WorldWideScience

Sample records for ngpa incentive prices

  1. 48 CFR 46.707 - Pricing aspects of fixed-price incentive contract warranties.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Pricing aspects of fixed-price incentive contract warranties. 46.707 Section 46.707 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION CONTRACT MANAGEMENT QUALITY ASSURANCE Warranties 46.707 Pricing aspects of...

  2. Incentive, sustainable and fair pricing, a trilogy out of reach?

    OpenAIRE

    Maria Salvetti

    2005-01-01

    The Water Framework Directive requires Member-States to implement by 2010 an incentive tariffication policy in order to ensure efficient use of water resources and compliance with environmental goals (good ecological status). But working out an incentive pricing system, that is both sustainable and fair, is not an easy task. 1) Can an incentive pricing be a sustainable pricing? a) Water & wastewater services are very capitalistic: fixed costs can represent up to 2/3 or 3/4 of the service cost...

  3. 48 CFR 16.403-1 - Fixed-price incentive (firm target) contracts.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... (firm target) contracts. 16.403-1 Section 16.403-1 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL... Fixed-price incentive (firm target) contracts. (a) Description. A fixed-price incentive (firm target... incentive (firm target) contract is appropriate when the parties can negotiate at the outset a firm target...

  4. Price signals and investment incentives in wholesale electricity spot markets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vassilopoulos, Philippe

    2007-01-01

    We look at how prices from energy-only power markets can send the right signals and give the correct incentives for investments in production capacity. Through numerical simulations of spot prices over 2003-2005 we compare the investment signal sent by observed electricity prices in France and what would be competitive prices with an optimal mix and with the installed capacity. Observed prices tend to overestimate profitability for the base-load, making the signal too strong and underestimate profitability for the peak load, making the signal too weak. However, as a large share of consumers is still paying regulated tariffs, scarcity rents are capped. We simulate future prices for France for 2010 to 2020 to understand the incentives to invest. When the entry is free, the incentives to invest given by the future prices are consistent with the optimal mix including the interconnections and nuclear build is strong. With political or regulatory barriers to the construction of new power plants for new entrants (i.e. finding new sites), there are no incentives for the incumbent (that owns all existing base-load and peak load capacity) to add more nuclear capacity. In this situation, new entry would have to be coal or gas except if units are bid strategically to maintain profitability and market share. Moreover, it can also be profitable to limit prices and restrain entry in order to receive higher future revenues. When the base-load is less concentrated and instead of a dominant firm the nuclear capacity is divided into five (equal share) firms, the incentives to invest reappear and the threat of entry becomes more credible. (author) [fr

  5. 48 CFR 52.216-16 - Incentive Price Revision-Firm Target.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ...-Firm Target. 52.216-16 Section 52.216-16 Federal Acquisition Regulations System FEDERAL ACQUISITION... Clauses 52.216-16 Incentive Price Revision—Firm Target. As prescribed in 16.406(a), insert the following clause: Incentive Price Revision—Firm Target (OCT 1997) (a) General. The supplies or services identified...

  6. Pengaruh Pajak, Tunneling Incentive dan Mekanisme Bonus Terhadap Keputusan Transfer Pricing

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mispiyanti Mispiyanti

    2016-03-01

    Full Text Available The aim of the research is to find empirical effidence of tax, tunneling incentive and bonus mecahnism toward transfer pricing decision taken by manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The research population are manufacturing companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange arround 2010 to 2013. The samples were taken using purposive sampling method. The research results show that tax and bonus mechanism do not have effect toward companies’ transfer pricing decision. While, tunneling incentive has effect toward companies’transfer pricing decision.

  7. Incentive pricing and cost recovery at the basin scale.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ward, Frank A; Pulido-Velazquez, Manuel

    2009-01-01

    Incentive pricing programs have potential to promote economically efficient water use patterns and provide a revenue source to compensate for environmental damages. However, incentive pricing may impose disproportionate costs and aggravate poverty where high prices are levied for basic human needs. This paper presents an analysis of a two-tiered water pricing system that sets a low price for subsistence needs, while charging a price equal to marginal cost, including environmental cost, for discretionary uses. This pricing arrangement can promote efficient and sustainable water use patterns, goals set by the European Water Framework Directive, while meeting subsistence needs of poor households. Using data from the Rio Grande Basin of North America, a dynamic nonlinear program, maximizes the basin's total net economic and environmental benefits subject to several hydrological and institutional constraints. Supply costs, environmental costs, and resource costs are integrated in a model of a river basin's hydrology, economics, and institutions. Three programs are compared: (1) Law of the River, in which water allocations and prices are determined by rules governing water transfers; (2) marginal cost pricing, in which households pay the full marginal cost of supplying treated water; (3) two-tiered pricing, in which households' subsistence water needs are priced cheaply, while discretionary uses are priced at efficient levels. Compared to the Law of the River and marginal cost pricing, two-tiered pricing performs well for efficiency and adequately for sustainability and equity. Findings provide a general framework for formulating water pricing programs that promote economically and environmentally efficient water use programs while also addressing other policy goals.

  8. 76 FR 57677 - Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Increase the Use of Fixed-Price Incentive...

    Science.gov (United States)

    2011-09-16

    ...] RIN 0750-AH15 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Increase the Use of Fixed-Price...-price incentive (firm target) contracts, with particular attention to share lines and ceiling prices... the use of fixed-price incentive (firm target) contracts, especially for acquisitions moving from...

  9. Price versus Non-price Incentives for Participation in Quality Labeling: The Case of the German Fruit Juice Industry

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Simon Bleich

    2013-03-01

    Full Text Available Quality assurance and labeling play an important and increasing role in firms’ marketing strategies. In almost all cases, a price incentive has been stressed as the major incentive for firms to participate in such schemes. We argue here that important non-price incentives for participation in quality labeling may exist, too. In German retailing, it can be observed that discount retailers are listing more and more foods with quality labels. Processors may then participate in voluntary quality labeling in order to enter the large and growing market of discount retailers. The price-premium versus the market-entry hypothesis are analyzed theo-retically. We investigate then in an empirical hedonic pricing model for the German fruit juice market and for participation in the quality label of the Deutsche Landwirtschafts-Gesellschaft (DLG which of the two hypotheses is consistent with the data. There is strong support for the market-entry hypothesis

  10. Indirect Load Control for Energy Storage Systems Using Incentive Pricing under Time-of-Use Tariff

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mu-Gu Jeong

    2016-07-01

    Full Text Available Indirect load control (ILC is a method by which the customer determines load reduction of electricity by using a price signal. One of the ILCs is a time-of-use (TOU tariff, which is the most commonly used time-varying retail pricing. Under the TOU tariff, the customer can reduce the energy cost through an energy storage system (ESS. However, because this tariff is fixed for several months, the ESS operation does not truly reflect the wholesale market price, which could widely fluctuate. To overcome this limitation, this paper proposes an incentive pricing method in which the load-serving entity (LSE gives the incentive pricing signal to the customers with ESSs. Because the ESS charging schedule is determined by the customer through ILC, a bilevel optimization problem that includes the customer optimization problem is utilized to determine the incentive pricing signal. Further, the bilevel optimization problem is reformulated into a one-level problem to be solved by an interior point method. In the proposed incentive scheme: (1 the social welfare increases and (2 the increased social welfare can be equitably divided between the LSE and the customer; and (3 the proposed incentive scheme leads the customer to voluntarily follow the pricing signal.

  11. Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

    OpenAIRE

    Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A

    2009-01-01

    This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly information manipulation. We analyze the tradeoffs involved in conditioning pay on long- versus short-term performance and characterize a second-best optimal compensation scheme. The paper shows manipu...

  12. Customer response on price incentives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naesje, Paal C.; Andersen, Thale K.; Saele, Hanne

    2005-01-01

    This paper analyses the relation between end-users energy attitudes and their corresponding energy behaviour. It presents empirical findings from analyses of the effects of two-way communication between consumers and power companies. Two-way communication has made available high quality data on energy consumption. In the build-up to the analysis in this paper the a number of aspects thought to influence energy consumption has been looked at; including standard of housing, number and age of residents, as well as socio-economic factors, behaviour and preferences. Here we choose to focus specifically on attitudes and behaviour. These aspects are controlled for price incentives. The combination of very tight peak power balance in the Nordic power system and few investments in extension of power networks has turned the focus towards manual or automatic demand-response which requires hourly metering for documentation. The data are two-fold: Hourly recordings of meter-data of electric consumption of 10,894 customers (nearly half of these had installed technology for remote load control) in two different network areas and survey-data from a questionnaire distributed to consumers that resulted in nearly 550 answers. During the winter 2003/2004 these customers were offered different price incentives. The analyses showed a net reduction in electricity consumption of 1,0 kWh/h at the most in peak load hours. The paper is based on two connected studies, 'End-user flexibility by efficient use of ICT' and 'Improving end-user knowledge for managing energy loads end consumption' conducted in Norway by the SINTEF group

  13. Price Endogeneity and Marginal Cost Effects on Incentive Compatible Stormwater Management Policies

    OpenAIRE

    Huber, Matthew C.; Willis, David B.; Hayes, John C.; Privette, Charles V., III

    2010-01-01

    Incentive based stormwater management policies offer the prospect of reducing urban stormwater runoff while increasing developer profits. An incentive compatible Stormwater Banking Program (SBP) is presented that allows developers to build at higher residential densities in exchange for including low impact stormwater Best Management Practices (BMPs) in the development’s stormwater management infrastructure. Price endogeneity presents itself when the smaller residential lots created by buildi...

  14. Tuition Fees, as User Prices, and Private Incentives

    OpenAIRE

    Economides, George; Philippopoulos, Apostolis; Sakkas, Stelios

    2016-01-01

    This paper studies the aggregate and distributional implications of introducing tuition fees for public education services into a tax system with income and consumption taxes. The setup is a neoclassical growth model where agents differ in capital holdings. We show that the introduction of tuition fees (a) improves individual incentives to work and/or save and (b) can be both efficient and equitable. The focus is on the role of tuition fees as an extra price and how this affects private incen...

  15. Applying Psychology to Economic Policy Design: Using Incentive Preserving Rebates to Increase Acceptance of Critical Peak Electricity Pricing

    OpenAIRE

    Letzler, Robert

    2007-01-01

    This project extends the idea that policy makers should address problems by improving economic incentives. This project adds that presenting incentives in a way that reflects how people make decisions can sometimes improve consumers’ responses to the incentives and policy outcomes. This paper uses behavioral economics to propose ways to increase electricity policy effectiveness. The cost of generating power fluctuates enormously from hour to hour but most customers pay time-invariant prices f...

  16. Pricing hospital care: Global budgets and marginal pricing strategies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sutherland, Jason M

    2015-08-01

    The Canadian province of British Columbia (BC) is adding financial incentives to increase the volume of surgeries provided by hospitals using a marginal pricing approach. The objective of this study is to calculate marginal costs of surgeries based on assumptions regarding hospitals' availability of labor and equipment. This study is based on observational clinical, administrative and financial data generated by hospitals. Hospital inpatient and outpatient discharge summaries from the province are linked with detailed activity-based costing information, stratified by assigned case mix categorizations. To reflect a range of operating constraints governing hospitals' ability to increase their volume of surgeries, a number of scenarios are proposed. Under these scenarios, estimated marginal costs are calculated and compared to prices being offered as incentives to hospitals. Existing data can be used to support alternative strategies for pricing hospital care. Prices for inpatient surgeries do not generate positive margins under a range of operating scenarios. Hip and knee surgeries generate surpluses for hospitals even under the most costly labor conditions and are expected to generate additional volume. In health systems that wish to fine-tune financial incentives, setting prices that create incentives for additional volume should reflect knowledge of hospitals' underlying cost structures. Possible implications of mis-pricing include no response to the incentives or uneven increases in supply. Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd.. All rights reserved.

  17. How do minimum cigarette price laws affect cigarette prices at the retail level?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Feighery, E C; Ribisl, K M; Schleicher, N C; Zellers, L; Wellington, N

    2005-04-01

    Half of US states have minimum cigarette price laws that were originally passed to protect small independent retailers from unfair price competition with larger retailers. These laws prohibit cigarettes from being sold below a minimum price that is set by a formula. Many of these laws allow cigarette company promotional incentives offered to retailers, such as buydowns and master-type programmes, to be calculated into the formula. Allowing this provision has the potential to lower the allowable minimum price. This study assesses whether stores in states with minimum price laws have higher cigarette prices and lower rates of retailer participation in cigarette company promotional incentive programmes. Retail cigarette prices and retailer participation in cigarette company incentive programmes in 2001 were compared in eight states with minimum price laws and seven states without them. New York State had the most stringent minimum price law at the time of the study because it excluded promotional incentive programmes in its price setting formula; cigarette prices in New York were compared to all other states included in the study. Cigarette prices were not significantly different in our sample of US states with and without cigarette minimum price laws. Cigarette prices were significantly higher in New York stores than in the 14 other states combined. Most existing minimum cigarette price laws appear to have little impact on the retail price of cigarettes. This may be because they allow the use of promotional programmes, which are used by manufacturers to reduce cigarette prices. New York's strategy to disallow these types of incentive programmes may result in higher minimum cigarette prices, and should also be explored as a potential policy strategy to control cigarette company marketing practices in stores. Strict cigarette minimum price laws may have the potential to reduce cigarette consumption by decreasing demand through increased cigarette prices and reduced

  18. The response of maize production in Kenya to economic incentives

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Onono, P.A.,

    2013-06-01

    Full Text Available Agricultural development policy in Kenya has emphasised the use of incentives towards increased production and therefore self-sufficiency in maize which is a basic staple for most households. The channels used to provide incentives to maize farmers over the years include setting higher producer prices; subsidisation of inputs; provision of agricultural credit, research and extension services; construction and maintenance of roads, development of irrigation and water systems; legislative, institutional and macroeconomic reforms. Despite these efforts outputof maize has remained below domestic requirements in most years and the country continues to rely on imports to meet the deficits. Studies have assessed the responsiveness of maize to output price and reported inelastic responses and have recommended policies targeting non-price incentives to complement prices for the required increased production of maize. The studies, however, did not analyse the influence of the non-price incentives on the production of the crop. The findings of those studies are therefore deficient in explaining the relative importance of different non-price incentives and how they complement prices in influencing maize production in Kenya. This study investigated the response of maize production to both price and non-price incentives. The aim of this study was to ascertain the relative importance of non-price factors in influencing production of the crops as well as complementarity between price and non-price incentives. The findings show that maize production responds positively to its output price, development expenditures in agriculture, maize sales to marketing boards, growth in per capita GDP, liberalisation and governance reforms. However, maize production responds negatively to fertiliser price and unfavourable weather conditions. The response of maize output to its price is lower with rising inflation and grain market liberalisation.

  19. Irregular incentives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cicchetti, M.A.

    1993-01-01

    Public utility regulation lacks a formal proxy for the economic profits that can be earned in an effectively competitive market if a firm is efficient or innovative. After all, public utility regulation operated on cost-plus basis. If a utility is efficient or innovative and lowers its costs, its typical reward is to have its rates reduced. This is a perverse incentive to motivate a utility to produce at the most efficient level. In addition, since regulation operates on this cost-plus basis, a utility can increase its net income, all other things being equal, by overinvesting in (or open-quotes gold-platingclose quotes) its system, another perverse incentive. Recognizing these flaws of regulation, academicians, utility executives, regulators, and legislators have tried over the last several years to implement incentive regulation plans that correct such perverse incentives. However, under many of the earnings-sharing or price-regulation incentive plans, the rewards for efficient production are not tied directly to measures under a company's control. In fact, such plans could prove highly detrimental to ratepayers and competitors of the regulated company and its affiliates. An incentive regulation plan that ties an appropriate reward for efficient production to specific efficiency gains is a better proxy of an effectively competitive environment. What's more, it is superior to an incentive plan that rewards circumstances beyond the company's control or self-serving manipulation. This is particularly true if no earnings cap is associated with the reward for efficiency. Rewards for efficient production should be tied to specific actions. A suitable incentive plan does not preclude appropriately derived flexible prices for certain products or services where warranted

  20. The Government Incentive Regulation Model and Pricing Mechanism in Power Transmission and Distribution Market

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Huan Zhang

    2016-01-01

    Full Text Available The power transmission and distribution (T&D market’s natural monopoly and individual information have been the impediment to improving the energy efficiency in the whole T&D market. In order to improve the whole social welfare, T&D market should be controlled by government. An incentive regulation model with the target of maximizing social welfare has been studied. A list of contracts with transferring payment and quantity of T&D are given to motivate the corporation to reveal the true technical parameter and input the optimal investment. The corporate revenue, optimal investment, and effort are proved to depend on its own technical parameter. The part of incentive regulation model ends with the optimal pricing mechanism of T&D market. At the end of this paper, we give a numerical example to explain our research and confirm its function graphically.

  1. Non-fiscal price incentives. The energy-efficiency impact of differentiated energy prices; Niet-fiscale prijsprikkels. Onderzoek naar het besparingseffect van gedifferentieerde energieprijzen

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Leguijt, C.; Blom, M.B.J.; Schepers, B.L.; Warringa, G.E.A.

    2012-02-15

    An exploratory study has been carried out on the potential impact of non-fiscal energy incentives. The study will feed into the Dutch government policies on energy efficiency in the built environment. The study takes in both electricity and gas, and private dwellings as well as utility buildings. The following non-fiscal price incentives were considered: (1) consumer prices indexed to consumption volume; (2) consumer prices indexed to time of consumption; (3) the energy-efficiency impact of 'autonomous' increases in energy prices. The energy-efficiency effects of price changes (options 1 and 3) were calculated on the basis of price elasticities, while for option 2 use was made of the results of the Social Cost-Benefit Analysis of Smart Grids carried out by CE Delft in collaboration with KEMA. The conclusions of the study are as follows: (a) Although differentiating consumer prices by consumption volume may yield energy savings of up to 2%, this would require market agreements in breach of the competition rules underpinning the liberalised energy market. This option is therefore unfeasible via consumer prices; (b) The energy savings accruing from indexing consumer prices to time of consumption are uncertain, as the main impact will be a temporal shift in consumption. This option is highly feasible, as such differentiation will in all likelihood evolve of its own accord with the roll-out of smart meters and smart grids; (c) The energy-efficiency impact of autonomous energy price rises is 0.2 to 0.4% per annum [Dutch] CE Delft heeft in opdracht van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijkrelaties (BZK) een verkenning uitgevoerd naar de mogelijkheden voor niet-fiscale energieprijsprikkels. De studie maakt onderdeel uit van het plan van aanpak energiebesparing gebouwde omgeving van BZK. De verkenning betreft zowel elektriciteit als gas, en zowel huishoudens als utiliteitbouw. De niet-fiscale prijsprikkels die zijn verkend betreffen: (1

  2. Merger incentives and the failing firm defense

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bouckaert, J.M.C.; Kort, P.M.

    2014-01-01

    The merger incentives between profitable firms differ fundamentally from the incentives of a profitable firm to merge with a failing firm. We investigate these incentives under different modes of price competition and Cournot behavior. Our main finding is that firms strictly prefer exit of the

  3. Empirical studies of regulatory restructuring and incentives

    Science.gov (United States)

    Knittel, Christopher Roland

    This dissertation examines the actions of firms when faced with regulatory restructuring. Chapter I examines the equilibrium pricing behavior of local exchange telephone companies under a variety of market structures. In particular, the pricing behavior of three services are analyzed: residential local service, business local service, and intraLATA toll service. Beginning in 1984, a variety of market structure changes have taken place in the local telecommunications industry. I analyze differences in the method of price-setting regulation and the restrictions on entry. Specifically, the relative pricing behavior under rate of return and price cap regulation is analyzed, as well as the impact of entry in the local exchange and intraLATA toll service markets. In doing so, I estimate an empirical model that accounts for the stickiness of rates in regulated industries that is based on firm and regulator decision processes in the presence of adjustment costs. I find that, faced with competitive pressures that reduce rates in one service, incumbent firm rates increase in other services, thereby reducing the benefits from competition. In addition, the findings suggest that price cap regulation leads to higher rates relative to rate-of-return regulation. Chapter 2 analyzes the pricing and investment behavior of electricity firms. Electricity and natural gas markets have traditionally been serviced by one of two market structures. In some markets, electricity and natural gas are sold by a dual-product regulated monopolist, while in other markets, electricity and natural gas are sold by separate single-product regulated monopolies. This paper analyzes the relative pricing and investment decisions of electricity firms operating in the two market structures. The unique relationship between these two products imply that the relative incentives of single and dual-product firms are likely to differ. Namely electricity and natural gas are substitutes in consumption while natural

  4. Sellers' hedging incentives at EPA's emission trading auction

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dijkstra, B.R.; Haan, M

    1999-01-01

    Cason (1993) argued that the auction the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency in the USA) used in order to start the market for sulfur allowances, is not efficient. The set-up of the auction gives both buyers and sellers an incentive to understate their valuation of an allowance. In this paper, we show that the sellers' incentives are even more perverse than Cason suggested. In particular, we show that sellers have an incentive to set their ask price equal to zero, while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid. It is not possible to derive the Nash equilibrium for this set-up. If such an equilibrium exists, sellers either set only a positive ask price, or an ask price equal to zero, and a positive bid as well. 14 refs

  5. Auctioning incentive contracts: an experimental study

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Onderstal, S.; van de Meerendonk, A.

    2009-01-01

    In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically

  6. Incentives of carbon dioxide regulation for investment in low-carbon electricity technologies in Texas

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Castillo, Anya; Linn, Joshua

    2011-01-01

    This paper compares the incentives a carbon dioxide emissions price creates for investment in low carbon dioxide-emitting technologies in the electricity sector. We consider the extent to which operational differences across generation technologies - particularly, nuclear, wind and solar photovoltaic - create differences in the incentives for new investment, which is measured by the operating profits of a potential entrant. First, astylized model of an electricity system demonstrates that the composition of the existing generation system may cause electricity prices to increase by different amounts over time when a carbon dioxide price is imposed. Differences in operation across technologies therefore translate to differences in the operating profits of a potential entrant. Then, a detailed simulation model is used to consider a hypothetical carbon dioxide price of $10-$50 per metric ton for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) market. The simulations show that, for the range of prices considered, the increase in electricity prices is positively correlated with output from a typical wind unit, but the correlation is much weaker for nuclear and photovoltaic. Consequently, a carbon dioxide price creates much stronger investment incentives for wind than for nuclear or photovoltaic technologies in the Texas market. - Highlights: → Compare incentives for new investment in low-emission electricity technologies created by carbon dioxide price. → Focus on ERCOT power system using stochastic unit commitment model. →Find a greater incentive for wind than solar or nuclear because of correlation between wind generation and increase in electricity prices.

  7. Analysis of federal incentives used to stimulate energy consumption

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cole, R.J.; Cone, B.W.; Emery, J.C.; Huelshoff, M.; Lenerz, D.E.; Marcus, A.; Morris, F.A.; Sheppard, W.J.; Sommers, P.

    1981-08-01

    The purpose of the analysis is to identify and quantify Federal incentives that have increased the consumption of coal, oil, natural gas, and electricity. The introductory chapter is intended as a device for presenting the policy questions about the incentives that can be used to stimulate desired levels of energy development. In the theoretical chapter federal incentives were identified for the consumption of energy as Federal government actions whose major intent or result is to stimulate energy consumption. The stimulus comes through changing values of variables included in energy demand functions, thereby inducing energy consumers to move along the function in the direction of greater quantity of energy demanded, or through inducing a shift of the function to a position where more energy will be demanded at a given price. The demand variables fall into one of six categories: price of the energy form, price of complements, price of substitutes, preferences, income, and technology. The government can provide such incentives using six different policy instruments: taxation, disbursements, requirements, nontraditional services, traditional services, and market activity. The four major energy forms were examined. Six energy-consuming sectors were examined: residential, commercial, industrial, agricultural, transportation, and public. Two types of analyses of incentive actions are presented in this volume. The generic chapter focused on actions taken in 1978 across all energy forms. The subsequent chapters traced the patterns of incentive actions, energy form by energy form, from the beginning of the 20th century, to the present. The summary chapter includes the results of the previous chapters presented by energy form, incentive type, and user group. Finally, the implications of these results for solar policy are presented in the last chapter. (MCW)

  8. Delegating Pricing Decisions

    OpenAIRE

    Pradeep Bhardwaj

    2001-01-01

    An outstanding problem in marketing is why some firms in a competitive market delegate pricing decisions to agents and other firms do not. This paper analyzes the impact of competition on the delegation decision and, in turn, the impact of delegation on prices and incentives. The theory builds on the simplest framework of competition in two dimensions: prices and (sales agents') effort. Specifically, we are interested in answering the following questions: (1) Does competition affect the price...

  9. Clearwood quality and softwood lumber prices: what's the real premium?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Thomas R. Waggener; Roger D. Fight

    1999-01-01

    Diminishing quantities of appearance grade lumber and rising price premiums for it have accompanied the transition from old-growth to young-growth timber. The price premiums for better grades are an incentive for producers to undertake investments to increase the yield of those higher valued products. Price premiums, however, are also an incentive for users to...

  10. The pricing of bank debt guarantees

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Arping, S.

    2010-01-01

    We analyze the desirability of fair pricing of government guarantees for bank liabilities. Fair pricing is desirable only if the banking sector is sufficiently transparent. In opaque banking systems, fair pricing may exacerbate banks' incentive to take excessive risks.

  11. Incentive Mechanism of Micro-grid Project Development

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yong Long

    2018-01-01

    Full Text Available Due to the issue of cost and benefit, the investment demand and consumption demand of micro-grids are insufficient in the early stages, which makes all parties lack motivation to participate in the development of micro-grid projects and leads to the slow development of micro-grids. In order to promote the development of micro-grids, the corresponding incentive mechanism should be designed to motivate the development of micro-grid projects. Therefore, this paper builds a multi-stage incentive model of micro-grid project development involving government, grid corporation, energy supplier, equipment supplier, and the user in order to study the incentive problems of micro-grid project development. Through the solution and analysis of the model, this paper deduces the optimal subsidy of government and the optimal cooperation incentive of the energy supplier, and calculates the optimal pricing strategy of grid corporation and the energy supplier, and analyzes the influence of relevant factors on optimal subsidy and incentive. The study reveals that the cost and social benefit of micro-grid development have a positive impact on micro-grid subsidy, technical level and equipment quality of equipment supplier as well as the fact that government subsidies positively adjust the level of cooperation incentives and price incentives. In the end, the validity of the model is verified by numerical analysis, and the incentive strategy of each participant is analyzed. The research of this paper is of great significance to encourage project development of micro-grids and to promote the sustainable development of micro-grids.

  12. 10 CFR 212.78 - Tertiary incentive crude oil.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Tertiary incentive crude oil. 212.78 Section 212.78 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OIL MANDATORY PETROLEUM PRICE REGULATIONS Producers of Crude Oil § 212.78 Tertiary incentive crude oil. Annual prepaid expenses report. By January 31 of each year after 1980, the project...

  13. Joint replenishment and pricing decisions with different freight modes considerations for a supply chain under a composite incentive contract

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Noori-daryan, Mahsa; Taleizadeh, Ata Allah; Govindan, Kannan

    2018-01-01

    decisions of a single-manufacturer/multiple-retailer supply chain where a composite contract combines quantity and freight discounts, and a free shipping contract is incorporated into the model. Here, the transportation modes of raw materials and finished products are subject to a limited capacity...... in terms of their capacities regarding distance from the manufacturing site. In the third scenario, products are sent to a central warehouse for fast ship to the retailers. Demand depends on selling price and shortage is not permitted. The leader–follower game is considered between the members of the chain...... so that the manufacturer is a follower and the retailers are the leaders. This research aims to optimize the chain total profit concerning the selling prices and order quantities of the manufacturer and the retailers under different transport methods and a composite incentive contract. To clarify...

  14. Producer response to retail egg price in Ogun State Nigeria ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    Much has been said about farmers' responsiveness to price incentive with the inference that increasing producer price would be an effective incentive for increasing production. Against the backdrop that the nation's animal protein consumption is 5 grams / caput / day which is a far cry from the recommended level of 35 ...

  15. Price Trends Are Similar for Fruits, Vegetables, and Snack Foods

    OpenAIRE

    Kuchler, Fred; Stewart, Hayden

    2008-01-01

    An increase in the price of fruits and vegetables relative to less healthy foods could reduce consumers’ incentives to purchase fruits and vegetables and result in less healthy diets. Whether such a change in relative prices and incentives has occurred in the United States is difficult to prove because of substantial quality improvements in many fresh fruits and vegetables. For commonly consumed fresh fruits and vegetables for which quality has remained fairly constant, analysis of price tren...

  16. Incentives for solar energy in industry

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bergeron, K. D.

    1981-05-01

    Several issues are analyzed on the effects that government subsidies and other incentives have on the use of solar energy in industry, as well as on other capital-intensive alternative energy supplies. Discounted cash flow analysis is used to compare tax deductions for fuel expenses with tax credits for capital investments for energy. The result is a simple expression for tax equity. The effects that market penetration of solar energy has on conventional energy prices are analyzed with a free market model. It is shown that net costs of a subsidy program to the society can be significantly reduced by price. Several government loan guarantee concepts are evaluated as incentives that may not require direct outlays of government funds; their relative effectiveness in achieving loan leverage through project financing, and their cost and practicality, are discussed.

  17. Designing incentive market mechanisms for improving restructured power system reliabilities

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Ding, Yi; Østergaard, Jacob; Wu, Qiuwei

    2011-01-01

    state. The reliability management of producers usually cannot be directly controlled by the system operators in a restructured power system. Producers may have no motivation to improve their reliabilities, which can result in serious system unreliability issues in the new environment. Incentive market...... mechanisms for improving the restructured power system reliabilities have been designed in this paper. In the proposed incentive mechanisms, penalty will be implemented on a producer if the failures of its generator(s) result in the variation of electricity prices. Incentive market mechanisms can motivate......In a restructured power system, the monopoly generation utility is replaced by different electricity producers. There exists extreme price volatility caused by random failures by generation or/and transmission systems. In these cases, producers' profits can be much higher than those in the normal...

  18. Introduction to pricing issues

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1991-01-01

    This chapter provides an overview of pricing issues the proper pricing of transmission services is essential to efficient operation of the grid. Wheeling rights have little meaning if capacity on existing lines is scarce and there is no incentive to build new lines. Depending on the type of transmission pricing policies FERC adopts, the Commission may be able to encourage more voluntary wheeling service, and to influence decisions to build or upgrade the supply of facilities

  19. Healthier food choices for children through menu pricing

    OpenAIRE

    Kellershohn, J.; Walley, K.; Vriesekoop, F.

    2017-01-01

    Purpose\\ud The purpose of this paper is to investigate the use of pricing (incentive and deterrent) to shift the purchase decision intent of parents when they order food for their child in a fast food restaurant.\\ud Design/methodology/approach\\ud A financial incentive and a deterrent pricing tactic was tested using an online quantitative approach with a sample of 400 Canadian parents, representative of the Canadian population based on geography, household income and education level.\\ud Findin...

  20. Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ying Yu

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available This paper designs an incentive contract menu to achieve long-term stability for electricity prices in a day-ahead electricity market. A bi-level Stackelberg game model is proposed to search for the optimal incentive mechanism under a one-leader and multi-followers gaming framework. A multi-agent simulation platform was developed to investigate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism using an independent system operator (ISO and multiple power generating companies (GenCos. Further, a Q-learning approach was implemented to analyze and assess the response of GenCos to the incentive menu. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the incentive contract.

  1. Deregulated power prices: comparison of diurnal patterns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ying Li; Flynn, P.C.

    2004-01-01

    We examine electrical power price, and in particular its daily and average weekday vs. weekend pattern of change, for 14 deregulated markets. Power price in deregulated markets shows fundamentally different patterns. North American markets show a monotonic diurnal weekday price pattern, while all other markets studied show more than one price peak. Deregulated power markets differ in maximum vs. minimum daily average price and in average weekday to weekend price, in turn creating a different incentive for a consumer to time shift power consuming activities. Markets differ in the extent to which a small fraction of the days shapes the average diurnal pattern and value of price. Deregulated markets show a wide variation in the correlation between load and price. Some deregulated markets, most notably Britain and Spain, show patterns that are predictable and consistent, and hence that can encourage a customer to shape consumption behaviors. Other markets, for example South Australia, have patterns that are inconsistent and irregular, and hence are hard for a customer to interpret; a customer in such a market will have a higher incentive to escape risk through hedging mechanisms. (Author)

  2. Deregulated power prices: comparison of diurnal patterns

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Ying; Flynn, Peter C.

    2004-01-01

    We examine electrical power price, and in particular its daily and average weekday vs. weekend pattern of change, for 14 deregulated markets. Power price in deregulated markets shows fundamentally different patterns. North American markets show a monotonic diurnal weekday price pattern, while all other markets studied show more than one price peak. Deregulated power markets differ in maximum vs. minimum daily average price and in average weekday to weekend price, in turn creating a different incentive for a consumer to time shift power consuming activities. Markets differ in the extent to which a small fraction of the days shapes the average diurnal pattern and value of price. Deregulated markets show a wide variation in the correlation between load and price. Some deregulated markets, most notably Britain and Spain, show patterns that are predictable and consistent, and hence that can encourage a customer to shape consumption behaviors. Other markets, for example South Australia, have patterns that are inconsistent and irregular, and hence are hard for a customer to interpret; a customer in such a market will have a higher incentive to escape risk through hedging mechanisms

  3. Policy incentives for switchgrass production using valuation of non-market ecosystem services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chamberlain, Jim F.; Miller, Shelie A.

    2012-01-01

    This study presents a linear profit model with combined economic and environmental factors for a switchgrass-for-biofuels agricultural system in the southeastern U.S. The objectives are to establish conversion-to-switchgrass thresholds for various market prices and identify policy incentives that would ensure economic profit while also maximizing environmental benefits (carbon sequestration, displacement of fossil fuels) and minimizing negative impacts (global warming potential, nitrate loss). Weighting factors are chosen to represent incentives and penalties by assigning value to the impacts. With no other incentives, switchgrass market prices of at least $51 and $58/dton would be needed in order to make a profitable switch from corn/Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) lands and cotton, respectively. At a mid-range offering of $50/dton, feasible carbon credit prices of $3/ $8/ $23 per metric tonne CO 2 e would incentivize conversion from corn, CRP, or cotton, respectively. Similarly, a water quality penalty of $0.20/ $3/ $2 per kilogram NO 3 –N leached would incentivize the same conversions with resultant watershed improvement. At a lower price of $30/dton switchgrass, incentives based on valuation of ecosystem services begin to exceed feasible ranges of these valuations. - Highlights: ► A linear effective profit model predicts conversion thresholds to switchgrass. ► Carbon and nitrogen fluxes can be valued and incorporated into producer choices. ► Farmgate prices alone of $51 and $58/dton switchgrass will entice conversion. ► Reasonable ecosystem service valuations will encourage adoption of switchgrass.

  4. A uniform price auction with locational price adjustments for competitive electricity markets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ethier, R.; Mount, T.; Schulze, W.; Zimmerman, R.; Thomas, R.

    1999-01-01

    Competitive electricity markets which rely on centralized dispatch require a mechanism to solicit offers from competing generators. Ideally, such an auction mechanism, provides incentives to submit offers equal to the marginal cost of generation for each generator. Economic theory suggests that the Uniform Price auction is an appropriate institution. However, an efficient implementation of this auction in an electricity context requires that the offers used in the auction reflect the appropriate locational price adjustments for transmission losses and congestion. This paper describes a uniform price auction that incorporates locational price adjustments on a Web-based platform suitable for experimentation. Preliminary results show dramatically different price and revenue results when compared with a simple continuous Discriminative auction. (author)

  5. Wind power in the Danish liberalised power market-Policy measures, price impact and investor incentives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Munksgaard, Jesper; Morthorst, Poul Erik

    2008-01-01

    Wind power has a strong position at the Danish electricity market, mainly caused by high feed-in tariffs in the 1990s. Investments in new wind-power installations on land, however, have declined dramatically after the Danish electricity market was liberalised in 1999. First, the paper describes how policy measures directed towards wind power have been redesigned to match the liberalised market. Then, we estimate the impact of the redesigned tariffs on the electricity prices. Finally, we assess whether the new tariffs make an incentive to invest in wind power. The paper concludes that the new tariffs not by itself make evidence for the actual Danish recession in new wind-power installations after the electricity reform. The main causes could include a combination of problems in spatial planning, high risk aversion of new wind turbine investors and perhaps more favourable support schemes in other countries

  6. Economic incentives as a policy tool to promote safety and health at work.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kankaanpää, Eila

    2010-06-01

    Incentives are regarded as a promising policy tool for promoting occupational safety and health (OSH). This article discusses the potential of different kinds of incentives in light of economic theory and evidence from research. When incentives are used as a policy tool, it implies the existance of an institution that has both the interest and the power to apply incentives to stakeholders, usually to employers. Governments can subsidize employers' investments in OSH with subsidies and tax structures. These incentives are successful only if the demand for OSH responds to the change in the price of OSH investments and if the suppliers of OSH are able to increase their production smoothly. Otherwise, the subsidy will only lead to higher prices for OSH goods. Both public and private insurance companies can differentiate insurance premiums according to claim behavior in the past (experience rating). There is evidence that this can effectively lower the frequency of claims, but not the severity of cases. This papers concludes that incentives do not directly lead to improvement. When incentives are introduced, their objective(s) should be clear and the end result (ie what the incentive aims to promote) should be known to be effective in achieving healthy and safe workplaces.

  7. Water Authorities’ Pricing Strategies to Recover Supply Costs in the Absence of Water Metering for Irrigated Agriculture

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alban Lika

    2017-11-01

    Full Text Available Most of the irrigated agricultural regions in Europe are supplied by surface irrigation networks managed by local water authorities (WAs. Under such conditions, WAs are not able to fully monitor water usage and farmers have an information advantage vis-a-vis the WA. This results in the water authority suffering ‘pricing failure’ if it decides to apply an incentive pricing strategy (tariffs proportional to the alleged water uses. Indeed, farmers could exploit their information advantage by behaving in an opportunistic manner, withdrawing more water than declared, and ultimately paying less than they should. This situation could also undermine the efficacy and the efficiency of the WA incentive pricing strategies. This paper analyses incentive water pricing schemes under asymmetric information by the means of a Principal-Agent model. The Agency problem between the WA and farmers is addressed by introducing a monitoring strategy that would enable the WA to detect farms action. In doing so, we compare incentive strategies with flat rate water pricing and investigate under what conditions the WA might provide/not provide incentive water pricing in the absence of water metering.

  8. Security Price Informativeness with Delegated Traders

    OpenAIRE

    Gary Gorton; Ping He; Lixin Huang

    2010-01-01

    Trade in securities markets is conducted by agents acting for principals, using "mark-to-market" contracts whereby performance is assessed using security market prices. We endogenize contract choices, information production, informed trading, and security price informativeness. But there is a contract externality. Prices are informative only because other principals induce their agents to trade based on privately produced information. The agent-traders then have an incentive to coordinate and...

  9. Risk management versus incentives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aven, E.; Lovas, K.; Osmundsen, P.

    2006-01-01

    Portfolio theory indicates that risk management should take place at the group level. Hedging at the project level or in the individual business areas may lead to suboptimal results. However, the efficiency of a profit centre depends on its management's being able to influence factors that are crucial to the unit's financial results. Price hedging could be one such factor. In the wider perspective, this constitutes part of the balancing between centralisation and decentralisation. This article covers important elements of risk management and incentive design. It goes on to discuss the balancing of overall risk management at the group level and incentive design in profit centres and corporate units. Throughout the article, the oil industry serves as a case. (author)

  10. The Architecture of Emission Allowance Markets and Incentives for Investment in Electricity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palmer, Karen; Burtraw, Dallas

    2007-06-01

    Regulating emissions through a cap-and-trade mechanism provides firms with more options for coming into compliance with an environmental rule than just installing emissions controls. Research on the SO 2 and NO x cap and trade programs in the US suggest that by placing a price on each ton of emissions these programs encourage R and D into improving the emissions reducing capability of control technologies and encourage investment in other types of know how. This is exemplified, for example, by experiments with blending of low and medium sulphur coals, which allows for cost-effective reductions in emissions especially along a transition path to tighter SO 2 constraints over time. Looking ahead to future climate regulation, the importance of continuous incentives for control of emissions that are priced under the regulation should not be under-estimated. Some have suggested that binding restrictions on CO 2 emissions should be postponed until low-emitting technologies (carbon capture and sequestration) or non emitting technologies (renewables) experience a major technological break through and that the main focus of public resources should be on encouraging technological advance in these areas. Experience with SO 2 regulation suggests that pricing emissions will produce unexpected innovations to reduce emissions related costs and waiting for the 'big fix' will not be sufficient. How allowances are initially allocated can have an important influence on the turn-over of capital and what types of technologies firms choose to invest in. The EU ETS provision that discontinues allowance allocation to existing facilities that retire creates a disincentive to retire dirty plants. This may be partially offset by the new unit set aside feature of the ETS. An updating approach to allocation could lead the industry to prefer lower emitting technologies and fuels and could be structured in a way that encourages renewables, but this set of incentives comes at the cost of reduced

  11. Pricing offshore wind power

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Levitt, Andrew C.; Kempton, Willett; Smith, Aaron P.; Musial, Walt; Firestone, Jeremy

    2011-01-01

    Offshore wind offers a very large clean power resource, but electricity from the first US offshore wind contracts is costlier than current regional wholesale electricity prices. To better understand the factors that drive these costs, we develop a pro-forma cash flow model to calculate two results: the levelized cost of energy, and the breakeven price required for financial viability. We then determine input values based on our analysis of capital markets and of 35 operating and planned projects in Europe, China, and the United States. The model is run for a range of inputs appropriate to US policies, electricity markets, and capital markets to assess how changes in policy incentives, project inputs, and financial structure affect the breakeven price of offshore wind power. The model and documentation are made publicly available. - Highlights: → We calculate the Breakeven Price (BP) required to deploy offshore wind plants. → We determine values for cost drivers and review incentives structures in the US. → We develop 3 scenarios using today's technology but varying in industry experience. → BP differs widely by Cost Scenario; relative policy effectiveness varies by stage. → The low-range BP is below regional market values in the Northeast United States.

  12. Residential dual energy programs: Tariffs and incentives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doucet, J.A.

    1992-01-01

    The problem of efficiently pricing electricity has been of concern to economists and policy makers for some time. A natural solution to variable demand is tariffs to smooth demand and reduce the need for excessive reserve margins. An alternative approach is dual energy programs whereby electric space heating systems are equipped with a secondary system (usually oil) which is used during periods of peak demand. Comments are presented on two previous papers (Bergeron and Bernard, 1991; Sollows et al., 1991) published in Energy Studies Review, applying them to Hydro Quebec tariff structure and dual energy programs. The role of tariffs in demand-side management needs to be considered more fully. Hydro-Quebec's bi-energy tariff structure could be modified by using positive incentives to make use of bi-energy attractive below -12 C to give the following benefits. The modified tariff would be easier for consumers to understand, corrects the misallocation problem due to differential pricing in the current tariff, transfers the risk related to price fluctuations of the alternative energy source from the consumer to the utility, and corrects the potential avoidance problem due to the negative incentive of the current tariff. 21 refs

  13. 18 CFR 2.104 - Mechanisms for passthrough of pipeline take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... actually paid as of the date of filing plus similar costs which are known and measurable within the... No. PL85-1-000) that take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs do not violate the pricing provision of the... pricing provisions of the NGPA. This policy statement applies only to buyout and buydown costs paid by...

  14. Incentive Elasticity of Demand for Bike/Walk Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    2008-12-29

    The primary objective of this research is to estimate the "incentive" (price) elasticity of demand for using non-motorized transportation (specifically walking and bicycling) to work. Results can be used directly in the formation of local policies to...

  15. Tariff rebalancing and price structure in privatised utilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weyman-Jones, T.; Burns, P.

    1996-01-01

    The document contains the end of award report on research into re-balancing and price structure in privatised utilities, funded by the Economic and Social Science Research Council (ESRC). Ramsey pricing ideas in United Kingdom utilities were modelled under different forms of regulation and cost/price relationships measured. Alternative forms of regulation that permit Ramsey pricing were also evaluated. Option price theory is shown to be central to an understanding of incentive mechanisms and their relationship to regulatory options. (UK)

  16. Canadian incentives for oil and gas exploration. [Applicability to USA

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-04-01

    During the 1970s a number of different exploration and production incentive programs were put in place in Canada, in particular in the Province of Alberta, Canada's principal oil- and gas-producing province. The DOE/RA is evaluating Canadian incentives for oil and gas exploration, and this study is intended to provide information that will help guide DOE/RA in determining the applicability of Canadian incentive programs in US energy policy. The study describes and documents the fiscal structure in which the Canadian oil industry operates. The incentive features of pricing policy, taxation policy, and provincial royalty systems are discussed. A principal focus of the study is on one of the most important of Canada's specific incentive programs, the Alberta Exploratory Drilling Incentive Credit Program (EDICP). The study describes and evaluates the effect of the EDICP on increased oil and gas exploration activity. Similarly, the study also reviews and evaluates other specific incentive programs such as the Alberta Geophysical Incentive Program, Frontier Exploration Allowances, and various tar sand and heavy oil development incentives. Finally the study evaluates the applicability of Canadian incentives to US energy policy.

  17. Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: Lessons of experience from Britain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jamasb, Tooraj; Pollitt, Michael

    2007-01-01

    This paper reviews the recent experience of the UK electricity distribution sector under incentive regulation. The UK has a significant and transparent history in implementing incentive regulation in the period since 1990. We demonstrate the successes of this period in reducing costs, prices, and energy losses while maintaining quality of service. We also draw out the lessons for other countries in implementing distribution sector reform. We conclude by discussing the place of incentive regulation of networks within the wider reform context, the required legislative framework, the need for appropriate unbundling, the importance of quality of service incentives, the regulatory information requirements, and the role of sector rationalisation. (author)

  18. Photovoltaic (PV) Pricing Trends: Historical, Recent, and Near-Term Projections

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Feldman, David [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Barbose, Galen [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Margolis, Robert [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Wiser, Ryan [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Darghouth, Naim [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Goodrich, Alan [National Renewable Energy Lab. (NREL), Golden, CO (United States)

    2012-11-30

    The installed capacity of global and U.S. photovoltaic (PV) systems has soared in recent years, driven by declining PV prices and government incentives. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) SunShot Initiative aims to make PV cost competitive without incentives by reducing the cost of PV-generated electricity by about 75% between 2010 and 2020. This summary report—based on research at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)—examines progress in PV price reductions to help DOE and other PV stakeholders manage the transition to a market-driven PV industry, and to provide clarity surrounding the wide variety of potentially conflicting data available about PV system prices.

  19. An energy pricing scheme for the diffusion of decentralized renewable technology investment in developing countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thiam, Djiby Racine

    2011-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is to investigate price support for market penetration of renewable energy in developing nations through a decentralized supply process. We integrate the new decentralized energy support: renewable premium tariff, to analyze impacts of tariff incentives on the diffusion of renewable technology in Senegal. Based on photovoltaic and wind technologies and an assessment of renewable energy resources in Senegal, an optimization technique is combined with a cash flow analysis to investigate investment decisions in renewable energy sector. Our findings indicate that this support mechanism could strengthen the sustainable deployment of renewable energy in remote areas of Senegal. Although different payoffs emerged, profits associated with a renewable premium tariff are the highest among the set of existing payoffs. Moreover in analyzing impacts of price incentives on social welfare, we show that price tariffing schemes must be strategically scrutinized in order to minimize welfare loss associated with price incentives. Finally we argue that a sustainable promotion of incentive mechanisms supporting deployment of renewable technology in developing nations should be carried out under reliable institutional structures. The additional advantage of the proposed methodology is its ability to integrate different stakeholders (producers, investors and consumers) in the planning process. - Highlights: → We simulate impacts of price support for market penetration of renewable technology in developing nations. → An array of price incentive mechanisms strengthens diffusion of renewable technology in Senegal. → Moreover, reliable institutional frameworks in developing nations are a requirement in order to strengthen diffusion path of renewable technologies.

  20. Option Strike Price and Managerial Investment Decisions

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    刘鸿雁; 张维

    2003-01-01

    The manager′s investment decisions is modeled when the manager is risk-averse and has stock options as compensation. It is found that the strike price of options is crucial to the investment incentives of managers, and that the correct value, or interval of values, of managerial stock option strike price can bring stockholder and manager interests in agreement.

  1. Managing risk selection incentives in health sector reforms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Puig-Junoy, J

    1999-01-01

    The object of the paper is to review theoretical and empirical contributions to the optimal management of risk selection incentives ('cream skimming') in health sector reforms. The trade-off between efficiency and risk selection is fostered in health sector reforms by the introduction of competitive mechanisms such as price competition or prospective payment systems. The effects of two main forms of competition in health sector reforms are observed when health insurance is mandatory: competition in the market for health insurance, and in the market for health services. Market and government failures contribute to the assessment of the different forms of risk selection employed by insurers and providers, as the effects of selection incentives on efficiency and their proposed remedies to reduce the impact of these perverse incentives. Two European (Netherlands and Spain) and two Latin American (Chile and Colombia) case studies of health sector reforms are examined in order to observe selection incentives, their effects on efficiency and costs in the health system, and regulation policies implemented in each country to mitigate incentives to 'cream skim' good risks.

  2. 48 CFR 16.403-2 - Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... target cost plus the firm target profit as a guide. (ii) If negotiation of a firm fixed price is... pricing information is not sufficient to permit the negotiation of a realistic firm target cost and profit...; and (2) Cost or pricing information adequate for establishing a reasonable firm target cost is...

  3. Deregulated power prices: comparison of volatility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Ying; Flynn, P.C.

    2004-01-01

    We examine electrical power price variability for 14 deregulated markets. Power price volatility is measured by price velocity, the daily average of the absolute value of price change per hour. Deregulated markets show a wide variability in price velocity. Some price velocity is expected and arises from the daily diurnal price pattern, which differs significantly between markets. Even when the expected daily variability in price is removed, the residual unexpected variability differs between markets. Some deregulated markets, most notably Britain and Spain, show patterns that are predictable and consistent and have low values of unexpected price velocity. These markets create a climate conducive to consumers facing the market through real time pricing and shaping consumption behaviors in response to price changes. Other markets, for example, South Australia and Alberta, have patterns that are inconsistent and irregular, and hence are hard for a customer to interpret; a customer in such a market will have a higher incentive to avoid demand side management and escape risk through hedging mechanisms

  4. A Game Theory Analysis of the OPEC's Influence on World Oil Price

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    2006-01-01

    Most studies concerning OPEC's behavior were based on traditional market microstructure. However, the assumptions about oil market structure are either very rigorous or rather fuzzy. This paper demonstrates the rationality and necessity of OPEC's price band policy by using the game theory. We conclude that OPEC has the incentive to limit its price within a specific range if the game period is sufficiently long. This incentive comes either from preference for long-term interest or from future expectations. In such a way, OPEC tries its best to maximize its profit with the quotaprice dual policy and plays a price stabilizing role in the future world oil market.

  5. Unlocking the potential of established products: toward new incentives rewarding innovation in Europe

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nayroles, Gabrielle; Frybourg, Sandrine; Gabriel, Sylvie; Kornfeld, Åsa; Antoñanzas-Villar, Fernando; Espín, Jaime; Jommi, Claudio; Martini, Nello; de Pouvourville, Gérard; Tolley, Keith; Wasem, Jürgen; Toumi, Mondher

    2017-01-01

    ABSTRACT Background: Many established products (EPs – marketed for eight years or more) are widely used off-label despite little evidence on benefit–risk ratio. This exposes patients to risks related to safety and lack of efficacy, and healthcare providers to liability. Introducing new indications for EPs may represent a high societal value; however, manufacturers rarely invest in R&D for EPs. The objective of this research was to describe incentives and disincentives for developing new indications for EPs in Europe and to investigate consequences of current policies. Methods: Targeted literature search and expert panel meetings. Results: Within the current European-level and national-level regulatory framework there are limited incentives for development of new indications with EPs. Extension of indication normally does not allow the price to be increased or maintained, the market protection period to be extended, or exclusion from a reference price system. New indication frequently triggers re-evaluation, resulting in price erosion, regardless of the level of added value with the new indication. In consequence, manufacturers are more prone to undertake R&D efforts at early to mid-stage of product life cycle rather than with EPs, or to invest in new chemical entities, even in therapeutic areas with broad off-label use. This represents a potentially missed opportunity as developing new indications for EPs offers an alternative to off-label use or lengthy and expensive R&D for new therapies, opens new opportunities for potentially cost-effective treatment alternatives, as well as greater equity in patients’ access to treatment options. Conclusion: There are potential benefits from the development of new indications for EPs that are currently not being realized due to a lack of regulatory and pricing incentives in Europe. Incentives for orphan or paediatric drugs have proven to be effective in promoting R&D. Similarly, incentives to promote R&D in EPs should

  6. Unlocking the potential of established products: toward new incentives rewarding innovation in Europe.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nayroles, Gabrielle; Frybourg, Sandrine; Gabriel, Sylvie; Kornfeld, Åsa; Antoñanzas-Villar, Fernando; Espín, Jaime; Jommi, Claudio; Martini, Nello; de Pouvourville, Gérard; Tolley, Keith; Wasem, Jürgen; Toumi, Mondher

    2017-01-01

    Background : Many established products (EPs - marketed for eight years or more) are widely used off-label despite little evidence on benefit-risk ratio. This exposes patients to risks related to safety and lack of efficacy, and healthcare providers to liability. Introducing new indications for EPs may represent a high societal value; however, manufacturers rarely invest in R&D for EPs. The objective of this research was to describe incentives and disincentives for developing new indications for EPs in Europe and to investigate consequences of current policies. Methods : Targeted literature search and expert panel meetings. Results : Within the current European-level and national-level regulatory framework there are limited incentives for development of new indications with EPs. Extension of indication normally does not allow the price to be increased or maintained, the market protection period to be extended, or exclusion from a reference price system. New indication frequently triggers re-evaluation, resulting in price erosion, regardless of the level of added value with the new indication. In consequence, manufacturers are more prone to undertake R&D efforts at early to mid-stage of product life cycle rather than with EPs, or to invest in new chemical entities, even in therapeutic areas with broad off-label use. This represents a potentially missed opportunity as developing new indications for EPs offers an alternative to off-label use or lengthy and expensive R&D for new therapies, opens new opportunities for potentially cost-effective treatment alternatives, as well as greater equity in patients' access to treatment options. Conclusion : There are potential benefits from the development of new indications for EPs that are currently not being realized due to a lack of regulatory and pricing incentives in Europe. Incentives for orphan or paediatric drugs have proven to be effective in promoting R&D. Similarly, incentives to promote R&D in EPs should be developed

  7. Design of variable energy and price components of electricity tariffs as an incentive for system-efficient energy management of flexible consumers in households

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schreiber, Michael

    2017-01-01

    To mitigate anthropogenic climate change, both the heating and transport sectors will need to be electrically driven, with the higher electrical demand met by emission-free technologies, in addition to general efficiency improvements. On the generation side, wind and photovoltaic power plants must have a rated power significantly exceeding the current peak demand, in order to cover this increased electrical requirement. On the consumption side, heat pumps and private electric vehicles will increase the percentage of energy withdrawn at the low-voltage level of the new system. Given the right incentives, these customers will shift the energy demand in such a way as to benefit the system. This flexibility can be used as a tool to deal with variable renewable insertion while avoiding simultaneous overloading of the power grid. This thesis analyses and evaluates the effects of different electricity tariff designs on energy consumption. These tariffs should incentivise households to adapt their energy consumption to market prices, without inducing critical peak demands in times of particularly low prices. Therefore, time-varying energy price components and power price components are combined into flexible electricity tariffs and implemented as target functions within an optimization problem. The cost-minimizing effect of household energy management is determined under these flexible tariffs, and the effects of the tariff designs on energy consumption and the induced costs are evaluated. Additionally, the results of the flexible tariff approach are compared with results from a centralized optimization by a virtual power plant. It is possible to develop a design for a suitable flexible tariff that decreases the energy procurement costs of electric vehicles while simultaneously reducing peak demand in comparison to a single real-time pricing incentive. Furthermore, this thesis shows that certain kinds of electricity tariff design do not only fail to support but actually

  8. Expert views on most suitable monetary incentives on food to stimulate healthy eating.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Waterlander, Wilma E; Steenhuis, Ingrid H M; de Vet, Emely; Schuit, Albertine J; Seidell, Jacob C

    2010-06-01

    Pricing strategies are an important component in the marketing mix and may also be useful in stimulating healthier food choices. However, due to competing interests and feasibility problems, the introduction of pricing strategies is complicated. For successfully introducing food pricing strategies, it is essential to explore incentives that are not only promising but also realizable and being approved by different sectors. We aimed to assemble a list of pricing strategies by exploring expert views using the Delphi method. Subjects included experts from academia, industry, retail, agriculture, policymakers, consumers and non-governmental organizations. Data were collected in three rounds. In round one, experts designed promising pricing strategies. Based on a time-budget model incorporating Sleep, Leisure, Occupation, Transportation and Home-based activities, these strategies were in the subsequent rounds judged on several criteria. Results were analysed using median and interquartile deviations scores. We found fair consensus levels among experts and a varied list of promising pricing strategies. The panel agreed on the potential success of offering small presents, providing price-cuts on healthy foods and discounting healthier foods more frequently. Also, it was found that experts gave higher rates to pricing strategies for which the implementation responsibilities could be placed elsewhere. The resulted list of promising monetary incentives is an essential first step for the future design of pricing strategies. Following this study, it is important to determine how to make solid agreements on responsibility and implementation issues. Also, consumer perceptions regarding the proposed pricing strategies should be studied.

  9. The impact of government incentives for hybrid-electric vehicles: Evidence from US states

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Diamond, David

    2009-01-01

    This paper examines the impact of government incentives policies designed to promote the adoption of hybrid-electric vehicles (HEVs). As a primary methodology, it employs cross-sectional analysis of hybrid registration data over time from US states to test the relationship between hybrid adoption and a variety of socioeconomic and policy variables. It also compares hybrid adoption patterns over time to the US average for specific states that have changed incentive policies, to examine how differences in incentive schemes influence their efficacy. The results of these analyses suggest a strong relationship between gasoline prices and hybrid adoption, but a much weaker relationship between incentive policies and hybrid adoption. Incentives that provide payments upfront also appear to be the most effective

  10. Endogenous Market-Clearing Prices and Reference Point Adaptation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dragicevic, Arnaud Z.

    When prices depend on the submitted bids, i.e. with endogenous market-clearing prices in repeated-round auction mechanisms, the assumption of independent private values that underlines the property of incentive-compatibility is to be brought into question; even if these mechanisms provide active involvement and market learning. In its orthodox view, adaptive bidding behavior imperils incentive-compatibility. We relax the assumption of private values' independence in the repeated-round auctions, when the market-clearing prices are made public at the end of each round. Instead of using game-theory learning models, we introduce a behavioral model that shows that bidders bid according to the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, which neither ignores the rationality and incentive-compatibility constraints, nor rejects the posted prices issued from others' bids. Bidders simply weight information at their disposal and adjust their discovered value using reference points encoded in the sequential price weighting function. Our model says that bidders and offerers are sincere boundedly rational utility maximizers. It lies between evolutionary dynamics and adaptive heuristics and we model the concept of inertia as high weighting of the anchor, which stands for truthful bidding and high regard to freshly discovered preferences. Adjustment means adaptive rule based on adaptation of the reference point in the direction of the posted price. It helps a bidder to maximize her expected payoff, which is after all the only purpose that matters to rationality. The two components simply suggest that sincere bidders are boundedly rational. Furthermore, by deviating from their anchor in the direction of the public signal, bidders operate in a correlated equilibrium. The correlation between bids comes from the commonly observed history of play and each bidder's actions are determined by the history. Bidders are sincere if they have limited memory and confine their reference point adaptation

  11. Corruption of pharmaceutical markets: addressing the misalignment of financial incentives and public health.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gagnon, Marc-André

    2013-01-01

    This paper explains how the current architecture of the pharmaceutical markets has created a misalignment of financial incentives and public health that is a central cause of harmful practices. It explores three possible solutions to address that misalignment: taxes, increased financial penalties, and drug pricing based on value. Each proposal could help to partly realign financial incentives and public health. However, because of the limits of each proposal, there is no easy solution to fixing the problem of financial incentives. © 2013 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Inc.

  12. Did the price-related reforms in Ghana's cocoa sector favour farmers?

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Quarmine, W.; Haagsma, R.; Huis, van A.; Sakyi-Dawson, O.; Obeng-Ofori, D.; Asante, F.

    2014-01-01

    It is generally hypothesized in the innovation systems literature that institutions can create production incentives for farmers. This paper examines whether the introduction in 1984 of the Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC) in Ghana's cocoa sector has improved the transmission of world prices

  13. Importance of Electricity Transport Pricing in Liberalised Energy Markets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wohlgemuth, N.

    2001-01-01

    Electricity has traditionally been supplied by vertically integrated companies providing generation, transmission and distribution services. Consumers have purchased a bundled commodity - delivered electricity - and there has been no need to price the components individually. This is no longer the case in competitive and unbundled electricity markets. One of the outstanding issues in the restructuring of the electricity markets is the way in which transmission costs are translated into tariffs. The efforts to create a single European electricity market are difficult to reconcile due to different national network pricing approaches. The European Commission's draft regulation on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges of electricity sets general principles for the pricing of international electricity exchanges. Nodal pricing provides incentives for an efficient use of generation and transmission assets. Experience shows that nodal pricing is workable, and its use may be expected to increase progressively. Postage stamp pricing does not generally provide adequate incentives for efficiency. However, inefficiencies may be small under certain conditions, and postage stamp pricing has the advantage of being relatively transparent and easy to implement. This paper presents an overview of objectives related to an effective design of transmission pricing approaches, of transmission pricing models and presents recent developments in Europe in this respect. Due to the great number of institutional designs of electricity market organisations, it will be difficult to design and implement a model of cross-border transmission pricing that results in a high degree of non-discriminatory international competition in electricity markets, a key objective of the Electricity Directive.(author)

  14. Analysis of the results of Federal incentives used to stimulate energy production

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cone, B.W.; Emery, J.C.; Fassbender, A.G.

    1980-06-01

    The research program analyzed the Federal incentives used to stimulate nuclear, hydro, coal, gas, oil, and electricity production in order to supply what was learned to the selection of an incentives strategy to induce new energy production from renewable resources. Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 examines the problem of estimating effects from a theoretical perspective. Methods of quantifying and identifying the many interactive effects of government actions are discussed. Chapter 3 presents a generic analysis of the result of Federal incentives. Chapters 4 through 9 deal with incentives to energy forms - nuclear, hydro, coal, oil, gas, and electricity. Chapter 10 summarizes the estimated results of the incentives, which are presented in terms of their quantity and price impacts. The incentive costs per million Btu of induced energy production is also discussed. Chapter 11 discusses the parity issue, that is an equivalence between Federal incentives to renewable resources and to traditional energy resources. Any analysis of incentives for solar needs will profit from an analysis of the costs of solar incentives per million Btu compared with those for traditional energy forms. Chapter 12 concludes the analysis, discussing the history of traditional energy incentives as a guide to solar-energy incentives. 216 references, 38 figures, 91 tables.

  15. Incentive-based Financial Support Scheme for Immature Renewable Energy Systems

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Andersen, Morten Thøtt; Frigaard, Peter Bak

    2015-01-01

    Most of today’s renewable energy systems rely heavily on investments as well as public financial support. This support is often given by means of a higher sales price for each kWh produced, i.e. feed-in tariffs (FITs), green certificates or Renewable Obligation Certificates (ROCs), or by a fixed...... amount, being a percentage of the construction costs of the facility. All these ways of financing have different downsides. The feed-in tariff based kWh prices have some incentives to improve the technology, but enables infeasible solutions to stay financially supported even while R&D is in status quo....... The fixed amount only helps with installation costs, which should not be an issue once the technology is sufficiently feasible. This means that the current ways of granting financial support all lack incentives for increasing production or decreasing construction costs. This paper presents a unique scheme...

  16. Using financial incentives to improve value in orthopaedics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lansky, David; Nwachukwu, Benedict U; Bozic, Kevin J

    2012-04-01

    A variety of reforms to traditional approaches to provider payment and benefit design are being implemented in the United States. There is increasing interest in applying these financial incentives to orthopaedics, although it is unclear whether and to what extent they have been implemented and whether they increase quality or reduce costs. We reviewed and discussed physician- and patient-oriented financial incentives being implemented in orthopaedics, key challenges, and prerequisites to payment reform and value-driven payment policy in orthopaedics. We searched the MEDLINE database using as search terms various provider payment and consumer incentive models. We retrieved a total of 169 articles; none of these studies met the inclusion criteria. For incentive models known to the authors to be in use in orthopaedics but for which no peer-reviewed literature was found, we searched Google for further information. Provider financial incentives reviewed include payments for reporting, performance, and patient safety and episode payment. Patient incentives include tiered networks, value-based benefit design, reference pricing, and value-based purchasing. Reform of financial incentives for orthopaedic surgery is challenged by (1) lack of a payment/incentive model that has demonstrated reductions in cost trends and (2) the complex interrelation of current pay schemes in today's fragmented environment. Prerequisites to reform include (1) a reliable and complete data infrastructure; (2) new business structures to support cost sharing; and (3) a retooling of patient expectations. There is insufficient literature reporting the effects of various financial incentive models under implementation in orthopaedics to know whether they increase quality or reduce costs. National concerns about cost will continue to drive experimentation, and all anticipated innovations will require improved collaboration and data collection and reporting.

  17. Marketplace pricing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1991-01-01

    As discussed in this chapter, interest in marketplace pricing has been increasing in recent years, reflecting the societal trend toward substituting competition for regulation where appropriate. Competition is valuable because it encourages utilities to make efficient decisions with a minimum of regulatory intervention. It enhances efficiency through the incentive for innovation by the regulated companies and by increasing the likelihood they will come forward with proposals for better services, lower prices or both. Ultimately, consumers are beneficiaries. Marketplace pricing is emblematic of the view that the degree of regulation should reflect the degree of market power, that workably competitive markets should be allowed to operate with as little regulatory interference as possible. The Edison Electric Institute has made perhaps the most detailed proposal on marketplace pricing. It and others perceive numerous benefits from this method of pricing transmission services. Given the undeniable market power resulting from line ownership, FERC has emphasized the need to find a workably competitive market before approving such proposals. The ability to make this distinction without a full-blown antitrust review for every transaction is questionable, and FERC has yet to provide generic guidance. Finally, FERC's legal ability to depart from cost-based standards is questionable

  18. Complexity, Contract Design and Incentive Design in the Construction Management Industry

    OpenAIRE

    Beg, Zeshawn Afsari

    2015-01-01

    In this paper I examine how one construction management company uses contract design and incentive design to respond to aspects of task complexity and relationship complexity present in its construction projects. In terms of contract design, I find that the company is unable to increase its use of cost-plus pricing when faced with technically complex projects. Instead, the company uses increased pre-execution design modification and price markups when technically complex projects are contract...

  19. The value of price transparency in residential solar photovoltaic markets

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    O’Shaughnessy, Eric; Margolis, Robert

    2018-06-01

    Installed prices for residential solar photovoltaic (PV) systems have declined significantly in recent years. However price dispersion and limited customer access to PV quotes prevents some prospective customers from obtaining low price offers. This study shows that improved customer access to prices - also known as price transparency - is a potential policy lever for further PV price reductions. We use customer search and strategic pricing theory to show that PV installation companies face incentives to offer lower prices in markets with more price transparency. We test this theoretical framework using a unique residential PV quote dataset. Our results show that installers offer lower prices to customers that are expected to receive more quotes. Our study provides a rationale for policies to improve price transparency in residential PV markets.

  20. Internet pricing: una breve rassegna critica (Internet Pricing: A Short Critical Survey

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Claudio Sardoni

    2001-03-01

    Full Text Available In the article, some recent literature on Internet pricing is surveyed. The author looks at the topic by setting it in the more general framework of the analysis of activities that can be regarded as similar to Internet from the technological and economic point of view. In particular, attention is focused on the problem of the divergence between private and social costs when there occurs network congestion and the problem of efficient prices in activities characterized by the existence of peak-loads. The author argues that dealing with such issues in the context of Internet cannot be reduced to a straightforward application of traditional results of welfare economics and the literature on peak-load pricing. In a competitive market with similar features to the market for Internet services, it is well possible that there do not exist incentives that induce firms to adopt price systems such as to prevent and/or eliminate congestion. Further theoretical and analytical developments are then in order.

  1. Nodal price volatility reduction and reliability enhancement of restructured power systems considering demand-price elasticity

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goel, L.; Wu, Qiuwei; Wang, Peng

    2008-01-01

    With the development of restructured power systems, the conventional 'same for all customers' electricity price is getting replaced by nodal prices. Electricity prices will fluctuate with time and nodes. In restructured power systems, electricity demands will interact mutually with prices. Customers may shift some of their electricity consumption from time slots of high electricity prices to those of low electricity prices if there is a commensurate price incentive. The demand side load shift will influence nodal prices in return. This interaction between demand and price can be depicted using demand-price elasticity. This paper proposes an evaluation technique incorporating the impact of the demand-price elasticity on nodal prices, system reliability and nodal reliabilities of restructured power systems. In this technique, demand and price correlations are represented using the demand-price elasticity matrix which consists of self/cross-elasticity coefficients. Nodal prices are determined using optimal power flow (OPF). The OPF and customer damage functions (CDFs) are combined in the proposed reliability evaluation technique to assess the reliability enhancement of restructured power systems considering demand-price elasticity. The IEEE reliability test system (RTS) is simulated to illustrate the developed techniques. The simulation results show that demand-price elasticity reduces the nodal price volatility and improves both the system reliability and nodal reliabilities of restructured power systems. Demand-price elasticity can therefore be utilized as a possible efficient tool to reduce price volatility and to enhance the reliability of restructured power systems. (author)

  2. Financial instruments help producers hedge gas deals in volatile market

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lawnin, J.N.; Kupiec, S.L.

    1993-01-01

    The Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) of 1978 and more recently the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Order 636 have changed gas marketing from a totally regulated industry to one that responds to free-market forces. The stable but controlled market in which producers once sold gas has become highly competitive and more efficient. Consequently, prices have become more volatile; they respond more quickly than they did before to changes in supply of and demand for natural gas. Prior to deregulation of the natural gas industry, producers had fewer marketing options than they do today. Under a typical gas sales contract, producers sold gas to the nearest pipeline at regulated prices, which remained relatively stable along the interstate distribution chain. The system, however, failed to generate adequate supply of gas. In an effort to realign supply and demand, Congress initiated the deregulation of natural gas with NGPA, which phased out most wellhead price controls. A series of FERC actions culminating in Order 636 extended the process. Now, independent producers can sell gas directly to end users. Under Order 636, interstate pipelines no longer offer merchant services to gas customers. The paper discusses the change in risk profiles, price protection, futures and options, hedged exposure, setting price floors, off-exchange contracts, risk considerations, types of risks, business controls, back office controls, and credit monitoring

  3. The food v. fuel debate. A nuanced view of incentive structures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Srinivasan, Sunderasan

    2009-01-01

    The rapid rise in crude oil prices and the geo-political uncertainty associated with ensuring uninterrupted supplies have compelled researchers, economists and politicians to look for indigenous substitutes. Liquid biofuels - ethanol and biodiesel - are widely recognized, technically feasible alternatives. Even as the jury is out to determine the environmental footprint of biofuels, the surrounding frenzy has often led to the announcement of unsustainable support prices for feedstock and unviable procurement prices for the finished product. This paper makes a detailed assessment of incentive structures facing the agriculturists, refiners and the consumers. Data from the Indian market are employed to illustrate. (author)

  4. Incentive-Based Voltage Regulation in Distribution Networks

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dall-Anese, Emiliano [National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Baker, Kyri A [National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Zhou, Xinyang [University of Colorado; Chen, Lijun [University of Colorado

    2017-07-03

    This paper considers distribution networks fea- turing distributed energy resources, and designs incentive-based mechanisms that allow the network operator and end-customers to pursue given operational and economic objectives, while concurrently ensuring that voltages are within prescribed limits. Two different network-customer coordination mechanisms that require different amounts of information shared between the network operator and end-customers are developed to identify a solution of a well-defined social-welfare maximization prob- lem. Notably, the signals broadcast by the network operator assume the connotation of prices/incentives that induce the end- customers to adjust the generated/consumed powers in order to avoid the violation of the voltage constraints. Stability of the proposed schemes is analytically established and numerically corroborated.

  5. World oil prices flat to declining

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Adelman, M.A.

    1993-01-01

    A forecast is presented of the likely trends in world oil prices over the short to medium term. A historical background is presented of the OPEC cartel and its role in influencing oil prices. The incentives and disincentives for OPEC to raise prices, and the tensions within the cartel are explored. Slower demand growth and the expansion of natural gas are expected to put downward pressure on oil prices, which are currently artificially high. The impacts of high taxes on development and exploration are examined, and it is shown that state ownership poses an obstacle to improved performance. Threats of price decline are expected to continue to lead to threats of hasty, or even violent action on the part of OPEC members, as happened in 1990. Privatization and tax codes designed to skim rent are positive trends

  6. Natural gas pricing reform in China: Getting closer to a market system?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Paltsev, Sergey; Zhang, Danwei

    2015-01-01

    Recent policy in China targets an increase in the contribution of natural gas to the nation's energy supply. Historically, China's natural gas prices have been highly regulated with a goal to protect consumers. The old pricing regime failed to provide enough incentives for natural gas suppliers, which often resulted in natural gas shortage. A new gas pricing reform was tested in Guangdong and Guangxi provinces in 2011, and introduced nationwide in 2013. The reform is aimed at creating a more market-based pricing mechanism. We show that a substantial progress toward a better predictability and transparency of prices has been made. The prices are now more connected with the international fuel oil and liquid petroleum gas prices. The government's approach for a temporary two-tier pricing when some volumes are still traded at old prices reduced a potential opposition during the new regime implementation. Some limitations of the natural gas pricing remain as it created biased incentives for producers and favors large natural gas suppliers. The pricing reform at its current stage falls short of establishing a complete market mechanism driven by an interaction of supply and demand of natural gas in China. - Highlights: • China's reform of natural gas pricing is in effect nationwide from 2013. • Prices are now connected to international fuel oil and liquid petroleum gas prices. • The reform benefits domestic producers and importers of natural gas. • There are still price distortions between industrial and residential sector. • The reform needs to create a system where both supply and demand are considered.

  7. The Impact of Policy Incentives on Long-Term Care Insurance and Medicaid Costs: Does Underwriting Matter?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cornell, Portia Y; Grabowski, David C

    2018-05-16

    To test whether underwriting modifies the effect of state-based incentives on individuals' purchase of long-term care insurance. Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 1996-2012. We estimated difference-in-difference regression models with an interaction of state policy indicators with individuals' probabilities of being approved for long-term care insurance. We imputed probabilities of underwriting approval for respondents in the HRS using a model developed with underwriting decisions from two U.S. insurance firms. We measured the elasticity response to long-term care insurance price using changes in simulated after-tax price as an instrumental variable for premium price. Tax incentives and Partnership programs increased insurance purchase by 3.62 percentage points and 1.8 percentage points, respectively, among those with the lowest risk (highest approval probability). Neither had any statistically significant effects among the highest risk individuals. We show that ignoring the effects of underwriting may lead to biased estimates of the potential state budget savings of long-term care insurance tax incentives. If the private market is to play a role in financing long-term care, policies need to address the underlying adverse selection problems. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

  8. North America markets for alcohol and alcohol-derived motor fuels and need for tax incentives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haigwood, B.

    1991-01-01

    The U.S. fuel alcohol and ether industry has grown from its infancy in 1979 to approximately 2.9 billion gallons of production capacity in 1991. With the emphasis on clean air, the uncertainties in the Middle East, and fluctuating oil prices, IRI believes the demand for alcohol-derived motor fuels is poised to begin a second phase of expansion. Historically, the two primary alcohol-derived motor fuels sold in the U.S. have been methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) and ethanol. There is also a limited but growing use of methanol as 85% blendstock for gasoline. Since 1978, fuel ethanol has provided the U.S. petroleum industry with an additional source of supply, octane, and profit. Its price was based on the price of wholesale gasoline plus available federal and state tax incentives. These incentives allowed ethanol, with production costs of $1.00 to $1.25 per gallon, to compete with gasoline at prices of 40 to 65 per gallon. Without the federal and state tax incentives, it would not be economically feasible to sell or manufacture fuel ethanol. On the other hand, the largest consumption of methanol has been as a feedstock for the production of MTBE, the world's fastest growing chemical over the past seven years. MTBE prices are based on the cost of raising the octane level of gasoline, and this commodity does not receive subsidies. Beginning in 1992, IRI predicts the price relationship between ethanol, MTBE, and gasoline will change as U.S. refiners and marketers are required to include oxygenated fuels (alcohol-derived) in their gasoline. In total, over 60 billion gallons of gasoline will need to be reformulated by the year 2000. The increased demand for oxygen will result in a 2.5-billion gallon deficit of MTBE and 1.2-billion gallon deficit of ethanol by the year 2000. 2 tabs

  9. Modelling the impacts of CDM incentives for the Thai electricity sector

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weiss, Philipp; Lefevre, Thierry; Moest, Dominik

    2008-01-01

    The CDM Executive Board recently took a positive decision on programmatic CDM, also known as a CDM Programme of Activities. This prompts the author to present a new tool that has been developed recently for the Thai electricity market. The Renewable Energy Development (RED) Model, initially developed in the framework of the DANIDA funded project: Promotion of Renewable Energy in Thailand (PRET), at the Ministry of Energy of Thailand, was designed for the modelling of different incentive schemes and their effects on the Thai power system for the promotion of renewable energy technologies (RETs). Within this article, an extension of the existing RED model, including the CDM as additional incentive measure, is presented (RED-CDM). Along with the project-based approach, also a sectoral and programmatic approach is included as well. Several scenarios developed with the RED-CDM model show the influence of different incentive mechanisms on the Thai power market and their potentials for reaching the policy targets stated in the Energy Strategy of Thailand for Competitiveness. The main results show that reaching the policy targets is possible, while the price can be extremely high if the targets are to be achieved on schedule. Another important result is that a sectoral CDM approach could help financing about 20% of the incentives needed for a shift towards a more sustainable power grid, if the certified emission reductions (CERs) are sold at a price of 15 Euro/ton

  10. Pricing Strategy for the Marine Supplies Industry

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jiang, Liping; Hansen, Carsten Ørts

    What Is the Issue? Sustaining long-term growth requires marine suppliers to define their pricing strategies in a holistic fashion. However, pricing is an under-managed activity in many companies. Especially when moving towards servitization, services or integrated solutions are frequently...... underpriced or promised at performance levels that cannot be delivered profitably. Why Is It Important? Pricing is one of the most important elements for all business and everything in the business works to justify the input value for a price and turn it into a profit. It therefore has a dramatic...... but frequently underappreciated effort on achieving profitability and keeping business thriving. What Can Be Done? The marine supplies industry needs radical change in pricing by thinking about customer’s needs and aligning the incentives between suppliers and customers for long-term relationship. Value...

  11. Incentives and barriers for wind power expansion and system integration in Denmark

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hvelplund, Frede; Ostergaard, Poul Alberg; Meyer, Niels I

    2017-01-01

    In Denmark expansion of on-shore, near-shore and off-shore wind power is planned to increase the wind power share to 50% of electricity consumption by 2020. In this situation a continuation of past policies will not suffice, and a dual-track incentive system that both establishes incentives...... for investing in wind power and integration infrastructure with integration between the electricity, heating and transportation sectors, is required. The current Danish taxation system discourages electricity use and works against this integration. Likewise, the current day-ahead electricity spot market...... is not appropriate for a high-wind future as wind reduces price levels, but integration across sectors can partly assist in increasing demand and prices. The European Emission Trading System does not suffice in providing a level playing field for wind power and thus needs a revision. Another barrier for on...

  12. Panel presentation: Should some type of incentive regulation replace traditional methods for regulating LDCs?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Costello, K.W.

    1992-01-01

    State regulators should consider new approaches to regulating LDCs. They should seriously look at different incentive systems, even if only as an experiment, to address the major inefficiencies they see plaguing LDCs. Regulators have become more receptive in recent years to applying different incentive systems for historically heavily regulated industries such as the telecommunications and electric industries. In view of prevailing conditions in the natural gas industry, there is no good reason why regulators should not be as receptive to applying incentive systems for LDCs. For gas services offered in competitive markets, regulators should ask themselves whether regulation is necessary any longer. For services still requiring regulation, regulators should explore whether changes in traditional regulation are needed. While some PUCs have undertaken new regulatory practices, the question before them today is whether they should do more; whether, for example, states should accelerate their efforts toward adopting more flexible pricing and other incentive-based regulations or toward considering deregulating selected services. PUCs have different options. They can choose from among a large number of incentive systems. Their choices should hinge upon what they view as major sources of inefficiencies. For example, if uneconomical bypass is perceived as a problem then different price rules might constitute the cornerstone of an incentive-based policy. On the other hand, if excessive purchased-gas costs seem to be a major problem, a PUC may want to consider abolishing the PGA or modifying it in a form that would eliminate the cost-plus component

  13. Support Mechanisms for Renewables: How Risk Exposure Influences Investment Incentives

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kitzing, Lena; Weber, Christoph

    2015-01-01

    and the Capital Asset Pricing Model as well as through active liquidity management. Applying the model to a specific case, a German offshore wind park, we find that the support levels required to give adequate investment incentives are for a feed-in tariff scheme approximately 4-10% lower than for a feed......We analyse quantitatively how risk exposure from different support mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs and premiums, can influence the investment incentives for private investors. We develop a net cash flow approach that takes systematic and unsystematic risks into account through cost of capital...

  14. Competition and the Reference Pricing Scheme for pharmaceuticals.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ghislandi, Simone

    2011-12-01

    By introducing n (>1) firms with infinite cross-price elasticity (i.e. generic drugs), we explore the effects of competition on the optimal pricing strategies under a Reference Pricing Scheme (RPS). A two-stage model repeated infinite number of times is presented. When stage 1 is competitive, the equilibrium in pure strategies exists and is efficient only if the reference price (R) does not depend on the price of the branded product. When generics collude, the way R is designed is crucial for both the stability of the cartel among generics and the collusive prices in equilibrium. An optimally designed RPS must set R as a function only of the infinitely elastic side of the market and should provide the right incentives for competition. Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  15. Financing renewable energy infrastructure: Formulation, pricing and impact of a carbon revenue bond

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tang, Amy; Chiara, Nicola; Taylor, John E.

    2012-01-01

    Renewable energy systems depend on large financial incentives to compete with conventional generation methods. Market-based incentives, including state-level REC markets and international carbon markets have been proposed as solutions to increase renewable energy investment. In this paper we introduce and formulate a carbon revenue bond, a financing tool to complement environmental credit markets to encourage renewable energy investment. To illustrate its use, we value the bond by predicting future revenue using stochastic processes after analyzing historical price data. Three illustrative examples are presented for renewable energy development in three different markets: Europe, Australia and New Jersey. Our findings reveal that the sale of a carbon revenue bond with a ten year maturity can finance a significant portion of a project's initial cost. - Highlights: ► Current financial incentives for renewable energy in the US are inadequate. ► We introduce and structure a “carbon revenue bond” as an innovative financing tool. ► Stochastic models of environmental credit prices are used to illustrate bond pricing. ► Three examples illustrate revenue bond impact on initial cost of infrastructure.

  16. Financial incentive increases CPAP acceptance in patients from low socioeconomic background.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tarasiuk, Ariel; Reznor, Gally; Greenberg-Dotan, Sari; Reuveni, Haim

    2012-01-01

    We explored whether financial incentives have a role in patients' decisions to accept (purchase) a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) device in a healthcare system that requires cost sharing. Longitudinal interventional study. The group receiving financial incentive (n = 137, 50.8±10.6 years, apnea/hypopnea index (AHI) 38.7±19.9 events/hr) and the control group (n = 121, 50.9±10.3 years, AHI 39.9±22) underwent attendant titration and a two-week adaptation to CPAP. Patients in the control group had a co-payment of $330-660; the financial incentive group paid a subsidized price of $55. CPAP acceptance was 43% greater (p = 0.02) in the financial incentive group. CPAP acceptance among the low socioeconomic strata (n = 113) (adjusting for age, gender, BMI, tobacco smoking) was enhanced by financial incentive (OR, 95% CI) (3.43, 1.09-10.85), age (1.1, 1.03-1.17), AHI (>30 vs. acceptance was affected by AHI (>30 vs. 30 vs. acceptance among low socioeconomic status patients. Thus, financial incentive should be applied as a policy to encourage CPAP treatment, especially among low socioeconomic strata patients.

  17. Incentives for innovation and adoption of new technology under emissions trading

    OpenAIRE

    Mandell, Svante

    2009-01-01

    A common claim in both the public and academic debate is that a tradable emission permits scheme does not provide sufficient incentives for R&D investments. The present paper addresses R&D investments and penetration rates of new technology focusing on the specific characteristics of a tradable permits market. It is showed that a complex dependency between the emissions cap, the market price for emission permits, the price for technology once it is developed and the R&D investment decision ad...

  18. The effects of unit pricing system upon household solid waste management: The Korean experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hong, S.

    1999-09-01

    Initial effects of adoption of a unit pricing system paired with aggressive recycling programs appear to be substantial. This paper explores the impact of price incentives under the unit pricing system on household solid waste generation and recycling in Korea. The author employs a simultaneous equation model considering the feedback effects between total waste generation and recycling. Estimation results using 3017 Korean household survey data indicate that a rise in waste collection fee induces households to recycle more wastes. However, this effect is partially offset by decreases in source-reduction efforts due to the feedback effects, resulting in relatively lower price elasticity of demand for solid waste collection services. This implies that household demand for solid waste collection services will not decrease much with additional increases in the collection fee, unless further recycling incentives such as more frequent recyclable pickup services are accompanied.

  19. Internet pricing: una breve rassegna critica (Internet Pricing: A Short Critical Survey

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Claudio Sardoni

    2012-04-01

    Full Text Available In the article, some recent literature on Internet pricing is surveyed. The author looks at the topic by setting it in the more general framework of the analysis of activities that can be regarded as similar to Internet from the technological and economic point of view. In particular, attention is focused on the problem of the divergence between private and social costs when there occurs network congestion and the problem of efficient prices in activities characterized by the existence of peak-loads. The author argues that dealing with such issues in the context of Internet cannot be reduced to a straightforward application of traditional results of welfare economics and the literature on peak-load pricing. In a competitive market with similar features to the market for Internet services, it is well possible that there do not exist incentives that induce firms to adopt price systems such as to prevent and/or eliminate congestion. Further theoretical and analytical developments are then in order.  JEL Codes: L86, L11Keywords: Pricing

  20. Customer perspectives on district heating price models

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kerstin Sernhed

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available In Sweden there has been a move towards more cost reflective price models for district heating in order to reduce economic risks that comes with variable heat demand and high shares of fixed assets. The keywords in the new price models are higher shares of fixed cost, seasonal energy prices and charging for capacity. Also components that are meant to serve as incentives to affect behaviour are introduced, for example peak load components and flow components. In this study customer responses to these more complex price models have been investigated through focus group interviews and through interviews with companies that have changed their price models. The results show that several important customer requirements are suffering with the new price models. The most important ones are when energy savings do not provide financial savings, when costs are hard to predict and are perceived to be out of control.

  1. Navy Shipbuilding: Need to Document Rationale for the Use of Fixed-Price Incentive Contracts and Study Effectiveness of Added Incentives

    Science.gov (United States)

    2017-03-01

    share line and 120 percent ceiling price should be the norm , or starting point.8 The Director of Defense Pricing stated that he believes DOD’s...constructing nuclear submarines. We previously reported that this is in contrast to commercial ship buyers, who have an array of yards and suppliers to...overrun up until costs reached a specified point, with the government’s maximum liability capped at the ceiling price. Cost increases above target

  2. Incentive contracts for development projects

    Science.gov (United States)

    Finley, David T.; Smith, Byron; DeGroff, B.

    2012-09-01

    Finding a contract vehicle that balances the concerns of the customer and the contractor in a development project can be difficult. The customer wants a low price and an early delivery, with as few surprises as possible as the project progresses. The contractor wants sufficient cost and schedule to cover risk. Both want to clearly define what each party will provide. Many program offices do not want to award cost plus contracts because their funding sources will not allow it, their boards do not want an open ended commitment, and they feel like they lose financial control of the project. A fixed price incentive contract, with a mutually agreed upon target cost, provides the owner with visibility into the project and input into the execution of the project, encourages both parties to save costs, and stimulates a collaborative atmosphere by aligning the respective interests of customers and contractors.

  3. Pricing Unmetered Irrigation Water under Asymmetric Information and Full Cost Recovery

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Alban Lika

    2016-12-01

    Full Text Available The objective of this study is to define an efficient pricing scheme for irrigation water in conditions of unmetered water use. The study is based on a principal-agent model and identifies a menu of contracts, defined as a set of payments and share of irrigated area, able to provide incentives for an efficient use of the resource by maximizing social welfare. The model is applied in the case study of the Çukas region (Albania where irrigation water is not metered. The results demonstrate that using a menu of contracts makes it possible to define a second best solution that may improve the overall social welfare derived from irrigation water use compared with the existing pricing structure, though, in the specific case study, the improvement is small. Furthermore, the results also suggest that irrigation water pricing policy needs to take into account different farm types, and that appropriate contract-type pricing schemes have a potential role in providing incentives to farmers to make irrigation choices to the social optimum.

  4. Incentive-Based Voltage Regulation in Distribution Networks: Preprint

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zhou, Xinyang; Chen, Lijun; Dall' Anese, Emiliano; Baker, Kyri

    2017-03-03

    This paper considers distribution networks fea- turing distributed energy resources, and designs incentive-based mechanisms that allow the network operator and end-customers to pursue given operational and economic objectives, while concurrently ensuring that voltages are within prescribed limits. Two different network-customer coordination mechanisms that require different amounts of information shared between the network operator and end-customers are developed to identify a solution of a well-defined social-welfare maximization prob- lem. Notably, the signals broadcast by the network operator assume the connotation of prices/incentives that induce the end- customers to adjust the generated/consumed powers in order to avoid the violation of the voltage constraints. Stability of the proposed schemes is analytically established and numerically corroborated.

  5. Gas analysis modeling system forecast for the Energy Modeling Forum North American Natural Gas Market Study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mariner-Volpe, B.; Trapmann, W.

    1989-01-01

    The Gas Analysis Modeling System is a large computer-based model for analyzing the complex US natural gas industry, including production, transportation, and consumption activities. The model was developed and first used in 1982 after the passage of the NGPA, which initiated a phased decontrol of most natural gas prices at the wellhead. The categorization of gas under the NGPA and the contractual nature of the natural gas market, which existed at the time, were primary factors in the development of the basic structure of the model. As laws and regulations concerning the natural gas market have changed, the model has evolved accordingly. Recent increases in competition in the wellhead market have also led to changes in the model. GAMS produces forecasts of natural gas production, consumption, and prices annually through 2010. It is an engineering-economic model that incorporates several different mathematical structures in order to represent the interaction of the key groups involved in the natural gas market. GAMS has separate supply and demand components that are equilibrated for each year of the forecast by means of a detailed transaction network

  6. The Value of Negotiating Cost-Based Transfer Prices

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anne Chwolka

    2010-10-01

    Full Text Available This paper analyzes the potential of one-step transfer prices based on either variable or full costs for coordinating decentralized production and quality-improving investment decisions. Transfer prices based on variable costs fail to induce investments on the upstream stage. In contrast, transfer prices based on full costs provide strong investment incentives for the upstream divisions. However, they fail to coordinate the investment decisions. We show that negotiations prevent such coordination failure. In particular, we find that the firm benefits from a higher degree of decentralization so that total profit increases in the number of parameters being subject to negotiations.

  7. Pricing and University Autonomy: Tuition Deregulation in Texas

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jeongeun Kim

    2016-04-01

    Full Text Available This paper investigates changes in tuition policies in the wake of tuition deregulation in Texas, which in 2003 transferred tuition-setting authority from the state legislature to institutions. We find that price increases accelerated, particularly at the most selective institutions. Institutions also began differentiating price by undergraduate program, raising relative prices for the most costly and lucrative majors, including engineering, business, nursing, and architecture. Price increases were particularly large for institutions with the highest initial costs and for programs with a high earnings premium within institutions, though lower for institutions with more low-income students. These distinctions suggest that public postsecondary institutions respond to microeconomic incentives when given greater autonomy to set price, and take some measures to alleviate impacts on low-income students. The Texas experience suggests that decentralized price-setting generates greater price differentiation within the public higher education system, both across and within institutions.

  8. Will the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation produce an incentive to continue carbon emissions?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wang, Rong; Moreno-Cruz, Juan; Caldeira, Ken

    2017-05-01

    Integrated assessment models are commonly used to generate optimal carbon prices based on an objective function that maximizes social welfare. Such models typically project an initially low carbon price that increases with time. This framework does not reflect the incentives of decision makers who are responsible for generating tax revenue. If a rising carbon price is to result in near-zero emissions, it must ultimately result in near-zero carbon tax revenue. That means that at some point, policy makers will be asked to increase the tax rate on carbon emissions to such an extent that carbon tax revenue will fall. Therefore, there is a risk that the use of a carbon tax to generate revenue could eventually create a perverse incentive to continue carbon emissions in order to provide a continued stream of carbon tax revenue. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy (DICE) model, we provide evidence that this risk is not a concern for the immediate future but that a revenue-generating carbon tax could create this perverse incentive as time goes on. This incentive becomes perverse at about year 2085 under the default configuration of DICE, but the timing depends on a range of factors including the cost of climate damages and the cost of decarbonizing the global energy system. While our study is based on a schematic model, it highlights the importance of considering a broader spectrum of incentives in studies using more comprehensive integrated assessment models. Our study demonstrates that the use of a carbon tax for revenue generation could potentially motivate implementation of such a tax today, but this source of revenue generation risks motivating continued carbon emissions far into the future.

  9. Household electricity consumers’ incentive to choose dynamic pricing under different taxation schemes

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Katz, Jonas; Kitzing, Lena; Schröder, Sascha Thorsten

    2018-01-01

    Dynamic pricing of retail electricity, as opposed to the widely applied average pricing, has often been proposed to enhance economic efficiency through demand response. The development of variable production from renewable energies and expectations about the installation of heat pumps and electric...

  10. Price Undertakings, VERs, and Foreign Direct Investment

    OpenAIRE

    Ishikawa, Jota; Miyagiwa, Kaz

    2006-01-01

    We compare the relative effect of a voluntary export restraint (VER) and a price undertaking on foreign firms' incentive to engage in FDI. We emphasize foreign rivalry as a determinant of FDI. We show, in a model that has two foreign firms competing with a home firm in the home country, that a price undertaking induces more FDI than a VER. The home country government, operating under the constraint to protect the home firm, is generally better off settling an antidumping case with a VER than ...

  11. Assessing distorted trading incentives of balance responsible parties based on the example of the Swiss power system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scherer, Marc; Haubensak, Oliver; Staake, Thorsten

    2015-01-01

    Power systems require a continuous balance of supply and demand. In Europe, this task is shared between Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs) and Transmission System Operators (TSOs). For this purpose, the European electricity sector consists of several markets. Objective of this paper is to investigate distorted incentives that stem from loopholes in the market design which BRPs can use to undermine electricity balancing principles in favour of gaming opportunities between the domestic imbalance energy pricing and international wholesale markets. These incentives are evaluated using historical data from the Swiss power system which features a typical European imbalance pricing mechanism. The results imply that little effort would have been needed to make a good profit at the expense of system security. The major loophole arises from the interdependence between cross-border trading and national imbalance energy pricing. Bearing in mind the European Union's Third Energy Package, the importance of national balancing mechanisms will increase strongly. In this context, national remedies to cope with distorted incentives are outlined and the importance of harmonising balancing markets on an international level is elaborated. - Highlights: • We investigate distorted incentives that stem from loopholes in the market design. • Cross-border trading that undermines electricity balancing principles is evaluated. • Little effort is necessary to make a good profit at the expense of system security. • We examine historical data from the Swiss power system. • We outline remedies to limit the possibilities of profiting from potential loopholes.

  12. 78 FR 70080 - Market Dominant Price Adjustment

    Science.gov (United States)

    2013-11-22

    .... Attachment D presents the 2014 Mailing Promotions and Incentives Calendar. The Postal Service filed six sets... plans to require FSS preparation for all flat- shaped mail pieces destinating in FSS zones. Second, it is proposing separate FSS pricing for presorted flat-shaped pieces in Standard Mail, Outside County...

  13. Tax incentives to promote green electricity. An overview of EU-27 countries

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cansino, Jose M.; Pablo-Romero, Maria del P.; Roman, Rocio; Yniguez, Rocio

    2010-01-01

    This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the main tax incentives used in the EU-27 member states (MSs) to promote green electricity. Sixteen MSs use tax incentives to promote green electricity simultaneously with other promotion measures, especially quota obligations and price regulation. However, not all available technologies are promoted. For example, six MSs (Germany, Romania, Slovak Republic, Denmark, Sweden and Poland) have included an exemption on the payments of excise duties for electricity when the electricity is generated from renewable energy sources (RES). This tax incentive is the most widely used. Limited tax incentives in personal income tax are available in Belgium, France, Czech Republic and Luxembourg. In corporate tax, tax incentives consist mainly of a deduction in the taxable profit (Belgium, Greece, Czech Republic and Spain). Lower tax rates in VAT are applied in three MSs, France, Italy and Portugal. Only Spain and Italy use effective tax incentives in property tax. As a great diversity of tax incentives has been used to promote green electricity, this adds another difficulty to the EU objective of providing a renewable energy policy framework, but also it offers a useful set of case studies which can be used to inform EU policy development. (author)

  14. Financial incentive increases CPAP acceptance in patients from low socioeconomic background.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ariel Tarasiuk

    Full Text Available OBJECTIVE: We explored whether financial incentives have a role in patients' decisions to accept (purchase a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP device in a healthcare system that requires cost sharing. DESIGN: Longitudinal interventional study. PATIENTS: The group receiving financial incentive (n = 137, 50.8±10.6 years, apnea/hypopnea index (AHI 38.7±19.9 events/hr and the control group (n = 121, 50.9±10.3 years, AHI 39.9±22 underwent attendant titration and a two-week adaptation to CPAP. Patients in the control group had a co-payment of $330-660; the financial incentive group paid a subsidized price of $55. RESULTS: CPAP acceptance was 43% greater (p = 0.02 in the financial incentive group. CPAP acceptance among the low socioeconomic strata (n = 113 (adjusting for age, gender, BMI, tobacco smoking was enhanced by financial incentive (OR, 95% CI (3.43, 1.09-10.85, age (1.1, 1.03-1.17, AHI (>30 vs. 30 vs. 30 vs. <30 (5.25, 1.34-18.5. CONCLUSIONS: Minimizing cost sharing reduces a barrier for CPAP acceptance among low socioeconomic status patients. Thus, financial incentive should be applied as a policy to encourage CPAP treatment, especially among low socioeconomic strata patients.

  15. The influence of the PFI on waste management pricing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2000-01-01

    This report analyses the pricing mechanisms generated within the waste management sector under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and compares them with the cost-plus pricing mechanisms. The background to the research is traced, and the influence of the PFI on service procurement, the incentives to use PFI, the procurement process, and the allocation of contractual risk are discussed. The PFI pricing mechanisms are described, and a case study of a hypothetical local authority involved in the tender for integrated waste management services is created to illustrate the pricing mechanisms under the PFI, comparisons with traditional pricing, and a quantitative analysis. A non-PFI model, a PFI 20 year model, and PFI 25 year model are presented in the appendix

  16. The influence of the PFI on waste management pricing

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2000-07-01

    This report analyses the pricing mechanisms generated within the waste management sector under the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and compares them with the cost-plus pricing mechanisms. The background to the research is traced, and the influence of the PFI on service procurement, the incentives to use PFI, the procurement process, and the allocation of contractual risk are discussed. The PFI pricing mechanisms are described, and a case study of a hypothetical local authority involved in the tender for integrated waste management services is created to illustrate the pricing mechanisms under the PFI, comparisons with traditional pricing, and a quantitative analysis. A non-PFI model, a PFI 20 year model, and PFI 25 year model are presented in the appendix.

  17. Incentive Ratios of Fisher Markets

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Chen, Ning; Deng, Xuaitue; Zhang, Hongyang

    2012-01-01

    In a Fisher market, a market maker sells m items to n potential buyers. The buyers submit their utility functions and money endowments to the market maker, who, upon receiving submitted information, derives market equilibrium prices and allocations of its items. While agents may benefit...... by misreporting their private information, we show that the percentage of improvement by a unilateral strategic play, called incentive ratio, is rather limited—it is less than 2 for linear markets and at most $e^{1/e}\\thickapprox 1.445$ for Cobb-Douglas markets. We further prove that both ratios are tight....

  18. The cost of policy simplification in conservation incentive programs

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Armsworth, Paul R.; Acs, Szvetlana; Dallimer, Martin

    2012-01-01

    of biodiversity. Common policy simplifications result in a 49100% loss in biodiversity benefits depending on the conservation target chosen. Failure to differentiate prices for conservation improvements in space is particularly problematic. Additional implementation costs that accompany more complicated policies......Incentive payments to private landowners provide a common strategy to conserve biodiversity and enhance the supply of goods and services from ecosystems. To deliver cost-effective improvements in biodiversity, payment schemes must trade-off inefficiencies that result from over-simplified policies...... with the administrative burden of implementing more complex incentive designs. We examine the effectiveness of different payment schemes using field parameterized, ecological economic models of extensive grazing farms. We focus on profit maximising farm management plans and use bird species as a policy-relevant indicator...

  19. Modeling regulated water utility investment incentives

    Science.gov (United States)

    Padula, S.; Harou, J. J.

    2014-12-01

    This work attempts to model the infrastructure investment choices of privatized water utilities subject to rate of return and price cap regulation. The goal is to understand how regulation influences water companies' investment decisions such as their desire to engage in transfers with neighbouring companies. We formulate a profit maximization capacity expansion model that finds the schedule of new supply, demand management and transfer schemes that maintain the annual supply-demand balance and maximize a companies' profit under the 2010-15 price control process in England. Regulatory incentives for costs savings are also represented in the model. These include: the CIS scheme for the capital expenditure (capex) and incentive allowance schemes for the operating expenditure (opex) . The profit-maximizing investment program (what to build, when and what size) is compared with the least cost program (social optimum). We apply this formulation to several water companies in South East England to model performance and sensitivity to water network particulars. Results show that if companies' are able to outperform the regulatory assumption on the cost of capital, a capital bias can be generated, due to the fact that the capital expenditure, contrarily to opex, can be remunerated through the companies' regulatory capital value (RCV). The occurrence of the 'capital bias' or its entity depends on the extent to which a company can finance its investments at a rate below the allowed cost of capital. The bias can be reduced by the regulatory penalties for underperformances on the capital expenditure (CIS scheme); Sensitivity analysis can be applied by varying the CIS penalty to see how and to which extent this impacts the capital bias effect. We show how regulatory changes could potentially be devised to partially remove the 'capital bias' effect. Solutions potentially include allowing for incentives on total expenditure rather than separately for capex and opex and allowing

  20. Comparison of energy efficiency incentive programs: Rebates and white certificates

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Transue, Morghan; Felder, Frank A. [Center for Energy, Economic, and Environmental Policy, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey, Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, 33 Livingston Avenue, New Brunswick, NJ 08901 (United States)

    2010-06-15

    With increased interest in energy efficiency in recent years, energy efficiency portfolio standards (EEPS) have gained popularity in state policymaking. This analysis employed New Jersey specific data to compare two incentive based approaches to EEPS implementation: rebates and white certificates. Quantitative modeling suggests that white certificate approaches that depend on market-clearing prices generate much larger upfront incentive outlays than rebate programs. They do not however increase societal burden. Both programs overcome high upfront efficiency measure costs and both recoup the expenses over the long run. Administration costs and participation rates can affect this dynamic however and require additional research to determine which approaches are most cost effective for various energy efficiency measures. (author)

  1. Pricing methodologies for congestion management in a deregulated ...

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    DR OKE

    new facilities into the existing system and the long term firm transactions. ... view. The probabilistic approach has been applied in [73-77] to OPF to compute the locational marginal pricing. ... smaller and provides a reduced incentive for investment when installed reserves are above the target. .... contingencies," IEEE Trans.

  2. Economic incentives for evidence generation: promoting an efficient path to personalized medicine.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Towse, Adrian; Garrison, Louis P

    2013-01-01

    The preceding articles in this volume have identified and discussed a wide range of methodological and practical issues in the development of personalized medicine. This concluding article uses the resulting insights to identify implications for the economic incentives for evidence generation. It argues that promoting an efficient path to personalized medicine is going to require appropriate incentives for evidence generation including: 1) a greater willingness on the part of payers to accept prices that reflect value; 2) consideration of some form of intellectual property protection (e.g., data exclusivity) for diagnostics to incentivize generation of evidence of clinical utility; 3) realistic expectations around the standards for evidence; and 4) public investment in evidence collection to complement the efforts of payers and manufacturers. It concludes that such incentives could build and maintain a balance among: 1) realistic thresholds for evidence and the need for payers to have confidence in the clinical utility of the drugs and tests they use; 2) payment for value, with prices that ensure cost-effectiveness for health systems; and 3) levels of intellectual property protection for evidence generation that provide a return for those financing research and development, while encouraging competition to produce both better and more efficient tests. Copyright © 2013, International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR). Published by Elsevier Inc.

  3. Impact of cigarette minimum price laws on the retail price of cigarettes in the USA.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tynan, Michael A; Ribisl, Kurt M; Loomis, Brett R

    2013-05-01

    Cigarette price increases prevent youth initiation, reduce cigarette consumption and increase the number of smokers who quit. Cigarette minimum price laws (MPLs), which typically require cigarette wholesalers and retailers to charge a minimum percentage mark-up for cigarette sales, have been identified as an intervention that can potentially increase cigarette prices. 24 states and the District of Columbia have cigarette MPLs. Using data extracted from SCANTRACK retail scanner data from the Nielsen company, average cigarette prices were calculated for designated market areas in states with and without MPLs in three retail channels: grocery stores, drug stores and convenience stores. Regression models were estimated using the average cigarette pack price in each designated market area and calendar quarter in 2009 as the outcome variable. The average difference in cigarette pack prices are 46 cents in the grocery channel, 29 cents in the drug channel and 13 cents in the convenience channel, with prices being lower in states with MPLs for all three channels. The findings that MPLs do not raise cigarette prices could be the result of a lack of compliance and enforcement by the state or could be attributed to the minimum state mark-up being lower than the free-market mark-up for cigarettes. Rather than require a minimum mark-up, which can be nullified by promotional incentives and discounts, states and countries could strengthen MPLs by setting a simple 'floor price' that is the true minimum price for all cigarettes or could prohibit discounts to consumers and retailers.

  4. Achieving high value care for all and the perverse incentives of 340B price agreements.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Whittington, Melanie D; Campbell, Jonathan D; McQueen, R Brett

    2018-04-01

    Section 340B of the Public Health Service Act requires drug manufacturers to enter into price agreements with the Department of Health and Human Services. These agreements result in variation in the price paid to acquire a drug by sector, which complicates the price used in cost-effectiveness analyses. We describe the transactions and sectors in a 340B agreement using a multiple sclerosis drug. Cost-effectiveness estimates were calculated for the drug using drug prices from the manufacturer and payer perspective. We found the amount paid to the manufacturer (340B price) was a good value ($118,256 per quality-adjusted life-year); however, from the payer drug cost perspective, good value ($196,683 per quality-adjusted life-year) was not achieved. Given that emerging value frameworks incorporate cost-effectiveness, these price variations may have downstream negative consequences, including inaccurate coverage and reimbursement policy recommendations. Upcoming policy changes to the 340B program should incentivize pricing schemes hinged on transparency and value.

  5. The effect of policy incentives on electric vehicle adoption

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Langbroek, Joram H.M.; Franklin, Joel P.; Susilo, Yusak O.

    2016-01-01

    In order to increase the attractiveness of electric vehicles (EVs), packages of policy incentives are provided in many countries. However, it is still unclear how effective different policy incentives are. Also, it is questionable that they have the same impact on different groups of people. In this study, based on a stated-choice experiment, the effect of several potential policy incentives on EV-adoption, as well as the influence of socio-psychological determinants are investigated, using constructs of the Transtheoretical Model of Change (TTM) and the Protection Motivation Theory (PMT). The probability of stated EV-adoption increases if policy incentives are offered in the choice experiment, which is expected because of the decrease of the generalized cost of EV-use. The high stated valuation of free parking or access to bus lanes makes those incentives an efficient alternative to expensive subsidies. EV-adoption probability increases for people that are further in the process of behavioural change. However, the responsiveness to subsidies decreases for people in more advanced stages-of-change. People that believe EVs to be effective in decreasing the negative externalities of the current transport system and people whose travel patterns can cope with the use of EVs also have a higher probability to choose the EV. - Highlights: •Policy incentives have a positive influence on electric vehicle adoption. •Being in advanced stages-of-change to EV-adoption increases likelihood to adopt EVs. •People in more advanced stages-of-change to EV-adoption are less price-sensitive. •People with a high self-efficacy and response efficacy are more likely to adopt EVs.

  6. Helping consumers manage their exposure to volatile natural gas prices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campion, A.

    2004-01-01

    This presentation provided a customer's view of forward gas prices and outlined different buying behaviours in terms of characteristics of novice and seasoned buyers. It presented a portfolio overview of natural gas and described the risks facing customers in terms of fixed prices and fixed volumes. An energy smart price plan considers floating gas prices instead of a fixed market price. An automobile manufacturer was presented as an example of a gas consumer that would prefer to manage internal costs of production rather than manage gas volatility. The importance of understanding the drivers of individual businesses was emphasized. Natural Resources Canada and the Office of Energy Efficiency offer financial incentives for manufacturers for energy retrofit feasibility studies that result in energy retrofit projects in lighting, heating, boiler replacement, chiller upgrades, and heat recovery. tabs., figs

  7. Pricing structures in US coal supply contracts

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kacker, Kanishka

    The subject of my dissertation is the study of coal procurement by electric utilities in the US over 2 decades, from 1979 to 2000. Energy markets are typically characterized by severe contracting problems. Buyers and sellers therefore employ various instruments, such as contract length or complex pricing arrangements, to restrict these problems. Relationship specific investment, wherein buyers make investments specific to their suppliers, has been advanced as a prominent explanation for contractual length. Investment decisions are however endogenous in length or pricing, making causal identification of the role of investment specificity difficult. In my first chapter, I attempt a resolution. I use the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment as an exogenous shifter of the extent of relationship specific investment. A key feature of the Amendment's design helps me define a difference-in-difference model arguably free of the endogeneity issues discussed above. I find that the plants forced into switching - Phase I plants located in the US Midwest - are more likely to choose fixed price contracts than those that were not. Further they also write contracts of shorter terms, with the reduction being approximately 30%. Considerably little is known about the performance implications of contractual choices. These form the basis for Chapter 2. Here I find prices to be lower, by between 5% to 20% of the total transaction price, but the probability of renegotiation higher, under fixed price contracts than under escalator or cost-plus contracts. Contract choices appear consistent with a trade-off between establishing incentives ex-ante and lowering negotiation costs ex-post, with relationship specific investments in particular making such a trade-off compelling. Chapter 3 considers the regulatory environment these utilities were subject to. Both incentive based regulation as well as the restructuring of electricity generation are smaller in comparison to relationship specific investment

  8. Financial Incentive Increases CPAP Acceptance in Patients from Low Socioeconomic Background

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tarasiuk, Ariel; Reznor, Gally; Greenberg-Dotan, Sari; Reuveni, Haim

    2012-01-01

    Objective We explored whether financial incentives have a role in patients′ decisions to accept (purchase) a continuous positive airway pressure (CPAP) device in a healthcare system that requires cost sharing. Design Longitudinal interventional study. Patients The group receiving financial incentive (n = 137, 50.8±10.6 years, apnea/hypopnea index (AHI) 38.7±19.9 events/hr) and the control group (n = 121, 50.9±10.3 years, AHI 39.9±22) underwent attendant titration and a two-week adaptation to CPAP. Patients in the control group had a co-payment of $330–660; the financial incentive group paid a subsidized price of $55. Results CPAP acceptance was 43% greater (p = 0.02) in the financial incentive group. CPAP acceptance among the low socioeconomic strata (n = 113) (adjusting for age, gender, BMI, tobacco smoking) was enhanced by financial incentive (OR, 95% CI) (3.43, 1.09–10.85), age (1.1, 1.03–1.17), AHI (>30 vs. CPAP (4.29, 1.05–17.51). Among average/high-income patients (n = 145) CPAP acceptance was affected by AHI (>30 vs. CPAP adherence was similar in the financial incentive and control groups, 35% and 39%, respectively (p = 0.82). Adherence rate was sensitive to education (+yr) (1.28, 1.06–1.55) and AHI (>30 vs. CPAP acceptance among low socioeconomic status patients. Thus, financial incentive should be applied as a policy to encourage CPAP treatment, especially among low socioeconomic strata patients. PMID:22479368

  9. The value of solar: Prices and output from distributed photovoltaic generation in South Australia

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maine, Tony; Chapman, Paul

    2007-01-01

    The Australian government's Solar Cities Program sees great value in so-called 'cost-reflective pricing', code for valuing solar at pool prices. We test that proposition in South Australia where pool prices and insolation are often high and we show that there were few days in 2004 when the pool price gives better outcomes than if the solar is valued at the regulated and fixed, so-called standing contract price. We also find that the illustrative day used in the Solar Cities Program literature to promote the notion of cost-reflective pricing is highly atypical. Finally, we consider ways in which the incentive to install distributed photovoltaic generation might be improved

  10. Deconstructing Solar Photovoltaic Pricing: The Role of Market Structure, Technology, and Policy

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Gillingham, Kenneth [Yale Univ., New Haven, CT (United States); Deng, Hao [Yale Univ., New Haven, CT (United States); Wiser, Ryan [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Darghouth, Naim [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Nemet, Gregory [Univ. of Wisconsin, Madison, WI (United States); Barbose, Galen [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Rai, Varun [Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States); Dong, C. G. [Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States)

    2014-12-15

    Solar photovoltaic (PV) system prices in the United States display considerable heterogeneity both across geographic locations and within a given location. Such heterogeneity may arise due to state and federal policies, differences in market structure, and other factors that influence demand and costs. This paper examines the relative importance of such factors on equilibrium solar PV system prices in the United States using a detailed dataset of roughly 100,000 recent residential and small commercial installations. As expected, we find that PV system prices differ based on characteristics of the systems. More interestingly, we find evidence suggesting that search costs and imperfect competition affect solar PV pricing. Installer density substantially lowers prices, while regions with relatively generous financial incentives for solar PV are associated with higher prices.

  11. Alternative natural gas contract and pricing structures and incentives for the LNG industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Attanasi, E.D.

    1991-01-01

    Gas conversion to liquefied gas (LNG) and transport by LNG tankers is one option for meeting expanding gas consumption and for gas traded internationally. This paper examines the impact of the traditional gas contract provisions of indefinite pricing, market out price ceilings, and take-or-pay requirements on the profitability of LNG projects in the context of markets characterized by price and quantity uncertainty. Simulation of experiments are used to examine and calibrate the effects of those provisions. The results provide guidance to operators, host countries and purchasers in structuring such contracts. The paper also assesses prospects of future expansion of world LNG capacity. (author). 11 refs, 3 figs, 4 tabs

  12. The provinces and carbon pricing : three inconvenient truths

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Courchene, T.J.; Allan, J.R. [Queen' s Univ., Kingston, ON (Canada). Inst. of Intergovernmental Relations

    2008-12-15

    This article discussed the role that the federal government should play in introducing a carbon price policy in Canada whereby a carbon tax would be instituted to send a price signal to those considering future investment in carbon-intensive energy projects. It focused on bridging the gap between federal and provincial jurisdictions and assessed how various carbon pricing models can play a role in environmental federalism while allowing provinces to remain involved in policy making. Policy commitments related to emissions and cap-and-trade systems were discussed along with carbon import tariffs and domestic carbon taxes. In a market-based policy on climate change, proceeds of carbon taxes will serve to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This article also reviewed tax incentives as well as price signal systems designed to ensure successful climate change adjustments for Canadian enterprises. 1 fig.

  13. The provinces and carbon pricing : three inconvenient truths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Courchene, T.J.; Allan, J.R.

    2008-01-01

    This article discussed the role that the federal government should play in introducing a carbon price policy in Canada whereby a carbon tax would be instituted to send a price signal to those considering future investment in carbon-intensive energy projects. It focused on bridging the gap between federal and provincial jurisdictions and assessed how various carbon pricing models can play a role in environmental federalism while allowing provinces to remain involved in policy making. Policy commitments related to emissions and cap-and-trade systems were discussed along with carbon import tariffs and domestic carbon taxes. In a market-based policy on climate change, proceeds of carbon taxes will serve to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This article also reviewed tax incentives as well as price signal systems designed to ensure successful climate change adjustments for Canadian enterprises. 1 fig

  14. Pricing schemes for new drugs: a welfare analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Levaggi, Rosella

    2014-02-01

    Drug price regulation is acquiring increasing significance in the investment choices of the pharmaceutical sector. The overall objective is to determine an optimal trade-off between the incentives for innovation, consumer protection, and value for money. However, price regulation is itself a source of distortion. In this study, we examine the welfare properties of listing through a bargaining process and value-based pricing schemes. The latter are superior instruments to uncertain listing processes for maximising total welfare, but the distribution of the benefits between consumers and the industry depends on rate of rebate chosen by the regulator. However, through an appropriate choice, it is always possible to define a value-based pricing scheme with risk sharing, which both consumers and the industry prefer to an uncertain bargaining process. Copyright © 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  15. Standard gasoline and ACPM - First year of the measure of prices liberation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Unidad de Planeacion Minero Energetica, UPME

    2000-01-01

    At the beginning of 1999, amid a lingering period of low prices of petroleum and relative stability of exchange market, due at the high interest rate levels and it offers of foreign currencies, the national government through the of Mines and Energy Ministry, decided to start the prices liberation for the standard gasoline and ACPM. In that moment, the economic politics of the state pointed to the maintenance of the flow of revenues of the nation, the creation of incentives for the investment of the national and international private capital, the elimination of subsidies of the public sector, the best assignment in the public expense, the construction of an environment competitive and the protection of the real wage of the Colombians. Specifically of liberation measure of the internal prices of standard gasoline and ACPM modified two components of prices structure, entrance to the producer (EP) and margin retailer; to rationalize the finances of Ecopetrol, to achieve a better assignment of the public resources with the elimination from an outline of subsidies to high strata, to look for the specialization of the state company in the exploration, to eliminate the effect that the expectations of increment of prices of hydrocarbons generated on the prices to the consumer index (PCI), to foment the free competition along the production chain and distribution and to improve the quality and covering of the service, by means of the incentive to the investments

  16. Traditional and incentive regulation - applications to natural gas pipelines in Canada

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Mansell, R.L.; Church, J.R.

    1995-12-31

    A study was conducted to examine alternative regimes for the regulation of major natural gas pipelines in Canada, with the specific objective of clarifying and analyzing key issues relating to these regulatory alternatives. An overview of the development and structure of the gas pipeline industry and a discussion of the main changes in the market and regulatory environment was included. The appropriateness of greater tolling flexibility and the role that competition plays in optimizing the use of existing pipelines was also discussed. Some of the incentive alternatives included price caps, automatic rate adjustment mechanisms, yardstick competition, profit sharing, benchmarking, capital cost incentives, and franchising. An evaluation of each alternative was provided. Examination of the various alternatives led to the conclusion that none of the new-style incentive regimes represent a panacea, nor is any of them uniformly better in terms of the key evaluation criteria than the traditional cost of service (COS) approach, especially that which incorporates streamlining. 163 refs., 13 figs.

  17. Nonlinear Pricing in Energy and Environmental Markets

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ito, Koichiro

    Consumers Respond to Nonlinear Pricing? Evidence from Household Water Demand" provides similar empirical evidence in residential water markets. In this paper, I exploit variation in residential water pricing in Southern California to examine how consumers respond to nonlinear pricing. Contrary to the standard predictions for nonlinear budget sets, I find no bunching of consumers around the kink points of their nonlinear price schedule. I then explore whether consumers respond to marginal price, expected marginal price, or average price when faced with nonlinear water price schedules. The price schedule of one service area was changed from a linear price schedule to a nonlinear price schedule. This policy change lead to an increase in marginal price and expected marginal price but a decrease in average price for many consumers. Using household-level panel data, I find strong evidence that consumers respond to average price rather than marginal or expected marginal price. Estimates of the short-run price elasticity for the summer and winter months are -.127 and -.097, and estimates of the long-run price elasticity for the summer and winter months are -.203 and -.154. I conclude with "The Effect of Cash Rewards on Energy Conservation: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design" to examine the effect of an alternative form of nonlinear pricing that was developed to provide an explicit financial incentive for conservation. In the summer of 2005, California residents received a 20% discount on their summer electricity bills if they could reduce their electricity consumption by 20% relative to 2004. Nearly all households automatically participated in the program, but the eligibility rule required households to have started their electricity service by a certain cutoff date in 2004. This rule generated an essentially random assignment of the program among households that started their service right before and after the cutoff date. Using household-level monthly billing records

  18. Price competition among Dutch sickness funds

    OpenAIRE

    Varkevisser, Marco; Geest, Stéphanie

    2003-01-01

    textabstractIn general, competition enhances efficiency. On the market for health insurance free market competition, however, has unwanted side-effects. The existence of asymmetrical information can lead to adverse selection and cream skimming. Adequate risk-adjustment removes the incentives for cream skimming and balances the negative consequences of adverse selection. In an attempt to enhance efficiency, the Dutch government in 1992 introduced price competition between social health insurer...

  19. Markets, prices and regulation in energetic activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Percebois, Jacques

    2015-09-01

    The author first outlines some fundamental characteristics of the different energy world markets (oil, natural gas, coal, electricity). He outlines their availability, locations, and different main geographical areas. Then, he discusses the relationships between costs and prices in which intervene external costs, taxes, feed-in tariffs, national regulations, incentives for consumers. He discusses the issue of regulation of some energy activities, i.e. how State may or may not intervene on the markets, how competition may influence the market, how activities can thus be divided (production, transport, distribution) with implications and consequences for prices. He finally outlines concerns about the future financing of investments required to face tomorrow's needs

  20. Efficient dynamic scarcity pricing in urban water supply

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lopez-Nicolas, Antonio; Pulido-Velazquez, Manuel; Rougé, Charles; Harou, Julien J.; Escriva-Bou, Alvar

    2017-04-01

    Water pricing is a key instrument for water demand management. Despite the variety of existing strategies for urban water pricing, urban water rates are often far from reflecting the real value of the resource, which increases with water scarcity. Current water rates do not bring any incentive to reduce water use in water scarcity periods, since they do not send any signal to the users of water scarcity. In California, the recent drought has spurred the implementation of drought surcharges and penalties to reduce residential water use, although it is not a common practice yet. In Europe, the EU Water Framework Directive calls for the implementation of new pricing policies that assure the contribution of water users to the recovery of the cost of water services (financial instrument) while providing adequate incentives for an efficient use of water (economic instrument). Not only financial costs should be recovered but also environmental and resource (opportunity) costs. A dynamic pricing policy is efficient if the prices charged correspond to the marginal economic value of water, which increases with water scarcity and is determined by the value of water for all alternative uses in the basin. Therefore, in the absence of efficient water markets, measuring the opportunity costs of scarce water can only be achieved through an integrated basin-wide hydroeconomic simulation approach. The objective of this work is to design a dynamic water rate for urban water supply accounting for the seasonal marginal value of water in the basin, related to water scarcity. The dynamic pricing policy would send to the users a signal of the economic value of the resource when water is scarce, therefore promoting more efficient water use. The water rate is also designed to simultaneously meet the expected basic requirements for water tariffs: revenue sufficiency (cost recovery) and neutrality, equity and affordability, simplicity and efficiency. A dynamic increasing block rate (IBR

  1. Electricity pricing model in thermal generating stations under deregulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reji, P.; Ashok, S.; Moideenkutty, K.M.

    2007-01-01

    In regulated public utilities with competitive power markets, deregulation has replaced the monopoly. Under the deregulated power market, the electricity price primarily depends on market mechanism and power demand. In this market, generators generally follow marginal pricing. Each generator fixes the electricity price based on their pricing strategy and it leads to more price volatility. This paper proposed a model to determine the electricity price considering all operational constraints of the plant and economic variables that influenced the price, for a thermal generating station under deregulation. The purpose of the model was to assist existing stations, investors in the power sector, regulatory authorities, transmission utilities, and new power generators in decision-making. The model could accommodate price volatility in the market and was based on performance incentive/penalty considering plant load factor, availability of the plant and peak/ off peak demand. The model was applied as a case study to a typical thermal utility in India to determine the electricity price. It was concluded that the case study of a thermal generating station in a deregulated environment showed that the electricity price mainly depended on the gross calorific value (GCV) of fuel, mode of operation, price of the fuel, and operating charges. 11 refs., 2 tabs., 1 fig

  2. Support mechanisms for renewables: How risk exposure influences investment incentives

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lena Kitzing

    2016-06-01

    Full Text Available We analyse quantitatively how risk exposure from different support mechanisms, such as feed-in tariffs and premiums, can influence the investment incentives for private investors. We develop a net cash flow approach that takes systematic and unsystematic risks into account through cost of capital and the Capital Asset Pricing Model as well as through active liquidity management. Applying the model to a specific case, a German offshore wind park, we find that the support levels required to give adequate investment incentives are for a feed-in tariff scheme approximately 4-10% lower than for a feed-in premium scheme. The effect of differences in risk exposure from the support schemes is significant and cannot be neglected in policy making, especially when deciding between support instruments or when determining adequate support levels.

  3. An analysis of cost effective incentives for initial commercial deployment of advanced clean coal technologies

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Spencer, D.F. [SIMTECHE, Half Moon Bay, CA (United States)

    1997-12-31

    This analysis evaluates the incentives necessary to introduce commercial scale Advanced Clean Coal Technologies, specifically Integrated Coal Gasification Combined Cycle (ICGCC) and Pressurized Fluidized Bed Combustion (PFBC) powerplants. The incentives required to support the initial introduction of these systems are based on competitive busbar electricity costs with natural gas fired combined cycle powerplants, in baseload service. A federal government price guarantee program for up to 10 Advanced Clean Coal Technology powerplants, 5 each ICGCC and PFBC systems is recommended in order to establish the commercial viability of these systems by 2010. By utilizing a decreasing incentives approach as the technologies mature (plants 1--5 of each type), and considering the additional federal government benefits of these plants versus natural gas fired combined cycle powerplants, federal government net financial exposure is minimized. Annual net incentive outlays of approximately 150 million annually over a 20 year period could be necessary. Based on increased demand for Advanced Clean Coal Technologies beyond 2010, the federal government would be revenue neutral within 10 years of the incentives program completion.

  4. Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU emission trading scheme

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schleich, Joachim [Fraunhofer-Institut fuer Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung (ISI), Karlsruhe (Germany); Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., Blacksburg, VA (United States); Rogge, Karoline [Fraunhofer-Institut fuer Systemtechnik und Innovationsforschung (ISI), Karlsruhe (Germany); ETH Zurich (Switzerland). Group for Sustainability and Technology; Betz, Regina [New South Wales Univ. (Australia). Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets

    2008-07-01

    This paper explores the incentives for energy efficiency induced by the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for installations in the energy and industry sectors. Our analysis of the National Allocation Plans for 27 EU Member States for phase 2 of the EU ETS (2008-2012) suggests that the price and cost effects for improvements in carbon and energy efficiency in the energy and industry sectors will be stronger than in phase 1 (2005-2007), but only because the European Commission has substantially reduced the number of allowances to be allocated by the Member States. To the extent that companies from these sectors (notably power producers) pass through the extra costs for carbon, higher prices for allowances translate into stronger incentives for demand- side energy efficiency. With the cuts in allocation to energy and industry sectors these will be forced to greater reductions, thus the non-ET sectors like household, tertiary and transport will have to reduce less, which is more in line with the cost-efficient share of emission reductions. The findings also imply that domestic efficiency improvements in the energy and industry sectors may remain limited since companies can make substantial use of credits from the Kyoto mechanisms. The analysis of the rules for existing installations, new projects and closures suggests that incentives for energy efficiency are higher in phase 2 than in phase 1 because of the increased application of benchmarking to new and existing installations and because a lower share of allowances will be allocated for free. Nevertheless, there is still ample scope to further improve the EU ETS so that the full potential for energy efficiency can be realized. (orig.)

  5. Pricing Models of e-Books When Competing with p-Books

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Yan Li

    2013-01-01

    Full Text Available With the rise in popularity of e-books, there is a growing need to reexamine the pricing strategy in the e-book supply chain. In this paper, we study two forms of pricing models widely used in the book industry: wholesale and agency pricing models. We first assume a stylized deterministic demand model in which the demand depends on the price, the degree of substitution, and the overall market potential. Subsequently, we employ the game theory to determine the price equilibriums and profit distribution under different pricing models. Finally, we explore the behavior of the publisher and the retailer under different preferences and degrees of substitution through a computational study. Our findings indicate that the e-book price will be lower under the agency pricing model than under the wholesale pricing model, which is counterintuitive. The publishers have higher incentives to adopt the agency pricing model than the wholesale pricing model. The agency pricing model benefits the whole system and can provide readers with books at lower prices. The degree of substitution between the two forms of books and the readers’ preference toward e-book will affect the books’ price and the profit distribution between the publisher and the retailers.

  6. Changing incentives for long-term gas contracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bohi, D.R.

    1992-01-01

    There is much concern about the absence of long-term gas contracts with fixed price and quantity conditions, which until recent years was the standard way of doing business in the gas industry. These types of contracts performed a valuable service in the development of the gas industry, and there comparative absence today is sometimes thought to be one reason for the current malaise in the industry. One hears the argument that there must be some kind of 'market failure' that prevents buyers and sellers from entering into these long term arrangements, and recent changes in state and federal regulations are often cited as the cause of the problem. The purpose of the author's remarks is to argue that what is taken as a breakdown in the market may be simply a reaction to a decline in economic incentives to enter into long-term contracts with rigid price and quantity terms. This is, in other words, simply one more aspect of change in the gas business that Frank Heintz referred to in his opening remarks this morning. The author starts by giving a brief description of the motives for engaging in long-term contracts, and then describes how incentives to use long-term contracts have declined for both gas buyers and gas sellers. He concludes that the decline in the use of long-term contracts is not cause for regulatory concern, but a result of the continuing transformation of the gas business to one that more closely resembles other commodity markets

  7. Price and Service Discrimination in Queuing Systems: Incentive Compatibility of Gc\\mu Scheduling

    OpenAIRE

    Jan A. Van Mieghem

    2000-01-01

    This article studies the optimal prices and service quality grades that a queuing system---the "firm"---provides to heterogeneous, utility-maximizing customers who measure quality by their experienced delay distributions. Results are threefold: First, delay cost curves are introduced that allow for a flexible description of a customer's quality sensitivity. Second, a comprehensive executable approach is proposed that analytically specifies scheduling, delay distributions and prices for arbitr...

  8. Panel presentation: Should some type of incentive regulation replace traditional methods for LDC's?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richard, O.G.

    1992-01-01

    This paper discusses the problems with existing fixed-rate price regulation and how a deregulation of both the pipeline and gas utility companies are needed to enhance competition. The paper suggests alternative methods to traditional regulation which include a financial incentive package which allows or encourages utilities to make investments in more efficient energy management, to improve load factors to balance the energy demands between industrial and residential users, and reward purchases of gas supplies that out-perform an agreed upon level of rates of a cost index. Other incentive programs are proposed by the author with a relative detailed discussion on each topic

  9. The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Isamu Okada

    2015-05-01

    Full Text Available Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards and negative incentives (punishments with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players' incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1 second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2 a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3 a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4 a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives.

  10. The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Toriumi, Fujio; Sasaki, Tatsuya

    2015-05-01

    Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players' incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives.

  11. New scenario of the non-conventional renewable energies on Chile after the incentives created on the ''Short Law I''

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leonardo, Valencia M.

    2008-01-01

    Non-conventional renewable energies have never played an important role in the Chilean energy generation system, mainly due to the economic barriers that actually exists on our country for the inclusion of these kinds of technologies. Nevertheless, the use of renewable energy system technologies have started to be an interesting issue for the Chilean government, and for that reason, the last modification of the Energy Law during 2004, usually known as ''Short Law I'', introduced the first direct incentive to renewable energy generation (specifically in the art. 71-7). In this work we analyze in detail the modification on the electric law we mentioned before, especially for geothermal and wind power generation, and we compare the economic incentive generated with the new law and the differences between the real energy costs using renewable energy systems technologies and the current energy price in Chile. It is clear from the analysis that the total incentives do not cover more than 8.3% of the price differences between incomes and costs. (author)

  12. Smart Pricing for Smart Grid

    OpenAIRE

    Wang, Zhimin

    2014-01-01

    Flat-rate electricity tariffs in Great Britain, which have no price variation throughout a day or a year, have been ongoing for decades to recover the cost of energy production and delivery. However, this type of electricity tariff has little incentives to encourage customers to modify their demands to suit the condition of the power supply system. Hence, it is challenged in the new smart grid environment, where demand side responses have important roles to play to encourage conventional ener...

  13. North American natural gas storage, market and price outlook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    George, R.

    1999-01-01

    A series of overhead viewgraphs accompanied this presentation which dealt with the fundamental factors and short-term considerations that will impact Canadian and U.S. natural gas pricing. The short-term pricing outlook and some transportation issues were also highlighted. The major transportation issues for 1999/2000 are: (1) Nova tolling, (2) incentive tolling and negotiations, (3) decontracting, (4) pipeline project schedules, and (5) land use and environmental considerations. The major supply issues are: (1) impact of oil prices on gas drilling and production, (2) impact of merger and acquisition activity, and (3) land use and environmental considerations. The major demand issues for the same time period are: (1) greenhouse gas emissions, (2) electricity restructuring, and (3) new end-use technologies. 3 tabs., 21 figs

  14. The carbon price: a toothless tool for material efficiency?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Skelton, Alexandra C H; Allwood, Julian M

    2017-06-13

    This article explores whether a carbon price will effectively encourage the more efficient use of greenhouse gas intensive materials such as steel. The article identifies a range of distortions that arise when some of the restrictive assumptions of neoclassical economics are relaxed. Distortions occur due to the sequential nature of decision-making along supply chains, due to imperfect competition and due to government intervention to reduce the risk of carbon leakage. If upstream sectors do not pass on carbon costs, downstream sectors do not have the opportunity to react. Of the distortions identified, compensation mechanisms that reduce the risk of carbon leakage are likely to act as the greatest hinderance to appropriate incentives for the more efficient use of steel in the UK: as things currently stand, unless upstream companies are encouraged to make windfall profits, incentives downstream are weakened. The article concludes by exploring policy options to address the distortions identified, including efforts to reinstate the carbon price downstream and efforts to remove other distortive taxes.This article is part of the themed issue 'Material demand reduction'. © 2017 The Authors.

  15. Transmission pricing and expansion methodology: lessons from Argentina

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, K.P.; McCarthy, A.

    1999-01-01

    This paper focuses on the pricing of electric transmission service in Argentina and on the mechanisms for expanding the transmission system as of late 1998. We also discuss the pricing of energy and generating capacity, since locational differences in their prices constitute charges for transmission service. We find that the methods in place for pricing transmission service are, in the main, consistent with the principles of efficient pricing but that the incentives and mechanisms established for expanding transmission are deficient in some respects. Most notable is the failure to provide for transmission rights, given the system's heavy reliance on user-driven expansion. We find that Argentina can improve upon its pioneering effort to implement user-driven expansion and indeed is exploring ways to do so. The most important tasks are to investigate (a) whether a system of financial transmission rights can be made to work as part of the process of user-driven expansion and (b) whether a backstop role for centrally planned expansion can be preserved without inhibiting or preempting the user-driven process. (author)

  16. PRICING OF BT COTTON SEEDS IN INDIA: THE DEBATE BEHIND

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Anchal ARORA

    2014-11-01

    Full Text Available In 2006 the state government of Andhra Pradesh reduced the Bt cotton seed prices from Indian Rs1600 to Rs750 in order to make the technology affordable and accessible to small and marginal farmers in the state and also to prevent the monopolistic market structure in the seed market. The drastic reduction in seed prices, on the other hand could affect the profitability of seed providing companies and curb their incentives to innovate in future. Recent literature has also examined the impact of price controls on diffusion of technology, revenue and profitability of seed providers. It suggests that price controls have positively impacted the diffusion of technology in India, and were also successful in increasing the revenue of seed providers in the short run. However, the impact of price controls on profitability would depend on cost conditions. In the light of the above discussion, this article attempts to discuss the debate behind price controls and draws certain policy implications pertaining to pricing of Bt seeds, which has an international policy relevance.

  17. A Longitudinal Analysis of Cigarette Prices in Military Retail Outlets

    Science.gov (United States)

    Haddock, Christopher Keith; Hyder, Melissa L.; Poston, Walker S. C.; Jahnke, Sara A.; Williams, Larry N.; Lando, Harry

    2014-01-01

    Objectives. We conducted a longitudinal assessment of tobacco pricing in military retail outlets, including trends within each service branch. Methods. We determined the price of a single pack of Marlboro Red cigarettes at military retail stores located in the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii and at their nearest Walmarts in spring 2011 and 2013 (n = 128 for pairs available at both assessments). Results. The average difference between cigarettes sold in military retail outlets and Walmarts decreased from 24.5% in 2011 to 12.5% in 2013. The decrease was partially attributable to significant price decreases at Walmarts. The largest increases in cigarette prices occurred on naval installations. Potential savings at stores on several installations remained substantial in 2013; the largest approached $6 per pack. Stores on 17 military installations decreased cigarette prices during the study period. Conclusions. Tobacco can be purchased in military retail stores at substantial savings over civilian stores. If tobacco pricing is to cease to be an incentive for use among personnel, a revised military tobacco pricing policy is needed. PMID:24524503

  18. An incentive mechanism for electricity transmission expansion in Mexico

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rosellon, Juan

    2007-01-01

    This study proposes an incentive regulatory framework for expanding electricity transmission in Mexico. A two-part pricing model is implemented within a combined merchant-regulatory structure. Three cases are considered. In the first, a monopolist with 'postage stamp tariffs' serves the whole country using uniform prices. In the second case, one firm holds a regional monopoly in each of the five electricity areas. In the third, a monopolist operates in all areas of the national electricity system and discriminates in the prices it charges in each of the regions. This approach is described and then applied to the Mexican electricity transmission network. Using real data, the study compares all three cases in terms of profits, capacity increases, and network expansion. The results are found to depend on two effects: the 'economies-of-scale effect', in which the maximum level is reached with a single network; and the 'discriminatory effect' that results when a firm can discriminate among types of consumers. The economies-of-scale effect produces greater capacity and network expansion, whereas the discriminatory effect increases profits

  19. Incentives to invest in deregulated electricity industries in the North and South: the need for suitable institutional arrangements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finon, D.

    2003-01-01

    The stake of long-term investments is all too often underplayed in deregulation reforms in electricity industries. The new market and regulatory institutions have not yet been properly tested to assess their capacity for turning the increasing scarcity of capacity into incentives to invest in production and networks. This paper deals with the deficiencies of the investment incentive frameworks in the deregulated electricity industries. Initially it deals with the optimistic approach of the theory of investment incentives through market signals in deregulated electricity industries. The very high price volatility creates a determining uncertainty of return on investment, both for peak equipment and for base equipment, for which the greater part of the investment should be made profitable by income from peak and extreme peak periods. Secondly, this volatility expresses itself in a counter-cycle effect, which is very negative in the eyes of lenders and investors in peak and trough periods. Next, there is a problem of acceptability, as the wholesale prices may reach extremely high and often unexpected levels and the system may enter a situation of tension over peak reserves with the risk of a shortage and cut in supply. (author)

  20. Benefits of Government Incentives for Reusable Launch Vehicle Development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Shaw, Eric J.; Hamaker, Joseph W.; Prince, Frank A.

    1998-01-01

    Many exciting new opportunities in space, both government missions and business ventures, could be realized by a reduction in launch prices. Reusable launch vehicle (RLV) designs have the potential to lower launch costs dramatically from those of today's expendable and partially-expendable vehicles. Unfortunately, governments must budget to support existing launch capability, and so lack the resources necessary to completely fund development of new reusable systems. In addition, the new commercial space markets are too immature and uncertain to motivate the launch industry to undertake a project of this magnitude and risk. Low-cost launch vehicles will not be developed without a mature market to service; however, launch prices must be reduced in order for a commercial launch market to mature. This paper estimates and discusses the various benefits that may be reaped from government incentives for a commercial reusable launch vehicle program.

  1. Insurance and nuclear power: The Price-Anderson act

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whipple, C.

    1985-01-01

    This chapter evaluates the Price-Anderson Act, which establishes procedures for insuring nuclear facilities (including nuclear power plants) and was enacted in order to protect the public and to encourage the development of a private nuclear energy industry. Under the Act, the aggregate liability of the reactor operator, the US NRC, or any others who might be at fault (e.g. equipment manufacturers) is limited to $560 million. The reactor operator assumes all public liability, including that of the manufacturers of the plant or its equipment. The Price-Anderson Act has been criticized on the grounds that the limitation on liability removes a significant safety incentive and that the public would not be protected in the event of accident damages exceeding $ million. It is pointed out that under Price-Anderson, the limitation on liability at $560 million is not intended to be absolute

  2. Why strategic pricing is the most powerful DSM [demand-side management] tool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    LeBlanc, W.

    1990-01-01

    Strategic pricing has long been under-utilized as a strategic tool by the electric utility industry. Ways by which utility, customer and regulatory interests can and should overlap with reference to strategic planning, and how the electric industry could enhance its ability to continue providing premier energy services to its customers and society are examined. Strategic pricing in the airline, banking, automobile and telephone industries are examined and compared. Strategic pricing can help utilities segment markets to improve service value, define products, create customer incentives to purchase/consume desirable goods and services, and signal competitors. Each of these benefits is illustrated with an example that closely integrates strategic pricing with demand-side management. Pricing strategically takes many steps, but can be broken down into: meet common challenges of business and marketing objectives; gain regulatory acceptance; and energize the organization to accept, adopt and implement strategic pricing

  3. The effect of fiscal incentives on market penetration of electric vehicles: A pairwise comparison of total cost of ownership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lévay, Petra Zsuzsa; Drossinos, Yannis; Thiel, Christian

    2017-01-01

    An important barrier to electric vehicle (EV) sales is their high purchase price compared to internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. We conducted total cost of ownership (TCO) calculations to study how costs and sales of EVs relate to each other and to examine the role of fiscal incentives in reducing TCO and increasing EV sales. We composed EV-ICE vehicle pairs that allowed cross-segment and cross-country comparison in eight European countries. Actual car prices were used to calculate the incentives for each model in each country. We found a negative TCO-sales relationship that differs across car segments. Compared to their ICE vehicle pair, big EVs have lower TCO, higher sales, and seem to be less price responsive than small EVs. Three country groups can be distinguished according to the level of fiscal incentives and their impact on TCO and EV sales. In Norway, incentives led to the lowest TCO for the EVs. In the Netherlands, France, and UK the TCO of EVs is close to the TCO of the ICE pairs. In the other countries the TCO of EVs exceeds that of the ICE vehicles. We found that exemptions from flat taxes favour big EVs, while lump-sum subsidies favour small EVs. - Highlights: • Pairwise comparison of EV and ICE vehicle TCO and sales in eight European countries. • In NO, EV TCO is lower than ICE TCO; in NL, FR, and UK, EV TCO is slightly higher. • Compared to ICE vehicles, big EVs have lower TCO and higher sales than small EVs. • Exemptions from flat taxes favour big EVs, lump-sum subsidies favour small EVs. • Most popular EV models: Tesla Model S, Nissan Leaf, Mitsubishi Outlander PHEV.

  4. Demand response with locational dynamic pricing to support the integration of renewables

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupont, B.; De Jonghe, C.; Olmos, L.; Belmans, R.

    2014-01-01

    Electricity production from centralised and decentralised renewable energy resources in Europe is gaining significance, resulting in operational challenges in the electricity system. Although these challenges add to the locational and time dependency of the underlying cost of operating the system, this variability in time and location is not reflected in residential tariff schemes. Consequently, residential users are not incentivised to react to varying system conditions and to help the integration of renewable energy resources. Therefore, this paper provides a theoretical framework for designing a locational dynamic pricing scheme. This can be used to assess existing tariff structures for consumption and injection, and can serve as a theoretical background for developing new tariff schemes. Starting from the underlying costs, this paper shows that the potential for locational dynamic pricing depends on the locational and time dependency of its cost drivers. When converting costs into tariffs, the tariff design should be determined. This includes the advance notice of sending tariffs to users, and the length of price blocks and price patterns. This tariff design should find a balance between tariff principles related to costs, practicality and social acceptability on the one hand, and the resulting demand response incentive on the other. - Highlights: • The integration of renewables affects the locational and time dependency of costs. • Locational dynamic pricing reflects cost variability and allows demand response. • A theoretical framework for designing and assessing tariff schemes is proposed. • Tariff variability depends on the locational and time dependency of its cost drivers. • The tariff design should consider the resulting demand response incentive

  5. The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation

    OpenAIRE

    Okada, Isamu; Yamamoto, Hitoshi; Toriumi, Fujio; Sasaki, Tatsuya

    2015-01-01

    Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (re...

  6. Structuring economic incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation within Indonesia.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Busch, Jonah; Lubowski, Ruben N; Godoy, Fabiano; Steininger, Marc; Yusuf, Arief A; Austin, Kemen; Hewson, Jenny; Juhn, Daniel; Farid, Muhammad; Boltz, Frederick

    2012-01-24

    We estimate and map the impacts that alternative national and subnational economic incentive structures for reducing emissions from deforestation (REDD+) in Indonesia would have had on greenhouse gas emissions and national and local revenue if they had been in place from 2000 to 2005. The impact of carbon payments on deforestation is calibrated econometrically from the pattern of observed deforestation and spatial variation in the benefits and costs of converting land to agriculture over that time period. We estimate that at an international carbon price of $10/tCO(2)e, a "mandatory incentive structure," such as a cap-and-trade or symmetric tax-and-subsidy program, would have reduced emissions by 163-247 MtCO(2)e/y (20-31% below the without-REDD+ reference scenario), while generating a programmatic budget surplus. In contrast, a "basic voluntary incentive structure" modeled after a standard payment-for-environmental-services program would have reduced emissions nationally by only 45-76 MtCO(2)e/y (6-9%), while generating a programmatic budget shortfall. By making four policy improvements--paying for net emission reductions at the scale of an entire district rather than site-by-site; paying for reductions relative to reference levels that match business-as-usual levels; sharing a portion of district-level revenues with the national government; and sharing a portion of the national government's responsibility for costs with districts--an "improved voluntary incentive structure" would have been nearly as effective as a mandatory incentive structure, reducing emissions by 136-207 MtCO(2)e/y (17-26%) and generating a programmatic budget surplus.

  7. Structuring economic incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation within Indonesia

    Science.gov (United States)

    Busch, Jonah; Lubowski, Ruben N.; Godoy, Fabiano; Steininger, Marc; Yusuf, Arief A.; Austin, Kemen; Hewson, Jenny; Juhn, Daniel; Farid, Muhammad; Boltz, Frederick

    2012-01-01

    We estimate and map the impacts that alternative national and subnational economic incentive structures for reducing emissions from deforestation (REDD+) in Indonesia would have had on greenhouse gas emissions and national and local revenue if they had been in place from 2000 to 2005. The impact of carbon payments on deforestation is calibrated econometrically from the pattern of observed deforestation and spatial variation in the benefits and costs of converting land to agriculture over that time period. We estimate that at an international carbon price of $10/tCO2e, a “mandatory incentive structure,” such as a cap-and-trade or symmetric tax-and-subsidy program, would have reduced emissions by 163–247 MtCO2e/y (20–31% below the without-REDD+ reference scenario), while generating a programmatic budget surplus. In contrast, a “basic voluntary incentive structure” modeled after a standard payment-for-environmental-services program would have reduced emissions nationally by only 45–76 MtCO2e/y (6–9%), while generating a programmatic budget shortfall. By making four policy improvements—paying for net emission reductions at the scale of an entire district rather than site-by-site; paying for reductions relative to reference levels that match business-as-usual levels; sharing a portion of district-level revenues with the national government; and sharing a portion of the national government's responsibility for costs with districts—an “improved voluntary incentive structure” would have been nearly as effective as a mandatory incentive structure, reducing emissions by 136–207 MtCO2e/y (17–26%) and generating a programmatic budget surplus. PMID:22232665

  8. International Microgrid Assessment. Governance, INcentives, and Experience (IMAGINE)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Marnay, Chris [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Zhou, Nan [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Qu, Min [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Romankiewicz, John [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2012-06-01

    Microgrids can provide an avenue for increasing the amount of distributed generation and delivery of electricity, where control is more dispersed and quality of service is locally tailored to end-use requirements. Much of this functionality is very different from the predominant utility model to date of centralized power production which is then transmitted and distributed across long distances with a uniform quality of service. This different functionality holds much promise for positive change, in terms of increasing reliability, energy efficiency, and renewable energy while decreasing and carbon emissions. All of these functions should provide direct cost savings for customers and utilities as well as positive externalities for society. As we have seen from the international experience, allowing microgrids to function in parallel with the grid requires some changes in electricity governance and incentives to capture cost savings and actively price in positive externalities. If China can manage to implement these governance changes and create those incentive policies, it will go beyond the establishment of a successful microgrid demonstration program and become an international leader in microgrid deployment.

  9. Managing Disease Risks from Trade: Strategic Behavior with Many Choices and Price Effects.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chitchumnong, Piyayut; Horan, Richard D

    2018-03-16

    An individual's infectious disease risks, and hence the individual's incentives for risk mitigation, may be influenced by others' risk management choices. If so, then there will be strategic interactions among individuals, whereby each makes his or her own risk management decisions based, at least in part, on the expected decisions of others. Prior work has shown that multiple equilibria could arise in this setting, with one equilibrium being a coordination failure in which individuals make too few investments in protection. However, these results are largely based on simplified models involving a single management choice and fixed prices that may influence risk management incentives. Relaxing these assumptions, we find strategic interactions influence, and are influenced by, choices involving multiple management options and market price effects. In particular, we find these features can reduce or eliminate concerns about multiple equilibria and coordination failure. This has important policy implications relative to simpler models.

  10. Photovoltaic power: the inadequate purchase price

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finon, D.

    2009-01-01

    The current policy of guaranteed purchase prices applied to photovoltaic power lacks rationality: prices are not graduated, commitment times are too long, there is no capping to capacity developed, subsidies (tax credit, direct subsidy, etc) are complex and give too favourable a return time. The lack of differentiation between products may also delay the emergence of new PV technologies. As a result, it is legitimate to envisage a cost/benefit analysis of future subsidies and to wonder about Frances ability, as a second rank player, to catch up with the leaders (Germany, Japan, United States). The report does not criticize policy based on purchase prices in itself: this is suitable or technology close to commercial operation in that it guarantees stable terms close to wholesale electricity market prices. It does, however, criticize adequacy in terms of less advanced PV technology, which results in purchase prices five times that of wind power. The report proposes re-targeting the system to take account of the significant stakes in PV power. Costly incentives for installing land PV cells and units should be quickly reduced, while industrial demonstration budgets deserve increases to further the development of new technologies (improved crystal silicon and thin layers). The demonstration phase and industrial development should be the primary focus, where a large part of potentially promising reductions in costs are likely to be achieved. (author)

  11. Blanket guarantee, deposit insurance, and risk-shifting incentive: evidence from Indonesia

    OpenAIRE

    Kariastanto, Bayu

    2011-01-01

    Indonesia established a deposit insurance system to maintain stability in its banking sector after the abolishment of blanket guarantees in 2005. Since the insurance premiums are fixed and flat, deposit insurance may create an incentive for banks to take more risks and transfer the risks to the deposit insurer. Using an option pricing based model of deposit insurance, we compute the fair deposit insurance premiums for all banks listed on the Indonesian stock exchange. We find evidence that ba...

  12. Impact of gender and personality traits on preferred pricing of public transport in rush hours

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Pavlicek, Antonin; Sudzina, Frantisek

    2017-01-01

    Price is an inherent part of marketing mix. It is used for multiple reasons, from skimming consumer's surplus to antimarketing. In public transport, higher prices are often used in rush hours. The logic is to give an incentive to customers to travel outside rush hours, thus more evenly distribute...... the load. But it is possible to argue that prices should be lower in rush hours because means of public transportation tend to be full, i.e. there is a lower comfort of travelling, possibly even taking longer to travel the same distance. It is also possible to argue that the prices should be the same all...

  13. Generating efficiency: The power of price caps in the public and private Spanish electricity sectors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arocena, P.; Price, C.W.

    1999-01-01

    Economic regulation of firms with market power has placed increasing emphasis on incentive-based regulation such as price caps. The move to such regulation often coincides with a change of ownership, making it difficult to separate the incentive effects. We focus on the effect of regulation alone by analysing the imposition of price cap type regulation on both publicly and privately owned Spanish electricity generators in 1988, several years before three was any change of ownership. Our initial results indicate that the publicly owned generators are generally more efficient than the private ones, but that the effect of price caps is to increase the efficiency of private sector plants faster than those in the public sector. We introduce two novelties into the analysis: we incorporate levels of CO2 and NOx emissions; and we include declared plant availability as an output. The outcome is dependent on the choice of inputs and outputs, and we argue that our measures are more appropriate than traditional measures for a system of central despatch for generators facing environmental constraints. (au) 37 refs

  14. Do follow-on therapeutic substitutes induce price competition between hospital medicines? Evidence from the Danish hospital sector

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hostenkamp, Gisela

    2013-01-01

    Objective The pricing of follow-on drugs, that offer only limited health benefits over existing therapeutic alternatives, is a recurring health policy debate. This study investigates whether follow-on therapeutic substitutes create price competition between branded hospital medicines. Methods New...... pioneer products were significantly reduced as a reaction to competition from follow-on drugs. Conclusion Competition between patented therapeutic substitutes did not seem to increase price competition and containment of pharmaceutical expenditures in the Danish hospital market. Strengthening hospitals......’ incentives to consider the price of alternative treatment options paired with a more active formulary management may increase price competition between therapeutic substitutes in the Danish hospital sector in the future....

  15. Incentive-compatible demand-side management for smart grids based on review strategies

    Science.gov (United States)

    Xu, Jie; van der Schaar, Mihaela

    2015-12-01

    Demand-side load management is able to significantly improve the energy efficiency of smart grids. Since the electricity production cost depends on the aggregate energy usage of multiple consumers, an important incentive problem emerges: self-interested consumers want to increase their own utilities by consuming more than the socially optimal amount of energy during peak hours since the increased cost is shared among the entire set of consumers. To incentivize self-interested consumers to take the socially optimal scheduling actions, we design a new class of protocols based on review strategies. These strategies work as follows: first, a review stage takes place in which a statistical test is performed based on the daily prices of the previous billing cycle to determine whether or not the other consumers schedule their electricity loads in a socially optimal way. If the test fails, the consumers trigger a punishment phase in which, for a certain time, they adjust their energy scheduling in such a way that everybody in the consumer set is punished due to an increased price. Using a carefully designed protocol based on such review strategies, consumers then have incentives to take the socially optimal load scheduling to avoid entering this punishment phase. We rigorously characterize the impact of deploying protocols based on review strategies on the system's as well as the users' performance and determine the optimal design (optimal billing cycle, punishment length, etc.) for various smart grid deployment scenarios. Even though this paper considers a simplified smart grid model, our analysis provides important and useful insights for designing incentive-compatible demand-side management schemes based on aggregate energy usage information in a variety of practical scenarios.

  16. Simulation of current pricing-tendencies in the German electricity market for private consumption

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mueller, Moritz; Sensfuss, Frank; Wietschel, Martin

    2007-01-01

    The German electricity market for private consumption is characterized by increasing prices and low participation of the consumers. This prompts us to investigate the interdependencies between the customers' engagement in the market and the suppliers' pricing strategies. Based on an analysis of the German retail market, an agent-based simulation model is developed. Whereas the behaviour of private customers is calibrated on field data, the suppliers learn to maximize profits with a feedback-learning heuristic. The simulation results show a tendency of rising prices, which are created without the assumption of tacit collusion among suppliers. We conclude that in Germany the current market pressure of private customers may not be a sufficient incentive for suppliers to lower electricity prices. (author)

  17. An incentive mechanism for electricity transmission expansion in Mexico

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rosellon, Juan [Division de Economia, Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (CIDE), Carret. Mexico-Toluca 3655, Lomas de Santa Fe, C.P. 01210, Mexico DF (Mexico)

    2007-05-15

    This study proposes an incentive regulatory framework for expanding electricity transmission in Mexico. A two-part pricing model is implemented within a combined merchant-regulatory structure. Three cases are considered. In the first, a monopolist with ''postage stamp tariffs'' serves the whole country using uniform prices. In the second case, one firm holds a regional monopoly in each of the five electricity areas. In the third, a monopolist operates in all areas of the national electricity system and discriminates in the prices it charges in each of the regions. This approach is described and then applied to the Mexican electricity transmission network. Using real data, the study compares all three cases in terms of profits, capacity increases, and network expansion. The results are found to depend on two effects: the ''economies-of-scale effect'', in which the maximum level is reached with a single network; and the ''discriminatory effect'' that results when a firm can discriminate among types of consumers. The economies-of-scale effect produces greater capacity and network expansion, whereas the discriminatory effect increases profits. (author)

  18. Process Innovation, Product Differentiation, and Channel Structure: Strategic Incentives in a Duopoly

    OpenAIRE

    Sudheer Gupta; Richard Loulou

    1998-01-01

    In this paper we analyze the joint implications of two effects: (a) inserting independent profit-maximizing retailers into the channel system provides “buffering” to the manufacturers from price competition when their products are highly substitutable and intrachannel contracts are observable (as shown by McGuire and Staelin 1983 under the assumption of constant marginal production costs), and, (b) lack of channel coordination results in a reduction in manufacturer's incentives to invest in e...

  19. Incentive Compatibility

    OpenAIRE

    Ledyard, John O.

    1987-01-01

    Incentive compatibility is described and discussed. A summary of the current state of understanding is provided. Key words are: incentive compatibility, game theory, implementation, mechanism, Bayes, Nash, and revelation.

  20. Is Historical Cost Accounting a Panacea? Market Stress, Incentive Distortions, and Gains Trading

    OpenAIRE

    Ellul, Andrew; Jotikasthira, Chotibhak; Lundblad, Christian T; Wang, Yihui

    2015-01-01

    This paper explores the trading incentives of financial institutions induced by the interaction between regulatory accounting rules and capital requirements by investigating insurance companies’ trading behavior during the recent financial crisis. According to insurance regulation, life insurers have a greater degree of flexibility to hold downgraded instruments at historical cost, whereas property and casualty insurers are forced to re-mark many of their downgraded securities to market price...

  1. Case Study on Incentive Mechanism of Energy Efficiency Retrofit in Coal-Fueled Power Plant in China

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yuan, Donghai; Guo, Xujing; Cao, Yuan; He, Liansheng; Wang, Jinggang; Xi, Beidou; Li, Junqi; Ma, Wenlin; Zhang, Mingshun

    2012-01-01

    An ordinary steam turbine retrofit project is selected as a case study; through the retrofit, the project activities will generate emission reductions within the power grid for about 92,463 tCO2e per annum. The internal rate of return (IRR) of the project is only −0.41% without the revenue of carbon credits, for example, CERs, which is much lower than the benchmark value of 8%. Only when the unit price of carbon credit reaches 125 CNY/tCO2, the IRR could reach the benchmark and an effective carbon tax needs to increase the price of carbon to 243 CNY/tce in order to make the project financially feasible. Design of incentive mechanism will help these low efficiency enterprises improve efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions, which can provide the power plants sufficient incentive to implement energy efficiency retrofit project in existing coal-fuel power generation-units, and we hope it will make a good demonstration for the other low efficiency coal-fueled power generation units in China. PMID:23365532

  2. Case Study on Incentive Mechanism of Energy Efficiency Retrofit in Coal-Fueled Power Plant in China

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Donghai Yuan

    2012-01-01

    Full Text Available An ordinary steam turbine retrofit project is selected as a case study; through the retrofit, the project activities will generate emission reductions within the power grid for about 92,463 tCO2e per annum. The internal rate of return (IRR of the project is only −0.41% without the revenue of carbon credits, for example, CERs, which is much lower than the benchmark value of 8%. Only when the unit price of carbon credit reaches 125 CNY/tCO2, the IRR could reach the benchmark and an effective carbon tax needs to increase the price of carbon to 243 CNY/tce in order to make the project financially feasible. Design of incentive mechanism will help these low efficiency enterprises improve efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions, which can provide the power plants sufficient incentive to implement energy efficiency retrofit project in existing coal-fuel power generation-units, and we hope it will make a good demonstration for the other low efficiency coal-fueled power generation units in China.

  3. Case study on incentive mechanism of energy efficiency retrofit in coal-fueled power plant in China.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Yuan, Donghai; Guo, Xujing; Cao, Yuan; He, Liansheng; Wang, Jinggang; Xi, Beidou; Li, Junqi; Ma, Wenlin; Zhang, Mingshun

    2012-01-01

    An ordinary steam turbine retrofit project is selected as a case study; through the retrofit, the project activities will generate emission reductions within the power grid for about 92,463 tCO(2)e per annum. The internal rate of return (IRR) of the project is only -0.41% without the revenue of carbon credits, for example, CERs, which is much lower than the benchmark value of 8%. Only when the unit price of carbon credit reaches 125 CNY/tCO(2), the IRR could reach the benchmark and an effective carbon tax needs to increase the price of carbon to 243 CNY/tce in order to make the project financially feasible. Design of incentive mechanism will help these low efficiency enterprises improve efficiency and reduce CO(2) emissions, which can provide the power plants sufficient incentive to implement energy efficiency retrofit project in existing coal-fuel power generation-units, and we hope it will make a good demonstration for the other low efficiency coal-fueled power generation units in China.

  4. Tax Incentives : Using Tax Incentives to Attract Foreign Direct Investment

    OpenAIRE

    Morisset, Jacques

    2003-01-01

    The increasing mobility of international firms and the gradual elimination of barriers to global capital flows have stimulated competition among governments to attract foreign direct investment, often through tax incentives. This note reviews the debate about the effectiveness of tax incentives, examining two much-contested questions: can tax incentives attract foreign investment? And what...

  5. Health, Wealth and the Price of Oil.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Evans, Robert G

    2016-05-01

    The correlation between health and wealth is arguably a very solidly established relationship. Yet that relationship may be reversing. Falling oil prices have raised (average) per capita incomes, worldwide. But from a long-run perspective they are a public health disaster. The latter is easy to see: low oil reduces the incentive to develop alternative energy sources and "bend the curve" of global warming. Their principal impact on incomes has been redistributional - Alberta and Russia lose, Ontario and Germany gain, etc. Zero net gain. But the price has fallen because technical progress in extracting American shale oil has forced the Saudis' hand. These efficiencies have real benefits for (average) incomes, but costs for long-run health. A compensating carbon tax is an obvious response. Copyright © 2016 Longwoods Publishing.

  6. Rationales for capacity remuneration mechanisms: Security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keppler, Jan Horst

    2017-01-01

    Economics so far provides little conceptual guidance on capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRM) in deregulated electricity markets. Ubiquitous in real-world electricity markets, CRMs are introduced country by country in an ad hoc manner, lacking the theoretical legitimacy and the conceptual coherence enabling comparability and coordination. They are eyed with suspicion by a profession wedded to a theoretical benchmark model that argues that competitive energy-only markets with VOLL pricing provide adequate levels of capacity. While the benchmark model is a consistent starting point for discussions about electricity market design, it ignores the two market failures that make CRMs the practically appropriate and theoretically justified policy response to capacity issues. First, energy-only markets fail to internalize security-of-supply externalities as involuntary curbs on demand under scarcity pricing generate social costs beyond the private non-consumption of electricity. Second, when demand is inelastic and the potential capacity additions are discretely sized, investors face asymmetric incentives and will underinvest at the margin rather than overinvest. After presenting the key features of the theoretical benchmark model, this paper conceptualizes security of supply externalities and asymmetric investment incentives and concludes with some consideration regarding design of CRMs. - Highlights: • Capacity remuneration mechanisms are ubiquitous in real-world electricity markets. • Theory claims that energy-only markets can provide optimal capacity on their own. • However theory fails to account for two types of market failures. • Involuntary demand curbs under VOLL-pricing create security-of-supply externalities. • With inelastic demand, discretely sized capacity options lead to underinvestment.

  7. Aligning ambition and incentives

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Koch, Alexander; Peyrache, Eloïc

    2011-01-01

    Labor turnover creates longer term career concerns incentives that motivate employees in addition to the short term monetary incentives provided by the current employer. We analyze how these incentives interact, and derive implications for the design of incentive contracts and organizational choice...

  8. Aligning Ambition and Incentives

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Koch, Alexander; Peyrache, Eloïc

    Labor turnover creates longer term career concerns incentives that motivate employees in addition to the short term monetary incentives provided by the current employer. We analyze how these incentives interact and derive implications for the design of incentive contracts and organizational choice...

  9. Impact of a Rewards-Based Incentive Program on Promoting Fruit and Vegetable Purchases

    Science.gov (United States)

    Phipps, Etienne J.; Braitman, Leonard E.; Stites, Shana D.; Singletary, S. Brook; Wallace, Samantha L.; Hunt, Lacy; Axelrod, Saul; Glanz, Karen; Uplinger, Nadine

    2015-01-01

    Objectives. We assessed the impact of a rewards-based incentive program on fruit and vegetable purchases by low-income families. Methods. We conducted a 4-phase prospective cohort study with randomized intervention and wait-listed control groups in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in December 2010 through October 2011. The intervention provided a rebate of 50% of the dollar amount spent on fresh or frozen fruit and vegetables, reduced to 25% during a tapering phase, then eliminated. Primary outcome measures were number of servings of fruit and of vegetables purchased per week. Results. Households assigned to the intervention purchased an average of 8 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.5, 16.9) more servings of vegetables and 2.5 (95% CI = 0.3, 9.5) more servings of fruit per week than did control households. In longitudinal price-adjusted analyses, when the incentive was reduced and then discontinued, the amounts purchased were similar to baseline. Conclusions. Investigation of the financial costs and potential benefits of incentive programs to supermarkets, government agencies, and other stakeholders is needed to identify sustainable interventions. PMID:24625144

  10. A problem of incentive compatibility in the North Sea petroleum industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kashani, Hossein A.

    2006-01-01

    The principal-agent relationship between the governments of the UK and Norway, and the multinational oil companies active in the North Sea petroleum industry is, to some extent, different from a typical principal-agent interaction. For almost three decades, the major criterion for allowing a company to take part in the activity was its previous and planned contribution to the domestic economy by means of applying the highest possible domestic inputs. This study applies mathematical modeling to show that the authorities had the opportunity to offer an incentive scheme to persuade the oil companies to involve domestic suppliers at the governments' preferred level. Unlike a typical government regulatory framework, which aims to increase efficiency in terms of price and/or quality, the incentive compatible scheme discussed in this paper could, in certain circumstances, generate inefficiency in the daily operation of the oil and gas fields

  11. Do Tax Incentives Affect Business Location? Evidence from State Film Incentives

    OpenAIRE

    Patrick Button

    2015-01-01

    I provide the first estimates of the impacts of recently-popular U.S. state film incentives on filming location, establishment location, and employment in the film industry. Filming in this industry is relatively insensitive to locational characteristics, and these incentives are numerous and strong, so this is a good case study to bound the effects of tax incentives on business location. I compile a detailed database of incentives across U.S. states, matching this with TV series and feature ...

  12. Pricing strategies for capitated delivery systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gruenberg, Leonard; Wallack, Stanley S.; Tompkins, Christopher P.

    1986-01-01

    This article discusses alternative methods for establishing a fairer pricing mechanism for Medicare recipients who enroll in health maintenance organizations and other competitive medical plans. The current method, based upon the adjusted average per capita cost, is inadequate because it fails to adjust premium levels for differences in health status; it establishes undesirable incentives that may lead to underservice, and it is tied to costs in the fee-for-service system. Alternative methods would incorporate health status, have Medicare share the risk with HMO's, and base payment on HMO experience. PMID:10311925

  13. Cost Conscious: Incentive and Discount Programs Help Students Meet the Rising Cost of a Community College Education

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ullman, Ellen

    2013-01-01

    Aware that rising costs could force some community colleges to compromise their long-standing open-door policies, administrators have put in place programs and incentives to offset the higher price of the average community college education. This article features ideas and programs to help struggling community colleges cope with rising costs such…

  14. Policy interactions, risk and price formation in carbon markets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Blyth, William; Bunn, Derek; Kettunen, Janne; Wilson, Tom

    2009-01-01

    Carbon pricing is an important mechanism for providing companies with incentives to invest in carbon abatement. Price formation in carbon markets involves a complex interplay between policy targets, dynamic technology costs, and market rules. Carbon pricing may under-deliver investment due to R and D externalities, requiring additional policies which themselves affect market prices. Also, abatement costs depend on the extent of technology deployment due to learning-by-doing. This paper introduces an analytical framework based on marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves with the aim of providing an intuitive understanding of the key dynamics and risk factors in carbon markets. The framework extends the usual static MAC representation of the market to incorporate policy interactions and some technology cost dynamics. The analysis indicates that supporting large-scale deployment of mature abatement technologies suppresses the marginal cost of abatement, sometimes to zero, whilst increasing total abatement costs. However, support for early stage R and D may reduce both total abatement cost and carbon price risk. An important aspect of the analysis is in elevating risk management considerations into energy policy formation, as the results of the stochastic modelling indicate wide distributions for the emergence of carbon prices and public costs around the policy expectations. (author)

  15. Productivity growth and price regulation of Slovenian water distribution utilities

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jelena Zorić

    2010-06-01

    Full Text Available This paper aims to analyse the price regulation method and performance of thewater industry in Slovenia. A stochastic cost frontier model is employed to estimate and decompose the total factor productivity (TFP growth of water distribution utilities in the 1997-2003 period. The main goal is to find out whether the lack of proper incentives to improve performance has resulted in the low TFP growth of Slovenian water distribution utilities. The evidence suggests that cost inefficiencies are present in water utilities, which indicates considerable cost saving potential in the analysed industry. Technical change is found to have positively affected the TFP growth over time, while cost inefficiency levels remained essentially unchanged. Overall, the average annual TFP growth in the analysed period is estimated to be only slightly above zero, which is a relatively poor result. This can largely be contributed to the present institutional and regulatory setting that does not stimulate utilities to improve productivity. Therefore, the introduction of an independent regulatory agency and an incentive-based price regulation scheme should be seriously considered in order to enhance the performance of Slovenian water distribution utilities.

  16. ANALYSIS OF SUPPLY RESPONSE AND PRICE RISK ON RICE PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Opeyemi Eyitayo Ayinde

    2017-03-01

    Full Text Available  Nigeria, like most African countries, has engaged in agricultural liberalization since 1986 in the hope that reforms emphasizing price incentives will encourage producers to respond. Thus far, the reforms seem to have introduced greater uncertainty into the market given increasing rates of price volatility. This study amongst other things therefore seeks to determine and model the responsiveness of rice supply to price risk in Nigeria. Statistical information on domestic and imported quantities of rice was obtained for 41 years (1970 to 2011 from various sources, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO database, Federal Ministry of Agriculture statistical bulletins, Central Bank of Nigeria statistical bulletins and National Bureau of Statistic (NBS. Data were analyzed using equilibrium output supply function, co-integration models, and vector autoregressive distributed lag model. Rice importation was statistically significant and changes in output were also responsive to changes in price. The results indicate that producers are more responsive not only to price and non-price factor but also to price risk and exchange rate. It is therefore imperative to reduce the effects of price risk as to increase the response of producer to supply by bridging the gap in production

  17. Grain price spikes and beggar-thy-neighbor policy responses

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Boysen, Ole; Jensen, Hans Grinsted

    on the agenda of various international policy fora, including the annual meetings of G20 countries in recent years. For that reason, recent studies have attempted to quantify the extent to which such policy actions contributed to the rise in food prices. A study by Jensen & Anderson (2014) uses the global AGE...... model GTAP and the corresponding database to quantify the global policy actions contributions to the raise in food prices by modeling the changes in distortions to agricultural incentives in the period 2006 to 2008. We link the results from this global model into a national AGE model, highlighting how...... global "Beggar-thy-Neighbor Policy Responses" impacted on poor households in Uganda. More specifically we examine the following research questions: What were the Ugandan economy-wide and poverty impacts of the price spikes? What was the impact of other countries "Beggar-thy-Neighbor Policy Responses...

  18. Prices vs. quantities. Incentives for renewable power generation. Numerical analysis for the European power market

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Nagl, Stephan

    2013-02-15

    In recent years, many countries have implemented policies to incentivize renewable power generation. This paper outlines the effects of weather uncertainty on investment and operation decisions of electricity producers under a feed-in tariff and renewable quota obligation. Furthermore, this paper tries to quantify the sectoral welfare and investments risks under the different policies. For this purpose, a spatial stochastic equilibrium model is introduced for the European electricity market. The numerical analysis suggests that including the electricity market price in renewable policies (wholesale price + x) reduces the loss of sectoral welfare due to a renewable policy by 11-20 %. Moreover, investors face an only slightly higher risk than under fixed price compensations. However, electricity producers face a substantially larger investment risk when introducing a renewable quota obligation without the option of banking and borrowing of green certificates. Given the scenario results, an integration of the hourly market price in renewable support mechanisms is mandatory to keep the financial burden to electricity consumers at a minimum. Additionally, following the discussion of a European renewable quota after 2020, the analysis indicates the importance of an appropriate banking and borrowing mechanism in light of stochastic wind and solar generation.

  19. Green pricing: Customer-oriented marketing of the electricity industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Weller, T.

    1998-01-01

    There are at present about 15 established projects launched by energy suppliers in Germany which deserve to be called ''green pricing'' marketing strategies, and about an equal number of further projects at various stages of development which also offer as a ''green'' incentive for customers electricity from renewable energy sources. Worldwide, there are about 50 established green pricing projects, offered primarily in the USA, Switzerland and the Netherlands, and in Germany. The targeted customers of these projects for the time being are exclusively households that cannot easily switch over to other than their local suppliers. It can be expected that with progressive market liberalisation in Great Britain, the USA and, finally, in Germany, competition for this customer group will rapidly increase the number of green pricing marketing projects in these countries. This is why the article here presents a thorough analysis of the specific features of green pricing contracts, their impact on enhanced development and application of the technology for electricity generation from renewables, and a forecast on future developments. (orig./CB) [de

  20. Effectiveness of unit-based pricing of waste in the Netherlands: Applying a general equilibrium model

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    van Beukering, P.J.H.; Bartelings, H.; Linderhof, V.G.M.; Oosterhuis, F.H.

    2009-01-01

    Differential and variable rates (DVR) in waste collection charging give a price incentive to households to reduce their waste and increase recycling. International empirical evidence confirms the effectiveness of DVR schemes, with limited unwanted side effects. In the Netherlands, currently some 20%

  1. Effectiveness of unit-based pricing of waste in the Netherlands: applying a general equilibrium model

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Beukering, van P.J.H.; Bartelings, H.; Linderhof, V.G.M.; Oosterhuis, F.H.

    2009-01-01

    Differential and variable rates (DVR) in waste collection charging give a price incentive to households to reduce their waste and increase recycling. International empirical evidence confirms the effectiveness of DVR schemes, with limited unwanted side effects. In the Netherlands, currently some 20%

  2. Uranium price formation. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-10-01

    The modern uranium industry came into existence in 1946. Until 1966, its sole customer was the Atomic Energy Commission, whose needs for U 3 O 8 relative to industry capacity declined over the years. The development of the commercial market after 1965 coincided with a period of excess capacity and falling nominal and real prices. Gradually in 1973 and dramatically thereafter, market conditions changed and prices rose as utilities sought larger quantities of U 3 O 8 and longer term contracts. Questions about availability of long-run supplies were raised, given the known reserve base. The response of the supply of U 3 O 8 to incentives offered first by the AEC and later by the utilities in the context of new and developing market conventions is examined. The methodology used is microeconomic analysis, qualitatively applied to the history of price formation in the market. Because the study emphasizes the implications of the history of uranium price formation for forecasting supply response, the study presents many different kinds of data and evaluates their quality and appropriateness for forecasting. A simple, very-useful framework for analyzing the history of the market for U 3 O 8 was developed and used to describe supply responses in selected important periods of the industry's development. It is concluded that the response of supply of U 3 O 8 to rising prices or to expectations of demand growth has been impressively strong. The potential reserve inventory is large enough to meet the needs for nuclear power generation through the end of this century. The price necessary to induce producers to find and produce these reserves is uncertain, partly because of problems inherent in estimating long-run supply curves and partly because recent inflation has created major uncertainties about the cost of future supplies

  3. Insufficient incentives for investment in electricity generations

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Neuhoff, K. [Cambridge University (United Kingdom). Dept. of Applied Economics; De Vries, L. [Delft University of Technology (Netherlands). Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management

    2004-12-01

    In theory, competitive electricity markets provide incentives for efficient investment in generation capacity. We show that if consumers and investors are risk averse, investment is efficient only if investors in generation capacity can sign long-term contracts with consumers. Otherwise the uncovered price risk increases financing costs, reduces equilibrium investment levels, distorts technology choice towards less capital-intensive generation and reduces consumer utility. We observe insufficient levels of long-term contracts in existing markets, possibly because retail companies are not credible counter-parties if their final customers can switch easily between them. With a consumer franchise, retailers can sign long-term contracts, but this solution comes at the expense of retail competition. Alternative capacity mechanisms to stimulate investment are discussed. (author)

  4. Russian natural gas exports-Will Russian gas price reforms improve the European security of supply?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sagen, Eirik Lund; Tsygankova, Marina

    2008-01-01

    In this paper we use both theoretical and numerical tools to study potential effects on Russian gas exports from different Russian domestic gas prices and production capacities in 2015. We also investigate whether a fully competitive European gas market may provide incentives for Gazprom, the dominant Russian gas company, to change its export behaviour. Our main findings suggest that both increased domestic gas prices and sufficient production capacities are vital to maintain Gazprom's market share in Europe over the next decade. In fact, Russia may struggle to carry out its current long-term export commitments if domestic prices are sufficiently low. At the same time, if Russian prices approach European net-back levels, Gazprom may reduce exports in favour of a relatively more profitable domestic market

  5. Photovoltaic Incentive Design Handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hoff, T. E.

    2006-12-01

    Investments in customer-owned grid-connected photovoltaic (PV) energy systems are growing at a steady pace. This is due, in part, to the availability of attractive economic incentives offered by public state agencies and utilities. In the United States, these incentives have largely been upfront lump payments tied to the system capacity rating. While capacity-based ''buydowns'' have stimulated the domestic PV market, they have been criticized for subsidizing systems with potentially poor energy performance. As a result, the industry has been forced to consider alternative incentive structures, particularly ones that pay based on long-term measured performance. The industry, however, lacks consensus in the debate over the tradeoffs between upfront incentive payments versus longer-term payments for energy delivery. This handbook is designed for agencies and utilities that offer or intend to offer incentive programs for customer-owned PV systems. Its purpose is to help select, design, and implement incentive programs that best meet programmatic goals. The handbook begins with a discussion of the various available incentive structures and then provides qualitative and quantitative tools necessary to design the most appropriate incentive structure. It concludes with program administration considerations.

  6. Incentives for cooperation in quality improvement among hospitals--the impact of the reimbursement system.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kesteloot, K; Voet, N

    1998-12-01

    Up to now, few analytical models have studied the incentives for cooperation in quality improvements among hospitals. Only those dealing with reimbursement systems have shown that, from the point of view of individual or competing hospitals, retrospective reimbursement is more likely to encourage quality improvements than prospective financing, while the reverse holds for efficiency improvements. This paper studies the incentives to improve the quality of hospital care, in an analytical model, taking into account the possibility of cooperative agreements, price besides non-price (quality) competition and quality improvements that may simultaneously increase demand, increase or reduce costs and spill over to rival hospitals. In this setting quality improvement efforts rise with the rate of prospective reimbursement, while the impact of the rate of retrospective reimbursement is ambiguous, but likely to be negative for quality improvements that are highly cost-reducting and create large spillovers. Cooperation may lead to more or less quality improvement than non-cooperative conduct, depending on the magnitude of spillovers and the degree of product market competition, relative to the net effect of quality on profits and the share of costs that is reimbursed retrospectively. Finally, the stability of cooperative agreements, supported by grim trigger strategies, is shown to depend upon exactly the opposite interaction between these factors.

  7. Capacity market design and renewable energy: Performance incentives, qualifying capacity, and demand curves

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Botterud, Audun; Levin, Todd; Byers, Conleigh

    2018-01-01

    A review of capacity markets in the United States in the context of increasing levels of variable renewable energy finds substantial differences with respect to incentives for operational performance, methods to calculate qualifying capacity for variable renewable energy and energy storage, and demand curves for capacity. The review also reveals large differences in historical capacity market clearing prices. The authors conclude that electricity market design must continue to evolve to achieve cost-effective policies for resource adequacy.

  8. The impact of federal incentives on the adoption of hybrid electric vehicles in the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jenn, Alan; Azevedo, Inês L.; Ferreira, Pedro

    2013-01-01

    Starting in 2004, the federal government in the United States offered several nationwide incentives to consumers to increase the adoption of hybrid electric vehicles. This study assesses the effectiveness of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in this regard using econometric methods and data between 2000 and 2010. Our model accounts for network externalities by using lagged sales as an independent variable. This approach helps to capture the exponential initial growth associated with the diffusion of new technologies and avoids overestimating the effect of the policy incentives. Our results show that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 increased the sales of hybrids from 3% to 20% depending on the vehicle model considered. In addition, we find that this incentive is only effective when the amount provided is sufficiently large. - Highlights: • We collected data on monthly car sales by vehicle model for 11 years. • Econometric methods are used to model vehicle sales. • Inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is employed to control for natural growth. • Direct monetary incentives are found to be statistically insignificant. • Macro-effects of unemployment and gas prices are important for vehicle sales

  9. Take the money and run? Redemption of a gift card incentive in a clinician survey.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chen, Jane S; Sprague, Brian L; Klabunde, Carrie N; Tosteson, Anna N A; Bitton, Asaf; Onega, Tracy; MacLean, Charles D; Harris, Kimberly; Schapira, Marilyn M; Haas, Jennifer S

    2016-02-24

    Clinician surveys provide critical information about many facets of health care, but are often challenging to implement. Our objective was to assess use by participants and non-participants of a prepaid gift card incentive that could be later reclaimed by the researchers if unused. Clinicians were recruited to participate in a mailed or online survey as part of a study to characterize women's primary health care provider attitudes towards breast and cervical cancer screening guidelines and practices (n = 177). An up-front incentive of a $50 gift card to a popular online retailer was included with the study invitation. Clinicians were informed that the gift card would expire if it went unused after 4 months. Outcome measures included use of gift cards by participants and non-participants and comparison of hypothetical costs of different incentive strategies. 63.5% of clinicians who responded to the survey used the gift card, and only one provider who didn't participate used the gift card (1.6%). Many of those who participated did not redeem their gift cards (36.5% of respondents). The price of the incentives actually claimed totaled $3700, which was less than half of the initial outlay. Since some of the respondents did not redeem their gift cards, the cost of incentives was less than it might have been if we had provided a conditional incentive of $50 to responders after they had completed the survey. Redeemable online gift card codes may provide an effective way to motivate clinicians to participate in surveys.

  10. Examination of incentive mechanisms for innovative technologies applicable to utility and nonutility power generators

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    McDermott, K.A. [Illinois Commerce Commission, Springfield, IL (United States); Bailey, K.A.; South, D.W. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States). Environmental Assessment and Information Sciences Div.

    1993-08-01

    Innovative technologies, built by either utility or nonutility power generators, have the potential to lower costs with less environmental emissions than conventional technologies. However, the public-good nature of information, along with uncertain costs, performance, and reliability, discourages rapid adoption of these technologies. The effect of regulation of electricity production may also have an adverse impact on motivation to innovate. Slower penetration of cleaner, more efficient technologies could result in greater levels of pollution, higher electricity prices, and a reduction in international competitiveness. Regulatory incentives could encourage adoption and deployment of innovative technologies of all kinds, inducting clean coal technologies. Such incentives must be designed to offset risks inherent in innovative technology and encourage cost-effective behavior. To evaluate innovative and conventional technologies equally, the incremental cost of risk (ICR) of adopting the innovative technology must be determined. Through the ICR, the magnitude of incentive required to make a utility (or nonutility) power generator equally motivated to use either conventional or innovative technologies can be derived. Two technology risks are examined: A construction risk, represented by a 15% cost overrun, and an operating risk, represented by a increased forced outage rate (decreased capacity factor). Different incentive mechanisms and measurement criteria are used to assess the effects of these risks on ratepayers and shareholders. In most cases, a regulatory incentive could offset the perceived risks while encouraging cost-effective behavior by both utility and nonutility power generators. Not only would the required incentive be recouped, but the revenue requirements would be less for the innovative technology; also, less environmental pollution would be generated. In the long term, ratepayers and society would benefit from innovative technologies.

  11. Pricing and tariffs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dyrelund, A.

    1993-01-01

    Danish suppliers of electricity and district heating are with a few exceptions either public utilities or cooperatives owned by consumers. The basic tariff regulations for electricity and heat in Denmark state that the tariff has to cover all costs and that only a reasonable interest of invested capital may be included in the tariff. Consequently, all profit has to be used to lower prices. For municipality-owned utilities the consumer prices would be the same if the consumers were the owners. It is typical for the district heating and electricity sector that the technical system, the organizations involved and the tariff levels show the same structure: Plants - transmission - distribution - consumer. E.g. the price of energy from the transmission system includes costs of plants and transmission, but not costs of distribution. Concerning energy saving measures in buildings it is important to note that energy saving measures should not be evaluated on the basis of saved GJ (Giga Joule) thermal energy and GJ electricity because the fuel energy consumption and the share of variable costs depend on the supply system. To find least-cost solutions to satisfy the basic demand for energy services, it is necessary to be aware of the whole chain of elements from fuel to services: fuel - plant - network - consumer installations - building envelope - services. The consumer tariff is the most important link between the supply systems and the buildings. A reasonably designed incentive tariff may work for least-cost solutions, whereas other tariffs may encourage a waste of resources, either waste of fuel energy or waste of investments. (AB)

  12. Incentives, health promotion and equality.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Voigt, Kristin

    2012-07-01

    The use of incentives to encourage individuals to adopt 'healthier' behaviours is an increasingly popular instrument in health policy. Much of the literature has been critical of 'negative' incentives, often due to concerns about equality; 'positive' incentives, however, have largely been welcomed as an instrument for the improvement of population health and possibly the reduction of health inequalities. The aim of this paper is to provide a more systematic assessment of the use of incentives from the perspective of equality. The paper begins with an overview of existing and proposed incentive schemes. I then suggest that the distinction between 'positive' and 'negative' incentives - or 'carrots' and 'sticks' - is of limited use in distinguishing those incentive schemes that raise concerns of equality from those that do not. The paper assesses incentive schemes with respect to two important considerations of equality: equality of access and equality of outcomes. While our assessment of incentive schemes will, ultimately, depend on various empirical facts, the paper aims to advance the debate by identifying some of the empirical questions we need to ask. The paper concludes by considering a number of trade-offs and caveats relevant to the assessment of incentive schemes.

  13. The effect of fossil energy and other environmental taxes on profit incentives for change in an open economy: Evidence from the UK

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Webster, Allan; Ayatakshi, Sukanya

    2013-01-01

    This paper argues that the underlying supply and demand analysis of fossil energy and other environmental taxes needs further elaboration when a country (a) introduces national fossil energy or environmental taxes and (b) is open to international trade at given world prices. We provide evidence that such conditions are plausible for many sectors in the UK. A key implication is that the short run effects of such taxes should not be felt in final good prices, since these are determined in world markets, but in terms of underlying profitability. These changes in underlying profits provide two key incentives for producers—to change to more environmentally friendly production techniques and to switch resources to production of less environmentally harmful goods. Using input—output techniques we provide evidence for the UK to show how existing fossil energy and other “green” taxes have affected underlying profitability. The evidence shows quite strong profit incentives to shift resources from a small number of energy intensive industries to others. - Highlights: • Energy taxes affect profits more than prices for sectors trading at world prices. • This study suggests that many sectors in the UK satisfy these conditions. • Our evidence suggests that few sectors are strongly affected by energy taxes. • Energy taxes have a strong effect relative to other possible environmental taxes

  14. Evaluating the impact of three incentive programs on the economics of cofiring willow biomass with coal in New York State

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tharakan, P.J.; Volk, T.A.; Lindsey, C.A.; Abrahamson, L.P.; White, E.H.

    2005-01-01

    Plantations of fast-growing willow shrubs are being promoted as a source quality biomass feedstock for bioenergy and bioproducts in New York State (NY). In the near-term, cofiring of the feedstock--in combination with other woody biomass--with coal in existing utility power boilers is considered to be the most promising conversion method for energy generation. Despite the clear technological viability and associated environmental benefits, cofiring of willow has not been widely adopted. The relatively high production cost of the willow feedstock, which is over twice that of coal, is the primary reason for this lack of interest. Taxes that account for some of the social costs of using coal and/or incentives that appropriate value for some of the social benefits of using willow are essential for eliminating most or the entire current price differential. This paper presents an integrated analysis of the economics of power generation from cofiring willow biomass feedstock with coal, from the perspective of the grower, aggregator and the power plant. Emphasis is placed on analyzing the relative impact of a green premium price, a closed-loop biomass tax credit, and payments to growers under the proposed Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) harvesting exemption policy. The CRP payments reduced the delivered cost of willow by 36-35%, to $1.90 GJ -1 and $1.70 GJ -1 , under current and increased yield conditions, respectively. These prices are still high, relative to coal. Other incentives are required to ensure commercial viability. The required levels of green premium price (0.4-1.0 cents kWh -1 ) and biomass tax credit (0.75-2.4 cents kWh -1 ) vary depending on whether the incentives were being applied by themselves or in combination, and whether current yield or potential increased yields were being considered. In the near term, cofiring willow biomass and coal can be an economically viable option for power generation in NY if the expected overall beneficial effects

  15. Incentive delegation and collusion

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Mukherjee, A.

    2000-01-01

    In an infinitely repeated duopoly the implications of strategic incentive delegation are shown. Whether incentive delegation makes consumers or producers better-off depends on the nature of competition. WeThe presence or absence of incentive delegation may affect the interests of the consumers and

  16. Feasibility and attractiveness of indication value-based pricing in key EU countries.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Flume, Mathias; Bardou, Marc; Capri, Stefano; Sola-Morales, Oriol; Cunningham, David; Levin, Lars-Ake; Touchot, Nicolas

    2016-01-01

    Indication value-based pricing (IBP) has been proposed in the United States as a tool to capture the differential value of drugs across indications or patient groups and is in the early phases of implementation. In Europe, no major country has experimented with IBP or is seriously discussing its use. We assessed how the reimbursement and pricing environment allows for IBP in seven European countries, evaluating both incentives and hurdles. In price setting countries such as France and Germany, the Health Technology Assessment and pricing process already accounts for differences of value across indications. In countries where differential value drives coverage decisions such as the United Kingdom and Sweden, IBP is likely to be used, at least partially, but not in the short-term. Italy is already achieving some form of differential value through managed entry agreements, whereas in Spain the electronic prescription system provides the infrastructure necessary for IBP but other hurdles exist.

  17. Wind and solar energy incentives in Iran

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Taleghani, G.; Kazemi Karegar, H.

    2006-01-01

    Incentive have yet been viewed as a means of supporting technological developments until a new technology becomes cost competitive wind based electricity is not jet generally competitive with alternate sources of electricity such as fossil fuels. This paper presents the potential for wind and solar in Iran and shows how much electric energy is now produced by renewable power plants compared to steam and gas. The importance of renewable energy effects on Iran environment and economy is also discussed and the issue of the contribution of renewable energy for producing electricity in the future will be shown. Also this paper highlights the ability of Iran to manufacture the components of the wind turbine and solar system locally, and its effect on the price of wind turbine and solar energy

  18. The influence of financial incentives and other socio-economic factors on electric vehicle adoption

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sierzchula, William; Bakker, Sjoerd; Maat, Kees; Wee, Bert van

    2014-01-01

    Electric vehicles represent an innovation with the potential to lower greenhouse gas emissions and help mitigate the causes of climate change. However, externalities including the appropriability of knowledge and pollution abatement result in societal/economic benefits that are not incorporated in electric vehicle prices. In order to address resulting market failures, governments have employed a number of policies. We seek to determine the relationship of one such policy instrument (consumer financial incentives) to electric vehicle adoption. Based on existing literature, we identified several additional socio-economic factors that are expected to be influential in determining electric vehicle adoption rates. Using multiple linear regression analysis, we examined the relationship between those variables and 30 national electric vehicle market shares for the year 2012. The model found financial incentives, charging infrastructure, and local presence of production facilities to be significant and positively correlated to a country's electric vehicle market share. Results suggest that of those factors, charging infrastructure was most strongly related to electric vehicle adoption. However, descriptive analysis suggests that neither financial incentives nor charging infrastructure ensure high electric vehicle adoption rates. - Highlights: • This research analyzes electric vehicle adoption of 30 countries in 2012. • Financial incentives and charging infrastructure were statistically significant factors. • Country-specific factors help to explain diversity in national adoption rates. • Socio-demographic variables e.g., income and education level were not significant

  19. Financial incentives to promote renewable energy systems in European electricity markets: a survey

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haas, R.; Huber, C.; Wohlgemuth, N.

    2001-01-01

    Renewable energy systems may contribute to sustainable development. Therefore, one of the challenges for energy policy is to ensure that renewable energy options have a fair opportunity to compete with other supply resources. This paper presents a survey on promotion mechanisms to enhance the market penetration of renewable energies in European electricity markets. Strategies include rebates and tax incentives, regulated rates, system benefit charges, bidding-oriented mechanisms and various types of green pricing programs. The paper concludes that efficient promotion mechanisms should focus on incentives per kWh generated rather than on rebates on the investment in generating capacity (kW), and that there is no one single program type which has the best application to the promotion of all renewable technologies. For example, enhanced buy-back rates work as a dissemination strategy for wind energy but they do not work for photovoltaics. (author)

  20. Russian gas price reform and the EU-Russia gas relationship: Incentives, consequences and European security of supply

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Spanjer, Aldo

    2007-01-01

    In order to provide a comprehensive picture on the relationship between Russia and the EU, the focus should be on both the external energy relationship as well as Russia's internal organization. This paper sets out to do this by combining both strands of research in order to arrive at recommendations for Europe on the way to adjust its energy policy towards Russia. The emphasis is on whether or not Russia should impose unified gas pricing. Main conclusions are that the perceived advantages of unified Russian gas pricing to Russia as well as Europe are in fact overstated and that EU security of supply might worsen under unified gas prices. Three policy recommendations are that EU policy should (1) more explicitly acknowledge the interdependence between Russia and Europe; (2) not push Russia towards unified gas pricing; and (3) not take for granted any increase in Russian exports flowing to Europe

  1. The Theory of Value-Based Payment Incentives and Their Application to Health Care.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Conrad, Douglas A

    2015-12-01

    To present the implications of agency theory in microeconomics, augmented by behavioral economics, for different methods of value-based payment in health care; and to derive a set of future research questions and policy recommendations based on that conceptual analysis. Original literature of agency theory, and secondarily behavioral economics, combined with applied research and empirical evidence on the application of those principles to value-based payment. Conceptual analysis and targeted review of theoretical research and empirical literature relevant to value-based payment in health care. Agency theory and secondarily behavioral economics have powerful implications for design of value-based payment in health care. To achieve improved value-better patient experience, clinical quality, health outcomes, and lower costs of care-high-powered incentives should directly target improved care processes, enhanced patient experience, and create achievable benchmarks for improved outcomes. Differing forms of value-based payment (e.g., shared savings and risk, reference pricing, capitation, and bundled payment), coupled with adjunct incentives for quality and efficiency, can be tailored to different market conditions and organizational settings. Payment contracts that are "incentive compatible"-which directly encourage better care and reduced cost, mitigate gaming, and selectively induce clinically efficient providers to participate-will focus differentially on evidence-based care processes, will right-size and structure incentives to avoid crowd-out of providers' intrinsic motivation, and will align patient incentives with value. Future research should address the details of putting these and related principles into practice; further, by deploying these insights in payment design, policy makers will improve health care value for patients and purchasers. © Health Research and Educational Trust.

  2. Cue-Elicited Increases in Incentive Salience for Marijuana: Craving, Demand, and Attentional Bias

    Science.gov (United States)

    Metrik, Jane; Aston, Elizabeth R.; Kahler, Christopher W.; Rohsenow, Damaris J.; McGeary, John E.; Knopik, Valerie S.; MacKillop, James

    2016-01-01

    Background Incentive salience is a multidimensional construct that includes craving, drug value relative to other reinforcers, and implicit motivation such as attentional bias to drug cues. Laboratory cue reactivity (CR) paradigms have been used to evaluate marijuana incentive salience with measures of craving, but not with behavioral economic measures of marijuana demand or implicit attentional processing tasks. Methods This within-subjects study used a new CR paradigm to examine multiple dimensions of marijuana’s incentive salience and to compare CR-induced increases in craving and demand. Frequent marijuana users (N=93, 34% female) underwent exposure to neutral cues then to lit marijuana cigarettes. Craving, marijuana demand via a marijuana purchase task, and heart rate were assessed after each cue set. A modified Stroop task with cannabis and control words was completed after the marijuana cues as a measure of attentional bias. Results Relative to neutral cues, marijuana cues significantly increased subjective craving and demand indices of intensity (i.e., drug consumed at $0) and Omax (i.e., peak drug expenditure). Elasticity significantly decreased following marijuana cues, reflecting sustained purchase despite price increases. Craving was correlated with demand indices (r’s: 0.23–0.30). Marijuana users displayed significant attentional bias for cannabis-related words after marijuana cues. Cue-elicited increases in intensity were associated with greater attentional bias for marijuana words. Conclusions Greater incentive salience indexed by subjective, behavioral economic, and implicit measures was observed after marijuana versus neutral cues, supporting multidimensional assessment. The study highlights the utility of a behavioral economic approach in detecting cue-elicited changes in marijuana incentive salience. PMID:27515723

  3. Why do Economic Instruments Fail? The role of Water trading and Pricing at a River Basin Scale

    Science.gov (United States)

    Pérez-Blanco, C. D.; Gomez, C.; Loch, A. J.; Adamson, D. C.

    2016-12-01

    Water management problems stem from the mismatch between a multitude of individual decisions, on the one hand, and the current and projected status of water resources, on the other. Economics provides valuable information on the incentives that drive individual decisions and can be used to design instruments that address the problem. Yet, proposals from economists regarding instruments like water pricing or trading are mostly based upon basic and general principles of welfare economics that are not straightaway applicable to assets as complex as water. For example, while water markets clearly serve to the parts directly involved in the transaction, the unique characteristics of water often leads to Pareto inefficient allocations that affect the environment and related economic uses. The flaw in this approach lies in the understanding that water prices and water trading schemes may be good or bad on their own (e.g. finding the "right" price). This vision changes radically when we focus on the problem, instead of the instrument. In this case addressing water management challenges is equivalent to making the multitude of decisions people do about water compatible with collective water governance goals such as curbing degradation trends or building water security for the future. These ideas provide both the basis for assessing existing incentives such as pricing and trading schemes and reshaping economic instruments to serve the objectives of an integrated water resources management.

  4. Take the money and run? Redemption of a gift card incentive in a clinician survey

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Jane S. Chen

    2016-02-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Clinician surveys provide critical information about many facets of health care, but are often challenging to implement. Our objective was to assess use by participants and non-participants of a prepaid gift card incentive that could be later reclaimed by the researchers if unused. Methods Clinicians were recruited to participate in a mailed or online survey as part of a study to characterize women’s primary health care provider attitudes towards breast and cervical cancer screening guidelines and practices (n = 177. An up-front incentive of a $50 gift card to a popular online retailer was included with the study invitation. Clinicians were informed that the gift card would expire if it went unused after 4 months. Outcome measures included use of gift cards by participants and non-participants and comparison of hypothetical costs of different incentive strategies. Results 63.5 % of clinicians who responded to the survey used the gift card, and only one provider who didn’t participate used the gift card (1.6 %. Many of those who participated did not redeem their gift cards (36.5 % of respondents. The price of the incentives actually claimed totaled $3700, which was less than half of the initial outlay. Since some of the respondents did not redeem their gift cards, the cost of incentives was less than it might have been if we had provided a conditional incentive of $50 to responders after they had completed the survey. Conclusions Redeemable online gift card codes may provide an effective way to motivate clinicians to participate in surveys.

  5. Estimating the price elasticity for demand for electricity by sector in South Africa

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Roula Inglesi-Lotz

    2011-12-01

    Full Text Available This paper analyses electricity consumption patterns in South Africa in an attempt to understand and identify the roots of the current electricity crisis. This is done by investigating various economic sectors’ responses to price changes using panel data for the period 1993–2004. Positive and statistically significant price elasticities over this period were found for the transport (rail and commercial sectors while there are positive, but small and statistically insignificant responses to price changes in the agriculture and mining sectors. Only the industrial sector responded to changes in electricity prices according to theory, namely illustrating negative demand elasticities. This sector, however, dominates electricity consumption resulting in aggregate demand elasticities that are negative. These results explain, in part, the current electricity crisis. Given the historic low level of electricity prices in conjunction with, on the whole, a real price decline, i.e. price increases lower than the inflation rate; there was no major incentive to reduce electricity consumption and/or to be efficient. This result supports the notion that prices do have an important signalling effect in the economy. Hence, the electricity prices should be considered not only from an economic growth or social vantage point, but also from a supply and technocratic perspective, which includes environmental factors such as CO2-emissions. Prices should not be determined without considering the system-wide implications thereof.

  6. Drug plan design incentives among Medicare prescription drug plans.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Huskamp, Haiden A; Keating, Nancy L; Dalton, Jesse B; Chernew, Michael E; Newhouse, Joseph P

    2014-07-01

    Medicare Advantage prescription drug plans (MA-PDs) and standalone prescription drug plans (PDPs) face different incentives for plan design resulting from the scope of covered benefits (only outpatient drugs for PDPs versus all drug and nondrug services for Medicare Advantage [MA]/MA-PDs). The objective is to begin to explore how MA-PDs and PDPs may be responding to their different incentives related to benefit design. We compared 2012 PDP and MA-PD average formulary coverage, prior authorization (PA) or step therapy use, and copayment requirements for drugs in 6 classes used commonly among Medicare beneficiaries. We primarily used 2012 Prescription Drug Plan Formulary and Pharmacy Network Files and MA enrollment data. 2011 Truven Health MarketScan claims were used to estimate drug prices and to compute drug market share. Average coverage and PA/step rates, and average copayment requirements, were weighted by plan enrollment and drug market share. MA-PDs are generally more likely to cover and less likely to require PA/step for brand name drugs with generic alternatives than PDPs, and MA-PDs often have lower copayment requirements for these drugs. For brands without generics, we generally found no differences in average rates of coverage or PA/step, but MA-PDs were more likely to cover all brands without generics in a class. We found modest, confirmatory evidence suggesting that PDPs and MA-PDs respond to different incentives for plan design. Future research is needed to understand the factors that influence Medicare drug plan design decisions.

  7. Using Priced Options to Solve the Exposure Problem in Sequential Auctions

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mous, Lonneke; Robu, Valentin; La Poutré, Han

    This paper studies the benefits of using priced options for solving the exposure problem that bidders with valuation synergies face when participating in multiple, sequential auctions. We consider a model in which complementary-valued items are auctioned sequentially by different sellers, who have the choice of either selling their good directly or through a priced option, after fixing its exercise price. We analyze this model from a decision-theoretic perspective and we show, for a setting where the competition is formed by local bidders, that using options can increase the expected profit for both buyers and sellers. Furthermore, we derive the equations that provide minimum and maximum bounds between which a synergy buyer's bids should fall in order for both sides to have an incentive to use the options mechanism. Next, we perform an experimental analysis of a market in which multiple synergy bidders are active simultaneously.

  8. Boom or bust : developing countries' rough ride on the commodity price rollercoaster

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, O.; Gibson, J.

    2006-10-01

    Current high commodity prices are driven by strong demand from the emerging economies of China and India in addition to high consumption in the United States. Many developing countries are experiencing massive windfall revenues from high commodity prices. However, commodity prices are highly volatile in the short term, and can vary as much as 50 per cent in a single year. While developed country producers are supported by subsidies and social safety nets, developing countries and smallholder producers feel the extent of commodity price volatility more directly. Many developing countries are becoming locked into the production and export of primary commodities whose volatile prices are declining over the long term, and over which they have very little control. Price volatility makes sound fiscal planning difficult for both countries and producers. Price booms and busts also drive social inequalities, livelihood inequalities, and corruption. Price swings can cause conflict over valuable land and resources, and does not create incentives for sound environmental stewardship. This paper described the impacts of commodity price volatility in developing countries with the aim of promoting discussion about what can be done to help stabilize revenues for countries as well as producers. Price trends and their importance were reviewed, and the theoretical benefits of liberalized commodity markets were examined. Previous attempts to stabilize commodity prices were reviewed. It was concluded that the best long-term solution to the commodity price problem is economic diversification. Recommendations for promoting economic diversification were provided. 43 refs., 1 tab., 2 figs

  9. Electrical markets, energy security and technology diversification: nuclear as cover against gas and carbon price risks?

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roques, F.A.; Newbery, D.M.; Nuttall, W.J.; Neufville, R. de

    2005-01-01

    Recent tension in the oil and gas markets has brought back the concept of energy offer diversification. Electrical production technology diversification in a country helps improve the security of supply and make up for the negative effects of hydrocarbons price variations. The portfolio and real options theories help to quantify the optimum diversification level for a country or a power company. The cover value of a nuclear investment for a power company facing cost uncertainties (price of gas and of carbon dioxide emission permit) and proceeds (price of electricity) is assessed. A strong link between the prices of gas and electricity reduces incentives to private producers to diversify, disputing the capacity of a liberalized electrical market to achieve optimum technology diversity from a domestic point of view. (authors)

  10. Rise of oil prices and energy policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2005-01-01

    This document reprints the talk of the press conference given by D. de Villepin, French prime minister, on August 16, 2005 about the alarming rise of oil prices. In his talk, the prime minister explains the reasons of the crisis (increase of worldwide consumption, political tensions in the Middle East..) and presents the strategy and main trends of the French energy policy: re-launching of energy investments in petroleum refining capacities and in the nuclear domain (new generation of power plants), development of renewable energy sources and in particular biofuels, re-launching of the energy saving policy thanks to financial incentives and to the development of clean vehicles and mass transportation systems. In a second part, the prime minister presents his policy of retro-cession of petroleum tax profits to low income workers, and of charge abatement to professionals having an occupation strongly penalized by the rise of oil prices (truckers, farmers, fishermen, taxi drivers). (J.S.)

  11. Do ultra-orphan medicinal products warrant ultra-high prices? A review

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Picavet E

    2013-06-01

    Full Text Available Eline Picavet,1 David Cassiman,2 Steven Simoens1 1Department of Pharmaceutical and Pharmacological Sciences, KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium; 2Department of Hepatology, University Hospital Leuven, Leuven, Belgium Abstract: Ultra-orphan medicinal products (ultra-OMPs are intended for the treatment, prevention, or diagnosis of ultra-rare diseases, ie, life-threatening or chronically debilitating diseases that affect less than one per 50,000 individuals. Recently, high prices for ultra-OMPs have given rise to debate on the sustainability and justification of these prices. The aim of this article is to review the international scientific literature on the pricing of ultra-OMPs and to provide an overview of the current knowledge on the drivers of ultra-OMP pricing. The pricing process of ultra-OMPs is a complex and nontransparent issue. Evidence in the literature seems to indicate that ultra-OMPs are priced according to rarity and what the manufacturer believes the market will bear. Additionally, there appears to be a trend between the price of an ultra-OMP and the number of available alternatives. Patients, third-party payers, and pharmaceutical companies could benefit from more transparent pricing strategies. With a view to containing health care costs, it is likely that cost-sharing strategies, such as performance-based risk sharing arrangements, will become increasingly more important. However, it is vital that any measures for price control are consistent with the intended goals of the incentives to promote the development of new OMPs. Ideally, a balance must be struck between attaining affordable prices for ultra-OMPs and securing a realistic return on investment for the pharmaceutical industry. Keywords: ultra-orphan medicinal product, ultra-rare disease, pricing

  12. Incentive-based demand response programs designed by asset-light retail electricity providers for the day-ahead market

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fotouhi Ghazvini, Mohammad Ali; Faria, Pedro; Ramos, Sergio; Morais, Hugo; Vale, Zita

    2015-01-01

    Following the deregulation experience of retail electricity markets in most countries, the majority of the new entrants of the liberalized retail market were pure REP (retail electricity providers). These entities were subject to financial risks because of the unexpected price variations, price spikes, volatile loads and the potential for market power exertion by GENCO (generation companies). A REP can manage the market risks by employing the DR (demand response) programs and using its' generation and storage assets at the distribution network to serve the customers. The proposed model suggests how a REP with light physical assets, such as DG (distributed generation) units and ESS (energy storage systems), can survive in a competitive retail market. The paper discusses the effective risk management strategies for the REPs to deal with the uncertainties of the DAM (day-ahead market) and how to hedge the financial losses in the market. A two-stage stochastic programming problem is formulated. It aims to establish the financial incentive-based DR programs and the optimal dispatch of the DG units and ESSs. The uncertainty of the forecasted day-ahead load demand and electricity price is also taken into account with a scenario-based approach. The principal advantage of this model for REPs is reducing the risk of financial losses in DAMs, and the main benefit for the whole system is market power mitigation by virtually increasing the price elasticity of demand and reducing the peak demand. - Highlights: • Asset-light electricity retail providers subject to financial risks. • Incentive-based demand response program to manage the financial risks. • Maximizing the payoff of electricity retail providers in day-ahead market. • Mixed integer nonlinear programming to manage the risks

  13. Impacts of Transitioning from Firm Fixed Price to Fixed Price Incentive Firm Target Contracts in PEO Missiles and Space

    Science.gov (United States)

    2016-09-01

    this graph, the Defense Index recognized lower operating margins than S&P indices for capital goods, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology , technical...Research Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22942.pdf Frick, D. (2013). Risk in fixed-price contracts. Defense AT&L Magazine . November...Joint_Light_Tactical_Vehicle Kendall, F. (2011). Better Buying Power special issue foreword. Defense AT&L Magazine . September-October 2011. Retrieved from http://www.dau.mil

  14. How tobacco companies ensure prime placement of their advertising and products in stores: interviews with retailers about tobacco company incentive programmes.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Feighery, E C; Ribisl, K M; Clark, P I; Haladjian, H H

    2003-06-01

    About 81% of cigarette manufacturers' marketing expenditures in the USA is spent to promote cigarette sales in stores. Relatively little is known about how these expenditures help the manufacturers achieve their marketing goals in stores. A better understanding of how tobacco companies influence the retail environment would help researchers and tobacco control activists to monitor industry presence in stores. To describe the types of tobacco company incentive programmes offered to retailers, how these programmes impact the store environments, and possible visual indicators of retailer participation in incentive programmes. In-depth qualitative interviews with a convenience sample of 29 tobacco retailers were conducted in 2001. USA. The types and requirements of retailer incentive programmes provided by tobacco companies, and how participation in a programme alters their stores. The retailers provided insights into how tobacco companies convey promotional allowances and special offers to them and how these incentives shape the retail environment. Retailers noted that tobacco companies exert substantial control over their stores by requiring placement of products in the most visible locations, and of specific amounts and types of advertising in prime locations in the store. Retailers also described how tobacco companies reduce prices by offering them volume based discounts, "buy two, get one free" specials, and "buying down" the price of existing product. Tobacco companies are concentrating their marketing dollars at the point-of-sale to the extent that the store is their primary communication channel with customers. As a result, all shoppers regardless of age or smoking status are exposed to pro-smoking messages. Given the financial resources spent by tobacco companies in stores, this venue warrants closer scrutiny by researchers and tobacco control advocates.

  15. Team incentives in relational contracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kvaloey, Ola

    2003-01-01

    Incentive schemes for teams are compared. I ask: under which conditions are relational incentive contracts based on joint performance evaluation, relative performance evaluation and independent performance evaluation self-enforceable. The framework of Che and Yoo (2001) on team incentives is combined with the framework of Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) on relational contracts. In a repeated game between one principal and two agents, I find that incentives based on relative or independent performance are expected to dominate when the productivity of effort is high, while joint performance evaluation dominates when productivity is low. Incentives based on independent performance are more probable if the agents own critical assets. (author)

  16. A distributed incentive compatible pricing mechanism for P2P networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Zhang, Jie; Zhao, Zheng; Xiong, Xiao; Shi, Qingwei

    2007-09-01

    Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems are currently receiving considerable interest. However, as experience with P2P networks shows, the selfish behaviors of peers may lead to serious problems of P2P network, such as free-riding and white-washing. In order to solve these problems, there are increasing considerations on reputation system design in the study of P2P networks. Most of the existing works is concerning probabilistic estimation or social networks to evaluate the trustworthiness for a peer to others. However, these models can not be efficient all the time. In this paper, our aim is to provide a general mechanism that can maximize P2P networks social welfare in a way of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves family, while assuming every peer in P2P networks is rational and selfish, which means they only concern about their own outcome. This mechanism has some desirable properties using an O(n) algorithm: (1) incentive compatibility, every peer truly report its connection type; (2) individually rationality; and (3) fully decentralized, we design a multiple-principal multiple-agent model, concerning about the service provider and service requester individually.

  17. Mergers, managerial incentives, and efficiencies

    OpenAIRE

    Jovanovic, Dragan

    2014-01-01

    We analyze the effects of synergies from horizontal mergers in a Cournot oligopoly where principals provide their agents with incentives to cut marginal costs prior to choosing output. We stress that synergies come at a cost which possibly leads to a countervailing incentive effect: The merged firm's principal may be induced to stifle managerial incentives in order to reduce her agency costs. Whenever this incentive effect dominates the well-known direct synergy effect, synergies actually red...

  18. An analysis of residential PV system price differences between the United States and Germany

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Seel, Joachim; Barbose, Galen L.; Wiser, Ryan H.

    2014-01-01

    Residential photovoltaic (PV) systems were twice as expensive in the United States as in Germany (median of $5.29/W vs. $2.59/W) in 2012. This price discrepancy stems primarily from differences in non-hardware or “soft” costs between the two countries, which can only in part be explained by differences in cumulative market size and associated learning. A survey of German PV installers was deployed to collect granular data on PV soft costs in Germany, and the results are compared to those of a similar survey of U.S. PV installers. Non-module hardware costs and all analyzed soft costs are lower in Germany, especially for customer acquisition, installation labor, and profit/overhead costs, but also for expenses related to permitting, interconnection, and inspection procedures. Additional costs occur in the United States due to state and local sales taxes, smaller average system sizes, and longer project-development times. To reduce the identified additional costs of residential PV systems, the United States could introduce policies that enable a robust and lasting market while minimizing market fragmentation. Regularly declining incentives offering a transparent and certain value proposition—combined with simple interconnection, permitting, and inspection requirements—might help accelerate PV cost reductions in the United States. - Highlights: • Residential PV system prices are twice as high in the USA than in Germany in 2012. • Different cumulative national PV market sizes explain only 35% of price gap. • Installer surveys show that price differences stem from non-module and soft costs. • Largest cost differences stem from customer acquisition and installation labor. • Incentives in the US are less effective in driving and following cost reductions

  19. Winds of change: How high wind penetrations will affect investment incentives in the GB electricity sector

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Steggals, Will; Gross, Robert; Heptonstall, Philip

    2011-01-01

    Wind power is widely expected to expand rapidly in Britain over the next decade. Large amounts of variable wind power on the system will increase market risks, with prices more volatile and load factors for conventional thermal plant lower and more uncertain. This extra market risk may discourage investment in generation capacity. Financial viability for thermal plant will be increasingly dependent on price spikes during periods of low wind. Increased price risk will also make investment in other forms of low-carbon generation (e.g. nuclear power) more challenging. A number of policies can reduce the extent to which generators are exposed to market risks and encourage investment. However, market risks play a fundamental role in shaping efficient investment and dispatch patterns in a liberalised market. Therefore, measures to improve price signals and market functioning (such as a stronger carbon price and developing more responsive demand) are desirable. However, the scale of the investment challenge and increased risk mean targeted measures to reduce (although not eliminate) risk exposure, such as capacity mechanisms and fixed price schemes, may have increasing merit. The challenge for policy is to strike the right balance between market and planned approaches. - Research highlights: → Analyses how increases penetrations of wind power effect electricity market functioning. → Assesses the impacts of this on investment incentives for different technologies. → Discusses implications for policy and market design.

  20. Incentives and technologies for improving irrigation water use efficiency

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bruggeman, Adriana; Djuma, Hakan; Giannakis, Elias; Eliades, Marinos

    2014-05-01

    The European Water Framework Directive requires Member States to set water prices that provide adequate incentives for users to use water resources efficiently. These new water pricing policies need to consider cost recovery of water services, including financial, environmental and resource cost. Prices were supposed to have been set by 2010. So far the record has been mixed. The European Commission has sent reasoned opinions to a number of countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, Sweden) requesting them to adjust their national legislation to include all water services. Unbalanced water pricing may negatively affect the agricultural sector, especially in the southern EU countries, which are more dependent on irrigation water for production. The European Commission is funding several projects that aim to reduce the burden of increasing water prices on farmers by developing innovative technologies and decision support systems that will save water and increase productivity. The FP7 ENORASIS project (grant 282949) has developed a new integrated irrigation management decision support platform, which include high-resolution, ensemble weather forecasting, a GIS widget for the location of fields and sensors and a comprehensive decision support and database management software package to optimize irrigation water management. The field component includes wireless, solar-powered soil moisture sensors, small weather stations, and remotely controlled irrigation valves. A mobile App and a web-package are providing user-friendly interfaces for farmers, water companies and environmental consultants. In Cyprus, agricultural water prices have been set to achieve a cost recovery rate of 54% (2010). The pricing policy takes in consideration the social importance and financial viability of the agricultural sector, an important flexibility provided by the Water Framework Directive. The new price was set at 0.24 euro per m3 for water supply

  1. Design of variable energy and price components of electricity tariffs as an incentive for system-efficient energy management of flexible consumers in households; Design variabler Energie- und Leistungspreiskomponenten von Stromtarifen als Anreiz fuer ein systemdienliches Energiemanagement flexibler Verbraucher in Haushalten

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Schreiber, Michael

    2017-11-01

    To mitigate anthropogenic climate change, both the heating and transport sectors will need to be electrically driven, with the higher electrical demand met by emission-free technologies, in addition to general efficiency improvements. On the generation side, wind and photovoltaic power plants must have a rated power significantly exceeding the current peak demand, in order to cover this increased electrical requirement. On the consumption side, heat pumps and private electric vehicles will increase the percentage of energy withdrawn at the low-voltage level of the new system. Given the right incentives, these customers will shift the energy demand in such a way as to benefit the system. This flexibility can be used as a tool to deal with variable renewable insertion while avoiding simultaneous overloading of the power grid. This thesis analyses and evaluates the effects of different electricity tariff designs on energy consumption. These tariffs should incentivise households to adapt their energy consumption to market prices, without inducing critical peak demands in times of particularly low prices. Therefore, time-varying energy price components and power price components are combined into flexible electricity tariffs and implemented as target functions within an optimization problem. The cost-minimizing effect of household energy management is determined under these flexible tariffs, and the effects of the tariff designs on energy consumption and the induced costs are evaluated. Additionally, the results of the flexible tariff approach are compared with results from a centralized optimization by a virtual power plant. It is possible to develop a design for a suitable flexible tariff that decreases the energy procurement costs of electric vehicles while simultaneously reducing peak demand in comparison to a single real-time pricing incentive. Furthermore, this thesis shows that certain kinds of electricity tariff design do not only fail to support but actually

  2. Variation in Incentive Effects across Neighbourhoods

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mark J Hanly

    2014-03-01

    Full Text Available Small monetary incentives increase survey cooperation rates, however evidence suggests that the appeal of incentives may vary across sample subgroups. Fieldwork budgets can be most effectively distributed by targeting those subgroups where incentives will have the strongest appeal. We examine data from a randomised experiment implemented in the pilot phase of the Irish Longitudinal Study of Ageing, which randomly assigned households to receive a higher (€25 or lower (€10 incentive amount. Using a random effects logistic regression model, we observe a variable effect of the higher incentive across geographic neighbourhoods. The higher incentive has the largest impact in neighbourhoods where baseline cooperation is low, as predicted by Leverage-Saliency theory. Auxiliary neighbourhood-level variables are linked to the sample frame to explore this variation further, however none of these moderate the incentive effect, suggesting that richer information is needed to identify sample subgroups where incentive budgets should be directed.

  3. Incentives Between Firms (and Within)

    OpenAIRE

    Robert Gibbons

    2005-01-01

    This paper reviews the significant progress in Üagency theoryÝ (i.e., the economic theory of incentives) during the 1990s, with an eye toward applications to supply transactions. I emphasize six recent models, in three pairs: (1) new foundations for the theory of incentive contracts, (2) new directions in incentive theory, and (3) new applications to supply transactions. By reviewing these six models, I hope to establish three things. First, the theory of incentive contracts needed and receiv...

  4. Reforming residential electricity tariff in China: Block tariffs pricing approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sun, Chuanwang; Lin, Boqiang

    2013-01-01

    The Chinese households that make up approximately a quarter of world households are facing a residential power tariff reform in which a rising block tariff structure will be implemented, and this tariff mechanism is widely used around the world. The basic principle of the structure is to assign a higher price for higher income consumers with low price elasticity of power demand. To capture the non-linear effects of price and income on elasticities, we set up a translog demand model. The empirical findings indicate that the higher income consumers are less sensitive than those with lower income to price changes. We further put forward three proposals of Chinese residential electricity tariffs. Compared to a flat tariff, the reasonable block tariff structure generates more efficient allocation of cross-subsidies, better incentives for raising the efficiency of electricity usage and reducing emissions from power generation, which also supports the living standards of low income households. - Highlights: • We design a rising block tariff structure of residential electricity in China. • We set up a translog demand model to find the non-linear effects on elasticities. • The higher income groups are less sensitive to price changes. • Block tariff structure generates more efficient allocation of cross-subsidies. • Block tariff structure supports the living standards of low income households

  5. Simulating price patterns for tradable green certificates to promote electricity generation from wind

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ford, A.

    2007-01-01

    This article uses computer simulation to anticipate the price dynamics in a market for Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs). These markets have been used in Europe to promote generation of electricity from renewable resources like wind. Similar markets have been proposed in the United States of America (USA) where the certificates are called Renewable Energy Credits (RECs). The certificates are issued to the generating companies for each megawatt-hour of renewable electricity generation. The companies may sell the certificates in a market, and the revenues from certificate sales provide an extra incentive to invest in new generating capacity. Proponents argue that this market-based incentive can be designed to support government mandates for a growing fraction of electricity generation from renewable sources. In the USA, these mandates are set by the states and are known as Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). We simulate the price dynamics of a market designed to support an aggressive mandate for wind generation in the northwestern USA. The simulations show that the certificate price climbs rapidly to the cap in the early years after the market opens. Investors then react to these high prices with construction of new wind capacity. After a few years, wind generation meets, and then exceeds the requirement. We show that this pattern appears again and again when the simulations are repeated with wide variations in the estimates of behavioral parameters. We use the model to study the impact of different trading strategies by the wind companies and by the distribution companies. We also study the simulated market response if the USA adopts the carbon allowance market envisioned in The Climate Stewardship Act. The article concludes with recommendations for policy makers involved in TGC market design. [Author

  6. Simulating price patterns for tradable green certificates to promote electricity generation from wind

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ford, Andrew; Vogstad, Klaus; Flynn, Hilary

    2007-01-01

    This article uses computer simulation to anticipate the price dynamics in a market for Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs). These markets have been used in Europe to promote generation of electricity from renewable resources like wind. Similar markets have been proposed in the United States of America (USA) where the certificates are called Renewable Energy Credits (RECs). The certificates are issued to the generating companies for each megawatt-hour of renewable electricity generation. The companies may sell the certificates in a market, and the revenues from certificate sales provide an extra incentive to invest in new generating capacity. Proponents argue that this market-based incentive can be designed to support government mandates for a growing fraction of electricity generation from renewable sources. In the USA, these mandates are set by the states and are known as Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). We simulate the price dynamics of a market designed to support an aggressive mandate for wind generation in the northwestern USA. The simulations show that the certificate price climbs rapidly to the cap in the early years after the market opens. Investors then react to these high prices with construction of new wind capacity. After a few years, wind generation meets, and then exceeds the requirement. We show that this pattern appears again and again when the simulations are repeated with wide variations in the estimates of behavioral parameters. We use the model to study the impact of different trading strategies by the wind companies and by the distribution companies. We also study the simulated market response if the USA adopts the carbon allowance market envisioned in The Climate Stewardship Act. The article concludes with recommendations for policy makers involved in TGC market design

  7. Marine Corps Pay Incentives

    Science.gov (United States)

    Marines from 2000 to 2017. The thesis includes a literature review on economic theory related to pay incentives in the Department of Defense, a...The purpose of this thesis to provide the Marine Corps with a comprehensive report on pay incentive programs and special pay that were available to...summarization of pay incentive categories, a data analysis on take-up rates and average annual amounts at the end of each fiscal year, and a program review

  8. Changing physician incentives for affordable, quality cancer care: results of an episode payment model.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Newcomer, Lee N; Gould, Bruce; Page, Ray D; Donelan, Sheila A; Perkins, Monica

    2014-09-01

    This study tested the combination of an episode payment coupled with actionable use and quality data as an incentive to improve quality and reduce costs. Medical oncologists were paid a single fee, in lieu of any drug margin, to treat their patients. Chemotherapy medications were reimbursed at the average sales price, a proxy for actual cost. Five volunteer medical groups were compared with a large national payer registry of fee-for-service patients with cancer to examine the difference in cost before and after the initiation of the payment change. Between October 2009 and December 2012, the five groups treated 810 patients with breast, colon, and lung cancer using the episode payments. The registry-predicted fee-for-service cost of the episodes cohort was $98,121,388, but the actual cost was $64,760,116. The predicted cost of chemotherapy drugs was $7,519,504, but the actual cost was $20,979,417. There was no difference between the groups on multiple quality measures. Modifying the current fee-for-service payment system for cancer therapy with feedback data and financial incentives that reward outcomes and cost efficiency resulted in a significant total cost reduction. Eliminating existing financial chemotherapy drug incentives paradoxically increased the use of chemotherapy. Copyright © 2014 by American Society of Clinical Oncology.

  9. An analysis of strategic price setting in retail gasoline markets

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jaureguiberry, Florencia

    This dissertation studies price-setting behavior in the retail gasoline industry. The main questions addressed are: How important is a retail station's brand and proximity to competitors when retail stations set price? How do retailers adjust their pricing when they cater to consumers who are less aware of competing options or have less discretion over where they purchase gasoline? These questions are explored in two separate analyses using a unique datasets containing retail pricing behavior of stations in California and in 24 different metropolitan areas. The evidence suggests that brand and location generate local market power for gasoline stations. After controlling for market and station characteristics, the analysis finds a spread of 11 cents per gallon between the highest and the lowest priced retail gasoline brands. The analysis also indicates that when the nearest competitor is located over 2 miles away as opposed to next door, consumers will pay an additional 1 cent per gallon of gasoline. In order to quantify the significance of local market power, data for stations located near major airport rental car locations are utilized. The presumption here is that rental car users are less aware or less sensitive to fueling options near the rental car return location and are to some extent "captured consumers". Retailers located near rental car locations have incentives to adjust their pricing strategies to exploit this. The analysis of pricing near rental car locations indicates that retailers charge prices that are 4 cent per gallon higher than other stations in the same metropolitan area. This analysis is of interest to regulators who are concerned with issues of consolidation, market power, and pricing in the retail gasoline industry. This dissertation concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the empirical analysis.

  10. The Dynamics of Bertrand Price Competition with Cost-Reducing Investments

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Iskhakov, Fedor; Rust, John; Schjerning, Bertel

    We present a dynamic extension of the classic static model of Bertrand price competition that allows competing duopolists to undertake cost-reducing investments in an attempt to “leapfrog” their rival to attain low-cost leadership – at least temporarily. We show that leapfrogging occurs in equili......We present a dynamic extension of the classic static model of Bertrand price competition that allows competing duopolists to undertake cost-reducing investments in an attempt to “leapfrog” their rival to attain low-cost leadership – at least temporarily. We show that leapfrogging occurs...... in equilibrium, resolving the Bertrand investment paradox., i.e. leapfrogging explains why firms have an ex ante incentive to undertake cost-reducing investments even though they realize that simultaneous investments to acquire the state of the art production technology would result in Bertrand price competition...... leader. We show that the equilibrium involves investment preemption only when the firms invest in a deterministically alternating fashion and technological progress is deterministic. We prove that when technological progress is deterministic and firms move in an alternating fashion, the game has a unique...

  11. Regulatory reform for natural gas pipelines: The effect on pipeline and distribution company share prices

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jurman, Elisabeth Antonie

    1997-08-01

    The natural gas shortages in the 1970s focused considerable attention on the federal government's role in altering energy consumption. For the natural gas industry these shortages eventually led to the passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) in 1978 as part of the National Energy Plan. A series of events in the decade of the 1980s has brought about the restructuring of interstate natural gas pipelines which have been transformed by regulators and the courts from monopolies into competitive entities. This transformation also changed their relationship with their downstream customers, the LDCs, who no longer had to deal with pipelines as the only merchants of gas. Regulatory reform made it possible for LDCs to buy directly from producers using the pipelines only for delivery of their purchases. This study tests for the existence of monopoly rents by analyzing the daily returns of natural gas pipeline and utility industry stock price data from 1982 to 1990, a period of regulatory reform for the natural gas industry. The study's main objective is to investigate the degree of empirical support for claims that regulatory reforms increase profits in the affected industry, as the normative theory of regulation expects, or decrease profits, as advocates of the positive theory of regulation believe. I also test Norton's theory of risk which predicts that systematic risk will increase for firms undergoing deregulation. Based on a sample of twelve natural gas pipelines, and 25 utilities an event study concept was employed to measure the impact of regulatory event announcements on daily natural gas pipeline or utility industry stock price data using a market model regression equation. The results of this study provide some evidence that regulatory reforms did not increase the profits of pipeline firms, confirming the expectations of those who claim that excess profits result from regulation and will disappear, once that protection is removed and the firms are operating in

  12. A dynamic simulation model for assessing the overall impact of incentive policies on power system reliability, costs and environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ibanez-Lopez, A.S.; Martinez-Val, J.M.; Moratilla-Soria, B.Y.

    2017-01-01

    The liberalization of power markets has entailed dramatic changes in power system planning worldwide. The inception of new alternative technologies, smart grids and distributed generation and storage is expected to make system planning even more challenging. Government policies still play a major role in the evolution of a country's power generation mix, even in those countries with liberalized markets. This paper presents a System Dynamics model aimed at assessing the overall technical, economic and environmental impact of renewable energy incentives and capacity payment policies. The model has been used to simulate Spain's power industry in order to assess the impact of electric power policies with the goal of getting insights regarding how to achieve an optimum power generation mix. The main conclusions of the present paper are (i) the necessity of specific regulatory actions in Spain in order to keep adequate reliability levels, avoid price spikes and boom and bust investment cycles as well as to deploy specific technologies, (ii) the fact that capacity payments are a better instrument for keeping adequate reserve margins and avoiding power price spikes than renewable energy incentives and (iii) the evidence that both instruments entail additional system costs over the base case scenario. - Highlights: • A System Dynamics model of Spain's power generation mix is proposed. • The overall policy impact on system costs, environment and reliability is assessed. • Current policies are not enough to keep adequate reliability levels. • Capacity payments are an adequate instrument for guaranteeing system reliability. • RES incentives do not solve reliability issues and entail greater system costs.

  13. Financial incentive policies at workplace cafeterias for preventing obesity--a systematic review and meta-analysis (Protocol).

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sawada, Kimi; Ota, Erika; Shahrook, Sadequa; Mori, Rintaro

    2014-10-28

    Various studies are currently investigating ways to prevent lifestyle-related diseases and obesity among workers through interventions using incentive strategies, including price discounts for low-fat snacks and sugar-free beverages at workplace cafeterias or vending machines, and the provision of a free salad bar in cafeterias. Rather than assessing individual or group interventions, we will focus on the effectiveness of nutrition education programs at the population level, which primarily incorporate financial incentive strategies to prevent obesity. This paper describes the protocol of a systematic review that will examine the effectiveness of financial incentive programs at company cafeterias in improving dietary habits, nutrient intake, and obesity prevention. We will conduct searches in the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL), MEDLINE, Embase, and PsycINFO. Interventions will be assessed using data from randomized control trials (RCTs) and cluster RCTs. However, if few such trials exist, we will include quasi-RCTs. We will exclude controlled before-and-after studies and crossover RCTs. We will assess food-based interventions that include financial incentive strategies (discount strategies or social marketing) for workplace cafeterias, vending machines, and kiosks. Two authors will independently review studies for inclusion and will resolve differences by discussion and, if required, through consultation with a third author. We will assess the risk of bias of included studies according to the Cochrane Collaboration's "risk of bias" tool. The purpose of this paper is to outline the study protocol for a systematic review and meta-analysis that will investigate the effectiveness of population-level, incentive-focused interventions at the workplace cafeteria that aim to promote and prevent obesity. This review will give an important overview of the available evidence about the effectiveness of incentive-based environmental interventions to

  14. Concentrating solar power plant investment and operation decisions under different price and support mechanisms

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kost, Christoph; Flath, Christoph M.; Möst, Dominik

    2013-01-01

    The dispatch opportunities provided by storage-enhanced Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) plants have direct implications on the investment decisions as not only nameplate capacity but also the storage capacity and the solar multiple play a crucial role for the viability of the plant investment. By integrating additional technical aspects and operation strategies, this paper extends the optimization model proposed by Madaeni et al., How Thermal Energy Storage Enhances the Economic Viability of Concentrating Solar Power. Using a mixed integer maximization approach the paper yields both the optimal layout decision and the operation of CSP plants. Subsequently, the economic value of CSP storage is analyzed via energy modeling of a Spanish plant location under the respective wholesale market prices as well as the local feed-in tariff. The analysis shows that investment incentives for CSP plants with storage need to appropriately account for the interdependency between the price incentives and the plant operating strategy. As the resulting revenue characteristics influence the optimal size of solar field and storage differing operating strategies also give rise to differing optimal plant layouts. Most noteworthy, the current Spanish support scheme offers only limited incentives for larger thermal storage capacity. - Highlights: • Dispatch opportunities of CSP have direct implications on both investment and operational decisions. • Valuation approach with a single mixed integer maximization problem. • Profitability of CSP plants under the premium feed-in tariff in Spain was assessed. • Layout decision and storage size are influenced by remuneration scheme. • Discuss alternative remuneration schemes for “dispatchable” RE technologies

  15. PRICE AND PRICING STRATEGIES

    OpenAIRE

    SUCIU Titus

    2013-01-01

    In individual companies, price is one significant factor in achieving marketing success. In many purchase situations, price can be of great importance to customers. Marketers must establish pricing strategies that are compatible with the rest of the marketing mix. Management should decide whether to charge the same price to all similar buyers of identical quantities of a product (a one-price strategy) or to set different prices (a flexible price strategy). Many organizations, especially retai...

  16. Differential dependence of Pavlovian incentive motivation and instrumental incentive learning processes on dopamine signaling

    Science.gov (United States)

    Wassum, Kate M.; Ostlund, Sean B.; Balleine, Bernard W.; Maidment, Nigel T.

    2011-01-01

    Here we attempted to clarify the role of dopamine signaling in reward seeking. In Experiment 1, we assessed the effects of the dopamine D1/D2 receptor antagonist flupenthixol (0.5 mg/kg i.p.) on Pavlovian incentive motivation and found that flupenthixol blocked the ability of a conditioned stimulus to enhance both goal approach and instrumental performance (Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer). In Experiment 2 we assessed the effects of flupenthixol on reward palatability during post-training noncontingent re-exposure to the sucrose reward in either a control 3-h or novel 23-h food-deprived state. Flupenthixol, although effective in blocking the Pavlovian goal approach, was without effect on palatability or the increase in reward palatability induced by the upshift in motivational state. This noncontingent re-exposure provided an opportunity for instrumental incentive learning, the process by which rats encode the value of a reward for use in updating reward-seeking actions. Flupenthixol administered prior to the instrumental incentive learning opportunity did not affect the increase in subsequent off-drug reward-seeking actions induced by that experience. These data suggest that although dopamine signaling is necessary for Pavlovian incentive motivation, it is not necessary for changes in reward experience, or for the instrumental incentive learning process that translates this experience into the incentive value used to drive reward-seeking actions, and provide further evidence that Pavlovian and instrumental incentive learning processes are dissociable. PMID:21693635

  17. Distributor pricing approaches enabled in Smart Grid to differentiate delivery service quality

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Zhongwei Jake Zhang

    2014-12-01

    Full Text Available Industry practitioners who advocate retail competition and Demand-side Participation now look for approaches to link both initiatives through distributor pricing. As distributors incrementally convert more traditional assets into Smart Grid assets, they also need to consider different pricing approaches to recover the investment costs and meet the regulatory business requirements. Small electricity consumers need incentives to take part in these initiatives but their delivery service quality should also be closely guarded. Hence this paper addresses the above needs as a whole and investigates a set of distributor pricing approaches with Smart Grid technologies. Pricing of network and non-network based solutions should follow the incremental basis, such as the long run average incremental cost (LRAIC. The benefit of deferring network investment is calculated and should be passed to consumers as peak pricing rebate. A concept of reliability premium (RP based on load point reliability index is proposed, through which customers can express their preference of service quality and adjust their network tariff payment accordingly. A service delivery model is also proposed to utilize the savings from wholesale market trading to compensate for the downgraded service when loads are controlled. The IEEE 123-node distribution test feeder and the IEEE distribution system for RBTS Bus No. 2 are simulated, and solved using General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS to demonstrate the proposed distributor pricing approaches in Smart Grid.

  18. A competitive carbon emissions scheme with hybrid fiscal incentives: The evidence from a taxi industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liu, Yang; Han, Liyan; Yin, Ziqiao; Luo, Kongyi

    2017-01-01

    As two major approaches to reduce carbon emissions, command-and-control instruments and market-based carbon trading systems have their own weaknesses. Our paper first proposes a type of endogenous equilibrium methodology to dynamically derive the industrial carbon emissions standards. At the equilibrium, the sum of all carbon assets and liabilities is zero in the considered industry. Moreover, the standards fall over time with low-carbon technological advance. Most importantly, combining Pigou's and Coase's ideas, we construct a fiscal instrument accounting for both carbon taxes and allowances based on the dynamically improved emissions standards and carbon trading prices. This “No revenue for government” method implements a self-operated ecology for carbon trading market. Finally, considering the “Waterloo” recession of carbon prices, we introduce an adjustment factor into the model, which generates a negative-feedback mechanism with carbon prices. To support our idea, we present the application to Beijing taxi industry in detail and raise relative policy implications based on the evidence. - Highlights: • Dynamic endogenous equilibrium standards for carbon emissions. • A public policy oriented market mechanism combining command-and-control instruments and carbon trading. • Hybrid incentives to emission reduction combining carbon taxes and allowances. • The adjustment coefficient generating a negative feedback mechanism with carbon prices.

  19. Empirical analysis of the solar incentive policy for Tennessee solar value chain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sawhney, Rapinder; Thakur, Kaveri; Venkatesan, Bharadwaj; Ji, Shuguang; Upreti, Girish; Sanseverino, John

    2014-01-01

    Highlights: • Tennessee solar value chain (TNSVC) is modeled to analyze effect of policy on demand. • TNSVC model replicates realistic scenarios to gauge the economic impact on state. • Simulation study determines that the TNSVC capacity is greater than demand. • Direct cash incentives have greater impact on demand than indirect incentives. • The model portrays a holistic approach to assist strategic energy policy analysis. - Abstract: The market for solar energy in the US has grown exponentially due to increased consumer demand resulting from price reduction via economies of scale, technological progress, and a variety of incentives from federal and state governments as well as utility companies. The installation of solar power in Tennessee has more than doubled each year from 2009 to 2011. In this paper, we focus on the behavior of the Tennessee Solar Value Chain (TNSVC) to study the factors that influence growth of solar industry in the state. The impact of existing incentives on the TNSVC is analyzed. The TNSVC is simulated based on inputs from on-site survey to estimate economic impact in terms of the number of jobs added and the tax revenue generated in the state. In addition, a sensitivity analysis for the impact on the TNSVC under different policies those may be adopted by the state of Tennessee in the future is conducted. This paper employs a holistic model which can predict PV installation demand, understand solar value chain capacity, and estimate the revenue generation. It should be noted that the method employed in this study is not unique to the solar energy industry in Tennessee. The data utilized in this study is a combination of public domain information and surveys of suppliers, manufacturers, distributors, and installers. This makes the model in this paper flexible enough to be applied to assess the solar value chain in other state or country

  20. Determining consumer purchase intentions: the importance of dry matter, size, and price of kiwifruit.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jaeger, Sara R; Harker, Roger; Triggs, Chris M; Gunson, Anne; Campbell, Rachel L; Jackman, Richard; Requejo-Jackman, Cecilia

    2011-04-01

    Knowledge of the relative importance of food quality attributes in determining consumer purchase intention is critical for robust assessment of economic opportunities for industry growth. The aim of this study is to demonstrate how conjoint analysis methodology that incorporates tasting of fruit can be used to collect such information. Three hundred Japanese consumers took part in research designed to measure the importance of dry matter (DM), size, and price of kiwifruit (Actinidia deliciosa "Hayward" and Actinidia chinensis "Hort16A") for purchase intention. Measurement of consumer liking for kiwifruit of different DM content was a key first step. Liking increased as DM increased and was accompanied by increased purchase likelihood/choice probability for kiwifruit. The size of kiwifruit presented to consumers varied from "small" to "extra large." Consumers liked "mid-sized" kiwifruit over "small" or "extra-large" kiwifruit. Despite these differences in liking, size was of little importance in determining purchase likelihood/choice probability for kiwifruit. Price was a very important factor in determining purchase likelihood/choice probability but was less important than DM content. As price increased, purchase likelihood/choice probability decreased. Beneath these general findings, heterogeneity existed. Some consumers placed more/less importance on the focal purchase drivers than suggested by the aggregate model. Overall, the results suggest that incentive schemes already implemented by industry should consider rewarding high-DM fruit more than fruit size.   This research has contributed to the New Zealand kiwifruit industry gaining a better understanding of the relative importance consumers place on DM, size, and price of kiwifruit and has resulted in changes to grower incentive schemes. The research approach presented forces consumer to tradeoff attributes of kiwifruit against each other and decide on how important two key quality attributes-DM and

  1. Merit-order effects of renewable energy and price divergence in California’s day-ahead and real-time electricity markets

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Woo, C.K.; Moore, J.; Schneiderman, B.; Ho, T.; Olson, A.; Alagappan, L.; Chawla, K.; Toyama, N.; Zarnikau, J.

    2016-01-01

    We answer two policy questions: (1) what are the estimated merit-order effects of renewable energy in the California Independent System Operator’s (CAISO’s) day-ahead market (DAM) and real-time market (RTM)? and (2) what causes the hourly DAM and RTM prices to systematically diverge? The first question is timely and relevant because if the merit-order effect estimates are small, California’s renewable energy development is of limited help in cutting electricity consumers’ bills but also has a lesser adverse impact on the state’s investment incentive for natural-gas-fired generation. The second question is related to the efficient market hypothesis under which the hourly RTM and DAM prices tend to converge. Using a sample of about 21,000 hourly observations of CAISO market prices and their fundamental drivers during 12/12/2012–04/30/2015, we document statistically significant estimates (p-value≤0.01) for the DAM and RTM merit-order effects. This finding lends support to California’s adopted procurement process to provide sufficient investment incentives for natural-gas-fired generation. We document that the RTM-DAM price divergence partly depends on the CASIO’s day-ahead forecast errors for system loads and renewable energy. This finding suggests that improving the performance of the CAISO’s day-ahead forecasts can enhance trading efficiency in California’s DAM and RTM electricity markets. - Highlights: •Estimate the day-ahead and real-time merit-order effects of renewable energy in California. •Document statistically significant merit-order effects of solar and wind energy. •Document the difference between the day-ahead and real-time prices. •Attribute the price differences to forecast errors for load, solar and wind energy. •Discuss the evidence’s implications for California’s energy policy.

  2. Energy Efficiency Under Alternative Carbon Policies. Incentives, Measurement, and Interregional Effects

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Steinberg, Daniel C. [National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO (United States); Boyd, Erin [National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO (United States)

    2015-08-28

    In this report, we examine and compare how tradable mass-based polices and tradable rate-based policies create different incentives for energy efficiency investments. Through a generalized demonstration and set of examples, we show that as a result of the output subsidy they create, traditional rate-based policies, those that do not credit energy savings from efficiency measures, reduce the incentive for investment in energy efficiency measures relative to an optimally designed mass-based policy or equivalent carbon tax. We then show that this reduced incentive can be partially addressed by modifying the rate-based policy such that electricity savings from energy efficiency measures are treated as a source of zero-carbon generation within the framework of the standard, or equivalently, by assigning avoided emissions credit to the electricity savings at the rate of the intensity target. These approaches result in an extension of the output subsidy to efficiency measures and eliminate the distortion between supply-side and demand-side options for GHG emissions reduction. However, these approaches do not address electricity price distortions resulting from the output subsidy that also impact the value of efficiency measures. Next, we assess alternative approaches for crediting energy efficiency savings within the framework of a rate-based policy. Finally, we identify a number of challenges that arise in implementing a rate-based policy with efficiency crediting, including the requirement to develop robust estimates of electricity savings in order to assess compliance, and the requirement to track the regionality of the generation impacts of efficiency measures to account for their interstate effects.

  3. Split incentives and energy efficiency in Canadian multi-family dwellings

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maruejols, Lucie; Young, Denise

    2011-01-01

    This paper examines the energy-related behaviour of owners and occupants of multi-family dwellings in Canada, some of whom do not pay directly for electricity or heat, but instead have these costs included in their rent or condo fees. Using data from the 2003 Survey of Household Energy Use, we look at the extent to which split incentives that result from bill-paying arrangements affect a variety of activities including the setting of temperatures at various times of the day and the use of eco-friendly options in basic household tasks. Findings suggest that these split incentives do indeed impact some aspects of occupant behaviour, with households who do not pay directly for their heat opting for increased thermal comfort and being less sensitive to whether or not somebody is at home and the severity of the climate when deciding on temperature settings. Regardless of who pays for utilities, Canadian households who live in multi-family dwellings are generally unresponsive to fuel prices. Our empirical results suggest the possibility of environmental benefits from policies aimed at improving energy-efficiency in this sector, especially if targeted at reducing the impacts of the behaviour of those who do not pay directly for energy use. - Highlights: → Many occupants of multi-family dwellings do not pay directly for electricity or heat. → The resulting 'split incentives' impact the efficiency of energy use. → Canadian survey data from 2003 suggest that these impacts are often significant. → Households who do not directly pay for heat opt for increased thermal comfort. → Policy designers should consider especially targeting these households.

  4. The case for indexed price caps for U.S. electric utilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, M.N.

    1991-01-01

    Indexed price caps are a promising alternative to traditional, cost-of-service utility rate regulation. In just a decade, they have sprung from the drawing boards of economists to use by major utilities in a number of industries. Several authors have discussed the merits of indexed price caps for U.S. electric utilities. Despite their efforts, many parties to electric utility policy making are unfamiliar with the subject. This is unsurprising given the policy controversies that already embroil the industry. It is also unfortunate, since indexed price caps may help solve some of the problems that prompt these controversies. Indexed price caps can improve electric utility rate regulation in two ways. Utilities would have strong incentives to improve performance without the micromanagement that increasingly characterizes state-level regulation. Utilities could also be granted more extensive marketing freedoms, since indexes can protect customers from cross-subsidization. Two areas of concern about indexed price cap plans have emerged in recent discussions that the author has held with officials of electric utilities, intervenor groups, and regulatory agencies. Officials are often unclear on plan details, and therefore may not appreciate the degree of flexibility that is possible in plan design. Confusion over the available options in price cap adjustment indexes and the logic behind them is especially widespread. Officials also desire a clearer expression of how indexed price caps can coexist with current regulatory initiatives. This article details the major attributes of index plans, provides a brief history of indexing, discusses index design options in depth, and concludes with a vision of how indexed price caps can be made operational in today's electric utility industry

  5. The price may not be right: the value of comparison shopping for prescription drugs.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arora, Sanjay; Sood, Neeraj; Terp, Sophie; Joyce, Geoffrey

    2017-07-01

    To measure variations in drug prices across and within zip codes that may reveal simple strategies to improve patients' access to prescribed medications. We compared drug prices at different types of pharmacies across and within local markets. In-store prices were compared with a Web-based service providing discount coupons for prescription medications. Prices were collected for 2 generic antibiotics because most patients have limited experience with them and are less likely to know the price ranges for them. Drug prices were obtained via telephone from 528 pharmacies in Los Angeles (LA) County, California, from July to August 2014. Online prices were collected from GoodRx, a popular Web-based service that aggregates available discounts and directly negotiates with retail outlets. Drug prices found at independent pharmacies and by using discount coupons available online were lower on average than at grocery, big-box, or chain drug stores for 2 widely prescribed antibiotics. The lowest-price prescription was offered at a grocery, big-box, or chain drug store in 6% of zip codes within the LA County area. Drug prices varied dramatically within a zip code, however, and were less expensive in lower-income areas. The average price difference within a zip code was $52 for levofloxacin and $17 for azithromycin. Price shopping for medications within a small geographic area can yield considerable cost savings for the uninsured and consumers in high-deductible health plans with high negotiated prices. Clinicians and patient advocates have an incentive to convey this information to patients to improve adherence to prescribed medicines and lower the financial burden of purchasing prescription drugs.

  6. Switching insurer in the Irish voluntary health insurance market: determinants, incentives, and risk equalization.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Keegan, Conor; Teljeur, Conor; Turner, Brian; Thomas, Steve

    2016-09-01

    The determinants of consumer mobility in voluntary health insurance markets providing duplicate cover are not well understood. Consumer mobility can have important implications for competition. Consumers should be price-responsive and be willing to switch insurer in search of the best-value products. Moreover, although theory suggests low-risk consumers are more likely to switch insurer, this process should not be driven by insurers looking to attract low risks. This study utilizes data on 320,830 VHI healthcare policies due for renewal between August 2013 and June 2014. At the time of renewal, policyholders were categorized as either 'switchers' or 'stayers', and policy information was collected for the prior 12 months. Differences between these groups were assessed by means of logistic regression. The ability of Ireland's risk equalization scheme to account for the relative attractiveness of switchers was also examined. Policyholders were price sensitive (OR 1.052, p sensitivity declined with age. Age (OR 0.971; p Consumers appear price-responsive, which is important for competition provided it is based on correct incentives. Risk equalization payments largely eliminated the profitable status of switchers, although further refinements may be required.

  7. Washington biofuel feedstock crop supply under output price and quantity uncertainty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zheng Qiujie; Shumway, C. Richard

    2012-01-01

    Subsidized development of an in-state biofuels industry has received some political support in the state of Washington, USA. Utilizing in-state feedstock supplies could be an efficient way to stimulate biofuel industries and the local economy. In this paper we estimate supply under output price and quantity uncertainty for major biofuel feedstock crops in Washington. Farmers are expected to be risk averse and maximize the utility of profit and uncertainty. We estimate very large Washington price elasticities for corn and sugar beets but a small price elasticity for a third potential feedstock, canola. Even with the large price elasticities for two potential feedstocks, their current and historical production levels in the state are so low that unrealistically large incentives would likely be needed to obtain sufficient feedstock supply for a Washington biofuel industry. Based on our examination of state and regional data, we find low likelihood that a Washington biofuels industry will develop in the near future primarily using within-state biofuel feedstock crops. - Highlights: ► Within-state feedstock crop supplies insufficient for Washington biofuel industry. ► Potential Washington corn and sugar beet supplies very responsive to price changes. ► Feedstock supplies more responsive to higher expected profit than lower risk. ► R and D for conversion of waste cellulosic feedstocks is potentially important policy.

  8. Prices and Price Setting

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    R.P. Faber (Riemer)

    2010-01-01

    textabstractThis thesis studies price data and tries to unravel the underlying economic processes of why firms have chosen these prices. It focuses on three aspects of price setting. First, it studies whether the existence of a suggested price has a coordinating effect on the prices of firms.

  9. Carbon price instead of support schemes: wind power investments by the electricity market

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petitet, Marie; Finon, Dominique; Janssen, Tanguy

    2014-10-01

    In this paper we study the development of wind power by the electricity market without any usual support scheme which is aimed at subsidizing non mature renewables, with the sole incentive of a significant carbon price. Long term electricity market and investment decisions simulation by system dynamics modelling is used to trace the electricity generation mix evolution over a 20-year period in a pure thermal system. A range of stable carbon price, as a tax could be, is tested in order to determine the value above which wind power development by market forces becomes economically possible. Not only economic competitiveness in terms of cost price, but also profitability against traditional fossil fuel technologies are necessary for a market-driven development of wind power. Results stress that wind power is really profitable for investors only if the carbon price is very significantly higher than the price required for making wind power MWh's cost price competitive with CCGT and coal-fired plants on the simplistic basis of levelized costs. In this context, the market-driven development of wind power seems only possible if there is a strong commitment to climate policy, reflected by the preference for a stable and high carbon price rather than a fuzzy price of an emission trading scheme. Besides, results show that market-driven development of wind power would require a sky-rocketing carbon price if the initial technology mix includes a share of nuclear plants even with a moratorium on new nuclear development. (authors)

  10. An emissions trading scheme design for power industries facing price regulation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Yong-Gun; Lim, Jong-Soo

    2014-01-01

    The electricity market, monopolistic in nature, with government price regulation, poses a serious challenge for policy makers with respect to the cost-effectiveness of emissions trading, particularly in Asian countries. This paper argues that a cap-and-trade regulatory system for indirect emissions combined with a rate-based allocation system for direct emissions can achieve market efficiency even in the presence of price and quantity controls in the electricity market. This particular policy mix could provide appropriate incentives for industries to reduce their electricity consumption while inducing power producers to reduce their direct carbon emissions cost-effectively in conditions where there is strict government control of electricity prices. Another advantage of the suggested policy mix is that it allows carbon leakage in cross-border power trades to be effectively eliminated. - Highlights: • A rate-based allocation induces power producers to minimize direct emissions. • A cap-and-trade on indirect emission induces firms to reduce electricity consumption. • These two can jointly achieve market efficiency even in the regulated power market

  11. Private versus social incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    González, Paula; Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David

    2016-12-01

    We provide a theoretical framework to contribute to the current debate regarding the tendency of pharmaceutical companies to direct their R&D toward marketing products that are "follow-on" drugs of already existing drugs, rather than toward the development of breakthrough drugs. We construct a model with a population of patients who can be treated with drugs that are horizontally and vertically differentiated. In addition to a pioneering drug, a new drug can be marketed as the result of an innovative process. We analyze physician prescription choices and the optimal pricing decision of an innovative firm. We also characterize the incentives of the innovative firm to conduct R&D activities, disentangling the quest for breakthrough drugs from the firm effort to develop follow-on drugs. Our results offer theoretical support for the conventional wisdom that pharmaceutical firms devote too many resources to conducting R&D activities that lead to incremental innovations. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  12. Associations of cycling with urban sprawl and the gasoline price.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rashad, Inas

    2009-01-01

    Determine the relationships between cycling and urban sprawl and between cycling and the gasoline price. Cross-sectional multivariate regression analyses using pooled data from two individual-level national surveys to analyze the effects of variations in levels of urban sprawl and the gasoline price on cycling as a form of physical activity. Metropolitan areas representative of the U.S. population, 1990 to 2001. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System: 146,730 individuals at least 18-years-old in the United States; Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey: 73,903 individuals at least 18-years-old in the United States. Self-reported information on bicycling served as the dependent variable. Urban sprawl and the gasoline price served as key independent variables. Living in a metropolitan area with a lower degree of urban sprawl increased the probability of cycling in the past month by 3.4 to 4.4 percentage points and 1.6 to 2.1 percentage points from the means for men and women, respectively. Increasing the gasoline price by one dollar increased the probability of cycling by 4.3 to 4.7 percentage points and 2.9 to 3.5 percentage points for men and women, respectively. Results indicate that the prevalence of cycling is higher in less sprawling areas and areas with higher gasoline prices. More research is needed to refine results on how individuals respond to incentives and the roles that monetary and time costs play in improving public health.

  13. Dynamic electricity pricing for electric vehicles using stochastic programming

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soares, João; Ghazvini, Mohammad Ali Fotouhi; Borges, Nuno; Vale, Zita

    2017-01-01

    Electric Vehicles (EVs) are an important source of uncertainty, due to their variable demand, departure time and location. In smart grids, the electricity demand can be controlled via Demand Response (DR) programs. Smart charging and vehicle-to-grid seem highly promising methods for EVs control. However, high capital costs remain a barrier to implementation. Meanwhile, incentive and price-based schemes that do not require high level of control can be implemented to influence the EVs' demand. Having effective tools to deal with the increasing level of uncertainty is increasingly important for players, such as energy aggregators. This paper formulates a stochastic model for day-ahead energy resource scheduling, integrated with the dynamic electricity pricing for EVs, to address the challenges brought by the demand and renewable sources uncertainty. The two-stage stochastic programming approach is used to obtain the optimal electricity pricing for EVs. A realistic case study projected for 2030 is presented based on Zaragoza network. The results demonstrate that it is more effective than the deterministic model and that the optimal pricing is preferable. This study indicates that adequate DR schemes like the proposed one are promising to increase the customers' satisfaction in addition to improve the profitability of the energy aggregation business. - Highlights: • A stochastic model for energy scheduling tackling several uncertainty sources. • A two-stage stochastic programming is used to tackle the developed model. • Optimal EV electricity pricing seems to improve the profits. • The propose results suggest to increase the customers' satisfaction.

  14. A Game Theoretic Framework for Bandwidth Allocation and Pricing in Federated Wireless Networks

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gu, Bo; Yamori, Kyoko; Xu, Sugang; Tanaka, Yoshiaki

    With the proliferation of IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks, large numbers of wireless access points have been deployed, and it is often the case that a user can detect several access points simultaneously in dense metropolitan areas. Most owners, however, encrypt their networks to prevent the public from accessing them due to the increased traffic and security risk. In this work, we use pricing as an incentive mechanism to motivate the owners to share their networks with the public, while at the same time satisfying users' service demand. Specifically, we propose a “federated network” concept, in which radio resources of various wireless local area networks are managed together. Our algorithm identifies two candidate access points with the lowest price being offered (if available) to each user. We then model the price announcements of access points as a game, and characterize the Nash Equilibrium of the system. The efficiency of the Nash Equilibrium solution is evaluated via simulation studies as well.

  15. Earnings progression, human capital and incentives

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Frederiksen, Anders

    progression by investigating the effects of on-the-job human capital acquisition, explicit short-run incentives and career concern incentives on earnings progression. The model leads to predictions about the incentive structure and the progression in both cross-sectional and individual earnings which...

  16. Measuring the CO2 shadow price for wastewater treatment: A directional distance function approach

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Molinos-Senante, María; Hanley, Nick; Sala-Garrido, Ramón

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • The shadow price of CO 2 informs about the marginal abatement cost of this pollutant. • It is estimated the shadow price of CO 2 for wastewater treatment plants. • The shadow prices depend on the setting of the directional vectors of the distance function. • Sewage sludge treatment technology affects the CO 2 shadow price. - Abstract: The estimation of the value of carbon emissions has become a major research and policy topic since the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol. The shadow price of CO 2 provides information about the marginal abatement cost of this pollutant. It is an essential element in guiding environmental policy issues, since the CO 2 shadow price can be used when fixing carbon tax rates, in environmental cost-benefit analysis and in ascertaining an initial market price for a trading system. The water industry could play an important role in the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This paper estimates the shadow price of CO 2 for a sample of wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), using a parametric quadratic directional distance function. Following this, in a sensitivity analysis, the paper evaluates the impact of different settings of directional vectors on the shadow prices. Applying the Mann–Whitney and Kruskal–Wallis non-parametric tests, factors affecting CO 2 prices are investigated. The variation of CO 2 shadow prices across the WWTPs evaluated argues in favour of a market-based approach to CO 2 mitigation as opposed to command-and-control regulation. The paper argues that the estimation of the shadow price of CO 2 for non-power enterprises can provide incentives for reducing GHG emissions

  17. Political freedom and the response to economic incentives: labor migration in Africa, 1972-1987.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barkley, A P; Mcmillan, J

    1994-12-01

    This study examines the thesis that political institutions and the freedoms and civil rights generated by these institutions affect migration decisions. The hypothesis is based on one stated by Adam Smith in 1776, that economic conditions that reflect greater political freedoms and civil liberties harbor higher levels of resource mobility in response to economic incentives. Pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis is based on data from the World Bank for 32 African countries during 1972-87. Findings support the hypothesis that migration rate is more affected by the expected returns ratio to labor in countries where civil liberties are greater than in nations with fewer civil liberties. The implication, from the inclusion of institutional factors in the model, is that civil liberties have an indirect impact on the rate of labor migration out of agriculture in Africa. The impact is a mix of economic incentives and civil liberties. In the political rights model, the most free countries had the largest migration elasticity. The findings on political rights impacts support findings by Friedman and McMillan that civil liberties are a more important determinant of economic growth than political rights. Further testing for measurement error confirmed that the data were flawed, but not so greatly that the basic findings were overturned. The migration out of African agriculture was found to be sensitive to the effect of price signals, which were conditioned by the degree of political rights and civil liberties. Policy makers are urged to consider both changes in pricing and institutions.

  18. Dynamics of Aviation Biofuel Investment, Incentives, and Market Growth: An Exploration Using the Biomass Scenario Model

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Vimmerstedt, Laura; Newes, Emily

    2016-10-25

    The Federal Aviation Administration promotes the development of an aviation biofuel market, and has pursued a goal of 1 billion gallons of production annually by 2018. Although this goal is unlikely to be met, this analysis applies the Biomass Scenario Model to explore conditions affecting market growth, and identifies policy incentive and oil price conditions under which this level of production might occur, and by what year. Numerous combinations of conditions that are more favorable than current conditions can reach the goal before 2030.

  19. AEP Ohio gridSMART Demonstration Project Real-Time Pricing Demonstration Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Widergren, Steven E.; Subbarao, Krishnappa; Fuller, Jason C.; Chassin, David P.; Somani, Abhishek; Marinovici, Maria C.; Hammerstrom, Janelle L.

    2014-02-01

    This report contributes initial findings from an analysis of significant aspects of the gridSMART® Real-Time Pricing (RTP) – Double Auction demonstration project. Over the course of four years, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) worked with American Electric Power (AEP), Ohio and Battelle Memorial Institute to design, build, and operate an innovative system to engage residential consumers and their end-use resources in a participatory approach to electric system operations, an incentive-based approach that has the promise of providing greater efficiency under normal operating conditions and greater flexibility to react under situations of system stress. The material contained in this report supplements the findings documented by AEP Ohio in the main body of the gridSMART report. It delves into three main areas: impacts on system operations, impacts on households, and observations about the sensitivity of load to price changes.

  20. Incentives for an adequate, economic and reliable Swiss transmission grid. Final version

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Twomey, P.; Neuhoff, K.; Newbery, D.

    2006-11-01

    This comprehensive final report for the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) discusses incentives necessary for the implementation of an adequate, economic and reliable Swiss electricity transmission grid. As Switzerland moves towards a more liberalised and competitive electricity market, an essential task of policy makers will be to ensure that incentives are in place for the construction, maintenance and operation of adequate, economic and reliable transmission infrastructure. As well as continuing to serve the domestic market, the location of Switzerland at the centre of Europe also means that policy should embrace opportunities in servicing the developing European Internal Market by providing transit and other services. Topics discussed include the economic evaluation of transmission investment proposals, regulated transmission investment, investments in transmission lines by power merchants, power auctions and congestion management as well as inter-TSO compensation mechanisms. European regulations and practice are discussed as are access questions and transmission charges. Developments in interconnection management and harmonisation are examined. The particular characteristics of the Swiss energy system, its prices and its legal frameworks are discussed. Cross-border trading and security of supply are also discussed

  1. Incentives for an adequate, economic and reliable Swiss transmission grid. Final version

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Twomey, P.; Neuhoff, K.; Newbery, D.

    2006-11-15

    This comprehensive final report for the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) discusses incentives necessary for the implementation of an adequate, economic and reliable Swiss electricity transmission grid. As Switzerland moves towards a more liberalised and competitive electricity market, an essential task of policy makers will be to ensure that incentives are in place for the construction, maintenance and operation of adequate, economic and reliable transmission infrastructure. As well as continuing to serve the domestic market, the location of Switzerland at the centre of Europe also means that policy should embrace opportunities in servicing the developing European Internal Market by providing transit and other services. Topics discussed include the economic evaluation of transmission investment proposals, regulated transmission investment, investments in transmission lines by power merchants, power auctions and congestion management as well as inter-TSO compensation mechanisms. European regulations and practice are discussed as are access questions and transmission charges. Developments in interconnection management and harmonisation are examined. The particular characteristics of the Swiss energy system, its prices and its legal frameworks are discussed. Cross-border trading and security of supply are also discussed

  2. Tax incentives in emerging economies

    OpenAIRE

    Brodzka, Alicja

    2013-01-01

    Emerging economies have introduced tax incentives for various reasons. In some countries in transition, such instruments may be seen as a counterweight to the investment disincentives inherent in the general tax system. In other countries, the incentives are intended to offset other disadvantages that investors may face, such as a lack of infrastructure, complicated and antiquated laws, bureaucratic complexities and weak administration. The article brings closer the issue of tax incentives of...

  3. Impact of the oil price and fiscal facilities on offshore mining at the Dutch Continental Shelf

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cate, Arie ten; Mulder, Machiel

    2007-01-01

    The surge in the oil price has raised questions about the magnitude of global reserves of oil. According to some analysts, the current high oil prices indicate a looming decline in the global production of oil. Others believe, however, that the increased level of the oil price encourages exploration and production activities, bringing the oil price to a lower equilibrium level in the near future. In this paper, we assess the impact of the unit profit (depending on the oil price) as well as fiscal facilities on the level of exploration and development drillings in the Dutch Continental Shelf. We conducted an econometric analysis of exploration and development drillings in the Dutch Continental Shelf over the period 1981-2003. Except a few fiscal changes, the regulatory framework for offshore activities in the Netherlands, the so-called 'small fields policy' was unchanged in this period. We find that the expected unit profit based on a moving average of the oil price significantly explains the level of both exploration and development drillings. In addition, the analysis suggests that fiscal facilities have only a temporary effect on exploration activities but are more important for development activities. We conclude that the oil price is a major economic incentive for activities of the mining industry

  4. INEQUALITY, INCENTIVES AND THE INTERPERSONAL TEST

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper

    2008-01-01

    ABSTRACT This article defends three claims: (1) even if Rawls' difference principle permits incentives to induce talented people to be more productive, it does not follow that it permits inequalities; (2) the difference principle, when adequately specified, may in some circumstances permit incent...... incentives and allow that the worst off are not made as well off as they could be; and (3) an argument for incentives might pass Cohen's interpersonal test even if it is unsound and might not pass it even if it is sound. 1...

  5. Price signals and end consumer flexibility in shortage situations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunnes, Arngrim; Grande, Ove S.

    2002-08-01

    This report is written as a part of the project ''Consumer flexibility and efficient use of ICT''. The project aim is 1) to provide a decision basis and suggest external conditions for a priority guided development of an infrastructure based on future ICT solutions and 2) develop, test and evaluate various measures which stimulate flexibility in consumption with consideration to power price, network rent and new market solutions. The central question in the report is how to stimulate the end consumer to be flexible in the consumption of electric power. The use of power price and system rent is desired tools for communicating the right price signals to the end consumers and thereby give the end users an incentive. The focus is primarily on the short term flexibility. The first chapter in the report gives an introduction to the price signals and the two way communication. There is a clear distinction between price signals from power suppliers and price signals from network companies. The two following chapters contain a more thorough discussion. As to the price signals from the power suppliers it is pointed out that most of the existing power contracts have a design so that they in the short term do not give the right price signals to the end users. It is proposed that two new contract types are tested: 1) Spot price and time settling. 2) Contract for reduced power price in a certain period provided the consumer is willing to reduce the load when 1) the spot price exceeds a level given by the end user, 2) the present load exceeds the subscribed level. In the chapter about the price signals from network companies there is first a brief introduction to the natural monopoly and the demands of the authorities to network tariffs. There is also a survey of the size of the system tariffs in the various counties. The central section of the chapter contains suggestions for designing network tariffs. Based on the deductions it is proposed that the project will test the

  6. 7 CFR 1000.50 - Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing... advanced pricing factors. Class prices per hundredweight of milk containing 3.5 percent butterfat, component prices, and advanced pricing factors shall be as follows. The prices and pricing factors described...

  7. Non-price competition in NHS secondary care contracting: empirical results.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gray, Keith; Bailey, Mark F

    2008-01-01

    The purpose of this paper is, for English acute NHS hospitals, to investigate how they operate their governance systems in the area of secondary care contracting and identify the key determinants of relationship building within the contacting/commissioning of secondary care focusing upon non-price competitive behaviour. A survey instrument was designed and mailed to a sample of all acute NHS hospitals in England of whom 35 per cent responded. This survey was then analysed using logit techniques. The analysis suggests that: those NHS Trusts offering volume discounts, non-price competitive incentives or having a strong belief in performance being by "payment by results" criteria are significantly more likely to offer augmented services to secondary care purchasers over and above contractual minima; those NHS Trusts strongly believing in the importance of non-price factors (such as contract augmentation or quality) in the contracting process are more likely to offer customisation of generic services; and those NHS Trusts using cost-sharing agreements to realign contracts when negotiating contracts or who strongly believe in the importance of service augmentation in strengthening relationships, or that increased hospital efficiency is the most important aspect of recent NHS reform are more likely to utilise default measures to help realign contracts. This paper fills a gap in the area of non-price competition in English NHS acute secondary care contracting.

  8. U.S. gas outlook: The price is right

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Parent, L.

    1997-01-01

    The gas business is on a roll. Prices are higher than ever since deregulation became a reality; the gas-well rig count is higher than it has been in years; pipelines are adding capacity; demand is growing; and the prospect of adding substantial gas-fired electric generating capacity is the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. The players also recognize that competition is fierce and that they need to be cost-effective operators at the leading edge of technology, and flexible enough to manage change. Supporting these premises, the following discussion covers: (1) pricing factors--trends for a slight increase, futures, the market driver, status/effect of storage, and supply/demand; (2) gas well drilling--an increase in 1996, effects of geographics on incentive, good news/bad news of creating another surplus; (3) energy marketing trends--electric power industry restructuring, pairing of electrics and pipelines; (4) gas industry standards--new proposals for 1997 implementation; and (5) Canada/Mexico--competition along the northern US border, Mexico still getting its act together

  9. Deregulation, market structure and gas prices in the Canadian Natural Gas Industry

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uhler, R.S.

    1992-01-01

    During the course of the development of the natural gas industry in Canada, gas purchase and sales markets have evolved from being relatively free of regulation to being highly regulated and back again. Though pipeline transport charges were regulated, the pipeline companies, or their subsidiaries, owned the gas that they transported and price and other provisions of purchase and sales contracts were freely negotiated with the producers at one end and distributing utilities or industrial users at the other end. The Western Accord of 1985 set the process of deregulation of the Canadian natural gas industry in motion. On November 1, 1986, natural gas prices in interprovincial trade were deregulated in that domestic natural gas prices were to be freely negotiated. Although not stated explicitly, government policy is to permit export prices to be freely negotiated so long as they do not fall below domestic prices. The deregulation process has dramatically changed the relationship between buyers and sellers. Of particular importance is that deregulation has permitted companies to negotiate gas purchase contracts directly with producers with the pipeline company acting solely as a gas transporter. The purpose of this paper is to examine the forces that have led to shorter term contracts and to examine the likely effect of these contract terms on reservoir development investment incentives. 5 refs., 3 figs

  10. Tax incentives as a solution to the uninsured: evidence from the self-employed.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gumus, Gulcin; Regan, Tracy L

    2013-11-01

    Between 1996 and 2003, a series of amendments were made to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that gradually increased the tax deduction for health insurance purchases by the self-employed (SE) from 25 to 100 percent. We study how these changes have influenced the likelihood that a SE person has health insurance coverage as the policyholder. The Current Population Survey is used to construct a data set corresponding to 1995-2005. Both the difference-in-differences and price elasticity of demand estimates suggest that the series of tax deductions did not provide sufficient incentives for the SE to obtain health insurance coverage. © The Author(s) 2014.

  11. The Promise of Tailoring Incentives for Healthy Behaviors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kullgren, Jeffrey T; Williams, Geoffrey C; Resnicow, Kenneth; An, Lawrence C; Rothberg, Amy; Volpp, Kevin G; Heisler, Michele

    2016-01-01

    To describe how tailoring financial incentives for healthy behaviors to employees' goals, values, and aspirations might improve the efficacy of incentives. We integrate insights from self-determination theory (SDT) with principles from behavioral economics in the design of financial incentives by linking how incentives could help meet an employee's life goals, values, or aspirations. Tailored financial incentives could be more effective than standard incentives in promoting autonomous motivation necessary to initiate healthy behaviors and sustain them after incentives are removed. Previous efforts to improve the design of financial incentives have tested different incentive designs that vary the size, schedule, timing, and target of incentives. Our strategy for tailoring incentives builds on strong evidence that difficult behavior changes are more successful when integrated with important life goals and values. We outline necessary research to examine the effectiveness of this approach among at-risk employees. Instead of offering simple financial rewards for engaging in healthy behaviors, existing programs could leverage incentives to promote employees' autonomous motivation for sustained health improvements. Effective application of these concepts could lead to programs more effective at improving health, potentially at lower cost. Our approach for the first time integrates key insights from SDT, behavioral economics, and tailoring to turn an extrinsic reward for behavior change into an internalized, self-sustaining motivator for long-term engagement in risk-reducing behaviors.

  12. Predicting the deforestation-trend under different carbon-prices

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Obersteiner Michael

    2006-12-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Global carbon stocks in forest biomass are decreasing by 1.1 Gt of carbon annually, owing to continued deforestation and forest degradation. Deforestation emissions are partly offset by forest expansion and increases in growing stock primarily in the extra-tropical north. Innovative financial mechanisms would be required to help reducing deforestation. Using a spatially explicit integrated biophysical and socio-economic land use model we estimated the impact of carbon price incentive schemes and payment modalities on deforestation. One payment modality is adding costs for carbon emission, the other is to pay incentives for keeping the forest carbon stock intact. Results Baseline scenario calculations show that close to 200 mil ha or around 5% of todays forest area will be lost between 2006 and 2025, resulting in a release of additional 17.5 GtC. Today's forest cover will shrink by around 500 million hectares, which is 1/8 of the current forest cover, within the next 100 years. The accumulated carbon release during the next 100 years amounts to 45 GtC, which is 15% of the total carbon stored in forests today. Incentives of 6 US$/tC for vulnerable standing biomass payed every 5 year will bring deforestation down by 50%. This will cause costs of 34 billion US$/year. On the other hand a carbon tax of 12 $/tC harvested forest biomass will also cut deforestation by half. The tax income will, if enforced, decrease from 6 billion US$ in 2005 to 4.3 billion US$ in 2025 and 0.7 billion US$ in 2100 due to decreasing deforestation speed. Conclusion Avoiding deforestation requires financial mechanisms that make retention of forests economically competitive with the currently often preferred option to seek profits from other land uses. Incentive payments need to be at a very high level to be effective against deforestation. Taxes on the other hand will extract budgetary revenues from the regions which are already poor. A combination of

  13. Lessons from game theory about healthcare system price inflation: evidence from a community-level case study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Agee, Mark D; Gates, Zane

    2013-02-01

    Game theory is useful for identifying conditions under which individual stakeholders in a collective action problem interact in ways that are more cooperative and in the best interest of the collective. The literature applying game theory to healthcare markets predicts that when providers set prices for services autonomously and in a noncooperative fashion, the market will be susceptible to ongoing price inflation. We compare the traditional fee-for-service pricing framework with an alternative framework involving modified doctor, hospital and insurer pricing and incentive strategies. While the fee-for-service framework generally allows providers to set prices autonomously, the alternative framework constrains providers to interact more cooperatively. We use community-level provider and insurer data to compare provider and insurer costs and patient wellness under the traditional and modified pricing frameworks. The alternative pricing framework assumes (i) providers agree to manage all outpatient claims; (ii) the insurer agrees to manage all inpatient clams; and (iii) insurance premiums are tied to patients' healthy behaviours. Consistent with game theory predictions, the more cooperative alternative pricing framework benefits all parties by producing substantially lower administrative costs along with higher profit margins for the providers and the insurer. With insurance premiums tied to consumers' risk-reducing behaviours, the cost of insurance likewise decreases for both the consumer and the insurer.

  14. Incentives and nuclear waste siting: Prospects and constraints

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnes, S.A.; Copenhaver, E.D.; Sorensen, J.H.; Soderstrom, E.J.; Reed, J.H.; Bjornstad, D.J.; Peelle, E.

    1983-01-01

    Limited anecdotal evidence from existing incentive-based facility sitings, and from a survey of rural Wisconsin residents in 1980 regarding the acceptability of a nuclear waste repository, indicates that incentives may help ahcieve the twin goals of increasing local support and decreasing local opposition to hosting nuclear waste facilities. Incentives are classified according to functional categories (i.e., mitigation, compensation, and reward), and prerequisites to the use of incentives are outlined (i.e., guarantee of public health and safety, some measure of local control, and a legitimation of negotiations during siting). Criteria for evaluating the utility of incentives packages may be more useful than single incentives, and nonmonetary incentives, such as independent monitoring and access to credible information, may be as important in eliciting support as monetary incentives. 54 references, 1 figure, 4 tables

  15. On the long run effects of market splitting: Why more price zones might decrease welfare

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grimm, Veronika; Martin, Alexander; Weibelzahl, Martin; Zöttl, Gregor

    2016-01-01

    In liberalized electricity markets we observe different approaches to congestion management. While nodal pricing is implemented in Canada and some markets in the United States, European markets are split up into a limited number of price zones with uniform prices, in order to at least partially realize the benefits of regional price differentiation. Zonal boundaries often coincide with national borders, but some countries are also split into multiple zones. In this paper we shed light on possible negative welfare effects of market splitting that arise in a model where investment incentives in new generation capacity are taken into account if zones are misspecified. We show that standard approaches to configure price zones – on the basis of projected nodal price differences or congested transmission capacity – may fail to suggest reasonable zone specifications. Also an adjustment of Available Transfer Capacities (ATCs) between zones or a switch to flow-based market splitting does not ensure positive welfare effects. Our analysis suggests that a careful and detailed evaluation of the system is needed to ensure a reasonable zone configuration. - Highlights: •We analyze investment and production in energy only markets with market splitting. •Market splitting can lead to decreased welfare even for reasonably chosen zones. •We identify the reasons for the negative impact of introducing prices zones.

  16. Incentives and the siting of radioactive waste facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carnes, S.A.; Copenhaver, E.D.; Reed, J.H.; Soderstrom, E.J.; Sorensen, J.H.; Peelle, E.; Bjornstad, D.J.

    1982-08-01

    The importance of social and institutional issues in the siting of nuclear waste facilities has been recognized in recent years. Limited evidence from a survey of rural Wisconsin residents in 1980 indicates that incentives may help achieve the twin goals of increasing local support and decreasing local opposition to hosting nuclear waste facilities. Incentives are classified according to functional categories (i.e., mitigation, compensation, and reward) and the conditions which may be prerequisites to the use of incentives are outlined (i.e., guarantee of public health and safety, some measure of local control, and a legitimation of negotiations during siting). Criteria for evaluating the utility of incentives in nuclear waste repository siting are developed. Incentive packages may be more useful than single incentives, and nonmonetary incentives, such as independent monitoring and access to credible information, may be as important in eliciting support as monetary incentives. Without careful attention to prerequisites in the siting process it is not likely that incentives will facilitate the siting process.

  17. DSM shareholder incentives: Current designs and economic theory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stoft, S.; Eto, J.; Kito, S.

    1995-01-01

    This report reviews recent DSM shareholder incentive designs and performance at 10 US utilities identifies opportunities for regulators to improve the design of DSM shareholder incentive mechanisms to increase the procurement of cost-effective DSM resources. We develop six recommendations: (1) apply shared-savings incentives to DSM resource programs; (2) use markup incentives for individual programs only when net benefits are difficult to measure, but are known to be positive; (3) set expected incentive payments based on covering a utility's open-quotes hidden costs,close quotes which include some transitional management and risk-adjusted opportunity costs; (4) use higher marginal incentives rates than are currently found in practice, but limit total incentive payments by adding a fixed charge; (5) mitigate risks to regulators and utilities by lowering marginal incentive rates at high and low performance levels; and (6) use an aggregate incentive mechanism for all DSM resource programs, with limited exceptions (e.g., information programs where markups are more appropriate)

  18. Incentives and the siting of radioactive waste facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carnes, S.A.; Copenhaver, E.D.; Reed, J.H.; Soderstrom, E.J.; Sorensen, J.H.; Peelle, E.; Bjornstad, D.J.

    1982-08-01

    The importance of social and institutional issues in the siting of nuclear waste facilities has been recognized in recent years. Limited evidence from a survey of rural Wisconsin residents in 1980 indicates that incentives may help achieve the twin goals of increasing local support and decreasing local opposition to hosting nuclear waste facilities. Incentives are classified according to functional categories (i.e., mitigation, compensation, and reward) and the conditions which may be prerequisites to the use of incentives are outlined (i.e., guarantee of public health and safety, some measure of local control, and a legitimation of negotiations during siting). Criteria for evaluating the utility of incentives in nuclear waste repository siting are developed. Incentive packages may be more useful than single incentives, and nonmonetary incentives, such as independent monitoring and access to credible information, may be as important in eliciting support as monetary incentives. Without careful attention to prerequisites in the siting process it is not likely that incentives will facilitate the siting process

  19. Pricing and reimbursement of orphan drugs: the need for more transparency

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Simoens Steven

    2011-06-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Pricing and reimbursement of orphan drugs are an issue of high priority for policy makers, legislators, health care professionals, industry leaders, academics and patients. This study aims to conduct a literature review to provide insight into the drivers of orphan drug pricing and reimbursement. Although orphan drug pricing follows the same economic logic as drug pricing in general, the monopolistic power of orphan drugs results in high prices: a orphan drugs benefit from a period of marketing exclusivity; b few alternative health technologies are available; c third-party payers and patients have limited negotiating power; d manufacturers attempt to maximise orphan drug prices within the constraints of domestic pricing and reimbursement policies; and e substantial R&D costs need to be recouped from a small number of patients. Although these conditions apply to some orphan drugs, they do not apply to all orphan drugs. Indeed, the small number of patients treated with an orphan drug and the limited economic viability of orphan drugs can be questioned in a number of cases. Additionally, manufacturers have an incentive to game the system by artificially creating monopolistic market conditions. Given their high price for an often modest effectiveness, orphan drugs are unlikely to provide value for money. However, additional criteria are used to inform reimbursement decisions in some countries. These criteria may include: the seriousness of the disease; the availability of other therapies to treat the disease; and the cost to the patient if the medicine is not reimbursed. Therefore, the maximum cost per unit of outcome that a health care payer is willing to pay for a drug could be set higher for orphan drugs to which society attaches a high social value. There is a need for a transparent and evidence-based approach towards orphan drug pricing and reimbursement. Such an approach should be targeted at demonstrating the relative effectiveness

  20. Pricing and reimbursement of orphan drugs: the need for more transparency.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Simoens, Steven

    2011-06-17

    Pricing and reimbursement of orphan drugs are an issue of high priority for policy makers, legislators, health care professionals, industry leaders, academics and patients. This study aims to conduct a literature review to provide insight into the drivers of orphan drug pricing and reimbursement. Although orphan drug pricing follows the same economic logic as drug pricing in general, the monopolistic power of orphan drugs results in high prices: a) orphan drugs benefit from a period of marketing exclusivity; b) few alternative health technologies are available; c) third-party payers and patients have limited negotiating power; d) manufacturers attempt to maximise orphan drug prices within the constraints of domestic pricing and reimbursement policies; and e) substantial R&D costs need to be recouped from a small number of patients. Although these conditions apply to some orphan drugs, they do not apply to all orphan drugs. Indeed, the small number of patients treated with an orphan drug and the limited economic viability of orphan drugs can be questioned in a number of cases. Additionally, manufacturers have an incentive to game the system by artificially creating monopolistic market conditions. Given their high price for an often modest effectiveness, orphan drugs are unlikely to provide value for money. However, additional criteria are used to inform reimbursement decisions in some countries. These criteria may include: the seriousness of the disease; the availability of other therapies to treat the disease; and the cost to the patient if the medicine is not reimbursed. Therefore, the maximum cost per unit of outcome that a health care payer is willing to pay for a drug could be set higher for orphan drugs to which society attaches a high social value. There is a need for a transparent and evidence-based approach towards orphan drug pricing and reimbursement. Such an approach should be targeted at demonstrating the relative effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and

  1. Designing Incentives for Public School Teachers: Evidence from a Texas Incentive Pay Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    Springer, Matthew G.; Taylor, Lori L.

    2016-01-01

    Pay-for-performance is a popular public education reform, but there is little evidence about the characteristics of a well-designed incentive pay plan for teachers. Some of the literature suggests that effective incentive plans must offer relatively large awards to induce behavioral changes. On the other hand, the experimental economics literature…

  2. Specialty pharmaceuticals: policy initiatives to improve assessment, pricing, prescription, and use.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Robinson, James C; Howell, Scott

    2014-10-01

    The value of "specialty pharmaceuticals" for cancer and other complex conditions depends not merely on their molecular structures but also on the manner in which the drugs are assessed, insured, priced, prescribed, and used. This article analyzes the five principal stages through which a specialty drug must pass on its journey from the laboratory to the bedside. These include regulatory approval by the Food and Drug Administration for market access, insurance coverage, pricing and payment, physician prescription, and patient engagement. If structured appropriately, each stage improves performance and supports continued research and development. If structured inappropriately, however, each stage adds to administrative burdens, distorts clinical decision making, and weakens incentives for innovation. Cautious optimism is in order, but neither the continued development of breakthrough products nor their use according to evidence-based guidelines can be taken for granted. Project HOPE—The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc.

  3. Incentives to promote family planning.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Heil, Sarah H; Gaalema, Diann E; Herrmann, Evan S

    2012-11-01

    Over the past 60 years, population control has become an increasingly urgent issue worldwide as a growing population strains already limited resources. The use of financial incentives to promote family planning is an innovative approach that has potential to make a contribution to efforts to better manage population growth. This report reviews eight studies that examined the effect of incentives on family planning. Published studies that tested the impact of incentives to promote some aspect of family planning and included an appropriate control or comparison condition were reviewed. Incentives have been used to promote attendance at contraceptive education sessions, adoption and continuation of contraceptive methods, sterilization, and to limit family size. All but one of the eight studies reviewed reported positive outcomes, but weaknesses in study design and execution limit the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn. Review of this literature suggests that family planning behaviors, like other behaviors, are sensitive to incentives. Given the tremendous need for efficacious interventions in global efforts to manage population growth, further research on this topic using more rigorous experimental methods is warranted. Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  4. Price Transparency in Primary Care: Can Patients Learn About Costs When Scheduling an Appointment?

    Science.gov (United States)

    Saloner, Brendan; Cope, Lisa Clemans; Hempstead, Katherine; Rhodes, Karin V; Polsky, Daniel; Kenney, Genevieve M

    2017-07-01

    Cost-sharing in health insurance plans creates incentives for patients to shop for lower prices, but it is unknown what price information patients can obtain when scheduling office visits. To determine whether new patients can obtain price information for a primary care visit and identify variation across insurance types, offices, and geographic areas. Simulated patient methodology in which trained interviewers posed as non-elderly adults seeking new patient primary care appointments. Caller insurance type (employer-sponsored insurance [ESI], Marketplace, or uninsured) and plan were experimentally manipulated. Callers who were offered a visit asked for price information. Unadjusted means and regression-adjusted differences by insurance, office types, and geography were calculated. Calls to a representative sample of primary care offices in ten states in 2014: Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Illinois, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Texas (N = 7865). Callers recorded whether they were able to obtain a price. If not, they recorded whether they were referred to other sources for price information. Overall, 61.8% of callers with ESI were able to obtain a price, versus 89.2% of uninsured and 47.3% of Marketplace callers (P information was also more readily available in small offices and in counties with high uninsured rates. Among callers not receiving a price, 72.1% of callers with ESI were referred to other sources (billing office or insurance company), versus 25.8% of uninsured and 50.9% of Marketplace callers (P information is often unavailable for privately insured patients seeking primary care visits at the time a visit is scheduled.

  5. The Impact of Hybrid Electric Vehicles Incentives on Demand and the Determinants of Hybrid-Vehicle Adoption

    Science.gov (United States)

    Riggieri, Alison

    incentives. Overall, these results suggest automobile manufacturing did not impact whether these policies were implemented, nor were they implemented to address air quality issues or gas price increases. Rather these policies were responses to popular support for hybrid vehicles. In addition, this dissertation identifies the average treatment effect of these incentives on state-level demand for hybrid vehicles. These effects are estimated using traditional parametric techniques, difference-in-difference regression, and fixed effects on two comparison groups: (1) the natural control group, states that did not adopt subsidies, and (2) a constructed control group, states that proposed subsidies during this same time period but did not adopt them. In addition to these parametric models, propensity score matching was used to construct a third comparison group using the models that identified determinants of the policy adoption. These findings were supplemented by exploratory analyses using the individual-level National Household Travel Survey. This multitude of evaluative analyses shows that overall, monetary hybrid incentives are not overwhelming effective in promoting the diffusion of this technology, but that HOV lane exemptions, however, if implemented in places with high traffic congestion, were found to impact aggregate demand and an individual's propensity to adopt a hybrid. The other two types of incentives, sales tax exemptions and income tax credits, were not found to be effective at the aggregate or the individual level. In addition, travel behavior was found to strongly predict adoption, more so than socioeconomic variables, stated attitudes, or characteristics of the built environment. The number of walking trips per month and the number of times a person used public transportation were found to be significant predictors of hybrid adoption, implying the decision to adopt a hybrid includes factors other than purely economic ones, such as environmental attitudes. These

  6. Impact analysis of coal-electricity pricing linkage scheme in China based on stochastic frontier cost function

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li, Hong-Zhou; Tian, Xian-Liang; Zou, Tao

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • This study evaluates the coal-electricity pricing linkage policy in China. • Six stochastic frontier cost models are used to estimate efficiency measures. • The coal-electricity pricing linkage scheme is a double-edged sword. • We suggest the threshold value of 5% or group specific. - Abstract: This study evaluates the feasibility and fairness of 2012 amendment to coal-electricity pricing linkage policy in China. Our empirical design is based on several stochastic frontier cost functions and the results show that the amended pricing linkage scheme is a double-edged sword as follows. On the one hand, it provides incentives for less-efficient (with efficiency less than 90%) power plants to increase their efficiency. One the other hand, it imposes a penalty to highly-efficient power plants (with efficiency more than 90%). And even worse, the higher the efficiency is, the bigger the penalty will be. To make the current coal-electricity pricing linkage scheme more feasible, we suggest the threshold value of 5 instead of 10%, and a group specific threshold value instead of the current one-size-for-all practice

  7. The Price Is Right, but Are the Bids? An Investigation of Rational Decision Theory.

    OpenAIRE

    Berk, Jonathan B; Hughson, Eric; Vandezande, Kirk

    1996-01-01

    The television game show The Price Is Right is used as a laboratory to conduct a preference-free test of rational decision theory in an environment with substantial economic incentives. It is found that contestants' strategies are transparently suboptimal. In response to this evidence, simple rules of thumb are developed that are shown to explain observed bidding patterns better than rational decision theory. Further, learning during the show reduces the frequency of strategic errors. This is...

  8. Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Longfei He

    2015-04-01

    Full Text Available We study an emission-dependent dyadic fashion supply chain made up of a supplier and a manufacturer, both of which can reduce their own component/product emissions to serve the carbon-footprint sensitive consumers. With Carbon Tax regulation, we consider four scenarios resulting from two ways in form of adopting transfer price contract and/or introducing third-party emission-reduction service (TPERS to enhance the efficiency of systematic emission reductions. We refine four models from these corresponding scenarios, which in turn constitute a decision-making framework composed of determining vertical incentives and choosing supply chain structures. By exploiting Stackelberg games in all models, we compare their emission reduction efficiencies and profitability for each pair of settings. Theoretic analysis and numerical studies show that adopting vertical transfer payment schemes can definitely benefit channel carbon footprint reduction and Pareto improvement of supply chain profitability, regardless of whether the emission-reduction service exists or not. However, whether introducing TPERS or not is heavily depending on systematic parameters when the transfer payment incentive is adopted there. We also provide insights on the sensitivity of carbon tax parameters with respect to the supply chain performance, overall carbon emission reduction, vertical incentive and TPERS adopting decision-makings.

  9. Curtailment of renewable generation: Economic optimality and incentives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Klinge Jacobsen, Henrik; Schröder, Sascha Thorsten

    2012-01-01

    The loss from curtailing generation based on renewable energy sources is generally seen as an unacceptable solution by the public. The main argument is that it is a loss of green energy and an economic loss to curtail generation with near zero marginal costs. However, this view could lead to overinvestment in grid infrastructure and underinvestment in renewable energy sources. This article argues that some curtailment of fluctuating (variable) generation is optimal. We address the possible contributions to total curtailment from involuntary and voluntary curtailment. The costs of curtailment in terms of lost generation are discussed based on market price and support levels including the rationale for compensating generators for losses. The extent of actual curtailment is illustrated by examples from different global markets. In general, both the value of the curtailed energy and the amount of curtailed energy relative to total fluctuating generation is low but rising. Single generators may be affected considerably if insufficient compensation measures are in place. In the future, optimal curtailment will increase along with an increased share of fluctuating renewable generation. Extending renewable generation comparatively cheaply can be achieved by the installation of additional capacity at offshore locations until optimal curtailment levels are reached. - Highlights: ► Curtailment of renewable generation can be optimal. ► Voluntary and involuntary curtailment categories. ► Compensation for involuntary curtailment should be provided. ► Asymmetrical balancing price provides incentive for voluntary curtailment. ► Network enforcement costs can be reduced per renewable generation.

  10. Incentives for partitioning, revisited

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cloninger, M.O.

    1980-01-01

    The incentives for separating and eliminating various elements from radioactive waste prior to final geologic disposal were investigated. Exposure pathways to humans were defined, and potential radiation doses to an individual living within the region of influence of the underground storage site were calculated. The assumed radionuclide source was 1/5 of the accumulated high-level waste from the US nuclear power economy through the year 2000. The repository containing the waste was assumed to be located in a reference salt site geology. The study required numerous assumptions concerning the transport of radioactivity from the geologic storage site to man. The assumptions used maximized the estimated potential radiation doses, particularly in the case of the intrusion water well scenario, where hydrologic flow field dispersion effects were ignored. Thus, incentives for removing elements from the waste tended to be maximized. Incentives were also maximized by assuming that elements removed from the waste could be eliminated from the earth without risk. The results of the study indicate that for reasonable disposal conditions, incentives for partitioning any elements from the waste in order to minimize the risk to humans are marginal at best

  11. Late-stage pharmaceutical R&D and pricing policies under two-stage regulation.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Jobjörnsson, Sebastian; Forster, Martin; Pertile, Paolo; Burman, Carl-Fredrik

    2016-12-01

    We present a model combining the two regulatory stages relevant to the approval of a new health technology: the authorisation of its commercialisation and the insurer's decision about whether to reimburse its cost. We show that the degree of uncertainty concerning the true value of the insurer's maximum willingness to pay for a unit increase in effectiveness has a non-monotonic impact on the optimal price of the innovation, the firm's expected profit and the optimal sample size of the clinical trial. A key result is that there exists a range of values of the uncertainty parameter over which a reduction in uncertainty benefits the firm, the insurer and patients. We consider how different policy parameters may be used as incentive mechanisms, and the incentives to invest in R&D for marginal projects such as those targeting rare diseases. The model is calibrated using data on a new treatment for cystic fibrosis. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  12. Tax shift : eliminating subsidies and moving to full cost electricity pricing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gibbons, J.

    2008-01-01

    In order to ensure that Ontario's service needs are met at the lowest possible total cost, energy conservation and small-scale distributed generation options must be able to compete with large scale-centralized generation and transmission options on a level playing field. This report discussed how electricity is priced in Ontario. The report described the policies that subsidize coal and nuclear generation and promote excessive consumption of grid-supplied electricity. The report also presented an analysis of the impact of these subsidies and policies on Ontario's electricity consumption, electricity productivity, standard of living and air pollutant emissions. It described a practical strategy whereby these subsidies can be eliminated by recycling or shifting the monies currently spent on subsidies in a way that creates an incentive to reduce electricity consumption. It also described how full cost pricing could lead to a net financial benefit for residential customers as well as an adaptation strategy for businesses that would ensure that they remain competitive. Finally the report identified ten major subsidies that artificially reduce the cost of electricity in Ontario. These included below-market water royalty rates; corporate income tax revenue subsidy for nuclear debt; sales tax exemption; average cost pricing; and bulk metering. It was concluded that phasing out the subsidies for grid-supplied electricity and moving to full cost pricing will provide multiple benefits for Ontario. 36 refs., 5 tabs., 5 figs

  13. 48 CFR 1552.216-77 - Award term incentive.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... award term incentive periods] years. (c) Right not to grant or cancel the award term incentive. (1) The Government has the unilateral right not to grant or to cancel award term incentive periods and the associated... the award term incentive is cancelled, a unilateral modification will cite this clause as the...

  14. Healthy and Unhealthy Food Prices across Neighborhoods and Their Association with Neighborhood Socioeconomic Status and Proportion Black/Hispanic.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kern, David M; Auchincloss, Amy H; Robinson, Lucy F; Stehr, Mark F; Pham-Kanter, Genevieve

    2017-08-01

    This paper evaluates variation in food prices within and between neighborhoods to improve our understanding of access to healthy foods in urbanized areas and potential economic incentives and barriers to consuming a higher-quality diet. Prices of a selection of healthier foods (dairy, fruit juice, and frozen vegetables) and unhealthy foods (soda, sweets, and salty snacks) were obtained from 1953 supermarkets across the USA during 2009-2012 and were linked to census block group socio-demographics. Analyses evaluated associations between neighborhood SES and proportion Black/Hispanic and the prices of healthier and unhealthy foods, and the relative price of healthier foods compared with unhealthy foods (healthy-to-unhealthy price ratio). Linear hierarchical regression models were used to explore geospatial variation and adjust for confounders. Overall, the price of healthier foods was nearly twice as high as the price of unhealthy foods ($0.590 vs $0.298 per serving; healthy-to-unhealthy price ratio of 1.99). This trend was consistent across all neighborhood characteristics. After adjusting for covariates, no association was found between food prices (healthy, unhealthy, or the healthy-to-unhealthy ratio) and neighborhood SES. Similarly, there was no association between the proportion Black/Hispanic and healthier food price, a very small positive association with unhealthy price, and a modest negative association with the healthy-to-unhealthy ratio. No major differences were seen in food prices across levels of neighborhood SES and proportion Black/Hispanic; however, the price of healthier food was twice as expensive as unhealthy food per serving on average.

  15. Three essays on access pricing

    Science.gov (United States)

    Sydee, Ahmed Nasim

    In the first essay, a theoretical model is developed to determine the time path of optimal access price in the telecommunications industry. Determining the optimal access price is an important issue in the economics of telecommunications. Setting a high access price discourages potential entrants; a low access price, on the other hand, amounts to confiscation of private property because the infrastructure already built by the incumbent is sunk. Furthermore, a low access price does not give the incumbent incentives to maintain the current network and to invest in new infrastructures. Much of the existing literature on access pricing suffers either from the limitations of a static framework or from the assumption that all costs are avoidable. The telecommunications industry is subject to high stranded costs and, therefore, to address this issue a dynamic model is imperative. This essay presents a dynamic model of one-way access pricing in which the compensation involved in deregulatory taking is formalized and then analyzed. The short run adjustment after deregulatory taking has occurred is carried out and discussed. The long run equilibrium is also analyzed. A time path for the Ramsey price is shown as the correct dynamic price of access. In the second essay, a theoretical model is developed to determine the time path of optimal access price for an infrastructure that is characterized by congestion and lumpy investment. Much of the theoretical literature on access pricing of infrastructure prescribes that the access price be set at the marginal cost of the infrastructure. In proposing this rule of access pricing, the conventional analysis assumes that infrastructure investments are infinitely divisible so that it makes sense to talk about the marginal cost of investment. Often it is the case that investments in infrastructure are lumpy and can only be made in large chunks, and this renders the marginal cost concept meaningless. In this essay, we formalize a model of

  16. U.S. Army Incentive Program: Incentives That Motivate Recruiters

    National Research Council Canada - National Science Library

    Starkey, Benjamin

    1999-01-01

    .... Sixty recruiters and staff personnel at the brigade, battalion and company echelons were randomly selected and interviewed on how the various national and local incentives motivate recruiters to meet...

  17. Drilling contracts and incentives

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osmundsen, Petter; Sorenes, Terje; Toft, Anders

    2008-01-01

    Shortages of rigs and personnel have encouraged discussion of designing incentive contracts in the drilling sector. However, for the drilling contracts, there are not a large variety of contract types in use. This article describes and analyses incentives for drilling contractors. These are directly represented by the compensation formats utilised in the present and in the consecutive drilling contracts. Indirectly, incentives are also provided by the evaluation criteria that oil companies use for awarding drilling assignments. Changes in contract format pose a number of relevant questions relating to resource management, and the article takes an in-depth look at some of these. Do evaluation criteria for awarding drilling assignments encourage the development of new technology and solutions? How will a stronger focus on drilling efficiency influence reservoir utilisation?

  18. Countervailing incentives in value-based payment.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Arnold, Daniel R

    2017-09-01

    Payment reform has been at the forefront of the movement toward higher-value care in the U.S. health care system. A common belief is that volume-based incentives embedded in fee-for-service need to be replaced with value-based payments. While this belief is well-intended, value-based payment also contains perverse incentives. In particular, behavioral economists have identified several features of individual decision making that reverse some of the typical recommendations for inducing desirable behavior through financial incentives. This paper discusses the countervailing incentives associated with four behavioral economic concepts: loss aversion, relative social ranking, inertia or status quo bias, and extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation. Copyright © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

  19. Effort and Selection Effects of Incentive Contracts

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Bouwens, J.F.M.G.; van Lent, L.A.G.M.

    2003-01-01

    We show that the improved effort of employees associated with incentive contracts depends on the properties of the performance measures used in the contract.We also find that the power of incentives in the contract is only indirectly related to any improved employee effort.High powered incentive

  20. The role of behavioral economic incentive design and demographic characteristics in financial incentive-based approaches to changing health behaviors: a meta-analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Haff, Nancy; Patel, Mitesh S; Lim, Raymond; Zhu, Jingsan; Troxel, Andrea B; Asch, David A; Volpp, Kevin G

    2015-01-01

    To evaluate the use of behavioral economics to design financial incentives to promote health behavior change and to explore associations with demographic characteristics. Studies performed by the Center for Health Incentives and Behavioral Economics at the University of Pennsylvania published between January 2006 and March 2014. Randomized, controlled trials with available participant-level data. Studies that did not use financial incentives to promote health behavior change were excluded. Participant-level data from seven studies were pooled. Meta-analysis on the pooled sample using a random-effects model with interaction terms to examine treatment effects and whether they varied by incentive structure or demographic characteristics. The pooled study sample comprised 1403 participants, of whom 35% were female, 70% were white, 24% were black, and the mean age was 48 years (standard deviation 11.2 years). In the fully adjusted model, participants offered financial incentives had higher odds of behavior change (odds ratio [OR]: 3.96; p financial incentives and gender, age, race, income, or education. When further adjusting for incentive structure, blacks had higher odds than whites of achieving behavior change (OR: 1.67; p Financial incentives designed using concepts from behavioral economics were effective for promoting health behavior change. There were no large and consistent relationships between the effectiveness of financial incentives and observable demographic characteristics. Second-order examinations of incentive structure suggest potential relationships among the effectiveness of financial incentives, incentive structure, and the demographic characteristics of race and income.

  1. Research document no. 25. Prices versus quantities: environmental policies for promoting the development of renewable energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menanteau, Ph.; Finon, D.; Lamy, M.L.

    2001-05-01

    Now that the risks of climate change have been confirmed and the European States have declared their willingness to pursue ambitious objectives for producing electricity from renewable energy sources, it becomes crucial to take a look at the relative efficiency of the different incentive schemes used. Such schemes may focus on quantities, or on prices. Whatever the system chosen, the role of the public authorities is quite specific: to stimulate technical progress and speed up the technological learning processes so that ultimately renewable energy technologies will be able to compete with conventional technologies, once the environmental costs have been internalized. The authors examine the efficiency of the different incentive schemes for the development of renewable energy sources, both from a theoretical point of view by comparing price-based approaches with quantity-based approaches, and from a practical point of view by looking at concrete examples of how these different instruments have been implemented. The paper concludes that a system of fixed feed-in tariffs is more efficient than a bidding system, but highlights the theoretical interest of green certificate trading which must be confirmed through practice, given the influence of market structures and rules on the performance of this type of approach. (A.L.B.)

  2. Professional norms, public service motivation and economic incentives

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Andersen, Lotte Bøgh

    2007-01-01

    The theories of professions, public service motivation, and economic incentives explain the behaviour of the producers of publicly financed services differently. They emphasize professional norms, sector, and economic incentives, respectively. The few existing attempts to integrate these theories...... have, however, indicated that these factors interact. Using interviews, surveys and registers, the paper investigated how professional norms, economic incentives and sector affected the behaviour of Danish dentists and physicians. It was found that when strong professional norms existed, economic...... incentives were unimportant for both public and private employees. In contrast, when no firm professional norm applied, economic incentives affected behaviour. Controlling for different economic incentives, sector does not seem to affect the behaviour much. The results imply that the economic...

  3. Incentives for reducing emissions in Krakow

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Uberman, R.; Pierce, B.; Lazecki, A.

    1994-01-01

    This effort is identifying, specific incentives that may be used by Krakow city officials to encourage, residents to change the way they heat their homes and businesses in order to reduce pollution. This paper describes the incentives study for converting small coal or coke-fired boilers to gas in the Old Town area. A similar study looked at incentives for expanding the district heating system and future analyses will be performed for home stove options

  4. Generation and Demand Scheduling for a Grid-Connected Hybrid Microgrid Considering Price-based Incentives

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Hernández, Adriana Carolina Luna; Aldana, Nelson Leonardo Diaz; Savaghebi, Mehdi

    2017-01-01

    Microgrids rely on energy management levels to optimally schedule their components. Conventionally, the research in this field has been focused on the optimal formulation of the generation or the demand side management separately without considering real case scenarios and validated only...... by simulation. This paper presents the power scheduling of a real site microgrid under a price-based demand response program defined in Shanghai, China managing generation and demand simultaneously. The proposed optimization problem aims to minimize operating cost by managing renewable energy sources as well...

  5. The merit-order effect in the Italian power market: The impact of solar and wind generation on national wholesale electricity prices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clò, Stefano; Cataldi, Alessandra; Zoppoli, Pietro

    2015-01-01

    Italy promoted one of the most generous renewable support schemes worldwide which resulted in a high increase of solar power generation. We analyze the Italian day-ahead wholesale electricity market, finding empirical evidence of the merit-order effect. Over the period 2005–2013 an increase of 1 GWh in the hourly average of daily production from solar and wind sources has, on average, reduced wholesale electricity prices by respectively 2.3€/MWh and 4.2€/MWh and has amplified their volatility. The impact on prices has decreased over time in correspondence with the increase in solar and wind electricity production. We estimate that, over the period 2009–2013, solar production has generated higher monetary savings than wind production, mainly because the former is more prominent than the latter. However, in the solar case, monetary savings are not sufficient to compensate the cost of the related supporting schemes which are entirely internalized within end-user tariffs, causing a reduction of the consumer surplus, while the opposite occurs in the case of wind. - Highlights: • We find empirical evidence of the merit-order effect in the Italian market. • 1 GWh from solar and wind (hourly average) reduces prices by 2.3€/MW and 4.2€/MWh. • The impact of RES on price has declined as RES production has increased. • Monetary savings from solar production do not compensate the cost of the incentives. • Monetary savings from wind production are higher than the cost of the incentives

  6. Incentive-based demand response programs designed by asset-light retail electricity providers for the day-ahead market

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Fotouhi Ghazvini, Mohammad Ali; Faria, Pedro; Ramos, Sergio

    2015-01-01

    how a REP with light physical assets, such as DG (distributed generation) units and ESS (energy storage systems), can survive in a competitive retail market. The paper discusses the effective risk management strategies for the REPs to deal with the uncertainties of the DAM (day-ahead market) and how...... to hedge the financial losses in the market. A two-stage stochastic programming problem is formulated. It aims to establish the financial incentive-based DR programs and the optimal dispatch of the DG units and ESSs. The uncertainty of the forecasted day-ahead load demand and electricity price is also...... taken into account with a scenario-based approach. The principal advantage of this model for REPs is reducing the risk of financial losses in DAMs, and the main benefit for the whole system is market power mitigation by virtually increasing the price elasticity of demand and reducing the peak demand....

  7. Load-shift incentives for household demand response: Evaluation of hourly dynamic pricing and rebate schemes in a wind-based electricity system

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Katz, Jonas; Møller Andersen, Frits; Morthorst, Poul Erik

    2016-01-01

    under scenarios with large shares of wind power in a Danish case study. Our results indicate strategies that could be favourable in ensuring high adoption of products and efficient response by households. We find that simple pricing schemes, though economically less efficient, could become important......Applying a partial equilibrium model of the electricity market we analyse effects of exposing household electricity customers to retail products with variable pricing. Both short-term and long-term effects of exposing customers to hourly spot market prices and a simpler rebate scheme are analysed...... in an early phase to initialise the development of household demand response. At a later point, when long-term dynamics take effect, a larger effort should be made to shift consumers onto real-time rates, and an increased focus on overall adoption of variable pricing will be required. Another finding...

  8. Incentives Increase Participation in Mass Dog Rabies Vaccination Clinics and Methods of Coverage Estimation Are Assessed to Be Accurate.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Abel B Minyoo

    2015-12-01

    Full Text Available In this study we show that incentives (dog collars and owner wristbands are effective at increasing owner participation in mass dog rabies vaccination clinics and we conclude that household questionnaire surveys and the mark-re-sight (transect survey method for estimating post-vaccination coverage are accurate when all dogs, including puppies, are included. Incentives were distributed during central-point rabies vaccination clinics in northern Tanzania to quantify their effect on owner participation. In villages where incentives were handed out participation increased, with an average of 34 more dogs being vaccinated. Through economies of scale, this represents a reduction in the cost-per-dog of $0.47. This represents the price-threshold under which the cost of the incentive used must fall to be economically viable. Additionally, vaccination coverage levels were determined in ten villages through the gold-standard village-wide census technique, as well as through two cheaper and quicker methods (randomized household questionnaire and the transect survey. Cost data were also collected. Both non-gold standard methods were found to be accurate when puppies were included in the calculations, although the transect survey and the household questionnaire survey over- and under-estimated the coverage respectively. Given that additional demographic data can be collected through the household questionnaire survey, and that its estimate of coverage is more conservative, we recommend this method. Despite the use of incentives the average vaccination coverage was below the 70% threshold for eliminating rabies. We discuss the reasons and suggest solutions to improve coverage. Given recent international targets to eliminate rabies, this study provides valuable and timely data to help improve mass dog vaccination programs in Africa and elsewhere.

  9. Incentives Increase Participation in Mass Dog Rabies Vaccination Clinics and Methods of Coverage Estimation Are Assessed to Be Accurate

    Science.gov (United States)

    Steinmetz, Melissa; Czupryna, Anna; Bigambo, Machunde; Mzimbiri, Imam; Powell, George; Gwakisa, Paul

    2015-01-01

    In this study we show that incentives (dog collars and owner wristbands) are effective at increasing owner participation in mass dog rabies vaccination clinics and we conclude that household questionnaire surveys and the mark-re-sight (transect survey) method for estimating post-vaccination coverage are accurate when all dogs, including puppies, are included. Incentives were distributed during central-point rabies vaccination clinics in northern Tanzania to quantify their effect on owner participation. In villages where incentives were handed out participation increased, with an average of 34 more dogs being vaccinated. Through economies of scale, this represents a reduction in the cost-per-dog of $0.47. This represents the price-threshold under which the cost of the incentive used must fall to be economically viable. Additionally, vaccination coverage levels were determined in ten villages through the gold-standard village-wide census technique, as well as through two cheaper and quicker methods (randomized household questionnaire and the transect survey). Cost data were also collected. Both non-gold standard methods were found to be accurate when puppies were included in the calculations, although the transect survey and the household questionnaire survey over- and under-estimated the coverage respectively. Given that additional demographic data can be collected through the household questionnaire survey, and that its estimate of coverage is more conservative, we recommend this method. Despite the use of incentives the average vaccination coverage was below the 70% threshold for eliminating rabies. We discuss the reasons and suggest solutions to improve coverage. Given recent international targets to eliminate rabies, this study provides valuable and timely data to help improve mass dog vaccination programs in Africa and elsewhere. PMID:26633821

  10. The role of regulation, fiscal incentives and changes in tastes in the diffusion of unleaded petrol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stoneman, P.; Battisti, G.

    2000-01-01

    This paper analyses the diffusion of unleaded petrol in the UK. Changes in the market share of unleaded fuel are the results of changes in the composition of the car stock and changes in the choice of fuel given the car stock. We find the fuel type choices have been mainly driven by changes in tastes and learning as opposed to changes in relative prices induced by fiscal incentives. However car stock composition effects dominate the diffusion process and we find that through this route regulatory changes have made major contributions to changes in the market share of unleaded fuel. (Author)

  11. 7 CFR 1124.50 - Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1124.50 Section 1124.50 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued... prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.50. ...

  12. 7 CFR 1030.50 - Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1030.50 Section 1030.50 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued... prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.50. ...

  13. Gas prices and price process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Groenewegen, G.G.

    1992-01-01

    On a conference (Gas for Europe in the 1990's) during the Gasexpo '91 the author held a speech of which the Dutch text is presented here. Attention is paid to the current European pricing methods (prices based on the costs of buying, transporting and distributing the natural gas and prices based on the market value, which is deducted from the prices of alternative fuels), and the transparency of the prices (lack of information on the way the prices are determined). Also attention is paid to the market signal transparency and gas-gas competition, which means a more or less free market of gas distribution. The risks of gas-to-gas competition for a long term price stability, investment policies and security of supply are discussed. Opposition against the Third Party Access (TPA), which is the program to implement gas-to-gas competition, is caused by the fear of natural gas companies for lower gas prices and lower profits. Finally attention is paid to government regulation and the activities of the European Commission (EC) in this matter. 1 fig., 6 ills., 1 tab

  14. A field study using an adaptive in-house pricing model for commercial and industrial customers in Korea

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Min-Jeong

    2017-01-01

    Demand response programs provide customers with economic incentives for load reductions at times of high market prices and system reliability constraints. One type of demand response programs, price-based program, induces customers to respond to changes in product rates. However, some large-scale customers find it difficult to change their electricity consumption patterns, even with rate changes, because their electricity demands are commercial and industrial. This study proposes an adaptive in-house pricing model for large-scale customers, particularly those with multiple business facilities, for self-regulating price-based program. The adaptive in-house pricing model charges higher rates to customers with lower load factors by employing a peak-to-off-peak usage ratio in order to reduce usage at times of high prices at each facility. This study analyzes the daily electricity consumption patterns of large-scale customers through a field trial of the proposed pricing model at a telecom company with 447 offices and worksites for one month. The results show that the pricing model corresponds to average reductions of 3.54–28.69% during peak-demand times for four different types of workplaces. However, reductions in electricity consumption during off-peak periods did not show a significant difference. The results of this study prove that this proposed pricing model can be successfully applied to large-scale operations. - Highlights: • The pricing model induces reductions in energy consumption during peak-demand times. • The greatest decrease occurs in commercial buildings with higher POR. • Data centers with flat loads for necessities can do little to reduce usage.

  15. Photovoltaic power: the inadequate purchase price; Photovoltaique: les defauts du tarif d'achat

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Finon, D. [CNRS, CIRED, GIS LARSEN, 92 - Fontenay aux Roses (France)

    2009-03-15

    The current policy of guaranteed purchase prices applied to photovoltaic power lacks rationality: prices are not graduated, commitment times are too long, there is no capping to capacity developed, subsidies (tax credit, direct subsidy, etc) are complex and give too favourable a return time. The lack of differentiation between products may also delay the emergence of new PV technologies. As a result, it is legitimate to envisage a cost/benefit analysis of future subsidies and to wonder about Frances ability, as a second rank player, to catch up with the leaders (Germany, Japan, United States). The report does not criticize policy based on purchase prices in itself: this is suitable or technology close to commercial operation in that it guarantees stable terms close to wholesale electricity market prices. It does, however, criticize adequacy in terms of less advanced PV technology, which results in purchase prices five times that of wind power. The report proposes re-targeting the system to take account of the significant stakes in PV power. Costly incentives for installing land PV cells and units should be quickly reduced, while industrial demonstration budgets deserve increases to further the development of new technologies (improved crystal silicon and thin layers). The demonstration phase and industrial development should be the primary focus, where a large part of potentially promising reductions in costs are likely to be achieved. (author)

  16. Wellness Programs With Financial Incentives Through Disparities Lens.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cuellar, Alison; LoSasso, Anthony T; Shah, Mona; Atwood, Alicia; Lewis-Walls, Tanya R

    2018-02-01

    To examine wellness programs with financial incentives and their effect on disparities in preventive care. Financial incentives were introduced by 15 large employers, from 2010 to 2013. Fifteen private employers. A total of 299 436 employees and adult dependents. Preventive services and participation in financial incentives. Multivariate linear regression. Disparities in preventive services widened after introduction of financial incentives. Asians were 3% more likely and African Americans were 3% less likely to receive wellness rewards than whites and non-Hispanics, controlling for other factors. Federal law limits targeting of wellness financial incentives by subgroups; thus, employers should consider outreach and culturally appropriate messaging.

  17. Layoffs as part of an optimal incentive mix:

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Frederiksen, Anders; Takáts, Elöd

    Firms offer highly complex contracts to their employees. These contracts contain a mix of incentives, such as fixed wages, bonus payments, promotion options, and layoff threats. In general, economists understand how incentives motivate employees but not why a particular mix should be used....... In this paper we present a model in which the observed incentive mix is an optimal contract. In particular, we show that it can be optimal for firms to combine cost-efficient incentives such as promotions and bonuses with layoffs. The intuition is that layoffs play a dual role. First, they create incentives...

  18. Performance comparison of renewable incentive schemes using optimal control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Oak, Neeraj; Lawson, Daniel; Champneys, Alan

    2014-01-01

    Many governments worldwide have instituted incentive schemes for renewable electricity producers in order to meet carbon emissions targets. These schemes aim to boost investment and hence growth in renewable energy industries. This paper examines four such schemes: premium feed-in tariffs, fixed feed-in tariffs, feed-in tariffs with contract for difference and the renewable obligations scheme. A generalised mathematical model of industry growth is presented and fitted with data from the UK onshore wind industry. The model responds to subsidy from each of the four incentive schemes. A utility or ‘fitness’ function that maximises installed capacity at some fixed time in the future while minimising total cost of subsidy is postulated. Using this function, the optimal strategy for provision and timing of subsidy for each scheme is calculated. Finally, a comparison of the performance of each scheme, given that they use their optimal control strategy, is presented. This model indicates that the premium feed-in tariff and renewable obligation scheme produce the joint best results. - Highlights: • Stochastic differential equation model of renewable energy industry growth and prices, using UK onshore wind data 1992–2010. • Cost of production reduces as cumulative installed capacity of wind energy increases, consistent with the theory of learning. • Studies the effect of subsidy using feed-in tariff schemes, and the ‘renewable obligations’ scheme. • We determine the optimal timing and quantity of subsidy required to maximise industry growth and minimise costs. • The premium feed-in tariff scheme and the renewable obligations scheme produce the best results under optimal control

  19. The use of financial incentives in Australian general practice.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kecmanovic, Milica; Hall, Jane P

    2015-05-18

    To examine the uptake of financial incentive payments in general practice, and identify what types of practitioners are more likely to participate in these schemes. Analysis of data on general practitioners and GP registrars from the Medicine in Australia - Balancing Employment and Life (MABEL) longitudinal panel survey of medical practitioners in Australia, from 2008 to 2011. Income received by GPs from government incentive schemes and grants and factors associated with the likelihood of claiming such incentives. Around half of GPs reported receiving income from financial incentives in 2008, and there was a small fall in this proportion by 2011. There was considerable movement into and out of the incentives schemes, with more GPs exiting than taking up grants and payments. GPs working in larger practices with greater administrative support, GPs practising in rural areas and those who were principals or partners in practices were more likely to use grants and incentive payments. Administrative support available to GPs appears to be an increasingly important predictor of incentive use, suggesting that the administrative burden of claiming incentives is large and not always worth the effort. It is, therefore, crucial to consider such costs (especially relative to the size of the payment) when designing incentive payments. As market conditions are also likely to influence participation in incentive schemes, the impact of incentives can change over time and these schemes should be reviewed regularly.

  20. Sex, price and preferences: accounting for unsafe sexual practices in prostitution markets.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Adriaenssens, Stef; Hendrickx, Jef

    2012-06-01

    Unsafe sexual practices are persistent in prostitution interactions: one in four contacts can be called unsafe. The determinants of this are still matter for debate. We account for the roles played by clients' preferences and the hypothetical price premium of unsafe sexual practices with the help of a large dataset of clients' self-reported commercial sexual transactions in Belgium and The Netherlands. Almost 25,000 reports were collected, representing the whole gamut of prostitution market segments. The first set of explanations consists of an analysis of the price-fixing elements of paid sex. With the help of the so-called hedonic pricing method we test for the existence of a price incentive for unsafe sex. In accordance with the results from studies in some prostitution markets in the developing world, the study replicates a significant wage penalty for condom use of an estimated 7.2 per cent, confirmed in both multilevel and fixed-effects regressions. The second part of the analysis reconstructs the demand side basis of this wage penalty: the consistent preference of clients of prostitution for unsafe sex. This study is the first to document empirically clients' preference for intercourse without a condom, with the help of a multilevel ordinal regression. © 2011 The Authors. Sociology of Health & Illness © 2011 Foundation for the Sociology of Health & Illness/Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

  1. The incentive sensitization theory of addiction: some current issues

    OpenAIRE

    Robinson, Terry E; Berridge, Kent C

    2008-01-01

    We present a brief overview of the incentive sensitization theory of addiction. This posits that addiction is caused primarily by drug-induced sensitization in the brain mesocorticolimbic systems that attribute incentive salience to reward-associated stimuli. If rendered hypersensitive, these systems cause pathological incentive motivation (‘wanting’) for drugs. We address some current questions including: what is the role of learning in incentive sensitization and addiction? Does incentive s...

  2. The role of economic incentives for managing technological risks

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kunreuther, H.

    1995-01-01

    A key issue facing society in dealing with the management of technological facilities is balancing the costs of reducing risks with the relevant benefits. These tradeoffs are difficult for both experts and laypersons to make when there is limited objective data on the nature of the health and safety risks. Economic incentives, such as insurance and compensation, can play an important role in reducing and preventing losses associated with technological facilities if they are coupled with appropriate regulations and/or standards. They also can communicate information to the public on the price associated with different levels of risk. The talk will focus on how these policy tools can be utilized for improving the risk management process in conjunction with risk assessment. The siting of facilities for storing and disposing of potentially hazardous wastes will be used to illustrate these concepts and indicate how the public can be made a more integral part of the process

  3. Electricity structure and the impact on pricing, trade and the environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pineau, P.O.

    2007-01-01

    The feasibility of integrating different electricity markets was discussed along with the benefits that can be derived. It was noted that some important differences in Canadian electricity markets create distortions that are harmful both economically and environmentally. Indirect subsidies provided to electricity consumers in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Quebec result in inefficient consumption levels and in missed opportunities to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The structure of the Canadian electricity sector is characterized by public ownership and decentralization at the provincial level. The impact that this structure has on pricing policies, independent planning and environmental strategies was discussed. Alberta and Ontario have an hourly spot market fixing the market price for electricity, but all the other provinces use a pricing policy based on average cost, including a return on investment. This article also addressed the issue of electric generating units (EGUs) within each province and and their role in meeting provincial electricity demands. It was shown that electricity prices do not reflect the value of the resource across Canada. It was cautioned that subsidies create low electricity prices that result in inefficient consumption levels, thereby preventing clean hydropower to be exported to market-based provinces as a substitute to diesel, natural gas or coal-fuelled EGUs. An estimate of the indirect subsidies was presented in this article along with an analysis of possible consumption reduction scenarios if market prices were used. Carbon dioxide-equivalent emissions reductions that could be obtained if the saved energy was entirely exported were also estimated. Transmission issues involved in exporting electricity were also reviewed. It was argued that once strong financial incentives are in place to induce change, then economic and environmental gains will be proven. 9 tabs., 3 figs

  4. Design incentives to increase vehicle size created from the U.S. footprint-based fuel economy standards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitefoot, Kate S.; Skerlos, Steven J.

    2012-01-01

    The recently amended U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards determine fuel-economy targets based on the footprint (wheelbase by track width) of vehicles such that larger vehicles have lower fuel-economy targets. This paper considers whether these standards create an incentive for firms to increase vehicle size by presenting an oligopolistic-equilibrium model in which automotive firms can modify vehicle dimensions, implement fuel-saving technology features, and trade off acceleration performance and fuel economy. Wide ranges of scenarios for consumer preferences are considered. Results suggest that the footprint-based CAFE standards create an incentive to increase vehicle size except when consumer preference for vehicle size is near its lower bound and preference for acceleration is near its upper bound. In all other simulations, the sales-weighted average vehicle size increases by 2–32%, undermining gains in fuel economy by 1–4 mpg (0.6–1.7 km/L). Carbon-dioxide emissions from these vehicles are 5–15% higher as a result (4.69×10 11 –5.17×10 11 kg for one year of produced vehicles compared to 4.47×10 11 kg with no size changes), which is equivalent to adding 3–10 coal-fired power plants to the electricity grid each year. Furthermore, results suggest that the incentive is larger for light trucks than for passenger cars, which could increase traffic safety risks. - Highlights: ► New U.S. fuel-economy standards may create an incentive to increase vehicle size. ► We model firms as choosing vehicle designs and prices in oligopolistic equilibrium. ► Vehicle size increases 2–32% for 20 out of 21 scenarios of consumer preferences. ► Increases in size reduce fuel economy gains from 5–13%, resulting in 5–15% higher CO 2 emissions. ► Incentive is larger for trucks than cars, which may increase traffic safety risks.

  5. Barriers and incentives of CCS deployment in China. Results from semi-structured interviews

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dapeng, Liang; Weiwei, Wu

    2009-01-01

    From March to July of 2008, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 31 experts from the Chinese government, scientific institutes and industrial sectors. This paper summarizes the experts' opinions and draws conclusions about four crucial aspects that influence CO 2 capture and storage (CCS) deployment in China: technology research and experience accumulation, finance support, market development and policy and system. According to interviews result, technological improvement is necessary to cut down on CO 2 capture cost and decrease technological uncertainty. Then, to make some rational policies and systems, with elements such as a carbon tax and clean electricity pricing, to drive power plants to adopt CO 2 capture technology. Furthermore, financial incentive in both the long term and the short term, such as subsidies and CDM, will be important for CCS incentives, encouraging enterprises' enthusiasm for CCS and their capacity to enact it. Lastly, CCS deployment should be conducted under a market-oriented framework in the long term, so a business model and niche market deployment should be considered in advance. Among these aspects, policy and system is more complex than other three aspects, to resolve this obstacle, the innovation on electricity market and government decision model for climate change is crucial. (author)

  6. Relating price strategies and price-setting practices

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Ingenbleek, P.T.M.; Lans, van der I.A.

    2013-01-01

    Purpose - This article addresses the relationship between price strategies and price-setting practices. The first derive from a normative tradition in the pricing literature and the latter from a descriptive tradition. Price strategies are visible in the market, whereas price-setting practices are

  7. Short-term incentive schemes for hospital managers

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Lucas Malambe

    2013-10-01

    Full Text Available Orientation: Short-term incentives, considered to be an extrinsic motivation, are commonly used to motivate performance. This study explored hospital managers’ perceptions of short term incentives in maximising performance and retention. Research purpose: The study explored the experiences, views and perceptions of private hospital managers in South Africa regarding the use of short-term incentives to maximise performance and retention, as well as the applicability of the findings to public hospitals. Motivation for the study: Whilst there is an established link between performance reward schemes and organisational performance, there is little understanding of the effects of short term incentives on the performance and retention of hospital managers within the South African context. Research design, approach, and method: The study used a qualitative research design: interviews were conducted with a purposive sample of 19 hospital managers, and a thematic content analysis was performed. Main findings: Short-term incentives may not be the primary motivator for hospital managers, but they do play a critical role in sustaining motivation. Participants indicated that these schemes could also be applicable to public hospitals. Practical/managerial implications: Hospital managers are inclined to be more motivated by intrinsic than extrinsic factors. However, hospital managers (as middle managers also seem to be motivated by short-term incentives. A combination of intrinsic and extrinsic motivators should thus be used to maximise performance and retention. Contribution/value-add: Whilst the study sought to explore hospital managers’ perceptions of short-term incentives, it also found that an adequate balance between internal and external motivators is key to implementing an effective short-term incentive scheme.

  8. A study of the improvement of the district heat price cap system

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Yoo, S.J. [Korea Energy Economics Institute, Euiwang (Korea)

    2001-11-01

    This study proposes revision of the price cap mechanism applied to the district heating company, which was introduced in 1999. The revision aims at the provision of the incentives to lower the production cost to the heat producers and preventing the monopoly price from being charged to the consumer. It is proposed to extend the application period of the price cap to 3 or 5 years. 3 year application period is recommended because of lack of the experiences of the price cap mechanism and information of its performance in the public utility industries in Korea. The calculation of the price cap is better to be set based upon the minimum of the full cost of heat production in the last year of the previous application periods or the prices actually charged to the consumer during the previous application period. As the opportunity cost of the equity capital, the interest rate of the 5 year government bond or the actual interest cost of the debt financed capital is recommended to increase the share of the equity capital and to reflect the investment risk of the district heating industry. Production efficiency index applicable to the district heating company is estimated with 3 different methods. Among three different results, 3% is the first choice from a conservative perspective. It is also recommended to adjust production efficiency index as the data are accumulated and to be implemented with a profit sharing mechanism between the consumer and the monopoly supplier. In application of the price index, producer price index is applicable if the price cap is calculated from the full production cost. consumer price index is applicable if the price cap is set from the previous year's actual district heat prices (tariffs). Transfer of the ownership either by transferring stocks or by asset selling could affect the price cap determined by the full cost of the district heat production. In order to keep the consumer's welfare from being decreased, it is necessary to set

  9. Value-Based Pricing and Reimbursement in Personalised Healthcare: Introduction to the Basic Health Economics

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Louis P. Garrison

    2017-09-01

    Full Text Available ‘Value-based’ outcomes, pricing, and reimbursement are widely discussed as health sector reforms these days. In this paper, we discuss their meaning and relationship in the context of personalized healthcare, defined as receipt of care conditional on the results of a biomarker-based diagnostic test. We address the question: “What kinds of pricing and reimbursement models should be applied in personalized healthcare?” The simple answer is that competing innovators and technology adopters should have incentives that promote long-term dynamic efficiency. We argue that—to meet this social objective of optimal innovation in personalized healthcare—payers, as agents of their plan participants, should aim to send clear signals to their suppliers about what they value. We begin by revisiting the concept of value from an economic perspective, and argue that a broader concept of value is needed in the context of personalized healthcare. We discuss the market for personalized healthcare and the interplay between price and reimbursement. We close by emphasizing the potential barrier posed by inflexible or cost-based reimbursement systems, especially for biomarker-based predictive tests, and how these personalized technologies have global public goods characteristics that require global value-based differential pricing to achieve dynamic efficiency in terms of the optimal rate of innovation and adoption.

  10. Value-Based Pricing and Reimbursement in Personalised Healthcare: Introduction to the Basic Health Economics.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Garrison, Louis P; Towse, Adrian

    2017-09-04

    'Value-based' outcomes, pricing, and reimbursement are widely discussed as health sector reforms these days. In this paper, we discuss their meaning and relationship in the context of personalized healthcare, defined as receipt of care conditional on the results of a biomarker-based diagnostic test. We address the question: "What kinds of pricing and reimbursement models should be applied in personalized healthcare?" The simple answer is that competing innovators and technology adopters should have incentives that promote long-term dynamic efficiency. We argue that-to meet this social objective of optimal innovation in personalized healthcare-payers, as agents of their plan participants, should aim to send clear signals to their suppliers about what they value. We begin by revisiting the concept of value from an economic perspective, and argue that a broader concept of value is needed in the context of personalized healthcare. We discuss the market for personalized healthcare and the interplay between price and reimbursement. We close by emphasizing the potential barrier posed by inflexible or cost-based reimbursement systems, especially for biomarker-based predictive tests, and how these personalized technologies have global public goods characteristics that require global value-based differential pricing to achieve dynamic efficiency in terms of the optimal rate of innovation and adoption.

  11. Value-Based Pricing and Reimbursement in Personalised Healthcare: Introduction to the Basic Health Economics

    Science.gov (United States)

    Garrison, Louis P.; Towse, Adrian

    2017-01-01

    ‘Value-based’ outcomes, pricing, and reimbursement are widely discussed as health sector reforms these days. In this paper, we discuss their meaning and relationship in the context of personalized healthcare, defined as receipt of care conditional on the results of a biomarker-based diagnostic test. We address the question: “What kinds of pricing and reimbursement models should be applied in personalized healthcare?” The simple answer is that competing innovators and technology adopters should have incentives that promote long-term dynamic efficiency. We argue that—to meet this social objective of optimal innovation in personalized healthcare—payers, as agents of their plan participants, should aim to send clear signals to their suppliers about what they value. We begin by revisiting the concept of value from an economic perspective, and argue that a broader concept of value is needed in the context of personalized healthcare. We discuss the market for personalized healthcare and the interplay between price and reimbursement. We close by emphasizing the potential barrier posed by inflexible or cost-based reimbursement systems, especially for biomarker-based predictive tests, and how these personalized technologies have global public goods characteristics that require global value-based differential pricing to achieve dynamic efficiency in terms of the optimal rate of innovation and adoption. PMID:28869571

  12. Pattern of the rational worker incentive system

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kopytova A.V.

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available The article presents a model of rational incentive system with the structure consisting of three blocks. The first block (financial incentives provides monetary compensation to a worker. The second block (stimulating by comfortable living conditions is aimed to regulate the quality of a worker’s life in and outside the place he works. The third block (non-financial incentives takes into account cultural and social worker’s needs. The proposed structure of incentive system provides the most comprehensive coverage to the employee’s needs and organizes them in the way accessible both for specialists of labor economics and human resource management and for ordinary workers.

  13. 48 CFR 16.304 - Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-incentive-fee...-incentive-fee contracts. A cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides... allowable costs to total target costs. Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts are covered in subpart 16.4...

  14. Economic assessment of solar and conventional biomass gasification technologies: Financial and policy implications under feedstock and product gas price uncertainty

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nickerson, Thomas A.; Hathaway, Brandon J.; Smith, Timothy M.; Davidson, Jane H.

    2015-01-01

    Four configurations of a novel solar-heated biomass gasification facility and one configuration of conventional biomass gasification are analyzed through financial and policy scenarios. The purpose of this study is to determine the potential financial position for varying configurations of a novel technology, as compared to the current state-of-the-art gasification technology. Through the use of project finance and policy scenario development, we assess the baseline breakeven syngas price (normalized against natural gas prices and based upon annual feedstock consumption), the sensitivity of major cost components for the novel facilities, and the implications of policy levers on the economic feasibility of the solar facilities. Findings show that certain solar configurations may compete with conventional facilities on a straightforward economic basis. However, with renewable energy policy levers in place the solar technologies become increasingly attractive options. - Highlights: • We model four solar and one conventional biomass gasification systems. • We assess economic feasibility of these systems with and without policy incentives. • Solar facilities compete with the conventional system in certain scenarios. • Feedstock costs are the largest contributor to system cost sensitivity. • Policy incentives create an economically favorable scenario for solar facilities

  15. Maximizing Energy Savings Reliability in BC Hydro Industrial Demand-side Management Programs: An Assessment of Performance Incentive Models

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gosman, Nathaniel

    For energy utilities faced with expanded jurisdictional energy efficiency requirements and pursuing demand-side management (DSM) incentive programs in the large industrial sector, performance incentive programs can be an effective means to maximize the reliability of planned energy savings. Performance incentive programs balance the objectives of high participation rates with persistent energy savings by: (1) providing financial incentives and resources to minimize constraints to investment in energy efficiency, and (2) requiring that incentive payments be dependent on measured energy savings over time. As BC Hydro increases its DSM initiatives to meet the Clean Energy Act objective to reduce at least 66 per cent of new electricity demand with DSM by 2020, the utility is faced with a higher level of DSM risk, or uncertainties that impact the costeffective acquisition of planned energy savings. For industrial DSM incentive programs, DSM risk can be broken down into project development and project performance risks. Development risk represents the project ramp-up phase and is the risk that planned energy savings do not materialize due to low customer response to program incentives. Performance risk represents the operational phase and is the risk that planned energy savings do not persist over the effective measure life. DSM project development and performance risks are, in turn, a result of industrial economic, technological and organizational conditions, or DSM risk factors. In the BC large industrial sector, and characteristic of large industrial sectors in general, these DSM risk factors include: (1) capital constraints to investment in energy efficiency, (2) commodity price volatility, (3) limited internal staffing resources to deploy towards energy efficiency, (4) variable load, process-based energy saving potential, and (5) a lack of organizational awareness of an operation's energy efficiency over time (energy performance). This research assessed the capacity

  16. Incentive mechanism based on cooperative advertising for cost information sharing in a supply chain with competing retailers

    Science.gov (United States)

    Setak, Mostafa; Kafshian Ahar, Hajar; Alaei, Saeed

    2017-09-01

    This paper proposes a new motivation for information sharing in a decentralized channel consisting of a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer provides a common product to the retailers at the same wholesale price. Both retailers add their own values to the product and distribute it to consumers. Factors such as retail prices, values added to the product, and local advertising of the retailers simultaneously have effect on market demand. Each retailer has full information about the own added value which is unknown to the manufacturer and other retailer. The manufacturer uses a cooperative advertising program for motivating the retailers to disclose their private information. A numerical study is presented to compare different scenarios of information sharing. Computational results show that there is a condition in which full information sharing is beneficial for all members of the supply chain through cooperative advertising program and, therefore, retailers have enough incentive to disclose their cost information to the manufacturer.

  17. Incentive schemes in development of socio-economic systems

    Science.gov (United States)

    Grachev, V. V.; Ivushkin, K. A.; Myshlyaev, L. P.

    2018-05-01

    The paper is devoted to the study of incentive schemes when developing socio-economic systems. The article analyzes the existing incentive schemes. It is established that the traditional incentive mechanisms do not fully take into account the specifics of the creation of each socio-economic system and, as a rule, are difficult to implement. The incentive schemes based on the full-scale simulation approach, which allow the most complete information from the existing projects of creation of socio-economic systems to be extracted, are proposed. The statement of the problem is given, the method and algorithm of the full-scale simulation study of the efficiency of incentive functions is developed. The results of the study are presented. It is shown that the use of quadratic and piecewise linear functions of incentive allows the time and costs for creating social and economic systems to be reduced by 10%-15%.

  18. 7 CFR 1131.53 - Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1131.53 Section 1131.53 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.53. ...

  19. 7 CFR 1005.53 - Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1005.53 Section 1005.53 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.53. ...

  20. 7 CFR 1126.53 - Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1126.53 Section 1126.53 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.53. ...

  1. 7 CFR 1032.53 - Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1032.53 Section 1032.53 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.53. ...

  2. 7 CFR 1030.53 - Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1030.53 Section 1030.53 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.53. ...

  3. 7 CFR 1033.53 - Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1033.53 Section 1033.53 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.53. ...

  4. 7 CFR 1001.53 - Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1001.53 Section 1001.53 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.53. ...

  5. 7 CFR 1007.53 - Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1007.53 Section 1007.53 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.53. ...

  6. 7 CFR 1006.53 - Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1006.53 Section 1006.53 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.53. ...

  7. Modeling the return and volatility of the Greek electricity marginal system price

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Theodorou, Petros; Karyampas, Dimitrios

    2008-01-01

    Traditional cost based optimization models (WASP) for expansion planning do not allow for mark-to-market valuation and cannot satisfy arbitrage free requirements. This work will fill this gap by developing and estimating models for mark-to-market valuation. Furthermore the present paper examines the return and volatility of the newly born Greek's electricity market's marginal system price. A detailed description of the market mechanism and regulation is used to describe how prices are determined in order to proceed with return and volatility modeling. Continuous time mean reverting and time varying mean reverting stochastic processes have been solved in discrete time processes and estimated econometrically along with ARMAX and GARCH models. It was found that GARCH model gave much better estimation and forecasting ability. Strong persistence in mean has been found giving suspicions of market inefficiency and strong incentives for arbitrage opportunities. Finally, the change in the regulatory framework has been controlled and found to have significant impact. (author)

  8. 7 CFR 1033.50 - Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1033.50 Section 1033.50 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued..., and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.50. ...

  9. 7 CFR 1005.50 - Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1005.50 Section 1005.50 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued..., and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.50. ...

  10. 7 CFR 1001.50 - Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1001.50 Section 1001.50 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued..., and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.50. ...

  11. 7 CFR 1006.50 - Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1006.50 Section 1006.50 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued..., and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.50. ...

  12. 7 CFR 1126.50 - Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1126.50 Section 1126.50 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued..., and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.50. ...

  13. 7 CFR 1032.50 - Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1032.50 Section 1032.50 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued..., and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.50. ...

  14. 7 CFR 1131.50 - Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1131.50 Section 1131.50 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued..., and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.50. ...

  15. 7 CFR 1007.50 - Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1007.50 Section 1007.50 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture (Continued..., and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.50. ...

  16. Incentives of Health Care Expenditure

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Eero Siljander

    2012-12-01

    Full Text Available The incentives of health care expenditure (HCE have been a topic of discussion in the USA (Obama reforms and in Europe (adjustment to debt crisis. There are competing views of institutional versus GDP (unit income elasticity and productivity related factors of growth of expenditure. However ageing of populations, technology change and economic incentives related to institutions are also key drivers of growth according to the OECD and EU’s AWG committee. Simulation models have been developed to forecast the growth of social expenditure (including HCEs to 2050. In this article we take a historical perspective to look at the institutional structures and their relationship to HCE growth. When controlling for age structure, price developments, doctor density and in-patient and public shares of expenditures, we find that fee-for-service in primary care, is according to the results, in at least 20 percent more costly than capitation or salary remuneration. Capitation and salary (or wage remuneration are at same cost levels in primary care. However we did not find the cost lowering effect for gatekeeping which could have been expected based on previous literature. Global budgeting 30 (partly DRG based percent less costly in specialized care than other reimbursement schemes like open contracting or volume based reimbursement. However the public integration of purchaser and provider cost seems to result to about 20 higher than public reimbursement or public contracting. Increasing the number of doctors or public financing share results in increased HCEs. Therefore expanding public reimbursement share of health services seems to lead to higher HCE. On the contrary, the in-patient share reduced expenditures. Compared to the previous literature, the finding on institutional dummies is in line with similar modeling papers. However the results for public expansion of services is a contrary one to previous works on the subject. The median lag length of

  17. 7 CFR 1124.53 - Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 9 2010-01-01 2009-01-01 true Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. 1124.53 Section 1124.53 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture... Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors. See § 1000.53. ...

  18. Incentives and provider payment methods.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Barnum, H; Kutzin, J; Saxenian, H

    1995-01-01

    The mode of payment creates powerful incentives affecting provider behavior and the efficiency, equity and quality outcomes of health finance reforms. This article examines provider incentives as well as administrative costs, and institutional conditions for successful implementation associated with provider payment alternatives. The alternatives considered are budget reforms, capitation, fee-for-service, and case-based reimbursement. We conclude that competition, whether through a regulated private sector or within a public system, has the potential to improve the performance of any payment method. All methods generate both adverse and beneficial incentives. Systems with mixed forms of provider payment can provide tradeoffs to offset the disadvantages of individual modes. Low-income countries should avoid complex payment systems requiring higher levels of institutional development.

  19. Agreement to provide energy planning, analysis, and evaluation

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-03-01

    Three separate subjects are analyzed: (1) the incremental pricing requirements of LNG projects, (2) cooperative Arab/Israeli energy programs based on natural gas, and (3) the effects of the 1978 Natural Gas Policy Act on the country as a whole and particularly on Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The studies found that (1) incremental pricing of LNG complicates the financing of LNG projects and reduces the number of viable projects, leading to increased oil and LP-gas imports, (2) cooperative gas-utilization ventures between Egypt and Israel should aim at developing a regional pipeline network, constructing export facilities, and producing chemical feedstocks, and (3) the peculiarities of each region of the US, along with the interdependency of the factors involved in assessing the NGPA's impact on each region, complicate any attempt to quantify the act's effects, but the profile constructed for Region 5 will facilitate quantification when more data become available.

  20. The effective use of property tax incentives for economic development

    OpenAIRE

    Daphne A. Kenyon; Adam H. Langley; Bethany P. Paquin

    2013-01-01

    To make property-tax incentives for business more effective, do not approve every incentive request, target use of incentives, avoid incentive wars, cooperate with surrounding localities, and conduct regular evaluations.

  1. Transfer prices assignment with integrated production and marketing optimization models

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Enrique Parra

    2018-04-01

    Full Text Available Purpose: In decentralized organizations (today a great majority of the large multinational groups, much of the decision-making power is in its individual business units-BUs-. In these cases, the management control system (MCS uses transfer prices to coordinate actions of the BUs and to evaluate their performance with the goal of guaranteeing the whole corporation optimum. The purpose of the investigation is to design transfer prices that suit this goal. Design/methodology/approach: Considering the results of the whole company supply chain optimization models (in the presence of seasonality of demand the question is to design a mechanism that creates optimal incentives for the managers of each business unit to drive the corporation to the optimal performance. Mathematical programming models are used as a start point. Findings: Different transfer prices computation methods are introduced in this paper for decentralised organizations with two divisions (production and marketing. The methods take into account the results of the solution of the whole company supply chain optimization model, if exists, and can be adapted to the type of information available in the company. It is mainly focused on transport costs assignment. Practical implications: Using the methods proposed in this paper a decentralized corporation can implement more accurate transfer prices to drive the whole organization to the global optimum performance. Originality/value: The methods proposed are a new contribution to the literature on transfer prices with special emphasis on the practical and easy implementation in a modern corporation with several business units and with high seasonality of demand. Also, the methods proposed are very flexible and can be tuned depending on the type of information available in the company.

  2. Tracking the Sun V: An Historical Summary of the Installed Price of Photovoltaics in the United States from 1998 to 2011

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barbose, Galen [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Darghouth, Naim [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Wiser, Ryan [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States)

    2012-11-01

    As the deployment of grid-connected solar photovoltaic (PV) systems has increased, so too has the desire to track the installed price of these systems over time and by location, customer type, and system characteristics. This report helps to fill this need by summarizing trends in the installed price of grid-connected PV systems in the United States from 1998 through 2011, with preliminary data for 2012. The analysis is based on project-level data for more than 150,000 individual residential, commercial, and utility-scale PV systems, totaling more than 3,000 megawatts (MW) and representing 76% of all grid-connected PV capacity installed in the United States through 2011. The report describes installed price trends for residential and commercial PV systems, and another set of trends for utility-scale PV. In all cases, installed prices are identified in terms of real 2011 dollars per installed watt (DC-STC), prior to receipt of any direct financial incentives or tax credits.

  3. Edgeworth Price Cycles, Cost-Based Pricing, and Sticky Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets

    OpenAIRE

    Michael D. Noel

    2007-01-01

    This paper examines dynamic pricing behavior in retail gasoline markets for 19 Canadian cities over 574 weeks. I find three distinct retail pricing patterns: 1. cost-based pricing, 2. sticky pricing, and 3. steep, asymmetric retail price cycles that, while seldom documented empirically, resemble those of Maskin & Tirole[1988]. Using a Markov switching regression, I estimate the prevalence of patterns and the structural characteristics of the cycles. Retail price cycles prevail in over 40% of ...

  4. Stock-based Compensation Plans and Employee Incentives

    OpenAIRE

    Jan Zabojnik

    2014-01-01

    Standard principal-agent theory predicts that large firms should not use employee stock options and other stock-based compensation to provide incentives to non-executive employees. Yet, business practitioners appear to believe that stock-based compensation improves incentives, and mounting empirical evidence points to the same conclusion. This paper provides an explanation for why stock-based incentives can be effective. In the model of this paper, employee stock options complement individual...

  5. Incentives and cooperation in firms: Field evidence

    OpenAIRE

    Berger, Johannes; Herbertz, Claus; Sliwka, Dirk

    2011-01-01

    We empirically investigate the impact of incentive scheme structure on the degree of cooperation in firms using a unique and representative data set. Combining employee survey data with detailed firm level information on the relative importance of individual, team, and company performance for compensation, we find a significant positive relation between the intensity of team incentives and several survey measures of cooperation. Moreover, higher powered team incentives are associated with low...

  6. 42 CFR 495.310 - Medicaid provider incentive payments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 42 Public Health 5 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Medicaid provider incentive payments. 495.310 Section 495.310 Public Health CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN... INCENTIVE PROGRAM Requirements Specific to the Medicaid Program § 495.310 Medicaid provider incentive...

  7. A New Availability-Payment Model for Pricing Performance-Based Logistics Contracts

    Science.gov (United States)

    2014-05-01

    Grant number: N00244‐13‐1‐0009 A New “Availability‐ Payment ”  Model  for Pricing Performance‐ Based Logistics Contracts A. KashaniPour, X. Zhu, P...DATE MAY 2014 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2014 to 00-00-2014 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A New ’Availability‐ Payment ’ Model for...is how the  payment   model  in the contract  quantifies the contractor’s  performance for awarding incentives  or penalties Discrete‐Event Simulator ut

  8. 75 FR 10843 - Special Summer Postal Rate Program

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-03-09

    ..., Pricing Strategy, as the official available to provide prompt responses to requests for clarification from... special volume pricing incentive for certain Standard Mail this summer. This document announces... Standard Mail Volume Incentive Pricing Program (Standard Mail Incentive Program) similar to the one...

  9. Competitive Pricing by a Price Leader

    OpenAIRE

    Abhik Roy; Dominique M. Hanssens; Jagmohan S. Raju

    1994-01-01

    We examine the problem of pricing in a market where one brand acts as a price leader. We develop a procedure to estimate a leader's price rule, which is optimal given a sales target objective, and allows for the inclusion of demand forecasts. We illustrate our estimation procedure by calibrating this optimal price rule for both the leader and the follower using data on past sales and prices from the mid-size sedan segment of the U.S. automobile market. Our results suggest that a leader-follow...

  10. Behavioural economics: Cash incentives avert deforestation

    Science.gov (United States)

    Cárdenas, Juan Camilo

    2017-10-01

    There is tension in developing countries between financial incentives to clear forests and climate regulation benefits of preserving trees. Now research shows that paying private forest owners in Uganda reduced deforestation, adding to the debate on the use of monetary incentives in forest conservation.

  11. 24 CFR 599.507 - Tax incentives utilization plan.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-04-01

    ... 24 Housing and Urban Development 3 2010-04-01 2010-04-01 false Tax incentives utilization plan....507 Tax incentives utilization plan. (a) Preliminary plan. Within six months of designation, the CoRA must prepare and submit to HUD a preliminary tax incentives utilization plan for achieving the State...

  12. The impact of the Market Power Mitigation Agreement on power prices in Ontario

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chute, R. G.

    2000-01-01

    Market power was defined by the Market Design Committee (MDC) as 'the ability to sustain a significant price increase profitably', although it is generally understood to refer to the 'overwhelming dominance of generating capacity and supply capability of Ontario Power Generation' (OPG), the former generating arm of Ontario Hydro. The MDC sought to address market power within the context of the Ontario Government's White Paper on electricity sector reform, entitled 'Directions for Change'. The solution was the Market Power Mitigation Agreement (MPMA), a negotiated agreement between the MDC and OPG that established market share goals and provided incentives and penalties to meet these goals. Briefly, the major instrument used by the MPMA is the price of electric power sold in the Ontario market to reward, or penalize the actions of OPG in moving towards its market share goals as defined in the MPMA. This paper explains the principal elements of the MPMA and how they are expected to influence the market prices for power in Ontario. The principal elements of the Agreement are price cap and rebate, decontrol targets, and intertie capacity and limits, while the instruments comprise licence conditions, settlement agreements, market rules and ministerial directives. The issue of the impact of the MPMA on the cost of power, and the future prospects of market power after the expiration of the MPMA are also addressed

  13. Incentives and intrinsic motivation in healthcare.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Berdud, Mikel; Cabasés, Juan M; Nieto, Jorge

    It has been established in the literature that workers within public organisations are intrinsically motivated. This paper is an empirical study of the healthcare sector using methods of qualitative analysis research, which aims to answer the following hypotheses: 1) doctors are intrinsically motivated; 2) economic incentives and control policies may undermine doctors' intrinsic motivation; and 3) well-designed incentives may encourage doctors' intrinsic motivation. We conducted semi-structured interviews à-la-Bewley with 16 doctors from Navarre's Healthcare Service (Servicio Navarro de Salud-Osasunbidea), Spain. The questions were based on current theories of intrinsic motivation and incentives to test the hypotheses. Interviewees were allowed to respond openly without time constraints. Relevant information was selected, quantified and analysed by using the qualitative concepts of saturation and codification. The results seem to confirm the hypotheses. Evidence supporting hypotheses 1 and 2 was gathered from all interviewees, as well as indications of the validity of hypothesis 3 based on interviewees' proposals of incentives. The conclusions could act as a guide to support the optimal design of incentive policies and schemes within health organisations when healthcare professionals are intrinsically motivated. Copyright © 2016 SESPAS. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L.U. All rights reserved.

  14. Incentives and Earnings Growth

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Frederiksen, Anders

    2013-01-01

    The career prospects of newly recruited employees differ substantially within an organization. The stars experience considerable growth in earnings; others can hardly maintain their entry salaries. This article sheds light on the mechanisms generating the observed heterogeneity in earnings growth...... by investigating the effects that explicit short-run incentives and implicit incentives have on earnings growth. The model’s predictions are tested using personnel records from a large bank and are found to be consistent with the observed earnings growth during the first half of the employees’ careers....

  15. List prices vs. bargain prices: which solution to estimate consumer price indices?

    OpenAIRE

    Carlo De Gregorio

    2010-01-01

    Alternative approaches to CPI surveys are here evaluated, in markets where final prices are based on some sort of price listing. Three types of surveys are compared: local surveys (LOC), with small samples and a local price collection; list price surveys (LIS), with huge samples and centralised collection; mixed surveys (MXD), in which LOC and LIS are jointly used. Based on a multiplicative pricing model, some conditions are derived to establish the relative efficiency of these approaches. Th...

  16. 10 CFR 451.6 - Duration of incentive payments.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 10 Energy 3 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Duration of incentive payments. 451.6 Section 451.6 Energy DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ENERGY CONSERVATION RENEWABLE ENERGY PRODUCTION INCENTIVES § 451.6 Duration of incentive... part with respect to a qualified renewable energy facility for 10 consecutive fiscal years. Such period...

  17. Peace Incentives

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Emmanuel, Nikolas G.

    2015-01-01

    How does economic assistance influence the success or failure of peace processes in Africa? Can economic assistance act as an incentive to facilitate an end to conflict? The literature largely ignores aid as a factor supporting peace processes. In addressing this topic, the current study tries...

  18. Non-organ donors' attitudes toward incentives.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Tumin, Makmor; Noh, Abdillah; Chong, Chin-Sieng; Lim, Soo-Kun; Abdullah, Nawi; Ng, Kok-Peng

    2013-01-01

    Malaysians indicating that they did not intend to become organ donors upon their death were surveyed regarding interest in non-fungible financial incentives to be granted to surviving family members. Among the 730 (56% of the total sample of 1311) indicating unwillingness to be donors, 29.6% (216/730) subsequently indicated that they would be willing donors if the government introduced policies that, upon their death, "rewarded your (their) family with incentives for your (their) deeds." Among the 69% (504/730) who insisted that they would not become organ donor even with incentive, nearly 80% (404/501) of them were able to identify relevant incentives they thought should be provided by the state to those who make organ donations upon death. The majority of both groups preferred the state provide medical benefits to a surviving family member, suggesting this may be an attractive policy option for the state to raise the deceased organ donation pool. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons A/S.

  19. Linking performance incentives to ethical practice

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Boudi FB

    2018-02-01

    Full Text Available No abstract available. Article truncated after 150 words. Health spending is a huge part of the United States economy as it is a large business. We all have seen increasing inclusion of corporate practices in health care. One such inclusion is the incentive programs which have at their core the goal of production of the desired behavioral outcomes directly related either to performance output or extraordinary achievement. However, management influence on the organization’s ethical environment and culture can inadvertently encourage or endorse unethical behavior despite the best intentions. One way would be failing to link performance incentives to ethical practice. When leaders create strong incentives to accomplish a goal without creating equally strong incentives to adhere to ethical practice in achieving the desired goal, they effectively set the stage for ethical malpractice. Incentivizing ethical practice is equally important as incentivizing other behaviors (1. In the health care industry, unlike in the sales industry, professionalism and patient care are …

  20. Design of price incentives for adjunct policy goals in formula funding for hospitals and health services

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Duckett Stephen J

    2008-04-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Hospital policy involves multiple objectives: efficiency of service delivery, pursuit of high quality care, promoting access. Funding policy based on hospital casemix has traditionally been considered to be only about promoting efficiency. Discussion Formula-based funding policy can be (and has been used to pursue a range of policy objectives, not only efficiency. These are termed 'adjunct' goals. Strategies to incorporate adjunct goals into funding design must, implicitly or explicitly, address key decision choices outlined in this paper. Summary Policy must be clear and explicit about the behaviour to be rewarded; incentives must be designed so that all facilities with an opportunity to improve have an opportunity to benefit; the reward structure is stable and meaningful; and the funder monitors performance and gaming.

  1. Arbitrage Pricing, Capital Asset Pricing, and Agricultural Assets

    OpenAIRE

    Louise M. Arthur; Colin A. Carter; Fay Abizadeh

    1988-01-01

    A new asset pricing model, the arbitrage pricing theory, has been developed as an alternative to the capital asset pricing model. The arbitrage pricing theory model is used to analyze the relationship between risk and return for agricultural assets. The major conclusion is that the arbitrage pricing theory results support previous capital asset pricing model findings that the estimated risk associated with agricultural assets is low. This conclusion is more robust for the arbitrage pricing th...

  2. Output Price Risk, Material Input Price Risk, and Price Margins: Evidence from the US Catfish Industry.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    David Bouras

    2017-07-01

    Full Text Available Aim/purpose - To develop a conceptual model for analyzing the impact of output price risk and material input price risk on price margins. Design/methodology/approach - To analyze the combined effect of output price risk and material input risk on price margins, we use a series of comparative static analyses, GARCH models, and data ranging from 1990/01 to 2012/12. Findings - The theoretical results indicate that the impact of output price risk and the impact of material input price risk on price margins are ambiguous and, to a great extent, hinge on the correlation between output price and material input price. The empirical results show that whole frozen catfish price risk and live catfish price risk negatively affect the price margin for frozen catfish. The empirical results, however, indicate that the risk of the price of live catfish affects markedly the price margin for frozen whole catfish in contrast to the impact of the risk of the price of frozen whole catfish. Research implications/limitations - The empirical results have significant implications for managerial decision-making especially when crafting strategies for improving price margins. Accordingly, in order to beef up the price margin for frozen whole catfish, catfish processors may consider engaging in vertical integration. This paper has some limitations: first, it assumes that firms operate in competitive markets; second, it assumes that firms produce and sell a single product. Originality/value/contribution - Unlike earlier studies that focused solely on the effect of output price risk on price margins, this paper analyzes theoretically and empirically the impact of output price risk and material input price risk on price margins.

  3. Environmental pricing of externalities from different sources of electricity generation in Chile

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Aravena, Claudia; Hutchinson, W. George; Longo, Alberto

    2012-01-01

    The rapid increase in electricity demand in Chile means a choice must be made between major investments in renewable or non-renewable sources for additional production. Current projects to develop large dams for hydropower in Chilean Patagonia impose an environmental price by damaging the natural environment. On the other hand, the increased use of fossil fuels entails an environmental price in terms of air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions contributing to climate change. This paper studies the debate on future electricity supply in Chile by investigating the preferences of households for a variety of different sources of electricity generation such as fossil fuels, large hydropower in Chilean Patagonia and other renewable energy sources. Using Double Bounded Dichotomous Choice Contingent Valuation, a novel advanced disclosure method and internal consistency test are used to elicit the willingness to pay for less environmentally damaging sources. Policy results suggest a strong preference for renewable energy sources with higher environmental prices imposed by consumers on electricity generated from fossil fuels than from large dams in Chilean Patagonia. Policy results further suggest the possibility of introducing incentives for renewable energy developments that would be supported by consumers through green tariffs or environmental premiums. Methodological findings suggest that advanced disclosure learning overcomes the problem of internal inconsistency in SB-DB estimates.

  4. Lowering Saudi Arabia's fuel consumption and energy system costs without increasing end consumer prices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Matar, Walid; Murphy, Frederic; Pierru, Axel; Rioux, Bertrand

    2015-01-01

    Using a multi-sector equilibrium model of the Saudi energy system that handles administered prices in a mixed-complementarity formulation, we present results from a set of policy scenarios that lower oil consumption in the country. Some of these scenarios are the solutions to Mathematical Programs subject to Equilibrium Constraints (MPECs) that maximize the net economic gain for the Saudi economy. The policies examined have the potential to generate economic gains exceeding 23 billion USD in 2011, or about 4% of Saudi Arabia's GDP. This economic gain comes mainly from inter-sectoral fuel pricing policies that incent shifting the mix in technologies that generate electricity and produce water from energy intensive technologies to more efficient ones. We show that when complemented by credits for investments in solar and nuclear power generation capacities, a modest increase in the transfer prices of fuels among sectors is sufficient to produce economic gains close to those achieved by deregulating transfer prices. The approach we develop here is an alternative to the classic recommendation of deregulating inter-sectoral fuel prices in situations where the conditions for successful liberalized markets do not exist. It is a template for introducing the notions of incentivizing behavior using prices into countries that rely more on administrative procedures than markets, leading to a deeper understanding of how markets can lead to economic gain. - Highlights: • The policies examined would have potentially generated economic gains exceeding 23 billion USD in 2011. • We design policies that produce economic benefits close to those achieved by deregulating inter-sectoral fuel prices. • This paper provides a template for building multi-sector models when transfer prices between sectors are administered

  5. Changes in Incentives, Rewards and Sanctions.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lonsdale, Alan

    1993-01-01

    A review of the literature over the past decade reflects substantial changes in rewards, incentives, and sanctions used with college faculty. These changes parallel changes in the public sector generally. Increasing emphasis on formal evaluation and on use of money as an incentive and reward for performance is noted. (MSE)

  6. 7 CFR 3560.656 - Incentives offers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... 7 Agriculture 15 2010-01-01 2010-01-01 false Incentives offers. 3560.656 Section 3560.656... AGRICULTURE DIRECT MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING LOANS AND GRANTS Housing Preservation § 3560.656 Incentives offers. (a) The Agency will offer a borrower, who submits a prepayment request meeting the conditions of § 3560...

  7. 7 CFR 1000.53 - Announcement of class prices, component prices, and advanced pricing factors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... advanced pricing factors. 1000.53 Section 1000.53 Agriculture Regulations of the Department of Agriculture..., component prices, and advanced pricing factors. (a) On or before the 5th day of the month, the market... administrator for each Federal milk marketing order shall announce the following prices and pricing factors for...

  8. Theories of the price and quantity of physician services. A synthesis and critique.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Farley, P J

    1986-12-01

    In the traditional neoclassical model of supply and demand, prices determine the allocation of economic resources. The difficulty in applying this model to physician services is the rationing of resources directly by physicians themselves, eliminating the allocative function of prices. Welfare consequences are appropriately judged in terms of efficiency and equity, not departures from the structural relationships implied by supply and demand. As interpreted here, both competitive theories and target-income theories of this market imply that physicians consider both their own welfare and the welfare of their patients in their decision-making. All consumer benefits and all producer costs are internalized by physicians. They consequently have an incentive to obtain the maximum possible social benefit from the resources at their disposal, to the extent that they are (implicitly) allowed to share in the resulting social gains. The distribution of gains between patients and physicians is determined by professional ethics within bounds imposed by competitive forces.

  9. Ex-vessel Fish Price Database: Disaggregating Prices for Low-Priced Species from Reduction Fisheries

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Travis C. Tai

    2017-11-01

    Full Text Available Ex-vessel fish prices are essential for comprehensive fisheries management and socioeconomic analyses for fisheries science. In this paper, we reconstructed a global ex-vessel price database with the following areas of improvement: (1 compiling reported prices explicitly listed as “for reduction to fishmeal and fish oil” to estimate prices separately for catches destined for fishmeal and fish oil production, and other non-direct human consumption purposes; (2 including 95% confidence limit estimates for each price estimation; and (3 increasing the number of input data and the number of price estimates to match the reconstructed Sea Around Us catch database. Our primary focus was to address this first area of improvement as ex-vessel prices for catches destined for non-direct human consumption purposes were substantially overestimated, notably in countries with large reduction fisheries. For example in Peru, 2010 landed values were estimated as 3.8 billion real 2010 USD when using separate prices for reduction fisheries, compared with 5.8 billion using previous methods with only one price for all end-products. This update of the price database has significant global and country-specific impacts on fisheries price and landed value trends over time.

  10. R&D Incentives for Neglected Diseases

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dimitri, Nicola

    2012-01-01

    Neglected diseases are typically characterized as those for which adequate drug treatment is lacking, and the potential return on effort in research and development (R&D), to produce new therapies, is too small for companies to invest significant resources in the field. In recent years various incentives schemes to stimulate R&D by pharmaceutical firms have been considered. Broadly speaking, these can be classified either as ‘push’ or ‘pull’ programs. Hybrid options, that include push and pull incentives, have also become increasingly popular. Supporters and critics of these various incentive schemes have argued in favor of their relative merits and limitations, although the view that no mechanism is a perfect fit for all situations appears to be widely held. For this reason, the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches has been important for policy decisions, but is dispersed in a variety of sources. With this in mind, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the economic determinants behind R&D investments for neglected diseases by comparing the relative strength of different incentive schemes within a simple economic model, based on the assumption of profit maximizing firms. The analysis suggests that co-funded push programs are generally more efficient than pure pull programs. However, by setting appropriate intermediate goals hybrid incentive schemes could further improve efficiency. PMID:23284648

  11. R&D incentives for neglected diseases.

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nicola Dimitri

    Full Text Available Neglected diseases are typically characterized as those for which adequate drug treatment is lacking, and the potential return on effort in research and development (R&D, to produce new therapies, is too small for companies to invest significant resources in the field. In recent years various incentives schemes to stimulate R&D by pharmaceutical firms have been considered. Broadly speaking, these can be classified either as 'push' or 'pull' programs. Hybrid options, that include push and pull incentives, have also become increasingly popular. Supporters and critics of these various incentive schemes have argued in favor of their relative merits and limitations, although the view that no mechanism is a perfect fit for all situations appears to be widely held. For this reason, the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches has been important for policy decisions, but is dispersed in a variety of sources. With this in mind, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the economic determinants behind R&D investments for neglected diseases by comparing the relative strength of different incentive schemes within a simple economic model, based on the assumption of profit maximizing firms. The analysis suggests that co-funded push programs are generally more efficient than pure pull programs. However, by setting appropriate intermediate goals hybrid incentive schemes could further improve efficiency.

  12. R&D incentives for neglected diseases.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Dimitri, Nicola

    2012-01-01

    Neglected diseases are typically characterized as those for which adequate drug treatment is lacking, and the potential return on effort in research and development (R&D), to produce new therapies, is too small for companies to invest significant resources in the field. In recent years various incentives schemes to stimulate R&D by pharmaceutical firms have been considered. Broadly speaking, these can be classified either as 'push' or 'pull' programs. Hybrid options, that include push and pull incentives, have also become increasingly popular. Supporters and critics of these various incentive schemes have argued in favor of their relative merits and limitations, although the view that no mechanism is a perfect fit for all situations appears to be widely held. For this reason, the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches has been important for policy decisions, but is dispersed in a variety of sources. With this in mind, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the economic determinants behind R&D investments for neglected diseases by comparing the relative strength of different incentive schemes within a simple economic model, based on the assumption of profit maximizing firms. The analysis suggests that co-funded push programs are generally more efficient than pure pull programs. However, by setting appropriate intermediate goals hybrid incentive schemes could further improve efficiency.

  13. On incentives for assurance of petroleum supply

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osmundsen, Petter; Aven, Terje; Tomasgard, Asgeir

    2010-01-01

    Assurance of supply is a crucial objective for producers and consumers of oil and gas. A basic requirement to meet this objective is that producers and transmitters have sufficient economic incentives and capabilities to assure a desired degree of supply. The topic of this paper is to evaluate these incentives from a broad perspective. We examine economic trade-offs inherent in a delay of production, including reputational issues, as well as contract incentives for gas sellers, drilling companies, and oil service companies.

  14. Demand side management—A simulation of household behavior under variable prices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gottwalt, Sebastian; Ketter, Wolfgang; Block, Carsten; Collins, John; Weinhardt, Christof

    2011-01-01

    Within the next years, consumer households will be increasingly equipped with smart metering and intelligent appliances. These technologies are the basis for households to better monitor electricity consumption and to actively control loads in private homes. Demand side management (DSM) can be adopted to private households. We present a simulation model that generates household load profiles under flat tariffs and simulates changes in these profiles when households are equipped with smart appliances and face time-based electricity prices. We investigate the impact of smart appliances and variable prices on electricity bills of a household. We show that for households the savings from equipping them with smart appliances are moderate compared to the required investment. This finding is quite robust with respect to variation of tariff price spreads and to different types of appliance utilization patterns. Finally, our results indicate that electric utilities may face new demand peaks when day-ahead hourly prices are applied. However, a considerable amount of residential load is available for shifting, which is interesting for the utilities to balance demand and supply. - Highlights: ► Our model generates residential load profiles that are based on real world data. ► We simulate changes in load profiles when smart appliances and time-of-use tariffs are applied. ► The economic incentive for households to invest in smart appliances is low. ► Time-of-use tariffs create new, even higher peaks. ► Electric utilities have a large amount of the hourly load available for shifting.

  15. Where do we go from here? Now that some utilities have won the incentive regulation war, many executives are wondering how they can manage the peace

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Christensen, L.R.; Meitzen, M.E.; Schoech, P.E.

    1993-01-01

    Productivity is a measure of how efficiently a company uses its resources. The productivity budgeting model (PBM) is one tool that can aid management in the transition from cost-plus, rate-of-return regulation to the market-oriented, cost-control environment of incentive regulation. Most, if not all, utilities use some type of budgeting/forecasting process that provides the blueprint for future company activity. The PBM reveals the growth in total factor productivity (TFP) implied by a budget and, thus, provides a forecast of the company's future efficiency. The PBM can be used to guide resource usage, because it analyzes investment, labor force, and operating decisions from an economic efficiency perspective. In general, the model makes the budgeting process more relevant to the kind of decisions utility management must make for long-term success under incentive regulation. Furthermore, under many incentive regulation. Furthermore, under many incentive regulation plans (such as the FCC's price-cap plan), a company must meet or beat the productivity offset to increase its profitability. With PBM, the company can determine whether its proposed budget is on track and devise a plan to meet any offset. The PBM can also be used to track productivity using financial data from the period in question

  16. Prices versus quantities: choosing policies for promoting the development of renewable energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Menanteau, Philippe; Finon, Dominique; Lamy, Marie-Laure

    2003-01-01

    Now that the risks of climate change have been confirmed and the European States have declared their willingness to pursue ambitious objectives for producing electricity from renewable energy sources, it becomes crucial to take a look at the relative efficiency of the different incentive schemes used. Such schemes may focus on quantities-defining national targets and setting up bidding systems, or quota systems providing for green certificate trading, or they may focus on prices-feed-in tariffs. Clearly, these instruments are much the same as those used in environmental policies, with similar discussion involved in their choice. Whatever the system chosen, the role of the public authorities is quite specific: to stimulate technical progress and speed up the technological learning processes so that ultimately renewable energy technologies will be able to compete with conventional technologies, once the environmental costs have been internalised. A comparison of instruments must thus take into account the characteristics of the innovation process and adoption conditions--uncertainties regarding cost curves, learning effects--which means also looking at dynamic efficiency criteria. The authors examine the efficiency of the different incentive schemes for the development of renewable energy sources, both from a theoretical point of view by comparing price-based approaches with quantity-based approaches, and from a practical point of view by looking at concrete examples of how these different instruments have been implemented. The paper concludes that a system of feed-in tariffs is more efficient than a bidding system, but highlights the theoretical interest of green certificate trading which must be confirmed through practice, given the influence of market structures and rules on the performance of this type of approach

  17. Doing More for More: Unintended Consequences of Financial Incentives for Oncology Specialty Care.

    Science.gov (United States)

    O'Neil, Brock; Graves, Amy J; Barocas, Daniel A; Chang, Sam S; Penson, David F; Resnick, Matthew J

    2016-02-01

    Specialty care remains a significant contributor to health care spending but largely unaddressed in novel payment models aimed at promoting value-based delivery. Bladder cancer, chiefly managed by subspecialists, is among the most costly. In 2005, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) dramatically increased physician payment for office-based interventions for bladder cancer to shift care from higher cost facilities, but the impact is unknown. This study evaluated the effect of financial incentives on patterns of fee-for-service (FFS) bladder cancer care. Data from a 5% sample of Medicare beneficiaries from 2001-2013 were evaluated using interrupted time-series analysis with segmented regression. Primary outcomes were the effects of CMS fee modifications on utilization and site of service for procedures associated with the diagnosis and treatment of bladder cancer. Rates of related bladder cancer procedures that were not affected by the fee change were concurrent controls. Finally, the effect of payment changes on both diagnostic yield and need for redundant procedures were studied. All statistical tests were two-sided. Utilization of clinic-based procedures increased by 644% (95% confidence interval [CI] = 584% to 704%) after the fee change, but without reciprocal decline in facility-based procedures. Procedures unaffected by the fee incentive remained unchanged throughout the study period. Diagnostic yield decreased by 17.0% (95% CI = 12.7% to 21.3%), and use of redundant office-based procedures increased by 76.0% (95% CI = 59% to 93%). Financial incentives in bladder cancer care have unintended and costly consequences in the current FFS environment. The observed price sensitivity is likely to remain a major issue in novel payment models failing to incorporate procedure-based specialty physicians. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

  18. R&D tax incentives for innovation and managerial decisions

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Monika Walicka

    2016-09-01

    Full Text Available In many countries tax incentives are a popular means of realizing political, economic and social objectives. The main motive of their application is often to achieve and accelerate the selected activities in the public interest and also stimulate development of industry, and induce growth in research and investment. The key element that helps a company achieve a competitive advantage is innovation. Global competition forces the production of unique products and services. Tax incentives in science, research and development are important in stimulating innovation. The purpose of this article is to show the level of managerial awareness about R&D tax incentives, the level of R&D tax incentive usage by companies in Poland, and main obstacles that managers meet with R&D tax incentives in practice. We explore R&D tax incentives as a government instrument on R&D management and aim to find the reasons why Polish companies do not take advantage of them. We examine 275 companies using a semi-structured questi onnaire. Our findings suggest that many firms report lack of knowledge about such incentives, and firms find many obstacles to reach all of the requirements which are necessary to use the incentive. Due to our analysis we find that large firms, especially those that implement innovation, are more likely to use the tax incentives, but small and medium sized companies find more obstacle. The effect of this tax policy is significant mainly in large, high-tech sector firms.

  19. Cost incentives for doctors

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Schottmüller, Christoph

    2013-01-01

    If doctors take the costs of treatment into account when prescribing medication, their objectives differ from their patients' objectives because the patients are insured. This misalignment of interests hampers communication between patient and doctor. Giving cost incentives to doctors increases...... welfare if (i) the doctor's examination technology is sufficiently good or (ii) (marginal) costs of treatment are high enough. If the planner can costlessly choose the extent to which doctors take costs into account, he will opt for less than 100%. Optimal health care systems should implement different...... degrees of cost incentives depending on type of disease and/or doctor....

  20. Tracking the Sun 10: The Installed Price of Residential and Non-Residential Photovoltaic Systems in the United States

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barbose, Galen [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Darghouth, Naim R. [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Millstein, Dev [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); LaCommare, Kristina [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); DiSanti, Nicholas [Exeter Associates, Columbia, MD (United States); Widiss, Rebecca [Exeter Associates, Columbia, MD (United States)

    2017-09-21

    Berkeley Lab’s Tracking the Sun report series is dedicated to summarizing trends in the installed price of grid-connected, residential and non-residential systems solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in the United States. The present report, the tenth edition in the series, focuses on systems installed through year-end 2016, with preliminary data for the first half of 2017. The report provides an overview of both long-term and more-recent trends, highlighting key drivers for installed price declines over different time horizons. The report also extensively characterizes the widespread variability in system pricing, comparing installed prices across states, market segments, installers, and various system and technology characteristics. The trends described in this report derive from project-level data collected by state agencies and utilities that administer PV incentive programs, solar renewable energy credit (SREC) registration systems, or interconnection processes. In total, data for this report were compiled and cleaned for more than 1.1 million individual PV systems, though the analysis in the report is based on a subset of that sample, consisting of roughly 630,000 systems with available installed price data. The full underlying dataset of project-level data (excluding any confidential information) is available in a public data file, for use by other researchers and analysts.

  1. Improving uptake and use of malaria rapid diagnostic tests in the context of artemisinin drug resistance containment in eastern Myanmar: an evaluation of incentive schemes among informal private healthcare providers.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Aung, Tin; White, Christopher; Montagu, Dominic; McFarland, Willi; Hlaing, Thaung; Khin, Hnin Su Su; San, Aung Kyaw; Briegleb, Christina; Chen, Ingrid; Sudhinaraset, May

    2015-03-06

    As efforts to contain artemisinin resistance and eliminate Plasmodium falciparum intensify, the accurate diagnosis and prompt effective treatment of malaria are increasingly needed in Myanmar and the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). Rapid diagnostic tests (RDTs) have been shown to be safe, feasible, and effective at promoting appropriate treatment for suspected malaria, which are of particular importance to drug resistance containment. The informal private sector is often the first point of care for fever cases in malaria endemic areas across Myanmar and the GMS, but there is little published information about informal private provider practices, quality of service provision, or potential to contribute to malaria control and elimination efforts. This study tested different incentives to increase RDT use and improve the quality of care among informal private healthcare providers in Myanmar. The study randomized six townships in the Mon and Shan states of rural Myanmar into three intervention arms: 1) RDT price subsidies, 2) price subsidies with product-related financial incentives, and 3) price subsidies with intensified information, education and counselling (IEC). The study assessed the uptake of RDT use in the communities by cross-sectional surveys of 3,150 households at baseline and six months post-intervention (6,400 households total, 832 fever cases). The study also used mystery clients among 171 providers to assess quality of service provision across intervention arms. The pilot intervention trained over 600 informal private healthcare providers. The study found a price subsidy with intensified IEC, resulted in the highest uptake of RDTs in the community, as compared to subsidies alone or merchandise-related financial incentives. Moreover, intensified IEC led to improvements in the quality of care, with mystery client surveys showing almost double the number of correct treatment following diagnostic test results as compared to a simple subsidy. Results show

  2. Applied economics: The use of monetary incentives to modulate behavior.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Strang, S; Park, S Q; Strombach, T; Kenning, P

    2016-01-01

    According to standard economic theory higher monetary incentives will lead to higher performance and higher effort independent of task, context, or individual. In many contexts this standard economic advice is implemented. Monetary incentives are, for example, used to enhance performance at workplace or to increase health-related behavior. However, the fundamental positive impact of monetary incentives has been questioned by psychologists as well as behavioral economists during the last decade, arguing that monetary incentives can sometimes even backfire. In this chapter, studies from proponents as well as opponents of monetary incentives will be presented. Specifically, the impact of monetary incentives on performance, prosocial, and health behavior will be discussed. Furthermore, variables determining whether incentives have a positive or negative impact will be identified. © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  3. 48 CFR 16.405-1 - Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-plus-incentive-fee... CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES TYPES OF CONTRACTS Incentive Contracts 16.405-1 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts. (a) Description. The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that...

  4. Incentive regulation of nuclear power plants by state public utility commissions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petersen, J.C.

    1987-12-01

    This report on incentive regulation of nuclear power plants by state public utility commissions (PUCs). Economic performance incentives established by state PUCs are applicable to the construction or operation of about 45 nuclear power reactors owned by 30 utilities in 17 states. The NRC staff monitors development of the incentives and periodically provides an updated report on all nuclear plant incentives to its regional offices. The staff maintains contact with the PUCs and the utilities responsible for implementing the incentives in order to obtain the updated information and to consider potential safety effects of the incentives. This report presents the NRC staff's concerns on potential safety effects of economic performance incentives. It also includes a plant-by-plant survey that describes the mechanics of each incentive and discusses the financial effects of the incentive on the utility-owner(s) of the plant

  5. Incentives in Agency Relationships: To Be Monetary or Non-Monetary?

    OpenAIRE

    Patricia Crifo; Marc-Arthur Diaye

    2004-01-01

    In this paper, we develop a Principal-Agent model with both monetary and non-monetary incentives. We show that the latter are always more efficient, that is Pareto-dominate, monetary incentives. Indeed, we not only show that all what monetary incentives can do, non-monetary incentives can do it as well, we go further and show the possibility for non-monetary incentives to increase intrinsic motivation, thereby compensating the fact that higher rewards, rather than being encouraging can reduce...

  6. Economic incentives to wind systems commercialization. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lotker, M.; Shaw, Jr, R. W.; Adolfson, W. F.; Bernardi, R. P.; Davidoff, P. H.; Eckhart, M. T.; Gunwaldsen, D. S.; Mettam, P. J.; Narayanan, P.; Sillin, J. O.

    1978-08-01

    This assessment of Economic Incentives to Wind Systems Commercialization is an analysis of the quantitative and qualitative impacts of a variety of Government funded economic incentives on Wind Energy Conversion Systems (WECS). The purpose of this study is to achieve better understanding of the relationship between implementation of specific economic incentives for WECS, and the factors surrounding WECS commercial introduction.

  7. Price strategy and pricing strategy: terms and content identification

    OpenAIRE

    Panasenko Tetyana

    2015-01-01

    The article is devoted to the terminology and content identification of seemingly identical concepts "price strategy" and "pricing strategy". The article contains evidence that the price strategy determines the direction, principles and procedure of implementing the company price policy and pricing strategy creates a set of rules and practical methods of price formation in accordance with the pricing strategy of the company.

  8. The Incompatibility of Pareto Optimality and Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility in Sufficiently-Anonymous Budget-Constrained Quasilinear Settings

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Rica Gonen

    2013-11-01

    Full Text Available We analyze the space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto optimal combinatorial auctions. We examine a model with multidimensional types, nonidentical items, private values and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation; the players are subject to publicly-known budget constraints. We show that the space includes dictatorial mechanisms and that if dictatorial mechanisms are ruled out by a natural anonymity property, then an impossibility of design is revealed. The same impossibility naturally extends to other abstract mechanisms with an arbitrary outcome set if one maintains the original assumptions of players with quasilinear utilities, public budgets and nonnegative prices.

  9. Value based pricing: the least valued pricing strategy

    OpenAIRE

    Hoenen, Bob

    2017-01-01

    Pricing has been one of the least researched topics in marketing, although within these pricing strategies: cost-plus pricing is considered as the leading pricing strategy worldwide. Why should companies use such an unprofitable strategy, where fighting for a higher market share due to low prices is more a rule than exception? VBP is one of the most underestimated strategies by organizations. The definition of VBP is: 'value pricing applies to products that have the potential of being differe...

  10. 48 CFR 36.207 - Pricing fixed-price construction contracts.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 1 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Pricing fixed-price... Contracting for Construction 36.207 Pricing fixed-price construction contracts. (a) Generally, firm-fixed... methods. (b) Lump-sum pricing shall be used in preference to unit pricing except when— (1) Large...

  11. Paperless Transaction for Publication Incentive System

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ibrahim, Rosziati; Madon, Hamiza Diana; Nazri, Nurul Hashida Amira Mohd; Saarani, Norhafizah; Mustapha, Aida

    2017-08-01

    Within the Malaysian context, incentive system in scientific publishing rewards authors for publishing journal articles or conference papers that are indexed by Scopus. At Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia, the incentive system is going into its third year in operational. The main challenge lies in preparing the evidences as required by the application guideline. This paper presents an online module for publication incentive within the University Publication Information System (SMPU). The module was developed using the Scrum methodology based on the existing workflow of paper-based application. The module is hoped to increase the quality of the system deliverables of SMPU as well as having the ability to cope with change of university requirements in the future.

  12. Price strategy and pricing strategy: terms and content identification

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Panasenko Tetyana

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available The article is devoted to the terminology and content identification of seemingly identical concepts "price strategy" and "pricing strategy". The article contains evidence that the price strategy determines the direction, principles and procedure of implementing the company price policy and pricing strategy creates a set of rules and practical methods of price formation in accordance with the pricing strategy of the company.

  13. Incentive contracts and time use

    OpenAIRE

    Tor Viking Eriksson; Jaime Ortega

    2011-01-01

    Empirical studies on incentive contracts have primarily been concerned with the effects on employees’ productivity and earnings. The productivity increases associated with such contracts may, however, come at the expense of quality of life at or outside work. In this paper we study the effect on the employees’ non-work activities, testing whether incentive contracts lead to a change in the allocation of time across work and non-work activities. In doing so, we distinguish between two effects,...

  14. Incentive regulation of nuclear power plants by state Public Utility Commissions

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, R.L.; Olson, J.; Hendrickson, P.

    1989-12-01

    Economic performance incentives established by state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) currently are applicable to the construction or operation of approximately 73 nuclear power reactors owned by 27 utilities with investment greater than 10% in 18 states. The NRC staff monitors development of the incentives and periodically provides an updated report on all nuclear plant incentives to its headquarters and regional offices. The staff maintains contact with the PUCs and the utilities responsible for implementing the incentives in order to obtain the updated information and to consider potential safety effects of the incentives. This report on incentive regulation of nuclear power plants by state PUCs presents the NRC staff's concerns on potential safety effects of economic performance incentives. It also includes a plant-by-plant survey that describes the mechanics of each incentive and discusses the financial effects of the incentive on the utility-owner(s) of the plant

  15. Peak-load pricing in two-step-modeling of power generation and transmission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Korunig, Jens-Holger

    2005-01-01

    profits, and thus diminish the consumer surplus and cause a welfare loss. It therefore appears meaningful in the interest of the welfare maximization to prevent (or at least to reduce) this behaviour by regulatory intervention. But if one intervenes in the behaviour possibilities of the natural monopolist, it can happen that the obtained yields are too small to finance the - in the long run necessary - investments (the network carriers state exactly this argument, if they act against planned regulatory intervention). Additionally this situation is intensified by the fact that in a decreasing marginal costs industry welfare optimal prices lead to deficits of the enterprise. Prices, which orientate at the average costs, are from the aspect of welfare sub optimal. A regulator (or a regulatory rule) thus has to trade off between different economic criteria (welfare maximization, sufficient incentives to long term investments, no deficits). In a further step it is to be examined which connection between Peak-load- Pricing (by sub additive cost functions) and different methods of regulatory intervention exists and to what extent incentives to long-term investments are affected by the interaction of the examined factors. (Author)

  16. High prices for rare species can drive large populations extinct: the anthropogenic Allee effect revisited.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Holden, Matthew H; McDonald-Madden, Eve

    2017-09-21

    Consumer demand for plant and animal products threatens many populations with extinction. The anthropogenic Allee effect (AAE) proposes that such extinctions can be caused by prices for wildlife products increasing with species rarity. This price-rarity relationship creates financial incentives to extract the last remaining individuals of a population, despite higher search and harvest costs. The AAE has become a standard approach for conceptualizing the threat of economic markets on endangered species. Despite its potential importance for conservation, AAE theory is based on a simple graphical model with limited analysis of possible population trajectories. By specifying a general class of functions for price-rarity relationships, we show that the classic theory can understate the risk of species extinction. AAE theory proposes that only populations below a critical Allee threshold will go extinct due to increasing price-rarity relationships. Our analysis shows that this threshold can be much higher than the original theory suggests, depending on initial harvest effort. More alarmingly, even species with population sizes above this Allee threshold, for which AAE predicts persistence, can be destined to extinction. Introducing even a minimum price for harvested individuals, close to zero, can cause large populations to cross the classic anthropogenic Allee threshold on a trajectory towards extinction. These results suggest that traditional AAE theory may give a false sense of security when managing large harvested populations. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

  17. Incentive theory: IV. Magnitude of reward

    OpenAIRE

    Killeen, Peter R.

    1985-01-01

    Incentive theory is successfully applied to data from experiments in which the amount of food reward is varied. This is accomplished by assuming that incentive value is a negatively accelerated function of reward duration. The interaction of the magnitude of a reward with its delay is confirmed, and the causes and implications of this interaction are discussed.

  18. Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist?

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Marta Fernández-Olmos

    2009-07-01

    Full Text Available The central purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive contract as an equilibrium phenomenon. We analyse a model of vertical differentiation in which we deal with the strategic role of the competitor’s decisions in a successive duopoly. Is it better for a processor to offer an incentive contract to an upstream producer or the spot market? We determine the equilibrium of a game in which the processors simultaneously decide whether to offer an incentive contract or to continue at the spot market to acquire their input. Our results show that under successive duopoly, offering an incentive contract constitutes the unique equilibrium solution, which highlights the incentive contract persistence.

  19. Logistics: Price Rises Incurred by High Oil Price

    Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (English)

    Lai Zhihui

    2011-01-01

    @@ "When the oil price grows by 100%, the logistic indus-try will see a price growth of 40%, while the logistics in-dustry a price rise of 35%, which means every price increase of 5% in the oil price will bring along that of 2% in this industry." said Liu Zongsheng, General Manager of Itochu Logistics Co., Ltd., on the seminar "Focusing on the eco-nomic consequences of raising oil price, interest rate and deposit reserve ratio", which was held recently.

  20. The Wisconsin experience with incentives for demand-side management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Landgren, D.A.

    1990-01-01

    It has been noted that, within traditional regulatory frameworks for electric utilities, factors exist which discourage demand side management (DSM) and that there is a lack of positive incentives for DSM. Regulatory agencies should therefore make it possible for DSM measures to benefit from the same treatment as supply-side measures. The Wisconsin Public Service Commission (WPSC) has recognized this need and has adopted various measures accordingly. The need for efficiency incentives is described according to the particular experience of Wisconsin Electric concerning their recourse to a DSM incentive and according to new incentive models being tested in collaboration with other electricity suppliers in Wisconsin. The WPSC has concluded that the fact of considering the costs relating to DSM as expenses or capitalizing them within the rate base does not motivate the utility to promote DSM programs. The WPSC has thus decided to experiment with energy efficiency incentives in order to evaluate their eventual impact. The choice of the type of incentive had an objective of starting the process in an area where the lack of experience has created, from the regulatory point of view, a reticence on the part of utilities to engage in DSM programs. The WPSC has designed a variety of incentive models which have been adapted to each utility's own situation. Specific incentive programs developed for three Wisconsin utilities are reviewed

  1. A Novel Stackelberg-Bertrand Game Model for Pricing Content Provider

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Cheng Zhang

    2015-11-01

    Full Text Available With the popularity of smart devices such as smartphone, tablet, contents that traditionally be viewed on a personal computer, can also be viewed on these smart devices. The demand for contents thus is increasing year by year, which makes the content providers (CPs get great revenue from either users’ subscription or advertisement. On the other hand, Internet service providers (ISPs, who keep investing in the network technology or capacity capacity to support the huge traffic generated by contents, do not benefit directly from the content traffic. One choice for ISPs is to charge CPs to share the revenue from the huge content traffic. Then ISPs have enough incentives to invest in network infrastructure to improve quality of services (QoS, which eventually benefit CPs and users. This paper presents a novel economic model called Stackelberg-Bertrand game to capture the interaction and competitions among ISPs, CPs and users when ISPs charge CPs. A generic user demand function is assumed to capture the sensitivity of demand to prices of ISPs and CPs. The numerical results show that the price elasticity of ISP and CP plays an important part on the payoff of the ISP and CP.

  2. An examination of the effect on cigarette prices and promotions of Philip Morris USA penalties to stores that sell cigarettes to minors.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Feighery, E C; Schleicher, N C; Ribisl, K M; Rogers, T

    2009-12-01

    The purpose of this study was to assess the potential impact of public policies to regulate price discounting strategies on retail cigarette prices and advertising. Philip Morris USA (PM USA) has a policy designed to sanction stores violating state laws banning illegal tobacco sales to minors by temporarily suspending price discounting incentives. This study examined the impact of those sanctions on retail cigarette prices and sales promotion advertising. In November 2006, the California Attorney General's Office informed PM USA that 196 stores were found guilty of illegal underage sales. Of these, 109 stores that participated in the PM USA Retail Leaders Program were notified that their merchandising and/or promotional resources would be suspended for the month of April 2007. The remaining 87 stores were not sanctioned and served as a comparison group. Trained raters assessed advertising and prices of selected PM USA brands in these stores pre-penalty and during the penalty phase. There were no significant differences between sanctioned and non-sanctioned stores on median changes in price and sales promotion advertising from the pre-penalty to the penalty phase. The lack of impact on cigarette prices and advertising indicate that the PM USA policy may be flawed in its design or execution. If public policies are developed to restrain cigarette price discounting strategies, they should be crafted to ensure compliance and preclude possible compensatory actions by retailers.

  3. Numerical semigroups in a problem about economic incentives for consumers

    OpenAIRE

    Robles-Pérez, Aureliano M.; Rosales, José Carlos

    2016-01-01

    Motivated by a promotion to increase the number of musical downloads, we introduce the concept of $C$-incentive and show an algorithm that compute the smallest $C$-incentive containing a subset $X \\subseteq {\\mathbb N}$. On the other hand, in order to study $C$-incentives, we see that we can focus on numerical $C$-incentives. Then, we establish that the set formed by all numerical $C$-incentives is a Frobenius pseudo-variety and we show an algorithmic process to recurrently build such a pseud...

  4. CROSS-CULTURAL INCENTIVES FOR THE FDI

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Dumitru ZAIȚ

    2014-06-01

    Full Text Available In order to invest there are some incentives needed, including among them, certainly, the ones discussed and analysed in the scientific literature such as: specific earning chances (expectations of each participant (wage, profit, dividend, budget revenue, etc., potential investor’s general or current state, etc.. Less visible incentives from complex areas not obviously related to the investment are, however, less considered. Among these could be incentives arising from inherited or education and culture transmitted philosophy, generally regarding earnings, business and investment. We notice these incentives in case of FDI in different shades and intensities.Investor’s decision to acquire, sell or to carry out projects in a particular area, region or country is not only due to purely economic, commercial or financial reasoning. In such operations, meeting among businessmen, managers and other professionals in the field is, first of all, meeting in specific circumstances, among more or less different cultures.Both theory and practice must be concerned in what way and to what extent these factors influence the investment intention, outcome and yield. Our study proposes a list of the most important cultural type incentives for investment (mainly FDI, based on a set of cases, through a logical and empirical research, using some of the most relevant and recent studies and several real situations to which we got access. These are early data and analysis that will allow us to draw attention to the problem and to develop further research to reach generalizable results

  5. Enhancing medicine price transparency through price information mechanisms.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hinsch, Michael; Kaddar, Miloud; Schmitt, Sarah

    2014-05-08

    Medicine price information mechanisms provide an essential tool to countries that seek a better understanding of product availability, market prices and price compositions of individual medicines. To be effective and contribute to cost savings, these mechanisms need to consider prices in their particular contexts when comparing between countries. This article discusses in what ways medicine price information mechanisms can contribute to increased price transparency and how this may affect access to medicines for developing countries. We used data collected during the course of a WHO project focusing on the development of a vaccine price and procurement information mechanism. The project collected information from six medicine price information mechanisms and interviewed data managers and technical experts on key aspects as well as observed market effects of these mechanisms.The reviewed mechanisms were broken down into categories including objective and target audience, as well as the sources, types and volumes of data included. Information provided by the mechanisms was reviewed according to data available on medicine prices, product characteristics, and procurement modalities. We found indications of positive effects on access to medicines resulting from the utilization of the reviewed mechanisms. These include the uptake of higher quality medicines, more favorable results from contract negotiations, changes in national pricing policies, and the decrease of prices in certain segments for countries participating in or deriving data from the various mechanisms. The reviewed mechanisms avoid the methodological challenges observed for medicine price comparisons that only use national price databases. They work with high quality data and display prices in the appropriate context of procurement modalities as well as the peculiarities of purchasing countries. Medicine price information mechanisms respond to the need for increased medicine price transparency and have the

  6. Incentive Pass-through for Residential Solar Systems in California

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dong, C. G. [Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States); Wiser, Ryan [Lawrence Berkeley National Lab. (LBNL), Berkeley, CA (United States); Rai, Varun [Univ. of Texas, Austin, TX (United States)

    2014-10-01

    The deployment of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems has grown rapidly over the last decade, partly because of various government incentives. In the United States, among the largest and longest-running incentives have been those established in California. Building on past research, this report addresses the still-unanswered question: to what degree have the direct PV incentives in California been passed through from installers to consumers? This report helps address this question by carefully examining the residential PV market in California (excluding a certain class of third-party-owned PV systems) and applying both a structural-modeling approach and a reduced-form regression analysis to estimate the incentive pass-through rate. The results suggest an average pass-through rate of direct incentives of nearly 100%, though with regional differences among California counties. While these results could have multiple explanations, they suggest a relatively competitive market and well-functioning subsidy program. Further analysis is required to determine whether similar results broadly apply to other states, to other customer segments, to all third-party-owned PV systems, or to all forms of financial incentives for solar (considering not only direct state subsidies, but also utility electric bill savings and federal tax incentives).

  7. Dynamic Pricing

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Sharifi, Reza; Anvari-Moghaddam, Amjad; Fathi, S. Hamid

    2017-01-01

    Dynamic pricing scheme, also known as real-time pricing (RTP), can be more efficient and technically beneficial than the other price-based schemes (such as flat-rate or time-of-use (TOU) pricing) for enabling demand response (DR) actions. Over the past few years, advantages of RTP-based schemes h...... of dynamic pricing can lead to increased willingness of consumers to participate in DR programs which in turn improve the operation of liberalized electricity markets.......Dynamic pricing scheme, also known as real-time pricing (RTP), can be more efficient and technically beneficial than the other price-based schemes (such as flat-rate or time-of-use (TOU) pricing) for enabling demand response (DR) actions. Over the past few years, advantages of RTP-based schemes...

  8. The perils of altering incentive plans: A case study

    OpenAIRE

    Kauhanen, Antti

    2011-01-01

    This paper studies a retail chain that introduced a sales incentive plan that rewarded for exceeding a sales target and subsequently cut the incentive intensity in addition to increasing the target. Utilizing monthly panel data for 54 months for all 53 units of the chain the paper shows that the introduction of the sales incentive plan increased sales and profitability, while the changes in the plan lead to a marked drop in sales and profitability. Thus, modifying the incentive plan proved co...

  9. Credit ratings and CEO risk-taking incentives

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Kuang, Y.; Qin, B.

    2013-01-01

    This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk-taking incentives into their credit risk evaluation. We measure risk-taking incentives using two proxies: the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity of

  10. Tools for a collective management of the climate risks. An analysis framework centered on the means to derive a signal-price

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Godard, O.; Hourcade, J.C.

    1991-01-01

    The greenhouse effect appears as a particular problem (collective uncertainty, imprecise understanding, etc.) that necessitates a specific strategical approach and tool selection adequate criteria. The applicability of any environmental regulation concerning greenhouse gas abatement must take into account aspects such as efficiency, predictability, political sovereignty, perverted effects and practicability. Combined tools have to be coordinated: regulations, negotiation, financial incentives, exchangeable emission rights..., that could be controlled by a signal price system

  11. Managing imperfect competition by pay for performance and reference pricing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Mak, Henry Y

    2018-01-01

    I study a managed health service market where differentiated providers compete for consumers by choosing multiple service qualities, and where copayments that consumers pay and payments that providers receive for services are set by a payer. The optimal regulation scheme is two-sided. On the demand side, it justifies and clarifies value-based reference pricing. On the supply side, it prescribes pay for performance when consumers misperceive service benefits or providers have intrinsic quality incentives. The optimal bonuses are expressed in terms of demand elasticities, service technology, and provider characteristics. However, pay for performance may not outperform prospective payment when consumers are rational and providers are profit maximizing, or when one of the service qualities is not contractible. Copyright © 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

  12. Electricity pricing policy and rational energy use and conservation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Faure-Mallen, A.

    1995-01-01

    With a threefold combination of rate system /R and D industrial policy/ communication and information for customers, the French electrical system appears as a major actor in Demand Side Management. Especially, the electricity tariffs are a cost reflective rate system which had been implemented and adapted over several decades with an efficient impact on national electricity load curve. As a part of IRP (integrated resources planning), within the global regulation of the energy supply and demand system, tariffs based on marginal costs have a double function: 1) tariffs reflect costs of different kind of supplies; 2) tariffs are an economic signal for customers. These pricing principles alone provide incentive for energy savings through peak-day-demand-reduction of transfer to less costly off-peak period, when they are economically sound

  13. Coupons for Success: A Marketing Incentive in Academic Support

    Science.gov (United States)

    Potacco, Donna R.; Chen, Peter; Desroches, Danielle; Chisholm, Daniel R.; De Young, Sandra

    2013-01-01

    How does a Coupon Incentive Program motivate students to seek academic support in high-risk courses? Results from this study demonstrated that the Coupon Incentive Program was effective in motivating voluntary student attendance and improving student outcomes. Recommendations related to implementation of the Coupon Incentive Program are discussed.…

  14. Biofuels, tax policies and oil prices in France: Insights from a dynamic CGE model

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Doumax, Virginie; Philip, Jean-Marc; Sarasa, Cristina

    2014-01-01

    The 2009 Renewable Energies Directive (RED) has set up ambitious targets concerning biofuel consumption in the European Union by 2020. Nevertheless, budgetary constraints and growing concerns about the environmental integrity of first-generation biofuels have imposed a phasing out of the fiscal instruments to promote them. Focusing on France, this paper combines an exogenous increase in oil prices and tax policies on fossil fuels. The objective is to determine the efficiency of an alternative incentive scheme for biodiesel consumption based on a higher price of the fossil fuel substitute. Policy simulations are implemented through a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated on 2009 French data. The results show that the 10% biodiesel mandate set by the RED would not be achieved even if the fixed taxes on diesel reach the same level as those on gasoline. Although integrating the rise in oil prices into the fiscal framework improves the biodiesel penetration rate, it remains below the target. Moreover, we find that the effects of biofuel consumption are limited to the biofuel chain sectors. In other agricultural sectors, the substitution effect of biodiesel with diesel is partially offset by the pricing effect induced by higher energy production costs. - Highlights: • We represent the French biodiesel production chain through a dynamic CGE model. • We examine the efficiency of alternative support schemes to biodiesel in France. • Ambitious targets require substantial additional taxes on diesel and rising oil prices. • Spillover effects are limited to the biodiesel chain sectors. • Energy-intensive sectors suffer from higher production costs

  15. The development in energy consumption, price sensitivity and allocation of power; Utviklingen i stroemforbruket, prisfoelsomheten og stroemmarkedet

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Halvorsen, Bente

    2012-11-15

    This report discusses the development in energy consumption in households, service industries, primary industries and other small industries, both in the short run (hour to hour, day by day) and over a longer period, back to the 1960. The report discusses the main driving forces behind this development, as well as the demand price sensitivity and its role in the allocation of power between customers and over time. The analysis shows that for the short-term fluctuations in consumption from hour to hour, the temperature of the main driver, while price changes have less influence. For the long-term trend, however, changes in relative energy prices are a key driver, along with population and income growth. Even if the short term price sensitivity is low for end-users, it may still have a big influence on the short-term clearance of the market (from hour to hour), as it affects the short term price sensitivity in the spot market. The long-term price elasticities in the retail markets is more important for determining consumption over a time period, and is important in allocating energy resources over time in the spot market, e.g. over the winter months. Empirical analyses show that the Norwegian demand responds to price changes, both in the short term in the spot market and in the longer term in the retail market. It takes a few weeks before the price signals from spot market affects the consumer prise for most end-users, but by then, most of the price signal has been transmitted. It also follows from the analysis that it is important to let prices vary between regions of the market in the event of scarcity, so customers in regions where shortages occur, have the incentive to change their demand. The faster these price signals affect consumer prices, the more efficient the market will be able to handle a tight power situation.(Author)

  16. Conjoint Analysis of Farmers’ Response to Conservation Incentives

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    David Conner

    2016-07-01

    Full Text Available Environmental degradation threatens the long term resiliency of the US food and farming system. While USDA has provided conservation incentives for the adoption of best management practices (BMPs, only a small percentage of farms have participated in such conservation programs. This study uses conjoint analysis to examine Vermont farmers’ underlying preferences and willingness-to-accept (WTA incentives for three common BMPs. Based on the results of this survey, we hypothesize that federal cost share programs’ payments are below preferred incentive levels and that less familiar and more complex BMPs require a higher payment. Our implications focus on strategies to test these hypotheses and align incentive payments and other non-monetary options to increase BMP adoption.

  17. Are Delegation and Incentives Complementary Instruments ?

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Lando, Henrik

    2004-01-01

    It is natural to suppose that delegation and incentives are complementaryboth in the sense that when more decisions are delegated toa lower level of an organizational hierarchy, more use should be madeof incentives at that level, and in the sense that more use of incentivesshould be accompanied...... by more delegation. This issue is analyzedwithin a Principal-Agent framework in which there are two decisionsto be made: an effort decision which can only be made by the Agent,and some other decision which can be made by either the Principal(i.e. be centralized) or by the Agent (i.e. be delegated). Within...... thisframework it is shown that delegation and incentives are not necessarilycomplementary instruments; some decisions should be centralized whenincentives are introduced....

  18. The safety-incentive theory of liability

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marshall, J.M.

    1977-11-01

    The use of liability law to improve incentives for safety is supported by certain recent theoretical results. The main ideas and the key argumants are summarized. Basic weaknesses of the theory are discussed, namely: (1) the simple model of Calabresi does not generalize; (2) the more complex systems of J.P. Brown, P. Diamond, and J. Green require that courts possess a great deal of information and use it to set appropriate standards of due care; (3) in practice safety incentives also depend upon fear of criminal penalties and the sense of social responsibility. The questions whether and when liability rules can significantly affect incentives are addressed. It is concluded that the theory in its present state can hardly serve as a basis for altering liability rules

  19. A choice modelling analysis on the similarity between distribution utilities' and industrial customers' price and quality preferences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Soederberg, Magnus

    2008-01-01

    The Swedish Electricity Act states that electricity distribution must comply with both price and quality requirements. In order to maintain efficient regulation it is necessary to firstly, define quality attributes and secondly, determine a customer's priorities concerning price and quality attributes. If distribution utilities gain an understanding of customer preferences and incentives for reporting them, the regulator can save a lot of time by surveying them rather than their customers. This study applies a choice modelling methodology where utilities and industrial customers are asked to evaluate the same twelve choice situations in which price and four specific quality attributes are varied. The preferences expressed by the utilities, and estimated by a random parameter logit, correspond quite well with the preferences expressed by the largest industrial customers. The preferences expressed by the utilities are reasonably homogenous in relation to forms of association (private limited, public and trading partnership). If the regulator acts according to the preferences expressed by the utilities, smaller industrial customers will have to pay for quality they have not asked for. (author)

  20. Transmission pricing in privately-owned electricity grids: An illustration from the Argentine electricity pool

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abdala, Manuel A.

    2008-01-01

    The Argentine electricity reform of 1992 offers an interesting example of decentralized transmission pricing arrangements within a competitive system. This paper is a shortened version of an original analysis made in 1994 of the regulation of the Argentine transmission system, with emphasis on investment cost allocation rules. To make up for the limitation of short-run marginal cost (SRMC) pricing, incentives on service quality were put in place, including penalties for lack of line availability. The mechanism for capacity expansion, based on ad-hoc rules for allocations of investment costs, had the potential to produce non-optimal investment outcomes, as such rules ignored beneficiaries on the demand side. For fine tuning of this system, I proposed an alternative rule based on traditional welfare analysis that broadens the universe of identified beneficiaries, and thus can be expected to produce a fairer outcome on investment cost allocation, reducing the potential risks of non-optimal investment. A brief postscript comments on the paper from the perspective of 2007. (author)

  1. Incentive mechanisms for Opportunistic Cloud Computing Services

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Kuada, Eric; Olesen, Henning

    2012-01-01

    to the OCCS platform as well as the efficient usage of these resources. We employ game theory and mechanism design to model and design the incentive schemes. We present two game models and show the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for both the cooperative and non-cooperative games. Three base...... ever contributing resources. It may also suffer from resource wastage from members or external entities trying to attack the system so that genuine users are deprived of valuable resources. The purpose of this paper is to design incentive schemes that will encourage the contribution of resources...... incentive schemes are presented and two advanced schemes one based on discount factor and the other a stochastic scheme are also presented. We perform analytical evaluation of our incentive schemes and conclude that the schemes meet the desired properties of budget-balance, ex-post individual rationality...

  2. Consumer perception and preference for suboptimal food under the emerging practice of expiration date based pricing in supermarkets

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Aschemann-Witzel, Jessica

    2017-01-01

    , it is unclear which contextual, individual, and product-related factors impact consumer likelihood of choice and thus acceptance of the practice in the long run. The study aimed at exploring the effect of communicating different motives for purchase, the product being organic, familiarity with the practice...... and the interaction with gender is observed for milk in particular. Overall, perceived quality and estimated likelihood of consumption at home majorly determine likelihood of choice. Consumer acceptance of expiration date based pricing of suboptimal food can be increased through furthering consumer familiarity......Consumers have been found to majorly prefer ‘optimal’ food over ‘suboptimal’ when purchasing food. To provide an incentive for consumers to select suboptimal food and thus decrease food waste in the supply chain, expiration date based pricing is suggested and increasingly applied. However...

  3. ACCOUNTING ASPECTS OF PRICING AND TRANSFER PRICING

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    TÜNDE VERES

    2011-01-01

    Full Text Available The pricing methods in practice need really complex view of the business situation and depend on the strategy and market position of a company. The structure of a price seems simple: cost plus margin. Both categories are special area in the management accounting. Information about the product costs, the allocation methodologies in cost accounting, the analyzing of revenue and different level of the margin needs information from accounting system. This paper analyzes the pricing methods from management accounting aspects to show out the role of the accounting system in the short term and long term pricing and transfer pricing decisions.

  4. Emotional responses to behavioral economic incentives for health behavior change.

    Science.gov (United States)

    van der Swaluw, Koen; Lambooij, Mattijs S; Mathijssen, Jolanda J P; Zeelenberg, Marcel; Polder, Johan J; Prast, Henriëtte M

    2018-03-05

    Many people aim to change their lifestyle, but have trouble acting on their intentions. Behavioral economic incentives and related emotions can support commitment to personal health goals, but the related emotions remain unexplored. In a regret lottery, winners who do not attain their health goals do not get their prize but receive feedback on what their forgone earnings would have been. This counterfactual feedback should provoke anticipated regret and increase commitment to health goals. We explored which emotions were actually expected upon missing out on a prize due to unsuccessful weight loss and which incentive-characteristics influence their likelihood and intensity. Participants reported their expected emotional response after missing out on a prize in one of 12 randomly presented incentive-scenarios, which varied in incentive type, incentive size and deadline distance. Participants primarily reported feeling disappointment, followed by regret. Regret was expected most when losing a lottery prize (vs. a fixed incentive) and intensified with prize size. Multiple features of the participant and the lottery incentive increase the occurrence and intensity of regret. As such, our findings can be helpful in designing behavioral economic incentives that leverage emotions to support health behavior change.

  5. Investigating financial incentives for maternal health: an introduction.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Stanton, Mary Ellen; Higgs, Elizabeth S; Koblinsky, Marge

    2013-12-01

    Projection of current trends in maternal and neonatal mortality reduction shows that many countries will fall short of the UN Millennium Development Goal 4 and 5. Underutilization of maternal health services contributes to this poor progress toward reducing maternal and neonatal morbidity and mortality. Moreover, the quality of services continues to lag in many countries, with a negative effect on the health of women and their babies, including deterring women from seeking care. To enhance the use and provision of quality maternal care, countries and donors are increasingly using financial incentives. This paper introduces the JHPN Supplement, in which each paper reviews the evidence of the effectiveness of a specific financial incentive instrument with the aim of improving the use and quality of maternal healthcare and impact. The US Agency for International Development and the US National Institutes of Health convened a US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and Use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives on 24-25 April 2012 in Washington, DC. The Summit brought together leading global experts in finance, maternal health, and health systems from governments, academia, development organizations, and foundations to assess the evidence on whether financial incentives significantly and substantially increase provision, use and quality of maternal health services, and the contextual factors that impact the effectiveness of these incentives. Evidence review teams evaluated the multidisciplinary evidence of various financial mechanisms, including supply-side incentives (e.g. performance-based financing, user fees, and various insurance mechanisms) and demand-side incentives (e.g. conditional cash transfers, vouchers, user fee exemptions, and subsidies for care-seeking). At the Summit, the teams presented a synthesis of evidence and initial recommendations on practice, policy, and research for discussion. The Summit enabled structured

  6. Does a monetary incentive improve the response to a postal questionnaire in a randomised controlled trial? The MINT incentive study

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Mt-Isa Shahrul

    2009-06-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Sending a monetary incentive with postal questionnaires has been found to improve the proportion of responders, in research in non-healthcare settings. However, there is little research on use of incentives to improve follow-up rates in clinical trials, and existing studies are inconclusive. We conducted a randomised trial among participants in the Managing Injuries of the Neck Trial (MINT to investigate the effects on the proportion of questionnaires returned and overall non-response of sending a £5 gift voucher with a follow-up questionnaire. Methods Participants in MINT were randomised to receive either: (a a £5 gift voucher (incentive group or (b no gift voucher (no incentive group, with their 4 month or 8 month follow-up questionnaire. We recorded, for each group, the number of questionnaires returned, the number returned without any chasing from the study office, the overall number of non-responders (after all chasing efforts by the study office, and the costs of following up each group. Results 2144 participants were randomised, 1070 to the incentive group and 1074 to the no incentive group. The proportion of questionnaires returned (RR 1.10 (95% CI 1.05, 1.16 and the proportion returned without chasing (RR 1.14 (95% CI 1.05, 1.24 were higher in the incentive group, and the overall non-response rate was lower (RR 0.68 (95% CI 0.53, 0.87. Adjustment for injury severity and hospital of recruitment to MINT made no difference to these results, and there were no differences in results between the 4-month and 8-month follow up questionnaires. Analysis of costs suggested a cost of £67.29 per additional questionnaire returned. Conclusion Monetary incentives may be an effective way to increase the proportion of postal questionnaires returned and minimise loss to follow-up in clinical trials. Trial registration number ISRCTN61305297

  7. Design of economic incentive instruments in nutrition policy

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Jensen, Jørgen Dejgård

    2011-01-01

    • Economic incentives are instruments to improve diets and reduce the fraction of people exposed to diet-related health risks • Proper targeting and design of economic incentive instruments is important, if such instruments should be efficient and feasible policy measures in the improvement...... of dietary behaviour in industrialised countries • From a cost-effectiveness perspective, there are considerable potential for optimizing the targeting and design of economic incentive instruments in nutritional policy...

  8. Globalisation and National Incentives for Protecting Environmental Goods

    OpenAIRE

    Alkuin Kölliker

    2004-01-01

    This article tries to explain national incentives for protecting environmental goods either autonomously or collectively; it explores how globalisation has affected those incentives; and it suggests how national environmental policy might respond so as to ensure its effectiveness. The central argument is that national incentives for environmental protection may to a considerable extent be explained by a combination of the type of environmental good to be protected (in terms of public goods th...

  9. Oil price volatility and the asymmetric response of gasoline prices to oil price increases and decreases

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Radchenko, S.

    2005-01-01

    This paper analyzes the effect of volatility in oil prices on the degree of asymmetry in the response of gasoline prices to oil price increases and decreases. Several time series measures of the asymmetry between the responses of gasoline prices to oil price increases and decreases and several measures of the oil price volatility are constructed. In all models, the degree of asymmetry in gasoline prices declines with an increase in oil price volatility. The results support the oligopolistic coordination theory as a likely explanation of the observed asymmetry and are not consistent with the standard search theory and the search theory with Bayesian updating. (author)

  10. Incentive-Based Primary Care: Cost and Utilization Analysis.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Hollander, Marcus J; Kadlec, Helena

    2015-01-01

    In its fee-for-service funding model for primary care, British Columbia, Canada, introduced incentive payments to general practitioners as pay for performance for providing enhanced, guidelines-based care to patients with chronic conditions. Evaluation of the program was conducted at the health care system level. To examine the impact of the incentive payments on annual health care costs and hospital utilization patterns in British Columbia. The study used Ministry of Health administrative data for Fiscal Year 2010-2011 for patients with diabetes, congestive heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and/or hypertension. In each disease group, cost and utilization were compared across patients who did, and did not, receive incentive-based care. Health care costs (eg, primary care, hospital) and utilization measures (eg, hospital days, readmissions). After controlling for patients' age, sex, service needs level, and continuity of care (defined as attachment to a general practice), the incentives reduced the net annual health care costs, in Canadian dollars, for patients with hypertension (by approximately Can$308 per patient), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (by Can$496), and congestive heart failure (by Can$96), but not diabetes (incentives cost about Can$148 more per patient). The incentives were also associated with fewer hospital days, fewer admissions and readmissions, and shorter lengths of hospital stays for all 4 groups. Although the available literature on pay for performance shows mixed results, we showed that the funding model used in British Columbia using incentive payments for primary care might reduce health care costs and hospital utilization.

  11. The roles of incentives and voluntary cooperation for contractual compliance

    OpenAIRE

    Gächter, Simon; Kessler, Esther; Königstein, Manfred

    2011-01-01

    Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit incentives affect cooperation. We first show that there is substantial cooperation under non-incentive compatible contracts. Incentive-compatible contracts induce best-reply effort and crowd out any voluntar...

  12. The effect of explicit financial incentives on physician behavior.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Armour, B S; Pitts, M M; Maclean, R; Cangialose, C; Kishel, M; Imai, H; Etchason, J

    2001-05-28

    Managed care organizations use explicit financial incentives to influence physicians' use of resources. This has contributed to concerns regarding conflicts of interest for physicians and adverse effects on the quality of patient care. In light of recent publicized legislative and legal battles about this issue, we reviewed the literature and analyzed studies that examine the effect of these explicit financial incentives on the behavior of physicians. The method used to undertake the literature review followed the approach set forth in the Cochrane Collaboration handbook. Our literature review revealed a paucity of data on the effect of explicit financial incentives. Based on this limited evidence, explicit incentives that place individual physicians at financial risk appear to be effective in reducing physician resource use. However, the empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of bonus payments on physician resource use is mixed. Similarly, our review revealed mixed effects of the influence of explicit financial incentives on the quality of patient care. The effect of explicit financial incentives on physician behavior is complicated by a lack of understanding of the incentive structure by the managed care organization and the physician. The lack of a universally acceptable definition of quality renders it important that future researchers identify the term explicitly.

  13. Can an incentive-based intervention increase physical activity and reduce sitting among adults? the ACHIEVE (Active Choices IncEntiVE) feasibility study.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ball, Kylie; Hunter, Ruth F; Maple, Jaimie-Lee; Moodie, Marj; Salmon, Jo; Ong, Kok-Leong; Stephens, Lena D; Jackson, Michelle; Crawford, David

    2017-03-21

    Despite recent interest in the potential of incentivisation as a strategy for motivating healthier behaviors, little remains known about the effectiveness of incentives in promoting physical activity and reducing sedentary behavior, and improving associated health outcomes. This pre-post-test design study investigated the feasibility, appeal and effects of providing non-financial incentives for promoting increased physical activity, reduced sedentary time, and reduced body mass index (BMI) and blood pressure among inactive middle-aged adults. Inactive men (n = 36) and women (n = 46) aged 40-65 years were recruited via a not-for-profit insurance fund and participated in a 4 month pre-post design intervention. Baseline and post-intervention data were collected on self-reported physical activity and sitting time (IPAQ-Long), BMI and blood pressure. Participants were encouraged to increase physical activity to 150 mins/week and reduce sedentary behavior by 150 mins/week in progressive increments. Incentives included clothing, recipe books, store gift vouchers, and a chance to win one of four Apple iPad Mini devices. The incentive component of the intervention was supported by an initial motivational interview and text messaging to encourage participants and provide strategies to increase physical activity and reduce sedentary behaviors. Only two participants withdrew during the program, demonstrating the feasibility of recruiting and retaining inactive middle-aged participants. While two-thirds of the sample qualified for the easiest physical activity incentive (by demonstrating 100 mins physical activity/week or 100 mins reduced sitting time/week), only one third qualified for the most challenging incentive. Goals to reduce sitting appeared more challenging, with 43% of participants qualifying for the first incentive, but only 20% for the last incentive. More men than women qualified for most incentives. Mean leisure-time physical activity increased by 252

  14. IS THE PRICE RIGHT? PRICING FOR LONG TERM PROFITABILITY

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Andrea Erika NYÁRÁDI

    2007-01-01

    Full Text Available The way how we choose our pricing strategy has a significant impact on company’s success. Nowadays companies more and more adopt a new way of thinking in pricing, namely pricing for a long term period in order to bring higher profitability, to build an efficient pricing strategy. Marketers have only recently begun to focus seriously on effective pricing. These companies are the so called progressive companies. They have begun doing more than just worrying about pricing. To increase profitability many are abandoning traditional reactive pricing procedures in favor of proactive pricing, making explicit corporate decisions to change their focus to growth in top-line sales to growth in profitability. The long-term implications of price strategies are still under-researched, and managers should be aware of shifts in customer reactions that may result from frequent adoption of certain strategies. The company pricing strategy should be seen in relation to developments in the company variables, internal ones (capital strength, competencies, organizational conditions, efficiency of the work force etc. as well as external ones (customers, competitors, the technological development etc., adopting strategic pricing. In this paper I will present the most effective pricing strategies leading to long term profitability, and also suggest practical conditions for pricing strategies to maximize profit in the long run.

  15. Patients' views on price shopping and price transparency.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Semigran, Hannah L; Gourevitch, Rebecca; Sinaiko, Anna D; Cowling, David; Mehrotra, Ateev

    2017-06-01

    Driven by the growth of high deductibles and price transparency initiatives, patients are being encouraged to search for prices before seeking care, yet few do so. To understand why this is the case, we interviewed individuals who were offered access to a widely used price transparency website through their employer. Qualitative interviews. We interviewed individuals enrolled in a preferred provider organization product through their health plan about their experience using the price transparency tool (if they had done so), their past medical experiences, and their opinions on shopping for care. All interviews were transcribed and manually coded using a thematic coding guide. In general, respondents expressed frustration with healthcare costs and had a positive opinion of the idea of price shopping in theory, but 2 sets of barriers limited their ability to do so in reality. The first was the salience of searching for price information. For example, respondents recognized that due to their health plan benefits design, they would not save money by switching to a lower-cost provider. Second, other factors were more important than price for respondents when choosing a provider, including quality and loyalty to current providers. We found a disconnect between respondents' enthusiasm for price shopping and their reported use of a price transparency tool to shop for care. However, many did find the tool useful for other purposes, including checking their claims history. Addressing the barriers to price shopping identified by respondents can help inform ongoing and future price transparency initiatives.

  16. The diversification value of nuclear power as part of a utility technology mix when gas and carbon prices are uncertain

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roques, Fabien A.; Nuttall, William J.; Newbery, David M.; Neufville, Richard de; Connors, Stephen

    2005-01-01

    Despite recent revived interest, the prospects for new nuclear power investment in liberalized electricity industries without government support do not seem promising. The objective of this paper is twofold. First it aims to identify the specific features of nuclear power technology that makes it an unattractive choice. The second objective is to estimate the value to a utility of a nuclear investment as a hedge against uncertain gas and carbon prices. A stylized 5-plant Real Option utility model shows that while the nuclear option value represents about 18% of the net present value (NPV) of the nuclear plant investment in the case where electricity and gas prices are uncorrelated, it reduces to nearly zero for correlation factors between electricity and gas price greater than 30%. These results suggest that the private diversification incentives in electricity markets might not be aligned with the social value of a diverse fuel-mix at the country level. (Author)

  17. Third-Party Incentive Strategies and Conflict Management in Africa

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Emmanuel, Nikolas G.

    2016-01-01

    Dr. Nikolas Emmanuel's examines the use of an incentives approach in managing intrastate conflict in Africa because in many cases, risks and costs make applications of hard power alone unfeasible. Furthermore, simply ignoring episodes of civil conflict in the hope that they will "burn themselves...... out"� does not appear to be a viable alternative. That said, both noncoercive and coercive incentive strategies exist and have been deployed by third parties in a variety of conflict situations. Such incentives seek to manage conflict by encouraging political bargaining. The clear intention...... parties can help manage conflicts. Second, it offers a typology of the available incentive strategies, classifying them along noncoercive and coercive lines. Thus, the article outlines the possibilities offered by an incentives approach, focusing on examples drawn from recent African cases....

  18. Financial Incentives to Promote Active Travel

    OpenAIRE

    Martin, Adam; Suhrcke, Marc; Ogilvie, David

    2012-01-01

    Context Financial incentives, including taxes and subsidies, can be used to encourage behavior change. They are common in transport policy for tackling externalities associated with use of motor vehicles, and in public health for influencing alcohol consumption and smoking behaviors. Financial incentives also offer policymakers a compromise between ?nudging,? which may be insufficient for changing habitual behavior, and regulations that restrict individual choice. Evidence acquisition The lit...

  19. 5 CFR 575.107 - Agency recruitment incentive plan and approval levels.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-01-01

    ... of employees who are prohibited from receiving recruitment incentives; (3) Required documentation for... approve each determination to pay a recruitment incentive to a newly appointed employee, unless there is... the recruitment incentive determination before the agency may pay the incentive to the employee. (2...

  20. Flexible Demand Management under Time-Varying Prices

    Science.gov (United States)

    Liang, Yong

    In this dissertation, the problem of flexible demand management under time-varying prices is studied. This generic problem has many applications, which usually have multiple periods in which decisions on satisfying demand need to be made, and prices in these periods are time-varying. Examples of such applications include multi-period procurement problem, operating room scheduling, and user-end demand scheduling in the Smart Grid, where the last application is used as the main motivating story throughout the dissertation. The current grid is experiencing an upgrade with lots of new designs. What is of particular interest is the idea of passing time-varying prices that reflect electricity market conditions to end users as incentives for load shifting. One key component, consequently, is the demand management system at the user-end. The objective of the system is to find the optimal trade-off between cost saving and discomfort increment resulted from load shifting. In this dissertation, we approach this problem from the following aspects: (1) construct a generic model, solve for Pareto optimal solutions, and analyze the robust solution that optimizes the worst-case payoffs, (2) extend to a distribution-free model for multiple types of demand (appliances), for which an approximate dynamic programming (ADP) approach is developed, and (3) design other efficient algorithms for practical purposes of the flexible demand management system. We first construct a novel multi-objective flexible demand management model, in which there are a finite number of periods with time-varying prices, and demand arrives in each period. In each period, the decision maker chooses to either satisfy or defer outstanding demand to minimize costs and discomfort over a certain number of periods. We consider both the deterministic model, models with stochastic demand or prices, and when only partial information about the stochastic demand or prices is known. We first analyze the stochastic

  1. Analyzing the effects of past prices on reference price formation

    OpenAIRE

    van Oest, R.D.; Paap, R.

    2004-01-01

    textabstractWe propose a new reference price framework for brand choice. In this framework, we employ a Markov-switching process with an absorbing state to model unobserved price recall of households. Reference prices result from the prices households are able to remember. Our model can be used to learn how many prices observed in the past are used for reference price formation. Furthermore, we learn to what extent households have sufficient price knowledge to form an internal reference price...

  2. BSN completion barriers, challenges, incentives, and strategies.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Duffy, Marie T; Friesen, Mary Ann; Speroni, Karen Gabel; Swengros, Diane; Shanks, Laura A; Waiter, Pamela A; Sheridan, Michael J

    2014-04-01

    The objectives of this study were to explore RN perceptions regarding barriers/challenges and incentives/supports for BSN completion and identify recommendations to increase RN BSN completion. The Institute of Medicine's 2011 The Future of Nursing report recommended the proportion of RNs with a BSN increase to 80% by 2020. This qualitative study included 41 RNs who participated in 1 of 6 focus groups based on their BSN completion status. Primary themes were sacrifices, barriers/challenges, incentives/supports, value, how to begin, and pressure. Primary BSN completion barriers/challenges were work-life balance and economic issues. Incentives/supports identified were financial compensation, assistance from employer and academic institution, and encouragement from family. Institutional strategies recommended for increasing BSN completion rates were improved access to education and financial support facilitated by collaboration between hospitals and academic institutions. Exploring RN barriers/challenges and incentives/supports for BSN completion can lead to implementation of institutional strategies, such as tuition reimbursement and academic collaboration.

  3. Quantitative and experimental analysis of investment incentive mechanisms in electricity markets: short- and long-term analysis of actors' strategies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khalfallah, Mohamed Haikel

    2009-01-01

    In this thesis, we deal with the question of reliability of electricity system and particularly the problem of generation capacity adequacy in electricity markets, characterized by uncertain and volatile demand. This question is currently the object of many politics and economics debates in the European Commission of energy. It occurs within the context of de-regulations and reforms of liberalization operated in western countries. This deregulation was caused many shortages and crisis in many electricity markets in the world. Failures are caused by several factors such as, the presence of uncertainties on future demand and fuel prices, the risk-averse behavior of investors and the market power exercised by existing generators. They had led to high spot market prices and a fundamental imbalance between the steadily growing demand for power and the limited increases, due to the lack of investments, in generation capacities. Many mechanisms, additional to the energy market, that ensure an adequate incentive for investments and a stable and socially acceptable electricity prices have been proposed. In this work, we compare different investment incentive mechanisms, in terms of long-term capacity adequacy in an uncertain environment, cost effectiveness and the ability of reducing market power. In the literature, the problem of long-term system reliability has been largely studied in qualitative terms. A few works attempt to model the quantitative effects of those market designs. The contribution of this work is to propose a quantitative analysis based on dynamics models. Competition is considered by using the principles of game theory. Stochastic dynamic programming is used to deal with the stochastic environment of the market and mixed complementarity problem and variational inequality formulations are employed to find Nash equilibrium. In addition to the analytic analysis, an experimental study is carried out in order to include a larger diversity of strategy. The

  4. Incentives to invest in liberalised electricity industries in the North and South. Differences in the need for suitable institutional arrangements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Finon, Dominique

    2006-01-01

    The issue of investment is all too often underplayed in deregulation reforms focused on market rules and de-integration measures. This presentation criticises first the optimistic approach of the theory of investment incentives through market signals when it is applied to deregulated electricity industries. The greater part of the investment in base-load and peak equipment should be made profitable by income from very high prices during peak and extreme peak periods, that raises a problem of political acceptability. The problem is then addressed in the context of the mature electricity industries in the North. Given the maturity of markets there, a number of modifications to the pure market model could be envisaged to strengthen incentives to invest, but none of them is perfect. The main way is to focus on adaptation of market rules on the supply of power at peaks and extreme peaks by considering 'capacity adequacy' as a public good (with three solutions: capacity payment, reserve obligations, centralised procurement by auctioning for peak capacity). Observation of reforms suggests also the validity of some other solutions based on a limitation of the competition by allowing long-term contracts and vertical integration between production and supply. Finally the question is extended to the specific problem of developing countries characterised by irregular growth. It is argued that reforms must be designed in view of the importance of the need for investment through long-term coordination and reduction of investment risks. Indeed experiences of Latin American liberalised industries show that they have to include a number of competition-based imperfections and to allow ongoing exercise of market power in order to allow prices to rise above competition prices. The single buyer model or some variants of it appear to be good alternatives if one wishes to avoid the twists and turns of the competition paradigm. The difficulty with this model arises from the institutional

  5. Incentive regulation of nuclear power plants by state regulators

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martin, R.L.; Baker, K.; Olson, J.

    1991-02-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) monitors incentive programs established by state regulators in order to obtain current information and to consider the potential safety effects of the incentive programs as applied to nuclear units. The current report is an update of NUREG/CR-5509, Incentive Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants by State Public Utility Commissions, published in December 1989. The information in this report was obtained from interviews conducted with each state regulator and each utility with a minimum entitlement of 10%. The agreements, orders, and settlements from which each incentive program was implemented were reviewed as required. The interviews and supporting documentation form the basis for the individual state reports describing the structure and financial impact of each incentive program. The programs currently in effect represent the adoption of an existing nuclear performance incentive program proposal and one new program. In addition, since 1989 a number of nuclear units have been included in one existing program; while one program was discontinued and another one concluded. 6 refs., 27 tabs

  6. Forecasting Day-Ahead Electricity Prices : Utilizing Hourly Prices

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    E. Raviv (Eran); K.E. Bouwman (Kees); D.J.C. van Dijk (Dick)

    2013-01-01

    textabstractThe daily average price of electricity represents the price of electricity to be delivered over the full next day and serves as a key reference price in the electricity market. It is an aggregate that equals the average of hourly prices for delivery during each of the 24 individual

  7. 48 CFR 416.405 - Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.

    Science.gov (United States)

    2010-10-01

    ... 48 Federal Acquisition Regulations System 4 2010-10-01 2010-10-01 false Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts. 416.405 Section 416.405 Federal Acquisition Regulations System DEPARTMENT OF...-reimbursement incentive contracts. ...

  8. Blood donor incentives: A step forward or backward

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Abolghasemi Hassan

    2010-01-01

    Full Text Available Dramatic increase in blood usage and critical seasonal blood shortages are faced by various countries. Countries which previously reached 100% voluntary nonremunerated donation have been led to offer different kinds of incentives to recruit blood donors and meet their blood demands. In some cases, these incentives are considered monetary and are in complete contrast with International standards like World Health Organization (WHO. It seems that attitudes toward sole dependency on nonremunerated voluntary blood donation have been changed in recent years and experts in some developed countries are reevaluating partial reliance on paid donation. On the other hand, besides the effects of such incentives on blood safety, several economic and psychological studies have shown that incentives have discouraging effects on pro-social behaviors like blood donation and will reduce the number of blood donors in long term. With regard to the results of such studies, it seems that implementing incentive-based blood donor recruitment programs to meet blood requirements by some countries is becoming a challenge for blood banks.

  9. Oil prices and the stock prices of alternative energy companies

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henriques, Irene; Sadorsky, Perry

    2008-01-01

    Energy security issues coupled with increased concern over the natural environment are driving factors behind oil price movements. While it is widely accepted that rising oil prices are good for the financial performance of alternative energy companies, there has been relatively little statistical work done to measure just how sensitive the financial performance of alternative energy companies are to changes in oil prices. In this paper, a four variable vector autoregression model is developed and estimated in order to investigate the empirical relationship between alternative energy stock prices, technology stock prices, oil prices, and interest rates. Our results show technology stock prices and oil prices each individually Granger cause the stock prices of alternative energy companies. Simulation results show that a shock to technology stock prices has a larger impact on alternative energy stock prices than does a shock to oil prices. These results should be of use to investors, managers and policy makers. (author)

  10. Forecasting Day-Ahead Electricity Prices: Utilizing Hourly Prices

    OpenAIRE

    Raviv, Eran; Bouwman, Kees E.; van Dijk, Dick

    2013-01-01

    This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Energy Economics' , 2015, 50, 227-239. The daily average price of electricity represents the price of electricity to be delivered over the full next day and serves as a key reference price in the electricity market. It is an aggregate that equals the average of hourly prices for delivery during each of the 24 individual hours. This paper demonstrates that the disaggregated hourly prices contain useful predictive information for the daily average ...

  11. A performance incentive contract that pays off for all parties

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krummrich, C.R.; Johnston, R.E.; Crist, T.W.

    1995-01-01

    The Western Business Unit Bakersfield drilling department of Chevron, U.S.A. Production Company developed a drilling performance incentive contract that was implemented during 1994 in the Lost Hills field of California. The performance incentive contract (PIC) financially rewarded all of the drilling contractor's rig employees for outperforming pre-established drilling performance goals. The key elements of the performance incentive program are: (1) Goals that rigger incentives are based on cost categories that are controllable by the drilling team; (2) Goals were established using a database of past years performance; (3) Goals that are not achieved negatively impact the incentive earned in an effort to deter repeated errors; (4) Accidents that occur on the job negatively impact the incentive earned; (5) Administration of the program is not time consuming. The results of using an incentive contract in the Lost Hills drilling program are: (1) Time and cost of operations are reduced; (2) The results are measurable and repeatable; (3) A team environment develops in which ideas are shared and acted upon by crew members and supervisory personnel

  12. Participatory development of incentives to coexist with jaguars and pumas.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Amit, Ronit; Jacobson, Susan K

    2018-01-22

    Reducing costs and increasing benefits for rural communities coexisting with large carnivores is necessary for conservation of jaguar (Panthera onca) and puma (Puma concolor). To design acceptable incentives, stakeholders must be involved in the process. We conducted an innovative, structured, group communication process based on a Delphi technique as a template for identifying potential incentives. Community workshops with 133 members of 7 communities and surveys with 25 multidisciplinary experts from government, nongovernmental organizations, and academia provided iterative data to design a plan of incentives through 4 rounds of discussion. The final product integrated 862 ideas into 6 types of incentives: organization of communities, mechanisms for improved dialogue, citizen technical assistance, green labeling for community products, payment for the ecosystem service of biodiversity, and an assessment of financial alternatives. We used quantitative and qualitative techniques to indicate support for decisions about the design of incentives, which reduced researcher subjectivity. The diverse incentives developed and the cooperation from multiple stakeholders resulted in an incentive plan that integrated issues of governance, equity, and social norms. © 2018 Society for Conservation Biology.

  13. Costs and results of federal incentives for commercial nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bezdek, R.H.; Wendling, R.M.

    1991-01-01

    This paper (1) estimates the total costs of federal expenditures in support of incentives for the development of commercial nuclear energy through 1988, and (2) analyzes the results and benefits to the nation of this federal investment. The federal incentives analyzed include research and development, regulation of commercial nuclear energy, tax incentives, waste management and disposal, enrichment plants, liability insurance, the uranium mining industry, and all other federal support activities. The authors estimate that net federal incentives totaled about $45-50 billion (1988 dollars). They estimate the results of the federal incentives, focusing on six categories, namely, electric energy produced, the total (direct plus indirect) economic benefits of the industry created, R and D program benefits, value of energy imports displaced, environmental effects, and health, safety, and risk effects. The results total $1.9 trillion, with approximately $250-300 billion identified as net benefits. The authors conclude that the high return on the investment justified federal incentives for nuclear energy development over the past four decades and that the federal government and the nation have received a significant return on the incentives investment

  14. Comparing Types of Financial Incentives to Promote Walking: An Experimental Test.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Burns, Rachel J; Rothman, Alexander J

    2018-04-19

    Offering people financial incentives to increase their physical activity is an increasingly prevalent intervention strategy. However, little is known about the relative effectiveness of different types of incentives. This study tested whether incentives based on specified reinforcement types and schedules differentially affected the likelihood of meeting a walking goal and explored if observed behavioural changes may have been attributable to the perceived value of the incentive. A 2 (reinforcement type: cash reward, deposit contract) × 2 (schedule: fixed, variable) between-subjects experiment with a hanging control condition was conducted over 8 weeks (n = 153). Although walking was greater in the incentive conditions relative to the control condition, walking did not differ across incentive conditions. Exploratory analyses indicated that the perceived value of the incentive was associated with the likelihood of meeting the walking goal, but was not affected by reinforcement type or schedule. The reinforcement type and schedule manipulations tested in this study did not differentially affect walking. Given that walking behaviour was associated with perceived value, designing incentive strategies that optimise the perceived value of the incentive may be a promising avenue for future research. © 2018 The International Association of Applied Psychology.

  15. Review. The incentive sensitization theory of addiction: some current issues.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Robinson, Terry E; Berridge, Kent C

    2008-10-12

    We present a brief overview of the incentive sensitization theory of addiction. This posits that addiction is caused primarily by drug-induced sensitization in the brain mesocorticolimbic systems that attribute incentive salience to reward-associated stimuli. If rendered hypersensitive, these systems cause pathological incentive motivation ('wanting') for drugs. We address some current questions including: what is the role of learning in incentive sensitization and addiction? Does incentive sensitization occur in human addicts? Is the development of addiction-like behaviour in animals associated with sensitization? What is the best way to model addiction symptoms using animal models? And, finally, what are the roles of affective pleasure or withdrawal in addiction?

  16. Higher Education Prices and Price Indexes. 1976 Supplement.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Halstead, Kent D.

    The 1976 supplement presents higher education price index data for fiscal years 1971 through 1976. The basic study, "Higher Education Prices and Price Indexes" (ED 123 996) presents complete descriptions of the indexes together with index values and price data for fiscal years 1961 through 1974. Indexes are presented for research and development,…

  17. The Impact of Lottery Incentives on Student Survey Response Rates.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Porter, Stephen R.; Whitcomb, Michael E.

    2003-01-01

    A controlled experiment tested the effects of lottery incentives using a prospective college applicant Web survey, with emails sent to more than 9,000 high school students. Found minimal effect of postpaid incentives for increasing levels of incentive. (EV)

  18. Another look on the relationships between oil prices and energy prices

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lahiani, Amine; Miloudi, Anthony; Benkraiem, Ramzi; Shahbaz, Muhammad

    2017-01-01

    This paper employs the Quantile Autoregressive Distributed Lags (QARDL) model developed recently by Cho et al. (2015) to investigate the pass-through of oil prices to a set of energy prices. This approach allows analyzing simultaneously short-term connections and long-run cointegrating relationships across a range of quantiles. It also provides insights on the short-run predictive power of oil prices in predicting energy prices while accounting for the cointegration between oil prices and each of the considered energy prices in low, medium and high quantiles. Two key findings emerge from this paper. First, all considered energy prices are shown to be cointegrated with oil price across quantiles meaning that a stationaryequilibriumrelationship exists between single energy price and oil price. Second, we find evidence that oil price is a significant predictor of individual petroleum products prices and natural gas in the short run. This paper has important policy implications for forecasters, energy policy-makers and portfolio managers. - Highlights: • The pass-through of oil prices to a set of energy prices is investigated for US economy. • All considered energy prices are shown to be cointegrated with oil price across quantiles. • Oil price is a significant predictor of individual petroleum products prices in the short run. • Oil price also predicts natural gas prices in the short run.

  19. Price elasticity of the demand for soft drinks, other sugar-sweetened beverages and energy dense food in Chile.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Guerrero-López, Carlos M; Unar-Munguía, Mishel; Colchero, M Arantxa

    2017-02-10

    Chile is the second world's largest per capita consumer of caloric beverages. Caloric beverages are associated with overweight, obesity and other chronic diseases. The objective of this study is to estimate the price elasticity of demand for soft drinks, other sugar-sweetened beverages and high-energy dense foods in urban areas in Chile in order to evaluate the potential response of households' consumption to changes in prices. We used microdata from the VII Family Budget Survey 2012-2013, which collects information on expenditures made by Chilean urban households on items such as beverages and foods. We estimated a Linear Approximation of an Almost Ideal Demand System Model to derive own and cross price elasticities of milk, coffee, tea and other infusions, plain water, soft drinks, other flavored beverages, sweet snacks, sugar and honey, and desserts. We considered the censored nature of the data and included the Inverse Mills Ratio in each equation of the demand system. We estimated a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System and a two-part model as sensitivity analysis. We found an own price-elasticity of -1.37 for soft drinks. This implies that a price increase of 10% is associated with a reduction in consumption of 13.7%. We found that the rest of food and beverages included in the demand system behave as substitutes for soft drinks. For instance, plain water showed a cross-price elasticity of 0.63: a 10% increase in price of soft drinks could lead to an increase of 6.3% of plain water. Own and cross price elasticities were similar between models. The demand of soft drinks is price sensitive among Chilean households. An incentive system such as subsidies to non-sweetened beverages and tax to soft drinks could lead to increases in the substitutions for other healthier beverages.

  20. Price elasticity of the demand for soft drinks, other sugar-sweetened beverages and energy dense food in Chile

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Carlos M. Guerrero-López

    2017-02-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background Chile is the second world’s largest per capita consumer of caloric beverages. Caloric beverages are associated with overweight, obesity and other chronic diseases. The objective of this study is to estimate the price elasticity of demand for soft drinks, other sugar-sweetened beverages and high-energy dense foods in urban areas in Chile in order to evaluate the potential response of households’ consumption to changes in prices. Methods We used microdata from the VII Family Budget Survey 2012–2013, which collects information on expenditures made by Chilean urban households on items such as beverages and foods. We estimated a Linear Approximation of an Almost Ideal Demand System Model to derive own and cross price elasticities of milk, coffee, tea and other infusions, plain water, soft drinks, other flavored beverages, sweet snacks, sugar and honey, and desserts. We considered the censored nature of the data and included the Inverse Mills Ratio in each equation of the demand system. We estimated a Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System and a two-part model as sensitivity analysis. Results We found an own price-elasticity of −1.37 for soft drinks. This implies that a price increase of 10% is associated with a reduction in consumption of 13.7%. We found that the rest of food and beverages included in the demand system behave as substitutes for soft drinks. For instance, plain water showed a cross-price elasticity of 0.63: a 10% increase in price of soft drinks could lead to an increase of 6.3% of plain water. Own and cross price elasticities were similar between models. Conclusions The demand of soft drinks is price sensitive among Chilean households. An incentive system such as subsidies to non-sweetened beverages and tax to soft drinks could lead to increases in the substitutions for other healthier beverages.