscoelastic coupling between the blocks and the driving plate. By mapping the model into a cellular automaton we derive the functional form of the stress transfer mechanism in the model. We show that the nonlinear viscoelasticity plays a critical role in triggering of aftershocks. It explains the functional form of the Omori-Utsu law and gives physical interpretation of its parameters. The proposed model also suggests that the power-law rheology of the fault gauge and underlying lower crust and upper mantle control the decay rate of aftershocks. To verify this, we analyze several prominent aftershock sequences to estimate their decay rates and correlate with the rheological properties of the underlying lower crust and

  10. A high-resolution aftershock seismicity image of the 2002 Sultandaği-Çay earthquake (Mw = 6.2), Turkey

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ergin, Mehmet; Aktar, Mustafa; Özalaybey, Serdar; Tapirdamaz, Mustafa C.; Selvi, Oguz; Tarancioglu, Adil

    2009-10-01

    A moderate-size earthquake (Mw = 6.2) occurred on 3 February 2002 (07:11:28 GMT) in the Sultandağı-Çay region of southwest Turkey. The mainshock was followed by a strong aftershock of Mw = 6.0 just 2 h after the mainshock, at 09:26:49 GMT. A temporary seismic network of 27 vertical component seismometers was installed to monitor aftershock activity. One thousand sixty nine aftershocks (0.2 AAG). The westernmost end of the aftershock activity corresponds to a structurally complex zone distinct from the main rupture. It is characterized by both ENE-WSW- and NNE-SSW-trending oblique-slip normal faulting mechanisms, the latter being associated with the NNE-SSW-trending Karamık Graben. The intersection of these two grabens, AAG and Karamık Graben, provides abundant faults available for failure in this region. The occurrence pattern of large events in recent years indicates a possible migration of earthquakes from east to west. Thus, we conclude that this has an important implication for earthquake hazard for the city of Afyon, which lies along the same fault line and only 20 km west of the termination point of the aftershock zone.

  11. Some statistical features of the aftershock temporal behavior after the M7.4 Izmit earthquake of august 17, 1999 in Turkey

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gospodinov, D.; Fajtin, H.; Rangelov, B.; Marekova, E.

    2009-04-01

    lower cut-off. In this case each event in the sequence can generate its own secondary events. The analysis points out that about 12 days before the Duzce earthquake a relative quiescence begins which then turns to a relative activization about 5 days before the strong shock. This can be explained by a possible realization of several stronger aftershocks before the Duzce event, which are considered as its foreshocks. Another result which can be outlined is that the MOF model is not good for a sequence in which we have secondary activity (strong aftershock or several main events). For a complex aftershock sequence as is the case for the Izmit-Duzce zone, it is adequate to apply the RETAS model which gives more possibilities to model the aftershock activity in time. This allows to perform a better geotectonic interpretation later. The analysis of the aftershock activity after the strong Izmit earthquake, executed through the RETAS model makes it possible to draw some conclusions when interpreting the results: - The RETAS model supplies a methodology to identify the best fit model of the relaxation temporal development and in our case this is the ETAS model (each aftershock is capable to trigger secondary activity). - The recognized best fit model for the sequence provides an opportunity to identify separate periods of relative quiescence and activization. A quiescence period of several days was identified before the strongest aftershock - the Duzce earthquake. - For standard aftershock sequences the different versions of the RETAS model (ETAS, MOF and the intermediate ones) are closer to each other. For a more complex sequence with strong aftershock activity the RETAS model provides better possibilities to model the temporal aspect of the relaxation process and to perform the most adequate geotectonic interpretation. References Akaike, H., 1974, A new look at the statistical model identification. IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr. AC-19, 716-723. Gospodinov, D., R. Rotondi, 2006

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: the President Obama's Prague speech; Non-proliferation et desarmement nucleaires: discours de Prague du president Obama

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hautecouverture, B. [Centre d' Etudes de Securite Internationale et de Maitrise des Armements (CESIM), 75 - Paris (France)

    2010-07-15

    The author comments the content and the consequences of President Obama's speech on the future of nuclear weapons in the 21. century. After a recall of the political context, the author shows how this declaration sounded with a real new tone, defined a new direction and introduced a new method, but may reach its objectives only on a long term. Then, he comments how these objectives are challenged by the present context and events, and outlines how the US Nuclear Posture Review will be important

  13. University-level Non-proliferation and Safeguards Education and Human Capital Development Activities at Brookhaven National Laboratory

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bachner K. M.; Pepper, S.; Gomera, J.; Einwechter, M.; Toler, L. T.

    2016-07-24

    BNL has offered Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards and Security in the 21st Century,? referred to as NNSS, every year since 2009 for graduate students in technical and policy fields related to nuclear safeguards and nonproliferation. The course focuses on relevant policy issues, in addition to technical components, and is part of a larger NGSI short course initiative that includes separate courses that are delivered at three other national laboratories and NNSA headquarters. [SCHOLZ and ROSENTHAL] The course includes lectures from esteemed nonproliferation experts, tours of various BNL facilities and laboratories, and in-field and table-top exercises on both technical and policy subjects. Topics include the history of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other relevant treaties, the history of and advances in international nuclear safeguards, current relevant political situations in countries such as Iran, Iraq, and the Democratic Peoples? Republic of Korea (DPRK), nuclear science and technology, instrumentation and techniques used for verification activities, and associated research and development. The students conduct a mock Design Information Verification (DIV) at BNL?s decommissioned Medical Research Reactor. The capstone of the course includes a series of student presentations in which students act as policy advisors and provide recommendations in response to scenarios involving a current nonproliferation related event that are prepared by the course organizers. ?The course is open to domestic and foreign students, and caters to students in, entering, or recently having completed graduate school. Interested students must complete an application and provide a resume and a statement describing their interest in the course. Eighteen to 22 students attend annually; 165 students have completed the course to date. A stipend helps to defray students? travel and subsistence expenses. In 2015, the course was shortened from three weeks to

  14. Simulating Aftershocks for an On Site Inspection (OSI) Exercise

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sweeney, J. J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States); Ford, S. R. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

    2015-10-05

    The experience of IFE14 emphasizes the need for a better way to simulate aftershocks during an OSI exercise. The obvious approach is to develop a digital model of aftershocks that can be used either for a real field exercise or for a computer simulation that can be done in an office, for training for example. However, this approach involves consideration of several aspects, such as how and when to introduce waveforms in a way that maximizes the realism of the data and that will be convincing to a savvy, experienced seismic analyst. The purpose of this report is to outline a plan for how this approach can be implemented.

  15. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Review conference of the States Parties Geneva 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-01-01

    The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1985 with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized. The Treaty, commonly referred to as the non-proliferation Treaty, is the fundamental instrument to avert the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons and is, perhaps, the most important multilateral arms regulation agreement of our time. It was negotiated in the 1960s in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and in the United Nations General Assembly. The Treaty was opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington on July 1, 1968. On that date, it was signed by the three Depositary Governments - the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States - and by 58 other States. As of December 31, 1983 the number of States parties to the Treaty had risen to 119

  16. Assessment of nuclear fuel cycles with respect to assurance of energy supply; economic aspects; environmental aspects; non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-01-01

    This paper, which was presented to all INFCE Working Groups gives a broad qualitative assessment in tabular form of the following five fuel cycles: LWR once-through, LWR with thermal recycle, HWR once-through, HTR with uranium recycle, fast breeder reactor. The assessment is given of the assurance of supply aspects, the macro- and micro-economic aspects, the environmental aspects, and the non-proliferation, including safeguards, aspects of each fuel cycle

  17. The new generation of nuclear submarines: in violation of the non proliferation treaty - Booklet No. 3, June 2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-06-01

    The Observatory of French nuclear weapons looks forwards to the elimination of nuclear weapons in conformity with the aims of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. The object of this booklet of the Observatory of French nuclear weapons about the program of new generation missile-launching nuclear submarines is to show the amplitude of this program that is going to mobilize considerable industrial resources and energies to the detriment of other security alternatives

  18. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the insertion of the Brazilian State in its regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Silva, Marcos Valle Machado da

    2010-01-01

    The issue of nuclear weapons continues to appear as a focal point of International Relations. The efforts and concrete actions on disarmament, non-proliferation, and nuclear arms control are still issues that generate recurring tensions between States. However, in Brazil, there is little analysis of an academic nature about these issues and, with respect to current and prospective position of the Brazilian State in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime, studies and analysis are even more scarce, or incipient. The present dissertation has as its object of study to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Regime arisen from NPT, and the Brazilian State insertion process in this Regime. Therefore our research work is structured in three areas: the first one is about the role of nuclear weapons in States security perception, the second is about NPT and its Regime, the third runs over the insertion of the Brazilian state in this regime. So, in summary, the research performed included the reasons that make a State to develop nuclear weapons, the NPT genesis and evolution of the perception of the meaning of that Treaty by the States, and the process and the degree of insertion of Brazil in the Nuclear Weapons Non- Proliferation Regime. The inquiry sought to place this object of study in the broader debate on Foreign Relations, based on the approaches of the discipline devoted to the question of managing the security of States, id est, the two approaches that constitute the mainstream of the discipline: the perspective theoretical liberal (and neoliberal variants) and realistic thinking (and neo-realist). Thus, we have used different theoretical lenses, which we think necessary for understanding the specific parts and causal connections between these parts of a complex issue. (author)

  19. IHEDN-FRS round table - Nuclear non proliferation in front of today's challenges, 10 November 2009 - Vallieres amphitheatre

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Laborde, Richard; Grand, Camille; Tertrais, Bruno; Champchesnel, Tiphaine de; Hautecouverture, Benjamin; Briens, Martin

    2009-01-01

    This document first proposes a synthetic overview of contributions and then the texts of these contributions. After some introducing speeches, a first set of contributions addressed the present limitations of international instruments of struggle against proliferation (challenges of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the resolution 1540 of the UN Security Council and the new instruments of struggle against proliferation). The second set of contributions discussed the Iranian and Pakistani cases as examples of proliferation outside of and within the non proliferation regime

  20. Accountability and non-proliferation nuclear regime: a review of the mutual surveillance Brazilian-Argentine model for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Xavier, Roberto Salles

    2014-01-01

    The regimes of accountability, the organizations of global governance and institutional arrangements of global governance of nuclear non-proliferation and of Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards are the subject of research. The starting point is the importance of the institutional model of global governance for the effective control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context, the research investigates how to structure the current arrangements of the international nuclear non-proliferation and what is the performance of model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine of Nuclear Safeguards in relation to accountability regimes of global governance. For that, was searched the current literature of three theoretical dimensions: accountability, global governance and global governance organizations. In relation to the research method was used the case study and the treatment technique of data the analysis of content. The results allowed: to establish an evaluation model based on accountability mechanisms; to assess how behaves the model Mutual Vigilance Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Safeguards front of the proposed accountability regime; and to measure the degree to which regional arrangements that work with systems of global governance can strengthen these international systems. (author)

  1. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-01-01

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  2. Germany and the nuclear non-proliferation; Current situation and prospects; Deutschland und die nukleare Nichtverbreitung; Zwischenbilanz und Ausblick

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Preisinger, J.

    1993-07-01

    A summary is given of the consequences, both positive and negative, of international non-proliferation policy. The numerous, complex branches and connections of national measures and inter-stake agreements for the peaceful, controlled uses of nuclear technology and related military technologies are expertly described, and assessed on their effectiveness. Weak aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime are pointed out and past reforms are illustrated and assessed in the light of recent developments. The interests of the German Federal Republic from the centre of this analysis. The author shows that, after a certain hesitary, German diplomacy has now become active in the establishment of an international non-proliferation regime. He concludes that Germany should take a strong initiative role in maintaining a peaceful international nuclear order. (orig.) [Deutsch] Es wird ein Resuemee der bisherigen Erfolge und Misserfolge internationaler Nichtverbreitungspolitik gezogen. Die komplexen, vielfach veraestelten und verschachtelten nationalen Massnahmen und zwischenstaatlichen Vereinbarungen zur Ueberwachung und friedlichen Zweckbindung von Nukleartechnologie und militaerisch relevanten Anschlusstechnologien werden sachkundig erlaeutert und auf ihre Wirksamkeit ueberprueft. Schwachstellen des nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsregimes werden offengelegt, Reformschritte der vergangenen Jahre werden dargestellt und im Lichte der juengsten Entwicklungen bewertet. Dabei steht die Interessenlage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Zentrum der Analyse. Der Autor zeigt, dass die deutsche Diplomatie sich nach einer gewissen Zurueckhaltung schliesslich aktiv in die Gestaltung des internationalen Nichtverbreitungsregimes eingeschaltet hat. Er plaediert fuer eine kraftvolle Initiativrolle Deutschlands zur Erhaltung einer friedlichen internationalen Nuklearordnung. (orig.)

  3. Statement at Inauguration Ceremony for Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 25 February 2011, Vienna, Austria

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Y.

    2011-01-01

    I was a member of the Group of Governmental Experts which drafted the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non proliferation Education in 2002. In my new role at the IAEA, I continue to attach great importance to education. I believe it is vital that we educate the people of the world about how devastating nuclear weapons are and build awareness of the importance of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I have no doubt that the new Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation will make an important contribution in this area. The recent conclusion of the new START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States was a welcome development in the nuclear disarmament field. Reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons is a positive step towards a safe and peaceful world free of nuclear weapons which can impact positively on nuclear non-proliferation efforts. But, of course, further steps are needed. Disarmament and non-proliferation education have an essential role to play in maintaining and strengthening the momentum towards achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The IAEA has for decades been actively involved in promoting nuclear non-proliferation education. My colleagues and I speak about nuclear non-proliferation throughout the world. We organize briefings here in Vienna for members of parliament, government officials, think tanks, academics and other groups. We host educational seminars for NGOs, diplomats and journalists on the Agency's non-proliferation activities - the latest one was held this week. The IAEA also provides opportunities for on-the-job training and work experience to students and young professionals. Indeed, several Monterey Institute graduates are currently working with us. This is an excellent example of how disarmament and non-proliferation education can contribute to promoting international peace and security. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States took place during my time with Monterey in

  4. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING RELIABLE NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICE APPROACHES: ECONOMIC AND NON-PROLIFERATION MERITS OF NUCLEAR FUEL LEASING

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kreyling, Sean J.; Brothers, Alan J.; Short, Steven M.; Phillips, Jon R.; Weimar, Mark R.

    2010-01-01

    The goal of international nuclear policy since the dawn of nuclear power has been the peaceful expansion of nuclear energy while controlling the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Numerous initiatives undertaken in the intervening decades to develop international agreements on providing nuclear fuel supply assurances, or reliable nuclear fuel services (RNFS) attempted to control the spread of sensitive nuclear materials and technology. In order to inform the international debate and the development of government policy, PNNL has been developing an analytical framework to holistically evaluate the economics and non-proliferation merits of alternative approaches to managing the nuclear fuel cycle (i.e., cradle-to-grave). This paper provides an overview of the analytical framework and discusses preliminary results of an economic assessment of one RNFS approach: full-service nuclear fuel leasing. The specific focus of this paper is the metrics under development to systematically evaluate the non-proliferation merits of fuel-cycle management alternatives. Also discussed is the utility of an integrated assessment of the economics and non-proliferation merits of nuclear fuel leasing.

  5. Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-11-15

    The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

  6. Non proliferation regimes undertakings: Benefits and limits of synergies in verification technologies and procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richard, M.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Thirty years ago the NPT was entering into force. Therewith, when a State became party to the NPT, it had, in accordance with article III.1 of the Treaty, an undertaking to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards agreement with the IAEA and accept safeguards verification on source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territories in order to verify that such material is not diverted. This multilateral instrument was the foundation stone of the non-proliferation regime and marked the actual birth of internationally accepted measures to verily compliance with politically stringent agreements. Since that time several important multilateral or bilateral instruments on non-proliferation and disarmament have been negotiated and adopted to curb the development and the acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) most of them since the middle of the eighties and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Amongst the multilateral instruments are the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapon and Toxin Weapons (1972), the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (1993), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996), the Strengthening of the IAEA Safeguards and the Additional Protocol (1997), with some still in negotiation like the Protocol of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons, and some on which negotiation is still a wish like the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Bilateral disarmament agreements between the United States of America and the Russian Federation such as the INF Treaty, START I and II, the agreements on the elimination of excess defence nuclear material as well as the Trilateral Initiative with the IAEA pave the way to nuclear disarmament with the reduction of both the number of nuclear weapons arsenal and the fissile material inventories. The politically stringent undertakings of States that have become parties to those agreements would not be possible without the

  7. Dynamic triggering of remote aftershocks of the M=6.6 July 20, 2017 Bodrum-Kos, Turkey, earthquake?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stein, R. S.; Pollitz, F. F.; Sevilgen, V.

    2017-12-01

    The M=6.6 July 20, 2017 Bodrum-Kos, Turkey, earthquake occurred within Eurasian lithosphere in the back-arc region of the Hellenic trench. This large extensional event on a roughly E-W striking normal fault led to a band of regional aftershocks during the first 24 hours in the European Mediterranean Seismological Centre catalog, with M≤4.2. These events are listed as reviewed in the EMSC catalog, and some have since been re-examined by Aurelie Guilhem Trilla (CEA/DAM/ DIF, F 91297 Arpajon, France). The more distant aftershocks extend north-northwestward up to 500 km from the epicentral region. Because such remote triggering cannot be explained by the pattern of static stress change calculated for the M=6.6 mainshock, we explore how dynamic stresses imparted by the mainshock could have influenced the occurrence of these aftershocks. Measures of triggering potential include the peak dynamic stress, and the duration for which the dynamic stress exceeds a nominal threshold, e.g., 0.1 MPa. Point-source models of the mainshock suggest preferential dynamic stressing from the propagating Rayleigh wave along broad swaths trending north and south from the epicenter, reflecting the source radiation pattern. Finite-fault models are expected to modify the dynamic stressing pattern through directivity effects. In the absence of available finite-source models, we explore suites of such models involving unilateral rupture on either of the two nodal planes admitted by the mainshock focal mechanism solution.

  8. Anomalous stress diffusion, Omori's law and Continuous Time Random Walk in the 2010 Efpalion aftershock sequence (Corinth rift, Greece)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Michas, Georgios; Vallianatos, Filippos; Karakostas, Vassilios; Papadimitriou, Eleftheria; Sammonds, Peter

    2014-05-01

    Efpalion aftershock sequence occurred in January 2010, when an M=5.5 earthquake was followed four days later by another strong event (M=5.4) and numerous aftershocks (Karakostas et al., 2012). This activity interrupted a 15 years period of low to moderate earthquake occurrence in Corinth rift, where the last major event was the 1995 Aigion earthquake (M=6.2). Coulomb stress analysis performed in previous studies (Karakostas et al., 2012; Sokos et al., 2012; Ganas et al., 2013) indicated that the second major event and most of the aftershocks were triggered due to stress transfer. The aftershocks production rate decays as a power-law with time according to the modified Omori law (Utsu et al., 1995) with an exponent larger than one for the first four days, while after the occurrence of the second strong event the exponent turns to unity. We consider the earthquake sequence as a point process in time and space and study its spatiotemporal evolution considering a Continuous Time Random Walk (CTRW) model with a joint probability density function of inter-event times and jumps between the successive earthquakes (Metzler and Klafter, 2000). Jump length distribution exhibits finite variance, whereas inter-event times scale as a q-generalized gamma distribution (Michas et al., 2013) with a long power-law tail. These properties are indicative of a subdiffusive process in terms of CTRW. Additionally, the mean square displacement of aftershocks is constant with time after the occurrence of the first event, while it changes to a power-law with exponent close to 0.15 after the second major event, illustrating a slow diffusive process. During the first four days aftershocks cluster around the epicentral area of the second major event, while after that and taking as a reference the second event, the aftershock zone is migrating slowly with time to the west near the epicentral area of the first event. This process is much slower from what would be expected from normal diffusion, a

  9. Aftershock activity of Bhuj earthquake of January 26th, 2001

    Indian Academy of Sciences (India)

    R. Narasimhan (Krishtel eMaging) 1461 1996 Oct 15 13:05:22

    2001-01-26

    Jan 26, 2001 ... The epicenter of the mainshock falls on the southern edge of ... Daily frequency of aftershocks (ML ≥ 1) from February 5th to February 27th, 2001. local network around the .... Financial support to carry out the study became.

  10. Nonlinear Viscoelastic Rheology and the Occurrence of Aftershocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shcherbakov, R.; Zhang, X.

    2017-12-01

    Aftershocks are ubiquitous in nature. They are the manifestation of relaxation phenomena observed in various physical systems. In one prominent example, they typically occur after large earthquakes. The observed aftershock sequences usually obey several well defined non-trivial empirical laws in magnitude, temporal, and spatial domains. In many cases their characteristics follow scale-invariant distributions. The occurrence of aftershocks displays a prominent temporal behavior due to time-dependent mechanisms of stress and/or energy transfer. There are compelling evidences that the lower continental crust and upper mantle are governed by various solid state creep mechanisms. Among those mechanisms a power-law viscous flow was suggested to explain the postseismic surface deformation after large earthquakes. In this work, we consider a slider-block model to mimic the behavior of a seismogenic fault. In the model, we introduce a nonlinear viscoelastic coupling mechanism to capture the essential characteristics of crustal rheology and stress interaction between the blocks and the medium. For this purpose we employ nonlinear Kelvin-Voigt elements consisting of an elastic spring and a dashpot assembled in parallel to introduce viscoelastic coupling between the blocks and the driving plate. By mapping the model into a cellular automaton we derive the functional form of the stress transfer mechanism in the model. We show that the nonlinear viscoelasticity plays a critical role in triggering of aftershocks. It explains the functional form of the Omori-Utsu law and gives physical interpretation of its parameters. The proposed model also suggests that the power-law rheology of the fault gauge and underlying lower crust and upper mantle controls the decay rate of aftershocks. To verify this, we analyze several prominent aftershock sequences to estimate their decay rates and correlate with the rheological properties of the underlying lower crust and mantle, which were estimated

  11. Predictability in the Epidemic-Type Aftershock Sequence model of interacting triggered seismicity

    Science.gov (United States)

    Helmstetter, AgnèS.; Sornette, Didier

    2003-10-01

    As part of an effort to develop a systematic methodology for earthquake forecasting, we use a simple model of seismicity on the basis of interacting events which may trigger a cascade of earthquakes, known as the Epidemic-Type Aftershock Sequence model (ETAS). The ETAS model is constructed on a bare (unrenormalized) Omori law, the Gutenberg-Richter law, and the idea that large events trigger more numerous aftershocks. For simplicity, we do not use the information on the spatial location of earthquakes and work only in the time domain. We demonstrate the essential role played by the cascade of triggered seismicity in controlling the rate of aftershock decay as well as the overall level of seismicity in the presence of a constant external seismicity source. We offer an analytical approach to account for the yet unobserved triggered seismicity adapted to the problem of forecasting future seismic rates at varying horizons from the present. Tests presented on synthetic catalogs validate strongly the importance of taking into account all the cascades of still unobserved triggered events in order to predict correctly the future level of seismicity beyond a few minutes. We find a strong predictability if one accepts to predict only a small fraction of the large-magnitude targets. Specifically, we find a prediction gain (defined as the ratio of the fraction of predicted events over the fraction of time in alarms) equal to 21 for a fraction of alarm of 1%, a target magnitude M ≥ 6, an update time of 0.5 days between two predictions, and for realistic parameters of the ETAS model. However, the probability gains degrade fast when one attempts to predict a larger fraction of the targets. This is because a significant fraction of events remain uncorrelated from past seismicity. This delineates the fundamental limits underlying forecasting skills, stemming from an intrinsic stochastic component in these interacting triggered seismicity models. Quantitatively, the fundamental

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation: The security context, 5 October 2007, University of Florence, Florence, Italy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2007-01-01

    Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, stated that nuclear threats have become more dangerous and more complex. We have witnessed the emergence of illicit trade in nuclear technology. Countries have managed to develop clandestine nuclear programmes. Sophisticated extremist groups have shown keen interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. n parallel, nuclear material and nuclear material production have become more difficult to control. Energy security concerns and fears of climate change are prompting many countries to revisit the nuclear power option. And to ensure a supply of reactor fuel, more countries have shown interest in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle - a step that brings them quite close to nuclear weapons capability. Add to this the 27 000 nuclear warheads that already exist in the arsenals of nine countries, and the hair trigger alert deployment level of some of these weapons. And as if these stockpiles and their deployment were not threat enough, most of these countries continue to repeat two inherently contradictory mantras: first, that it is important for them to continue to rely on nuclear weapons for their security; and second, that no one else should have them. 'Do as I say, not as I do'. Against this backdrop, there are four critical aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime that we must strengthen - addressing both symptoms and root causes - if we are to avoid a cascade of nuclear proliferation, and our ultimate self-destruction. First, we must develop a more effective approach for dealing with proliferation threats. Second, we must secure existing nuclear material stockpiles and tighten controls over the transfer and production of nuclear material. Third, we must strengthen the verification authority and capability of the IAEA. Fourth, we urgently need to find a way for disarmament to be given the prominence and priority it deserves. In conclusion, it is clear that a security strategy rooted in 'Us

  13. Seven law concepts on nuclear non-proliferation suggested by the International Group of Legal Experts (ILG)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Steen, G. [Djursholm (Sweden); Wredberg, L. [ILG Consultant LTD, Vienna (Austria)

    2001-03-01

    The ILG has worked as an independent group under the Swedish Support Programme on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The ILG's mission is concluded with this report. When developing the seven Law Concepts on national nuclear legislation that are presented in this report, the ILG has applied certain basic principles, which are firmly established in modern Western legislation. A summary of these principles is made here. They are essential cornerstones in laws and regulations that apply both to the nuclear industry and to other high technology areas, characterised by advanced safety and security requirements. Of essential importance is that the Operator alone is responsible for the fulfilment of requirements stipulated in laws and authority directives. The technical complexity of the nuclear industry and the far-reaching requirements on safety and security necessitate a qualified and complete national system of legislation and regulations. As all legislation in general, the nuclear legislation should be clear, easy to understand and give little room for misunderstandings and loopholes. It should also present the legally established requirements on safety and security in a form that facilitates the application and implementation by both state authorities, facility operators and individuals. The investigations of the causes of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents brought into focus the impact on nuclear safety from human failure. As a consequence, increased emphasis has since then been put on the development of an overall high safety culture in the nuclear field. It is recognised that a good safety culture also promotes the non-proliferation systems and safeguards measures and helps to reduce the risk of illicit trafficking. In a high safety culture environment, each individual facility employee has to be motivated and encouraged to carry out the assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with rules and

  14. Seven law concepts on nuclear non-proliferation suggested by the International Group of Legal Experts (ILG)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steen, G.; Wredberg, L.

    2001-03-01

    The ILG has worked as an independent group under the Swedish Support Programme on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The ILG's mission is concluded with this report. When developing the seven Law Concepts on national nuclear legislation that are presented in this report, the ILG has applied certain basic principles, which are firmly established in modern Western legislation. A summary of these principles is made here. They are essential cornerstones in laws and regulations that apply both to the nuclear industry and to other high technology areas, characterised by advanced safety and security requirements. Of essential importance is that the Operator alone is responsible for the fulfilment of requirements stipulated in laws and authority directives. The technical complexity of the nuclear industry and the far-reaching requirements on safety and security necessitate a qualified and complete national system of legislation and regulations. As all legislation in general, the nuclear legislation should be clear, easy to understand and give little room for misunderstandings and loopholes. It should also present the legally established requirements on safety and security in a form that facilitates the application and implementation by both state authorities, facility operators and individuals. The investigations of the causes of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents brought into focus the impact on nuclear safety from human failure. As a consequence, increased emphasis has since then been put on the development of an overall high safety culture in the nuclear field. It is recognised that a good safety culture also promotes the non-proliferation systems and safeguards measures and helps to reduce the risk of illicit trafficking. In a high safety culture environment, each individual facility employee has to be motivated and encouraged to carry out the assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with rules and regulations

  15. Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle; Nukleare Abruestung. Optionen fuer den kommenden Ueberpruefungszyklus des NVV

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mueller, Harald

    2011-07-01

    The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

  16. The Seismic Aftershock Monitoring System (SAMS) for OSI - Experiences from IFE14

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gestermann, Nicolai; Sick, Benjamin; Häge, Martin; Blake, Thomas; Labak, Peter; Joswig, Manfred

    2016-04-01

    An on-site inspection (OSI) is the third of four elements of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The sole purpose of an OSI is to confirm whether a nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in violation of the treaty and to gather any facts which might assist in identifying any possible violator. It thus constitutes the final verification measure under the CTBT if all other available measures are not able to confirm the nature of a suspicious event. The Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) carried out the Integrated Field Exercise 2014 (IFE14) in the Dead Sea Area of Jordan from 3 November to 9. December 2014. It was a fictitious OSI whose aim was to test the inspection capabilities in an integrated manner. The technologies allowed during an OSI are listed in the Treaty. The aim of the Seismic Aftershock Monitoring System (SAMS) is to detect and localize aftershocks of low magnitudes of the triggering event or collapses of underground cavities. The locations of these events are expected in the vicinity of a possible previous explosion and help to narrow down the search area within an inspection area (IA) of an OSI. The success of SAMS depends on the main elements, hardware, software, deployment strategy, the search logic and not least the effective use of personnel. All elements of SAMS were tested and improved during the Built-Up Exercises (BUE) which took place in Austria and Hungary. IFE14 provided more realistic climatic and hazardous terrain conditions with limited resources. Significant variations in topography of the IA of IFE14 in the mountainous Dead Sea Area of Jordan led to considerable challenges which were not expected from experiences encountered during BUE. The SAMS uses mini arrays with an aperture of about 100 meters and with a total of 4 elements. The station network deployed during IFE14 and results of the data analysis will be presented. Possible aftershocks of

  17. Aftershocks, groundwater changes and postseismic ground displacements related to pore pressure gradients: Insights from the 2012 Emilia-Romagna earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Albano, Matteo; Barba, Salvatore; Solaro, Giuseppe; Pepe, Antonio; Bignami, Christian; Moro, Marco; Saroli, Michele; Stramondo, Salvatore

    2017-07-01

    During the 2012 Emilia-Romagna (Italy) seismic sequence, several time-dependent phenomena occurred, such as changes in the groundwater regime and chemistry, liquefaction, and postseismic ground displacements. Because time-dependent phenomena require time-dependent physical mechanisms, we interpreted such events as the result of the poroelastic response of the crust after the main shock. In our study, we performed a two-dimensional poroelastic numerical analysis calibrated with Cosmo-SkyMed interferometric data and measured piezometric levels in water wells. The simulation results are consistent with the observed postseismic ground displacement and water level changes. The simulations show that crustal volumetric changes induced by poroelastic relaxation and the afterslip along the main shock fault are both required to reproduce the amplitude (approximately 4 cm) and temporal evolution of the observed postseismic uplift. Poroelastic relaxation also affects the aftershock distribution. In fact, the aftershocks are correlated with the postseismic Coulomb stress evolution. In particular, a considerably higher fraction of aftershocks occurs when the evolving poroelastic Coulomb stress is positive. These findings highlight the need to perform calculations that adequately consider the time-dependent poroelastic effect when modeling postseismic scenarios, especially for forecasting the temporal and spatial evolution of stresses after a large earthquake. Failing to do so results in an overestimation of the afterslip and an inaccurate definition of stress and strain in the postseismic phase.

  18. Authentication of monitoring systems for non-proliferation and arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fuller, J.L.; Kouzes, R.T.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Radiation measurement and systems are central to the affirmation of compliance with nuclear material control agreements associated with a variety of arms control and non-proliferation regimes. A number of radiation measurement systems are under development for this purpose, and the correct functioning of these systems will be authenticated. Authentication is the process by which a monitoring party to an agreement is assured that measurement systems are assembled as designed, function as designed, and do not contain hidden features that allow the passing of material inconsistent with an accepted declaration. Attribute measurement systems are specific examples of radiation measurement systems that are being developed in the United States and the Russian Federation. Under one bilateral agreement, the U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Cooperative Threat Reduction (DoD DTRA/CTR) Program is constructing a Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) at Mayak to hold up to 50 tons of plutonium from the disassembly of Russian Federation nuclear weapons. Negotiations are being held between the U.S. and the Russian Federation for cooperative development of attribute measurement systems to provide confidence that the material is of weapons origin and other purposes. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is leading the authentication effort for U.S. interests at FMSF. There are two basic requirements for an attribute measurement system: protection of classified information, and assurance of credible performance of the system for the measurement. The technology used to protect classified information is referred to as an information barrier. An information barrier consists of technology and procedures that prevent the release of host-country classified information to a monitoring party during a joint inspection of a sensitive item. Information barriers are used on monitoring systems that are exposed to host-party classified materials

  19. New insights on co- and post-seismic deformation and slip behavior associated with the Mw7.8 2016 Pedernales, Ecuador earthquake and its aftershock sequence

    Science.gov (United States)

    Soto-Cordero, L.; Nealy, J. L.; Meltzer, A.; Agurto-Detzel, H.; Alvarado, A. P.; Beck, S. L.; Benz, H.; Bergman, E. A.; Charvis, P.; Font, Y.; Hayes, G. P.; Hernandez, S.; Hoskins, M.; Leon Rios, S.; Lynner, C.; Regnier, M. M.; Rietbrock, A.; Stachnik, J. C.; Yeck, W. L.

    2017-12-01

    On April 16, 2016, a Mw7.8 earthquake, associated with oblique subduction of the Nazca Plate under South America, ruptured a segment approximately 130x100km in the region north of the intersection of the Carnegie ridge with the Ecuador subduction zone. The rupture coincides with the rupture area of the Mw7.8 1942 earthquake. To characterize the aftershock sequence, we analyze seismic data recorded by 30 stations from April 17, 2016 to May 8, 2017; 11 stations belong to Ecuador's national network and 19 are part of a PASSCAL temporary deployment. We apply a kurtosis detector to obtain automatic P- and S-wave picks. Earthquake locations, magnitudes, and regional moment tensors are obtained using the U.S. Geological Survey National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) processing system. We also determine calibrated relocations using the Hypocentroidal Decomposition approach for a subset of events for which we combine phase readings from local and temporary PASSCAL stations with regional and teleseismic phase readings from the NEIC. In contrast with other earthquake relocation approaches, this method evaluates absolute location uncertainties for each event in the cluster, which allows us to more confidently assess the relationships between mainshock slip and aftershock activity. We find the aftershock sequence is characterized by a series of event clusters that predominantly surround the main rupture patches. However, the aftershocks extend beyond the mainshock rupture area, covering a region approximately 250x100km. Aftershocks north of the 2016 rupture fall in the rupture area of the Mw7.7 1958 earthquake. The southernmost region of elevated seismicity occurs south of a region of low coupling where the Carnegie ridge meets the subduction zone. The characterization of this sequence allows a detailed spatial and temporal analysis of the rupture processes, stress patterns and slip behavior during this earthquake sequence in Ecuador subduction zone.

  20. The Iranian Atomic program - Energy- versus Safety policy? On the problem of international non-proliferation regime

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klimas, Mirko

    2007-01-01

    The Iranian atomic program: An important part of national energy policy or military way out of the international safety dilemma? In detail the author investigates - against background of Neorealism Theory - the coherences between international non-proliferation regimes - from Atoms for Peace program of the 1950 years up to actual measures of the IAEA - and the development of the Iranian atomic program. Off from superficial discussions on intentions of the Iranian government the book lightens the background of an international policy, which not only favours Iran during production of nuclear weapons as also invites the country to a military utilization of its atomic program. (orig./GL)

  1. Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abdelwahab, Biad

    2010-01-01

    The NPT was negotiated during the Cold War period to prevent the emergence of new nuclear players by distinguishing between 'nuclear-weapon states' (NWS) which had carried out nuclear testing before 1 January 1967, that is the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China, and 'non-nuclear-weapon states' (NNWS). Under the NPT, the two groups of states commit to comply with a series of commitments formulated around 'three pillars': 1 - Non-proliferation: the NWSs undertake under Article I not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any NNWS to acquire them, while the NNWSs are bound under Article II to neither develop or acquire nuclear weapons or 'other nuclear explosive devices' nor to receive any assistance in that connection. 2 - Peaceful use of nuclear energy: Article IV guarantees the 'inalienable right' to 'develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination'. 3 - Nuclear disarmament: each state party to the treaty undertakes under Article VI 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'. The treaty entered in force in March 1970 and has since become universal, with 189 states parties in May 2010. At five-year intervals, parties to the treaty convene review conferences in order to review the operation of the treaty, Article VIII(3). The 1975, 1985 and 2000 review conferences culminated in the adoption of a final declaration and the 1995 review conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The preparatory committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 review conference, which met from April 2007 to May 2009, did not adopt any recommendations, in absence of a consensus on essential issues concerning the operation of the treaty. Hence the importance of this 8. review conference of the parties held in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010 in a

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  4. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-12-13

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  5. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-04-19

    The text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  6. The Text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-02-22

    The text of the Agreement between Iraq and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  7. The text of the Agreement between Turkey and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-02-01

    The full text of the agreement between Turkey and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the agreement between Iran and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

  9. Post-Cold War Effects on the Non-proliferation Regime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kessler, Carol E.

    2006-03-31

    This journal article analyzes nuclear and security related events of the past 15 years to illustrate the changes in geopolitics and the shifting balance of power following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reflection upon these events establishes the context for strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The author concludes that post Soviet communism hastened the movement towards a unipolar system with hegemonic power vested in the United States, and this geopolitical imbalance fostered insecurities and greater threats. Multilateral cooperation and commitment from the US would help this leader achieve its goal of security through increased global confidence in the international system.

  10. Low stress drops observed for aftershocks of the 2011 Mw 5.7 Prague, Oklahoma, earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sumy, Danielle F.; Neighbors, Corrie J.; Cochran, Elizabeth S.; Keranen, Katie M.

    2017-01-01

    In November 2011, three Mw ≥ 4.8 earthquakes and thousands of aftershocks occurred along the structurally complex Wilzetta fault system near Prague, Oklahoma. Previous studies suggest that wastewater injection induced a Mw 4.8 foreshock, which subsequently triggered a Mw 5.7 mainshock. We examine source properties of aftershocks with a standard Brune-type spectral model and jointly solve for seismic moment (M0), corner frequency (f0), and kappa (κ) with an iterative Gauss-Newton global downhill optimization method. We examine 934 earthquakes with initial moment magnitudes (Mw) between 0.33 and 4.99 based on the pseudospectral acceleration and recover reasonable M0, f0, and κ for 87 earthquakes with Mw 1.83–3.51 determined by spectral fit. We use M0 and f0 to estimate the Brune-type stress drop, assuming a circular fault and shear-wave velocity at the hypocentral depth of the event. Our observations suggest that stress drops range between 0.005 and 4.8 MPa with a median of 0.2 MPa (0.03–26.4 MPa with a median of 1.1 MPa for Madariaga-type), which is significantly lower than typical eastern United States intraplate events (>10 MPa). We find that stress drops correlate weakly with hypocentral depth and magnitude. Additionally, we find the stress drops increase with time after the mainshock, although temporal variation in stress drop is difficult to separate from spatial heterogeneity and changing event locations. The overall low median stress drop suggests that the fault segments may have been primed to fail as a result of high pore fluid pressures, likely related to nearby wastewater injection.

  11. Imaging and Understanding Foreshock and Aftershock Behavior Around the 2014 Iquique, Northern Chile, Earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yang, H.; Meng, X.; Peng, Z.; Newman, A. V.; Hu, S.; Williamson, A.

    2014-12-01

    On April 1st, 2014, a moment magnitude (MW) 8.2 earthquake occurred offshore Iquique, Northern Chile. There were numerous smaller earthquakes preceding and following the mainshock, making it an ideal case to study the spatio-temporal relation among these events and their association with the mainshock. We applied a matched-filter technique to detect previously missing foreshocks and aftershocks of the 2014 Iquique earthquake. Using more than 900 template events recorded by 19 broadband seismic stations (network code CX) operated by the GEOFON Program of GFZ Potsdam, we found 4392 earthquakes between March 1st and April 3rd, 2014, including more than 30 earthquakes with magnitude larger than 4 that were previously missed in the catalog from the Chile National Seismological Center. Additionally, we found numerous small earthquakes with magnitudes between 1 and 2 preceding the largest foreshock, an MW 6.7 event occurring on March 16th, approximately 2 weeks before the Iquique mainshock. We observed that the foreshocks migrated northward at a speed of approximately 6 km/day. Using a finite fault slip model of the mainshock determined from teleseismic waveform inversion (Hayes, 2014), we calculated the Coulomb stress changes in the nearby regions of the mainshock. We found that there was ~200% increase in seismicity in the areas with increased Coulomb stress. Our next step is to evaluate the Coulomb stress changes associated with earlier foreshocks and their roles in triggering later foreshocks, and possibly the mainshock. For this, we plan to create a fault model of the temporal evolution of the Coulomb behavior along the interface with time, assuming Wells and Coppersmith (1994) type fault parameters. These results will be compared with double-difference relocations (using HypoDD), presenting a more accurate understanding of the spatial-temporal evolution of foreshocks and aftershocks of the 2014 Iquique earthquake.

  12. 2014 mainshock-aftershock activity versus earthquake swarms in West\

    Czech Academy of Sciences Publication Activity Database

    Jakoubková, Hana; Horálek, Josef; Fischer, T.

    2018-01-01

    Roč. 175, č. 1 (2018), s. 109-131 ISSN 0033-4553 R&D Projects: GA ČR GAP210/12/2336; GA MŠk(CZ) LM2015079 Institutional support: RVO:67985530 Keywords : West Bohemia/Vogtland * earthquake swarms * mainshock-aftershock sequence * total seismic moment * statistical characteristics of earthquake activities Subject RIV: DC - Siesmology, Volcanology, Earth Structure Impact factor: 1.591, year: 2016

  13. Preliminary report on aftershock sequence for earthquake of January 31, 1986, near Painesville, Ohio (time period: 2/1/86-2/10/86)

    Science.gov (United States)

    Borcherdt, R.D.

    1986-01-01

    A ten-station array of broad-band digital instrumentation (GEOS) was deployed by the U. S. Geological Survey with partial support provided by Electric Power Research Institute to record the aftershock sequence of the moderate (mb ~ 4.9) earthquake that occurred on January 31, 1986 (16:46:43 UTC) near Painesville, Ohio. The occurrence of the event has raised questions concerning possible contributory factors to the occurrence of the event and questions concerning the character of earthquake-induced high-frequency ground motions in the area. To aid in the timely resolution of the implications of some of these questions, this preliminary report provides copies of the ground motion time-histories and corresponding spectra for the six identified aftershocks and two events, thought to be quarry blasts, recorded as of February 10, 1986. Recording station locations and epicenter locations based on two preliminary estimates of local seismic velocity structure are provided.

  14. Remarks on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, United Nations Security Council, 24 September 2009, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2009-01-01

    IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) limited his speech to a few key issues. First he stated that the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is fragile and has many shortcomings because the IAEA's legal authority is severely limited in some countries and the IAEA verification mandate is centred on nuclear material and not on weaponization activities. Secondly there is a growing number of states that have mastered uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. Any one of these states could develop nuclear weapons in a short span of time, if, for example, it decided to withdraw from the NPT. There is a need to move from national to multinational control of the nuclear fuel cycle. Thirdly the highest level of protection for nuclear and radioactive material has to be provided. A fourth issue is the need to strengthen the IAEA. A fifth issue is that the IAEA cannot do its work in isolation but depends on a supportive political process, with the Security Council at its core. A sixth issue is that the Security Council must put more emphasis on addressing the insecurities that lie behind many cases of proliferation, such as endemic conflicts, security imbalances and lack of trust. Finally, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is gratified to see nuclear disarmament back at the top of the international agenda, as well as recognition of the intrinsic link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

  15. Cell kinetics of irradiated experimental tumors: cell transition from the non-proliferating to the proliferating pool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Potmesil, M.; Goldfeder, A.

    1980-01-01

    In murine mammary carcinomas, parenchymal tumor cells with dense nucleoli traverse the cell cycle and divide, thus constituting the proliferating pool. Cells with trabeculate or ring-shaped nucleoli either proceed slowly through G 1 phase or are arrested in it. The role of these non-proliferating, G 1 phase-confined cells in tumor regeneration was studied in vivo after a subcurative dose of X-irradiation in two transplantable tumor lines. Tumor-bearing mice were continuously injected with methyl[ 3 H]thymidine before and after irradiation. Finally, the labeling was discontinued, mice injected with vincristine sulfate and cells arrested in metaphase were accumulated over 10-hrs. Two clearly delineated groups of vincristine-arrested mitoses emerged in autoradiograms prepared from tumor tissue at the time of starting tumor regrowth: one group with the silver-grain counts corresponding to the background level, the other with heavily labeled mitoses. As the only source of unlabeled mitoses was unlabeled G 1 phase-confined cells persisting in the tumor, this indicated cell transition from the non-proliferating to the proliferating pool, which took place in the initial phase of the tumor regrowth. Unlabeled progenitors have apparently remained in G 1 phase for at least 5-12 days after irradiation. (author)

  16. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented

  17. Review and comment on the advanced spent fuel management process (1): Technical aspects and non-proliferation concerns

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Song, Yo Taik

    2001-01-01

    Efforts are made to analyze the project, the Advanced Spent Fuel Management Technology (ASFMT), which is currently carried out at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, on the technical feasibility and validity as well as on the nuclear non-proliferation concerns. The project is a part of a program under the 'Long and Midterm Nuclear Development Program'. On the technical analysis, reviewed the papers presented at the national and international meetings on the subject by KAERI staffs, and also participated to various technical discussions on the 'Mock-up Test', currently in progress. On the non-proliferation concerns, the ASFMT project was reviewed and analyzed in reference to various programs currently in progress or in a formulation stages in US, such as the DOE TOPS and ATW. Further reviewed the past JASNEC process and programs for possible application of the ASFMT project for JASNEC project. Provided a few thoughts for effectively carrying out the ASFMT project, and a plan for the next phase is presented.

  18. The G1/S Specific Cyclin D2 Is a Regulator of HIV-1 Restriction in Non-proliferating Cells

    Science.gov (United States)

    Badia, Roger; Pujantell, Maria; Riveira-Muñoz, Eva; Puig, Teresa; Torres-Torronteras, Javier; Martí, Ramón; Clotet, Bonaventura; Ampudia, Rosa M.; Ballana, Ester

    2016-01-01

    Macrophages are a heterogeneous cell population strongly influenced by differentiation stimuli that become susceptible to HIV-1 infection after inactivation of the restriction factor SAMHD1 by cyclin-dependent kinases (CDK). Here, we have used primary human monocyte-derived macrophages differentiated through different stimuli to evaluate macrophage heterogeneity on cell activation and proliferation and susceptibility to HIV-1 infection. Stimulation of monocytes with GM-CSF induces a non-proliferating macrophage population highly restrictive to HIV-1 infection, characterized by the upregulation of the G1/S-specific cyclin D2, known to control early steps of cell cycle progression. Knockdown of cyclin D2, enhances HIV-1 replication in GM-CSF macrophages through inactivation of SAMHD1 restriction factor by phosphorylation. Co-immunoprecipitation experiments show that cyclin D2 forms a complex with CDK4 and p21, a factor known to restrict HIV-1 replication by affecting the function of the downstream cascade that leads to SAMHD1 deactivation. Thus, we demonstrate that cyclin D2 acts as regulator of cell cycle proteins affecting SAMHD1-mediated HIV-1 restriction in non-proliferating macrophages. PMID:27541004

  19. Post-test geologic observations made at the non-proliferation experiment site, N-tunnel, Nevada Test Site

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Townsend, D.R.; Bradford, R.P.; Hopkins, S.P. [Raytheon Services Nevada, Mercury, NV (United States)] [and others

    1994-12-31

    Qualitative evaluations of damage resulting from an underground explosion can provide valuable information concerning the size of the charge, as well as the location of a clandestine detonation. However, caution must be exercised during the appraisal because the effects of an explosion are a function of many factors in addition to yield. Construction techniques, the physical properties of the surrounding rock, and the depth of burial are all important considerations when evaluating the effects of an underground detonation. Raytheon Services Nevada geologists documented underground and surface effects of the Non-Proliferation Experiment, as they have for all recent underground weapons-effects tests conducted by the Defense Nuclear Agency. Underground, the extent of the visible damage decreased rapidly from severe at the closest inspection point 100 m from the Working Point, to insignificant 300 m from the Working Point. The severity of damage correlates in some instances with the orientation of the drift with respect to the shock-wave propagation direction. No evidence of the Non-Proliferation explosion was visible on the mesa surface 389 m above the Working Point the day after the explosion.

  20. Coherent Seismic Arrivals in the P Wave Coda of the 2012 Mw 7.2 Sumatra Earthquake: Water Reverberations or an Early Aftershock?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fan, Wenyuan; Shearer, Peter M.

    2018-04-01

    Teleseismic records of the 2012 Mw 7.2 Sumatra earthquake contain prominent phases in the P wave train, arriving about 50 to 100 s after the direct P arrival. Azimuthal variations in these arrivals, together with back-projection analysis, led Fan and Shearer (https://doi.org/10.1002/2016GL067785) to conclude that they originated from early aftershock(s), located ˜150 km northeast of the mainshock and landward of the trench. However, recently, Yue et al. (https://doi.org/10.1002/2017GL073254) argued that the anomalous arrivals are more likely water reverberations from the mainshock, based mostly on empirical Green's function analysis of a M6 earthquake near the mainshock and a water phase synthetic test. Here we present detailed back-projection and waveform analyses of three M6 earthquakes within 100 km of the Mw 7.2 earthquake, including the empirical Green's function event analyzed in Yue et al. (https://doi.org/10.1002/2017GL073254). In addition, we examine the waveforms of three M5.5 reverse-faulting earthquakes close to the inferred early aftershock location in Fan and Shearer (https://doi.org/10.1002/2016GL067785). These results suggest that the reverberatory character of the anomalous arrivals in the mainshock coda is consistent with water reverberations, but the origin of this energy is more likely an early aftershock rather than delayed and displaced water reverberations from the mainshock.

  1. Full Aftershock Sequence of the M w 6.9 2003 Boumerdes Earthquake, Algeria: Space-Time Distribution, Local Tomography and Seismotectonic Implications

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kherroubi, Abdelaziz; Yelles-Chaouche, Abdelkrim; Koulakov, Ivan; Déverchère, Jacques; Beldjoudi, Hamoud; Haned, Abderrahmane; Semmane, Fethi; Aidi, Chafik

    2017-07-01

    We present a detailed analysis of the aftershocks of the May 21, 2003 Boumerdes earthquake ( M w = 6.9) recorded by 35 seismological stations and 2 OBS deployed in the epicentral area. This network recorded the aftershock activity for about 1 year and resulted in locating about 2500 events. The five main aftershocks (4.7 stress change is predicted to increase. At the SW tip of the rupture, short-lived clusters locate at intersections of faults near the contact between the inner (Kabylia) and outer (Tell) zones. The tomographic inversion depicts high-velocity P- and S-wave anomalies coinciding with Miocene magmatic intrusive bodies in the upper crust, partially hidden by surrounding basins. The area of the main shock is associated with a large low-velocity body subdivided into sub-domains, including Neogene basins on land and offshore. Our results support a rupture model strongly controlled by geological inhomogeneities and extending as ramp-flat-ramp systems upward, favoring heterogeneous slip and segmentation in the fault plane with strong afterslip toward the surface. The diffuse aftershock activity in the footwall evidences an inherited discontinuity at mid-crustal depth that we interpret as the contact of Kabylian and African (Tethyan) continental crusts that were stacked during the Upper Miocene collision.

  2. Non proliferation and disarmament: chronology of the multilateral force (1960-1965) - Historical note

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2007-06-01

    The Multilateral Force (MLF) is a US project of the mid 1950's for the development of NATO integrated strategic force. The author proposes a brief history of this project which emerged at the end of 1960, and was finally given up at the end of 1965 for various reasons. The author indicates the different events and facts related to this project or occurring at these moments. He distinguishes three main periods: a period of propositions (1960-1962), a political phase (1963-1964), and the abandonment phase of the project. In a last part, the author discusses the relationships between MLF, proliferation and disarmament

  3. Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: the President Obama's Prague speech

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, B.

    2010-01-01

    The author comments the content and the consequences of President Obama's speech on the future of nuclear weapons in the 21. century. After a recall of the political context, the author shows how this declaration sounded with a real new tone, defined a new direction and introduced a new method, but may reach its objectives only on a long term. Then, he comments how these objectives are challenged by the present context and events, and outlines how the US Nuclear Posture Review will be important

  4. Events

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Igor V. Karyakin

    2016-02-01

    Full Text Available The 9th ARRCN Symposium 2015 was held during 21st–25th October 2015 at the Novotel Hotel, Chumphon, Thailand, one of the most favored travel destinations in Asia. The 10th ARRCN Symposium 2017 will be held during October 2017 in the Davao, Philippines. International Symposium on the Montagu's Harrier (Circus pygargus «The Montagu's Harrier in Europe. Status. Threats. Protection», organized by the environmental organization «Landesbund für Vogelschutz in Bayern e.V.» (LBV was held on November 20-22, 2015 in Germany. The location of this event was the city of Wurzburg in Bavaria.

  5. Rapid Seismic Deployment for Capturing Aftershocks of the September 2017 Tehuantepec, Mexico (M=8.1) and Morelos-Puebla (M=7.1), Mexico Earthquakes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Velasco, A. A.; Karplus, M. S.; Dena, O.; Gonzalez-Huizar, H.; Husker, A. L.; Perez-Campos, X.; Calo, M.; Valdes, C. M.

    2017-12-01

    The September 7 Tehuantepec, Mexico (M=8.1) and the September 19 Morelos-Puebla, Mexico (M=7.1) earthquakes ruptured with extensional faulting within the Cocos Plate at 70-km and 50-km depth, as it subducts beneath the continental North American Plate. Both earthquakes caused significant damage and loss of life. These events were followed by a M=6.1 extensional earthquake at only 10-km depth in Oaxaca on September 23, 2017. While the Morelos-Puebla earthquake was likely too far away to be statically triggered by the Tehuantepec earthquake, initial Coulomb stress analyses show that the M=6.1 event may have been an aftershock of the Tehuantepec earthquake. Many questions remain about these earthquakes, including: Did the Cocos Plate earthquakes load the upper plate, and could they possibly trigger an equal or larger earthquake on the plate interface? Are these the result of plate bending? Do the aftershocks migrate to the locked zone in the subduction zone? Why did the intermediate depth earthquakes create so much damage? Are these earthquakes linked by dynamic stresses? Is it possible that a potential slow-slip event triggered both events? To address some of these questions, we deployed 10 broadband seismometers near the epicenter of the Tehuantepec, Mexico earthquake and 51 UTEP-owned nodes (5-Hz, 3-component geophones) to record aftershocks and augment networks deployed by the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). The 10 broadband instruments will be deployed for 6 months, while the nodes were deployed 25 days. The relative ease-of-deployment and larger numbers of the nodes allowed us to deploy them quickly in the area near the M=6.1 Oaxaca earthquake, just a few days after that earthquake struck. We deployed them near the heavily-damaged cities of Juchitan, Ixtaltepec, and Ixtepec as well as in Tehuantepec and Salina Cruz, Oaxaca in order to test their capabilities for site characterization and aftershock studies. This is the first test of these

  6. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-01

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in various projects financed by the European Union. The purpose of this project-oriented report is to provide the Swedish Government and other funding agencies as well as other interested audiences in Sweden and abroad with an encompassing understanding of our work and in particular the work performed during 2008. the activities are divided into four subfields: Nuclear waste management; Reactor safety; Radiation safety and emergency preparedness; and, Nuclear non-proliferation. SSM implements projects in the field of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management in Russia. The problems in this field also exist in other countries, yet the concentration of nuclear and radioactive materials are nowhere higher than in north-west Russia. And given the fact that most of these materials stem from the Cold War era and remain stored under conditions that vary from 'possibly acceptable' to 'wildly appalling' it is obvious that Sweden's first priority in the field of managing nuclear spent fuel and radioactive waste lies in this part of Russia. The prioritisation and selection of projects in reactor safety are established following thorough discussions with the partners in Russia and Ukraine. For specific guidance on safety and recommended safety improvements at RBMK and VVER reactors, SSM relies on analyses and handbooks established by the IAEA in the 1990s. In 2008, there were 16 projects in reactor safety. SSM implements a large number of projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. The activities are at a first glance at some distance from the activities covered and foreseen by for instance the

  7. Non proliferation and disarmament: the 'golden age' of the Irish diplomacy (1957-1961) - Historical note

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2007-06-01

    The author proposes an analysis of the Irish diplomatic actions and policy with respect to non proliferation and disarmament at the end of the 1950's. Inspired by the Swedish international posture, this policy notably produced the so-called 'Irish resolution'. The author first comments the origin of this resolution, and then describes the negotiation process which lasted about two years to finally produce this resolution which was voted by the United Nations General Assembly. The last part of the article comments the content of the resolution which stated that the NPT had to be considered as a first step on the way to disarmament. While evoking the evolution of the Irish diplomatic action during the following years, the author comments the implications and influence of this Irish resolution

  8. Evaluation of selected features of US nuclear non-proliferation law and policy. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    Because other nations now have uranium enrichment facilities, no nation can use nuclear fuel services to dictate actions to others. The United States, therefore, should avoid undue reliance on its uranium enrichment capability as a tool to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1978 nuclear non-proliferation law requires the United States to ensure the availability of US enrichment services to meet foreign demand, but it is not apparent that a new enrichment plant authorized in 1975 is needed to meet this demand. The 1978 law has proven to be administratively workable as a means of exercising control over nuclear exports, but more needs to be done to make Government reviews of nuclear exports predictable and timely. A comprehensive interagency reassessment is needed of the controls the Department of Energy administers over foreign activities of US firms and individuals

  9. The third review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was held in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty were being realized. The Conference ended with the adoption by consensus of a Final Declaration, by which the States parties, among other things, solemnly declared their conviction that the Treaty was essential to international peace and security and expressed their support for its objectives. This Fact Sheet provides information on the preparations for the Conference, developments at the Conference and the main features of the Final Declaration. Te text of the Treaty is reproduced in Disarmament Fact Sheet No. 33, and its historical background is contained in Fact Sheet No. 41

  10. Proceedings of the symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE): Results and implications for test ban treaties

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Denny, M.D.; Stull, S.P. [eds.

    1994-12-31

    The large amounts of chemical explosives used worldwide in mining, quarrying, and civil engineering projects presents a challenge for policy makers molding a test ban, since their use could provide the necessary cover for a clandestine nuclear test. The Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) seeks to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical explosion in the same geology. Two chemical explosions were detonated at the Nevada Test Site to compare their signatures with previous nuclear tests. This conference presents results of these tests and discusses implications for test ban treaties. Conference papers are divided into the following sections: Background; Test preparations; EOS and code simulations; Rainier Mesa structure; Ground motion measurements; Non-seismic technologies; On-site inspection technologies; and a panel discussion. Selected papers are indexed separately for inclusion in the Energy Science and Technology Database.

  11. International Cooperation for Enhancing Nuclear Safety, Security, Safeguards and Non-proliferation : 60 Years of IAEA and EURATOM

    CERN Document Server

    Abousahl, Said; Plastino, Wolfango

    2018-01-01

    This open access book examines key aspects of international cooperation to enhance nuclear safety, security, safeguards, and non-proliferation, thereby assisting in development and maintenance of the verification regime and fostering progress toward a nuclear weapon-free world. The book opens by addressing important political, institutional, and legal dimensions. Current challenges are discussed and attempts made to identify possible solutions and future improvements. Subsequent sections consider scientific developments that have the potential to increase the effectiveness of implementation of international regimes, particularly in critical areas, technology foresight, and the ongoing evaluation of current capabilities. The closing sections examine scientific and technical challenges and discuss the role of international cooperation and actions of the scientific community in leading the world toward peace and security. The book – which celebrates 60 years of IAEA Atoms for Peace and Development and the EURA...

  12. Nuclear non-proliferation: the U.S. obligation to accept spent fuel from foreign research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shapar, Howard K.; Egan, Joseph R.

    1995-01-01

    The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) had a 35-year program for the sale and receipt (for reprocessing) of high-enriched research reactor fuel for foreign research reactors, executed pursuant to bilateral agreements with nuclear trading partners. In 1988, DOE abruptly let this program lapse, citing environmental obstacles. DOE promised to renew the program upon completion of an environmental review which was to take approximately six months. After three and a half years, an environmental assessment was finally produced.Over a year and half elapsed since publication of the assessment before DOE finally took action to renew the program. The paper sets forth the nuclear non-proliferation and related foreign policy considerations which support renewal of the program. It also summarized the contractual and other commitments made to foreign research reactors and foreign governments and aspects of U.S. environmental law as they apply to continuation of the program. (author)

  13. TOWARDS FULFILLMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    s. Bagheri

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT is an international treaty that should be implemented during both peace and wartime. However, the obligations included in the treaty are dependent upon states' attitudes regarding other issues. Non-use of nuclear weapons is directly related to negotiations done for the purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, non-production or accumulation by other means and disarmament. In our day, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the issues of international law.The present study is of crucial significance due to its endeavor to clarify the general principles of Humanitarian Law in a relationship to the threat of nuclear weapons' up to now, a special norm; significantly limiting or completely prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, has not been accepted in international law. However, customary international humanitarian law regarding the use of nuclear weapons holds great value because of its purpose in eliminating nuclear weapons as a means of war through ascertaining their non-use and also appeasing the importance of nuclear ascendancy. In this respect, the NPT regime and its relationship with international humanitarian law will be discussed. Firstly, the NPT background, formation, main objectives and principles will be analyzed. In order to evaluate the relationship between the NPT and humanitarian law, the humanitarian obligations in general, humanitarian obligations in the context of the NPT and fulfillmen t of these obligations under the NPT should be studied. One of the main parts of the study is nuclear disarmament obligation included in the NPT. In this section, nuclear disarmament obligation in the context of the NPT and the legal framework of possible, general and comprehensive disarmament will be examined.

  14. THE ROLE AND RATIONALE OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Tom COPPEN

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available Much has been written about perceived weaknesses of the NPT and the challenges it has been facing over the last decades. Analysing the most important provisions of the NPT, this article demonstrates how the treaty has managed to maintain its central role in the non-proliferation regime since its conclusion, and how it retains enough flexibility within its review mechanism and its managerial approach to supervision to keep this position for the decades to come. The theoretical framework of the article is formed by theory of arms control law, relevant features of which are: a large influence of politics and national interests of states on the rule of law; its flexible yet treaty-based nature; and the distinctive role of supervision in order to ensure compliance with primary rules. The article analyses key NPT provisions. Based on Article VIII, the NPT Review Conferences have both an important political and legal function. They are the NPT’s mechanism for review, implementation and supervision; in legal terms, they enable the evolution of the NPT based on subsequent agreement and practice. The NPT articles on non-proliferation and disarmament illustrate how the NPT has evolved to close off loopholes (Articles I and II and retains its flexibility whilst providing a global platform for negotiations on nuclear disarmament (Article VI. Article III evolved and must be understood to oblige NPT states to sign an Additional Protocol (AP with the IAEA. Article IV sets the parameters for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but leaves room for negotiation and conflict. The supervision of the NPT, illustrated by the case of Iran, is a complicated process involving international organisations such as the IAEA and the UNSC; while these may play important roles, however, the enforcement of the NPT is ultimately left to the NPT states themselves.

  15. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, Jan; Kinley, David III

    2002-09-01

    One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

  16. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Verification research in support of non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Linger, D.

    1997-01-01

    The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits nuclear weapons testing at any yield. The detection and positive identification of any evasive test presents a challenge to the technical community, however. Low yield testing can be masked by normal background seismic noise or permissible chemical explosions for mining or other purposes. Cavity decoupling can reduce the seismic signal from the nuclear explosion by a factor of 50 or more. The combination of decoupling and high explosive masking represents a particular technical challenge for positive identification. To address this problem, a technical program in cooperation with the Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center has been initiated to conduct a series of tests in the Balapan area of the Semipalatinsk Test Site to provide fundamental data on the depth of burial effects on seismic signals emanating from an explosion. If the depth of burial can be positively determined from the characteristics of the seismic waveform, near-surface mining blasts can be distinguished from deep underground evasive nuclear explosions, thus eliminating the capability to easily mask the nuclear event. This paper will briefly describe the basic concepts of some evasive nuclear testing options and discuss the cooperative test program that is being carried out to improve the capability to positively identify such tests. The paper will also discuss possible additional cooperative tests that might be done in 1998 to further improve the identification capability

  17. Testing the Predictive Power of Coulomb Stress on Aftershock Sequences

    Science.gov (United States)

    Woessner, J.; Lombardi, A.; Werner, M. J.; Marzocchi, W.

    2009-12-01

    Empirical and statistical models of clustered seismicity are usually strongly stochastic and perceived to be uninformative in their forecasts, since only marginal distributions are used, such as the Omori-Utsu and Gutenberg-Richter laws. In contrast, so-called physics-based aftershock models, based on seismic rate changes calculated from Coulomb stress changes and rate-and-state friction, make more specific predictions: anisotropic stress shadows and multiplicative rate changes. We test the predictive power of models based on Coulomb stress changes against statistical models, including the popular Short Term Earthquake Probabilities and Epidemic-Type Aftershock Sequences models: We score and compare retrospective forecasts on the aftershock sequences of the 1992 Landers, USA, the 1997 Colfiorito, Italy, and the 2008 Selfoss, Iceland, earthquakes. To quantify predictability, we use likelihood-based metrics that test the consistency of the forecasts with the data, including modified and existing tests used in prospective forecast experiments within the Collaboratory for the Study of Earthquake Predictability (CSEP). Our results indicate that a statistical model performs best. Moreover, two Coulomb model classes seem unable to compete: Models based on deterministic Coulomb stress changes calculated from a given fault-slip model, and those based on fixed receiver faults. One model of Coulomb stress changes does perform well and sometimes outperforms the statistical models, but its predictive information is diluted, because of uncertainties included in the fault-slip model. Our results suggest that models based on Coulomb stress changes need to incorporate stochastic features that represent model and data uncertainty.

  18. The third review conference of the parties of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and recent developments concerning international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canty, M.J.; Richter, B.; Schlupp, C.; Stein, G.

    1986-11-01

    The non-proliferation activities and instruments are listed in a table. The two main instruments are the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA Safeguards, which are supplemented by treaties of regional restricted effects, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the EURATOM treaty. The two-tier structure of the treaties, i.e. to provide for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and at the same time foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, has proven to have a particularly stabilizing effect, which was confirmed by the last Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. The conference members were particularly satisfied with the results of the IAEA Safeguards. Future developments towards improving international safeguards will concentrate on operator-friendly and financially reasonable safeguards measures, such as safeguards effectiveness evaluations and near-real-time accountancy. The results of the CAS discussions on the definition of principles and goals of co-operation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are of importance also to the PUNE conference. The PUNE conference will be held in 1987 and is expected to yield points of orientation for further embedding the non-proliferation principle in the international co-operative activities and the nuclear business in the 1980s. (orig./HP) [de

  19. Spatiotemporal Analysis of the Foreshock-Mainshock-Aftershock Sequence of the 6 July 2017 M5.8 Lincoln, Montana Earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    McMahon, N. D.; Stickney, M.; Aster, R. C.; Yeck, W.; Martens, H. R.; Benz, H.

    2017-12-01

    On 6 July 2017, a Mw 5.8 earthquake occurred 11 km southeast of Lincoln, Montana. The event was widely-felt from Edmonton, Alberta, Canada (750 km north), Seattle, Washington (800 km west), the Idaho/Utah and Idaho/Nevada borders (550 km south), and Rapid City, South Dakota (750 km east). This is the largest earthquake to occur in the state since the 1959 M 7.3 Hebgen Lake event 250 km to the southeast. In the three weeks following the 6 July 2017 Mw 5.8 main shock, the U.S. Geological Survey and Montana Bureau of Mines and Geology located more than 300 aftershocks. Preliminary observations show most of these aftershocks form a short NNE zone that suggests that the main shock may have slipped on a NNE left-lateral fault. A smaller number of aftershocks extend along a longer WNW-trending zone. These faults are part of the Lewis and Clark line, a prominent zone of Middle Proterozoic to Holocene age strike-slip, dip slip, and oblique slip faulting trending 400 km east-southeast from northern Idaho to east of Helena, Montana, and terminating southeast of this earthquake. We use identified aftershock waveforms as templates to examine the data from 1 June 2017 through 27 July 2017 with cross-correlation techniques on nearby permanent and temporary seismic stations deployed shortly after the mainshock to identify foreshocks and additional small aftershocks. Locating these events allows us to study subsurface geology, map fault structures, and provide insight on the spatial and temporal evolution of the earthquake sequence, which may continue to produce aftershocks for years. Other notable earthquakes in the region include a damaging M 6.6 earthquake 100 km to the south in June 1925, M 6.2 and M 6.0 earthquakes near Helena, Montana in October 1935 that caused significant damage and four fatalities, and a M 5.6 earthquake 170 km to the south in July 2005 that caused minor damage in Dillon and the surrounding region. We hope this work not only allows us to map the involved

  20. 2014 Mainshock-Aftershock Activity Versus Earthquake Swarms in West Bohemia, Czech Republic

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jakoubková, Hana; Horálek, Josef; Fischer, Tomáš

    2018-01-01

    A singular sequence of three episodes of ML3.5, 4.4 and 3.6 mainshock-aftershock occurred in the West Bohemia/Vogtland earthquake-swarm region during 2014. We analysed this activity using the WEBNET data and compared it with the swarms of 1997, 2000, 2008 and 2011 from the perspective of cumulative seismic moment, statistical characteristics, space-time distribution of events, and prevailing focal mechanisms. For this purpose, we improved the scaling relation between seismic moment M0 and local magnitude ML by WEBNET. The total seismic moment released during 2014 episodes (M_{0tot}≈ 1.58× 10^{15} Nm) corresponded to a single ML4.6+ event and was comparable to M_{0tot} of the swarms of 2000, 2008 and 2011. We inferred that the ML4.8 earthquake is the maximum expected event in Nový Kostel (NK), the main focal zone. Despite the different character of the 2014 sequence and the earthquake swarms, the magnitude-frequency distributions (MFDs) show the b-values ≈ 1 and probability density functions (PDFs) of the interevent times indicate the similar event rate of the individual swarms and 2014 activity. Only the a-value (event-productivity) in the MFD of the 2014 sequence is significantly lower than those of the swarms. A notable finding is a significant acceleration of the seismic moment release in each subsequent activity starting from the 2000 swarm to the 2014 sequence, which may indicate an alteration from the swarm-like to the mainshocks-aftershock character of the seismicity. The three mainshocks are located on a newly activated fault segment/asperity (D in out notation) of the NK zone situated in the transition area among fault segments A, B, C, which hosted the 2000, 2008 and 2011 swarms. The segment D appears to be predisposed to an oblique-thrust faulting while strike-slip faulting is typical of segments A, B and C. In conclusion, we propose a basic segment scheme of the NK zone which should be improved gradually.

  1. On certain aftershock and foreshock parameters in the area of Greece

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    B. C. PAPAZACHOS

    1974-06-01

    Full Text Available Published information (l2 on the aftershocks and foreshocks of many principal shallow earthquakes occurred in the area of Greece between 1911 and 1973 constitutes a more or less homogeneous and complete sample of data in respect to some properties of these seismic sequences. These data have been used to determine certain parameters of these sequences. The value of the decay parameter p, in the time distribution law of aftershocks, is independent of the magnitude range and varies between 0.7 and 1.9 in this area. The smallest value was found for the aftershock sequence of an earthquake believed to be associated with the Kremasta artificial lake, while the largest value was found for the aftershock sequence of an earthquake occurred in the volcanic part of the Hellenic arc. The probability, N, that the largest aftershock will occur Tl days after the main shock or later is given by a relation of the form N = c — k log Tl. Representative values of the parameter b, in the frequency-magnitude relation, have been found for the foreshocks as well as for the aftershocks of the same main shocks, by a proper grouping of the data. This value is equal to 0.67 for foresliocks and equal to 0.92 for the corresponding aftershocks. The difference in magnitude between the main shock and the largest aftershock is almost independent of the magnitude of the main shock. The relation M0 — = 1.1 holds on an average.

  2. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okko, O [ed.

    2012-07-01

    The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

  3. Body and Surface Wave Modeling of Observed Seismic Events

    Science.gov (United States)

    1981-04-30

    mechanisms for foreshock , mainshock, and aftershock sequences using Seismic Research Observatory (SRO) data, EOS, 57(12), p. 954, 1976. Bache, T.C., W.L...the event as well as that of the immediate foreshock were 95 located (Allen and Nordquist, 1972) and where the largest surface displacements were...1972). Foreshock , main shock and larger aftershocks of the Borrego Mountain earthquake, U. S. Geological Survey Professional Paper 787, 16-23. Bache

  4. Update on the development and evaluation of a program of regional collaboration for non-proliferation and transparency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Furaus, James P.; Hori, Masato; Glidewell, Don

    2003-01-01

    The purpose of the research is to develop and evaluate a Program of Regional Cooperation for Non-proliferation and transparency in the Pacific Rim arena. There has been interest in the development of regional collaboration in the Pacific Rim for over thirty years, but without the kind of results that have been observed in other areas of the world, such as Europe and South America. While there have been many discussions and many papers written on the topic, there has not been a concept or a program that has been proposed and successfully implemented. This research will identify attributes of existing successful regional collaborations in other parts of the world, research the open literature for past ideas and attempts for regional collaboration in the Pacific Rim, and propose a model for a sustainable regional collaboration in the Pacific Rim. One of the strategies for developing the program of collaboration is to create a Joint Program Plan for the Implementation of Technology Based Regional Cooperation. This plan will be developed jointly by Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (JNC) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), with input from the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration/National Nuclear Security Administration (USDOE/NNSA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other interested organizations. The plan will be a 'living plan,' that will be reviewed on a yearly basis to review status, and update as necessary. Another strategy is to implement technical objectives in parallel with the development of the program plan. This would include the completion of the implementation of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) system at JNC and sharing transparency data with SNL, USDOE/NNSA, IAEA, and other interested Pacific Rim entities. The availability of commercial off-the-shelf VPN systems, a technology that allows secure, inexpensive transfer of data across the Internet, will potentially be a key ingredient in the development

  5. The self-consistent energy system with an enhanced non-proliferated core concept for global nuclear energy utilization

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kawashima, Masatoshi; Arie, Kazuo; Araki, Yoshio; Sato, Mitsuyoshi; Mori, Kenji; Nakayama, Yoshiyuki; Nakazono, Ryuichi; Kuroda, Yuji; Ishiguma, Kazuo; Fujii-e, Yoichi

    2008-01-01

    A sustainable nuclear energy system was developed based on the concept of Self-Consistent Nuclear Energy System (SCNES). Our study that trans-uranium (TRU) metallic fuel fast reactor cycle coupled with recycling of five long-lived fission products (LLFP) as well as actinides is the most promising system for the sustainable nuclear utilization. Efficient utilization of uranium-238 through the SCNES concept opens the doors to prolong the lifetime of nuclear energy systems towards several tens of thousand years. Recent evolution of the concept revealed compatibility of fuel sustainability, minor actinide (MA) minimization and non-proliferation aspects for peaceful use of nuclear energy systems through the discussion. As for those TRU compositions stabilized under fast neutron spectra, plutonium isotope fractions are remained in the range of reactor grade classification with high fraction of Pu240 isotope. Recent evolution of the SCNES concept has revealed that TRU recycling can cope with enhancing non-proliferation efforts in peaceful use with the 'no-blanket and multi-zoning core' concept. Therefore, the realization of SCNES is most important. In addition, along the process to the goals, a three-step approach is proposed to solve concurrent problems raised in the LWR systems. We discussed possible roles and contribution to the near future demand along worldwide expansion of LWR capacities by applying the 1st generation SCNES. MA fractions in TRU are more than 10% from LWR discharged fuels and even higher up to 20% in fuels from long interim storages. TRU recycling in the 1st generation SCNES system can reduce the MA fractions down to 4-5% in a few decades. This capability significantly releases 'MA' pressures in down-stream of LWR systems. Current efforts for enhancing capabilities for energy generation by LWR systems are efficient against the global warming crisis. In parallel to those movements, early realization of the SCNES concept can be the most viable decision

  6. Model-free aftershock forecasts constructed from similar sequences in the past

    Science.gov (United States)

    van der Elst, N.; Page, M. T.

    2017-12-01

    The basic premise behind aftershock forecasting is that sequences in the future will be similar to those in the past. Forecast models typically use empirically tuned parametric distributions to approximate past sequences, and project those distributions into the future to make a forecast. While parametric models do a good job of describing average outcomes, they are not explicitly designed to capture the full range of variability between sequences, and can suffer from over-tuning of the parameters. In particular, parametric forecasts may produce a high rate of "surprises" - sequences that land outside the forecast range. Here we present a non-parametric forecast method that cuts out the parametric "middleman" between training data and forecast. The method is based on finding past sequences that are similar to the target sequence, and evaluating their outcomes. We quantify similarity as the Poisson probability that the observed event count in a past sequence reflects the same underlying intensity as the observed event count in the target sequence. Event counts are defined in terms of differential magnitude relative to the mainshock. The forecast is then constructed from the distribution of past sequences outcomes, weighted by their similarity. We compare the similarity forecast with the Reasenberg and Jones (RJ95) method, for a set of 2807 global aftershock sequences of M≥6 mainshocks. We implement a sequence-specific RJ95 forecast using a global average prior and Bayesian updating, but do not propagate epistemic uncertainty. The RJ95 forecast is somewhat more precise than the similarity forecast: 90% of observed sequences fall within a factor of two of the median RJ95 forecast value, whereas the fraction is 85% for the similarity forecast. However, the surprise rate is much higher for the RJ95 forecast; 10% of observed sequences fall in the upper 2.5% of the (Poissonian) forecast range. The surprise rate is less than 3% for the similarity forecast. The similarity

  7. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Eastern Europe

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, Lars van; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; Keyser, Peter; Turner, Roland; Rosengaard, Ulf; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Andersson, Sarmite; Sandberg, Viviana; Olsson, Kjell; Stenberg, Tor

    2009-10-15

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in various projects financed by the European Union. The purpose of this project-oriented report is to provide the Swedish Government and other funding agencies as well as other interested audiences in Sweden and abroad with an encompassing understanding of our work and in particular the work performed during 2008. the activities are divided into four subfields: Nuclear waste management; Reactor safety; Radiation safety and emergency preparedness; and, Nuclear non-proliferation. SSM implements projects in the field of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management in Russia. The problems in this field also exist in other countries, yet the concentration of nuclear and radioactive materials are nowhere higher than in north-west Russia. And given the fact that most of these materials stem from the Cold War era and remain stored under conditions that vary from 'possibly acceptable' to 'wildly appalling' it is obvious that Sweden's first priority in the field of managing nuclear spent fuel and radioactive waste lies in this part of Russia. The prioritisation and selection of projects in reactor safety are established following thorough discussions with the partners in Russia and Ukraine. For specific guidance on safety and recommended safety improvements at RBMK and VVER reactors, SSM relies on analyses and handbooks established by the IAEA in the 1990s. In 2008, there were 16 projects in reactor safety. SSM implements a large number of projects in the field of radiation protection and emergency preparedness. The activities are at a first glance at some distance from the activities covered and

  8. Accelerator-driven subcritical systems - An analysis with a focus on non-proliferation and export control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Andersson, Per; Nielsen, Fredrik; Sunhede, Daniel

    2013-01-01

    The Department of Nuclear Weapons Related Issues at The Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, as commissioned by the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, SSM, conducted a study concerning Accelerator Driven Subcritical Systems, ADS, with emphasis on non-proliferation and export control. An ADS looks at first glance like a traditional nuclear reactor, but the nuclear core is designed to always remain subcritical, both during normal and off-normal conditions. Neutrons are instead supplied by an external source in the form of an proton accelerator and a spallation target. This report gives a short walk-through to the physical processes that governs the neutron flux and reactivity in the core and how they are affected by the design of the core including the accelerator and spallation target. Furthermore is the results from reactor core simulations presented, where the isotopic nuclear fuel inventory has been studied as a function of burn up and initial configuration. Finally the report contains an analysis of the potential risks involved from the perspective of nuclear proliferation and exports. This study shows that ADS in the future could constitute a proliferation concern. The subsystems and components in question share design and materials with the equivalent components in traditional reactors with the exception of the proton accelerator and spallation target, which is unique for accelerator driven systems

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1972-11-17

    The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  10. Non-proliferation through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear disarmament and international control of plutonium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Imai, Ryukichi

    1993-01-01

    The role of nuclear factors in the international political situation has changed. The emphasis is now on the new circumstance of the post cold-war world. Non-proliferation is dealt with through effective international control, with particular reference to peaceful uses of nuclear material as a result of nuclear weapons dismantling and international control of plutonium

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Greece and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1972-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Kingdom of Greece and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1972-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Romania and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for Romania on 1 May 2010 [es

  14. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1972-06-15

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-05-18

    The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-06-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  17. The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-06-10

    The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-12-13

    The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Uruguay and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1972-03-24

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  20. The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-07-10

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Yugoslavia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 28 December 1973, pursuant to Article 25.

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between Australia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 July 1974, pursuant to Article 26.

  3. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1972-06-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  4. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1971-05-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [es

  5. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1975-04-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [ru

  6. The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

  7. The Text of the Agreement between Ireland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the two Protocols thereto, between Ireland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  8. The Text of the Agreement between Lebanon and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Lebanon and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  9. The Text of the Agreement between Malaysia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement. and of the Protocol thereto, between Malaysia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

  10. Comparison of aftershock sequences between 1975 Haicheng earthquake and 1976 Tangshan earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liu, B.

    2017-12-01

    The 1975 ML 7.3 Haicheng earthquake and the 1976 ML 7.8 Tangshan earthquake occurred in the same tectonic unit. There are significant differences in spatial-temporal distribution, number of aftershocks and time duration for the aftershock sequence followed by these two main shocks. As we all know, aftershocks could be triggered by the regional seismicity change derived from the main shock, which was caused by the Coulomb stress perturbation. Based on the rate- and state- dependent friction law, we quantitative estimated the possible aftershock time duration with a combination of seismicity data, and compared the results from different approaches. The results indicate that, aftershock time durations from the Tangshan main shock is several times of that form the Haicheng main shock. This can be explained by the significant relationship between aftershock time duration and earthquake nucleation history, normal stressand shear stress loading rateon the fault. In fact the obvious difference of earthquake nucleation history from these two main shocks is the foreshocks. 1975 Haicheng earthquake has clear and long foreshocks, while 1976 Tangshan earthquake did not have clear foreshocks. In that case, abundant foreshocks may mean a long and active nucleation process that may have changed (weakened) the rocks in the source regions, so they should have a shorter aftershock sequences for the reason that stress in weak rocks decay faster.

  11. A change in fault-plane orientation between foreshocks and aftershocks of the Galway Lake earthquake, ML = 5.2, 1975, Mojave desert, California

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fuis, G.S.; Lindh, A.G.

    1979-01-01

    A marked change is observed in P/SV amplitude ratios, measured at station TPC, from foreshocks to aftershocks of the Galway Lake earthquake. This change is interpreted to be the result of a change in fault-plane orientation occurring between foreshocks and aftershocks. The Galway Lake earthquake, ML= 5.2, occurred on June 1, 1975. The first-motion fault-plane solutions for the main shock and most foreshocks and aftershocks indicate chiefly right-lateral strike-slip on NNW-striking planes that dip steeply, 70-90??, to the WSW. The main event was preceded by nine located foreshocks, ranging in magnitude from 1.9 to 3.4, over a period of 12 weeks, starting on March 9, 1975. All of the foreshocks form a tight cluster approximately 1 km in diameter. This cluster includes the main shock. Aftershocks are distributed over a 6-km-long fault zone, but only those that occurred inside the foreshock cluster are used in this study. Seismograms recorded at TPC (?? = 61 km), PEC (?? = 93 km), and CSP (?? = 83 km) are the data used here. The seismograms recorded at TPC show very consistent P/SV amplitude ratios for foreshocks. For aftershocks the P/SV ratios are scattered, but generally quite different from foreshock ratios. Most of the scatter for the aftershocks is confined to the two days following the main shock. Thereafter, however, the P/SV ratios are consistently half as large as for foreshocks. More subtle (and questionable) changes in the P/SV ratios are observed at PEC and CSP. Using theoretical P/SV amplitude ratios, one can reproduce the observations at TPC, PEC and CSP by invoking a 5-12?? counterclockwise change in fault strike between foreshocks and aftershocks. This interpretation is not unique, but it fits the data better than invoking, for example, changes in dip or slip angle. First-motion data cannot resolve this small change, but they permit it. Attenuation changes would appear to be ruled out by the fact that changes in the amplitude ratios, PTPC/PPEC and ptpc

  12. Moment tensor analysis of the 3 September 2017 DPRK announced nuclear explosion and collapse aftershock

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ichinose, G. A.; Ford, S. R.; Chiang, A.; Walter, W. R.; Dreger, D. S.

    2017-12-01

    The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted its sixth announced nuclear test on 3 September 2017, 03:30:00 with a magnitude of 6.1 (IDC mb). At 03:38:27, there was an aftershock of magnitude 4.1 (IDC mb). Moment tensor analysis using regional long-period surface waves was performed to identify the source type of these two events. The first event was an explosive isotropic source with total seismic moment magnitude of Mw 5.34 (Mo=1.16e+17 Nm) with strong 66% isotropic component (eigenvalues: 1.30e+17, 0.75e+17, 0.44e+17 Nm). The second event was a closing crack source with an Mw 4.64 (Mo=1.04e+17 Nm) also with a strong 68% isotropic component (eigenvalues: -4.82e+16, -5.33e+16, -10.93e+16 Nm). We used the same stations within 360-1140 km for inversion of both events (stations: IC.MDJ, IC.BJT, IC.HIA) and predict the long-period displacements at KG.TJN and IU.INCN. We used a 1-D velocity model appropriate for active tectonic regions and band pass the data between periods of 20 and 100 sec. Waveform time-shifts were incorporated from previous event-station pairs to account for velocity model inadequacies. Both DPRK events source-types plot within the population of other NNSS nuclear and western US collapse events (Ford et al., 2009) on the fundamental lune (Tape and Tape, 2012). The DPRK collapse event is similar to the hole collapse 0h21m26s after the 5 September 1982 Atrisco shot at NNSS (Springer et al., 2002; DOE NV-209). The DPRK collapse could be explained by a complete or partial apical cavity collapse. The estimated collapse volume is 122000-277000 m3 and crack radius is 30-40 m given the seismic moment, elastic moduli for granite and a closing crack model (Mueller, 2001). In comparison to Denny and Johnson (1994) cavity-yield scaling in granite, the cavity radius ranges from 40 to 60 m given an explosion yield range of 140-400 kT. This collapse event is noteworthy because large aftershocks are rare in nuclear testing and even more rare are

  13. Complex rupture process of the Mw 7.8, 2016, Kaikoura earthquake, New Zealand, and its aftershock sequence

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cesca, S.; Zhang, Y.; Mouslopoulou, V.; Wang, R.; Saul, J.; Savage, M.; Heimann, S.; Kufner, S.-K.; Oncken, O.; Dahm, T.

    2017-11-01

    The M7.8 Kaikoura Earthquake that struck the northeastern South Island, New Zealand, on November 14, 2016 (local time), is one of the largest ever instrumentally recorded earthquakes in New Zealand. It occurred at the southern termination of the Hikurangi subduction margin, where the subducting Pacific Plate transitions into the dextral Alpine transform fault. The earthquake produced significant distributed uplift along the north-eastern part of the South Island, reaching a peak amplitude of ∼8 m, which was accompanied by large (≥10 m) horizontal coseismic displacements at the ground surface along discrete active faults. The seismic waveforms' expression of the main shock indicate a complex rupture process. Early automated centroid moment tensor solutions indicated a strong non-double-couple term, which supports a complex rupture involving multiple faults. The hypocentral distribution of aftershocks, which appears diffuse over a broad region, clusters spatially along lineaments with different orientations. A key question of global interest is to shed light on the mechanism with which such a complex rupture occurred, and whether the underlying plate-interface was involved in the rupture. The consequences for seismic hazard of such a distributed, shallow faulting is important to be assessed. We perform a broad seismological analysis, combining regional and teleseismic seismograms, GPS and InSAR, to determine the rupture process of the main shock and moment tensors of 118 aftershocks down to Mw 4.2. The joint interpretation of the main rupture and aftershock sequence allow reconstruction of the geometry, and suggests sequential activation and slip distribution on at least three major active fault domains. We find that the rupture nucleated as a weak strike-slip event along the Humps Fault, which progressively propagated northward onto a shallow reverse fault, where most of the seismic moment was released, before it triggered slip on a second set of strike

  14. The crisis bears the chance. The nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime; In der Krise liegt die Chance. Der Atomkonflikt mit Iran und seine Auswirkungen auf das nukleare Nichtverbreitungsregime

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Meier, Oliver

    2014-10-15

    The contribution on the nuclear conflict with Iran and the impact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime covers the following topics: Iran and the verification of non-nuclear -weapon states, the system of nuclear safeguards, the application of new verification instruments, verification of possible military research and development activities, the limitation of proliferation relevant activities, delivery guarantees as mean for non-proliferation, Iran and the handling of contract violations, graded reactions, political issues, problems of harmonization, capacity and process deficiencies, before the ninth non-proliferation verification conference, approaches for strengthening the non-proliferation regime, recommendation to the German politics.

  15. Aftershocks illuminate the 2011 Mineral, Virginia, earthquake causative fault zone and nearby active faults

    Science.gov (United States)

    Horton, J. Wright; Shah, Anjana K.; McNamara, Daniel E.; Snyder, Stephen L.; Carter, Aina M

    2015-01-01

    Deployment of temporary seismic stations after the 2011 Mineral, Virginia (USA), earthquake produced a well-recorded aftershock sequence. The majority of aftershocks are in a tabular cluster that delineates the previously unknown Quail fault zone. Quail fault zone aftershocks range from ~3 to 8 km in depth and are in a 1-km-thick zone striking ~036° and dipping ~50°SE, consistent with a 028°, 50°SE main-shock nodal plane having mostly reverse slip. This cluster extends ~10 km along strike. The Quail fault zone projects to the surface in gneiss of the Ordovician Chopawamsic Formation just southeast of the Ordovician–Silurian Ellisville Granodiorite pluton tail. The following three clusters of shallow (<3 km) aftershocks illuminate other faults. (1) An elongate cluster of early aftershocks, ~10 km east of the Quail fault zone, extends 8 km from Fredericks Hall, strikes ~035°–039°, and appears to be roughly vertical. The Fredericks Hall fault may be a strand or splay of the older Lakeside fault zone, which to the south spans a width of several kilometers. (2) A cluster of later aftershocks ~3 km northeast of Cuckoo delineates a fault near the eastern contact of the Ordovician Quantico Formation. (3) An elongate cluster of late aftershocks ~1 km northwest of the Quail fault zone aftershock cluster delineates the northwest fault (described herein), which is temporally distinct, dips more steeply, and has a more northeastward strike. Some aftershock-illuminated faults coincide with preexisting units or structures evident from radiometric anomalies, suggesting tectonic inheritance or reactivation.

  16. Assessment of Quantitative Aftershock Productivity Potential in Mining-Induced Seismicity

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kozłowska, Maria; Orlecka-Sikora, Beata

    2017-03-01

    Strong mining-induced earthquakes exhibit various aftershock patterns. The aftershock productivity is governed by the geomechanical properties of rock in the seismogenic zone, mining-induced stress and coseismic stress changes related to the main shock's magnitude, source geometry and focal mechanism. In order to assess the quantitative aftershock productivity potential in the mining environment we apply a forecast model based on natural seismicity properties, namely constant tectonic loading and the Gutenberg-Richter frequency-magnitude distribution. Although previous studies proved that mining-induced seismicity does not obey the simple power law, here we apply it as an approximation of seismicity distribution to resolve the number of aftershocks, not considering their magnitudes. The model used forecasts the aftershock productivity based on the background seismicity level estimated from an average seismic moment released per earthquake and static stress changes caused by a main shock. Thus it accounts only for aftershocks directly triggered by coseismic process. In this study we use data from three different mines, Mponeng (South Africa), Rudna and Bobrek (Poland), representing different geology, exploitation methods and aftershock patterns. Each studied case is treated with individual parameterization adjusted to the data specifics. We propose the modification of the original model, i.e. including the non-uniformity of M 0, resulting from spatial correlation of mining-induced seismicity with exploitation. The results show that, even when simplified seismicity distribution parameters are applied, the modified model predicts the number of aftershocks for each analyzed case well and accounts for variations between these values. Such results are thus another example showing that coseismic processes of mining-induced seismicity reflect features of natural seismicity and that similar models can be applied to study the aftershock rate in both the natural and the

  17. Report of “the 2013 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station”

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamamura, Tsukasa; Suda, Kazunori; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Kuno, Yusuke; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2014-03-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held “International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Ensuring Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station –” on 3 and 4 December 2013, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials from Japan, the United States, France and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled “Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security measures of nuclear fuel cycle options in consideration of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” and “Roles of safeguards and technical measures for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation for nuclear fuel cycle options”. In the first panel based on the implications of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on the domestic and global nuclear energy use and increased interest in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle, discussion was made on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security challenges on both fuel cycle options from the policy and institutional viewpoints whereas in the second panel the roles of safeguards and proliferation resistant nuclear technology including plutonium burning technology in ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security in the back end of nuclear fuel cycle were discussed. Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France and Republic of Korea participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the presentations in the forum. The editors take full responsibility for the wording

  18. Global Omori law decay of triggered earthquakes: Large aftershocks outside the classical aftershock zone

    Science.gov (United States)

    Parsons, Tom

    2002-09-01

    Triggered earthquakes can be large, damaging, and lethal as evidenced by the1999 shocks in Turkey and the 2001 earthquakes in El Salvador. In this study, earthquakes with Ms ≥ 7.0 from the Harvard centroid moment tensor (CMT) catalog are modeled as dislocations to calculate shear stress changes on subsequent earthquake rupture planes near enough to be affected. About 61% of earthquakes that occurred near (defined as having shear stress change ∣Δτ∣ ≥ 0.01 MPa) the Ms ≥ 7.0 shocks are associated with calculated shear stress increases, while ˜39% are associated with shear stress decreases. If earthquakes associated with calculated shear stress increases are interpreted as triggered, then such events make up at least 8% of the CMT catalog. Globally, these triggered earthquakes obey an Omori law rate decay that lasts between ˜7-11 years after the main shock. Earthquakes associated with calculated shear stress increases occur at higher rates than background up to 240 km away from the main shock centroid. Omori's law is one of the few time-predictable patterns evident in the global occurrence of earthquakes. If large triggered earthquakes habitually obey Omori's law, then their hazard can be more readily assessed. The characteristic rate change with time and spatial distribution can be used to rapidly assess the likelihood of triggered earthquakes following events of Ms ≥ 7.0. I show an example application to the M = 7.7 13 January 2001 El Salvador earthquake where use of global statistics appears to provide a better rapid hazard estimate than Coulomb stress change calculations.

  19. To make a national based historical survey of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Experiences from the example of Sweden

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jonter, T.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: This project was initiated by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and approved by the Agency as a Support Programme Task to increase transparency and support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. A general model of how such a historical survey can be conducted has been worked out in order to serve as help for other countries evaluating their nuclear and nuclear related activities in the framework of the Additional Protocol. The model consists of the following parts: 1. A State's nuclear activities profile since the mid-forties. In this part the task is to analyse the State's civil and military nuclear plans in broad terms, as well as to investigate how these ambitions were carried out in practice. A central ingredient is to map-out how the nuclear energy projects were organised over time; i. e. to pin-point the government authorities, organisations, private companies, universities and research institutions who were involved in the activities and who had the authoritative power at different times since 1945. 2. A description and analysis of the State's role and interactions in the area of international non-proliferation. This part of the model includes a list of the national laws that have regulated the use of nuclear materials since 1945. Are there exceptions in the national jurisdictions that obstruct the international/national inspections to be carried out in practical terms? How have the import and export regulations been designed since 1945? Who are allowed to use sensitive nuclear materials and on what conditions? Another part of the analysis of the State's international policy of non-proliferation includes a description of the international and bilateral agreements that were signed and ratified over the span of the period under consideration. The experiences from the work with the survey of the Swedish nuclear activities show that not all co-operation necessarily went through bilateral (government controlled) agreements

  20. Investigations of the low frequency seismic waves recorded at near-regional distances from the Non-Proliferation Experiment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Patton, H.J. [Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)

    1994-12-31

    Seismic waves recorded at near-regional distances are used to characterize the source of the Non-Proliferation Experiment (NPE) and three selected nuclear explosions detonated in N-tunnel on Rainier Mesa. For periods longer than 5 sec, the signal-to-noise ratio is poor on most recordings of the NPE. A seismogram-stacking method is used in order to reduce background noise in coherent arrivals of Rayleigh waves. This method requires equalization of path dispersion and attenuation, which is accomplished in this study with empirical Green`s functions. The stacked, equalized Rayleigh-wave spectra are inverted, along with the spectral amplitudes of Lg waves with periods of 2-5 sec, for estimates of the seismic moment tensor. The NPE isotropic moment is 1.6 x 10{sup 14} Nt-m. The inferred static level of the reduced displacement potential is 825 m{sup 3}, which is about two times smaller than the estimate from free-field data recorded within 1 km of the NPE. Moment tensors of the NPE and nuclear explosions are asymmetric, describing prolate ellipsoids of rotation with the long axis in the vertical direction. The asymmetries are among the largest for explosions on Pahute and Rainier Mesa. The non-isotropic component is a compensated linear vector dipole (CLVD), which may represent driven block motions occurring within a conical volume of material extending from the shot point (apex) to the free surface. The CLVD source can help explain some observations of scalloping in the spectra of Lg waves and Lg spectral ratios. Seismic radiation from the NPE is virtually indistinguishable from that of nearby nuclear explosions for frequencies below 1 Hz.

  1. Seismic aftershock monitoring for on-site inspection purposes. Experience from Integrated Field Exercise 2008.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Labak, P.; Arndt, R.; Villagran, M.

    2009-04-01

    One of the sub-goals of the Integrated Field Experiment in 2008 (IFE08) in Kazakhstan was testing the prototype elements of the Seismic aftershock monitoring system (SAMS) for on-site inspection purposes. The task of the SAMS is to collect the facts, which should help to clarify nature of the triggering event. Therefore the SAMS has to be capable to detect and identify events as small as magnitude -2 in the inspection area size up to 1000 km2. Equipment for 30 mini-arrays and 10 3-component stations represented the field equipment of the SAMS. Each mini-array consisted of a central 3-component seismometer and 3 vertical seismometers at the distance about 100 m from the central seismometer. The mini-arrays covered approximately 80% of surrogate inspection area (IA) on the territory of former Semipalatinsk test site. Most of the stations were installed during the first four days of field operations by the seismic sub-team, which consisted of 10 seismologists. SAMS data center comprised 2 IBM Blade centers and 8 working places for data archiving, detection list production and event analysis. A prototype of SAMS software was tested. Average daily amount of collected raw data was 15-30 GB and increased according to the amount of stations entering operation. Routine manual data screening and data analyses were performed by 2-6 subteam members. Automatic screening was used for selected time intervals. Screening was performed using the Sonoview program in frequency domain and using the Geotool and Hypolines programs for screening in time domain. The screening results were merged into the master event list. The master event list served as a basis of detailed analysis of unclear events and events identified to be potentially in the IA. Detailed analysis of events to be potentially in the IA was performed by the Hypoline and Geotool programs. In addition, the Hyposimplex and Hypocenter programs were also used for localization of events. The results of analysis were integrated

  2. Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    ElBaradei, M.

    2005-01-01

    The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

  3. The passive seismic aftershock Monitoring system: testing program and preliminary results

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mokhtari, M.

    2005-01-01

    The paper is dedicated to testing program (phase of the passive seismic aftershock monitoring system with RefTek equipment (Refraction Technology, Inc., USA) for On-Site Inspection purposes that was carried out near Vienna International Centre in 2000. Equipment and applied software are described. Testing results were analyzed; in particular, least needs in maintenance personnel during operation. Development perspectives of passive seismic aftershock monitoring system for On-Site Inspection have been discussed. (author)

  4. Investigation of the 27 February 2010 Mw 8.8 Chilean earthquake integrating aftershock analysis, back-projection imaging and cGPS results

    Science.gov (United States)

    Clévédé, E.; Satriano, C.; Bukchin, B.; Lancieri, M.; Fuenzalida, A.; Vilotte, J.; Lyon-Caen, H.; Vigny, C.; Socquet, A.; Aranda, C.; Campos, J. A.; Scientific Team of the Lia Montessus de Ballore (Cnrs-Insu, U. Chile)

    2010-12-01

    The Mw 8.8 earthquake in central Chile ruptured more than 400 km along the subduction bound between the Nazca and the South American plates. The aftershock distribution clearly shows that this earthquake filled a well-known seismic gap, corresponding to rupture extension of the 1835 earthquake. The triggered post-seismic activity extends farther north of the gap, partially overlapping the 1985 and the 1960 Valparaiso earthquakes. However, the analysis of continuous GPS (cGPS) recordings, and back projection imaging of teleseismic body wave energy, indicate that the rupture stopped south of Valparaiso, around -33.5 degrees of latitude. An important question is how far the rupture actually extended to the north and the potential relation between the northernmost aftershock activity and remaining asperities within the ruptured zone of the previous Valparaiso earthquakes. The extension of the rupture offshore, towards west, also deserves further investigation. The aftershock distribution and the back propagation analysis support the hypothesis that, in the northern part, the rupture may have reached the surface at the trench. In this work, we performed a CMT and depth location study for more than 10 of the immediate largest aftershocks using teleseismic surface wave analysis constrained by P-wave polarity. In parallel, a detailed analysis of aftershocks in the northern part of the rupture, between 2010-03-11 and 2010-05-13, have been performed using the data from the station of the Chilean Servicio Sismológico Nacional (SSN), and of the post-seismic network, deployed by the French CNRS-INSU, GFZ, IRIS, and Caltech. We accurately hand-picked 153 larger events, which have been located using a non-linear probabilistic code, with improved depth location. Focal mechanisms have been computed for the larger events. Those results have been integrated with the analysis of cGPS and teleseismic back projection, and the overall kinematic of the Maule earthquake is discussed as

  5. The history of Finnish nuclear non-proliferation policy during the cold war. What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ahosniemi, A.

    2004-03-01

    This article is a summary of the Finnish historical survey during the Cold War. In the article, I try to show how the Finnish Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy during the Cold War is linked to the broader context of the Finnish foreign and security policy. In the research report I have focused on several questions. One of the most important is the following: What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons during the Cold War? And in this context scientific knowledge is meant by knowing something about nuclear weapons. Basically, the Finnish national based survey of nuclear non-proliferation policy attempted to investigate issues like the kind of research concerning Nuclear Technology in general, Nuclear weapons, and Nuclear weapon policies of super powers in Finland during the Cold War era. (author)

  6. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the process for its enhanced review on the eve of the 2000 review conference

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pinel, C.

    2000-01-01

    This article sets out the principle and essentials of the process for reviewing the operation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970. In 1995 the NPT was extended. The 2000 review conference is of considerable importance for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly in the light of the fact that after the indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states urged the nuclear-weapon states to take new steps towards nuclear disarmament. This article presents a review of the 30 year period of the application of NPT

  7. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Annual report 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Okko, O. (ed.)

    2012-07-01

    The regulatory control of nuclear materials (i.e. nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. Safeguards are required for Finland to comply with international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2011 continued to demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations.

  8. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    The Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO), combines the statutory office of Director of Safeguards with that of Director, Chemical Weapons Convention Office (CWCO). The Director General also performs the functions of the Director, Australian Comprehensive Test-Ban Office (ACTBO) on an informal basis, as the relevant legislation has not yet come into effect. Throughout the year, ASNO made a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Additional Protocol enters general application, as well as the specific arrangements which will apply in Australia. In the latter context, ASNO offers the IAEA a safeguards-friendly environment, together with constructive critique, to assist in the development and testing of new techniques. This work is important in ensuring the effective implementation of strengthened safeguards elsewhere. Substantial progress were made on several new bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements. An agreement with the US covering transfer of the Silex laser enrichment technology came into force, and ASNO is now working with US authorities to develop the detailed administrative arrangements required to give effect to this agreement. Also concluded during the year was an agreement with New Zealand covering transfers of uranium for non-nuclear use (as a colouring agent in glass manufacture). ASNO was also working closely with ANSTO to ensure that nuclear material accountancy and control at Lucas Heights accords with best international practice, particularly having regard to the requirements of the IAEA under integrated safeguards. Excellent professional relationship were maintained with the OPCW and counterpart national authorities

  9. Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Chemical Weapons Convention Annual Report 1999-2000

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) primary focus is national security-verification and treaty compliance across several regimes addressing weapons of mass destruction-linked to a major facilitation role in regard to industry compliance. The key aspect here is ensuring Australia's treaty commitments are met. Additionally, ASNO's activities are central to Government policy on the mining and export of uranium. Throughout the past year, ASNO continued to make a substantial contribution to the development of strengthened IAEA safeguards and the integration of strengthened safeguards with the established (classical) safeguards system. Australia played a key role in the negotiations leading to the adoption by the IAEA in 1997 of the Model Protocol, which provides the IAEA Secretariat with the authority to implement strengthened safeguards measures. In December 1997, Australia was the first country to bring into effect a Protocol with the IAEA based on this model. ASNO is working closely with the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods required to effectively implement the IAEA's authority and responsibilities as the Protocol enters general application. ASNO's As mentioned above, ASNO has developed and implemented new safeguards arrangements in Australia under the Protocol for strengthened safeguards, including facilitation of IAEA verification activities at the Ranger uranium mine-this is the first time the IAEA (under the Protocol) has visited a uranium mine and the lessons learned will help the IAEA develop its procedures. One major activity for ASNO is monitoring the progress of the Silex project to ensure that, as soon as appropriate, the technology is declared 'associated technology' and controlled in accordance with relevant legislative and Treaty requirements. In anticipation of this, ASNO has taken steps to protect the Silex technology against unauthorised access. Over the past 12 months, ASNO has established itself as the provisional

  10. The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-07-01

    The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  11. The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  12. The Text of the Agreement between Fiji and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Fiji and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 March 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  13. The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1973-01-01

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  14. The Text of the Agreement between Mauritius and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-06-12

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Mauritius and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 31 January 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  15. The Text of the Agreement between Fiji and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1973-07-10

    The text of the Agreement and of the Protocol thereto, between Fiji and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 March 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  16. The Text of the Agreement between Madagascar and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-02-19

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Madagascar and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 June 1973 pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  17. The Text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977 between Singapore and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1978-07-15

    The text of the Agreement of 18 October 1977, and of the Protocol thereto, between Singapore and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 October 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  18. The Text of the Agreement between Lesotho and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1974-02-15

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between Lesotho and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 12 June 1973, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article III thereof.

  19. The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1971-10-27

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

  20. Proceedings of the review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Geneva, 5-30 May 1975

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1976-01-01

    The proceedings of the 1975 Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons review the different Articles of the Treaty and their implementation following a report on the preparations for the Conference. The Annexes contain the text of the Treaty, as well as addresses by various Delegates concerning their countries' positions together with the final declaration and a series of draft resolutions. (NEA) [fr

  1. The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1971-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document

  2. The Text of the Agreement between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1971-01-01

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Finland and the Agency for the application of safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

  3. The Text of the Agreement between Austria and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1971-11-19

    The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Republic of Austria and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. Members will be informed of the entry into force of the Agreement pursuant to Article 25 thereof by an addendum to this document.

  4. Agreements Provided for in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Declarations Received from Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1970-01-01

    The Director General has received from the Governments of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and Poland declarations in which they express their readiness, in conformity with the obligations they have assumed under Article III of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to begin negotiation of safeguards agreements with the Agency. The texts of these declarations are reproduced below for the information of all Members

  5. Agreements Provided for in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Declarations Received from Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and Poland

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1970-06-11

    The Director General has received from the Governments of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary and Poland declarations in which they express their readiness, in conformity with the obligations they have assumed under Article III of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to begin negotiation of safeguards agreements with the Agency. The texts of these declarations are reproduced below for the information of all Members.

  6. The Text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 between Ethiopia and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Non-Proliferation Treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-07-01

    The text of the Agreement of 2 December 1977 and of the Protocol thereto between Ethiopia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 2 December 1977. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

  7. Structural Constraints On The Spatial Distribution of Aftershocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    McCloskey, J.; Nalbant, S. S.; Steacy, S.; Nostro, C.; Scotti, O.; Baumont, D.

    Real-time, forward modelling of spatial distributions of potentially damaging after- shocks by calculating stress perturbations due to large earthquakes may produce so- cially useful, time- dependent hazard estimates in the foreseeable future. Such calcula- tions, however, rely on the resolution of a stress perturbation tensor (SPT) onto planes whose geometry is unknown and decisions as to the orientations of these planes have a first order effect on the geometry of the resulting hazard distributions. Commonly, these decisions are based on the assumption that structures optimally oriented for fail- ure in the regional stress field, exist everywhere and stress maps are produced by resolving onto these orientations. Here we investigate this proposition using a 3D cal- culation for the optimally oriented planes (OOPs) for the 1992 Landers earthquake (M = 7.3). We examine the encouraged mechanisms as a function of location and show that enhancement for failure exists over a much wider area than in the equivalent, and more usual, 2.5D calculations. Mechanisms predicted in these areas are not consistent with the local structural geology, however, and corresponding aftershocks are gener- ally not observed. We argue that best hazard estimates will result from geometrically restricted versions of the OOP concept in which observed structure constrains possible orientations for failure.

  8. Long-term earthquake forecasts based on the epidemic-type aftershock sequence (ETAS model for short-term clustering

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jiancang Zhuang

    2012-07-01

    Full Text Available Based on the ETAS (epidemic-type aftershock sequence model, which is used for describing the features of short-term clustering of earthquake occurrence, this paper presents some theories and techniques related to evaluating the probability distribution of the maximum magnitude in a given space-time window, where the Gutenberg-Richter law for earthquake magnitude distribution cannot be directly applied. It is seen that the distribution of the maximum magnitude in a given space-time volume is determined in the longterm by the background seismicity rate and the magnitude distribution of the largest events in each earthquake cluster. The techniques introduced were applied to the seismicity in the Japan region in the period from 1926 to 2009. It was found that the regions most likely to have big earthquakes are along the Tohoku (northeastern Japan Arc and the Kuril Arc, both with much higher probabilities than the offshore Nankai and Tokai regions.

  9. 'For good and for bad': the relations between universal obligations and particular efforts in the field of nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen Van, L.

    2005-01-01

    Full text: The world has 'nuclear non-proliferation' on its lips. Presidents, politicians, journalists and others refer to it as the number one peril in our times. This may be right or wrong but irrespective of the real salience of 'nuclear dangers' it has a grip on our minds and wallets. A long range of states now make active investments in the improvement of nuclear security; not only at home as they used to do, but even abroad in other places and countries where there is concern with regard to how safe nuclear and materials are kept and stored. This development is surely an expression of a shared broadening of our sense of responsibility beyond the narrow confines of statehood and borders, and therefore this development should please us. On the other hand, the truly universal measures and instruments of the NPT and the regime round it are in trouble. It is being stated in some quarters that the NPT is inadequate in a new era with new threats from sub-state actors. Nevertheless, the NPT is the only legal instrument that is a framework that either by itself or as a starting-point can serve as a tool box for long-term storage of the proliferation risks. The reason for this is that the NPT is an expression of fairness in terms of rights and balances for all states committed to non-proliferation. And its foundations are those of international law. To the extent the NPT is being questioned will there also be a risk that non-proliferation efforts in the framework of cooperative threat reduction and for instance global partnership will lose legitimacy; simply for the reason that only a small number of the non-proliferation concerns are given attention. This relationship between cooperative threat reduction efforts on the one hand and universal legal instruments for non-proliferation on the other is a double-edged sword. While the two can reinvigorate and strengthen each other, there is also a risk that the one - cooperative threat reduction - when given preference over

  10. Tuning critical failure with viscoelasticity: How aftershocks inhibit criticality in an analytical mean field model of fracture.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Baro Urbea, J.; Davidsen, J.

    2017-12-01

    The hypothesis of critical failure relates the presence of an ultimate stability point in the structural constitutive equation of materials to a divergence of characteristic scales in the microscopic dynamics responsible of deformation. Avalanche models involving critical failure have determined universality classes in different systems: from slip events in crystalline and amorphous materials to the jamming of granular media or the fracture of brittle materials. However, not all empirical failure processes exhibit the trademarks of critical failure. As an example, the statistical properties of ultrasonic acoustic events recorded during the failure of porous brittle materials are stationary, except for variations in the activity rate that can be interpreted in terms of aftershock and foreshock activity (J. Baró et al., PRL 2013).The rheological properties of materials introduce dissipation, usually reproduced in atomistic models as a hardening of the coarse-grained elements of the system. If the hardening is associated to a relaxation process the same mechanism is able to generate temporal correlations. We report the analytic solution of a mean field fracture model exemplifying how criticality and temporal correlations are tuned by transient hardening. We provide a physical meaning to the conceptual model by deriving the constitutive equation from the explicit representation of the transient hardening in terms of a generalized viscoelasticity model. The rate of 'aftershocks' is controlled by the temporal evolution of the viscoelastic creep. At the quasistatic limit, the moment release is invariant to rheology. Therefore, the lack of criticality is explained by the increase of the activity rate close to failure, i.e. 'foreshocks'. Finally, the avalanche propagation can be reinterpreted as a pure mathematical problem in terms of a stochastic counting process. The statistical properties depend only on the distance to a critical point, which is universal for any

  11. Probabilistic aftershock hazard analysis, two case studies in West and Northwest Iran

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ommi, S.; Zafarani, H.

    2018-01-01

    Aftershock hazard maps contain the essential information for search and rescue process, and re-occupation after a main-shock. Accordingly, the main purposes of this article are to study the aftershock decay parameters and to estimate the expected high-frequency ground motions (i.e., Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)) for recent large earthquakes in the Iranian plateau. For this aim, the Ahar-Varzaghan doublet earthquake (August 11, 2012; M N =6.5, M N =6.3), and the Ilam (Murmuri) earthquake (August 18, 2014 ; M N =6.2) have been selected. The earthquake catalogue has been collected based on the Gardner and Knopoff (Bull Seismol Soc Am 64(5), 1363-1367, 1974) temporal and spatial windowing technique. The magnitude of completeness and the seismicity parameters ( a, b) and the modified Omori law parameters ( P, K, C) have been determined for these two earthquakes in the 14, 30, and 60 days after the mainshocks. Also, the temporal changes of parameters (a, b, P, K, C) have been studied. The aftershock hazard maps for the probability of exceedance (33%) have been computed in the time periods of 14, 30, and 60 days after the Ahar-Varzaghan and Ilam (Murmuri) earthquakes. For calculating the expected PGA of aftershocks, the regional and global ground motion prediction equations have been utilized. Amplification factor based on the site classes has also been implied in the calculation of PGA. These aftershock hazard maps show an agreement between the PGAs of large aftershocks and the forecasted PGAs. Also, the significant role of b parameter in the Ilam (Murmuri) probabilistic aftershock hazard maps has been investigated.

  12. A study for collaborative management for nuclear spent fuel control. Seeking for nuclear non-proliferation in East Asia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-03-01

    Because of the rapid increase of power generation with nuclear fuel in East Asia area, the management and control of nuclear spent fuel from nuclear reactors has become an essential and urgent issue in this area. This study focused on the possibility of forming an intergovernmental collaborative management system for nuclear spent fuel with an emphasize on nuclear non-proliferation among East Asian countries, i.e. China, Korea, Taiwan and Japan who own and operate nuclear power plants. First, we studied the present situation for nuclear spent fuel, including the storage measures, the future fore- cast on the accumulation and the government measures to deal with these spent fuel. Then, based upon first step studies, we examined the pros and cons when the collaborative management is realized particularly from the viewpoint of prevention of nuclear proliferation. Further, we estimated possible means for management and control of nuclear spent fuel, including its system size and cost. Finally, we extracted some technological tasks to be solved and political issues to be discussed. Our findings are as follows. 1. The total amount of the power generation in three East Asian counties (China, Korea and Taiwan) is about 17 million KW presently. This will be tripled to 51 million KW by the year 2010. When Japan's ability is added it is 62 million KW currently and 121 million by 2010. 2. The nuclear spent fuel in Taiwan and Korea will be saturated for their storage capacity. On the other hand, Japan will start to operate her reprocessing plant in Aomori prefecture in 2003 and her new storage capability is completed in 1999. Also in China, a reprocessing pilot plant is under construction and its operation is scheduled in 2001. 3. As their national policy, China and Japan does reprocess from spent fuel but Korea and Taiwan don't. Instead, they take non-reprocessing and direct geological disposal. 4. If the collaborative management of nuclear wastes is realized Multi

  13. Report of 'the 2014 international forum on peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the new strategic energy plan'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yamaga, Chikanobu; Tomikawa, Hirofumi; Kobayashi, Naoki; Naoi, Yosuke; Oda, Tetsuzo; Mochiji, Toshiro

    2015-10-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) held 'International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security – Future direction toward promoting non-proliferation and the ideal method of developing human resources using Centers of Excellence (COEs) following the New Strategic Energy Plan -' on 3 December 2014, with the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) and School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo, and International Nuclear Research Center, Tokyo Institute of Technology as co-hosts. In the Forum, officials and experts from Japan, the United States explained their efforts regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy, nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. Discussion was made in two panels, entitled 'Effective and efficient measures to ensure nuclear non-proliferation based on domestic and foreign issues and the direction and role of technology development' and 'Roles of nuclear security COEs and future expectations'. In Panel Discussion 1, as the nuclear non-proliferation regime is facing various problems and challenges under current international circumstances, how to implement effective and efficient safeguards was discussed. In Panel Discussion 2, panelists discussed the following three points: 1. Current status of Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers and COEs, and Good Practice; 2. What these centers can do to enhance nuclear security (New role for COEs); 3. Regional cooperation in the Nuclear Security Training and Support Center (NSSC) and COEs in states, which the IAEA recommends establishing, and international cooperation and partnerships with international initiatives (New Role). Officials and experts from Japan, IAEA, the United States, France, Republic of Korea, and Indonesia participated in the panel and made contributions to active discussion. This report includes abstracts of keynote speeches, summaries of two panel discussions and materials of the

  14. Foreshocks and aftershocks locations of the 2014 Pisagua, N. Chile earthquake: history of a megathrust earthquake nucleation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fuenzalida Velasco, Amaya; Rietbrock, Andreas; Tavera, Hernando; Ryder, Isabelle; Ruiz, Sergio; Thomas, Reece; De Angelis, Silvio; Bondoux, Francis

    2015-04-01

    The April 2014 Mw 8.1 Pisagua earthquake occurred in the Northern Chile seismic gap: a region of the South American subduction zone lying between Arica city and the Mejillones Peninsula. It is believed that this part of the subduction zone has not experienced a large earthquake since 1877. Thanks to the identification of this seismic gap, the north of Chile was well instrumented before the Pisagua earthquake, including the Integrated Plate boundary Observatory Chile (IPOC) network and the Chilean local network installed by the Centro Sismologico Nacional (CSN). These instruments were able to record the full foreshock and aftershock sequences, allowing a unique opportunity to study the nucleation process of large megathrust earthquakes. To improve azimuthal coverage of the Pisagua seismic sequence, after the earthquake, in collaboration with the Instituto Geofisico del Peru (IGP) we installed a temporary seismic network in south of Peru. The network comprised 12 short-period stations located in the coastal area between Moquegua and Tacna and they were operative from 1st May 2014. We also installed three stations on the slopes of the Ticsiani volcano to monitor any possible change in volcanic activity following the Pisagua earthquake. In this work we analysed the continuous seismic data recorded by CSN and IPOC networks from 1 March to 30 June to obtain the catalogue of the sequence, including foreshocks and aftershocks. Using an automatic algorithm based in STA/LTA we obtained the picks for P and S waves. Association in time and space defined the events and computed an initial location using Hypo71 and the 1D local velocity model. More than 11,000 events were identified with this method for the whole period, but we selected the best resolved events that include more than 7 observed arrivals with at least 2 S picks of them, to relocate these events using NonLinLoc software. For the main events of the sequence we carefully estimate event locations and we obtained

  15. Systematic deficiency of aftershocks in areas of high coseismic slip for large subduction zone earthquakes

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wetzler, Nadav; Lay, Thorne; Brodsky, Emily E.; Kanamori, Hiroo

    2018-01-01

    Fault slip during plate boundary earthquakes releases a portion of the shear stress accumulated due to frictional resistance to relative plate motions. Investigation of 101 large [moment magnitude (Mw) ≥ 7] subduction zone plate boundary mainshocks with consistently determined coseismic slip distributions establishes that 15 to 55% of all master event–relocated aftershocks with Mw ≥ 5.2 are located within the slip regions of the mainshock ruptures and few are located in peak slip regions, allowing for uncertainty in the slip models. For the preferred models, cumulative deficiency of aftershocks within the central three-quarters of the scaled slip regions ranges from 15 to 45%, increasing with the total number of observed aftershocks. The spatial gradients of the mainshock coseismic slip concentrate residual shear stress near the slip zone margins and increase stress outside the slip zone, driving both interplate and intraplate aftershock occurrence near the periphery of the mainshock slip. The shear stress reduction in large-slip regions during the mainshock is generally sufficient to preclude further significant rupture during the aftershock sequence, consistent with large-slip areas relocking and not rupturing again for a substantial time. PMID:29487902

  16. Machine-Learning Inspired Seismic Phase Detection for Aftershocks of the 2008 MW7.9 Wenchuan Earthquake

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhu, L.; Li, Z.; Li, C.; Wang, B.; Chen, Z.; McClellan, J. H.; Peng, Z.

    2017-12-01

    Spatial-temporal evolution of aftershocks is important for illumination of earthquake physics and for rapid response of devastative earthquakes. To improve aftershock catalogs of the 2008 MW7.9 Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan, China, Alibaba cloud and China Earthquake Administration jointly launched a seismological contest in May 2017 [Fang et al., 2017]. This abstract describes how we handle this problem in this competition. We first used Short-Term Average/Long-Term Average (STA/LTA) and Kurtosis function to obtain over 55000 candidate phase picks (P or S). Based on Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), about 40000 phases (P or S) are selected. So far, these 40000 phases have a hit rate of 40% among the manually picks. The causes include that 1) there exist false picks (neither P nor S); 2) some P and S arrivals are mis-labeled. To improve our results, we correlate the 40000 phases over continuous waveforms to obtain the phases missed by during the first pass. This results in 120,000 events. After constructing an affinity matrix based on the cross-correlation for newly detected phases, subspace clustering methods [Vidal 2011] are applied to group those phases into separated subspaces. Initial results show good agreement between empirical and clustered labels of P phases. Half of the empirical S phases are clustered into the P phase cluster. This may be a combined effect of 1) mislabeling isolated P phases to S phases and 2) clustering errors due to a small incomplete sample pool. Phases that were falsely detected in the initial results can be also teased out. To better characterize P and S phases, our next step is to apply subspace clustering methods directly to the waveforms, instead of using the cross-correlation coefficients of detected phases. After that, supervised learning, e.g., a convolutional neural network, can be employed to improve the pick accuracy. Updated results will be presented at the meeting.

  17. Technical cooperation of Tajikistan and IAEA in the field of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Salomov, Dzh.A.; Mirsaidov, I.U.

    2010-01-01

    Full text: Republic of Tajikistan is a member of IAEA from 2001. Starting from that period the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) renders assistance to Tajikistan in rehabilitation of sites contaminated in result uranium extraction, strengthens the regulatory authority infrastructure, IAEA through national projects supported Tajikistan by new equipment for Scientific Centre of Oncology under Ministry of Health of the Republic of Tajikistan; new nuclear medicine department is established under Institute of Gastroenterology. Different equipment for identification of soil erosion, diagnosis of brucellosis decease among animals as well as for medical and industry diagnosis were received. Technical cooperation of Tajikistan with IAEA especially is successful on monitoring of uranium tailing dumps of Northern Tajikistan, which facilitates to weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation regime. During 2005-2008 two national and two regional projects were implemented with the following tasks: elaboration of regulatory basis and decision making process with the purpose of evaluation of residual radioactive substances influence on former sites on uranium extraction and reprocessing; assessment of carried out rehabilitation measures; ensuring the compliance international safety norms; action plan development on reducing the residual radioactive substances influence on population and rendering assistance to sustainable development. Seminars and practical training session and personnel training efficiently were carried out, resource base of State Enterprise Vostokredmet was strengthened by equipment, fellowship and scientific visits were organized and etc. In Dushanbe and Chkalovsk a number of seminars were organized. The participants attending those seminars were representatives of regulatory authority and industry. The program of seminars and practical training sessions were targeted for advance training of participants and better understanding of planning issues as

  18. Utsu aftershock productivity law explained from geometric operations on the permanent static stress field of mainshocks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mignan, Arnaud

    2018-03-01

    The aftershock productivity law is an exponential function of the form K ∝ exp(αM), with K being the number of aftershocks triggered by a given mainshock of magnitude M and α ≈ ln(10) being the productivity parameter. This law remains empirical in nature although it has also been retrieved in static stress simulations. Here, we parameterize this law using the solid seismicity postulate (SSP), the basis of a geometrical theory of seismicity where seismicity patterns are described by mathematical expressions obtained from geometric operations on a permanent static stress field. We first test the SSP that relates seismicity density to a static stress step function. We show that it yields a power exponent q = 1.96 ± 0.01 for the power-law spatial linear density distribution of aftershocks, once uniform noise is added to the static stress field, in agreement with observations. We then recover the exponential function of the productivity law with a break in scaling obtained between small and large M, with α = 1.5ln(10) and ln(10), respectively, in agreement with results from previous static stress simulations. Possible biases of aftershock selection, proven to exist in epidemic-type aftershock sequence (ETAS) simulations, may explain the lack of break in scaling observed in seismicity catalogues. The existence of the theoretical kink, however, remains to be proven. Finally, we describe how to estimate the solid seismicity parameters (activation density δ+, aftershock solid envelope r∗ and background stress amplitude range Δo∗) for large M values.

  19. The 2012 Emilia seismic sequence (Northern Italy): Imaging the thrust fault system by accurate aftershock location

    Science.gov (United States)

    Govoni, Aladino; Marchetti, Alessandro; De Gori, Pasquale; Di Bona, Massimo; Lucente, Francesco Pio; Improta, Luigi; Chiarabba, Claudio; Nardi, Anna; Margheriti, Lucia; Agostinetti, Nicola Piana; Di Giovambattista, Rita; Latorre, Diana; Anselmi, Mario; Ciaccio, Maria Grazia; Moretti, Milena; Castellano, Corrado; Piccinini, Davide

    2014-05-01

    Starting from late May 2012, the Emilia region (Northern Italy) was severely shaken by an intense seismic sequence, originated from a ML 5.9 earthquake on May 20th, at a hypocentral depth of 6.3 km, with thrust-type focal mechanism. In the following days, the seismic rate remained high, counting 50 ML ≥ 2.0 earthquakes a day, on average. Seismicity spreads along a 30 km east-west elongated area, in the Po river alluvial plain, in the nearby of the cities Ferrara and Modena. Nine days after the first shock, another destructive thrust-type earthquake (ML 5.8) hit the area to the west, causing further damage and fatalities. Aftershocks following this second destructive event extended along the same east-westerly trend for further 20 km to the west, thus illuminating an area of about 50 km in length, on the whole. After the first shock struck, on May 20th, a dense network of temporary seismic stations, in addition to the permanent ones, was deployed in the meizoseismal area, leading to a sensible improvement of the earthquake monitoring capability there. A combined dataset, including three-component seismic waveforms recorded by both permanent and temporary stations, has been analyzed in order to obtain an appropriate 1-D velocity model for earthquake location in the study area. Here we describe the main seismological characteristics of this seismic sequence and, relying on refined earthquakes location, we make inferences on the geometry of the thrust system responsible for the two strongest shocks.

  20. The text of the Agreement of 14 July 1980 between Indonesia and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-09-01

    The full text of the agreement between Indonesia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  1. The text of the Agreement of 14 January 1980 between Senegal and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-04-01

    The full text of the agreement between Senegal and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is presented

  2. Dynamic Aftershock Triggering Correlated with Cyclic Loading in the Slip Direction

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hardebeck, J.

    2014-12-01

    Dynamic stress changes have been shown to contribute to aftershock triggering, but the physical triggering mechanisms are not fully understood. Some proposed mechanisms are based on dynamic stress loading of the target fault in a direction that encourages earthquake slip (e.g. dynamic Coulomb stress triggering), while other mechanisms are based on fault weakening due to shaking. If dynamic stress loading in the fault slip direction plays a role in aftershock triggering, we would expect to see a relationship between the dynamic stress orientations and the aftershock focal mechanisms. Alternatively, if dynamic stress change triggering functions only through a fault weakening mechanism that is independent of the slip direction of the target fault, no such relationship is expected. I study aftershock sequences of 4 M≥6.7 mainshocks in southern California, and find a small but significant relationship between modeled dynamic stress direction and aftershock focal mechanisms. The mainshock dynamic stress changes have two observed impacts: changing the focal mechanisms in a given location to favor those aligned with the dynamic stress change, and changing the spatial distribution of seismicity to favor locations where the dynamic stress change aligns with the background stress. The aftershock focal mechanisms are significantly more aligned with the dynamic stress changes than the preshock mechanisms for only the first 0.5-1 year following most mainshocks, although for at least 10 years following Hector Mine. Dynamic stress effects on focal mechanisms are best observed at long periods (30-60 sec). Dynamic stress effects are only observed when using metrics based on repeated stress cycling in the same direction, for example considering the dominant stress orientation over the full time series, and not for the peak dynamic stress. These results imply that dynamic aftershock triggering operates at least in part through cyclic loading in the direction of fault slip, although

  3. Location of early aftershocks of the 2004 Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake (M = 6.8) in central Japan using seismogram envelopes as templates

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kosuga, M.

    2013-12-01

    The location of early aftershocks is very important to obtain information of mainshock fault, however, it is often difficult due to the long-lasting coda wave of mainshock and successive occurrence of afterrshocks. To overcome this difficulty, we developed a method of location using seismogram envelopes as templates, and applied the method to the early aftershock sequence of the 2004 Mid-Niigata Prefecture (Chuetsu) Earthquake (M = 6.8) in central Japan. The location method composes of three processes. The first process is the calculation of cross-correlation coefficients between a continuous (target) and template envelopes. We prepare envelopes by taking the logarithm of root-mean-squared amplitude of band-pass filtered seismograms. We perform the calculation by shifting the time window to obtain a set of cross-correlation values for each template. The second process is the event detection (selection of template) and magnitude estimate. We search for the events in descending order of cross-correlation in a time window excluding the dead times around the previously detected events. Magnitude is calculated by the amplitude ratio of target and template envelopes. The third process is the relative event location to the selected template. We applied this method to the Chuetsu earthquake, a large inland earthquake with extensive aftershock activity. The number of detected events depends on the number of templates, frequency range, and the threshold value of cross-correlation. We set the threshold as 0.5 by referring to the histogram of cross-correlation. During a period of one-hour from the mainshock, we could detect more events than the JMA catalog. The location of events is generally near the catalog location. Though we should improve the methods of relative location and magnitude estimate, we conclude that the proposed method works adequately even just after the mainshock of large inland earthquake. Acknowledgement: We thank JMA, NIED, and the University of Tokyo for

  4. IAEA safeguards: Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons. As the world's nuclear inspectorate, the IAEA performs an indispensable role in furthering nuclear non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    Following the completion of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, the IAEA has become the instrument with which to verify that the peaceful use commitments made under the NPT or similar agreements are kept through performing what is known as its safeguards role. Under the NPT, governments around the world have committed to three common objectives: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; pursuing nuclear disarmament; and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT has made it obligatory for all its non-nuclear weapon State parties to submit all nuclear material in nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. With all but a handful of the world community as State parties, the NPT is by far the most widely adhered to legal agreement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The IAEA takes account of all source and special fissionable material in countries under safeguards. Monitoring and verification activities focus on those types of nuclear material that are the most crucial and relevant to nuclear weapons manufacturing. This includes plutonium-239, uranium-233 and -235 and any material containing one or more of these. Safeguards activities are applied routinely at over 900 facilities in 71 countries. In 2001 alone, more than 21,000 calendar days in the field were devoted to verifying hundreds of tons of special fissionable material by more than IAEA 250 inspectors

  5. Proceedings of the Symposium on the Non-Proliferation Experiment: Results and Implications for Test Ban Treaties, Rockville, Maryland, April 19-21, 1994

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Denny, Marvin D

    1994-01-01

    To address a critical verification issue for the current Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and for a possible future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Department of Energy sought to measure certain differences between an underground nuclear test and a chemical test in the same geology, so that other explosions could be identified. This was done in a field experiment code-named the NonProliferation Experiment (NPE).This comprehensive experiment was designed to determine the signatures of chemical explosions for a broad range of phenomena for comparison with those of previous nuclear tests. If significant differences can be measured, then these measures can be used to discriminate between the two types of explosions. In addition, when these differences are understood, large chemical explosions can be used to seismically calibrate regions to discriminate earthquakes from explosions. Toward this end, on-site and off-site measurements of transient phenomena were made, and on-site measurements of residual effects are in progress.Perhaps the most striking result was that the source function for the chemical explosion was identical to that of a nuclear one of about twice the yield. These proceedings provide more detailed results of the experiment.

  6. Institutional effectiveness in international regimes. An analysis of the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime coping with the political malignity in the case of Iran

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Oezden, Tugba

    2015-07-01

    Among the international security regimes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime has a prominent ranking due to the destructive power of the nuclear weapons over regional and global peace and stability. The NPT Regime has come across with two major challenges in the recent decade: North Korea and Iran. Contrary to North Korea, Iran is determined to stay as a state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Regime still did not confirm the character and extent of Iranian nuclear program. The question of this study is ''why the processes of the NPT Regime cannot specify the nature and scope of Irans nuclear program?'' The three main the processes of the regime, which are the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the multilateral negotiations, are examined to determine the weaknesses of the regime. This study argues that the regime is modulated to cope with operational challenges and it remains relatively incompetent when a political challenge arises.

  7. Information report on the behalf of the foreign affairs, defence and armed forces Commission on France security, nuclear disarmament and non proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    This report first gives an overview of nuclear disarmament and non proliferation twenty years after the end of Cold War: evolution and status of Russia's and United States' nuclear weapon arsenals, France's and United Kingdom's trend to reduce their nuclear armament, reinforcement of China's nuclear armament, effects and limitations of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It notices that the new international context gave birth to some expectations and may lead to a lower nuclear pressure, notably with the influence of START negotiations between Russia and the United States, provided that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is ratified by more countries, and that negotiations promote a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The report also outlines the importance of the promotion of better controlled peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It discusses the relationship between maintaining the world nuclear order and the reduction of international and regional tensions, and the importance of struggle against all forms of proliferation. It analyses the French nuclear posture in terms of security requirements, and in front of the zero nuclear option, in a context of ballistic missile proliferation, and in relationship with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

  8. Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Annual report 2007

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haemaelaeinen, M.; Karhu, P.

    2008-04-01

    Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation - mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting. The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2007 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders' declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of two licence holders in 2007, setting required actions for them to correct their reporting and to update the descriptions of their procedures. Neither the IAEA nor the European Commission made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections. By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear safeguards

  9. The nuclear weapon non-proliferation treaty and terrorism: the consequences of 11 september 2001 on the treaty review process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arbellot du Repaire, G.

    2003-01-01

    The evolution of the terrorism makes the future uncertain, in such a context, the objective of universality of the Ntp and the construction of a comprehensive regime for protecting nuclear materials, technologies, sites, weapon and information may be postponed indefinitely or, on the contrary, become achievable. Should the latter be the case, this would be an unprecedented contribution to consolidating the international security system. Events could overtake political procrastination.But the price to pay risks being a high one. (N.C.)

  10. Static stress drop of the largest recorded M 4.6 hydraulic fracturing induced earthquake and its aftershock pattern in the northern Montney Play, British Columbia, Canada

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, B.; Harrington, R. M.; Liu, Y.; Kao, H.

    2016-12-01

    The largest suspected fracking-induced earthquake to date occurred near Fort St. John, British Columbia on August 17, 2015, with a reported magnitude of Mw 4.6. Here we estimate the static stress released by the mainshock and the five cataloged aftershocks using new data from eight broadband seismometers installed approximately 50km from the hypocenter of the mainshock, at distances much closer than the Natural Resources Canada regional seismic stations. The estimated cross-correlation coefficient among the 5 cataloged earthquakes is 0.35 or greater. We will present seismic moment (M0) and spectral corner frequency (fc) values estimated using both individual earthquake spectra and spectral ratios to correct for travel-path attenuation and site effects. Static stress drop and scaled energy value calculations based on the estimated moment and corner frequency values will be presented, as well as focal mechanisms for the largest events with adequate station coverage. We will also use a multi-station matched-filter approach to detect additional uncataloged earthquakes on continuous waveforms for a period of two months after the mainshock. Using the results of the matched-filter approach, we will present the aftershock magnitude distribution and locations. The results of our detection and location calculations will be compared to reported fracking parameters, such as fluid injection pressure and duration, to determine their correlation with the spatial and temporal distribution of aftershocks. The objective of this study is to relate operational parameters to earthquake occurrence in order to help to develop procedures to understand the mechanisms responsible for fracking induced earthquakes, their relation to the maximum induced magnitude, and to reduce potential hazards of anthropogenically induced seismic activity.

  11. Simulation of spatial and temporal properties of aftershocks by means of the fiber bundle model

    Science.gov (United States)

    Monterrubio-Velasco, Marisol; Zúñiga, F. R.; Márquez-Ramírez, Victor Hugo; Figueroa-Soto, Angel

    2017-11-01

    The rupture processes of any heterogeneous material constitute a complex physical problem. Earthquake aftershocks show temporal and spatial behaviors which are consequence of the heterogeneous stress distribution and multiple rupturing following the main shock. This process is difficult to model deterministically due to the number of parameters and physical conditions, which are largely unknown. In order to shed light on the minimum requirements for the generation of aftershock clusters, in this study, we perform a simulation of the main features of such a complex process by means of a fiber bundle (FB) type model. The FB model has been widely used to analyze the fracture process in heterogeneous materials. It is a simple but powerful tool that allows modeling the main characteristics of a medium such as the brittle shallow crust of the earth. In this work, we incorporate spatial properties, such as the Coulomb stress change pattern, which help simulate observed characteristics of aftershock sequences. In particular, we introduce a parameter ( P) that controls the probability of spatial distribution of initial loads. Also, we use a "conservation" parameter ( π), which accounts for the load dissipation of the system, and demonstrate its influence on the simulated spatio-temporal patterns. Based on numerical results, we find that P has to be in the range 0.06 sequences. This means that the system requires a small difference in the spatial distribution of initial stress, and a very particular fraction of load transfer in order to generate realistic aftershocks.

  12. Aftershock Activity Triggered By the 2014 Earthquake (Mw=6.5), and Its Implications for the Future Seismic Risk in the Marmara Sea, Turkey

    Science.gov (United States)

    Polat, O.; Kilic, T.; Turkoglu, M.; Kaplan, M.; Kilicarslan, O.; Özer, Ç.; Gok, E.

    2014-12-01

    We have performed aftershocks analysis triggered by 24.05.2014 (Mw=6.5) Gokceada Island (GI) earthquake where occurred at the W of North Anatolian Fault zone. Mainshock was widely felt in Aegean and Marmara regions of Turkey. Major damage in 228 homes was reported. Other 49 residences suffered moderate or light damage. We have well located 699 events over 1041 by at least 5 stations for one month period after the mainshock. Double difference relocation algorithm allowed us to minimize rms values less than 0.39. Initial results show clear unilateral rupture towards Gallipoli Peninsula at the W of Marmara Sea region. Aftershocks show linearity with an extension of ~110 km length, ~25 km width. Largest aftershock (Mw=5.3) was at the NE end of activation zone. Depths are mainly confined from 5 to 25 km ranges. Two locking depths are detected beneath 8 km in Lemnos Basin and Saros Trough. We also constructed focal mechanisms from regional moment tensor solutions. Digital waveform data obtained from AFAD (Turkey) and HT-AUTH (Greece). Focal mechanisms reflect complex tectonic settings. Nevertheless numerous mechanisms show dominant dextral strike-slip motions aligned NE-SW direction with minor reverse component. State of stress before the mainshock was pure shear regime. But two principal stress axes are observed as oblique for the aftershocks showing ambiguity between compression and shear. It is likely that the mean stress regime has changed after the GI earthquake. If this is so, we may expect that the strike-slip component would slowly increase later in order to recover the conditions existing before. Coulomb stress values rise at the edges of the fault segment due to accumulation of slip. We observed strong spatial correlation between the static stress change after 2014 GI earthquake and the segment that ruptured during the 1912 Murefte-Ganos (Mw=7.4) earthquake. The analysis showed that the areas of positive static stress changes reach to seismic gap in the Marmara

  13. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  14. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of Safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

    2006-06-01

    This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

  15. Diffusion of epicenters of earthquake aftershocks, Omori's law, and generalized continuous-time random walk models

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Helmstetter, A.; Sornette, D.

    2002-01-01

    The epidemic-type aftershock sequence (ETAS) model is a simple stochastic process modeling seismicity, based on the two best-established empirical laws, the Omori law (power-law decay ∼1/t 1+θ of seismicity after an earthquake) and Gutenberg-Richter law (power-law distribution of earthquake energies). In order to describe also the space distribution of seismicity, we use in addition a power-law distribution ∼1/r 1+μ of distances between triggered and triggering earthquakes. The ETAS model has been studied for the last two decades to model real seismicity catalogs and to obtain short-term probabilistic forecasts. Here, we present a mapping between the ETAS model and a class of CTRW (continuous time random walk) models, based on the identification of their corresponding master equations. This mapping allows us to use the wealth of results previously obtained on anomalous diffusion of CTRW. After translating into the relevant variable for the ETAS model, we provide a classification of the different regimes of diffusion of seismic activity triggered by a mainshock. Specifically, we derive the relation between the average distance between aftershocks and the mainshock as a function of the time from the mainshock and of the joint probability distribution of the times and locations of the aftershocks. The different regimes are fully characterized by the two exponents θ and μ. Our predictions are checked by careful numerical simulations. We stress the distinction between the 'bare' Omori law describing the seismic rate activated directly by a mainshock and the 'renormalized' Omori law taking into account all possible cascades from mainshocks to aftershocks of aftershock of aftershock, and so on. In particular, we predict that seismic diffusion or subdiffusion occurs and should be observable only when the observed Omori exponent is less than 1, because this signals the operation of the renormalization of the bare Omori law, also at the origin of seismic diffusion in

  16. A rate-state model for aftershocks triggered by dislocation on a rectangular fault: a review and new insights

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    F. Catalli

    2006-06-01

    Full Text Available We compute the static displacement, stress, strain and the Coulomb failure stress produced in an elastic medium by a finite size rectangular fault after its dislocation with uniform stress drop but a non uniform dislocation on the source. The time-dependent rate of triggered earthquakes is estimated by a rate-state model applied to a uniformly distributed population of faults whose equilibrium is perturbated by a stress change caused only by the first dislocation. The rate of triggered events in our simulations is exponentially proportional to the shear stress change, but the time at which the maximum rate begins to decrease is variable from fractions of hour for positive stress changes of the order of some MPa, up to more than a year for smaller stress changes. As a consequence, the final number of triggered events is proportional to the shear stress change. The model predicts that the total number of events triggered on a plane containing the fault is proportional to the 2/3 power of the seismic moment. Indeed, the total number of aftershocks produced on the fault plane scales in magnitude, M, as 10M. Including the negative contribution of the stress drop inside the source, we observe that the number of events inhibited on the fault is, at long term, nearly identical to the number of those induced outside, representing a sort of conservative natural rule. Considering its behavior in time, our model does not completely match the popular Omori law; in fact it has been shown that the seismicity induced closely to the fault edges is intense but of short duration, while that expected at large distances (up to some tens times the fault dimensions exhibits a much slower decay.

  17. International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament - A possible international regime to cover radiological materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hautecouverture, Benjamin

    2009-10-01

    Even if a 'dirty bomb' has never been used to date, the perception of the existence of a threat is shared by many. Four main types of radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks can be outlined: - acquisition and use of a nuclear weapon, - attacks and acts of sabotage against a nuclear reactor or another nuclear facility, - acquisition of fissile material for the elaboration of an Improvised Nuclear Device, - terrorist use of radiological materials for the elaboration of a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). This paper seeks to evaluate the probability for a terrorist group to acquire and make use of radiological materials in the objective of detonating a RDD, and the current international framework put into place to address such a threat. Is an international regime to cover radiological materials already in place? How comprehensive / integrated is it? Does a new and/or separate system need to be set up? Before 9/11, two events in particular served to illustrate the threat of a radiological or nuclear terrorist attack: Moscow in 1996, Argun in 1998. Since the 9/11 attacks, a few other radiological events have occurred, which could suggest that the threat is becoming more pressing. It must be noted that the use of a dirty bomb by a terrorist group would most probably be aimed at the contamination of a given geographical area, rather than mass destruction and killing. Indeed, the lethal impact of such weapons remains limited. For this reason, dirty bombs are considered by analysts as weapons of mass disruption rather than weapons of mass destruction. Impacts would be more important in the psychological or economic realms: - targeting highly populated environments, such as cities, would most probably not result in a high death toll; - compared with impacts on health, psychological impacts of such an attack would be much more serious, both within and outside the targeted population; - economic damage is probably the greatest threat posed by such attacks, particularly

  18. A model of return intervals between earthquake events

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhou, Yu; Chechkin, Aleksei; Sokolov, Igor M.; Kantz, Holger

    2016-06-01

    Application of the diffusion entropy analysis and the standard deviation analysis to the time sequence of the southern California earthquake events from 1976 to 2002 uncovered scaling behavior typical for anomalous diffusion. However, the origin of such behavior is still under debate. Some studies attribute the scaling behavior to the correlations in the return intervals, or waiting times, between aftershocks or mainshocks. To elucidate a nature of the scaling, we applied specific reshulffling techniques to eliminate correlations between different types of events and then examined how it affects the scaling behavior. We demonstrate that the origin of the scaling behavior observed is the interplay between mainshock waiting time distribution and the structure of clusters of aftershocks, but not correlations in waiting times between the mainshocks and aftershocks themselves. Our findings are corroborated by numerical simulations of a simple model showing a very similar behavior. The mainshocks are modeled by a renewal process with a power-law waiting time distribution between events, and aftershocks follow a nonhomogeneous Poisson process with the rate governed by Omori's law.

  19. An Application of the Coherent Noise Model for the Prediction of Aftershock Magnitude Time Series

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Stavros-Richard G. Christopoulos

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available Recently, the study of the coherent noise model has led to a simple (binary prediction algorithm for the forthcoming earthquake magnitude in aftershock sequences. This algorithm is based on the concept of natural time and exploits the complexity exhibited by the coherent noise model. Here, using the relocated catalogue from Southern California Seismic Network for 1981 to June 2011, we evaluate the application of this algorithm for the aftershocks of strong earthquakes of magnitude M≥6. The study is also extended by using the Global Centroid Moment Tensor Project catalogue to the case of the six strongest earthquakes in the Earth during the last almost forty years. The predictor time series exhibits the ubiquitous 1/f noise behavior.

  20. Properties of foreshocks and aftershocks of the nonconservative self-organized critical Olami-Feder-Christensen model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Helmstetter, Agnes; Hergarten, Stefan; Sornette, Didier

    2004-01-01

    Following Hergarten and Neugebauer [Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 238501, 2002] who discovered aftershocks and foreshocks in the Olami-Feder-Christensen (OFC) discrete block-spring earthquake model, we investigate to what degree the simple toppling mechanism of this model is sufficient to account for the clustering of real seismicity in time and space. We find that synthetic catalogs generated by the OFC model share many properties of real seismicity at a qualitative level: Omori's law (aftershocks) and inverse Omori's law (foreshocks), increase of the number of aftershocks and of the aftershock zone size with the mainshock magnitude. There are, however, significant quantitative differences. The number of aftershocks per mainshock in the OFC model is smaller than in real seismicity, especially for large mainshocks. We find that foreshocks in the OFC catalogs can be in large part described by a simple model of triggered seismicity, such as the epidemic-type aftershock sequence (ETAS) model. But the properties of foreshocks in the OFC model depend on the mainshock magnitude, in qualitative agreement with the critical earthquake model and in disagreement with real seismicity and with the ETAS model

  1. Internal tectonic structure of the Central American Wadati-Benioff zone based on analysis of aftershock sequences

    Science.gov (United States)

    Špičák, Aleš; Hanuš, Václav; Vaněk, Jiří; Běhounková, Marie

    2007-09-01

    Relocated Engdahl et al. (1998) global seismological data for 10 aftershock sequences were used to analyze the internal tectonic structure of the Central American subduction zone; the main shocks of several of these were the most destructive and often referenced earthquakes in the region (e.g., the 1970 Chiapas, 1983 Osa, 1992 Nicaragua, 1999 Quepos, 2001 El Salvador earthquakes). The spatial analysis of aftershock foci distribution was performed in a rotated Cartesian coordinate system (x, y, z) related to the Wadati-Benioff zone, and not in a standard coordinate system ($\\varphi$, λ, h are latitude, longitude, focal depth, respectively). Available fault plane solutions were also transformed into the plane approximating the Wadati-Benioff zone. The spatial distribution of earthquakes in each aftershock sequence was modeled as either a plane fit using a least squares approximation or a volume fit with a minimum thickness rectangular box. The analysis points to a quasi-planar distribution of earthquake foci in all aftershock sequences, manifesting the appurtenance of aftershocks to fracture zones. Geometrical parameters of fracture zones (strike, dip, and dimensions) hosting individual sequences were calculated and compared with the seafloor morphology of the Cocos Plate. The smooth character of the seafloor correlates with the aftershock fracture zones oriented parallel to the trench and commonly subparallel to the subducting slab, whereas subduction of the Cocos Ridge and seamounts around the Quepos Plateau coincides with steeply dipping fracture zones. Transformed focal mechanisms are almost exclusively (>90%) of normal character.

  2. Observation of aftershocks of the 2003 Tokachi-Oki earthquake for estimation of local site effects

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yamanaka, Hiroaki; Motoki, Kentaro; Etoh, Kiminobu; Murayama, Masanari; Komaba, Nobuhiko

    2004-03-01

    Observation of aftershocks of the 2003 Tokachi-Oki earthquake was conducted in the southern part of the Tokachi basin in Hokkaido, Japan for estimation of local site effects. We installed accelerographs at 12 sites in Chokubetsu, Toyokoro, and Taiki areas, where large strong motion records were obtained during the main shock at stations of the K-NET and KiK-net. The stations of the aftershock observation are situated with different geological conditions and some of the sites were installed on Pleistocene layers as reference sites. The site amplifications are investigated using spectral ratio of S-waves from the aftershocks. The S-wave amplification factor is dominant at a period of about 1 second at the site near the KiK-net site in Toyokoro. This amplification fits well with calculated 1D amplification of S-wave in alluvial layers with a thickness of 50 meters. In addition to the site effects, we detected nonlinear amplification of the soft soils only during the main shock. The site effects at the strong motion site of the K-NET at Chokubetsu have a dominate peak at a period of 0.4 seconds. This amplification is due to soft soils having a thickness of about 13 meters. Contrary to the results at the two areas, site effects are not significantly different at the stations in the Taiki area, because of similarity on surface geological conditions.

  3. Outlook on non-proliferation activities in the world and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy among Turkish speaking countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Birsen, N.

    2002-01-01

    Nuclear technology is being widely used in protecting the environment, manufacturing industry, medicine, agriculture, food industry and electricity production. In the world, 438 nuclear power plants are in operation, and 31 are under construction. Nuclear share of total electricity generation have reached to 17 percent. However, 2053 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1999 and 2 atom bombs to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 have initiated nonproliferation activities aiming to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to create a climate where cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be fostered. In addition to international efforts for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, great efforts were made for disarmament and banning the nuclear tests which damage the environment. Following the first Geneva Conference in 1955 for expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Turkey was one of the first countries to start activities in the nuclear field. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) was established in 1956 and Turkey became a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency established in 1957 by the United Nations for spreading the use of nuclear energy to contribute peace, health and prosperity throughout the world in same year. Turkey is a candidate state to join to European Union and has already signed Custom Union Agreement, also part of the Eurasian Region. So, there are significant developments in cultural, social, technical, economical and trade relations owning to our common historical and cultural values with the countries in the region and Central Asia. TAEK was established to support, co-ordinate and perform the activities in peaceful uses of nuclear energy and act as a regulatory body and establish cooperation with countries and international organizations. In the late 1990's TAEK, besides the cooperation with various countries, has involved to cooperating with nuclear institutes of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan for

  4. Information report on the behalf of the foreign affairs, defence and armed forces Commission on France security, nuclear disarmament and non proliferation; Rapport d'information fait au nom de la commission des affaires etrangeres, de la defense et des forces armees (1) sur le desarmement, la non-proliferation nucleaires et la securite de la France

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2010-07-01

    This report first gives an overview of nuclear disarmament and non proliferation twenty years after the end of Cold War: evolution and status of Russia's and United States' nuclear weapon arsenals, France's and United Kingdom's trend to reduce their nuclear armament, reinforcement of China's nuclear armament, effects and limitations of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It notices that the new international context gave birth to some expectations and may lead to a lower nuclear pressure, notably with the influence of START negotiations between Russia and the United States, provided that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is ratified by more countries, and that negotiations promote a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. The report also outlines the importance of the promotion of better controlled peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It discusses the relationship between maintaining the world nuclear order and the reduction of international and regional tensions, and the importance of struggle against all forms of proliferation. It analyses the French nuclear posture in terms of security requirements, and in front of the zero nuclear option, in a context of ballistic missile proliferation, and in relationship with the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe

  5. Along-strike Variations in the Himalayas Illuminated by the Aftershock Sequence of the 2015 Mw 7.8 Gorkha Earthquake Using the NAMASTE Local Seismic Network

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mendoza, M.; Ghosh, A.; Karplus, M. S.; Nabelek, J.; Sapkota, S. N.; Adhikari, L. B.; Klemperer, S. L.; Velasco, A. A.

    2016-12-01

    As a result of the 2015 Mw 7.8 Gorkha earthquake, more than 8,000 people were killed from a combination of infrastructure failure and triggered landslides. This earthquake produced 4 m of peak co-seismic slip as the fault ruptured 130 km east under densely populated cities, such as Kathmandu. To understand earthquake dynamics in this part of the Himalayas and help mitigate similar future calamities by the next destructive event, it is imperative to study earthquake activities in detail and improve our understanding of the source and structural complexities. In response to the Gorkha event, multiple institutions developed and deployed a 10-month long dense seismic network called NAMASTE. It blanketed a 27,650 km2 area, mainly covering the rupture area of the Gorkha earthquake, in order to capture the dynamic sequence of aftershock behavior. The network consisted of a mix of 45 broadband, short-period, and strong motion sensors, with an average spacing of 20 km. From the first 6 months of data, starting approximately 1.5 after the mainshock, we develop a robust catalog containing over 3,000 precise earthquake locations, and local magnitudes that range between 0.3 and 4.9. The catalog has a magnitude of completeness of 1.5, and an overall low b-value of 0.78. Using the HypoDD algorithm, we relocate earthquake hypocenters with high precision, and thus illustrate the fault geometry down to depths of 25 km where we infer the location of the gently-dipping Main Frontal Thrust (MFT). Above the MFT, the aftershocks illuminate complex structure produced by relatively steeply dipping faults. Interestingly, we observe sharp along-strike change in the seismicity pattern. The eastern part of the aftershock area is significantly more active than the western part. The change in seismicity may reflect structural and/or frictional lateral heterogeneity in this part of the Himalayan fault system. Such along-strike variations play an important role in rupture complexities and

  6. High-Resolution Uitra Low Power, Intergrated Aftershock and Microzonation System

    Science.gov (United States)

    Passmore, P.; Zimakov, L. G.

    2012-12-01

    Rapid Aftershock Mobilization plays an essential role in the understanding of both focal mechanism and rupture propagation caused by strong earthquakes. A quick assessment of the data provides a unique opportunity to study the dynamics of the entire earthquake process in-situ. Aftershock study also provides practical information for local authorities regarding the post earthquake activity, which is very important in order to conduct the necessary actions for public safety in the area affected by the strong earthquake. Refraction Technology, Inc. has developed a self-contained, fully integrated Aftershock System, model 160-03, providing the customer simple and quick deployment during aftershock emergency mobilization and microzonation studies. The 160-03 has no external cables or peripheral equipment for command/control and operation in the field. The 160-03 contains three major components integrated in one case: a) 24-bit resolution state-of-the art low power ADC with CPU and Lid interconnect boards; b) power source; and c) three component 2 Hz sensors (two horizontals and one vertical), and built-in ±4g accelerometer. Optionally, the 1 Hz sensors can be built-in the 160-03 system at the customer's request. The self-contained rechargeable battery pack provides power autonomy up to 7 days during data acquisition at 200 sps on continuous three weak motion and triggered three strong motion recording channels. For longer power autonomy, the 160-03 Aftershock System battery pack can be charged from an external source (solar power system). The data in the field is recorded to a built-in swappable USB flash drive. The 160-03 configuration is fixed based on a configuration file stored on the system, so no external command/control interface is required for parameter setup in the field. For visual control of the system performance in the field, the 160-03 has a built-in LED display which indicates the systems recording status as well as a hot swappable USB drive and battery

  7. Nuclear weapons non proliferation treaty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1969-01-01

    Taking into account the devastation that a nuclear war would inflict upon mankind, and the resulting need to do all that is in our power to keep such a tragedy from occuring, as well as to implement measures to safeguard all the peoples' safety, each State that owns nuclear weapons and that is a part of the Treaty pledges not to trade nuclear weapons, other explosive devices nor the control over such instruments to any other entity whatsoever, wether directly or indirectly. Likewise, all States that does not posses any nuclear weaponry and that are part of the Treaty, in turn pledge not to receive from any other entity nuclear weaponry or other explosive devices in trade, wether directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire this fashion of weaponry and not to request or accept any help whatsoever in the manufacturing of nuclear weaponry or related devices. The present Treaty remains open to the subscription of other countries, on July 26, 1968, with Mexico as one of the signatory countries

  8. Ultracentrifuge and non-proliferation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Voortman, A.J.

    1977-01-01

    The author states that there is no meaningful difference, from the point of view of proliferation between peaceful, civil, scientific application of nuclear fission, and the use of it in nuclear weapons. The proliferation of the nuclear technology for weapons appeared and appears to be closely connected with the spread of peaceful applications of nuclear technology. In connection with this, he discusses the Ultracentrifuge plant at Almelo (Netherlands) and the supply of nuclear technology by West-Germany especially to Brazil. Further the changed American policy and the possibility of an American/Russian deal to prevent the spread of the nuclear enrichment technology is discussed

  9. The Non-Proliferation Malaise

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sur, Serge

    2013-01-01

    Issues pertaining to nuclear weapons no longer occupy more than a relatively modest position in the international security field, which is more significantly threatened by recent forms of conflict - particularly asymmetrical -, the contemporary challenges posed by terrorism, the collapse of States and ensuing civil violence, organised crime, massacres, regional destabilisation, and the emerging threats related to deleterious uses of the Internet. Analysing these challenges and threats, and defining and implementing effective responses constitutes the priorities of the international agenda and mobilizes the energy and capabilities of States, alliances and coalitions, and international organisations. The time when the nuclear arms race between the United States and the USSR and the arms control efforts that attempted to frame and control it dominated the international relations scene has passed. This duo has been succeeded by a relative lack of interest on the part of nuclear powers towards their own arms. (author)

  10. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dassen, Lars van; Andersson, Sarmite; Bejarano, Gabriela; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Karlberg, Olof; Olsson, Kjell; Sandberg, Viviana; Stenberg, Tor; Turner, Roland; Zinger, Irene

    2010-06-01

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in a number of projects financed by the European Union. This report gives an overview of the cooperation projects in 2009 as well as the framework in which they are performed. Summaries of each project are given in an Appendix. The project managers in the Section for Cooperation and Development in the Department of International Affairs are responsible for the cooperation projects and the implementation of the bilateral programmes. But the positive outcome of the projects is also dependent on a large number of experts at SSM who work with the regulatory functions in the nuclear and radiation protection fields in a Swedish context as well as on external consultants. Together, their experience is invaluable for the implementation of the projects. But the projects also give experience of relevance for the SSM staff.

  11. Statement to 2010 Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 3 May 2010, New York, USA

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amano, Y.

    2010-01-01

    The IAEA works to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technical cooperation. The IAEA also has a role to play in verifying nuclear disarmament. As all of these activities are relevant to the work of the NPT Review Conference, I would like to provide you with a brief overview of recent developments. As you know, reliable supplies of energy are vital to ensure continued prosperity and sustained development. Nuclear power is enjoying growing acceptance as a stable and clean source of energy that can help to mitigate the impact of climate change. More than 60 countries are considering introducing nuclear power to generate electricity. It is expected that between 10 and 25 new countries will bring their first nuclear power plants online by 2030. Certainly, it is for each sovereign State to decide whether or not to use nuclear power, but the IAEA assists interested countries in establishing a reliable nuclear infrastructure. Nuclear power must be accessible not only for developed countries but also for developing countries. Nuclear power needs to be efficient, sustainable and profitable. Any expansion in its use must be done safely and securely, and without increasing the proliferation risk.A successful NPT Review Conference is indispensable because it will enhance confidence in the non-proliferation regime, which in turn will provide the Agency with a stronger basis for our work in all areas

  12. A study on strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime through the export control system of sensitive materials, equipment and technology related to nuclear activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kikuchi, Masahiro; Kurosawa, Mitsuru; Komizo, Yasuyoshi

    2004-01-01

    The strengthened safeguards caused from safeguards experiences to Iraq and DPRK leads to the expansion of the IAEA's activities for verification of all nuclear activities as well as verification of nuclear material in the States. The purpose of the activities, of course, includes detection of undeclared exports and imports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material. The Additional Protocol to the agreements between States and the IAEA for the application of safeguards requires to the States to declare the exports and imports information regarding specified equipment and non-nuclear material corresponding to the export control list that is established by the nuclear suppliers group. The Additional Protocol also insists the IAEA's right to access to the location identified by the State to resolve a question related to the declarations. Recently, the IAEA detected the black market group of the sensitive materials, equipment and technologies relevant to the nuclear proliferation through the safeguards activities to Iran and Libya. International community stated deeply concerns to the indecent facts. This paper would discuss and propose the supplemental strengthening measures of non-proliferation regime by effective combination of the safeguards activities under additional protocol and the export control regime. (author)

  13. Cooperation in Nuclear Waste Management, Radiation Protection, Emergency Preparedness, Reactor Safety and Nuclear Non-Proliferation with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dassen, Lars van; Andersson, Sarmite; Bejarano, Gabriela; Delalic, Zlatan; Ekblad, Christer; German, Olga; Grapengiesser, Sten; Karlberg, Olof; Olsson, Kjell; Sandberg, Viviana; Stenberg, Tor; Turner, Roland; Zinger, Irene

    2010-06-15

    The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) is trusted with the task of implementing Sweden's bilateral cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and Armenia in the fields of reactor safety, nuclear waste management, nuclear non-proliferation as well as radiation protection and emergency preparedness. In these fields, SSM also participates in a number of projects financed by the European Union. This report gives an overview of the cooperation projects in 2009 as well as the framework in which they are performed. Summaries of each project are given in an Appendix. The project managers in the Section for Cooperation and Development in the Department of International Affairs are responsible for the cooperation projects and the implementation of the bilateral programmes. But the positive outcome of the projects is also dependent on a large number of experts at SSM who work with the regulatory functions in the nuclear and radiation protection fields in a Swedish context as well as on external consultants. Together, their experience is invaluable for the implementation of the projects. But the projects also give experience of relevance for the SSM staff.

  14. U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy: impact on exports and nuclear industry could not be determined. Report to the Congress

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 established new measures to prevent the diversion to weapons use of peaceful nuclear exports. It also created a policy to confirm U.S. reliability as a nuclear supplier. GAO did not identify any export sales lost as a result of the Act, but did find indications that nonproliferation policies can influence export sales. Based on available data, GAO could not determine the impact of the Act on the competitiveness of U.S. nuclear exports. However, U.S. companies are at some disadvantage because importers perceive that implementation of the Act may result in delayed export licenses. The United States dominated the nuclear export market through the early 1970s. However, foreign competitors, some aided by U.S. technology transfers, emerged to monopolize home markets and compete for third-country business. Further, the market has been depressed since 1974 and prospects for U.S. nuclear power plant exports have dimmed greatly. However, U.S. companies continue to view exports as important to sustain production capacity

  15. 2011 Van earthquake (Mw=7.2) aftershocks using the source spectra an approach to real-time estimation of moment magnitude

    Science.gov (United States)

    Meral Ozel, N.; Kusmezer, A.

    2012-04-01

    The Converging Grid Search (CGS) algorithm was tested on broadband waveforms data from large aftershocks of the October 23, Van earthquake with the hypocentral distances within 0-300 km over a magnitude range of 4.0≤M≤5.6.Observed displacement spectra were virtually well adapted to the Brune's source model in the whole frequency range for many waveforms.The estimated Mw solutions were compared to global CMT catalogue solutions, and were seen to be in good agreement. To estimate Mw from a shear-wave displacement spectrum, an automatic routine named as CGS was applied to attempt to test and develop a method for stable moment magnitude estimation to be used as a real-time operation.The spectra were corrected for average an elastic attenuation and geometrical spreading factors and then were scaled to compute moment at the long period asymptote where the spectral plateau for 0 Hz is flat.For this aim, an automatic procedure was utilized: 1)calculating the displacement spectra for vertical components at a given station, 2)estimating corner frequency and seismic moment using CGS which is based on minimizing the differences between observed and synthetic source spectra, 3)calculating moment magnitude from seismic moment for each station separately, and then are averaged to give the mean values of each event. The best fitting iteration of these parameters was obtained after a few seconds. The noise spectrum was also computed to suggest a comparison between signals to noise ratio before performing the inversion.Weak events with low SNR were excluded from the computations. The method examined on the Van earthquake aftershock dataset proved that it is applicable to have stable and reliable estimates of magnitude for the routine processing within a few seconds from the initial P wave detection though the location estimation is necessary.This allows a fast determination of Mw magnitude and assist to measure physical quantities of the source available for the real time

  16. The Text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1974-01-01

    The text of the Agreement between the Philippines and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 16 October 1974, pursuant to Article 25.

  17. Agreement between the Republic of Slovenia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Republic of Slovenia on 1 September 2006 [es

  18. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Estonia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

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    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the Protocol Additional thereto, entered into force for the Czech Republic on 1 October 2009 [es

  20. The Text of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Suspension

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2007-01-01

    The Agreement of 5 April 1973 between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (I) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force for the Slovak Republic on 1 December 2005 [es