WorldWideScience

Sample records for integrated safeguards experiment

  1. Integrated safeguards: Australian views and experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.; Bragin, V.; Leslie, R.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: Australia has had a pioneering role in assisting the IAEA to develop the procedures and methods for strengthened safeguards, both before and after the conclusion of Australia's additional protocol. Australia played a key role in the negotiation of the model additional protocol, and made ratification a high priority in order to encourage early ratification by other States. Australia was the first State to ratify an additional protocol, on 10 December 1997, and was the first State in which the IAEA exercised complementary access and managed access under an additional protocol. Australia has undergone three full cycles of evaluation under strengthened safeguards measures, enabling the Agency to conclude it was appropriate to commence implementation of integrated safeguards. In January 2001 Australia became the first State in which integrated safeguards are being applied. As such, Australia's experience will be of interest to other States as they consult with the IAEA on the modalities for the introduction of integrated safeguards in their jurisdictions. The purpose of the paper is to outline Australia's experience with strengthened safeguards and Australia's views on the implementation of integrated safeguards. Australia has five Material Balance Areas (MBAs), the principal one covering the 10 MWt research reactor at Lucas Heights and the associated inventory of fresh and irradiated HEU fuel. Under classical safeguards, generally Australia was subject to annual Physical Inventory Verifications (PIVs) for the four MBAs at Lucas Heights, plus quarterly interim inspections, making a total of four inspections a year (PIVs for the different MBAs were conducted concurrently with each other or with interim inspections in other MBAs), although there was a period when the fresh fuel inventory exceeded one SQ, requiring monthly inspections. Under strengthened safeguards, this pattern of four inspections a year was maintained, with the addition of complementary

  2. Lessons learned: Experiences with Integrated Safeguards in Norway

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sekse, T.; Hornkjol, S.

    2010-01-01

    Integrated safeguards (IS) was implemented in Norway in 2002 as one of the first countries in the world. The implementation of IS has provided both advantages and disadvantages for Norway. Lessons learned will be discussed. The concept of unannounced inspections under the integrated safeguards regime compared to traditional safeguards is one of the major issues. Small users with depleted uranium as shielding containers and the effort used to safeguard them is an aspect of this issue. Recently there has been an interest from the IAEA to investigate the historical boundaries between a research reactor site and a neighboring defense research site. The paper will address this issue as a part of the implementation of IS. Lately, we have seen that several commercial parties have started research on nuclear fuel cycle related projects. This raises some questions concerning what to declare under Article 2 of the Additional Protocol (AP). Today anyone with a computer connected to the internet could carry out research amenable to declaration under the AP. This paper will discuss this issue. (author)

  3. The Canadian experience in implementing the State-level integrated safeguards concept

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kent, M.A.; Ellacott, T.

    2013-01-01

    After receiving the Broad Safeguards Conclusion in 2005 that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities, Canada began implementing the State-level Integrated Safeguards Approach for Canada (SLISAC) on a Sector-by-Sector basis, culminating in the full State-wide implementation of Integrated Safeguards in January 2010. The Approach has resulted in a significant reduction in IAEA person days of inspection, a shift from scheduled routine inspections to randomized, short-notice and unannounced inspections, increased information streams on operational activities and inventory flows to the IAEA, and closer collaboration between the Agency and the SSAC (State System of Accounting and Control). This paper will describe the implementation of this new approach, touching on: the main features of the Canadian SLA (State-level Approach); the agreed order of priority in the transition to the approach within the various sectors of the Canadian fuel cycle; the work plan established for moving forward in a logical and orderly manner, thereby allowing all parties to put in place the necessary protocols and procedures; and some initial thoughts on the lessons learned throughout this process. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  4. Experience of Integrated Safeguards Approach for Large-scale Hot Cell Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miyaji, N.; Kawakami, Y.; Koizumi, A.; Otsuji, A.; Sasaki, K.

    2010-01-01

    The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has been operating a large-scale hot cell laboratory, the Fuels Monitoring Facility (FMF), located near the experimental fast reactor Joyo at the Oarai Research and Development Center (JNC-2 site). The FMF conducts post irradiation examinations (PIE) of fuel assemblies irradiated in Joyo. The assemblies are disassembled and non-destructive examinations, such as X-ray computed tomography tests, are carried out. Some of the fuel pins are cut into specimens and destructive examinations, such as ceramography and X-ray micro analyses, are performed. Following PIE, the tested material, in the form of a pin or segments, is shipped back to a Joyo spent fuel pond. In some cases, after reassembly of the examined irradiated fuel pins is completed, the fuel assemblies are shipped back to Joyo for further irradiation. For the IAEA to apply the integrated safeguards approach (ISA) to the FMF, a new verification system on material shipping and receiving process between Joyo and the FMF has been established by the IAEA under technical collaboration among the Japan Safeguard Office (JSGO) of MEXT, the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) and the JAEA. The main concept of receipt/shipment verification under the ISA for JNC-2 site is as follows: under the IS, the FMF is treated as a Joyo-associated facility in terms of its safeguards system because it deals with the same spent fuels. Verification of the material shipping and receiving process between Joyo and the FMF can only be applied to the declared transport routes and transport casks. The verification of the nuclear material contained in the cask is performed with the method of gross defect at the time of short notice random interim inspections (RIIs) by measuring the surface neutron dose rate of the cask, filled with water to reduce radiation. The JAEA performed a series of preliminary tests with the IAEA, the JSGO and the NMCC, and confirmed from the standpoint of the operator that this

  5. Advanced integrated safeguards at Barnwell

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bambas, K.J.; Barnes, L.D.

    1980-06-01

    The development and initial performance testing of an advanced integrated safeguards system at the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant (BNFP) is described. The program concentrates on the integration and coordination of physical security and nuclear materials control and accounting at a single location. Hardware and software for this phase have been installed and are currently being evaluated. The AGNS/DOE program is now in its third year of development at the BNFP

  6. Safeguarding genome integrity

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Sørensen, Claus Storgaard; Syljuåsen, Randi G

    2012-01-01

    Mechanisms that preserve genome integrity are highly important during the normal life cycle of human cells. Loss of genome protective mechanisms can lead to the development of diseases such as cancer. Checkpoint kinases function in the cellular surveillance pathways that help cells to cope with D...

  7. Separations and safeguards model integration.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen

    2010-09-01

    Research and development of advanced reprocessing plant designs can greatly benefit from the development of a reprocessing plant model capable of transient solvent extraction chemistry. This type of model can be used to optimize the operations of a plant as well as the designs for safeguards, security, and safety. Previous work has integrated a transient solvent extraction simulation module, based on the Solvent Extraction Process Having Interaction Solutes (SEPHIS) code developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, with the Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) developed at Sandia National Laboratory, as a first step toward creating a more versatile design and evaluation tool. The goal of this work was to strengthen the integration by linking more variables between the two codes. The results from this integrated model show expected operational performance through plant transients. Additionally, ORIGEN source term files were integrated into the SSPM to provide concentrations, radioactivity, neutron emission rate, and thermal power data for various spent fuels. This data was used to generate measurement blocks that can determine the radioactivity, neutron emission rate, or thermal power of any stream or vessel in the plant model. This work examined how the code could be expanded to integrate other separation steps and benchmark the results to other data. Recommendations for future work will be presented.

  8. Steps of Ukrainian SSAC to Integrated Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lopatin, S.

    2010-01-01

    Strengthening of SSAC is a necessary condition for application of integrated safeguards. Ukrainian State System has been working since 1994 and passed several stages in its development: At the early stage it allowed us to conclude the first Safeguards Agreement; In 2003 SSAC covered also all nuclear material at locations outside facilities; In 2006 Additional Protocol (AP) entered into force. The significant contribution to strengthening of SSAC has been made by ISSAS mission carried out in Ukraine in 2007. The mission helped us to evaluate the State Safeguards System, provided us recommendations on improving of legislation, in particular to establish the system of personnel training. Cooperation between the IAEA and Ukrainian SSAC is carried out in following directions. Annual meeting of Safeguards Implementation Review Group takes place in Kiev. Participants discuss current tasks or problem issues of Safeguards implementation and work out Action Plan in order to resolve a problem or find a way for improving situation. Ukrainian State inspectors organize and take part in each IAEA inspection and complementary access. Ukraine has got considerable experience in the AP implementation, to a certain extent determined by peculiarities of Ukraine as a former part of a nuclear weapon state. For 5 years we have accumulated a significant amount of AP information and it became a problem to keep track of it. Due to Protocol Reporter software has limited possibilities there was a need to develop additional software for AP information management. The transmission of encrypted data on nuclear materials from surveillance systems installed at all NPPs directly to the IAEA Headquarters has started recently. Since September 2010 the IAEA plans to use these data for drawing conclusion of safeguards implementation that will allow to reduce the number of IAEA inspections to the Ukrainian NPPs. While implementing the AP we got a question about correspondence of efforts spent for

  9. Experience on implementation of the Integrated Safeguards approach for the MOX facility from the operator's point of view

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nomi, Takayoshi; Nagatani, Taketeru; Ninagawa, Junichi; Nakajima, Shinji; Maruyama, Hajime; Asano, Takashi; Fujiwara, Shigeo

    2011-01-01

    The IS approach for the JNC-1 site was implemented in August 2008, and this was the first experience in the world. This IS approach aimed not only to improve efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards but also to reduce burden of the plant operation by improvement of efficiency of the inspection activity. It was planned to review effectiveness of this new approach after three years from implementation. And JAEA also evaluated effects by application of the IS approach for two MOX fuel facilities in the JNC-1 site based on the three years experiences from the operator's view point. As the result of evaluation, it was confirmed that there were some difference of benefits by application of the IS approach depending on features of the facility, automation level of equipment and advance level of safeguards systems. (author)

  10. Integrated safeguards and facility design and operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, J.W.; Coulter, C.A.; Markin, J.T.; Thomas, K.E.

    1987-01-01

    The integration of safeguards functions to deter or detect unauthorized actions by an insider requires the careful communication and management of safeguards-relevant information on a timely basis. The traditional separation of safeguards functions into physical protection, materials control, and materials accounting often inhibits important information flows. Redefining the major safeguards functions as authorization, enforcement, and verification, and careful attention to management of information from acquisition to organization, to analysis, to decision making can result in effective safeguards integration. The careful inclusion of these ideas in facility designs and operations will lead to cost-effective safeguards systems. The safeguards authorization function defines, for example, personnel access requirements, processing activities, and materials movements/locations that are permitted to accomplish the mission of the facility. Minimizing the number of authorized personnel, limiting the processing flexibility, and maintaining up-to-date flow sheets will facilitate the detection of unauthorized activities. Enforcement of the authorized activities can be achieved in part through the use of barriers, access control systems, process sensors, and health and safety information. Consideration of safeguards requirements during facility design can improve the enforcement function. Verification includes the familiar materials accounting activities as well as auditing and testing of the other functions

  11. Integrating virtual reality applications in nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barletta, Michael; Crete, Jean-Maurice; Pickett, Susan

    2011-01-01

    Virtual reality (VR) tools have already been developed and deployed in the nuclear industry, including in nuclear power plant construction, project management, equipment and system design, and training. Recognized as powerful tools for, inter alia, integration of data, simulation of activities, design of facilities, validation of concepts and mission planning, their application in nuclear safeguards is still very limited. However, VR tools may eventually offer transformative potential for evolving the future safeguards system to be more fully information-driven. The paper focuses especially on applications in the area of training that have been underway in the Department of Safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It also outlines future applications envisioned for safeguards information and knowledge management, and information-analytic collaboration. The paper identifies some technical and programmatic pre-requisites for realizing the integrative potential of VR technologies. If developed with an orientation to integrating applications through compatible platforms, software, and models, virtual reality tools offer the long-term potential of becoming a real 'game changer,' enabling a qualitative leap in the efficiency and effectiveness of nuclear safeguards. The IAEA invites Member States, industry, and academia to make proposals as to how such integrating potential in the use of virtual reality technology for nuclear safeguards could be realized. (author)

  12. Nuclear Safeguards Infrastructure Development and Integration with Safety and Security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kovacic, Donald N.; Raffo-Caiado, Ana Claudia; McClelland-Kerr, John; Van sickle, Matthew; Bissani, Mo

    2009-01-01

    Faced with increasing global energy demands, many developing countries are considering building their first nuclear power plant. As a country embarks upon or expands its nuclear power program, it should consider how it will address the 19 issues laid out in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) document Milestones in Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power. One of those issues specifically addresses the international nonproliferation treaties and commitments and the implementation of safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons. Given the many legislative, economic, financial, environmental, operational, and other considerations preoccupying their planners, it is often difficult for countries to focus on developing the core strengths needed for effective safeguards implementation. Typically, these countries either have no nuclear experience or it is limited to the operation of research reactors used for radioisotope development and scientific research. As a result, their capacity to apply safeguards and manage fuel operations for a nuclear power program is limited. This paper argues that to address the safeguards issue effectively, a holistic approach must be taken to integrate safeguards with the other IAEA issues including safety and security - sometimes referred to as the '3S' concept. Taking a holistic approach means that a country must consider safeguards within the context of its entire nuclear power program, including operations best practices, safety, and security as well as integration with its larger nonproliferation commitments. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) has been involved in bilateral technical cooperation programs for over 20 years to promote nonproliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. INSEP is currently spearheading efforts to promote the development of

  13. International safeguards: experience and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.; Menlove, H.O.

    1982-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have been applied to over 95% of the nuclear material and facilities outside of the nuclear weapon states. The present system of nonproliferation agreements implemented by IAEA safeguards likely will not be changed in the foreseeable future. Instruments used for nondestructive analysis are described: portable multichannel analyzer, high-level neutron coincidence counter, active well coincidence counter, and neutron coincidence collar. 7 figs

  14. Safeguards Implementation in Kazakhstan: Experience and Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zhantikin, T.

    2015-01-01

    Experience of Kazakhstan joined the NPT in 1993, just after desintegration of USSR, and enforced Safeguards Agreement in 1995 can be interesting in implementation of safeguards in non-standard cases. Having weapon materials and test infrastructure legacy, the country together with IAEA and several donor countries found acceptable approaches to meet NPT provisions. One of challenges was to provide protection of sensitive information that could be accidentally disclosed in safeguards activities. With support of several weapon countries in close cooperation with the IAEA Kazakhstan liquidated test infrastructure in Semipalatinsk, implemented projects on elimination and minimization of use of HEU in civil sector, decommissioning of BN-350 fast breeder reactor. Now the IAEA LEU Bank is going to be established in Kazakhstan, and more challenges are coming in implementation of safeguards. Some technical and organizational details will be described from the experience of Kazakhstan in these projects. (author)

  15. Integrated international safeguards concepts for fuel reprocessing

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.; Camp, A.L.; Cameron, C.P.; Bleck, M.E.; Ellwein, L.B.

    1981-12-01

    This report is the fourth in a series of efforts by the Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, to identify problems and propose solutions for international safeguarding of light-water reactor spent-fuel reprocessing plants. Problem areas for international safeguards were identified in a previous Problem Statement (LA-7551-MS/SAND79-0108). Accounting concepts that could be verified internationally were presented in a subsequent study (LA-8042). Concepts for containment/surveillance were presented, conceptual designs were developed, and the effectiveness of these designs was evaluated in a companion study (SAND80-0160). The report discusses the coordination of nuclear materials accounting and containment/surveillance concepts in an effort to define an effective integrated safeguards system. The Allied-General Nuclear Services fuels reprocessing plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, was used as the reference facility

  16. The integration of process monitoring for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Zinaman, Owen R.

    2010-01-01

    The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model is a reprocessing plant model that has been developed for safeguards analyses of future plant designs. The model has been modified to integrate bulk process monitoring data with traditional plutonium inventory balances to evaluate potential advanced safeguards systems. Taking advantage of the wealth of operator data such as flow rates and mass balances of bulk material, the timeliness of detection of material loss was shown to improve considerably. Four diversion cases were tested including both abrupt and protracted diversions at early and late times in the run. The first three cases indicated alarms before half of a significant quantity of material was removed. The buildup of error over time prevented detection in the case of a protracted diversion late in the run. Some issues related to the alarm conditions and bias correction will need to be addressed in future work. This work both demonstrates the use of the model for performing diversion scenario analyses and for testing advanced safeguards system designs.

  17. Year 2000 experience with safeguards instruments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Coffing, J.

    1999-01-01

    Presentation covers the following items concerning the experiences with safeguards instruments related to Y2K issues: initial Y2K evaluation process; improvement of Y2K testing procedure, policy of the Aquila Technologies Group, Inc. The results concerning Y2K evaluation are presented as designed in the manufacturing process in order to assure success

  18. State system experience with safeguarding power reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Roehnsch, W.

    1982-01-01

    This session describes the development and operation of the State System of Accountancy and Control in the German Democratic Republic, and summarizes operating experience with safeguards at power reactor facilities. Overall organization and responsibilities, containment and surveillance measures, materials accounting, and inspection procedures will be outlined. Cooperation between the IAEA, State system, facility, and supplier authorities will also be addressed

  19. The state-level approach: moving beyond integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tape, James W.

    2008-01-01

    The concept of a State-Level Approach (SLA) for international safeguards planning, implementation, and evaluation was contained in the Conceptual Framework for Integrated Safeguards (IS) agreed in 2002. This paper describes briefly the key elements of the SLA, including State-level factors and high-level safeguards objectives, and considers different cases in which application of the SLA methodology could address safeguards for 'suspect' States, 'good' States, and Nuclear Weapons States hosting fuel cycle centers. The continued use and further development of the SLA to customize safeguards for each State, including for States already under IS, is seen as central to effective and efficient safeguards for an expanding nuclear world.

  20. Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

    1984-07-01

    An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: (1) a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values; (2) a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives; (3) a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them; and (4) a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs. 6 references, 4 figures, 5 tables

  1. Design and evaluation of an integrated safeguards system: principles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Markin, J.T.; Coulter, C.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Whitty, W.J.

    1984-01-01

    An integrated safeguards system is defined as a collection of safeguards activities in which system components are coordinated to meet safeguards objectives efficiently within constraints imposed by safeguards resources, facility operations, potential adversaries, and regulatory requirements. This paper describes principles for designing and evaluating an integrated safeguards system that consists of four parts: a problem definition phase that specifies resources and constraints composing the problem boundary values, a system analysis/synthesis phase that describes how to select and integrate safeguards activities for efficient attainment of system objectives, a system evaluation/optimization phase that defines measures of safeguards performance and develops methods for evaluating them, and a decision-making phase that develops principles for selecting admissible designs and preference-ordering designs

  2. Safeguards by Design - Experiences from New Nuclear Installation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Okko, O.; Honkamaa, T.; Kuusi, A.; Rautjaervi, J.

    2010-01-01

    The experiences obtained from the current construction projects at Olkiluoto clearly point out the need to introduce the safeguards requirements into facility design process at an early stage. The early Design Information is completed, in principle, before the construction. However, during the design of containment, surveillance systems, and non-destructive assay equipment and their cabling, the design requirements for safeguards systems were not available either for the new reactor unit or for the disposal plant with a geological repository. Typically, the official Design Information documents are not available early enough for efficient integration of safeguards systems into new facilities. In case of the Olkiluoto projects, this was due to understandable reasons: at the new reactor unit the design acceptance by the ordering company and by the nuclear safety authorities was a long process, ongoing simultaneously with parts of the construction; and at the geological repository the national legislation assigns the repository the status of a nuclear facility only after the initial construction and research phase of the repository when the long-term safety of the disposal concept is demonstrated. As similar factors are likely to delay the completion of the official Design Information documents with any new reactor projects until the construction is well underway and efficient integration of safeguards systems is impossible. Therefore, the proliferation resistance of new nuclear installations should be addressed in the design phase before the official Design Information documents are finished. This approach was demonstrated with the enlargement of the Olkiluoto spent fuel storage building. For this approach to work, strong national contribution is needed to facilitate the early communication and exchange of information between the IAEA and the other stakeholders to enable the design of facilities that can be efficiently safeguarded. With the renaissance of nuclear

  3. Future directions for international safeguards - ESARDA WG on integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rezniczek, A.

    2013-01-01

    Reducing IAEA inspection effort does not mean that the overall safeguards effort will be reduced. There will be compensation and additional effort spent by states and SSACs (State Systems of Accounting and Control). State and/or regional authorities take very serious their responsibilities to safeguard the nuclear material. Enhanced cooperation between all players should be more seriously considered by the IAEA. A more effective implementation of the principle 'one job - one person' and sub-delegation of verification tasks should be taken into account for future evolution. At present, the state level approach is still based on a bottom up approach and not developed top down. The basis is still an aggregation of the facility specific safeguards approaches with some minor adjustments by state specific factors. The touchstone for a true state level approach would be a top-down development process with the result that safeguards effort spent in a state is no longer strongly correlated to the amount and quality of nuclear material in that state. The limitation of the Physical Model is that only the technical aspects are reflected. To actually perform a proliferation, the technical capability is a necessary but insufficient condition. Besides the pure technical capabilities, one has to consider the feasibility for a state to actually implement a proliferation action in its given environment. Factors to be considered are for example institutional factors, ownership of facilities and social and political structures in the state. The help a purely technical assessment can provide is also limited in cases where states have a well developed fuel cycle and thus have at their disposal all required technical capabilities. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  4. Agreement reached on integrated safeguards in European Union

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    Full text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in cooperation with the European Commission, has reached agreement on arrangements to implement 'integrated safeguards' in all non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Union with significant nuclear activities. 'This important milestone is the result of the constructive common efforts of all parties concerned. It is a clear signal of the importance attributed by the EU and its Member States, as well as the IAEA, to the reinforcement of the nuclear non-proliferation regime,' said Andris Piebalgs, Member of the European Commission in charge of Energy. 'Once we have sufficient confidence that a State' s nuclear activities are purely peaceful, we can apply safeguards measures in a less prescriptive, more customised manner. This reduces the inspection burden on the State and the inspection effort of the IAEA, while enabling the IAEA to maintain the conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities,' said Olli Heinonen, Deputy Director General and Head of IAEA Safeguards Department. Background The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the main international Treaty prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. It entrusts the IAEA to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices through the application of 'safeguards'. IAEA safeguards include comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols that enable the IAEA to conclude that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State. Integrated Safeguards refers to the optimum combination of all safeguards measures available to the Agency under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency in meeting the Agency ' s safeguards obligations. In the European Union, nuclear safeguards are implemented on the basis of the Euratom Treaty and trilateral agreements between Euratom, its Member States and the IAEA

  5. IAEA Safeguards: Present status and experience gained

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thorne, L.; Buechler, C.; Haegglund, E.

    1983-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are at the present under critical review with regard to their purpose and effectiveness. This paper describes the development of the IAEA Safeguards System from the early days, when procedures were developed on an ad hoc basis, to the present day. The development of State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC), and of sophisticated instrumentation, has been necessary to deal with the rapid growth in the quantities of nuclear material and in the number of facilities under safeguards. The paper also discusses some of the managerial and organizational issues that are inherent in such a large international inspectorate. (author)

  6. Integrating Safeguards and Security with Safety into Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert S.; Hockert, John W.; Hebditch, David J.

    2009-01-01

    There is a need to minimize security risks, proliferation hazards, and safety risks in the design of new nuclear facilities in a global environment of nuclear power expansion, while improving the synergy of major design features and raising operational efficiency. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) launched the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) covering many safeguards areas. One of these, launched by NNSA with support of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, was a multi-laboratory project, led by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), to develop safeguards by design. The proposed Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process has been developed as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost effective integration of international safeguards and other nonproliferation barriers with national material control and accountability, physical security, and safety objectives into the overall design process for the nuclear facility lifecycle. A graded, iterative process was developed to integrate these areas throughout the project phases. It identified activities, deliverables, interfaces, and hold points covering both domestic regulatory requirements and international safeguards using the DOE regulatory environment as exemplar to provide a framework and guidance for project management and integration of safety with security during design. Further work, reported in this paper, created a generalized SBD process which could also be employed within the licensed nuclear industry and internationally for design of new facilities. Several tools for integrating safeguards, safety, and security into design are discussed here. SBD appears complementary to the EFCOG TROSSI process for security and safety integration created in 2006, which focuses on standardized upgrades to enable existing DOE facilities to meet a more severe design basis threat. A collaborative approach is suggested.

  7. Safeguards operations in the integral fast reactor fuel cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goff, K.M.; Benedict, R.W.; Brumbach, S.B.; Dickerman, C.E.; Tompot, R.W.

    1994-01-01

    Argonne National Laboratory is currently demonstrating the fuel cycle for the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR), an advanced reactor concept that takes advantage of the properties of metallic fuel and liquid metal cooling to offer significant improvements in reactor safety, operation, fuel-cycle economics, environmental protection, and safeguards. The IFR fuel cycle employs a pyrometallurgical process using molten salts and liquid metals to recover actinides from spent fuel. The safeguards aspects of the fuel cycle demonstration must be approved by the United States Department of Energy, but a further goal of the program is to develop a safeguards system that could gain acceptance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency. This fuel cycle is described with emphasis on aspects that differ from aqueous reprocessing and on its improved safeguardability due to decreased attractiveness and diversion potential of all process streams, including the fuel product

  8. Implementation of integrated safeguards at Nuclear Fuel Plant Pitesti, Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olaru, Vasilica; Ivana, Tiberiu; Epure, Gheorghe

    2010-01-01

    The nuclear activity in ROMANIA was for many years under Traditional Safeguards (TS) and has developed in good conditions this type of nuclear safeguards. Now, the opportunity exists to improve the performance and quality of the safeguards activity and increase the accountancy and control of nuclear material by passing to Integrated Safeguards (IS). The legal framework is the Law 100/2000 for ratification of the Protocol between Romania and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), additional to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania Government and IAEA related to safeguards as part of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons published in the Official Gazette no. 3/31 January 1970, and the Additional Protocol content published in the Official Gazette no. 295/ 29.06.2000. The first discussion about Integrated Safeguards (IS) between Nuclear Fuel Plant (NFP) representatives and IAEA inspectors was in June 2005. In Feb. 2007 an IAEA mission visited NFP and established the main steps for implementing the IS. There were visited the storages, technological flow, and was reviewed the disposal times for different nuclear materials, the applied chemical analysis, measuring methods, weighting method and elaborating procedure of the documents and lists. At that time the IAEA and NFP representatives established the main points for starting the IS at NFP: performing the Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI); communication of the days established for SNRI for each year; communication of the estimated deliveries and shipments for first quarter and then for the rest of the year: daily mail box declaration (DD) with respect to the deposit time for several nuclear materials i.e. advance notification (AN) for each nuclear material transfer (shipments and receipts), others. At 01 June 2007 Romania has passed officially to Integrated Safeguards and NFP (WRMD) has taken all measures to implement this objective. (authors)

  9. Safeguards-by-Design: An Element of 3S Integration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, R.S.; Bjornard, T.A.; Hebdich, D.J.

    2009-01-01

    In 2008, the '20/20 Vision for the Future' background report by the IAEA Director General identified the possibility of integrating certain activities related to safeguards, safety, and security. Later in the year, the independent Commission report prepared at the request of the IAEA Director General noted that the Agency's's roles in nuclear safeguards, safety, and security (3S) complement and can mutually reinforce each other. Safeguards-by-design (SBD) is a practical measure that strengthens 3S integration, especially for the stage of nuclear facility design and construction, but also with ramifications for other stages of the facility life-cycle. This paper describes the SBD concept, with examples for diverse regulatory environments, being developed in the U.S under the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative. This is compared with related international SBD work performed in the recent IAEA workshop on 'Facility Design and Plant Operation Features that Facilitate the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards'. Potential future directions for further development of SBD and its integration within 3S are identified.

  10. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    1998-01-01

    Safeguards activities at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre SCK/CEN answer internal needs, support the Belgian authorities, and support the IAEA. The main objectives of activities concerning safeguards are: (1) to contribute to a prevention of the proliferation of nuclear materials by maintaining an up-to-date expertise in the field of safeguards and providing advice and guidance as well as scientific and technical support to the Belgian authorities and nuclear industry; (2) to improve the qualification and quantification of nuclear materials via nondestructive assay. The main achievements for 1997 are described

  11. Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

    1978-06-01

    Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially-severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. This paper describes a facilities safeguards system suitable for production plant, in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely-coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

  12. Design of integrated safeguards systems for nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    de Montmollin, J.M.; Walton, R.B.

    1976-01-01

    Safeguards systems that are capable of countering postulated threats to nuclear facilities must be closely integrated with plant layout and processes if they are to be effective and if potentially severe impacts on plant operations are to be averted. A facilities safeguards system suitable for a production plant is described in which the traditional elements of physical protection and periodic material-balance accounting are extended and augmented to provide close control of material flows. Discrete material items are subjected to direct, overriding physical control where appropriate. Materials in closely coupled process streams are protected by on-line NDA and weight measurements, with rapid computation of material balances to provide immediate indication of large-scale diversion. The system provides an information and actions at the safeguards/operations interface

  13. Nuclear material data management and integration. A safeguard perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wilkey, David D.; Martin, H.R.; O'Leary, Jerry

    1999-01-01

    This paper is a discussion of the use of available data in the performance of nuclear material (NM) safeguards. The discussion considers the various sources of data and system requirements for collecting and managing that data, and is preliminary concerned with domestic safeguards requirements such as those specified by the US Department of Energy. The preferred configuration for integrated data management does not necessarily require a single computer system; however, separate computerized systems with direct inter-system connections is preferred. Use of all relevant data NM accounting, NM control, physical protection, and non-safeguards) is necessary to assure the most effective protection for the NM inventories. Where direct exchange of data is not possible, a systematic program to implement indirect exchange is essential [ru

  14. CIPSS [computer-integrated process and safeguards system]: The integration of computer-integrated manufacturing and robotics with safeguards, security, and process operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leonard, R.S.; Evans, J.C.

    1987-01-01

    This poster session describes the computer-integrated process and safeguards system (CIPSS). The CIPSS combines systems developed for factory automation and automated mechanical functions (robots) with varying degrees of intelligence (expert systems) to create an integrated system that would satisfy current and emerging security and safeguards requirements. Specifically, CIPSS is an extension of the automated physical security functions concepts. The CIPSS also incorporates the concepts of computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) with integrated safeguards concepts, and draws upon the Defense Advance Research Project Agency's (DARPA's) strategic computing program

  15. Safeguards at Kozloduy NPP - Experience and expectations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Elenkov, Todor

    2001-01-01

    Bulgaria is a party of Non Proliferation Treaty since 5 September 1969. The agreement between IAEA and Bulgaria - INFCIRC 178 - has been in force since 29 February 1972. At that time Bulgaria had one research reactor IRT-2000 in Sofia and two power reactors of WWER-440 type under construction. Now at Kozloduy NPP site there are 4 facilities, which consist of 4 WWER-440 and 2 WWER-1000 type power reactors, producing almost 50% of the electricity in Bulgaria and 1 wet away from reactor spent fuel storage. In 1991 under the green movements and social pressure, the research reactor in Sofia was closed and the construction of the second NPP in Belene with 2 WWER-1000 type reactors was halted. After the transfer in 1994 of the fresh fuel from the research reactor to Kozloduy due to security reasons practically NPP Kozloduy remains the only significant (from safeguards point of view) nuclear site in Bulgaria. In 1972 a 'Nuclear Fuel' group was formed at the Physicists Department in NPP Kozloduy with responsibilities to carry out for safeguards records and reports, fresh and spent fuel transport and control. In 1990 this group was transferred to the Safety Section and since 1992 it exists as 'Control and Accounting for of the Nuclear Materials' - a section in the Safety Department. Currently the section serves all four facilities in NPP Kozloduy and has four people: section head, chief inspector and two inspectors. The main activities of the section include: a) Control of the nuclear fuel location as well as meeting the storage and transport conditions regulations; b) Control of the conditions for normal operations of the installed IAEA surveillance systems; c) Preparation of documents for licensing of fresh and spent nuclear fuel transport; d) Preparation of the official information on nuclear materials location and quantity; e) Preparation of accounting records and the reports for IAEA (ICR, PIL, MBR); f) Co-ordination of the IAEA safeguards inspection activities at NPP

  16. IAEA integrated safeguards instrumentation program (I2SIP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arlt, R.; Fortakov, V.; Gaertner, K.J.

    1995-01-01

    This article is a review of the IAEA integrated safeguards instrumentation program. The historical development of the program is outlined, and current activities are also noted. Brief technical descriptions of certain features are given. It is concluded that the results of this year's efforts in this area will provide significant input and be used to assess the viability of the proposed concepts and to decide on the directions to pursue in the future

  17. Integrated Safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) - Strengthening SSAC for Enhancing Confidence in Compliance with Safeguards Obligations -

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iso, S.; Nishiyama, N.; Kumakura, S.; Takizawa, K.; Yoshida, H.; Kobayashi, I.; Kikuchi, M.; Kimura, N.; Matsubara, T.; Yatsu, S.

    2010-01-01

    IAEA has stated the importance of enhancing cooperation with SSAC. Therefore, Japan has developed the Integrated Safeguards Information System for enhancing confidence in compliance with the national obligation under the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol. Japan already established the National System including national inspections with NDA and DA verification functions and evaluation of data obtained from national inspections and has maintained the National System of safeguards as a SSAC in accordance with the safeguards agreement. Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) is engaged in national safeguards activities as designated organization of national inspectorate and information treatment including safeguards data analysis. Recently, purpose of IAEA's safeguards activities may shift to detection of proliferation based on plausible proliferation paths from detection of diversion by certain material accountancy measures. Major safeguards activities of IAEA have changed from quantitative aspects to qualitative them. As supplements for declining the quantitative measures such as the activities based on the safeguards criteria the IAEA would expect the SSAC functions for maintaining the activities of quantitative manners. Japan believes that the State's responsibility for enhancing cooperation between the National System and the IAEA must assure the confidence level of correctness and completeness of the State declarations with accurate and precise accountability as findings from SSAC. Japan has started the development of the strengthened and autonomous national system namely the Integrated safeguards Information System for Japan (ISIS-J) in order to fulfil our responsibility. Japan would seek to improve quality of information including nuclear material accounting data as well as expanded declaration relevant to nuclear activities in Japan, and to increase abilities for explaining safeguards relevant events in Japan. The enhanced findings could include

  18. Quality control of MC and A system and integrated safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    2000-01-01

    In the integrated safeguards regime, co-operation with SSAC is a vital element to achieve efficiency of safeguards implementation while maintaining the effectiveness. However, the degree of co-operation fully depends upon the credibility, technical capability and the transparency of SSAC. Since the credibility of SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) depends heavily on effectiveness of facility operator's Material Control and Accounting (MC and A) practice, some measures to provide continuous assurance of the function and effectiveness of the system such as quality assurance program including periodical system audit (diagnostic) function ought to be established. This paper discusses quality assurance program for facility level MC and A including audit (diagnostic) method to maintain continuous assurance of the effectiveness. (author)

  19. Swedish experiences in implementing national and international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nilsson, A.; Elborn, M.; Grahn, P.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports that international safeguards have been applied in Sweden since the early 70s. Experiences have been achieved from exclusive bilateral and trilateral control followed by NPT safeguards in 1975. The Swedish State System for accountancy and Control (SSAC) includes all regulations that follows from prevailing obligations regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear material. The system has been developed in cooperation between the national authority, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish nuclear industry. The paper presents experiences from the practical implementation of the SSAC and the IAEA safeguards system, gained by the SKI and the nuclear industry, respectively. Joint approaches and solutions to some significant safeguards issues are presented. The cooperation between the nuclear industry and the authority in R and D activities, in particular with respect to the Swedish Support Program is highlighted, e.g. the use of nuclear facilities in development or training tasks. some of the difficulties encountered with the system are also touched upon

  20. A functional integrated data evaluation system for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Benoit, R.; Cuypers, M.; Guardini, S.; De Grandi, G.F.; Franklin, M.; Muller, K.; Rota, A.

    1983-01-01

    The quantitative assurance provided by the safeguards of nuclear material is based on the analysis of a very large amount of data of different origins and quality. They are generated by operators on a regular basis, or provided during discussions of facility attachments or declaration of production schedules. They are also generated by inspectors during their verification activities which are related to accountancy data, auditing, independent measurements, sealing, surveillance, etc. The Joint Research Centre and Safeguards Directorate of the Commission of the European Communities are studying a Functional Integrated Data Evaluation System (FIDES) for safeguards. A preliminary outline of such a system was presented at the 3rd ESARDA symposium at Karlsruhe. This paper first emphasises the decisional thread which underlies the ESARDA activities and, second, gives a progress report on JRC work which is designed to give effect to these ideas. This progess, reported below, covers two activities. The first is the automatic co-ordination of the operator's measurement system information with the operator's accounting declaration. The second element is the development of a functional structure for NDA data generation evaluation and transmission. (author)

  1. The experience of ABACC after ten years applying safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Feu Alvim, Carlos A.; Palacios, Elias; Esteves dos Santos, Jose M.; Oliveira, Antonio

    2001-01-01

    Full text: During the second half of this century, Argentina and Brazil shared a common ambition: to gain knowledge on and develop the technology required for attaining a full command of the nuclear fuel cycle. Until mid-1990's, neither of these countries had fully adhered to the Tlatelolco Treaty, nor had they signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as a way to protect themselves towards the development of such technology. The discriminatory nature of the NPT was the argument used to resist the international pressure for its signature. On the other hand, the text of the Tlatelolco Treaty involved special inspections to non-declared facilities that meant a threat of industrial espionage which Argentina and Brazil wanted to avoid. This position -maintained for almost two decades - led the international community to view these countries as competing for nuclear supremacy. As of 1985, both Argentina and Brazil, by means of joint declarations, expressed their decision to provide transparency to their nuclear programs. Consequently, they undertook several commitments concerning the exclusively peaceful purposes in their use of nuclear energy and in their respective nuclear programs. This process of joint declarations led to the signature of a Bilateral Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy in July 1991. Through this agreement, they formally established their Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC) and created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in order to implement the established verification system. Also at that time, the decision was made to start negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) towards a joint agreement on safeguards based on the SCCC. In March 1994, the Quadripartite Agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the IAEA entered into force. The experience in the application of SCCC during its first ten years and the

  2. Safeguards and physical protection - The Belarus experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Krevsun, E.

    1999-01-01

    Taking into account the new initiatives of the IAEA Belarus indented to continue activity on improving the Material Protection, Control and Accounting system in various directions. The significant ones are: electronic transmission of information to the IAEA, measurement standards of nuclear materials, upgraded Wiegard cards with photographs of their holders, preventive measures (threat, evaluation of safety for objects, sabotage from the staff etc.). The Belarus experience testifies that there is a unique way for increasing nuclear and radiation safety: cooperation and exchange of experience on a global scale

  3. Fully integrated safeguards and security for reprocessing plant monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Duran, Felicia Angelica; Ward, Rebecca; Cipiti, Benjamin B.; Middleton, Bobby D.

    2011-01-01

    Nuclear fuel reprocessing plants contain a wealth of plant monitoring data including material measurements, process monitoring, administrative procedures, and physical protection elements. Future facilities are moving in the direction of highly-integrated plant monitoring systems that make efficient use of the plant data to improve monitoring and reduce costs. The Separations and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM) is an analysis tool that is used for modeling advanced monitoring systems and to determine system response under diversion scenarios. This report both describes the architecture for such a future monitoring system and present results under various diversion scenarios. Improvements made in the past year include the development of statistical tests for detecting material loss, the integration of material balance alarms to improve physical protection, and the integration of administrative procedures. The SSPM has been used to demonstrate how advanced instrumentation (as developed in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies campaign) can benefit the overall safeguards system as well as how all instrumentation is tied into the physical protection system. This concept has the potential to greatly improve the probability of detection for both abrupt and protracted diversion of nuclear material.

  4. Integrated safeguards and security for a highly automated process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.; Hunteman, W.J.; Jaeger, C.D.

    1993-01-01

    Before the cancellation of the New Production Reactor Programs for the production of tritium, the reactors and associated processing were being designed to contain some of the most highly automated and remote systems conceived for a Department of Energy facility. Integrating safety, security, materials control and accountability (MC and A), and process systems at the proposed facilities would enhance the overall information and protection-in-depth available. Remote, automated fuel handling and assembly/disassembly techniques would deny access to the nuclear materials while upholding ALARA principles but would also require the full integration of all data/information systems. Such systems would greatly enhance MC and A as well as facilitate materials tracking. Physical protection systems would be connected with materials control features to cross check activities and help detect and resolve anomalies. This paper will discuss the results of a study of the safeguards and security benefits achieved from a highly automated and integrated remote nuclear facility and the impacts that such systems have on safeguards and computer and information security

  5. Technical workshop on safeguards, verification technologies, and other related experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    The aim of the Technical Workshop on safeguards was to encourage a clearer understanding of the IAEA Safeguards System, its origins and evolution and the present state of the art. Presentations held by the IAEA officials and outside experts examined as well other components of the non-proliferation regime, the current practices and procedures, and the future prospects. A series of presentations described the characteristics of the interaction between global and regional verification systems and described relevant past and present experience. Prominence given to such state of the art verification technologies as environmental sampling, satellite imaging and monitoring thorough remote and unattended techniques demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the essentially dynamic nature of verification. It is generally acknowledged that there have been major achievements in preventing spread of nuclear weapons, but no verification system can in itself prevent proliferation

  6. Technical workshop on safeguards, verification technologies, and other related experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-12-31

    The aim of the Technical Workshop on safeguards was to encourage a clearer understanding of the IAEA Safeguards System, its origins and evolution and the present state of the art. Presentations held by the IAEA officials and outside experts examined as well other components of the non-proliferation regime, the current practices and procedures, and the future prospects. A series of presentations described the characteristics of the interaction between global and regional verification systems and described relevant past and present experience. Prominence given to such state of the art verification technologies as environmental sampling, satellite imaging and monitoring thorough remote and unattended techniques demonstrated, beyond any doubt, the essentially dynamic nature of verification. It is generally acknowledged that there have been major achievements in preventing spread of nuclear weapons, but no verification system can in itself prevent proliferation Refs, figs, tabs

  7. Safeguards Export-Import Training: Adapting to Changes in the Department of Safeguards Over 6 Years of Experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; ); Crete, J.-M.; Schot, P.-M.; Hushbeck, E.C.; Heine, P.

    2015-01-01

    Safeguards relevant information encompasses information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfiling its obligations under relevant safeguards agreement(s). It includes information relating to nuclear or nuclear related trade like international transfers of nuclear material, or export (or import upon request by the Agency) of specified equipment described in annex 2 of the Additional Protocol. It may also include information provided by States on a voluntary basis. In 2005, the General Conference (see GC(49)/RES/13) encouraged the provision of information on procurement enquiries, export denials and other nuclear related information. Objectively and independently assessing this information and combining it with other Safeguards data and knowledge requires relevant expertise and well defined processes. Since 2008, the bi-annual Export-Import (EXIM) Training Workshop, jointly run by the IAEA Department of Safeguards and the U.S. Department of Energy, enables SG staff to develop competencies required for collecting, processing and drawing objective conclusions in this area. Over the years, more than 150 SG staff have been exposed to technical information on relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, trade data from different origins, analytical processes, and exercises to use this knowledge in realistic safeguards work scenarios. The EXIM training has also been an opportunity to develop analytical best practices and explore how this analytical work finds it place in the verification process. The paper describes the background and purpose of the EXIM training, how it helps Safeguards to independently collect and analyze relevant trade information to fulfil its obligations. It also touches on the lessons learned from six years of training experience, observing how the Department of Safeguards develops and implements structured processes to collect, process and evaluate safeguards relevant trade information, in order to establish findings and draw

  8. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. Integration is approached by coordinating all safeguards information through a safeguards coordination center. This center represents a higher level in a communication, data-processing, and decision-making structure which is needed for efficient real-time operation of the integrated system. The safeguards coordination center functions to assess alarm and warning data required to resolve threats in the safeguards system, coordinate information and interaction involving the material accounting, physical protection, and facility monitoring and control systems, and present a single unified interface for interaction with facility management, facility operations, safeguards system personnel, and response forces

  9. Integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitors for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fehlau, P.E.

    1994-01-01

    Radiation monitoring is one nuclear-safeguards measure used to protect against the theft of special nuclear materials (SNM) by pedestrians departing from SNM access areas. The integrated neutron/gamma-ray portal monitor is an ideal radiation monitor for the task when the SNM is plutonium. It achieves high sensitivity for detecting both bare and shielded plutonium by combining two types of radiation detector. One type is a neutron-chamber detector, comprising a large, hollow, neutron moderator that contains a single thermal-neutron proportional counter. The entrance wall of each chamber is thin to admit slow neutrons from plutonium contained in a moderating shield, while the other walls are thick to moderate fast neutrons from bare or lead-shielded plutonium so that they can be detected. The other type of detector is a plastic scintillator that is primarily for detecting gamma rays from small amounts of unshielded plutonium. The two types of detector are easily integrated by making scintillators part of the thick back wall of each neutron chamber or by inserting them into each chamber void. The authors compared the influence of the two methods of integration on detecting neutrons and gamma rays, and they examined the effectiveness of other design factors and the methods for signal detection as well

  10. Safeguards-by-Design: Early Integration of Physical Protection and Safeguardability into Design of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    T. Bjornard; R. Bean; S. DeMuth; P. Durst; M. Ehinger; M. Golay; D. Hebditch; J. Hockert; J. Morgan

    2009-09-01

    The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities has the potential to minimize proliferation and security risks as the use of nuclear energy expands worldwide. This paper defines a generic SBD process and its incorporation from early design phases into existing design / construction processes and develops a framework that can guide its institutionalization. SBD could be a basis for a new international norm and standard process for nuclear facility design. This work is part of the U.S. DOE’s Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), and is jointly sponsored by the Offices of Non-proliferation and Nuclear Energy.

  11. Integrated Safeguards proposal for Finland. Final report on Task FIN C 1264 of the Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anttila, M.

    2000-08-01

    The IAEA has requested several member states to present their proposal of the application of the Integrated Safeguards (IS) system in their nuclear facilities. This report contains a IS proposal for Finland prepared under the Task FIN C 1264 of The Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been one of the main tools in the fight against nuclear proliferation since the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty three decades ago. In the 1990s some of the inherent weaknesses of this so-called traditional safeguards system were revealed first in Iraq and then in North Korea. Therefore, the member states of the LAEA decided to give the Agency additional legal authority in order to make its control system more effective as well as more efficient than before. This was accomplished by the approval of the so-called Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. Straightforward implementation of new safeguards measures allowed by the Additional Protocol (INF-CIRC540) without careful review of the old procedures based on INFCIRC153 would only result in increased costs within the IAEA and in the member states. In order to avoid that kind of outcome the old and new means available to the Agency shall be combined to form an optimised integrated safeguards (IS) system. When creating an effective and efficient system a necessary approach is a state-level evaluation, which means that each state shall be assessed by the IAEA separately and as a whole. The assessment of a country's nuclear field shall result in credible assurance of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials to prohibited purposes and of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, facilities and materials. Having achieved that assurance and being able to maintain it in a state the LAEA can leave some traditional routine safeguards activities undone there. At present, the nuclear fuel cycle in

  12. Performance results from the first integrated NDA VXI safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bot, D.; Messner, R.

    1999-01-01

    The VIFM system is the first integrated safeguard system to be developed and deployed by the IAEA. The system is also noteworthy in that it is the most versatile of any NDA system thus far deployed. Due to the high level of functionality, the VIFM is probably the most 'tested' of all IAEA systems. This paper discusses the results obtained from detailed in field and laboratory testing of a variety of VIFM configurations ranging from simple single systems to highly integrated system implementations. A total of 4 sites have had VIFM equipment installed. Data collected from these sites have been of very high quality and consistency despite the failure of commercial hard disk drive equipment. The systematic failure of these drives have been corrected using a variety of methods and performance since those corrections have been excellent with no equipment failures. The tests carried out also included the test of a twisted pair to coaxial cable interface. This interface was required in order to allow installation even with a significant facility cabling limitation. The performance obtained from the system utilizing this device showed no degradation as compared to that of systems utilizing direct coaxial cable connections. To conclude, the VIFM system, has been reliable even after partial failure of commercial off-the-shelf components which required the systems to operate on full fail-safe backup. These tests have thus shown both the reliable operation of the VIFM in normal operating conditions as well as the most adverse

  13. Integrated safeguards and the role of the SSAC: an Australian perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, John

    1998-01-01

    'Classical' safeguards retain a strong emphasis on facility-based materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognised as a major shortcoming in the classical safeguards system, and major efforts are being made to establish the Agency's capabilities in this regard. Current priorities include, ensuring the wide-spread conclusion of individual Additional Protocols so the Strengthened Safeguards System enters into general application without delay, and continuing the development of new methodologies - including associated quality assurance and evaluation. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalisation of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. The strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system is a matter of the highest priority to Australia. Australia has had a major influence in this process, that is provision of consultancy services to the Agency on new safeguards and analytical techniques, and in the development and field testing of new safeguards technology such as remote surveillance. (Yi, J. H.)

  14. Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX). An experience in international co-operation on safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fukuda, G.; Koizumi, T.; Higuchi, K.

    1983-01-01

    TASTEX stands for Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise, and was the joint programme of Japan, the United States of America, France and the International Atomic Energy Agency for developing, testing and evaluating advanced safeguards technology to be used in reprocessing facilities. The TASTEX programme, which started early in 1978 and successfully ended in May 1981, consisted of thirteen safeguards-technology-related tasks, from Task A to M. They were classified into four groups from the viewpoints of their usefulness and effectiveness: (1) Tasks technically feasible for international safeguards application in the near future: Tasks E, G, H and part of Task A (underwater CCTV and monitoring cameras); (2) Tasks which can be used in the future if research and development are continued: Tasks F, I, J, C and the other part of Task A (exclusive of the themes shown in (1)); (3) Tasks which may be used in future at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility if research and development are continued: Tasks K and L; and (4) Tasks which are difficult to be used at the Tokai Reprocessing Facility: Tasks B, D and M. The tasks classified under Group (1) are being developed further as part of the JASPAS (Japan Support Programme for Agency's Safeguards) project. (author)

  15. Unannounced inspection for integrated safeguards: A theoretical perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Canty, M.J.; Avenhaus, R.

    2001-01-01

    the option of legal behavior, interpreting our results in the light of current discussions of integrated safeguards under the new Protocol. (author)

  16. Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting functions in a safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Reynolds, D.A.

    1981-01-01

    Concepts on integration of physical protection and material accounting systems to enhance overall safeguards capability are developed and presented. These concepts identify ways in which material accounting systems can be used to enable effective monitoring of authorized movement of nuclear material through physical protection boundaries. Concepts are also discussed for monitoring user access to nuclear material and for tagging user identification to material accounting transactions through physical protection functions. These result in benefits in detecting diversion and in positively tracing material movement. Finally, coordination of safeguards information from both subsystems in such an integrated system through a safeguards coordination center is addressed with emphasis on appropriate response in case of discrepancies

  17. The application of state-level integration of safeguards in Sweden. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dahlin, G.; Haeggblom, E.; Larsson, Mats; Rehn, I.

    2000-12-01

    SSAC/SKI activities as well as activities of the Euratom inspectorate. IAEA would be required to carry out the necessary measures, including sufficient independent verification activities, to assure that the results obtained are correct, and that they correctly represent the actual inventory of nuclear material. One or two unannounced inspections are foreseen to provide, as applicable, material balance verification and quality assurance, as well as to contribute to deterrence. It is expected, however, that such inspections will be co-ordinated between IAEA and Euratom to ensure the cost-effectiveness. The use of advanced technology, C/S and NDA instruments, with or without remote monitoring capability, would be limited to situations where repetition of costly verification measurements could be avoided. As regards fresh MOX, such instruments could be used to avoid costly measurements and to increase the detection capability of diversion, thus providing additional deterrence. Such technology and measures may also be used in special safeguard situations. The implementation of integrated safeguards in a cost-effective manner in Sweden would depend, on one hand, on the ability of the IAEA to ensure the application of all measures so that 'there is credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials' in Sweden. On the other hand, the increased use of SSAC/SKI and RSAC/Euratom would facilitate the optimal use of all resources involved in implementation of integrated safeguards in Sweden. In order to add credibility to any decision that would reduce measures aimed at assuring the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials, the value of the measures of the Additional Protocol should be better understood in that respect. The confidence in the ability of the IAEA to draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in a State is expected to increase as experience is gained. The roles and functional responsibilities of the four

  18. The European experience in safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Synetos, Sotiris

    2013-01-01

    Civil nuclear programs in the European Union member states have from their onset included fuel recycling as an option. The EURATOM Treaty gives to the European Commission the obligation to apply safeguards controls to all civil Nuclear Material in the European Union, and to facilitate the implementation of IAEA safeguards. The European Commission (EURATOM) has thus gained years of experience in safeguarding reprocessing plants, Pu storages, and MOX fuel fabrication plants and is currently participating in the development of approaches and measures for safeguarding long term repositories. The aim of this paper is to present the regulator's views and experience on safeguarding nuclear fuel recycle processes and Pu stores, which is based on the following principles: -) Early involvement of the control organizations in the design of the safeguards measures to be developed for a plant (currently referred to as Safeguards by Design); -) Early definition of a safeguards strategy including key measurement points; -) The design and development of plant specific Safeguards equipment, including an on site laboratory for sample analysis; -) The development by the operator of an appropriate Nuclear Material accountancy system to facilitate their declaration obligations; -) The introduction of an inspection regime allowing comprehensive controls under the restrictions imposed by financial and Human Resources limitations; -) Optimization of the inspection effort by using unattended measuring stations, containment and surveillance systems and secure remote transmission of data to the regulator's headquarters. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation. (authors)

  19. Nuclear safety, security and safeguards. An application of an integrated approach

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Chapman, Howard; Edwards, Jeremy; Fitzpatrick, Joshua; Grundy, Colette; Rodger, Robert; Scott, Jonathan [National Nuclear Laboratory, Warrington (United Kingdom)

    2018-01-15

    National Nuclear Laboratory has recently produced a paper regarding the integrated approach of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. The paper considered the international acknowledgement of the inter-relationships and potential benefits to be gained through improved integration of the nuclear '3S'; Safety, Security and Safeguards. It considered that combining capabilities into one synergistic team can provide improved performance and value. This approach to integration has been adopted, and benefits realised by the National Nuclear Laboratory through creation of a Safety, Security and Safeguards team. In some instances the interface is clear and established, as is the case between safety and security in the areas of Vital Area Identification. In others the interface is developing such as the utilisation of safeguards related techniques such as nuclear material accountancy and control to enhance the security of materials. This paper looks at a practical example of the progress to date in implementing Triple S by a duty holder.

  20. Regional safeguards arrangements: The Argentina-Brazil experience

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marzo, M.; Gonzales, H.L.; Iskin, M.C.L.; Vicens, H.

    1997-01-01

    A Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (SCCC) was established by Argentina and Brazil in July 1992. It is a full scope safeguard's system in both countries. The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created to apply the SCCC. The main elements of the SCCC are presented. The main safeguards' procedures are described. A brief discussion of the inspection methodology and its impact for facility operators is performed. The safeguard's implementation from the operator's point of view is commented, taking as example a fuel fabrication plant in Argentina and a uranium enrichment plant in Brazil. (author)

  1. Tracking and position recognition applied to remote monitoring to be used in integrated safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bonino, Anibal D; Perez, Adrian C; Krimer, Mario J; Teira, Ruben O; Vigile, Rodolfo S; Valentino, Lucia I; Giordano, Luis A; Ferro, Juan M [Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear, Buenos Aires (Argentina)

    2001-07-01

    In the framework of the Strengthening and integrated Safeguards Systems new measures and tools are available to meet the safeguards objective. The credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities derived from the implementation of the Additional Protocol has an impact on the current safeguards approach to declared facilities thus their through review is advisable. Among these tools, a more intensive use of unattended systems and remote transmission of safeguards relevant information are considered, specifically for On Load Reactors (ORLs). A Remote Monitoring Systems (RMS) to cover the transfers of spent fuels from the ponds to a dry storage is being tested at Embalse nuclear power plant. In connection with the RMS, this paper describes some of the technologies involved: the Global Position System (GPS) and the Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID), which were implemented due to the requirement to ascertain the position of valuable elements. The main objective of this design aimed at safeguarding the spent fuels transfers from the welding cell to the silos field by a strict surveillance of the whereabouts. The bases for the development were settled by the specifications imposed by the integrated Safeguards of the Nuclear Regulatory Authority in Argentina. The resultant tracking and position recognition system is based on GPS receivers operating in Differential Mode, with the aid of Radio Frequency Identification. In compliance with the safeguard requirement the whole system is able to operate in a continuous and remote mode, what means without human being attention. (author)

  2. The process monitoring computer system an integrated operations and safeguards surveillance system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Liester, N.A.

    1995-01-01

    The use of the Process Monitoring Computer System (PMCS) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) relating to Operations and Safeguards concerns is discussed. Measures taken to assure the reliability of the system data are outlined along with the measures taken to assure the continuous availability of that data for use within the ICPP. The integration of process and safeguards information for use by the differing organizations is discussed. The PMCS successfully demonstrates the idea of remote Safeguards surveillance and the need for sharing of common information between different support organizations in an operating plant

  3. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R., E-mail: M.Barletta@iaea.or [IAEA, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, 1400 Vienna (Austria)

    2010-10-15

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  4. Open source information acquisition, analysis and integration in the IAEA Department of Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barletta, M.; Zarimpas, N.; Zarucki, R.

    2010-10-01

    Acquisition and analysis of open source information plays an increasingly important role in the IAEA strengthened safeguards system. The Agency's focal point for open source information collection and analysis is the Division of Safeguards Information Management (SGIM) within the IAEA Department of Safeguards. In parallel with the approval of the Model Additional Protocol in 1997, a new centre of information acquisition and analysis expertise was created within SGIM. By acquiring software, developing databases, retraining existing staff and hiring new staff with diverse analytical skills, SGIM is pro actively contributing to the future implementation of information-driven safeguards in collaboration with other Divisions within the Department of Safeguards. Open source information support is now fully integrated with core safeguards processes and activities, and has become an effective tool in the work of the Department of Safeguards. This provides and overview of progress realized through the acquisition and use of open source information in several thematic areas: evaluation of additional protocol declarations; support to the State Evaluation process; in-depth investigation of safeguards issues, including assisting inspections and complementary access; research on illicit nuclear procurement networks and trafficking; and monitoring nuclear developments. Demands for open source information have steadily grown and are likely to continue to grow in the future. Coupled with the enormous growth and accessibility in the volume and sources of information, new challenges are presented, both technical and analytical. This paper discusses actions taken and future plans for multi-source and multi-disciplinary analytic integration to strengthen confidence in safeguards conclusions - especially regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. (Author)

  5. Role of materials accounting in integrated safeguards systems for reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Gutmacher, R.G.; Markin, J.T.; Shipley, J.P.; Whitty, W.J.

    1981-01-01

    Integration of materials accounting and containment/surveillance techniques for international safeguards requires careful examination and definition of suitable inspector activities for verification of operator's materials accounting data. The inspector's verification procedures are designed to protect against data falsification and/or the use of measurement uncertainties to conceal missing material. Materials accounting activities are developed to provide an effective international safeguards system when combined with containment/surveillance activities described in a companion paper

  6. Integrated Safeguards and Security Management Self-Assessment 2004

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lunford, Dan; Ramsey, Dwayne

    2005-04-01

    In 2002 Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory deployed the first Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM) Self-Assessment process, designed to measure the effect of the Laboratory's ISSM efforts. This process was recognized by DOE as a best practice and model program for self-assessment and training. In 2004, the second Self-Assessment was launched. The cornerstone of this process was an employee survey that was designed to meet several objectives: (1) Ensure that Laboratory assets are protected. (2) Provide a measurement of the Laboratory's current security status that can be compared against the 2002 Self-Assessment baseline. (3) Educate all Laboratory staff about security responsibilities, tools, and practices. (4) Provide security staff with feedback on the effectiveness of security programs. (5) Provide line management with the information they need to make informed decisions about security. This 2004 Self Assessment process began in July 2004 with every employee receiving an information packet and instructions for completing the ISSM survey. The Laboratory-wide survey contained questions designed to measure awareness and conformance to policy and best practices. The survey response was excellent--90% of Berkeley Lab employees completed the questionnaire. ISSM liaisons from each division followed up on the initial survey results with individual employees to improve awareness and resolve ambiguities uncovered by the questionnaire. As with the 2002 survey, the Self-Assessment produced immediate positive results for the ISSM program and revealed opportunities for longer-term corrective actions. Results of the questionnaire provided information for organizational profiles and an institutional summary. The overall level of security protection and awareness was very high--often above 90%. Post-survey work by the ISSM liaisons and line management consistently led to improved awareness and metrics, as shown by a comparison of

  7. The application of state-level integration of safeguards in Sweden. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Dahlin, G.; Haeggblom, E.; Larsson, Mats; Rehn, I

    2000-12-01

    results of SSAC/SKI activities as well as activities of the Euratom inspectorate. IAEA would be required to carry out the necessary measures, including sufficient independent verification activities, to assure that the results obtained are correct, and that they correctly represent the actual inventory of nuclear material. One or two unannounced inspections are foreseen to provide, as applicable, material balance verification and quality assurance, as well as to contribute to deterrence. It is expected, however, that such inspections will be co-ordinated between IAEA and Euratom to ensure the cost-effectiveness. The use of advanced technology, C/S and NDA instruments, with or without remote monitoring capability, would be limited to situations where repetition of costly verification measurements could be avoided. As regards fresh MOX, such instruments could be used to avoid costly measurements and to increase the detection capability of diversion, thus providing additional deterrence. Such technology and measures may also be used in special safeguard situations. The implementation of integrated safeguards in a cost-effective manner in Sweden would depend, on one hand, on the ability of the IAEA to ensure the application of all measures so that 'there is credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials' in Sweden. On the other hand, the increased use of SSAC/SKI and RSAC/Euratom would facilitate the optimal use of all resources involved in implementation of integrated safeguards in Sweden. In order to add credibility to any decision that would reduce measures aimed at assuring the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials, the value of the measures of the Additional Protocol should be better understood in that respect. The confidence in the ability of the IAEA to draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in a State is expected to increase as experience is gained. The roles and functional

  8. Safeguards equipment of the future integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-01-01

    Becoming aware of the significant events of the past four years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on which direction the development of nuclear safeguards in a new era needs to take and the implications. The lime proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factor's and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. Within such a regime, the associated measures need to be determined and technological support identified. This paper will identify the proven techniques which, with appropriate implementation support, could most quickly make available additional measures for a comprehensive, transparent and open implementation regime. In particular, it will examine the future of Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in international safeguards, including technical and other related factors

  9. Beyond integrated safeguards: Performance-based assessments for future nuclear controls

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong Sylvester, Kory W.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: In the future, if the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agendas are to advance, they will likely become increasingly seen as parallel undertakings with the objective of comprehensive cradle-to-grave controls over nuclear materials and possibly even warheads removed from defense programs along with materials in civilian use. This 'back to the future' prospect was envisioned in the Acheson-Lillienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, and more modestly in the Atoms-for-Peace Proposal. Unlike the grand plans of the early nuclear years, today's and tomorrow's undertakings will more likely consist of a series of incremental steps with the goal of expanding nuclear controls. These steps will be undertaken at a time of fundamental change in the IAEA safeguards system, and they will be influenced by those changes in profound ways. This prospective influence needs to be taken into account as the IAEA develops and implements integrated safeguards, including its efforts to establish new safeguards criteria, undertake technological and administrative improvements in safeguards, implement credible capabilities for the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities and, perhaps, provide for a more intensive involvement in applying safeguards in new roles such as the verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Performance-based criteria offer one promising way to address the effectiveness of integrated safeguards and to provide a common means of assessing the other key areas of a comprehensive approach to nuclear controls as these develop independently and to the extent that they are coordinated in the future. (author)

  10. Implementation of integrated safeguards in Nuclear Fuel Plant at Pitesti, Romania

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Olaru, V.; Ivana, T.; Epure, Gh.

    2009-01-01

    The nuclear activity was conducted for many years in Romania under Traditional Safeguards (TS) and has developed in good conditions the specific nuclear safeguards. Now there is a good opportunity to improve the performance and quality of the safeguards activity and at the same time to increase the accountancy and control of nuclear materials by passing to Integrated Safeguards (IS) implementation. The legal framework is the Law 100/2000 for ratification of the Protocol between Romania and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), additional completion to the Agreement between the Socialist Republic of Romania Government and IAEA relating to safeguards. It is part of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons published in the Official Gazette no. 3/31 January 1970, and the Additional Protocol published in the Official Gazette no. 295/ 29.06.2000. The first discussion about Integrated Safeguards (IS) between the Nuclear Fuel Plant (FCN) representatives and IAEA inspectors has taken place in June 2005. In Feb. 2007 an IAEA mission visited FCN and established the main steps for implementing the IS. There were visited the storage and the technological flow and it was reviewed the residence times for different nuclear materials, the applied chemical analysis, metrological methods, weighting method and procedures of elaborating the implied documents and lists. At the same time the IAEA and FCN representatives established the main points for implementing the IS at FCN i.e. performing the Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI), communicating the eligible days for SNRI for each year, communicating the estimated deliveries and shipments for the first quarter and then for the rest of the year, mail box daily declaration (DD) with respect to the residence time for several nuclear materials, advance notification (AN) for each nuclear material transfer (shipments and receipts), etc. At 01 June 2007 Romania has passed officially to Integrated Safeguards and FCN (RO

  11. Nonproliferation and safeguards aspects of the Integral Fast Reactor (IFR)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hannum, W.H.; Wade, D.C.; McFarlane, H.F.; Hill, R.N.

    1997-01-01

    The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) has declared that the large and growing stocks of plutonium from weapons dismantlement in the U.S. and the former Soviet Union FSU are a ''clear and present danger'' to peace and security. Moreover, the opinion of some experts that plutonium of any isotopic blend is a proliferation threat has been well publicized, heightening the concern that plutonium produced in the civilian fuel cycle is itself a proliferation threat. Assuring that separated plutonium, from dismantled warheads as well as from civilian power programs, is under effective control has (again) become a high priority of U.S. diplomacy. One pole of the debate on how to manage this material is to declare it to be a waste, and to search for some way to dispose of it safely, securely, and permanently. The other pole is to view it as an energy resource and to safeguard it against diversion, putting it into active use in the civilian power program. The ultimate choice cannot be separated from the long-term strategy for use of peaceful nuclear power. Continued use of a once-through fuel cycle will lead to an ever-increasing quantity of excess plutonium-requiring safeguarding. Alternatively, recycling the world's stocks of plutonium in fast reactors, contrary to common misconception, will cap the world supply of plutonium and hold it in working inventories for generating power. Transition from the current-generation light water cooled reactors (LWRs) to a future fast-reactor-based nuclear energy supply under international safeguards would, henceforth, limit world plutonium inventories to the amount necessary and useful for power generation, with no further excess production. (author)

  12. Operational facility-integrated computer system for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Armento, W.J.; Brooksbank, R.E.; Krichinsky, A.M.

    1980-01-01

    A computer system for safeguards in an active, remotely operated, nuclear fuel processing pilot plant has been developed. This sytem maintains (1) comprehensive records of special nuclear materials, (2) automatically updated book inventory files, (3) material transfer catalogs, (4) timely inventory estimations, (5) sample transactions, (6) automatic, on-line volume balances and alarmings, and (7) terminal access and applications software monitoring and logging. Future development will include near-real-time SNM mass balancing as both a static, in-tank summation and a dynamic, in-line determination. It is planned to incorporate aspects of site security and physical protection into the computer monitoring

  13. Timely integration of safeguards and security with projects at Los Alamos National Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Price, R.; Blount, P.M.; Garcia, S.W.; Gonzales, R.L.; Salazar, J.B.; Campbell, C.H.

    2004-01-01

    The Safeguards and Security (S and S) Requirements Integration Team at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has developed and implemented an innovative management process that will be described in detail. This process systematically integrates S and S planning into construction, facility modifications or upgrades, mission changes, and operational projects. It extends and expands the opportunities provided by the DOE project management manual, DOE M 413.3-1. Through a series of LANL documents, a process is defined and implemented that formally identifies an S and S professional to oversee, coordinate, facilitate, and communicate among the identified S and S organizations and the project organizations over the life cycle of the project. The derived benefits, namely (1) elimination/reduction of re-work or costly retrofitting, (2) overall project cost savings because of timely and improved planning, (3) formal documentation, and (4) support of Integrated Safeguards and Security Management at LANL, will be discussed. How many times, during the construction of a new facility or the modification of an existing facility, have the persons responsible for the project waited until the last possible minute or until after construction is completed to approach the security organizations for their help in safeguarding and securing the facility? It's almost like, 'Oh, by the way, do we need access control and a fence around this building and just what are we going to do with our classified anyway?' Not only is it usually difficult; it's also typically expensive to retrofit or plan for safeguards and security after the fact. Safeguards and security organizations are often blamed for budget overruns and delays in facility occupancy and program startup, but these problems are usually due to poor front-end planning. In an effort to help projects engage safeguards and security in the pre-conceptual or conceptual stages, we implemented a high level formality of operations. We

  14. Integrated software package for nuclear material safeguards in a MOX fuel fabrication facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Schreiber, H.J.; Piana, M.; Moussalli, G.; Saukkonen, H.

    2000-01-01

    Since computerized data processing was introduced to Safeguards at large bulk handling facilities, a large number of individual software applications have been developed for nuclear material Safeguards implementation. Facility inventory and flow data are provided in computerized format for performing stratification, sample size calculation and selection of samples for destructive and non-destructive assay. Data is collected from nuclear measurement systems running in attended, unattended mode and more recently from remote monitoring systems controlled. Data sets from various sources have to be evaluated for Safeguards purposes, such as raw data, processed data and conclusions drawn from data evaluation results. They are reported in computerized format at the International Atomic Energy Agency headquarters and feedback from the Agency's mainframe computer system is used to prepare and support Safeguards inspection activities. The integration of all such data originating from various sources cannot be ensured without the existence of a common data format and a database system. This paper describes the fundamental relations between data streams, individual data processing tools, data evaluation results and requirements for an integrated software solution to facilitate nuclear material Safeguards at a bulk handling facility. The paper also explains the basis for designing a software package to manage data streams from various data sources and for incorporating diverse data processing tools that until now have been used independently from each other and under different computer operating systems. (author)

  15. Experience of Brazilian safeguards analytical laboratory in DA analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bezerra, J.H.B.; Araujo, R.M.S.; Pereira, J.C.A.

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The Brazilian Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, inaugurated in September 1983, performs uranium analysis in samples of nuclear materials taken during national safeguards inspections as well as in samples taken during ABACC's inspections performed in Argentina. The Laboratory analyzes Intercomparison samples provided by IAEA, NBL, ABACC, CEN and EQRAIN. The method used to perform uranium analysis is the Davies and Gray/NBL. All the steps of the analytical procedures, such as chemical kinetics of the reactions and instrumental parameters, are rigorously controlled. An internal Quality Control of the measurements is made by means of analysis of Certified Reference Materials and the performance of the results meets the ESARDA's Target Values for Random and Systematic Components both in Intercomparison Samples and in samples taken during inspections. The typical precision, expressed as relative standard deviation, and accuracy obtained in a routine basis for nuclear grade materials is 0.1% and 0.14% respectively. The performance of the results obtained are comparable to the best international laboratories which perform uranium analysis in nuclear materials for safeguards purposes. (author)

  16. Dynamic material accountancy in an integrated safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murrell, J.S.

    1979-01-01

    The nuclear material safeguards system at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant is currently being improved. A new material control system will provide computerized monitoring and accountability, and a new physical protection system will provide upgraded perimeter and portal entry monitoring. The control system incorporates remote computer terminals at all processing, transfer and storage areas throughout the plant. Terminal equipment is interfaced to a computer through teletype equipment. A typical terminal transaction would require verification that the particular activity (material movement or process operation) is authorized, identifying the container involved, weighing the container, and then verifying the enrichment with non-destructive assay instrumentation. The system, when fully operational, will provide near real-time accountability for each eight-hour work shift for all items in process. (author)

  17. Integrating Safeguards into the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Clark, T.G.

    2002-01-01

    In September 2000, the United States and the Russian Federation entered into an agreement which stipulates each country will irreversibly transform 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium into material which could not be used for weapon purposes. Supporting the Department of Energy's (DOE) program to dispose of excess nuclear materials, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility (PDCF) is being designed and constructed to disassemble the weapon ''pits'' and convert the nuclear material to an oxide form for fabrication into reactor fuel at the separate Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. The PDCF design incorporates automation to the maximum extent possible to facilitate material safeguards, reduce worker dose, and improve processing efficiency. This includes provisions for automated guided vehicle movements for shipping containers, material transport via automated conveyor between processes, remote process control monitoring, and automated Nondestructive Assay product systems

  18. Dynamic material accountancy in an integrated safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Murrell, J.S.

    1978-01-01

    The nuclear material safeguards system at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant is currently being improved. A new material control system will provide computerized monitoring and accountability, and a new physical protection system will provide upgraded perimeter and portal entry monitoring. The control system incorporates remote computer terminals at all processing, transfer, and storage areas throughout the plant. Terminal equipment is interfaced to a computer through teletype equipment. A typical terminal transaction would require verification that the particular activity (material movement or process operation) is authorized, identifying the container involved, weighing the container, and then verifying the enrichment with non-destructive assay instrumentation. The system, when fully operational, will provide near real-time accountability for each eight-hour work shift for all items in process

  19. The Site Approach - Lessons Learned from the Integrated Safeguards Approach for JNC-1

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kikuchi, M.; Iso, S.; Tomine, K.; Hirato, Y.; Namekawa, M.; Takasugi, N.; Watanabe, M.; Tsutaki, Y.; Asano, T.; Nagatani, T.; Ninagawa, J.; Fujiwara, S.; Takahashi, S.; Kimura, T.; Kodani, Y.; Fukuhara, J.; Miyaji, N.; Kawakami, Y.; Koizumi, A.; Yamazaki, Y.; Nishinosono, S.; Sasaki, K.

    2010-01-01

    Integrated safeguards approaches for specific sites are recognized important elements in the design of a State-level approach under the concept of grouping facilities. Japan and the IAEA agreed further improvement of integrated safeguards implementation in effective and efficient manner, particularly at large complex nuclear sites in Japan. Japan and the IAEA developed the integrated safeguards approach for specific sites defined at Article 18 of Additional Protocol. In 2008, the IAEA started the three-year test implementation of JNC-1 site approach for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards implementation of UDU material handling facilities. Japan and IAEA agreed to adopt the sector concept in order to make clear of subjected nuclear material to be verified. The sector is defined as spatial assignment that treats the same material stratum beyond MBAs in the site. The arrangement of MBAs and related material balance calculations as well as statistical analysis is maintained as a fundamental safeguards measure. At the boundaries of each sector, appropriate unattended NDA system and/or C/S system are installed, and material flows across the boundaries are verified by the system or attendance of resident inspectors. For inventory verification of the nuclear material stayed in sectors, an appropriate numbers of randomly scheduled inspections will be implemented. IAEA can access to the randomly selected sectors within 2 hours after notification. NRTA based on frequent operator's declaration will be performed for achievement of timeliness detection goal. The JNC-1 site approach has been implemented under the enhanced co-operation between the IAEA and SSAC through joint use of equipment and arrangements for DA analysis. Especially, national inspectors are working with IAEA together for coordination with operators. Because NMCC lab analyses all DA samples taken from facilities and the analysis results will be shared by the IAEA, certain numbers of DA

  20. Safeguards equipment of the future: Integrated monitoring systems and remote monitoring

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1994-01-01

    From the beginning, equipment to support IAEA Safeguards could be characterized as that which is used to measure nuclear material, Destructive Assay (DA) and Non Destructive Assay (NDA), and that which is used to provide continuity of knowledge between inspection intervals, Containment ampersand Surveillance (C/S). C/S equipment has often been thought of as Cameras and Seals, with a limited number of monitors being employed as they became available. In recent years, technology has advanced at an extremely rapid rate, and continues to do so. The traditional film cameras are being replaced by video equipment, and fiber optic and electronic seals have come into rather widespread use. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this evolution, and that which indicates the wave of the future without much question, is the integration of video surveillance and electronic seals with a variety of monitors. This is demonstrated by safeguards systems which are installed in several nuclear facilities in France, Germany, Japan, the UK, the USA, and elsewhere. The terminology of Integrated Monitoring Systems (IMS) has emerged, with the employment of network technology capable of interconnecting all desired elements in a very flexible manner. Also, the technology for transmission of a wide variety of information to off-site locations, termed Remote Monitoring, is in widespread industrial use, requiring very little adaptation for safeguards use. This paper examines the future of the Integrated Monitoring Systems and Remote Monitoring in International Safeguards, including technical and other related factors

  1. Optimizing the integrated safeguards system: Pragmatism and fresh views are the keys to a viable system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Albert, M.-G.

    2001-01-01

    The implementation of the new Integrated Safeguards System is a major responsibility for the IAEA and its Member States. Providing not only the capability to better control declared activities, but also to detect clandestine attempts, it is essential to improve the international nuclear weapons control regime and to increase the credibility of assurances given to the international community. Having the sole goal of establishing integrated safeguards in an optimal manner would in itself be a very challenging and demanding task. Unfortunately, the Secretariat is faced with other conflicting challenges: statutory obligations, additional programme requests from Member States and, not the least, the obligation to fit all its activities within a strict budgetary framework. Universal and early acceptance is necessary for the system to be fully effective and credible. It must however be recognised that wide and rapid adherence will be only achieved if the system is attractive enough and offers shared benefits, that is not only increased non-proliferation assurances, but also perspectives of optimisation and reduction of the inspection burden, not to forget the assurance of keeping costs under control. It is essential that the safeguards system be non-discriminatory and apply the same objectives and implementation principles to all States. Integrated Safeguards should only be applied in States which are in good standing with respect to their obligations under their safeguards Agreements and Protocols, and for which the Agency has reached positive conclusions after having applied all necessary verification measures and having performed a complete evaluation of the information available. Cost neutrality is obviously a primary constraint for Integrated Safeguards. Even if one has to recognise the additional costs and difficulties generated in the short term by the implementation of the new system, it is essential to be conscious that budgetary limits will be maintained, and to

  2. Framework for Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards in the Design and Operation of Nuclear Facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Darby, John L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Horak, Karl Emanuel [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); LaChance, Jeffrey L. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Tolk, Keith Michael [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Whitehead, Donnie Wayne [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2007-10-01

    The US is currently on the brink of a nuclear renaissance that will result in near-term construction of new nuclear power plants. In addition, the Department of Energy’s (DOE) ambitious new Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) program includes facilities for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel and reactors for transmuting safeguards material. The use of nuclear power and material has inherent safety, security, and safeguards (SSS) concerns that can impact the operation of the facilities. Recent concern over terrorist attacks and nuclear proliferation led to an increased emphasis on security and safeguard issues as well as the more traditional safety emphasis. To meet both domestic and international requirements, nuclear facilities include specific SSS measures that are identified and evaluated through the use of detailed analysis techniques. In the past, these individual assessments have not been integrated, which led to inefficient and costly design and operational requirements. This report provides a framework for a new paradigm where safety, operations, security, and safeguards (SOSS) are integrated into the design and operation of a new facility to decrease cost and increase effectiveness. Although the focus of this framework is on new nuclear facilities, most of the concepts could be applied to any new, high-risk facility.

  3. Safeguards in Pyroprocessing: an Integrated Model Development and Measurement Data Analysis

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Zhang, Jinsuo [The Ohio State Univ., Columbus, OH (United States). Nuclear Engineering Program, Dept. of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering

    2017-10-01

    Pyroprocessing is an electrochemical method based on the molten salt electrolyte, mainly the LiCl-KCl eutectic molten salt, to recycle the used nuclear fuel. For a conceptual design of commercial pyroprocessing facility, tons of special nuclear materials, namely U and Pu, may be involved, which could be used for non-peaceful purposes if they are diverted. Effective safeguards approaches have to be developed prior to the development and construction of a pyroprocessing facility. Present research focused on two main objectives, namely calculating the properties of nuclear species in LiCl-KCl molten salt and developing integrated model to safeguard a pyroprocessing facility. Understanding the characteristics of special nuclear materials in LiCl-KCl eutectic salt is extremely important to understand their behaviors in an electrorefiner. The model development for the separation processes in the pyroprocessing, including electrorefining, actinide drawdown, and rare earth drawdown benefits the understanding of material transport and separation performance of these processes under various conditions. The output signals, such as potential, current, and species concentration contribute to the material balance closure and provide safeguards signatures to detect the scenarios of diversion. U and Pu are the two main elements concerned in this study due to our interest in safeguards.

  4. Experience in safeguarding nuclear material at the Rheinsberg nuclear power station

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Winkler, R.

    1976-01-01

    The three years' experience that has been gained in application of the Safeguards Agreement shows that the carrying out of inspections at the nuclear power plant has virtually no effect on operating conditions. In future it will be possible to reduce this effect even further and still maintain the operational reliability of the station. Verification of the transfer of nuclear material and detection of possible violations have proved relatively simple. The labour requirement of each unit at the station for the performance of inspections is not more that thirty man-days. Constructive collaboration between power station staff and inspectors is of great importance in improving the safeguards procedures. (author)

  5. Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Badwan, Faris M. [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States); Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2015-01-06

    Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the

  6. Integrated safeguards and security for the INEL Special Isotope Separation Plant

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Warner, G.F.; Zack, N.R.

    1990-01-01

    This paper describes the development of the safeguards and security system that was to be used for the Special Isotope Separation (SIS) Production Plant. The US Department of Energy has postponed the construction of the SIS Plant that was to be built at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) site near Idaho Falls, Idaho. The Plant was designed to produce weapons grade plutonium from DOE owned fuel grade plutonium by converting off-spec. plutonium dioxide into metal buttons that would meet required chemical and isotopic specifications. Because this was to be a completely new facility there was a unique opportunity to provide an in-depth, ''state-of-the- art'' safeguards and security system without attempting to overlay upon an existing, older system. This facility was being designed to be in complete compliance with the new DOE Orders by integrating safeguards and security into the plant operating system and by providing graded protection to the areas of varying sensitivity within the plant

  7. An Integrated Passive (Battery-Free) Seals-and-Tag for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nekoogar, F.; Dowla, F.

    2015-01-01

    The ability to reliably and securely automate the monitoring of SNM is an important goal in Safeguards. Although item level monitoring of SNM requires both seal and tag technologies, the two technologies thus far have been developed more or less independently, and had been a lack of an integrated compact system. An integrated seal-and-tag approach not only aids inspectors to perform their tasks effectively, this approach also allows real-time inspection in large scale facilities. A typical facility could be the size of a large warehouse with hundreds or thousands of items that need to be sealed and monitored in real-time. Previously we reported on advanced secure RF passive (battery-less) tags with special features including, long-range interrogation of passive tags, communicating with passive tags with strong encryption and dynamic authentication features, and the ability to place the tags directly on metal objects. In this paper, we report on a novel secure passive tag integrated with fibre optics seal that allows real-time monitoring of items through secure wireless communications that employs AES encryption and dynamic authentication. Furthermore, the devices can be networked for large scale operations. The proposed passive seal has the same capabilities as active seals in that it allows realtime monitoring. However, the battery lifetimes of conventional active seals are limited or unpredictable. As the long-term storage of SNM might last for several years, these passive seals having been integrated with passive RF tags, extends the lifetime of the physical seals and tags indefinitely, while getting the same performance of active seals and tags. The integrated seal-and-tag is transformational in addressing a critical need in Safeguards area for long-term real-time monitoring. (author)

  8. Some technological aspects of an evaluation and visualisation component for the safeguards integrated information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Belenki, A.; Nishiwaki, Y.; Matsuoka, H.; Fedoseeva, I.

    2001-01-01

    According to Safeguards strengthening measures which include both Measures under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Measures under Model Additional Protocol, the Agency receives much more information than some years before. It seems reasonable to develop an integrated information system (IIS) because information evaluation and review are important parts of Safeguards assessments. An integrated information system can include the following components: information search, primary messages selection, evaluation of received information, data storage, visualisation and evaluation of State's nuclear programme (SNP) and elaboration of management decisions. Hereby, IIS is a human-computer system where all components listed above are implemented. Within the framework of SNP a human factor plays an important role. SNP has a number of special properties such as uniqueness, multi-dimensions, subjectivity of its state evaluation, time variation, incompleteness of its description and the mentioned above human factor. For realistic simulation of SNP development it is necessary to reduce usage of quantitative methods and apply methods which are closer to perception of the outward things by a human being. This task requires to convert all available information, both qualitative and quantitative, into a special format. The format requires methods which are being developed on the basis of pragmatic, visual and Zadeh's linguistic variables which define corresponding scales. A pragmatic scale is defined on a basic metric scale taking into account a particular pragmatic cut of SNP. In other words pragmatic scale maps a pragmatic cut of the problem which is important from the point of view of IIS goal. By using pragmatic scales it is possible, for example, to estimate the speed of development of processes existing within the framework of SNP. The visual variable allows to solve the following engineering tasks: input of the expert's evaluations in the system and interpretations of its

  9. The challenges of integrating multiple safeguards systems in a large nuclear facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lavietes, A.; Liguori, C.; Pickrell, M.; Plenteda, R.; Sweet, M.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: Implementing safeguards in a cost-effective manner in large nuclear facilities such as fuel conditioning, fuel reprocessing, and fuel fabrication plants requires the extensive use of instrumentation that is operated in unattended mode. The collected data is then periodically reviewed by the inspectors either on-site at a central location in the facility or remotely in the IAEA offices. A wide variety of instruments are deployed in large facilities, including video surveillance cameras, electronic sealing devices, non-destructive assay systems based on gamma ray and neutron detection, load cells for mass measurement, ID-readers, and other process-specific monitors. The challenge to integrate these different measurement instruments into an efficient, reliable, and secure system requires implementing standardization at various levels throughout the design process. This standardization includes the data generator behaviour and interface, networking solutions, and data security approaches. This standardization will provide a wide range of savings, including reduced training for inspectors and technicians, reduced periodic technical maintenance, reduced spare parts inventory, increased system robustness, and more predictive system behaviour. The development of standard building blocks will reduce the number of data generators required and allow implementation of simplified architectures that do not require local collection computers but rather utilize transmission of the acquired data directly to a central server via Ethernet connectivity. This approach will result in fewer system components and therefore reduced maintenance efforts and improved reliability. This paper discusses in detail the challenges and the subsequent solutions in the various areas that the IAEA Department of Safeguards has committed to pursue as the best sustainable way of maintaining the ability to implement reliable safeguards systems. (author)

  10. Design considerations for an integrated safeguards system for fuel-reprocessng plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cartan, F.O.

    1982-05-01

    This report presents design ideas for safeguards systems in nuclear fuels reprocessing plants. The report summarizes general safeguards requirements and describes a safeguards system concept being developed and tested at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant. The report gives some general concepts intended for design consideration and a checklist of specific problems that should be considered. The report is intended as an aid for the safeguards system designer and as a source of useful information

  11. VISA-2 - a general, vulnerability-oriented method for evaluating the performance of integrated safeguards/security systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, L.; Owel, W.R.

    1981-01-01

    This paper discusses the VISA (Vulnerability of Integrated Safeguards Analysis) method, developed in 1976-77 for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and which has been adapted more recently to a broader range of uses. The performance of VISA systems is evaluated in terms of how they perform as an integrated safeguards/security system. The resulting method has been designated VISA-2. 7 refs

  12. Euratom experience in safeguarding reprocessing and thermal reactor mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities within the European Community

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    The legal basis and instruments for the application of safeguards in the European Community are described. Euratom safeguards apply throughout the fuel cycle starting at the ore stage. Euratom has had experience in the application of safeguards to small and medium size reprocessing and MOX fabrication plants. In reprocessing plants accountancy, containment and surveillance methods are applied and the plant is divided into three material balance areas. Similar procedures are applied at fabrication plants. Euratom inspectors apply their main verification activities at strategic points but have the right of access at any time to all places which contain nuclear material. Under the Euratom-IAEA Agreements 'Joint Teams' of Euratom and IAEA inspectors will operate together to minimise the burden on operators and to avoid duplication of effort while enabling both organisations to achieve their safeguards objectives

  13. The safeguards on-site laboratory at Sellafield. Five years operational experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Duinslaeger, L.; Belle, P. van; Mayer, K.; Casteleyn, K.; Abousahl, S.; Daures, P.; Eberle, H.; Enright, T.; Guiot, A.; Hild, M.; Horta Domenech, J.; Lajarge, P.; Laurent, P.; Le Terrier, A.; Lynch, B.; Marucci, M.; Millet, S.; Ottmar, H.; Richir, P.; Street, S.; Vallet, P.; Zuleger, E. [European Commission, Karlsruhe (Germany). Inst. for Transuranium Elements

    2004-06-01

    The start of operation of the large reprocessing facilities led Euratom Safeguards to a new approach for verification analysis of samples taken at the facility: the installation of on-site laboratories. The availability of analytical capabilities for independent verification measurements at the site of these facilities offers obvious advantages in view of timeliness of results. The 'On-Site Laboratory' (OSL) at the BNFL Sellafield site was the first ever and entered into operation in 1999. For almost five years, the Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) has been operating the laboratory under routine conditions. During this period, more than one thousand safeguards samples were analysed. The experience gained in the management, logistics and operation of the OSL allow a critical review based on a significant period in time. This includes also aspects of training of staff, maintenance of equipment, flow of information, and improvements in the efficiency. The analytical issues are of key importance: based on the operational experience, the measurement methods were adapted (changing boundary conditions), the distribution of samples according to material type changed (start up of MOS fabrication plant), and the cutback in resources triggered a further streamlining of the analytical efforts. (orig.)

  14. Integrated Information Technology Framework for Analysis of Data from Enrichment Plants to Support the Safeguards Mission

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marr, Clifton T.; Thurman, David A.; Jorgensen, Bruce V.

    2008-01-01

    Many examples of software architectures exist that support process monitoring and analysis applications which could be applied to enrichment plants in a fashion that supports the Safeguards Mission. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has developed mature solutions that will provide the framework to support online statistical analysis of enrichment plans and the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Most recently, PNNL has developed a refined architecture and supporting tools that address many of the common problems analysis and modeling environments experience: pipelining, handling large data volumes, and real-time performance. We propose the architecture and tools may be successfully used in furthering the goals of nuclear material control and accountability as both an aid to processing plant owners and as comprehensive monitoring for oversight teams.

  15. Integrating Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) into the design of small modular reactors : a handbook.

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Middleton, Bobby D. [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Mendez, Carmen Margarita [Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

    2013-10-01

    The existing regulatory environment for nuclear reactors impacts both the facility design and the cost of operations once the facility is built. Delaying the consideration of regulatory requirements until late in the facility design - or worse, until after construction has begun - can result in costly retrofitting as well as increased operational costs to fulfill safety, security, safeguards, and emergency readiness requirements. Considering the scale and scope, as well as the latest design trends in the next generation of nuclear facilities, there is an opportunity to evaluate the regulatory requirements and optimize the design process for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), as compared to current Light Water Reactors (LWRs). To this end, Sandia has embarked on an initiative to evaluate the interactions of regulations and operations as an approach to optimizing the design of SMR facilities, supporting operational efficiencies, as well as regulatory requirements. The early stages of this initiative consider two focus areas. The first focus area, reported by LaChance, et al. (2007), identifies the regulatory requirements established for the current fleet of LWR facilities regarding Safety, Security, Operations, Safeguards, and Emergency Planning, and evaluates the technical bases for these requirements. The second focus area, developed in this report, documents the foundations for an innovative approach that supports a design framework for SMR facilities that incorporates the regulatory environment, as well as the continued operation of the facility, into the early design stages, eliminating the need for costly retrofitting and additional operating personnel to fulfill regulatory requirements. The work considers a technique known as Integrated Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (ISOSS) (Darby, et al., 2007). In coordination with the best practices of industrial operations, the goal of this effort is to develop a design framework that outlines how ISOSS

  16. Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2012-07-01

    The concepts of nuclear safety and security culture are well established; however, a common understanding of safeguards culture is not internationally recognized. Supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the authors prepared this report, an analysis of the concept of safeguards culture, and gauged its value to the safeguards community. The authors explored distinctions between safeguards culture, safeguards compliance, and safeguards performance, and evaluated synergies and differences between safeguards culture and safety/security culture. The report concludes with suggested next steps.

  17. Experience with an ultrasonic sealing system for nuclear safeguards in irradiated fuel bay demonstrations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    White, B.F.; Smith, M.T.

    1985-07-01

    The development of the irradiated fuel safeguards containment assembly for CANDU nuclear generating stations has stimulated the development of the AECL Random Coil Sealing System. The ARC seal combines the identity and integrity elements in an ultrasonically-determined signature. This is verified in situ, in real time with the seal reading system. The maturation of this technology has been facilitated with demonstration trials in the NRU and NPD irradiated fuel bays. The NPD demonstration includes operation of the systems tooling by Ontario Hydro staff. It provides the opportunity for IAEA inspectors from Toronto and Vienna to direct the operational procedures and to perform the data acquisition. The procedures and systems developed in these trials are reviewed. The estimation of the system performance characteristics from the observations is presented. A minimum frequency of reading for individual seals is recommended to be once per annum following initial deployment

  18. Integration of the advanced transparency framework to advanced nuclear systems : enhancing Safety, Operations, Security and Safeguards (SOSS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mendez, Carmen Margarita; Rochau, Gary Eugene; Cleary, Virginia D.

    2008-01-01

    The advent of the nuclear renaissance gives rise to a concern for the effective design of nuclear fuel cycle systems that are safe, secure, nonproliferating and cost-effective. We propose to integrate the monitoring of the four major factors of nuclear facilities by focusing on the interactions between Safeguards, Operations, Security, and Safety (SOSS). We proposed to develop a framework that monitors process information continuously and can demonstrate the ability to enhance safety, operations, security, and safeguards by measuring and reducing relevant SOSS risks, thus ensuring the safe and legitimate use of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. A real-time comparison between expected and observed operations provides the foundation for the calculation of SOSS risk. The automation of new nuclear facilities requiring minimal manual operation provides an opportunity to utilize the abundance of process information for monitoring SOSS risk. A framework that monitors process information continuously can lead to greater transparency of nuclear fuel cycle activities and can demonstrate the ability to enhance the safety, operations, security and safeguards associated with the functioning of the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has developed a risk algorithm for safeguards and is in the process of demonstrating the ability to monitor operational signals in real-time though a cooperative research project with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The risk algorithms for safety, operations and security are under development. The next stage of this work will be to integrate the four algorithms into a single framework

  19. New safeguards system and JNC's activities in the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Iwanaga, Masayuki

    2000-01-01

    The Japan Nuclear Fuel Cycle Development Institute (JNC) has been developing the various area of the technology in the nuclear fuel cycle more than 30 years, as the leading organization. Standing on the accumulated experiences through those activities, JNC will construct the new fuel cycle concept based on the principle for safety, environment, economy and nonproliferation. In this process, evaluation of the specific nonproliferation features with the nuclear material control methods taking in to account of the safegurdability might have one of the major importance. On the other hand, recently, in addition to the conventional safeguards (INFCIRC153), an additional protocol (INFCIRC540) which defines the activities that complement the integrity of a member country's declaration has come into effect in several countries, including Japan. IAEA and other international organizations are now discussing the safeguards concept, which integrates the conventional as well as new safeguards measures. In JNC's efforts to construct the new fuel cycle concept, it is necessary to give sufficient consideration to reflect the integrated safeguards concept. In the process of implementing the concept of the new integrated safeguards system, we presume that changes will have to be made in the traditional approach, which mainly deals with nuclear material. It will become necessary to develop a concrete method and approach in order to analyze and evaluate information, and work will have to be undertaken to optimize such a method based on its effects and efficiency. JNC will make contributions to international society by making the best use of its experience and technological infrastructure to reflect further safeguards development program in JNC so that the new IAEA safeguards can be firmly established. Related to this point of view, the following two subjects is to be introduced on the whole; 1. JNC's experiences and expertise of the development of safeguards technology with the fuel

  20. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stevens, Rebecca S.; McClelland-Kerr, John

    2009-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of these three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports them should be strengthened. The focus of this paper will be on the role safeguards plays in the 3S concept and how to support the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards. The objective of this paper has been to provide a working definition of safeguards infrastructure, and to discuss xamples of how building safeguards infrastructure is presented in several models. The guidelines outlined in the milestones document provide a clear path for establishing both the safeguards and the related infrastructures needed to support the development of nuclear power. The model employed by the INSEP program of engaging with partner states on safeguards-related topics that are of current interest to the level of nuclear development in that state provides another way of approaching the concept of building safeguards infrastructure. The Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is yet another approach that underscored five principal areas for growth, and the United States commitment to working with partners to promote this growth both at home and abroad.

  1. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of system upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and costs and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers. The model is in the preliminary stages of implementation, and an effort is ongoing to make the approach and quantitative model available for general use. The model, which is designed to complement existing nuclear safeguards evaluation tools, incorporates a variety of factors and integrates information on the likelihood of potential threats, safeguards capabilities to defeat threats, and the relative consequences if safeguards fail. The model uses this information to provide an overall measure for comparing safeguards upgrade projects at a facility

  2. Good practices in provision of nuclear safeguards and security training courses at the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Kobayashi Naoki

    2017-01-01

    Full Text Available More than five years have passed since the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN was established under the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA in December 2010 and started its activities, in response to the commitment of Japan at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington D.C.. The ISCN has been vigorously involved in capacity building assistance on nuclear nonproliferation (safeguards and nuclear security, mainly in the Asian region. It has provided 105 training courses to 2901 participants in total as of August 2016. The ISCN plays a major role in strengthening nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security in the region, and this can be considered one of the great results of the Nuclear Security Summit process. The ISCN has cooperated with the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL to establish a base of instructors, particularly for the Center's flagship two-week courses, the Regional Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities (RTC on PP and the Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (RTC on SSAC. Furthermore, the ISCN has provided training courses for experts in Japan, making the best use of the Center's knowledge and experience of organizing international courses. The ISCN has also started joint synchronized training with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (EC JRC on nuclear safeguards. This paper describes the good practices at the ISCN through its five years of activities, focusing on its progress in nuclear safeguards and nuclear security training.

  3. Approach to integrate current safeguards measures with additional protocol requirements at national level

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramirez, R.

    2001-01-01

    Peru adhered to the Additional Protocol in March 2000 which was also approved by the Congress in May 2001. After approval by law the obligations derived from this Additional Protocol will be in force after 180 days. After the signing of the Protocol an approach was designed to help better fulfill these requirements in an integrated way with the previous measures. As first stage, a review of the current state of safeguards was undertaken. Under the current agreement (an INFCIRC/153 type agreement) the reporting is less complicated and inexpensive to be carried out because these reports include only the declared nuclear material and the features of declared facilities where the nuclear material is used. No other related facility or material or activity needs to be declared. In Peru there are only two MBAs where low enriched uranium (LEU) is used and the record system includes general ledgers, inventory records and operational books. The results of national inspections and copies of reports and communications sent to the IAEA are also kept in this system. Under the agreement and subsidiary arrangements material balance reports (MBR), physical inventory listings (PIL) and inventory change reports (ICR) are prepared and submitted to the IAEA at scheduled periods. The MBR and PIL reports are sent after yearly regular inspections carried out by the IAEA. The ICR is sent just every time when an import or export of nuclear material is made. The time devoted to carry out all of these activities is not so extensive for both the State System for Accountability and Control (SSAC) and the users because of the limited nuclear activities in the country. Because of the characteristics and limited quantities of nuclear material the efforts for inspection and reporting activities are few. Another subject under review was the procedure for controlling the imports of nuclear material. Under the current agreement this subject was not a problem, as all of the radioactive and nuclear

  4. Technology Integration Experiences of Teachers

    Science.gov (United States)

    Çoklar, Ahmet Naci; Yurdakul, Isil Kabakçi

    2017-01-01

    Teachers are important providers of educational sustainability. Teachers' ability to adapt themselves to rapidly developing technologies applicable to learning environments is connected with technology integration. The purpose of this study is to investigate teachers' technology integration experiences in the course of learning and teaching…

  5. Experience on the application of safeguard systems to the Italian nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Marzocchi, A.; Venchiarutti, R.; Gatti, S.; Bertini, A.; Zaffiro, B.

    1977-01-01

    The safeguard systems applied in Italy to the various fuel cycle phases, including nuclear power stations, are presented in this paper in view of the present situation resulting from the Rome Treaty obligations and from the obligations to be defined in relation to the ratification of TNP by Italy. This short survey concerns not only the systems usually applied, but also the research and development aspects of new systems that facilitate the attainment of the aims specified in the Treaties. Moreover this paper illustrates the philosophy of nuclear material physical security, aiming at supplementing the efficiency of the safeguard systems [fr

  6. An integrated approach to validation of safeguards and security program performance

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Altman, W.D.; Hunt, J.S.; Hockert, J.W.

    1988-01-01

    Department of Energy (DOE) requirements for safeguards and security programs are becoming increasingly performance oriented. Master Safeguards and Security Agreemtns specify performance levels for systems protecting DOE security interests. In order to measure and validate security system performance, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has developed cost effective validation tools and a comprehensive validation approach that synthesizes information gained from different activities such as force on force exercises, limited scope performance tests, equipment testing, vulnerability analyses, and computer modeling; into an overall assessment of the performance of the protection system. The analytic approach employs logic diagrams adapted from the fault and event trees used in probabilistic risk assessment. The synthesis of the results from the various validation activities is accomplished using a method developed by LLNL, based upon Bayes' theorem

  7. Guarantying and testing the nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Turcu, Ilie

    2002-01-01

    Apparently, the nuclear power will ensure an important share of the world energy demand at least for the next decades because there is no viable alternative in the fan of energy sources neither one complying with the environment preservation requirements. The nuclear energy future depends not only on technical and economical aspects but also on preventing any danger of nuclear safeguards nature. The main international legal instrument which provides concrete commitments for nations in this field is the Nuclear Safeguard Convention. It provides guarantees and testings of the nuclear safeguards over the entire service life of the nuclear power plants. In the two general conferences (of 1999 and 2002) the status and measures adopted in the field of nuclear safeguards by the states adhering to the convention were discussed and reviewed, as well as the issues of financial resources, licensing and the adequate measures in emergency cases. The nuclear safeguards is a major issue among the criteria of integration in UE. Essential for maintaining and endorsing the provisions of nuclear safeguards in Romania are specific research and development activities aiming at integrating the equipment and structures, solving the operation problems of nuclear facilities, studying the behavior of installations in transient regimes, investigating the reliability and probabilistic assessing of nuclear safeguards, examining the phenomenology and simulating severe accidents or human factor behavior. Of major importance appears to be the international cooperation aiming that a permanent exchange of information and experience, dissemination of the best results, solutions and practices. The paper presents the status and trends at the world level, as well as in Romania, underlining the main issues of the strategy in this field and stressing the financial and human resources implied the implementing the nuclear safeguards provisions

  8. More efficient integrated safeguards by applying a reasonable detection probability for maintaining low presence probability of undetected nuclear proliferating activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Otsuka, Naoto

    2013-01-01

    Highlights: • A theoretical foundation is presented for more efficient Integrated Safeguards (IS). • Probability of undetected nuclear proliferation activities should be maintained low. • For nations under IS, the probability to start proliferation activities is very low. • The fact can decrease the detection probability of IS by dozens of percentage points. • The cost of IS per nation can be cut down by reducing inspection frequencies etc. - Abstract: A theoretical foundation is presented for implementing more efficiently the present International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) integrated safeguards (ISs) on the basis of fuzzy evaluation of the probability that the evaluated nation will continue peaceful activities. It is shown that by determining the presence probability of undetected nuclear proliferating activities, nations under IS can be maintained at acceptably low proliferation risk levels even if the detection probability of current IS is decreased by dozens of percentage from the present value. This makes it possible to reduce inspection frequency and the number of collected samples, allowing the IAEA to cut costs per nation. This will contribute to further promotion and application of IS to more nations by the IAEA, and more efficient utilization of IAEA resources from the viewpoint of whole IS framework

  9. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  10. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2001-07-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards (including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security.

  11. Symposium on international safeguards: Verification and nuclear material security. Book of extended synopses. Addendum

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2001-01-01

    The symposium covered the topics related to international safeguards, verification and nuclear materials security, namely: verification and nuclear material security; the NPT regime: progress and promises; the Additional Protocol as an important tool for the strengthening of the safeguards system; the nuclear threat and the nuclear threat initiative. Eighteen sessions dealt with the following subjects: the evolution of IAEA safeguards ( including strengthened safeguards, present and future challenges; verification of correctness and completeness of initial declarations; implementation of the Additional Protocol, progress and experience; security of material; nuclear disarmament and ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq; evolution of IAEA verification in relation to nuclear disarmament); integrated safeguards; physical protection and illicit trafficking; destructive analysis for safeguards; the additional protocol; innovative safeguards approaches; IAEA verification and nuclear disarmament; environmental sampling; safeguards experience; safeguards equipment; panel discussion on development of state systems of accountancy and control; information analysis in the strengthened safeguard system; satellite imagery and remote monitoring; emerging IAEA safeguards issues; verification technology for nuclear disarmament; the IAEA and the future of nuclear verification and security

  12. Strengthening safeguards information evaluation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harry, J.; Hudson, P.

    2001-01-01

    The strengthening of safeguards should not be limited to the verification of explicit declarations made by the States. Additional information should guide the IAEA to set priorities for further investigations. Not only all aspects of the State's nuclear programme, including the application of safe, secure and transparent nuclear management, but also the level of compliance with other verifiable treaties, political motivation, economic capabilities, international relations and ties, co-operative attitude to safeguards, and general openness and transparency should be included. The evaluation of the diverse forms of information from different sources requires new reliable processes that will result in a high credibility and detection probability. The IAEA uses the physical model for the evaluation of the technical information, and proposed also Fuzzy Logic, or Calculation with Words, to handle the information. But for the evaluation it is questioned whether fuzziness could lead to a crisp judgement. In this paper an objective method of information evaluation is proposed, which allows to integrate different kinds of information and to include calibration and tests in the establishment of the evaluation process. This method, Delta, uses elicitation of a syndicate of experienced inspectors to integrate obvious indicators together with apparently innocent indicators, into a database that forms the core of the evaluation process. Nominal or ordinal scales could be applied to come to an objective and quantifiable result. Experience with this method can in the course of time result in predictive conclusions. 9 refs

  13. The safeguards options study

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States); Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R. [Argonne National Lab., IL (United States); Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J. [Brookhaven National Lab., Upton, NY (United States); Filby, E. [Idaho National Engineering Lab., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)] [and others

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq`s obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state.

  14. The safeguards options study

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Mullen, M.F.; Olinger, C.T.; Stanbro, W.D.; Olsen, A.P.; Roche, C.T.; Rudolph, R.R.; Bieber, A.M.; Lemley, J.; Filby, E.

    1995-04-01

    The Safeguards Options Study was initiated to aid the International Safeguards Division (ISD) of the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation in developing its programs in enhanced international safeguards. The goal was to provide a technical basis for the ISD program in this area. The Safeguards Options Study has been a cooperative effort among ten organizations. These are Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia National Laboratories, and Special Technologies Laboratory. Much of the Motivation for the Safeguards Options Study is the recognition after the Iraq experience that there are deficiencies in the present approach to international safeguards. While under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at their declared facilities, Iraq was able to develop a significant weapons program without being noticed. This is because negotiated safeguards only applied at declared sites. Even so, their nuclear weapons program clearly conflicted with Iraq's obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nonnuclear weapon state

  15. The international safeguards profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1986-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a staff of safeguards professionals who are responsible for carrying out on-site inspections to determine compliance with international safeguards agreements. By IAEA Statute, the paramount consideration in recruiting IAEA staff is to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. An analysis of the distribution of professionals in the IAEA Department of Safeguards has revealed some interesting observations regarding the distribution of grade levels, age, time in service, gender, and geographical origin. Following several earlier studies performed by contractors for ACDA, U.S. efforts have been undertaken to attract and better prepare candidates for working at the IAEA

  16. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative: Human Capital Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scholz, M.; Irola, G.; Glynn, K.

    2015-01-01

    Since 2008, the Human Capital Development (HCD) subprogramme of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has supported the recruitment, education, training, and retention of the next generation of international safeguards professionals to meet the needs of both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United States. Specifically, HCD's efforts respond to data indicating that 82% of safeguards experts at U.S. Laboratories will have left the workforce within 15 years. This paper provides an update on the status of the subprogramme since its last presentation at the IAEA Safeguards Symposium in 2010. It highlights strengthened, integrated efforts in the areas of graduate and post-doctoral fellowships, young and midcareer professional support, short safeguards courses, and university engagement. It also discusses lessons learned from the U.S. experience in safeguards education and training as well as the importance of long-range strategies to develop a cohesive, effective, and efficient human capital development approach. (author)

  17. The design and performance evaluation of the ultrasonic random coil identity-integrity element for underwater safeguards seals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Allen, V.H.; Backer, S.; Smith, M.T.

    1983-06-01

    Irradiated fuel discharged from CANDU power reactors is stored underwater and, in order to comply with the requirements of International Safe-guards, the fuel is stacked in sealed containers which are examined at intervals by IAEA inspectors. The seals are verified for identity and integrity and this report describes the design of an identity/integrity element for the seals. The element is in the form of a random coil of wire which is interrogated by ultrasonic methods. An evaluation of thirty-six seals is reported. The application of seals to stacks of fuel was simulated in a water-filled bay at CRNL and repetitive verification measurements were made which simulated inspection procedures. The seal identity signatures were compared using cross-correlation methods and the results show that a broken or tampered seal can be identified with a high level of confidence

  18. Integrated safeguards testing laboratories in support of the advanced fuel cycle initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Santi, Peter A.; Demuth, Scott F.; Klasky, Kristen L.; Lee, Haeok; Miller, Michael C.; Sprinkle, James K.; Tobin, Stephen J.; Williams, Bradley

    2009-01-01

    A key enabler for advanced fuel cycle safeguards research and technology development for programs such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is access to facilities and nuclear materials. This access is necessary in many cases in order to ensure that advanced safeguards techniques and technologies meet the measurement needs for which they were designed. One such crucial facility is a hot cell based laboratory which would allow developers from universities, national laboratories, and commercial companies to perform iterative research and development of advanced safeguards instrumentation under realistic operating conditions but not be subject to production schedule limitations. The need for such a facility arises from the requirement to accurately measure minor actinide and/or fission product bearing nuclear materials that cannot be adequately shielded in glove boxes. With the contraction of the DOE nuclear complex following the end of the cold war, many suitable facilities at DOE sites are increasingly costly to operate and are being evaluated for closure. A hot cell based laboratory that allowed developers to install and remove instrumentation from the hot cell would allow for both risk mitigation and performance optimization of the instrumentation prior to fielding equipment in facilities where maintenance and repair of the instrumentation is difficult or impossible. These benefits are accomplished by providing developers the opportunity to iterate between testing the performance of the instrumentation by measuring realistic types and amounts of nuclear material, and adjusting and refining the instrumentation based on the results of these measurements. In this paper, we review the requirements for such a facility using the Wing 9 hot cells in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility as a model for such a facility and describe recent use of these hot cells in support of AFCI.

  19. Integrated safeguards testing laboratories in support of the advanced fuel cycle initiative

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Santi, Peter A [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Demuth, Scott F [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Klasky, Kristen L [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Lee, Haeok [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Miller, Michael C [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Sprinkle, James K [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Tobin, Stephen J [Los Alamos National Laboratory; Williams, Bradley [DOE, NE

    2009-01-01

    A key enabler for advanced fuel cycle safeguards research and technology development for programs such as the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) is access to facilities and nuclear materials. This access is necessary in many cases in order to ensure that advanced safeguards techniques and technologies meet the measurement needs for which they were designed. One such crucial facility is a hot cell based laboratory which would allow developers from universities, national laboratories, and commercial companies to perform iterative research and development of advanced safeguards instrumentation under realistic operating conditions but not be subject to production schedule limitations. The need for such a facility arises from the requirement to accurately measure minor actinide and/or fission product bearing nuclear materials that cannot be adequately shielded in glove boxes. With the contraction of the DOE nuclear complex following the end of the cold war, many suitable facilities at DOE sites are increasingly costly to operate and are being evaluated for closure. A hot cell based laboratory that allowed developers to install and remove instrumentation from the hot cell would allow for both risk mitigation and performance optimization of the instrumentation prior to fielding equipment in facilities where maintenance and repair of the instrumentation is difficult or impossible. These benefits are accomplished by providing developers the opportunity to iterate between testing the performance of the instrumentation by measuring realistic types and amounts of nuclear material, and adjusting and refining the instrumentation based on the results of these measurements. In this paper, we review the requirements for such a facility using the Wing 9 hot cells in the Los Alamos National Laboratory's Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility as a model for such a facility and describe recent use of these hot cells in support of AFCI.

  20. IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1985-01-01

    IAEA safeguards are a system of technical measures within the framework of international non-proliferation policy entrusted to the IAEA in its Statute and by other treaties. About 98% of the world's nuclear installations outside the nuclear-weapon countries are now under safeguards. This paper gives a review of IAEA activities in this field: objectives, agreements, work and development of staff of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, instruments and techniques for direct measurement and verification of nuclear material. (author)

  1. Status and Prospect of Safeguards By Design for Pyroprocessing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Ho-Dong; Shin, H.S.; Ahn, S.K.

    2010-01-01

    The concept of Safeguards-By-Design (SBD), which is proposed and developed by the United States and the IAEA, is now widely acknowledged as a fundamental consideration for the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards. The application of a SBD concept is of importance especially for developmental nuclear facilities which have new technological features and relevant challenges to their safeguards approach. At this point of time, the examination of the applicability of SBD on a pyroprocessing facility, which has been being developed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), would be meaningful. The ROK developed a safeguards system with the concept of SBD for Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF) and DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) before the SBD concept was formally suggested. Currently. The PRIDE (PyRoprocess Integrated Inactive Demonstration) facility for the demonstration of pyroprocess using 10 ton of non-radioactive nuclear materials per year is being constructed in the ROK. The safeguards system for the facility has been designed in cooperation with a facility designer from the design phase, and the safeguards system would be established according to the future construction schedule. In preparing the design of Engineering Scale Pyroprocess Facility (ESPF), which will use spent fuels in an engineering scale and be constructed in 2016, a research on the safeguards system for this facility is also being conducted. In this connection, a project to support for development of safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility has been carried out by KAERI in cooperation with KINAC and the IAEA through an IAEA Member State Support Program (MSSP). When this MSSP project is finished in August, 2011, a safeguards system model and safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility would be established. Maximizing these early experiences and results, a safeguards system of ESPF based on the concept of SBD would be designed and

  2. Safeguards as an evolutionary system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, J.

    1998-01-01

    NPT safeguards pursuant to INFCIRC/153 retain a strong emphasis on materials accountancy, and are primarily concerned with verifying nuclear activities as declared by the State - the correctness of States' declarations. This decade, failure to adequately address the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities - the issue of the completeness of States' declarations - has been recognized as a major shortcoming in the safeguards system. Since the 'classical' safeguards system is unable to provide credible assurance of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, substantial efforts are being made to strengthen the IAEA's capabilities in this regard. Agreement has been reached on a Model Protocol substantially extending the Agency's authority, and good progress has been made in developing the new approaches, technologies and techniques required to ensure this authority is used effectively. Increasingly, safeguards will involve more qualitative judgements. Transparency will be very important - without a clear understanding by Member States of how the Agency goes about its new tasks and reaches its conclusions about the absence of undeclared activities, the safeguards system will not fulfil its vital confidence-building role. A major theme in current safeguards thinking is integration, the rationalization of classical safeguards with the new safeguards strengthening measures. As part of the rationalization process, it is timely to re-assess traditional safeguards implementation practices. One of these is uniformity in the way safeguards activities are implemented in different States. Another is whether the traditional concept of safeguards confidentiality is consistent with the increasing importance of transparency. (author)

  3. A DOE multi-site approach to safeguards integration with facility operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ostenak, C.A.

    1987-01-01

    The Accountability Technology Exchange (ATEX) Working Group was established in October 1986 by the US Department of Energy (DOE) to help identify nuclear materials accountability measurement needs within the DOE plutonium community and recommend potential improvements. ATEX Working Group membership represents nuclear materials production, safeguards, nondestructive assay (NDA), and analytical chemistry at a multitude of DOE plutonium sites. Currently, the ATEX Working Group has identified twenty NDA accountability measurement needs that fall into five major classes: NDA standards representing various nuclear materials and matrix compositions; NDA for impure nuclear materials compounds, residues, and wastes; NDA for product-grade nuclear materials; NDA for nuclear materials process holdup and in-process inventory; and NDA for nuclear materials item control and verification. Specific needs within these classes have been evaluated and ranked for individual sites and for the total DOE plutonium community

  4. Safeguards on nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cisar, V.; Keselica, M.; Bezak, S.

    2001-01-01

    The article describes the implementation of IAEA safeguards for nuclear materials in the Czech and Slovak Republics, the establishment and development of the State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC) at the levels of the state regulatory body and of the operator, particularly at the Dukovany nuclear power plant. A brief overview of the historical development is given. Attention is concentrated on the basic concepts and legal regulation accepted by the Czech and Slovak Republics in accordance with the new approach to create a complete legislative package in the area of nuclear energy uses. The basic intention is to demonstrate the functions of the entire system, including safeguards information processing and technical support of the system. Perspectives of the Integrated Safeguards System are highlighted. The possible ways for approximation of the two national systems to the Safeguards System within the EU (EURATOM) are outlined, and the necessary regulatory and operators' roles in this process are described. (author)

  5. Developing a simulation for border safeguarding

    CSIR Research Space (South Africa)

    Van Rooyen, S

    2011-09-01

    Full Text Available Border safeguarding is the defence of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and this is a joint responsibility of the military and the police. Military doctrine for conventional warfare is not sufficient for Border Safeguarding operations due...

  6. NPT safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kyd, D.R.

    1993-10-01

    Origin of safeguards system and of comprehensive safeguards agreements, assurance given by IAEA safeguards, penalties and sanctions in case of breach of a safeguards agreement, recent experiences with Iraq, South Africa and DPRK as well as limits of the safeguards system are described

  7. VISA: a method for evaluating the performance of integrated safeguards systems at nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Donnelly, H.; Fullwood, R.; Glancy, J.

    1977-06-01

    This is the second volume of a two volume report on the VISA method for evaluating safeguards at fixed-site facilities. This volume contains appendices that support the description of the VISA concept and the initial working version of the method, VISA-1, presented in Volume I. The information is separated into four appendices, each describing details of one of the four analysis modules that comprise the analysis sections of the method. The first appendix discusses Path Analysis methodology, applies it to a Model Fuel Facility, and describes the computer codes that are being used. Introductory material on Path Analysis given in Chapter 3.2.1 and Chapter 4.2.1 of Volume I. The second appendix deals with Detection Analysis, specifically the schemes used in VISA-1 for classifying adversaries and the methods proposed for evaluating individual detection mechanisms in order to build the data base required for detection analysis. Examples of evaluations on identity-access systems, SNM portal monitors, and intrusion devices are provided. The third appendix describes the Containment Analysis overt-segment path ranking, the Monte Carlo engagement model, the network simulation code, the delay mechanism data base, and the results of a sensitivity analysis. The last appendix presents general equations used in Interruption Analysis for combining covert-overt segments and compares them with equations given in Volume I, Chapter 3

  8. Safeguarding children in dentistry: 1. Child protection training, experience and practice of dental professionals with an interest in paediatric dentistry.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Harris, J C; Elcock, C; Sidebotham, P D; Welbury, R R

    2009-04-25

    Following several highly publicised inquiries into the deaths of children from abuse and neglect, there has been much recent interest in the role and responsibility of all health professionals to protect children at risk of maltreatment. The findings of a postal questionnaire, sent in March 2005 to 789 dentists and dental care professionals with an interest in paediatric dentistry working in varied settings in the UK, are presented in a two-part report and discussed in the context of current multi-agency good practice in safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children. This first part explores reported child protection training, experience and practice. There was a significant gap between recognising signs of abuse and responding effectively: 67% of respondents had suspected abuse or neglect of a child patient at some time in their career but only 29% had ever made a child protection referral. The dental profession is alerted to the need to ensure necessary appropriate action to safeguard children is always taken when child abuse or neglect are suspected.

  9. Safeguards Culture: lesson learned

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, S.; Mladineo, S.V.

    2010-01-01

    After the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear program in 1991, the international community developed new tools for evaluating and demonstrating states' nuclear intentions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed a more holistic approach toward international safeguards verification to garner more complete information about states' nuclear activities. This approach manifested itself in State Level Evaluations, using information from a variety of sources, including the implementation of integrated safeguards in Member States, to reach a broader conclusion. Those wishing to exhibit strong nonproliferation postures to a more critical international community took steps to demonstrate their nonproliferation 'bona fides'. As these Member States signed and brought into force the Additional Protocol, submitted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports and strengthened their export control laws, the international community began to consider the emergence of so-called safeguards cultures. Today, safeguards culture can be a useful tool for measuring nonproliferation postures, but so far its impact on the international safeguards regime has been under appreciated. There is no agreed upon definition for safeguards culture nor agreement on how it should be measured.

  10. A view to the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tsuboi, Hiroshi

    2000-01-01

    The Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA entered into force on 16 December 1999. An initial declaration of the expanded information will be provided to the IAEA by next June in accordance with the Additional Protocol. In Japan the new integrated safeguards system, which strengthens the effectiveness and improves efficiency of IAEA Safeguards, is considered to be very important issue. The establishment of a permanent and universal safeguards system including application of safeguards in Nuclear Weapon States also is an important issue from the view-point of not only non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. Safeguards are expected to have an increasingly important role. (author)

  11. Experience in ensuring authenticity of information from safeguards systems installed in facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abedin-Zadeh, R.; Thiele, R.; Wagner, W.; Whichello, J.

    1991-01-01

    The increasing sophistication of non-destructive assay instruments, containment and surveillance devices and ancillary computer facilities used for safeguards purposes has resulted in a growing requirement for means to ensure the authenticity of information and thus preserve for the IAEA its capability to draw independent conclusions. The achievements of the last few years, particularly with regard to the development of new instruments, one of a kind instrumentation, conceptually new approaches such as the use of near-real-time accounting, and joint use arrangements, are largely the result of cooperation between the IAEA, state authorities, plant operators and certain national laboratories. It is anticipated that demands for various authentication features will further expand as growth in sophistication of equipment and automation of nuclear facilities continues, and that increasing reliance on in-line, unattended use instrumentation will become in future years the approach of choice. 8 refs, 1 fig., 1 tab

  12. Building safeguards infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    McClelland-Kerr, J.; Stevens, J.

    2010-01-01

    Much has been written in recent years about the nuclear renaissance - the rebirth of nuclear power as a clean and safe source of electricity around the world. Those who question the nuclear renaissance often cite the risk of proliferation, accidents or an attack on a facility as concerns, all of which merit serious consideration. The integration of three areas - sometimes referred to as 3S, for safety, security and safeguards - is essential to supporting the clean and safe growth of nuclear power, and the infrastructure that supports these three areas should be robust. The focus of this paper will be on the development of the infrastructure necessary to support safeguards, and the integration of safeguards infrastructure with other elements critical to ensuring nuclear energy security

  13. Safeguards '85

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1981-01-01

    IAEA safeguards watch over the pledge of those non-nuclear weapon countries, which are signatories to the NPT, to refrain from using nuclear installations for military purposes. At present, some 700 installations are inspected in 50 countries, among them 117 nuclear power plants. Further advancement of these safeguards measures serves to develop new methods and equipment for safeguards inspection, ensure that the growing numbers of new plants are inspected, and achieve complete coverage of the eleven countries not signatories to the NPT. However, the long term effectiveness of safeguards will depend on progress being made in the contractual obligations fur nuclear disarmament and in assuring the continuity of supply to non-nuclear weapon countries by the atomic powers and the supplier countries. (orig.) [de

  14. Nuclear safeguards in challenging times [Experts on nuclear safeguards and verification assess the global picture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Park, W.S.; Hillerman, J.

    2007-01-01

    Meeting at the IAEA's International Safeguards Symposium in October 2006, more than 500 experts from 60-plus countries and organizations addressed current and future challenges related to safeguards concepts, approaches, technologies, and experience. Sessions addressed five main issues driving developments: Current challenges to the safeguards system; Further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches; Improving the collection and analysis of safeguards information; Advances in safeguards techniques and technology; and Future challenges. Every four to five years, the IAEA brings together safeguards experts from all over the world at international symposia. In October 2001, they met in the shadow of 9/11 and the symposium included a special session on the prevention of nuclear terrorism

  15. Nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrampres, J.

    2010-01-01

    Close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry with representation from the UNESA Safeguards Group, has meant that, after almost two years of intense meetings and negotiations, Spain has a specific plant to plant agreement for the application of Safeguards under this new method. This is an agreement which aims to be a benchmark for all other EU countries, as the IAEA tends to apply a generic agreement that, in many cases, majority interferes in the nuclear power plants own processes. (Author).

  16. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Ha Vinh Phuong

    1976-01-01

    Since the start of the post-war era, international safeguards were considered essential to ensure that nuclear materials should not be diverted to unauthorised uses. In parallel, it was proposed to set up an international atomic energy agency within the United Nations through which international cooperation in nuclear matters would be channelled and controlled. Created in 1957, the IAEA was authorized to administer safeguards in connection with any assistance it provided as well as at the request of Member State and of any party to bilateral or multilateral arrangements in its ambit. Today, there are two international treaties requiring that its parties should accept Agency safeguards unilaterally, the Latin America Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), operative since 1970, which requires in particular that non-nuclear weapon states should accept Agency safeguards on its peaceful nuclear activities. Thus while NPT covers peaceful nuclear activities indiscriminately in a country, the Agency's original safeguards system is applied according to specific agreements and to given facilities. A basic conflict has now emerged between commercial interests and the increasing wish that transfer of nuclear equipment and know-how should not result in proliferation of military nuclear capacity; however, serious efforts are currently in progress to ensure universal application of IAEA safeguards and to develop them in step with the uses of nuclear energy. (N.E.A.) [fr

  17. A Trusted Autonomic Architecture to Safeguard Cyber-Physical Control Leaf Nodes and Protect Process Integrity

    OpenAIRE

    Chiluvuri, Nayana Teja

    2015-01-01

    Cyber-physical systems are networked through IT infrastructure and susceptible to malware. Threats targeting process control are much more safety-critical than traditional computing systems since they jeopardize the integrity of physical infrastructure. Existing defence mechanisms address security at the network nodes but do not protect the physical infrastructure if network integrity is compromised. An interface guardian architecture is implemented on cyber-physical control leaf nodes to mai...

  18. The early intervention safeguarding nurse pilot: an integrated model of working.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Fifield, Lucille; Blake, Susan

    2011-11-01

    Some of the most vulnerable children will need co-ordinated help from health, children's services and other agencies. Co-ordinated and joint working hinges on effective communication at all levels. Evidence shows that direct verbal communication is a more effective way to share concerns and that this should be followed up by written information. Yet barriers persist that prevent this from happening. Integrated health and social care teams are purported to break down professional and communication barriers. This paper reports on the evaluation of a pilot integrated model of health and social care in the North West of England. Such models can work and produce positive outcomes for children and families, but require full commitment from all parties. There are principles that need to be in place for this integrated model to achieve its aims and objectives, such as a robust governance framework that specifies the roles and responsibilities of each agency, managers and practitioners. Despite the model achieving its aim, the project was not as efficient as it could have been due to the lack of an integrated information technology system.

  19. Safeguards-relevant information collection from small holders – experiences and challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sundén, Erika; Dufva, Martina; Dahlberg, Joakim

    2015-01-01

    A number of universities, research institutions, hospitals, and other businesses are in possession of relatively small amounts of nuclear material. In some cases the material is in activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle, but there is also a wide variety of other applications. Regardless of application, material accountancy must be reported to the European Commission (EC) and, in Sweden, to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM). However, checking the completeness and correctness of the reports from operators with very small amounts of nuclear material can easily be forgotten or viewed as being less important. Starting in the beginning of 2013 SSM increased its effort in this area and began working more actively gathering information and checking its correctness. Informing the operators in possession of nuclear material of the rules and regulations is a major part of this work, as it has been noted that the knowledge level of safeguarding nuclear material in many locations is very low. This paper will give a description of the work being performed by SSM to ensure that information related to the possession of nuclear material are gathered and correctly declared. It will give an overview of the different procedures that are applied to different categories of small holders in Sweden (where the differences are mostly due to historical reasons). It will also entail some of the challenges met along the way; such as explaining to radiographers that for nuclear non-proliferation purposes it is the shielding uranium container which is of interest, not the isotope emitting the radiation. What we have experienced being the major differences between collecting information from small holders as compared to larger nuclear facilities will also be outlined. The paper ends with an outline for future work.

  20. Knowledge-based inspection:modelling complex processes with the integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Abazi, F.

    2011-01-01

    Increased level of complexity in almost every discipline and operation today raises the demand for knowledge in order to successfully run an organization whether to generate profit or to attain a non-profit mission. Traditional way of transferring knowledge to information systems rich in data structures and complex algorithms continue to hinder the ability to swiftly turnover concepts into operations. Diagrammatic modelling commonly applied in engineering in order to represent concepts or reality remains to be an excellent way of converging knowledge from domain experts. The nuclear verification domain represents ever more a matter which has great importance to the World safety and security. Demand for knowledge about nuclear processes and verification activities used to offset potential misuse of nuclear technology will intensify with the growth of the subject technology. This Doctoral thesis contributes with a model-based approach for representing complex process such as nuclear inspections. The work presented contributes to other domains characterized with knowledge intensive and complex processes. Based on characteristics of a complex process a conceptual framework was established as the theoretical basis for creating a number of modelling languages to represent the domain. The integrated Safeguards Modelling Method (iSMM) is formalized through an integrated meta-model. The diagrammatic modelling languages represent the verification domain and relevant nuclear verification aspects. Such a meta-model conceptualizes the relation between practices of process management, knowledge management and domain specific verification principles. This fusion is considered as necessary in order to create quality processes. The study also extends the formalization achieved through a meta-model by contributing with a formalization language based on Pattern Theory. Through the use of graphical and mathematical constructs of the theory, process structures are formalized enhancing

  1. Safeguard sleuths

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lowry, D.

    1989-01-01

    A report of the conference of the European Safeguards Research and Development Association, which tries to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses is given. Some of the problems encountered by safeguards inspectors are mentioned, such as being able to follow the material through the maze of piping in a reprocessing plant, the linguistic difficulties if the inspector does not speak the operator's language, the difference between precision and accuracy and the necessity of human inspection, containment and surveillance systems. Unexplained outages at a reprocessing plant are always treated as suspicious, as are power failures which prevent normal surveillance. The UK practice of allocating civil fuel temporarily to military use at Harwell also makes safeguard policing more difficult. (UK)

  2. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials

  3. IAEA symposium on international safeguards. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1997-10-01

    The most important subjects treated in 188 papers presented by the participants from member state and IAEA Safeguards Inspectors at the Symposium were as follows: implementation of IAEA safeguards; national support programs to the IAEA safeguards; experiences in application of safeguard monitoring devices; improved methods for verification of plutonium; highly enriched uranium; surveillance of spent fuel storage facilities, reprocessing plants, fuel fabrication plants; excess weapon grade plutonium and other fissile materials Refs, figs, tabs

  4. Reactor safeguards

    CERN Document Server

    Russell, Charles R

    1962-01-01

    Reactor Safeguards provides information for all who are interested in the subject of reactor safeguards. Much of the material is descriptive although some sections are written for the engineer or physicist directly concerned with hazards analysis or site selection problems. The book opens with an introductory chapter on radiation hazards, the construction of nuclear reactors, safety issues, and the operation of nuclear reactors. This is followed by separate chapters that discuss radioactive materials, reactor kinetics, control and safety systems, containment, safety features for water reactor

  5. Safeguards by design - The early consideration of safeguards concepts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Killeen, T.; Moran, B.; Pujol, E.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The IAEA Department of Safeguards is in the process of formalizing its approach to long-range strategic planning. As a result of this activity new endeavours are being identified. One of these endeavours is to develop a concept known as Safeguards by Design. Safeguarding nuclear material and facilities can be made more effective and cost efficient by improving the safeguardability of the system. By taking into account design features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards early in the design phase, a concept known as safeguards by design, the proliferation resistance of the system can be improved. This improvement process requires an understanding by designers and operators of safeguards and its underlying principles. To advance the safeguards by design approach, the IAEA determined that there is a need to develop written guidance. This guidance would help the major stakeholders - the designers, operators, owners, and regulatory bodies - to better understand how a facility could be designed, built and operated in such a way that effective safeguards could be implemented at reduced cost and with minimal burden to facility operations. By enlisting the cooperation of Member States through the support programme structure, the IAEA is working to first develop a document that describes the basic principles of safeguards, and the fundamental design features and measures that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. Facility-specific guidance will then be developed utilizing the resources, expertise and experience of the IAEA and its Member States. This paper will review the foundation for the development of this task, describe the progress that has been made and outline the path forward. (author)

  6. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement of regional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards

  7. IAEA safeguards for the 21st century

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-07-01

    The publication includes the lectures held during the seminar on IAEA safeguards for the 21st century. The topics covered are as follows: the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Legal instruments related to the application of safeguards; multilateral nuclear export controls; physical protection and its role in nuclear non-proliferation; the evolution of safeguards; basis for the strengthening of safeguards; information required from states, including 'small quantities protocol'; processing and evaluation of new information for strengthened safeguards; additional physical access and new technologies for strengthened safeguards; equipping the IAEA Inspectorate with new skills; achievements to date the strengthened safeguards; complement ofregional non-proliferation arrangements in international nuclear verification; promotion of transparency through Korean experience; and the future prospects of safeguards.

  8. Contribution of the 'safeguarded' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. The familiar ''Blue Book'' (INFCIRC 153) recognizes clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective IAEA system of safeguards. It is therefore helpful to summarize the relevant contributions from the 'safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of measurement systems and physical inventory procedures relevant to safeguards. Attention is also drawn to those areas where the specific objectives of IAEA Safeguards lead to requirements additional to those required for management purposes. (author)

  9. Recent advances in safeguards operations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Agu, B.; Iwamoto, H.

    1983-01-01

    The facilities and nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards have steadily increased in the past few years with consequent increases in the manpower and effort required for the implementation of effective international safeguards. To meet this challenge, various techniques and instruments have been developed with the assistance, support and cooperation of the Member States. Improved NDA equipment now permits accurate verification of plutonium and HEU bearing items; and optical and TV surveillance systems have improved remarkably. Experience in safeguarding nuclear facilities now includes fast-reactor fuel reprocessing and enrichment plants, even though the Hexapartite Safeguards Project is yet to define an agreed approach for safeguarding enrichment plants. The establishment of field offices now enables the IAEA to adequately implement safeguards at important facilities and also with more effective use of manpower. Closer cooperation with Member States via liaison or similar committees makes for effective safeguards implementation and the speedy solution of attendant problems. The technical support programmes from the Member States continue to provide the basis of the recent advances in safeguards techniques and instrumentation. (author)

  10. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  11. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  12. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2002-06-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  13. IAEA safeguards glossary. 2001 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2002-01-01

    IAEA safeguards have evolved since their inception in the late 1960s. In 1980 the IAEA published the first IAEA Safeguards Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l) with the aim of facilitating understanding of the specialized safeguards terminology within the international community. In 1987 the IAEA published a revised edition of the Glossary (IAEA/SG/INF/l (Rev.l)) which took into account developments in the safeguards area as well as comments received since the first edition appeared. Since 1987, IAEA safeguards have become more effective and efficient, mainly through the series of strengthening measures approved by the IAEA Board of Governors during 1992-1997, the Board's approval, in 1997, of the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)), and the work, begun in 1999, directed towards the development and implementation of integrated safeguards. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition reflects these developments. Each of the 13 sections of the Glossary addresses a specific subject related to IAEA safeguards. To facilitate understanding. definitions and, where applicable, explanations have been given for each of the terms listed. The terms defined and explained intentionally have not been arranged in alphabetical order, but their sequence within each section corresponds to the internal relationships of the subject treated. The terms are numbered consecutively within each section and an index referring to these numbers has been provided for ease of reference. The terms used have been translated into the official languages of the IAEA, as well as into German and Japanese. The IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition has no legal status and is not intended to serve as a basis for adjudicating on problems of definition such as might arise during the negotiation or in the interpretation of safeguards agreements or additional protocols. The IAEA

  14. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Petit, A.

    1991-01-01

    The IAEA has now 200 Inspectors or so, and Euratom a similar number. People in Vienna are talking about increases of this staff, in the range of a possible doubling in the five years to come, although even an immediate restart of the expansion of nuclear industry, would not materialize significantly within this period. This means that keeping the same safeguarding approach would probably lead to another doubling of such staff in the ten following years, which is completely unrealistic. Such a staff is our of proportion with those of national inspectorates in other fields. The paper analyzes the basic irrealistic dogma which have hindered the progress of international safeguards, and recall the suggestions made since ten years to improve them

  15. Recent advances in IAEA safeguards systems analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bahm, W.; Ermakov, S.; Kaniewski, J.; Lovett, J.; Pushkarjov, V.; Rosenthal, M.D.

    1983-01-01

    Efficient implementation of effective safeguards, the objective of the IAEA's Department of Safeguards, would be unthinkable without carrying out systematic studies on many different problems related to technical and other aspects of safeguards. The System Studies Section of the Department concentrates its efforts on such studies with the purpose of elaborating concepts, criteria, approaches and rules for the implementation of safeguards. In particular, the Section elaborates concepts and approaches for applying safeguards at the complex facilities that are expected to enter under safeguards in the future, develops approaches and rules in the areas where the Agency is still gaining experience, and assists in the implementation of safeguards whenever problems requiring non-routine solutions arise. This paper presents examples of the present activities of the System Studies Section: development of guidelines for use by facility designers in order to make safeguards easier and more effective, studies on near-real-time material accountancy, preparation of safeguards approaches for specific facility types, preparation of model inspection activity lists for different facility types and alternative safeguards approaches and preparation of safeguards policy papers containing the rules and regulations to be followed in the design and implementation of safeguards. (author)

  16. International safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1995-01-01

    The system of international safeguards carried out by the IAEA is designed to verify that governments are living up to pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes under the NPT (Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) and similar agreements. The film illustrates the range of field inspections and analytical work involved. It also shows how new approaches are helping to strengthen the system

  17. Reactor safeguards against insider sabotage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, H.A.

    1982-03-01

    A conceptual safeguards system is structured to show how both reactor operations and physical protection resources could be integrated to prevent release of radioactive material caused by insider sabotage. Operational recovery capabilities are addressed from the viewpoint of both detection of and response to disabled components. Physical protection capabilities for preventing insider sabotage through the application of work rules are analyzed. Recommendations for further development of safeguards system structures, operational recovery, and sabotage prevention are suggested

  18. Symposium on International Safeguards: Preparing for Future Verification Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2010-01-01

    The purpose of the symposium is to foster dialogue and information exchange involving Member States, the nuclear industry and members of the broader nuclear non-proliferation community to prepare for future verification challenges. Topics addressed during the 2010 symposium include the following: - Supporting the global nuclear non-proliferation regime: Building support for strengthening international safeguards; Enhancing confidence in compliance with safeguards obligations; Legal authority as a means to enhance effectiveness and efficiency; Verification roles in support of arms control and disarmament. - Building collaboration and partnerships with other international forums: Other verification and non-proliferation regimes; Synergies between safety, security and safeguards regimes. - Improving cooperation between IAEA and States for safeguards implementation: Strengthening State systems for meeting safeguards obligations; Enhancing safeguards effectiveness and efficiency through greater cooperation; Lessons learned: recommendations for enhancing integrated safeguards implementation. - Addressing safeguards challenges in an increasingly interconnected world: Non-State actors and covert trade networks; Globalization of nuclear information and technology. - Preparing for the global nuclear expansion and increasing safeguards workload: Furthering implementation of the State-level concept and integrated safeguards; Information-driven safeguards; Remote data-driven safeguards inspections; Safeguards in States without comprehensive safeguards agreements. - Safeguarding advanced nuclear facilities and innovative fuel cycles: Proliferation resistance; Safeguards by design; Safeguards approaches for advanced facilities. - Advanced technologies and methodologies: For verifying nuclear material and activities; For detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities; For information collection, analysis and integration. - Enhancing the development and use of safeguards

  19. {sup 3}He Replacement for Nuclear Safeguards Applications- an integrated test program to compare alternative neutron detectors

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Menlove, H. O.; Henzlova, D.; Evans, L. G.; Swinhoe, M. T.; Marlow, J. B. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, Safeguards Science and Technology Group, Los Alamos, (United States)

    2011-12-15

    During the past several years, the demand for {sup 3}He gas has far exceeded the gas supply. This shortage of {sup 3}He gas is projected to continue into the foreseeable future. There is a need for alternative neutron detectors that do not require {sup 3}He gas. For more than four decades, neutron detection has played a fundamental role in the safeguarding and control of nuclear materials at production facilities, fabrication plants and storage sites worldwide. Neutron measurements for safeguards applications have requirements that are unique to the quantitative assay of special nuclear materials. These neutron systems measure the neutron multiplicity distributions from each spontaneous fission and/or induced fission event. The neutron time correlation counting requires that two or more neutrons from a single fission event be detected. The doubles and triples neutron counting rate depends on the detector efficiency to the 2nd and 3rd power, respectively, so low efficiency systems will not work for the coincidence measurements, and any detector instabilities are greatly amplified. In the current test program, we will measure the alternative detector properties including efficiency, die-away time, multiplicity precision, gamma sensitivity, dead-time, and we will also consider the detector properties that would allow commercial production to safeguards scale assay systems. This last step needs to be accomplished before the proposed technologies can reduce the demand on {sup 3}He gas in the safeguards world. This paper will present the methodology that includes MCNPX simulations for comparing divergent detector types such as {sup 10}B lined proportional counters with {sup 3}He gas based systems where the performance metrics focus on safeguards applications.

  20. Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sapir, J.L. (comp.)

    1977-06-01

    The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer.

  1. Nuclear safeguards research and development program. Status report, January--April 1977

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sapir, J.L.

    1977-06-01

    The status of the Nuclear Safeguards Research and Development program pursued by LASL Safeguards Groups Q-1, Q-2, Q-3, and Q-4 is presented . Topics covered include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, perimeter safeguards and surveillance, concepts and subsystems development (e.g., DYMAC program), integrated safeguards systems, training courses, and technology transfer

  2. Some developments in safeguards techniques

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beets, C.

    1977-01-01

    The fundamental principles of safeguards and the research and development of safeguards techniques are described. Safeguard accountancy based upon the partition of the fuel cycle into suitable material balance areas will be further improved. Implementation of international safeguards in the European fuel fabrication and reprocessing facilities is described. The effectiveness of a material accounting system depends on the quality of the quantitative data. The allocation of the tasks in the framework of an integrated safeguards is concerned with R and D work only and has no bearing on the allocation of the implementation costs. Bulk measurements, sampling and destructive or non-destructive analysis of samples are described for the determination of batch data. Testing of the safeguards techniques as a keystone in relation to plant instrumentation programmes are still being developed throughout the world. In addition to accountancy and control, it also includes an effective physical security program. The system of international safeguards that prevailed in the sixties has been re-modelled to comply with the new requirements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and with the growth of nuclear energy

  3. Contribution of the ''safeguarded'' to the development of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anderson, A.R.

    1977-01-01

    The development of an efficient system of international safeguards requires close and detailed interaction between the safeguarding authority and those being safeguarded, i.e. the plant operator and the State System to which he belongs. Such interaction is found in other control systems but the degree of international collaboration involved in Safeguards is perhaps unique and it is valuable to review and analyse the contributions which have arisen from prudent management considerations. Management has many reasons to exercise stringent control of nuclear materials stemming from the value and hazardous nature of the materials being used, and the requirements of relevant national legislation. Because systems at a plant and within a State are generally designed to control quantities of nuclear materials within limits smaller than those specified in the I.A.E.A.'s Safeguards objectives, experience at the plant level has contributed significantly to the development of International Safeguards procedures. In making such contributions, plant management and the national authorities have a common objective with that of the I.A.E.A. in developing a Safeguards system which is both technically-effective and cost-effective. The pursuit of this objective requires that implementation of the Safeguards system can be modified in the light of relevant practical experience of plant operators and of the I.A.E.A. The familiar Blue Book (INFCIRC 153) recognises clearly the need for an effective State's System of accounting for and control of nuclear materials as a necessary pre-requisite for the development and implementation of an effective I.A.E.A. system of Safeguards. It is therefore helpful to review the relevant contributions from the 'Safeguarded' in terms of the components of the State's System specified in paragraph 32 of the Blue Book. This paper reviews the continuing contributions stemming from plant and national experience, with particular emphasis on the development of

  4. Overview of the Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) Process

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Bari, Robert A.; Hockert, John; Wonder, Edward F.; Johnson, Scott J.; Wigeland, Roald; Zentner, Michael D.

    2012-08-01

    Executive Summary The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is intended to provide the international community with credible assurance that a State is fulfilling its safeguards obligations. Effective and cost-efficient IAEA safeguards at the facility level are, and will remain, an important element of IAEA safeguards as those safeguards evolve towards a “State-Level approach.” The Safeguards by Design (SBD) concept can facilitate the implementation of these effective and cost-efficient facility-level safeguards (Bjornard, et al. 2009a, 2009b; IAEA, 1998; Wonder & Hockert, 2011). This report, sponsored by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Safeguards and Security, introduces a methodology intended to ensure that the diverse approaches to Safeguards by Design can be effectively integrated and consistently used to cost effectively enhance the application of international safeguards.

  5. Status and Prospect of Safeguards By Design for the Pyroprocessing Facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kim, Hodong; Shin, H.S.; Ahn, S.K.

    2010-01-01

    The concept of Safeguards-By-Design (SBD), which is proposed and developed by the United States and the IAEA, is now widely acknowledged as a fundamental consideration for the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards. The application of a SBD concept is of importance especially for developmental nuclear facilities which have new technological features and relevant challenges to their safeguards approach. At this point of time, the examination of the applicability of SBD on a pyroprocessing facility, which has been being developed in the Republic of Korea (ROK), would be meaningful. The ROK developed a safeguards system with the concept of SBD for Advanced spent fuel Conditioning Process Facility (ACPF) and DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) before the SBD concept was formally suggested. Currently. The PRIDE (PyRoprocess Integrated Inactive Demonstration) facility for the demonstration of pyroprocess using 10 ton of non-radioactive nuclear materials per year is being constructed in the ROK. The safeguards system for the facility has been designed in cooperation with a facility designer from the design phase, and the safeguards system would be established according to the future construction schedule. In preparing the design of Engineering Scale Pyroprocess Facility (ESPF), which will use spent fuels in an engineering scale and be constructed in 2016, a research on the safeguards system for this facility is also being conducted. In this connection, a project to support for development of safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility has been carried out by KAERI in cooperation with KINAC and the IAEA through an IAEA Member State Support Program (MSSP). When this MSSP project is finished in August, 2011, a safeguards system model and safeguards approach for a reference pyroprocessing facility would be established. Maximizing these early experiences and results, a safeguards system of ESPF based on the concept of SBD would be designed and

  6. Remote monitoring in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.; Johnson, C.S.

    1996-01-01

    In recent years, technology that permits the integration of monitoring sensors and instruments into a coherent network has become available. Such integrated monitoring systems provide a means for the automatic collection and assessment of sensor signals and instrument readings and for processing such signals and readings in near real time. To gain experience with the new monitoring system technology, the US Department of energy, through bilateral agreements with its international partners, has initiated a project to emplace demonstration systems in various nuclear facilities and conduct field trials of the technology. This effort is the International Remote Monitoring Project. Under this project, remote monitoring systems are being deployed around the world in an incremental manner. Each deployment is different and each offers lessons for improving the performance and flexibility of the technology. Few problems were encountered with the operation of the installations to date, and much has been learned about the operation and use of the new technology. In the future, the authors believe systems for safeguards applications should be capable of being monitored remotely, emphasize the use of sensors, and utilize selective triggering for recording of images. Remote monitoring across national borders can occur only in the context of a cooperative, nonadversarial implementation regime. However, significant technical and policy work remains to be done before widespread safeguards implementation of remote monitoring should be considered. This paper shows that an abundance of technology supports the implementation of integrated and remote monitoring systems. Current field trials of remote monitoring systems are providing practical data and operational experience to aid in the design of tomorrow's systems

  7. International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included

  8. Safeguards technology research and development at CIAE

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Yang Qun

    2001-01-01

    domestic inspection, CIAE is developing necessary elements such as inspection criteria and procedures, inspection equipment and inspection information management. CIAE often holds domestic technical training courses to share our experience in the field of safeguards. At the same time, international cooperation played a very important role. Many scientists from other countries were invited to give lecture on safeguards. Laboratory also sent some scientists abroad for academic and technical exchange. Some scientists have received Agency' technical training on their areas of interest such as nuclear material accountancy and physical protection. In addition, CIAE assisted Agency to hold the training courses on physical protection in March 1998 and June 2000 respectively. In July 1998, Chinese and US scientists worked together to implement a MPC and A demonstration. The Laboratory of Technical Research for Nuclear Safeguards of CIAE was chosen as the site. The integrated MPC and A demonstration is a first project that has brought Chinese and US nuclear scientists together to work for a common goal. The suite of technologies in this demonstration are illustrative of many safeguards and monitoring techniques. CIAE has made great achievement on nuclear material accountancy, physical protection and has developed equipment and technology of NDA and DA. CIAE hope to made deeper, more concrete and innovative technical solution to the many remaining challenges on safeguards. (author)

  9. J. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1976-01-01

    Like many drugs, poisons, and explosives in common use in our society today, nuclear materials are dangerous. This was recognised well before the advent of nuclear power, and precautions have been taken to isolate the substances from the environment. The expected expansion of nuclear power generation, and consequent proliferation of the materials, has caused opponents of the industry to voice pessimism over the ability of the authorities to contain these substances. The author discusses the dangers associated with the illicit use of nuclear materials, and the safeguards employed to minimise the risks arising from the commercial exploitation of nuclear power

  10. The next generation safeguards initiative

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tobey, William

    2008-01-01

    NGSI or the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative is designed to revitalize the U.S. safeguards technical base, as well as invest in human resources, and to mobilize our primary asset - the U.S. National Laboratories - as well as industry and academia to restore capabilities. While NGSI is a U.S. effort it is intended to serve as a catalyst for a much broader commitment to international safeguards in partnership with the IAEA and other countries. Initiatives over the last years include such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and initiatives of the G-8 and NSG to discourage the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. NGSI augments this agenda by providing a means to strengthen the technical and political underpinnings of IAEA safeguards. Priorities and envisioned activities under NGSI are the following. (1) Cooperation with IAEA and others to promote universal adoption of safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol including greater information sharing between member states and the IAEA, investigation of weaponization and procurement activities, and options to strengthen the state-level approach to safeguards. (2) NGSI anticipates the deployment of new types of reactors and fuel cycle facilities, as well as the need to use limited safeguards resources effectively and efficiently, especially in plants that pose the largest burden specifically complex, bulk-handling facilities. (3) NGSI will encourage a generational improvement in current safeguards technologies including improvement of precision and speed of nuclear measurements, performance of real-time process monitoring and surveillance in unattended mode, enabling in-field, pre-screening and analysis of nuclear and environmental samples, and collection, integration, analysis and archiving safeguards-relevant information from all available sources.(4) NGSI will address human capital management. Training and

  11. GPFS HPSS Integration: Implementation Experience

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hazen, Damian; Hick, Jason

    2008-08-12

    In 2005 NERSC and IBM Global Services Federal began work to develop an integrated HSM solution using the GPFS file system and the HPSS hierarchical storage system. It was foreseen that this solution would play a key role in data management at NERSC, and fill a market niche for IBM. As with many large and complex software projects, there were a number of unforeseen difficulties encountered during implementation. As the effort progressed, it became apparent that DMAPI alone could not be used to tie two distributed, high performance systems together without serious impact on performance. This document discusses the evolution of the development effort, from one which attempted to synchronize the GPFS and HPSS name spaces relying solely on GPFS?s implementation of the DMAPI specification, to one with a more traditional HSM functionality that had no synchronized namespace in HPSS, and finally to an effort, still underway, which will provide traditional HSM functionality, but requires features from the GPFS Information Lifecycle Management (ILM) to fully achieve this goal in a way which is scalable and meets the needs of sites with aggressive performance requirements. The last approach makes concessions to portability by using file system features such as ILM and snapshotting in order to achieve a scalable design.

  12. Safeguards effectiveness criteria and safeguards efficiency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stein, G.; Canty, M.J.; Knapp, U.; Munch, E.

    1983-01-01

    A critical examination of current tendencies in quantification, assessment and enhancement of the effectiveness of international safeguards is undertaken. It is suggested that the present narrow and overly technical interpretation of some elements of international safeguards is both impractical and detrimental. A pragmatic, case-bycase approach is called for to implement the provisions of safeguards agreements in a more balanced, efficient way

  13. Safeguards and Non-destructive Assay

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.; Bruggeman, M.

    2001-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and non-destructive assay includes: (1) various activities to assure nuclear materials accountancy; (2) contributes to the implementation of Integrated Safeguards measures in Belgium and to assist the IAEA through the Belgian Support Programme; (3) renders services to internal and external customers in the field of safeguards; (4) improves passive neutron coincidence counting techniques for waste assay and safeguards verification measurements by R and D on correlation algorithms implemented via software or dedicated hardware; (5) improves gamma assay techniques for waste assay by implementing advanced scanning techniques and different correlation algorithms; and (6) develops numerical calibration techniques. Major achievements in these areas in 2000 are reported

  14. The IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmelin, W.R.; Parsick, R.

    1976-01-01

    The IAEA safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is meant to follow the model agreement developed by the Safeguards Committee in 1970 and formulated in document INFCIRC/153, which contains provisions that Member States, having concluded Safeguards Agreements with the Agency, should provide design information and reports on initial inventories, changes in the inventories and material balances in respect of each nuclear facility and material balance area for all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. The Agency, on the other hand, should establish and maintain an accountancy system which would provide the data on the location and the movements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards on the basis of the reported information and information obtained during inspections in order to support the Agency's verification activities in the field, to enable the preparation of safeguards statements and to adjust the inspection intensity. Following these requirements, a computer-based information system has been developed and is being implemented and used routinely for input manipulations and queries on a limited scale. This information system comprises two main parts: Part 1 for processing the information as provided by the States, and Part 2 (still under development) for processing the inspection data obtained during verification. This paper describes the characteristics of the Agency information system for processing data under the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as recent operational experience. (author)

  15. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1978-11-01

    The present IAEA approach to safeguarding various types of nuclear facilities is examined. The IAEA safeguards objectives, criteria and specific techniques are addressed, with reference e.g. to concepts like timely detection, quantities of safeguards significance, and conversion times. Material accountancy and containment and surveillance as basic features of IAEA safeguards verification are discussed. Safeguards measures for specific facility types are considered and corresponding levels of IAEA safeguards experience are assessed. Outlines of expected IAEA safeguard approaches to large bulk handling facilities are discussed. The evolutionary nature of safeguards based on experience and research and development is mentioned

  16. The basis for the strengthening of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, P.

    1999-01-01

    For the past 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime, by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. This paper will summarize the evolution of the safeguards system, describe strengthened safeguards, report on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outline plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  17. Safeguards activities in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Osabe, Takeshi

    1998-01-01

    Current Japanese State System for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) has been developing and fully satisfies requirements of both IAEA Safeguards and bilateral partners. However, the public attention on the national and international safeguards activities were increased and the safeguards authorities were required to promote the objective assessment of safeguards implementation to avoid mistrust in safeguards activities which directly influence the public acceptance of nuclear energy in itself. Additionally, since Japan has promoted to complete nuclear fuel cycle including spent fuel reprocessing, enrichment and mixed oxide fuel fabrication this would require further assurance of Japanese non-proliferation commitment. Japan supports the introduction of strengthened safeguards. In this context it is particularly important to strengthen the relationship between national and the IAEA safeguards to contribute actively to the IAEA safeguards in development and utilization of new technologies towards more effective and efficient IAEA safeguards

  18. Tour of safeguards equipment van

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, B.W.; Fager, J.E.

    1984-01-01

    Increasing use is being made of nondestructive assay instruments for identification and measurements of nuclear materials. Important advantages of NDA are: timeliness, portability, and ease of use. Recent development in computer systems and NDA allow for the integration of sample planning, control of NDA, and data analysis into one transportable system. This session acquainted the course participants with the use of mobile NDA safeguards measurement systems. This session considered the practical problems and the type of results that can be expected from field use of NDA instruments. An existing mobile safeguards system was used to demonstrate some of the differences between field and laboratory conditions

  19. IAEA safeguards in new nuclear facilities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Catton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Durbin, K. [United States Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (United States); Hamilton, A. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Martikka, E. [STUK, Helsinki (Finland); Poirier, S.; Sprinkle, J. K.; Stevens, R. [International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (Austria); Whitlock, J. [Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Chalk River, ON (Canada)

    2014-07-01

    The inclusion of international safeguards early in the design of nuclear facilities offers an opportunity to reduce project risk. It also has the potential to minimize the impact of safeguards activities on facility operations. Safeguards by design (SBD) encourages stakeholders to become familiar with the requirements of their safeguards agreements and to decide when and how they will fulfil those requirements. As one example, modular reactors are at a design stage where SBD can have a useful impact. Modular reactors might be turnkey projects where the operator takes ownership after commissioning. This comes with a legal obligation to comply with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards requirements. Some of the newcomer countries entering the reactor market have little experience with IAEA safeguards and the associated non-proliferation obligations. To reduce delays or cost increments, one can embed safeguards considerations in the bid and design phases of the project, along with the safety and security considerations. SBD does not introduce any new requirements - it is a process whereby facility designers facilitate the implementation of the existing safeguards requirements. In short, safeguards experts share their expertise with the designers and vice versa. Once all parties understand the fundamentals of all of the operational constraints, they are better able to decide how best to address them. This presentation will provide an overview of SBD activities. (author)

  20. Remote monitoring for international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1999-01-01

    Remote monitoring is not a new technology, and its application to safeguards-relevant activities has been examined for a number of years. On behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy and international partners, remote monitoring systems have been emplaced in nuclear facilities and laboratories in various parts of the world. The experience gained from these Geld trials of remote monitoring systems has shown the viability of the concept of using integrated monitoring systems. Although a wide variety of sensors has been used in the remote monitoring field trials conducted to date, the possible range of instrumentation that might be used has scarcely been touched. As the technology becomes widespread, large amounts of data will become available to inspectors responsible for safeguards activities at the sites. Effective use of remote monitoring will require processing, archiving, presenting, and assessing of these data. To provide reasonable efficiency in the application of this technology, data processing should be done in a careful and organized manner. The problem will be not an issue of poring over scant records but of surviving under a deluge of information made possible by modern technology Fortunately, modem technology, which created the problem of the data glut, is available to come to the assistance of those inundated by data. Apart from the technological problems, one of the most important aspects of remote monitoring is the potential constraint related to the transmission of data out of a facility or beyond national borders. Remote monitoring across national borders can be seriously considered only in the context of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. (author)

  1. Achieving the Benefits of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Hebditch, David; Morgan, Jim; Meppen, Bruce; DeMuth, Scott; Ehinger, Michael; Hockert, John

    2008-01-01

    The overarching driver for developing a formalized process to achieve safeguards by design is to support the global growth of nuclear power while reducing 'nuclear security' risks. This paper discusses an institutional approach to the design process for a nuclear facility, for designing proliferation resistance, international safeguards and U.S. national safeguards and security into new nuclear facilities. In the United States, the need exists to develop a simple, concise, formalized, and integrated approach for incorporating international safeguards and other non-proliferation considerations into the facility design process. An effective and efficient design process is one which clearly defines the functional requirements at the beginning of the project and provides for the execution of the project to achieve a reasonable balance among competing objectives in a cost effective manner. Safeguards by Design is defined as 'the integration of international and national safeguards, physical security and non-proliferation features as full and equal partners in the design process of a nuclear energy system or facility,' with the objective to achieve facilities that are intrinsically more robust while being less expensive to safeguard and protect. This Safeguards by Design process has been developed such that it: (sm b ullet) Provides improved safeguards, security, and stronger proliferation barriers, while reducing the life cycle costs to the operator and regulatory agencies, (sm b ullet) Can be translated to any international context as a model for nuclear facility design, (sm b ullet) Fosters a culture change to ensure the treatment of 'nuclear security' considerations as 'full and equal' partners in the design process, (sm b ullet) Provides a useful tool for the project manager responsible for the design, construction, and start-up of nuclear facilities, and (sm b ullet) Addresses the key integration activities necessary to efficiently incorporate International Atomic

  2. INTEGRATION POLICY TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS: CURRENT EXPERIENCE

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Nadiia Bureiko

    2012-03-01

    Full Text Available In the contemporary world the intensity of the immigration movements is constantly increasing. Countries which experience great immigrant flows are facing numerous problems which should be solved. The article studies the current immigration flows in EU countries, the United States of America and Canada and presents three main models of integration policy towards immigrants – political assimilation, functional integration and multicultural model. Separate models are distinguished for the Muslims’ integration. The author examines the peculiarities of every model and examines the conclusions provided by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX concerning the situation of the immigrants’ integration in 31 countries in 2011. Among all the policy indicators the first that are defined are as follows: political participation, education, labour market mobility and anti-discrimination. The situation with immigrants’ integration in Ukraine is also studied as it is gaining a great attention of the authorities and the public. The measures and practical steps done regarding this situation in Ukraine in recent years are analyzed using the information offered by the State Migration Service of Ukraine.

  3. International safeguards 1979

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1979-01-01

    First, the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem is reviewed. Afterward, the extent to which the risk of further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is being contained by international agreements and by the application of the IAEA's safeguards under these agreements is investigated. The geographical scope of such safeguards, the gaps in safeguards coverage, and the political and technical effectiveness of such safeguards are examined. In conclusion, it is pointed out that IAEA safeguards are the cutting edge of almost every nonproliferation measure that has so far been applied or put forward. Safeguards would also play a part in any international scheme for limiting vertical proliferation. If the cutting edge of safeguards is blunted or if, for one reason or another, safeguards cannot be or are not being applied, the nonproliferation regime will suffer commensurate damage

  4. Nuclear safeguards: a perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Walske, C.

    1975-01-01

    Safeguards, both international and domestic, are discussed from the industrial viewpoint. Anti-criminal measures are considered in more detail. Areas of anti-criminal safeguards which need improvement are pointed out; they include communications, recovery force, and accounting

  5. Safeguards Implementation at KAERI

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Jung, Juang; Lee, Sung Ho; Lee, Byung-Doo; Kim, Hyun-Sook [Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-05-15

    The main objective of the safeguards implementation activities is to assure that there are no diversions of declared nuclear material and/or no undeclared activity. The purpose of safeguards implementation activities is the assistance facility operators to meet the safeguards criteria set forth by the Atomic Energy Safety Acts and Regulations. In addition, the nuclear material and technology control team has acted as a contact point for domestic and international safeguards inspection activities and for the relevant safeguards cooperation. Domestic inspections were successfully carried out at the KAERI nuclear facilities pursuant to the domestic laws and regulations in parallel with the IAEA safeguards inspections. It is expected that safeguards work will be increased due to the pyro-related facilities such as PRIDE, ACPF and DUPIC, for which the IAEA is making an effort to establish safeguards approach. KAERI will actively cope with the plan of the NSSC by changing its domestic inspection regulations on the accounting and control of nuclear materials.

  6. Safeguards and security requirements for weapons plutonium disposition in light water reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thomas, L.L.; Strait, R.S.

    1994-10-01

    This paper explores the issues surrounding the safeguarding of the plutonium disposition process in support of the United States nuclear weapons dismantlement program. It focuses on the disposition of the plutonium by burning mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors (LWR) and addresses physical protection, material control and accountability, personnel security and international safeguards. The S and S system needs to meet the requirements of the DOE Orders, NRC Regulations and international safeguards agreements. Experience has shown that incorporating S and S measures into early facility designs and integrating them into operations provides S and S that is more effective, more economical, and less intrusive. The plutonium disposition safeguards requirements with which the US has the least experience are the implementation of international safeguards on plutonium metal; the large scale commercialization of the mixed oxide fuel fabrication; and the transportation to and loading in the LWRs of fresh mixed oxide fuel. It is in these areas where the effort needs to be concentrated if the US is to develop safeguards and security systems that are effective and efficient

  7. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems.

  8. International safeguards for reprocessing plants. Final report

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kratzer, M.; Scheinman, L.; Sievering, N.; Wonder, E.; Lipman, D.; Immerman, W.; Elliott, J.M.; Crane, F.

    1981-04-01

    Proliferation risks inherent in reprocessing show the need to employ technically effective safeguards which can detect, with a high degree of assurance and on a timely basis, the diversion of significant quantities of fissionable material. A balance must be struck between what is technically feasible and effective and what is institutionally acceptable. Purpose of this report is to examine the several technical approaches to safeguards in light of their prospective acceptability. This study defines the economic, political and institutional nature of the safeguards problem; surveys generically alternative technical approaches to international safeguards including their effectiveness and relative development; characterizes the institutional implications and uncertainties associated with the acceptance and implementation of each technical alternative; and integrates these assessments into a set of overall judgments on feasible directions for reprocessing plant safeguards systems

  9. ORNL fusion reactor shielding integral experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Santoro, R.T.; Alsmiller, R.G. Jr.; Barnes, J.M.; Chapman, G.T.

    1980-01-01

    Integral experiments that measure the neutron and gamma-ray energy spectra resulting from the attenuation of approx. 14 MeV T(D,n) 4 He reaction neutrons in laminated slabs of stainless steel type 304, borated polyethylene, and a tungsten alloy (Hevimet) and from neutrons streaming through a 30-cm-diameter iron duct (L/D = 3) imbedded in a concrete shield have been performed. The facility, the NE-213 liquid scintillator detector system, and the experimental techniques used to obtain the measured data are described. The two-dimensional discrete ordinates radiation transport codes, calculational models, and nuclear data used in the analysis of the experiments are reviewed

  10. EURATOM safeguards. Safeguards verifications in reprocessing plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heppleston, M.

    1999-01-01

    This paper provides a brief historical view of the legal basis for EURATOM. The specific application of safeguards to large scale reprocessing plants, from the theoretical model to the practical application of inspection is considered. The challenge to adequately safeguard major commercial reprocessing facilities has led to many novel approaches being developed. These lessons will also benefit other safeguard projects as a result. Good cooperation between the operator and regulator is essential for the satisfactory installation of adequate safeguard controls. The use of modern data processing technology combined with other diverse monitoring techniques has shown that a major industrial scale reprocessing plant can be controlled under international safeguards to provide a high level of assurance [ru

  11. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included. (LK)

  12. Nuclear safeguards technology handbook

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-12-01

    The purpose of this handbook is to present to United States industrial organizations the Department of Energy's (DOE) Safeguards Technology Program. The roles and missions for safeguards in the U.S. government and application of the DOE technology program to industry safeguards planning are discussed. A guide to sources and products is included

  13. Safeguards in the Slovak Republic

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vaclav, J.

    2010-01-01

    The former Czechoslovakia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968. Based on requirements of the Safeguard Agreement the State System of Accounting for and Control of nuclear material has been established. After dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovak Republic succeeded to the Safeguards Agreement. As a regulator the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (UJD) has been constituted. After European Union (EU) accession EU legislation became valid in the Slovak republic. Atomic Law No. 541/2004 Coll. on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy adopts this legislation. In the frame of strengthening the IAEA safeguards an implementation of the Protocol Additional became actual. The Protocol Additional was signed by the government of the Slovak Republic in September 1999. On 1 December 2005 safeguards agreement INFCIRC/193 including the relevant Additional Protocol entered into force. As an instrument supporting non-proliferation of nuclear weapons a control of export/import of nuclear material, nuclear related and dual-use material following the EC regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual use items. The execution of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspection activities has been considerably influenced by the implementation of integrated safeguards, implemented in the Slovak Republic on 1 September 2009. The aim of mentioned integrated safeguards regime is to decrease the amount and difficulty of inspections. At the same time the possibility of accountancy and control of nuclear material inspections announced 24 hours in advance took effect. The execution of Protocol Additional inspections remains the same. Additionally to international safeguards system UJD has kept the national safeguards system which observes all nuclear material on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The government of the Slovak Republic plays active role within activities of the NSG

  14. Implementing Safeguards-by-Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip Casey; Hockert, John; Morgan, James

    2010-01-01

    Excerpt Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) is an approach to the design and construction of nuclear facilities whereby safeguards are designed-in from the very beginning. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards (MC and A), physical security, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge, and this report focuses on that aspect of SBD. The present report continues the work begun in 2008 and focuses specifically on the design process, or project management and coordination - the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of activities of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project, in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, as well as describing the documents created and how they are used. Designing and constructing a nuclear facility is an extremely complex undertaking. The stakeholders in an actual project are many - owner, operator, State regulators, nuclear facility primary contractor, subcontractors (e.g. instrument suppliers), architect engineers, project management team, safeguards, safety and security experts, in addition to the IAEA and its team. The purpose of the present report is to provide a common basis for discussions amongst stakeholders to collaboratively develop a SBD approach that will be both practically useful and mutually beneficial. The principal conclusions from the present study are: (1) In the short term, the successful implementation of SBD is principally a project management problem. (2) Life-cycle cost

  15. Implementing The Safeguards-By-Design Process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J. Michael; McGinnis, Brent; Laughter, Mark D.; Morgan, Jim; Bjornard, Trond; Bean, Robert; Durst, Phillip; Hockert, John; DeMuth, Scott; Lockwood, Dunbar

    2010-01-01

    The Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) approach incorporates safeguards into the design and construction of nuclear facilities at the very beginning of the design process. It is a systematic and structured approach for fully integrating international and national safeguards for material control and accountability (MC and A), physical protection, and other proliferation barriers into the design and construction process for nuclear facilities. Implementing SBD is primarily a project management or project coordination challenge. This paper focuses specifically on the design process; the planning, definition, organization, coordination, scheduling and interaction of the safeguards experts and stakeholders as they participate in the design and construction of a nuclear facility. It delineates the steps in a nuclear facility design and construction project in order to provide the project context within which the safeguards design activities take place, describes the involvement of the safeguards experts in the design process, the nature of their analyses, interactions and decisions, and describes the documents created and how they are used. This report highlights the project context of safeguards activities, and identifies the safeguards community (nuclear facility operator, designer/builder, state regulator, SSAC and IAEA) must accomplish in order to implement SBD within the project.

  16. Inventory of safeguards software

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Suzuki, Mitsutoshi; Horino, Koichi

    2009-03-01

    The purpose of this survey activity will serve as a basis for determining what needs may exist in this arena for development of next-generation safeguards systems and approaches. 23 software tools are surveyed by JAEA and NMCC. Exchanging information regarding existing software tools for safeguards and discussing about a next R and D program of developing a general-purpose safeguards tool should be beneficial to a safeguards system design and indispensable to evaluate a safeguards system for future nuclear fuel facilities. (author)

  17. Safeguards approach for conditioning facility for spent fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Younkin, J.M.; Barham, M.; Moran, B.W.

    1999-01-01

    A safeguards approach has been developed for conditioning facilities associated with the final disposal of spent fuel in geologic repositories. The proposed approach is based on a generic conditioning facility incorporating common features of conditioning facility designs currently proposed. The generic facility includes a hot cell for consolidation of spent fuel pins and repackaging of spent fuel items such as assemblies and cans of pins. The consolidation process introduces safeguards concerns which have not previously been addressed in traditional safeguards approaches. In developing the safeguards approach, diversion of spent fuel was assessed in terms of potential target items, operational activities performed on the items, containment of the items, and concealment activities performed on the items. The combination of these factors defines the potential diversion pathways. Diversion pathways were identified for spent fuel pellets, pins, assemblies, canisters, and casks. Diversion activities provide for opportunities of detection along the diversion paths. Potential detection methods were identified at several levels of diversion activities. Detection methods can be implemented through safeguards measures. Safeguards measures were proposed for each of the primary safeguards techniques of design information verification (DIV), containment and surveillance (C/S), and material accountancy. Potential safeguards approaches were developed by selection of appropriate combinations of safeguards measures. For all candidate safeguards approaches, DIV is a fundamental component. Variations in the approaches are mainly in the degree of C/S measures and in the types and numbers of material accountancy verification measures. The candidate safeguards approaches were evaluated toward the goal of determining a model safeguards approach. This model approach is based on the integrated application of selected safeguards measures to use International Atomic Energy Agency resources

  18. Task team approach to safeguards and security designs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zack, N.R.; Wilkey, D.D.

    1991-01-01

    In 1987, a U.S. department of Energy (DOE) supported task team was organized at the request of the DOE Idaho Field Office (DOE-ID) to provide support for safeguards and security (S and S) designs of the Special Isotope Separation (SIS) facility. Prior to deferral of the project, the SIS facility was to be constructed at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) to produce weapons grade plutonium from DOE owned fuel grade plutonium. The task team was assembled to provide the resources necessary to assure that S and S considerations were included as an integral part of the design of the facility, and that SIS designs would take advantage of available technology in the areas of physical security, measurements, accountability, and material and personnel tracking. The task team included personnel from DOE/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE-OSS), DOE-ID, DOE contractors, and the national laboratories providing a wide range of expertise and experience. This paper reports that the team reviewed proposed designs and provided recommendations for safeguards and security features in each stage of the design process. The value of this approach to safeguards and security designs will be discussed with respect to benefits, lessons learned, and recommendations for future applications

  19. Planning for an Integrated Research Experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barnard, J.J.; Ahle, L.E.; Bangerter, R.O.; Bieniosek, F.M.; Celata, C.M.; Faltens, A.; Friedman, A.; Grote, D.P.; Haber, I.; Henestroza, E.; Kishek, R.A.; Hoon, M.J.L. de; Karpenko, V.P.; Kwan, J.W.; Lee, E.P.; Logan, B.G.; Lund, S.M.; Meier, W.R.; Molvik, A.W.; Sangster, T.C.; Seidl, P.A.; Sharp, W.M.

    2000-01-01

    The authors describe the goals and research program leading to the Heavy Ion Integrated Research Experiment (IRE). They review the basic constraints which lead to a design and give examples of parameters and capabilities of an IRE. We also show design tradeoffs generated by the systems code IBEAM. A multi-pronged Phase 1 research effort is laying the groundwork for the Integrated Research Experiment. Experiment, technology development, theory, simulation, and systems studies are all playing major roles in this Phase I research. The key research areas are: (1) Source and injector (for investigation of a high brightness, multiple beam, low cost injector); (2) High current transport (to examine effects at full driver-scale line charge density, including the maximization of the beam filling-factor and control of electrons); (3) Enabling technology development (low cost and high performance magnetic core material, superconducting magnetic quadrupole arrays, insulators, and pulsers); and (4) Beam simulations and theory (for investigations of beam matching, specification of accelerator errors, studies of emittance growth, halo, and bunch compression, in the accelerator, and neutralization methods, stripping effects, spot size minimization in the chamber); and (5) Systems optimization (minimization of cost and maximization of pulse energy and beam intensity). They have begun the process of designing, simulating, and optimizing the next major heavy-ion induction accelerator, the IRE. This accelerator facility will, in turn, help provide the basis to proceed to the next step in the development of IFE as an attractive source of fusion energy

  20. Simulation of integrated beam experiment designs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Grote, D.P.; Sharp, W.M.

    2004-01-01

    Simulation of designs of an Integrated Beam Experiment (IBX) class accelerator have been carried out. These simulations are an important tool for validating such designs. Issues such as envelope mismatch and emittance growth can be examined in a self-consistent manner, including the details of injection, accelerator transitions, long-term transport, and longitudinal compression. The simulations are three-dimensional and time-dependent, and begin at the source. They continue up through the end of the acceleration region, at which point the data is passed on to a separate simulation of the drift compression. Results are be presented

  1. Handbook of nuclear data for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lammer, M.; Schwerer, O.

    1991-06-01

    This handbook contains nuclear data needed by safeguards users for their work. It was initiated by an IAEA working group, and the contents were defined by the relies to a questionnaire sent to safeguards specialists. This is a preliminary edition of the handbook for distribution to safeguards and nuclear data experts for review. The present edition of the handbook contains the following basic nuclear data: actinides: nuclear decay data, thermal neutron cross sections and resonance integrals, prompt neutron data, delayed neutron data; fission products: nuclear decay data, thermal neutron capture cross sections and resonance integrals; fission product yields. Also included are appendices that summarize the data requested by safeguards users, and that present a number of questions to them and to data experts on the data contained in this preliminary issue and about additional data for possible inclusion in future editions and updates of the handbook

  2. Hungarian experience in the role of a Technical Support Organization - Expert support and R and D activities in nuclear safeguards and forensics, participation in international cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Szeles, E.; Kovacs, A.; Biro, T.

    2010-01-01

    The Institute of Isotopes (IoI) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences has been - since the mid-fifties - engaged not only in basic and applied research related to the use of radioisotopes in Hungary but also in the production, trade and safety of radioisotopes supported by the central accountancy at national level. Based on its experience and capabilities the technical tasks of nuclear safeguards and forensics have been delegated to the Institute by governmental decrees. Thus the Institute is one of the Technical Support Organizations of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) providing expert support in the areas mentioned above and maintaining the central isotope registry. An Agreement between HAEA and IoI specifies both routine and R and D activities supporting authority functions. These include the development and application of both non-destructive (i.e. gamma spectrometry, neutron-coincidence counting and laser ablation inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry) and destructive (i.e. inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry) analytical methods to satisfy domestic needs as well as to explore novel methods both for safeguards and nuclear forensics purposes. Methods have been developed to identify and quantify nuclear material in fresh and spent fuel assemblies and to characterize seized or found nuclear material of unknown origin and also environmental samples. The validation of these measurement methods have been performed in inter-laboratory comparisons organized by the Joint Research Centers of the European Union and by other international organizations such as IAEA and the International Technical Working Group on Nuclear Smuggling (ITWG). The presentation describes TSO activities both at domestic level and in potential international cooperation initiatives. The need of regional cooperation is emphasized discussing advantages and difficulties. (author)

  3. Review of potential technology contributions to safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sellers, T.A.

    1977-01-01

    Separate, uncoordinated approaches to nuclear facility safeguards such as physical security and accounting are no longer adequate. A comprehensive, integrated strategy for improved in-depth protection of nuclear facilities with acceptable operational impact is needed. The safeguards system concept, analysis techniques, and hardware required to implement such a strategy are presented in this paper. Handbooks for intrusion detection, entry control systems, barrier, etc. are described briefly. 17 figures

  4. Fusion Ignition Research Experiment System Integration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, T.

    1999-01-01

    The FIRE (Fusion Ignition Research Experiment) configuration has been designed to meet the physics objectives and subsystem requirements in an arrangement that allows remote maintenance of in-vessel components and hands-on maintenance of components outside the TF (toroidal-field) boundary. The general arrangement consists of sixteen wedged-shaped TF coils that surround a free-standing central solenoid (CS), a double-wall vacuum vessel and internal plasma-facing components. A center tie rod is used to help support the vertical magnetic loads and a compression ring is used to maintain wedge pressure in the inboard corners of the TF coils. The magnets are liquid nitrogen cooled and the entire device is surrounded by a thermal enclosure. The double-wall vacuum vessel integrates cooling and shielding in a shape that maximizes shielding of ex-vessel components. The FIRE configuration development and integration process has evolved from an early stage of concept selection to a higher level of machine definition and component details. This paper describes the status of the configuration development and the integration of the major subsystem components

  5. Implementation of safeguards in Spanish NPPs: advantages of cooperation and coordination

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Estrampes Blanch, J.; Recio Santamaria, M.

    2007-01-01

    In 2002 the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce (MITYC) informed the operators of the soon entry into force of the Additional Protocol (AP) to the Safeguards Agreement, once its ratification by the Member States of the EU were completed and the Community and national legislations were adapted to the new requirements. The Spanish association for the electrical industry (UNESA) responded to that announcement setting up the UNESA's Safeguards Working Group (USWG), made up of staff of the NPPs in charge of nuclear material accountancy. The USWG was mandated to ensure coordinated implementation of the new safeguards obligation of the Additional Protocol in close cooperation with the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce (MITYC), Spanish authority for safeguards implementation follow up. Although the group was initially meant only for NPPs, later on representatives of other main nuclear facilities (i.e. ENUSA's fuel fabrication facility, the national rad waste company ENRESA, and CIEMAT national research centre) have been also participating in the group's meeting and activities when general discussion points on the entry into force of the AP were dealt with. From 2003 on, the USWG has met periodically with the aim of exchanging experiences in the field of safeguards implementation and jointly dealing with changes to EURATOM and IAEA safeguards systems lately introduced to reinforce their effectiveness and efficiency in response to the challenges posed to the international community by the recent discovery of undeclared nuclear programmes. Along the operation of the USWG, presence of Spanish nuclear industry representatives in international for a dealing with safeguards has remarkably grown up. Moreover, representatives of the USWG have also maintained an active participation in the ESARDA working groups on integrated safeguards (ISWG) and nuclear material accountancy and audit focus group (NMAC-AF)

  6. Sustainable Development Impacts of NAMAs: An integrated approach to assessment of co-benefits based on experience with the CDM

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Olsen, Karen Holm

    to assess the SD impacts of NAMAs. This paper argues for a new integrated approach to asses NAMAs' SD impacts that consists of SD indicators, procedures for stakeholder involvement and safeguards against negative impacts. The argument is based on a review of experience with the CDM’s contribution to SD...... and a comparison of similarities and differences between NAMAs and CDM. Five elements of a new approach towards assessment of NAMAs SD impacts are suggested based on emerging approaches and methodologies for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of greenhouse gas reductions and SD impacts of NAMAs....

  7. Nuclear Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Findlay, T.

    2015-01-01

    The paper will consider safeguards culture both at the IAEA and among member states. It will do so through the lens of organizational culture theory and taking into account developments in safeguards since the Iraq case of the early 1990s. The study will seek to identify the current characteristics of safeguards culture and how it has evolved since the 93+2 programme was initiated, as well as considering the roles of the most important purveyors of such culture, including member states and their national safeguards authorities, the General Conference and Board of Governors, the Director General, the Secretariat as a whole, the Safeguards Department and the inspectorate. The question of what might be an optimal safeguards culture at the Agency and among member states will be investigated, along with the issue of how such a culture might be engendered or encouraged. (author)

  8. Safeguards and nuclear forensics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gangotra, Suresh

    2016-01-01

    Nuclear Safeguards is the detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by early detection. Safeguards implementation involves nuclear material accounting and containment and surveillance measures. The safeguards are implemented in nuclear facilities by the states, or agencies and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The measures for the safeguards include nuclear material Accounting (NUMAC) and Containment and surveillance systems. In recent times, there have been advances in safeguards like Near Real Time Monitoring (NRTM), Dynamic Nuclear Material Accounting (DNMA), Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), satellite imagery, information from open sources, remote monitoring etc

  9. Structure of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.

    1978-06-01

    An effective safeguards system for domestic nuclear fuel cycle facilities consists of several important subsystems that must coordinate their functions with plant management and process control. The safeguards system must not unnecessarily disrupt plant operations, compromise safety requirements, or infringe on employee working conditions. This report describes concepts, which have been developed with the cooperation of the nuclear industry and the safeguards community, for achieving these objectives

  10. IAEA safeguards assessments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.; Parisick, R.; Pushkarjov, V.; Shea, T.; Brach, E.

    1981-01-01

    This paper describes the safeguards program administered by the IAEA, which must provide assurance to the international community that agency safeguards have the capacity to deter diversion, if contemplated, to detect diversion, if undertaken, and to provide assurance that no diversions have occurred when none are detected. This assurance to the international community is based upon the capability of the Agency's safeguards program to detect diversion and its complementary effect of deterrance

  11. Nuclear safeguards policy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1982-01-01

    Claims have been made that Australia's nuclear safeguards policy, announced in 1977, has changed. However, examination of the texts of nuclear safeguards agreements negotiated by Australia shows that the policy has been implemented and adhered to. The purpose of these agreements is to obtain assurance that uranium exported is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The questions of reprocessing, transfer to third countries and the application of IAEA safeguards are discussed

  12. IAEA safeguards glossary

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-01-01

    An unambiguous definition and rationalization of many of the terms for the purpose of IAEA safeguards are given, with a view to improving the common understanding of such terms within the international community. The glossary focuses only on safeguards meanings in general, and IAEA meanings in particular, of the terms discussed. Terms belong to the following problems: nuclear and non-nuclear material, nuclear equipment, design of the safeguards approach, nuclear material accountancy, physical standards, sampling, measurements, statistical concepts and others

  13. [Integrity].

    Science.gov (United States)

    Gómez Rodríguez, Rafael Ángel

    2014-01-01

    To say that someone possesses integrity is to claim that that person is almost predictable about responses to specific situations, that he or she can prudentially judge and to act correctly. There is a closed interrelationship between integrity and autonomy, and the autonomy rests on the deeper moral claim of all humans to integrity of the person. Integrity has two senses of significance for medical ethic: one sense refers to the integrity of the person in the bodily, psychosocial and intellectual elements; and in the second sense, the integrity is the virtue. Another facet of integrity of the person is la integrity of values we cherish and espouse. The physician must be a person of integrity if the integrity of the patient is to be safeguarded. The autonomy has reduced the violations in the past, but the character and virtues of the physician are the ultimate safeguard of autonomy of patient. A field very important in medicine is the scientific research. It is the character of the investigator that determines the moral quality of research. The problem arises when legitimate self-interests are replaced by selfish, particularly when human subjects are involved. The final safeguard of moral quality of research is the character and conscience of the investigator. Teaching must be relevant in the scientific field, but the most effective way to teach virtue ethics is through the example of the a respected scientist.

  14. The Canadian safeguards program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zarecki, C.W.; Smith, R.M.

    1981-12-01

    In support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Canada provides technical support to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the development of safeguards relevant to Canadian designed and built nuclear facilities. Some details of this program are discussed, including the philosophy and development of CANDU safeguards systems; the unique equipment developed for these systems; the provision of technical experts; training programs; liaison with other technical organizations; research and development; implementation of safeguards systems at various nuclear facilities; and the anticipated future direction of the safeguards program

  15. Safeguards on nuclear waste

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Crawford, D.W.

    1995-01-01

    Safeguards and security policies within the Department of Energy (DOE) have been implemented in a graded fashion for the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials. This graded philosophy has meant that safeguards on low-equity nuclear materials, typically considered of low diversion attractiveness such as waste, has been relegated to minimal controls. This philosophy has been and remains today an acceptable approach for the planning and implementation of safeguards on this material. Nuclear waste protection policy and guidance have been issued due to a lack of clear policy and guidance on the identification and implementation of safeguards controls on waste. However, there are issues related to safe-guarding waste that need to be clarified. These issues primarily stem from increased budgetary and resource pressures to remove materials from safeguards. Finally, there may be an unclear understanding, as to the scope and content of vulnerability assessments required prior to terminating safeguards on waste and other discardable materials and where the authority should lie within the Department for making decisions regarding safeguards termination. This paper examines these issues and the technical basis for Departmental policy for terminating safeguards on waste

  16. Safeguards technology development for spent fuel storage and disposal

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, K.E.

    1991-01-01

    This paper reports on facilities for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository that will be operating in the US by 1998 and 2010 respectively. The international safeguards approach for these facilities will be determined broadly by the Safeguards Agreement and the IAEA Safeguards Criteria (currently available for 1991-1995) and defined specifically in the General Subsidiary Arrangements and Specific Facility Attachments negotiated under the US/IAEA Safeguards Agreement. Design information for these facilities types, as it is conceptualized, will be essential input to the safeguards approach. Unique design and operating features will translate into equally unique challenges to the application of international safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards. The development and use of new safeguards technologies offers the greatest potential for improving safeguards by enabling efficient and effective application with regard to the operator's interest, US policies, and the IAEA's statutorial obligations. Advanced unattended or remote measurement, authentication of operator's measurement, authentication of operator's measurement data, and integration of monitoring and containment/surveillance potentially are among the most fruitful areas of technology development. During the next year, a long range program plan for international safeguard technology development for monitored retrievable storage and geologic repository will be developed by the International Branch in close coordination with the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. This presentation preliminarily identifies elements of this long range program

  17. Promoting Safeguards Best Practice through the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Floyd, R.; Everton, C.; Lestari, S.

    2015-01-01

    There is a growing international focus on effective regulatory oversight of nuclear energy across the three pillars of nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Regarding nuclear safeguards, States in the Asia-Pacific region recognize the importance of cooperation and sharing of experiences to ensure that this is implemented to high international standards. For this reason the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN) was formed in 2009 - an informal network of departments, agencies and regulatory authorities with safeguards responsibilities from some 15 countries across the Asia-Pacific region. The objective of APSN it to bring States in the region together to develop practical measures for enhancing effective safeguards implementation, through workshops, sharing experiences and other safeguards projects. APSN works closely with the IAEA to achieve these objectives. This paper will outline the role and objectives of APSN and provide examples of how APSN work together to enhance safeguards effectiveness and raise awareness. The paper will also explore how this model of a broad community of States working together on safeguards could enhance implementation and awareness in other regions of the world. (author)

  18. International seminar on safeguards information reporting and processing. Extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1999-12-31

    Review of the safeguards of information technology, its current developments and status of safeguards in Member States are described concerning especially the role of domestic safeguards in cooperation with IAEA Safeguards. A Number of reports is dealing with declarations provided to the IAEA pursuant to Protocols Additional to Safeguard agreements. The Information Section of the IAEA Safeguards Information Technology Division is responsible for the data entry, loading and quality control od State supplied declarations. A software system is used to process information which should be readily accessible and usable in implementation of the strengthened safeguards system. Experiences in combating illegal trafficking of nuclear materials in a number of countries are included Refs, figs, 1 tab

  19. Office of Safeguards and Security - Operational Interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hammond, G.A.

    1987-01-01

    The mission of the Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS), Department of Energy (DOE) is to: Develop policy and programs to protect DOE facilities, nuclear materials, and classified information; Provide oversight for safeguards and security operations; Direct research and development (RandD) to support the protection program; and Strengthen international safeguards in support of nonproliferation policy. Objectives are to maintain an integrated safeguards and security system that is effective against a wide range of threats, and do so in a manner to minimize impacts on facility operation. Implementation is the responsibility of field offices and contractors operating DOE facilities. The OSS-operational interface is the focus of this discussion with emphasis on RandD to meet user needs. The scope and project selection process will be discussed along with information required for evaluation, and field operational planning and budgeting commitments to permit implementation of successful RandD results

  20. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2015-01-01

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreements. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This

  1. Measurement trends for future safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Baloga, S.M.; Hakkila, E.A.

    1980-01-01

    Safeguards for future commercial-scale nuclear facilities may employ three materials control and accounting concepts: classical accounting, dynamic materials balancing, and independent verification of inventories and materials balances. Typical measurement needs associated with the implementation of these concepts at high-throughput facilities are discussed. Promising measurement methods for meeting these needs are described and recent experience is cited. General directions and considerations for meeting advanced safeguards systems needs through measurement technology development over the next decade are presented

  2. Evolution of safeguards systems design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shipley, J.P.; Christensen, E.L.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-01-01

    Safeguards systems play a vital detection and deterrence role in current nonproliferation policy. These safeguards systems have developed over the past three decades through the evolution of three essential components: the safeguards/process interface, safeguards performance criteria, and the technology necessary to support effective safeguards. This paper discusses the background and history of this evolutionary process, its major developments and status, and the future direction of safeguards system design

  3. Safeguards effectiveness evaluations in safeguards planning

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes analytic tools we developed to quantify the effectiveness of safeguards against theft of special nuclear material by insiders. These tools help identify vulnerabilities in existing safeguards, suggest potential improvements, and help assess the benefits of these upgrades prior to implementation. Alone, these tools are not sufficient for safeguards planning, since the cost of implementing all suggested upgrades almost always exceeds the available resources. This paper describes another tool we developed to allow comparsion of benefits of various upgrades to identify those upgrade packages that achieve the greatest improvement in protection for a given cost and to provide a priority ranking among cost-effective packages, thereby helping decision-makers select the upgrades to implement and highlight the mount of residual risk. 5 refs., 3 figs

  4. Optimizing IAEA Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Varjoranta, Tero

    2016-01-01

    IAEA safeguards make a vital contribution to international security. Through safeguards, the IAEA deters the spread of nuclear weapons and provides credible assurance that States are honouring their international obligations to use nuclear material only for peaceful purposes. Its independent verification work allows the IAEA to facilitate building international confidence and strengthening collective security for all.

  5. IAEA safeguard system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pontes, B.C.

    1987-01-01

    The intents of IAEA safeguards, analysing into the IAEA statutes, are presented. The different types of safeguard agreements; the measurements of accounting, containment and caution used by the operator and; the information to be provided and the verification to be developed by IAEA are described. (M.C.K.) [pt

  6. Japan-IAEA Workshops on Advanced Safeguards for Future Nuclear Fuel Cycles

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hoffheins, B.; Hori, M.; Suzuki, M.; Kuno, Y.; Kimura, N.; Naito, K.; Hosoya, M.; Khlebnikov, N.; Whichello, J.; Zendel, M.

    2010-01-01

    Beginning in 2007, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Department of Safeguards initiated a workshop series focused on advanced safeguards technologies for the future nuclear fuel cycle (NFC). The goals for these workshops were to address safeguards challenges, to share implementation experiences, to discuss fuel cycle plans and promising research and development, and to address other issues associated with safeguarding new fuel cycle facilities. Concurrently, the workshops also served to promote dialog and problem solving, and to foster closer collaborations for facility design and planning. These workshops have sought participation from IAEA Member States' support programmes (MSSP), the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, state systems of accounting and control (SSAC), regulators and inspectorates to ensure that all possible stakeholder views can be shared in an open process. Workshop presentations have covered, inter alia, national fuel cycle programs and plans, research progress in proliferation resistance (PR) and safeguardability, approaches for nuclear measurement accountancy of large material throughputs and difficult to access material, new and novel radiation detectors with increased sensitivity and automation, and lessons learned from recent development and operation of safeguards systems for complex facilities and the experiences of integrated safeguards (IS) in Japan. Although the title of the workshops presumes an emphasis on technology, participants recognized that early planning and organization, coupled with close cooperation among stakeholders, that is, through the application of 'Safeguards by Design' (SBD) processes that include nuclear safety and security coordination, 'Remote Inspections' and 'Joint-Use of Equipment (JUE)' would be required to enable more successful implementations of safeguards at future NFC facilities. The needs to cultivate the future workforce, effectively preserve

  7. Safeguarding the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.; Szasz, P.

    1985-01-01

    Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. This book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It focuses on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined. (author)

  8. Safeguards resource management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.

    1986-01-01

    Protecting nuclear materials is a challenging problem for facility managers. To counter the broad spectrum of potential threats, facility managers rely on diverse safeguards measures, including elements of physical protection, material control and accountability, and human reliability programs. Deciding how to upgrade safeguards systems involves difficult tradeoffs between increased protection and the costs and operational impact of protection measures. Effective allocation of safeguards and security resources requires a prioritization of systems upgrades based on a relative measure of upgrade benefits to upgrade costs. Analytical tools are needed to help safeguards managers measure the relative benefits and cost and allocate their limited resources to achieve balanced, cost-effective protection against the full spectrum of threats. This paper presents a conceptual approach and quantitative model that have been developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to aid safeguards managers

  9. Strengthened safeguards: Present and future challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Goldschmidt, Pierre

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The safeguards system is experiencing what has been seen as a revolution and, in doing so, it is confronting a series of challenges. These can be grouped into three areas. Drawing and maintaining safeguards conclusions - The process by which the safeguards conclusions are derived is based upon the analysis, evaluation and review of all the information available to the Agency. This process is on- going, but the State Evaluation Reports are compiled and reviewed periodically. For States with an additional protocol in force, the absence of indicators of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities provides the basis for the safeguards conclusion. Future challenges center on States' expectations of, and reactions to, the results of the evaluation and review process. Designing and implementing integrated safeguards - The conceptual framework of integrated safeguards is being actively pursued. Basic principles have been defined and integrated safeguards approaches have been developed for various types of facilities. Work is also progressing on the design of integrated safeguards approaches for specific States. Complementary access is being successfully implemented, and procedures for the use of unannounced inspections are being developed with the prospect of cost- effectiveness gains. Costs neutrality vs. quality and credibility - The Department faces serious staff and financial challenges. It has succeeded so far in 'doing more' and 'doing better' within a zero-real growth budget, but the scope for further significant efficiency gains is exhausted. There is no capacity to absorb new or unexpected tasks. Difficulties in recruiting and retaining qualified and experienced staff exacerbate the problems and add to costs. The Director General of the IAEA has referred to the need for new initiatives to bridge the budgetary gap; a possible measure is proposed. The tasks of meeting the challenges and demands of strengthened safeguards have been added to

  10. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pepper,S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-07-12

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL’s International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  11. Next Generation Safeguards Initiative Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pepper, S.E.; Rosenthal, M.D.; Fishbone, L.G.; Occhogrosso, D.M.; Lockwood, D.; Carroll, C.J.; Dreicer, M.; Wallace, R.; Fankhauser, J.

    2009-01-01

    Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) hosted a Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards October 22 and 23, 2008. The workshop was sponsored by DOE/NA-243 under the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI). Placing well-qualified Americans in sufficient number and in key safeguards positions within the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) Department of Safeguards is an important U.S. non-proliferation objective. The goal of the NGSI Workshop on Enhanced Recruiting for International Safeguards was to improve U.S. efforts to recruit U.S. citizens for IAEA positions in the Department of Safeguards. The participants considered the specific challenges of recruiting professional staff, safeguards inspectors, and managers. BNL's International Safeguards Project Office invited participants from the U.S. Department of Energy, the IAEA, U.S. national laboratories, private industry, academia, and professional societies who are either experts in international safeguards or who understand the challenges of recruiting for technical positions. A final report for the workshop will be finalized and distributed in early 2009. The main finding of the workshop was the need for an integrated recruitment plan to take into account pools of potential candidates, various government and private agency stakeholders, the needs of the IAEA, and the NGSI human capital development plan. There were numerous findings related to and recommendations for maximizing the placement of U.S. experts in IAEA Safeguards positions. The workshop participants offered many ideas for increasing the pool of candidates and increasing the placement rate. This paper will provide details on these findings and recommendations

  12. Applying new safeguards technology to existing nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, C.E.; Wagner, E.P.

    1979-01-01

    The application and operation of safeguards instrumentation in a facility containing special nuclear material is most successful when the installation is designed for the operation of the specific facility. Experience at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory demonstrates that installation designs must consider both Safeguards and Production requirements of specific facilities. Equipment selection and installation design influenced by the training and experience of production operations and safeguards personnel at a specific facility help assure successful installation, reliable operation, and minimal operator training. This minimizes impacts on existing plant production activities while maximizing utility of the safeguards information obtained

  13. Applying new safeguards technology to existing nuclear facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Harris, W.J.; Wagner, E.P.

    1979-01-01

    The application and operation of safeguards instrumentation in a facility containing special nuclear material is most successful when the installation is desinged for the operation of the specific facility. Experience at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory demonstrates that installation designs must consider both safeguards and production requirements of specific facilities. Equipment selection and installation design influenced by the training and experience of production operations and safeguards personnel at a specific facility help assure successful installation, reliable operation, and minimal operator training. This minimizes impacts on existing plant production activities while maximizing utility of the safeguards information obtained

  14. Safeguards and Security progress report, January--December 1989

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B.; Jaramillo, G.R. (comps.)

    1990-11-01

    From January to December 1989, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Research and Development (R D) program carried out the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Science and Technology Base Development, Basic Systems Design, Onsite Test and Evaluation and Facility Support, and International Safeguards. For the most part, these activities were sponsored by the Department of Energy's Office of Safeguards and Security. Part 1 covers development of the basic technology essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards and security. It includes our computer security R D and the activities of the DOE Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this important technology. Part 2 treats activities aimed at developing methods for designing and evaluating safeguards systems, with special emphasis on the integration of the several subsystems into a real safeguards system. Part 3 describes efforts of direct assistance to the DOE and its contractors and includes consultation on materials control and accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and demonstration of advanced safeguards systems. Part 3 also reports a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards that makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Part 5 reports several safeguards-related activities that have sponsors other than the DOE/OSS. 87 refs., 52 figs.

  15. ABACC: A regional safeguards agency

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palacios, E.

    1998-01-01

    Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created as a common system of accounting and control. It is based on Bilateral Agreement between the two countries and the agreement with the IAEA. After a few years of experience it might be concluded that a regional system may contribute in many ways to enhance the safeguards system. The most relevant are: to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards by sending as professionals who are experts in the process involved in installations that are to be inspected; to have much more information on nuclear activities in each of the two countries than available to the IAEA; and to maintain formal and informal channels of communication

  16. Middle term prospects for Japan's safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ogawa, T.

    2001-01-01

    Japan has responded to IAEA requirements on reinforced safeguard regulations. The IAEA additional protocol entered in force in Japan on December 1999. Japan submitted a preliminary information report to IAEA on June 2000 after joint works with the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) of Japan. The first annual report was submitted to IAEA on May 2001. Another activity for the additional protocol is complementary accesses. The total 36 accesses to facilities have been done from November 2000 to September 2001. Procedures of access to managements are under discussion. MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology) has been constructing the Rokkasho Safeguards On-Site Laboratory from 1997, and the Rokkasho Safeguards Center from 2000. The Design Information Verification (DIV) is now ongoing. Much more personal resources will be needed for future inspections. Therefore, the budget for safeguards is increasing in contrast to the flat base budget for the total atomic energy. As for future activity, a MOX (Mixed Oxide Fuels) fuel processing plant is one of the issues for discussion. The construction of the MOX processing plant is supposed to begin on around 2004. The conclusion of additional protocol will be given by IAEA until end of 2002. Shift to integrated safeguards are under discussions by MEXT, NMCC and utilities of Japan parallel with IAEA. Key issues of discussion are cost saving for safeguards, development of personal resources for inspectors and the role of NMCC. (Y. Tanaka)

  17. Safeguards training at Pacific Northwest Laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dickman, D.A.

    1986-10-01

    Safeguarding our country's nuclear materials against theft or diversion is extremely important due to their significantly strategic value. In addition, nuclear materials also have an extremely high monetary value. The term ''safeguards'' is defined as an integrated system of physical protection, accountability, and material control measures designed to deter, prevent, detect, and respond to unauthorized possession and use of special nuclear materials. An aggressive Safeguards program, therefore, employs both good security measures and a strong material control and accountability system. For effective internal control of nuclear materials, having people qualified in the many aspects of safeguards and accountability is essential. At Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL), this goal is accomplished through a Laboratory-wide Safeguards Awareness Program. All PNL staff members receive a level of Safeguards training appropriate to their particular function within the Laboratory. This paper presents an overview of the unique training opportunities this topic provides and how the training goals are accomplished through the various training courses given to the staff members

  18. Modeling and simulation for process and safeguards system design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gutmacher, R.G.; Kern, E.A.; Duncan, D.R.; Benecke, M.W.

    1983-01-01

    A computer modeling and simulation approach that meets the needs of both the process and safeguards system designers is described. The results have been useful to Westinghouse Hanford Company process designers in optimizing the process scenario and operating scheme of the Secure Automated Fabrication line. The combined process/measurements model will serve as the basis for design of the safeguards system. Integration of the process design and the safeguards system design should result in a smoothly operating process that is easier to safeguard

  19. Comprehensive safeguards evaluation methods and societal risk analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Richardson, J.M.

    1982-03-01

    Essential capabilities of an integrated evaluation methodology for analyzing safeguards systems are discussed. Such a methodology must be conceptually meaningful, technically defensible, discriminating and consistent. A decompostion of safeguards systems by function is mentioned as a possible starting point for methodology development. The application of a societal risk equation to safeguards systems analysis is addressed. Conceptual problems with this approach are discussed. Technical difficulties in applying this equation to safeguards systems are illustrated through the use of confidence intervals, information content, hypothesis testing and ranking and selection procedures

  20. Preliminary concepts: safeguards for spent light-water reactor fuels

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cobb, D.D.; Dayem, H.A.; Dietz, R.J.

    1979-06-01

    The technology available for safeguarding spent nuclear fuels from light-water power reactors is reviewed, and preliminary concepts for a spent-fuel safeguards system are presented. Essential elements of a spent-fuel safeguards system are infrequent on-site inspections, containment and surveillance systems to assure the integrity of stored fuel between inspections, and nondestructive measurements of the fuel assemblies. Key safeguards research and development activities necessary to implement such a system are identified. These activities include the development of tamper-indicating fuel-assembly identification systems and the design and development of nondestructive spent-fuel measurement systems

  1. Integrating conceptualizations of experience into the interaction design process

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Dalsgaard, Peter

    2010-01-01

    From a design perspective, the increasing awareness of experiential aspects of interactive systems prompts the question of how conceptualizations of experience can inform and potentially be integrated into the interaction design process. This paper presents one approach to integrating theoretical...

  2. Novel technologies for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Annese, C.; Monteith, A.; Whichello, J.

    2009-01-01

    Full-text: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Novel Technologies Project is providing access to a wider range of methods and instruments, as well as establishing a systematic mechanism to analyse gaps in the inspectorate's technical support capabilities. The project also targets emerging and future inspectorate needs in the areas of verification and the detection of undeclared nuclear activities, materials, and facilities, providing an effective pathway to technologies in support of safeguards implementation. The identification of safeguards-useful nuclear fuel cycle (NFC) indicators and signatures (I and S) is a fundamental sub-task within the Project. It interfaces with other IAEA efforts currently underway to develop future safeguards approaches through undertaking an in-depth review of NFC processes. Primarily, the sub-task aims to identify unique and safeguards-useful 'indicators', which identify the presence of a particular process, and 'signatures', which emanate from that process when it is in operation. The matching of safeguards needs to detection tool capabilities facilitates the identification of gaps where no current method or instrument exists. The Project has already identified several promising technologies based on atmospheric gas sampling and analysis, laser spectrometry and optically stimulated luminescence. Instruments based on these technologies are presently being developed through support programme tasks with Member States. This paper discusses the IAEA's project, Novel Technologies for the Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Activities, Materials and Facilities and its goal to develop improved methods and instruments. The paper also describes the method that has been devised within the Project to identify safeguards-useful NFC I and S and to determine how the sub-task interfaces with other IAEA efforts to establish emerging safeguards approaches. As with all safeguards-targeted research and development (R and D), the IAEA depends

  3. The Vehicle Integrated Performance Analysis Experience: Reconnecting With Technical Integration

    Science.gov (United States)

    McGhee, D. S.

    2006-01-01

    Very early in the Space Launch Initiative program, a small team of engineers at MSFC proposed a process for performing system-level assessments of a launch vehicle. Aimed primarily at providing insight and making NASA a smart buyer, the Vehicle Integrated Performance Analysis (VIPA) team was created. The difference between the VIPA effort and previous integration attempts is that VIPA a process using experienced people from various disciplines, which focuses them on a technically integrated assessment. The foundations of VIPA s process are described. The VIPA team also recognized the need to target early detailed analysis toward identifying significant systems issues. This process is driven by the T-model for technical integration. VIPA s approach to performing system-level technical integration is discussed in detail. The VIPA process significantly enhances the development and monitoring of realizable project requirements. VIPA s assessment validates the concept s stated performance, identifies significant issues either with the concept or the requirements, and then reintegrates these issues to determine impacts. This process is discussed along with a description of how it may be integrated into a program s insight and review process. The VIPA process has gained favor with both engineering and project organizations for being responsive and insightful

  4. Beyond Human Capital Development: Balanced Safeguards Workforce Metrics and the Next Generation Safeguards Workforce

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI's ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI's long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.

  5. Safety, security and safeguard

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zakariya, Nasiru Imam; Kahn, M.T.E.

    2015-01-01

    Highlights: • The 3S interface in the design of PPS is hereby proposed. • The 3S synergy enhances the reduction in vulnerability and terrorism. • Highlighted were concept of detection, delay and response. - Abstract: A physical protection system (PPS) integrates people, procedures, and equipment for the protection of assets or facilities against theft, sabotage and terrorist attacks. Therefore, this paper proposes the use of a systematic and measurable approach to the design of PPS and its emphases on the concept of detection, delay and response. The proposed performance based PPS has the capability of defeating adversaries thereby achieving its targets. Therefore, timely detection of intrusion – based on the use of sensors, signal lines and alarm systems – is a major principle in the proposed system. Also the need for deterrence such as barriers in form of guards, access control, close circuit television (CCTV), strong policy and procedures, then the security culture amongst the facility workers was appropriately discussed. Since nuclear power is considered the only source that can provide large scale electricity with comparatively minimal impact on the environment, the paper also considered base guidelines for the application of PPS in any nuclear and radioactive facilities, followed with the necessity to incorporate inherent safety, security and safeguard (3S) synergy innovation in the physical protection system design and other characteristics that will enhance to reduce the vulnerability of nuclear facilities and materials to theft sabotage and terrorist attacks

  6. Mergers and integrated care: the Quebec experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Demers, Louis

    2013-01-01

    As a researcher, I have studied the efforts to increase the integration of health and social services in Quebec, as well as the mergers in the Quebec healthcare system. These mergers have often been presented as a necessary transition to break down the silos that compartmentalize the services dispensed by various organisations. A review of the studies about mergers and integrated care projects in the Quebec healthcare system, since its inception, show that mergers cannot facilitate integrated care unless they are desired and represent for all of the actors involved an appropriate way to deal with service organisation problems. Otherwise, mergers impede integrated care by creating increased bureaucratisation and standardisation and by triggering conflicts and mistrust among the staff of the merged organisations. It is then preferable to let local actors select the most appropriate organisational integration model for their specific context and offer them resources and incentives to cooperate.

  7. Mergers and integrated care: the Quebec experience

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Louis Demers

    2013-02-01

    Full Text Available As a researcher, I have studied the efforts to increase the integration of health and social services in Quebec, as well as the mergers in the Quebec healthcare system. These mergers have often been presented as a necessary transition to break down the silos that compartmentalize the services dispensed by various organisations. A review of the studies about mergers and integrated care projects in the Quebec healthcare system, since its inception, show that mergers cannot facilitate integrated care unless they are desired and represent for all of the actors involved an appropriate way to deal with service organisation problems. Otherwise, mergers impede integrated care by creating increased bureaucratisation and standardisation and by triggering conflicts and mistrust among the staff of the merged organisations. It is then preferable to let local actors select the most appropriate organisational integration model for their specific context and offer them resources and incentives to cooperate.

  8. Strengthening regional safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Palhares, L.; Almeida, G.; Mafra, O.

    1996-01-01

    Nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been growing since the early 1980's and as it grew, so did cooperation with the US Department of Energy (DOE). The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was formed in December 1991 to operate the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). In April 1994, ABACC and the DOE signed an Agreement of Cooperation in nuclear material safeguards. This cooperation has included training safeguards inspectors, exchanging nuclear material measurement and containment and surveillance technology, characterizing reference materials, and studying enrichment plant safeguards. The goal of the collaboration is to exchange technology, evaluate new technology in Latin American nuclear facilities, and strengthen regional safeguards. This paper describes the history of the cooperation, its recent activities, and future projects. The cooperation is strongly supported by all three governments: the Republics of Argentina and Brazil and the United States

  9. Licensee safeguards contingency plans

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1978-01-01

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is amending its regulations to require that licensees authorized to operate a nuclear reactor (other than certain research and test reactors), and those authorized to possess strategic quantities of plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium-235 develop and implement acceptable plans for responding to threats, thefts, and industrial sabotage of licensed nuclear materials and facilities. The plans will provide a structured, orderly, and timely response to safeguards contingencies and will be an important segment of NRC's contingency planning programs. Licensee safeguards contingency plans will result in organizing licensee's safeguards resources in such a way that, in the unlikely event of a safeguards contingency, the responding participants will be identified, their several responsibilities specified, and their responses coordinated

  10. Part 7. Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Amundson, P.I.; Rusch, G.K.

    1980-01-01

    This report describes fissile nuclear material safeguards technology, both current and developmental, and discusses the possible application of this technology to FBR systems. The proliferation risks associated with both subnational and national-level diversion are addressed

  11. Application of safeguards procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1977-01-01

    The earliest applications of safeguards procedures took place in a political and technical climate far different from that of today. In the early 1960's there was a fear of the proliferation possibilities which could arise as more and more countries acquired nuclear power plants. Today nuclear power is being produced in some 20 countries without resulting in nuclear weapons proliferation. The export of equipment and technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, however, has become the subject of current concern. In view of these developments, it is not surprising that techniques in the application of safeguards have also changed. In order to appreciate the nature of these changes, it is important to be aware of the original general attitude towards the technical problems of safeguards applications. Originally, the common attitude was that the objectives of safeguards were self-evident and the methods, while in need of development, were known at least in outline. Today, it has become evident that before a safeguards procedure can be applied, the objectives must first be carefully defined, and the criteria against which success in meeting those objectives can be measured must also be developed. In line with this change, a significant part of the effort of the safeguards inspectorate is concerned with work preliminary and subsequent to the actual inspection work in the field. Over the last two years, for example, a considerable part of the work of experienced safeguards staff has been spent in analysing the possibilities of diverting material at each facility to be safeguarded. These analyses are carried out in depth by a 'facility officer' and are subjected to constructive criticism by teams composed of staff responsible for similar types of facilities as well as other technical experts. The analyses consider the measures currently considered practicable, to meet the diversion possibilities and where necessary list the development work needed to overcome any present

  12. Safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fattah, A.

    2000-01-01

    Direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological repositories is a recognised option for closing nuclear fuel cycles. Geological repositories are at present in stages of development in a number of countries and are expected to be built and operated early next century. A State usually has an obligation to safely store any nuclear material, which is considered unsuitable to re-enter the nuclear fuel cycle, isolated from the biosphere. In conjunction with this, physical protection has to be accounted for to prevent inadvertent access to such material. In addition to these two criteria - which are fully under the State's jurisdiction - a third criterion reflecting international non-proliferation commitments needs to be addressed. Under comprehensive safeguards agreements a State concedes verification of nuclear material for safeguards purposes to the IAEA. The Agency can thus provide assurance to the international community that such nuclear material has been used for peaceful purposes only as declared by the State. It must be emphasised that all three criteria mentioned constitute a 'unit'. None can be sacrificed for the sake of the other, but compromises may have to be sought in order to make their combination as effective as possible. Based on comprehensive safeguards agreements signed and ratified by the State, safeguards can be terminated only when the material has been consumed or diluted in such a way that it can no longer be utilised for any nuclear activities or has become practicably irrecoverable. As such safeguards for nuclear material in geological repositories have to be continued even after the repository has been back-filled and sealed. The effective application of safeguards must assure continuity-of-knowledge that the nuclear material in the repository has not been diverted for an unknown purpose. The nuclear material disposed in a geological repository may eventually have a higher and long term proliferation risk because the inventory is

  13. Safeguards and physics measurements

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Carchon, R

    2002-04-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'.

  14. Psychology of nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Parker, L [Manchester Univ. (UK)

    1978-08-17

    it is argued that it is unreasonable to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons, which it was designed to do. However it is considered that although prevention cannot be guaranteed it is possible to deter such diversions. The question of publicity is examined since any safeguards system is judged exclusively on what is seen to be their failures and safeguard authorities will be tempted to conceal any diversion.

  15. Safeguards and physics measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2002-01-01

    SCK-CEN's programme on safeguards and physics measurements involves gamma and neutron dosimetry, calibrations and irradiations, electronic support, metrology of various samples including internal contamination of human beings, of waste barrels and of fissile materials, neutron activation analysis, and radioisotope source preparation. The document reports on the main activities and achievements of the sections 'Instrumentation, Calibration and Dosimetry' and 'Safeguards and Nuclear Physics Measurements'

  16. Technology development for safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Song, D. Y. [and others

    2005-04-01

    The objective of this project are to establish the safeguards technology of the nuclear proliferation resistance to the facilities which handle with high radioactivity nuclear materials like the spent fuel, to provide the foundation of the technical independency for the establishment of the effective management of domestic spent fuels, and to construct the base of the early introduction of the key technology relating to the back-end nuclear fuel cycle through the development of the safeguards technology of the DFDF of the nuclear non-proliferation. The essential safeguards technologies of the facility such as the measurement and account of nuclear materials and the C/S technology were carried out in this stage (2002-2004). The principal results of this research are the development of error reduction technology of the NDA equipment and a new NDA system for the holdup measurement of process materials, the development of the intelligent surveillance system based on the COM, the evaluation of the safeguardability of the Pyroprocessing facility which is the core process of the nuclear fuel cycle, the derivation of the research and development items which are necessary to satisfy the safeguards criteria of IAEA, and the presentation of the direction of the technology development relating to the future safeguards of Korea. This project is the representative research project in the field of the Korea's safeguards. The safeguards technology and equipment developed while accomplishing this project can be applied to other nuclear fuel cycle facilities as well as DFDF and will be contributed to increase the international confidence in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle facility of Korea and its nuclear transparency.

  17. IAEA safeguards information system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Nardi, J.

    1984-01-01

    The basic concepts, structure, and operation of the Agency Safeguards Information System is discussed with respect to its role in accomplishing the overall objectives of safeguards. The basis and purposes of the Agency's information system, the structure and flow of information within the Agency's system, the relationship of the components is the Agency system, the requirements of Member States in respect of their reporting to the Agency, and the relationship of accounting data vis-a-vis facility and inspection data are described

  18. Overcoming Safeguards Challenges

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Henriques, Sasha

    2011-01-01

    The focus of the 2010 IAEA International Safeguards Symposium was how best, from a technical perspective, to prepare for future verification challenges during this time of change. By bringing together the leading experts in the field from across the world, this symposium provided an opportunity for stakeholders to explore possible solutions in support of the IAEA's nuclear verification mission, and to identify areas where the different stakeholders in the safeguards business can help address these challenges

  19. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-01-01

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  20. Measuring Safeguards Culture

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2011-07-19

    As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a State Level Approach to its safeguards verification responsibilities, a number of countries are beginning new nuclear power programs and building new nuclear fuel cycle faculties. The State Level approach is holistic and investigatory in nature, creating a need for transparent, non-discriminatory judgments about a state's nonproliferation posture. In support of this need, the authors previously explored the value of defining and measuring a state's safeguards culture. We argued that a clear definition of safeguards culture and an accompanying set of metrics could be applied to provide an objective evaluation and demonstration of a country's nonproliferation posture. As part of this research, we outlined four high-level metrics that could be used to evaluate a state's nuclear posture. We identified general data points. This paper elaborates on those metrics, further refining the data points to generate a measurable scale of safeguards cultures. We believe that this work could advance the IAEA's goals of implementing a safeguards system that is fully information driven, while strengthening confidence in its safeguards conclusions.

  1. The IAEA: politicization and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.

    1983-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is widely understood to be an essential element of an effective international nonproliferation regime which is itself a condition sine qua non to international nuclear cooperation and commerce. The progressive intrusion into Agency activities of extraneous political issues has threatened the Agency's integrity and undermined confidence in the organization. The consequences of continued deterioration would be substantial, most particularly for international safeguards which are unique and invaluable to peaceful nuclear development and international security. Measures to reverse this trend are identified and discussed

  2. The international safeguards and domestic safeguards and security interface

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitworth, A.

    1996-01-01

    The International Safeguards Division, in conjunction with the Office of Safeguards and Security, organized a workshop on the international safeguards/domestic safeguards and security interface that was held in March 1996. The purpose of the workshop was to identify and resolve domestic safeguards and security issues associated with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The workshop drew heavily upon lessons learned in the application of IAEA safeguards at storage facilities in oak Ridge, Hanford, and Rocky Flats. It was anticipated that the workshop would facilitate a consistent DOE safeguards and security approach for the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the DOE complex. This paper discusses the issues and resolutions of several issues raised at the workshop that involve primarily the domestic material control and accountability program

  3. The potential use of domestic safeguards interior monitors in International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Williams, J.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1998-01-01

    An important future element of International Safeguards instrumentation is expected to be the merging of containment/surveillance and nondestructive assay equipment with domestic physical protection equipment into integrated systems, coupled with remote monitoring. Instrumentation would include interior monitoring and assessment and entry/exit monitoring. Of particular importance is the application of interior monitors in spaces of declared inactivity; for example, in nuclear material storage locations that are entered infrequently. The use of modern interior monitors in International Safeguards offers potential for improving effectiveness and efficiency. Within the context of increased cooperation, one can readily envision increased interaction between International Safeguards and Domestic Safeguards, including increased joint use of State System of Accounting and Control data

  4. U.S. integral and benchmark experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maienschein, F.C.

    1978-01-01

    Verification of methods for analysis of radiation-transport (shielding) problems in Liquid-Metal Fast Breeder Reactors has required a series of experiments that can be classified as benchmark, parametric, or design-confirmation experiments. These experiments, performed at the Oak Ridge Tower Shielding Facility, have included measurements of neutron transport in bulk shields of sodium, steel, and inconel and in configurations that simulate lower axial shields, pipe chases, and top-head shields. They have also included measurements of the effects of fuel stored within the reactor vessel and of gamma-ray energy deposition (heating). The paper consists of brief comments on these experiments, and also on a recent experiment in which neutron streaming problems in a Gas-Cooled Fast Breeder Reactor were studied. The need for additional experiments for a few areas of LMFBR shielding is also cited

  5. Development of the strengthened safeguards system and the Additional Protocol

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Vidaurre-Henry, Jaime

    2001-01-01

    For the past 30 years, the IAEA's safeguards system has contributed to the international non-proliferation regime by providing, inter alia, assurances regarding the peaceful uses of declared nuclear material. However, the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq in 1991 drew world-wide attention to the need to strengthen the system to address the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Efforts to strengthen the IAEA's safeguards system began in 1991 and culminated in 1997 when the IAEA's Board of Governors approved a Model Protocol Additional to IAEA Safeguards Agreements which greatly expands the legal basis and scope of IAEA safeguards. Within this strengthened system it is expected that the IAEA be able to provide assurance not only of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear material but also on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. This is to be done within a safeguards system that uses an optimal combination of all safeguards measures available, thereby achieving maximum effectiveness and efficiency within the available resources. The paper summarizes the evolution of the safeguards system, describes strengthened safeguards, reports on the status of implementing the strengthening measures, and outlines plans for integrating all available safeguards measures. (author)

  6. Institutionalizing Safeguards By Design for Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Morgan, James B.; Kovacic, Donald N.; Whitaker, J. Michael

    2008-01-01

    Safeguards for nuclear facilities can be significantly improved by developing and implementing methodologies for integrating proliferation resistance into the design of new facilities. This paper proposes a method to systematically analyze a facility's processes, systems, equipment, structures and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could potentially result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated and mitigated. This approach could be institutionalized into a country's regulatory structure similar to the way facilities are licensed to operate safely and are monitored through inspections and incident reporting to ensure compliance with domestic and international safeguards. Furthermore, taking credit for existing systems and equipment that have been analyzed and approved to assure a facility's reliable and safe operations will reduce the overall cost of implementing intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistant features. The ultimate goal is to integrate safety, reliability, security and safeguards operations into the design of new facilities to effectively and efficiently prevent diversion, theft and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies at both the facility and state level. To facilitate this approach at the facility level, this paper discusses an integrated proliferation resistance analysis (IPRA) process. If effectively implemented, this integrated approach will also facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards

  7. Verification and the safeguards legacy

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Perricos, Demetrius

    2001-01-01

    A number of inspection or monitoring systems throughout the world over the last decades have been structured drawing upon the IAEA experience of setting up and operating its safeguards system. The first global verification system was born with the creation of the IAEA safeguards system, about 35 years ago. With the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, inspections were to be performed under safeguards agreements, concluded directly between the IAEA and non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty. The IAEA developed the safeguards system within the limitations reflected in the Blue Book (INFCIRC 153), such as limitations of routine access by the inspectors to 'strategic points', including 'key measurement points', and the focusing of verification on declared nuclear material in declared installations. The system, based as it was on nuclear material accountancy. It was expected to detect a diversion of nuclear material with a high probability and within a given time and therefore determine also that there had been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes. The most vital element of any verification system is the inspector. Technology can assist but cannot replace the inspector in the field. Their experience, knowledge, intuition and initiative are invaluable factors contributing to the success of any inspection regime. The IAEA inspectors are however not part of an international police force that will intervene to prevent a violation taking place. To be credible they should be technically qualified with substantial experience in industry or in research and development before they are recruited. An extensive training program has to make sure that the inspectors retain their professional capabilities and that it provides them with new skills. Over the years, the inspectors and through them the safeguards verification system gained experience in: organization and management of large teams; examination of records and evaluation of material balances

  8. Facility safeguards at an LEU fuel fabrication facility in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, H.; Osabe, T.

    1984-01-01

    A facility description of a Japanese LEU BWR-type fuel fabrication plant focusing on safeguards viewpoints is presented. Procedures and practices of MC and A plan, measurement program, inventory taking, and the report and record system are described. Procedures and practices of safeguards inspection are discussed and lessons learned from past experiences are reviewed

  9. Remote monitoring: A global partnership for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bardsley, J.

    1996-01-01

    With increased awareness of the significant changes of the past several years and their effect on the expectations to international safeguards, it is necessary to reflect on the direction for development of nuclear safeguards in a new era and the resulting implications. The time proven monitoring techniques, based on quantitative factors and demonstrated universal application, have shown their merit. However, the new expectations suggest a possibility that a future IAEA safeguards system could rely more heavily on the value of a comprehensive, transparent, and open implementation regime. With the establishment of such a regime, it is highly likely that remote monitoring will play a significant role. Several states have seen value in cooperating with each other to address the many problems associated with the remote interrogation of integrated monitoring systems. As a consequence the International Remote Monitoring Project was organized to examine the future of remote monitoring in International Safeguards. This paper provides an update on the technical issues, the future plans, and the safeguards implications of cooperative programs relating to remote monitoring. Without providing answers to the policy questions involved, it suggests that it is timely to begin addressing these issues

  10. International safeguards for spent fuel storage

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kratzer, M.; Wonder, E.; Immerman, W.; Crane, F.

    1981-08-01

    This report analyzes the nonproliferation effectiveness and political and economic acceptability of prospective improvements in international safeguard techniques for LWR spent fuel storage. Although the applicability of item accounting considerably eases the safeguarding of stored spent fuel, the problem of verification is potentially serious. A number of simple gamma and neutron nondestructive assay techniques were found to offer considerable improvements, of a qualitative rather than quantitative nature, in verification-related data and information, and possess the major advantage of intruding very little on facility operations. A number of improved seals and monitors appear feasible as well, but improvements in the timeliness of detection will not occur unless the frequency of inspection is increased or a remote monitoring capability is established. Limitations on IAEA Safeguards resources and on the integration of results from material accounting and containment and surveillance remain problems

  11. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise [Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

    2016-09-13

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  12. Safeguards by Design Challenge

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Alwin, Jennifer Louise

    2016-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA's limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

  13. Safeguards systems parameters

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Avenhaus, R.; Heil, J.

    1979-01-01

    In this paper analyses are made of the values of those parameters that characterize the present safeguards system that is applied to a national fuel cycle; those values have to be fixed quantitatively so that all actions of the safeguards authority are specified precisely. The analysis starts by introducing three categories of quantities: The design parameters (number of MBAs, inventory frequency, variance of MUF, verification effort and false-alarm probability) describe those quantities whose values have to be specified before the safeguards system can be implemented. The performance criteria (probability of detection, expected detection time, goal quantity) measure the effectiveness of a safeguards system; and the standards (threshold amount and critical time) characterize the magnitude of the proliferation problem. The means by which the values of the individual design parameters can be determined with the help of the performance criteria; which qualitative arguments can narrow down the arbitrariness of the choice of values of the remaining parameters; and which parameter values have to be fixed more or less arbitrarily, are investigated. As a result of these considerations, which include the optimal allocation of a given inspection effort, the problem of analysing the structure of the safeguards system is reduced to an evaluation of the interplay of only a few parameters, essentially the quality of the measurement system (variance of MUF), verification effort, false-alarm probability, goal quantity and probability of detection

  14. Experiences in integrated leak rate measurements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shirk, R.E.

    1982-01-01

    During a hypothetical design basis accident for nuclear power plants, the reactor containment system is relied upon to maintain radioactive exposure limits below acceptable limits. Integrated leak rate testing is a means of verifying that the leakage of radioactivity material from the reactor containment will be below allowable limits. Leakage rate computations are based on the ideal gas law. The absolute method of leakage rate testing utilizing mass point method of data analysis is recommended. Integrated leak rate testing data is obtained from pressure, drybulb temperature, dewpoint temperature, and flow measuring systems. Test data does not support the usual leakage (flow) - pressure square root relationship. The major source of potential leakage from the reactor containment is reactor containment isolation valves

  15. Points for Improvement in Mexican Legislation on Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maciel Sánchez, S.; Carreño Padilla, A. L.

    2015-01-01

    The main goal of this paper is to underline the specific points needed still to be improved on safeguards in the Mexican legal framework. The problem: Mexico proposed the Tlatelolco Treaty which was before the TNP. So the Mexican legislation on safeguards should to be one of the best around the world, but there are still points to be improved, such as a specific regulation on the topic. Justification: Remembering that the exact sciences need of the law in order to be applied in a desirable way. I mean, the safeguards could be well conceived and well worked from the physics and mathematics point of view, but in order to be followed in any country, it is necessary the right legal framework. Hypothesis: What has Mexico now in its legislation on safeguards and what remains to be done (what is pending in the Mexican legal scope of the safeguards)? Objectives: – To propose legal solutions to correct the weakness of the Mexican legal framework on Safeguards; taking into account my own experience drafting the Mexican regulation on safeguards from 2008 for the Mexican Government in my nuclear law firm “Martínez and Maciel”. – To propose a legal framework on safeguards for Mexico as it is understood by the IAEA. – To update the legal frame work on safeguards in Mexico linking it to the Back end of the spent fuel. (Considering that sooner or later the Mexican Government will have to define its politic on this topic). (author)

  16. IAEA safeguards for geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moran, B.W.

    2005-01-01

    In September. 1988, the IAEA held its first formal meeting on the safeguards requirements for the final disposal of spent fuel and nuclear material-bearing waste. The consensus recommendation of the 43 participants from 18 countries at this Advisory Group Meeting was that safeguards should not terminate of spent fuel even after emplacement in, and closure of, a geologic repository.' As a result of this recommendation, the IAEA initiated a series of consultants' meetings and the SAGOR Programme (Programme for the Development of Safeguards for the Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories) to develop an approach that would permit IAEA safeguards to verify the non-diversion of spent fuel from a geologic repository. At the end of this process, in December 1997, a second Advisory Group Meeting, endorsed the generic safeguards approach developed by the SAGOR Programme. Using the SAGOR Programme results and consultants' meeting recommendations, the IAEA Department of Safeguards issued a safeguards policy paper stating the requirements for IAEA safeguards at geologic repositories. Following approval of the safeguards policy and the generic safeguards approach, the Geologic Repository Safeguards Experts Group was established to make recommendations on implementing the safeguards approach. This experts' group is currently making recommendations to the IAEA regarding the safeguards activities to be conducted with respect to Finland's repository programme. (author)

  17. Advanced Safeguards Technology Road-map for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, M.C.; Tobin, S.; Smith, L.E.; Ehinger, M.; Dougan, A.; Cipiti, B.; Bakel, A.; Bean, R.

    2008-01-01

    Strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including advanced safeguards, is a cornerstone of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). To meet these challenges, the Safeguards Campaign was formed, whose mission is to provide research and technology development for the foundation of next generation safeguards systems for implementation in U.S. GNEP facilities. The Safeguards Campaign works closely with the Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security department (NA-24) of NNSA (National Nuclear Safety Administration) to ensure that technology developed for domestic safeguards applications are optimum with respect to international safeguards use. A major milestone of the program this year has been the development of the advanced safeguards technology road-map. This paper will broadly describe the road-map, which provides a path to next generation safeguards systems including advanced instrumentation; process monitoring; data integration, protection, and analysis; and system level evaluation and knowledge extraction for real time applications. (authors)

  18. Reporting of safeguards events

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Dwyer, P.A.; Ervin, N.E.

    1988-02-01

    On June 9, 1987, the Commission published in the Federal Register a final rule revising the reporting requirements for safeguards events. Safeguards events include actual or attempted theft of special nuclear material (SNM); actual or attempted acts or events which interrupt normal operations at power reactors due to unauthorized use of or tampering with machinery, components, or controls; certain threats made against facilities possessing SNM; and safeguards system failures impacting the effectiveness of the system. The revised rule was effective October 8, 1987. On September 14, 1987, the NRC held a workshop in Bethesda, MD, to answer affected licensees' questions on the final rule. This report documents questions discussed at the September 14 meeting, reflects a completed staff review of the answers, and supersedes previous oral comment on the topics covered

  19. Fuel cycle based safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    De Montmollin, J.M.; Higinbotham, W.A.; Gupta, D.

    1985-07-01

    In NPT safeguards the same model approach and absolute-quantity inspection goals are applied at present to all similar facilities, irrespective of the State's fuel cycle. There is a continuing interest and activity on the part of the IAEA in new NPT safeguards approaches that more directly address a State's nuclear activities as a whole. This fuel cycle based safeguards system is expected to a) provide a statement of findings for the entire State rather than only for individual facilities; b) allocate inspection efforts so as to reflect more realistically the different categories of nuclear materials in the different parts of the fuel cycle and c) provide more timely and better coordinated information on the inputs, outputs and inventories of nuclear materials in a State. (orig./RF) [de

  20. Safeguarding arms control

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Flanagan, S.J.

    1988-01-01

    This essay reviews the evolution of various safeguards concepts associated with U.S. Soviet arms control negotiations over the past twenty-five years. It explore in some detail the origins, nature, and effectiveness of the safeguards packages associated with six agreements: the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), the SALT I Interim Agreement (1972), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972), the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) and the SALT II Treaty (1979). Finally, the implications of this historical record for developing future nuclear and conventional arms control accords and for shoring up existing pacts, such as the ABM Treaty, are assessed with a view towards practicable prescriptions for Western policymakers. The treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) incorporates several verification safeguards, and it is very likely that analogous measures would be attached to any accord constraining conventional forces in Europe

  1. Safeguards management inspection procedures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barth, M.J.; Dunn, D.R.

    1984-08-01

    The objective of this inspection module is to independently assess the contributions of licensee management to overall safeguards systems performance. The inspector accomplishes this objective by comparing the licensee's safeguards management to both the 10 CFR, parts 70 and 73, requirements and to generally accepted management practices. The vehicle by which this comparison is to be made consists of assessment questions and key issues which point the inspector to areas of primary concern to the NRC and which raise additional issues for the purpose of exposing management ineffectiveness. Further insight into management effectiveness is obtained through those assessment questions specifically directed toward the licensee's safeguards system performance. If the quality of the safeguards is poor, then the inspector should strongly suspect that management's role is ineffective and should attempt to determine management's influence (or lack thereof) on the underlying safeguards deficiencies. (The converse is not necessarily true, however.) The assessment questions in essence provide an opportunity for the inspector to identify, to single out, and to probe further, questionable management practices. Specific issues, circumstances, and concerns which point to questionable or inappropriate practices should be explicitly identified and referenced against the CFR and the assessment questions. The inspection report should also explain why the inspector feels certain management practices are poor, counter to the CFR, and/or point to ineffecive management. Concurrent with documenting the inspection results, the inspector should provide recommendations for alleviating observed management practices that are detrimental to effective safeguards. The recommendations could include: specific changes in the practices of the licensee, followup procedures on the part of NRC, and proposed license changes

  2. Pickering safeguards: a preliminary analysis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Todd, J.L.; Hodgkinson, J.G.

    1977-05-01

    A summary is presented of thoughts relative to a systems approach for implementing international safeguards. Included is a preliminary analysis of the Pickering Generating Station followed by a suggested safeguards system for the facility

  3. Safeguards and Physics Measurements: Services

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carchon, R.

    2000-01-01

    SCK-CEN's department of Safeguards and Physics Measurements provides a wide variety of internal and external services including dosimetry, calibration, instrumentation, whole body counting, safeguards and non-destructive analysis. Main developments in these areas in 1999 are described

  4. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1998-11-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make `quantum jump` into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the `Strengthened Safeguards System`. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  5. The evolution of IAEA safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1998-01-01

    This, second in a new series of booklets dealing with IAEA safeguards is intended for persons professionally interested in the subject as government officials responsible for non-proliferation or management of nuclear facilities, and practitioners of safeguards - the international and national officials charged with implementing IAEA safeguards. It is also aimed at the broader public concerned with the spread of nuclear weapons and interested in nuclear arms control and disarmament. It presents the situation as IAEA safeguards make 'quantum jump' into new phase characterized by the IAEA as the 'Strengthened Safeguards System'. It includes the historical overview of the International safeguards from 1945-1998; the aims and limitations of IAEA Safeguards; a chapter on how safeguards work in practice; as well as new challenges and opportunities

  6. Fusion Ignition Research Experiment System Integration

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Brown, T.

    2000-01-01

    This paper describes the current status of the FIRE configuration and the integration of the major subsystem components. FIRE has a major radius of 2 m, a field on axis of 10T, a plasma current of 6.4 MA. It is capable of 18 second pulses when operated with DT and 26 s when operated with DD. The general arrangement consists of sixteen wedged TF coils that surround a free standing central solenoid, a double wall vacuum vessel and internal plasma facing components that are segmented for maintenance through horizontal ports. Large rings located outside the TF coils are used to obtain a load balance between wedging of the intercoil case structure and wedging at the upper/lower inboard corners of the TF coil winding. The magnets are liquid nitrogen cooled and the entire device is surrounded by a thermal enclosure. The double wall vacuum vessel integrates cooling and shielding in a shape that maximizes shielding of ex-vessel components. Within the vacuum vessel, plasma-facing components frame the plasma. First wall tiles are attached directly to inboard and outboard vacuum vessel walls. The divertor is designed for a high triangularity, double-null plasma with a short inner null point-to-wall distance and near vertical outer divertor flux line. The FIRE configuration has been developed to meet the physics objectives and subsystem requirements in an arrangement that allows remote maintenance of in-vessel components and hands-on maintenance of components outside the TF boundary

  7. Status of safeguards instrumentation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is performing safeguards at some nuclear power reactors, 50 bulk processing facilities, and 170 research facilities. Its verification activities require the use of instruments to measure nuclear materials and of surveillance instruments to maintain continuity of knowledge of the locations of nuclear materials. Instruments that are in use and under development to measure weight, volume, concentration, and isotopic composition of nuclear materials, and the major surveillance instruments, are described in connection with their uses at representative nuclear facilities. The current status of safeguards instrumentation and the needs for future development are discussed

  8. Trade Analysis and Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chatelus, R.; Schot, P.M.

    2010-01-01

    In order to verify compliance with safeguards and draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) collects and analyses trade information that it receives from open sources as well as from Member States. Although the IAEA does not intervene in national export controls, it has to monitor the trade of dual use items. Trade analysis helps the IAEA to evaluate global proliferation threats, to understand States' ability to report exports according to additional protocols but also to compare against State declarations. Consequently, the IAEA has explored sources of trade-related information and has developed analysis methodologies beyond its traditional safeguards approaches. (author)

  9. Australian nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kerin, J.C.

    1988-01-01

    The Australian Government considers that allegations made by the West German magazine - Der Spiegel in its January and February 1988 editions, flow from a lack of understanding of the complexities of international trade in nuclear materials, confusion between internal and international flag swaps and failure to comprehend the equivalence principle used in nuclear materials accounting. The Ministerial statement briefly outlines these issues and concludes that there is no evidence that any material subject to Australia's bilateral safeguards agreement has been diverted from peaceful uses or that Australia's safeguard requirements have been breached

  10. Integrated circuits for particle physics experiments

    CERN Document Server

    Snoeys, W; Campbell, M; Cantatore, E; Faccio, F; Heijne, Erik H M; Jarron, Pierre; Kloukinas, Kostas C; Marchioro, A; Moreira, P; Toifl, Thomas H; Wyllie, Ken H

    2000-01-01

    High energy particle physics experiments investigate the nature of matter through the identification of subatomic particles produced in collisions of protons, electrons, or heavy ions which have been accelerated to very high energies. Future experiments will have hundreds of millions of detector channels to observe the interaction region where collisions take place at a 40 MHz rate. This paper gives an overview of the electronics requirements for such experiments and explains how data reduction, timing distribution, and radiation tolerance in commercial CMOS circuits are achieved for these big systems. As a detailed example, the electronics for the innermost layers of the future tracking detector, the pixel vertex detector, is discussed with special attention to system aspects. A small-scale prototype (130 channels) implemented in standard 0.25 mu m CMOS remains fully functional after a 30 Mrad(SiO/sub 2/) irradiation. A full-scale pixel readout chip containing 8000 readout channels in a 14 by 16 mm/sup 2/ ar...

  11. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1965-01-01

    On 28 September 1965 the Board of Governors approved the Agency's revised safeguards system which is set forth in this document for the information of all Members. For ease of reference the revised system may be cited as 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1965)' to distinguish it from the original system - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961)'- and from the original system as extended to large reactor facilities - 'The Agency's Safeguards System (1961, as Extended in 1964)'

  12. Fundamentals of materials accounting for nuclear safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. (comp.)

    1989-04-01

    Materials accounting is essential to providing the necessary assurance for verifying the effectiveness of a safeguards system. The use of measurements, analyses, records, and reports to maintain knowledge of the quantities of nuclear material present in a defined area of a facility and the use of physical inventories and materials balances to verify the presence of special nuclear materials are collectively known as materials accounting for nuclear safeguards. This manual, prepared as part of the resource materials for the Safeguards Technology Training Program of the US Department of Energy, addresses fundamental aspects of materials accounting, enriching and complementing them with the first-hand experiences of authors from varied disciplines. The topics range from highly technical subjects to site-specific system designs and policy discussions. This collection of papers is prepared by more than 25 professionals from the nuclear safeguards field. Representing research institutions, industries, and regulatory agencies, the authors create a unique resource for the annual course titled ''Materials Accounting for Nuclear Safeguards,'' which is offered at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

  13. The future of IAEA safeguards: challenges and responses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, Joseph F.; Budlong-Sylvester, Kory W.

    2011-01-01

    For nearly two decades, the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) has been transforming its safeguards system to address the challenges posed by undeclared nuclear programs, the associated revelation of an extensive non-State nuclear procurement network and other issues, including past limits to its verification mandate and the burden of noncompliance issues. Implementing the new measures, including those in the Additional Protocol, and integrating new and old safeguards measures, remains a work in progress. Implementation is complicated by factors including the limited teclmological tools that are available to address such issues as safeguarding bulk handling facilities, detection of undeclared facilities/activities, especially related to enrichment, etc. As this process continues, new challenges are arising, including the demands of expanding nuclear power production worldwide, so-called safeguards by design for a new generation of facilities, the possible IAEA role in a fissile material cutoff treaty and other elements of the arms control and disarmament agenda, the possible role in 'rollback' cases, etc. There is no doubt safeguards will need to evolve in the future, as they have over the last decades. In order for the evolutionary path to proceed, there will inter alia be a need to identify technological gaps, especially with respect to undeclared facilities, and ensure they are filled by adapting old safeguards technologies, by developing and introducing new and novel safeguards teclmologies and/or by developing new procedures and protocols. Safeguards will also need to respond to anticipated emerging threats and to future, unanticipated threats. This will require strategic planning and cooperation among Member States and with the Agency. This paper will address challenges to IAEA safeguards and the technological possibilities and R and D strategies needed to meet those challenges in the context of the forty-year evolution of safeguards, including the

  14. Facility Safeguardability Analysis in Support of Safeguards by Design

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wonder, E.F.

    2010-01-01

    The idea of 'Safeguards-by-Design' (SBD) means designing and incorporating safeguards features into new civil nuclear facilities at the earliest stages in the design process to ensure that the constructed facility is 'safeguardable,' i.e. will meet national and international nuclear safeguards requirements. Earlier consideration of safeguards features has the potential to reduce the need for costly retrofits of the facility and can result in a more efficient and effective safeguards design. A 'Facility Safeguardability Analysis' (FSA) would be a key step in Safeguards-by-Design that would link the safeguards requirements with the 'best practices', 'lessons learned', and design of the safeguards measures for implementing those requirements. The facility designer's nuclear safeguards experts would work closely with other elements of the project design team in performing FSA. The resultant analysis would support discussions and interactions with the national nuclear regulator (i.e. State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material - SSAC) and the IAEA for development and approval of the proposed safeguards system. FSA would also support the implementation of international safeguards by the IAEA, by providing them with a means to analyse and evaluate the safeguardability of facilities being designed and constructed - i.e. by independently reviewing and validating the FSA as performed by the design team. Development of an FSA methodology is part of a broader U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration program to develop international safeguards-by-design tools and guidance documents for use by facility designers. The NNSA NGSI -sponsored project team is looking, as one element of its work, at how elements of the methodology developed by the Generation IV International Forum's Working Group on Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection can be adapted to supporting FSA. (author)

  15. Integrated vector management: the Zambian experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Chanda, Emmanuel; Masaninga, Fred; Coleman, Michael; Sikaala, Chadwick; Katebe, Cecilia; Macdonald, Michael; Baboo, Kumar S; Govere, John; Manga, Lucien

    2008-08-27

    The Zambian Malaria Control Programme with the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) partners have developed the current National Malaria Strategic Plan (NMSP 2006-2011) which focuses on prevention based on the Integrated Vector Management (IVM) strategy. The introduction and implementation of an IVM strategy was planned in accordance with the World Health Organization (WHO) steps towards IVM implementation namely Introduction Phase, Consolidation Phase and Expansion Phase. IVM has created commitment for Legal and Regulatory policy review, monitoring, Research and a strong stewardship by the chemical suppliers. It has also leveraged additional resources, improved inter-sectoral collaboration, capacity building and enhanced community participation which facilitated a steady scaling up in coverage and utilisation of key preventive interventions. Thus, markedly reducing malaria incidence and case fatalities in the country. Zambia has successfully introduced, consolidated and expanded IVM activities. Resulting in increased coverage and utilization of interventions and markedly reducing malaria-related morbidity and mortality while ensuring a better protection of the environment.

  16. Integrating mental health services: the Finnish experience

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Ville Lehtinen

    2001-06-01

    Full Text Available The aim of this paper is to give a short description of the most important developments of mental health services in Finland during the 1990s, examine their influences on the organisation and provision of services, and describe shortly some national efforts to handle the new situation. The Finnish mental health service system experienced profound changes in the beginning of the 1990s. These included the integration of mental health services, being earlier under own separate administration, with other specialised health services, decentralisation of the financing of health services, and de-institutionalisation of the services. The same time Finland underwent the deepest economic recession in Western Europe, which resulted in cut-offs especially in the mental health budgets. Conducting extensive national research and development programmes in the field of mental health has been one typically Finnish way of supporting the mental health service development. The first of these national programmes was the Schizophrenia Project 1981–97, whose main aims were to decrease the incidence of new long-term patients and the prevalence of old long-stay patients by developing an integrated treatment model. The Suicide Prevention Project 1986–96 aimed at raising awareness of this special problem and decreasing by 20% the proportionally high suicide rate in Finland. The National Depression Programme 1994–98 focused at this clearly increasing public health concern by several research and development project targeted both to the general population and specifically to children, primary care and specialised services. The latest, still on-going Meaningful Life Programme 1998–2003 which main aim is, by multi-sectoral co-operation, to improve the quality of life for people suffering from or living with the threat of mental disorders. Furthermore, the government launched in 1999 a new Goal and Action Programme for Social Welfare and Health Care 2000–2003, in

  17. Nuclear safeguards research and development

    Science.gov (United States)

    Henry, C. N.

    1981-11-01

    The status of a nuclear safeguard research and development program is presented. Topics include nondestructive assay technology development and applications, international safeguards, training courses, technology transfer, analytical chemistry methods for fissionable materials safeguards, the Department of Energy Computer Security Technical Center, and operational security.

  18. Integrated Networks: National and International Online Experiences

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Osvaldo Muniz-Solari

    2009-02-01

    Full Text Available There is an increasing impression among online geography educators that interaction can be developed based on specific teaching and learning methods. The authors developed a practical research study to investigate this issue. The study was based on advanced graduate courses in geography at Beijing Normal University and Texas State University. International interaction was complemented by online collaboration among the US local group. Both synchronous and asynchronous communication systems were used, which spanned two platforms. Results of this experience indicate that teaching and learning methods must be enhanced by a flexible online learning model and extensive organizational support in order to increase interaction and reach a certain level of cooperation.

  19. Complementarity of integral and differential experiments for reactor physics purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Tellier, Henry.

    1981-04-01

    In this paper, the following topics are studied: uranium 238 effective integral; thermal range uranium 238 capture cross section; Americium 242 m capture cross section. The mentioned examples show that differential and integral experiments are both useful to the reactor physicists

  20. Integrated vector management: The Zambian experience

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Katebe Cecilia

    2008-08-01

    Full Text Available Abstract Background The Zambian Malaria Control Programme with the Roll Back Malaria (RBM partners have developed the current National Malaria Strategic Plan (NMSP 2006–2011 which focuses on prevention based on the Integrated Vector Management (IVM strategy. The introduction and implementation of an IVM strategy was planned in accordance with the World Health Organization (WHO steps towards IVM implementation namely Introduction Phase, Consolidation Phase and Expansion Phase. Achievements IVM has created commitment for Legal and Regulatory policy review, monitoring, Research and a strong stewardship by the chemical suppliers. It has also leveraged additional resources, improved inter-sectoral collaboration, capacity building and enhanced community participation which facilitated a steady scaling up in coverage and utilisation of key preventive interventions. Thus, markedly reducing malaria incidence and case fatalities in the country. Conclusion Zambia has successfully introduced, consolidated and expanded IVM activities. Resulting in increased coverage and utilization of interventions and markedly reducing malaria-related morbidity and mortality while ensuring a better protection of the environment.

  1. The integrated project as a learning experience

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Maria Angeles Antequera

    2012-03-01

    Full Text Available Florida is a higher education centre specialising in technical and business training. Postgraduate programs, university qualifications, vocational training, secondary education, further education, occupational training and languages are taught at Florida. An educational model in accordance with the demands of the European Higher Education Area has been designed, focussing on teaching for professional competencies. We have chosen to use a methodology which promotes the development of skills and abilities, it promotes participation and it is student-centric as s/he must look for knowledge him/herself thus connecting the educational and the real world. In the different university degrees taught in our centre, each year the student carries out a project set in a real context which integrates specific competencies from the course subject and develops transversal competencies associated with the project which are the purpose of planning and progressive learning: team work, effective communication, conflict resolution, leadership skills, innovation and creativity. The IP counts for 25% of each course in terms of objectives, scheduling and final evaluation. The project grade is an individual grade for each student and is the same for all subjects which form part of the project.

  2. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-01-01

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of 'safeguards by design'. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how 'safeguardability' was introduced into RRP.

  3. The evolution of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.

    1999-01-01

    The Agency's safeguards system has demonstrated a flexibility capable of responding to the verification demands of its Member States. It is capable of safeguarding nuclear materials, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material. The Agency is in the process of strengthening safeguards in its verification of declared activities. Since the early 1990's the Board of Governors took up the issue of strengthening measures such as inspections at undeclared locations, the early provision of design information, a system of universal reporting on nuclear material and certain nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material. Following the Agency's 'Programme 93+2', a major step forward was the adoption by the Board of Governors of the Additional Protocol in May 1997. This included important strengthened safeguards measures based on greater access to information and locations. A number of member states have already indicated their willingness to participate in this system by signing the Additional Protocol and this is now in the early stages of implementation for a few states. (author)

  4. Safeguards system design methodology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cravens, M.N.; Winblad, A.E.

    1977-01-01

    Sandia Laboratories is developing methods for the design of physical protection systems to safeguard special nuclear material and vital equipment at fixed sites. One method is outlined and illustrated with simplified examples drawn from current programs. The use of an adversary sequence diagram as an analysis tool is discussed

  5. Technical basis of safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Buechler, C.

    1975-01-01

    Definition of nuclear materials control. Materials accountancy and physical control as technical possibilities. Legal possibilities and levels of responsibility: material holders, national and international authority. Detection vs. prevention. Physical security and containment surveillance. Accountancy: materials balance concept. Materials measurement: inventory taking, flow determination. IAEA safeguards; verification of operator's statement. (HP) [de

  6. Nuclear safeguards project

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mache, H.R.

    1978-10-01

    The present report describes the major activities carried out in 1977 in the framework of the Nuclear Safeguards Project by the institutes of the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Kernforschungsanlage Juelich, the European Institute of Transuranium Elements and some industrial firms. (orig.) 891 HP 892 AP [de

  7. Safeguards techniques and equipment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1997-01-01

    The current booklet is intended to give a full and balanced description of the techniques and equipment used for both nuclear material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures, and for the new safeguards measure of environmental sampling. As new verification measures continue to be developed, the material in the booklet will be periodically reviewed and updated versions issued. (author)

  8. IAEA safeguards technical manual

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-03-01

    Part F of the Safeguards Technical Manual is being issued in three volumes. Volume 1 was published in 1977 and revised slightly in 1979. Volume 1 discusses basic probability concepts, statistical inference, models and measurement errors, estimation of measurement variances, and calibration. These topics of general interest in a number of application areas, are presented with examples drawn from nuclear materials safeguards. The final two chapters in Volume 1 deal with problem areas unique to safeguards: calculating the variance of MUF and of D respectively. Volume 2 continues where Volume 1 left off with a presentation of topics of specific interest to Agency safeguards. These topics include inspection planning from a design and effectiveness evaluation viewpoint, on-facility site inspection activities, variables data analysis as applied to inspection data, preparation of inspection reports with respect to statistical aspects of the inspection, and the distribution of inspection samples to more than one analytical laboratory. Volume 3 covers generally the same material as Volumes 1 and 2 but with much greater unity and cohesiveness. Further, the cook-book style of the previous two volumes has been replaced by one that makes use of equations and formulas as opposed to computational steps, and that also provides the bases for the statistical procedures discussed. Hopefully, this will help minimize the frequency of misapplications of the techniques

  9. The project 'nuclear safeguards'

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gupta, D.

    1976-01-01

    A survey is given on the elaboration and implementation of a nuclear safeguards system which takes into account the economic needs of an expanding nuclear industry as well as the international monitoring commitments of the FRG under the Euratom and Non-Proliferation treaties. (RW) [de

  10. Brazilian reactors under safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1967-01-01

    Three nuclear reactors in Brazil have been placed under Agency safeguards against diversion to military use. They are used for research purposes under a bilateral treaty with the USA, and are located at Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte

  11. Nuclear safeguards technology 1986

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-01-01

    This publication presents the results of the sixth in a series of international symposia on nuclear material safeguards. Development efforts related to safeguards for reprocessing plants constituted over twenty per cent of the programme. Other papers present results of over four years of field testing of near real time material accountancy at a plant in Japan, and results for a lesser period of time at a plant in Scotland. Papers reporting work on destructive and non-destructive measurement procedures or equipment constituted another thirty per cent of the programme, more if measurements in reprocessing and poster presentations are included. In honour of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratory, two sessions were devoted to a review of destructive analytical measurement procedures. Some subjects received only minor attention during the Symposium. The statistical theory of random sampling, safeguards for uranium enrichment plants, material accountancy systems and several other topics appear only incidentally in the programme, but primarily because there are few remaining problems, not because there is little remaining interest

  12. DOE assessment guide for safeguards and security

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bennett, C.A.; Christorpherson, W.E.; Clark, R.J.; Martin, F.; Hodges, Jr.

    1978-04-01

    DOE operations are periodically assessed to assure that special nuclear material, restricted data, and other classified information and DOE facilities are executed toward continuing the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. A guide to describe the philosophy and mechanisms through which these assessments are conducted is presented. The assessment program is concerned with all contractor, field office, and Headquarters activities which are designed to assure that safeguards and security objectives are reached by contractors at DOE facilities and operations. The guide takes into account the interlocking relationship between many of the elements of an effective safeguards and security program. Personnel clearance programs are a part of protecting classified information as well as nuclear materials. Barriers that prevent or limit access may contribute to preventing theft of government property as well as protecting against sabotage. Procedures for control and surveillance need to be integrated with both information systems and procedures for mass balance accounting. Wherever possible, assessment procedures have been designed to perform integrated inspection, evaluation, and follow-up for the safeguards and security program

  13. Information collection strategies to support strengthened safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Costantini, L.; Hill, J.

    2001-01-01

    The IAEA Board of Governors approved the implementation of Part 1 of Strengthened Safeguards in June 1995. Since then, the collection and analysis of information beyond that provided by States parties and acquired by inspectors under NPT Safeguards Agreements has been an integral part of IAEA safeguards. The Agency has formally established internal structures and procedures to facilitate the effective use of open-source and other information not previously used in safeguards. Over this period the IAEA Division of Safeguards Information Technology (SGIT) has been building its collections of electronically held open source information. Some of these collections are quite nuclear-specific, such as material from the Monterey Institute in California, and nuclear news collections provided voluntarily by a number of Member States. Others are completely general news sources. Several of these collections contain many more reports than could possibly be reviewed by a human analyst. So a need has arisen for computerised search facilities to identify nuclear-relevant items from those collections. The Agency has more than one piece of software available to help searching and analysis of substantial collections of reports. Search 97 from Verity was chosen for this particular application because it is very straightforward to use, and it was expected that personnel from all over the Department of Safeguards would carry out these searches on a routine basis. The approach whereby special-purpose search mechanisms are designed for use by a large number of users, who are unfamiliar with the details of the search software, seems to be unusual if not unique to the Agency

  14. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2014-12-15

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

  15. Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2014-01-01

    The IAEA implements safeguards pursuant to agreements concluded with States. It is in the interests of both States and the IAEA to cooperate to facilitate the practical implementation of safeguards. Such cooperation is explicitly required under all types of safeguards agreement. Effective cooperation depends upon States and the IAEA sharing a common understanding of their respective rights and obligations. To address this, in 2012 the IAEA published Services Series 21, Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, which aimed at enhancing understanding of the safeguards obligations of both States and the IAEA and at improving their cooperation in safeguards implementation. States may establish different processes and procedures at the national level, and set up different systems as required to meet their safeguards obligations. Indeed, a variety of approaches are to be expected, owing to such differences as the size and complexity of States’ nuclear programmes and their regulatory framework. The purpose of this Safeguards Implementation Practices (SIP) Guide is to share the experiences and good practices as well as the lessons learned by both States and the IAEA, acquired over the many decades of safeguards implementation. The information contained in the SIP Guides is provided for explanatory purposes and use of the Guides is not mandatory. The descriptions in the SIP Guides have no legal status and are not intended to add to, subtract from, amend or derogate from, in any way, the rights and obligations of the IAEA and the States set forth in The Structure and Content of Agreements between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (issued as INFCIRC/153 (Corrected)) and Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (issued as INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)). This SIP

  16. Facility Safeguardability Analysis In Support of Safeguards-by-Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Philip Casey Durst; Roald Wigeland; Robert Bari; Trond Bjornard; John Hockert; Michael Zentner

    2010-07-01

    The following report proposes the use of Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) to: i) compare and evaluate nuclear safeguards measures, ii) optimize the prospective facility safeguards approach, iii) objectively and analytically evaluate nuclear facility safeguardability, and iv) evaluate and optimize barriers within the facility and process design to minimize the risk of diversion and theft of nuclear material. As proposed by the authors, Facility Safeguardability Analysis would be used by the Facility Designer and/or Project Design Team during the design and construction of the nuclear facility to evaluate and optimize the facility safeguards approach and design of the safeguards system. Through a process of “Safeguards-by-Design” (SBD), this would be done at the earliest stages of project conceptual design and would involve domestic and international nuclear regulators and authorities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The benefits of the Safeguards-by-Design approach is that it would clarify at a very early stage the international and domestic safeguards requirements for the Construction Project Team, and the best design and operating practices for meeting these requirements. It would also minimize the risk to the construction project, in terms of cost overruns or delays, which might otherwise occur if the nuclear safeguards measures are not incorporated into the facility design at an early stage. Incorporating nuclear safeguards measures is straight forward for nuclear facilities of existing design, but becomes more challenging with new designs and more complex nuclear facilities. For this reason, the facility designer and Project Design Team require an analytical tool for comparing safeguards measures, options, and approaches, and for evaluating the “safeguardability” of the facility. The report explains how preliminary diversion path analysis and the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) evaluation

  17. The regional energy integration: the latin-american experiences

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    The ways of the regional economic integrations are not identical and generate different repercussions on the markets and the energy industries evolution. The example of the Latin America proposes many various experiences to evaluate the stakes and the limits of each regional integrations. These limits lead to solution researches including indisputable convergencies. The first part of this document presents the genesis of these regional economic integrations experiences in Latina America, to study in the second part the energy consequences of the liberal ALENA and of the more political MERCOSUR. (A.L.B.)

  18. Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Pillay, K.K.S. [Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)

    1996-05-01

    Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.

  19. Policy on manager involvement in work re-integration: managers' experiences in a Canadian setting.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Maiwald, Karin; Meershoek, Agnes; de Rijk, Angelique; Nijhuis, Frans J N

    2014-01-01

    In Canada and other countries, sickness absence among workers is a significant concern. Local return-to-work policies developed by both management and workers' representatives are preferred to tackle the problem. This article examines how managers perceive this local bipartite agreed upon return-to-work policy, wherein a social constructivist view on the policy process is taken. In-depth interviews were held with 10 managers on their experiences with execution of this policy in a Canadian healthcare organization. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and qualitative analyses were completed to gain deep insight into the managers' perspectives. Results show that the managers viewed themselves as a linchpin between the workplace and the worker. They did not feel heard by the other stakeholders, wrestled with worker's limitations, struggled getting plans adjusted and became overextended to meet return-to-work objectives. The study shows that the managers felt unable to meet the responsibilities the policy demanded and got less involved in the return-to-work process than this policy intended. RTW policy needs to balance on the one hand, flexibility to safeguard active involvement of managers and, on the other hand, strictness regarding taking responsibility by stakeholders, particularly the health care and re-integration professionals.

  20. Proliferation Resistance and Safeguards by Design: The Safeguardability Assessment Tool Provided by the INPRO Collaborative Project ''INPRO'' (Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haas, E.; Chang, H.-L.; Phillips, J.R.; Listner, C.

    2015-01-01

    Since the INPRO Collaborative Project on Proliferation Resistance and Safeguardability Assessment Tools (PROSA) was launched in 2011, Member State experts have worked with the INPRO Section and the IAEA Department of Safeguards to develop a revised methodology for self-assessment of sustainability in the area of proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system (NES). With the common understanding that there is ''no proliferation resistance without safeguards'' the revised approach emphasizes the evaluation of a new 'User Requirement' for ''safeguardability'', that combines metrics of effective and efficient implementation of IAEA Safeguards including ''Safeguards-by-Design'' principles. The assessment with safeguardability as the key issue has been devised as a linear process evaluating the NES against a ''Basic Principle'' in the area of proliferation resistance, answering fundamental questions related to safeguards: 1) Do a State's legal commitments, policies and practices provide credible assurance of the exclusively peaceful use of the NES, including a legal basis for verification activities by the IAEA? 2) Does design and operation of the NES facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of IAEA safeguards? To answer those questions, a questionnaire approach has been developed that clearly identifies gaps and weaknesses. Gaps include prospects for improvements and needs for research and development. In this context, the PROSA approach assesses the safeguardability of a NES using a layered ''Evaluation Questionnaire'' that defines Evaluation Parameters (EP), EP-related questions, Illustrative Tests and Screening Questions to present and structure the evidence of findings. An integral part of the assessment process is Safeguards-by-Design, the identification of potential diversion, misuse and concealment strategies (coarse diversion path

  1. Safeguards and security. Progress report, August 1982-January 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.

    1983-11-01

    Activities are described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats a relatively new set of Los Alamos activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, in every case they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  2. Engineering Physics Division integral experiments and their analyses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1980-01-01

    Integral experiments are performed as part of the Engineering Physics Division's on-going research in the development and application of radiation shielding methods. Integral experiments performed at the Oak Ridge Electron Linear Accelerator (ORELA) under the Division's Magnetic Fusion program are designed to provide data against which ORNL and all other organizations involved in shielding calculations for fusion devices can test their calculational methods and interaction data. The Tower Shielding Facility (TSF) continues to be the primary source of integral data for fission reactor shielding design. The experiments performed at the TSF during the last few years have been sponsored by the Gas Cooled Fast Reactor (GCFR) program. During this report period final documentation was also prepared for the remaining LMFBR shielding experiments, including an examination of streaming through annular slits and measurement of secondary gamma-ray production in reinforced concrete

  3. Safeguards sealing systems for Zebra

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ingram, G.; Jamieson, G.R.

    1983-01-01

    A relatively simple design has been produced for safeguards seals to be applied throughout the fuel containing areas at Zebra. It is based on the use of wire seals and regular Inspector surveillance. The application of the system would allow an Inspector to establish to a high degree of confidence that significant quantities of fuel had not been diverted during an intensive experimental programme. It would add about 5% to the time required for experiments, and careful planning would reduce this value. The inspection effort required to witness element movements during the experimental programme would average about 2 hours per day, with a further 2 hours spent each week on NDA of the fuel exposed. The Safeguards Inspector would require to spend about 25% of his time in the reactor area and would have ample time to deal with the relatively small number of fuel movements taking place in the storage area and with his duties elsewhere in the plant. During a core change, full-time inspection effort would be required for about 6 weeks each year. (author)

  4. The regional energy integration: the latin-american experiences; L'integration energetique regionale: les experiences latino-americaines

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-07-01

    The ways of the regional economic integrations are not identical and generate different repercussions on the markets and the energy industries evolution. The example of the Latin America proposes many various experiences to evaluate the stakes and the limits of each regional integrations. These limits lead to solution researches including indisputable convergencies. The first part of this document presents the genesis of these regional economic integrations experiences in Latina America, to study in the second part the energy consequences of the liberal ALENA and of the more political MERCOSUR. (A.L.B.)

  5. The regional energy integration: the latin-american experiences; L'integration energetique regionale: les experiences latino-americaines

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2003-07-01

    The ways of the regional economic integrations are not identical and generate different repercussions on the markets and the energy industries evolution. The example of the Latin America proposes many various experiences to evaluate the stakes and the limits of each regional integrations. These limits lead to solution researches including indisputable convergencies. The first part of this document presents the genesis of these regional economic integrations experiences in Latina America, to study in the second part the energy consequences of the liberal ALENA and of the more political MERCOSUR. (A.L.B.)

  6. Nuclear safeguards surveys as performed by the Albuquerque operations office

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jewell, D.

    1987-01-01

    The nuclear safeguards survey program as administered by the Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) is comprehensive in scope and evaluates the facility's safeguards program for an entire appraisal period. The survey program focuses on both the integrated and graded safeguards concepts and includes both compliance and performance evaluations. The program utilizes independent measurement support to verify facility inventory values and measurement system capabilities. The AL survey program is oriented towards facility development and management as opposed to development and management by numerous detailed departmental directives

  7. Reliability analysis of safety systems of nuclear power plant and utility experience with reliability safeguarding of systems during specified normal operation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Balfanz, H.P.

    1989-01-01

    The paper gives an outline of the methods applied for reliability analysis of safety systems in nuclear power plant. The main tasks are to check the system design for detection of weak points, and to find possibilities of optimizing the strategies for inspection, inspection intervals, maintenance periods. Reliability safeguarding measures include the determination and verification of the broundary conditions of the analysis with regard to the reliability parameters and maintenance parameters used in the analysis, and the analysis of data feedback reflecting the plant response during operation. (orig.) [de

  8. Design measures to facilitate implementation of safeguards at future water cooled nuclear power plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The report is intended to present guidelines to the State authorities, designers and prospective purchasers of future water cooled power reactors which, if taken into account, will minimize the impact of IAEA safeguards on plant operation and ensure efficient and effective acquisition of safeguards data to the mutual benefit of the Member State, the plant operator and the IAEA. These guidelines incorporate the IAEA's experience in establishing and carrying out safeguards at currently operating nuclear power plants, the ongoing development of safeguards techniques and feedback of experience from plant operators and designers on the impact of IAEA safeguards on plant operation. The following main subjects are included: The IAEA's safeguards function for current and future nuclear power plants; summary of the political and legal foundations of the IAEA's safeguards system; the technical objective of safeguards and the supply and use of required design information; safeguards approaches for nuclear power plants; design implications of experience in safeguarding nuclear power plants and guidelines for future water cooled reactors to facilitate the implementation of safeguards

  9. Networking of safeguards systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Chare, P.; Dutrannois, A.; Kloeckner, W.; Swinhoe, M.

    1995-01-01

    This paper discusses the design of a safeguards system that can be incorporated into a plant during the final phase of its construction to permit the acquisition and transmission of data during plant operation in the absence of an inspector. The system is an example of a networked data system of weighing, identity, and NDA information. It collects all of its non-surveillance data produced by safeguards equipment in a fuel fabrication plant. The data collection and transfer tasks are carried out by two software packages: NEGUS, a redundant data acquisition system designed to record neutron coincidence data, high-resolution gamma spectra, and sensor data for the NDA information and associated barcode identity information, and BRANCH, which deals with weighing and associated identity information. These processes collect data from local electronics using an ethernet network and provide information to the main review program

  10. IAEA Safeguards: Status and prospects

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gruemm, H.

    1983-01-01

    The IAEA has just celebrated its 25th anniversary, and the first safeguards inspections were performed twenty years ago. Counting only since 1978, some 5100 inspections had been performed up to mid-1982, using a staff which now includes about 130 inspectors. Despite these impressive figures, and the fact that the IAEA has never detected any apparent diversion of nuclear materials, there are increasing public allegations that safeguards lack effectiveness. After briefly reviewing the nature of IAEA safeguards agreements, the paper examines the political and technical objectives of safeguards together with some of the criticisms which have been voiced. Allocation of limited safeguards resources is examined in terms of the sometimes conflicting allocation criteria which are contained in various safeguards documents. The paper argues that the credibility and deterrent effect of IAEA safeguards should not be underestimated. It should be of greater concern that a few States are known to be operating or constructing non-safeguarded nuclear facilities capable of producing weapons-grade nuclear materials. Thus the risk of safeguards would appear to be greatest at exactly the point where safeguards end. (author)

  11. Reassessment of safeguards parameters

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Richter, J.L.; Mullen, M.F.

    1994-07-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency is reassessing the timeliness and goal quantity parameters that are used in defining safeguards approaches. This study reviews technology developments since the parameters were established in the 1970s and concludes that there is no reason to relax goal quantity or conversion time for reactor-grade plutonium relative to weapons-grade plutonium. For low-enriched uranium, especially in countries with advanced enrichment capability there may be an incentive to shorten the detection time.

  12. International safeguards problem

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scheinman, L.; Curtis, H.B.

    1977-01-01

    To recognize the limitations of safeguards as a barrier to nuclear proliferation is not to deny their essential role in the effort to contain that problem. Without a safeguards system, international nuclear commerce and development would not, indeed could not, be what they are today. The problems evoked in the discussion of the spread of sensitive nuclear technology underscore the importance of ensuring that activities do not outpace our ability to control them. To sustain a global nuclear economy requires a readiness to live within the constraints that such an economy requires. Enhanced safeguards and strengthened national commitments to facilitate their application are key elements of those constraints. So also may be a prepardness by many nations to forego explicitly national control over all facets of the nuclear fuel cycle while still sharing fully and equally in the benefits of the peaceful atom. The challenge of the coming years will be to craft mechanisms and institutions enabling the continued growth of peaceful nuclear activity without further impairing international security. The constraints that such an outcome entails are not limited to nations lacking sophisticated nuclear technology; they apply to the most advanced nuclear nations as well--partly through adherence to the safeguards system that these countries call upon others to adopt, and partly through greater willingness to entertain solutions that may involve greater international involvement in, and control over, their own peaceful nuclear productive activities. With time, the relative incompatibility of nuclear energy with full national sovereignty, and the far-sighted wisdom of the Baruch Plan, are becoming increasingly clear. 1 table, 10 references

  13. Safeguarding research reactors

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Powers, J.A.

    1983-03-01

    The report is organized in four sections, including the introduction. The second section contains a discussion of the characteristics and attributes of research reactors important to safeguards. In this section, research reactors are described according to their power level, if greater than 25 thermal megawatts, or according to each fuel type. This descriptive discussion includes both reactor and reactor fuel information of a generic nature, according to the following categories. 1. Research reactors with more than 25 megawatts thermal power, 2. Plate fuelled reactors, 3. Assembly fuelled reactors. 4. Research reactors fuelled with individual rods. 5. Disk fuelled reactors, and 6. Research reactors fuelled with aqueous homogeneous fuel. The third section consists of a brief discussion of general IAEA safeguards as they apply to research reactors. This section is based on IAEA safeguards implementation documents and technical reports that are used to establish Agency-State agreements and facility attachments. The fourth and last section describes inspection activities at research reactors necessary to meet Agency objectives. The scope of the activities extends to both pre and post inspection as well as the on-site inspection and includes the examination of records and reports relative to reactor operation and to receipts, shipments and certain internal transfers, periodic verification of fresh fuel, spent fuel and core fuel, activities related to containment and surveillance, and other selected activities, depending on the reactor

  14. Safeguards for the atom

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    1959-10-15

    Concern over the destructive potentialities of nuclear energy has grown all over the world. In fact, it was this concern, coupled with an awareness of the equally great potentialities for peaceful prosperity, that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes is an ideal to which all people would subscribe. Realization of this ideal, however, is dependent on many complex factors which are outside the scope of the Agency. In its own limited sphere, however, the Agency has the responsibility to ensure that in its efforts to promote the peaceful uses it does not in any way increase the potentiality of military use. The possibility of military application is not the only danger that the Agency must guard against, it has a further function arising from the nature of the materials needed in atomic energy work. Since the basic materials are radioactive and since all ionizing radiation is potentially dangerous, the Agency must ensure that in helping its Member States to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy it does not increase the hazards of nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination. It must establish standards of safe practice for activities carried out under its auspices or with its assistance. Since the safeguards will have two distinct objectives, a distinction can be made between those which will be designed to prevent the diversion of Agency assistance to military use and those against health and safety hazards. So far as the health and safety measures are concerned, a good deal of work has already been done in determining the standards of safe practice which will be the basis for the relevant rules. The Agency has published the first in its series of safety manuals, 'Safe Handling of Radioisotopes', which deals with such standards. Safeguards against the diversion or loss of nuclear materials and facilities are more difficult to devise. It is not considered feasible for

  15. Safeguards for the atom

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1959-01-01

    Concern over the destructive potentialities of nuclear energy has grown all over the world. In fact, it was this concern, coupled with an awareness of the equally great potentialities for peaceful prosperity, that led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That nuclear energy should be used solely for peaceful purposes is an ideal to which all people would subscribe. Realization of this ideal, however, is dependent on many complex factors which are outside the scope of the Agency. In its own limited sphere, however, the Agency has the responsibility to ensure that in its efforts to promote the peaceful uses it does not in any way increase the potentiality of military use. The possibility of military application is not the only danger that the Agency must guard against, it has a further function arising from the nature of the materials needed in atomic energy work. Since the basic materials are radioactive and since all ionizing radiation is potentially dangerous, the Agency must ensure that in helping its Member States to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy it does not increase the hazards of nuclear radiation or radioactive contamination. It must establish standards of safe practice for activities carried out under its auspices or with its assistance. Since the safeguards will have two distinct objectives, a distinction can be made between those which will be designed to prevent the diversion of Agency assistance to military use and those against health and safety hazards. So far as the health and safety measures are concerned, a good deal of work has already been done in determining the standards of safe practice which will be the basis for the relevant rules. The Agency has published the first in its series of safety manuals, 'Safe Handling of Radioisotopes', which deals with such standards. Safeguards against the diversion or loss of nuclear materials and facilities are more difficult to devise. It is not considered feasible for

  16. Safeguards for a nuclear weapon convention

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fischer, D.

    1999-01-01

    An NDT presupposes a fundamental commitment by all parties to its final objective and hence requires a high and sustained level of confidence amongst all states concerned. The appropriate format for an Nuclear Disarmament Treaty (NDT) would probably be a multilateral treaty open to all states. The treaty must necessarily include the five nuclear weapon states and a procedure would have to be found for securing the ratification of the threshold states without conferring upon them the status of nuclear weapon states. While the IAEA may well be able to carry out the safeguards tasks required by an NDT it would probably be necessary to establish a new international organization to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The experience of UNSCOM and the IAEA in Iraq, and of the IAEA in the DPRK, have shown how difficult the verification of international obligations is in the absence of a commitment to disarm, while the experience of the INF and START treaties, and of the IAEA in South Africa have shown how much simpler it is when the parties concerned are fully committed to the process. Verifying and safeguarding an NDT would be largely an extrapolation of activities already carried out by the nuclear weapon states under the INF and START treaties and by the IAEA in the routine application of safeguards as well as in its less routine work in Iraq, South Africa and the DPRK. Both the verification and safeguarding tasks would be made very much easier if it were possible to bring down to a few hundred the number of nuclear warheads remaining in the hands of any avowed nuclear weapon state, and to conclude a cutoff convention. Experience is needed to show whether the additional safeguards authority accorded to the IAEA by 'programme 93+2' will enable it to effectively safeguard the facilities that would be decommissioned as a result of an NDT and those that would remain in operation to satisfy civilian needs. Subject to this rider and on condition that the IAEA

  17. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  18. IAEA's Safeguards Implementation Practices Guides

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Mathews, C.; Sahar, S.; Cisar, V.

    2015-01-01

    Implementation of IAEA safeguards benefits greatly from effective cooperation among the IAEA, State or regional authorities (SRAs), and operators of facilities and other locations. To improve such cooperation, the IAEA has produced numerous safeguards guidance documents in its Services Series publications. The IAEA also provides assistance, training and advisory services that are based on the published guidance. The foundation of the IAEA's safeguards guidance is the Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (IAEA Services Series 21) published in March of 2012. The large majority of States have concluded CSAs and therefore will benefit from this guidance. Many States with CSAs also have concluded small quantities protocols (SQPs) to their CSAs. In April of 2013, the IAEA published the Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with SQPs (IAEA Services Series 22). Other guidance focuses on specific topics such as preparing additional protocol declarations and nuclear material accounting. This paper will describe a recent effort to produce a ''Safeguards Implementation Practices'' (SIP) series of guides that will provide additional explanatory information about safeguards implementation, and share the practical experiences and lessons learned of States and the IAEA over the many decades of implementing safeguards. The topics to be addressed in four SIP guides include: 1) Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities; 2) Establishing and Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure; 3) Provision of Information to the IAEA; and 4) Collaborative Approaches to Safeguards Implementation. The SIP Guides build upon the content of IAEA Services Series 21. Because the SIP Guides are intended to share implementation practices and lessons learned of States, a number of experienced State experts have participated in the development of the documents, through a joint Member State Support Programme task

  19. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1985

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1987-03-01

    From January to December 1985, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Safeguards Operations, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Support. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development and demonstration of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and evaluation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this period was on continuing the activities of the Center for Computer Security, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards and international safeguards for reprocessing plants required a significant portion of our resources. All of these efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  20. The voluntary safeguards offer of the United States

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Houck, F.S.

    1985-01-01

    During negotiations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concerns were expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States that their acceptance of Agency safeguards would put them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the nuclear-weapon States. To allay these concerns, the United States and the United Kingdom in December 1967 made voluntary offers to accept Agency safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities. Subsequently, France made a voluntary offer, the safeguards agreement for which was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in February 1978, with a view to encouraging acceptance of Agency safeguards by additional States. More recently, in February 1985 the Board approved the safeguards agreement for the voluntary offer of the USSR, made inter alia to encourage further acceptance of Agency safeguards. These safeguards agreements with nuclear-weapon-States have two important features in common: Namely, they result from voluntary offers to accept safeguards rather than from multilateral or bilateral undertakings, and they give the Agency the right but generally not an obligation to apply its safeguards. The agreements differ in certain respects, the most noteworthy of which is the scope of the nuclear activities covered by each offer. The agreements of the United States and United Kingdom are the broadest, covering all peaceful nuclear activities in each country. The safeguards agreement for the US voluntary offer has been in force since December 1980. Now is an appropriate time to review the experience with the agreement's implementation during its first four years, as well as its history and salient features

  1. Leveraging physical protection technology for international safeguards applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Glidewell, Don

    2001-01-01

    Full text: In an effort to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, and reliability of equipment used for International Safeguards, the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) Reflection Group requested the ESARDA Containment and Surveillance Working Group to investigate the feasibility of employing physical protection technologies for international safeguards applications. The physical protection market has traditionally been much greater than the international safeguards market. Consequently, physical protection technology has been subjected to greater testing and evaluation, and has enjoyed much greater real world experience. The larger market yields economies of scale, and the greater testing and experience should arguably result in improved reliability. This paper will compare requirements for physical protection versus international safeguards equipment, and identify types of physical protection equipment, which have potential for safeguards applications. It will evaluate both Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) and non-COTS equipment. Finally, for selected physical protection equipment, the paper will evaluate the degree of modification that would be needed to make it acceptable for safeguards applications. (author)

  2. Safeguarding the Plutonium Fuel Cycle

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Johnson, S.J.; Lockwood, D.

    2013-01-01

    In developing a Safeguards Approach for a plutonium process facility, two general diversion and misuse scenarios must be addressed: 1) Unreported batches of undeclared nuclear material being processed through the plant and bypassing the accountancy measurement points, and 2) The operator removing plutonium at a rate that cannot be detected with confidence due to measurement uncertainties. This paper will look at the implementation of international safeguards at plutonium fuel cycle facilities in light of past lessons learned and current safeguards approaches. It will then discuss technical areas which are currently being addressed as future tools to improve on the efficiency of safeguards implementation, while maintaining its effectiveness. The discussion of new improvements will include: safeguards by design (SBD), process monitoring (PM), measurement and monitoring equipment, and data management. The paper is illustrated with the implementation of international safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan and its accountancy structure is detailed. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  3. Rural nurses' safeguarding work: reembodying patient safety.

    Science.gov (United States)

    MacKinnon, Karen

    2011-01-01

    Practice-based evidence includes research that is grounded in the everyshift experiences of rural nurses. This study utilized institutional ethnography to reembody the work of rural nurses and to explore how nurses' work experiences are socially organized. Registered nurses who work in small acute care hospitals were observed and interviewed about their work with the focus on their experiences of providing maternity care. The safeguarding work of rural nurses included anticipating problems and emergencies and being prepared; careful watching, surveillance, and vigilance; negotiating safety; being able to act in emergency situations; and mobilizing emergency transport systems. Increased attention to inquiry about safeguarding as an embodied nursing practice and the textual organization of the work of rural nurses is warranted.

  4. The Office of Safeguards and Security Nonproliferation Support Program

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Desmond, W.J.

    1996-01-01

    The Nonproliferation Support Program was established in the Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security on october 1, 1995. its mission includes providing assistance to Departmental efforts for improved international material protection, control and accounting programs by coordinating and leveraging domestic safeguards and security policy, practice and experience into the international arena. A major objective of the program is to balance US national security requirements with global support of the nonproliferation objectives. This paper describes the organization of the Office of Safeguards and Security and the Nonproliferation Support Program role and responsibility, and presents some of the current areas of program emphasis and activity

  5. IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-10-01

    Publication of this technical document should serve for better understanding of the technical and functional features of the IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS) within the Agency, as well as in the National Systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material. It will also serve as a foundation for further development and improvement of the design and modifications of the Safeguards Information System and its services as a function of Safeguards implementation

  6. Defining and Measuring Safeguards Culture

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Frazar, Sarah L.; Mladineo, Stephen V.

    2010-01-01

    In light of the shift toward State Level Evaluations and information driven safeguards, this paper offers a refined definition of safeguards culture and a set of metrics for measuring the extent to which a safeguards culture exists in a state. Where the IAEA is able to use the definition and metrics to come to a positive conclusion about the country, it may help reduce the burden on the Agency and the state.

  7. IAEA safeguards - a 1988 perspective

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Jennekens, J.

    1988-01-01

    The problem of IAEA safeguards as regards its perspectives for 1988 is discussed. The necessity of balancing between safeguards measures required for the timely detection of nuclear material diversion to military purposes and measures to prove the absence of diversion is stated. Accurately working safeguards system aimed at the provision of nondiversion can include, as an accompanying component, any deterrence element required. Such a system will be more expensive than any other altrenatives but it will undoubtly be more suitable and accepatble

  8. Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilman, F.M.; Dittmore, M.H.; Orvis, W.J.; Wahler, P.S.

    1980-01-01

    This report gives an overview of the Safeguard Vulnerability Analysis Program (SVAP) developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. SVAP was designed as an automated method of analyzing the safeguard systems at nuclear facilities for vulnerabilities relating to the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. SVAP addresses one class of safeguard threat: theft or diversion of nuclear materials by nonviolent insiders, acting individually or in collusion. SVAP is a user-oriented tool which uses an interactive input medium for preprocessing the large amounts of safeguards data. Its output includes concise summary data as well as detailed vulnerability information

  9. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    NONE

    2006-07-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately.

  10. Symposium on international safeguards: Addressing verification challenges. Book of extended synopses

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2006-01-01

    A safeguards symposium has traditionally been organized by the Safeguards Department approximately every four years. The 2006 symposium addresses challenges to IAEA safeguards that have emerged or grown more serious since 2001. The increase in size and flexibility of uranium enrichment plants, for instance, and the spread of enrichment technology to a wider circle of States, pose challenges to traditional safeguards approaches. The procurement and supply networks discovered in 2004, dealing in sensitive nuclear technology and information, have serious implications for the future effectiveness of IAEA safeguards. The symposium will provide an opportunity for the IAEA and Member States to discuss options for dealing constructively with trade in sensitive nuclear technology. Reflecting developments since 2001, the 2006 symposium will focus on current challenges to the safeguards system, improving collection and analysis of safeguards information (analysis, processing tools, satellite imagery), advances in safeguards techniques and technology (future technology, neutron techniques, spent fuel verification, reprocessing, environmental sampling, containment and surveillance), further strengthening safeguards practices and approaches (safeguards approaches, integrated safeguards, R/SSAC, destructive analysis, non-destructive analysis, enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel transfer) and future challenges. This publication contains 183 extended synopses, each of them was indexed separately

  11. BDI: the Cadarache data bank for LMBFR integral experiment data

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rimpault, G.; Reynaud, G.

    1986-09-01

    The Integral Data Bank is part of the procedure to create the so-called neutronic formulaire with which every design calculation is performed with associated uncertainty. A modern way to store the integral data has been set up in order to handle and recalculate easily with a standard procedure (fig. 1) each experimental programme. A direct access way to read the data allows an automatic way to obtain the calculation/experiment discrepancies associated with a particular data base. The BDI has proved to be fully operational and has been used with the new nuclear data file JEF1. In the present version of the BDI more than 140 experiments (critical mass, spectrum indexes, buckling, etc...) both from MASURCA and SNEAK critical experiments are documented and stored in an easy-to-retrieve from. Also included are irradiation experiments in PHENIX and the STEK fission product related experiments. Future plans of development concern reactivity measurements in critical assemblies, irradiation experiments and start-up experiments of SUPER PHENIX and ZEBRA critical experiments

  12. Tablets in K-12 Education: Integrated Experiences and Implications

    Science.gov (United States)

    An, Heejung, Ed.; Alon, Sandra, Ed.; Fuentes, David, Ed.

    2015-01-01

    The inclusion of new and emerging technologies in the education sector has been a topic of interest to researchers, educators, and software developers alike in recent years. Utilizing the proper tools in a classroom setting is a critical factor in student success. "Tablets in K-12 Education: Integrated Experiences and Implications"…

  13. Comment for nuclear data from the FNS integral experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Maekawa, Hiroshi

    1983-01-01

    Among the integral experiments that were carried out during last one year at FNS, the following three experimental results and their analyses are discribed. 1) Tritium production-rate distribution in a Li 2 O-C assembly, 2) Angle dependent neutron leakage spectra from Li 2 O slab assemblies, 3) Induced activity of Type 316 stainless steel. (author)

  14. Teaching with Videogames: How Experience Impacts Classroom Integration

    Science.gov (United States)

    Bell, Amanda; Gresalfi, Melissa

    2017-01-01

    Digital games have demonstrated great potential for supporting students' learning across disciplines. But integrating games into instruction is challenging and requires teachers to shift instructional practices. One factor that contributes to the successful use of games in a classroom is teachers' experience implementing the technologies. But how…

  15. International Students' Experiences of Integrating into the Workforce

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nunes, Sarah; Arthur, Nancy

    2013-01-01

    This study explored the integration experiences of 16 international students entering the Canadian workforce using a semistructured interview and constant comparison method. The international students were pursuing immigration to Canada, despite unmet job prospects. Students recommended that employers refrain from discriminating against students…

  16. Colleges' Experiences: Integrating Support Services for Military Veterans

    Science.gov (United States)

    Karp, Melinda Mechur; Klempin, Serena

    2017-01-01

    To improve the educational experiences and outcomes of student veterans, the Kisco Foundation developed the Kohlberg Prize in 2015. Two cohorts of colleges were awarded competitive grants to enhance their veterans services. This piece examines the process of creating integrated services for student veterans through the institutionalization of…

  17. Experiences of technology integration in home care nursing.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Johnson, K A; Valdez, R S; Casper, G R; Kossman, S P; Carayon, P; Or, C K L; Burke, L J; Brennan, P F

    2008-11-06

    The infusion of health care technologies into the home leads to substantial changes in the nature of work for home care nurses and their patients. Nurses and nursing practice must change to capitalize on these innovations. As part of a randomized field experiment evaluating web-based support for home care of patients with chronic heart disease, we engaged nine nurses in a dialogue about their experience integrating this modification of care delivery into their practice. They shared their perceptions of the work they needed to do and their perceptions and expectations for patients and themselves in using technologies to promote and manage self-care. We document three overarching themes that identify preexisting factors that influenced integration or represent the consequences of technology integration into home care: doing tasks differently, making accommodations in the home for devices and computers, and being mindful of existing expectations and skills of both nurses and patients.

  18. 2. JAPAN-IAEA workshop on advanced safeguards technology for the future nuclear fuel cycle. Abstracts

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2009-01-01

    This international workshop addressed issues and technologies associated with safeguarding the future nuclear fuel cycle. The workshop discussed issues of interest to the safeguards community, facility operators and State Systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials. Topic areas covered were as follows: Current Status and Future Prospects of Developing Safeguards Technologies for Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, Technology and Instrumentation Needs, Advanced Safeguards Technologies, Guidelines on Developing Instrumentation to Lead the Way for Implementing Future Safeguards, and Experiences and Lessons learned. This workshop was of interest to individuals and organizations concerned with future nuclear fuel cycle technical developments and safeguards technologies. This includes representatives from the nuclear industry, R and D organizations, safeguards inspectorates, State systems of accountancy and control, and Member States Support Programmes

  19. Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned From the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Johnson, Shirley J.; Ehinger, Michael

    2010-08-07

    This paper will address the lessons learned during the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP) which are relevant to the issue of ‘safeguards by design’. However, those lessons are a result of a cumulative history of international safeguards experiences starting with the West Valley reprocessing plant in 1969, continuing with the Barnwell plant, and then with the implementation of international safeguards at WAK in Germany and TRP in Japan. The design and implementation of safeguards at RRP in Japan is the latest and most challenging that the IAEA has faced. This paper will discuss the work leading up to the development of a safeguards approach, the design and operating features that were introduced to improve or aid in implementing the safeguards approach, and the resulting recommendations for future facilities. It will provide an overview of how ‘safeguardability’ was introduced into RRP.

  20. Introduction of designated organization to safeguards implementation in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Terada, Hiromi; Akiba, Mitsunori; Ando, Hisataka; Okazaki, Shuji; Irikura, Masatoshi; Kurihara, Hiroyoshi

    2000-01-01

    With domestic application of the IAEA new measures (program 93+2) for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system, the Nuclear Regulation Laws was amended for implementation of the new measures based upon the Additional Protocol, and also the new Designated Organization System was introduced to the SSAC (States' System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials) for safeguards implementation in Japan since beginning of January 2000. On the basis of accumulated experiences of the state safeguards implementation for more than 20 years and then established standardization of the inspection procedures, the Japan's Government is able to utilize the expertise of private organizations for the safeguards implementation. Any capable organizations can be designated by the Government as the Designated Organization for all or a part of safeguards implementations on behalf of the Government. According to the amended Law, the Prime Minister can make the Designated Organization implement safeguards implementations that are defined firstly as safeguards inspections which can be done along the Government instructions without any discussions and decisions, secondarily as destructive analysis of safeguards samples, and thirdly as technical research on advanced safeguards measures. The amendment of the Law was approved by the National Diet on June 9th 1999 and entered into force on December 16th 1999. The Additional Protocol also entered into force in Japan at the same time. The NMCC (Nuclear Material Control Center) was designated as the Organization on December 27th 1999 and started the safeguards implementation in January 7th 2000. In order to prepare for the Designated Organization, the NMCC rearranged the organizational system and kept capable human resources enough for the safeguards implementations. Also the NMCC carried out many programs of education and training for the inspectors. Furthermore, manuals and criteria for the

  1. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  2. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1984

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.

    1986-01-01

    From January to December 1984, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. was Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  3. IAEA symposium on international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1999-01-01

    The eighth IAEA Symposium on International Safeguards was organized by the IAEA in cooperation with the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management and the European Safeguards Research and Development Association. It was attended by over 350 specialists and policy makers in the field of nuclear safeguards and verification from more than 50 countries and organizations. The purpose of the Symposium was to foster a broad exchange of information on concepts and technologies related to important developments in the areas of international safeguards and security. For the first time in the history of the symposia, the IAEA is issuing proceedings free of charge to participants on CD-ROM. The twenty-two plenary, technical, and poster sessions featured topics related to technological and policy aspects from national, regional and global perspectives. The theme of the Symposium: Four Decades of Development - Safeguarding into the New Millennium set the stage for the commemoration of a number of significant events in the annals of safeguards. 1997 marked the Fortieth Anniversary of the IAEA, the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and the Twentieth Anniversary of the Department of Safeguards Member State Support Programmes. There were special events and noted presentations featuring these anniversaries and giving the participants an informative retrospective view of safeguards development over the past four decades. The proceedings of this symposium provide the international community with a comprehensive view of where nuclear safeguards and verification stood in 1997 in terms of the growing demands and expectations. The Symposium offered thoughtful perspectives on where safeguards are headed within the broader context of verification issues. As the world of international nuclear verification looks towards the next millennium, the implementation of the expanding and strengthened safeguards system presents formidable challenges

  4. Neutron techniques in Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zucker, M.S.

    1982-01-01

    An essential part of Safeguards is the ability to quantitatively and nondestructively assay those materials with special neutron-interactive properties involved in nuclear industrial or military technology. Neutron techniques have furnished most of the important ways of assaying such materials, which is no surprise since the neutronic properties are what characterizes them. The techniques employed rely on a wide selection of the many methods of neutron generation, detection, and data analysis that have been developed for neutron physics and nuclear science in general

  5. The present status of IAEA safeguards on nuclear fuel cycle facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1979-02-01

    This paper examines the present approach of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguarding various types of facilities in the nuclear fuel cycle, in the hope that it will serve as useful background material for several of the various working groups of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). The objectives and criteria of safeguards as well as the specific safeguards techniques which are utilized by the Agency, are addressed. In Part I, a general overview of safeguards as well as a discussion of procedures applicable to most if not all IAEA safeguarded facilities are included. Part II is broken down into specific facility types and focusses on the particular safeguards measures applied to them. Safeguards have reached different degrees of development for different types of facilities, in part because the Agency's experience in safeguarding certain types is considerably greater than for other types. Thus the Agency safeguards described herein are not static, but are continuously evolving. This evolution results not only from the fact that larger and more complex facilities have been coming under safeguards. Changes are also continually being introduced based on practical experience and research and development aimed at improving safeguards efficiency, reducing intrusiveness into plant operations, minimizing operator and inspector radiation exposure, and reducing subjective evaluations in determining the effectiveness of safeguards. To these ends, the technical support programmes of various countries are playing an important role. It is emphasized that this paper is not intended to evaluate the effectiveness of Agency safeguards or to highlight problem areas. It is simply aimed at providing a picture of what safeguards are or are planned to be at various stages of the fuel cycle

  6. Trends in integrated circuit design for particle physics experiments

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Atkin, E V

    2017-01-01

    Integrated circuits are one of the key complex units available to designers of multichannel detector setups. A whole number of factors makes Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) valuable for Particle Physics and Astrophysics experiments. Among them the most important ones are: integration scale, low power dissipation, radiation tolerance. In order to make possible future experiments in the intensity, cosmic, and energy frontiers today ASICs should provide new level of functionality at a new set of constraints and trade-offs, like low-noise high-dynamic range amplification and pulse shaping, high-speed waveform sampling, low power digitization, fast digital data processing, serialization and data transmission. All integrated circuits, necessary for physical instrumentation, should be radiation tolerant at an earlier not reached level (hundreds of Mrad) of total ionizing dose and allow minute almost 3D assemblies. The paper is based on literary source analysis and presents an overview of the state of the art and trends in nowadays chip design, using partially own ASIC lab experience. That shows a next stage of ising micro- and nanoelectronics in physical instrumentation. (paper)

  7. Experience Supporting the Integration of LHC Experiments Software Framework with the LCG Middleware

    CERN Document Server

    Santinelli, Roberto

    2006-01-01

    The LHC experiments are currently preparing for data acquisition in 2007 and because of the large amount of required computing and storage resources, they decided to embrace the grid paradigm. The LHC Computing Project (LCG) provides and operates a computing infrastructure suitable for data handling, Monte Carlo production and analysis. While LCG offers a set of high level services, intended to be generic enough to accommodate the needs of different Virtual Organizations, the LHC experiments software framework and applications are very specific and focused on the computing and data models. The LCG Experiment Integration Support team works in close contact with the experiments, the middleware developers and the LCG certification and operations teams to integrate the underlying grid middleware with the experiment specific components. The strategical position between the experiments and the middleware suppliers allows EIS team to play a key role at communications level between the customers and the service provi...

  8. Safeguards can not operate alone

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Martikka, E.; Honkamaa, T.; Haemaelaeinen, M.; Okko, O.

    2013-01-01

    There are around 20 new states which are planning to use nuclear energy in the near future. Globally there are several nuclear power plants under construction and they will be bigger than ever. Also new type of nuclear facility, final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, will be constructed and in operation in Finland and Sweden in ca. 10 years time. It is evident that the nuclear world is changing much and quickly. After the Additional Protocol, safeguards are no longer only about accounting and control of nuclear materials, but also about verifying that there are no undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the state. It is not possible or effective anymore to implement safeguards without taking into account of the nuclear safety and security. The safeguards should not be isolated. The synergy between safeguards, security and safety exist, when implementing nationally that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities. In safeguards we could not do our duties effectively if we ignore some of those other S's. Safeguards by Design process does not work properly if only international safeguards and security requirements has been taken into account, it urges all 3S to be taken care at the same time. Safeguards should operate also with other synergetic regimes and organisations like CTBTO, Fissile Material Cut-off, disarmament, export control, border control,... The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  9. Technology choices for the Integrated Beam Experiment (IBX)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Leitner, M.A.; Celata, C.M.; Lee, E.P.; Sabbi, G.; Waldron, W.L.; Barnard, J.J.

    2002-10-31

    Over the next three years the research program of the Heavy Ion Fusion Virtual National Laboratory (HIF-VNL), a collaboration among LBNL, LLNL, and PPPL, is focused on separate scientific experiments in the injection, transport and focusing of intense heavy ion beams at currents from 100 mA to 1 A. As a next major step in the HIF-VNL program, we aim for a complete ''source-to-target'' experiment, the Integrated Beam Experiment (IBX). By combining the experience gained in the current separate beam experiments IBX would allow the integrated scientific study of the evolution of a single heavy ion beam at high current ({approx}1 A) through all sections of a possible heavy ion fusion accelerator: the injection, acceleration, compression, and beam focusing. This paper describes the main parameters and technology choices of the planned IBX experiment. IBX will accelerate singly charged potassium or argon ion beams up to 10 MeV final energy and a longitudinal beam compression ratio of 10, resulting in a beam current at target of more than 10 Amperes. Different accelerator cell design options are described in detail: Induction cores incorporating either room temperature pulsed focusing-magnets or superconducting magnets.

  10. Induction Accelerator Technology Choices for the Integrated Beam Experiment (IBX)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Leitner, M.A.; Celata, C.M.; Lee, E.P.; Logan, B.G.; Sabbi, G.; Waldron, W.L.; Barnard, J.J.

    2003-01-01

    Over the next three years the research program of the Heavy Ion Fusion Virtual National Laboratory (HIF-VNL), a collaboration among LBNL, LLNL, and PPPL, is focused on separate scientific experiments in the injection, transport and focusing of intense heavy ion beams at currents from 100 mA to 1 A. As a next major step in the HIF-VNL program, we aim for a complete 'source-to-target' experiment, the Integrated Beam Experiment (IBX). By combining the experience gained in the current separate beam experiments IBX would allow the integrated scientific study of the evolution of a single heavy ion beam at high current (∼1 A) through all sections of a possible heavy ion fusion accelerator: the injection, acceleration, compression, and beam focusing.This paper describes the main parameters and technology choices of the planned IBX experiment. IBX will accelerate singly charged potassium or argon ion beams up to 10 MeV final energy and a longitudinal beam compression ratio of 10, resulting in a beam current at target of more than 10 Amperes. Different accelerator cell design options are described in detail: Induction cores incorporating either room temperature pulsed focusing-magnets or superconducting magnets

  11. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Smith, D.B. (comp.)

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments.

  12. Safeguards and security progress report, January-December 1983

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, D.B.

    1984-09-01

    From January to December 1983, the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Program was involved in the activities described in the first four parts of this report: Nuclear Facility Support, Security Development and Support, Safeguards Technology Development, and International Safeguards. Part 1 covers efforts of direct assistance to the Department of Energy (DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensee facilities. This assistance includes consultation on materials accounting problems, development of specialized techniques and instruments, and comprehensive participation in the design and implementation of advanced safeguards systems. In addition, a series of training courses in various aspects of safeguards makes the technology more accessible to those who must apply it. Part 2 treats activities aimed at the security of information and computer systems. Our focus this peiod was on continuing the activities of the Computer Security Center, which provides the basis for encouraging and disseminating this emerging technology, and on the development and demonstration of secure computer systems. Part 3 describes the broad development efforts essential to continuing improvements in the practice of safeguards. Although these projects are properly classified as developmental, they address recognized problems that commonly occur in operating facilities. Finally, Part 4 covers international safeguards activities, including both support to the International Atomic Energy Agency and bilateral exchanges. Enrichment plant safeguards, especially those concerning the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant, required a significant portion of our resources. These efforts are beginning to provide substantial returns on our investment in technology transfer, not only in raising the level of safeguards effectiveness but also in our benefiting from field experiences in operating environments

  13. Technology Development of Safeguards

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, Ho Dong; Kang, H. Y.; Ko, W. I. (and others)

    2007-04-15

    The objective of this project is to perform R and D on the essential technologies in nuclear material measurement and surveillance and verification system, and to improve the state of being transparent on the nuclear material management of DUPIC Fuel Development Facility (DFDF) through the evaluation of safeguard ability on non-proliferation fuel cycle and nuclear proliferation resistance. Nuclear material position scan system for the reduction of measurement error was developed for the spatial distribution search of spent fuel in DUPIC facility. Web-based realtime remote monitoring system was designed and constructed for satisfying the IAEA's performance criteria of continuous monitoring, and also developed a software for the function of remote control and message. And diversion paths in a proliferation resistant pyroprocess for SFR were analyzed and its protecting system against the diversion paths were suggested for enhancing proliferation resistance of advanced nuclear fuel cycle. These results could be used for planning the further R and D items in the area of safeguards. Those R and D results mentioned above would be helpful for increasing Korean nuclear transparency in the future.

  14. IAEA safeguards approaches and goals

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Khlebnikov, Nikolai

    2001-01-01

    IAEA safeguards provide a technical means of verifying that political obligations undertaken by States party to international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are being honored. The Agency assures the international community that States party to Safeguards Agreements are complying with their undertaking not to use facilities and divert nuclear materials from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. The task of IAEA safeguards can be summed up as to detect diversion of nuclear materials committed to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, or the misuse of equipment or facilities subject to certain safeguards agreements, and to deter such diversion or misuse through the risk of early detection. This lecture concentrates on the factors the Agency takes into account in designing and implementing safeguards approaches at facilities. (author)

  15. Safeguards on MOX assemblies at LWRs

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Arenas Carrasco, J.; Koulikov, I.; Heinonen, O.J.; Arlt, R.; Grigoleit, K.; Clarke, R.; Swinhoe, M.

    2000-01-01

    Operating within the framework of the New Partnership Approach (NPA) for unirradiated MOX fuel assemblies in LWRs, the IAEA and EURATOM have gained experience in safeguarding 13 LWRs licensed to operate with MOX assemblies. In order to fulfil SIR requirements, verification methods and techniques capable of measuring MOX assemblies under water have been and are still being developed. These encompass both qualitative tests for the detection of plutonium (gross attribute tests) and quantitative tests for the measurement of the amount of plutonium (partial defect tests) and are based on gamma and neutron detection techniques. There are nine PWR and two BWR where the reactor and the spent fuel pond can be covered by the same surveillance device. These are Type I reactors where the reactor and the pond are located in the same hall. In these types of facilities relying on surveillance during the MOX refuelling is especially difficult at the BWRs due to the depth of the core pond. There are two PWR type facilities where the reactor and the spent fuel pond are located in different halls and cannot be covered by the same surveillance device (Type II). An open core camera has not been installed during refuelling and therefore indirect surveillance is currently used to survey MOX loading. Improvements are therefore required and are under consideration. After receipt at the facility, there are a few facilities which must keep the received fresh MOX fuel in wet storage, not only for a short period prior to refuelling, but for more than a year, until the next refuelling campaign. In these cases timely inspections for direct use fresh nuclear material require considerable inspection effort. Additionally, where human surveillance of core loading and finally core closure are necessary there is also a large demand for manpower. Either an agreement should be reached with the operators to delay the MOX loading until the end of the fuelling campaign, or alternative approaches should be

  16. Experience and Strategy of Biodiversity Data Integration in Taiwan

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    K T Shao

    2013-02-01

    Full Text Available The integration of Taiwan's biodiversity databases started in 2001, the same year that Taiwan joined GBIF as an associate participant. Taiwan, hence, embarked on a decade of integrating biodiversity data. Under the support of NSC and COA, the database and websites of TaiBIF, TaiBNET (TaiCOL, TaiBOL, and TaiEOL have been established separately and collaborate with the GBIF, COL, BOL, and EOL respectively. A cross-agency committee was thus established in Academia Sinica in 2008 to formulate policies on data collection and integration as well as the mechanism to make data available to the public. Any commissioned project will hereafter be asked to include these policy requirements in its contract. So far, TaiBIF has gained recognition in Taiwan and abroad for its efforts over the past several years. It can provide its experience and insights for others to reference or replicate.

  17. Integrated multiscale biomaterials experiment and modelling: a perspective

    Science.gov (United States)

    Buehler, Markus J.; Genin, Guy M.

    2016-01-01

    Advances in multiscale models and computational power have enabled a broad toolset to predict how molecules, cells, tissues and organs behave and develop. A key theme in biological systems is the emergence of macroscale behaviour from collective behaviours across a range of length and timescales, and a key element of these models is therefore hierarchical simulation. However, this predictive capacity has far outstripped our ability to validate predictions experimentally, particularly when multiple hierarchical levels are involved. The state of the art represents careful integration of multiscale experiment and modelling, and yields not only validation, but also insights into deformation and relaxation mechanisms across scales. We present here a sampling of key results that highlight both challenges and opportunities for integrated multiscale experiment and modelling in biological systems. PMID:28981126

  18. Software for the Integration of Multiomics Experiments in Bioconductor.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Ramos, Marcel; Schiffer, Lucas; Re, Angela; Azhar, Rimsha; Basunia, Azfar; Rodriguez, Carmen; Chan, Tiffany; Chapman, Phil; Davis, Sean R; Gomez-Cabrero, David; Culhane, Aedin C; Haibe-Kains, Benjamin; Hansen, Kasper D; Kodali, Hanish; Louis, Marie S; Mer, Arvind S; Riester, Markus; Morgan, Martin; Carey, Vince; Waldron, Levi

    2017-11-01

    Multiomics experiments are increasingly commonplace in biomedical research and add layers of complexity to experimental design, data integration, and analysis. R and Bioconductor provide a generic framework for statistical analysis and visualization, as well as specialized data classes for a variety of high-throughput data types, but methods are lacking for integrative analysis of multiomics experiments. The MultiAssayExperiment software package, implemented in R and leveraging Bioconductor software and design principles, provides for the coordinated representation of, storage of, and operation on multiple diverse genomics data. We provide the unrestricted multiple 'omics data for each cancer tissue in The Cancer Genome Atlas as ready-to-analyze MultiAssayExperiment objects and demonstrate in these and other datasets how the software simplifies data representation, statistical analysis, and visualization. The MultiAssayExperiment Bioconductor package reduces major obstacles to efficient, scalable, and reproducible statistical analysis of multiomics data and enhances data science applications of multiple omics datasets. Cancer Res; 77(21); e39-42. ©2017 AACR . ©2017 American Association for Cancer Research.

  19. Safeguards document (INFCIRC/153) and the new safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Haginoya, Tohru

    1997-01-01

    INFCIRC/153. The NPT covers nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices but not other military uses of nuclear materials. The NPT safeguards applies all nuclear materials including undeclared nuclear materials. The protection of commercially sensitive information is important. The new safeguards system. The Model protocol amends INFCIRC/153 (the Protocol prevails). Apply nuclear fuel cycle related activities with no nuclear material. The environmental monitoring is an important measure, but non-weapon countries have no such technology. Impact and benefit from the new system. Simplification of the conventional safeguards. Could possibly define three categories of plutonium. (author)

  20. Los Alamos safeguards program overview and NDA in safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1988-01-01

    Over the years the Los Alamos safeguards program has developed, tested, and implemented a broad range of passive and active nondestructive analysis (NDA) instruments (based on gamma and x-ray detection and neutron counting) that are now widely employed in safeguarding nuclear materials of all forms. Here very briefly, the major categories of gamma ray and neutron based NDA techniques, give some representative examples of NDA instruments currently in use, and cite a few notable instances of state-of-the-art NDA technique development. Historical aspects and a broad overview of the safeguards program are also presented

  1. Recent developments in the implementation of Euratom safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gmelin, W.; Bommelle, P.; Sharpe, B.W.; Love, B.

    1983-01-01

    The EURATOM safeguards system is based legally on the 1958 Treaty of Rome establishing the original Community of six (now 10) countries. Under this safeguards system, the Commission has, inter alia, ''to satisfy itself that any particular safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with a third state or an international organisation are complied with'' (art. 77b). The practical implementation of safeguards within the Community is significantly influenced by the requirements of: (a) the three different agreements between the Community, its Member States and the IAEA, concerning the application of IAEA safeguards to some or all of the civil nuclear materials in the Community, and (b) the various agreements between the Community and certain third countries, concerning inter alia the application of safeguards within the Community to nuclear materials supplied, directly or indirectly, by these third countries. Within the past four years significant developments have occurred in both groups of agreements. The EURATOM safeguards organisation is the only multinational safeguards organisation in the world, and currently has a staff of some 120 inspectors, with appropriate administrative support, and can draw for research and development work on the resources of the Community's Joint Research Centre. The recent changes in inspection techniques, particularly in relation to non-destructive assay techniques, and the implementation of containment and surveillance measures, are discussed. A description is given of the experience gained in recent years in the operation of ''Joint Teams'' of EURATOM and IAEA inspectors in certain plants as well as the continuing experience gained under the normal regime, using the observation principle, as foreseen in the respective Agreement

  2. Implementation of Safeguards in Thailand

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rueanngoen, A.; Changkrueng, K.; Srijittawa, L.; Mungpayaban, H.; Wititteeranon, A.

    2015-01-01

    Thailand is a non-nuclear weapon state. The non-nuclear activities are mainly medical, agricultural, and industrial. Therefore, Thailand ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1972 and has been entry into force of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC 241) since 1974. Based on the INFCIRC 153, Thailand established a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In order to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear in Thailand the Nuclear-Non- Proliferation Center of Office of Atoms for Peace (NPC, OAP) was established to act as State level Safeguards. NPC is responsible for keeping records and providing information under requirement of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, the strengthening of cooperation and good coordination between Thailand and IAEA are indeed important and necessary to implementation safeguards in country. Based on the report of IAEA safeguards statement, there is no indication of the diversion of nuclear materials or misuse of the facility or the items in Thailand. Up to present, nuclear activities in Thailand are peaceful without diversion of using. This paper reviews the current status of the implementation Safeguards in Thailand. (author)

  3. How safe are nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sullivan, E.

    1979-01-01

    Reports of weaknesses in IAEA safeguards have alarmed the US and since September 1977, US officials have refused to certify that the IAEA can adequately safeguard nuclear material the US exports. For political reasons, the IAEA safeguards system cannot perform an actual policing role or physically protect strategic material. The IAEA can only send out inspectors to verify bookkeeping and install cameras to sound the alarm should a diversion occur. Based on these IAEA reports and on interviews with scientists and US officials, the following serious problems hampering the Agency's safeguards effort can be identified: no foolproof safeguards for commercial reprocessing plants, uranium enrichment facilities, or fast breeder reactors; equipment failure and unreliable instruments; faulty accounting methods; too few well-trained inspectors; restrictions on where inspectors can go; commercial conflicts. Programs by the US, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and developing nations devised to better safeguards are briefly discussed. Some experts question whether international safeguards can be improved quickly enough to successfully deter nuclear weapons proliferation, given the rapid spread of nuclear technology to the third world

  4. National viewpoints: Views on strengthened safeguards from Australia, Cuba and South Africa

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Biggs, I.; Saburido, E.F.; Mxakato-Diseko, N.J.

    1999-01-01

    This paper presents views of Australia, Cuba and South Africa concerned with strengthened safeguards regime. Australia has been involved with the IAEA safeguards system since the first plenary meeting of the Conference on the IAEA Statute in 1956, joined the NPT in 1973 and began concluding bilateral safeguards agreements in 1977. Australia has the greatest respect for the IAEA coordinated efforts started in 1998 to strengthen and integrate the safeguards system. Cuba has always attached special importance to nuclear safeguards activities, recognizing their high priority as well as the important role they have in respect to international disarmament and security. South Africa supports the efforts in strengthening the safeguards activities and remains hopeful that the international community will address the challenges posed by the Trilateral Initiative between Russian federation, USA and IAEA in a mature and cooperative way

  5. Safeguards techniques and equipment. 2003 ed

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2003-01-01

    -destructive analysis (NDA) techniques, and compare their findings with the declared figures and the operator's records. The next level of verification has the aim of detecting whether a fraction of a declared amount is missing (partial defect) and may involve the weighing of items and measurements with NDA techniques such as neutron counting or gamma-ray spectrometry. For detecting bias defects, which would arise if small amounts of material were diverted over a protracted length of time, it is necessary to sample some of the items and to apply physical and chemical analysis techniques having the highest possible accuracy, typically less than one per cent. In order to apply these destructive analysis (DA) techniques, the IAEA requires access to laboratories which use such accurate techniques on a routine basis. Containment and surveillance (C/S) techniques, which are complementary to nuclear material accountancy techniques, are applied in order to maintain continuity of the knowledge gained through IAEA verification, by giving assurance that nuclear material follows predetermined routes, that the integrity of its containment remains unimpaired and that the material is accounted for at the correct measurement points. They also lead to savings in the safeguards inspection effort, e.g. by reducing the frequency of accountancy verification. A variety of C/S techniques are used, primarily optical surveillance and sealing. In remote monitoring, the unattended equipment transmits the data off-site. For unattended and remote monitoring, additional criteria must be met, including high reliability and authentication of the data source. Data communication costs have dropped dramatically in recent years. Data security is an important feature of unattended and remote monitoring systems. Environmental sampling, which allows detection of minute traces of nuclear material, was added to the IAEA's verification measures in the early 1990s as a powerful tool for detecting indications of undeclared

  6. The organisation of interagency training to safeguard children in England: a case study using realistic evaluation

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Demi Patsios

    2010-11-01

    Full Text Available Background: Joint training for interagency working is carried out by Local Safeguarding Children Boards in England to promote effective local working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.Purpose: This paper reports on the findings of the outputs and outcomes of interagency training to safeguard children in eight Local Safeguarding Children Boards.Methods: A review of Local Safeguarding Children Board documentation, observations of Local Safeguarding Children Board training sub-group meetings and a series of interviews with training key stakeholders in each Local Safeguarding Children Board were used to assess how partner agencies in the Local Safeguarding Children Boards carried out their statutory responsibilities to organise interagency training. 'Realistic Evaluation' was used to evaluate the mechanisms by which a central government mandate produced particular inter-agency training outputs (number of courses, training days and joint working outcomes (effective partnerships, within particular Local Safeguarding Children Board contexts.Results: The 'mandated partnership' imposed on Local Safeguarding Children Boards by central government left little choice but for partner agencies to work together to deliver joint training, which in turn affected the dynamics of working partnerships across the various sites. The effectiveness of the training sub group determined the success of the organisation and delivery of training for joint working. Despite having a central mandate, Local Safeguarding Children Boards had heterogeneous funding and training arrangements. These resulted in significant variations in the outputs in terms of the number of courses per 'children in need' in the locality and in the cost per course.Conclusions: Interagency training which takes account of the context of the Local Safeguarding Children Board is more likely to produce better trained staff, effective partnership working, and lead to better integrated

  7. Safeguards summary event list (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1989-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, also included are events reported involving byproduct material which is exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, alcohol and drugs, and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  8. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fadden, M.; Yardumian, J.

    1993-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List provides brief summaries of hundreds of safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Events are described under the categories: Bomb-related, Intrusion, Missing/Allegedly Stolen, Transportation-related, Tampering/Vandalism, Arson, Firearms-related, Radiological Sabotage, Non-radiological Sabotage, and Miscellaneous. Because of the public interest, the Miscellaneous category also includes events reported involving source material, byproduct material, and natural uranium, which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Information in the event descriptions was obtained from official NRC sources

  9. IAEA safeguards: Challenges and opportunities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1993-01-01

    The history of the IAEA safeguards regime is described. New challenges and opportunities are discussed in connection with the discovery in Iraq of a clandestine nuclear weapons development programme, the difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, recent developments in South Africa, the emergence of newly independent States that made up the former USSR. 2 figs

  10. Some reflections on nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Campbell, Ross.

    1981-01-01

    The author doubts whether, in view of the 1976 policy of requiring adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or equivalent IAEA safeguards, Canada still needs the 1974 policy of bilateral safeguards on technology as well as material. The opinion is expressed that bilateral safeguards create difficulties for the IAEA, and are resented by some potential customers. Much better, if it were achievable, would be a code agreed by a convention of vendors and customers alike, to include sanctions against transgressors. The author expresses confidence in the IAEA, but perceives a need for more men and money. Also needed are better instruments to account for materials

  11. Multi-Level Policy Dialogues, Processes, and Actions: Challenges and Opportunities for National REDD+ Safeguards Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Pamela Jagger

    2014-09-01

    Full Text Available REDD+ social safeguards have gained increasing attention in numerous forums. This paper reviews the evolution of multi-level policy dialogues, processes, and actions related to REDD+ social safeguards (e.g., Cancun Safeguards 1–5 among policy makers, civil society organizations, and within the media in Brazil, Indonesia and Tanzania, three countries with well advanced REDD+ programs. We find that progress on core aspects of social safeguards is uneven across the three countries. Brazil is by far the most advanced having drafted a REDD+ social safeguards policy. Both Brazil and Indonesia have benefited from progress made by strong sub-national entities in the operationalization of REDD+ safeguards including free prior and informed consent (FPIC, participation, and benefit sharing. Tanzania has weakly articulated how social safeguards will be operationalized and has a more top-down approach. We conclude that in all three countries, measuring, reporting and verifying progress on social safeguards is likely to be a complex issue. Stakeholders with vested interests in REDD+ social safeguards operate in polycentric rather than nested systems, suggesting that aggregation of information from local to national-scale will be a challenge. However, polycentric systems are also likely to support more transparent and comprehensive safeguards systems. Clear direction from the international community and financing for REDD+ safeguard MRV is essential if REDD+ social safeguards are to be meaningfully integrated into forest-based climate mitigation strategies.

  12. IAEA safeguards information system re-engineering project (IRP)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, G.; Becar, J.-M.; Ifyland, N.; Kirkgoeze, R.; Koevesd, G.; Szamosi, L.

    2007-01-01

    The Safeguards Information System Re-engineering Project (IRP) was initiated to assist the IAEA in addressing current and future verification and analysis activities through the establishment of a new information technology framework for strengthened and integrated safeguards. The Project provides a unique opportunity to enhance all of the information services for the Department of Safeguards and will require project management 'best practices' to balance limited funds, available resources and Departmental priorities. To achieve its goals, the Project will require the participation of all stakeholders to create a comprehensive and cohesive plan that provides both a flexible and stable foundation for address changing business needs. The expectation is that high quality integrated information systems will be developed that incorporate state-of-the-art technical architectural standards, improved business processes and consistent user interfaces to store various data types in an enterprise data repository which is accessible on-line in a secure environment. (author)

  13. Technology transfer - insider protection workshop (Safeguards Evaluation Method - Insider Threat)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strait, R.S.; Renis, T.A.

    1986-01-01

    The Safeguards Evaluation Method - Insider Threat, developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, is a field-applicable tool to evaluate facility safeguards against theft or diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by nonviolent insiders. To ensure successful transfer of this technology from the laboratory to DOE field offices and contractors, LLNL developed a three-part package. The package includes a workbook, user-friendly microcomputer software, and a three-day training program. The workbook guides an evaluation team through the Safeguards Evaluation Method and provides forms for gathering data. The microcomputer software assists in the evaluation of safeguards effectiveness. The software is designed for safeguards analysts with no previous computer experience. It runs on an IBM Personal Computer or any compatible machine. The three-day training program is called the Insider Protection Workshop. The workshop students learn how to use the workbook and the computer software to assess insider vulnerabilities and to evaluate the benefits and costs of potential improvements. These activities increase the students' appreciation of the insider threat. The workshop format is informal and interactive, employing four different instruction modes: classroom presentations, small-group sessions, a practical exercise, and ''hands-on'' analysis using microcomputers. This approach to technology transfer has been successful: over 100 safeguards planners and analysts have been trained in the method, and it is being used at facilities through the DOE complex

  14. Safeguarding of spent fuel conditioning and disposal in geological repositories

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Forsstroem, H.; Richter, B.

    1997-01-01

    Disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological formations, without reprocessing, is being considered in a number of States. Before disposal the fuel will be encapsulated in a tight and corrosion resistant container. The method chosen for disposal and the design of the repository will be determined by the geological conditions and the very strict requirements on long-term safety. From a safeguards perspective spent fuel disposal is a new issue. As the spent fuel still contains important amounts of material under safeguards and as it can not be considered practicably irrecoverable in the repository, the IAEA has been advised not to terminate safeguards, even after closure of the repository. This raises a number of new issues where there could be a potential conflict of interests between safety and safeguards demands, in particular in connection with the safety principle that burdens on future generations should be avoided. In this paper some of these issues are discussed based on the experience gained in Germany and Sweden about the design and future operation of encapsulation and disposal facilities. The most important issues are connected to the required level of safeguards for a closed repository, the differences in time scales for waste management and safeguards, the need for verification of the fissile content in the containers and the possibility of retrieving the fuel disposed of. (author)

  15. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung [KAIST, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2016-10-15

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source.

  16. Investigation of novel spent fuel verification system for safeguard application

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lee, Haneol; Yim, Man-Sung

    2016-01-01

    Radioactive waste, especially spent fuel, is generated from the operation of nuclear power plants. The final stage of radioactive waste management is disposal which isolates radioactive waste from the accessible environment and allows it to decay. The safety, security, and safeguard of a spent fuel repository have to be evaluated before its operation. Many researchers have evaluated the safety of a repository. These researchers calculated dose to public after the repository is closed depending on their scenario. Because most spent fuel repositories are non-retrievable, research on security or safeguards of spent fuel repositories have to be performed. Design based security or safeguard have to be developed for future repository designs. This study summarizes the requirements of future spent fuel repositories especially safeguards, and suggests a novel system which meets the safeguard requirements. Applying safeguards to a spent fuel repository is becoming increasingly important. The future requirements for a spent fuel repository are suggested by several expert groups, such as ASTOR in IAEA. The requirements emphasizes surveillance and verification. The surveillance and verification of spent fuel is currently accomplished by using the Cerenkov radiation detector while spent fuel is being stored in a fuel pool. This research investigated an advanced spent fuel verification system using a system which converts spent fuel radiation into electricity. The system generates electricity while it is conveyed from a transportation cask to a disposal cask. The electricity conversion system was verified in a lab scale experiment using an 8.51GBq Cs-137 gamma source

  17. Upgrading nuclear safeguards in Kazakhstan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hunt, Maribeth; Murakami, Kenji

    2005-01-01

    accurately account for the nuclear material received, and to generally upgrade the safety, security, and accountancy standards. While the material that is actually in hold-up may not be of particular concern with respect to nuclear proliferation and nuclear security, a plant's declaration of hold-up may be a way of concealing diversion of nuclear material. Overstating the amount of material in hold-up can allow an operator to divert material. In the past, neither the UMP nor the IAEA has had an accurate estimate of the material designated as hold-up. When the hold-up of a plant can be characterized and verified it assures that this proliferation pathway is protected. During the PIV in September 2004, the Agency used its ISOCS system to re-measure points that had been measured during the PIV in 2003 and to measure points that the operator had measured with the systems provided by the Japanese and the United States. The result was that at the Physical Inventory Taking in 2004, UMP staff were able to make an effective declaration of hold-up and the Agency was able to verify it. At the same time, the rest of the work of the donor States was progressing. The funding from the Japanese government has assured the preparation of three procedures to standardize the nuclear material accountancy and control at the UMP and has sponsored the training of two UMP safeguards officials in Japan. One of the original goals of this integrated project was to significantly reduce, by 2005, the uncertainty in the measurement of hold-up at the UMP. Through the concerted efforts of the IAEA, donor States, and the European Union, this goal was reached in September 2004. Over the next year, work will concentrate on further training of personnel, the Russian translation and distribution of the procedures funded by the Japanese government, coordinating the delivery and installation of equipment from the United States, and UMP staff training in safeguards and safety culture

  18. Safeguards for special nuclear materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carlson, R.L.

    1979-12-01

    Safeguards, accountability, and nuclear materials are defined. The accuracy of measuring nuclear materials is discussed. The use of computers in nuclear materials accounting is described. Measures taken to physically protect nuclear materials are described

  19. Nuclear safeguards - a new profession

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Thorne, L.

    1984-01-01

    Early moves to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons are described together with the application of vigorous scientific techniques to the political framework of international treaties. Technical criteria for safeguards and verification methods are discussed. (U.K.)

  20. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Bean, Robert; Metcalf, Richard; Bevill, Aaron

    2008-01-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant's large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis

  1. Development of DUPIC safeguards technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Kim, H D; Ko, W I; Song, D Y [and others

    2000-03-01

    During the first phase of R and D program conducted from 1997 to 1999, nuclear material safeguards studies system were performed on the technology development of DUPIC safeguards system such as nuclear material measurement in bulk form and product form, DUPIC fuel reactivity measurement, near-real-time accountancy, and containment and surveillance system for effective and efficient implementation of domestic and international safeguards obligation. For the nuclear material measurement system, the performance test was finished and received IAEA approval, and now is being used in DUPIC Fuel Fabrication Facility(DFDF) for nuclear material accounting and control. Other systems being developed in this study were already installed in DFDF and being under performance test. Those systems developed in this study will make a contribution not only to the effective implementation of DUPIC safeguards, but also to enhance the international confidence build-up in peaceful use of spent fuel material. (author)

  2. Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stanchi, L.

    1991-01-01

    The book contains contributed papers from various authors on the following subjects: Safeguards systems and implementation, Measurement techniques: general, Measurement techniques: destructive analysis, Measurement techniques: non-destructive assay, Containment and surveillance, Spent fuel strategies, Material accounting and data evaluation

  3. Experiences with integral microelectronics on smart structures for space

    Science.gov (United States)

    Nye, Ted; Casteel, Scott; Navarro, Sergio A.; Kraml, Bob

    1995-05-01

    One feature of a smart structure implies that some computational and signal processing capability can be performed at a local level, perhaps integral to the controlled structure. This requires electronics with a minimal mechanical influence regarding structural stiffening, heat dissipation, weight, and electrical interface connectivity. The Advanced Controls Technology Experiment II (ACTEX II) space-flight experiments implemented such a local control electronics scheme by utilizing composite smart members with integral processing electronics. These microelectronics, tested to MIL-STD-883B levels, were fabricated with conventional thick film on ceramic multichip module techniques. Kovar housings and aluminum-kapton multilayer insulation was used to protect against harsh space radiation and thermal environments. Development and acceptance testing showed the electronics design was extremely robust, operating in vacuum and at temperature range with minimal gain variations occurring just above room temperatures. Four electronics modules, used for the flight hardware configuration, were connected by a RS-485 2 Mbit per second serial data bus. The data bus was controlled by Actel field programmable gate arrays arranged in a single master, four slave configuration. An Intel 80C196KD microprocessor was chosen as the digital compensator in each controller. It was used to apply a series of selectable biquad filters, implemented via Delta Transforms. Instability in any compensator was expected to appear as large amplitude oscillations in the deployed structure. Thus, over-vibration detection circuitry with automatic output isolation was incorporated into the design. This was not used however, since during experiment integration and test, intentionally induced compensator instabilities resulted in benign mechanical oscillation symptoms. Not too surprisingly, it was determined that instabilities were most detectable by large temperature increases in the electronics, typically

  4. A Monte Carlo based spent fuel analysis safeguards strategy assessment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fensin, Michael L.; Tobin, Stephen J.; Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Menlove, Howard O.; Sandoval, Nathan P.

    2009-01-01

    Safeguarding nuclear material involves the detection of diversions of significant quantities of nuclear materials, and the deterrence of such diversions by the risk of early detection. There are a variety of motivations for quantifying plutonium in spent fuel assemblies by means of nondestructive assay (NDA) including the following: strengthening the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies ability to safeguards nuclear facilities, shipper/receiver difference, input accountability at reprocessing facilities and burnup credit at repositories. Many NDA techniques exist for measuring signatures from spent fuel; however, no single NDA technique can, in isolation, quantify elemental plutonium and other actinides of interest in spent fuel. A study has been undertaken to determine the best integrated combination of cost effective techniques for quantifying plutonium mass in spent fuel for nuclear safeguards. A standardized assessment process was developed to compare the effective merits and faults of 12 different detection techniques in order to integrate a few techniques and to down-select among the techniques in preparation for experiments. The process involves generating a basis burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library, creating diversion scenarios, developing detector models and quantifying the capability of each NDA technique. Because hundreds of input and output files must be managed in the couplings of data transitions for the different facets of the assessment process, a graphical user interface (GUI) was development that automates the process. This GUI allows users to visually create diversion scenarios with varied replacement materials, and generate a MCNPX fixed source detector assessment input file. The end result of the assembly library assessment is to select a set of common source terms and diversion scenarios for quantifying the capability of each of the 12 NDA techniques. We present here the generalized

  5. A Monte Carlo Based Spent Fuel Analysis Safeguards Strategy Assessment

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fensin, Michael L.; Tobin, Stephen J.; Swinhoe, Martyn T.; Menlove, Howard O.; Sandoval, Nathan P. [Los Alamos National Laboratory, E540, Los Alamos, NM 87545 (United States)

    2009-06-15

    Safeguarding nuclear material involves the detection of diversions of significant quantities of nuclear materials, and the deterrence of such diversions by the risk of early detection. There are a variety of motivations for quantifying plutonium in spent fuel assemblies by means of nondestructive assay (NDA) including the following: strengthening the capabilities of the International Atomic Energy Agencies ability to safeguards nuclear facilities, shipper/receiver difference, input accountability at reprocessing facilities and burnup credit at repositories. Many NDA techniques exist for measuring signatures from spent fuel; however, no single NDA technique can, in isolation, quantify elemental plutonium and other actinides of interest in spent fuel. A study has been undertaken to determine the best integrated combination of cost effective techniques for characterizing Pu mass in spent fuel for nuclear safeguards. A standardized assessment process was developed to compare the effective merits and faults of 12 different detection techniques in order to integrate a few techniques and to down-select among the techniques in preparation for experiments. The process involves generating a basis burnup/enrichment/cooling time dependent spent fuel assembly library, determining and identifying limiting diversion scenarios, developing detector models and quantifying the capability of each NDA technique. Because hundreds of input and output files must be managed in the couplings of data transitions for the different facets of the assessment process, a graphical user interface (GUI) was development that automates the process. This GUI allows users to visually create diversion scenarios with varied replacement materials, and generate a MCNPX fixed source detector assessment input file. The end result of the assembly library assessment is to select a set of common source terms and diversion scenarios for quantifying the capability of each of the 12 NDA techniques. We present here

  6. Technical Solution for Improved Safeguards/State Cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Miller, S.

    2015-01-01

    This paper will discuss an information technology solution to allow the IAEA Safeguards Department to improve cooperation with States. The solution will be a portal or hub to integrate the information, processes, and people between Safeguards and States. It will allow for two-way communication and collaboration between Safeguards staff and State representatives. This paper discusses the information security challenges inherent in building such a system. It proposes technical architectures that might allow the existing integration approach (e.g., encrypted email exchange) to be kept, while expanding it to include modern integration technologies (e.g., web services), as well explorer new collaborative web technologies. It looks at current Safeguards processes and approaches to cooperation and discusses efficiencies that could be achieved through the adoption of this technology solution. Example process areas for improvement include: a) Safeguards Agreements: States are obligated to submit data on their nuclear programme to the IAEA on a periodic basis. Declarations are received through two separate systems using encrypted email. The proposed solution would allow for enhanced exchange of declaration where States can submit any type of declaration using one system. When declarations are received and validated, an acknowledgement would automatically be sent to the State. The solution would provide the Safeguards Department the ability to ask for clarification as well as collaborate on the submitted declarations. Both the question and the response would be recorded in the system. The solution could also integrate tools allowing declarations to be added directly and validated before submission. b) Other areas that could benefit from this solution include declarations from States with small quantities protocol, facility declarations, as well as systems that support extra-budgetary funding (e.g., SPRICS). (author)

  7. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1984-03-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  8. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1983-02-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  9. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1982-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  10. Safeguards through secure automated fabrication

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    DeMerschman, A.W.; Carlson, R.L.

    1982-01-01

    Westinghouse Hanford Company, a prime contractor for the U.S. Department of Energy, is constructing the Secure Automated Fabrication (SAF) line for fabrication of mixed oxide breeder fuel pins. Fuel processing by automation, which provides a separation of personnel from fuel handling, will provide a means whereby advanced safeguards concepts will be introduced. Remote operations and the inter-tie between the process computer and the safeguards computer are discussed

  11. Development and application of a safeguards system in a fabrication plant for highly enriched uranium

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cuypers, M.; Stricht, E. van der

    1979-01-01

    This paper gives a general view of the safeguards activities performed at the Nukem Fabrication plant (Hanau, Federal Republic of Germany) during the last seven years. The main safeguards-relevant features of the plant are given and discussed. The importance is stressed of a good working relationship between the three principal partners, viz. the operator, the safeguards authority and the latter's technical support service. The definition, implementation and improvement of safeguards equipment and activities are outlined. The paper describes the internal organization established by the operator to fulfil his responsibilities, the safeguards philosophy, the Non-Destructive Assay equipment permanently installed by Euratom Safeguards, the results obtained, and the evaluation of the material balances. Conclusions are drawn (and specific comments made throughout the paper) from the experience gained over this period of seven years. (author)

  12. DOE/ABACC safeguards cooperation

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Whitaker, J.M.; Toth, P.; Rubio, J.

    1995-01-01

    In 1994, the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) signed a safeguards cooperation agreement. The agreement provides for cooperation in the areas of nuclear material control, accountancy, verification, and advanced containment and surveillance technologies for international safeguards applications. ABACC is an international safeguards organization responsible for verifying the commitments of a 1991 bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil in which both countries agreed to submit all nuclear material in all nuclear activities to a Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). DOE provides critical assistance (including equipment and training) through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to countries and international organizations to enhance their capabilities to control and verify nuclear material inventories. Specific activities initiated under the safeguards agreement include: (1) active US participation in ABACC's safeguards training courses, (2) joint development of specialized measurement training workshops, (3) characterization of laboratory standards, and (4) development and application of an extensive analytical laboratory comparison program. The results realized from these initial activities have been mutually beneficial in regard to strengthening the application of international safeguards in Argentina and Brazil

  13. Nuclear safeguards implementations in Taiwan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hou, R-H.; Chang, C-K.; Lin, C-R.; Gone, J-K.; Chen, W-L.; Yao, D.

    2006-01-01

    Full text: Now with six Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) units in operation, two Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units under construction, and other peaceful applications of nuclear and radiation technology expanding in great pace, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC) has been focused on reactor safety regulation, radiation protection, radioactive waste administration, environmental monitoring and R and D for technology development and other civilian nuclear applications. Despite Taiwan's departure from the United Nations and therefore its family member International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1971, Taiwan remains its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To date, Taiwan is still part of the international nuclear safeguards system and accepts IAEA's inspections in accordance with its regulations on nuclear safeguards. In 1998, Taiwan further agreed, through exchange of letters between the AEC and IAEA, to implementation of the measures provided for in the model Protocol Additional to its safeguards agreement. In this paper, we will introduce Taiwan's nuclear safeguards history and describe some highlights of safeguards implementation in recent years, such as complementary accesses, transparency visits, remote monitoring inspections, unannounced inspections, facility attachment termination for the decommissioned facilities, and annual safeguards implementation meeting with IAEA

  14. Introduction to nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kuroi, Hideo

    1986-01-01

    This article is aimed at outlining the nuclear material safeguards. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 and safeguards inspection was started in 1962. It is stressed that any damage resulting from nuclear proliferation would be triggered by a human intentional act. Various measures have been taken by international societies and nations, of which the safeguards are the only means which relay mainly on technical procedures. There are two modes of diversing nuclear materials to military purposes. One would be done by national intension while the other by indivisulas or expert groups, i.e., sub-national intention. IAEA is responsible for the prevention of diversification by nations, for which the international safeguards are being used. Measures against the latter mode of diversification are called nuclear protection, for which each nation is responsible. The aim of the safeguards under the Nonproliferation Treaty is to detect the diversification of a significant amount of nuclear materials from non-military purposes to production of nuclear explosion devices such as atomic weapons or to unidentified uses. Major technical methods used for the safeguards include various destructive and non-destructive tests as well as containment and monitoring techniques. System techniques are to be employed for automatic containment and monitoring procedures. Appropriate nuclear protection system techniques should also be developed. (Nogami, K.)

  15. Setting priorities for safeguards upgrades

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Al-Ayat, R.A.; Judd, B.R.; Patenaude, C.J.; Sicherman, A.

    1987-01-01

    This paper describes an analytic approach and a computer program for setting priorities among safeguards upgrades. The approach provides safeguards decision makers with a systematic method for allocating their limited upgrade resources. The priorities are set based on the upgrades cost and their contribution to safeguards effectiveness. Safeguards effectiveness is measured by the probability of defeat for a spectrum of potential insider and outsider adversaries. The computer program, MI$ER, can be used alone or as a companion to ET and SAVI, programs designed to evaluate safeguards effectiveness against insider and outsider threats, respectively. Setting the priority required judgments about the relative importance (threat likelihoods and consequences) of insider and outsider threats. Although these judgments are inherently subjective, MI$ER can analyze the sensitivity of the upgrade priorities to these weights and determine whether or not they are critical to the priority ranking. MI$ER produces tabular and graphical results for comparing benefits and identifying the most cost-effective upgrades for a given expenditure. This framework provides decision makers with an explicit and consistent analysis to support their upgrades decisions and to allocate the safeguards resources in a cost-effective manner

  16. Implementation and operational experience of an integrated fuel information service at the BNFL THORP facility

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Robson, D.N.; Ramsden, P.N.

    1995-01-01

    BNFL's THORP Plant, which started active operations early in 1994, has contracts to reprocess 7000t(U) of fuel belonging to 33 customers in 9 countries in the UK, Europe and Japan during its first 10 years of operation. Contracts are in place or being negotiated, and further business sought after, with the expectation of extending THORP's operations well beyond the initial 10 years. An integrated data management service, for the fuel storage areas of BNFL's THORP Division, is being implemented to replace several, independent, systems. This Fuel Information Service (FIS) will bring the Nuclear Materials Accountancy and Safeguards Records together with the Operating Records into one database from which all Safeguards Reports will be made. BNFL's contractual and commercial data and technical data on the stored fuel, required to support the reprocessing business, will also be brought into the common database. FIS is the first stage in a project to integrate the Materials Management systems throughout the THORP nuclear recycling business including irradiated fuel receipt and storage, reprocessing and storage of products, mixed oxide fuel manufacture and the conditioning and storage of wastes

  17. Vehicle Integrated Performance Analysis, the VIPA Experience: Reconnecting with Technical Integration

    Science.gov (United States)

    McGhee, David S.

    2005-01-01

    Today's NASA is facing significant challenges and changes. The Exploration initiative indicates a large increase in projects with limited increase in budget. The Columbia report has criticized NASA for its lack of insight and technical integration impacting its ability to provide safety. The Aldridge report is advocating NASA find new ways of doing business. Very early in the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) program a small team of engineers at MSFC were asked to propose a process for performing a system level assessment of a launch vehicle. The request was aimed primarily at providing insight and making NASA a "smart buyer." Out of this effort the VIPA team was created. The difference between the VIPA effort and many integration attempts is that VIPA focuses on using experienced people from various disciplines and a process which focuses them on a technically integrated assessment. Most previous attempts have focused on developing an all encompassing software tool. In addition, VIPA anchored its process formulation in the experience of its members and in early developmental Space Shuttle experience. The primary reference for this is NASA-TP-2001-210092, "Launch Vehicle Design Process: Characterization, Technical Integration, and Lessons Learned," and discussions with its authors. The foundations of VIPA's process are described. The VIPA team also recognized the need to drive detailed analysis earlier in the design process. Analyses and techniques typically done in later design phases, are brought forward using improved computing technology. The intent is to allow the identification of significant sensitivities, trades, and design issues much earlier in the program. This process is driven by the T-model for Technical Integration described in the aforementioned reference. VIPA's approach to performing system level technical integration is discussed in detail. Proposed definitions are offered to clarify this discussion and the general systems integration dialog. VIPA

  18. International nuclear material safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Syed Azmi Syed Ali

    1985-01-01

    History can be a very dull subject if it relates to events which have long since lost their relevance. The factors which led to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), however, are as important and relevant today as they were when the Agency was first created. Without understanding these factors it is impossible to realise how important the Agency is in the present world or to understand some of the controversies surrounding its future. Central to these controversies is the question of how best to promote the international transfer of nuclear technology without contributing further to the problem of proliferating nuclear explosives or explosive capabilities. One effective means is to subject nuclear materials (see accompanying article in box), which forms the basic link between the manufacture of nuclear explosives and nuclear power generation, to international safeguards. This was realized very early in the development of nuclear power and was given greater emphasis following the deployment of the first two atomic bombs towards the end of World War II. (author)

  19. Unattended safeguards instrumentation at centrifuge enrichment plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Smith, L. Eric; Lebrun, Alain R.; Labella, Rocco

    2014-01-01

    As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants, particularly high‑capacity plants, while working within budgetary constraints. New safeguards approaches should meet the high‑level verification objectives for such facilities (i.e., timely detection of: diversion of declared material, excess production beyond declared amounts, and production of enrichment levels higher than declared), but should also strive for efficiency advantages in implementation, for both the IAEA and operators. Under the Agency’s State- level approach to safeguards implementation, the Agency needs a flexible toolbox of technologies, allowing tailoring of safeguards measures for each individual enrichment facility. In this paper, the potential roles and development status for three different types of unattended measurement instrumentation are discussed. On‑Line Enrichment Monitors (OLEM) could provide continuous enrichment measurement for 100% of the declared gas flowing through unit header pipes. Unattended Cylinder Verification Stations (UCVS) could provide unattended verification of the declared uranium mass and enrichment of 100% of the cylinders moving through the plant, but also apply and verify an ‘NDA Fingerprint’ to preserve verification knowledge on the contents of each cylinder throughout its life in the facility. Sharing of the operator’s load cell signals from feed and withdrawal stations could count all cylinders introduced to the process and provide periodic monitoring of the uranium mass balance for in‑process material. The integration of load cell, OLEM and UCVS data streams offers the possibility for 100% verification of declared cylinder flow, and enables the periodic verification of the declared 235 U mass balance in the plant. These new capabilities would enhance the IAEA

  20. The present status and development of the state's system of safeguards in Japan

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kurihara, H.; Haginoya, T.; Natsume, H.; Hirata, M.

    1977-01-01

    This paper summarizes developmental activities aiming at improving, the status of the Japan's System of safeguards. The integral tests are described which are now being implemented by the Japanese Government to check the effectiveness of the State's System, which must be maintained by the Government under the Safeguards Agreement between Japan and the IAEA under the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, ratified by Japan in June 1976. A joint experiment has been now implemented by the Nuclear Safety Bureau and the NMCC for knowing and improving the precision and accuracy of analytical measurements used at the bulk-facilities. JAERI, is conducting various R and D work on its own, and through cooperation with NMCC, NSB etc. The authors describe the results of non-destructive γ-spectrometry for the development of isotopic correlation techniques, as well as for the identification, and also refer briefly to measurement methods using the Fast Critical Assembly in JAERI. Measurement methods used in the Pu-fabrication facility of the PNC, and the problem of spent fuels application of safeguards for the reprocessing plant are discussed. The accounting reports coming from Japanese facilities are processed by the computer at the NMCC, and converted into (a) the State's material balance, and (b) the formats to be sent to IAEA. The authors discuss the experience of such data-processing as well as the developmental works for analysing MUF. As a part of the integral test, the experiences concerning planning and performance of inspection are discussed. The present status and future plans of the system of national analytical laboratories are described

  1. Implementation of the CNEN's safeguards laboratory

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Almeida, S.G. de

    1986-01-01

    The International Safeguards Agreements between Brazil and others countries has been concluded with the participation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (AIEA), and involve the Physical Protection and Control of Nuclear Material activities, which set up the National Safeguards System. The Safeguards Laboratory was constructed to the implementation and maintenance of this National Safeguards System, under responsability of CNEN's Safeguards Division, in order to carry out measurements of nuclear materials under safeguards. Technical requirements applied to the construction, setting up and operation of the laboratory are showed. The first results refer to the implementation of safeguards methods and techniques, as well as its participation within international scientific and technical co-operation programs in the safeguards area, through of them we wait its credencement by the AIEA as Regional Safeguards Laboratory for every countries of the Latin America. (Author) [pt

  2. A Safeguardability Check-List for Safeguards by Design

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Sevini, F. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy); Renda, G. [European Commission, DG Energy, Directorate E ' Nuclear Safeguards' , Unit 4 ' Inspections: reactors, storages and others facilities, Luxembourg (Luxembourg); Sidlova, V. [European Commission - Joint Research Centre, Institute for Transuranium Elements, Nuclear Security Unit, Ispra (Italy)

    2011-12-15

    Safeguards by design is a complex step-by-step interactive decision process involving various stake-holders and design choices to be made over a certain period of time. The resulting plant design should be a compromise among economical, safety, security and safeguards implementation constraints. Access to technology and equipment, as well as to the nuclear fuel cycle, determines the basic choices that the designer has to make. Once the boundary conditions for a given facility have been fixed, the designer still faces the challenge of setting several design and operational parameters that will require various trade-offs . Concerning safeguards, these can be seen in three groups, i.e. those related to the general design and its intrinsic proliferation resistance; those related to the specific lay-out and planning; those related to the actual safeguards instrumentation, its effectiveness and efficiency. The paper aims at describing a model for a phased, or 'layered' approach to safeguards-by-design, focusing on the example of off-load reactors.

  3. Automatic image processing as a means of safeguarding nuclear material

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kahnmeyer, W.; Willuhn, K.; Uebel, W.

    1985-01-01

    Problems involved in computerized analysis of pictures taken by automatic film or video cameras in the context of international safeguards implementation are described. They include technical ones as well as the need to establish objective criteria for assessing image information. In the near future automatic image processing systems will be useful in verifying the identity and integrity of IAEA seals. (author)

  4. Overview of safeguards aspects related to MOX fuel

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinonen, O.J.; Murakami, K.; Shea, T.

    2000-01-01

    Recent developments in the light of the IAEA verification requirements for MOX fuel at reactors and bulk handling facilities are discussed. Impact of the Additional Protocol and Integrated Safeguards System is briefly addressed. Agency's work undertaken with regard to the nuclear arms control and reduction is presented. (author)

  5. Progress in heavy ion driven inertial fusion energy: From scaled experiments to the integrated research experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Barnard, J.J.; Ahle, L.E.; Baca, D.; Bangerter, R.O.; Bieniosek, F.M.; Celata, C.M.; Chacon-Golcher, E.; Davidson, R.C.; Faltens, A.; Friedman, A.; Franks, R.M.; Grote, D.P.; Haber, I.; Henestroza, E.; Hoon, M.J.L. de; Kaganovich, I.; Karpenko, V.P.; Kishek, R.A.; Kwan, J.W.; Lee, E.P.; Logan, B.G.; Lund, S.M.; Meier, W.R.; Molvik, A.W.; Olson, C.; Prost, L.R.; Qin, H.; Rose, D.; Sabbi, G.-L.; Sangster, T.C.; Seidl, P.A.; Sharp, W.M.; Shuman, D.; Vay, J.-L.; Waldron, W.L.; Welch, D.; Yu, S.S.

    2001-01-01

    The promise of inertial fusion energy driven by heavy ion beams requires the development of accelerators that produce ion currents (∼100's Amperes/beam) and ion energies (∼1-10 GeV) that have not been achieved simultaneously in any existing accelerator. The high currents imply high generalized perveances, large tune depressions, and high space charge potentials of the beam center relative to the beam pipe. Many of the scientific issues associated with ion beams of high perveance and large tune depression have been addressed over the last two decades on scaled experiments at Lawrence Berkeley and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, the University of Maryland, and elsewhere. The additional requirement of high space charge potential (or equivalently high line charge density) gives rise to effects (particularly the role of electrons in beam transport) which must be understood before proceeding to a large scale accelerator. The first phase of a new series of experiments in Heavy Ion Fusion Virtual National Laboratory (HIF VNL), the High Current Experiments (HCX), is now being constructed at LBNL. The mission of the HCX will be to transport beams with driver line charge density so as to investigate the physics of this regime, including constraints on the maximum radial filling factor of the beam through the pipe. This factor is important for determining both cost and reliability of a driver scale accelerator. The HCX will provide data for design of the next steps in the sequence of experiments leading to an inertial fusion energy power plant. The focus of the program after the HCX will be on integration of all of the manipulations required for a driver. In the near term following HCX, an Integrated Beam Experiment (IBX) of the same general scale as the HCX is envisioned. The step which bridges the gap between the IBX and an engineering test facility for fusion has been designated the Integrated Research Experiment (IRE). The IRE (like the IBX) will provide an

  6. GumTree-An integrated scientific experiment environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lam, Tony; Hauser, Nick; Goetz, Andy; Hathaway, Paul; Franceschini, Fredi; Rayner, Hugh; Zhang, Lidia

    2006-01-01

    GumTree is an open source and multi-platform graphical user interface for performing neutron scattering and X-ray experiments. It handles the complete experiment life cycle from instrument calibration, data acquisition, and real time data analysis to results publication. The aim of the GumTree Project is to create a highly Integrated Scientific Experiment Environment (ISEE), allowing interconnectivity and data sharing between different distributed components such as motors, detectors, user proposal database and data analysis server. GumTree is being adapted to several instrument control server systems such as TANGO, EPICS and SICS, providing an easy-to-use front-end for users and simple-to-extend model for software developers. The design of GumTree is aimed to be reusable and configurable for any scientific instrument. GumTree will be adapted to six neutron beam instruments for the OPAL reactor at ANSTO. Other European institutes including ESRF, ILL and PSI have shown interest in using GumTree as their workbench for instrument control and data analysis

  7. GumTree - An Integrated Scientific Experiment Environment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Lam, Tony; Hauser, Nick; Hathaway, Paul; Franceschini, Fredi; Rayner, Hugh; Zhang, Lidia; Goetz, Andy

    2005-01-01

    Full text: GumTree is an open source and multi-platform graphical user interface for performing neutron scattering and X-ray experiments. It handles the complete experiment life cycle from instrument calibration, data acquisition, and real time data analysis to results publication. The aim of the GumTree Project is to create a highly Integrated Scientific Experiment Environment (ISEE), allowing interconnectivity and data sharing between different distributed components such as motors, detectors, user proposal database and data analysis server. GumTree is being adapted to several instrument control server systems such as TANGO, EPICS and SICS, providing an easy-to-use front-end for users and simple-to-extend model for software developers. The design of GumTree is aimed to be reusable and configurable for any scientific instrument. GumTree will be adapted to six neutron beam instruments for the OPAL reactor at ANSTO. Other European institutes including ESRF, ILL and PSI have shown interest in using GumTree as their workbench for instrument control and data analysis. (authors)

  8. Isotopic safeguards statistics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Timmerman, C.L.; Stewart, K.B.

    1978-06-01

    The methods and results of our statistical analysis of isotopic data using isotopic safeguards techniques are illustrated using example data from the Yankee Rowe reactor. The statistical methods used in this analysis are the paired comparison and the regression analyses. A paired comparison results when a sample from a batch is analyzed by two different laboratories. Paired comparison techniques can be used with regression analysis to detect and identify outlier batches. The second analysis tool, linear regression, involves comparing various regression approaches. These approaches use two basic types of models: the intercept model (y = α + βx) and the initial point model [y - y 0 = β(x - x 0 )]. The intercept model fits strictly the exposure or burnup values of isotopic functions, while the initial point model utilizes the exposure values plus the initial or fabricator's data values in the regression analysis. Two fitting methods are applied to each of these models. These methods are: (1) the usual least squares fitting approach where x is measured without error, and (2) Deming's approach which uses the variance estimates obtained from the paired comparison results and considers x and y are both measured with error. The Yankee Rowe data were first measured by Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS) and remeasured by Nuclear Audit and Testing Company (NATCO). The ratio of Pu/U versus 235 D (in which 235 D is the amount of depleted 235 U expressed in weight percent) using actual numbers is the isotopic function illustrated. Statistical results using the Yankee Rowe data indicates the attractiveness of Deming's regression model over the usual approach by simple comparison of the given regression variances with the random variance from the paired comparison results

  9. Sustainable Development Impacts of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions: An integrated approach to assessment of co-benefits based on experience with the Clean Development Mechanism

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Olsen, Karen Holm

    to assess the SD impacts of NAMAs. This paper argues for a new integrated approach to asses NAMAs' SD impacts that consists of SD indicators, procedures for stakeholder involvement and safeguards against negative impacts. The argument is based on a review of experience with the CDM’s contribution to SD......, particularly how a combined process and results approach known from the CDM SD Tool can be applied to develop a strong approach for SD assessment of NAMAs based on a comparison of similarities and differences between NAMAs and CDM. Five elements of a new approach towards assessment of NAMAs SD impacts...... are suggested based on emerging approaches and methodologies for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of greenhouse gas reductions and SD impacts of NAMAs....

  10. Safeguards technology: present posture and future impact

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Keepin, G.R.

    1976-01-01

    With widespread and growing concern over the issues of nuclear safeguards, international nuclear trade and nuclear weapons proliferation, the full development of the world's nuclear energy potential could well depend on how effectively the strategic nuclear materials that fuel nuclear power are controlled and safeguarded. The broad U.S. program in nuclear safeguards and security is directed toward a balanced safeguards system incorporating the two major components of physical security and materials control. The current posture of modern safeguards technology, its impact on plant operations, and the key role it must play in the implementation of stringent cost-effective safeguards systems in facilities throughout the nuclear fuel cycle are outlined

  11. Evolution of the Nuclear Safeguards Performance Laboratory PERLA on the Ispra Site of the Institute for Transuranium Elements

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Berndt, R.; Abbas, K.; Berthou, V.; De Almeida Carrapico, C.; Forcina, V.; Mayorov, V.; Mortreau, P.; Mosconi, M.; Pedersen, B.; Peerani, P.; Rosas, F.; Tagziria, H.; Tomanin, A.; Rozite, A.; Marin-Ferrer, M.; Crochemore, J.-M.; Roesgen, E.; Janssens, W.A.M.; )

    2015-01-01

    Based upon the experience of many years of operation, the safeguards Performance Laboratory PERLA will be reshaped in the near future (and relocated on the Ispra site such as not to interfere with decommissioning activities). During almost 30 years of successfully operating nuclear facilities in Ispra for supporting nuclear safeguards inspectorates with R&D, equipment development and training for in the meantime more than 1250 trainees, this laboratory is the main work-horse in this field and has functioned very frequently in the last years as easily accessible nuclear laboratory for external users. Even if a constant evolution took place in the last years, and additional facilities like the active neutron laboratory PUNITA or the ITRAP test laboratory for nuclear security R&D, testing and training have been taken in service, this step-change will allow refiguring the laboratory to face also new user expectations. NDA for safeguards continues to be a cornerstone of the measurement capacities complemented by experimental and advanced approaches, such as using active neutron interrogation, automation of measurements, complemented by Monte-Carlo simulations for neutron and gamma radiation. The tendency is also to integrate multiple plant signals (not only NDA measurements) in an overall assessment scheme and we envisage offering training and exercising capabilities for the inspectors also in this direction in the future. This paper will thus provide some insight in the concepts for the future use of the nuclear facilities on the Ispra site, which is complementary to two other contributions to this symposium, i.e., one describing the activities of our sister unit in Karlsruhe on NDA Safeguards Training and another on the new Advanced Safeguards Measurement, Monitoring and Modelling Laboratory (AS3ML) being built currently in Ispra. (author)

  12. Planning of Medium- and Long-Term Strategy for the Safeguards Technology Development

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Shin, Dong Hoon; Ahn, Gil Hoon; Choi, Kwan Gyu

    2009-01-01

    In Rep. of Korea, active safeguards technology development suitable to phase of a nuclear advanced country is necessary because of below reasons. First reasons are '6th ranked position in the nuclear energy generation all over the world', 'continuously increased outcomes in the various nuclear fields such as research or patent', 'strengthened intention of the new government for nuclear industries', and 'weakness of the R and D foundation related to the safeguards technology'. Second reasons are optimization necessity of the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards according to enlargement of the SSAC (State Systems of Accounting for and Control) role. The reason of the enlargement of the SSAC is IAEA IS (Integrated Safeguards) application for Korea. Third reasons are necessity for the systematic national development plan considering the Korea R and D level and the degree of the difficulty of technology. This is to say, there is necessity of the system construction of safeguards technology development connected to the NuTRM(Nuclear Technology Road Map), integrated national nuclear energy promotion plans because of necessity for concentration of the technology level and development abilities which are spread in the industry fields, the academic world and research fields. So, in this study, the foundation of the advanced safeguards technology is provided through determining the priority of the individual technology of National Safeguards, establishing development strategy for the middle or long term of Safeguards technology, based on domestic and foreign status

  13. Preliminary considerations on developing IAEA technical safeguards for LMFBR power systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Persiani, P.J.

    1980-09-01

    Nuclear fuel cycles safeguards should be considered in the dynamic context of a world deployment of various reactor types and varying availability of fuel-cycle services. There will be a close interaction between thermal-reactor cycles and the future deployment of fast breeders. The quantitites of plutonium and the reprocessing, conversion, fabrication, and storage methods of the fuel for the fast breeders will have a significant impact on safeguards techniques. The approach to the fast breeder fuel cycle safeguards follows the general safeguards system approach proposed by the IAEA. Objective of IAEA safeguards is the detection of diversion of nuclear material and deterrence of such diversion. To achieve independent verification of material balance accountancy requires the capability to monitor inventory status and verify material flows and quantities of all nuclear materials subject to safeguards. Containment and surveillance measures are applied to monitor key measurement points, maintain integrity of material balance, and complement material accountancy. The safeguards study attempts to develop a generic reference IAEA Safeguards System and explores various system options using containment/surveillance and material accountancy instrumentation and integrated systems designs

  14. Developing the Next Generation of International Safeguards and Nonproliferation Experts: Highlights of Select Activities at the National Laboratories

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Reed, J; Mathews, C; Kirk, B; Lynch, P; Doyle, J; Meek, E; Pepper, S; Metcalf, R

    2010-03-31

    With many safeguards experts in the United States at or near retirement age, and with the growing and evolving mission of international safeguards, attracting and educating a new generation of safeguards experts is an important element of maintaining a credible and capable international safeguards system. The United States National Laboratories, with their rich experience in addressing the technical and policy challenges of international safeguards, are an important resource for attracting, educating, and training future safeguards experts. This presentation highlights some of the safeguards education and professional development activities underway at the National Laboratories. These include university outreach, summer courses, internships, mid-career transition, knowledge retention, and other projects. The presentation concludes with thoughts on the challenge of interdisciplinary education and the recruitment of individuals with the right balance of skills and backgrounds are recruited to meet tomorrow's needs.

  15. Exploratory study on potential safeguards applications for shared ledger technology

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Frazar, Sarah L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Jarman, Kenneth D. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Joslyn, Cliff A. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Kreyling, Sean J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Sayre, Amanda M. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Schanfein, Mark J. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); West, Curtis L. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Winters, Samuel T. [Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

    2017-02-07

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for providing credible assurance that countries are meeting their obligations not to divert or misuse nuclear materials and facilities for non-peaceful purposes. To this end, the IAEA integrates information about States’ nuclear material inventories and transactions with other types of data to draw its safeguards conclusions. As the amount and variety of data and information has increased, the IAEA’s data acquisition, management, and analysis processes have greatly benefited from advancements in computer science, data management, and cybersecurity during the last 20 years. Despite these advancements, inconsistent use of advanced computer technologies as well as political concerns among certain IAEA Member States centered on trust, transparency, and IAEA authorities limit the overall effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. As a result, there is an ongoing need to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards while improving Member State cooperation and trust in the safeguards system. These chronic safeguards needs could be met with some emerging technologies, specifically those associated with the digital currency bitcoin.

  16. International safeguards data management system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Franklin, M.; Dondi, M.G.

    1981-01-01

    The data base management system ''ISADAM'' (i.e. International Safeguards Data Management System) described in this report is intended to facilitate the safeguards authority in making efficient and effective use of accounting reports. ISADAM has been developed using the ADABAS data base management system and is implemented on the JRC-Ispra computer. The evaluation of safeguards declarations focuses on three main objectives: - the requirement of syntactical consistency with the legal conventions of data recording for safeguards accountancy; - the requirement of accounting evidence that there is no material unaccounted for (MUF); - the requirement of semantic consistency with the technological characteristics of the plant and the processing plans of the operator. Section 2 describes in more detail the facilities which ISADAM makes available to a safeguards inspector. Section 3 describes how the MUF variance computation is derived from models of measurement error propagation. Many features of the ISADAM system are automatically provided by ADABAS. The exceptions to this are the utility software designed to: - screen plant declarations before loading into the data base, - prepare variance summary files designed to support real-time computation of MUF and variance of MUF, - provide analyses in response to user requests in interactive or batch mode. Section 4 describes the structure and functions of this software which have been developed by JRC-Ispra

  17. Future issues in international safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hakkila, E.A.; Markin, J.T.; Mullen, M.F.

    1991-01-01

    The introduction of large bulk-handling facilities into the internationally safeguarded, commercial nuclear fuel cycle, increased concerns for radiation exposure, and the constant level of resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are driving new and innovative approaches to international safeguards. Inspector resources have traditionally been allocated on a facility-type basis. Approaches such as randomization of inspections either within a facility or across facilities in a State or the application of a fuel-cycle approach within a State are being considered as means of conserving resources. Large bulk-handling facilities require frequent material balance closures to meet IAEA timeliness goals. Approaches such as near-real-time accounting, running book inventories, and adjusted running book inventories are considered as means to meet these goals. The automated facilities require that safeguards measures also be automated, leading to more reliance on operator-supplied equipment that must be authenticated by the inspectorate. New Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory States with advanced nuclear programs will further drain IAEA resources. Finally, the role of special inspections in IAEA safeguards may be expanded. This paper discusses these issues in terms of increasing safeguards effectiveness and the possible impact on operators. 14 refs

  18. IAEA safeguards and classified materials

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pilat, J.F.; Eccleston, G.W.; Fearey, B.L.; Nicholas, N.J.; Tape, J.W.; Kratzer, M.

    1997-01-01

    The international community in the post-Cold War period has suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) utilize its expertise in support of the arms control and disarmament process in unprecedented ways. The pledges of the US and Russian presidents to place excess defense materials, some of which are classified, under some type of international inspections raises the prospect of using IAEA safeguards approaches for monitoring classified materials. A traditional safeguards approach, based on nuclear material accountancy, would seem unavoidably to reveal classified information. However, further analysis of the IAEA's safeguards approaches is warranted in order to understand fully the scope and nature of any problems. The issues are complex and difficult, and it is expected that common technical understandings will be essential for their resolution. Accordingly, this paper examines and compares traditional safeguards item accounting of fuel at a nuclear power station (especially spent fuel) with the challenges presented by inspections of classified materials. This analysis is intended to delineate more clearly the problems as well as reveal possible approaches, techniques, and technologies that could allow the adaptation of safeguards to the unprecedented task of inspecting classified materials. It is also hoped that a discussion of these issues can advance ongoing political-technical debates on international inspections of excess classified materials

  19. Assessing and Promoting the Level of Safeguards Culture in Hungarian Nuclear Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Stefanka, Z.; Vincze, A.

    2015-01-01

    The Hungarian SSAC has introduced a comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system consisting of regular comprehensive SSAC verifications in the whole lifetime of the facilities. The main goals of the comprehensive verification system are: (i) to assess the facility's safeguards system compliance with the relevant national legislation and recommendations, (ii) to assess the activities of the facility aimed at maintaining and further developing its safeguards system, and, (iii) to revise validity of data and information previously provided by the facility subject to safeguards licencing procedures. The maintenance level of the system as well as the available knowledge on the possible needs for change reflect the top management's awareness of this issue and is a good indicator of the present and future effectiveness of the facility level safeguards system and the level of safeguards culture. The structure, preparation, conduction, documentation and initial experiences of the comprehensive safeguards verification system is introduced in the paper. Additionally, HAEA has just introduced a safeguards indexing method for evaluation the safeguards culture at Hungarian nuclear facilities. The main goal of indexing method and the evaluated parameters are also shown in the paper. (author)

  20. Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards: Safeguards-by-Design at Enrichment Facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Long, Jon D.; McGinnis, Brent R.; Morgan, James B.; Whitaker, Michael; Lockwood, Dunbar; Shipwash, Jacqueline L.

    2011-01-01

    The Third International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards (NGS3) was hosted by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) in Washington, D.C. on 14-15 December 2010; this meeting focused on the Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) concept. There were approximately 100 participants from 13 countries, comprised of safeguards policy and technical experts from government and industry. Representatives also were present from the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the European Atomic Energy Agency (Euratom), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The primary objective of this meeting was to exchange views and provide recommendations on implementation of the SBD concept for four specific nuclear fuel cycle facility types: gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs), GEN III and GEN IV reactors, aqueous reprocessing plants, and mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities. The general and facility-specific SBD documents generated from the four working groups, which were circulated for comment among working group participants, are intended to provide a substantive contribution to the IAEA's efforts to publish SBD guidance for these specific types of nuclear facilities in the near future. The IAEA has described the SBD concept as an approach in which 'international safeguards are fully integrated into the design process of a new nuclear facility from the initial planning through design, construction, operation, and decommissioning.' As part of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), the DOE is working to establish SBD as a global norm through DOE laboratory studies, international workshops, engagement with industry and the IAEA, and setting an example through its use in new nuclear facilities in the United States. This paper describes the discussion topics and final recommendations of the Enrichment Facilities Working

  1. Development of a data bank system for LWR integral experiment

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Naito, Yoshitaka; Aoyagi, Hideo

    1983-01-01

    A data bank system for LWR integral experiment has been developed for the purpose of alleviating various efforts associated with the verification of computer codes. The final aim of this system is such that the imput data for the code to be verified can be easily obtained, and the results of calculation can be obtained in the form of the comparison with measurement. Geometry and material composition as well as measured data are stored in the data bank. This data bank system is composed of four sub-programs; (1) registration program, (2) information retrieval program, (3) maintenance program, and (4) figure representation program. In this report, the structure of this data bank system and how to use the system are explained. An example of the use of this system is also included. (Aoki, K.)

  2. Dealing with scientific integrity issues: the Spanish experience.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Puigdomènech, Pere

    2014-02-01

    Integrity has been an important matter of concern for the scientific community as it affects the basis of its activities. Most countries having a significant scientific activity have dealt with this problem by different means, including drafting specific legal or soft law regulations and the appointment of stable or ad hoc committees that take care of these questions. This has also been the case in Spain. After the period of transition between dictatorship to a democratic regime, and, particularly, after the entrance in the European Union, scientific activity has increased in the country. As it could be expected, problems of misconduct have appeared and different institutions have been dealing with these matters. One of the best examples is that of Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC), the largest institution devoted to scientific research belonging to the Spanish Government. The experience of the CSIC’s Ethics Committee in dealing with conflicts related to scientific practices is discussed here.

  3. Non-infant adoption from care: lessons for safeguarding children.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Rees, C A; Selwyn, J

    2009-07-01

    To explore use of adoption in remedying abuse and neglect, to inform child protection practice and to identify professional responsibilities to adoptive families. A cohort of 130 children was identified for whom adoption was recommended in 1991-1996 at a mean age of 5.7 years (range 3-11). All were in local authority care for child protection reasons. information was gathered from social work records. The children were traced between 6 and 11 years later and their adopters interviewed. The Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire and the Parent-Child Communication Scale were completed. All but three birth parents had traumatic childhoods involving abuse, neglect and/or time in care. Eighty-six per cent had violent adult relationships. Mental illness, learning difficulties and substance abuse were prominent. Sixty-seven per cent of families were known to social services when children were born, but 98% experienced abuse or neglect. Most adopters found the first year challenging, though rewarding. Depression, anxiety and marital problems were common. Children's learning difficulties, conduct problems, emotional 'phoniness' and rejection affected closeness. At follow-up 28% described rewarding, happy placements, and 62% described continuing difficulties tempered by rewards. However, 10% reported no rewards. Hyperactivity and inattention frequently persisted despite stable adoption and were associated with conduct and attachment difficulties. Use of professional services was substantial. Thirty-eight per cent of children failed to achieve stable adoption. Later entry to care correlated with poorer outcome. This study highlights the importance in safeguarding children of considering the implications of parental childhood experiences, and indicates the risk of delay. The high prevalence of domestic violence in birth families indicates the need for better resources for managing emotional dysregulation. Adoption is a valuable therapeutic tool, but professional

  4. Experience with building integrated solar collectors; Erfaring med bygningsintegrerte solfangere

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Simonsen, Ingeborg; Time, Berit; Andresen, Inger

    2011-07-01

    The main objective of the research 'Zero Emission Buildings' ZEB is to develop products and solutions that provide buildings with zero greenhouse gas emissions associated with the production, operation and disposal. Can we make this happen must the building produce more energy than it needs to compensate for greenhouse gas emissions from the production of materials and the actual construction.To build up knowledge on experience with building integrated solar collectors in Norway, we have in this study made interviews with suppliers and manufacturers of solar collectors and some building owners. Since the focus is on climate shell, we have limited the study to include solar collectors to replace a part of the cladding or roofing. Construction upstairs roofing, outside facade or freestanding rack is not considered as building integrated in this context. The providers we have been in contact with appeals to slightly different parts of the market. This is reflected in the product's development, assembly and approach to the calculation of energy delivery. Overall, providers may offer a range of products suitable for both the professional and skilled carpenter, the interested 'man in the street' . The feedback we have received shows generally good experiences with the product and the installation. Because of the preliminary short operating periods of the investigated plants we have little data on energy supply from these plants. In summary, we can say that the knowledge and the products are available and it is up to use to use them.(Author)

  5. Students' integration of multiple representations in a titration experiment

    Science.gov (United States)

    Kunze, Nicole M.

    A complete understanding of a chemical concept is dependent upon a student's ability to understand the microscopic or particulate nature of the phenomenon and integrate the microscopic, symbolic, and macroscopic representations of the phenomenon. Acid-base chemistry is a general chemistry topic requiring students to understand the topics of chemical reactions, solutions, and equilibrium presented earlier in the course. In this study, twenty-five student volunteers from a second semester general chemistry course completed two interviews. The first interview was completed prior to any classroom instruction on acids and bases. The second interview took place after classroom instruction, a prelab activity consisting of a titration calculation worksheet, a titration computer simulation, or a microscopic level animation of a titration, and two microcomputer-based laboratory (MBL) titration experiments. During the interviews, participants were asked to define and describe acid-base concepts and in the second interview they also drew the microscopic representations of four stages in an acid-base titration. An analysis of the data showed that participants had integrated the three representations of an acid-base titration to varying degrees. While some participants showed complete understanding of acids, bases, titrations, and solution chemistry, other participants showed several alternative conceptions concerning strong acid and base dissociation, the formation of titration products, and the dissociation of soluble salts. Before instruction, participants' definitions of acid, base, and pH were brief and consisted of descriptive terms. After instruction, the definitions were more scientific and reflected the definitions presented during classroom instruction.

  6. Saudi Aramco experience towards establishing Pipelines Integrity Management Systems (PIMS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    AlAhmari, Saad A. [Saudi Aramco, Dhahran (Saudi Arabia)

    2009-12-19

    Saudi Aramco pipelines network transports hydrocarbons to export terminals, processing plants and domestic users. This network faced several safety and operational-related challenges that require having a more effective Pipelines Integrity Management System (PIMS). Therefore Saudi Aramco decided to develop its PIMS on the basis of geographical information system (GIS) support through different phases, i.e., establishing the integrity management framework, risk calculation approach, conducting a gap analysis toward the envisioned PIMS, establishing the required scope of work, screening the PIMS applications market, and selecting suitable tools that satisfy expected deliverables, and implement PIMS applications. Saudi Aramco expects great benefits from implementing PIMS, e.g., enhancing safety, enhancing pipeline network robustness, optimizing inspection and maintenance expenditures, and facilitating pipeline management and the decision-making process. Saudi Aramco's new experience in adopting PIMS includes many challenges and lessons-learned associated with all of the PIMS development phases. These challenges include performing the gap analysis, conducting QA/QC sensitivity analysis for the acquired data, establishing the scope of work, selecting the appropriate applications and implementing PIMS. (author)

  7. Saudi Aramco experience towards establishing Pipelines Integrity Management System (PIMS)

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Al-Ahmari, Saad A. [Saudi Aramco, Dhahran (Saudi Arabia)

    2009-07-01

    Saudi Aramco pipelines network transports hydrocarbons to export terminals, processing plants and domestic users. This network faced several safety and operational-related challenges that require having a more effective Pipelines Integrity Management System (PIMS). Therefore Saudi Aramco decided to develop its PIMS on the basis of geographical information system (GIS) support through different phases, i.e., establishing the integrity management framework, risk calculation approach, conducting a gap analysis toward the envisioned PIMS, establishing the required scope of work, screening the PIMS applications market, and selecting suitable tools that satisfy expected deliverables, and implement PIMS applications. Saudi Aramco expects great benefits from implementing PIMS, e.g., enhancing safety, enhancing pipeline network robustness, optimizing inspection and maintenance expenditures, and facilitating pipeline management and the decision-making process. Saudi Aramco's new experience in adopting PIMS includes many challenges and lessons-learned associated with all of the PIMS development phases. These challenges include performing the gap analysis, conducting QA/QC sensitivity analysis for the acquired data, establishing the scope of work, selecting the appropriate applications and implementing PIMS. (author)

  8. Nurse practitioner integration: Qualitative experiences of the change management process.

    Science.gov (United States)

    Lowe, Grainne; Plummer, Virginia; Boyd, Leanne

    2018-04-30

    The aim of this qualitative research was to explore perceptions of organisational change related to the integration of nurse practitioners from key nursing stakeholders. The ongoing delivery of effective and efficient patient services is reliant upon the development and sustainability of nurse practitioner roles. Examination of the factors contributing to the underutilization of nurse practitioner roles is crucial to inform future management policies. A change management theory is used to reveal the complexity involved. Qualitative interviews were undertaken using a purposive sampling strategy of key stakeholders. Thematic analysis was undertaken and key themes were correlated to the theoretical framework. The results confirm the benefits of nurse practitioner roles, but suggest organisational structures and embedded professional cultures present barriers to full role optimization. Complicated policy processes are creating barriers to the integration of nurse practitioner roles. The findings increase understanding of the links between strategic planning, human resource management, professional and organisational cultures, governance and politics in change management. Effective leadership drives the change process through the ability to align key components necessary for success. Sustainability of nurse practitioners relies on recognition of their full potential in the health care team. The results of this study highlight the importance of management and leadership in the promotion of advanced nursing skills and experience to better meet patient outcomes. The findings reinforce the potential of nurse practitioners to deliver patient centred, timely and efficient health care. © 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

  9. From Differentiation to Concretisation: Integrative Experiments in Sustainable Architecture

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Graham Farmer

    2017-12-01

    Full Text Available It is widely recognised that the achievement of a sustainable built environment requires holistic design practices and approaches that are capable of balancing the varied, and often conflicting, demands of environmental, social and economic concerns. However, academics and practitioners have recently highlighted, and expressed concerns about the knowledge gap that currently exists within environmental policy, research and practice between understandings of the technical performance of buildings and their social meaning and relevance. This paper acknowledges these concerns and is developed from the author’s own direct experiences of practice-led research and active participation in design-build projects. It argues for a theoretically-informed and socially-engaged approach to built environment research, pedagogy and practice that seeks to encourage an integrative understanding of the design, realisation and use of sustainable architecture. The paper draws on the Philosophy of Technology and in particular the work of Andrew Feenberg to analyse the buildings and to propose an integrated and inclusive framework for understanding sustainable design that acknowledges not just what the built environment does, but also what it means. It also suggests that what a building means also informs what it can do, and for whom. Although the technical and social dimensions of design can be interpreted as distinct practices and are often institutionally separated, this paper argues that the realisation of sustainable design must seek a conscious interaction and interchange between these two differentiated dimensions.

  10. Implementation of remove monitoring in facilities under safeguards with unattended systems

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Beddingfield, David H.; Nordquist, Heather A.; Umebayaashi, Eiji

    2009-01-01

    Remote monitoring is being applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at nuclear facilities around the world. At the Monju Reactor in Japan we have designed, developed and implemented a remote monitoring approach that can serve as a model for applying remote monitoring to facilities that are already under full-scope safeguards using unattended instrumentation. Remote monitoring implementations have historically relied upon the use of specialized data collection hardware and system design features that integrate remote monitoring into the safeguards data collection system. The integration of remote monitoring and unattended data collection increases the complexity of safeguards data collection systems. This increase in complexity necessarily produces a corresponding reduction of system reliability compared to less-complex unattended monitoring systems. At the Monju facility we have implemented a remote monitoring system that is decoupled from the activity of safeguards data collection. In the completed system the function of remote data transfer is separated from the function of safeguards data collection. As such, a failure of the remote monitoring function cannot produce an associated loss of safeguards data, as is possible with integrated remote-monitoring implementations. Currently, all safeguards data from this facility is available to the IAEA on a 24/7 basis. This facility employs five radiation-based unattended systems, video surveillance and numerous optical seal systems. The implementation of remote monitoring at this facility, while increasing the complexity of the safeguards system, is designed to avoid any corresponding reduction in reliability of the safeguards data collection systems by having decoupled these functions. This design and implementation can serve as a model for implementation of remote monitoring at nuclear facilities that currently employ unattended safeguards systems.

  11. Containment and surveillance - A principal IAEA safeguards measure

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drayer, D.D.; Dupree, S.A.; Sonnier, C.S.

    1997-01-01

    The growth of the safeguards inspectorate of the Agency, spanning more than 40 years, has produced a variety of interesting subjects (legal, technical, political, etc.) for recollection, discussion, and study. Although the Agency was established in 1957, the first practical inspections did not occur until the early 1960s. In the early inspections, thee was little C/S equipment available, and no optical surveillance was used. However, by the third decade of the IAEA, the 1980s, many technology advances were made, and the level of C/S equipment activities increased. By the late 1980s, some 200 Twin Minolta film camera systems were deployed by the Agency for safeguards use. At the present time, the Agency is evaluating and beginning to implement remote monitoring as part of the Strengthened Safeguards System. However, adoption of remote monitoring by international agencies cannot occur rapidly because of the many technical and policy issues associated with this activity. A glimpse into the future indicates that an important element of safeguards instrumentation will be the merging of C/S and NDA equipment into integrated systems. The use of modern interior area monitors in International Safeguards also offers a great potential for advancing C/S measures. The research in microsensors is in its infancy, and the opportunities for their reducing the cost, increasing the life time, and increasing the reliability of sensors for safeguards applications are manifold. A period may be approaching in which the terminology of C/S will no longer have its original meaning, as integrated systems combining NDA instruments and C/S instruments are already in use and are expected to be the norm in the near future

  12. Potential development of non-destructive assay for nuclear safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Benoit, R.; Cuypers, M.; Guardini, S.

    1983-01-01

    After a brief summary on the role of non-destructive assay in safeguarding the nuclear fuel cycle, its evolution from NDA methods development to other areas is illustrated. These areas are essentially: a) the evaluation of the performances of NDA techniques in field conditions; b) introduction of full automation of measurement instrument operation, using interactive microprocessors and of measurement data handling evaluation and retrieval features; c) introduction of the adequate link and compatibility to assure NDA measurement data transfer in an integrated safeguards data evaluation scheme. In this field, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) is developing and implementing a number of techniques and methodologies allowing an integrated and rational treatment of the large amount of safeguards data produced. In particular for the non-destructive assay measurements and techniques, the JRC has studied and tested methodologies for the automatic generation and validation of data of inventory verification. In order to apply these techniques successfully in field, the JRC has studied the design requirements of NDA data management and evaluation systems. This paper also discusses the functional requirements of an integrated system for NDA safeguards data evaluation

  13. Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1991-07-01

    The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Because of public interest, the Miscellaneous category includes a few events which involve either source material, byproduct material, or natural uranium which are exempt from safeguards requirements. Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, tampering/vandalism, arson, firearms, radiological sabotage, nonradiological sabotage, pre-1990 alcohol and drugs (involving reactor operators, security force members, or management persons), and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

  14. Optimizing the IAEA safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Drobysz, Sonia; Sitt, Bernard

    2011-09-01

    During the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, States parties recognized that the Additional Protocol (AP) provides increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole. They agreed in action 28 of the final document to encourage 'all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an AP as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force'. Today, 109 out of 189 States parties to the NPT have brought an AP in force. The remaining outliers have not yet done so for three types of reasons: they do not clearly understand what the AP entails; when they do, they refuse to accept new non-proliferation obligations either on the ground of lack of progress in the realm of disarmament, or simply because they are not ready to bear the burden of additional safeguards measures. Strong incentives are thus needed in order to facilitate universalization of the AP. While external incentives would help make the AP a de facto norm and encourage its conclusion by reducing the deplored imbalanced implementation of non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, internal incentives developed by the Agency and its member States can also play an important role. In this respect, NPT States parties recommended in action 32 of the Review Conference final document 'that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented'. The safeguards system should therefore be optimized: the most effective use of safeguards measures as well as safeguards human, financial and technical resources would indeed help enhance the acceptability and even attractiveness of the AP. Optimization can be attractive for States committed to a stronger verification regime independently from other claims, but still

  15. 1. Introduction. 2. Laboratory experiments. 3. Field experiments. 4. Integrated field-laboratory experiments. 5. Panel recommendations

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Anon.

    1975-01-01

    Some recommendations for the design of laboratory and field studies in marine radioecology are formulated. The difficulties concerning the comparability of various experimental methods used to measure the fluxes of radionuclides through marine organisms and ecosystems, and also the use of laboratory results to make predictions for the natural environment are discussed. Three working groups were established during the panel meeting, to consider laboratory experiments, field studies, and the design and execution of integrated laboratory and field studies respectively. A number of supporting papers dealing with marine radioecological experiments were presented

  16. IAEA safeguards: some pros and cons

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Kelly, P.

    1986-01-01

    The author gives a personal view of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards. The IAEA safeguards system is described (including containment, surveillance and inspection), and the limitations and strengths of the system are examined. (U.K.)

  17. International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    St. Pierre, D.E.; Steinmaus, K.L.; Moon, B.D.

    1994-07-01

    DOE is committed to providing technologies to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet escalating monitoring and inspection requirements associated with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). One example of technology provided to the IAEA is the information management and remote monitoring capabilities being customized for the IAEA by the International Safeguards Division of the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security. The ongoing Safeguards Information Management Systems (SIMS) program is an interlaboratory effort providing the IAEA with a range of information management capabilities designed to enhance the effectiveness of their nuclear inspection activities. The initial commitment involved the customization of computer capabilities to provide IAEA with the basic capability to geographically organize, store, and retrieve the large quantity of information involved in their nuclear on site inspection activities in Iraq. This initial system, the International Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Support Tool (INSIST), was developed by DOE's Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL). To date, two INSIST workstations have been deployed at the IAEA. The first has been used to support the IAEA Action Team in the inspection of Iraqi nuclear facilities since August 1993. A second, and similar, workstation has been deployed to support environmental monitoring under the IAEA 93+2 Programme. Both INSIST workstations geographically integrate analog (video) and digital data to provide an easy to use and effective tool for storing retrieving and displaying multimedia site and facility information including world-wide maps, satellite and aerial imagery, on site photography, live inspection videos, and treaty and inspection textual information. The interactive, UNIX-based workstations have a variety of peripheral devices for information input and output. INSIST software includes commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) modules and application-specific code developed at PNL

  18. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D.

    2013-01-01

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers

  19. Safeguards and security modeling for electrochemical plants

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Cipiti, B.B.; Duran, F.A.; Mendoza, L.A.; Parks, M.J.; Dominguez, D.; Le, T.D. [Sandia National Laboratories, PO Box 5800 MS 0747, Albuquerque, NM 87185 (United States)

    2013-07-01

    Safeguards and security design for reprocessing plants can lead to excessive costs if not incorporated early in the design process. The design for electrochemical plants is somewhat uncertain since these plants have not been built at a commercial scale in the past. The Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM), developed at Sandia National Laboratories, has been used for safeguards design and evaluation for multiple reprocessing plant types. The SSPM includes the following capabilities: -) spent fuel source term library, -) mass tracking of elements 1-99 and bulk solid/liquids, -) tracking of heat load and activity, -) customisable measurement points, -) automated calculation of ID and error propagation, -) alarm conditions and statistical tests, and -) user-defined diversion scenarios. Materials accountancy and process monitoring data can provide more timely detection of material loss specifically to protect against the insider threat. While the SSPM is capable of determining detection probabilities and examining detection times for material loss scenarios, it does not model the operations or spatial effects for a plant design. The STAGE software was chosen to model the physical protection system. STAGE provides a framework to create end-to-end scalable force-on-force combat simulations. It allows for a complete 3D model of a facility to be designed along with the design of physical protection elements. This software, then, can be used to model operations and response for various material loss scenarios. The future integration of the SSPM model data with the STAGE software will provide a more complete analysis of diversion scenarios to assist plant designers.

  20. Commercial-off-the-shelf digital surveillance systems for safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Neufing, C.; Tschritter, C.; Meylemans, P.; Vandaele, R.; Heppleston, M.; Chare, P.; Kloeckner, W.

    2001-01-01

    The reasons why safeguards authorities are from time to time looking for Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (C.O.T.S.) equipment for safeguards purposes are for the following reasons: Equipment that is designed from scratch to satisfy specific safeguards requirements is very likely to go through a period of teething problems. If these problems are only discovered once the equipment is deployed for routine use, this will be accompanied with large overhead costs for the safeguards authorities to maintain and repair such equipment. The overhead costs are much higher if unattended equipment is concerned that is permanently installed on-site. In that case an extra mission has to be organised to return the faulty equipment to our headquarters before it can be repaired. Using C.O.T.S. equipment that is also used by others reduces the risk of teething problems. At least the burden of going through such kind of problem period is shared with other customers of the concerned equipment. It is clear that safeguards is not a big market on its own. The non-negligible cost of the development of equipment that only fits safeguards requirements will therefore have to be recovered on the expected sales. If the market is small, if the expected number of units that can be sold is small, a large part of the unit cost will depend on the initial development costs. Going for C.O.T.S. equipment that is also sold in other markets, would in that respect lower the equipment cost. That not any safeguards equipment can be obtained commercially off the shelf is clear, but in certain domains like digital surveillance, the functionality of C.O.T.S. equipment has been approaching the one needed for safeguards. That is why in 1998 the Euratom Safeguards Office published an open call for tender for the purchase of a digital surveillance system that is able to support up to 64 colour camera channels. In response to a successful bid for this call for tender a contract for the delivery of 3 prototype systems and 6

  1. Safeguards Implementation Guide for States with Small Quantities Protocols

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    2013-01-01

    The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy for peace and prosperity around the world, while helping to ensure that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental independent verification role, providing credible assurances that States' safeguards commitments are being respected. Most of the world's non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) have concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The IAEA and States are required to cooperate in the implementation of such agreements. Effective cooperation demonstrates a State's commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and furthers the State's national interests by reducing the risk of unauthorized use of nuclear material. Over 100 NNWSs party to the NPT have very limited quantities of nuclear material and have concluded protocols to their CSAs which hold in abeyance many procedures in Part II of a CSA. These protocols are referred to as 'small quantities protocols' or 'SQPs' and remain in effect as long as the State meets certain eligibility criteria. The purpose of an SQP is to reduce the burden of safeguards implementation for States with little or no nuclear activities, while retaining the integrity of the safeguards system. States with SQPs have very important obligations they must fulfil under their CSAs. In 1997, as part of the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system, the Model Additional Protocol to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards was developed to provide the IAEA with broader access to information and locations, thus significantly increasing the IAEA's ability to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in States. Many States with SQPs have

  2. International safeguards and nuclear terrorism

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Moglewer, S.

    1987-01-01

    This report provides a critical review of the effectiveness of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards against potential acts of nuclear terrorism. The author argues that IAEA safeguards should be made applicable to deterring diversions of nuclear materials from civil to weapons purposes by subnational groups as well as by nations. Both technical and institutional factors are considered, and suggestions for organizational restructuring and further technical development are made. Awareness of the necessity for effective preventive measures is emphasized, and possible directions for further effort are suggested

  3. Safeguards agreements - Their legal and conceptual basis

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Sanders, B.; Rainer, R.H.

    1977-01-01

    The application of Agency safeguards requires treaty arrangements (Safeguards Agreements) between the State or States concerned and the Agency. The authority for the Agency to conclude such agreements and to implement them is provided for in the Agency's Statute. On the basis of the statutory provisions safeguards principles and procedures have been elaborated. These have been laid down in: The Agency's Safeguards System 1965, extended in 1966 and 1968; and the basis for negotiating safeguards agreements with NNWS pursuant to NPT. The verification of the undertaking by the State concerned not to use items subject to safeguards for purposes contrary to the terms of the agreement is ensured through the application of various safeguards measures. Containment and surveillance measures are expected to play an increasingly important role. One of the specific features of NPT Safeguards Agreements is the establishment of national systems of accounting and control of nuclear material. The majority of the agreements concluded under the non-NPT safeguards agreements implement obligations undertaken under co-operation agreements between States for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These agreements naturally reflect approaches adopted by the parties, in particular regarding the circumstances under which safeguards should be applied. Thus, the concepts used in the non-NPT safeguards agreements and the Safeguards System document, which is incorporated in these agreements by reference, are in continuous evolution. The Agency's Safeguards System document (INFCIRC/66/Rev.2) continues to be supplemented in practical application and through explicit decision by the Board. The non-NPT safeguards agreements contain, besides technical safeguards provisions from this document, and further provision for notification, inventories and financial matters, legal and political provisions such as sanctions in the case of non-compliance, and privileges and immunities. The paper discusses the

  4. Understanding national and international safeguards: an evolutionary process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Higinbotham, W.A.

    1983-01-01

    Domestic and international safeguards have been evolving and will continue to evolve. in the case of the United States, the concern was to protect the classified materials, at first. Then attention focussed on material accounting, then on measures to promptly detect theft by individuals with access, and later on physical protection to ward-off armed terrorists. The objective of the IAEA has always been to provide assurance that nuclear materials are not being diverted from the peaceful facilities that are under safeguards. The evolution has taken place in deciding how to provide this assurance, and in the definition of specific safeguards goals. In both cases the technology needed to meet the goals has improved due to R and D and to experience. A plea is made for more cooperation betwen those who develop and manage the policies, those who develop safeguards techniques, and those who are subject to national and IAEA safeguards. Some illustrations of the evolution of policies, inadequate coordination and general progress are given

  5. Safeguard Verification as Cooperative Measure for Non Proliferation Control in Peru

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ramirez, R.

    2010-01-01

    Peru applies the safeguard measures on its nuclear activities based in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguard Agreement and the Additional Protocol which has been fully implemented becoming part of the Integrated Safeguard since 2005. In addition to international safeguard commitments Peru is also committed with the United Nations 1540 Resolution by which national controls has to be established for preventing the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their vector systems. The safeguards measures have become an important part of the verification activities related to this Resolution by analyzing of materials and equipment to be imported or that may be in transit across the country. These activities are part of those developed jointly with other governmental organizations. (author)

  6. Multi-Disciplinary Research Experiences Integrated with Industry –Field Experiences

    Directory of Open Access Journals (Sweden)

    Suzanne Lunsford

    2015-10-01

    Full Text Available The purpose of this environmentally inquiry-based lab was to allow the students to engage into real-world concepts that integrate industry setting (Ohio Aggregate Industrial Mineral Association with the academia setting. Our students are engaged into a field trip where mining occurs to start the problem based learning of how the heavy metals leak in the mining process. These heavy metals such as lead and indium in the groundwater are a serious concern for the environment (Environmental Protection Agency from the mining process. The field experiences at the mining process assist in building our students interest in developing sensors to detect heavy metals of concern such as lead and indium simultaneously by a unique electrochemistry technique called Square Wave Anodic Stripping Voltammetry (SWASV. The field experience assists building the students interest in real –world application and what qualities do they want the electrochemical sensor to possess to be successful for real world usage. During the field trip the students are engaged into learning novel instrumentation such as an SEM (Scanning Electron Microscope to study the working electrode sensor developed to understand the sensor surface morphology properties better as well. The integration of industry setting with academia has been a positive experience for our students that has allowed their understanding of real-world science research needs to succeed in an industrial setting of research.

  7. The International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Wagner, W.

    2000-01-01

    A system of international safeguards has been established to provide assurance that nuclear materials in civilian use are not diverted from their peaceful purpose. The safeguards system is administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency/Department of Safeguards and devolves from treaties and other international agreements. Inspectors from the Agency verify reports from States about nuclear facilities by audits, observation, and measurements. (author)

  8. Safeguards planning in a plant design process

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Heinrich, L.A.

    1977-01-01

    The safeguards efforts for the partitioning fuel cycle are considered. Included in the discussion are the organization of the safeguards study, the development of safeguards criteria, the expression of these criteria as requirements for facility design, and some preliminary details of the implementation of these requirements in facility and process layout

  9. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control

  10. International training course on nuclear materials accountability for safeguards purposes

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    1980-12-01

    The two volumes of this report incorporate all lectures and presentations at the International Training Course on Nuclear Materials Accountability and Control for Safeguards Purposes, held May 27-June 6, 1980, at the Bishop's Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico. The course, authorized by the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and sponsored by the US Department of Energy in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, was developed to provide practical training in the design, implementation, and operation of a National system of nuclear materials accountability and control that satisfies both National and IAEA International safeguards objectives. Volume I, covering the first week of the course, presents the background, requirements, and general features of material accounting and control in modern safeguard systems. Volume II, covering the second week of the course, provides more detailed information on measurement methods and instruments, practical experience at power reactor and research reactor facilities, and examples of operating state systems of accountability and control.

  11. A model to improve efficiency and effectiveness of safeguards measures

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    D'Amato, Eduardo; Llacer, Carlos; Vicens, Hugo

    2001-01-01

    Full text: The main purpose of our current studies is to analyse the measures to be adopted tending to integrate the traditional safeguard measures to the ones stated in the Additional Protocol (AP). A simplified nuclear fuel cycle model is considered to draw some conclusions on the application of integrated safeguard measures. This paper includes a briefing, describing the historical review that gave birth to the A.P. and proposes a model to help the control bodies in the making decision process. In May 1997, the Board of Governors approved the Model Additional Protocol (MAP) which aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguard measures. For States under a comprehensive safeguard agreement the measures adopted provide credible assurance on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. In September 1999, the governments of Argentina and Brazil formally announced in the Board of Governors that both countries would start preliminary consultations on one adapted MAP applied to the Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (Quatripartite Agreement/INFCIRC 435). In December 1999, a first draft of the above mentioned document was provided as a starting point of discussion. During the year 2000 some modifications to the original draft took place. These were the initial steps in the process aiming at reaching the adequate conditions to adhere to the A.P. in each country in a future Having in mind the future AP implementation, the safeguards officers of the Regulatory Body of Argentina (ARN) began to think about the future simultaneous application of the two types of safeguards measures, the traditional and the non traditional ones, what should converge in an integrated system. By traditional safeguards it is understood quantitative

  12. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Safeguards Applications

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Ludewigt, Bernhard A; Quiter, Brian J; Ambers, Scott D

    2011-02-04

    In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of {gamma} rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. The promise of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique (NDA) in safeguards applications lies in its potential to directly quantify a specific isotope in an assay target without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as often required by other NDA methods. The use of NRF for detection of sensitive nuclear materials and other contraband has been researched in the past. In the safeguards applications considered here one has to go beyond mere detection and precisely quantify the isotopic content, a challenge that is discussed throughout this report. Basic NRF measurement methods, instrumentation, and the analytical calculation of NRF signal strengths are described in Section 2. Well understood modeling and simulation tools are needed for assessing the potential of NRF for safeguards and for designing measurement systems. All our simulations were performed with the radiation transport code MCNPX, a code that is widely used in the safeguards community. Our initial studies showed that MCNPX grossly underestimated the elastically scattered background at backwards angles due to an incorrect treatment of Rayleigh scattering. While new, corrected calculations based on ENDF form factors showed much better agreement with experimental data for the elastic scattering of photons on an uranium target, the elastic backscatter is still not rigorously treated. Photonuclear scattering processes (nuclear Thomson, Delbruck and Giant Dipole Resonance scattering), which are expected to play an important role at higher energies, are not yet included. These missing elastic scattering contributions were studied and their importance evaluated evaluated against data found in the literature as discussed in Section 3. A transmission experiment

  13. The 50 Years of Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in Poland

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Pawlak, A.; Jurkowski, M.; Zagrajek, M.

    2015-01-01

    Milestones of safeguards and non-proliferation activities are presented. Poland has declared its compliance with non-proliferation regime by ratification of Treaty of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1969. Poland concluded in 1972 Agreement with IAEA for application of safeguards — INFCIRC/153. Next steps in implementation of international safeguards were: ratification of Additional Protocol and introduction of Integrated Safeguards. After accession to European Union, Poland fulfils its safeguards obligations according to following international legal instruments: Treaty establishing Euratom, Agreement between Poland, European Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency in connection with implementation of Article III of Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — INFCIRC/193 and Additional Protocol to this Agreement — INFCIRC/193 Add.8. Detailed safeguards requirements are established by domestic Act of Parliament of 29th November 2000 — Atomic law and European Union's Regulations of Commission (Euratom) No 302/2005 on application of Euratom safeguards and the Commission Recommendation on guidelines for the application of Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005. SSAC was established in 1972 as required by CSA. Activities related to accounting for and control of nuclear material were conducted from 1970s till 1990s by Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection and National Inspectorate for Radiation and Nuclear Safety. Currently, NAEA is responsible for collecting and maintenance of accounting data and safeguards inspections at all MBAs. Around 30 routine inspections/year are performed by the NAEA, Euratom and IAEA. In addition, usually 2 unannounced inspections/year under framework of Integrated Safeguards are conducted. In accordance with implementation of Global Threat Reduction Initiative seven shipments of high enriched nuclear fuel from research reactor to Russian Federation under supervision of safeguards inspectors from NAEA

  14. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W. [comp.

    1997-03-01

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years.

  15. Safeguards and security research and development: Progress report, October 1994--September 1995

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rutherford, D.R.; Henriksen, P.W.

    1997-03-01

    The primary goal of the Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development Program, International Safeguards, and other Safeguards and Security Programs is to continue to be the center of excellence in the field of Safeguards and Security. This annual report for 1995 describes those scientific and engineering projects that contribute to all of the aforementioned programs. The authors have presented the information in a different format from previous annual reports. Part I is devoted to Nuclear Material Measurement Systems. Part II contains projects that are specific to Integrated Safeguards Systems. Part III highlights Safeguards Systems Effectiveness Evaluations and Part IV is a compilation of highlights from Information Assurance projects. Finally Part V highlights work on the projects at Los Alamos for International Safeguards. The final part of this annual report lists titles and abstracts of Los Alamos Safeguards and Security Technology Development reports, technical journal articles, and conference papers that were presented and published in 1995. This is the last annual report in this format. The authors wish to thank all of the individuals who have contributed to this annual report and made it so successful over the years

  16. Transit Matching for International Safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Gilligan, K.; Whitaker, M.; Oakberg, J.

    2015-01-01

    In 2013 the U.S. Department of Energy / National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Non-proliferation and International Security (NIS) supported a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) processes and procedures for ensuring that shipments of nuclear material correspond to (match) their receipts (i.e., transit matching). Under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, Member States are obliged to declare such information within certain time frames. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily declare such information under INFCIRC/207. This study was funded by the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Concepts and Approaches program. Oak Ridge National Laboratory led the research, which included collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS), and the IAEA Section for Declared Information Analysis within the Department of Safeguards. The project studied the current transit matching methodologies, identified current challenges (e.g., level of effort and timeliness), and suggested improvements. This paper presents the recommendations that resulted from the study and discussions with IAEA staff. In particular, it includes a recommendation to collaboratively develop a set of best reporting practices for nuclear weapons states under INFCIRC/207. (author)

  17. Safeguards against Takeover after Volkswagen

    DEFF Research Database (Denmark)

    Werlauff, Erik

    2009-01-01

    The article analyses the significance of the European Court's decision on the effects of the rules on the free movement of capital on the takeover safeguards in Volkswagen AG for restrictions on the right to vote, ownership ceilings, division into A and B share classes, increased majority require...

  18. Safeguards Envelope Progress FY08

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Robert Bean; Richard Metcalf; Aaron Bevill

    2008-09-01

    The Safeguards Envelope Project met its milestones by creating a rudimentary safeguards envelope, proving the value of the approach on a small scale, and determining the most appropriate path forward. The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant’s large cache of reprocessing process monitoring data, dubbed UBER Data, was recovered and used in the analysis. A probabilistic Z test was used on a Markov Monte Carlo simulation of expected diversion data when compared with normal operating data. The data regarding a fully transient event in a tank was used to create a simple requirement, representative of a safeguards envelope, whose impact was a decrease in operating efficiency by 1.3% but an increase in material balance period of 26%. This approach is operator, state, and international safeguards friendly and should be applied to future reprocessing plants. Future requirements include tank-to-tank correlations in reprocessing facilities, detailed operations impact studies, simulation inclusion, automated optimization, advanced statistics analysis, and multi-attribute utility analysis.

  19. The future for safeguards technology

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Zykov, S.

    2013-01-01

    The present paper presents some elements of an emerging vision of a new and updated potential role for safeguard instrumentation in the overall process of deterring the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The paper focusses on installed, transportable and portable measurement systems and in-situ techniques for maintaining continuity of knowledge. The paper is followed by the slides of the presentation

  20. Enrichment plant management and safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hurt, N.H.

    1978-01-01

    The next increment of enrichment at Portsmouth will be gas centrifuge. The safeguards program at Portsmouth is discussed, including the DYMCAS system, the computerization, and the detectors. Control of the material access areas is discussed. The licensee material surveillance and verification program is also described

  1. MACSSA (Macintosh Safeguards Systems Analyzer)

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Argentesi, F.; Costantini, L.; Kohl, M.

    1986-01-01

    This paper discusses MACSSA a fully interactive menu-driven software system for accountancy of nuclear safeguards systems written for Apple Macintosh. Plant inventory and inventory change records can be entered interactively or can be downloaded from a mainframe database. Measurement procedures and instrument parameters can be defined. Partial or total statistics on propagated errors is performed and shown in tabular or graphic form

  2. Safeguards Technology Strategic Planning Pentachart

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Carroll, C. J.

    2017-01-01

    Builds on earlier strategic planning workshops conducted for SGIT, SGTS, and SGCP. Many of recommendations from these workshops have been successfully implemented at the IAEA. Provide a context for evaluating new approaches for anticipated safeguards challenges of the future. Approach used by government and military to plan for an uncertain future. Uses consensus decision-making.

  3. A collaborative environment for information driven safeguards

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Scott, Mark R.; Michel, Kelly D.

    2010-01-01

    For two decades, the IAEA has recognized the need for a comprehensive and strongly integrated Knowledge Management system to support its Information Driven Safeguards activities. In the past, plans for the development of such a system have progressed slowly due to concerns over costs and feasibility. In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed a knowledge management system that could serve as the basis for an IAEA Collaborative Environment (ICE). The ICE derivative knowledge management system described in this paper addresses the challenge of living in an era of information overload coupled with certain knowledge shortfalls. The paper describes and defines a system that is flexible, yet ensures coordinated and focused collaboration, broad data evaluation capabilities, architected and organized work flows, and improved communications. The paper and demonstration of ICE will utilize a hypothetical scenario to highlight the functional features that facilitate collaboration amongst and between information analysts and inspectors. The scenario will place these two groups into a simulated planning exercise for a safeguards inspection drawing upon past data acquisitions, inspection reports, analyst conclusions, and a coordinated walk-through of a 3-D model of the facility. Subsequent to the conduct of the simulated facility inspection, the detection of an anomaly and pursuit of follow up activities will illustrate the event notification, information sharing, and collaborative capabilities of the system. The use of a collaborative environment such as ICE to fulfill the complicated knowledge management demands of the Agency and facilitate the completion of annual State Evaluation Reports will also be addressed.

  4. Researchers' experiences, positive and negative, in integrative landscape projects

    NARCIS (Netherlands)

    Tress, B.; Tress, G.; Fry, G.

    2005-01-01

    Integrative (interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary) landscape research projects are becoming increasingly common. As a result, researchers are spending a larger proportion of their professional careers doing integrative work, participating in shifting interdisciplinary teams, and cooperating

  5. Nuclear data and integral experiments in reactor physics

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Farinelli, U.

    1980-01-01

    The material given here broadly covers the content of the 10 lectures delivered at the Winter Course on Reactor Theory and Power Reactors, ICTP, Trieste (13 February - 10 March 1978). However, the parts that could easily be found in the current literature have been omitted and replaced with the appropriate references. The needs for reactor physics calculations, particularly as applicable to commercial reactors, are reviewed in the introduction. The relative merits and shortcomings of fundamental and semi-empirical methods are discussed. The relative importance of different nuclear data, the ways in which they can be measured or calculated, and the sources of information on measured and evaluated data are briefly reviewed. The various approaches to the condensation of nuclear data to multigroup cross sections are described. After some consideration to the sensitivity calculations and the evaluation of errors, some of the most important type of integral experiments in reactor physics are introduced, with a view to showing the main difficulties in the interpretation and utilization of their results and the most recent trends in experimentation. The conclusions try to assign some priorities in the implementation of experimental and calculational capabilities, especially for a developing country. (author)

  6. integration of environmental safeguards into ethiopian investment

    African Journals Online (AJOL)

    RAYAN_

    2009 do not use similar language with proceeding proclamations. This article argues ... development as its objective should take into account environmental protection. ...... information required under this Proclamation shall be punished with.

  7. International safeguards for critical facilities

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Ney, J.F.; Todd, J.L.

    1979-01-01

    A study was undertaken to investigate various approaches to provide international safeguards for critical facilities and to select an optimized system. Only high-inventory critical facilities were considered. The goal of the study was to detect and confirm the protracted or abrupt diversion of 8kg of plutonium or 25kg of the uranium isotope 235 within approximately a week of the diversion. The general safeguards alternatives considered were (1) continuous inspections by resident inspectors, with varying degrees of comprehensiveness, (2) periodic inspections by regional inspectors at varying time intervals, (3) unattended containment/surveillance measures, and (4) various combinations of the above. It was concluded that a practical and effective international safeguards system can be achieved by employing a method of continuously monitoring facility activities which could lead to diversion. This is in addition to the routine inspections typical of current international safeguards. Monitoring detects inventory discrepancies and violations of agreed-upon procedural restrictions, as well as unauthorized removal of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM). A special inventory is used following detection to confirm any suspected diversion. Comparison of 28 safeguards options led to the selection of a system for further development which uses a combination of surveillance and inspection by resident IAEA personnel, containment/surveillance by unattended equipment, and routine inventory sampling. A development programme is described which is intended to demonstrate the feasibility of several containment and surveillance measures proposed in the study. Included are a personnel portal and an instrument/material pass-through as well as associated recording and tamper-protection features. (author)

  8. Validating the BISON fuel performance code to integral LWR experiments

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Williamson, R.L., E-mail: Richard.Williamson@inl.gov [Fuel Modeling and Simulation, Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3840 (United States); Gamble, K.A., E-mail: Kyle.Gamble@inl.gov [Fuel Modeling and Simulation, Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3840 (United States); Perez, D.M., E-mail: Danielle.Perez@inl.gov [Fuel Modeling and Simulation, Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3840 (United States); Novascone, S.R., E-mail: Stephen.Novascone@inl.gov [Fuel Modeling and Simulation, Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3840 (United States); Pastore, G., E-mail: Giovanni.Pastore@inl.gov [Fuel Modeling and Simulation, Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3840 (United States); Gardner, R.J., E-mail: Russell.Gardner@inl.gov [Fuel Modeling and Simulation, Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3840 (United States); Hales, J.D., E-mail: Jason.Hales@inl.gov [Fuel Modeling and Simulation, Idaho National Laboratory, P.O. Box 1625, Idaho Falls, ID 83415-3840 (United States); Liu, W., E-mail: Wenfeng.Liu@anatech.com [ANATECH Corporation, 5435 Oberlin Dr., San Diego, CA 92121 (United States); Mai, A., E-mail: Anh.Mai@anatech.com [ANATECH Corporation, 5435 Oberlin Dr., San Diego, CA 92121 (United States)

    2016-05-15

    Highlights: • The BISON multidimensional fuel performance code is being validated to integral LWR experiments. • Code and solution verification are necessary prerequisites to validation. • Fuel centerline temperature comparisons through all phases of fuel life are very reasonable. • Accuracy in predicting fission gas release is consistent with state-of-the-art modeling and the involved uncertainties. • Rod diameter comparisons are not satisfactory and further investigation is underway. - Abstract: BISON is a modern finite element-based nuclear fuel performance code that has been under development at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) since 2009. The code is applicable to both steady and transient fuel behavior and has been used to analyze a variety of fuel forms in 1D spherical, 2D axisymmetric, or 3D geometries. Code validation is underway and is the subject of this study. A brief overview of BISON's computational framework, governing equations, and general material and behavioral models is provided. BISON code and solution verification procedures are described, followed by a summary of the experimental data used to date for validation of Light Water Reactor (LWR) fuel. Validation comparisons focus on fuel centerline temperature, fission gas release, and rod diameter both before and following fuel-clad mechanical contact. Comparisons for 35 LWR rods are consolidated to provide an overall view of how the code is predicting physical behavior, with a few select validation cases discussed in greater detail. Results demonstrate that (1) fuel centerline temperature comparisons through all phases of fuel life are very reasonable with deviations between predictions and experimental data within ±10% for early life through high burnup fuel and only slightly out of these bounds for power ramp experiments, (2) accuracy in predicting fission gas release appears to be consistent with state-of-the-art modeling and with the involved uncertainties and (3) comparison

  9. Inspection technologies -Development of national safeguards technology-

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Hong, J. S.; Kim, B. K.; Kwack, E. H.

    1996-12-01

    17 facility regulations prepared by nuclear facilities according to the Ministerial Notices were evaluated. Safeguards inspection activities under Safeguards are described. Safeguards inspection equipments and operation manuals to be used for national inspection are also described. Safeguards report are produced and submitted to MOST by using the computerized nuclear material accounting system at state level. National inspection support system are developed to produce the on-site information for domestic inspection. Planning and establishment of policy for nuclear control of nuclear materials, international cooperation for nuclear control, CTBT, strengthening of international safeguards system, and the supply of PWRs to North Korea are also described. (author). 43 tabs., 39 figs

  10. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available

  11. Network adaptable information systems for safeguard applications

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Rodriguez, C.; Burczyk, L.; Chare, P.; Wagner, H.

    1996-01-01

    While containment and surveillance systems designed for nuclear safeguards have greatly improved through advances in computer, sensor, and microprocessor technologies, the authors recognize the need to continue the advancement of these systems to provide more standardized solutions for safeguards applications of the future. The benefits to be gained from the use of standardized technologies are becoming evident as safeguard activities are increasing world-wide while funding of these activities is becoming more limited. The EURATOM Safeguards Directorate and Los Alamos National Laboratory are developing and testing advanced monitoring technologies coupled with the most efficient solutions for the safeguards applications of the future

  12. Safeguards instrumentation: a computer-based catalog

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Fishbone, L.G.; Keisch, B.

    1981-08-01

    The information contained in this catalog is needed to provide a data base for safeguards studies and to help establish criteria and procedures for international safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities. The catalog primarily presents information on new safeguards equipment. It also describes entire safeguards systems for certain facilities, but it does not describe the inspection procedures. Because IAEA safeguards do not include physical security, devices for physical protection (as opposed to containment and surveillance) are not included. An attempt has been made to list capital costs, annual maintenance costs, replacement costs, and useful lifetime for the equipment. For equipment which is commercially available, representative sources have been listed whenever available.

  13. Addressing Safeguards Challenges for the Future

    Energy Technology Data Exchange (ETDEWEB)

    Majali, Raed; Yim, Man-Sung [Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon (Korea, Republic of)

    2015-10-15

    IAEA safeguard system is considered the corner stone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Effective implementation of this legal instrument enables the IAEA to draw a conclusion with a high degree of confidence on the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities in the state. This paper aims to provide an opportunity to address various challenges encountered by IAEA. Strengthening safeguards system for verification is one of the most urgent challenges facing the IAEA. The IAEA should be able to provide credible assurance not only about declared use of nuclear material and facilities but also about the absence of undeclared material and activities. Implementation of IAEA safeguards continue to play a vital role within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA must move towards more enhanced safeguards system that is driven by the full use of all the safeguards available relevant information. Safeguards system must be responsive to evolving challenges and continue innovation through efficient implementations of more effective safeguards.

  14. The integrated circuit IC EMP transient state disturbance effect experiment method investigates

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Li Xiaowei

    2004-01-01

    Transient state disturbance characteristic study on the integrated circuit, IC, need from its coupling path outset. Through cable (aerial) coupling, EMP converts to an pulse current voltage and results in the impact to the integrated circuit I/O orifice passing the cable. Aiming at the armament system construction feature, EMP effect to the integrated circuit, IC inside the system is analyzed. The integrated circuit, IC EMP effect experiment current injection method is investigated and a few experiments method is given. (authors)

  15. Close-up on safeguards training

    International Nuclear Information System (INIS)

    Strelkov, D.; Kashirsky, A.

    1985-01-01

    Co