Project 'WINDBANK mittleres Aaretal' - Analysis, Diagnosis and Forecast of Wind Fields around the Nuclear Power Plant Goesgen

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Graber, W. K.; Tinguely, M.

2002-07-01

An emergency decision support system for accidental releases of radioactivity into the atmosphere providing regional wind field information is presented. This system is based on intensive meteorological field campaigns each lasting 3-4 months in the regions around the Swiss nuclear power plants. The wind data from temporary and permanent stations are analysed to evaluate the typical wind field patterns occurring in these regions. A cluster analysis for these data-sets lead to 12 different wind field classes with a high separation quality. In the present report, it is demonstrated that an on-line acquisition of meteorological data from existing permanent stations is enough to diagnose the recent wind field class in a region with a radius of 25 km around the nuclear power station of Goesgen with a probability of 95% to hit the correct class. Furthermore, a method is presented to use a high resolution weather prediction model to forecast the future wind field classes. An average probability of 76% to hit the correct class for a forecast time of 24 hours is evaluated. Finally, a method for parameterization of turbulence providing input for dispersion models from standard meteorological online data is presented. (author)

Poolside fuel assembly inspection campaigns performed at Kernkraftwerk Leibstadt during summer 1997

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Zwicky, H.U.; Wiktor, C.G.; Schrire, D.

1998-01-01

In order to minimise fuel cycle costs, fuel assembly discharge burnup and average U-235 enrichment were increasing over past years in the Kernkraftwerk Leibstadt (KKL) plant. In parallel, high burnup verification programs were defined in collaboration with fuel suppliers. The aim of these programs is to demonstrate safe and reliable fuel performance up to the designed burnup limit and to identify any problems in due time. This is not only achieved by detailed poolside inspections of lead test assemblies, but also by hot cell post-irradiation examination of selected rods. In the frame of a hot cell examination campaign, enhanced localised corrosion in the vicinity of spacers on SVEA-96 fuel rods was identified in May 1997 as a potential problem. The average rod burnup of the investigated rods was around 50 MWd/kgU after 5 one year cycles of operation. As fuel operation up to six cycles is foreseen in KKLs fuel management plants, the risk of fuel failures caused by enhanced localised corrosion could not be excluded. An action plan was therefore developed in order to identify the root cause. Part of the action plan were two poolside inspection campaigns: 1. Visual inspection of 38 assemblies unloaded during refuelling outage 1996 after 5 cycles in operation. This campaign was performed in June 1997. It gave a broader data base to develop a concept for fuel management for the upcoming refuelling outage scheduled in August 1997. 2. Visual inspection, oxide layer thickness measurements, crud sampling and rod diameter measurements on 29 assemblies with different operation histories. This campaign was performed during the outage. A large portion of the inspected bundles was re-inserted for continued operation. The collected data confirmed that assumptions made for reload licensing and safety analyses were conservative. The inspection campaigns performed at KKL during summer 1997 by ABB Atom demonstrated that it is possible to address unexpected problems in a short time

Investigation of sensors and instrument components in boiling water reactors. Results from Oskarshamn 2, Barsebaeck 2 in Sweden and Kernkraftwerk Muehleberg in Switzerland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bergdahl, B.G.

1998-05-01

The reactor monitoring instruments are important for the operation and safety of the plants. Static properties of the instruments are controlled annually, but the dynamic properties are rarely, if ever, examined. This study is the result of a project initiated by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate. The examinations are based on signal analysis and simultaneous measurement of multiple signals. Results from Oskarshamn 2 (O2), Barsebaeck 2 (B2) and Kernkraftwerk Muehleberg (KKM) are discussed in this report. The presentation is focused on reactor pressure and reactor level signals. the analysis of O2 revealed that the dynamics for 3 out of 14 sensors was 'filtered', meaning that a rapid level displacement is registered with delay. Inspection showed that a 1 sec filter was installed instead of 1.2 sec. The study also showed that old pressure-sensors in use both at O2 and B2 could not cope with high frequencies, and that some level-sensors were disturbed by mechanical oscillations at Bw. At KKM, a 2 Hz resonance was observed with 12 pressure and level sensors. The oscillation was created by an old pressure sensor and influenced the other sensors through the common impulse network

ENSI's technical view on the periodic safety review 2008 of the nuclear power plant Goesgen

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-08-01

The owner of a license for a nuclear power plant operation in Switzerland has to undergo every 10 years a comprehensive safety check called 'periodic safety review' (PSR). The regulatory authority, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI), reviews the documents supplied by the licensee. The Goesgen power plant (KKG) obtained its operation license and started operation in 1978. A first PSR was performed in the years 1996 to 1998 (PSR 1998) and reported. KKG delivered an analysis of the safety status, an evaluation of subsystems as well as test reports. The new PSR covers the period 1998 to 2007. The basis of the evaluation by ENSI is the new nuclear energy law in force since 1 February 2005. In comparison to PSR 1998, new aspects have to be considered like the description of the safety concept, including the technical safety classification of buildings, systems and components, or consideration of the protection objective 'limitation of the radiation exposure'. The PSR 2008 is focussed on the estimate of the nuclear safety of KKG. Basically, for the operation of a nuclear power plant, a sufficient protection has to be guaranteed against the release of radioactive materials to the environment as well as the irradiation of persons, during normal operation as well as in the case of accidents. The licensee of a nuclear power plant in operation must retrofit his plant according to the experience already gained and the state-of-the-art. The purpose of the PSR is to check the quality of the plant in the domain of safety. A probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) study must prove that the probability of damages to the reactor core is smaller than 10 -5 /year. In Switzerland the life time of a nuclear power plant is not limited by a fixed maximum time of operation. On the contrary, the limitation proceeds from safety criteria. Insufficiencies in the plant design are often recognized only through the evolution of the technique or some unexpected events. Ageing

Summary of Operating Experience in Swiss Nuclear Power Plants 1999

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2000-05-15

The five Swiss nuclear power units produced a net total of 23.6 TWh of electricity in 1999 - not as high as the all-time record (24.45 TWh in 1998), but nonetheless a solid operational performance. The nuclear share in overall electricity production was 35.3%, again lower than the previous year's 40%. In general, plant operation in 1999 was practically as undisturbed and as reliable as in 1998, reflecting the ongoing tradition of careful maintenance that contributes so much to keeping the plants in excellent condition. However, due to exceptional outage activities at Beznau 2 (steam generator replacement) and an unplanned shut-down at Goesgen to replace a hydrogen seal on the main generator, 1999 nuclear production could not match that of the previous year. Also, record hydro power production caused the nuclear share in total electricity production to drop. With the exception of Beznau 2, all refueling and maintenance outages were once again short. The Leibstadt outage lasted 26 days, Goesgen 33 days, Beznau 1 lasted 29 days, Beznau 2 89 days and Muehleberg 27 days. At Goesgen, MOX fuel was loaded for the third time in 1999. Of the 44 freshly-loaded fuel elements, 20 were MOX elements. Non-electrical energy supplies from the Beznau and Goesgen nuclear power plants functioned flawlessly. Beznau fed 143.6 GWh of heat energy into the Refuna district heating system, while Goesgen supplied 169 GWh of process heat to the neighboring Niedergoesgen cardboard factory. At the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000 all Swiss nuclear units continued to operate flawlessly - notwithstanding the challenges posed by the 'Lothar' storm that hit Western Europe in late December and the so-called Y2K computer bug that threatened to hit shortly afterwards, during the 'millennial' change-over. (authors)

Summary of Operating Experience in Swiss Nuclear Power Plants 1999

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-05-01

The five Swiss nuclear power units produced a net total of 23.6 TWh of electricity in 1999 - not as high as the all-time record (24.45 TWh in 1998), but nonetheless a solid operational performance. The nuclear share in overall electricity production was 35.3%, again lower than the previous year's 40%. In general, plant operation in 1999 was practically as undisturbed and as reliable as in 1998, reflecting the ongoing tradition of careful maintenance that contributes so much to keeping the plants in excellent condition. However, due to exceptional outage activities at Beznau 2 (steam generator replacement) and an unplanned shut-down at Goesgen to replace a hydrogen seal on the main generator, 1999 nuclear production could not match that of the previous year. Also, record hydro power production caused the nuclear share in total electricity production to drop. With the exception of Beznau 2, all refueling and maintenance outages were once again short. The Leibstadt outage lasted 26 days, Goesgen 33 days, Beznau 1 lasted 29 days, Beznau 2 89 days and Muehleberg 27 days. At Goesgen, MOX fuel was loaded for the third time in 1999. Of the 44 freshly-loaded fuel elements, 20 were MOX elements. Non-electrical energy supplies from the Beznau and Goesgen nuclear power plants functioned flawlessly. Beznau fed 143.6 GWh of heat energy into the Refuna district heating system, while Goesgen supplied 169 GWh of process heat to the neighboring Niedergoesgen cardboard factory. At the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000 all Swiss nuclear units continued to operate flawlessly - notwithstanding the challenges posed by the 'Lothar' storm that hit Western Europe in late December and the so-called Y2K computer bug that threatened to hit shortly afterwards, during the 'millennial' change-over. (authors)

Expert report of ENSI on the request of KKN AG for a general license - Project 'New nuclear power plant Niederamt'; Gutachten des ENSI zum Rahmenbewilligungsgesuch der KKN AG. Neubauprojekt Kernkraftwerk Niederamt

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2010-09-15

The 'Kernkraftwerk Niederamt AG' (KKN) Company submitted to the Swiss Federal Inspectorate of Nuclear Safety (ENSI) a request for a general license for a new power plant to be built near to the Goesgen power plant. According to the law, all damage risks with a probability higher than 10{sup -4}/a must be taken into account through protection measures. The considered risks concern the power plant itself as well as the population in the neighbourhood and the environment. The purpose of the general license is to demonstrate that the site chosen for the foreseen power plant is acceptable and that the risks can be counteracted through adequate measures. The buildings of the power plant and their partition over the two banks of the Aare River are briefly described. The reactor is a Light Water Reactor of third generation with a maximum thermal power of 5.8 GW{sub th}. The main cooling is provided by a hybrid system of water evaporation and air heating, what reduces the plume at the exit of the cooling tower. First, it is demonstrated that, in the case of a very unlikely severe accident in the power plant, the people in the neighbourhood can be evacuated quickly. Then, numerous types of possible accidents in the neighbourhood of the power plant are analyzed in order to settle their possible negative influence on the operation of the power plant: bursting of gas containers on the neighbouring roads and railways, fires of all types of hydrocarbons, air pollution through chloride gas, etc. The check by ENSI of the KKN studies on the potential danger for the power plant through neighbouring industrial plants, roads or railways demonstrated that none of the considered accidents presents an unacceptable risk for the power plant: on the one hand, these plants are located too far from the power plant, so that a sensible injury to the power plant safety can be excluded; on the other, the protection of the power plant can be guaranteed through appropriate technical

Summary of operating experience in Swiss nuclear power plants 1994

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1995-05-01

In 1994 the Swiss nuclear power plants produced their highest-ever combined annual output. Their contribution to total electricity generation in the country was 36%. At Muehleberg the power uprate, undertaken in 1993, was effective for the first time for an entire year. The larger capacity of the new steam generators installed in 1993 in unit 1 of the Beznau NPP allows for an electric output of 103% of nominal power. The plant efficiency of the Goesgen and Leibstadt units was increased by replacing the low pressure turbines by the new ones with a modern design. The application for a power uprate of the Leibstadt reactor is still pending. For the first time in Switzerland, one of the reactor units, Beznau 2, operated on an extended cycle of one and a half years, with no refuelling outage in 1994. In spite of the replacements of two of its three low pressure turbines, Goesgen had the shortest refuelling shutdown since the start of commercial operation. The average number of reactor scrams at the Swiss plants remained stable, at less than one scram per reactor year. Re-inspection of crack indications detected in 1990 in the core shroud of the Muehleberg reactor revealed no significant changes. A crack indication was found in one of the other welds inspected. The Swiss government issued a limited operating licence for Beznau 2 for the next ten years, i.e. until the end of 2004. The only other unit with a limited operating licence (until 2003) is Muehleberg. The remaining three reactor units, have no time limits on their operating licences, in accordance with the Atomic Law. Goesgen is the first Swiss nuclear power plant having now produced more than 100 billion kWh. As from January 1, 1995, the nominal net power of the largest Swiss reactor unit, Leibstadt, has been fixed at 1030 MW; that of the Goesgen NPP has been increased by 25 MW to 965 MW. (author) figs., tabs

Summary of operating experience in Swiss nuclear power plants 1994

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-05-01

In 1994 the Swiss nuclear power plants produced their highest-ever combined annual output. Their contribution to total electricity generation in the country was 36%. At Muehleberg the power uprate, undertaken in 1993, was effective for the first time for an entire year. The larger capacity of the new steam generators installed in 1993 in unit 1 of the Beznau NPP allows for an electric output of 103% of nominal power. The plant efficiency of the Goesgen and Leibstadt units was increased by replacing the low pressure turbines by the new ones with a modern design. The application for a power uprate of the Leibstadt reactor is still pending. For the first time in Switzerland, one of the reactor units, Beznau 2, operated on an extended cycle of one and a half years, with no refuelling outage in 1994. In spite of the replacements of two of its three low pressure turbines, Goesgen had the shortest refuelling shutdown since the start of commercial operation. The average number of reactor scrams at the Swiss plants remained stable, at less than one scram per reactor year. Re-inspection of crack indications detected in 1990 in the core shroud of the Muehleberg reactor revealed no significant changes. A crack indication was found in one of the other welds inspected. The Swiss government issued a limited operating licence for Beznau 2 for the next ten years, i.e. until the end of 2004. The only other unit with a limited operating licence (until 2003) is Muehleberg. The remaining three reactor units, have no time limits on their operating licences, in accordance with the Atomic Law. Goesgen is the first Swiss nuclear power plant having now produced more than 100 billion kWh. As from January 1, 1995, the nominal net power of the largest Swiss reactor unit, Leibstadt, has been fixed at 1030 MW; that of the Goesgen NPP has been increased by 25 MW to 965 MW. (author) figs., tabs.

Cancellation of the Kaiseraugst nuclear power plant project

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Blocher, C.; Schoenenberger, J.; Stucky, G.

1988-01-01

The nuclear power plant project at Kaiseraugst has been worked on for over 20 years. In 1985 the Swiss Parliament decided to license the plant. The cost of the work to date is about 1.2 x10 6 Swiss Franks. Continuation of the project is only sensible if it can be realized within a foreseeable space of time. It is probable that the discussions concerning future energy, environment and safety will continue for a long time. If this is clear that the Kaiseraugst project will not be realized during the next five to ten years for social, civic and political reasons. A continuation of the project is not justifiable. Kernkraftwerk Kaiseraugst AG must be adequately compensated. A motion has been presented to Parliament which charges the Government to negotiate with Kernkraftwerk Kaiseraugst AG for cancellation of the project

PRA for emergency planning: assessing the risk profile of a 3-loop PWR on the basis of US and German risk studies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Chakraborty, S.; Fuchs, H.; Gubler, R.; Landolt, J.; Miteff, L.

1985-01-01

Emergency planning around nuclear power plants should be based on a realistic assessment of their risk profile. Since the results of the Rasmussen study (WASH-1400) and later of the German risk study (Phase A) were not judged to be fully representative for NPP's in Switzerland, an investigation was started to transfer applicable US and German results to a Swiss 3-loop PWR (Goesgen) and to assess the impact of differences in plant design compared to Surry-1 and Biblis-B. The core melt probability for Goesgen was calculated to be more than a factor of ten smaller than for the US and German studies. This is mainly due to more redundancy/better separation (especially in the emergency feedwater) and to partial automation of cooldown after a small break. The results were instrumental in limiting the release categories to be used as reference cases for emergency planning. Further reduction of postulated accidental releases is expected from the current source term research

The 500 billion euro market. Dismantling of nuclear power plants; Der 500-Milliarden-Euro-Markt. Rueckbau von Kernkraftwerken

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Trueck, Peter [Rochus Mummert Clean Energy, Hamburg (Germany); Oberle, Berthold [Rochus Mummert Clean Energy, Hamburg (Germany). Technologieberatung und Interim Management

2013-10-01

The decommissioning of the shut-down nuclear power plants is an enormous market potential. In order to develop this strategic business segment, different strategies offer for companies. [German] Der Rueckbau der abgeschalteten Kernkraftwerke bildet ein enormes Marktpotential. Um dieses strategische Geschaeftsfeld zu erschliessen, bieten sich fuer Unternehmen unterschiedliche Strategien an.

ALARA-based strengthening of radiation protection in a high dose rate nuclear power plant: A practical overview

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lips, Marcel

2008-01-01

In the first years of operation the dose rates at Goesgen nuclear power plant increased more strongly than expected. Co-60 has been the main radiation contributor from the beginning. As an immediate step, investigations were initiated to find and remove unknown cobalt sources. System modifications and optimization in water chemistry were carried out to reduce material and activity transport within the primary system. As a result the dose rates were stabilized after a couple of years -unfortunately on a high level. To reduce the dose rate levels and the occupational radiation exposure, further long term measures were implemented. System decontamination and source replacement were considered as well as the implementation of enhanced shielding procedures and a more source oriented chemistry. As a result the dose rates have reduced significantly and the occupational radiation exposure has been decreased by more than a factor of 2 over the last two decades. The reduction of the mean individual dose turned out even better and was cut by a factor of 5. On terms of plant and personal safety, Goesgen nuclear power plant decided to improve radiation protection using a smooth step by step action plan and has been very successful with it. Currently the technical possibilities have been developed to a high standard. Further improvements will be selective only. In future the focus will be set to personal behavior and human performance, using enhanced target settings, briefings, debriefings, experience feedback and (international) experience exchange. Nevertheless it will be essential to avoid unnecessary administrative and counterproductive short term hurdles. Strengthening of radiation protection is and will be a long term and continuous process. Goesgen nuclear power plant will continue to introduce further actions one by one. (author)

Fotografie und atomare Katastrophe

OpenAIRE

Bürkner, Daniel

2015-01-01

Die Dissertation setzt sich mit den fotografischen Repräsentationen der Atombombenabwürfe auf Hiroshima und Nagasaki sowie der Havarie des Kernkraftwerks Tschernobyl auseinander. Dabei werden künstlerische, dokumentarische und touristische Bilder analysiert, die sich der jeweiligen Strahlenkatastrophe oftmals erst Jahre nach dem Ereignis annehmen und ikonografische oder medial-materielle Bezüge zu ihr aufweisen. Es zeigen sich zentrale Strategien, atomare Katastrophen, seien sie militäri...

Temporary provision against Kernkraftwerk Biblis dismissed

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1980-01-01

With its decision of November 19, 1979 - VIII IG 13/79 -, the Administrative Court of Hesse has refused the complaint of a Darmstadt resident whose application for a temporary provision interdicting further operation of the power plant units Biblis A and B had been refused by the Darmstadt Administrative Court. The costs of the procedure, including the extra-judicial costs of the witnesses heard, are to be paid by the plaintiff. The value in litigation was raised to DM 10 000,-. (orig./HP) 891 HP/orig.- 892 CKA [de

Energy supply - a global problem

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Barthelt, K.

1990-01-01

The text of a speech celebrating the 10 years operation of the nuclear power plant in Goesgen. The author expresses his opinion on the future of nuclear energy, on the responsibility towards the next generation and on the energy supply for the Third World. He draws attention to the gap between north and south and to the limited amount of resources and mention the CO2-problem and the potential of nuclear energy

Evaluation of load case ``switch-off of the high pressure pump of the emergency core cooling system``, measures of verification and in situ-test; Einstufung des Lastfalls ``Ausfall der TH-Hochdruckeinspeisepumpe``, Massnahmen zur Verifikation bis hin zum Grossversuch

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Trobitz, M.; Mattheis, A. [Kernkraftwerke Gundremmingen Betriebsgesellschaft m.b.H. (Germany); Kerkhof, K.; Hippelein, K. [Stuttgart Univ. (Germany). Staatliche Materialpruefungsanstalt; Gurr-Beyer, C. [Buero fuer Baudynamik, Stuttgart (Germany); Hofstoetter, P. [Technischer Ueberwachungs-Verein Rheinland e.V., Koeln (Germany)

1998-11-01

Within the framework of periodic safety inspection of the Gundremmingen power station (RWE-Bayernwerk - KRB II), the load collectives used for the design of safety-relevant systems and components were checked for their consistency with latest updates of the design basis. It was found that there was no analytical information or study available describing a particular process and its effects, namely switch-off of the high-pressure feedwater pump of the emergency core cooling system. The paper reports the work performed for closing the gap, including preparatory analyses, accompanying measures such as vibration measurements during plant shut-down, as well as the preparation and performance of the in-situ test. The experimental results and the comparative evaluation of calculated and experimental data are presented. (orig./CB) [Deutsch] Im Rahmen der periodischen Sicherheitsueberpruefung des Kernkraftwerkes Gundremmingen (Kernkraftwerke RWE-Bayernwerk - KRB II) wurden u.a. die Lastkollektive, die zur Auslegung sicherheitstechnisch relevanter Systeme und Komponenten herangezogen wurden, auf Aktualitaet ueberprueft. Dabei zeigte sich, dass bislang fuer eine Betriebsweise - naemlich das Abschalten der Hochdruckeinspeisepumpe des nuklearen Not- und Nachkuehlsystems (TH-HD-Pumpe) - keine analytischen Untersuchungen vorliegen. Vorbetrachtungen fuer analytische Untersuchungen, begleitende Massnahmen wie Schwingungsmessungen waehrend des Anlagenstillstandes, sowie der Versuchsaufbau und die Versuchsdurchfuehrung des Anlagenversuches werden hier dargestellt. Die Ergebnisse und der Vergleich Rechnung-Messung zum Grossversuch werden in diesem Beitrag vorgestellt. (orig.)

How to eliminate non-damaging earthquakes from the results of a probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA)-A comprehensive procedure with site-specific application

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kluegel, Jens-Uwe

2009-01-01

The results of probabilistic seismic hazard analyses are frequently presented in terms of uniform hazard spectra or hazard curves with spectral accelerations as the output parameter. The calculation process is based on the evaluation of the probability of exceedance of specified acceleration levels without consideration of the damaging effects of the causative earthquakes. The same applies to the empirical attenuation equations for spectral accelerations used in PSHA models. This makes interpreting and using the results in engineering or risk applications difficult. Uniform hazard spectra and the associated hazard curves may contain a significant amount of contributions of weak, low-energy earthquakes not able to damage the seismically designed structures of nuclear power plants. For the development of realistic engineering designs and for realistic seismic probabilistic risk assessments (seismic PRA) it is necessary to remove the contribution of non-damaging earthquakes from the results of a PSHA. A detailed procedure for the elimination of non-damaging earthquakes based on the CAV (Cumulative Absolute Velocity)-filtering approach was developed and applied to the results of the large-scale PEGASOS probabilistic seismic hazard study for the site of the Goesgen nuclear power plant. The procedure considers the full scope of epistemic uncertainty and aleatory variability present in the PEGASOS study. It involves the development of a set of empirical correlations for CAV and the subsequent development of a composite distribution for the probability of exceedance of the damaging threshold of 0.16 gs. Additionally, a method was developed to measure the difference in the damaging effects of earthquakes of different strengths by the ratio of a power function of ARIAS-intensity or, in the ideal case, by the ratio of the square roots of the associated strong motion durations. The procedure was applied for the update of the Goesgen seismic PRA and for the confirmation of a

Tasks of radiation protection in the centralized collection and ultimate disposal of radioactive waste

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Boerst, F.M.; Fasten, C.; Koerner, W.; Oppermann, U.; Werner, H.J.; Zappe, D.

1988-01-01

In the GDR, the ERAM (Endlager fuer radioaktive Abfaelle, Morsleben), an operating unit of Volkseigenes Kombinat Kernkraftwerke 'Bruno Leuschner' in Greifswald, is responsible for the central collection and ultimate disposal of radioactive waste. From the licensing body's point of view an assessment is given of the legislation for radioactive wastes, especially as to their collection, transport to and handling in the final repository. As a result, some conclusions are drawn concerning future work in this field. 9 tabs., 34 refs. (author)

A licence to discharge cooling waters in tidal rivers, examplified by the 'Nuclear Power Station Unterweser'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kunz, H.

1976-01-01

Illustrated by the example of the lower Weser, aspects for automatic control, supervision measurements, and measurements for the securing of evidence, all in connection with cooling water discharges, are presented. The particularities of tidal rivers and the conditions for measuring systems resulting therefrom are explained. The cooling water discharge of the Kernkraftwerk Unterweser has been assigned an extensive measurement system for the automatic compilation of hydrologic data. The measurement systems design, the measurement stations, and the central station are described. (orig.) [de

Objectives and present status of the German risk evaluation study

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Birkhofer, A.; Koeberlein, K.; Heuser, F.W.

1977-01-01

For the German risk evaluation study, analogous to the Rasmussen report (WASH--1400), embarked upon in June 1976, the Kernkraftwerk Biblis B serves as the plant of reference. The first interim results are available for various sub-headings of the study. The main finding seems to be the decisive importance of the containment in limiting the accident consequences even in those cases where, on account of postulated failure of safety systems, the melt down of the reactor core is to be expected. (orig./HP) [de

D1+ Simulator: A cost and risk optimized approach to nuclear power plant simulator modernization

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wischert, W.

2006-01-01

D1-Simulator is operated by Kraftwerks-Simulator-Gesellschaft (KSG) and Gesellschaft f?r Simulatorschulung (GfS) at the Simulator Centre in Essen since 1977. The full-scope control room training simulator, used for Kernkraftwerk Biblis (KWB) is based on a PDP-11 hardware platform and is mainly programmed in ASSEMBLER language. The Simulator has reached a continuous high availability of operation throughout the years due to specialized hardware and software support from KSG maintenance team. Nevertheless, D1-Simulator largely reveals limitations with respect to computer capacity and spares and suffers progressively from the non-availability of hardware replacement materials. In order to ensure long term maintainability within the framework of the consensus on nuclear energy, a 2-years refurbishing program has been launched by KWB focusing on quality and budgetary aspects. The so-called D1+ Simulator project is based on the re-use of validated data from existing simulators. Allowing for flexible project management methods, the project outlines a cost and risk optimized approach to Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Simulator modernization. D1+ Simulator is being built by KSG/GfS in close collaboration with KWB and the simulator vendor THALES by re-using a modern hardware and software development environment from D56-Simulator, used by Kernkraftwerk Obrigheim (KWO) before its decommissioning in 2005. The Simulator project, launched in 2004, is expected to be completed by end of 2006. (author)

Kernkraftwerk Obrigheim GmbH. Annual report 1989

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koerner, C.

1990-01-01

The Obrigheim nuclear power station was operated at full load during the year 1989: 7.756 operating hours produced electrical energy of 2.689 GWh. This is the fifth best annual result during Obrigheim's operating period. Since commissioning in October 1968, 154.866 hours of operation have generated 52.125 GWh (gross) and from test operation in March 1969 until the end of 1989, 154.086 hours of operation have generated 52.013 GWh. This is an availability of power of 82.1% in this period and a time availability of 84.4%. In 1988, the plant was shut down for 927 hours for the 20th refueling including testing, inspection and repair work. Apart from refueling, the plant had a good time availability and therefore contributed 5% to the safe, economical and environmentally acceptable electricity supply of the Land Baden-Wuerttemberg. The power station is of great significance to the region, both in terms of power supply and the economy. (orig.) [de

Kernkraftwerk Obrigheim GmbH. Annual report 1990

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koerner, C.

1991-01-01

The Obrigheim nuclear power station was operated at full load from January 1 through May 25, 1990, generating 1.236 GWh of electrical energy in 3.475 operating hours. The Obrigheim nuclear power station thus achieved during this period of 145 days in 1990 an operating availability of 100%. Since its commissioning in October 1968, the Obrigheim reactor station has been operating for 158.341 hours, generating 53.361 GWh (gross), and from test operation started in March 1969 up to the end of 1990, all in all 53.249 GWh have been generated in 157.561 operating hours, which means an availability time ratio of 82.3 %, and a capacity factor of 80.1%. The plant was shut down in 1990 for the 21st refuelling operation including inspection and repair work, for a fictitious period of 942 hours. In addition, power operation was stopped by an order of the supervisory authority for another 4.343 hours, so that the plant remained disconnected from the grid between May 26 and December 31, 1990. In the first part of the year 1990, until May 26, the plant had an excellent availability time ratio and thus contributed about 2.5% of the safe, economic and environmentally sound electricity supplies in Baden-Wuerttemberg. (orig./HP) [de

Aeroradiometric Measurements In The Framework Of The ARM03 Exercise

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bucher, B.; Rybach, L.; Schwarz, G.

2004-11-01

The annually repeated measurement flights took place in 2003 from 23 to 26 June and were focused on the bilateral exercise with the Austrian team of the Bundesministerium fuer Inneres (BMI). This exercise was held near Klagenfurt in Kaernten. Furtheron the periodically surveys in the environs of the nuclear power plants Goesgen and Muehleberg were carried out. The flights took place in the framework of the exercise ARM03 and were lead by Y. Loertscher of the Swiss National Emergency Operations Centre (NAZ). As a further activity the results of the international exercise RESUME 2002 in Scotland were compared with measurements on soil sampIes and with in situ gamma spectrometry results. This comparison shows a good agreement within the uncertainties, whereas the 137 Cs results differ the most from the measurements of soil sampIes. This is mainly caused by the different size of the area from which the measured signal is coming for airborne and ground measurements and by the different depth distributions used in the calculations. Within the bilateral exercise in Kaernten six radioactive sources of activities between 120 MBq and 50.4 GBq should be localized by airborne measurements. Two areas with those six sources in each were measured. The Austrian team was using a large volume Geiger-Mueller counter and could localize three sources in each area. Because of the additional spectral information the Swiss team could localize and identify five radioactive sources in each area. The weakest 60 Co source with an activity of 120 MBq could not be detected. In the context of the regular measurements in the environs of the nuclear facilities in Switzerland the areas around the nuclear power plants Goesgen and Muehleberg were measured. The results were very similar to the results of earlier measurements in the last years. The nuclear power plant Goesgen couldn't be recognised on the activity maps. But the nuclear power plant Muehleberg could be identified by its direct radiation

Ion chromatography of anions in the primary and secondary circuit

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Brandt, F.; Trost, R.

1984-01-01

Ion chromatography - though based on the same, well-established basic principles as gas chromatography and high pressure fluid chromatography - has made an actual breakthrough only in recent years. The adaptability of the process permits the measurement of samples of different composition or concentration. Some of the experience which has been accumulated in the laboratory at Goesgen nuclear power station during the last two years, is reported. This relates particularly to the composition of the samples, the need to use extremely pure calibration samples, the choice of special laboratory accessories and the like. (orig.) [de

Steam explosions-induced containment failure studies for Swiss nuclear power plants

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Zuchuat, O.; Schmocker, U. [Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, Villigen (Switzerland); Esmaili, H.; Khatib-Rahbar, M.

1998-01-01

The assessment of the consequences of both in-vessel and ex-vessel energetic fuel-coolant interaction for Beznau (a Westinghouse pressurized water reactor with a large, dry containment), Goesgen (a Siemens/KWU pressurized water reactor with a large, dry containment) and Leibstadt (a General Electric boiling water reactor-6 with a free standing steel, MARK-III containment) nuclear power plants is presented in this paper. The Conditional Containment Failure Probability of the steel containment of these Swiss nuclear power plants is determined based on different probabilistic approaches. (author)

Hamor-2: a computer code for LWR inventory calculation

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Guimaraes, L.N.F.; Marzo, M.A.S.

1985-01-01

A method for calculating the accuracy inventory of LWR reactors is presented. This method uses the Hamor-2 computer code. Hamor-2 is obtained from the coupling of two other computer codes Hammer-Techion and Origen-2 for testing Hamor-2, its results were compared to concentration values measured from activides of two PWR reactors; Kernkraftwerk Obrighein (KWO) and H.B. Robinson (HBR). These actinides are U 235 , U 236 , U 238 , Pu 239 , Pu 241 and PU 242 . The computer code Hammor-2 shows better results than the computer code Origem-2, when both are compared with experimental results. (E.G.) [pt

Publication concerning licensing notices for the Kernkraftwerk Kruemmel

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-01-01

The 3rd supplement to the 2nd partial licence sector concerns the change of concept regarding the scram system by going over from the scram collecting tank system to the individual tank system. The 7th partial licence notice refers to the construction of 1) the control rod drive and the scram system including the related operational controls; 2) the emergency power diesel aggregates; 3) the condensation pipe transverse system (transverse system in the condensation chamber). (orig./HP) [de

Hochtemperatur-Kernkraftwerk GmbH (HKG). Annual report 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1986-01-01

The annual report presents the agenda of the general meeting of members, held on July 3, 1986 at Hamm-Uentrop, the report of the managing board, and the annual financial statement as of December 31, 1985, including the profit and loss account of the period January 1 to December 31, 1985. The object of the HKG GmbH is the planning, financing, installation, and operation of the Hamm-Uentrop nuclear power station equipped with a high-temperature reactor, as a joint enterprise of the European partners. (UA) [de

Kernkraftwerk Obrigheim (KWO) GmbH. Annual report 1991

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koerner, C.

1992-01-01

The Obrigheim nuclear power station was operated at full load from August 21 through Dec. 31, 1991, generating 1.108 GWh of electrical energy in 3.186 operating hours. The Obrigheim nuclear power station thus achieved during this period of 133 days in 1991 an operating availability of 100%. Since its commissioning in October 1968, the Obrigheim reactor station has been operating for 161.527 hours, generating 54.409 GWh (gross), and from test operation started in March 1969 up to the end of 1991, all in all 54.284 GWh have been generated in 160.747 operating hours, which means an availability time ratio of 78.2%, and a capacity factor of 80.4%. The plant was shut down in 1991 for the 21st refuelling operation including inspection and repair work, for a fictitious period of 1783 hours. In addition, power operation was stopped by an order of the supervisory authority for another 3.791 hours, so that the plant remained disconnected from the grid between Januar 1 and August 8, 1991. In the last part of the year 1991, until May 26, the plant had an excellent availability time ratio and thus contributed about 2.5% of the safe, economic and environmentally sound electricity supplies in Baden-Wuerttemberg. (orig.) [de

Aeroradiometric Measurements In The Framework Of The ARM03 Exercise; Aeroradiometrische Messungen im Rahmen der Uebung ARM03

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bucher, B.; Rybach, L.; Schwarz, G

2004-11-01

The annually repeated measurement flights took place in 2003 from 23 to 26 June and were focused on the bilateral exercise with the Austrian team of the Bundesministerium fuer Inneres (BMI). This exercise was held near Klagenfurt in Kaernten. Furtheron the periodically surveys in the environs of the nuclear power plants Goesgen and Muehleberg were carried out. The flights took place in the framework of the exercise ARM03 and were lead by Y. Loertscher of the Swiss National Emergency Operations Centre (NAZ). As a further activity the results of the international exercise RESUME 2002 in Scotland were compared with measurements on soil sampIes and with in situ gamma spectrometry results. This comparison shows a good agreement within the uncertainties, whereas the {sup 137}Cs results differ the most from the measurements of soil sampIes. This is mainly caused by the different size of the area from which the measured signal is coming for airborne and ground measurements and by the different depth distributions used in the calculations. Within the bilateral exercise in Kaernten six radioactive sources of activities between 120 MBq and 50.4 GBq should be localized by airborne measurements. Two areas with those six sources in each were measured. The Austrian team was using a large volume Geiger-Mueller counter and could localize three sources in each area. Because of the additional spectral information the Swiss team could localize and identify five radioactive sources in each area. The weakest {sup 60}Co source with an activity of 120 MBq could not be detected. In the context of the regular measurements in the environs of the nuclear facilities in Switzerland the areas around the nuclear power plants Goesgen and Muehleberg were measured. The results were very similar to the results of earlier measurements in the last years. The nuclear power plant Goesgen couldn't be recognised on the activity maps. But the nuclear power plant Muehleberg could be identified by its

Financing the management of wastes generated by the Swiss nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Baumgartner, K.; Enderli, P.

1996-01-01

Since the beginning of nuclear power production in Switzerland, expenditure on managing operational waste and spent fuel has represented a fixed component of the kilowatt hour production costs which is calculated on the basis of careful estimates of waste management costs. For making these estimates, the operators of the nuclear power plants at Beznau, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt rely on calculations performed by recognised nuclear fuel specialists and on data and empirical values from domestic and foreign waste management organisations. The calculations are subject to periodic review and, where necessary, take into account new information. The last review was concluded at the beginning of 1996. (author) 1 fig

Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems GmbH (KLE). 1995 annual report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1996-01-01

The tasks and activities of the operators of the Emsland reactor station (KKE) are reported. The year-end statement of 1995 includes many details about the financial situation, (such as the balance sheet, profit and loss account, etc.). (UA) [de

Annual report 1988 of the Kernkraftwerk Obrigheim GmbH

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Koerner, C.

1989-01-01

The Obrigheim nuclear power station was operated at full load during the year 1988; 7.800 operating hours produced electrical energy of 2.755 GWh. This is the second best annual result during Obrigheim's operating period. Since commissioning in October 1968, 147.110 hours of operation have generated 49.436 GWh (gross) and from test operation in March 1969 until the end of 1988, 146.330 hours of operation have generated 49.324 GWh. This is an availability of power of 81.9% in this period and a time availability of 84.1%. In 1988, the plant was shut down for 927 hours for the 18th refueling including testing, inspection and repair work. Apart from refueling, the plant had a good time availability and therefore contributed 5% to the safe, economical and environmentally acceptable electricity supply of the Land Baden-Wuerttemberg. The power station is of great significance to the region, both in terms of power supply and the economy. (orig./HP) [de

German study on the risks of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Wollny, V.

1987-01-01

The 'Deutsche Risikostudie Kernkraftwerke', DRS, (German study on the risks of nuclear plants) calculates a frequency of 1/10000 years (i.e. once in 10000 years of reactor operation) for the event of insufficient cooling of the reactor core occurring. The resulting collective risk is put at approximately 10 deaths per year for 25 plants. As the explanations show, the error margin of such a risk statement is enormous. Moreover, much seems to indicate that the risk was underrated. Apart from this, risk analyses are of doubtful value in the decision process for or against the introduction of large-scale technologies. They cannot replace the individual decision of all concerned. (orig./HSCH) [de

The Swiss nuclear installations. Annual report 1993

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-08-01

Surveillance of the Swiss nuclear installations with regard to nuclear safety, including radiation protection, is among the tasks of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK). Five nuclear power plants are operational in Switzerland: the three units Beznau I and II and Muehleberg with electrical capacities in the range of 300 to 400 MWe, and the two units Goesgen and Leibstadt with capacities between 900 and 1200 MWe. These are light water reactors; at Beznau and Goesgen of the PWR type, and at Muehleberg and Leibstadt of the BWR type. Research reactors of thermal capacities below 10 MWth are operational at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne and at the University of Basel. Further subject to HSK's supervision are all activities at PSI involving nuclear fuel or ionizing radiation, the shut-down experimental reactor of Lucens, the exploration of final disposal facilities for radwaste and the interim radwaste storage facilities in Switzerland. The report first deals with the nuclear power and covers, in individual sections, the aspects of installation safety, radiation protection as well as personnel and organization, and the resulting overall impression from the point of view of HSK. In chapter 5, the corresponding information is given for research installations. Chapter 6, on radwaste disposal, is dedicated to the treatment of waste, waste from reprocessing, interim storage and exploration by NAGRA. In chapter 7, the status of emergency planning in the nuclear power plants' proximity is reported. Certificates issued for the transport of radioactive materials are dealt with in chapter 8. Finally chapter 9 goes into general questions relating to the safety of nuclear installations. All in all, the safety of operation of the Swiss nuclear installations, in the period of 1993, is judged as good by HSK. (author) 10 figs., 11 tabs

The Swiss nuclear installations. Annual report 1994

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-06-01

Surveillance of the Swiss nuclear installations with regard to nuclear safety, including radiation protection, is among the tasks of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK). Five nuclear power plants are operational in Switzerland: the three units Beznau I and II and Muehleberg with electrical capacities in the range of 300 to 400 MWe, and the two units Goesgen and Leibstadt with capacities between 900 and 1200 MWe. These are light water reactors; at Beznau and Goesgen of the PWR type, and at Muehleberg and Leibstadt of the BWR type. Research reactors of thermal capacities below 10 MWth are operational at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne and at the University of Basel. Further subject to HSK`s supervision are all activities at PSI involving nuclear fuel or ionizing radiation, the shut-down experimental reactor of Lucens, the exploration, in Switzerland, of final disposal facilities for radwaste and the interim radwaste storage facilities. The report first deals with the nuclear power and covers, in individual sections, the aspects of installation safety, radiation protection as well as personnel and organization, and the resulting overall impression from the point of view of HSK. In chapter 5, the corresponding information is given for research installations. Chapter 6, on radwaste disposal, is dedicated to the treatment of waste, waste from reprocessing, interim storage and exploration by NAGRA. In chapter 7, the status of emergency planning in the nuclear power plants` proximity is reported. Certificates issued for the transport of radioactive materials are dealt with in chapter 8. Finally chapter 9 goes into general questions relating to the safety of nuclear installations. All in all, the safety of operation of the Swiss nuclear installations, in the period of 1994, is judged as good by HSK. (author) 11 figs., 13 tabs.

Comparison of plant-specific probabilistic safety assessments and lessons learned

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Balfanz, H.P. [TUeV Nord, Hamburg (Germany); Berg, H.P. [Bundesamt fuer Strahlenschutz, Salzgitter (Germany); Steininger, U. [TUeV Energie- und Systemtechnik GmbH, Unternehmensgruppe TUeV Sueddeutschland, Muenchen (Germany)

2001-11-01

Probabilistic safety assessments (PSA) have been performed for all German nuclear power plants in operation. These assessments are mainly based on the recent German PSA guide and an earlier draft, respectively. However, comparison of these PSA show differences in the results which are discussed in this paper. Lessons learned from this comparison and further development of the PSA methodology are described. (orig.) [German] Probabilistische Sicherheitsanalysen (PSA) sind fuer alle in Betrieb befindlichen deutschen Kernkraftwerke durchgefuehrt worden. Diese Analysen basierten in der Regel auf dem aktuellen deutschen PSA-Leitfaden bzw. einem frueheren Entwurf. Ein Vergleich dieser PSA zeigt Unterschiede in den Ergebnissen, die in diesem Beitrag diskutiert werden. Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse, die aus diesem Vergleich abgeleitet werden koennen, und weitere Entwicklungen der PSA-Methoden werden beschrieben. (orig.)

A 'YES' to the partial revision of the law on atomic energy

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1979-01-01

The Swiss Atomic Energy Law, dated 23 December 1959, has been reviewed by a National Council and it was agreed on 6 October 1978 that it should be partially revised, with a full revision to be made by the end of 1983. Station construction authorisations previously made for Muehleberg, Beznau I, II, Goesgen and Leibstadt are to be followed in a simplified fashion for Kaiseraugst, Groben and Verbois. Safety precautions, however, must be shown to be met, and this includes storage facilities for spent fuel. Final decision on a new station must be approved by democratic means. The final paragraph of the article states that the economics of nuclear power appear to be favourable and that there is no other apparently acceptable alternative. (G.C.)

Investigation of the effects of the nuclear power plants at Obrigheim, Stade, and Goesgen

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Dosky, D. von.

1987-01-01

This study investigates the effects of power stations - especially when sited in peripheral regions - on the regional economic structure, population structure and settlement structure. The questions of in how far the potential positive effects are actually utilized and of whether they can be integrated into a regional development strategy are also dealt with. In particular, this study discusses the aspects of regional planning policy and energy policy for siting, the space effectiveness of power stations, the economic and employment structure, the regional financial power, infrastructure, settlement structure, furthermore the regional effects during phases of operation and the influence of a shut down on the region concerned. (orig./HSCH) [de

Contributions to economical and safe operation of nuclear power plants

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Ackermann, G.; Meyer, K.

1989-01-01

Selected results of scientific and technical research works in the Department 'Nuclear Power' of the Zittau Technical University are summarized which have been obtained on behalf of the Kombinat Kernkraftwerke 'Bruno Leuschner' and in conjunction with the education of scientific successors and have been partly adopted in textbooks. Works on improved utilization of nuclear fuel in pressurized water reactors are mentioned which, among other things, are related with the use of stretch-out mode of operation and optimization of nuclear fuel loading sequence. Results of experimental and theoretical investigations on coolant mixing in the reactor core are presented. A complex modelling of the dynamical long-term behaviour of nuclear power plants with pressurized water reactors due to xenon poisoning are briefly described. Finally, some results on noise diagnostics theory of power reactors are summarized. (author)

A current perspective on the risk significance of steam explosions

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Snyder, A.W.

1982-01-01

The view currently held in the Sandia National Laboratory is that, in the case of a meltdown in the reactor core, the probability of a steam explosion is greater than was estimated in WASH-1400, but that the extent and effect of an explosion will be very much smaller than assumed in WASH-1400. This results in a far smaller total risk with regard to containment. In WASH-1400, a nominal conditional probability of 1% was assumed for a containment rupture in a PWR-type reactor, should a large part of the reactor fuel be subject to meltdown during the course of the accident. The German risk analysis study 'Deutsche Risikostudie Kernkraftwerke' dated 1979 considers an explosion of a size sufficient to represent a threat to containment to be considerably more improbable than was assumed in WASH-1400. (orig./DG) [de

Safety culture in nuclear power plants. Proceedings; Sicherheitskultur im Kernkraftwerk. Seminarbericht

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1994-12-01

As a consequence of the INSAG-4 report on `safety culture`, published by the IAEA in 1991, the Federal Commission for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants (KSA) decided to hold a one-day seminar as a first step in this field. The KSA is an advisory body of the Federal Government and the Federal Department of Transport and Energy (EVED). It comments on applications for licenses, observes the operation of nuclear power plants, assists with the preparation of regulations, monitors the progress of research in the field of nuclear safety, and makes proposals for research tasks. The objective of this seminar was to familiarise the participants with the principles of `safety culture`, with the experiences made in Switzerland and abroad with existing concepts, as well as to eliminate existing prejudices. The main points dealt with at this seminar were: - safety culture from the point of view of operators, - safety culture from the point of view of the authorities, - safety culture: collaboration between power plants, the authorities and research organisations, - trends and developments in the field of safety culture. Invitations to attend this seminar were extended to the management boards of companies operating Swiss nuclear power plants, and to representatives of the Swiss authorities responsible for the safety of nuclear power plants. All these organisations were represented by a large number of executive and specialist staff. We would like to express our sincerest thanks to the Head of the Federal Department of Transport and Energy for his kind patronage of this seminar. (author) figs., tabs., refs.

The Chernobyl reactor accident, ten years on. Teaching projects for mathematics instruction in interdisciplinary working groups; 10 Jahre nach Tschernobyl. Unterrichtsprojekte fuer den Mathematikunterricht in faecheruebergreifenden Kooperationen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Boer, H. [comp.; Delle, E. [comp.; Mies, K. [comp.; Warmeling, A. [comp.

1996-10-01

The booklet presents background information and addresses the following aspects: ionizing radiation and radiation effects; safety of German nuclear power plants; statistical evidence of radiation injuries; short-lived and long-lived ionizing radiation; radioactive waste; CO{sub 2} emissions as an argument in favour of nuclear power generation. The material presented is intended for use by a school project team interested in the subjects, or as a basis for collaborative, interdisciplinary teaching in working groups, and it offers information and problems for mathematics teaching. (HP) [Deutsch] Neben vielen Informationen behandelt die Broschuere: Strahlen und Strahlenwirkungen; Sicherheit deutscher Kernkraftwerke; statistischer Nachweis von Strahlenschaeden; Kurz- und Langfestigkeit der Strahlenbelastung; radioaktiver Abfall; CO{sub 2}-Problematik als Argument fuer die Kernenergie. Die Broschuere ist gedacht z.B. fuer eine Projektgruppe, einen Projekttag, fuer eine Lerngruppe in faecheruebergreifender Kooperation. Die Materialien sind ausgearbeitet fuer die Themembearbeitung im Mathematikunterricht mit Uebungsaufgaben. (HP)

Hybrid cooling tower Neckarwestheim 2 cooling function, emission, plume dispersion

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Braeuning, G.; Ernst, G.; Maeule, R.; Necker, P.

1990-01-01

The fan-assisted hybrid cooling tower of the 1300 MW power plant Gemeinschafts-Kernkraftwerk Neckarwestheim 2 was designed and constructed based on results from theoretical and experimental studies and experiences from a smaller prototype. The wet part acts in counterflow. The dry part is arranged above the wet part. Each part contains 44 fans. Special attention was payed to the ducts which mix the dry into the wet plume. The cooling function and state, mass flow and contents of the emission were measured. The dispersion of the plume in the atmosphere was observed. The central results are presented in this paper. The cooling function corresponds to the predictions. The content of drifted cooling water in the plume is extremely low. The high velocity of the plume in the exit causes an undisturbed flow into the atmosphere. The hybrid operation reduces visible plumes strongly, especially in warmer and drier ambient air

Federal Administrative Court on priorities between water law and nuclear law procedures

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1980-01-01

With its decision of November 22, 1979 - BVerwG 4 B 162/79 -, the Federal Administration Court, at the expense of the plaintiff, has judged against a Bremen resident who had lodged a complained against the non-admission of an appeal in a partial verdict by the Lueneburg Higher Administrative Court concerning licenses under water law for Kernkraftwerk Unterweser. The value in litigation for the complaint procedure was set at DM 5000,-. In its partial verdict of February 12, 1979 - VII OVG A 113/77 - the Lueneburg Higher Administrative Court had decided that the plaintiff's rights are not infringed by the administrative steps under water law taken by the defendant district, and that pleas under nuclear law cannot be entered in the present procedure. The Federal Administrative Court was of the same opinion. The reasons for its decision are given in full wording. (orig./HP) 891 HP/orig.- 892 CKA [de

Evidos: optimisation of individual monitoring in mixed neutron/photon fields at workplaces of the nuclear fuel cycle

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Luszik-Bhadra, M.; Reginatto, M.; Schuhmacher, H.; Lacoste, V.; Muller, M.; Boschung, M.; Fiechtner, A.; Coeck, M.; Vanhavere, F.; Curzio, G.; D'errico, F.; Kyllonen, J.E.; Lindborg, L.; Molinos, C.; Tanner, R.; Derdau, D.; Lahaye, Th.

2005-01-01

Within its 5. Framework Programme, the EC is funding the project EVIDOS ('Evaluation of Individual Dosimetry in Mixed Neutron and Photon Radiation Fields'). The aim of this project is the optimisation of individual monitoring at workplaces of the nuclear fuel cycle with special regard to neutrons. Various dosemeters for mixed field application - passive and new electronic devices - are tested in selected workplace fields in nuclear installations in Europe. The fields are characterised using a series of spectrometers that provide the energy distribution of neutron fluence (Bonner spheres) and newly developed devices that provide the energy and directional distribution of the neutron fluence. Results from the first measurement campaign, carried out in simulated workplace fields (IRSN, Cadarache. France), and those of a second measurement campaign, carried out at workplaces at a boiling water reactor and at a storage cask with used fuel elements (Kernkraftwerk Kriimmel, Germany), are described. (authors)

The EPR (European Pressurized Water Reactor) containment - concept, testing of leakage behaviour, FRP liner

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Touret, J.P. [EDF SEPTEN, Villeurbanne (France); Liersch, G. [Bayernwerk Kerenergie GmbH, Muenchen (Germany); Danisch, R. [Siemens AG, KWU NAD, Erlangen (Germany)

2001-07-01

The Basic Design of the EPR has now been completed. The containment plays a major safety-related role with respect to protection of the environment against radioactive releases. The EPR features a double (steel-reinforced concrete/prestressed concrete) containment design, with the inner containment coated additionally with a fibreglass-reinforced plastic (FRP) liner in certain areas. This means that containment leaktightness is provided mainly by the prestressed concrete and the FRP liner in the event of a postulated accident. The numerous findings of the tests carried out so far in both France and Germany are summarized. (orig.) [German] Das Basic Design fuer den EPR ist fertiggestellt. Entscheidend fuer eine Realisierung wird neben der politischen Akzeptanz vor allem die Wettbewerbsfaehigkeit mit anderen Energietraegern sein. Im EPR-Projekt wird der hohe Sicherheitsstandard der heutigen Kernkraftwerke in Deutschland und Frankreich ergaenzt, indem zusaetzlich technische Massnahmen ergriffen werden, um die Konsequenzen beim unterstellten Versagen aller sicherheitstechnischen Einrichtungen mit der Folge eines postulierten Niederschmelzen des Kerns technisch zu beherrschen. (orig.)

Comparison calculation/experiment on the load case ``shutdown of TH high pressure pumps under consideration of fluid structure interaction``; Vergleich Rechnung/Messung zum Lastfall ``Abschaltung der TH-Hochdruckpumpen unter Beruecksichtigung der Fluid-Struktur-Wechselwirkung``

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Erath, W.; Nowotny, B.; Maetz, J. [KED, Rodenbach (Germany)

1998-11-01

Measurements of an experiment in a pipe system with pump shutdown and valve closing have been performed in the nuclear power plant KRB II. Comparative calculations of fluid and structure including interaction show an excellent agreement with the measured results. Theory and implementation of the fluid/structure interaction and the results of the comparison are described. It turns out that the consideration of the fluid/structure interaction is mostly a significant increase of the effective structural damping. (orig.) [Deutsch] Es wurden Messungen am nuklearen Nachkuehlsystem des Kernkraftwerks Gundremmingen (KRB II) bei einem Versuche mit Pumpenabschalten und Ventilschliessen durchgefuehrt. Vergleichsrechnungen der Fluid-Strukturdynamik unter echter Beruecksichtigung der Wechselwirkung ergaben eine ausgezeichnete Uebereinstimmung der Rechnung mit den Messungen. Es werden Theorie und Implementierung der Koppelung der Fluid- und Struktur-Berechnungen sowie die Vergleiche von Messung und Rechnung beschrieben. Es ergibt sich, dass die Beruecksichtigung der Wechselwirkung notwendig ist zur genaueren Berechnung von `weichen` Rohrleitungsystemen. Eine wichtige Folge der Wechselwirkung ist meist eine deutliche Erhoehung der effektiven Strukturdaempfung. (orig.)

Practical event analysis; Durchfuehrung von Ereignisanalysen in der Praxis

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Scheuring, R. [Bayernwerk Kernenergie GmbH - Kernkraftwerk Grafenrheinfeld (Germany)

1999-04-01

The paper explains the systematic approaches and practical aspects of evaluation of NPP operating reports and implementation of identified remedial action for enhancing the safety in terms of human, organisational, and technology factors. The procedures adopted for the Grafenrheinfeld nuclear power station (KKG) serve as an example. (orig./CB) [German] Ein wichtiger Bestandteil zur Erhaltung und Fortentwicklung des Sicherheitsniveaus ist das Lernen aus der Erfahrung. Hierzu wiederum ist ein systematisches Vorgehen zur Vermeidung von Fehlern und Behebung von Schwachstellen menschlicher, technischer und organisatorischer Natur unabdingbare Voraussetzung. Die Anwendung einer umfassenden Auswertemethodik beinhaltet - die Erfassung und Informationsweitergabe externer und interner Vorkommnisse und Erfahrungen - eine systematische Analyse/Auswertung - eine konsequente Umsetzung der Abhilfemassnahmen unter Einbeziehen aller betroffenen Organisationseinheiten. Wie erfolgt die Umsetzung dieser Vorgaben in die Praxis? Im Kernkraftwerk Grafenrheinfeld (KKG) ist die Auswertung von externen und internen Betriebserfahrungen als Aufgabe im Betriebshandbuch (BHB) 'Personelle Betriebsorganisation' vorgegeben und im Detail im Sinne der Ablauforganisation im Qualitaetssicherungshandbuch in Qualitaetssicherungsanweisungen (QSA) beschrieben. (orig.)

Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The first Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1998-09-01

This report is issued according to Article 5 of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety. It has been produced by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate. Before submission to the Federal Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication, the report has been commented by the Federal Office of Energy (BFE/OFEN), the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Commission (KSA/CSA), and the Swiss nuclear power plants of Beznau, Leibstadt and Muehleberg. The Goesgen nuclear power plant has chosen not to comment on the report. The introduction to the report provides general information about Switzerland, a brief political history of nuclear power and an overview of the nuclear facilities in Switzerland. In the subsequent sections, numbered after the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, key aspects are commented on in such a way as to give a clear indication on how the various duties imposed by the Convention are fulfilled in Switzerland

International intercomparison exercise of airborne gammaspectrometric systems of Germany, France and Switzerland in the framework of the Swiss exercise ARM07

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Bucher, B.; Schwarz, G.; Guillot, L.; Gutierrez, S.; Strobl, Ch.; Thomas, M.; Hohmann, Ch.; Krol, I.; Butterweck, G.; Rybach, L.

2009-06-01

The aeroradiometric exercise ARM07 was a joint project of the measurement teams of France, Germany and Switzerland. The measurement flights of the exercise ARM07 were performed between 27th and 31st of August 2007 under the direction of G. Scharding of the National Emergency Operations Centre (NAZ) and coordination by the Expert Group for Aeroradiometrics (FAR). According to the alternating schedule of the annual ARM exercises, the environs of the nuclear power plants Muehleberg (KKM) and Goesgen (KKG) were surveyed. The measurements showed similar results to those obtained in former years. The results from the three teams agree well. The region of Basel, where the borders of Germany, France and Switzerland meet, was chosen for a composite aeroradiometric mapping. It was shown that the data measured by each team in adjacent areas could be uniformly processed and integrated within hours into joint radiological maps of the complete region. The methods for data acquisition, data processing and integration are described. (author)

Implementation of the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The first Swiss report in accordance with Article 5

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1998-09-01

This report is issued according to Article 5 of the International Convention on Nuclear Safety. It has been produced by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate. Before submission to the Federal Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication, the report has been commented by the Federal Office of Energy (BFE/OFEN), the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Commission (KSA/CSA), and the Swiss nuclear power plants of Beznau, Leibstadt and Muehleberg. The Goesgen nuclear power plant has chosen not to comment on the report. The introduction to the report provides general information about Switzerland, a brief political history of nuclear power and an overview of the nuclear facilities in Switzerland. In the subsequent sections, numbered after the Articles 6 to 19 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, key aspects are commented on in such a way as to give a clear indication on how the various duties imposed by the Convention are fulfilled in Switzerland.

Future of nuclear energy technology in Switzerland

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tiberini, A.; Brogli, R.; Jermann, M.; Alder, H.P.; Stratton, R.W.; Troyon, F.

1988-01-01

Despite the present gloom surrounding the nuclear option for electricity and heat generation, there are still people in Switzerland in industry, research, banking and even politics willing and capable to think in terms of long-range projections. The basis for these projections is the belief that a well-functioning and prosperous society always needs large and reliable sources of acceptably priced energy, which must be generated with a high respect for the necessity of a clean environment. Being aware of the current low acceptance level of the nuclear option, efforts to keep this option open are directed to achieving the following goals: to maintain and improve the country's capabilities to safely operate the four existing nuclear power plants of Beznau (twin units), Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt; to keep the capability of extending the applications of nuclear energy technology. In practice, this could be in the fields of district heating, fusion, and advanced power reactors

International intercomparison exercise of airborne gammaspectrometric systems of Germany, France and Switzerland in the framework of the Swiss exercise ARM07

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bucher, B.; Schwarz, G. [Eidgenoessisches Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat (ENSI), Villigen (Switzerland); Guillot, L.; Gutierrez, S. [Commissariat a l' energie atomique, Laboratoire Mesures Sol et Aeroportees, Bruyeres-le-Chatel (France); Strobl, Ch.; Thomas, M.; Hohmann, Ch.; Krol, I. [Bundesamt fuer Strahlenschutz, Abteilung Ueberwachung der Radioaktivitaet in der Umwelt, Oberschleissheim (Germany); Butterweck, G. [Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), Abteilung Strahlenschutz und Sicherheit, Villigen (Switzerland); Rybach, L. [Eidgenoessische Technische Hochschule (ETH) Zuerich, Institut fuer Geophysik, Zuerich (Switzerland)

2009-06-15

The aeroradiometric exercise ARM07 was a joint project of the measurement teams of France, Germany and Switzerland. The measurement flights of the exercise ARM07 were performed between 27th and 31st of August 2007 under the direction of G. Scharding of the National Emergency Operations Centre (NAZ) and coordination by the Expert Group for Aeroradiometrics (FAR). According to the alternating schedule of the annual ARM exercises, the environs of the nuclear power plants Muehleberg (KKM) and Goesgen (KKG) were surveyed. The measurements showed similar results to those obtained in former years. The results from the three teams agree well. The region of Basel, where the borders of Germany, France and Switzerland meet, was chosen for a composite aeroradiometric mapping. It was shown that the data measured by each team in adjacent areas could be uniformly processed and integrated within hours into joint radiological maps of the complete region. The methods for data acquisition, data processing and integration are described. (author)

Regulatory oversight report 2009 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations; Aufsichtsbericht 2009 zur nuklearen Sicherheit in den schweizerischen Kernanlagen/Rapport de surveillance 2009 sur la securite nucleaire dans les installations nucleaires en Suisse/Regulatory oversight report 2009 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2010-04-15

nuclear facilities in Switzerland. Chapter 9 provides an update on the three applications submitted so far for the outline approval of a new nuclear power plant. Chapter 10 provides information on the geological repository for radioactive waste and Chapter 11 deals with generic aspects not specific to any individual facility. The overall nuclear safety of the Beznau and Goesgen NPPs is rated as satisfactory. Based on its Systematic Safety Reviews at the Leibstadt and Muehleberg plants, ENSI rates their operating safety as good. All these facilities complied with their operating licenses. The licensees complied with the statutory reporting requirements, with exception of the Goesgen NPP which delayed notification of an incident in 2008 by several months. In 2009 there were 22 notifiable incidents at NPPs: 11 incidents occurred at Beznau NPP, 4 at Muehleberg, 3 at Goesgen, and 4 at Leibstadt. The incident at Beznau on 3 August 2009 was rated at Level 2 on INES scale, the one at Goesgen on 24 June 2008, where notification was delayed, was rated at level 1 on INES, and the remaining incidents during 2009 were rated as INES 0. ZWILAG consists of several interim storage halls, a conditioning plant, and the plasma plant. At the end of 2009, the cask storage hall contained 33 transport/storage casks with spent fuel assemblies and vitrified residue packages as well as 6 casks with decommissioned waste from the former experimental NPP at Lucens. About 16% of the capacity of the HLW store and about 21% of the capacity of the ILW store were occupied. The nuclear safety of the storage buildings and the hot cell was good. During 2009, there were 3 notifiable incidents at ZWILAG. In 2009 ENSI granted approval for the unrestricted use of the plasma plant. ZWILAG conducted two operations to process, incinerate and melt radioactive waste. At PSI the decommissioning work at the two research reactors DIORIT and SAPHIR continued smoothly. Experiments on the PROTEUS research reactor were

On the safety of French nuclear power plants. Zur Sicherheit der franzoesischen Kernkraftwerke

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Anon,

1990-04-01

An allegedly secret report by the inspector general for nuclear safety, of EDF, has recently been unearthed and published by the French weekly 'Le Canard Enchaine, and the response in France, and very soon after also in West Germany, has been a number of alarming reports and articles in the press. Readers in West Germany have been stirred up by press reports that made French nuclear power plants appear to be a herd of hazards, which of course again added fuel to the feeling of fear of nuclear power already existing in the population. A copy of the internal report in question was sent without any fuss upon request by the atw editorial office who was preparing the interview. The report is a sober account of the state and operating behaviour of French nuclear power plants, also stating weak points seen by the safety expert that need particular attention. Materials are a main aspect in this context, particularly the materials behaviour in steam raising units. The problems have been spotted, and are given due attention. (orig./HP).

High-resolution gamma spectroscopy with whole-body and partial-body counters. Experience, recommendations. Report; Hochaufloesende Gamma-Spektrometrie an Ganz- und Teilkoerperzaehlern. Erfahrungen, Empfehlungen. Bericht

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sahre, P. [comp.

1997-12-01

The application of high-resolution gamma spectroscopy with whole-body and partial-body counters shows a steadily rising upward trend over the last few years. This induced the ``Arbeitskreis Inkorporationsueberwachung`` of the association ``Fachverband fuer Strahlenschutz e.V.`` to organise a meeting for joint elaboration of a guide on recommended applications of this measuring technique, based on a review of existing experience and results. A key item on the agenda of the meeting was the comparative evaluation of the Ge semiconductor detector and the NaI solid scintillation detector. (orig./CB) [Deutsch] Der Einsatz der hochaufloesenden Gammaspektroskopie in Ganz- und Teilkoerperzaehlern hat in den letzten Jahren stetig zugenommen. Der ``Arbeitskreis Inkorporationsueberwachung`` des Fachverbandes fuer Strahlenschutz e.V. hat darum bisherige Erfahrungen zusammengetragen und Empfehlungen fuer den Einsatz dieser Messtechnik erarbeitet. Der Schwerpunkt der Tagung lag beim Vergleich von Germaniumhalbleiter- mit Natriumjodid-Festszintillationsdetektoren.Tl-Detektoren eignen sich v.a. beim Vorhandensein bekannter und zeitlich konstanter Nuklidvektoren (Kernkraftwerke, Nuklearmedizin). Bei unbekanntem bzw. variablem Nuklidvektor (Stoerfall, Unfall, Forschung) sollen Ge-Detektoren benutzt werden (orig./ABI)

Nuclear power: Hour of fog producers; Atomkraft: Stunde der Nebelwerfer

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Rauner, M.; Schuh, H.

2004-03-04

Seven advanced nuclear power plants in Germany can withstand a frontal crash by a full-tanked Jumbo-Jet. But for five older plants even smaller planes can cause an hazard impossible to control. A fog generation around the power plants, favorized by operators and politicians, to camouflage this plants against terroristic flights is absurd because of the possibility of flight automation. However terrorists may attack reactors also from the ground, but how they can do is top secret. (GL) [German] Einem frontalen Aufprall eines voll getankten Jumbo-Jets mit hoher Geschwindigkeit koennen in Deutschland sieben moderne Kernkraftwerke standhalten. Bei fuenf aelteren Modellen kann dagegen selbst ein kleineres Flugzeug ein schwer beherrschbares Unglueck ausloesen. Obwohl Experten eine vorzeitige Schliessung solch alter Meiler fuer realistisch halten, ist die Verhandlungslage aufgrund ideologischer Einfluesse verfahren. Die von Betreibern und Politikern gern gepriesenen Nebelwerfer zur Tarnung der Kraftwerke sind wegen der Moeglichkeit des Instrumentenfluges sinnlos. Die beste Abwehr bieten vorgelagerte Schutzbauten aus Beton. Jedoch koennen Terroristen Reaktoren auch vom Boden aus gefaehrden, wie, ist natuerlich geheim.

KWL Lingen nuclear plant. Technical annual report 2016; KWL Kernkraftwerk Lingen. Technischer Jahresbericht 2016

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2017-07-01

The technical annual report 2016 for KWL (Lingen nuclear plant) covers the following sections: dismantling project management and operation, monitoring and clearance; waste management, technical qualification, security and safety, central tasks; licensing and supervision procedures, operational data, radiation monitoring, radioactive materials, in-service inspections.

Impact of external grid disturbances on nuclear power plants; Rueckwirkungen von Netzstoerungen auf Kernkraftwerke

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Arains, Robert; Arnold, Simone; Brueck, Benjamin; Mueller, Christian; Quester, Claudia; Sommer, Dagmar

2017-06-15

The electrical design of nuclear power plants and the reliability of their electrical power supply including the offsite power supply are of high importance for the safe operation of the plants. The operating experience of recent years has shown that disturbances in the external grid can have impact on the electrical equipment of nuclear power plants. In the course of this project, possible causes and types of grid disturbances were identified. Based on these, scenarios of grid disturbances were developed. In order to investigate the impact of the developed scenarios of grid disturbances on the electrical equipment of nuclear power plants, the auxiliary power supply of a German pressurized water reactor of type Konvoi was simulated using the simulation tool NEPLAN. On the basis of the results of the analyses, it was identified whether there are possible measures to prevent the spread of grid disturbances in the plants which have not been implemented in the nuclear power plants today.

UO2 fuel behaviour at rod burn-ups up to 105 MWd/kgHM. A review of 10 years of high burn-up examinations commissioned by AREVA NP

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Goll, W.; Hoffmann, P.B.; Hellwig, C.; Sauser, W.; Spino, J.; Walker, C.T.

2007-01-01

Irradiation experience gained on fuel rods with burn-ups greater than 60 MWd/kgHM irradiated in the Nuclear Power Plant Goesgen, Switzerland, is described. Emphasis is placed on the fuel behaviour, which has been analysed by hot cell examinations at the Institute for Transuranium Elements and the Paul-Scherrer-Institute. Above 60 MWd/kgHM, the so-called high burn-up structure (HBS) forms and the fission gas release increases with burn-up and rod power. Examinations performed in the outer region of the fuel revealed that most if not all of the fission gas created was retained in the HBS, even at 25% porosity. Furthermore, the HBS has a relatively low swelling rate, greatly increased plasticity, and its thermal conductivity is higher than expected from the porosity. The post-irradiation examinations showed that the HBS has no detrimental effects on the performance of stationary irradiated PWR fuel irradiated to the high burn-ups that can be achieved with 5 wt% U-235 enrichment. On the contrary, the HBS results in fuel performance that is generally better than it would have been if the HBS had not formed. (orig.)

Mechanized radiation testing of austenitic pipe welds. Testing of media filled pipes and determination of the flaw depth by tomosynthesis; Mechanisierte Durchstrahlungspruefung von Rundschweissnaehten. Pruefung mediengefuellter Rohrleitungen und Tiefenlagenbestimmung durch Tomosynthese

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ewert, U.; Redmer, B. [Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin (Germany); Mueller, J. [COMPRA GmbH, Frechen (Germany); Trobitz, M. [Kernkraftwerke Gundremmingen Betriebsgesellschaft mbH, Gundremmingen (Germany); Baranov, V.A. [Institute for Introscopy, Tomsk (Russian Federation)

1999-08-01

A compact detection system was built for multi-angle inspection of pipes, consisting of a high-sensitivity radiometric line scanner and an ultrasonic manipulator. Improved flaw imaging quality is achieved with this system as compared to film radiography. Measurements have been carried out on site in a nuclear power plant and in a laboratory. Better flaw imaging quality was also achieved in the testing of water-filled pipes. Non-linear tomosynthesis was applied for processing and interpretation of measured data. The system delivers considerably better images of planary materials inhomogeneitites, (such as cracks and lack-of-bond defects). (orig./CB) [Deutsch] Eine hoch empfindliche radiometrische Zeilenkamera wurde mit einem Ultraschall-Manipulator zu einem Gesamtsystem aufgebaut und fuer Mehrwinkel-Inspektionen von Rohrleitungen angewandt. Bei der Inspektion von Rundschweissnaehten an Rohren mit ca. 8... 20 mm Wanddicke wurde eine Verbesserung der Bildqualitaet im Vergleich zur Filmradiographie erreicht. Diese Messungen wurden in einem Kernkraftwerk unter Vor-Ort-Bedingungen sowie im Labor ausgefuehrt. Ein signifikantes Ansteigen der Bildqualitaet wurde auch bei der Pruefung von wassergefuellten Rohren erzielt. Methoden der nicht-linearen Tomosynthese wurden fuer die Verarbeitung und Interpretation der gemessenen Projektionsdaten genutzt. Das entwickelte System gestattet eine erhebliche Verbesserung der Anzeige von planaren Materialinhomogenitaeten (z.B. Risse und Bindefehler). (orig./DGE)

Advanced handbook for accident analyses of German nuclear power plants; Weiterentwicklung eines Handbuches fuer Stoerfallanalysen deutscher Kernkraftwerke

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kerner, Alexander; Broecker, Annette; Hartung, Juergen; Mayer, Gerhard; Pallas Moner, Guim

2014-09-15

The advanced handbook of safety analyses (HSA) comprises a comprehensive electronic collection of knowledge for the compilation and conduction of safety analyses in the area of reactor, plant and containment behaviour as well as results of existing safety analyses (performed by GRS in the past) with characteristic specifications and further background information. In addition, know-how from the analysis software development and validation process is presented and relevant rules and regulations with regard to safety demonstration are provided. The HSA comprehensively covers the topic thermo-hydraulic safety analyses (except natural hazards, man-made hazards and malicious acts) for German pressurized and boiling water reactors for power and non-power operational states. In principle, the structure of the HSA-content represents the analytical approach utilized by safety analyses and applying the knowledge from safety analyses to technical support services. On the basis of a multilevel preparation of information to the topics ''compilation of safety analyses'', ''compilation of data bases'', ''assessment of safety analyses'', ''performed safety analyses'', ''rules and regulation'' and ''ATHLET-validation'' the HSA addresses users with different background, allowing them to enter the HSA at different levels. Moreover, the HSA serves as a reference book, which is designed future-oriented, freely configurable related to the content, completely integrated into the GRS internal portal and prepared to be used by a growing user group.

German risk study on nuclear power plants. Appendix 2. Reliability analysis. Deutsche Risikostudie Kernkraftwerke. Fachband 2: Zuverlaessigkeitsanalyse

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Dietlmeier, W.; Gossner, S.; Gueldner, W.; Hoertner, H.; von Linden, J.; Preischl, W.; Reichart, G.; Spindler, H.; Volmer, G.; Zipf, G.

1981-01-01

Based on the event tree analysis as documented in the Appendix 1, the failure probabilities of the system functions required to control the initiating events are evaluated in this Appendix 2. The reliability investigations necessary for the evaluation of the event sequences are performed mostly by means of the fault tree analysis. The methods of the reliability analysis, the composition and function of the systems important to safety and the functional tests performed on these systems are dealt with in detail. The comprehensive documentation of the reliability analyses as performed for the internal events necessitated a division of this Appendix 2 into two volumes.

Compact sodium cooled nuclear power plant with fast core (KNK II- Karlsruhe), Safety Report

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1977-09-01

After the operation of the KNK plant with a thermal core (KNK I), the installation of a fast core (KNK II) had been realized. The planning of the core and the necessary reconstruction work was done by INTERATOM. Owner and customer was the Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe (KfK), while the operating company was the Kernkraftwerk-Betriebsgesellschaft mbH (KBG) Karlsruhe. The main goals of the KNK II project and its special experimental test program were to gather experience for the construction, the licensing and operation of future larger plants, to develop and to test fuel and absorber assemblies and to further develop the sodium technology and the associated components. The present safety report consists of three parts. Part 1 contains the description of the nuclear plant. Hereby, the reactor and its components, the handling facilities, the instrumentation with the plant protection, the design of the plant including the reactor core and the nominal operation processes are described. Part 2 contains the safety related investigation and measures. This concerns the reactivity accidents, local cooling perturbations, radiological consequences with the surveillance measures and the justification of the choice of structural materials. Part three finally is the appendix with the figures, showing the different buildings, the reactor and its components, the heat transfer systems and the different auxiliary facilities [de

Some experience with measurements of stack releases and their correlation with environmental measurements

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Czarnecki, J.

1988-01-01

The first nuclear power plants (NPP) in Switzerland were built during the late 1960s and the early 1970s (PWR-Beznau and BWR-Muhleberg). A new generation of NPPs were built ten years later (PWR-Goesgen and BWR-Leibstadt). In all these NPP special attention was given to the sampling and measurements of the releases of radioactive materials, in particular long lived aerosols and J-131. The sampling systems at the Swiss NPP were originally installed on the basis of the American National Standard Guide to sampling Airborne Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities, (ANSI NI3, 1 - 1969) or equivalent standards such as ISO 2889 and DIN 25423. Unfortunately, the sampling systems described in these guides cover only that fraction of radioactive aerosols, which is preferentially retained in various portions of the respiratory tract (0.3 to 10 Μm). In a NPP one can expect during an accident a very wide range of particles with diameters as large as 100 and more Μm, which can be transported away by the stack effluent and may not be properly sampled and measured. It should be taken into account that there are some non filtered rooms and that filters can fail or even break. Such particles when released cause a ground contamination in the vicinity of the plant. Such an event occurred in September 1986 in the NPP-Muhleberg

Risk reduction category (RRC-A) accident studies in the safety analysis report of the EPR trademark reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Poehlmann, M.; Bleher, G.; Ismaier, A.; Knoll, A.; Levi, P.; Garcia, E. Vera; Schels, A.; Seitz, H.; Lima Campos, L.

2013-01-01

The Risk Reduction Category (RRC-A) is considered in the safety demonstration of nuclear reactors in addition to design basis operating conditions (Plant Condition Category, PCC), in order to analyze with a risk reduction approach any operating conditions with multiple failures. As extending the operating conditions of the plant 'beyond design basis', the Risk Reduction Category (RRC-A) is also denoted as Design Extension Condition (DEC-A). In the German licensing framework, the RRCA (or DEC-A) transients correspond to safety assessment level '4b' of the 'Sicherheitsanforderungen an Kernkraftwerke' (Safety Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants), Az. RS I 5 - 13303/01 of the German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety. These RRC-A (or DEC-A) operating conditions require specific design provisions (implemented by manual or automatic action), known as RRC-A measures, intended to render consequences of accumulated failures admissible. In contrast, RRC-B constitute severe accidents that lead to core melt. Identification of RRC-A operating conditions and corresponding RRC-A measures is based on the use of results of probabilistic safety assessments. After the Fukushima accident the RRC-A accidents like Station Black Out (SBO) or Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS) are of particular interest in the safety assessment of nuclear new builds. In several chapters of the Safety Analysis Report it is demonstrated that the AREVA EPRTM design is resistant at RRC-A accident conditions. (orig.)

Fifty years of Erlangen radiochemistry

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Morell, W.

2007-01-01

On June 29, 2006, the Radiochemical Laboratory of AREVA NP GmbH (formerly Siemens AG) in Erlangen celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. The occasion was marked by an event attended by more than 1,000 guests, among them Werner Gebauhr, the 85-year-old founder and first head of the Laboratory; the Managing Directors of AREVA NP GmbH, Ralf Gueldner and Ruediger Steuerlein; representatives of universities, research institutions, power utilities, and public authorities. The present head of the Radiochemical Laboratory, Wilfred Morell, sketched the highlights of the work performed over the past fifty years, which ranged from solid-state and very-high-purity materials technologies to development and service activities for nuclear technology. Manfred Erve, head of the Technical Center of AREVA NP GmbH, of which the Radiochemical Laboratory is a part, emphasized the changes in priorities over the past fifty years, which had always been met successfully by Radiochemistry. In the scientific part of the event, Wolfgang Schwarz (E.ON Kernkraftwerk GmbH, KKW Isar), Ulf Ilg (EnBW Kraftwerk AG, KKW Philippsburg), and Hans-Josef Allelein (Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit mbH) explained 3 major subject areas in which Erlangen Radio-chemistry over many years has contributed basic findings (see other articles in this atw issue). On the occasion of the anniversary, a comprehensive booklet was published under the title of '50 Jahre Radiochemie Erlangen - 1956-2006'. (orig.)

Harmonisation of licensing processes for decommissioning. Options and limitations; Genehmigungsverfahren fuer die Stilllegung der deutschen Kernkraftwerke. Konvoi oder Kakophonie?

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Raetzke, Christian

2016-03-15

The shutdown of eight reactors in Germany in the wake of Fukushima 2011 and the scheduled phase-out of the remaining units in several steps ending 2022 has obviously triggered a wave of applications for decommissioning and dismantling licences. It would seem natural to strive for a harmonised handling of these processes, analogous to the 'convoi' concept which was successfully employed for licensing and construction of the three most recent German NPPs in the 1980s. However, a comparative analysis shows that the motivation of all players is much different from that of earlier times and that harmonisation of licensing processes for dismantling is not as crucial for operators, authorities and technical support organisations as it was for construction.

Dismantling the activated annular water tank of the Rheinsberg nuclear power plant; Zerlegung des aktivierten Ringwasserbehaelters des Kernkraftwerks Rheinsberg

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Klietz, Maik; Konitzer, Arnold; Luedeke, Michael [Anlagen- und Kraftwerksrohrleitungsbau GmbH, Greifswald (Germany)

2010-10-15

Acting on behalf of Energiewerke Nord GmbH Lubmin, Anlagen- und Kraftwerksrohrleitungsbau Greifswald GmbH (AKB) planned and built a station for disassembly of the activated annular water tank (RWB) of the decommissioned Rheinsberg nuclear power plant. As part of this demolition step, the annular water tank must be conditioned and disposed of as a component of the reactor facility. This required planning, manufacturing, testing and construction on site of suitable disassembly and handling techniques and the necessary plant and equipment. The client opted for disassembly by means of a diamond cable saw for conditioning the annular water tank into segments fit for shipping, and defined the basic components for the disassembly station in a specification of deliveries and services. The disassembly station serves to divide the annular water tank by means of diamond cable saws into 2 sections in such a way that segment pieces for transport are produced. The existing activation of the annular water tank also entailed the need to plan for the shortest possible time to be spent on handling near the annular water tank, providing radiological protection to the personnel, and performing the sawing steps from a separate operating console assisted by camera surveillance. After works acceptance tests at the manufacturer's, AKB, in October 2009 and February 2010, the disassembly station was delivered to the customer at Rheinsberg KKR free from defects in June 2010. (orig.)

Integrated emergency management in KKG

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Kluegel, J.U.; Plank, H.

2007-01-01

The development and introduction of emergency measures in Switzerland was mainly characterized by the evaluation of international experience and by systematic analysis of beyond-design basis accidents within the framework of plant-specific probabilistic safety analyses. As early as in the mid-eighties, the Swiss regulatory authority demanded that measures be taken against severe accidents, and periodically added more detailed requirements, most recently in 2000 when the introduction of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SMAG) was demanded for power operation as well as operation in the non-power mode. The SMAG were introduced at the Goesgen nuclear power station within a project in the period between 2003 and 2005. For this purpose, a concept of integrated emergency management was developed which is based on updates of the proven emergency manual. One important aspect of this integrative concept is the distinction between preventive and mitigating procedures by defining appropriate criteria. The findings made in the implementation phase of the project include the realization that the introduction of procedures dealing with severe accidents also requires the ability to develop new ways of thinking and acting in accident management. This implies the awareness that procedures covering severe accidents must be applied much more flexibly and in the light of the situation than regulations covering fault conditions. Also possibilities to simulate severe accidents were created within the project both for the development of procedures and for training plant operators and members of the emergency staff. (orig.)

Expert report of ENSI on the request of KKN AG for a general license - Project 'New nuclear power plant Niederamt'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-09-01

The 'Kernkraftwerk Niederamt AG' (KKN) Company submitted to the Swiss Federal Inspectorate of Nuclear Safety (ENSI) a request for a general license for a new power plant to be built near to the Goesgen power plant. According to the law, all damage risks with a probability higher than 10 -4 /a must be taken into account through protection measures. The considered risks concern the power plant itself as well as the population in the neighbourhood and the environment. The purpose of the general license is to demonstrate that the site chosen for the foreseen power plant is acceptable and that the risks can be counteracted through adequate measures. The buildings of the power plant and their partition over the two banks of the Aare River are briefly described. The reactor is a Light Water Reactor of third generation with a maximum thermal power of 5.8 GW th . The main cooling is provided by a hybrid system of water evaporation and air heating, what reduces the plume at the exit of the cooling tower. First, it is demonstrated that, in the case of a very unlikely severe accident in the power plant, the people in the neighbourhood can be evacuated quickly. Then, numerous types of possible accidents in the neighbourhood of the power plant are analyzed in order to settle their possible negative influence on the operation of the power plant: bursting of gas containers on the neighbouring roads and railways, fires of all types of hydrocarbons, air pollution through chloride gas, etc. The check by ENSI of the KKN studies on the potential danger for the power plant through neighbouring industrial plants, roads or railways demonstrated that none of the considered accidents presents an unacceptable risk for the power plant: on the one hand, these plants are located too far from the power plant, so that a sensible injury to the power plant safety can be excluded; on the other, the protection of the power plant can be guaranteed through appropriate technical measures. The power

Power engineering. Systems for energy conversion. Compact knowledge for study and profession. 4. upd. and enl. ed.; Energietechnik. Systeme zur Energieumwandlung. Kompaktwissen fuer Studium und Beruf

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Zahoransky, Richard A.

2009-07-01

This textbook imparts to the reader a fundamental understanding for relations of energy conversion processes. It comprises the total spectra of energy engineering, starting with fundamentals of energy process engineering via description of operating power plants (all types) to energy distribution and - storage. Main topics are sustainable energy systems from renewable energy sources. combined systems (e.g. Gas/steam turbine power plants) and plants with cogeneration (e.g. modular cogeneration plants). A new chapter Kyoto-Protocol was created as a concept of emissions-free coal-fired power plants. A new wording for deregulation of energy markets was received. Numerous texts and graphs were been revised. Chapter 18 ''Deregulation of Energy Markets'' is newly revised. Due to its didactic concepts the book directs not only to students but also everybody, who is inerested into actual questions of energy engineering. (org./GL) [German] Dieses Lehrbuch vermittelt dem Leser ein grundlegendes Verstaendnis fuer die Zusammenhaenge der Energieumwandlungsprozesse. Es umfasst die gesamte Bandbreite der Energietechnik. Die Schwerpunkte reichen von nachhaltigen, erneuerbaren Energietechniken, Kombianlagen (z.B. Gas- und Dampfturbinen-Kraftwerke) ueber Anlagen mit Kraft-Waerme-Kaelte-Kopplung bis hin zum Kyoto-Protokoll. Die 4. Auflage beinhaltet erstmals Uebungsaufgaben mit ausfuehrlichen Loesungen zu den einzelnen Kapiteln. Mehrere Kapitel sind aktualisiert. Das Kapitel 18 ''Liberalisierung der Energiemaerkte'' ist neu gefasst. Aus dem Inhalt Energietechnische Grundlagen - Dampfkraftwerke - Kernkraftwerke - Gasturbinen - Kombinationskraftwerke - Stationaere Kolbenmotoren - Brennstoffzellen - Kraft-Waerme-Kaelte-Kopplung - Wasserkraft - Solartechnik - Windenergie - Biomasse - Geothermie - Energetische Muellverwertung - Energieverteilung und -speicherung - Liberalisierung der Energiemaerkte - Kyoto-Protokoll. (orig.)

Core supervision methods and future improvements of the core master/presto system at KKB

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lundberg, S.; Wenisch, J.; Teeffelen, W.V.

2000-01-01

Kernkraftwerk Brunsbuettel (KKB) is a KWU 806 MW e BWR located at the lower river Elbe, in Germany. The reactor has been in operation since 1976 and is now operating in its 14. cycle. The core supervision at KKB is performed with the ABB CORE MASTER system. This system mainly contains the 3-D simulator PRESTO supplied by Studsvik Scandpower A/S. The core supervision is performed by periodic PRESTO 3-D evaluations of the reactor operation state. The power distribution calculated by PRESTO is adapted with the ABB UPDAT program using the on-line LPRM readings. The thermal margins are based on this adapted power distribution. Related to core supervision, the function of the PRESTO/UPDAT codes is presented. The UPDAT method is working well and is capable of reproducing the true core power distribution. The quality of the 3-D calculation is, however, an important ingredient of the quality of the adapted power distribution. The adaptation method as such is also important for this quality. The data quality of this system during steady state and off-rate states (reactor manoeuvres) are discussed by presenting comparisons between PRESTO and UPDAT thermal margin utilisation from Cycle 13. Recently analysed asymmetries in the UPDAT evaluated MCPR values are also presented and discussed. Improvements in the core supervision such as the introduction of advanced modern nodal methods (PRESTO-2) are presented and an alternative core supervision philosophy is discussed. An ongoing project with the goal to update the data and result presentation interface (GUI) is also presented. (authors)

Materials for the field test - students' attitudes to nuclear power stations. Materialien zum Unterrichtsversuch: Kernkraftwerke in der Einstellung von Jugendlichen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hoffmann, L; Kattmann, U; Lucht, H; Spada, H [Kiel Univ. (Germany, F.R.). Inst. fuer die Paedagogik der Naturwissenschaften (IPN)

1975-01-01

This working paper contains all the materials developed for and used in the field test of 'Student Attitudes toward Atomic Power Stations'. This research is a component of a larger project called 'Attitudes and Attitudes Change with Regard to Problems of Energy Supply and their Consequences for our Environment'. A central aim of this project is the development of instrumental strategies enabling the student to build up in this field a critically reflective and active behavior and attitudes based on sound problem consciousness. These instrumental strategies are derived from theories of social, learning and environmental psychology. A concrete result of these efforts are the materials of the field test mentioned above. They include: a) The draft of an instructional unit 'Atomic Power Stations - Prosperity or Disaster' with - a booklet on the subject matter for students and teachers - a paper on the contents of the instructional unit and their sequence - information for the students concerning the aims of the investigation - working materials for the students - reading materials for the teachers informing them about the proposed instructional strategies based on the psychological theories: (1) model-learning and the structuring of knowledge, (2) how to activate and motivate students, (3) the stabilization of attitudes and (4) small group work. b) Instruments for testing and observation. These instruments were used within a criterion-oriented evaluation and for a test of the effects of the different proposed items used in the instruction.

VGH Mannheim: legitimacy of the decommissioning license for a nuclear power plant; VGH Mannheim: Rechtmaessigkeit der Stilllegungsgenehmigung fuer ein Kernkraftwerk

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Anon.

2015-03-16

The contribution describes the details of the court (VGH) decision on the legitimacy of the decommissioning license for the NPP Obrigheim. Inhabitants of the neighborhood (3 to 4.5 km distance from the NPP) are suspect hazards for life, health and property due to the dismantling of the nuclear power plant in case of an accident during the licensed measures or a terroristic attack with radioactive matter release.

New multi-purpose lifting devices for the Grafenrheinfeld and Unterweser nuclear power plants; Neue Kombihebetraversen fuer die Kernkraftwerke Grafenrheinfeld und Unterweser

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Aiglsdorfer, Christoph [Siempelkamp Nukleartechnik GmbH, Linz (Austria)

2011-03-15

After the extremely successful use of the multi-purpose lifting device and the reactor pressure vessel sealing head for the Brokdorf nuclear power plant, supplied by Siempelkamp Nukleartechnik in 2008 and 2009, a further contract was received in early 2010. E.ON Kernkraft decided to also order a multi-purpose lifting device each for the power plants at Grafenrheinfeld and Unterweser from Siempelkamp. The important innovation of the Siempelkamp multi-purpose lifting device is that it is manufactured entirely from austenitic steel. This allows it to remain in its storage location on the retracted upper core grid (UCG) in the flooded reactor pool during the unloading of the fuel elements, while the fuel elements are being changed. The advantage here for the operator is that the fuel elements change is shortened even further, and this reduces costs. Saving time is also an important requirement for the RPV sealing head. For the Brokdorf nuclear power plant, Siempelkamp manufactured and supplied the RPV sealing head. A precondition of this order was a total realisation time of seven months and to save valuable time during the outage for the operating company. With a new sealing concept, a further innovation from Siempelkamp came to bear on this contract. It makes it possible to safely handle the RPV sealing head using the multi-purpose lifting device. (orig.)

The year 2000 problem as seen by manufacturers; Das Jahr-2000-Problem in deutschen Kernkraftwerken. Aus der Sicht der Hersteller

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Graf, A. [Siemens AG, Erlangen (Germany). Bereich KWU

1999-11-01

The Y2K problem has many facets due mainly to two reasons: The extremely wide use of microcomputers, and the complexity of automation in modern industrial plants. For the past two years, Siemens AG has been checking the Y2K conformity of its products. The result of these investigations is this: All automation equipment, almost without exception, is in conformity with the year 2000 requirements as it works without the date function causing the errors. A few occasional malfunctions were discovered in older computer-supported operating and monitoring stations and in process computer applications. However, malfunctions are not going to cause failures of the system but only make its use more difficult. (orig.) [German] Ursache des Jahr-2000-Problems ist die Unfaehigkeit gewisser aelterer Software, das Jahresdatum 2000 beim Uebergang der letzten beiden Ziffern von '99' auf '00' richtig zu verarbeiten. Potenziell betroffen sind alle Geraete und Systeme, die in irgendeiner Form Rechner oder Mikrorechner enthalten. Das Jahr-2000-Problem ist sehr vielschichtig. Dies resultiert im Wesentlichen aus zwei Gruenden: Der extrem weiten Verbreitung von Mikrorechnern und der Komplexitaet der Automatisierung moderner Industrieanlagen. Die Siemens AG ueberprueft seit zwei Jahren die 2000-Jahr-Konformitaet ihrer Produkte. Ergebnis der Untersuchungen ist: Automatisierungsgeraete sind fast ausnahmslos Jahr-2000 konform, da sie ohne die fehlerverursachenden Datumsfunktionen auskommen. Vereinzelte Fehlfunktionen wurden in aelteren rechnergestuetzten Bedien- und Beobachtungssystemen sowie in Prozessrechneranwendungen gefunden. Fehlfunktionen fuehren jedoch meist nicht zum Versagen des Systems, sondern erschweren nur dessen Nutzung. In den sicherheitsrelevanten Bereichen der Kernkraftwerke werden ausschliesslich die vom Jahr-2000-Problem nicht betroffenen Automatisierungsgeraete eingesetzt. (orig.)

Strategy for decommissioning of NPP's in Germany

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rittscher, D.; Sterner, H.

2003-01-01

According to German Atomic Law, two different strategies are possible, i.e. direct dismantling and safe enclosure before dismantling. Both approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. Taking into account the site and plant specific conditions the optimal strategy can be evaluated. Both approaches have been applied in Germany in the past. The German Atomic Law and the Radiation Protection Ordinance (June 2002) were adapted recently (July 2002). Additionally, the life operation time of the German NPP's was fixed in a new law (April 2002): Orderly Termination of the Commercial Production of Nuclear Electricity. These issues have made it necessary for the power utilities to review the strategies applied. As long as the final disposal in Germany is still an open issue, the construction of local Interim Stores is necessary to be able to dismantle a NPP. The basic strategies are not excluding each other and it seems clear today, that the optimal approach is a combination of these strategies, e.g. dismantling of all auxiliary systems and leaving activated parts for a longer SE period. Within this approach the advantages of both basic strategies have been integrated in one. The EWN GmbH has developed such integrated but still different approaches for the decommissioning projects of the Kernkraftwerke Greifswald (KGR) and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Versuchsreaktor (AVR) Juelich. It can be stated that the decommissioning of a NPP does not present technical issues of concern, but is more a project management issue, although surrounded by sometime intricate political and juridical boundary conditions. A major strategy change is to be expected only when final disposal capacities are available in the future. (authors)

Final disposal of radioactive wastes in Switzerland: concept and overview of Project Guarantee 1985

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Anon.

1985-01-01

The validity of the operational licences of the existing Swiss nuclear power plants (NPP) Beznau I and II, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt after 31st. December 1985 is, because of official requirements, dependent on the demonstration of permanent, safe management and final disposal of radioactive waste. For this purpose, the NPP companies have to prepare a so-called guarantee project and present this to the Bundesrat for review. The appropriate investigations and research have been carried out by Nagra (National Cooperative for the Storage of Radioactive Waste). The 1985 Project Gewaehr (Guarantee) is described in an eight volume report NGB 85-01 to 85-08 and individual research projects are reported on in separate NTB-series reference reports. The present volume NGB 85-01 takes the form of a self-contained project overview in which the concepts for nuclear waste management are described, the contents of the remaining volumes NGB 85-02 to 85-08 are summarized and Project conclusions are drawn from Project Gewaehr 1985. Project Gewaehr 1985 covers two repository types: Type C repository for high-level and certain alpha-containing intermediate-level waste, and Type B repository for all remaining intermediate- and low-level waste. The Project shows in detail that technical feasibility of final disposal can be assumed given presently available methods, that the technical safety barriers show a high level of efficiency and that suitable geological options are available to ensure long-term safety in Switzerland as the concept is defined by official requirements. The Project safety analyses show that the chosen disposal concepts assure the protection of mankind and the environment under all realistically anticipated conditions

The Swiss nuclear installations annual report 1992

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1993-06-01

This report concerns the safety of the Swiss nuclear installations in the period of 1992. Surveillance of these installations with regard to nuclear safety, including radiation protection, is among the tasks of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK). In Switzerland five nuclear power plants are operational: Beznau I and II, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt. Research reactors of thermal capacities below 10 MWth are operational at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne and at the University of Basle. Further subject to HSK's supervision are all activities at PSI involving nuclear fuel or ionizing radiation, the shut down experimental reactor of Lucens, the exploration in Switzerland of final disposal facilities for radwaste and the interim radwaste storage facilities. The present report first deals with the nuclear power plants and covers, in individual sections, the aspects of installation safety, radiation protection as well as personnel and organization, and the resulting overall impression from the point of view of HSK (chapters 1-4). In chapter 5, the corresponding information is given for the research installations. Chapter 6 on radwaste disposal is dedicated to the waste treatment, waste from reprocessing, interim storage and exploration by the NAGRA. In chapter 7, the status of emergency planning in the nuclear power plants' vicinity is reported. Certificates issued for the transport of radioactive materials are dealt with in chapter 8. Finally chapter 9 goes into some general questions relating to the safety of nuclear installations, and in particular covers important events in nuclear installations abroad. In all, the operation of the Swiss nuclear installations in the period of 1992 is rated safe by HSK. (author) 7 figs., 13 tabs

TomoWELD. Precise detection of weld defects; TomoWELD. Defekte in Schweissnaehten praezise erkennen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Walter, David [Bundesanstalt fuer Materialforschung und -pruefung (BAM), Berlin (Germany)

2016-06-15

Nuclear power plants are complex and technically elaborate systems whose aim is to produce electricity. They must meet the highest safety requirements. Within the reactors, nuclear reactions and radioactive transformations release energy which is used to evaporate water. The steam generated drives turbines that in turn are coupled with generators which convert the kinetic energy provided by the turbines into electrical energy. The process is easy to illustrate but difficult to control and requires technical equipment such as kilometre-long pipe systems. Austenitic steel is frequently used for this purpose because of its high strength and corrosion resistance. The individual pipe components are joined by welding. However, welds may contain hidden defects. Cracks, lack of fusion or pore nests that can remain undetected may have catastrophic consequences. Therefore, all welds in a nuclear power plant, without exception, must be checked. Approved non-destructive methods use ultrasound and X-ray. The technology developed at BAM is called TomoWELD. [German] Kernkraftwerke sind komplexe und technisch aufwendige Anlagen zur Gewinnung von Elektrizitaet. Sie muessen allerhoechsten Sicherheitsanspruechen genuegen. Die bei Kernreaktionen und radioaktiven Umwandlungen freiwerdende Energie wird genutzt, um Wasser zu verdampfen. Der Dampf treibt Turbinen an und die wiederum sind mit Generatoren gekoppelt, welche die durch die Turbinen bereitgestellte kinetische Energie in elektrische Energie umwandeln. Der Prozess laesst sich einfach darstellen, ihn zu steuern ist allerdings kompliziert und erfordert weitere technische Komponenten, wie beispielsweise kilometerlange Rohrleitungssysteme. Wegen seiner hohen Festigkeit sowie Korrosionsbestaendigkeit wird oft austenitischer Stahl dafuer verwendet. Gefuegt werden die einzelnen Rohrteile durch Schweissen. Doch Schweissnaehte koennen viele verborgene Defekte enthalten. Bleiben Risse, Bindefehler oder Porennester unentdeckt, kann das

The term 'danger' according to the act on protection against nuisances - assessment of incidents on account of external effects

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Rehbinder, E.

1976-01-01

The author deliberates critically on the opinion taken up in the judgments of the Higher Administrative Court at Lueneburg dated February 25th, 1975 and June 27th, 1975 in the case of Dow Chemical, according to which the facilities subject to a licence under the Federal act on protection against nuisances have to be erected in such a way that dangers for the general public and the neighbourhood (in this case danger through gas cloud explosions from a chlorine plant of the Kernkraftwerk Stade) are excluded. If this view, hitherto only expressed by the OVG Lueneburg in summary proceedings according to section 80 paragraph 5 VwGO, gains acceptance, then, in the opinion of the author, the open air construction of the big chemical industry's plants would be illegal to a large extent. While defining the term of danger in police law, Rehbinder applies the term of probability and proportionateness to the term of danger in section 3 BImSchG. On the other hand, the term of danger would have to be taken in a wider sense in section 1 No. 2 and section 7 sub-section No. 2 and 4 Atomic Energy Act, because of the danger potential being here bigger in the long run. In a final conclusion with a view to politics and law, the author states, amongst other things, the following: an exaggerated safety philosophy hides the danger of a political discrediting of the whole environment protection idea, a danger which ought to weigh in the end more heavily than the minute remaining risk for the life and the health of people if a facility which has to have a licence is not protected against absolutely unlikely external incidents. (orig./HP) [de

Summary of operating experience in Swiss nuclear power plants 1993

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

1994-07-01

In 1993 the Swiss nuclear power plants produced their third highest combined annual output. The contribution to the total electricity generation in the country was close to 37%. Replacement of the steam generators in Beznau Unit 1 resulted in a longer than usual annual outage. For the other four units the availability figures were close to, or exceeded, those of previous years. The energy utilization was, however, lowered due to load reduction in autumn resulting from unusually high production by the hydro-electric power plants. The steam generator replacement at Beznau enabled an increase in electrical power of about 2% without increase in reactor power. With the approval of the Swiss government in December 1992, the output of the Muehleberg power plant was increased in two stages by a total of 10%. The application for an unlimited operating license for Beznau Unit 2, and for a power uprate at the Leibstadt power plant, are still pending. The average number of scrams at the Swiss plants remained stable, at less than one scram per reactor year. As a result of experience in the Swedish nuclear power plant at Barsebaeck, the suction strainers of the emergency core cooling systems of the boiling water reactors at Muehleberg and Leibstadt were replaced by strainers with larger surface areas. The re-inspection of crack indications previously detected in the core shroud of the Muehleberg reactor and the penetration tubes in the reactor pressure vessel closure head of Beznau revealed no growth during the intervening operating periods. Following the completion of installation activities during the annual outages at Beznau Unit 1, Goesgen and Leibstadt, all Swiss nuclear power plants are now equipped with filtered containment venting systems. (author) figs., tabs

ZZ SIESTA, Atmospheric Dispersion Experiment over Complex Terrain

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-01-01

1 - Name of experiment: SIESTA. 2 - Computer for which program is designed and other machine version packages available: To request or retrieve programs click on the one of the active versions below. A password and special authorization is required. Explanation of the status codes. Program-name: ZZ-SIESTA; Package-ID Status: NEA-1617/01 Tested; Machines used: Package-ID: NEA-1617/01; Orig. Computer: DEC VAX 6000; Test Computer: DEC VAX 6000. 3 - Purpose and phenomena tested: The aim of the project was to obtain knowledge of the general nature of the turbulence, advection and atmospheric dispersion in the two flow regimes parallel to the Swiss Jura ridge, which represent the most frequent wind systems occurring on the Swiss Plain. 4 - Description of the experimental set-up used: The atmospheric dispersion process was investigated by carrying out SF 6 tracer experiments. The tracer was released about 6 m above ground level near the Goesgen meteo tower. Sampling units were placed on ellipses around the release point. Total sampling time was at least one hour. Tracer concentrations were determined after each experiment by Gas chromatography. 5 - Special features: Because of the uncertainty in the transport direction of the tracer plume, a mobile tracer analyzing system was used. 6 - Description of experiment and analysis: To investigate the flow field in the test region, the following measuring setups were used: (1) Three tethered balloon sounding systems to measure temperature, humidity, wind speed and direction; (2) a meteo tower to measure 10-minute averages of wind direction and velocity at two fixed heights; (3) sonic anemometers to measure heat flux, friction velocity, Monin-Obukhov length, and wind speed at the release point and at a certain distance; (4) 2-m masts to measure wind speed and direction continuously. The wind flow system was measured by radar-tracked tetroons

Nuclear power plants in Germany. Recent developments in off-site nuclear emergency preparedness and response; Kernkraftwerke in Deutschland. Neue Entwicklungen im anlagenexternen Notfallschutz

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Gering, Florian [Bundesamt fuer Strahlenschutz, Oberschleissheim/Neuherberg (Germany). Abt. SW 2.2 Entscheidungshilfesysteme, Lageermittlung und Kommunikation

2014-10-15

The reactor accident in Fukushima, Japan, in 2011 triggered a thorough review of the off-site emergency preparedness and response for nuclear power plants in Germany. ''Off-site emergency preparedness and response'' includes all actions to protect the public outside the fence of a nuclear power plant. This review resulted in several changes in off-site emergency preparedness and response, which are briefly described in this article. Additionally, several recent activities are described which may influence emergency preparedness and response in the future.

Implementation of a radiological emergency monitoring system for Bruce Power nuclear power plant (Canada); Implementierung eines radiologischen Umgebungsueberwachungsmesssystems fuer das Kernkraftwerk Bruce Power (Kanada)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Madaric, M. [Saphymo GmbH, Frankfurt (Germany)

2016-07-01

The Bruce Power nuclear power plant (BP NPP) in Ontario, Canada, is the largest nuclear generating station in the world, operating 8 nuclear reactors producing 6300 MW. In correlation with Bruce Power's safety culture, ''Safety first'' and continuous improvements are essential and substantial parts of the Bruce Power philosophy and management system. After the Fukushima nuclear accident the existing radiological emergency monitoring was analyzed and improved.

Successful implementation of ageing management exemplified at the cooling tower of Emsland nuclear power plant; Erfolgreiche Umsetzung von Alterungsmanagement am Beispiel Kuehlturm des Kernkraftwerkes Emsland

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fischer, Alexander [Hochtief Solutions AG, Consult IKS Energy, Frankfurt am Main (Germany). Design Kraftwerke; Dueweling, Carsten [Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems GmbH, Lingen (Germany). Abschnitt Bautechnik

2013-07-15

The present paper describes the successful implementation of the restoration of water-distribution channels at the cooling tower of the Emsland nuclear power plant under the aspect of ageing management. The main challenge of aging management is the determination of potential aging mechanism and to avoid systematically and effectively their damaging influences. In the course of the annual site inspections abnormalities at the lower side of the water-distribution channels of the cooling tower were detected, analysed, and repaired. The extraordinary high chlorine equivalent of the cooling water was identified as main reason of the damages located. Due to extensive infiltration into the concrete structure, chloride-induced corrosion generates a volume expansion of the reinforcement and thereby to a blast off of the concrete covering. According to the restoration concept, the damaged concrete was removed by maximum pressure water jet blasting; where necessary the reinforcement was retrofitted and a layered concrete substitution was applied by synthetic cement mortar. The realised procedures conserve the load bearing reinforcement only for a certain period, because the permanent chloride infiltration could not be stopped. Therefore, the structure has to be monitored permanently. (orig.)

Methods and data of probabilistic safety analysis for nuclear power plants. Status May 2015; Methoden und Daten zur probabilistischen Sicherheitsanalyse fuer Kernkraftwerke. Stand: Mai 2015

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2016-09-15

The supplement for the methodology of probabilistic safety analyses includes modifications, extensions and actualizations based on recent experiences. The chapter on personnel actions has been reorganized and adapted to the status of science and technology. Especially the possibility of decision fault identification and evaluation has been included. The chapters on floods and earthquakes are revised with respect to the actual regulatory developments and the new safety requirements. An extension of the spectra of PSA methods and data for the non-power operation has not been revised with respect to the Fukushima experiences. Based on fire experiences during power operation a new section on fire during non-power operation was included.

Consequences of changed nuclear power plant lifetimes in Germany. Scenario analyses until 2035; Auswirkungen veraenderter Laufzeiten fuer Kernkraftwerke in Deutschland. Szenarioanalysen bis zum Jahre 2035

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Blesl, Markus; Bruchof, David; Fahl, Ulrich; Kober, Tom; Kuder, Ralf; Beestermoeller, Robert; Goetz, Birgit; Voss, Alfred

2011-06-01

The report is aimed to discuss the implications of changed NPP lifetimes in Germany on energy policy, environment, energy cost and macroeconomics. An extensive scenario analysis is used considering the effects on the German energy system in the frame of the European context. It is shown that a nuclear phase-out until 2017 is technically feasible, but needs adequate replacement options that will change the German energy system in the medium term. The study shows that the time of nuclear phase-out has no significant influence on the use of renewable energies.

Aspects of reactor dismantling planning following the safe entombment in the NPP Lingen (KWL); Aspekte der Abbauplanung nach dem Sicheren Einschluss im Kernkraftwerk Lingen (KWL)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Priesmeyer, U.; Rojahn, T.; Fries, B. [Kernkraftwerk Lingen GmbH (Germany)

2009-07-01

The NPP Lingen (KWL) was shut-down in 1977. Due to the fact that no final repository was available the safe entombment for 25 years was chosen following the decommissioning. The conventional plant components were dismantled and removed from the plant site. The licensing procedure for reactor dismantling with final disposal in Schacht Konrad has been started. The beginning of dismantling operation is scheduled for 2013. The authors describe the preparatory work, the boundary conditions for the dismantling, radiation protection considerations with respect to manual demolition work after the rather long decay time.

Transparency and efficiency through plant operations management systems; Transparenz und Effizienz durch Betriebsfuehrungssysteme

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Ladage, L. [RWE Power AG, Essen (Germany). Informationsmanagement

2001-04-01

Plant operations management systems, being IT application systems, provide integral support of the business processes making up plant operations management. The use of plant operations management systems improves mutually interdependent factors, such as high economic performance, high availability, and maximum safety. Since its commissioning in 1988, the Emsland nuclear power station (KKE) has been run with the IBFS plant operations management system. The work flow management system (WfMS), a module of IBFS, is described as an example of job order processing. IBFS-WfMS is to optimize all processes, thus cutting costs and ensuring that processes are run and documented reliably. Assessing the savings effect achieved through the use of IBFS-WfMS clearly reveals the savings in work/time achieved by the system. These savings are quoted as approx. 4 minutes and DM 10, respectively, per working step, which corresponds to several dozens of manyears or several million DM per annum in the KKE plant under consideration. This result can be extrapolated to other plants. (orig.) [German] Betriebsfuehrungssysteme stuetzen als EDV-Anwendungssystem integral die Geschaeftsprozesse der Kraftwerksbetriebsfuehrung. Durch den Einsatz von Betriebsfuehrungssystemen werden die in gegenseitiger Abhaengigkeit befindlichen Faktoren hohe Wirtschaftlichkeit, hohe Verfuegbarkeit und groesstmoegliche Sicherheit im Verbund gefoerdert. Im Kernkraftwerk Emsland (KKE) wird seit Inbetriebnahme der Anlage im Jahr 1988 das Betriebsfuehrungssystem IBFS eingesetzt. Am Beispiel des Workflowmanagementsystems (WfMS), einem Modul des IBFS, wird die Abwicklung von Arbeitsauftraegen dargestellt. Das IBFS-WfMS soll dabei durch Optimierung aller Prozesse sowohl kostensenkend wirken als auch sicherstellen, dass die Prozesse verlaesslich abgewickelt und dokumentiert werden. Eine Abschaetzung des Einspareffektes des IBFS-WfMS zeigt deutlich die durch das System erzielten Ersparnisse an Arbeits-/Zeitaufwand auf

Analysis of effects of pellet-cladding bonding on trapping of the released fission gases in high burnup KKL BWR fuels

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Brankov, Vladimir [Laboratory for Reactor Physics and Systems Behaviour at the Paul Scherrer Institute, 5232 Villigen-PSI (Switzerland); Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL), Route Cantonale, 1015 Lausanne (Switzerland); Khvostov, Grigori; Mikityuk, Konstantin [Laboratory for Reactor Physics and Systems Behaviour at the Paul Scherrer Institute, 5232 Villigen-PSI (Switzerland); Pautz, Andreas [Laboratory for Reactor Physics and Systems Behaviour at the Paul Scherrer Institute, 5232 Villigen-PSI (Switzerland); Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL), Route Cantonale, 1015 Lausanne (Switzerland); Restani, Renato; Abolhassani, Sousan [Laboratory for Nuclear Materials at the Paul Scherrer Institute, 5232 Villigen-PSI (Switzerland); Ledergerber, Guido [Kernkraftwerk Leibstadt, 5325 Leibstadt (Switzerland); Wiesenack, Wolfgang [Institutt for Energiteknikk - OECD Halden Reactor Project, Os Allé 5, 1777 Halden (Norway)

2016-08-15

Highlights: • Explanation for the scatter in measured fission gas release in high-BU BWR fuel rods. • Partial fuel-clad bond layer formation in high-BU BWR fuel. • Hypothesis for fission gas trapping facilitated by the pellet-cladding bond layer. • Correlation between burnup asymmetry and the quantity of trapped fission gas. • Implications of the trapped FG in LOCA transient. - Abstract: The first part of the paper presents results of a numerical analysis of the fuel behavior during base irradiation in the Kernkraftwerk Leibstadt Boiling Water Reactor (KKL BWR) using EPRI’s FALCON code coupled to GRSW-A – an advanced model for fuel swelling and fission gas release. Post-irradiation examinations conducted at the Paul Scherrer Institute’s (PSI) hot laboratory gave evidence of a distinct circumferential non-uniformity of local burnup at pellet surfaces. For several fuel samples, intact pellet-cladding bonding areas on the high burnup sides of the pellets at high burnup above ∼70 MWd/kgU were observed. It is hypothesized that a part of the fission gases, which are expected to be released by those areas, can be trapped and do not reach the rod plenum. In this paper, a simple approach to modeling of fission gas trapping is employed which reveals a potential correlation between the position of the rod within the fuel assembly (and therefore the degree of circumferential burnup non-uniformity) and the degree of fission gas trapping. A model is suggested to correlate the amount of locally trapped gas with the integral of the local contact pressure and the degree of circumferential burnup non-uniformity. The model is calibrated with available measurements of FGR from rod puncturing at the level of the plenums. In future work, the hypothesis about the axial distribution of trapped fission gas will be extrapolated to the Loss-Of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis as an attempt to explain the fission gas release observed in some samples fabricated from

Practical decommissioning experience with nuclear installations in the European Community

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Skupinski, E.

1993-01-01

Initiated by the Commission of the European Communities (CEC), this seminar was jointly organized by Kernkraftwerke RWE Bayernwerk GmbH (KRB) and the CEC at Gundremmingen-Guenzburg (D), where the former KRB-A BWR is presently being dismantled. The meeting aimed at gathering a limited number of European experts for the presentation and discussion of operations, the results and conclusions on techniques and procedures presently applied in the dismantling of large-scale nuclear installations in the European Community. Besides the four pilot dismantling projects of the presently running third R and D programme (1989-93) of the European Community on decommissioning of nuclear installations (WAGR, BR-3 PWR, KRB-A BWR and AT-1 FBR fuel reprocessing), the organizers selected the presentation of topics on the following facilities which have a significant scale and/or representative features and are presently being dismantled: the Magnox reprocessing pilot plant at Sellafield, the HWGCR EL4 at Monts d'Arree, the operation of an on-site melting furnace for G2/G3 GCR dismantling waste at Marcoule, an EdF confinement conception of shut-down LWRs for deferred dismantling, and the technical aspects of the Greifswald WWER type NPPs decommissioning. This was completed by a presentation on the decommissioning of material testing reactors in the United Kingdom and by an overview on the conception and implementation of two EC databases on tools, costs and job doses. The seminar concluded with a guided visit of the KRB-A dismantling site. This meeting was attended by managers concerned by the decommissioning of nuclear installations within the European Community, either by practical dismantling work or by decision-making functions. Thereby, the organizers expect to have contributed to the achievement of decommissioning tasks under optimal conditions - with respect to safety and economics - by making available a complete and updated insight into on-going dismantling projects and by

Successful implementation of ageing management exemplified at the cooling tower of the Emsland nuclear power plant; Erfolgreiche Umsetzung von Alterungsmanagement am Beispiel Kuehlturm des Kernkraftwerks Emsland

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fischer, Alexander [Hochtief Solutions AG, Consult IKS Energy, Frankfurt am Main (Germany). Design Kraftwerke; Dueweling, Carsten [Kernkraftwerke Lippe-Ems GmbH, Lingen (Germany). Abschnitt Bautechnik

2013-09-01

The paper describes the successful implementation of the restoration of water distribution channels at the cooling tower of the Emsland nuclear power plant under the aspect of ageing management. The main challenge of ageing management is the determination of potential ageing mechanism and to avoid systematically and effectively their damaging influences. In the course of the annual site inspections, abnormalities at the lower side of the water-distribution channels of the cooling tower were detected, analysed, and repaired. The procedures conserve the load bearing reinforcement only for a certain period. Therefore permanent structural monitoring is needed. (orig.)

Ultrasonic findings in the NPP Beznau. Report on the planned further procedure of the licensee; Ultraschallbefunde des Kernkraftwerks Beznau. Stellungnahme zum geplanten weiteren Vorgehen des Betreibers

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Mohr, Simone; Pistner, Christoph

2016-03-15

Due to the ultrasonic findings in the reactor pressure vessel of NPP Beznau-1 in 2015 the licensee had to provide a new structural integrity analysis based on the changed material properties. The authors discuss the interpretation of the findings in Beznau with in relation to similar findings in the Belgian NPPS Doel-3 and Tihange-2. A doubtless metallurgical characterization of the irregularities in the RPV wall as not possible based on ultrasonic testing only. Destructive testing of samples from the reactor pressure vessel is also not possible since no original material bearing irregularities is available.

Status report on the use of nuclear energy in the Federal Republic of Germany 2016; Statusbericht zur Kernenergienutzung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2016

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bredberg, Ines; Hutter, Johann; Kuehn, Kerstin; Niedzwiedz, Katarzyna; Philippczyk, Frank [Bundesamt fuer kerntechnische Entsorgungssicherheit (BFE), Salzgitter (Germany); Thoemmes, Achim [Bundesamt fuer Strahlenschutz, Salzgitter (Germany)

2017-08-15

. Information is provided on the purpose and capacity of nuclear fuel supply and disposal facilities. The approval history and the current operating and approval status are also displayed. In the field of final disposal, the new legal structures, supervision and ongoing projects are described. The information is summarized at the end of the report in tabular form. The report is issued annually in updated form. [German] Am 30.07.2016 ist das ''Gesetz zur Neuordnung der Organisationsstruktur im Bereich der Endlagerung'' in Kraft getreten. Es sieht vor, die staatlichen Aufgaben der Genehmigung und Aufsicht im Bereich der Kerntechnik, der Zwischenlagerung, der Standortauswahl und der Endlagerueberwachung mehrheitlich in einer neuen Behoerde zu buendeln, dem Bundesamt fuer kerntechnische Entsorgungssicherheit (BfE). Mit Inkrafttreten des Gesetzes wurden die entsprechenden Fachaufgaben des Bundesamtes fuer Strahlenschutz (BfS) auf das BfE uebertragen. Die Aufgabe zur Erstellung des jaehrlichen Statusberichtes zur Kernenergienutzung ist nunmehr Aufgabe des BfE. Fuer die operativen Aufgaben der Standortsuche, der Errichtung und des Betriebs der Endlager sowie der Schachtanlage Asse II und des Bergwerks Gorleben wird eine staatseigene Gesellschaft, die Bundesgesellschaft fuer Endlagerung (BGE), die Verantwortung uebernehmen. Der vorliegende Bericht mit dem Stand 31.12.2016 gibt einen Ueberblick ueber die Nutzung der Kernenergie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Im Bericht aufgefuehrt sind die wesentlichen Daten aller Kernkraftwerke, Forschungsreaktoren und der Anlagen der Kernbrennstoffver- und -entsorgung. Zum Berichtszeitpunkt 31.12.2016 waren acht Kernkraftwerksbloecke in Betrieb. Die Stromerzeugung durch Kernenergie im Jahr 2016 betrug insgesamt ca. 84,6 TWh (2015: 91,8 TWh). Der Anteil der Kernenergie an der Gesamt-Brutto-Stromerzeugung betrug 13,0 % (2015: 14,2 %). Fuer die Kernkraftwerke enthaelt der Bericht in zusammengefasster Form die wesentlichen

Corrosion product deposition on fuel element surfaces of a boiling water reactor

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Orlov, A.

2011-01-01

Over the last decade the problem of corrosion products deposition on light water reactor fuel elements has been extensively investigated in relation to the possibility of failures caused by them. The goal of the present study is to understand in a quantitative way the formation of such kind of deposits and to analytically understand the mechanism of formation and deposition with help of the quasi-steady state concentrations of a number of 3d metals in reactor water. Recent investigations on the complex corrosion product deposits on a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) fuel cladding have shown that the observed layer locally presents unexpected magnetic properties. The buildup of magnetic corrosion product deposits (crud) on the fuel cladding of the BWR, Kernkraftwerk Leibstadt (KKL) Switzerland has hampered the Eddy-current based measurements of ZrO 2 layer thickness. The magnetic behavior of this layer and its axial variation on BWR fuel cladding is of interest with respect to non-destructive cladding characterization. Consequently, a cladding from a BWR was cut at elevations of 810 mm, where the layer was observed to be magnetic, and of 1810 mm where it was less magnetic. The samples were subsequently analyzed using electron probe microanalysis (EPMA), magnetic analysis and X-ray techniques (μXRF, μXRD and μXAFS). Both EPMA and μXRF have shown that the observed corrosion deposit layer which is situated on the Zircaloy corrosion layer consists mostly of 3-d elements’ oxides (Fe, Zn, Ni and Mn). The distribution of these elements within the investigated layer is rather complex and not homogeneous. The main components identified by 2D μXRD mapping inside the layer were hematite and spinel phases with the common formula (M x Fe y )[M (1-x) Fe (2-y) ]O 4 , where M = Zn, Ni, Mn. With μXRD it was clearly shown that the cell parameter of analyzed spinel is different from the one of the pure endmembers (ZnFe 2 O 4 , NiFe 2 O 4 and MnFe 2 O 4 ) proving the existence of

Regulatory oversight report 2010 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-06-01

Acting as the regulatory body of the Swiss Confederation, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, ENSI, assesses and monitors nuclear facilities in Switzerland. This includes the five nuclear power plants (NPPs), the plant-based interim storage facilities, the Central Interim Storage Facility (ZWILAG) at Wuerenlingen, the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), the two universities of Basel and Lausanne, the transport of radioactive materials from and to nuclear facilities and the preparation for a deep geologic repository for radioactive waste. Using inspections, surveillance meetings, reviews and analyses as well as reports from plant licensees, ENSI obtains the required overview of the safety of the nuclear facilities. It maintains its own emergency organisation, which is an integral part of the national emergency structure. The legislative framework at the basis of the activity of ENSI specifies the criteria by which it evaluates the activities and plans of the operators of nuclear facilities. ENSI provides the public with information on particular events and observations relating to nuclear facilities. The five nuclear power plants in Switzerland (Beznau Units 1 und 2, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt) were all operated safely in 2010. Last year, there were 39 notifiable events in Switzerland: 4 events affected both Beznau Units, 10 events the Goesgen NPP, 6 the Leibstadt NPP and 13 the Muehleberg NPP and 6 in other facilities. Based on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) of 0-7, ENSI rated 38 events as Level 0, and as INES Level 2 the event on 31 August 2010 during maintenance work at the Leibstadt NPP, where a diver was exposed to radiation in excess of the maximum annual exposure rate of 20 mSv. The ZWILAG at Wuerenlingen consists of several interim storage halls, a conditioning plant and the plasma plant (incineration/melting plant). At the end of 2010, the cask storage hall contained 34 transport/storage casks with spent

Regulatory oversight report 2011 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-06-01

The Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI, acting as the regulatory body of the Swiss Confederation, assesses and monitors nuclear facilities in Switzerland. These include five nuclear power plants, the interim storage facilities based at each plant, the Central Interim Storage Facility (ZWILAG) at Wuerenlingen together with the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) and the two universities of Basel and Lausanne. ENSI ensures that the facilities comply with regulations and operate according to the law. Its regulatory responsibilities also include the transport of radioactive materials to and from nuclear facilities and the preparations for a deep geologic repository for nuclear waste. It maintains its own emergency organisation, which is an integral part of a national emergency structure. Building on the legislative framework, ENSI also formulates and updates its own guidelines. It provides the public with information on particular events and findings in nuclear facilities. In 2011, all five nuclear power reactors in Switzerland (Beznau Units 1 and 2, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt) were operated safely and ENSI concluded that they had complied with their approved operating conditions. There were 27 reportable events in the nuclear power plants in Switzerland: 7 at Beznau, 5 at Goesgen, 11 at Leibstadt und 4 at Muehleberg. On the international INES scale of 0 to 7, ENSI rated 26 events as Level 0. One event, at the Muehleberg nuclear power plant, was rated as INES Level 1. This related to a potential blockage of the emergency water intake system in the event of extreme flooding. The operator BKW shut down the Muehleberg plant ahead of the scheduled maintenance date and upgraded the system. ZWILAG consists of several interim storage halls, a conditioning plant and a plasma plant (incineration/melting plant). At the end of 2011, the cask storage hall contained 34 transport/storage casks with fuel assemblies and vitrified residue packages

Regulatory oversight report 2010 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations; Aufsichtsbericht 2010 zur nuklearen Sicherheit in den schweizerischen Kernanlagen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2011-06-15

Acting as the regulatory body of the Swiss Confederation, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, ENSI, assesses and monitors nuclear facilities in Switzerland. This includes the five nuclear power plants (NPPs), the plant-based interim storage facilities, the Central Interim Storage Facility (ZWILAG) at Wuerenlingen, the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), the two universities of Basel and Lausanne, the transport of radioactive materials from and to nuclear facilities and the preparation for a deep geologic repository for radioactive waste. Using inspections, surveillance meetings, reviews and analyses as well as reports from plant licensees, ENSI obtains the required overview of the safety of the nuclear facilities. It maintains its own emergency organisation, which is an integral part of the national emergency structure. The legislative framework at the basis of the activity of ENSI specifies the criteria by which it evaluates the activities and plans of the operators of nuclear facilities. ENSI provides the public with information on particular events and observations relating to nuclear facilities. The five nuclear power plants in Switzerland (Beznau Units 1 und 2, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt) were all operated safely in 2010. Last year, there were 39 notifiable events in Switzerland: 4 events affected both Beznau Units, 10 events the Goesgen NPP, 6 the Leibstadt NPP and 13 the Muehleberg NPP and 6 in other facilities. Based on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) of 0-7, ENSI rated 38 events as Level 0, and as INES Level 2 the event on 31 August 2010 during maintenance work at the Leibstadt NPP, where a diver was exposed to radiation in excess of the maximum annual exposure rate of 20 mSv. The ZWILAG at Wuerenlingen consists of several interim storage halls, a conditioning plant and the plasma plant (incineration/melting plant). At the end of 2010, the cask storage hall contained 34 transport/storage casks with spent

Regulatory oversight report 2011 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations; Aufsichtsbericht 2011 zur nuklearen Sicherheit in den schweizerischen Kernanlagen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2012-06-15

The Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate ENSI, acting as the regulatory body of the Swiss Confederation, assesses and monitors nuclear facilities in Switzerland. These include five nuclear power plants, the interim storage facilities based at each plant, the Central Interim Storage Facility (ZWILAG) at Wuerenlingen together with the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) and the two universities of Basel and Lausanne. ENSI ensures that the facilities comply with regulations and operate according to the law. Its regulatory responsibilities also include the transport of radioactive materials to and from nuclear facilities and the preparations for a deep geologic repository for nuclear waste. It maintains its own emergency organisation, which is an integral part of a national emergency structure. Building on the legislative framework, ENSI also formulates and updates its own guidelines. It provides the public with information on particular events and findings in nuclear facilities. In 2011, all five nuclear power reactors in Switzerland (Beznau Units 1 and 2, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt) were operated safely and ENSI concluded that they had complied with their approved operating conditions. There were 27 reportable events in the nuclear power plants in Switzerland: 7 at Beznau, 5 at Goesgen, 11 at Leibstadt und 4 at Muehleberg. On the international INES scale of 0 to 7, ENSI rated 26 events as Level 0. One event, at the Muehleberg nuclear power plant, was rated as INES Level 1. This related to a potential blockage of the emergency water intake system in the event of extreme flooding. The operator BKW shut down the Muehleberg plant ahead of the scheduled maintenance date and upgraded the system. ZWILAG consists of several interim storage halls, a conditioning plant and a plasma plant (incineration/melting plant). At the end of 2011, the cask storage hall contained 34 transport/storage casks with fuel assemblies and vitrified residue packages

Breeder development and breeder strategies worldwide; Brueterentwicklung und Brueterstrategien weltweit

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Marth, W. [Stabsabteilung Finanzen/Controlling, Bereich Stillegung Nuklearer Anlagen, Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH (Germany)

1997-05-01

indische Versuchsbrueter FBTR ist in der Inbetriebnahmephase von mancherlei technischen Problemen geplagt. Der amerikanische Schnelle Reaktor FFT wird seit Jahren im heissen, aber nichtnuklearen Zustand gehalten, da sich die Politiker ueber seine Bestimmung nicht einigen koennen. Das Schicksal des deutschen Brueterprototyps SNR-300 ist bekannt: Dem Kernkraftwerk Kalkar wurde sechs Jahre lang die Betriebsgenehmigung versagt. Nach seiner politisch erzwungenen Stillegung im Jahre 1991 wurde es teilweise demontiert und in einen Freizeitpark umgewandelt. (orig.)

Piercing of corporate veil of nuclear companies; Durchgriffshaftung der Atomkonzerne

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Frenz, Walter [RWTH Aachen Univ. (Germany). Lehr- und Forschungsgebiet Berg-, Umwelt- und Europarecht

2015-11-15

Belreibergesellschaften im Fall der Beendigung der Beherrschungs- und Ergebnisabfuehrungsvertraege fuer die Nuklearverbindlichkeiten nur sehr eingeschraenkt, und zwar in zweifacher Hinsicht: Der Anspruch ist lediglich auf Sicherungsleistung gerichtet und nicht auf Kostenuebernahme und zudem entsprechend der Judikatur auf fuenf Jahre nach seiner Begruendung begrenzt; fuer den Bereich des Umwandlungsrechts gelten vergleichbare Regelungen. Dabei dauert der Rueckbau eines Kernkraftwerks allein schon 20 Jahre und ein Endlager duerfte vor 2050 nicht verfuegbar sein.

Safety technical considerations on the 2012 periodic safety verification of the Beznau nuclear power plant; Sicherheitstechnische Stellungnahme zur Periodischen Sicherheitsüberprüfung 2012 des Kernkraftwerks Beznau

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2016-12-15

According to nuclear legislation, the owner of an operational license for a nuclear power plant has to provide a periodic safety verification (PSU) every 10 years. The 'North Eastern Power Plants' company (NOK), today AXPO Power AG already performed such a PSU for the Beznau-2 nuclear reactor block (KKB2) in 2002. The Beznau-1 nuclear reactor block (KKB1) received its definitive operational license in October 1970, after test operation during 7 months. After the license for test operation received on July 16{sup th}, 1971, the operational license of KKB2 was renewed several times, each time for a certain period of validity. In 1991, NOK requested a definitive operational license for KKB2, but in 1994 the Swiss Federal Council lengthened the license for only 10 years. Moreover, it laid down that NOK has to periodically report on the safety of the facility. With its letter of August 23{sup rd}, 1998, the Federal Office of Energy defined the documents to be produced for the PSU. The extent of the PSU was defined in such a way that many documents concern the whole power plant, i.e. both nuclear reactor blocks. On December 3{sup rd}, 2004, the Swiss Federal Council granted KKB2 an operational license of limited validity. The present report reviews the 2012 PSU, which covers the time interval from January 1{sup st}, 2002, to December 31{sup st}, 2011, from the point of view of safety. It contains documents for the evaluation of both reactor blocks at KKB. The Beznau interim storage pool was also taken into consideration; it is situated on the KKB site, but, according to a decision of the Swiss Federal Council of May 23{sup rd}, 1991, it has an independent operational license. The evaluation of ageing surveillance takes the whole operational period of the facility into account, i.e. the ageing mechanisms acting as from the beginning of the operation. Moreover, important developments that occurred after the surveillance time interval have been taken into account, especially the status of the examination of the defects discovered during the revision shutdown in 2015 concerning the material of the reactor pressure vessel of block 1. As far as the NOK’s request for an unlimited operational license is concerned, NOK has to prove in time, before the 40-year license limit is up, that the design boundaries of safety-relevant components will not be reached during the duration of extended operation. Otherwise, the necessary refit works have to be performed in time. KKB has produced the requested proof for the long-term operation of both blocks. The results of the supervisory work carried out by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) were published in the safety technical review for KKB1 and KKB2. ENSI concludes that there are no safety technical objections against the operation of both blocks beyond the limit of 40 years. On the basis of the state of knowledge when the considerations were made, the criteria for shutting down will not be reached in the 10 following operational years, neither by KKB1 nor by KKB2.

Replacement of the feedwater pipe system in reactor building outside containment at the nuclear power plant Philippsburg; Austausch der Speisewasserleitung im Reaktorgebaeude ausserhalb SHB im Kernkraftwerk Philippsburg I

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kessler, A. [Energie-Versorgung Schwaben AG, Stuttgart (Germany); Labes, M. [Siemens AG Unternehmensbereich KWU, Offenbach am Main (Germany); Schwenk, B. [Kernkraftwerk Philippsburg GmbH (Germany)

1998-11-01

After full replacement of the feedwater pipe system during the inspection period in 1997, combined with a modern materials, manufacturing and analysis concept, the entire pipe system of the water/steam cycle in the reactor building of KKP 1 now consists of high-toughness materials. The safety level of the entire plant has been increased by leaving aside postulation of F2 breaks in the reactor building and providing for protection against 0.1 leaks. Based on fluid-dynamic calculations for the cases of pump failure and pipe break, as well as pipe system calculations in 5 extensive calculation cycles, about 130 documents were filed for inspection and approval (excluding preliminary test documents on restraints). Points of main interest for safety analysis in this context were the optimised closing performance of the 3rd check valves and the integrity of the nozzle region at the RPV. (oirg./CB) [Deutsch] Durch den Restaustausch der Speisewasserleitungen in der Revision 1997, verbunden mit einem modernen Werkstoff-, Fertigungs- und Nachweiskonzept, sind im Reaktorgebaeude von KKP 1 in den Hauptleitungen des Wasser-Dampf-Kreislaufes nur noch hochzaehe Werkstoffe eingesetzt. Durch den Verzicht auf das Postulat von 2F-Bruechen im Reaktorgebaeude und durch die Auslegung gegen 0,1F-Lecks wird das Sicherheitsniveau der Anlage insgesamt gesteigert. Ausgehend von fluiddynamischen Berechnungen fuer Pumpenausfall und Rohrbruch sowie Rohrsystem-Berechnungen in 5 umfangreichen Berechnungskreisen wurden fuer die Genehmigung und Begutachtung ca. 130 Unterlagen (ohne Halterungs-Vorpruefunterlagen) eingereicht und vom Gutachter geprueft. Schwerpunkte der Nachweisfuehrung waren die Optimierung des Schliessverhaltens der 3. Rueckschlagarmaturen sowie der Integritaetsnachweis des RDB-Anschlusses. (orig./MM)

Target: The green meadow. How much knowledge is needed for the dismantling of nuclear power plants?; Ziel: die Gruene Wiese. Wieviel Know-how man braucht, um ein Kernkraftwerk zurueckzubauen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Bach, Friedrich-Wilhelm; Hassel, Thomas [Unterwassertechnikum Hannover (UWTH), Hannover (Germany). Inst. fuer Werkstoffkunde

2013-07-01

As from the year 2022, there will no nuclear power plant exist in Germany. In the contribution under consideration two scientists from the Institute of Materials Science (Hanover, Federal Republic of Germany) report on the preparations and the necessary technical knowledge in order to dismantle the highly complex nuclear facilities and to recultivate former nuclear power plant sites.

Recurrent safety inspection of German nuclear power plant - performance, schedule and goals. As of 11 August 1995; Periodische Sicherheitsueberpruefung (PSUe) fuer deutsche Kernkraftwerke - Durchfuehrung der PSUe. Vom 11. August 1995

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1995-08-23

The recurrent safety inspection is intended as an inspection supplementing the continuous operation monitoring activities within the framework given by the supervisory activities of the supervisory authority. The first recurrent safety inspection is scheduled to be performed about ten years after start-up of the plant, with subsequent inspection intervals to cover ten-year periods, and recorded operating and monitoring results to be taken into account at each recurrent inspection. The purpose of the recurrent safety inspections is to ascertain that post-inspection operation of the plant meets the then required safety standards. Significant testing results of the latest inspection are to be analysed and compared with regard to the current state of the art and operating results accumulated since the previous inspection, for subsequent definition of enhancements if required. (orig./HP) [Deutsch] Die PSUesoll eine Ergaenzung der staendigen Ueberpruefung im Rahmen der atomrechtlichen Aufsicht ueber den Betrieb sein. Eine erstmalige PSUesoll etwa zehn Jahre nach Inbetriebnahme erfolgen. Die weiteren Ueberpruefungen sollen danach jeweils im Abstand von etwa zehn Jahren stattfinden. Die zwischenzeitlichen Erfahrungen aus Betrieb und Aufsicht sind einzubeziehen. Ziel der PSUemuss sein, festzustellen, ob die Anlage auch im Hinblick auf den kuenftigen Betrieb ein ausreichendes Sicherheitsniveau besitzt. Zu diesem Zweck muessen repraesentative Ereignisse dann detailliert untersucht werden, wenn neue Erkenntnisse aus Forschung und Entwicklung sowie aus der Betriebserfahrung seit der letzten Periodischen Sicherheitsueberpruefung dies erfordern. (orig./HP)

The German-German history of the nuclear power plant Greifswald. Nuclear power between east and west. 2. ed.; Die deutsch-deutsche Geschichte des Kernkraftwerkes Greifswald. Atomenergie zwischen Ost und West

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Hoegselius, Per [Technische Hochschule Stockholm (Sweden). Bereich Gesellschaft, Wissenschaft und Technik

2015-07-01

The historical study covers the chapters The nuclear power plant Greifswald; Lubmin shortly before the ''Wende'' 1989; the German ''Wende''; from the last vote for the ''Volkskammer (parliament of the German Democratic Republic) to the German reunification; Lubmin in reunified Germany; conclusions and perspectives. In the attachment technical data about the reactors WWER-440/W-230 are summarized, including a list of WWERs in the former eastern bloc countries.

Real and mythical consequences of Chernobyl accident

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Osmachkin, V.S.

1999-01-01

This presentation describes the public Unacceptance of Nuclear Power as a consequence of Chernobyl Accident, an accident which was a severest event in the history of the nuclear industry. It was a shock for everybody, who has been involved in nuclear power programs. But nobody could expect that it was also the end romantic page in the nuclear story. The scale of the detriment was a great, and it could be compared with other big technological man-made catastrophes. But immediately after an accident mass media and news agencies started to transmit an information with a great exaggerations of the consequences of the event. In a report on the Seminar T he lessons of the Chernobyl - 1' in 1996 examples of such incorrect information, were cited. Particularly, in the mass media it was declared that consequences of the accident could be compared with a results of the second world war, the number of victims were more than hundred thousand people, more than million of children have the serious health detriments. Such and other cases of the misconstruction have been called as myths. The real consequences of Chernobyl disaster have been summed on the International Conference 'One decade after Chernobyl' - 2, in April 1996. A very important result of the Chernobyl accident was a dissemination of stable unacceptance of the everything connected with 'the atom'. A mystic horror from invisible mortal radiation has been inspired in the masses. And from such public attitude the Nuclear Power Programs in many countries have changed dramatically. A new more pragmatic and more careful atomic era started with a slogan: 'Kernkraftwerk ? Nein, danke'. No doubt, a Chernobyl accident was a serious technical catastrophe in atomic industry. The scale of detriment is connected with a number of involved peoples, not with a number of real victims. In comparison with Bhopal case, earthquakes, crashes of the airplanes, floods, traffic accidents and other risky events of our life - the Chernobyl is

Optimization potential in maintenance; Optimierungspotenzial in der Instandhaltung

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Janisch, H. [EnBW Kraftwerke AG, Kernkraftwerk Philippsburg (Germany)

2001-04-01

hohen Zuverlaessigkeit der Anlagen sind diese kapazitaetsbestimmenden Einfluesse auf die Erzeugungskosten aber praktisch ausgeschoepft. Somit steht der Kostenterm im Blickpunkt von Optimierungsansaetzen, d.h. bei den bestehenden Kernkraftwerken insbesondere die Instandhaltungskosten. Bei einem hohen und sich weiter entwickelnden Sicherheitsniveau kann dabei mit den zunehmenden Betriebserfahrungen von der vorbeugenden Instandhaltung auf die kostenoptimierte zustandsorientierte Instandhaltung uebergegangen werden. Weitere Massnahmen fuer fortgeschrittene Instandhaltungsstrategien betreffen die Arbeitsorganisation, das Personalmanagement sowie standortuebergreifende Planungen fuer den Personal- und Anlageneinsatz. Wichtige Komponenten sind EDV-gestuetzte Betriebsfuehrungssysteme, mit denen die komplexen Aufgaben geplant, durchgefuehrt, kontrolliert und analysiert werden koennen. Ziel dieser Massnahmen ist ein weiter optimierter Betrieb der Kernkraftwerke mit hoechster, dem technischen Fortschritt folgender, Sicherheit, bei demonstrierten wettbewerbsfaehigen Stromerzeugungskosten. (orig.)

Expertise about the request of the nuclear power plant Leibstadt for increasing the power to 3600 MW{sub th}; Gutachten zum Gesuch des Kernkraftwerks Leibstadt um Leistungserhoehung auf 3600 MW{sub th}

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

1996-03-15

On July 31, 1992, the nuclear power plant Leibstadt AG (KKL) submitted a request for a modification of its operation license for increasing the reactor thermal power to 3600 MW. In its examination, the Federal Agency for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (HSK) investigated the effects of the power increase on reactor safety, especially on the safety criteria which can limit the power. In doing this, a distinction has to be made between normal operation, design incidents and out-of-design accidents. KKL is a boiling water reactor (BWR) with a current maximum thermal power of 3,138 MW with 648 fuel assemblies in the core. Since the start of operation in February 1984, the reactor has been continuously improved and now almost fulfils the present state-of-the-art of science and technology for BWRs. After some incidents during the early years, the plant shows a high level of availability. During the past 6 years some fuel assembly damage has cast a shadow on good operational experience, but until now the collective irradiation dose of the plant staff and the environment has remained mostly below legal limits, as well as for the release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere and to the Rhine River. Calculations of core loading with the fuel assemblies presently used at KKL have shown that the operation and safety limits of the reactor core can still be preserved with a thermal power of 3600 MW. For normal operation, no objection can be raised against the power increase. This increase, however, has to be carried out step-by-step in order to gain experience concerning plant behaviour. With the higher power rating, increased dose rates are expected on systems and components, in plant rooms and in the plant area, which also leads to increased dose rates to the staff and environment. This increase has to be estimated and, possibly, correction measures will have to be taken in order to reduce them. Especially to be monitored is the dose rate increase in the machine hall. In the case of design incidents too, all safety-relevant limits and the maximal tolerable dose rates in the environment must be respected. In the context of design incidents, the 'transitory' group also constitutes the limiting case with the higher power. For the complete judgement of the safety of a nuclear power plant it is not sufficient to estimate the effects of a design incident through deterministic methods. The evaluation of the effects of out-of-design accidents needs a probabilistic safety analysis which determines the frequency as well as the consequences of an accident. The results show that KKL represents a very small risk for the environment. In KKL the measures necessary for safe operation and protection of mankind and environment at a thermal power of 3600 MW have already been taken or will be taken shortly. According to its examination, HSK concludes that there are no safety-relevant reasons speaking against an operational license for the increased thermal power. The increase will, however, have to be carried out in 4 steps of 1 year each in order to gain operational experience

Russia's nuclear industry - an overview; Russlands Kernenergiewirtschaft: Zustand, Probleme, Perspektiven

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Tscherkassov, V. [Konzern ROSENERGOATOM, Moskau (Russian Federation)

2000-04-01

After the Chernobyl disaster, improvements in materials and in training were made everywhere. As a result, the quality of operation of Russian reactors now is in third place after Germany and Japan. At the present time, it is becoming more and more evident that Russia will have no future in the absence of a nuclear power industry. This is due not only to the country's geographic and socio-economic features, its large territory, and the mismatch between the major energy resources in Siberia and the centers of energy consumption in the European part of Russia, but also to the fact that there is no technology other than nuclear at present which would be able to generate the volume of electricity required after the end of the 'natural gas break'. The generation of electricity in nuclear power plants contributed from 1999 on amounted to a share of approx. 15 per cent in all of Russia; 30 per cent in the European part of Russia and in the central supply region; of this share, 60 per cent in the central Chernozem region; 41 per cent in the northwestern supply region; 70 per cent in the northwest of the autonomous Chukchen region; 40 per cent in the FOREM single electricity market. The same percentages apply to electricity exports. (orig.) [German] Nach der Katastrophe von Tschernobyl wurden ueberall Verbesserungen bei Material und Ausbildung umgesetzt. Die Folge ist, dass heute die Betriebsqualitaet der russischen Reaktoren direkt hinter Deutschland und Japan rangiert. Kernkraftwerke spielen in der Wirtschaft des Landes eine wesentliche Rolle. Rentabel wirtschaftende KKW grosser Leistung werden an den Knotenpunkten des Versorgungsnetzes im Grundlastbereich betrieben und sichern einen stabilen Betrieb des gesamten Energieverbundsystems Russlands. Aus diesem Grund ist Russland an einem stabilen und sicheren Betrieb seiner KKW interessiert. Gegenwaertig zeigt sich immer deutlicher, dass Russland ohne Kernenergiewirtschaft keine entsprechende Zukunft hat. Dies

CNAAA spent fuel complementary storage building (UFC) construction and licensing: an overview of current status

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Lima Neto, Bertino do Carmo; Pacifi, Cicero Durval

2013-01-01

, representing a similar solution used in all the three CNAAA units to store the spent fuel assemblies. Taking into account the above described aspects, this paper aims to compare the licensing requirements included in the safety analysis report prepared for external spent fuel wet storage facilities in USA (NRC Regulatory Guide) and Switzerland (ENSI - Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate), considering that the standard formats applied by CNEN - the Brazilian Nuclear Regulatory Authority - are based on USNRC recommendations and Eletrobras Eletronuclear plans, as a preliminary idea, to take the Goesgen NPP - KKG (Switzerland) spent fuel facility as a reference one for of the UFC. (author)

Causes, consequences, and therapy of the Radiophobia syndrome; Ursachen, Folgen und Therapie des Radiophobie-Syndroms

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Becker, K.

2004-03-01

The final storage of high-level radioactive waste, which is said to be still open while, in fact, it was solved technically a long time ago and is only being blocked for political reasons, as well as alleged technical risks of German nuclear power plants which have never been demonstrated or proven, are listed again and again as grounds for opting out of the use of nuclear power. There is hardly any doubt that one of the main causes underlying also these arguments, and thus the main reason for the insufficient public acceptance of nuclear power in Germany at the present time as a safe, inexpensive, and non-polluting source of primary energy, is the widespread fear of radiation (radiophobia). Consequently, solutions proposed for successfully managing this radiophobia must be examined. Continued scientific studies of the subject do not seem to be promising, as funds are available at present only for continuing the search for negative biological effects. Important preconditions for a change in attitude are the appropriate initiatives to be taken by the relatively small number of sufficiently independent experts of proven scientific repute. Initiatives of this kind can now be observed in numerous countries and regions in the world. It must be pointed out in this connection, as is underlined again and again by experienced experts, that risk acceptance is not a matter of factual arguments, but of emotions. Psychological and pedagogic sensitivity certainly are important elements in changing public opinion in the interest of a more realistic assessment of the radiation risk and the acceptance of nuclear power. (orig.) [German] Die angeblich noch offene, tatsaechlich aber laengst technisch geloeste und nur politisch blockierte Frage der Endlagerung hochradioaktiver Abfaelle, ebenso wie vorgebliche, tatsaechlich aber nie nachgewiesene technische Risiken der deutschen Kernkraftwerke werden immer wieder als Ausstiegsgruende fuer die Kernenergie genannt. Es bestehen kaum

Catalogue of requirements for a plant-specific safety inspection of German nuclear power plants taking into account the Fukushima-I (Japan) events; Anforderungskatalog fuer anlagenbezogene Ueberpruefungen deutscher Kernkraftwerke unter Beruecksichtigung der Ereignisse in Fukushima-I (Japan)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2011-03-30

The catalogue of requirements for a plant-specific safety inspection of German nuclear power plants taking into account the Fukushima-I (Japan) events worked out by the German RSK (reactor safety commission) includes the following inspection topics: natural events like earth quakes, floods, weather-based consequences and possible superposition; civilization-based events like airplane crash, gas release, reactor accident consequences for neighboring units, terroristic impacts, external attacks on computer-based control systems. Further event-independent assumptions have to be considered: station blackout, long-term emergency power supply requirement, failure of auxiliary cooling water supply, efficacy of preventive measures, aggravating boundary conditions for the performance of emergency measures.

How does react power price on a possible lifetime extension for power plants? Nuclear power, power prices and power market models; Wie reagiert der Strompreis auf eine moegliche Verlaengerung der Laufzeiten fuer Kernkraftwerke? Kernkraft, Strompreis und Strommarktmodelle

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Nestle, Uwe [Buendnis 90/Die Gruenen, Berlin (Germany). Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Energie

2010-08-23

Extending the life of the nuclear power plants currently operated in Germany is being discussed in the light of a more likely change in government for a Christian Democrat/Liberal coalition. The reason cited most frequently is the impossibility to meet the objectives of climate protection without raising further the price of electricity if the life of nuclear power plants cannot be extended. The question to be looked into is that of the legal pre-requisites to be established in Germany in order for the existing nuclear power plants to be operated for longer periods of time. So in this contribution some discussion is done wether a possible lifetime extension of nuclear power plants will react on power prices.(GL)

Exercise ''contact point for persons from the neighborhood of a nuclear power station after a severe accident''; Uebung ''Kontaktstelle fuer Personen aus der Umgebung eines Kernkraftwerkes nach einem schweren Unfall''

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stuerm, R.P. [SafPro AG, Ausbildung und Beratung in Strahlenschutz, Basel (Switzerland); Schubiger, V.; Voegtli, M. [Abt. Militaer und Bevoelkerungsschutz des Kantons Aargau (Switzerland)

2001-07-01

After a severe nuclear power station accident with release of radioactivity, some few persons in the neighbourhood of the station may accumulate a dose of more than 1 Sv. A lot of other people may be in doubt, whether they have received a radiation dose. Hospitals and practitioners may break down under the run on them by terrified persons, who have no or only small doses. In order to prevent this, 'assembly centers' should be run at the outer limit of the irradiated area. About 1'000 persons per day from the INNER, MIDDEL and OUTER irradiated regions should be informed and psychologically attended. A concept for such a 'assembly center' has been elaborated by members of the National Commission for AC-Protection, the Office for Protection of the Population, the National Alarm Center, the Swiss Inspectorate for the Safety of Nuclear Power Stations as well as public health officers. The concept has been tested in an exercise with 185 persons. (orig.) [German] Wenn bei einem schweren KKW-Unfall mit Austritt von Radioaktivitaet die alarmierte Bevoelkerung die angeordneten Schutzmassnahmen nicht ergreifen wuerde, koennten in der allernaechsten Umgebung des KKW einige wenige Personen Strahlendosen von mehr als 1 Sv akkumulieren und in der weiteren Umgebung viele Personen mittlere und kleine Dosen erhalten. Um eine moegliche Strahlendosis bei diesen Personen (aber auch bei solchen, die im Zweifel sind) zu ermitteln, sollen am Rande der betroffenen Region Informationsstellen mit orts- und ereignisbezogener (individueller) Personenbeurteilung sowie psychologischer Betreuung errichtet werden; denn die Einrichtungen des oeffentlichen Gesundheitswesens (Spitaeler) und die privaten Arztpraxen waeren nicht in der Lage, einen groesseren Ansturm von zu beratenden Personen zu bewaeltigen, die groesstenteils gar nicht gefaehrdet sein duerften. Diese sog. Kontakstellen sind keine generellen Dekontaminationsstellen, bieten keine generellen medizinische Dienste an und sind auch keine Auskunftszentren fuer die Medien. Rund 1'000 Personen sollen pro 24 Stunden auf einer Kontaktstelle betreut werden, wobei rund 500 Personen mit Dosen von weniger als 50 mSv (Gruppe D), rund 300 Personen mit Dosen zwischen 50 und 500 mSv (Gruppen C und B) und knapp 200 Personen mit Dosen ueber 500 mSv (Gruppe A) erwartet werden. Unter diesen 1'000 Personen duerfte es 30 schwangere Frauen (Gruppe E) haben. Mittels eines einfachen Leitsystems sollen die Ratsuchenden in die Gruppen A bis E eingeteilt werden. Diese Einteilung erfolgt durch Selbstdeklaration (Aufenthaltsort waehrend der Wolkenphase), die bei der Gruppe A durch geschultes Personal mittels Integrationsberechnungen der Ortsdosisleistung individuell verifiziert wird. Die uebrigen Besucher der Kontaktstellen werden in Gruppen durch Aerzte und Strahlenphysiker informiert und psychologisch betreut. Mitglieder der Eidgenoessischen Kommission fuer AC-Schutz, der Abteilung Militaer und Bevoelkerungsschutz, der Nationalen Alarmzentrale, der Hauptabteilung fuer die Sicherheit von Kernanlagen sowie Kantonsaerzte (Leiter des Aerztlichen Dienstes der Landesgesundheitsbehoerde) hatten ein Konzept fuer solche Kontaktstellen ausgearbeitet. Am 26.10.00 fand eine Uebung im Massstab 1:10 mit 85 Figuranten und knapp 100 Beuebten statt, um dieses Konzept auf seine Machbarkeit zu pruefen. (orig.)

Chemistry in power plants 2011

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

Within the VGB Powertech conference from 25th to 27th October, 2011, in Munich (Federal Republic of Germany), the following lectures and poster contributions were presented: (1) The revised VGB standard for water-steam-cycle Chemistry; (2) Switchover from neutral operation to oxygen treatment at the power station Stuttgart-Muenster of EnBW Kraftwerke AG; (3) Steam contamination with degradation products of organic matters present in the feedwater of the Lanxess-Rubber cogeneration plant; (4) Laboratory scale on-line noble metal deposition experiments simulating BWR plant conditions; (5) Building a new demin installation for the power plant EPZ in Borssele; (6) Replacement of the cooling tower installations in the nuclear power plant Goesgen-Daenien AG; (7) Aging of IEX resins in demin plants - Cost optimisation by adaptation of regenerants; (8) The largest DOW trademark EDI System at a combined cycled plant in Europe; (9) Upgrading river Main water to boiler feed water - Experiences with ultrafiltration; (10) Experiences with treatment of the water-steam-cycle in the RDF power plant Nehlsen Stavenhagen with film-forming amines; (11) Comparative modelling of the bubbles thermal collapse and cavitations for estimation of bubbles collapse influence; (12) Overcoming the steam quality - issues from an HRSG for the production of process steam; (13) Legionella - new requirements for power plant operation; (14) How the right chemistry in the FGD helps to improve the removal in the waste water treatment plant; (15) High efficiency filtration in dry/semi-dry FGD plants; (16) Expanding the variety of renewable fuels in the biomass power plant Timelkam using the chemical input control; (17) Corrosion, operating experiences and process improvements to increase the availability and operating time of the biomass power plant Timelkam; (18) The influence of temperature on the measurement of the conductivity of highly diluted solutions; (19) A multiparameter instrumentation approach

Chemistry in power plants 2011; Chemie im Kraftwerk 2011

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2011-07-01

Within the VGB Powertech conference from 25th to 27th October, 2011, in Munich (Federal Republic of Germany), the following lectures and poster contributions were presented: (1) The revised VGB standard for water-steam-cycle Chemistry; (2) Switchover from neutral operation to oxygen treatment at the power station Stuttgart-Muenster of EnBW Kraftwerke AG; (3) Steam contamination with degradation products of organic matters present in the feedwater of the Lanxess-Rubber cogeneration plant; (4) Laboratory scale on-line noble metal deposition experiments simulating BWR plant conditions; (5) Building a new demin installation for the power plant EPZ in Borssele; (6) Replacement of the cooling tower installations in the nuclear power plant Goesgen-Daenien AG; (7) Aging of IEX resins in demin plants - Cost optimisation by adaptation of regenerants; (8) The largest DOW trademark EDI System at a combined cycled plant in Europe; (9) Upgrading river Main water to boiler feed water - Experiences with ultrafiltration; (10) Experiences with treatment of the water-steam-cycle in the RDF power plant Nehlsen Stavenhagen with film-forming amines; (11) Comparative modelling of the bubbles thermal collapse and cavitations for estimation of bubbles collapse influence; (12) Overcoming the steam quality - issues from an HRSG for the production of process steam; (13) Legionella - new requirements for power plant operation; (14) How the right chemistry in the FGD helps to improve the removal in the waste water treatment plant; (15) High efficiency filtration in dry/semi-dry FGD plants; (16) Expanding the variety of renewable fuels in the biomass power plant Timelkam using the chemical input control; (17) Corrosion, operating experiences and process improvements to increase the availability and operating time of the biomass power plant Timelkam; (18) The influence of temperature on the measurement of the conductivity of highly diluted solutions; (19) A multiparameter instrumentation approach

Transfer of financial obligations for the disposal of nuclear waste and decommissioning of German NPP's. Legal aspects of a trust model; Sicherstellung der finanziellen Entsorgungsvorsorge fuer die Stilllegungs- und Rueckbaukosten der deutschen Kernkraftwerke. Rechtliche Randbedingungen eines Stiftungsmodells

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Schewe, Markus; Wiesendahl, Stefan [Kuemmerlein Rechtsanwaelte und Notare, Essen (Germany)

2015-04-15

The nuclear power plant operators have to bear the costs associated with the closure and the decommissioning of the German nuclear power plants as well as the costs for the disposal of nuclear waste. For that purpose, the operators have to build up sufficient reserves for the decommissioning phase. These reserves at the end of 2013 amounted to approximately 36 billion Euro. Changing this system is discussed very so often. Last in May 2014, a public debate started dealing with the so called trust model (''Stiftungsmodell''). The press published deliberations of several operators to transfer their entire nuclear business to the Federal Republic of Germany. Under this deliberation the current nuclear power plant operations, as well as closure obligations would be contributed to trust. Further, also the reserves should be ''transferred'' to the trust. RAG-Foundation (RAG-Stiftung) - which will assume the financial obligations in connection with Germany's closure of underground coal mining activities - sometimes is cited as a role model. The article covers elements of German trust law and atomic energy law regarding such deliberations. In trust law e.g. it can be debated whether the trust should be established under public or - as in the case of RAG-Foundation - under private law. In this context we will set out the major differences between those two options. In the public law part we will notably address issues arising from individual licensing requirements for nuclear power plants and focus on questions concerning reliability, requisite qualification and organizational structures.

Occupational safety in the nuclear power plant. The contribution of sociology to the development of a communication tool for the elimination of hazardous situations; Arbeitssicherheit im Kernkraftwerk. Der Beitrag der Sozialpsychologie zur Entwicklung eines Kommunikationsinstrumentes fuer die Behebung von Gefaehrdungssituationen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Zedler, Christien [IAOP - Institut fuer Arbeitspsychologie, Organisation und Prozessgestaltung, Berlin (Germany); Huber, Veit [E.ON Kernkraft GmbH (Germany)

2012-11-01

Nuclear power plant companies make efforts to enhance the operational safety in the plant. Despite a variety of measures the number of accidents at work is still too high, esp. for external personnel. Social psychological considerations were used to develop communication tools for the elimination of hazardous situations, for instance by safety dialogues between employees. The observation of hazardous situations should trigger communication and discussion on the risk of the specific situation. In the contribution practical experiences and recommendations for the realization of a safety dialogue culture in the NPP Grafenrheinfeld are summarized and illustrated by examples.

CASTOR {sup registered} 1000/19. Transport and storage cask for the disposal of spent fuel from the nuclear power plant Temelin (Czech Republic); CASTOR {sup registered} 1000/19. Transport- und Lagerbehaelter zur Entsorgung abgebrannter Brennelemente aus dem Kernkraftwerk Temelin in Tschechien

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Fopp, Stefan; Kuehne, Bernhard; Schroeder, Jens [GNS Gesellschaft fuer Nuklear-Service mbH, Essen (Germany)

2011-07-01

The transport and storage cask CASTOR {sup registered} 1000/19 was designed for a dry interim storage of 19 spent fuel elements of WWER-1000 reactors. The project performed by GNS mbH included design, manufacture, licensing and delivery of 36 casks. The specific requirements for NPP Temelin concern loading and dispatch of the casks to be performed during the outage period of the reactor, thus high reliability and functionality of the casks and the manipulation equipment. The paper describes the mechanical design of the cask, stress analyses for a hypothetical fall accident from 9 m height, performed using the FEM program ANSYS and LS-DYNA. The 3D simulation models are based on conservative material characteristics and upper-bound boundary conditions. The safety analysis was performed using qualified software programs validated by the Czech authorities.

The development of engineered safeguards for nuclear power plants in the political and technical environment in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1955; Die Entwicklung der Sicherheitstechnik fuer Kernkraftwerke im politischen und technischen Umfeld der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit dem Jahr 1955

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Laufs, P. [Stuttgart Univ. (Germany). Philosophische-Historische Fakultaet

2007-01-15

The safety of nuclear power plants is determined largely by the integrity of the internally pressurized coolant containment system. The highly radioactive materials (fission products) generated within this pressurized containment (primary system) in the reactor core during nuclear power plant operation constitute an extremely great potential hazard. Catastrophic failure of the primary system, and the release into the environment of the radioactive inventory, must be avoided at all costs. Because of the high coolant pressure and the high power density, pressurized water reactors (PWR) impose particularly strict requirements with respect to reactor safety. German nuclear power plants equipped with light water reactors enjoy the reputation of being among the safest plants in the world. This frequent statement is justified in the light of the research and development work performed jointly by industry, government agencies, science, and expert bodies between the 1960s and the 1990s. The research projects, which implied considerable financial expenditures, their internationally acknowledged results, and the resultant additional backfitting measures conducted in German nuclear power plants at many billions of expenditures, were hardly noticed by the German body politic. (orig.)

Single or multi-repository concept? A personal contribution to the discussion of pros and cons; Ein- oder Mehr-Endlager-Konzept? Ein persoenlicher Beitrag zur Diskussion der Vor- und Nachteile

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Closs, K.-D. [Projektraeger fuer Wassertechnologie und Entsorgung, Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH (Germany); Duphorn, K. [Christian-Albrechts-Universitaet zu Kiel (Germany); Kuehn, K. [Institut fuer Bergbau, TU Clausthal-Zellerfeld (Germany)

2002-05-01

Gruenen nach der Bundestagswahl von 1998 wurde zur Entsorgung der deutschen Kernkraftwerke ein von der bis dahin angestrebten Praxis abweichender Weg vereinbart. Unter anderem soll nur ein einziges Endlager in tiefen geologischen Formationen etwa ab dem Jahr 2030 zur Verfuegung stehen. Die Erkundung des Salzstockes Gorleben soll aufgrund bestehender Zweifel unterbrochen werden bei paralleler grundsaetzlicher Diskussion zu potenziell geeigneten Wirtsgesteinen und Standorten. Der von der Bundesregierung einberufene 'Arbeitskreis Auswahlverfahren Endlagerstandorte (AkEnd)' soll mit diesen Vorgaben wissenschaftliche Standortkriterien erarbeiten. Die Autoren, Mitglieder des AkEnd, kommen aufgrund von fachlichen Erkenntnissen sowie der historisch gewachsenen Entsorgungs- und Standortsituation in Deutschland zu dem Schluss, dass ein Mehr-Endlager-Konzept substanzielle Vorteile aufweist. Folgende Aspekte werden dafuer genannt: - Entsorgungskonzeption: Das Mehr-Endlager-Konzept bietet mit dem weit fortgeschrittenen Endlagerprojekt Konrad eindeutige Vorteile. Dies auch vor dem Hintergrund der von der oeffentlichen Hand zu bewaeltigenden Menge an Abfaellen mit vernachlaessigbarer Waermeentwicklung. - Langzeitsicherheit: Vorteile, u.a. im Hinblick auf sicherheitstechnische Aspekte bezueglich der moeglichen Kompromisse bei einem Ein-Endlager-Konzept und der moeglichen Einschraenkung der Anzahl potenzieller Standorte, liegen vor. - Nachweisverfahren: Es liegen nachweistechnische Vorteile bei Aufteilung der Abfaelle auf zwei oder mehr Endlager vor. - Kosten: Eine differenzierte Betrachtung der Kosten fuer alle endzulagernden Abfaelle deutet auf Vorteile - insbesondere fuer die oeffentliche Hand - bei einem Mehr-Endlager-Konzept hin. (orig.)

Final storage of radioactive waste in Germany. Waste arisings and availability of a repository as seen by an electricity utility; Endlagerung radioaktiver Abfaelle in Deutschland. Abfallaufkommen und Endlagerverfuegbarkeit aus EVU-Sicht

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Broeskamp, H.; Brammer, K.J.; Graf, R. [Gesellschaft fuer Nuklearservice, Essen (Germany)

2004-04-01

The management of waste arising in the operation of nuclear power plants has been taken into account since the beginnings of the peaceful uses of nuclear power in Germany. As early as in 1957, a memorandum of the German Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy contains a reference to the need for safe disposal of radioactive waste. Legislation adopted the suggestion and laid down some provisions on the safe utilization of radioactive materials as early as in the Atomic Energy Act of December 23, 1959. In connection with the nuclear waste management center, the Federal Republic also looked for a suitable site for a repository. After thorough site selection proceedings by the federal government and the state of Lower Saxony, the Lower Saxony state government in 1977 defined Gorleben as the site. The decision has been preceded by a three-stage selection process in which more than 140 sites had been investigated. Exploration of the Gorleben site began in 1979 and was interrupted on October 1, 2000 to clarify conceptual and safety-related doubts of the federal government. The German Federal Ministry for the Environment (BMU) seeks to make a repository (for high-level waste) available in 2030. Technically, it is still possible to commission a repository for waste generating heat at Gorleben after 2025 if the salt dome is found to be suitable after speedy conclusion of the exploration work. Reference is made to foreseeable problem areas. Another project pursued by the federal government is the use of the Konrad mine as a repository for low and medium-level radioactive waste. After well over twenty years, the plans approval decision was made in May 2002 and is at present the subject of litigation. On the basis of the data presented about the expected arisings of waste generating no heat in combination with the possible start of emplacement in Konrad in 2013, detailed results are presented. (orig.) [German] Die Frage der Entsorgung der Kernkraftwerke wurde von Anfang der

Foreseeable cost and economic impacts of the approach proposed; Absehbare Kosten und volkswirtschaftliche Effekte des vom AkEnd vorgeschlagenen Vorgehens

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Broeskamp, H.; Brammer, K.-J. [GNS Gesellschaft fuer Nuclear-Service mbH, Essen (Germany); Schlombs, H. [E.ON Kernkraft GmbH, Hannover (Germany)

2003-05-01

radioaktive Abfaelle verantwortlich. Fruehzeitig mit der Inbetriebnahme der ersten Kernkraftwerke wurden in den 1960er Jahren entsprechende Schritte eingeleitet. Diese resultierten u.a. in den Beschluessen und Auswahlverfahren der 1970er und 1980er Jahre zum Salzstock Gorleben sowie zum ehemaligen Eisenerzbergwerk Konrad als potenzielle Endlagerstandorte. Die Bundesregierung hat im Jahr 2000 fuer Gorleben ein drei- bis maximal zehnjaehriges Moratorium fuer die weiteren Erkundungsarbeiten festgelegt, um aus Sicht des Bundesministeriums fuer Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (BMU) bestehende Zweifel abzuarbeiten. Fuer Konrad wurde im Mai 2002 ein positiver Planfeststellungsbeschluss erteilt. Nach Erlangung der Rechtssicherheit koennte ab etwa 2010-2012 die Einlagerung beginnen. Im Februar 1999 wurde der Arbeitskreis Auswahlverfahren Endlagerstandorte (AkEnd) durch das BMU berufen. Der Auftrag bestand in der Entwicklung eines nachvollziehbaren Verfahrens fuer die Suche und die Auswahl von Standorten zur Endlagerung aller Arten radioaktiver Abfaelle in Deutschland. Das vom AkEnd abschliessende vorgestellte Verfahren birgt erhebliche Unsicherheiten, u.a. bezueglich der rechtlichen Umsetzbarkeit, des erforderlichen Zeitbedarfs und der Finanzierung. Es koennen sich mit Blick auf den Salzstock Gorleben allein durch zusaetzliche Erkundungen und Verfahren Mehrkosten gegenueber der Weiterfuehrung der Projekttaetigkeiten in Hoehe von 3 bis 5 Mrd. Euro ergeben. Aehnlich hohe Mehrbelastungen - insbesondere fuer die oeffentliche Hand - sind bei einer Verzoegerung der Einlagerung in Konrad zu erwarten. Eine moeglichst zuegige Endlagerung aller Abfallarten in tiefen geologischen Formationen ist unter sicherheitstechnischen Aspekten anderen Alternativen vorzuziehen. Daher sollte unter Beruecksichtigung aller Faktoren eine weitere Erkundung von Gorleben zuegig abgeschlossen und das Projekt Konrad realisiert werden. (orig.)

Environmental effects on fatigue of steels for structural parts in water-steam-circuits of light water reactors. Considerations concerning the question of transferability of results from laboratory tests to real operating conditions; Der Einfluss des Mediums auf Ermuedungsvorgaenge in Staehlen fuer Strukturbauteile in Wasser-Dampf-Kreislaeufen von Leichtwasserreaktoren. Ueberlegungen zur Frage der Uebertragbarkeit von Ergebnissen aus Laborversuchen auf den realen Anlagenbetrieb

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Roth, Armin [AREVA NP GmbH, Erlangen (Germany)

2008-07-01

.B. von Staehlen, beeinflussen kann. Schon vor einigen Jahrzehnten wurde experimentell nachgewiesen, dass z.B. Hochtemperaturwasser in Laborversuchen zur Untersuchung des Ermuedungsverhaltens von Staehlen zu deutlichen Effekten fuehrt. Dabei wird je nach Versuchsfuehrung entweder die Zeit bis zur Initiierung von Anrissen verkuerzt oder die Wachstumsgeschwindigkeit vorhandener Risse erhoeht. Dieser zu erwartende Einfluss des Mediums auf den Ermuedungsprozess wurde in den Anfaengen der Regulierung von Konstruktion und Auslegung von Bauteilen und Komponenten fuer Kernkraftwerke in den relevanten Regelwerken (z.B. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III) weltweit nicht explizit beruecksichtigt. Pauschal beruecksichtigt werden Umgebungseffekte dagegen in den entsprechenden da/dN-Risswachstumskurven des ASME Code, Section XI zur Bewertung des betrieblichen Verhaltens von Oberflaechenfehlern. Historisch betrachtet erfolgte in den Regelwerken die Festlegung der Vorgehensweise zur Komponentenauslegung allerdings lange vor dem gezielten experimentellen Nachweis der Umgebungseffekte auf Rissinitiierung und Risswachstum durch Ermuedung von Staehlen in Hochtemperaturwasser. Trotz dieser Erkenntnis ist es weltweit nicht zu generischen, systematischen Schaeden in Medium fuehrenden Systemen von Leichtwasserreaktoren (LWR) durch Korrosionsermuedung infolge von Fehlauslegung gekommen. Vereinzelt aufgetretene Schaeden mit deutlichen Merkmalen umgebungsbeeinflusster Ermuedungsvorgaenge konnten immer eindeutig auf das Vorkommen von unerwarteten, nicht im spezifizierten Belastungskollektiv enthaltenen Betriebstransienten zurueckgefuehrt werden. Zu diesen Ursachen zaehlen z.B. das Auftreten von thermischer Schichtung oder lokale, stroemungsinduzierte Vibrationen. In diesem Beitrag werden Ueberlegungen vorgestellt, welche die zu beobachtende Diskrepanz zwischen der diesbezueglich weltweit ueberwiegend positiven Betriebserfahrung und den Ergebnissen aus Laborversuchen mit dem

Studies on the 'air-grass-cow-milk' exposure pathway of airborne /sup 131/I from Wuergassen nuclear power plant in the 1980 grazing season. Untersuchungen zum Expositionspfad 'Luft-Gas-Kuh-Milch' fuer Jod 131 in der Abluft des Kernkraftwerkes Wuergassen waehrend der Weidezeit 1980

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Haubelt, R; Burkhardt, J

1983-12-01

The measurements and statistics, which were much more detailed than the annual routine measurements, included /sup 131/I emission measurements on the stack, the registration of meteorological parameters, measurements of /sup 131/I concentrations in air, grass, and milk, and supplementary statistics on the farmers' animal keeping habits. The infant thyroid dose resulting from /sup 131/I in milk was found to be lower by at least one order of magnitude than the value calculated from the emission data for the point of maximum exposure according to the Guideline to Explain Sect. 45 StrlSchV. This result confirms the results of earlier investigations. The model calculation according to the Guideline yields a value of 30 mrem for incorporation of /sup 131/I into the infant thyroid via the ingestion pathway for the year 1980, i.e. 25 times the measured value. The possible reasons for this are discussed.

Comments on conceptual questions concerning the clearance of wastes for disposal on a dump site during the decommissioning and dismantling of the nuclear power plant Obrigheim (KWO); Stellungnahme zu konzeptionellen Fragen der Freigabe zur Beseitigung auf einer Deponie bei Stilllegung und Abbau des Kernkraftwerks Obrigheim (KWO)

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Kueppers, Christian

2015-08-03

The comments on conceptual questions concerning the clearance of wastes for disposal on a dump site during the decommissioning and dismantling of the nuclear power plant Obrigheim (KWO) cover the following issues: fundamentals of the 10 micro-Sv concept for clearance; specific regulations for the clearance of wastes from the dismantling of KWO for disposal on a dump site; disposal concept at shutdown and dismantling of KWO; measurements and control during clearance for disposal during shutdown and dismantling of KWO; documentation and reports.

Radiological protection report 2014; Strahlenschutzbericht 2014

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2015-06-15

In its 11{sup th} Annual Report on Radiological Protection, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) provides the public with information on dose rates for individuals professionally exposed to radiation, releases of radioactive material and the monitoring of environmental radiation. ENSI, as the regulatory body for nuclear facilities in Switzerland, is continuing to expand its information provision over and above that contained in the Radiological Protection Report. At 0.6 mSv per year, the average individual dose for professionally exposed persons remains significantly below the annual limit of 20 mSv specified by the Swiss Federal Council. It is also less than the average annual rate of natural environmental exposure of 5.5 mSv for the population in Switzerland as a whole. The highest individual dose during the year was 12 mSv. The collective doses lie within the range of past years. There is a trend towards higher collective doses at KKL. As a general rule, planning by the licensees of nuclear facilities in the field of radiological protection is of a high standard. Actual collective doses in 2014 at Beznau 1, Goesgen and Leibstadt were within 10% of projected exposure rates and at Beznau 2 and Muehleberg the doses were about 30% lower. Demands in terms of radiological protection were particularly high at Leibstadt and Beznau 1; at Leibstadt mainly as a result of a fuel cladding defect and at Beznau 1 because of the continuing elevated ambient rate for components in the primary circuit. ENSI concluded that the Swiss nuclear facilities continue to operate a consistent approach to radiological protection. In 2014, licensees of nuclear facilities remained within official release limits, in some cases by a significant margin. Liquid releases from Muehleberg were below the target value of 1 GBq per year set by ENSI on the basis of international recommendations. At the Central Interim Storage Facility (ZWILAG) and at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI

IAEA Leads Operational Safety Mission to Muehleberg Nuclear Power Plant

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2012-01-01

practices of the plant. These good practices will be shared with the nuclear industry world-wide for consideration. Examples include: - The plant has developed a comprehensive strategy to manage the core shroud cracking issue (detected in 1990 and monitored ever since) and allow long term operation; - Preserving and transferring corporate knowledge and know-how has been implemented by the plant as part of succession planning; - The plant has developed and implemented a comprehensive Accident Management Program including Severe Accident Management Guidance for shut-down conditions. Muehleberg NPP management expressed determination to address all the areas identified for improvement and requested that the IAEA schedule a follow-up mission in approximately 18 months. The team handed over a draft of their recommendations, suggestions and good practices to the plant management in the form of ''Technical Notes'' for factual comments. The technical notes will be reviewed at the IAEA headquarters including any comments from Muehleberg NPP and the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate. The final report will be submitted to the Government of Switzerland within three months. This was the 170th mission of the OSART programme, which began in 1982. OSART missions were performed in Switzerland in 1994 at Leibstadt NPP, in 1995 at Beznau NPP, in 1999 at Goesgen NPP and in 2000 at Muehleberg NPP. General information about OSART missions can be found on the IAEA Website: OSART Missions. Background: The IAEA Nuclear Safety Action Plan defines a programme of work to strengthen the nuclear safety framework worldwide in the light of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident. The plan was unanimously endorsed by IAEA Member States during the Agency's 55th General Conference in September 2011. The Action Plan recommended: ''Each Member State with nuclear power plants to voluntarily host at least one IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) mission during the coming three years

Intermediate review on the transportation of spent fuel assemblies

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2000-10-01

The transportation of spent fuel from the Swiss nuclear power plants to the reprocessing facilities in France and England was interrupted in May 1998 because of contamination that occurred. These measures were presented in the March 1999 statement made by the Office for the Safety of Nuclear Plants (HSK). The transport of spent fuel has been once more permitted and carried out under new conditions since August 1999. In its interim report of October 2000, HSK analyses and evaluates the experience gained since the resumption of transports. For each measure required, it compares the advantages and drawbacks and makes decisions on the maintenance or reduction of the measures to be taken. Between August 1999 and July 2000, 12 spent fuel transports were carried out between the Swiss nuclear power plants and the COGEMA reprocessing facility in France (7 from Goesgen, 4 from Beznau and 1 from Leibstadt). Neither noticeable disagreement with nor exceeding of contamination limits were noted during those 12 transports. This satisfactory result demonstrates that the measures required to be taken are effective. HSK expected from the measures a reduction of the frequency of exceeding contamination limits to less than 5% and also a marked reduction in their frequency. The present results correspond to this expectation; however, the statistical basis is not yet sufficient to be able to draw definitive conclusions. Nevertheless it is noticed that the situation in France, where similar measures have been taken, was very clearly improved. The frequency of exceeding contamination limits was reduced to 2% during the first semester of the year 2000, while it amounted to more than 30% before April 1998. It is the comprehensiveness of the measures required by HSK which allows the avoidance of contamination. The analysis shows that just a small number of measures only contribute insignificantly to the goal sought after. Therefore, two measures will be suppressed (packing of the empty

International Nuclear Safety Experts Conclude IAEA Peer Review of Swiss Regulatory Framework

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2011-01-01

Goesgen; 1 BWR at Leibstadt; Swiss nuclear power reactors in operation: 1 BWR at Muehleberg; Swiss nuclear research reactors in operation: University of Basel; EPF Lausanne. (IAEA)

Implementation of the obligations of the joint convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management. Third national report of Switzerland in accordance with Article 32 of the convention

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2008-09-01

submitted for a new NPP near the site of the Goesgen NPP. The submission of further general licence applications to replace the older NPPs of Beznau and Muehleberg has been announced. The major part of nuclear research in Switzerland is performed at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI). These include research related to spent fuel and radioactive waste management. PSI operates several nuclear facilities: the research reactor PROTEUS, a hot laboratory, and waste management facilities. The former research reactors DIORIT and SAPHIR are in the state of decommissioning. Two small research reactors exist at the University of Basel (Uni BS) and at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL) for teaching purposes. The former Lucens experimental NPP was decommissioned and dismantled after experiencing a loss of coolant accident in 1969. This site was declassified and released for non-nuclear activities. Each NPP has facilities for the conditioning and interim storage of radioactive waste. PSI operates the National Collection Centre for all non-NPP radioactive waste coming from medicine, industry and research. In Wuerenlingen, the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste (ZZL) has been constructed by the utility-owned company ZWILAG. The application for the general licence for a repository for low and intermediate level waste at the Wellenberg site was rejected by the citizens. Concerning the disposal of high level and long-lived intermediate level waste, the work was concentrated on the demonstration of the feasibility of such a repository in Switzerland. The feasibility study based on a repository in the crystalline basement of Northern Switzerland did not fully succeed in providing the required demonstration. The Federal Council ordered that research should be extended to sedimentary rocks. The results of these investigations formed the basis of a feasibility demonstration, which was submitted for review to the federal authorities. The Federal Council approved

Implementation of the obligations of the joint convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management. Third national report of Switzerland in accordance with Article 32 of the convention

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2008-09-15

application was submitted for a new NPP near the site of the Goesgen NPP. The submission of further general licence applications to replace the older NPPs of Beznau and Muehleberg has been announced. The major part of nuclear research in Switzerland is performed at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI). These include research related to spent fuel and radioactive waste management. PSI operates several nuclear facilities: the research reactor PROTEUS, a hot laboratory, and waste management facilities. The former research reactors DIORIT and SAPHIR are in the state of decommissioning. Two small research reactors exist at the University of Basel (Uni BS) and at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne (EPFL) for teaching purposes. The former Lucens experimental NPP was decommissioned and dismantled after experiencing a loss of coolant accident in 1969. This site was declassified and released for non-nuclear activities. Each NPP has facilities for the conditioning and interim storage of radioactive waste. PSI operates the National Collection Centre for all non-NPP radioactive waste coming from medicine, industry and research. In Wuerenlingen, the Central Storage Facility for Radioactive Waste (ZZL) has been constructed by the utility-owned company ZWILAG. The application for the general licence for a repository for low and intermediate level waste at the Wellenberg site was rejected by the citizens. Concerning the disposal of high level and long-lived intermediate level waste, the work was concentrated on the demonstration of the feasibility of such a repository in Switzerland. The feasibility study based on a repository in the crystalline basement of Northern Switzerland did not fully succeed in providing the required demonstration. The Federal Council ordered that research should be extended to sedimentary rocks. The results of these investigations formed the basis of a feasibility demonstration, which was submitted for review to the federal authorities. The Federal

Grohnde. Documentation of the police operation during the demonstration against the NPP Grohnde on 19.03.1977 and the evacuation of the occupied cooling tower site on 23.08.1977; Grohnde. Dokumentation der Polizeieinsaetze anlaesslich der Demonstration gegen das Kernkraftwerk Grohnde am 19.03.1977 und der Raeumung des besetzten Kuehlturmgelaendes am 23.08.1977

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Stricker, Michael

2014-07-01

The documentation of the police operation during the demonstration against the NPP Grohnde on 16.03.1977 and the evacuation of the occupied cooling tower site on 23.08.1977 covers the following issues: involved action forces: police Niedersachsen, police Nordrhein-Westfalen, police Schleswig-Holstein, police Bremen and the Bundesgrenzschutz; concept of the police operation, provisions (lodging and board) for the police, operating resources, details of the operation sequence; post-processing of the operation; the Grohnde trials.

Regulatory overview report 2013 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-06-01

The Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) acting as the regulatory body of the Swiss Federation assesses and monitors nuclear facilities in Switzerland: these include five nuclear power plants, the interim storage facilities based at each plant, the Central Interim Storage Facility (ZWILAG) at Wuerenlingen together with the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) and the two universities of Basel and Lausanne. Using a combination of inspections, regulatory meetings, examinations and analyses together with reports from the licensees of individual facilities, ENSI obtains the overview required concerning nuclear safety. It ensures that the facilities comply with regulations. Its regulatory responsibilities include the transport of radioactive materials from and to nuclear facilities and the preparations for a deep geological repository for nuclear waste. ENSI maintains its own emergency organisation, an integral part of the national emergency structure. It provides the public with information on particular events in nuclear facilities. This Surveillance Report describes operational experience, systems technology, radiological protection and management in all the nuclear facilities. Generic issues relevant to all facilities such as probabilistic safety analyses are described. In 2013, the five nuclear power plants in Switzerland (Beznau Units 1 and 2, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt) were all operated safely and had complied with their approved operating conditions. The nuclear safety at all plants was rated as being good. 34 events were reported. During operation, no reactor scrams were recorded. On the INES scale, ranging from 0-7, ENSI rated all reportable events as Level 0. The ENSI safety evaluation reflects both reportable events and the results of the approximately 460 inspections conducted during 2013. ZWILAG consists of several storage halls, a conditioning plant and a plasma plant. At the end of 2013, the cask storage hall

Regulatory oversight report 2016 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-06-01

ENSI, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, assesses and monitors safety in the Swiss nuclear facilities. These include the five nuclear power plants: Beznau Units 1 and 2 (KKB1 and KKB2), Muehleberg (KKM), Goesgen (KKG) and Leibstadt (KKL), the interim storage facilities based at each plant, the Central Interim Storage Facility (Zwilag) in Wuerenlingen together with the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), the University of Basel (UniB) and the Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL). Using a combination of inspections, regulatory meetings, checks, analyses and the reporting of the operators of individual facilities, ENSI obtains the required overview of nuclear safety in these facilities. It ensures that they operate as required by law. ENSI's regulatory responsibilities also include the transport of radioactive materials from and to nuclear facilities and preparations for a deep geological repository for radioactive waste. ENSI maintains its own emergency organisation, which is an integral part of the national emergency structure that would be activated in the event of a serious incident at a nuclear facility in Switzerland. ENSI reports periodically on its supervisory activities. It informs the public about special events and findings in the nuclear installations. All five nuclear power plants in Switzerland operated safely during the past year. Nuclear safety at all plants in operation was rated as good or satisfactory. In 2016, there were 31 reportable events at the nuclear power plants. 30 events were rated Level 0 (event of no or low safety significance) on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) and one was rated Level 1 (anomaly) at KKL. Zwilag consists of several interim storage buildings, a conditioning plant and a plasma plant (incineration/melting plant). At the end of 2016, the cask storage hall contained 56 transport/storage casks with spent fuel assemblies and vitrified residue

Regulatory overview report 2014 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2015-06-01

The Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI), acting as the regulatory body of the Swiss Federation, assesses and monitors nuclear facilities in Switzerland: the five nuclear power plants, the interim storage facilities based at each plant, the Central Interim Storage Facility (ZWILAG) at Wuerenlingen together with the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), the University of Basel (UniB) and the Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL). Using a combination of inspections, regulatory meetings, examinations and analyses together with reports from the licensees of individual facilities, ENSI obtains the required overview of nuclear safety. It ensures that they comply with regulations. Its regulatory responsibilities include the transport of radioactive materials from and to nuclear facilities and the preparations for a deep geological repository for nuclear waste. ENSI maintains its own emergency organisation, an integral part of the national emergency structure. It provides the public with information on particular events in nuclear facilities. This Surveillance Report describes the operational experience, systems technology, radiological protection and management in all nuclear facilities. Generic issues relevant to all facilities such as probabilistic safety analyses are described. In 2014, all five nuclear power plants in Switzerland (Beznau Units I and 2, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt) were operated safely. The nuclear safety at all plants was rated as good. 38 events were reported. There was one reactor scram at the Leibstadt nuclear power plant. On the International Event Scale (INES), ranging from 0--7, 37 events were rated as Level 0; one event was rated as INES 1: drill holes had penetrated the steel wall of the containment to secure two hand-held fire extinguishers. ZWILAG consists of several interim storage halls, a conditioning plant and a plasma plant. At the end of 2014, the cask storage hall contained 42

Swiss regulatory use of databanks for nuclear power plant life management, surveillance and safety analyses

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

Tipping, Ph.; Beutler, R.; Schoen, G.; Noeggerath, J.

2002-01-01

achieved. The Inspectorate processes these data under the auspices of its own specialist group, and a final decision as to the root cause and the safety importance is made. In this way, any differences in interpretation of importance and safety impact of events between the Inspectorate's own assessment and that of the NPP operators can be analysed, discussed and put into the correct context and perspective. Generally, the reportable event assessments and proposed mitigation or other actions of the operators have been found to be acceptable to the Inspectorate, but, in some cases, differences between the interpretations of the regulator and operator have become apparent. The Inspectorate has, over the years, collected data concerned with all aspects of safety, backfitting and modifications in the Swiss and also other NPPs. The main DBs of the Inspectorate are: 1) Reportable Events DB, 2) Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) DB and 3) Damage and Degradation of SSCs DB. The Inspectorate's reportable events DB has been conceived to incorporate a classification of SSCs and failure types according to the IAEA/NEA incident reporting system (IRS). All the DBs enable the user to obtain condensed reports of the incidents, materials and systems or components involved, the assessments of the NPP operators and the finally binding, salient points and lessons-learned summaries with recommendations or requirements to the NPP operator, from the Inspectorate. All of the DBs are updated regularly since they are living documents. The DBs are so conceived that the Swiss NPPs (Muehleberg/G.E.BWR; Beznau 1 and 2 /Westinghouse PWRs; Goesgen/KWU PWR and Leibstadt/G.E. BWR) can be individually analysed and, where applicable, comparisons undertaken. The Inspectorate's DBs have proven to be informative and practical tools to register, monitor and register information on all events concerned with the operation of NPPs. An overview of the structures of the individual DBs is provided. Focus is made on

Regulatory overview report 2014 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations; Aufsichtsbericht 2014 zur nuklearen Sicherheit in den schweizerischen Kernanlagen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2015-06-15

The Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI), acting as the regulatory body of the Swiss Federation, assesses and monitors nuclear facilities in Switzerland: the five nuclear power plants, the interim storage facilities based at each plant, the Central Interim Storage Facility (ZWILAG) at Wuerenlingen together with the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), the University of Basel (UniB) and the Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL). Using a combination of inspections, regulatory meetings, examinations and analyses together with reports from the licensees of individual facilities, ENSI obtains the required overview of nuclear safety. It ensures that they comply with regulations. Its regulatory responsibilities include the transport of radioactive materials from and to nuclear facilities and the preparations for a deep geological repository for nuclear waste. ENSI maintains its own emergency organisation, an integral part of the national emergency structure. It provides the public with information on particular events in nuclear facilities. This Surveillance Report describes the operational experience, systems technology, radiological protection and management in all nuclear facilities. Generic issues relevant to all facilities such as probabilistic safety analyses are described. In 2014, all five nuclear power plants in Switzerland (Beznau Units I and 2, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt) were operated safely. The nuclear safety at all plants was rated as good. 38 events were reported. There was one reactor scram at the Leibstadt nuclear power plant. On the International Event Scale (INES), ranging from 0--7, 37 events were rated as Level 0; one event was rated as INES 1: drill holes had penetrated the steel wall of the containment to secure two hand-held fire extinguishers. ZWILAG consists of several interim storage halls, a conditioning plant and a plasma plant. At the end of 2014, the cask storage hall contained 42

Regulatory overview report 2013 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations; Aufsichtsbericht 2013 zur nuklearen Sicherheit in den schweizerischen Kernanlagen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2014-06-15

The Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) acting as the regulatory body of the Swiss Federation assesses and monitors nuclear facilities in Switzerland: these include five nuclear power plants, the interim storage facilities based at each plant, the Central Interim Storage Facility (ZWILAG) at Wuerenlingen together with the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) and the two universities of Basel and Lausanne. Using a combination of inspections, regulatory meetings, examinations and analyses together with reports from the licensees of individual facilities, ENSI obtains the overview required concerning nuclear safety. It ensures that the facilities comply with regulations. Its regulatory responsibilities include the transport of radioactive materials from and to nuclear facilities and the preparations for a deep geological repository for nuclear waste. ENSI maintains its own emergency organisation, an integral part of the national emergency structure. It provides the public with information on particular events in nuclear facilities. This Surveillance Report describes operational experience, systems technology, radiological protection and management in all the nuclear facilities. Generic issues relevant to all facilities such as probabilistic safety analyses are described. In 2013, the five nuclear power plants in Switzerland (Beznau Units 1 and 2, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt) were all operated safely and had complied with their approved operating conditions. The nuclear safety at all plants was rated as being good. 34 events were reported. During operation, no reactor scrams were recorded. On the INES scale, ranging from 0-7, ENSI rated all reportable events as Level 0. The ENSI safety evaluation reflects both reportable events and the results of the approximately 460 inspections conducted during 2013. ZWILAG consists of several storage halls, a conditioning plant and a plasma plant. At the end of 2013, the cask storage hall

Regulatory oversight report 2016 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations; Aufsichtsbericht 2016 zur nuklearen Sicherheit in den schweizerischen Kernanlagen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2017-06-15

ENSI, the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate, assesses and monitors safety in the Swiss nuclear facilities. These include the five nuclear power plants: Beznau Units 1 and 2 (KKB1 and KKB2), Muehleberg (KKM), Goesgen (KKG) and Leibstadt (KKL), the interim storage facilities based at each plant, the Central Interim Storage Facility (Zwilag) in Wuerenlingen together with the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), the University of Basel (UniB) and the Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL). Using a combination of inspections, regulatory meetings, checks, analyses and the reporting of the operators of individual facilities, ENSI obtains the required overview of nuclear safety in these facilities. It ensures that they operate as required by law. ENSI's regulatory responsibilities also include the transport of radioactive materials from and to nuclear facilities and preparations for a deep geological repository for radioactive waste. ENSI maintains its own emergency organisation, which is an integral part of the national emergency structure that would be activated in the event of a serious incident at a nuclear facility in Switzerland. ENSI reports periodically on its supervisory activities. It informs the public about special events and findings in the nuclear installations. All five nuclear power plants in Switzerland operated safely during the past year. Nuclear safety at all plants in operation was rated as good or satisfactory. In 2016, there were 31 reportable events at the nuclear power plants. 30 events were rated Level 0 (event of no or low safety significance) on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) and one was rated Level 1 (anomaly) at KKL. Zwilag consists of several interim storage buildings, a conditioning plant and a plasma plant (incineration/melting plant). At the end of 2016, the cask storage hall contained 56 transport/storage casks with spent fuel assemblies and vitrified residue

Joint convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management -- Fifth Swiss national report in accordance with article 32 of the Convention

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2014-01-01

Scherrer Institute (PSI) in the areas of elementary particle physics, biological sciences including radiation protection, solid state research and material science, nuclear as well as non-nuclear energy research and environmental research related to energy production, medical research and medical treatment. These include research related to spent fuel and radioactive waste management. The research reactors DIORIT and SAPHIR were decommissioned. PROTEUS has been shut down and will be decommissioned. Two small research reactors at the University of Basel and at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne are used for teaching purposes. The reactor in Basel will be decommissioned. The former Lucens experimental NPP was decommissioned and dismantled after a loss of coolant accident in 1969. The nuclear waste was transported to the Central Interim Storage Facility (ZWILAG) at Wuerenlingen. The site was released from nuclear legislation. The research reactor at the University of Geneva was decommissioned. Each NPP has facilities for the conditioning and interim storage of radioactive waste. At the Beznau NPP, there is a facility for the dry storage of spent fuel elements and vitrified high-level waste. At the Goesgen NPP, a building for the wet storage of spent fuel elements was erected. The Leibstadt NPP is erecting a new building for solid radioactive waste and for interim storage of large components to be dismantled from the plant. PSI collects radioactive waste from medicine, industry and research. A pilot plant which was operated to incinerate low radioactive waste will be decommissioned. ZWILAG consists of many storage halls for spent fuel, vitrified high-level waste and other intermediate- and low-level radioactive waste. It includes facilities for the conditioning, incineration or melting of low level waste. After test campaigns with the plasma incinerator for radioactive waste, ENSI granted the licence for permanent operation. The producers of radioactive

Regulatory oversight report 2015 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2016-06-01

The Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) assesses and monitors nuclear facilities in Switzerland. These include the five nuclear power plants (Beznau Units 1 and 2, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt), the interim storage facilities based at each plant, the Central Interim Storage Facility (Zwilag) at Wuerenlingen together with the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), the University of Basel and the Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL), as well as the transport of radioactive materials and the preparatory work for a deep geological repository for nuclear waste. Using a combination of inspections, regulatory meetings, examinations and analyses together with reports from the licensees of individual facilities, ENSI obtains the required overview of nuclear safety in these facilities. ENSI maintains its own emergency organization. It provides the public with information on particular events and findings in nuclear facilities. ENSI publishes an annual Radiological Protection Report and a Research and Experience Report. Chapters 1 to 4 of this Surveillance Report deal with operational experience, systems technology, radiological protection and management of the 5 Swiss nuclear power plants. Chapter 5 deals with Zwilag. Chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to the nuclear facilities at PSI and the research reactor at EPFL as well as the decommissioned University of Basel’s research reactor. Chapter 8 covers the transport of radioactive materials. The subject of Chapter 9 is the deep geological storage of radioactive waste including work within the framework of the Sectoral Plan. Finally, Chapter 10 deals with generic issues relevant to all facilities such as probabilistic safety analyses. In 2015, all five nuclear power plants in Switzerland were safely operated and ENSI concluded that each had adhered to its approved operating conditions. There were 34 reportable events at the nuclear power plants; 32 events were rated at Level 0 on

Research and experience report 2016 - Developments in the technical and legal basis for nuclear oversight

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2017-04-01

nuclear power plants are analysed in conditions ranging from normal operation through to accidents involving core meltdown. The results of computer models are used for the quantitative identification of plant risk in probabilistic safety analyses. A new project run by the Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) deals with the quantification of safety margins when injecting cold coolant into the reactor pressure vessel (thermal shock). PSI's research activities concern radiation measurement techniques, aerial radiometrics (measuring airborne radioactivity), and development of new radionuclide analysis methods. The field of radioactive waste management covers not only deep geological disposal, but also waste transport and interim storage. A doctoral thesis at the University of Bayreuth in Germany is studying heat production in transport and storage casks. A dissertation at the ETH led to valuable findings on the hydromechanical behaviour of Opalinus Clay. ETH scientists are carrying out rock mechanics tests in Opalinus Clay. A doctoral thesis at the University of Bern was the first study to succeed in the absolute dating of the sheet gravel deposits; these highly perched deposits in Northern Switzerland are of particular interest for determining long-term denudation rates. A project is looking at the sequence of ice-age sediments in the Upper Rhine valley. The current report provides information on a selection of events in facilities outside Switzerland which could be relevant for Swiss nuclear facilities. Due to shortcomings in the documentation and quality of forged components in French nuclear power plants, ENSI had requested additional tests in Swiss nuclear power plants. Tests to check forged components in steam generators commence in early 2017 in the Beznau and Goesgen nuclear plants. Shortcomings in the documentation and quality of transport and storage casks were also observed in the waste management sector. Discrepancies found in a few cases

Research and experience report 2016 - Developments in the technical and legal basis for nuclear oversight; Erfahrungs- und Forschungsbericht 2016 - Entwicklungen im Bereich der Grundlagen der nuklearen Aufsicht

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2017-04-15

nuclear power plants are analysed in conditions ranging from normal operation through to accidents involving core meltdown. The results of computer models are used for the quantitative identification of plant risk in probabilistic safety analyses. A new project run by the Gesellschaft fuer Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) deals with the quantification of safety margins when injecting cold coolant into the reactor pressure vessel (thermal shock). PSI's research activities concern radiation measurement techniques, aerial radiometrics (measuring airborne radioactivity), and development of new radionuclide analysis methods. The field of radioactive waste management covers not only deep geological disposal, but also waste transport and interim storage. A doctoral thesis at the University of Bayreuth in Germany is studying heat production in transport and storage casks. A dissertation at the ETH led to valuable findings on the hydromechanical behaviour of Opalinus Clay. ETH scientists are carrying out rock mechanics tests in Opalinus Clay. A doctoral thesis at the University of Bern was the first study to succeed in the absolute dating of the sheet gravel deposits; these highly perched deposits in Northern Switzerland are of particular interest for determining long-term denudation rates. A project is looking at the sequence of ice-age sediments in the Upper Rhine valley. The current report provides information on a selection of events in facilities outside Switzerland which could be relevant for Swiss nuclear facilities. Due to shortcomings in the documentation and quality of forged components in French nuclear power plants, ENSI had requested additional tests in Swiss nuclear power plants. Tests to check forged components in steam generators commence in early 2017 in the Beznau and Goesgen nuclear plants. Shortcomings in the documentation and quality of transport and storage casks were also observed in the waste management sector. Discrepancies found in a few cases

Regulatory oversight report 2015 concerning nuclear safety in Swiss nuclear installations; Aufsichtsbericht 2015 zur nuklearen Sicherheit in den schweizerischen Kernanlagen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2016-06-15

The Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) assesses and monitors nuclear facilities in Switzerland. These include the five nuclear power plants (Beznau Units 1 and 2, Muehleberg, Goesgen and Leibstadt), the interim storage facilities based at each plant, the Central Interim Storage Facility (Zwilag) at Wuerenlingen together with the nuclear facilities at the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), the University of Basel and the Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL), as well as the transport of radioactive materials and the preparatory work for a deep geological repository for nuclear waste. Using a combination of inspections, regulatory meetings, examinations and analyses together with reports from the licensees of individual facilities, ENSI obtains the required overview of nuclear safety in these facilities. ENSI maintains its own emergency organization. It provides the public with information on particular events and findings in nuclear facilities. ENSI publishes an annual Radiological Protection Report and a Research and Experience Report. Chapters 1 to 4 of this Surveillance Report deal with operational experience, systems technology, radiological protection and management of the 5 Swiss nuclear power plants. Chapter 5 deals with Zwilag. Chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to the nuclear facilities at PSI and the research reactor at EPFL as well as the decommissioned University of Basel’s research reactor. Chapter 8 covers the transport of radioactive materials. The subject of Chapter 9 is the deep geological storage of radioactive waste including work within the framework of the Sectoral Plan. Finally, Chapter 10 deals with generic issues relevant to all facilities such as probabilistic safety analyses. In 2015, all five nuclear power plants in Switzerland were safely operated and ENSI concluded that each had adhered to its approved operating conditions. There were 34 reportable events at the nuclear power plants; 32 events were rated at Level 0 on

Joint convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste management -- Fifth Swiss national report in accordance with article 32 of the Convention

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2014-07-01

Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) in the areas of elementary particle physics, biological sciences including radiation protection, solid state research and material science, nuclear as well as non-nuclear energy research and environmental research related to energy production, medical research and medical treatment. These include research related to spent fuel and radioactive waste management. The research reactors DIORIT and SAPHIR were decommissioned. PROTEUS has been shut down and will be decommissioned. Two small research reactors at the University of Basel and at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne are used for teaching purposes. The reactor in Basel will be decommissioned. The former Lucens experimental NPP was decommissioned and dismantled after a loss of coolant accident in 1969. The nuclear waste was transported to the Central Interim Storage Facility (ZWILAG) at Wuerenlingen. The site was released from nuclear legislation. The research reactor at the University of Geneva was decommissioned. Each NPP has facilities for the conditioning and interim storage of radioactive waste. At the Beznau NPP, there is a facility for the dry storage of spent fuel elements and vitrified high-level waste. At the Goesgen NPP, a building for the wet storage of spent fuel elements was erected. The Leibstadt NPP is erecting a new building for solid radioactive waste and for interim storage of large components to be dismantled from the plant. PSI collects radioactive waste from medicine, industry and research. A pilot plant which was operated to incinerate low radioactive waste will be decommissioned. ZWILAG consists of many storage halls for spent fuel, vitrified high-level waste and other intermediate- and low-level radioactive waste. It includes facilities for the conditioning, incineration or melting of low level waste. After test campaigns with the plasma incinerator for radioactive waste, ENSI granted the licence for permanent operation. The producers of

Expert report of ENSI on the request of EKKB AG for a general license - Project 'New nuclear power plant to replace the Beznau plant'

International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

2010-09-01

The 'Ersatz Kernkraftwerk Beznau AG' (EKKB) Company submitted to the Swiss Federal Inspectorate of Nuclear Safety (ENSI) a request for a general license for a new power plant to be built near to the Beznau power plants. According to the law, all damage risks with a probability higher than 10 -4 /a must be taken into account through protection measures. The considered risks concern the power plant itself as well as the population in the neighbourhood and the environment. The purpose of the general license is to demonstrate that the site chosen for the foreseen power plant is acceptable and that the risks can be counteracted through adequate measures. The buildings of the power plant and their partition on the Beznau Island in the Aare River are briefly described. The reactor is a Light Water Reactor of third generation with a maximum electrical power of 1450 MW el ±20%. The main cooling is provided by a hybrid system of water evaporation and air heating, what reduces the plume at the exit of the cooling tower. First, it is demonstrated that, in the case of a very unlikely severe accident in the power plant, the people in the neighbourhood can be evacuated quickly. Then, numerous types of possible accidents in the neighbourhood of the power plant are analyzed in order to settle their possible negative influence on the operation of the power plant: bursting of gas containers on the neighbouring roads and railways, fires of all types of hydrocarbons, air pollution through chloride gas, etc. The check by ENSI of the EKKB studies on the potential danger for the power plant through neighbouring industrial plants, roads or railways demonstrated that none of the considered accidents presents an unacceptable risk for the power plant: on the one hand, these plants are located too far from the power plant, so that a sensible injury to the power plant safety can be excluded; on the other, the protection of the power plant can be guaranteed through appropriate technical

Expert report of ENSI on the request of EKKM AG for a general license - Project 'New nuclear power plant to replace the Muehleberg plant'; Gutachten des ENSI zum Rahmenbewilligungsgesuch der EKKM AG. Neubauprojekt Ersatzkernkraftwerk Muehleberg

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2010-09-15

The 'Ersatz Kernkraftwerk Muehleberg AG' (EKKM) Company submitted to the Swiss Federal Inspectorate of Nuclear Safety (ENSI) a request for a general license for a new power plant to be built near to the Muehleberg power plant. According to the law, all damage risks with a probability higher than 10{sup -4}/a must be taken into account through protection measures. The considered risks concern the power plant itself as well as the population in the neighbourhood and the environment. The purpose of the general license is to demonstrate that the site chosen for the foreseen power plant is acceptable and that the risks can be counteracted through adequate measures. The buildings of the power plant and their partition on the left side of the Aare River are briefly described. The reactor is a Light Water Reactor of third generation with a maximum electrical power of 1.6 GW{sub el}. The European Pressurized water Reactor, which is of the same power class, can be taken as an example for planning that will follow. The main cooling is provided by one or, if needed, two cooling towers using a hybrid system of water evaporation and air heating, what reduces the plume at the exit of the cooling towers. The population density in the neighbourhood of the power plant is low; it is demonstrated that, in the case of a very unlikely severe accident in the power plant, the people in the neighbourhood can be evacuated quickly. Then, numerous types of possible accidents in the neighbourhood of the power plant are analyzed in order to settle their possible negative influence on the operation of the power plant: bursting of gas containers on the neighbouring roads and railways, fires of all types of hydrocarbons, air pollution through chloride gas, etc. The check by ENSI of the EKKM studies on the potential danger for the power plant through neighbouring industrial plants, roads or railways demonstrated that none of the considered accidents presents an unacceptable risk for the

Expert report of ENSI on the request of EKKB AG for a general license - Project 'New nuclear power plant to replace the Beznau plant'; Gutachten des ENSI zum Rahmenbewilligungsgesuch der EKKB AG. Neubauprojekt Ersatzkernkraftwerk Beznau

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

NONE

2010-09-15

The 'Ersatz Kernkraftwerk Beznau AG' (EKKB) Company submitted to the Swiss Federal Inspectorate of Nuclear Safety (ENSI) a request for a general license for a new power plant to be built near to the Beznau power plants. According to the law, all damage risks with a probability higher than 10{sup -4}/a must be taken into account through protection measures. The considered risks concern the power plant itself as well as the population in the neighbourhood and the environment. The purpose of the general license is to demonstrate that the site chosen for the foreseen power plant is acceptable and that the risks can be counteracted through adequate measures. The buildings of the power plant and their partition on the Beznau Island in the Aare River are briefly described. The reactor is a Light Water Reactor of third generation with a maximum electrical power of 1450 MW{sub el} {+-}20%. The main cooling is provided by a hybrid system of water evaporation and air heating, what reduces the plume at the exit of the cooling tower. First, it is demonstrated that, in the case of a very unlikely severe accident in the power plant, the people in the neighbourhood can be evacuated quickly. Then, numerous types of possible accidents in the neighbourhood of the power plant are analyzed in order to settle their possible negative influence on the operation of the power plant: bursting of gas containers on the neighbouring roads and railways, fires of all types of hydrocarbons, air pollution through chloride gas, etc. The check by ENSI of the EKKB studies on the potential danger for the power plant through neighbouring industrial plants, roads or railways demonstrated that none of the considered accidents presents an unacceptable risk for the power plant: on the one hand, these plants are located too far from the power plant, so that a sensible injury to the power plant safety can be excluded; on the other, the protection of the power plant can be guaranteed through

Studies on the deterministic and probabilistic assessment of external effects. Deterministic investigation of the robustness of German nuclear power plants against external effects under consideration of actual findings on the events to be assumed; Untersuchungen zur deterministischen und probabilistischen Bewertung von Einwirkungen von aussen (EVA-Ereignisse). Deterministische Untersuchung der Widerstandsfaehigkeit deutscher Kernkraftwerke gegen Einwirkungen von aussen, unter Beruecksichtigung aktueller Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich der anzusetzenden Einwirkungen

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Sperbeck, Silvio; Strack, Christian; Thuma, Gernot

2013-11-15

The aim of the analyses on natural hazards described in this report was to evaluate the advantages of innovative hazard assessment methods available today over the hazard assessment methods commonly applied for German nuclear power plant sites in the past. For each hazard under consideration (earthquake, flooding, and wind loads) it has been assessed whether the new methods provide additional insights that could call for their mandatory application in future site specific hazard assessments. If no additional insights are gained, the hitherto applied methods can be considered adequate according to today's standards. In the context of this work, no areas could be identified where the hazard assessment methods stipulated in German (nuclear) regulations are generally inadequate. These methods that are commonly applied in practice do not seem to be prone to significantly underestimate the site specific hazard. Nevertheless, some newer methods allow for more precise (reduction of uncertainties) and more comprehensive (consideration of additional hazard characteristics) hazard assessments. Therefore, depending on the hazard under consideration, it could be advisable to supplement future site specific hazard assessments by some additional analyses. As the methods for some of these additional analyses are not yet fully developed, further research will be necessary to enable these amendments.

Scientific-technical cooperation with foreign (esp. Europe and INSC partner countries) nuclear regulatory authorities and their technical support organizations in the fields of nuclear safety of operating nuclear power plants and on the concept evaluation of generation 3+ plants. Final report; Wissenschaftlich-Technische Zusammenarbeit (WTZ) mit auslaendischen (insbesondere in Europa und INSC-Partnerstaaten) atomrechtlichen Behoerden und deren Sachverstaendigenorganisationen zur nuklearen Sicherheit in Betrieb befindlicher Kernkraftwerke und zur Konzeptbewertung von Generation-3+-Anlagen. Abschlussbericht

Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

Wolff, Holger

2016-09-15

The BMUB/BfS-Project 3614I01512 forms the frame of the GRS for the scientific-technical cooperation with Technical Support Organisations and Nuclear Regulatory Authorities in the field of nuclear safety in operating NPPs and for the concept evaluation of generation 3{sup +} plants in Europe and INSC Partner Countries. In the present final project report results are described which were gained within the project duration 15.10.2014 up to the 30.09.2016 in the following working packages: Investigations following the catastrophe of Fukushima Daiichi, Evaluation of selected National Action Plans, DBA and severe accident analyses for NPP with PWR (WWER-440, WWER-1000), cooperation with INSC partner countries on DBA, BDBA and severe accident analyses for WWER plants of generation 3{sup +} and building NRA and safety evaluation capacities and decommissioning of nuclear facilities and disposal of radioactive waste. The results are preceded by an outline on the activities related to the project management and to the planning of the bilateral work.