Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: The road ahead. London, 15 January 2001

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2001-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the conference given by the Director General of the IAEA at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 15 January 2001. The Director General points out that for over five decades since the summer of 1945, strategies of national and international security have been intertwined with the concept of nuclear weapons as a strategic deterrent. In his view, the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world will crucially depend on a fundamental change in that concept of 'security'. Besides the historical perspectives the paper focuses on the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament strategies. The Director General also states that to achieve the main goal of universal non-proliferation and disarmament it is indispensable to re-evaluate nuclear weapon states status; challenge the doctrine of nuclear deterrence; develop alternatives to nuclear deterrence; and engage in constructive dialogue. In conclusion it is re-emphasized that there remain both the difficulties and the opportunities of the road towards nuclear disarmament. It is pointed out that construction of a non-proliferation regime with near-universal participation has been successful and some progress towards nuclear disarmament has been achieved, but several goals must be pursued to maintain and build upon achievements

Nuclear weapon-free zone, non-proliferation treaty and South Asia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jayaramu, P.S.

1980-01-01

Emergence of and the motivations behind the concept of nuclear weapon free zone, the conceptual linkage between the nuclear weapon free zone and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the problems involved in the implementation of nuclear weapon free zone proposals put forward from time to time are discussed. Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear weapon free zone in South Asia, motivations behind the proposal, and India's response to it are examined. It is pointed out that both the NPT and nuclear weapon free zone indirectly grant a certain amount of legitimacy to the use of nuclear weapons. (M.G.B.)

Nuclear electric power and the proliferation of nuclear weapon states

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Walske, C.

1977-01-01

Control and elimination of the strategic nuclear weapons held by the nuclear weapon states remains the central problem in the arms control and disarmament field. Whether the proliferation of nations with nuclear weapons can be stopped is dubious. A sovereign nation will launch a nuclear weapons program if it has the motivation and resource. Motivation depends on military and political considerations. The necessary resources are economic and technological. Conditions in some sovereign states explain this issue. A survey of commercial nuclear power programs outside the USA lists 45 countries using or planning to use nuclear reactors for power generation. There are currently 112 reactors now operating outside the United States, 117 more under construction, 60 on order, and 180 planned. The U. S. as of December 1976 has 64 operating reactors, 72 under construction, 84 on order, and 8 planned. Nuclear trade and export policies are discussed. In this article, Mr. Walske says that American industry is convinced that the need for nuclear energy abroad is more urgent than in the United States; that in the long run, the breeder reactor must be developed to enable the supply of nuclear fuel to last for centuries; and that the experience of American industry abroad has convinced it that emphasis on restrictive, denial type policies will almost certainly fail--a collapse of what has been gained through the test ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty

Reframing the debate against nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tyson, Rhianna

2005-01-01

'Some 35,000 nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger alert. Whatever rationale these weapons may once have had has long since dwindled. Political, moral, and legal constraints on actually using them further undermine their strategic utility without, however, reducing the risks of inadvertent war or proliferation. The objective of nuclear non-proliferation is not helped by the fact that the nuclear weapon States continue to insist that those weapons in their hands enhance security, while in the hands of others they are a threat to world peace. If we were making steady progress towards disarmament, this situation would be less alarming. Unfortunately, the reverse is true.' - United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 'Something is wrong with the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Although seemingly well-equipped with an arsenal of legal and political mechanisms, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), decades' worth of General Assembly (GA) resolutions and even a recent slew of ad-hoc, plurilateral initiatives such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the regime created to prevent the catastrophe of nuclear war remains inadequate. This insufficiency is even starker when viewed in relation to the regimes controlling other weapons of mass destruction. Despite its own challenges, the Organization for the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons remains relatively well-funded and well-situated to facilitate the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Even the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), while still lacking the necessary verification mechanisms, has managed to effectively criminalize not just the use and threat of use of biological weapons, but also their production, development and stockpiling. Meanwhile, the anti-nuclear regime seems to be faltering. Progress made in

"Securing our survival (SOS": non-state actors and the campaign for a nuclear weapons convention through the prism of securitisation theory

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Renata H. Dalaqua

2013-12-01

Full Text Available This article analyses the security practices of the anti-nuclear movement in the post-Cold War period through the prism of securitisation theory. By exploring Buzan and Wæver's conceptual developments on macrosecuritisations, the practices involved in the struggle against the Bomb are interpreted as securitising moves, in which the anti-nuclear movement is the leading securitiser. In the capacity of securitising actors, nuclear abolition activists argue that nuclear disarmament, under a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC, would be the only way to protect humankind from the threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. The empirical analysis of these non-state actors and their campaign for a NWC shows that, despite uttering security, the anti-nuclear movement has so far failed to achieve the proposed security measure, that is, nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, securitisation has been instrumental for these non-state actors as a way of raising an issue on the agenda of decision-makers and urging them to take action.

Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chang Yenchiang

2009-01-01

This paper examines international treaties in relation to the threat or use of nuclear weapons including the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It can be concluded that the effect of the aforesaid international treaties is still in doubt without explicit enforcement mechanisms and penalty for non-compliance. This paper also reviews the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and comments that a clear explanation on the legality of use of nuclear weapons in 'extreme circumstances of self-defence' is required. Examples from current state practice in relation to nuclear non-proliferation efforts are also provided, with special attention to China, North Korea and Iran. This paper suggests that China as a leader of developing countries should extend its efforts on nuclear non-proliferation and conduct communication between North Korea and Iran and other nuclear weapons states to reduce or prohibit nuclear weapons.

New nuclear weapon states and their impact on Third World regional conflicts

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mazrui, A.A.

1986-01-01

The paper examines the new nuclear weapon states and their impact on third world regional conflicts. Nuclear technology in South Africa, nuclear terrorism and the Arab/Israeli conflict, Islam and the nuclear age, Egypt and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the 'masculinity' of warfare, are all discussed. (UK)

Indonesia ratifies the treaty on non proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Moendi Poernomo

1979-01-01

By Act no. 8 of 1978 Indonesia ratified the treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons. This means that Indonesia became a party to the treaty. Ratification does not guarantee that Indonesia will automatically obtain assistance in developing its nuclear technology capability, but in this way at least Indonesia demonstrates its intention to promote world peace as clearly stated in the Main Guide Lines of State Policy. Development of nuclear technology can be achieved through international cooperation with advanced countries without being suspected of having intention other than peace. (author)

The control of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear development - present uncertainties

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Machado de Faria, N.G.; Amaral Barros, E.

1983-01-01

This report gives the views of Brazilian lawyers on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It deals with the present situation and future prospects concerning the uses of nuclear energy. In particular, it proposes the preparation of a protocol prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

Between Shadow and Light: The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Forty Years On

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Abdelwahab, Biad

2010-01-01

The NPT was negotiated during the Cold War period to prevent the emergence of new nuclear players by distinguishing between 'nuclear-weapon states' (NWS) which had carried out nuclear testing before 1 January 1967, that is the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China, and 'non-nuclear-weapon states' (NNWS). Under the NPT, the two groups of states commit to comply with a series of commitments formulated around 'three pillars': 1 - Non-proliferation: the NWSs undertake under Article I not to transfer nuclear weapons or control over such weapons and not in any way to assist, encourage or induce any NNWS to acquire them, while the NNWSs are bound under Article II to neither develop or acquire nuclear weapons or 'other nuclear explosive devices' nor to receive any assistance in that connection. 2 - Peaceful use of nuclear energy: Article IV guarantees the 'inalienable right' to 'develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination'. 3 - Nuclear disarmament: each state party to the treaty undertakes under Article VI 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'. The treaty entered in force in March 1970 and has since become universal, with 189 states parties in May 2010. At five-year intervals, parties to the treaty convene review conferences in order to review the operation of the treaty, Article VIII(3). The 1975, 1985 and 2000 review conferences culminated in the adoption of a final declaration and the 1995 review conference decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The preparatory committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 review conference, which met from April 2007 to May 2009, did not adopt any recommendations, in absence of a consensus on essential issues concerning the operation of the treaty. Hence the importance of this 8. review conference of the parties held in New York from 3 to 28 May 2010 in a

For a convention for nuclear weapon elimination

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-03-01

This document contains two texts linked with the project of an international convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons (the text of this project has been sent to the UN General Secretary and is part of an international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, ICAN). These two texts are contributions presented in London at the Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-free World. The first one calls into question the deterrence principle and the idea of a nuclear weapon-based security. It calls for different forms of action to promote a nuclear weapon-free world. The second text stresses the role and the responsibility of states with nuclear weapons in nuclear disarmament and in the reinforcement of the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT)

The threat of nuclear terrorism: Nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maerli, Morten Bremer

2001-01-01

Full text: Conventional weaponry and tactics are likely to remain the primary terrorist means for a definitive majority of sub-national groups. No non-state actors have ever deployed or used a nuclear device. However, recent developments in international terrorism may point in the direction of future terrorist uses of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices. Some terrorist groups with a high international profile have showed disturbing interests in acquiring nuclear weapon capabilities. As the 'terrorist nuclear weapon standards' are likely to be lower than the strict requirements for traditional state nuclear weapons, technical barriers should not be considered sufficient to avoid future nuclear terrorist violence. Preventing any extremist group from achieving their goals of large-scale nuclear killing is likely best done by preventing the access to fissile materials through state compliances to rigorous standards of Material Protection, Control and Accountability (MPC and A). (author)

Non-State actors’ pursuit of CBRN weapons: From motivation to potential humanitarian consequences

NARCIS (Netherlands)

Meulenbelt, S.E.; Nieuwenhuizen, M.S.

2016-01-01

This paper discusses non-State actors’ motivation and capacity to develop and use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) improvised weapons in attacks, as well as the possible consequences of such use. Six types of groups have been identified as potential CBRN weapons users that may

Present status of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Netchaev, B.

1976-01-01

The Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons plays an important role in enhancing the security of all States. It is essential to maintain in the implementation of the Treaty an acceptable balance of the mutual responsibilities and obligations of all the countries Party to the Treaty wether or not nuclear weapon States. These questions were discussed during the Conference on the operation of the Treaty held in Geneva in May 1975. It was emphasized at the Conference that the first five years of application of the Treaty had shown a consistent increase in the number of ratifications and in the safeguards agreements concluded on the basis of the Agreement. (N.E.A.) [fr

Export of nuclear equipment and materials and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Courteix, Simone.

1977-01-01

The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of great concern today despite the entry into force in the early '70s of the NPT. To master civilian nuclear technology implies the ability to develop nuclear explosive devices; therefore in recent years contacts have strengthened between countries exporting nuclear equipment, specially in the frame of the 'London Club' so as to ensure that their exports will not result in disseminating nuclear weapons. (NEA) [fr

Non proliferation of nuclear weapons?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Le Guelte, Georges

2015-10-01

After having evoked the behaviour of nuclear countries regarding the development of nuclear weapons and uranium procurement, or nuclear programmes after the Second World War until nowadays, the author presents the non proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a construction at the service of super-powers. He comments and discusses the role of the IAEA control system and its evolutions: a control limited to declared installations, an export control with the spectre of plutonium, a control system thwarted by some technological innovations, information systems coming in, and an additional protocol related to the application of guarantees. He comments the evolution of the context from a bipolar world to a world without pole which raises the issue of how to have commitments respected: description of the role and practice of non proliferation during the Cold War, after the Cold War, and in a world without governance

IAEA safeguards: Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons. As the world's nuclear inspectorate, the IAEA performs an indispensable role in furthering nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Following the completion of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, the IAEA has become the instrument with which to verify that the peaceful use commitments made under the NPT or similar agreements are kept through performing what is known as its safeguards role. Under the NPT, governments around the world have committed to three common objectives: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons; pursuing nuclear disarmament; and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT has made it obligatory for all its non-nuclear weapon State parties to submit all nuclear material in nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, and to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency. With all but a handful of the world community as State parties, the NPT is by far the most widely adhered to legal agreement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. The IAEA takes account of all source and special fissionable material in countries under safeguards. Monitoring and verification activities focus on those types of nuclear material that are the most crucial and relevant to nuclear weapons manufacturing. This includes plutonium-239, uranium-233 and -235 and any material containing one or more of these. Safeguards activities are applied routinely at over 900 facilities in 71 countries. In 2001 alone, more than 21,000 calendar days in the field were devoted to verifying hundreds of tons of special fissionable material by more than IAEA 250 inspectors

Virtual nuclear weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Pilat, J.F.

1997-08-01

The term virtual nuclear weapons proliferation and arsenals, as opposed to actual weapons and arsenals, has entered in recent years the American lexicon of nuclear strategy, arms control, and nonproliferation. While the term seems to have an intuitive appeal, largely due to its cyberspace imagery, its current use is still vague and loose. The author believes, however, that if the term is clearly delineated, it might offer a promising approach to conceptualizing certain current problems of proliferation. The first use is in a reference to an old problem that has resurfaced recently: the problem of growing availability of weapon-usable nuclear materials in civilian nuclear programs along with materials made `excess` to defense needs by current arms reduction and dismantlement. It is argued that the availability of these vast materials, either by declared nuclear-weapon states or by technologically advanced nonweapon states, makes it possible for those states to rapidly assemble and deploy nuclear weapons. The second use has quite a different set of connotations. It is derived conceptually from the imagery of computer-generated reality. In this use, one thinks of virtual proliferation and arsenals not in terms of the physical hardware required to make the bomb but rather in terms of the knowledge/experience required to design, assemble, and deploy the arsenal. Virtual weapons are a physics reality and cannot be ignored in a world where knowledge, experience, materials, and other requirements to make nuclear weapons are widespread, and where dramatic army reductions and, in some cases, disarmament are realities. These concepts are useful in defining a continuum of virtual capabilities, ranging from those at the low end that derive from general technology diffusion and the existence of nuclear energy programs to those at the high end that involve conscious decisions to develop or maintain militarily significant nuclear-weapon capabilities.

A nuclear-weapon-free Middle East

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jortner, Joshua

1986-01-01

The paper examines the issue of nuclear-weapon States involvement in regional conflicts, and whether such a conflict in the Middle East could trigger a nuclear war between the Super-Powers. Comments on the Middle Eastern situation are given, along with a discussion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Middle East, Israel and the NPT, and the nuclear potential in Arab countries. The proposal, by Israel, of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East is outlined. (UK)

Nuclear weapons free zones

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Stahl, K.

1990-01-01

The article analyses the concept and problems of the two nuclear weapons free zones in Latin America and in the South Pacific established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga. So far the nuclear weapons states except China have refused to sign the additional protocols of the Treaties or have signed them only with considerable provisos. Therefore they don't fully recognize the nuclear weapons free status of those zones, or they don't recognize it at all. Both Treaties contain no provisions to regulate the transit of nuclear weapons through the zones. This allows de facto the stationing of nuclear weapons in the military bases of the US which are located within the nuclear weapons free zone of Latin America. The Treaty of Tlatelolco contains also the right of the states, party to the Treaty, to explode nuclear devices for peaceful purposes. Since peaceful and military nuclear explosions cannot be distinguished technically, this right could also undermine the nuclear weapons free status of the region. Important nuclear threshold countries like Argentina and Brazil have furthermore refrained from putting the Treaty into force. (orig.) [de

Towards the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Xie Zhiqiong

1998-01-01

For 40 years, the Pugwash Conference on Science and world affairs has been making unremitting efforts to achieve it main objectives the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons, the elimination of wars and maintenance of world peace. The end of the Cold War vigorously encouraged world efforts in arms control and disarmament. On the day of exploding her first nuclear bomb in October 1964, China declared solemnly that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time under any circumstances. China has also committed unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear free zones. China is the sole nuclear weapon state that has made this commitment, and she has kept her word. China is in favour of comprehensive nuclear test ban in the move towards complete nuclear disarmament, taking an active part in the CTBT negotiations in Geneva and contributing to the conclusion of a fair, reasonable, verifiable treaty of universal adherence and unlimited duration within this year

Is the nuclear weapon taboo? The nuclear weapon is useless and expensive. Let us not leave the nuclear weapon as an inheritance

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gauchet, Nathalie; Norlain, Bernard; Beach, Hugh; Beckett, Margaret; Quiles, Paul; Rocard, Michel; Ramsbotham, David

2012-03-01

Starting with the definition of the word taboo as stated in a dictionary (a topic it would be unbecoming to evoke, under social and moral proprieties), the author of the first article discusses the status of the nuclear weapon, outlining that it is expensive, useless and monstrous. She notices that conventions on chemical weapons seem to be more efficient than the NPT, that, even if the reasons for abolition are known as well as ways to reach it, it seems difficult to actually address this issue. She evokes different voices coming from different countries or international bodies calling for this abolition. She also states that the nuclear weapon is not a deterrent weapon but a weapon of domination, and calls for the mobilisation of the civil society throughout the world. A second article states that the nuclear weapon is useless and expensive, and that we have to get rid of this hazard for the sake of the planet. Former ministers, Prime ministers, and generals consider that we can and must give up nuclear weapons, notably because the strategic context has completely changed since the fall of the Berlin wall, and support the action of Global Zero

Nuclear power and nuclear weapons proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1978-01-01

An appropriate non-proliferation treaty should not discriminate among the non-weapon states, but should seek a cooperative approach with all countries seeking nuclear power and willing to accept international safeguards. Near-term proliferation problems, represented by nations already on the threshold of weapon capability, should not be confused with the long-term problem of world-wide nuclear development. The first can be handled with incentives and disincentives imposed on specific countries, while the latter involves the distribution of plutonium on the basis of alternative fuel cycles. To retain world leadership, U.S. efforts along these lines should be to encourage a dialogue between suppliers and recipients and to coordinate the economic and security issues of its own non-proliferation and foreign policies. One option is a U.S. commitment to a multinational fuel storage and reprocessing facility. Technical evaluation and demonstration of alternative fuel cycles to reach an international consensus would be a parallel activity

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 2005 review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005, United Nations, New York, USA

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2005-01-01

The core of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons can be summed up in two words: 'Security' and 'Development'. While the States Party to this Treaty hold differing priorities and views, I trust that all share these two goals: development for all through advanced technology; and security for all by reducing - and ultimately eliminating - the nuclear threat. These shared goals were the foundation on which the international community, in 1970, built this landmark Treaty. They agreed to work towards a world free of nuclear weapons. They agreed, while working towards this goal, to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States. And they agreed to make the peaceful applications of nuclear energy available to all. Folded together, these agreements, these commitments, are mutually reinforcing. They are as valid today as when they were first made - and even more urgent. What should be all too evident is that, if we cannot work together, each acknowledging the development priorities and security concerns of the other, then the result of this Conference will be inaction. In five years, since the 2000 NPT Review Conference the world has changed. Our fears of a deadly nuclear detonation, whatever the cause, have been reawakened. These realities have heightened the awareness of vulnerabilities in the NPT regime. The Treaty has served us well for 35 years. But unless we regard it as part of a living, dynamic regime - capable of evolving to match changing realities, it will fade into irrelevance and leave us vulnerable and unprotected. The expectations from this Conference are to: re-affirm the goals established in 1970; strengthen the IAEA's verification authority; control over proliferation sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle (activities that involve uranium enrichment and plutonium separation); secure and control nuclear material; show the world that our commitment to nuclear disarmament is firm; back the verification efforts by an

Nuclear deterrence in second tier nuclear weapon states: a case study of India

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sethi, Manpreet

2009-12-01

Nuclear deterrence today anchors the national security of all states that possess nuclear weapons. Certain principles or requirements of nuclear deterrence are the same for all such countries. For instance, the ability to threaten with unacceptable damage, or the ability to raise the costs of an action that an adversary might want to take by threatening punishment that would make the act seem meaningless and even regrettable. But must every nuclear nation indulge in an exercise of large-scale warhead accumulation or yield refinements through nuclear testing, or creation of elaborate nuclear war fighting plans in order to claim credible deterrence? Can the practice of deterrence in the second tier states follow a different course? The study examines the manner in which India is engaged in constructing a credible and stable deterrence relationship with two of its nuclear armed adversaries, Pakistan and China with an arsenal much smaller, and command and control structures far simpler than in any of the P-5 nations. Does this difference impact the nature of its nuclear deterrence? In its efforts at creating and sustaining credible nuclear deterrence should India necessarily be expected to follow the same path and rules as those of the P-5? Would it be compelled to build hundreds of warheads and a huge weapons infrastructure? Would a deterrence based on anything less not be credible or stable? The study concludes that even countries with small nuclear arsenals behave no differently from states that possess several thousands of such weapons. The assumption that small nuclear arsenals and rudimentary command and control lend themselves to temptations of easy nuclear use is misplaced. Credible nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan or India and China would hold on the same bases it has held elsewhere - fear of nuclear destruction, imposition of unacceptable damage, and the ability to rationally calculate and weigh the benefits against the costs of use of nuclear

Statement to Second Conference of States Parties to African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, 12 November 2012, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amano, Y.

2012-01-01

It is a great pleasure for me to address this Second Conference of States Parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba. I compliment the countries of Africa for their tenacity in pursuing the goal of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone for decades, until the Treaty finally entered into force in 2009. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are a highly effective means of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. The five nuclear-weapon-free zones in existence today cover a total of 113 countries. Each has its own special characteristics, but they also have many important elements in common. All nuclear-weapon-free zones prohibit the development, stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in their respective regions. They all cover large inhabited areas. They provide for IAEA verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have brought real security benefits, both regionally and to the whole world. The Treaty of Pelindaba incorporates a number of special features, including some measures which go beyond undertakings assumed by States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) . For example, it makes provision for the dismantling and destruction of nuclear explosive devices manufactured by a Party to the Treaty before the Treaty entered into force. It prohibits attacks on nuclear installations in the nuclear-weapon-free zone. It bars the dumping of radioactive waste within the zone. In addition, the Treaty of Pelindaba contains a commitment to promote the use of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development. Parties are encouraged to make use of the assistance of the IAEA. They also pledge to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment. In the Preamble to the Treaty, the Parties recognise that the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, especially in the Middle East, would enhance their security. Last November, I hosted an

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the statement of the Director General of the IAEA to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 24 April 2000. The speech focus on the IAEA activities relevant to the implementation of the Treaty, namely: verification through the IAEA safeguards, peaceful nuclear co-operation in the field of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental pollution monitoring, training

Re-examining the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion: Concerning the Legality of Nuclear Weapons

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Jasjit Singh

2012-10-01

Full Text Available The primary objections raised against total elimination of nuclear weapons are built around a few arguments mostly of non-technical nature.Nuclear weapons and the strategies for their use have resulted in the establishment of a vicious circle within which the international community is trapped.The argument that the world will be unsafe without nuclear weapons is only meant to further the narrow self-interest of the nuclear weapon states and their allies.The World Court’s far-reaching 1996 advisory opinion concluded that almost any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate international humanitarian law and law applicable in armed conflict, undermining most claims of nuclear weapon states regarding the legitimacy of possession, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The next logical step would be an initiative for a nuclear convention banning the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons in Asia and the adjoining oceans. But as long as the dominant elites in society and the nation-state believe in the utility of nuclear weapons for national security or as the currency of power, abolition of nuclear weapons will remain a mirage.

Issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mirsaidov, U.M.

2010-01-01

This article is devoted to issues of weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation in Tajikistan. Over a period of 20 century, starting from First World War, the weapons of mass destruction arouse serious concern of world community. Geneva protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. Once nuclear weapon was created, the weapons of mass destruction distributions become the subject of high concern. Besides, during the end of 'cold war', regional conflicts, collapse of Soviet Union, as well as access to sensitive technologies considerably increase the danger of weapons of mass destruction distribution. More than 10 countries have active programs, relating to weapons of mass destruction and, possibly, more than ten countries have potential to start implementing such kinds of programs. Nowadays, trans national organized criminal groups and international terrorist networks are appeared in the world scene, which show interest in obtaining an access to sensitive materials, technologies, weapons and their distribution. After 11 September events, the risk of such weapons of mass destruction components use by such forces for Governments blackmail become real scene, which, despite of low possibility of this threat implementation, could have very serious and disastrous consequences. International community responded to these problems and challenges, basically through the following actions, which is detailed regime development of multilateral international treaties, directed to weapons of mass destruction distribution prevention. Non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, Convention on prohibition of chemical weapons and Convention on prohibition of biological and toxin weapons are some of them. As it is known, Tajikistan signed all these treaties. For different reasons these treaties were subject of serious tests. Nuclear weapons tests in India and Pakistan in 1998 year, actual Israel status as state having nuclear weapon and North Korean program on

Nuclear weapons and the World Court ruling

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Singh, J.

1998-01-01

based on the initiatives by non-governmental organizations, the World Health Organisation (WHO) Assembly asked the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion in 1993 whether, considering the environmental and health consequences, the use of nuclear weapons by a state in war or other armed conflict would be a breach of its obligations under international law. The World Court decided that it was not able to give an advisory opinion as requested, because of the fact that questions of use of force and such like were beyond the scope of specialized agencies like the WHO. The Court has ruled that the international community, especially the five nuclear weapon states have not only an obligation to negotiate a treaty for total nuclear disarmament, but also have an obligation to conclude such treaty. We may expect that the nuclear weapon states will cynically disregard the ruling of the World Court as they have been doing to the basic obligation itself in pursuit of nuclear hegemony. But the remaining 150 countries or so also bear a responsibility to keep nudging the recalcitrant states into implementing their commitments to disarm

The history of Finnish nuclear non-proliferation policy during the cold war. What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ahosniemi, A.

2004-03-01

This article is a summary of the Finnish historical survey during the Cold War. In the article, I try to show how the Finnish Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy during the Cold War is linked to the broader context of the Finnish foreign and security policy. In the research report I have focused on several questions. One of the most important is the following: What did the Finns know about nuclear weapons during the Cold War? And in this context scientific knowledge is meant by knowing something about nuclear weapons. Basically, the Finnish national based survey of nuclear non-proliferation policy attempted to investigate issues like the kind of research concerning Nuclear Technology in general, Nuclear weapons, and Nuclear weapon policies of super powers in Finland during the Cold War era. (author)

Can we stop the spread of nuclear weapons?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blix, H.

1990-02-01

In his address to the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, IAEA Director General Hans Blix reviewed the world's non-proliferation regime and the role of IAEA safeguards in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the first and fundamental barrier to proliferation is the political will and determination of individual States not to acquire nuclear weapons, other barriers being legal obligations under treaties or agreements and the acceptance of safeguards inspections to verify peaceful uses of nuclear facilities

A Poor Man's Nuclear Deterrent: Assessing the Value of Radiological Weapons for State Actors

Science.gov (United States)

Donohue, Nathan

The threat of weapons of mass destruction is an issue which remains at the forefront on national security. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are all considered very dangerous by both state and non-state actors. Radiological weapons exist in that same category yet are not held in the same regard; the reason that is given is that these types of weapons are not the weapons of mass destruction that the other three are. Instead, radiological weapons are better considered weapons of mass disruption. Accordingly, in the academic and policy literature there has been very little perceived value associated with such weapons for use by state actors. However the historical focus on the military efficacy of radiological weapons has obscured the obvious truth that they may pose significant value for state actors. What this research shows is that the explosion of a radiological weapon could disrupt a target area in ways which could cripple the economy of an adversary state and promote widespread fear concerning exposure to radiation. Any such attack would not only necessitate large scale evacuation, but cleanup, decontamination, demolition, territory exclusion, and relocation. Moreover, the effects of such an attack would be unlikely to remain an isolated event as evacuated and displaced citizens spread across the nation carrying both fear and residual radiation. All of these factors would only be compounded by a state actor's ability to not only develop such weapons, but to manufacture them in such a composition that contemporary examples of such weapons grossly underestimate their impact. Accordingly, radiological weapons could hold great value for any state actor wishing to pursue their development and to threaten their use. Moreover, "while RDDs may not be well suited as "military weapons" in the classic sense, the use of RDDs could be powerfully coercive."1 In that sense, state actors could even acquire radiological weapons for their deterrent value. 1James L. Ford

Norm of nuclear weapons non-use and deterrence: interaction of the conceptions in case of usa

OpenAIRE

Bladaitė, Neringa

2016-01-01

Norm of Nuclear Weapons Non-use and Deterrence: Interaction of the Conceptions in Case of USA The problem that is analyzed in this master thesis is formed according the paradox. Although, US is thought to be the county that maintains norm of non-use, in the practice US forms the strategy according nuclear deterrence. The object of this master thesis is nuclear weapons posture of US during the period of 2009-2015. The main aim of this thesis is to explore posture of US nuclear weapons use base...

Can state-level safeguards be applied in nuclear weapon states?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Listner, Clemens; Canty, Morton J. [Forschungszentrum Juelich (Germany); Rezniczek, Arnold [UBA GmbH, Herzogenrath (Germany); Stein, Gotthard

2013-07-01

Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) is a key element of IAEA's State-level concept. Currently, this process is mainly based on expert judgment. However, the requirements from the IAEA state that the process must be objective, reproducible, transparent, standardized, documented and as a result non-discriminatory. A formal approach fulfilling these requirements has been set up by the authors in the past. In this paper, the refined methodology is presented. Improvements have been made in the interface definition between the three stages, the general network model has been updated, and the automatic visualization of acquisition paths has been accomplished. Furthermore, a prototype implementation will be shown. Based on this methodology, a test case example is presented which models a hypothetic nuclear weapon State not having signed the NPT. For this case, it will be shown how APA can be implemented using the proposed methodology.

North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Implications for future policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pollack, J.D.

2010-01-01

This essay assesses North Korea's long-standing quest for nuclear weapons; alternative strategies for inhibiting Pyongyang's weapons development; and the potential implications for regional security and nonproliferation should the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) retain and enhance its weapons programs. North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability has long provoked heated debate among policy makers and research analysts about the purposes of engagement with the North, reflecting the repeated frustrations in efforts to negotiate Korean denuclearization. These debates reflect widely divergent views of the North Korean regime; its sustainability as an autonomous political, economic, and military system; and the potential consequences of continued nuclear development in this isolated, highly idiosyncratic state. These questions assume additional salience as North Korea approaches a leadership succession for only the second time in its six-decade history. The effort to inhibit North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is among the longest running and least successful sagas in international security and non-proliferation policy of the past quarter century. In early 2010, Pyongyang claims a rudimentary nuclear capability by possession of weaponized plutonium, the conduct of two nuclear tests, and advances in the production of enriched uranium as an alternative means of fissile material production, though the latter step is nominally justified as a source for reactor fuel. North Korea defends its pursuit of a nuclear deterrent to counter what Pyongyang deems existential threats posed by the United States.Despite the resumption of high-level diplomatic contact between Washington and Pyongyang in late 2009, realization of a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula remains a very remote prospect. The DPRK insists that a peace agreement between the U.S. and North Korea and hence the cessation of 'hostile DPRK-U.S. relations' are necessary before any consideration of

Nuclear power without nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kaiser, K.; Klein, F.J.

1982-01-01

In this study leading experts summarize the work of a working group meeting during several years, and they represent the state of the art of the international discussion about the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The technical basis of proliferation, the relations between energy policy and nuclear energy, as well as the development of the non-proliferation system up to the present are thoroughly studied. Special attention is paid to the further development of the instruments of the non-proliferation policy, and approaches and ways to improving the control of the fuel cycle, e.g. by means of multinational methods or by improving the control requirements are analyzed. Also the field of positive inducements and negative sanctions to prevent the proliferation as well as the question of ensured supply are elucidated in detail. A further section then analyzes the functions of the international organizations active in this field and the nuclear policy of the most important western industrial nations, the RGW-states and the threshold countries of the Third World. This volume pays special attention to the nuclear policy of the Federal Republic of Germany and to the possibilities and necessities of a further development of the non-proliferation policy. (orig.) [de

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the process for its enhanced review on the eve of the 2000 review conference

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pinel, C.

2000-01-01

This article sets out the principle and essentials of the process for reviewing the operation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970. In 1995 the NPT was extended. The 2000 review conference is of considerable importance for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly in the light of the fact that after the indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states urged the nuclear-weapon states to take new steps towards nuclear disarmament. This article presents a review of the 30 year period of the application of NPT

Nuclear weapons: new threats, new challenges

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Durand, D.

2005-01-01

After a brief history of the Iranian nuclear crisis since 2003, the author discusses the four aspects of this crisis which make it a textbook case: a country which wants to control the whole nuclear process and therefore may reach the capacity to produce military-grade uranium (this raises the question of the relationship between nuclear energy and disarmament), the validity and efficiency of international controls is at stake, divergence may appear on the ways to have international treaties respected (different approaches between Europe and the USA), a country which is looking for nuclear weapon for matters of regional security and power (this raises the issue of a new approach to security). Then, the author describes the new nuclear threats: proliferating states, terrorist groups, and states with nuclear weapons (attitude of the USA, China, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, perspective of a nuclear disarmament of Europe). He gives an overview of the current status of disarmament and of treaties (START, NPT), and discusses the opportunities to save the non proliferation treaty from collapsing in 2005

Dangers associated with civil nuclear power programmes: weaponization and nuclear waste.

Science.gov (United States)

Boulton, Frank

2015-07-24

The number of nuclear power plants in the world rose exponentially to 420 by 1990 and peaked at 438 in 2002; but by 2014, as closed plants were not replaced, there were just 388. In spite of using more renewable energy, the world still relies on fossil fuels, but some countries plan to develop new nuclear programmes. Spent nuclear fuel, one of the most dangerous and toxic materials known, can be reprocessed into fresh fuel or into weapons-grade materials, and generates large amounts of highly active waste. This article reviews available literature on government and industry websites and from independent analysts on world energy production, the aspirations of the 'new nuclear build' programmes in China and the UK, and the difficulties in keeping the environment safe over an immense timescale while minimizing adverse health impacts and production of greenhouse gases, and preventing weaponization by non-nuclear-weapons states acquiring civil nuclear technology.

After fifty years of the nuclear age: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or elimination of them?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sugie, Ei-Ichi

1997-01-01

Ever since the first test of the atomic bomb and the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, mankind lived with nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were inevitably connected with the Cold War, with its end new opportunity has come concerning prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. Steps are to be undertaken in order to eliminate the nuclear weapons. First, would be the prohibition of the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. By excluding the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, the world could be closer to nuclear disarmament than ever. The prohibition of the use of some type of weapons could be a breakthrough towards the elimination of such weapons. While the negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons would be difficult, as were those to ban chemical weapons, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons would eventually lead to their elimination. During the Cold War, the imminent goal of disarmament was to stop the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. But in the post-Cold War era an opportunity has developed for further steps towards nuclear disarmament, the elimination of nuclear weapons

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lodding, Jan; Kinley, David III

2002-09-01

One of the most urgent challenges facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system for verification in order to increase the likelihood of detecting any clandestine nuclear weapons programme in breach of international obligations. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared nuclear material in a State but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Realising the full potential of the strengthened system will require that all States bring into force their relevant safeguards agreements, as well as additional protocols thereto. Today, 45 years after the Agency's foundation, its verification mission is as relevant as ever. This is illustrated by the special challenges encountered with regard to verification in Iraq and North Korea in the past decade. Moreover, the horrifying events of 11 September 2001 demonstrated all too well the urgent need to strengthen worldwide control of nuclear and other radioactive material. The IAEA will continue to assist States in their efforts to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and to prevent, detect and respond to illegal uses of nuclear and radioactive material. Adherence by as many States as possible to the strengthened safeguards system is a crucial component in this endeavour

The immediate need for US universities to promote research related to a nuclear-weapon-free world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ionno, S.

1999-01-01

If disarmament is a goal, then the requisite skills must be fostered in academic research. Too many students today view nuclear weapons as a non-issue. It is crucial that those people in positions of influence encourage more young people to explore in-depth the political, scientific, and social changes that a nuclear-weapon-free world will require. The data presented are based on a search of nuclear-weapons-related keywords in the UMI Dissertation Abstracts Database which includes work from over 1000 North American graduate schools and European Universities. The search was focused on US Phd dissertations between 1987 and 1996. There was no PhDs focused on issues such as: zero-level nuclear-weapons-free world; nuclear-weapons-free zones; decreasing nuclear alert status; a nuclear weapons convention; no-first-use or-no use against non-nuclear-weapons-states; START; French nuclear weapons; a possible 'Eurobomb'; peace groups outside the USA, UK, and Germany; nuclear-weapons secrecy; funding disarmament; the role od UN in a nuclear-weapons-free world; an so on

Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blix, H.; Journe, V.

2010-01-01

This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

Nuclear weapons proliferation and the new world order

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Krause, J.

1994-01-01

The proliferation of nuclear weapons has become the priority safety problem since the end of the cold war. The danger that new nuclear states may arise from the former Soviet Union, the limited effectiveness of existing control systems, the increased attractiveness of nuclear weapons for countries in which a 'safety vacuum' has developed since the withdrawal of American and Russian forces, as well as the danger that additional nuclear states (China, India, Pakistan) may become unstable or disintegrate, make it necessary to explore and show the ensuing risks. The study contains analyses from well-respected experts from Germany, Russia, Japan and the USA. They show how the changes in regional security situations could lead to nuclear risks under certain circumstances, and the likely international consequences. A second point of emphasis consens the feasibility of new approaches or instruments in international non-proliferatic policy. New possibilities for the improvement of excisting control systems and the extension of international consensus on an intensification of the non-proliferation regime are offered by the changes in world politics. (orig.) [de

The return of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Calvez, Jean-Yves

2005-01-01

Written after the 2005 NPT review conference, this article first recalls the early stages of nuclear proliferation: acquisition of nuclear weapons by Great-Britain, USSR, France and China, and creation of the NPT in 1970. The author briefly evokes some weaknesses and violations of this treaty: emergence of new nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, Israel) and of nuclear weapon programmes (Iran, North Korea). He outlines the lack of true rules to impede countries to develop nuclear weapons, and then states that the only solution seems to be a simple abolition of these weapons. This option is notably supported by the Catholic Church as outlined and recalled here. The author discusses the situation of this abolition option, and notices that, even though NPT members committed themselves on this way, some also decided to develop new and smaller weapons. Then, it becomes always more difficult to persuade countries not to possess these weapons. The author finally discusses the issues of terrorism threat in relationship to the miniaturisation process, and regrets the lack of commitment in an abolition process

The abolition of nuclear weapons: realistic or not? For physicians, a world without nuclear weapons is possible and above all necessary. To abolish, did you say abolish? Is the elimination of the nuclear weapon realistic?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Behar, Abraham; Gere, Francois; Lalanne, Dominique

2010-06-01

In a first article, a physician explains that eliminating nuclear weapons would be a way to get rid of the temptation for some persons to use this arm of massive destruction, and that it would be better for mankind to live without this threat. The author of the second article discusses the effect abolition could have, and, with a reference to President Obama's position about zero nuclear weapons, outlines that it could be at the benefit of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He also discusses the perspectives of this 'global zero logics' with a new approach to arms control, and comments the relationships between abolition and non proliferation. He finally discusses the reserved attitude of France on these issues. In the next contribution, a nuclear physicist wanders whether the elimination of nuclear weapons is realistic: whereas it has always been a political objective, nuclear states refused to commit themselves in this direction in 2010 and keep on developing military-oriented tools to design new weapons

The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Oelgaard, P.L.

1994-01-01

During the later years the risks of nuclear proliferation have again become a major topic of interest. This is primarily due to the acute problems caused by Iraq, North Korea, and the 3 new states of the former USSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Analysis shows that security problems and prestige are the two most important motives, when the risks of proliferation are considered. But motives are not enough. To produce nuclear weapons a number of technological requirements must also be fulfilled. The country must be able to produce almost pure fissile material, i.e. 235 U or 239 Pu. It must also be able to solve a number of metallurgical, explosive, ignition, physics and other problems. These are in particular non-trivial, if a implosion weapon is to be designed. A review is made of the nuclear facilities in a number of the countries which have been suggested as possible future nuclear weapons countries. In particular facilities which can produce almost pure fissile materials, 235 U and 239 Pu, are considered. The possibility of nuclear terrorists have often been discussed in the media. However, it seems very unlikely that even a major terrorist or mafia organization will be able to solve all the weapons design problems, even if they could steal the fissile material. It is finally discussed what can be done to reduce the risk of further nuclear proliferation. Political pressure can be brought to bear on countries outside the NPT to join it, but it can be counter-productive, and sometimes the countries that are able to exert such pressure, are not willing to do so for other political reasons. The problem of countries which are party to the NPT, but which are believed to acquire nuclear weapons capability in violation of the treaty, can be countered by unannounced inspections of non-declared facilities. However, such inspections can only be meaningfully performed if the necessary intelligence is available. (EG)

The US nuclear weapon infrastructure and a stable global nuclear weapon regime

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Immele, John D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Wagner, Richard L [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01

US nuclear weapons capabilities -- extant force structure and nuclear weapons infrastructure as well as declared policy -- influence other nations' nuclear weapons postures, at least to some extent. This influence can be desirable or undesirable, and is, of course, a mixture of both. How strong the influence is, and its nature, are complicated, controversial, and -- in our view -- not well understood but often overstated. Divergent views about this influence and how it might shape the future global nuclear weapons regime seem to us to be the most serious impediment to reaching a national consensus on US weapons policy, force structure and supporting infrastructure. We believe that a paradigm shift to capability-based deterrence and dissuasion is not only consistent with the realities of the world and how it has changed, but also a desirable way for nuclear weapon postures and infrastructures to evolve. The US and other nuclear states could not get to zero nor even reduce nuclear arms and the nuclear profile much further without learning to manage latent capability. This paper has defined three principles for designing NW infrastructure both at the 'next plateau' and 'near zero.' The US can be a leader in reducing weapons and infrastructure and in creating an international regime in which capability gradually substitutes for weapons in being and is transparent. The current 'strategy' of not having policy or a Congressionally-approved plan for transforming the weapons complex is not leadership. If we can conform the US infrastructure to the next plateau and architect it in such a way that it is aligned with further arms reductions, it will have these benefits: The extant stockpile can be reduced in size, while the smaller stockpile still deters attack on the US and Allies. The capabilities of the infrastructure will dissuade emergence of new challenges/threats; if they emerge, nevertheless, the US will be able to deal with them in

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Mexican States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the United Mexican States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 9 March 2004. It was signed on 29 March 2004 in Vienna, Austria. Pursuant to Article 17 of the Additional Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on 4 March 2011, the date on which the Agency received from the United Mexican States written notification that Mexico's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met

FMCT after South Asia's tests. A view from a nuclear-weapon state

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dunn, L.A.

1998-01-01

Proposals to negotiate an international treaty to cutoff the production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons have been on the international nuclear agenda for many decades. Hopes in the early 1990s that it would be possible finally to negotiate a FMCT, however, have not been borne out. Instead, a deadlock had ensued at the Geneva CD. It remains to be seen whether the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan will contribute to breaking that deadlock - or only to foreclosing any prospects for negotiating cutoff in the foreseeable future. The key lies in the attitudes of Delhi and Islamabad - influenced to the extent possible by the efforts of the international community to convince both countries' leaders to stop short of an escalating nuclear war in the region. Regardless, there are a variety of other initiatives aimed at heightening transparency and controls over the nuclear weapons materials in the five NPT nuclear weapon states that could be pursued as part of broader ongoing efforts to roll back the Cold War nuclear legacies

Scientists for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Transactions of international seminar

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

This publication presents the results of the Second International Seminar 'Scientists for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. The Seminar took place from 11 to 14 October 1994 in Nakhabino Country Club near Moscow. More than 60 specialists from Russia, USA, France, Belgium as well as IAEA and CEU took part in the seminar. Problems of cooperation in the field of nuclear materials accounting, control and safeguards, physical protection of nuclear materials, nuclear export regulations and disarmament control are discussed at the seminar

Precursor of other nuclear-weapon-free zones

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Roman-Morey, E.

1997-01-01

Based on the analysis of the long process of negotiations for implementing the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its history during the last three decades, especially its influence on other regions of the world for stimulating the creation of new nuclear-weapon-free zones, the following conclusions were drawn: nuclear danger still persists; the end of Cold War implies the end of a nuclear threat; the nuclear fear should not become nuclear complacency and be accepted by international community; common security as the goal of international community should be recognised and definitive abolition of nuclear weapons should be sought; the Treaty of Tlatelolco represents the cornerstone for creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones; Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba should be examples to be followed by other regions and groups of countries for creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones which should be recognised as very important phase in achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world and means for attaining an international regime of non-proliferation of weapons for mass destruction

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1970-04-22

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [fr

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-10-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depositary Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [ru

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-01-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970 [es

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Notification of the Entry into Force

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1970-04-01

By letters addressed to the Director General on 5, 6 and 20 March 1970 respectively, the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are designated as the Depository Governments in Article IX. 2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, informed the Agency that the Treaty had entered into force on 5 March 1970

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Graham, Thomas Jr. [7609 Glenbrook Rd., Bethesda, MD 20814 (United States)

2014-05-09

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

For a convention for nuclear weapon elimination; Pour une convention d'elimination des armes nucleaires

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2008-03-15

This document contains two texts linked with the project of an international convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons (the text of this project has been sent to the UN General Secretary and is part of an international campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, ICAN). These two texts are contributions presented in London at the Global Summit for a Nuclear Weapon-free World. The first one calls into question the deterrence principle and the idea of a nuclear weapon-based security. It calls for different forms of action to promote a nuclear weapon-free world. The second text stresses the role and the responsibility of states with nuclear weapons in nuclear disarmament and in the reinforcement of the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT)

The prevention of geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons: Nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in the Southern hemisphere

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fujita, E.

1989-01-01

It is understandable that many Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) worry about the dangers of further geographical or spatial proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the extension to their regions of rivalries that are foreign to them. In this regard, there has been since the 1950's a number of proposals and initiatives to turn specific regions into nuclear-weapons-free zones and zones of peace in order to prevent or reduce the above mentioned threats. Although differences exits between the concepts of nuclear-weapon-free-zones and zones of peace as well as among the various NWFZ and ZP, inter se, they do share a common feature insofar as they represent a regional approach to the question of curbing the arms race, especially the nuclear one. This study will address some of these initiatives, examine their specific characteristics and assess their role in the prevention of the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Among the relevant existing initiatives, those situated in the Southern Hemisphere offer an interesting focus of attention, in view of the fact that, together, they form a sort of a contiguous geographical area encompassing virtually half of the globe. The regions covered are the Antarctic, Latin American, South Pacific, South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The first three have been established as nuclear-weapons-free-zones and the last two are in the process of being turned into zones of peace. The aim of this study is to compare similarities and differences among them and to identify the factors that condition their efficiency. By understanding their usefulness and their weaknesses, one many eventually construct useful paradigms for further regional initiatives to curb the arms race, specially the nuclear one

Nuclear power and nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Vaughen, V.C.A.

1983-01-01

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the expanded use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity and other peaceful uses are compared. The difference in technologies associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants are described

The future of nuclear weapons in Europe workshop summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Larsen, J.A.; Garrity, P.J.

1991-12-01

A summary is presented of a workshop that addressed the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. The workshop topics included the evolving European security environment; the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and nuclear weapons; the United States, NATO, and nuclear weapons; and Western Europe and nuclear weapons. The workshop, held at Los Alamos July 26, 1991, was sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies of the Los Alamos National Laboratory

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons - crisis of a concept

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eisenbart, C.; Ehrenstein, D. von

1990-01-01

The Working Group of FEST (Protestant Study Community) and VDW (Association of German Scientists) presents twelve theses on the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and deduces recommendations, in particular for the Federal Government. The WG thinks that scope and significance of international nuclear policy has not been sufficiently perceived neither by the German public nor by politicians. The theses are supplemented and explained in more detail by special contributions of the WG's members. The contributions deal with the historical background, with the instruments of NP policy, with international law, with risks and limiting these risks, with economic aspects, with nuclear policy in the Third World, with the chances of nuclear disarmament, and with Federal NP policy. The 'twelve theses' as well as the 22 contributions are individual records. (HSCH) [de

Statement to Conference for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World, 12 October 2011, Astana, Kazakhstan

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Amano, Y.

2011-01-01

Full text: It is a great honour for me to address this Conference for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World. Astana is a highly appropriate venue for this Conference. Kazakhstan has made a very important contribution to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Under the leadership of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan renounced the nuclear weapons which it inherited from the Soviet Union and closed the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site, where over 450 underground and atmospheric nuclear tests had been conducted. It joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon State and has concluded both a safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with the IAEA. Kazakhstan played a significant role in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia in 2009. The treaty creating this nuclear-weapon-free zone established an important precedent as it is the only arms control treaty to date that requires its parties to bring into force an additional protocol to their IAEA safeguards agreements. The treaty, which was supported by the IAEA, forbids the development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition or possession of any nuclear explosive device within the zone. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy are permitted if placed under enhanced IAEA safeguards. The treaty also requires Parties to meet international standards regarding security of nuclear facilities. This is intended to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism and prevent smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials in the region. Today, the scientific and technical facilities at Semipalatinsk are being converted to peaceful uses under the jurisdiction of the National Nuclear Centre of the Republic of Kazakhstan. IAEA is pleased to have assisted in this work. Shutting down the nuclear test range at Semipalatinsk sends a strong signal of support for the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It contributes both directly and symbolically to the goals of the

IAEA safeguards related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons- T.N.P. and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America-Tlatelolco

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodrigues, M.D.F.

1978-04-01

The application of safeguards, focusing mainly the causes that gave origin to this type of control, is studied. The safeguard procedures used by the IAEA are also given, relative to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - Tlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons - T.N.P. and the Euratom safeguards. Some consideration is given to the organizations related to safeguards application such as IAEA, OPANAL and Euratom, their functions and aims. (F.E.) [pt

Is a nuclear weapon-free world desirable?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tertrais, Bruno

2009-01-01

In this article, the author shows that a nuclear weapon-free world would probably be more dangerous than today's world because benefits of the existence of nuclear weapons are probably more important that the risks related to their existence. He outlines that nuclear deterrence has been very efficient for these last 65 years. He states that the disappearance of nuclear weapons could be envisaged only after a large transformation of safety conditions, but that such transformations are actually not at all under way. It would indeed require peaceful and democratic world governance

Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meier, Oliver

2014-01-01

The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

Crisis as opportunity. Implications of the nuclear conflict with Iran for the nuclear non-proliferation regime

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Meier, Oliver

2014-11-15

The conflict over the Iranian nuclear programme represents the greatest challenge for international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. For decades Iran has been violating obligations contained in its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in order to become nuclear weapons capable. But what impact does the conflict over Tehran's nuclear programme have on the nuclear non-proliferation regime? In three areas there is significant overlap between efforts to find a solution with Iran and broader discussions about strengthening non-proliferation norms, rules and procedures: verification of civilian nuclear programmes, limiting the ability to produce weapons-grade fissile materials, and nuclear fuel supply guarantees. The nuclear dispute with Tehran is likely to have specific effects in each of these fields on the non-proliferation regime's norms, rules and procedures. The ninth NPT review conference, which will take place from 27 April to 22 May 2015, offers an opportunity to draw lessons from the nuclear conflict and discuss ideas for further strengthening the regime. Germany is the only non-nuclear-weapon state within the E3+3 group and the strongest proponent of nuclear disarmament. As a supporter of effective multilateralism, Berlin also bears a special responsibility for ensuring that steps to strengthen nuclear verification and control efforts in the talks with Iran also reflect the non-nuclear-weapon states' interest in disarmament and transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapons states.

The real value of nuclear-weapon-free zones

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Carasales, J.

1998-01-01

The international community has greeted the establishment of two new nuclear weapon-free zones with praise. Africa and South Asia are the regions which will join, once the respective treaties are ratified and in force, Latin America and the South Pacific to ensure that extensive areas of the earth remain free of nuclear weapons. The usual reaction to these accomplishments is to hail them as important contributions to international peace and security, and as meaningful steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon-free zones have their value but this value relates mainly to the countries within the zone. The interest of nuclear-weapon states are not really affected, or, if they are, the influence is not significant. One should bear in mind that the really important and meaningful nuclear weapon-free zones have yet to be achieved

Guarding the guardians: Civilian control of nuclear weapons in the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Feaver, P.D.

1992-01-01

This book has three separate complementary goals. First, it develops a model to explain how the command and control of nuclear weapons evolves over time. Second, it tells the story of the evolution of one critical aspect of the nuclear command system, the custody of nuclear weapons. Finally, it assesses the general problem of ensuring civilian control over nuclear operations. The focus is on the formation of operational policy. Where to deploy a weapon and at what state of alertness is an operational decision. Part I, The Theory of Civilian Control is divided into three chapters: Civilian control: Principles and problems; Civilian Control: From alerts to war termination; and Explaining changes in civilian control. Part II, The Evolution of Custody Policy has seven chapters: The Atomic Energy Act and the origin of assertive control, 1945-1947; The first test of assertive civilian control, 1948-1949; The breach in assertive control, 1950-1952; Assertive control becomes delegative control, 1953-1958; The resurgence of assertive control, 1959-1962; The cycle continues, 1963-1990; and Conclusion: The future of civilian control

Reconversion of nuclear weapons

CERN Document Server

Kapitza, Sergei P

1992-01-01

The nuclear predicament or nuclear option. Synopsis of three lectures : 1- The physical basis of nuclear technology. Physics of fission. Chain reaction in reactors and weapons. Fission fragments. Separration of isotopes. Radiochemistry.2- Nuclear reactors with slow and fast neutrons. Power, size, fuel and waste. Plutonium production. Dose rate, shielding and health hazard. The lessons of Chernobyl3- Nuclear weapons. Types, energy, blast and fallout. Fusion and hydrogen bombs. What to do with nuclear weapons when you cannot use them? Testing. Nonmilittary use. Can we get rid of the nuclear weapon? Nuclear proliferation. Is there a nuclear future?

Does nuclear power lead to nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Prawitz, J.

1977-01-01

It is pointed out that 'reactor grade' plutonium usually contains about 30 % Pu240 and is unsuitable for weapons. While it is possible to obtain an explosion, it is more difficult to initiate one and its effect, which will be considerably less than with bomb grade plutonium, is difficult to predict. The critical mass will be larger and more cooling required. The proliferation problem is then discussed and the four aspects, vertical, horizontal, sub-national and revolutionary, mentioned. In connection with nuclear power it is the second and third aspects which are of interest. In discussing the possibility of terrorist groups obtaining plutonium, a study by the Swedish Defence Research Institute is quoted as estimating that 10-20 qualified specialists and several years secret preparation would be necessary to make a nuclear weapon. Other authors, e.g. Ted Taylor, have maintained that it would be much easier, but examples of 'student designs' are primitive and unlikely to detonate. Even so, it is emphasised that safeguards and physical security are necessary. Horizontal proliferation is a more real problem and the NPT and IAEA safeguards are discussed in this connection. In conclusion the question of whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons via nuclear power can be prevented cannot be answered with a clear yes or no. Certain states may use nuclear weapon potential as a bargaining factor. However the decision to acquire nuclear weapons is political and while a nuclear power industry would be of help, it would not be decisively so. (JIW)

The spread of nuclear weapons among nations: militarization or development

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Khan, A.Q.

1986-01-01

The paper reviews nuclear proliferation among nations. Nuclear weapons promotion and proliferation are discussed, including both motivation and lack of motivation to manufacture nuclear weapons. The failure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is examined with respect to vertical and horizontal proliferation, and the containment of horizontal proliferation. Risks of nuclear war by accident are outlined, as well as nuclear weapon development. (UK)

Identification of nuclear weapons

Science.gov (United States)

Mihalczo, J.T.; King, W.T.

1987-04-10

A method and apparatus for non-invasively indentifying different types of nuclear weapons is disclosed. A neutron generator is placed against the weapon to generate a stream of neutrons causing fissioning within the weapon. A first detects the generation of the neutrons and produces a signal indicative thereof. A second particle detector located on the opposite side of the weapon detects the fission particles and produces signals indicative thereof. The signals are converted into a detected pattern and a computer compares the detected pattern with known patterns of weapons and indicates which known weapon has a substantially similar pattern. Either a time distribution pattern or noise analysis pattern, or both, is used. Gamma-neutron discrimination and a third particle detector for fission particles adjacent the second particle detector are preferably used. The neutrons are generated by either a decay neutron source or a pulled neutron particle accelerator.

Advantages of being a nuclear state

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ahmadova, S.

2012-01-01

Full text : Despite of some progress in the field of nuclear non-proliferation regime at the end of the last century, de-facto nuclear countries, and the issues such as Iran's uranium enrichment activities, the nuclear program of the North Korea proves the regime is in deep crisis. Besides, as a result of rapid scientific and technological development the number of enterprises processing raw material is increasing, the import of materials containing uranium and plutonium is becoming easier and reserves and facilities are widely spread in the black market. Unimpeded access to the information and scientific literature on production of nuclear weapons becomes available, organization and purposeful participation in the events related to the nuclear technology increase, the fact of involvement of scholars and engineers from the developed countries is observed. The growth of nuclear reactors amount with the purpose of energy supply increase the demand for enriched uranium and plutonium, and this hampers the protection these substances. Furthermore, the existence of local natural reserves, the state attention to the staff training able to create nuclear weapons, the staff aware of the work with radioactive substances, the programs considering military preparation on the application of nuclear weapons and so on problems directly threaten the non-proliferation regime. Despite the concern on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons expressed by many scholars and officials, the interest and attempts of states in becoming nuclear states always increase. These interests are stipulated by objective and subjective reasons

Safeguards for a nuclear weapon convention

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fischer, D.

1999-01-01

An NDT presupposes a fundamental commitment by all parties to its final objective and hence requires a high and sustained level of confidence amongst all states concerned. The appropriate format for an Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (NDT) would probably be a multilateral treaty open to all states. The treaty must necessarily include the five nuclear weapon states and a procedure would have to be found for securing the ratification of the threshold states without conferring upon them the status of nuclear weapon states. While the IAEA may well be able to carry out the safeguards tasks required by an NDT it would probably be necessary to establish a new international organization to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The experience of UNSCOM and the IAEA in Iraq, and of the IAEA in the DPRK, have shown how difficult the verification of international obligations is in the absence of a commitment to disarm, while the experience of the INF and START treaties, and of the IAEA in South Africa have shown how much simpler it is when the parties concerned are fully committed to the process. Verifying and safeguarding an NDT would be largely an extrapolation of activities already carried out by the nuclear weapon states under the INF and START treaties and by the IAEA in the routine application of safeguards as well as in its less routine work in Iraq, South Africa and the DPRK. Both the verification and safeguarding tasks would be made very much easier if it were possible to bring down to a few hundred the number of nuclear warheads remaining in the hands of any avowed nuclear weapon state, and to conclude a cutoff convention. Experience is needed to show whether the additional safeguards authority accorded to the IAEA by 'programme 93+2' will enable it to effectively safeguard the facilities that would be decommissioned as a result of an NDT and those that would remain in operation to satisfy civilian needs. Subject to this rider and on condition that the IAEA

Iran's nuclear program - for power generation or nuclear weapons?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kippe, Halvor

2008-11-01

would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), has generated enough concern among several of the dominant nations in the world, that they have gone to great lengths to try to dissuade Tehran from the continued pursuit of its in principle legal nuclear activities. As this report is issued, Iran still has some way ahead before its infrastructure can readily provide it with nuclear weapons on demand. But Iran seems almost to have overcome the presumably highest technological threshold, namely full-scale uranium enrichment. Today's infrastructure is far from sufficiently developed to be able to fully support Iran's planned nuclear power developments, but on the other hand the need for indigenously produced nuclear fuel is also several years ahead, as long as Iran's first self-constructed nuclear power plant is far from completion. The known and assumed uranium deposits, however, are of minute proportions compared to the stated ambitions of their nuclear power programme (20 GWe within 2030). Iran's future reactors will hardly be able to go online before they become dependent on fuel from abroad. The uranium deposits are, on the other hand, abundant for the future production of several thousands of nuclear weapons. And if the infrastructure that is arising today is actually directed towards that purpose, Iran will in theory some day be able to produce more than a hundred nuclear weapons a year. (Author)

FMCT after South Asia's tests. A view from a nuclear-weapon state

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dunn, L.A. [Science Applications Int. Corp. (United States)

1998-07-01

Proposals to negotiate an international treaty to cutoff the production of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons have been on the international nuclear agenda for many decades. Hopes in the early 1990s that it would be possible finally to negotiate a FMCT, however, have not been borne out. Instead, a deadlock had ensued at the Geneva CD. It remains to be seen whether the recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan will contribute to breaking that deadlock - or only to foreclosing any prospects for negotiating cutoff in the foreseeable future. The key lies in the attitudes of Delhi and Islamabad - influenced to the extent possible by the efforts of the international community to convince both countries' leaders to stop short of an escalating nuclear war in the region. Regardless, there are a variety of other initiatives aimed at heightening transparency and controls over the nuclear weapons materials in the five NPT nuclear weapon states that could be pursued as part of broader ongoing efforts to roll back the Cold War nuclear legacies.

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1982-05-01

Canada's non-proliferation safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to ensure that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, treating nuclear weapon and non-weapon states alike, and working for new approaches covering reprocessing, Canada promotes attainment of the first objective. The second is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its partners. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums is to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers may subsume their national requirements

Combating the terrorist use of mass destruction weapons, particularly nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barakat, M.

2008-01-01

The risks of mass destruction weapons vary and also forms of damages resulting therefrom. While the effects of nuclear weapons are focused, sudden and comprehensive, the chemical weapons have limited impacts relatively unless used intensively severe prejudice to the element of surprise, and thus impaired the efficacy of their influences,especially that they affect exceptionally the individuals in the area of injury and biological weapons do not announce themselves except through their effect that appears later than the time of use as they affect exceptionally the organisms in the area of injury.The mass destruction weapons have turned from being a purely military means in the early twentieth century and have now become the means of violence against governments and countries that they should prepare themselves for and respond in ways of successful and effective countermeasures. Despite the fact that the acquisition of mass destruction weapons can be considered as a priority objective, which terrorist groups and organizations steadily seek but their accessibility is flanked by a lot of difficulties. Addressing the risk of further spread of nuclear weapons, and especially after doubling the power of those high-risk weapons, the international community has an approach to take a number of arrangements that complement each other to control and resist nuclear proliferation, either for the states or for terrorist groups.

Plus c'est la meme chose: The future of nuclear weapons in Europe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Maaranen, S.A.

1996-01-01

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States perhaps more than any other nuclear weapon state has deeply questioned the future role of nuclear weapons, both in a strategic sense and in Europe. It is probably the United States that has raised the most questions about the continuing need for and efficacy of nuclear weapons, and has expressed the greatest concerns about the negative consequences of continuing nuclear weapons deployment. In the US, this period of questioning has now come to a pause, if not a conclusion. In late 1994 the United States decided to continue to pursue reductions in numbers of nuclear weapons as well as other changes designed to reduce the dangers associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. But at the same time the US concluded that some number of nuclear forces would continue to be needed for national security for the foreseeable future. These necessary nuclear forces include a continuing but greatly reduced stockpile of nuclear bombs deployed in Europe under NATO's New Strategic Concept. If further changes to the US position on nuclear weapons in Europe are to occur, it is likely to be after many years, and only in the context of dramatic additional improvements in the political and geo-political climate in and around Europe. The future role of nuclear weapons in Europe, as discussed in this report, depends in part on past and future decisions by the United States. but it must also be noted that other states that deploy nuclear weapons in Europe--Britain, France, and Russia, as well as the NATO alliance--have shown little inclination to discontinue their deployment of such weapons, whatever the United States might choose to do in the future

Does Britain need nuclear weapons?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hill, C.R.; Pease, R.S.; Peierls, R.E.; Rotblat, J.

1995-01-01

This report from the British Pugwash Group follows up a detailed international study of the desirability and feasibility of a world free from nuclear weapons with an analysis of issues particular to British nuclear weapons and the associated defense policies. United Kingdom nuclear weapons are reviewed historically, as are the nuclear weapons policies of other countries. A critique of present government policy is presented, with alternative uses for nuclear weapons in the post-Cold war world. The document concludes with a summary of the text and suggests how a British government could move towards global nuclear disarmament. (UK)

Chinese perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons. Prospects and potential problems in disarmament

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jing-dong, Yuan

2010-07-01

The Obama administration is putting nuclear disarmament back on the agenda. In a major speech in Prague in April 2009, he envisioned a world free of nuclear weapons and called on nations to work toward that end. Reversing years of setbacks and stagnation, Washington and Moscow agreed on renewing negotiation on extending the START I Treaty last year and concluded the New START treaty in March 2010. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review indicates a shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine in that Washington pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The prospects of nuclear disarmament look much promising as the momentum generated could also exert pressure on the second-tier nuclear-weapon States: Britain, France, and China. Beijing's responses to these developments have been favorable, viewing them as positive contribution to international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In particular China endorses President Obama's call for securing global nuclear materials and safeguarding vulnerable nuclear facilities to prevent nuclear terrorism. However, Chinese perspectives and policies on important international nuclear arms control and disarmament, and on the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain largely declaratory and less specific on its own commitments and participation. Chinese analyses, at the same time, point out the difficulties ahead on the road toward a nuclear weapons free world. Indeed, rhetoric notwithstanding, Beijing continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal to develop a secure and reliable second-strike deterrence capability. This paper takes a careful look at China's perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy and defense posture. This is important because China is perceived to be the only country among the five original nuclear-weapon States that is actually expanding its nuclear arsenal, as indicated by the recent

Chinese perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons. Prospects and potential problems in disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jing-dong, Yuan

2010-01-01

The Obama administration is putting nuclear disarmament back on the agenda. In a major speech in Prague in April 2009, he envisioned a world free of nuclear weapons and called on nations to work toward that end. Reversing years of setbacks and stagnation, Washington and Moscow agreed on renewing negotiation on extending the START I Treaty last year and concluded the New START treaty in March 2010. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review indicates a shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine in that Washington pledges not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that abide by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The prospects of nuclear disarmament look much promising as the momentum generated could also exert pressure on the second-tier nuclear-weapon States: Britain, France, and China. Beijing's responses to these developments have been favorable, viewing them as positive contribution to international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In particular China endorses President Obama's call for securing global nuclear materials and safeguarding vulnerable nuclear facilities to prevent nuclear terrorism. However, Chinese perspectives and policies on important international nuclear arms control and disarmament, and on the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain largely declaratory and less specific on its own commitments and participation. Chinese analyses, at the same time, point out the difficulties ahead on the road toward a nuclear weapons free world. Indeed, rhetoric notwithstanding, Beijing continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal to develop a secure and reliable second-strike deterrence capability. This paper takes a careful look at China's perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy and defense posture. This is important because China is perceived to be the only country among the five original nuclear-weapon States that is actually expanding its nuclear arsenal, as indicated by the recent deployment of the long

Ukraine's non-nuclear option

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Batiouk, V.

1992-01-01

It seems that only yesterday the dilemma confronting our world was not that of war or peace but rather of life or death for mankind, the reason being mainly the prospect of mass annihilation which became increasingly vivid with each and every new explosive nuclear device added to the already existing enormous stockpiles of warheads of mass annihilation. Against this gloomy background of a despairingly reckless arms race, the long-awaited signs began to appear. First the United States and the Soviet Union found it possible to initiate the process by cutting into their immeasurable nuclear arsenals, then Ukraine declared its intention to become non-nuclear by the end of 1994. All the newly independent States, of the former Soviet Union, except Russia, also agreed to renounce possession of nuclear arms. The declarations were put into effect and the most recent specific action was the removal by 6 may 1992 of all short-range nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory to Russian soil with a view to their ultimate dismantlement. The signature on 23 May 1992 in Lisbon by four ex-Soviet States (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine) and the United States of a Protocol to the 1991 Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Weapons (START), significantly lowered the risk of nuclear war. By this accord Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine agreed to destroy or turn over to Russia all strategic nuclear warheads and to accede ''in the shortest possible time to the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty''. In early May, Ukraine proposed to remove all nuclear weapons from the Black Sea and make it a zone of peace

Nuclear Weapons in Russia's approach to conflict

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Johnson, Dave

2016-11-01

President Putin has moved nuclear weapons to the foreground of the European security landscape. New risks and dangers arise from the apparent coupling of nuclear weapons capabilities with Moscow's revanchist and irredentist foreign and defence policies toward its neighbours. Nuclear weapons are the central feature and capstone capability in Russia's evolving concept of strategic deterrence and are important tools for achieving Russia's geopolitical aims. Russian thinking on the role and place of nuclear weapons in upholding national security and in achieving strategic aims is reflected in military policy, force structure and posture, and exercises and operations. Russia's political and military leaders are not only re-conceptualising the role of nuclear weapons. They are also building the military capabilities that can credibly threaten the calibrated employment of nuclear weapons for deterrence, de-escalation and war-fighting from the regional to large-scale and global levels of conflict. New and still developing concepts for the employment of conventional long-range precision weapons in tandem with nuclear weapons for regional deterrence and containment of local and regional conflicts add volatility to the regional tensions and uncertainties created by recent Russian aggression. Russia's reliance upon integrated conventional and nuclear capabilities in reasserting its influence in its perceived sphere of special interest, intended to contain conflicts at a manageable level, could actually increase the risk of the potential employment of nuclear weapons. NATO nations collectively, and the three NATO nuclear powers (Great Britain, France, and the United States) individually, have recognized this new reality and have begun to adapt to it. In that context, the aim of this paper is to elaborate a clearer understanding of the place and role of nuclear weapons in Russia's approach to conflict, based on nuclear-related policy statements and military-theoretical writing

A comparison of the additional protocols of the five nuclear weapon states and the ensuing safeguards benefits to international nonproliferation efforts

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Uribe, Eva C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, M Analisa [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sandoval, Marisa N [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Boyer, Brian D [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Leitch, Rosalyn M [Los Alamos National Laboratory

2009-01-01

With the 6 January 2009 entry into force of the Additional Protocol by the United States of America, all five declared Nuclear Weapon States that are part of the Nonproliferation Treaty have signed, ratified, and put into force the Additional Protocol. This paper makes a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the five Additional Protocols in force by the five Nuclear Weapon States with respect to the benefits to international nonproliferation aims. This paper also documents the added safeguards burden to the five declared Nuclear Weapon States that these Additional Protocols put on the states with respect to access to their civilian nuclear programs and the hosting of complementary access activities as part of the Additional Protocol.

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

Science.gov (United States)

2017-02-21

of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons and eliminate many of them. These 1991 announcements, coming after the abortive coup in Moscow in July 1991...of these weapons. The abortive coup in Moscow in August 1991 had also caused alarms about the strength of central control over nuclear weapons...assure other allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, but these assurances do not necessarily include legally binding commitments to retaliate

Verifying the transition from low levels of nuclear weapons to a nuclear weapon-free world. VERTIC research report no. 2

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Milne, T.; Wilson, H.

1999-01-01

results, would be very useful. By far the hardest verification problem facing nuclear disarmament is that of illicit acquisition or retention of nuclear weapons. This challenge would benefit from further study by each of the nuclear weapon states and as many other nations as are willing to devote resources to supporting nuclear disarmament. As is the case for all disarmament agreements, an industrialised country could, in theory, circumvent verification measures included in a nuclear weapons convention. But a verification regime should reduce the uncertainties in disarmament, and demonstrate an open and co-operative approach to creating a nuclear weapon-free world. Verification is just one of the many possible interlocking measures in an international disarmament treaty, and should not be seen as the single most important. While verification regimes have an important role to play in encouraging the participation of states in international disarmament treaties, and in ensuring that these treaties are effective, they are only part of a wider disarmament process. Since nuclear weapons might be eliminated over decades, it is relevant to consider the main respects in which the possibilities for verifying nuclear disarmament could change on such a timescale. Two important trends, in this respect, are those towards greater openness in the world, and towards improving technological verification capabilities. Greater openness at nuclear facilities is of particular importance in building international confidence in disarmament. Whenever possible, national research programmes on verification and other aspects of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament, should involve international collaboration, since this could be a primary means of increasing openness, as well as of perfecting verification techniques. Openness at nuclear weapons establishments, including regular interactions between nuclear weapons scientists from different countries, should promote societal verification

Can abolition of nuclear weapons be adequately verified?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rotblat, J.

1993-01-01

Speaking on the problems of preventing proliferations of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament the author suggests the following measures to reach these goals: signing a treaty that binds all the nuclear weapon states to the no-first-use principle as a basic policy; the United Nations should put the elimination of nuclear weapons on its agenda; having the treaty safeguarded two-pronged verification regime, one would be technological verification, the second one - so called societal verification which means that not just a group of experts but everybody would be asked to take part in ensuring that the treaty would not be violated

Civil nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-04-01

The issue of whether civil nuclear programmes contribute to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons has been discussed since civil programmes were first considered, and has always complicated public attitudes to civil nuclear energy. This paper seeks to define the extent to which there is such ''linkage''. It does not deal with the linkages that exist between nuclear weapons and other industries and activities - for example, those involved in weapons delivery systems -since these are not within the Uranium Institute's area of competence. Linkage concerns regarding civil nuclear programmes arise primarily over the possibility of their being used to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium for use in weapons. The technologies which can give rise directly to these materials are therefore ''sensitive'' in proliferation terms. Linkage may also arise through the relevant experience of the trained workforce. Such linkage is, however, limited by institutional, technical and economic factors. First, important institutional constraints on using a civil programme for military purposes exist in the form of a network of bilateral agreements and international treaties - most particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - and the international safeguards inspections. Secondly, without access to the technologies of enrichment or reprocessing, the fissile material needed for an explosive cannot be obtained from any plant or process used to produce electricity. Finally, establishing a civil programme - with equipment whose design is optimized for electricity production - in order to develop weapons is an expensive route compared to specialized facilities. (author)

The practical experience with assistance programs: view from a non-nuclear weapons-state with a significant nuclear infrastructure

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chetvergov, S.

2002-01-01

Full text: In the area of nuclear energy utilization, the Republic of Kazakhstan follows international legislation standards. Since December 13, 1993 Kazakhstan has been a participant of the Nuclear Weapon Non-proliferation Treaty and does not have nuclear weapons. In the framework of this treaty, Kazakhstan provides measures to ensure the non-proliferation regime. The republic signed the agreement with IAEA on the guarantees, that were ratified by a presidential decree in 1995. Nuclear objects in Kazakhstan have the following characteristics: Ulba Metallurgical Plant, located in the eastern area of Kazakhstan, manufactures fuel pellets of uranium dioxide for heat release assemblies of RBMK and LWR reactor types. These pellets have an enrichment of U235 1.6-4.4 %. Ulba also has a radioactive waste disposal storage site; a power plant for heat and power supply, and water desalination is based at the BN-350 fast breeder reactor. This reactor is located in Aktau city on the Caspian Sea. Since April 1999, the reactor has been in the process of being decommissioned. There is a lot of spent fuel with highly radioactive and toxic weapon plutonium there. There are also research reactors of National Nuclear Centre, located in the north-eastern area of Kazakhstan, near Semipalatinsk city. These research reactors have nuclear materials of the first category, which are attractive to criminal groups: IVG.1 M - light-water heterogeneous reactor of vessel type on thermal neutrons, with light water moderator and coolant, maximum power is 35 MW; IGR - impulse homogeneous graphite reactor on thermal neutrons, with graphite reflector; RA - high temperature gas cooled reactor on thermal neutrons, 0.5 MW power. There is also a research reactor site near Almaty city, with LWR-K - light-water reactor, with 10 MW power, uses highly enriched uranium (up to 36 % of U-235). The following activity was accomplished in the framework of physical security modernization for nuclear objects and

Nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1990-01-01

This patent describes the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which is the corner-stone of an international non-proliferation regime which has grown to embrace the overwhelming majority of countries in the world in the period since the Treaty. The other elements of the regime include, first of all, the safeguards system of IAEA-which operates to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military or other prohibited activities and must be accepted by all non-nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty and, secondly, the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the south Pacific Nuclear Free zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)-which serve to extend the regime geographically. The last two Treaties require safeguards agreements with IAEA. In addition, the Treaty of Tlatelolco contains provisions establishing the agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean to ensure compliance

The Uncertain Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Use

Science.gov (United States)

2015-04-15

this genre is the venerable, and classified, official “bible” of nuclear weapons effects, Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons. Widely referred to by...weekly comic Shukan Shonen Jampu and was later made into several film versions, a television drama series, and ten books, which follow Gen’s...civilized behavior. The film , distributed internationally and shown on Soviet television, was widely discussed in the United States and both depressed

Unmaking the bomb: Verifying limits on the stockpiles of nuclear weapons

Science.gov (United States)

Glaser, Alexander

2017-11-01

Verifying limits on the stockpiles of nuclear weapons may require the ability for international in-spectors to account for individual warheads, even when non-deployed, and to confirm the authenticity of nuclear warheads prior to dismantlement. These are fundamentally new challenges for nuclear verification, and they have been known for some time; unfortunately, due to a lack of sense of urgency, research in this area has not made substantial progress over the past 20 years. This chapter explores the central outstanding issues and offers a number of possible paths forward. In the case of confirming numerical limits, these in-clude innovative tagging techniques and approaches solely based on declarations using modern crypto-graphic escrow schemes; with regard to warhead confirmation, there has recently been increasing interest in developing fundamentally new measurement approaches where, in one form or another, sensitive infor-mation is not acquired in the first place. Overall, new international R&D efforts could more usefully focus on non-intrusive technologies and approaches, which may show more promise for early demonstration and adoption. In the meantime, while warhead dismantlements remain unverified, nuclear weapon states ought to begin to document warhead assembly, refurbishment, and dismantlement activities and movements of warheads and warhead components through the weapons complex in ways that international inspectors will find credible at a later time. Again, such a process could be enabled by modern cryptographic techniques such as blockchaining. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is important to recognize that the main reason for the complexity of technologies and approaches needed for nuclear disarmament verification is the requirement to protect information that nuclear weapon states consider sensitive. Ultimately, if information security concerns cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of all stakeholders, an alternative would be to "reveal the

Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1989-01-01

A summary of the report dispatched in the middle of 1978 by the Atlantic Council of United States, organized by North American citizens, is presented. The report considers the relation between the production of nucleoelectric energy and the capacity of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The factors which affect the grade of proliferation risk represented by the use of nuclear energy in the world comparing this risk with the proliferation risks independently of nuclear energy, are examined. (M.C.K.) [pt

Physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nilsson, A.

1999-01-01

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the main concerns of the international community since the first nuclear weapons were developed. To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been on the agenda for individual States, groups of States and the international organizations. A number of treaties, conventions and agreements, the most important being the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have been negotiated to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. States have concluded safeguards agreements with the IAEA to fulfill their obligations according to Article III.1 of the NPT. Other agreements relate to the prevention of vertical proliferation and also to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. It has also been recognized that sub-national, terrorist, or criminal activities may pose a proliferation risk. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium or plutonium, is a non-proliferation concern. States have recognized the need to prevent, as far as possible, the use of nuclear material in unlawful activities. The Convention of Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, obligates the State Parties to protect nuclear material from theft during international transport, and to make unlawful possession, use, etc., of nuclear material a criminal offense, subject to punishment under national law. Although the physical protection convention recognizes the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport, it does not obligate the State party to establish the necessary systems for this purpose. It is this limitation which led many States to believe that the international physical protection regime needs to be strengthened. Although not legally binding per se, the recommendations documented in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, has obtained wide recognition. There is recognition among States that protecting nuclear material

To make a national based historical survey of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: Experiences from the example of Sweden

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jonter, T.

2001-01-01

Full text: This project was initiated by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate and approved by the Agency as a Support Programme Task to increase transparency and support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. A general model of how such a historical survey can be conducted has been worked out in order to serve as help for other countries evaluating their nuclear and nuclear related activities in the framework of the Additional Protocol. The model consists of the following parts: 1. A State's nuclear activities profile since the mid-forties. In this part the task is to analyse the State's civil and military nuclear plans in broad terms, as well as to investigate how these ambitions were carried out in practice. A central ingredient is to map-out how the nuclear energy projects were organised over time; i. e. to pin-point the government authorities, organisations, private companies, universities and research institutions who were involved in the activities and who had the authoritative power at different times since 1945. 2. A description and analysis of the State's role and interactions in the area of international non-proliferation. This part of the model includes a list of the national laws that have regulated the use of nuclear materials since 1945. Are there exceptions in the national jurisdictions that obstruct the international/national inspections to be carried out in practical terms? How have the import and export regulations been designed since 1945? Who are allowed to use sensitive nuclear materials and on what conditions? Another part of the analysis of the State's international policy of non-proliferation includes a description of the international and bilateral agreements that were signed and ratified over the span of the period under consideration. The experiences from the work with the survey of the Swedish nuclear activities show that not all co-operation necessarily went through bilateral (government controlled) agreements

Policy and technical issues for international safeguards in nuclear weapons states

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Markin, J.T.; Stanbro, W.D.

1994-01-01

Expansion of international safeguards into the military and commercial fuel cycles of the nuclear weapons states (NWS) -- the subject of previous proposals in international safeguards discussions and of studies in the safeguards literature -- has been given impetus by recent US government initiatives for safeguards on excess weapons materials and a verified fissile materials production cutoff. These proposals, if implemented, would have implications on the safeguards objectives, approaches, and technologies that are traditionally employed in international safeguards. This paper examines the modifications and innovations that might be required to the current international safeguards regime in meeting these proposed new roles. Although the examples given are in the context of the US materials and facilities, many of the conclusions are valid for other NWS. None of the statements in this paper represent official US position on policy for international safeguards in weapons states. Instead, the purpose is to identify policy and technical issues and to offer, where possible, options for their resolution. This paper limits consideration to the potential role of the IAEA in verifying these proposed initiatives for declared facilities, recognizing that there may also be a role for bilateral, multilateral, or regional verification regimes. Indeed, in some cases verification of weapons materials may be more appropriate for a bilateral arrangement. Because traditional IAEA safeguards may not be admissible for weapons materials, the concept of ''transparency'' is suggested as a less intrusive alternative providing some confidence that materials are as declared

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

2006-06-01

This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear security. Overview of Safeguards requirements for States with limited nuclear material and activities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lodding, J.; Ribeiro, B.

2006-06-01

This booklet provides an overview of safeguards obligations that apply to States which are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. Most State parties to the NPT have no nuclear facilities and only limited quantities of nuclear material. For such States, safeguards implementation is expected to be simple and straightforward. This booklet provides an overview of the safeguards obligations that apply to such States. It is hoped that a better understanding of these requirements will facilitate the conclusion and implementation of safeguards agreements and additional protocols, and thereby contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA?s safeguards system and of collective security

Nuclear power and weapons proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Greenwood, T.; Rathjens, C.W.; Ruina, J.

1977-01-01

The relationship between nuclear weapons development and nuclear electric power is examined. A brief description of nuclear weapons design is first given. This is then followed by a discussion of various aspects of nuclear power technology and of how they affect a nuclear weapon programme. These include fuel cycles, chemical reprocessing of spent fuel, uranium enrichment, and the control of dissemination of nuclear technology. In conclusion there is a discussion of possible political and institutional controls for limiting nuclear proliferation. (U.K.)

Approaches to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Subrahmanyam, K.

1981-01-01

The logic behind the approach of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is based on: (1) The assumption that the less the number of decision makers who could initiate a nuclear war less the probability of war, (2) the claim of the NWS that their nuclear weapons are under strict control, and (3) the claim of the NWS who have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that the Treaty is being scrupulously observed by them. This logic is critically examined in the light of disclosures that indicate that: (1) both vertical and horizontal proliferation is going on without respite among the NWS, and (2) the fissile material is clandestinely being allowed to be diverted to the favoured clients by one or more of the NWS. These NWS are not subject to any safeguards under the NPT. They are using the NPT and the concept of nuclear free zone as a sort of tactic to divert the attention from the correct approach to the disarmament and to impose their hegemony over the Third World Countries. Moreover, the NPT has conferred a sort of legitimacy to the possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS. In these circumstances their preaching to the Third World countries about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation sounds hypocritical. The correct approach to these issues would be to put the nuclear weapons under the category of weapons of mass destruction and to ban their use under a non-discriminatory international convention as has been done in the case of biological and chemical weapons. (M.G.B.)

Nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Asia Pacific region

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yamada, Eiji

1997-01-01

The Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty decided on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and adopted two documents 'principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' and 'Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty'. In the former document, the Conference encourages the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the conviction that such zones will enhance global and regional peace and security. Besides the Rarotonga Treaty, ASEAN countries plan to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South-East Asia

Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, Harald

2011-01-01

The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

Elimination of ballistic missiles: An important step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheffran, J.

1997-01-01

Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty preamble emphasises 'the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control', the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not further specify how this ultimate goal could be achieved for delivery systems. Delivery systems are an important and costly part of nuclear weapons which should be sophisticated, therefore the control of nuclear-capable delivery systems would be an important step to make nuclear weapons useless and reduce the threat od their use. This is especially true for ballistic missiles, which represent effective and powerful means to deploy nuclear weapons

International agreements on nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dombey, N.

1982-01-01

The satellite detection of a nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic and Israel's destruction of a research reactor in Iraq make it essential to strengthen existing monitoring and enforcement programs to prevent proliferation. While there was no reliable evidence that either South Africa or Iraq was violating non-proliferation agreements, worst case scenarios can demonstrate to unfriendly countries that South Africa had diverted fuel to test a nuclear weapon and that Iraq is intending to produce weapons-grade plutonium 239. The situation can be improved by formulating better terms and conditions for internationalizing access to materials. Nuclear suppliers need to agree on terms that will assure their customers that contracts for civil programs will be honored. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which includes both nuclear suppliers and customers, could achieve stronger agreements that take into account recent technological advances that will expand enrichment and reprocessing activities. 23 references, 1 figure

Civil nuclear energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1990-04-01

The issue of whether civil nuclear programmes contribute to the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons has been discussed since civil programmes were first considered, and has always complicated public attitudes to civil nuclear energy. This paper seeks to define the extent to which there is such 'linkage'. Linkage concerns arise primarily over the possibility of their being used to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium for use in weapons. Linkage may also arise through the relevant experience of the trained workforce. Such linkage is, however, limited by institutional, technical and economic factors. First important institutional constraints on using a civil programme for military purposes exist in the form of a network of bilateral agreements and international treaties - most particularly the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - and the international safeguards inspections. Secondly, without access to the technologies of enrichment or reprocessing, the fissile material needed for an explosive cannot be obtained from any plant or process used to produce electricity. Even enrichment and reprocessing, as normally used in electricity programmes, do not give rise to the materials used in weapons. Finally, establishing a civil programme - with equipment whose design is optimized for electricity production - in order to develop weapons is an expensive route compared to specialized facilities. (Author)

Australia - a nuclear weapons testing ground

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dobbs, Michael.

1993-01-01

Between 1952 and 1958 Britain conducted five separate nuclear weapons trials in Australia. Australia had the uninhabited wide open spaces and the facilities which such tests need and Britain was able to use its special relationship with Australia to get agreement to conduct atomic tests in Australia and establish a permanent test site at Maralinga. Other non-nuclear tests were conducted between 1953-1963. The story of Britain's involvement in atomic weapons testing in Australia is told through its postal history. Both official and private covers are used to show how the postal communications were established and maintained throughout the test years. (UK)

Virtual nuclear capabilities and deterrence in a world without nuclear weapons. VERTIC research report no. 3

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Paloczi-Horvath, G.

1998-01-01

'Virtual nuclear capabilities' (VNC) can be defined as the ability of a state not equipped wth nuclear weapons to produce them within a matter of months or years, using fissile material and/or technological skills and materials available to it. 'Virtual nuclear deterrence' (VND) would use these capabilities to a specific end. It could be a temporary posture adopted by former nuclear weapon states as a guarantee against nuclear weapon 'break out'. VND could hence reinforce a temporary security architecture, even if in this instance 'temporary' might mean up to around ten years. In the context of getting to 'zero', VND could not be an end in itself, but rather serve as an element of the security architecture of a world free of nuclear weapons. VND would only be adopted by the acknowledged nuclear weapon states (NWS) - China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America - after the commit to complete nuclear disarmament, sign the appropriate treaties and perceive the temporary adoption of this form of deterrence to be in their political and security interests. As with the NWS, VND will only be accepted as an interim form of security by the de facto nuclear weapon states (DFNWS) - India, Israel and Pakistan - when they can be assured that their virtual security interests would be guaranteed by other means after they sign a nuclear disarmament treaty. There are several alternative approaches to VND. These range from various types of precise or explicit virtual deterrence to more implicit or tacit forms. An explicit VND posture might allow materials and capabilities relevant to the construction of a nuclear weapon to be retained under verified arrangements for a limited time. This report explains why explicit VND would not be a reliable tool for reinforcing a nuclear disarmament treaty, as it could undermine the treaty's whole purpose. An implicit VND posture would not permit the retention of any weapons-related fissile material or

Internationalization to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-01-01

The recent International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) has concluded that, in a world in which an increasing number of countries are using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, no technical ways exist to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation is a political problem and must, therefore, be solved by political means. The reasons why countries want nuclear weapons - whether to meet their real or perceived security requirements or for political prestige - must be removed. Resolution of regional conflicts would diminish the stimulus for proliferation, while significant nuclear disarmament measures would de-emphasize the role of nuclear weapons in international politics. Meanwhile, institutional arrangements could minimize the risks of nuclear weapon proliferation. One such arrangement could be the internationalization of the sensitive, that is, the most proliferation-prone, elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. This book analyses some of the political, economic, technical and legal issues involved in internationalizing the nuclear fuel cycle. It consists of two parts. Part I is SIPRI's (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) evaluation of the advantages, as well as the weaknesses, of the existing proposals for internationalization. Part II contains the papers contributed to the SIPRI symposium on 'internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle', which was held in October/ November 1979. (author)

IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material in the Russian Federation and the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2001-01-01

The Secretary of Energy of the United States, Spencer Abraham, Minister of the Russian Federation on Atomic Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, met in Vienna on 18 September 2001 to review progress on the Trilateral Initiative. The Initiative was launched in 1996 to develop a new IAEA verification system for weapon-origin material designated by the United States and the Russian Federation as released from their defence programmes. The removal of weapon-origin fissile material from the defence programmes of the Russian Federation and the United States is in furtherance of the commitment to disarmament undertaken by the two States pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA verification under this Initiative is intended to promote international confidence that fissile material made subject by either of the two States to Agency verification remains irreversibly removed from nuclear weapon programmes

International safeguards in nuclear weapon states - Status and look into the future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jorant, C.

2013-01-01

This paper shall recall the framework for the application of international safeguards in the 5 Nuclear Weapons States (USA, Russia, China, United-Kingdom and France) and give an overview on their implementation. It shall then discuss some reasons for an evolution of those States and IAEA's commitments to apply its safeguards and suggests ideas for an increased but efficient involvement of IAEA in those States fully taking into account the specificities of those States within the State Level Approach.The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (author)

International humanitarian law, nuclear weapons and the prospects for nuclear disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anastassov, Anguel

2013-11-01

The author first recalls the general principles of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and outlines its main gaps (application of the notion of protected person, classification between own territory and occupied territory). Then and in this respect, he comments the various characteristics of nuclear weapons considered as explosive devices, and notably as they are thus addressed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). He comments the legal status of the ICJ advisory opinions, and more particularly the relationship between the ICJ advisory opinion on nuclear weapons and the IHL. Different aspects are addressed and discussed: the principle of distinction, the prohibition of the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury. The author then comments NATO's nuclear policy in the international environment, and discusses the status and condition of nuclear deterrence. In order to address prospects for nuclear disarmament, the author notably compares differences between the arms control and non-proliferation approach, and the humanitarian disarmament approach

Monitoring non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Can regional CBMs play a role?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sood, R.

1994-01-01

The experience of regional Confidence Building Measures (CBM), has only limited applicability for tackling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Where the international norm has developed as in the case of biological and chemical weapons, through international disarmament treaties, regional initiatives can strengthen this norm. Where a norm is less well-founded, regional initiatives are not likely to succeed. Specifically, with regard to nuclear weapons, consensus on negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty and a convention for prohibition of production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes and explosive devices is a positive development. Successful conclusion of these universal and verifiable treaties will go a long way to strengthening the international norm against proliferation. Two other measures are critical - a development of a non-use assurance and commencement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations among all five nuclear weapon States. If the international community witnesses improvement in these areas, regional negotiations will be stimulated. Therefore, the primary focus should be on developing an international norm to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Regional efforts will take their cue from these international norms and would result in CBMs that are consistent with the international norm

Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Jamaica to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Jamaica to rescind the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to rescind the Protocol to the Agreement between Jamaica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members [es

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members

The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States required in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Estructura y contenido de los acuerdos entre los Estados y el Organismo requeridos en relacion con el Tratado sobre la no proliferacion de las armas nucleares

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1971-05-15

The Board of Governors has requested the Director General to use the material reproduced in this booklet as the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements between the Agency and non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [Spanish] El Acuerdo debe contener, de conformidad con el parrafo 1 del Articulo III del Tratado sobre la no proliferacion de las armas nucleares, el compromiso de aceptar salvaguardias por parte del Estado de conformidad con los terminos del Acuerdo, sobre todos los materiales basicos o materiales fisionables especiales en todas las actividades nucleares con fines pacificos realizadas en su territorio, bajo su jurisdiccion, o efectuadas bajo su control en cualquier lugar, a efectos unicamente de verificar que dichos materiales no se desvian hacia armas nucleares u otros dispositivos nucleares explosivos.

Cooperative Security: A New Paradigm For A World Without Nuclear Weapons?

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Marc Finaud

2013-11-01

Full Text Available If there is a loose consensus on aiming at a world free of nuclear weapons in the future, there are clear oppositions as to the timeframe as well as the means for achieving this goal. The approach to nuclear disarmament followed to date has only yielded limited success because it has been conceived in isolation from global and regional security environments and threat perceptions. A new paradigm should thus be sought in order to reconcile nuclear powers’ security doctrines with global aspirations for a safer world, and ensure that nuclear powers derive their security less from others’ insecurity but from mutually beneficial cooperative security. This should not become a pretext for preserving nuclear weapons for ever. It will on the contrary require parallel tracks addressing the initial motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD, in particular in the context of regional conflicts, as well as dealing with the current issues necessarily related to nuclear disarmament (missile defence, weaponization of space, conventional imbalances and future weapon systems. Ultimately, in a globalised nuclear-weapon free world, state security will not require nuclear weapons because it will be inserted into a broader network encompass­ing all aspects of security addressed in cooperative and multilateral approaches.

Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Dominican Government and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Nikitin, Mary B

2007-01-01

.... The Six-Party Talks include the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea, and were begun in August 2003 to attempt to resolve the current crisis over North Korean nuclear weapons...

The text of the Agreement of 22 February 1978 between Paraguay and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-08-01

The full text of the agreement between Paraguay and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America is presented

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Glasstone, Samuel

1957-06-01

This handbook prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant government agencies and published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, is a comprehensive summary of current knowledge on the effects of nuclear weapons. The effects information contained herein is calculated for yields up to 20 megatons and the scaling laws for hypothetically extending the calculations beyond this limit are given. The figure of 20 megatons however is not be taken as an indication of capabilities or developments.

Nuclear non-proliferation: Revisiting the basics. Carnegie international non-proliferation conference 2002. Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2002-01-01

The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament effort - and despite recent challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But the international community has to move forward, it is essential that a number of the basic assumptions should be revisited, and a number of new approaches reconsidered. A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually disappear. The nuclear non-proliferation regime has overall been successful - but with some shortcomings. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force - and the rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached on a mandate. The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the 'unequivocal undertaking' by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament - such as 'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further 'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,' 'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT - left without concrete follow-up actions and in

Strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime: An international priority. Tokyo, 10 December 2002

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

ElBaradei, M.

2002-01-01

The efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons has witnessed steady progress and a number of important milestones. Progress, however, is still required on this and many other fronts, including: the need to work energetically to ensure the universal adherence to safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements; the need for reducing existing nuclear weapon arsenals and adopting concrete steps that move us further towards nuclear disarmament; the need to draw in those States that remain outside the NPT regime; and the need to develop alternative approaches to regional and international security that are functional and inclusive, and that do not incorporate nuclear deterrence as a feature

Nuclear power and atomic weapons. Chapter 7

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

Following a brief historical introduction the concept of proliferation, vertical horizontal and subnational, is presented, and its relationship to nuclear power discussed. The risk of nuclear weapon proliferation, based on political decision, motivation and costs, is related to access to enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium 233. The possibilities for diversion and theft from nuclear facilities are discussed. International measures to prevent proliferation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)and the IAEA safeguards system, are described and discussed. Measures which may be enacted against countries which break the NPT are discussed. Restrictions on international nuclear trude, both multilateral and unilateral, are also discussed, especially those at present, or shortly to be, enforced by USA, Canada and Australia. The International Nuclear Feel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) is briefly presented. The physical protection of nuclear materials is also discussed. Finally the basc principles of nuclear weapons are briefly presented. (JIW)

Nuclear power and atomic weapons. Chapter 7

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

Following a brief historical introduction the concept of proliferation, vertical and horizontal and subnational, is presented, and its relationship to nuclear power discussed. The risk of nuclear weapon proliferation, based on political decision motivation and costs, is related to access to enriched uranium, plutonium and uranium 233. The possibilities for diversion and theft from nuclear facilities are discussed. International measures to prevent proliferation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the IAEA safeguards system, are described and discussed. Measures which may be enacted against countries which break the NPT are discussed. Restrictions on international nuclear trade, both multilateral and unilateral, are also discussed, especially those at present, or shortly to be, enforced by USA, Canada and Australia. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) is briefly presented. The physical protection of nuclear materials is also discussed. Finally the basic principles of nuclear weapons are briefly presented. (JIW)

China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Fieldhouse, R.

1991-01-01

Ultimately, it is nuclear whether the Chinese leadership has made up its collective mind on practical nuclear weapons. It is known from Chinese official sources, including articles in Communist Party and military publications and histories of the Chinese nuclear program, that an internal debate has proceeded for more than two decades, punctuated by occasional nuclear exercises or low-yield warhead tests. But China presumably has less reason now to pursue development of tactical nuclear weapons than in previous decades: relations with the Soviet Union have improved and military confrontation has eased; China's relations with India and Vietnam are also improving. The decision may already have been made, however, and the weapons built. The mystery surrounding Chinese tactical nuclear weapons is itself interesting, but it is also symbolic of the difficulty of understanding China's nuclear weapons program and policies. The West has accumulated a considerable body of knowledge about China's nuclear forces, especially historical material. But important aspects of China's nuclear behavior and its future as a nuclear power are hard to discern. A key question is China's future role in the spread of nuclear-capable weapons to other countries. China might add to international efforts to stem the proliferation of nuclear related technology, or it might become the world's missile merchant. It could make a constructive contribution to arms control efforts in general, or it could act as a spoiler

Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [ru

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Ecuador to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Aum Shinrikyo’s Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Development Efforts

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Andrea A. Nehorayoff

2016-03-01

Full Text Available This article details the terrorist activities of the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, from the perspective of its complex engineering efforts aimed at producing nuclear and chemical weapons. The experience of this millenarian organization illustrates that even violent non-state actors with considerable wealth and resources at their disposal face numerous obstacles to realizing their destructive aspirations. Specifically, Aum’s attempts at complex engineering were stymied by a combination of unchecked fantastical thinking, self-imposed ideological constraints, and a capricious leadership. The chapter highlights each of these mechanisms, as well as the specific ways in which they constrained the decision-making process and the implementation of the complex engineering tasks associated with their unconventional weapons development.

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1973-12-13

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

The Text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1973-01-01

The text of the Agreement between Mexico and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 14 September 1973 pursuant to Article 25.

Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Costa Rica to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement of 12 July 1973 between Costa Rica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with Costa Rica to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Nuclear Weapons Enterprise Transformation - A Sustainable Approach

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

O'Brien, K H

2005-01-01

Nuclear weapons play an essential role in United States (U.S.) National Security Policy and a succession of official reviews has concluded that nuclear weapons will continue to have a role for the foreseeable future. Under the evolving U.S. government policy, it is clear that role will be quite different from what it was during the Cold War. The nuclear-weapons stockpile as well as the nuclear-weapons enterprise needs to continue to change to reflect this evolving role. Stockpile reductions in the early 1990s and the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established after the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, began this process of change. Further evolution is needed to address changing security environments, to enable further reductions in the number of stockpiled weapons, and to create a nuclear enterprise that is cost effective and sustainable for the long term. The SSP has successfully maintained the U.S. nuclear stockpile for more than a decade, since the end of nuclear testing. Current plans foresee maintaining warheads produced in the 1980s until about 2040. These warheads continue to age and they are expensive to refurbish. The current Life Extension Program plans for these legacy warheads are straining both the nuclear-weapons production and certification infrastructure making it difficult to respond rapidly to problems or changes in requirements. Furthermore, refurbishing and preserving Cold-War-era nuclear weapons requires refurbishing and preserving an infrastructure geared to support old technology. Stockpile Stewardship could continue this refurbishment approach, but an alternative approach could be considered that is more focused on sustainable technologies, and developing a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. Guided by what we have learned from SSP during the last decade, the stewardship program can be evolved to address this increasing challenge using its computational and experimental tools and capabilities. This approach must start

U.S. - India nuclear cooperation and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yash Thomas, Mannully

2008-01-01

The agreement for cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy (referred as 123 agreement) acknowledges a shift in international strategies and relations in both countries. As to India, it marks the end of nuclear isolation resulting from constraint, embargoes and controls and instead opens the path for nuclear commerce. With respect to the United States it entails a major geo strategic ally in the evolving South Asia region and promises large commercial benefits to the US nuclear sector. This is called 'nuclear deal' and constitutes one of the major political, economic and strategic relationship developing between the two countries since 2001. It will lead to the separation of military and civilian nuclear installations in India, the latter to be placed under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It thus, de facto accepts India in the club of nuclear weapon states within the meaning of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) although it is not party to this treaty, refuses adhering to it, officially possesses nuclear weapons and is not subject to a comprehensive system of safeguards. This article will examine the developments which led to the 123 agreement and its subsequent implementation in a wider context of international relations and non proliferation. First, the articles gives a brief introduction into the Indian nuclear programme, the legislative framework and the factors which necessitated nuclear cooperation between India and the United States. Secondly, it will address the implementation of the nuclear deal and subsequent developments. Finally, it will analyse the non proliferation issues related to the implementation of the agreement. (N.C.)

Towards a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1991-01-01

Every year since 1974 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the subject ''Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East''. By that resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, taking into account the circumstances and characteristics of the Middle East, as well as the views and the suggestions of the parties of the region, and to submit this study to the General Assembly. The study was carried out between July 1989 and August 1990. The study discusses a number of steps and measures that could ease the process leading to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Those measures could be undertaken independently or in conjunction with each other, as well as by individual States or jointly by several, and also on a reciprocal basis; each of them would move the States concerned closer to their ultimate objective - the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons

Just war and nuclear weapons : just war theory and its application to the Korean nuclear weapons issue in Korean Christianity

OpenAIRE

Son, Changwan

2009-01-01

This thesis is primarily an application of the Christian tradition of Just War to the problems arising from the basing of US nuclear weapons in South Korea and the development of nuclear weapons by the regime in the North. The Christian theology of Just War has developed over the last two thousand years, adapting as first Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, through the break down of any enforceable norms in Europe‘s 'Dark Ages‘, to the emergence of the concept of th...

Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament: A long-term perspective

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Haeckel, E.

1990-01-01

International nuclear policy has been determined for a long time by the exigencies of the status quo. The non-proliferation regime draws its legitimacy from the continuation of extant patterns of power in world politics. Such a static policy cannot succeed forever. Overcoming the threat of nuclear proliferation will require innovative strategy that reaches beyond the status quo. It calls for structural change in the international system to be accomodated instead of resisted. If the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to hold, nuclear weapon states will finally have to forgo their privileged status. This cannot, however, be accomplished simply through the abolition or renunciation of nuclear weapons since nuclear weapons themselves continue to be instrumental for war prevention and international stability. Rather, what is needed is a new approach to the management of the nuclear world system under international responsibility. Nonproliferation and disarmament objectives together call for a concept of global security in which multilateral institutions assume an increasingly important role of nuclear diplomacy. (orig.) [de

Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Shinohara, Nobuo; Kokaji, Lisa; Ichimasa, Sukeyuki

2010-01-01

In Global Center of Excellence Program of The University of Tokyo, Non- Proliferation Study Committee by the members of nuclear industries, electricity utilities, nuclear energy institutes and universities has initiated on October 2008 from the viewpoints of investigating a package of measures for nuclear non-proliferation and bringing up young people who will support the near-future nuclear energy system. One of the non-proliferation issues in the Committee is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Objective of this treaty is to cease all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosion. This purpose should be contributed effectively to the political stability of the Asian region by continuous efforts to eliminate the nuclear weapons. In the Committee, by extracting several issues related to the CTBT, conception of 'Asia nuclear-test-ban network for nuclear non-proliferation' has been discussed with the aim of the nuclear-weapon security in Asian region, where environmental nuclear-test monitoring data is mainly treated and utilized. In this paper, the conception of the 'network' is presented in detail. (author)

Agreement of 18 April 1975 between Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Honduras to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement of 18 April 1975 between the Republic of Honduras and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

From weapons to waste: The future of the nuclear weapons complex

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wasserman Goodman, Sherri

1992-01-01

This paper examines how decision-making power has shifted within the nuclear weapons complex, from the federal government operating agency, in which power was originally vested by the Atomic Energy Act, to the states and to regulatory authorities. Additionally, when the original operating agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), was abolished in the 1970s, substantial decision-making power shifted from Washington to the field sites. This paper identifies the needs for future materials and weapons production, and recommends that restart of old plants be abandoned as no longer militarily necessary. Instead, the U. S. should take advantage of what may be a unique opportunity to 'leapfrog' to new, smaller, technologically-advanced plants that will meet the needs of the nuclear arsenal in the post-Cold War world. This paper then looks at the current state of DOE's environmental restoration/waste management program, and the technological, legal and political problems it faces in trying to accomplish its mission of cleaning up all nuclear weapons sites. This paper argues that the U. S. government no longer has the exclusive authority to make and carry out critical decisions affecting a cleanup program that will cost the U. S. over $200 billion over the next 20-40 years. Moreover, there are competing theories about the principles that should guide the cleanup program. Finally, the author examines alternative futures for the DOE'S environmental restoration/waste management program. (author)

Nuclear Society and non-proliferation problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gagarinskij, A.Ya.; Kushnarev, S.V.; Ponomarev-Stepnoj, N.N.; Sukhoruchkin, V.K.; Khromov, V.V.; Shmelev, V.M.

1997-01-01

In the USSR Nuclear Society in 1991 the special working group on the problems of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and nuclear materials control, uniting the experts of different types (nuclear physicists, lawyers, teachers), was created. This group became the mechanism of the practical Nuclear Society activity realization in this sphere. Three milestones of the innovative activity can be specified. First Milestone. In January 1992 the Central Nuclear Society Board (of the International Public Nuclear Society Association) published a special appeal to the First Leaders of all countries - former USSR republics. This address paid a special attention to the unity of the USSR power-industrial complex, and numerous problems arisen while separating this complex, including nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems, were indicated as well. Second Milestone. In 1992 and 1993 the Nuclear Society experts issued two selection 'Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control Problems' including reviewing basic papers. In addition, materials on non-proliferation and control are published regularly in the organs. Third Milestone.In 1993 - 1997 some special scientific and technical events (conferences, workshops, meetings) allowing to analyze the joint international projects and contracts outcomes, and establish new contacts between the specialists of NIS, Baltic states and others, have been hold

History of Nuclear Weapons Design and Production

Science.gov (United States)

Oelrich, Ivan

2007-04-01

The nuclear build-up of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War is often portrayed as an arms race. Some part was indeed a bilateral competition, but much was the result of automatic application of technical advances as they became available, without careful consideration of strategic implications. Thus, the history of nuclear weapon design is partly designers responding to stated military needs and partly the world responding to constant innovations in nuclear capability. Today, plans for a new nuclear warhead are motivated primarily by the desire to maintain a nuclear design and production capability for the foreseeable future.

Nuclear weapons policy at the crossroads

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Howlett, D.; Ogilvie-White, T.; Simpson, J.; Taylor, E.

2000-01-01

This study on nuclear futures is a product of work undertaken by the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (MCIS) of the University of Southampton. The study has pursued three goals: to attempt to understand the dynamics of the nuclear present; to elucidate a range of possible nuclear futures that may emerge; and to assess different strategies that could be pursued in response to these futures, including proposals for promoting nuclear disarmament. The aim was to draw on research, meetings and outreach to achieve these goals, and to use the knowledge gained to help inform the international policy-making community. The work underlying this study was divided into two stages. During the first stage, the apparent threat perceptions of the five acknowledged NWS (China, France, Russia, the UK and the United States) and the three de facto NWS (India, Israel and Pakistan) were explored . The purpose of this research was to identify the main factors (or shapers) that seem to have influenced nuclear weapons policy in all these states, and to assess their relative importance. The second stage of the work drew on the conclusions reached on the eight countries. The shapers were divided into categories on the basis of their apparent impact on nuclear weapons policy. This study summarizes the main conclusions reached in the course of this work

Agreement between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

The document reproduces the text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) concluded between the Kingdom of Cambodia and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The Agreement was approved by the Board of Governors on 11 November 1999, signed in Vienna on 17 December 1999, and entered into force on the same date

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [fr

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Republic of Nicaragua to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency

Agreement of 9 September 1996 between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An Agreement by Exchange of Letters with Antigua and Barbuda to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

The text of the Exchange of Letters, constituting an agreement to amend the Protocol to the Agreement between the Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is reproduced in this document for the information of all Member States of the Agency [es

Perspectives of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koungou, Leon

2004-01-01

To join traditional methods and new approaches of 'non-proliferation'. This is a technical method and the best way to fight against 'non-proliferation' which is facing few preoccupations: knowledge's disseminations; technologies; equipments and weapons that should be stopped. As it's important to note the return of nuclear danger as the end of confrontation between west-east which should be reduce. As the adaptation of mechanisms is necessary today, as it is important to react about states' incitations to violate international engagement of non-proliferation. Areas control allows finding out change and evolution, but more insufficient. Functional difficulties show that the IAEA (International Agency of Atomic Energy) does not work good. Safeguard system does not allow to respect 'non-proliferation' engagements; for instance 'junkies states' that they cannot dissuade traditional methods. The fight of 'non-proliferation' shows new progresses with fearing methods of prevention actions and heaviest international controls of exportation. The target of this is very ambitious. This new method is self-successful because it contributes to re-enforce international security when defeating acquisition of nuclear and mass destruction weapons by non-states factors. Therefore non-proliferation regime and especially 'non-proliferation treaty' remains delicate as long as some militaries state such USA will reject their 'non-proliferation' engagement. (author) [fr

Democracy, public opinion, and nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Russett, B.

1989-01-01

To the degree that people's fears of nuclear war are deep and pervasive, they become subject to manipulation by cynical or politically utopian promises, whether those promises be to abolish nuclear weapons from the earth or to create a leakproof peace shield (SDI). But the basic yearning for protection could also be mobilized to support serious arms reduction and arms control agreements. Nuclear weapons provide the basis for a vivid form of symbolic politics, perhaps equivalent in foreign policy considerations to the Korean and Vietnam wars during their durations, and in similar ways (although not necessarily as severe) as unemployment does among domestic policy issues. This paper presents survey research directed specifically at the role of public opinion on nuclear imagery (difference between expectation of nuclear war versus any kind of weapon war; willingness to spend on nuclear weapons versus conventional ones or general defense spending) can help in understanding these phenomena

From nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear disarmament: a need to refocus NPT priorities

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sethi, Manpreet

1998-01-01

This paper seeks to suggest that attempts at general and complete nuclear disarmament have largely failed because of an over emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly horizontal, while disarmament has attracted only lip service from the perpetrators of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that is deemed to be the core of the global non-proliferation regime is no less to blame for having indulged in a skewed pursuit of its twin objectives - nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The paper argues that nuclear non-proliferation can be sustainable only if complemented by nuclear disarmament. In the absence of the latter, proliferation of nuclear weapons, irrespective of the NPT and its safeguards regime, would always pose a potential risk

Strategy of nuclear power in Korea, non-nuclear-weapon state and peaceful use of nuclear power

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Nagasaki, Takao

2005-01-01

The nuclear power plant started at Kori in Korea in April, 1978. Korea has carried out development of nuclear power as a national policy. The present capacity of nuclear power plants takes the sixes place in the world. It supplies 42% total power generation. The present state of nuclear power plant, nuclear fuel cycle facility, strategy of domestic production of nuclear power generation, development of next generation reactor and SMART, strategy of export in corporation with industry, government and research organization, export of nuclear power generation in Japan, nuclear power improvement project with Japan, Korea and Asia, development of nuclear power system with nuclear diffusion resistance, Hybrid Power Extraction Reactor System, radioactive waste management and construction of joint management and treatment system of spent fuel in Asia are stated. (S.Y.)

Safeguarding nuclear weapon: Usable materials in Russia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cochran, T.

1998-01-01

Both the United States and Russia are retaining as strategic reserves more plutonium and HEU for potential reuse as weapons, than is legitimately needed. Both have engaged in discussions and have programs in various stages of development to dispose of excess plutonium and HEU. These fissile material disposition programs will take decades to complete. In the interim there will be, as there is now, hundreds of tons of separated weapon-usable fissile material stored in tens of thousands of transportable canisters, each containing from a few to several tons of kgs of weapon-usable fissile material. This material must be secured against theft and unauthorized use. To have high confidence that the material is secure, one must establish criteria against which the adequacy of the protective systems can be judged. For example, one finds such criteria in US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) regulations for the protection of special nuclear materials

Verifying a nuclear weapon`s response to radiation environments

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dean, F.F.; Barrett, W.H.

1998-05-01

The process described in the paper is being applied as part of the design verification of a replacement component designed for a nuclear weapon currently in the active stockpile. This process is an adaptation of the process successfully used in nuclear weapon development programs. The verification process concentrates on evaluating system response to radiation environments, verifying system performance during and after exposure to radiation environments, and assessing system survivability.

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

Simulated ICJ Judgment : Revisiting the Lawfulness of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

Winston P. Nagan

2012-04-01

Full Text Available The author prepared this simulated judgment at the request of Cadmus editors to demonstrate that there is ample ground for revisiting and revising the landmark 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legality of nuclear weapons. The ICJ failed to anticipate the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which expands the evolution of the concept of sovereignty, the potential cataclysmic impact of nuclear war on climate change, the multiplication of nuclear-weapon-free zones as evidence of a widespread rejection, mounting evidence regarding the physical and psychological harm, and unwillingness of the nuclear weapons states to fulfill their obligations under the NPT. This article challenges the notion that a few sovereign states should be the sole arbiters of international law and affirms the legitimate claim of the global community of protection from the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons. The use or threat of use undermines foundational values of the international legal system and the specific rules of self-defense and humanitarian law. The contribution seeks to give an accentuated role for the explicit use of the fundamental values of international legal order, in crafting an innovative methodology for the formulation of the judgment. The very existence of these weapons undermines the rights of all of humanity. The ICJ should be moved to categorically declare the use and possession of nuclear weapons a crime against humanity.

Nuclear weapons complex

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rezendes, V.S.

1992-04-01

In addition to long-standing safety and environmental problems plaguing the nuclear weapons complex, this paper reports that the Department of Energy (DOE) faces a major new challenge-how to reconfigure the weapons complex to meet the nation's defense needs in the 21st century. Key decisions still need to be made about the size of the complex; where, if necessary, to relocate various operations; what technologies to use for new tritium production; and what to do with excess weapons-grade material. The choices confronting DOE and Congress are difficult given the conflicting demands for limited resources

Nuclear weapon relevant materials and preventive arms control. Uranium-free fuels for plutonium elimination and spallation neutron sources

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Liebert, Wolfgang; Englert, Matthias; Pistner, Christoph

2009-01-01

Today, the most significant barrier against the access to nuclear weapons is to take hold on sufficient amounts of nuclear weapon-relevant nuclear materials. It is mainly a matter of fissionable materials (like highly enriched uranium and plutonium) but also of fusionable tritium. These can be used as reactor fuel in civil nuclear programmes but also in nuclear weapon programmes. To stop or to hinder nuclear proliferation, in consequence, there is not only a need to analyse open or covered political objectives and intentions. In the long term, it might be more decisive to analyse the intrinsic civil-military ambivalence of nuclear materials and technologies, which are suitable for sensitive material production. A farsighted strategy to avoid proliferation dangers should take much more account to technical capabilities as it is done in the political debate on nuclear non-proliferation so far. If a technical option is at a state's disposal, it is extremely difficult and lengthy to revert that again. The dangers, which one has to react to, are stemming from already existing stocks of nuclear weapon-relevant materials - in the military as well as in the civil realm - and from existing or future technologies, which are suitable for the production of such materials (cf. info 1 and 2). Therefore, the overall approach of this research project is to strive for a drastic reduction of the access to nuclear weapon-relevant material and its production capabilities. Thus, on one hand the nuclear proliferation by state actors could be answered more effectively, on the other hand by that approach a decisive barrier against the access on nuclear weapons by sub-national groups and terrorists could also be erected. For this purpose, safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other measures of physical accountancy will remain indispensable elements of arms control. However, one has to consider that the goal of nuclear non-proliferation could not be achieved and

Text of the Agreement of 2 March 1978 between Peru and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-09-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 March 1978 between Peru and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 1 August 1979.

Find and neutralize clandestine nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Canavan, G.H.

1997-09-01

The objective of finding nuclear material at entry portals is to provide a secure perimeter as large as a weapon damage radius so that operations could be conducted within it relatively unencumbered. The objective of wide area search for nuclear material to provide a safe zone of similar dimensions in an area in which it is not possible to maintain a secure perimeter, to provide assurance for civilians living at an area at risk, or to provide rapid, wide area search of regions that could conceal nuclear threats to forces in the field. This rapid, wide-area, and confident detection of nuclear materials is the essential first step in developing the ability to negate terrorist nuclear assemblies or weapons. The ability to detect and negate nuclear materials are necessary to prevent the forced, massive evacuation of urban populations or the disruption of military operations in response to terrorist threats. This paper describes the limitations to current sensors used for nuclear weapon detection and discusses a novel approach to nuclear weapon detection using a combination of directional information (imaging) and gamma ray energy (color) to produce a gamma ray color camera

Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1997-01-01

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department's first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department's legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle

Linking legacies: Connecting the Cold War nuclear weapons production processes to their environmental consequences

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1997-01-01

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has begun addressing the environmental consequences of five decades of nuclear weapons production. In support of this effort, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to describe the waste streams generated during each step in the production of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, this report responds to this mandate, and it is the Department`s first comprehensive analysis of the sources of waste and contamination generated by the production of nuclear weapons. The report also contains information on the missions and functions of nuclear weapons facilities, on the inventories of waste and materials remaining at these facilities, as well as on the extent and characteristics of contamination in and around these facilities. This analysis unites specific environmental impacts of nuclear weapons production with particular production processes. The Department used historical records to connect nuclear weapons production processes with emerging data on waste and contamination. In this way, two of the Department`s legacies--nuclear weapons manufacturing and environmental management--have become systematically linked. The goal of this report is to provide Congress, DOE program managers, non-governmental analysts, and the public with an explicit picture of the environmental results of each step in the nuclear weapons production and disposition cycle.

Limited war, limited autonomy: The state, domestic politics, and the evolution of U.S. nuclear weapons policy (Volumes 1 and 2)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mlyn, E.J.

1991-01-01

This study examines the nature of the relationship between state and society for the formation of US nuclear weapons policy. By looking at three case studies that cover the years 1960-1983, Mlyn, seeks to determine whether society and, in turn, domestic politics have been important for the formulation of US nuclear weapons policy. The theoretical approach, which applies the conceptual underpinnings of statism, draws on existing theory in American politics and international relations. The case studies are constructed from interviews with former government officials, archival research, and secondary sources. The substantive focus of the study is the relationship between declaratory policy and targeting policy. For much of the nuclear age, declaratory policy embraced mutual assured destruction (MAD) while actual targeting policy embraced war fighting, or the opposite of MAD. As the state moved toward a declaratory policy that embraced war fighting and limited nuclear options, it lost its autonomy from society in formulating nuclear weapons policy. This loss of autonomy coincided with a relative decline for the US vis a vis the Soviet Union in the overall strategic nuclear balance. The causes and consequences of this shift are explored

Nuclear weapons proliferation as a world order problem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Falk, R.

1977-01-01

World-order concerns have intensified recently in light of mounting evidence that a weapons capability will soon be within easy reach of more and more governments and of certain nongovernmental groupings as well. One reliable source estimates that by 1985 as many as fifty countries could ''produce enough plutonium each year for at least several dozen nuclear explosives.'' In an even more immediate sense, ''economic competition among nuclear suppliers today could soon lead to a world in which twenty or more nations are but a few months from a nuclear weapons force.'' Three developments have created this ''world order'' sense of concern: (1) increased pace of civilian nuclear power deployment globally as a consequence of rising oil prices, unreliability of oil supplies, and reality of dwindling oil reserves in any case; (2) actuality of India's nuclear explosion in May 1974 which demonstrated vividly how any state that pursues a ''civilian'' program can also develop its own weapons capability; and (3) the intensification of competition for international nuclear sales which makes it increasingly evident that nonproliferation goals are no longer compatible with the pursuit of national commercial advantage; essentially, this reality has emerged from a break in the American monopoly over civilian nuclear technology and the willingness of French and German suppliers to provide all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing facilities,to any nation that feels it can afford to buy them; the German-Brazilian deal (worth at least $4 billion) has proven to be the equivalent in the commercial realm of India's ''peaceful'' nuclear explosion. Such developments disclose the alarming prospect that easier access to nuclear technology will make it relatively simple and thus more likely for a beleaguered government or a desperate political actor of any sort to acquire and possibly use nuclear weapons

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Glasstone, Samuel

1964-02-01

This book is a revision of "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons" which was issued in 1957. It was prepared by the Defense Atomic Support Agency of the Department of Defense in coordination with other cognizant governmental agencies and was published by the U.S. Atomc Energy Commission. Although the complex nature of nuclear weapons effects does not always allow exact evaluation, the conclusions reached herein represent the combined judgment of a number of the most competent scientists working the problem. There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.

Nuclear weapons headed for the trash

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Arkin, W.M.; Durrant, D.; Kristensen, H.

1991-01-01

Whether he intended it or not, Bush has taken steps that mean the beginning of the end for nuclear weapons. His proposals significantly reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and the burdens associated with deploying and controlling them. And although he retains many of the options for continuing and regenerating the nuclear arsenal, he has exposed the fact that there are no longer any grand justifications or doctrinal needs for nuclear weapons - and that the nuclear machine is choking on its economic, political, environmental, and human contradictions. The initiatives fundamentally altered the nuclear stance of both nations. Yet, as momentous as the changes were, they were set in motion in an almost businesslike manner. Neither leader truly framed the moves as an end to the nuclear age. But they didn't need to. The steps they have taken practically guarantee it

Nuclear weapons in Europe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pierre, A.J.

1984-01-01

In this introduction to ''Nuclear Weapons in Europe'', the author summarized the views of two Americans and two Europeans, whose articles make up the volume. The introduction explains the different assumptions of the four authors before discussing their views on the military and political rationales for a nuclear force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the debate over battlefield nuclear weapons, conventional defense, and arms control proposals and talks. The four contributors whose views are analyzed are William G. Hyland, Lawrence D. Freeman, Paul C. Warnke, and Karstan D. Voight. The introduction notes that the agreements and differences do not fall strictly on American versus European dividing lines

IAEA Director General welcomes Cuba's intention to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Full text: IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei welcomed Cuba's announcement to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. He expressed the hope that Cuba will conclude soon a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency, as required under Article III of the NPT. 'With Cuba's intention to become party to the NPT, we have come a step closer to a universal nuclear non-proliferation regime,' Mr. ElBaradei said. Only three countries worldwide with significant nuclear activities now remain outside the NPT. With 188 countries party to the Treaty, the NPT is the most adhered to international agreement after the United Nations Charter and the most widely adhered to multilateral arms control treaty. The NPT makes it mandatory that all non-nuclear-weapon States conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA, and thus put all of their nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. The Director General also welcomed Cuba's ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty, which completes the process of having all countries in the region of Latin America and the Caribbean as members of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. Mr. ElBaradei said that, 'the Tlatelolco Treaty provides a good model for other regional nuclear-weapon-free zones to follow'. He added that 'universal adherence of all countries in regions having nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements is important to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime'. (IAEA)

The Belgium debate on tactical nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dumoulin, Andre

2008-01-01

This publication proposes a discussion about the opinions and positions of the various Belgium political actors and authorities regarding nuclear weapons. After a synthesis of several interviews with different actors, the author analyses the debate content, and more precisely the positions of peace movements, of the government, and of political parties. Several documents are proposed in appendix: a presentation of the evolution on Belgium nuclear missions, a government's answer to parliamentary resolutions regarding non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and a working paper submitted by Belgium, Norway and the Netherlands in the perspective of the 2005 Conference of Parties on the Non-Proliferation Treaty

The nuclear non-proliferation: The validity of the rule in Latin America

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Cubillos Meza, Adela

2005-01-01

The position of Latin American countries within the framework of the Non Nuclear Proliferation Treaty NPT is analyzed in this article. This treaty which entered into force in 1968, has been ratified by a significant number of countries. The nuclear- weapon states, the United States and the former USSR gave origin to the NPT in order to control nuclear proliferation. This treaty has been subject to criticism since it discriminates between the countries which have nuclear weapons and the ones that do not. Thus, the former are allowed to manufacture atomic devices, but it has been forbidden for the latter. Even nuclear- weapon states such as France and China did not support the treaty immediately because they consider it as highly discriminatory. Countries that do not have nuclear weapons have criticized the NPT and did not joined immediately. Among these parties, we can mention three Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The first two only signed the NPT when they were fully capable and autonomous in nuclear power. The Chilean position of not joining immediately depended upon the Argentinian and Brazilian decision [es

The medical consequences of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Humphrey, J.; Hartog, M.; Middleton, H.

1982-01-01

A pamphlet has been produced by the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (MCANW) and by the Medical Association for the Prevention of War (MAPW) to bring the catastrophic effects that the use of nuclear weapons would entail to the attention of the general public, politicians and members of the medical profession. It describes the medical consequences of the effects of blast, heat and ionizing radiation from nuclear weapons, including details from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings. The medical consequences of a nuclear attack including consideration of the casualties, care of the injured, psychological effects and the outcome are also discussed. It is concluded that if for none other than purely medical reasons, nuclear warfare must never be allowed to happen. (UK)

Act of 20 July 1978 establishing provisions enabling the International Atomic Energy Agency to undertake inspections and verifications on Belgian territory, in implementation of the International Agreement of 5 April 1973 made in application of 1 and 4 paragraphs of Article III of the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1978-01-01

Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Belgium concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA which enables the latter to verify the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by Belgium in accordance with the NPT, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. All non-nuclear weapon States party to the NPT enter into such agreements. (NEA) [fr

Beyond the nuclear weapon

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Quinlan, M.

2001-01-01

Since the end of the cold war, many people called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. That this decision seems difficult to realize because of the world political environment. Meanwhile the reduction of the nuclear weapons costs and risks believes more than ever a challenge of the international relations and more particularly in the proliferation domain. In this perspective the proliferation fight strategies need to be studied with a special interest in the domain of the alternatives and the possibilities of synergy. (A.L.B.)

Scope for nuclear weapon-free zone in central and eastern Europe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pande, Savita

1998-01-01

The idea of a Central Europe free of nuclear weapons has its roots, of course, in the end of the cold war and the break-up of the former Union. These historical developments created the necessary conditions for the Lisbon Protocol, the successful withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan as well as these countries' accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is admitted that even before these steps had been achieved, Belarus had put forward the nuclear-free zone initiative at the United Nations General Assembly in 1991. Like all the other nuclear weapon-free zones, existing or potential, a proposal for such a zone entails that it be analysed in the context of its political environment, regional specificity as well as the role, and implications of the relevant outside powers. These include Warsaw Pact dissolution and its impact on control of tactical nuclear weapons as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO's) expansion eastwards. It is equally important to look at the issue in the context of its history, or, in other words, the past attempts

Nuclear power, nuclear exports and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hildenbrand, G.

1977-01-01

Developed and developing countries alike unfortunately have no other options in replacing oil in electricity generation than to use coal or nuclear energy. As far as the supplier countries are concerned, there is no doubt that nobody is interested in adding to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the future electricity requirement in the developing countries, especially the need for nuclear power plants, represents a considerable market in the medium and long term which the supplier countries cannot simply ignore because they must seek to secure their export shares in order to protect jobs at home. For the receiver countries it is a matter of principle to achieve the highest possible degree of independence in energy generation so as to be able to guarantee continuity of supply. The interest in building up national fuel cycle activities is also closely linked with the creation of jobs in the receiver countries and with the efforts of these countries to straighten out their balance of payments situation. (orig.) [de

Nuclear weapons in Europe: Why zero is better

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Daalder, I.H.

1993-01-01

Given the fundamental changes in the political context and NATO's perception of nuclear weapons, what role remains for US nuclear weapons in preserving security in Europe? Are US nuclear deployments on the continent still necessary? Is there a requirement for extended deterrence and, if so, does its credibility depend on the continued basing of US nuclear weapons in Europe? And what is the role of arms control in effecting any desirable restructuring in nuclear force postures? In addressing these questions, it becomes clear that US nuclear weapons can now be removed from Europe - they no longer serve the political and military functions they once did

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Kerr, Paul; Nikitin, Mary B

2007-01-01

Pakistan's nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads. Pakistan continues fissile material production for weapons, and is adding to its weapons production facilities and delivery vehicles...

Public perspectives of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jenkins-Smith, H.C.; Herron, K.G. [Univ. of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (United States). Institute for Public Policy; Barke, R.P. [Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA (United States). School of Public Policy

1994-04-01

This report summarizes the findings of a nationwide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-cold war security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust and official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons; (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons, and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-cold war security environment.

Is further proliferation of nuclear weapons irrelevant to US national security

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pendley, R.E.

1985-01-01

For almost four decades, the United States has insisted that any increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons should be discouraged, claiming that nuclear proliferation would undermine international security and stability, and threaten the national security interests of the United States. This view was clearly emphasized by the Reagan administration when the President stated in 1981 that the basis of US nonproliferation policy was to ''establish the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons as a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective.'' However, actual implementation of this policy, seeking to obviate moves toward increased regional nuclear capabilities, will call for a variety of bilateral security dealings with so-called problem countries in regions important to the United States, relationships that US governments have been largely chary of so far. It will also require discrimination and forcefulness in identifying the security interests of the United States in these key regions, and crafting specific foreign policies to further those interests

1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

On 19 July 1995, the Director General received a letter, addressed to him by the Alternate Resident Representative of Canada to the International Atomic Energy Agency, concerning 1995 review and extension conference of the parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

Feasibility and options for purchasing nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium from the former Soviet Union (FSU)

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-01-01

In response to a recent tasking from the National Security Council, this report seeks to analyze the possible options open to the US for purchasing, from the former Soviet Union (FSU) substantial quantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium recovered from the accelerated weapons retirements and dismantlements that will soon be taking place. The purpose of this paper is to identify and assess the implications of some of the options that now appear to be open to the United States, it being recognized that several issues might have to be addressed in further detail if the US Government, on its own, or acting with others seeks to negotiate any such purchases on an early basis. As an outgrowth of the dissolution of the Soviet Union three of the C.I.S. republics now possessing nuclear weapons, namely the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have stated that it is their goal, without undue delay, to become non-nuclear weapon states as defined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of overriding US concern is the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Third World, and the significant opportunity that the availability of such a large quantity of surplus weapons grade material might present in this regard, especially to a cash-starved FSU Republic. Additionally, the US, in its endeavor to drawdown its own arsenal, needs to assure itself that these materials are not being reconfigured into more modern weapons within the CIS in a manner which would be inconsistent with the stated intentions and publicized activities. The direct purchase of these valuable materials by the US government or by interested US private enterprises could alleviate these security concerns in a straightforward and very expeditious manner, while at the same time pumping vitally needed hard currency into the struggling CIS economy. Such a purchase would seem to be entirely consistent with the Congressional mandate indicated by the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991

The Text of the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1974-02-21

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 11 October 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1974-01-01

The text of the Agreement, and of the Protocol thereto, between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 11 October 1973, pursuant to Article 24. Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine and a Path Forward

Science.gov (United States)

Chyba, Christopher

2007-04-01

During the Cold War, the United States considered a number of approaches for living in a world with nuclear weapons, including disarmament, preventive war, the incorporation of nuclear weapons into military strategy, passive and active defense, and deterrence. With the failure of early approaches to disarmament, and the rejection of preventive war against the Soviet Union (and later, China), deterrence became central to key nuclear relationships, though arms control continued to play an important role. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty made preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons another central component of U.S. policy. The Bush Administration has tried to devise a new policy for the post-Cold War period. Their approach has three salient pillars. First, it is characterized by an overall skepticism toward multilateral agreements, on the grounds that bad actors will not obey them, that agreements can lead to a false sense of security, and that such agreements are too often a way for the Lilliputians of the world to tie down Gulliver. The March 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy declared that U.S. strength ``will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak, using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism.'' Second, the Bush Administration declared its intention to maintain a military dominance so great that other states simply would not try to catch up. The 2002 National Security Strategy states that ``Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.'' Third, the 2002 National Security Strategy (reaffirmed by the 2006 National Security Strategy) moved preventive war (which the strategies called ``preemptive war'') to a central position, rather than deterrence and nonproliferation. In part this was because of the claim that certain ``rogue'' states, and terrorist groups, were not deterrable. This talk

Nuclear Weapons in U.S. National Security Policy: Past, Present, and Prospects

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

Woolf, Amy F

2008-01-01

.... During the Cold War, the United States often modified, or tailored, its nuclear targeting doctrine, its nuclear weapons employment policy, and its nuclear force structure to enhance or maintain...

Terror weapons. Ridding the world of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - Commission on mass destruction weapons; Armes de terreur. Debarrasser le monde des armes nucleaires, biologiques et chimiques - Commission sur les armes de destruction massive

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Blix, H.; Journe, V.

2010-07-01

This book approaches in 8 chapters the ambitious challenge of ridding the world of all mass destruction weapons: 1 - re-launching disarmament; 2 - terror weapons: nature of threats and answers (weakness of traditional answers, counter-proliferation); 3 - nuclear weapons: preventing proliferation and terrorism, reducing threat and nuclear weapons number, from regulation to banning); 4 - biological or toxin weapons; 5 - chemical weapons; 6 - vectors, anti-missile defenses and space weapons; 7 - exports control, international assistance and non-governmental actors; 8 - respect, verification, enforcement and role of the United Nations. The recommendations and works of the Commission are presented in appendix together with the declaration adopted on April 30, 2009. (J.S.)

Building Foundations for Nuclear Security Enterprise Analysis Utilizing Nuclear Weapon Data

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Josserand, Terry Michael [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Nuclear Security Enterprise and Cost Analysis; Young, Leone [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Nuclear Security Enterprise and Cost Analysis; Chamberlin, Edwin Phillip [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States). Nuclear Security Enterprise and Cost Analysis

2017-09-01

The Nuclear Security Enterprise, managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration - a semiautonomous agency within the Department of Energy - has been associated with numerous assessments with respect to the estimating, management capabilities, and practices pertaining to nuclear weapon modernization efforts. This report identifies challenges in estimating and analyzing the Nuclear Security Enterprise through an analysis of analogous timeframe conditions utilizing two types of nuclear weapon data - (1) a measure of effort and (2) a function of time. The analysis of analogous timeframe conditions that utilizes only two types of nuclear weapon data yields four summary observations that estimators and analysts of the Nuclear Security Enterprise will find useful.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wilmshurst, M.J.

1983-01-01

The author discusses the reasons of criticism and even rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, dealing in particular with the alledged discriminating nature of the Treaty and with the statement that the Treaty is not apt to prevent proliferation on a vertical plane. He further discusses the motives behind the efforts of potential nuclear weapons states to get nuclear weapons. The system of worldwide and bilateral safeguards and controls covering the transfer of nuclear technologies is explained. In conclusion the author suggests to pay more attention to article IV, sub-section (2) of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as this might offer a suitable approach to restricting the dissemination of nuclear explosives. (HP) [de

Nuclear weapons complex: What went wrong?

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Martin, J.E.

1991-01-01

The nuclear weapons complex has generated significant volumes of radioactive wastes dating back to the 1940s. Such wastes included transuranic radioisotopes-for example, plutonium-generated as byproducts of the operations. Most of these wastes at the major disposal site were not classified in the same way nuclear wastes are classified today; the definitions of high- and low-level wastes have changed over time, and, in the case of the latter, different classes have been established that determine methods for disposal and handling. Waste disposal was not a high priority during World War II. After the war, however; resources were not committed to either waste-disposal research or the development of a national waste management policy. AEC's failure to develop a national policy on radioactive waste disposal is easier to understand than to excuse. The disposal problem parallels the chemical waste disposal situation, where there were no federal and few state laws regulating chemical waste disposal until 1976, following publicity about Love Canal. This same story has been repeated for radioactive and mixed wastes and facility safety at the nation's nuclear weapon sites

Weapons of mass destruction: Overview of the CBRNEs (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives).

Science.gov (United States)

Prockop, Leon D

2006-11-01

The events of September 11, 2001, made citizens of the world acutely aware of disasters consequent to present-day terrorism. This is a war being waged for reasons obscure to many of its potential victims. The term "NBCs" was coined in reference to terrorist weapons of mass destruction, i.e., nuclear, biological and chemical. The currently accepted acronym is "CBRNE" which includes Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive weapons. Non-nuclear explosives are the most common terrorist weapon now in use. Nuclear and radiological weapons are beyond the scope of this publication, which focuses on the "CBEs", i.e. chemical, biological and explosive weapons. Although neurologists will not be the first responders to CBEs, they must know about the neurological effects in order to provide diagnosis and treatment to survivors. Neurological complications of chemical, biological and explosive weapons which have or may be used by terrorists are reviewed by international experts in this publication. Management and treatment profiles are outlined.

Non-Proliferation, the IAEA Safeguards System, and the importance of nuclear material measurements

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stevens, Rebecca S. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

2017-09-18

The objective of this project is to explain the contribution of nuclear material measurements to the system of international verification of State declarations and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Possible steps on the road to a nuclear-weapon-free Europe: The plan for the denuclearization of Europe

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gorbulin, V.; Shevtsov, A.

1998-01-01

In connection with the plans for NATO expansion in Eastern Europe, the issue of defining the role of nuclear weapons in Europe has become exceptionally acute. A 'hidden' nuclear proliferation in Europe arising from NATO expansion would unambiguously conflict with the spirit of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). At the same time the volume of possible military tasks of battlefield nuclear weapons has drastically shrunk in the pos-Cold War period. As a solution to the problems that have arisen, three steps to a nuclear-weapon-free Europe are proposed: obtain commitments from the USA, Great Britain and France not to expand the base areas of battlefield nuclear weapons; create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and East Europe; eliminate battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, final report, 'Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms', Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2006-07-01

Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are rightly called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they have the potential to kill thousands and thousands of people in a single attack, and their effects may persist in the environment and in our bodies, in some cases indefinitely. Many efforts have been made to free the world from the threat of these weapons and some progress has been made. Paradoxically, despite the end of the Cold War, the past decade has seen more setbacks than successes. States have failed to comply with their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, and terrorist groups have emerged that recognize no restraints. In September 2005, the United Nations World Summit was unable to agree on a single recommendation on disarmament and non-proliferation. It is time for all to wake up to the awesome reality that many of the old threats continue to hang over the world and that many new ones have emerged. It is time for all governments to revive their cooperation and to breathe new life into the disarmament work of the United Nations. Efforts to eradicate poverty and to protect the global environment must be matched by a dismantling of the world's most destructive capabilities. The gearshift now needs to be moved from reverse to drive. Biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions, but these need to be universally accepted and fully implemented. Nuclear weapons must also be outlawed. Before this aim is realized, there must be new initiatives to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the threat posed by them. It is equally urgent to prevent proliferation and to take special measures to ensure that terrorists do not acquire any weapons of mass destruction. This report presents ideas and recommendations on what the world community - including national governments and civil society - can and should do.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, final report, 'Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms', Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2006-01-01

Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are rightly called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Designed to terrify as well as destroy, they have the potential to kill thousands and thousands of people in a single attack, and their effects may persist in the environment and in our bodies, in some cases indefinitely. Many efforts have been made to free the world from the threat of these weapons and some progress has been made. Paradoxically, despite the end of the Cold War, the past decade has seen more setbacks than successes. States have failed to comply with their disarmament and non-proliferation commitments, and terrorist groups have emerged that recognize no restraints. In September 2005, the United Nations World Summit was unable to agree on a single recommendation on disarmament and non-proliferation. It is time for all to wake up to the awesome reality that many of the old threats continue to hang over the world and that many new ones have emerged. It is time for all governments to revive their cooperation and to breathe new life into the disarmament work of the United Nations. Efforts to eradicate poverty and to protect the global environment must be matched by a dismantling of the world's most destructive capabilities. The gearshift now needs to be moved from reverse to drive. Biological and chemical weapons have been comprehensively outlawed through global conventions, but these need to be universally accepted and fully implemented. Nuclear weapons must also be outlawed. Before this aim is realized, there must be new initiatives to reduce the number of nuclear weapons and the threat posed by them. It is equally urgent to prevent proliferation and to take special measures to ensure that terrorists do not acquire any weapons of mass destruction. This report presents ideas and recommendations on what the world community - including national governments and civil society - can and should do

Peaceful uses of nuclear weapon plutonium

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burtak, F.

1996-01-01

In 1993, the U.S.A. and the CIS signed Start 2 (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in which they committed themselves the reduce their nuclear weapon arsenals to a fraction of that of 1991. For forty-five years the antagonism between the superpowers had been a dominating factor in world history, determining large areas of social life. When Start 2 will have been completed in 2003, some 200 t of weapon grade plutonium and some 2000 t of highly enriched uranium (Heu) will arise from dismantling nuclear weapons. In the absence of the ideological ballast of the debate about Communism versus Capitalism of the past few decades there is a chance of the grave worldwide problem of safe disposal and utilization of this former nuclear weapon material being solved. Under the heading of 'swords turned into plowshares', plutonium and uranium could be used for peaceful electricity generation. (orig.) [de

The next generation(s) of Europeans facing nuclear weapons: forgetful, indifferent but supportive? EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, Non-Proliferation Papers No. 56 March 2017

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pelopidas, Benoit

2017-04-01

The post-cold war generation of citizens is forgetting nuclear weapon-related dangers and becoming indifferent to the issue. At the same time, the absence of mass grassroots, anti-nuclear protest suggests tacit support for current nuclear weapon policies. These three common diagnoses are potentially contradictory and, more importantly, are only assumptions. This paper is the first systematic attempt at assessing the attitude of the under 30's generation of European Union (EU) citizens with regard to nuclear weapons. It is based on a poll of over 10 000 citizens across the 28 EU member countries. The paper finds that none of these assumptions holds. Except for the cases of near nuclear use, the lack of knowledge about nuclear danger is not that widespread; it only increases slowly and not uniformly. Similarly, the lack of popular engagement in the nuclear weapon debate does not mean support for existing policies. In this paper, the sentiment of support is assessed with a set of three criteria: the feeling of safety attained from nuclear weapons; satisfaction with policies taken in one's name; and acceptance of vulnerabilities arising from the possession of nuclear weapons. This paper finds that overall support in these areas is below 30 per cent in every country for which there was a representative sample of respondents. Neither do the youth express a lack of concern, but rather a strong feeling of inability to affect the outcome. This suggests the need for both a research agenda and a reform of EU educational policies aimed at this generation on nuclear weapons

A nuclear-weapon-free world and true disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Salvini, G.

1999-01-01

This preliminary note about is important to consider when discussing hopes of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world. Without a serious effort to establish intelligent, powerful bodies to control and judge the behavior of the nations on Earth, whatever they future weapons may be, the objective to reach a nuclear-weapon-free world may even succeed, but it is not enough to stop wars and death. Even more than that: if taken alone, as the 'Great Way', it could prove negative, for it could slow down the general effort to achieve peace on out planet. A nuclear-weapon-free world is of course a very good idea but two points must be discussed: how to achieve the nuclear-weapon-free world; and what will happen afterwards. Some considerations on the second point are made

Nuclear weapons in the India-Pakistan context

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

2002-01-01

This thesis deals with the possible employment of nuclear weapons in the ongoing confrontation between India and Pakistan. After reviewing the nuclear capabilities of both Indian and Pakistan and assessing their possible delivery systems, this dissertation explores the emerging picture regarding the Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines. It is argued that, after exploring the current structure of the armed forces in both countries and after analyzing the theatres of operations, it is highly unlikely that either country seeks to employ nuclear weapons in a tactical, battlefield role. It is also argued that neither India or Pakistan is making an effort to evolve a nuclear war-fighting doctrine. Moreover, it is shown that nuclear weapons have simply led to a re-thinking of military tactics on the part of India so as to minimize the chance of a nuclear strike by limiting the aims and objectives of any Indian military action. In stark contrast, it is shown that South Asian cities present far more lucrative targets for nuclear strikes. As a result of this and the geographic and tactical limitations of South Asian battlefields, it is argued that both India and Pakistan have based their fledgling nuclear strategies around a 'city-busting' concept. The existing command and control systems in both countries are examined and found to be adequate if both countries adopt a strict 'second-strike' approach to the employment of nuclear weapons. It is further argued that nuclear weapons, while limiting the scale of any future India-Pakistan war, will not play a major role in preventing a conflict between the two countries. Rather, the basic operational parity that exists between the two countries in terms of their conventional forces is responsible for preventing the outbreak of war. The thesis also briefly explores the rationale behind the acquisition of nuclear weapons in both countries and on their basic security perceptions. The issue of confidence building measures and the

Agreement between the State of Qatar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Agreement (and the Protocol thereto) between the State of Qatar and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Agreement on 24 September 2008. It was signed in Vienna on 19 January 2009. Pursuant to Article 24 of the Agreement, the Agreement entered into force on 21 January 2009, the date on which the Agency received from the State of Qatar written notification that Qatar's statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force had been met. Pursuant to Article II of the Protocol, the Protocol entered into force on the same date

Safeguards against use of nuclear material for weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Sanders, B.; Rometsch, R.

1975-01-01

The history of safeguards is traced from the first session of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, through the various stages of the IAEA safeguard system for nuclear materials and to the initiation of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. The role of the IAEA under the treaty is discussed. The structure and content of safeguards agreements in connection with the treaty were laid down and the objective of safeguards clearly defined. The methods of verification by the IAEA of the facility operator's material accountancy through inspection and statistical analysis and evaluation of 'material unaccounted for' are explained. The extent to which the IAEA may make use of the State's system of accounting and control of nuclear materials is considered. Reference is also made to the question of protection against theft and sabotage. Finally the scope of safeguards work for the next 15 years is forecast. (U.K.)

Nuclear weapons research in Sweden. The co-operation between civilian and military research, 1947 - 1972

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jonter, Thomas

2002-05-01

metallic plutonium. Simultaneously, AE developed methods to separate plutonium from uranium (reprocessing) in order to be used as fuels in the reactors (plutonium recycling). This procedure would imply a better use of the natural uranium. Between 1949 and up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), four main investigations regarding the technical conditions for a manufacture of nuclear weapons were made (1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965). AE prepared several reports within the framework of this FOA research. It was mainly assignments, which dealt with reactor technique, production of plutonium and procurement of heavy water. The second purpose is to account for the reactors and other facilities where nuclear materials activities (especially with plutonium, U-235 and heavy water) have taken place. The results of this investigation are given in appendix 2. The third purpose is to investigate how much plutonium, U-235 and heavy water AE had at its disposal during the period 1945-1972. The results of this investigation are given in appendix 1. Appendix 4 contains a general model of how the historical review of Sweden's non-proliferation policy of nuclear weapons was carried out. This model has been created in order to serve as a guide for other states' efforts to make similar surveys

Proposed nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy concerning foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. Summary

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-03-01

The United States Department of Energy and United States Department of State are jointly proposing to adopt a policy to manage spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. Only spent nuclear fuel containing uranium enriched in the United States would be covered by the proposed policy. The purpose of the proposed policy is to promote U.S. nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives, specifically by seeking to reduce highly-enriched uranium from civilian commerce. This is a summary of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement. Environmental effects and policy considerations of three Management Alternative approaches for implementation of the proposed policy are assessed. The three Management Alternatives analyzed are: (1) acceptance and management of the spent nuclear fuel by the Department of Energy in the United States, (2) management of the spent nuclear fuel at one or more foreign facilities (under conditions that satisfy United States nuclear weapons nonproliferation policy objectives), and (3) a combination of components of Management Alternatives 1 and 2 (Hybrid Alternative). A No Action Alternative is also analyzed. For each Management Alternative, there are a number of alternatives for its implementation. For Management Alternative 1, this document addresses the environmental effects of various implementation alternatives such as varied policy durations, management of various quantities of spent nuclear fuel, and differing financing arrangements. Environmental impacts at various potential ports of entry, along truck and rail transportation routes, at candidate management sites, and for alternate storage technologies are also examined. For Management Alternative 2, this document addresses two subalternatives: (1) assisting foreign nations with storage; and (2) assisting foreign nations with reprocessing of the spent nuclear fuel

Defense against nuclear weapons: a decision analysis

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Orient, J.M.

1985-01-01

Response to the public health threat posed by nuclear weapons is a medical imperative. The United States, in contrast to other nations, has chosen a course that assures maximal casualties in the event of a nuclear attack, on the theory that prevention of the attack is incompatible with preventive measures against its consequences, such as blast injuries and radiation sickness. A decision analysis approach clarifies the risks and benefits of a change to a strategy of preparedness

Nuclear disarmament. Options for the coming non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle; Nukleare Abruestung. Optionen fuer den kommenden Ueberpruefungszyklus des NVV

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mueller, Harald

2011-07-01

The report is aimed on the nuclear disarmament discussion with respect to the disagreement of nuclear weapon states and those without nuclear weapons, esp. the non-aligned movement (NAM) concerning the non-proliferation treaty. The report covers the following issues: The role of the non-proliferation treaty, nuclear disarmament in the last surveillance conference 2010, the different disarmament philosophies, the possibilities of bridging the disagreement, further disarmament options for the future non-proliferation treaty surveillance cycle, German options for the future surveillance cycle.

Materials research and development for nuclear weapons applications

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1977-01-01

Highlights of a comprehensive summary of materials research and development being conducted at Sandia in support of the nuclear weapons development programs are presented. The developments include foams, encapsulants, metals with memories, material equations-of-state, composites, glass-to-metal bonds, and design processes

Weapons-grade nuclear material - open questions of a safe disposal

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Closs, K.D.; Giraud, J.P.; Grill, K.D.; Hensing, I.; Hippel, F. von; Holik, J.; Pellaud, B.

1995-01-01

There are suitable technologies available for destruction of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Weapons-grade uranium, consisting to 90% of the isotope U-235, can be diluted with the uranium isotope U-238 to make it non-weapons-grade, but it will then still be a material that can be used as a fuel in civil nuclear reactors. For safe plutonium disposal, several options are under debate. There is for instance a process called ''reverse reprocessing'', with the plutonium being blended with high-level radioactive fission products and then being put into a waste form accepted for direct ultimate disposal. The other option is to convert weapons-grade plutonium into MOX nuclear fuel elements and then ''burn'' them in civil nuclear power reactors. This is an option favoured by many experts. Such fuel elements should stay for a long time in the reactor core in order to achieve high burnups, and should then be ready for ultimate disposal. This disposal pathway offers essential advantages: the plutonium is used up or depleted as a component of reactor fuel, and thus is no longer available for illegal activities, and it serves as an energy source for power generation. (orig./HP) [de

Nuclear disarmament and evolution of the nuclear non-proliferation regime

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bragin, V.; Carlson, J.; Bardsley, J.; Hill, J.

1999-01-01

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference reaffirmed 'the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control' and endorsed 'universal application of safeguards once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved'. Hence strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and incremental broadening of its coverage towards the universal application of international safeguards in all States is a high priority albeit for the medium to long term. A tentative attempt is made in this paper to anticipate how the elements of verification under the NPT, FMCT and other conventions and arrangements related to nuclear non-proliferation will evolve against the background of the disarmament process, with the goal of achieving at some future stage an ultimate convergence of verification regimes under a complete nuclear disarmament. We think, however, that most of the new initiatives in the area of disarmament/non-proliferation should be realised during the current disarmament phase. We do not wish our model to be perceived as a rigid time-bound scheme. New initiatives should be implemented in parallel and as soon as practicable. This paper reflects the personal views of the authors and should not be taken to represent Australian Government policy. (author)

IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material in the Russian Federation and the United States

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

Full text: Russian Federation Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev, United States Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei met in Vienna on 16 September 2002 to review the status of the Trilateral Initiative and agree on its future direction. The parties concluded that the task entrusted to the Trilateral Initiative Working Group in 1996 has been fulfilled. The work completed has demonstrated practical approaches for IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material designated as released from defence programmes in classified forms or at certain sensitive facilities. The work included the examination of technical, legal and financial issues associated with such verification. The removal of weapon-origin fissile material from defence programmes of the Russian Federation and the United States is in furtherance of the commitment to disarmament steps undertaken by the two States pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA verification of the materials declared excess to nuclear weapons programmes and made subject to this Initiative would build international confidence that this material will never again be used in nuclear weapons. Minister Rumyantsev, Secretary Abraham and Director General ElBaradei recognized the value of the groundbreaking work completed over the last six years. Building on the work completed, they directed the technical experts to begin without delay discussions on future possible cooperation within the trilateral format. Minister Rumyantsev, Secretary Abraham and Director General ElBaradei agreed that the Principals would meet again in September 2003 to review progress within the trilateral format. (IAEA)

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1977-07-13

The text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Nicaragua and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 29 December 1976. The Protocol entered into force on the same date pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1976-01-13

The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ecuador and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 March 1975, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975 between Nicaragua and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 28 February 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Nicaragua and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members.The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 29 December 1976. The Protocol entered into force on the same date pursuant to Article III thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 6 November 1978 between Jamaica and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1979-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 6 November 1978 and of the Protocol thereto between Jamaica and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 6 November 1978. The Protocol entered into force on the same day, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 18 April 1975 between Honduras and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 18 April 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between Honduras and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 18 April 1975. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

The Text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974 between Ecuador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 2 October 1974, and of the Protocol thereto, between Ecuador and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 10 March 1975, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

United States non-proliferation policy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Scheinman, L.

1978-01-01

U.S. non-proliferation policy is aimed at slowing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, managing the destabilizing effects of nuclear technology for energy purposes, and fostering international standards and institutions to deal responsibly with global nuclear development. These goals assume that nuclear technology has not already precluded social control and recognize the social benefits offered by peaceful uses of atomic energy. Non-proliferation policies recognize that the motivation for possessing nuclear weapons is a more-difficult problem than technical ability and will concentrate on reducing those incentives through international agreements and safeguards and by maintaining the separation of commercial nuclear fuel cycles and military uses

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002 [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002 [fr

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2005-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Nicaragua and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for teh Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in the Annex to this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 12 June 2002

Scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre - ARSRITP and arms control and nuclear weapons non-proliferation problems

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Avrorin, E.N.; Andrusenko, B.A.; Voznyuk, R.I.; Voloshin, N.P.

1994-01-01

The activity of scientists of Russian Federal Nuclear Centre (RFNC) -ARSRITP in the field of nuclear disarmament control for the period of 1974 -1993 is discussed. RFNC - ARSRITP scientists in collaboration with american specialists have developed and employed in practice the techniques and equipment to control the bilateral Treaty on the limitation of Nuclear -Weapon Test. Experience of control over nuclear tests of threshold power and realization of new RFNC - ARSRITP scientific and technical projects have made a basis for development of measures and means of possible control methods to observe complete nuclear test ban

Iran's nuclear program - for power generation or nuclear weapons?; Irans kjernefysiske program - for kraftproduksjon eller kjernevaapen?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kippe, Halvor

2008-11-15

presumably would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), has generated enough concern among several of the dominant nations in the world, that they have gone to great lengths to try to dissuade Tehran from the continued pursuit of its in principle legal nuclear activities. As this report is issued, Iran still has some way ahead before its infrastructure can readily provide it with nuclear weapons on demand. But Iran seems almost to have overcome the presumably highest technological threshold, namely full-scale uranium enrichment. Today's infrastructure is far from sufficiently developed to be able to fully support Iran's planned nuclear power developments, but on the other hand the need for indigenously produced nuclear fuel is also several years ahead, as long as Iran's first self-constructed nuclear power plant is far from completion. The known and assumed uranium deposits, however, are of minute proportions compared to the stated ambitions of their nuclear power programme (20 GWe within 2030). Iran's future reactors will hardly be able to go online before they become dependent on fuel from abroad. The uranium deposits are, on the other hand, abundant for the future production of several thousands of nuclear weapons. And if the infrastructure that is arising today is actually directed towards that purpose, Iran will in theory some day be able to produce more than a hundred nuclear weapons a year. (Author)

UFOs and nukes. Extraordinary encounters at nuclear weapons sites

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Hastings, Robert L.

2015-01-01

Everyone knows about the reported recovery of a crashed alien spaceship near Roswell, New Mexico in July 1947. However, most people are unaware that, at the time of the incident, Roswell Army Airfield was home to the world's only atomic bomber squadron, the 509th Bomb Group. Was this merely a coincidence? During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built thousands of the far more destructive hydrogen bombs, some of them a thousand times as destructive as the first atomic bombs dropped on Japan. If the nuclear standoff between the superpowers had erupted into World War III, human civilization - and perhaps the very survival of our species - would have been at risk. Did this ominous state of affairs come to the attention of outside observers? Was there a connection between the atomic bomber squadron based at Roswell and the reported crash of a UFO nearby? Did those who pilot the UFOs monitor the superpowers' nuclear arms race during the dangerous Cold War era? Do they scrutinize American and Russian weapons sites even now? UFOs and Nukes provides the startling and sometimes shocking answers to these questions. Veteran researcher Robert Hastings has investigated nuclear weapons-related UFO incidents for more than three decades and has interviewed more than 120 ex-US Air Force personnel, from former Airmen to retired Colonels, who witnessed extraordinary UFO encounters at nuclear weapons sites. Their amazing stories are presented here.

History, framework and perspectives of international policy for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Czakainski, M.

1985-12-01

The study analyses the framework conditions, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the international non-proliferation regime and their interlacement with international nuclear energy policies, and evaluates the results achieved so far on an international level by the efforts directed towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conclusion to be drawn as stated by the author is that the classical tool of non-proliferation policy - denial of technology transfer - will lose in importance and give way to enhanced, controlled cooperation between countries of the Third World and the industrialised countries. Another instrument that will maintain its value for non-proliferation policy is cooperation for political stabilisation in those parts of the world where regional conflicts might aggravate. (orig./HP) [de

Defense Special Weapons Agency Advisory Panel on the Nuclear Weapon Effects Program

National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

1998-01-01

We performed the audit in response to allegations made to the Defense Hotline concerning conflicts of interest among members of the Defense Special Weapons Agency Advisory Panel on the Nuclear Weapon Effects Program...

Statement issued on 28 February 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on accession of Argentina to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The statement was issued on 28 February 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on accession of Argentina to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Statement was received from the Resident Representative of France to the International Atomic Energy Agency and is being circulated for the information of all Member States

Nuclear weapons research in Sweden. The co-operation between civilian and military research, 1947 - 1972

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jonter, Thomas [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of History

2002-05-01

metallic plutonium. Simultaneously, AE developed methods to separate plutonium from uranium (reprocessing) in order to be used as fuels in the reactors (plutonium recycling). This procedure would imply a better use of the natural uranium. Between 1949 and up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), four main investigations regarding the technical conditions for a manufacture of nuclear weapons were made (1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965). AE prepared several reports within the framework of this FOA research. It was mainly assignments, which dealt with reactor technique, production of plutonium and procurement of heavy water. The second purpose is to account for the reactors and other facilities where nuclear materials activities (especially with plutonium, U-235 and heavy water) have taken place. The results of this investigation are given in appendix 2. The third purpose is to investigate how much plutonium, U-235 and heavy water AE had at its disposal during the period 1945-1972. The results of this investigation are given in appendix 1. Appendix 4 contains a general model of how the historical review of Sweden's non-proliferation policy of nuclear weapons was carried out. This model has been created in order to serve as a guide for other states' efforts to make similar surveys.

TOWARDS FULFILLMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

s. Bagheri

2016-01-01

Full Text Available The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT is an international treaty that should be implemented during both peace and wartime. However, the obligations included in the treaty are dependent upon states' attitudes regarding other issues. Non-use of nuclear weapons is directly related to negotiations done for the purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, non-production or accumulation by other means and disarmament. In our day, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been one of the issues of international law.The present study is of crucial significance due to its endeavor to clarify the general principles of Humanitarian Law in a relationship to the threat of nuclear weapons' up to now, a special norm; significantly limiting or completely prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, has not been accepted in international law. However, customary international humanitarian law regarding the use of nuclear weapons holds great value because of its purpose in eliminating nuclear weapons as a means of war through ascertaining their non-use and also appeasing the importance of nuclear ascendancy. In this respect, the NPT regime and its relationship with international humanitarian law will be discussed. Firstly, the NPT background, formation, main objectives and principles will be analyzed. In order to evaluate the relationship between the NPT and humanitarian law, the humanitarian obligations in general, humanitarian obligations in the context of the NPT and fulfillmen t of these obligations under the NPT should be studied. One of the main parts of the study is nuclear disarmament obligation included in the NPT. In this section, nuclear disarmament obligation in the context of the NPT and the legal framework of possible, general and comprehensive disarmament will be examined.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007 [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin-America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Guatemala and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in Guatemala City on 14 December 2001

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 23 November 2006. It was signed in Vienna on 20 September 2007

The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security. Teacher's Guide. National Issues Forums in the Classroom.

Science.gov (United States)

Levy, Tedd

This teacher's guide is designed to accompany the National Issues Forums'"The Superpowers: Nuclear Weapons and National Security." Activities and ideas are provided to challenge students to debate and discuss the United States-Soviet related issues of nuclear weapons and national security. The guide is divided into sections that…

The third review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1985-01-01

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was held in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985, with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty were being realized. The Conference ended with the adoption by consensus of a Final Declaration, by which the States parties, among other things, solemnly declared their conviction that the Treaty was essential to international peace and security and expressed their support for its objectives. This Fact Sheet provides information on the preparations for the Conference, developments at the Conference and the main features of the Final Declaration. Te text of the Treaty is reproduced in Disarmament Fact Sheet No. 33, and its historical background is contained in Fact Sheet No. 41

Low yield nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rodionov, S.

1999-01-01

It is unlikely that anybody would imagine the route to a nuclear-weapon-free world as a straight and unimpeded one. At the moment, there is a fading interest in the possibility of the concerted bilateral reduction of the US and Russian nuclear weapon stockpiles. The reason is evident: these powers demonstrate quite different approaches to two large political campaigns initiated in American political circles, namely NATO expansion to the East, and the attack on Anti-Ballistic-Missile (ABM) Treaty. Russia considers these initiatives as provocative in content and high-handed in the form. The West argues that Russian response is unjustified and insists on the peaceful nature of its plans?

Statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1988-08-01

The document reproduces the following statements commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, statements on behalf of the depository Governments and statements on behalf of other Governments (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Western Samoa and Nordic Countries - Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden)

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Nuclear Program of the DPRK

Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

- Park Sang Hoon

2012-09-01

Full Text Available The article analyzes the contemporary aspects of the nuclear weapon nonproliferation issue as exemplified by the international approaches to the DPRK nuclear weapons program, as well as the international community efforts to resolve it, in particular via the Six-Party Talks.

How to Make Historical Surveys of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jonter, Thomas [Stockholm Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of Economic History

2003-05-01

In 1998 SKI initiated a project in order to make a historical survey of the Swedish nuclear weapons research during the period 1945-2000. The survey is now fulfilled and contains of three reports. IAEA became interested in the project and accepted it in 2000 as a support program to increase transparency and to support the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Sweden. In the eyes of IAEA, the most important aim is to create knowledge and refine tools to enhance the means to strengthen the Safeguard System within the Additional Protocol. Other countries have now showed interest to follow the Swedish example and to make their own reviews of the nuclear energy and nuclear weapons research of their pasts. A co-operation between Sweden, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and Latvia has now been initiated in order to make such historical reviews. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate is the initiator and financial supporter of the project. The cooperation project has three comprehensive goals: a. to create transparency in the nuclear energy field of the past. The intention is that the results of the conducted studies could be attached to the State Declaration according to the Additional Protocol in order to enhance transparency b. to account for the nuclear material traffic of the past and; c. to develop the competence in nuclear energy matters in general, and in particular, to extend the knowledge regarding each participating State's nuclear experience in the past. The first purpose of this paper is to describe the project and its aims. The second purpose is to present a general model of how a historical review of a State's nuclear related activities and nuclear weapons research can be designed. The model has been created in order to serve as a guide for other countries strengthening of their safeguards systems in the framework of the Additional Protocol. The third purpose is to present the pedagogy that has been used as a teaching method in order to train

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Ecuador and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 20 September 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 1 October 1999

The Text of the Agreement of 22 April 1975 between El Salvador and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1976-01-01

The text of the Agreement of 22 April 1975, and of the Protocol thereto, between El Salvador and the Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Agreement entered into force on 22 April 1975, pursuant to Article 24. The Protocol entered into force on the same date, pursuant to Article II thereof.

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Peru and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2002-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the Republic of Peru and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 10 December 1999. It was signed in Vienna on 22 March 2000

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Slovenia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement [es

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement [fr

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement [es

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Bulgaria

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2009-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Cyprus

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

The Text of the Agreement between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Accession of Slovenia

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Article 23(a) of the Agreement, and the Protocol thereto, between Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the Agency in implementation of Article III, (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides that the Agreement shall come into force for non-nuclear-weapon States Party to NPT which become members of the European Atomic Energy Community upon: (i) Notification to the Agency by the State concerned that its procedures with respect to the coming into force of the Agreement have been completed; and (ii) Notification to the Agency by the European Atomic Energy Community that it is in a position to apply its safeguards in respect of that State for the purposes of the Agreement

Nuclear energy and nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Robertson, J.A.L.

1983-06-01

We all want to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The issue before us is how best to achieve this objective; more specifically, whether the peaceful applications of nuclear energy help or hinder, and to what extent. Many of us in the nuclear industry are working on these applications from a conviction that without peaceful nuclear energy the risk of nuclear war would be appreciably greater. Others, however, hold the opposite view. In discussing the subject, a necessary step in allaying fears is understanding some facts, and indeed facing up to some unpalatable facts. When the facts are assessed, and a balance struck, the conclusion is that peaceful nuclear energy is much more part of the solution to preventing nuclear war than it is part of the problem

Nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power. Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program. Volume II. Proliferation resistance

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1980-06-01

The purpose of this volume is limited to an assessment of the relative effects that particular choices of nuclear-power systems, for whatever reasons, may have on the possible spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities. This volume addresses the concern that non-nuclear-weapons states may be able to initiate efforts to acquire or to improve nuclear-weapons capabilities through civilian nuclear-power programs; it also addresses the concern that subnational groups may obtain and abuse the nuclear materials or facilities of such programs, whether in nuclear-weapons states (NWS's) or nonnuclear-weapons states (NNW's). Accordingly, this volume emphasizes one important factor in such decisions, the resistance of nuclear-power systems to the proliferation of nuclear-weapons capabilities

The nuclear present. A guide to recent books on nuclear war, weapons, the peace movement, and related issues, with a chronology of nuclear events, 1789-1991

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Burns, G.

1992-01-01

The Nuclear Present brings the interested reader up-to-date on significant English-language books about nuclear weapons and related topics, identifying primarily important works of nuclear non-fiction that have come out since 1984. Each reference has a paragraph of comment about its subject and value. General organizational areas include the following: Reference Works; Nuclear weapons and Nuclear war (14 sub-headings including overviews, development, effects, tests, arms race, prospectives, legal considerations etc.); Strategy; proliferation; Stratigic Defense; Arms control and disarmament; ethical, pholosophical and religous perspectives; new paths to peace; periodic guide; the Chernobyl Disaster. An extensive Nuclear Chronology (1789-1991) written by the author allows a fairly detailed sense of the historical record of nuclear weapons, including testing, manufacture, use and movements for arms control and disarmament

New United States policies regarding international nuclear cooperation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Marshall, H.R. Jr.

1981-10-01

This paper discusses the United States policy on international nuclear power development in the light of the priorities established by President Reagan in the guidelines for his Administration's nuclear co-operation policy. The aim is to establish a framework allowing for co-operation in peaceful nuclear development while remaining committed to the objective of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, in particular by supporting the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the IAEA Safeguards System and the Tlatelolco Treaty (NEA) [fr

Dismantlement and destruction of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Schulte, N.T.

1997-01-01

The safe destruction and dismantling of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons is of fundamental importance to the security of all countries represented in this volume. Expertise in the field is not confined to one country or organisation: all can benefit from each other. There is an ever present danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: approximately two dozen countries have ongoing programmes to develop or acquire such weapons, and many are also gaining the capability to build air-surface delivery systems. But much can be done to prevent proliferation by reducing leakage of materials and know-how and by solving the problems of the destruction of surplus weapons systems, which has now come to be a key issue. In 13 sessions of the workshop attention was paid to (1) Dismantlement and Destruction of Chemical, Nuclear and Conventional Weapons; (2) Status of Implementation of Arms Control Treaties and Voluntary Commitments; (3) National Perspectives on Cooperation in Disarmament; (4) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Chemical Weapons; (5) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Nuclear Weapons; (6) Stocktaking of National and Bilateral Disposal/Destruction Programmes: Conventional Weapons. Session; (7) Experience with Currently Employed Chemical Destruction Technologies; (8) Alternative Chemical Destruction Technologies; (9) Deactivation, Dismantlement and Destruction of Delivery Systems and Infrastructure for Nuclear Weapons; (10) Storage, Safeguarding and Disposition of Fissile Materials; (11) Technologies for Conversion and Civil Use of Demilitarized Materials; (12) International Organizations; and (13) Environmental Challenges Posed by Chemical and Nuclear Disarmament

Brief history of the nuclear weapon - Between proliferation and disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chagnollaud, Jean-Paul

2011-01-01

During the hardest times of the Cold War, like in October 1962 with the Cuba crisis, the World lived in the fear of a nuclear confrontation between the USA and the USSR. If this time seems far away now, the risks of a nuclear conflict are probably greater today because no serious progress has bee done during the last ten years and because, from now on, nine, and maybe ten states possess nuclear weapons. In April 2009, US President Barack Obama, gave a talk in Prague (Czech Republic) in which he stressed again on the enormous risks that this situation was running on humanity and urged the world to get rid of nuclear weapons. The aim of this book is to present the main steps of this process, which started in the 1960's, and the arguments which justify its necessity. (J.S.)

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2013-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Antigua and Barbuda and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 10 September 2013. It was signed on 30 October 2013 in St. John's, Antigua and Barbuda, and on 15 November 2013 in Vienna, Austria

Nuclear weapons industry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bertsch, K.A.; Shaw, L.S.

1984-01-01

This unique study was written specifically as a reference source for institutional investors concerned about the threat posed to their stock portfolios by the debate over nuclear arms production. The authors focus their analysis on the 26 leading companies in the field. The perspective is neutral and refreshing. Background information on strategic policy, arms control and disarmament, and the influence of the industry on defense policy and the economy is presented rationally. The study also discusses the economic significance of both the conversion from military to civilian production and nuclear freeze initiatives. An appendix contains a fact-filled guide to nuclear weapon systems

World hazards and nuclear weapons: right and wrong answers. To reach a treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons is possible

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Durand, Daniel; Nivet, Roland

2017-01-01

A first article notices that modernisation of nuclear weapons are resumed with the emergence of new nuclear temptations: ambitious modernisation programme in the USA, catching-up race by Russia to be able to pierce antimissile defences, Chinese modernisation, renewal of the British Trident programme, doubling of nuclear military budgets in France, developments in India and Pakistan. However, the author discusses the possible emergence of new opportunities for a nuclear disarmament: humanitarian ICAN campaign for a treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons. He highlights the need of a debate in France on these issues even though no politician dares to take a strong position in favour of nuclear disarmament. In a third article, a member of an activist association shows that, after the adoption of a U N resolution on favour of the elaboration of a treaty of interdiction of nuclear weapons, reaching such a treaty is possible. The action of civil society seems necessary

Examination of Economic Feasibility of Nuclear Weapons in the Republic of Korea

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Suh, Young A; Yim, Man Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

2015-05-15

This observation implies that the popular view on nuclear weapons amongst Korean public is in part due to lack of knowledge about overall implications of possessing nuclear weapons. In this regard, pros and cons of nuclear weapons development need to be better characterized and understood by the public to support nuclear nonproliferation culture development. Noting lack of literature on characterizing the economics of nuclear weapons development, this study aims at performing economic feasibility analysis of nuclear weapons development in the ROK. For this purpose, an approach called Index technique based on the US experiences was applied to Korean historical data along with cost-benefit analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis. In this study, the scenario of nuclear weapons development against North Korean nuclear threat was compared with conventional weapons-based defense strategy. The comparison was based on cost benefit analysis and qualitative multi-criteria decision analysis. Results indicate that nuclear weapons development is not a desirable option. However, as this work was a rather simplistic academic exercise, further work is needed to support the outcome of the study. Outcome of these investigations would be useful for communication with the public regarding the need for nuclear weapons for national defense and to develop nuclear nonproliferation culture in the ROK.

Examination of Economic Feasibility of Nuclear Weapons in the Republic of Korea

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Suh, Young A; Yim, Man Sung

2015-01-01

This observation implies that the popular view on nuclear weapons amongst Korean public is in part due to lack of knowledge about overall implications of possessing nuclear weapons. In this regard, pros and cons of nuclear weapons development need to be better characterized and understood by the public to support nuclear nonproliferation culture development. Noting lack of literature on characterizing the economics of nuclear weapons development, this study aims at performing economic feasibility analysis of nuclear weapons development in the ROK. For this purpose, an approach called Index technique based on the US experiences was applied to Korean historical data along with cost-benefit analysis and Multi-Criteria Decision Making Analysis. In this study, the scenario of nuclear weapons development against North Korean nuclear threat was compared with conventional weapons-based defense strategy. The comparison was based on cost benefit analysis and qualitative multi-criteria decision analysis. Results indicate that nuclear weapons development is not a desirable option. However, as this work was a rather simplistic academic exercise, further work is needed to support the outcome of the study. Outcome of these investigations would be useful for communication with the public regarding the need for nuclear weapons for national defense and to develop nuclear nonproliferation culture in the ROK

Report on the 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Grape, S.; Jonter, T.

2013-01-01

The 8. ESARDA course on nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation took place in Uppsala, Sweden, on September 12-16, 2011. 44 participants from 15 countries followed the one week long course, comprising four days of lectures, one group exercise and one full day visit to the Swedish final repository (SFR) for short-lived radioactive waste. The lectures covered political and technical aspects related to the general background of safeguards legislation and treaties, the nuclear fuel cycle, destructive and non-destructive safeguards techniques, physical protection, verification technologies such as nuclear material accountancy and control, safeguards inspections, remote monitoring, containment and surveillance, export control, illicit trafficking and nuclear forensics. The course also contained a group exercise, whereby the participants learnt about different nonproliferation treaties on/or related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The task of the group exercise was to discuss and compare the treaties with respect to obligations and rights of state parties, verification of compliance, membership, terrorism, similarities/differences, successes and failures. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

The German Debate on Tactical Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Meier, Olivier

2008-01-01

This report analyses the debate in Germany about tactical nuclear weapons deployments in Europe. It is mainly based on interviews conducted with senior officials from the German Federal Foreign Ministry, the Federal Ministry of Defence, senior members of Parliament as well as experts from research institutes and think-tanks. The interviews focused on the more recent past in the German debate as well as the future of tactical nuclear weapon deployments in Germany and Europe. The report concludes that while a change of Germany's position on tactical nuclear weapons is unlikely to change in the short-term, several developments will make it unlikely that the continued involvement of Germany in NATO nuclear sharing will have to be debated in the medium term. Should the next Parliamentary elections, which will take place in 2009 at the latest, result in a Social Democrat-led government, a push for a reduction of Germany's involvement in NATO nuclear sharing appears possible. A conservative-led government is likely to maintain the nuclear status quo within NATO

Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Eaton, M.A.

2007-01-01

This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians' ideas about nuclear weapons

Canadians, nuclear weapons, and the Cold War security dilemma

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Eaton, M.A

2007-07-01

This dissertation provides a history of Canadian ideas about nuclear weapons from the late 1950s until the end of the Trudeau era in 1984. Throughout this period, Canadians reacted to the insecurity they felt in the world around them by expressing many conflicting, often irreconcilable views about a range of nuclear weapon issues, including Canada's acquisition of nuclear warheads in 1963, the U.S. ABM program in the 1960s and early 1970s, the role of Canadian nuclear technology in the development of India's first nuclear explosion, and the Trudeau government's decision to allow the U.S. military to test cruise missiles in northern Canada The dissertation concludes with an examination of the emergence of a broadly-based, increasingly mainstream and influential anti-nuclear movement in the early 1980s, the clearest manifestation of the insecurity Canadians experienced at the time. .The nuclear debates examined in this dissertation reveal that Canadians were divided over nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, the arms race, proliferation, and arms control and disarmament. In particular, they came to fundamentally different conclusions about how Canada's nuclear weapon policies, and its support for the nuclear policies of its alliances, would contribute to international stability and order. Some believed that their security rested on the maintenance of a strong Western nuclear deterrent and supported Canada contributing to its credibility; others believed that the constant modernisation of nuclear arsenals fuelled by the superpower arms race posed a serious threat to their security. This conceptual dilemma-the security through nuclear strength argument versus the fear that the quest for security through quantitative and qualitative improvements of nuclear stockpiles increased the likelihood of nuclear war-left Canadians divided over the value and utility of nuclear weapons and the strategies developed around them. At the same time, Canadians

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Harry, R.J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of the efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the exclusively peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this 'Full Scope Safeguards' on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear

IAEA safeguards and non-proliferation

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Harry, R J.S.

1995-02-01

An overview is given of efforts to contain the nuclear weapons proliferation during half a century of man-controlled nuclear fission. An initial policy of denial did not work, a following period of cooperation needed a gradual strengthening of international assurances on the peaceful character of the flourishing use of nuclear techniques for power generation and of other applications. The focus of the nuclear weapon proliferation concern changed from the highly developed states to developing states. The Non-Proliferation Treaty laid the basis for a unique system of voluntarily accepted international inspections to verify the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA got the task to implement this `Full Scope Safeguards` on all nuclear material and all nuclear activities in the non-nuclear weapon states. Thanks to the structure of the IAEA, in which both proponent and states with a critical attitude take part in the decision making process on the IAEA execution of its tasks, a balanced, and widely acceptable system emerged. International developments necessitated additional improvements of the non-proliferation system. The increase of strength of sub-national groups triggered international cooperation on physical protection, about a quarter of a century ago. More recently, it appeared that NPT states with assumed nuclear weapon ambitions operated in the margins between the interpretation of IAEA safeguards and the spirit and purpose of NPT. Improvements of the IAEA safeguards and a stronger cooperation between states, including the constraints which exporting states have imposed on nuclear supplies, strengthen the safeguards system. The important reductions in the two largest nuclear weapon arsenals lead, together with the delay in the fast breeder implementation, to large stockpiles of nuclear weapon usable materials. Also in this areas new internationally credible assurances have to be obtained, that these materials will never return to nuclear weapon applications.

Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2007-01-01

Agreement between the Dominican Republic and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. An agreement by Exchange of Letters with the Dominican Republic to amend the Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement

What Happens to Deterrence as Nuclear Weapons Decrease Toward Zero?

Science.gov (United States)

Drell, Sidney

2011-04-01

Steps reducing reliance on deployed nuclear weapons en route to zero will be discussed. They include broadly enhancing cooperation and transparency agreements beyond the provisions for verifying limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems in the New START treaty. Two questions that will be addressed are: What conditions would have to be established in order to maintain strategic stability among nations as nuclear weapons recede in importance? What would nuclear deterrence be like in a world without nuclear weapons?

A Study on Introduction of Nuclear Power Plants in India and the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Conditions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Yang, Seung Hyo; Lim, Dong Hyuk

2011-01-01

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) which was formed to build nuclear export control has been accepting the nuclear cooperation for the member nation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Korea exported nuclear power plants to United Arab Emirates in 2009 and research and training reactor to Jordan in 2010 based on the forcible non-proliferation regime as a member nation of NSG, so it is strengthening its position in the atomic energy industry. In addition, Korea concluded an agreement with India which is planning the construction of 25.based or more nuclear power plants for the next 20 years in last July, 25, so it will enter the atomic energy market in India. But India has been accepted the exceptionally civilian nuclear cooperation as a de facto Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) and non-member state of NPT, so concerns about nuclear proliferation has been raised. This study aims to introduce the allowance of exceptions background in India, to analyze its effect on the non-proliferation regime and to find nuclear non-proliferation conditions

Why are U.S. nuclear weapon modernization efforts controversial?

Science.gov (United States)

Acton, James

2016-03-01

U.S. nuclear weapon modernization programs are focused on extending the lives of existing warheads and developing new delivery vehicles to replace ageing bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and ballistic missile submarines. These efforts are contested and controversial. Some critics argue that they are largely unnecessary, financially wasteful and potentially destabilizing. Other critics posit that they do not go far enough and that nuclear weapons with new military capabilities are required. At its core, this debate centers on three strategic questions. First, what roles should nuclear weapons be assigned? Second, what military capabilities do nuclear weapons need to fulfill these roles? Third, how severe are the unintended escalation risks associated with particular systems? Proponents of scaled-down modernization efforts generally argue for reducing the role of nuclear weapons but also that, even under existing policy, new military capabilities are not required. They also tend to stress the escalation risks of new--and even some existing--capabilities. Proponents of enhanced modernization efforts tend to advocate for a more expansive role for nuclear weapons in national security strategy. They also often argue that nuclear deterrence would be enhanced by lower yield weapons and/or so called bunker busters able to destroy more deeply buried targets. The debate is further fueled by technical disagreements over many aspects of ongoing and proposed modernization efforts. Some of these disagreements--such as the need for warhead life extension programs and their necessary scope--are essentially impossible to resolve at the unclassified level. By contrast, unclassified analysis can help elucidate--though not answer--other questions, such as the potential value of bunker busters.

In Search of the Nuclear Taboo. Past, Present, and Future

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Potter, W.C.

2010-01-01

One of the most puzzling - if positive - phenomena of the past half century is the non-use of nuclear weapons. The puzzle relates to the absence of use despite the demonstrated technical effectiveness of the weapon, the enormous size of nuclear weapons stockpiles globally, the spread of nuclear weapons to states in most regions of the world, the centrality of nuclear weapons in the strategic doctrines and operational war plans of a growing number of states with very different cultures, political systems, and military traditions, and the observation of the tradition of non-use despite the lack of international legal prohibitions - unlike those in place with respect to chemical and biological weapons. This essay seeks to probe the underpinnings of nuclear weapons restraint, the strength and durability of the so-called nuclear 'taboo' - especially in light of the rise of non-states actors who covet nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence - and the most likely paths by which existing restraints might be breached, broken, or dissolved. Particular emphasis is placed on alternative futures as a number of other studies, including several important new volumes, have explored in depth the sources of non-use. (author)

In Search of the Nuclear Taboo. Past, Present, and Future

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Potter, W.C.

2010-07-01

One of the most puzzling - if positive - phenomena of the past half century is the non-use of nuclear weapons. The puzzle relates to the absence of use despite the demonstrated technical effectiveness of the weapon, the enormous size of nuclear weapons stockpiles globally, the spread of nuclear weapons to states in most regions of the world, the centrality of nuclear weapons in the strategic doctrines and operational war plans of a growing number of states with very different cultures, political systems, and military traditions, and the observation of the tradition of non-use despite the lack of international legal prohibitions - unlike those in place with respect to chemical and biological weapons. This essay seeks to probe the underpinnings of nuclear weapons restraint, the strength and durability of the so-called nuclear 'taboo' - especially in light of the rise of non-states actors who covet nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence - and the most likely paths by which existing restraints might be breached, broken, or dissolved. Particular emphasis is placed on alternative futures as a number of other studies, including several important new volumes, have explored in depth the sources of non-use. (author)

Introducing nuclear power into currently non-nuclear states

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Claassen, Gert

2007-01-01

As the nuclear renaissance gains momentum, many countries that currently have no nuclear power plants will begin to consider introducing them. It is anticipated that smaller reactors such as the Pebble Bed Modulator Reactor (PBMR) will not only be sold to current nuclear states to also to states where there is currently no nuclear experience. A range of issues would have to be considered for nuclear plants to be solid to non-nuclear states, such as the appropriate regulatory environment, standardization and codes, non-proliferation, security of supply, obtaining experienced merchant operators, appropriate financial structures and education and training. The paper considers nine major issues that need to be addressed by governments and vendors alike. International cooperation by organisations such as the IAEA, financial institutions and international suppliers will be required to ensure that developing countries as well as developed ones share the benefits of the nuclear renaissance. The opportunities that the nuclear industry affords to develop local skills, create job opportunities and to develop local manufacturing industries are among the important reasons that the South African Government has decided to support and fund the development of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor project. These considerations are included in the paper. (author)

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001 [es

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-07-01

The text of the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Republic of Costa Rica and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of all Members. The Board of Governors approved the Additional Protocol on 29 November 2001. It was signed in in San Jose, Costa Rica on 12 December 2001

Farewell to arms. What's blocking nuclear disarmament

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Mueller, Harald

2005-01-01

In the 1960s, when the United States and Soviet Union submitted their draft non-proliferation treaty to the 18-member Disarmament Committee in Geneva, it was exactly that - a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more States. It prohibited non-nuclear weapon States from acquiring nuclear weapons and prohibited the five acknowledged nuclear-weapon States from supplying them. However, it was not possible to conclude a treaty on those terms alone. Consequently, Article IV (on peaceful nuclear cooperation) and VI (on disarmament) were added. Only on the basis of this 'bargain' could the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) come into existence. It is ironic that the nuclear-weapon States that care for their own sovereignty rights would overlook that sovereignty is also dear to other States.Today, in an era of stagnating nuclear disarmament, one hears voices from some nuclear-weapon States that the disarmament stipulation was without substance and unnecessary. They argue that non-nuclear weapon States care only about their security and nothing else. If the Treaty is perceived as losing its value, withdrawing from it might eventually be seen as a consideration. At this point, non-nuclear weapon States had believed that they shared with their nuclear-armed counterparts a solid outlook on how to proceed with the implementation of Article VI. No one had the illusion that all the steps would be strictly implemented. Most accepted that the failure to achieve an agreed amendment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between Washington and Moscow led to the scrapping of that Treaty. But the pathetic under-achievement of the 'Thirteen Steps,' accompanied by statements of several nuclear-weapon States that they did not feel bound by these agreed measures came as a shock and led to great frustration among the majority of NPT members. If we start from the notion of the 'bargain' and accept that nuclear disarmament will not happen overnight, nuclear-weapon

Progress to a nuclear-weapon-free world through tactical nuclear arms control

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Matseiko, Youri

1999-01-01

At a time when, after some years of passivity, nuclear disarmament is becoming more of an urgent item on the international agenda and receiving accordingly more attention on the part of politicians and non-governmental experts. This is partly reflected in the Report of the Canberra Commission, and the statement on nuclear weapons by international generals and admirals. At the same time some developments such as uncertainties with START II ratification and the process of NATO enlargement make the task of nuclear arms control even more demanding. What is needed now is to pursue at last without any further delay negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. And these effective measures must include both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Only a sustained commitment at the highest political level will legitimate serious discussions of the elimination option and ensure that resources and personnel are devoted to finding solutions to the problems associated with moving to zero, and to crafting appropriate transition strategies. In the absence of such a commitment, the nations of the world may never reach the point at which the desirability and feasibility of a nuclear-free world can be evaluated with greater certainty. This Pugwash Conference is trying to make a modest contribution in helping to make possible such a vitally important commitment

Previewing the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Pomper, Miles A.

2010-01-01

Despite groundbreaking disarmament pledges and substantial effort, the Obama administration's hopes for a successful Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference may not be fully realised. Many developing countries are in no mood to grant new non-proliferation concessions, such as tightened rules on access to sensitive nuclear technologies, tougher inspection rules, or limits on withdrawing from the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) remain angered by the failure to move forward on many disarmament commitments pledged at the 1995 and 2000 Conferences. Moreover, progress on disarmament measures under Obama has been slower than hoped, as he faces considerable scepticism in Washington about his strategy. (author)

Assessing the optimism-pessimism debate: Nuclear proliferation, nuclear risks, and theories of state action

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Busch, Nathan Edward

2001-01-01

This dissertation focuses on the current debate in international relations literature over the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On this subject, IR scholars are divided into roughly two schools: proliferation 'optimists,' who argue that proliferation can be beneficial and that its associated hazards are at least surmountable, and proliferation 'pessimists,' who believe the opposite. This debate centers upon a theoretical disagreement about how best to explain and predict the behavior of states. Optimists generally ground their arguments on rational deterrence theory and maintain that nuclear weapons can actually increase stability among states, while pessimists often ground their arguments on 'organization theory,' which contends that organizational, bureaucratic, and other factors prevent states from acting rationally. A major difficulty with the proliferation debate, however, is that both sides tend to advance their respective theoretical positions without adequately supporting them with solid empirical evidence. This dissertation detailed analyses of the nuclear programs in the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan to determine whether countries with nuclear weapons have adequate controls over their nuclear arsenals and tissue material stockpiles (such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium). These case studies identify the strengths and weaknesses of different systems of nuclear controls and help predict what types of controls proliferating states are likely to employ. On the basis of the evidence gathered from these cases, this dissertation concludes that a further spread of nuclear weapons would tend to have seriously negative effects on international stability by increasing risks of accidental, unauthorized, or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and risks of thefts of fissile materials for use in nuclear or radiological devices by aspiring nuclear states or terrorist groups. (author)

Biological effects of nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Frischauf, H.

1983-01-01

Prompt and delayed biological effects of nuclear weapons are discussed. The response to excess pressure on man is estimated, the acute radiation syndrome caused by different radiation doses and cancerogenous and genetic effects are described. Medical care after a nuclear explosion would be difficult and imperfect. (M.J.)

Statement issued on 30 January 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union in connection with the accession of Algeria to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-01-01

The statement was issued on 30 January 1995 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union in connection with Algeria's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Statement was received from the Resident Representative of France to the International Atomic Energy Agency and is being circulated for the information of all Member States

Introducing nuclear power into currently non-nuclear states

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Gert, Claassen

2007-01-01

As the nuclear renaissance gains momentum, many countries that currently have no nuclear power plants will begin to consider introducing them. It is anticipated that smaller reactors such as the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) will not only be sold to current nuclear states to also to states where there is currently no nuclear experience. A range of issues would have to be considered for nuclear plants to be sold to non-nuclear states, such as the appropriate regulatory environment, standardization and codes, non-proliferation, security of supply, obtaining experienced merchant operators, appropriate financial structures and education and training. The paper considers nine major issues that need to be addressed by governments and vendors alike: 1) political enabling framework, 2) regulatory framework, 3) responsible owner, 4) responsible operator, 5) finance, 6) contact management, 7) fuel supply and waste management framework, 8) training and education, and 9) industrial infrastructure. International cooperation by organisations such as the IAEA, financial institutions and international suppliers will be required to ensure that developing countries as well as developed ones share the benefits of the nuclear renaissance. The opportunities that the nuclear industry affords to develop local skills, create job opportunities and to develop local manufacturing industries are among the important reasons that the South African Government has decided to support and fund the development of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor project. (author)

Comparison of methodologies for assessing the risks from nuclear weapons and from nuclear reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Benjamin, A.S.

1996-01-01

There are important differences between the safety principles for nuclear weapons and for nuclear reactors. For example, a principal concern for nuclear weapons is to prevent electrical energy from reaching the nuclear package during accidents produced by crashes, fires, and other hazards, whereas the foremost concern for nuclear reactors is to maintain coolant around the core in the event of certain system failures. Not surprisingly, new methods have had to be developed to assess the risk from nuclear weapons. These include fault tree transformations that accommodate time dependencies, thermal and structural analysis techniques that are fast and unconditionally stable, and parameter sampling methods that incorporate intelligent searching. This paper provides an overview of the new methods for nuclear weapons and compares them with existing methods for nuclear reactors. It also presents a new intelligent searching process for identifying potential nuclear detonation vulnerabilities. The new searching technique runs very rapidly on a workstation and shows promise for providing an accurate assessment of potential vulnerabilities with far fewer physical response calculations than would be required using a standard Monte Carlo sampling procedure

Sweden and the bomb. The Swedish plans to acquire nuclear weapons, 1945 - 1972

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Jonter, T [Uppsala Univ. (Sweden). Dept. of History

2001-09-01

This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid-50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The prime minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue

Sweden and the bomb. The Swedish plans to acquire nuclear weapons, 1945 - 1972

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jonter, T

2001-09-01

This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid-50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The prime minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue. During this period

The Swedish National Defence Research Establishment and the plans for Swedish nuclear weapons

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Jonter, Thomas

2001-03-01

This study analyses the Swedish nuclear weapons research since 1945 carried out by the Swedish National Defence Research Establishment (FOA). The most important aspect of this research was dealing with protection in broad terms against nuclear weapons attacks. However, another aspect was also important from early on - to conduct research aiming at a possible production of nuclear weapons. FOA performed an extended research up to 1968, when the Swedish Government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which meant the end of these production plans. Up to this date, five main investigations about the technical conditions were made, 1948, 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1965, which all together expanded the Swedish know-how to produce a bomb. The Swedish plans to procure nuclear weapons were not an issue in the debate until the mid 50's. The reason for this was simple, prior to 1954 the plans were secretly held within a small group of involved politicians, military and researchers. The change of this procedure did take place when the Swedish Supreme Commander in a public defence report in 1954 favoured a Swedish Nuclear weapons option. In 1958 FOA had reached a technical level that allowed the Parliament to make a decision. Two programs were proposed - the L-programme (the Loading Programme), to be used if the parliament would say yes to a production of nuclear weapons, and the S-programme (the Protection Programme), if the Parliament would say no. The debate on the issue had now created problems for the Social Democratic Government. The Prime Minister, Tage Erlander, who had earlier defended a procurement of nuclear weapons, was now forced to reach a compromise. The compromise was presented to the parliament in a creative manner that meant that only the S-programme would be allowed. The Government argued that the technical level did allow a 'freedom of action' up to at least the beginning of the 60's when Sweden was mature to make a decision on the issue. During this period

Joseph A. Burton Forum Award: Some Nuclear Weapons Dilemmas

Science.gov (United States)

May, Michael

2014-03-01

Nuclear weapons pose a combination of political and ethical dilemmas the solution to which has not been found. On one hand, in the view of both US government leaders and US allies, nuclear deterrence continues to play an essential part in the US role as the ultimate source of military strength for the alliances among the major democratic countries. It also continues to be in demand by countries that believe themselves to be isolated and threatened. On the other hand, nuclear weapons, besides being effective deterrents, can cause unprecedented loss of life and risk the demise of civilizations. No ban or technical precaution could prevent the rebuilding of nuclear weapons in a crisis. No diplomatic arrangement to date has erased the threat of invasion and war in the world. Only the abandonment of war and the threat of war as instruments of policy can make nuclear weapons obsolete. The slow, halting, risky road to that end remains the only hope for a world in which lasting solutions to the nuclear dilemmas are possible.

Science seeks [nuclear] weapons clean-up role

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Macilwain, Colin.

1996-01-01

US scientists argue for funding to support basic research which would make the decommissioning of one of the world's nuclear stockpiles cheaper and more effective. This runs contrary to current popular and political thought, from citizens' groups and state governments, that the stockpile should be dismantled immediately and publicly due to their suspicion of scientists and fear that stockpiled weapons could still be used. This article examines the debate between the two opposing views. (UK)

Constraining potential nuclear-weapons proliferation from civilian reactors

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Travelli, A.; Gaines, L.L.; Minkov, V.; Olson, A.P.; Snelgrove, J.

1993-01-01

Cessation of the Cold War and renewed international attention to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are leading to national policies aimed at restraining nuclear-weapons proliferation that could occur through the nuclear-fuel cycle. Argonne, which has unique experience, technology, and capabilities, is one of the US national laboratories contributing to this nonproliferation effort

Hitler's bomb: the secret story of Germans' attempts to get the nuclear weapon

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Karlsch, Rainer

2007-01-01

In this historical book, the author claims to have evidence concerning the development and testing of a possible 'nuclear weapon' by Nazi Germany in 1945. The 'weapon' in question is not alleged to be a standard nuclear weapon powered by nuclear fission, but something closer to either a radiological weapon (a so-called 'dirty bomb') or a hybrid-nuclear fusion weapon. Its new evidence is concerned primarily with the parts of the German nuclear energy project (an attempted clandestine scientific effort led by Germany to develop and produce atomic weapons during World War II) under Kurt Diebner, a German nuclear physicist who directed and administrated the project

One in a Million Given the Accident: Assuring Nuclear Weapon Safety

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Weaver, Jason [Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

2015-08-25

Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, there has not been a single instance of accidental or unauthorized nuclear detonation, but there have been numerous accidents and “close calls.” As the understanding of these environments has increased, the need for a robust nuclear weapon safety philosophy has grown. This paper describes some of the methods used by the Nuclear Weapon Complex today to assure nuclear weapon safety, including testing, modeling, analysis, and design features. Lastly, it also reviews safety’s continued role in the future and examines how nuclear safety’s present maturity can play a role in strengthening security and other areas and how increased coordination can improve safety and reduce long-term cost.

Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security